To Cologne - Gremberg by Oboe - tribute to Squadron Leader Robert A.M.Palmer VC, DFC & Bar

To Cologne - Gremberg by Oboe - tribute to Squadron Leader Robert A.M.Palmer VC, DFC & Bar

The story of an attack by Pathfinders of 35,105,109 and 582 Squadrons 23 December 1944. Tribute to Robert pPalmer and thirty comrades who died with him. Contains history of Battle of the Bulge. Description of Oboe system. List of aircraft and crews with some results and reports. Detailed hour by hour account of operation with recollections by some crews. Personal memories by Gordon Musgrave. Les Millett, Gordon Baker, Alan Bourne, Roy Shirley (F Freddie's last mission by Alan Roade). Russ Yeulett (Robert Palmer's rear gunner - the only crew member to survive). Continues with extracts from the German records and the RAF Historical branch. Next section headed Walt Reif and Crew. Arndt Walther Reif, Kenneth Harry Austin. Peter Uzelman, George Owen, Jack McClennan, Robert Pierce, John Paterson. Lists nine operations against French targets with 101 Squadron and then list 20 operations with 582 Squadron reported missing from last to Cologne. Telegram and letters sent to members of Walt Reif's crew and letter to Mrs Owen from Jack McClennan relating story of last operation. Next section - immediate interpretation report No K3465 - Cologne Gremberg. Assessment of damage. Quotes from newspapers, extracts from London Gazette citation for award of Victoria Cross to Robert Palmer. The American air offensive 23 December 1955 - list aircraft and losses. Lists losses for 23 December 1944. Includes friendly fire casualties and German fighter losses. Notes on German interceptions and tactics. Routes and timings. Headquarters Pathfinder Force 8 Group Bomber Command operational record book extract on attack on Cologne Gremberg. 105 and 109 Squadron operation record book extracts. Squadron Leader Robert A.M. Palmer VC, DFC and Bar list and numbers of operations on 75, 149 and 109 Squadron and 20 OTU. Biography of Robert Antony Maurice Palmer. Reflections. Photographs and map. Photographs of airmen, aircrew, aircraft, parties, Robert Palmer, 109 Squadron A Flight and other aircrew.

Sixty-five page printed document with photographs

This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.

BLanningWPalmerRAMv1

To Cologne – Gremberg by Oboe

The Story of an Attack by Pathfinders of
35 Squadron
105 Squadron
109 Squadron
582 Squadron

Saturday, 23rd December 1944

A Tribute to
Squadron Leader Robert A.M. Palmer, VC, DCF [sic], Bar and the thirty comrades who died with him

Bill Lanning DFM
[censored]

[Page break]

TO
COLOGNE – GREMBERG
BY OBOE

THE STORY OF AN ATTACK BY PATHFINDERS
OF
35 SQUADRON
105 SQUADRON
109 SQUADRON
582 SQUADRON

SATURDAY 23RD DECEMBER 1944

A TRIBUTE TO
SQUADRON LEADER ROBERT A.M. PALMER VC, DFC, BAR
AND THE 30 COMRADES WHO DIED WITH HIM

Bill Lanning DFM, [censored]

[Page break]

[Underlined] THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE [/underlined]

“The strength of an army is estimated by the weight plus the momentum” – Napoleon.

Hitler’s conception was for a massive counter attack against the Allies in the West. To provide the means he used his reliable Party favourites, Goebels [sic], Himmler and Speer. The German people now found themselves organised on a full war footing for the first time in a way that had been accepted by the British since 1940. In spite of the Allied bombing offensive German war production increased dramatically in the last six months of 1944. The age for military service was reduced to 16 years and these thousands of keen youngsters were joined by a similar number of older men to perform non-active duties such as guarding military buildings. Hitler washed his hands of Italy and brought home his battle troops. The result was that by December Germany had found another 25 well-equipped divisions. Where to use them?

The Allies provided the answer. The Allied offensive had become bogged down by the extreme length of its supply line from the northern French ports. This had been worsened by the onset of winter. In Holland and Belgium to the north were the British and Canadian armies. To the south were the Americans. They joined in the Ardennes, the route of victorious German armies in 1870, 1914 and 1940 and there was the weakest point. Hitler, in contrast, had a unified command and short supply routes radiating from his arsenals in the Ruhr. Cologne, the hub, was only forty miles from the front.

On 16th December 1944 the German offensive began on a 25 mile wide front with a ferocity which staggered the Americans who faced the main thrust. Within a week Panzer divisions had punched their way through to a depth of 60 miles. By the 22nd the Germans were poised to make their way to the Meuse and then to Antwerp, thereby isolating the British and Canadians in the north. Eisenhower had made urgent appeals to the Allied Air Forces to attack the German supply lines, marshalling yards and major rail and road junctions. But for a week the aeroplanes were grounded by the thick blankets of fog that covered most of northern Europe. Hitler had fortune on his side as he brought up fresh supplies and troops for the next stage to begin on the 23rd December.

On that morning the British newspapers were displaying headlines – “MONTHS ADDED TO THE WAR?”

[Underlined] OBOE [/underlined]

The following is a digest taken from the book “PATHFINDER FORCE, A History of 8 Group” by Gordon Musgrove with his kind permission. Gordon Musgrove was a navigator with 105 Squadron, PFF and took part in the operation to Cologne/Gremberg. His account is given elsewhere.

Oboe was the name given to a ground-controlled ‘blind’ bombing device of unique accuracy. From 30,000 feet at speeds over 300 mph the average operational error was less than 300 yards: for lower heights it was even less. The name came from a navigator who thought that the note of the signal they received sounded like an oboe and gradually the

[Page break]

name became associated with blind bombing. Dr. F.E. Jones and A.H. Reeves worked out a system using two ground stations each with a different role; one, the tracking station – code name ‘Cat’ – sent dot-dash signals to the pilot; the other, the releasing station – code name ‘Mouse’ – measured the ground speed of the aircraft, warned the navigator of the approximate time before the bomb release and gave the release signal.

The track to the target was along an arc of the Circle of Constant Path Range passing through the point of bomb release (R/P) with the ‘Cat’ at the centre. As the beam was an arc it was estimated that the average time for a pilot to settle on it and fly it accurately would be 10 minutes. A position on the arc, called point A, equal to 10 minutes flying time was measured back from the R/P. This was given to the crew at briefing together with the height and speed at which the run must be made. These were vitally important because they were part of the complicated formula to calculate the R/P and hence point A. The navigator’s job was to get the aircraft to point A ten minutes before the time on target.

Near point A another ‘Baillie’ beam was laid on called the Waiting Point. Oboe was switched on just before to make sure it was working and to give the crew a chance to assess the quality of the signals and their timing. Each crew was then ready to receive its own call sign transmitted from both stations. When they did so the Oboe repeater system was switched on and they prepared for the run to target. Almost immediately the pilot would receive dots if he was on the side of track nearest to the station or dashes if he was on the far side. When he settled on the beam he received an equi-signal tone, in other words a steady Oboe note. If the aircraft was some distance from the beam both stations sent an X, Y, or Z in morse indicating it was 5, 10 or 15 miles adrift. If it was further from point A an S was sent to show that it was short.

The Mouse sent A, B, C and D to the navigator indicating 10, 8, 6 and 3 minutes from the R/P. Finally the signal, 5 dits and a 2.5 second dah, was given. When the navigator pressed the bomb release it automatically cut out the aircraft transmitter and so the ground station knew the exact time of release. He then switched off the transmitter so that the next aircraft could be called.

When the idea was put to the Air Staff they were not very enthusiastic. Ten minutes on the run meant only six aircraft an hour. The plane could not take evasive action and all had to fly at the same height, speed and track. This would make them an easy prey for both ack-ack and night fighters. And the range was limited by the aircraft’s ceiling. The first full trials were held on 24th April, 1942 and the results were glowing. The Bomber Command observer witnessed amazingly accurate bombing through 10/10ths cloud.

During July 109 Sqdn. simultaneously joined PFF and began flying the Mosquito. On 20th December, 1942 the first true Oboe sorties were flown from Wyton to Lutterade. Of the six aircraft carrying three 500 Lb. bombs each, three made successful runs. The honour of dropping the first marker flares fell to S/L ‘Hal’ Bufton. On 31st December he dropped a skymarker over Dortmund for eight Lancasters of 83 PFF Squadron to mark. On 5th-6th March Oboe was sent to mark Essen for a force of 442 heavies. In 40 minutes they did more damage to Essen and dropped more bombs on the town than all the previous raids put together.

[Page break]

Development went on ahead and various refinements were made possible allowing for greater range and accuracy with reliability and to allow more aircraft to be handled at the same time over the target. What is more, they could all approach from a wider range of headings. There is no doubt whatsoever that operations using Oboe became the most successful marking and bombing system of the bomber offensive. It more than doubled the effectiveness of any other method used for both for mass raids and the tiny pinpoint targets.

[Page break]

COLOGNE/ GREMBURG: FIRST FORMATION
109 / 582 SQUADRONS

*Lancaster PB 371 V OBOE LEADER Up 10.27 FAILED TO RETURN

* S/L Palmer R A M – P 109
* F/L Russell G – N
* F/L Milne O S – P 582
* S/L Carter A – N
* F/S Nundy B – W
* F/O Dalgarno W – G
F/S Yeulett R K – G
Bombed on PD

* Mosquito XVI ML998 RESERVE OBOE LEADER Up 10.31 F T R

* F/L Carpenter E C – P 109
* F/O Lambert W T – N
Bombed on Leader

Lancaster PB 475 C Up 10.27.30 Down 14.54

W/C Peacock B A – P
F/S Ross J – N
F/L Bargh H – B
W/O Dawson B – W
W/O Pilling H – G
SGT Tungate J – G
F/S Walker G – EB
Bombed visually 12.54.12
Saw Eastward bend of river, bridge to north & M/Y. At about 12.47 we decided that a visual would be possible. & passed back the instruction to formation. Predicted H/F began about this time. No bombs were seen to drop before ours. Hit by flak- superficial damage.

* Lancaster PB 141 F Up 10.28 F T R

F/L Hockley R G – P
SGT Spier S – N
F/S Smith O H – N2
F/O Parratt G R – W
F/S Shirley J – G
F/L Jehan V – G
*P/O Hewitt K W – EB

Lancaster NE 130 T Up 10.28.15 Down 14.35

CAP Swales E E – P
W/O Johnson B G – N
P/O Wheaton R A – NB
P/O Goodacre A V – W
F/S Leach B – G
SGT Smith E G – G
SGT Bennington G W – E
Bombed visually 12.55
Ident. Bend in river. M/Y clearly seen. Instruction to bomb visually received 12.51. Leading Lanc and Mos. seen to carry on their run and bomb. Violent evasive action taken as soon as bombs were rekeased [sic] & no results seen.

* Lancaster PB 558 A Up 10.28.45 F T R

F/O Terpenning R P – P
F/L Dorrett A E C – N
W/O Groves – NB
W/O Anderson A A – W
F/S Watson J G – G
F/S McIlrath A W – G
P/O Snow L – E

* Lancaster PB 120 P Up 10.29 F T R

* F/O Reif A W – P
* P/O Austin K H – N
* W/O Uzelman P – NB
* F/S Owen G – W
F/S McLennan J E – G
F/S Pearce R E – G
* SGT Paterson J – E

[Page break]

* Lancaste [sic] PB 523 J Up 10.29 F T R

* F/L Thomas P A – P
F/O Vaughan J – N
F/L Whitaker A B – NB
W/O Fuller D – W
SGT Fallon J – G
* W/O Campbell F W – G
* F/S Hobbs V G – E

Lancaster ND 750 E Up 10.29.15 Down 14.33

F/L Manley H G – P
P/O George R O – N
W/O Hill G – N2
F/O Belanger – B
F/O Brown G T – W
SGT Ward G B – G
F/O McDonald D – G
SGT Hughes D – E
Bombed on Leader. 12.54
Did not hear instructions to bomb visually so continued with formation with Oboe Lancaster & Mosquito. [missing letter]amage [sic] Serious damage by H/F to bomb doors.

Lancaster PB 267 R Up 10.29.45 Down 14.40

W/C Clough J E – P
F/S Grey P R – N
SGT Hoare R N – N2
F/O Brown R – B
F/S Jacobs A F – W
F/S Keen D – G
F/S Moss R W – G
SGT Sturgess T A – E
Bombed on Leader 12.54
As we ran in the formation broke though we did not hear the order to bomb visually. As the formation broke we continued straight ahead and bombed about 200 yds to stbd & 200 ft below the Oboe Lanc. A number of flak holes all over the a/c.

* KILLED IN ACTION * Shot Down

Reported enemy fighter engagements:-

Lancaster NE 130 T CAP Swales E E
Attacked by 8 Me 109s and 1 FW 190. The FW shot down, 2 MeS damaged.

Lancaster PB 267 R W/C Clough J E
Attacked by Me 109, inconclusive

* Lancaster PB 558 A F/O Terpenning R P
Crew returned safely 27 December
Hit by H/F in bomb bay. Hydraulics u/s. Underside Port wing damaged. Port Inner u/S. Starboard Inner damaged.

12.59 hrs. 14,000 ft. Attacked by mixed bag of 5 FW 190s and Me 109s. Rear turret hit by cannon shells and Nav. compartment, F/Engineer’s instrument panel. Petrol Port side leaked out. Only Stbd. Outer working. Stbd aileron hanging half severed.

Crew baled out 5107N. 0540E. A/C crashed, burnt out.

It is now known that the following aircraft were damaged by H/F and shot down by enemy fighters:-

Lancaster PB 371 V S/L Palmer R A M / F/L Milne O S
Mosquito ML 998 F/L Carpenter E C
Lancaster PB 141 F F/L Hockley R G
Lancaster PB 120 P F/O Reif A W
Lancaster PB 523 J Flak details unknown; Shot down by enemy fighters

[Page break]

COLOGNE / GREMBERG : SECOND FORMATION
105 / 35 / 582 SQUADRONS

Lancaster PB 367 Z OBOE LEADER Up 10.36 Down 14.14 Manston

S/L Harding G W – P 105
S/L Millett L W – N
W/O Poley R W C – P 35
F/S Johnson H E L – N
F/S Ebdon H – N2
W/O Cohen M – W
SGT Speight R – G
F/S Therault D – G
SGT Spratt R – E
Sqdn bombed on PD 13.01.30
No formation bombing because a/C was engaged by very intense H/F & other a/c were probably bombing visually. Own bombs seen to straddle target. 1 x 1000 GP jettisoned 5115N.0200E at 13.54 from 11,000ft safe – hung up.

Mosquito WI 981 RESERVE OBOE LEADER Up 10.40 Down 14.24 Bourn

S/L Almond H – P 105
F/O Challis C R A – N
No attack

Aircraft of 582 Squadron:-

Lancaster PB 238 G Up 10.37 Down 14.44 Little Staughton

F/O Harvey R G – P
F/S Partridge S J – N
F/O Kelly R W – B
SGT Nuttall E I – W
P/O McGrath M K – G
F/S McMaster G T – G
SGT Heys R – E
Bombed visually
A/P clearly seen. About 20 seconds before we bombed we received the order to bomb visually but despite weaving to avoid flak we were close together at time of bombing. Small hole in front of astrodome.

Lancaster PB 119 H Up 10.37.15 Down 15.02

F/L Street D J – P
F/L Franklin H J – N
F/L McComb T J – B
F/L Watson C B – W
P/O Bourne H A – G
SGT Sykes J S – G
P/O Allen A – E
Bombed visually 12.57.30
Saw bend in river, autobahn bridge & finally Aiming Point. 12.51 broadcast to formation to bomb visually. Broadcast repeated 12.54. Formation broke up immediately and made individual attacks. Previous bombing seemed well concentrated across M/Yds.

Lancaster PB 179 Z Up 10.37.30 Down 14.39

F/L Cairns R M B – P
F/L Stevenson H G – N
W/O Crew J A – N2
F/L Hailstone – B
P/O Ansell P A C – W
SGT Perry R – G
F/S Ritchie W – G
SGT Rees – E
Bombed on Leader 12.59.06
Did not get instructions to bomb visually. Half of astrodome shot away, two of widscreen [sic] panels holed. Leading edge to starboard mainplane engine nascelles holed.

Lancaster PB 591 N Up 10.38 Down 15.08

S/L Owen-Jones J G – P
P/O Whitcomb R J – N
SGT Thomas E K – N2
F/O Buss F H – B
F/O Todd H – W
F/O Austin P – G
F/O Danino – G
F/S Gower J D – E
Bombed visually 12.59
Saw autobahn bridge over river & M/Yds. Received instructions from 582/H to bomb visually. Several loads – including ours fell across southern end of M/Yds but some loads undershot into river. Hit frequently by H/F. Pilot’s windscreen etc. F/Engineer received slight face injuries.

[Page break]

Lancaster PB 182 D Up 10.38.15 Down 14.46

F/O Lloyd F – P
SGT Edwards W C – N
SGT Lamb J B – B
SGT Axford P J – W
SGT Mummery A – G
SGT Satherley D W – G
SGT Woods B T – E
Bombed on Leader 12.59
Rear gunner reports M/Yds enveloped in smoke as we left the target. Hit by predicted H/F.

Lancaster PB 652 L Up 10.38.30 Down 14.45

F/O Finlay M J – P
P/O Drew A H – N
P/O McTernaghan J – B
SGT Beaumont – W
F/S Last K – G
F/O Wilson G – G
F/S Gunthorpe G – E
Bombed visually 12.58.20
Saw bridge over river north of bend & the M/Yds. Received orders from 582/H to bomb visually. Formation then broke up. Bombing appeared to be very good across southern end of yards which were covered by smoke. Hit by predicted H/F.

Lancaster PB 625 B Up 10.39.30 Down 14.46

F/O Brownell G J – P
F/O Tulloh J A – N
W/O Chartier J G – B
F/O Willmore A H – W
F/S Jackson G K – G
F/S Houston R C – G
SGT Webber F – E
Bombed visually 12.58.30
Saw Eastward bend of river, autobahn bridge & M/Yds. About 20 miles from target received instruction from 582/H to bomb visually. We stayed in formation until about 12.57 then we were hit by H/F in identifying A/P & saw bombs falling across tracks.

Lancaster NE 140 O Up 10.39.45 Down 14.53

P/O Baker G S – P
F/O Kitson N W – N
F/O Casey J H – N2
SGT Pratt G – B
F/S Ruddick G J – W
F/S Rothery J – G
F/S Dennis S R – G
SGT Sells J – E
Bombed visually 12.58.48
Bend of river & M/Yds clearly seen. Instructions received to break formation & bomb visually. Good Concentration of bombs on Southern end of M/Yds.

Enemy fighters reported by Lancaster crews H and O.
Escort (?) reported by P/O Baker in O

Lancaster OBOE LEADER Z
Severe H/F damage. Lost all hydraulics.

Mosquito OBOE RESERVE LEADER
Severe H/F damage. Lost all hydraulics unable to open bomb doors, bombs brought back. Engine cut out on landing circuit forced to make belly landing.

[Page break]

COLOGNE / GREMBURG : THIRD FORMATION
105 / 35 SQUADRONS

Lancaster PB 372 X OBOE LEADER Up 10.38 Down 14.45 Manston

F/L Jordan R E – P 105
F/L Plnkett [sic] J W – N
F/O Rigby E J – P 35
P/O Ramsey C J A – N
F/O Breeze H – B
F/S Coombs E C L – W
SGT Cooper R F – G
SGT Dickinson F – G
F/O Varney D J – E
No attack
Jettisoned Cologne area 13.05
A/C hit by H/F. Oboe run was spoilt by a/c ‘A’ formating closely on us until the last moment & thereby not giving us room to manoeuvre. Approch-target [sic] we were engaged very accurately by predicted H/F right from the beginning of the Oboe run. 1 x 1000 lb jettisoned safe at 14.12 5104N.0133E

Mosquito IX ML 922 OBOE RESERVE LEADER. Up 10.40 Down 14.13

S/L G W A Parker – P 105
F/L V W G Musgrove – N
Bombed on Leader. Last Resort

Lancaster ME 337 A Up 10.39 Down 14.34 Graveley

F/L Johnson A E – P 35
F/S Thomas G B – N
F/O Coulton H – B
F/S Jenkins R M – W
F/S Neale R – G
F/S Hadland D E – G
SGT Butler C A – E
Bombed visually 13.01
Target ident visually by M/Y & river bridges, etc. Just before arrival over target Oboe Leader waved us away & instructions to bomb visually. Lots of smoke seen which blotted out target.

Lancaster PB 684 B Up 10.39 Down 14.41

P/O Potts K – P
F/O Mills M A C – N
F/O Reeder A J – B
F/S Pope G A – W
F/S Bentley R – G
SGT Yallop R F – G
SGT Sharp H P – E
Bombed visually 13.01.06
Ident. visually by M/Y, river & bridges quite clearly. ‘Flak’ was very heavy & as target was quite clear gave instructions to bomb visually. Own bombs seen to burst right on M/Y. Consider attack should be successful.

Lancaster PB 613 O Up 10.39.30 Down 14.54

F/L Osmond J J – P
F/O Wolk A W – N
SGT Carr D – B
W/O Aston A C – W
F/O Ashton S T – G
W/O Perry G A – G
F/S Spedding J K – E
Bombed on Leader 13.01.54
M/Y clearly identified also town & river. Formation was maintained until defences opened up then it became very broken. Instructions not received from leader. Target clearly seen although several bombs had gone down on it & smoke was drifting above. Own bombs seen to straddle.

Lancaster PB 678 F Up 10.40.30 Missing

* W/O Clarke R T – P
* W/O Currie D R – N
* F/S Webb J E W – B
* W/O Norsworthy R K – W
* W/O Craddock T E – G
* F/S McGee J E – G
* SGT Mays J C – E
This aircraft is missing. It is reported to have collided with aircraft 35/H at 5107 1/2 N 0134E, 11.33.30 at 10,000ft.

[Page break]

Lancaster PB 614 G Up 10.41 Down 14.46

F/L Pettifer H – P
F/O McMath M – N
Flt/Off Caddle S – N2
F/O Williams M G – B
F/O Bullock K J – W
F/S Dent E – G
F/S Judd K F – G
P/O Williamson T C – E
Bombed visually 13.02.42
Identified visually. Instructions to bomb visually not received but as formation broke up we reverted to visual bombing. Yard clearly identified also river & town. Two loads had gone down before we bombed & were well in the yard.

Lancaster PB 683 H Up 10.42 Missing

* F/O Lawson G S – P
*F/L Faulkner J G – N
* F/L Brown N – B
* F/S Winter J S – W
* SGT Fleming A S – G
* SGT White L – G
* SGT Sutcliffe A – E
This aircraft is missing.
It is reported to have collided with aircraft 35/F at 51.07 1/2 N. 0134E at 11.33.30, 10,000ft.

Lancaster PB 685 J Up 10.42.30 Down 14.18 Manston

F/O Lawson L B – P
F/L Leydon J P – N
SGT Leeves P J – N2
F/O Card A J – B
F/O Herod G E – W
SGT Gale S R – G
F/S Nicholson L – G
SGT Edmonson F W – E
Bombed visually 13.01.30
M/Y & river seen. While we were running up in formation all a/c were engaged by moderate accurate predicted flak & were hit in many places including 3 engines hit. The formation had broken up about 10 mins before target on instructions received on R/T. Bomb smoke from previous formation was across NW part of M/Y & our bombs fell in SE part. We were continually engaged by H/F right up to time of bombing & after.

Lancaster PB 343 M Up 10.43 Down 15.00

F/O Moore H – P
F/O Markham G P – N
P/O Dovey L E – B
P/O Dobson R J – W
P/O McVey M H – G
F/O Connors D H – G
F/S Micklethwaite D – E
Bombed on Leader 13.01
Identified on A/C release in front. Formation maintained until about 10 minutes of target when instructions to revert to visual received. As our bomb-sight was u/s we hung on to a/c in front & released on his. After bombing a/c made their own way home.

* Aircraft collided over the sea on outward journey & both were lost. Mosquito Reserve Leader called for help which arrived in 30 minutes. Found 6 bodies but all were dead. No trace of others.

Lancaster PB 372 X F/L Jordan / F/O Rigby
Severe damage by flak causing fire. 3 engines hit, 1 lost.

Mosquito ML 922 Reserve Oboe Leader S/L Parker
Unable to take Reserve position because of 35/A too close to Oboe Leader.

Lancaster PB 685 J F/O Lawson
F/O Card A J & F/O Herod G E received slight wounds.

[Page break]

EARLY MORNING CALL: A PERSONAL MEMORY
Bill Lanning

0630 hours. Saturday, 23rd. December, 1944

There was a miserable darkness, a miserable coldness, a miserable stillness as the SPs made their cautious way around the dispersed Nissen huts. Only the blurred light from their masked torches gave a clue to the thickness of the morning fog.

Long experience had taught them that the only efficient way of waking the aircrew who were on the Batlle [sic] Order for that day’s operation was to rattle their batons along the ribbed sides of the tin huts. It took a particular sort of determination to resist such a noise only inches from one’s head but some managed it nevertheless.

Most were awake enough to answer to the name-call as the SP stood by the open door – not that the open door made any difference to the temperature or the atmosphere. Those who didn’t respond were first asked if they would care to buy a battleship before more drastic action was promised – usually suggested by those not on call and who wanted to get back to sleep.

Johnny Gould’s crew struggled back into their dreams after giving genial advice in various Aussie and Pommie accents. They had gone to bed with smiles a mile wide having learned that they had been replaced on the B.O. by Harry Manley’s crew and were free for Christmas leave. They weren’t to know that in a short while, one early morning on the way back from Chemnitz they would blow up over Chesham; that only Hart, the rear gunner, would escape alive.

We weren’t too happy about our loss of leave for this day’s Oboe operation even though we’d been assured that we could pick up our passes as soon as we got back. Four days of postponements looked like stretching into another, and another. Bert Nundy, our WOP, was as unperturbed as ever as he made his way to the ablution block in his pyjamas; it was just another day. We others put socks and shoes on before touching the deck and making the dreaded walk in the cold knowing that some idiot would have let the water run away overnight. A ‘lick and a promise’ was our response to King’s Regulations in that cold. ‘Cold?’ Bert snorted through his lather. ‘You should live in Hull.’

Nothing ever seemed to faze him and there was always a gentle response to most situations. Only once had we known him offer anger and that had only recently happened. A young pilot had committed suicide rather than face another operation. His crew had been worried about him after their first tour but, as Keith Sheppard said, they had tried to help him through it. The crew went to the funeral at Cambridge and came back shattered that the family had refused to attend. Bert heard about it from Cyril Cardnell and came to us swearing-angry.

Russ and Bert were bosom pals, well matched in temperament and keenness for their trade. Russ had been a Cranwell ‘Brat’ and had learnt his way through KRs with the same efficiency as his gunnery had proved to be; to our advantage, he’d saved our lives more than once. The first real test had seen us with a useless engine and flaps hanging and a full load on board when we were picked up by a JU 88. and 10-minute tussle followed before it was sent off with an engine on fire. But this had been no ordinary JU88 making its attack from astern or the beams, each effort was from underneath.

[Page home]

Our report of an upward-firing JU at 100 Squadron was one of the first to corroborate stories that had filtered back from POW camps about ‘Schrage Musik’ attacks in which they fired at the fuel tanks and engines from as close as 100 yards underneath in the ‘blind’ area. It ended speculation about flak ‘scarecrows’ put up by Jerry to simulate exploding aircraft – they were real! The range was so short and the tracer used so feint that nearby crews were unaware of the real cause.

‘Tex’ Barron slept on, his rabbit and bull terrier curled up beside him; what a character Newfoundland had sent us! His favourite spot for peaceful ‘snogging’ was the morgue – but it was strange going off on ops without him. He, and ‘Pin-point’ Newman our Navigator, and Bruce Hutchinson our Bomb Aimer, had decided to take a rest after our 45th – Bruce so that he could be sure of going back to his young bride in Canada. We hadn’t got a replacement Mid-Upper and that’s why I was going on this trip as Engineer and Gunner.

0730 hours.
We hunched our shoulders against the fog and cold as we made our silent way through the lanes to the Mess, past the cottages where a small crowd were already waiting for George, an old farm-labourer, to take them to Bedford in his ‘taxi’. Ruth gave us her usual bright smile as she handed us our precious egg, bacon and beans, – fare guaranteed to produce an abundance of ‘wind’ at altitude.

The papers were in with their cheery news; ‘WAR TO LAST LONGER’, ‘MONTHS ADDED TO THE WAR’, ‘THE BULGE WIDENS’. None of which was an aid to conversation.

0815 hours.
Conversation hadn’t improved by the time we got to the Briefing Room where we met all the other weather experts (which Colonial was it who complained that England didn’t have a climate, just ‘whether’ it was going to rain or not?) who were convinced that we were due for another ‘scrub’. One voice suggested that we had a whip-round to send to the factory workers to go on strike again. That gave us a giggle. The workers had complained that our weekend night flying spoilt their rest and our C.O. had been sent to give them a pep talk about our ‘gallant lads’, etc. To their surprise he assured them of our wholehearted support but would they, please, include all night flying in their protest? They went back to work. We all knew how dreary their lives were and we did have a sneaking sympathy for them.

The banter stopped as we entered and went to our crew places. On this occasion we went up front to meet ‘Skip’ Milne. Bob Palmer the 109 pilot was with him and we were introduced. We were in some awe for Skip had told us that this was to be Bob’s 111th op! We were also very comforted when we were told that he had done some Oboe formation work as well. George Russell, his Navigator, sat quietly by; apart from his introductory ‘Hullo’ I didn’t hear another word from him.

Whistles went up as the target was displayed. Cologne? Again? After two scrubbings in a few days? ‘Punch’ Yelland, the Intelligence Officer, gave us the background to the Ardennes offensive and how vital it was to stop supplies getting through. The weather that had grounded the Allies for a week had been a boon to Hitler. We listened and agreed, grudgingly; weren’t all targets vital?

The promise of fighter cover from inside France didn’t impress us

[Page break]

one bit: they were always ‘up there’ and we were always ‘down here’. Three briefings running for the same target was in our minds. We had also heard the Yanks getting up from nearby Thurleigh and Kimbolton, and that meant the Jerry knew and would have hours to prepare for us. The Met ‘Wallah’ promised us at least 6/10ths cloud all the way which was only a slight comfort – and then spoilt it by giving us emergency landing places should fog close Staughton down before we returned.

The Duty Flying Officer went through the Take-off procedure. Strict timing and order was to be observed for a staggered formation-order Take-off. ‘A’ Flight aircraft would make the south approach to the main runway in order – C, F, A, J and E; ‘B’ Flight’s approach would be from the north in order – V (the Oboe Leader), T, P and R. 109’s Mossie (the Reserve Oboe Leader) would T.O. last. They would T.O. at 15 second intervals and make three climbing turns through cloud to put them onto Track.

The Second Formation would T.O. 10 minutes later in order – G, H, D, and B of ‘A’ Flight and Z, N, L and O of ‘B’ Flight. They would make slightly different climbing turns to give them a different Track to the converging point at 0500E – where they would come under fighter cover on the run to the target. Their Oboe Leader would be TL-Z of 35 Squadron with a 105 Mossie GB as Reserve.

The third formation of 35 and 105 Squadrons would take off from Graveley. At least, they would have the advantage of F.I.D.O. for T.O. and landing, lucky devils.

Few of the crews had formation experience and fewer again had been on an Oboe run so the quiet deepened as the Oboe run was introduced. The run would take approximately 15 minutes and must be taken on an absolutely straight and level Track at 17,000 feet. Bomb Aimers would release their bombs when they saw the Leader release his.

15 minutes straight and level, in daylight? Hell! Murmers [sic] of disbelief slowly eased as Wingco Peter Cribb rose to speak. “Gentlemen. The Mossie boys fly and 30,000 feet and regularly get their bombs or indicators within 100 yards of the Aiming Point – and we all appreciate their talents on ‘Musical’ attacks. The Lanc is slower, steadier, and will be lower so your bombs should hit the target ‘Bang-on’. With a far heavier bomb load you will do considerably more damage with such accuracy, and Mr. Yelland has told you how important it is that you should.

15 minutes is a long time. The Oboe run is an exact 10 minutes. To pick up his staring signal he must be in position before then by at least 2 minutes. To get a good signal he must be in the best possible attitude before that; a good signal means a good attack. Good luck, Gentlemen.”

582’s C.O. sat down next to the burly figure of the Station C.O., Groupie Collings. Colling was, in our opinion, the most experienced flier in Bomber Command. He had formed 35 Squadron to fly the new Halifax on operations in November, 1940, and had been operational ever since. He had been an Olympic toboggan competitor before the war and the same competitive spirit remained. During the summer he had been instrumental in giving the village a new cricket pitch through the use of the experience of Bob Wyatt the England and Warwickshire Captain and now our Sports Officer. And together, they had borrowed cement lorries to transform a natural pond into a swimming pool. Next to Cribb and Collings sat the tall, upright

[Page break]

figure of Bob Law whose high-domed head was a familiar sight about camp. Rumour had it that he was the son of Bomar Law, ex-Prime Minister. I don’t know if it was true but it showed that Staughton got only the best!

A few had memories of the last 109/582 Oboe sortie on 20 July led by Foulsham of 109 and Weightman of 582 to the Foret de Croc rocket site. They, too, had been promised cloud cover but had arrived to clear skies, and had been met by heavy flak. They were soon on fire but pressed on for the Release Signal. Unknown to them, however, their set was faulty and they would not receive it. Foulsham had struggled on until he lost control beyond the target. The Lanc behind was also set on fire and suffered control damage that caused him to release his bombs inadvertently whereupon the formation dropped theirs. Foulsham’s steadiness and courage had been in vain.

Those who did remember sat quietly as the Bombing, Gunnery, and Engineer Leaders went through their instructions as advice. Old hands on their second, third, and even fourth tour, knew the need to take advice and sat quietly with them and so influenced the new hands.

As the others filed out Palmer told us about his own formation experiences and what he expected of us for this sortie. He appreciated that we had flown with Burt and Curtis to lead 405 Canadian Squadron to the Heimbach Dam just 3 weeks before and that we must have made a good impression or we wouldn’t have been chosen for this job. That was praise indeed, for both Burt and Curtis had done over the ‘ton’ of ops and knew the score. Bob went through the intercom procedure and general flying discipline and reminded us that once Oboe was ‘on’, nothing else could or would matter. There was no question of weaving or responding to fighter attacks. Once the signal was lost there could be no going round again to pick it up.

0930 hours.
Spirits had revived by the time we got to the Locker Room and had the usual jokes with Eve and Daisy and ‘Fluff’ about nylon nighties as they handed us our chutes. We then bustled our way to find space to prepare. The old hands and those with Yankee contacts sported their leather Irving jackets to the envy of all others. The temperature was expected to be about 20 degrees below freezing at 17,000 feet so most were concerned about warmth. Particularly the rear gunners who couldn’t rely on the yellow electrically-heated outer suits. Too often they had to make a choice between being burnt by overheating wires or suffer from frost bite. Many wore mascots of one sort or other. I wore a silk scarf of my mother’s; some wore more intimate reminders of passionate moments!

The worst part was the harness, getting it tight enough to hold you in if you were forced to jump into a 200 mile-an-hour slipstream, but with enough ease to stand upright for several hours. Testing the stomach clip for quick release if one should have to bale out over water. The chest clips where the chute was to be attached to the harness in an emergency. Put the clips into the wrong place and when you pulled the ripcord the harness would fly upwards while you flew downwards, quickly! And, always, the urge to test the ripcord!

Then over to the test rigs for intercom and oxygen. I now double-check my mask. Some time before we had been given a Stand Down and had merrily set about quaffing at the Silver Grill in Bedford when the SPs rousted us for an operation. In the rush to get airborne I did all the pre-flight checks with the mask dangling. Only as we began to roll did I fix the mask. My nose reacted immediately and my

[Page break]

stomach and chest followed suit. Somehow, I held it all back until we were airborne; the mask was full of mouse droppings! Yuk!

Olive, Mary and Frankie were waiting outside with their great Bedford trucks to take us out to the dispersals. Why did those on first always insist on sitting next to the drivers. Those next on always had to lug their kit over legs and bodies to make their way to the rear and the air was thick with jibes and curses. But the fog! We’d forgotten about it in the fuss and hubbub of the Locker Room. It was thicker out here and it was a very slow procession that wound its way around the perimeter track. When we got to ‘V-Victor’ we could just discern the glimmer of the red warning light on the church spire in between the banks of fog.

Chiefy and Taffy were standing by, as always, waiting for our approval after our pre-flight checks. Nothing was ever too much trouble for them. Not enough has been said about the ground crews who braved the most atrocious conditions to keep the aircraft flying. I’ve seen them white with frost and snow, numbed beyond belief, struggling to service engines, repair intricate instruments and electrics. Holding on for dear life as winds howled and shrieked across the moor. At all hours of the day and night for as long as the job took to get right. Jim, Dave, Ron, Eddie, Esther, Mary, George, Stan, Reg, Eric, Roma, Dick, Walt, Peter, John, Chas, Claude; I may not remember your surnames, and I may put names and faces in confusion, but not what you did.

When Taff discovered that I, in spite of my accent, was Welsh he nursed me like a mother hen. “Got to keep the Taffs alive, boyo, to keep the bloody Saxons in their place.” Gave me boxing lessons, too, and many a sore nose. “Never know when it’ll come in ‘andy like, see?” I think he sometimes despaired of ever making an engineer out of me. “You’ve got it in the head all right, boyo, but God knows what you do with it afterwards!”

1010 hours.
Skip gave us a nod whereupon we walked over to water the rear wheel. Nothing like good hot pee to frighten off the Gremlins; couldn’t stand the smell, apparently.

It does seem odd sitting back in the turret listening to Bob and Skip going through the start-up drill. Good thing Skip always insisted on us swapping jobs whenever we got the chance to prepare for any emergency. I shall never forget the first time he put me in the driver’s seat. Me, driving a Lanc! By now I’d even done a landing and was quite blase about it. Skip might have been a mad Scot on the ground with his Lagonda swirling through the country lanes, or riding a motorbike into the Mess; in the air he was a King.

I looked over to where our usual kite, ‘P – Peter’, was sited but could see nothing beyond our own dispersal. And I wondered how Reif and his lads would get on in him. After 3 messy September nights to Castrop Rauxel – where we saw ‘Tiny’ Shurlock go down – and Frankfurt and Osnabrouk [sic] coming back like a sieve each time, Russ painted the ITMA catch phrase on his turret – “I GO I COME BACK”. I hope it works for them today. George Owen and Paterson, Walt’s WOP and Engineer, were chatting to us about their last trip to Cologne when they had to fly home on 2 engines and more than 150 holes. ‘Peter’ would see them right. He’d done nearly a ‘ton’ and would know the way home.

[Page break]

1020 hours
The Merlins are turning nicely as we move out of dispersal. Very slowly. I can just see ‘Foxy’ from MT waving his torch for us. Last two-fingered Churchillian salutes are exchanged with the ground-crew and they are quickly lost in the fog. And there is the shadowy bulk of ‘T-Tommy’ carrying the bluff figure of Ed Swales. ‘Peter’ must be on his way, too.

We turned into the long runway and I could see the usual crowd of well-wishers standing around the chequered control caravan. Another look round showed me the ‘A’ Flight aircraft rolling into position on the other side of the runway. I felt a tug on my leg, looked down and saw Skip beckoning me. When I untangled myself from the turret he was by the open door and a kitted figure was climbing in. I recognised Bill Dalgarno, a regular gunner. I looked at Skip. He shouted in my eat that I couldn’t go as a gunner and had been replaced. Well, I asked, couldn’t I go as Engineer/Bomb Aimer in case Oboe didn’t work? He shook his head, and then my hand, and helped me out of the door.

I stood by the caravan with the crowd and watched ‘Victor’ disappear into the fog before they were half-way down the runway. When I thought it was airborne I went to my bed and lay down. And waited.

It was very dark when the SPs put the lights on and asked where Russ and Bert slept. I watched them pack their kit and take it away and then went back to sleep. Later, in the Mess, someone put gin into my beer and I started to cry (the same effect was had for many years after; often the smell was enough to set me off.) It seemed quite appropriate.

During the next day it dawned on me why the SPs had asked for my bed-space and then for my 1250. I hurried to the office and discovered that a telegram had been sent to my home. I made the long trek into Bedford on foot and the same way out to Wembley from St. Pancras. The reception was worth it and my sister’s Engagement Party went ahead as planned. By the time the King’s Speech had ended I’d had enough, made my excuses and went back to Staughton the way I’d come, to ‘normality’.

On my wrist I wore my new watch, inscribed ‘To Bill for his 21st’. That wouldn’t be until the next 3rd December but Mam and Dad had wanted to be sure I got it.

[Page break]

IN FORMATION TO COLOGNE/GREMBERG

Pathfinder crews existed for one purpose only, to get their target markers into position over the right target at the right time. As they usually carried bombs as well then only if neither could be dropped at the target would a sortie be aborted. Two stories circulated at Staughton to illustrate the Pathfinder ethos.

A new crew made an early return claiming that the aircraft would not climb above 13,000ft on 3 engines and was very sluggish at that height. The CO took them up the next day and put the aircraft through its paces. On landing he agreed with the pilot, it wouldn’t climb and it was sluggish. Nevertheless it was quite capable of taking them to the target at that height and they should have tried. They hadn’t shown the right spirit. They had packed their bags and were gone within the hour.

The second story concerned a rear gunner on his third tour who found that his guns were u/s when he reported at dispersal before take-off. He asked for them to be changed but there was no time nor could they change to the reserve aircraft for a minor fault. When he refused to fly his place was taken by another gunner and he was posted away very quickly. He was lucky not to be deemed LMF – Lack of Moral Fibre – and stripped of rank and badges.

The crew accepted as ‘hard cheese’ the accidental happenings of human weaknesses. A mid-upper gunner shot himself in the hand when cleaning a revolver and his place on a daylight operation to Heimbach was taken by the popular Gunnery Leader, Freddie Grillage. They were attacked by jets and all but Freddie baled out to safety. That, was part of life; and death. (It is believed that that was the first RAF loss to the ME262.)

The main responsibility for the outward flight lay with Bert Carter, a third tour navigator who had recently joined Milne. flying in the Oboe Leader, V-Victor. It was his job to get the aircraft, and the formation, into the right space in the sky at the right time some 300 miles away.

“Imagination may have been more active for one who could not see out. I vividly recall a sensation of struggle, of being held down by the turbulence from all the preceding propellers as we all took off in two staggered files within the space of 3 minutes. It was a relief, too, to be off at last after days of waiting in vain for the fog to clear,” wrote Bernard Johnson later.

Each pilot jiggled and juggled his way into his allotted position in the formation as they broke through cloud into the clear sky above. Each did so on his course to the target, quite unlike the silver-bodied Flying Fortresses from Thurleigh and Kimbolton who spent an hour spiralling their way to height and into their complicated formations.

Bernard, navigator with Ted Swales, went on, “It was as well to get as much reliable information as possible to supplement the forecasts on the way out, i.e. while all the radar systems were working. So my chart shows crosses for the ground positions I used from the Nav II radar chart. Air positions, getting further and further away on our chart from our real positions, were compared with ground positions for the same instant of time to enable me to calculate changes in wind speed and direction (W/V) for short.

On this occasion it was a case of ‘follow-my-leader’ and no need to

[Page break]

alter course as a result of my work – unless we were to lose the Leader. We didn’t, yet. Ross Wheaton was busy with his radar and I with my calculations until he, being Bomb aimer as well on this trip, went forward to his bombsight during the short leg to the target.”

There were so many flying corrections to make due to both natural air turbulence and the wash from aircraft in front that there was no opportunity for pilots to switch to ‘George’, the automatic pilot. “But it was only for a short while and it was not too strenuous,” thought Harry Manley, “and flying in daylight and in company made it seem much easier than flying manually in a bomber stream at night.”

Nor were the Flight Engineers too bothered by the frequent need to synchronise their engines with the changes made by the pilot as he worked the throttles to maintain station. “I had one engine that played up a little and threatened to overheat,” recalled Denny Hughes, “nothing to worry or get worked up about and I felt quite relaxed.”

The gunners enjoyed their ride. “It was comforting to see the other Lancs about you and your mates in their turrets. You were not alone,” were George Ward’s thoughts. Sentiments echoed by Satherley and Mummery in their aircraft, who added, “For once you felt you were sharing the same boat.”

The wireless operators continued to keep their watch tucked away in their tiny apartment amidship. Only occasionally did Al Jacobs or Phil Axford pop their heads into the astrodome above to catch a quick glimpse of the sky about them. Phil was impressed by the endless belt of rippled cloud and their apparent detachment from their real purpose.

Perhaps George Russell in ‘Victor’, new to flying with Bob Palmer, thought of the story that still rippled through 109 Squadron. On a dark night a few weeks before Johnny Liddle and ‘Smudge’ Smith had taken off from Staughton bound for Karlsruhe to search for their ‘spot in the sky’. One minute later Alan Relph and Jim Davis took off on the same journey.

“We were stooging along quite nicely when the Mossie suddenly turned to starboard, flipped over on its back and went into a spin. I was thrown out, fortunately with the seat harness well strapped, and made a fair landing in a field,” remembered Liddle.

“I remember the shock of being trapped and helpless and struggling to reach the hand that Johnny was stretching out towards me only to see him sucked out through the hatch. There was nothing I could do but adjust my mind to the inevitable. Just as I did the aircraft stopped spinning and I reacted instantly and got out at about a 1000 feet.” ‘Smudge’ recalls.

Ralph returned from dropping his TI’s and reported the sharp knock he had felt underneath him while flying over Belgium. An inspection in daylight showed obvious signs of a collision. Liddle had not returned; was it possible? Liddle’s return a few days later confirmed it. Remarkable navigation had produced a near disaster.

‘In all that sky’ and in daylight the 3rd formation of Lancs from Gravely made its way to the English coast. One crew finally found its position and to show his arrival to his station partner, and no doubt his pleasure, the pilot waggled his wings. 14 men died as a result. As Gordon Musgrove writes, “It would have been laughable were it not so tragic.” He stayed behind to radio for help, circling to mark the position of the tragedy. The formation pressed on, some

[Page break]

unaware. There was nothing they could do, anyway.

Each formation converged on a point near [indecipherable word] about 4 minutes or 12 miles behind one another. Johnson was now concentrating on his navigation. “At 12.39 our H2S showed us to be 8 miles from Aachen, on a bearing of 164 degrees. From this [indecipherable words] able to calculate a W/V for the bomb sight, and a course out of the target for the Skipper to use in due course. With Ross out of the way I was able to get up and go ‘forrard’, all of 2 steps, to watch. A cloudless sky, brilliant sunshine, and below, the Rhineland quite clear of fog. Of the fighter cover we were promised there was no sign.”

Each navigator warned his pilot of their position and he went through the crew stations in turn, giving words of encouragement. Extra words went always to the gunners in their exposed positions which they now began to feel more keenly. So much depended on their instant recognition and reaction; a moment of hesitation could become an eternity. George Ward saw contrails high above; if they were the escort they were surely too far away?

The crucial first stage of the Oboe run was about to begin; Carter’s navigation was about to be tested; would he get the Waiting Point? Milne had passed the controls to Palmer and was now in the Engineer’s position alongside. Russell was at his Oboe station in the nose. Only he and Palmer were now in communication; only they had any influence on the coming events. All of Palmer’s skills and judgements would be relayed to his hands and feet to find that 100 foot-wide beam and make a perfect approach. Nothing else mattered.

Just they and the tracking stations existed. The Controllers sat by their screens; everything seemed to be in order but the next moments would tell. John Tipton sat by his controls in the forward station based on the river Maas. He was resting from operations with 109 and knew well the tension in the Oboe aircraft; he sat, willing success. There was nothing else he could do.

A lone WAAF sat by her scrambler telephone in a tiny room just off the Interrogation Room at Little Staughton waiting for a running commentary on the Oboe run that would be relayed to her from the East Coast ‘Cat’ Station. Molly Nicholson’s log would be followed by the crews, Intelligence and Navigation Officers. Their professional interest in the progress of the run was tempered by their knowledge of the stresses involved to their friends.

1242.
Molly turned to the waiting group. “He’s on Waiting Point”. The moments went by.

1244.
“Palmer’s on Point A. Oboe is switched full on.” The tension eased, at least, that was good news. There was 10 minutes to go.

1246.
“Point B.” Molly logged.

Wing Commander Peacock in ‘Charlie’ was at the moment of his decision. Should he order a visual attack? ‘Johnny’ Walker, Engineer and Bomb Aimer, lay in the nose, waiting, his eyes flicking from the Oboe Leader in front to his bomb sight, checking his drift line. The visibility was excellent and Peacock could see the Rhine ahead. There was the bend.

12.47.
Peacock ordered that the attack should be made visually. Walker’s eyes went to his drift line and the target coming up ahead.

[Page break]

Simultaneously, flak puffs expanded around the Oboe Leader. “We saw the shells explode at our height on both sides. Then they closed in on us,” Ward saw from his turret. “Palmer was hit immediately and I saw flames.”

For 7 minutes the formation’s track, height and speed had been closely measured by German radar, now they could be seen. What could be better for them?

1248.
Point C: 6 minutes to go. Palmer was on fire amidships and the port outer engine had gone. Carpenter in the Mossie was on 1 engine, the other was feathered. Those who had heard the visual order had gained or lost a few hundred feet. Clough saw them go and realised why but as he hadn’t heard the order he stayed resolutely on height. Hoare watched the Leader intently; would he never drop his bombs so that he could do the same?

1251. Point D: 3 minutes to go. All aircraft were now receiving hits and were bucking from the thrust of the flak bursts. Palmer was on 2 engines and flying wing low. A huge black cloud expanded from a red centre just behind him and the Mossie disappeared into it. It emerged on fire but climbing back to its station.

“At 1251 we heard the order for a visual and climbed to 17,500 feet and at 1252 we were ‘running up’ and almost at once fighters were sighted ahead and closing fast. The formation held on despite the heavy flak and headlong rush of the fighters. I recall them as 24 black dots in flights of 3 before I sat down to record events and watch us on our course for home. ‘1255 bombs away! Mossie, V and P down.’ The log reflects the lightning speed of events.”

1255.
Tipton saw from his screen the desperate efforts being made by Palmer to stay on beam without knowing the reason. He saw the Release Point was reached and the quick fading of the signal and the sudden switch off; Russell had cleared his set for the next user.

The last images retained of ‘Victor’ by the following crews were of it spiralling earthwards. Deliberately, it seemed to some, as though Palmer, knowing that he had no further chance, was setting his aircraft at the target.

They saw, too, the Mossie drop its bombs and then dive away in flames with 4 fighters on its tail.

All crews were now in a desperate fight for survival. His bombs gone, Walker climbed into the front turret just as the fighters flashed by. Ward had been watching the beams and rear expecting the fighters to come from those quarters. On a warning he swung to face the front and through the flak smoke he saw them flash by, so fast that he thought they were jets. “They were so fast it was difficult to reverse the turret to get the guns to bear on them before they were gone. At the same time I felt the thump and heard the tearing of metal as we swung away into a dive.

No sooner had Reif’s bombs gone than they received a direct hit and he knew that Peter was lost. He tried to get out of the flak to give his crew a chance to escape when cannon shells tore into them and he cried for the crew to go. Only 2 could go.

Hockly, too, had been smashed by flak and a wing was ablaze when fighter shells completed the damage. He held on as long as he could for his crew to get clear. But without intercom. he couldn’t find out.

[Page break]

Terpening dropped several thousand feet after being hit by flak and was pulling the aircraft level when the fighters jumped him.

While the first formation was in its frantic throes the second was entering the cloud of flak 9 miles behind. Again, the leading Oboe aircraft were the prime targets. And again, not all had received the order to bomb visually given by Street at 1251 and 1254, just as Palmer was dropping his bombs.

1258
Harding received his ‘Point D’ signal and held his Lancaster in the severe turbulence and felt and heard the flak bursting against the sides. He could see the target ahead beyond the bend of the river. Conscious only of his signals, unaware of the extent of his damage, he flew on. There was no yielding to the temptation of a visual in spite of the probability that his formation had.

Down in the nose, struggling with the Oboe equipment, Les Millett had his own temptations; the signals were very poor.

Almond and Challis in the following Mosquito knew that whatever happened to Harding the damage to their own aircraft would prevent them acting as Reserve. But they knew, too, that they had to hold station to avoid confusing the formation behind.

1301.
Their bombs began to fall and they became free to take what avoiding action they could to prevent catastrophe. Almond, without hydraulics, and unable to open his bomb doors took a diving turn away. Baker chose to go on and take a wider circle and was shocked to meet fighters. Fortunately, they must have been returning from the earlier attacks and at the end of their endurance. When Mustangs just as suddenly appeared they decided on discretion and made a hasty retreat. How Baker and Bourne recall the relief they felt. Even Jim Gower was relieved at the slightness of his injuries. Roy Last, who had watched with horror at the shells exploding around him and had seen Harding’s struggles with his damaged Lanc, almost cried with his relief.

And, flying through the white-hot shards of razor-sharp shrapnel came the sadly reduced third formation led by Jordan. His Lancaster, shredded by shrapnel, had lost an engine so that he had to cope with unequal power and his crew were fighting the fire amidships. Severe turbulence added to his worries when, to his dismay, the Lanc behind had come in so close that he could not make the vital corrections to maintain his beam in those last moments.

Forced out of position by the same Lanc, Parker and Musgrove could only watch helplessly. Their bombs went away but useless as an Oboe attack and they felt that keenly even if Musgrove could later feel relief at what could have happened to them had they been in their proper station.

Potts had sent out his visual order, but, again, with mixed results. Osmond carried on with his Leader but Pettifer decided to break with the others. Moore made a first-class operational decision; with his bomb sight u/s he deliberately hung on to his Leader rather than make a wild drop. It showed moral courage of high order.

To his side flew Lawson who must have been very conscious of the fate of his namesake as he made his way through the black evil clouds of cordite. Flak burst against him sending shudders through- the frame as first one, then another of his engines was damaged.

1303.
All were through. But not all was over. Terpenning was coming to the end of his ability to hold his aircraft through another, and another dive or corkscrew away from the 5 fighters coming in on one attack

[Page break]

after another. Down another 3,000 feet, his rear turret u/s, instruments shattered, the starboard aileron hanging, all petrol gone on the port side and, incredibly, with only one engine, the tough Australian hung on with sufficient control for all his crew to get out safely. Not far from the tragic Thomas who had finally succumbed to the savage onslaughts against his aircraft.

And quite close, too, to another struggle for survival. “After the first head-on attack the fighters swung round to come in again and 3 picked on us. The next 15 minutes was a triumph for our 16 stone South African rugger player, Ted Swales, and for the two gunners. Bryn Leach gave most of the directions from his mid-upper turret and Jackie Smith in the rear used his guns to such effect from the rear. Bert Goodacre, the Wop, kept watch from the atrodome [sic] to keep all approaches covered.

“Ted began the most violent, sustained, evasive action, corkscrewing non-stop through 5 separate attacks and 15 long minutes. Then, the fighters, downed or dispirited or damaged and so far from base broke off and disappeared. Even for passengers like me it had been too hectic for fear. Apprehension yes, for every time the Skipper hauled out of a dive I was held to my seat as if by a vice with my cheeks seemingly held down to my chin by the force of G. Every time he pushed over the top, all my unpinned gear – and at first, my parachute pack, rose up to sail around my head. With pencils and protractors in constant flow about me, navigation was impossible.

“After slamming the bomb doors shut over Cologne and while the fighters were banking round, Ted had managed to turn onto a westerly course. We finished corkscrewing at 1310 and at 1311 Ross had found a fix to put us 8 3/4 miles south of Eindhoven. Only 16 miles north of track after all that. A second fix at 1315 confirmed the good news. I ordered a 40 degree course alteration to port to get us back onto track before crossing the coast and calculated a course for the North Sea crossing. There was no need now for detailed navigation; visibility was good and we could home in on radar.

“That ought to have been the end of the story but out over the sea Flight Engineer Gerry Bennington organised a systematic check of all controls and services. Miraculously, there was no serious damage anywhere. However, so quickly had the bomb doord [sic] been shut over the target to reduce drag and give more speed that 1 bomb had not dropped clear. It had been sloshing about in the bomb bay through all that action, and it was alive. The laconic log entry ‘1345: bomb away’ tells nothing of the relief, especially after the bang when it hit the empty sea. It was no dud.

“And that was it. We homed in on Gee, cutting the last corner, and landed at 1435 ending another 4 hours 6 minutes with Pathfinder Force. For the lucky ones . . .”

Poley and Rigby, in charge again of their Lancasters, were carrying out their checks. Both had to jettison a bomb over the North Sea and both were too seriously damaged and uncertain of their controls to risk landing at base. They made their way to the emergency landing field at Manston in Kent with its widened and lengthened runway for such conditions. Poley was glad of it when a tyre burst on touch-down. Lawson followed him in. Rigby took somewhat longer, but made it.

Almond had decided to go back to Bourn. On his final circuit an engine cut out. Knowing that he could not risk another approach he went straight in and made a perfect belly-landing.

Parker and Musgrove had already arrived and given a report. Almond should have been in before them and anxious minutes ticked by until they were heard and then seen. Breaths were held again as they

[Page break]

watched that last approach.

Manley was first back at Staughton. The damage to their bomb bays confirmed their stories of what they had been through, and confirmed again as others came in. Ground crews rushed to help their men from their damaged aircraft before taking stock of the visual evidence of the intensity of the flak attack. Few spoke, they were reduced to shaking heads and waving hands as some fresh piece of damage came to light.

But on 6 dispersals ground crews waited with ever growing fear. Surely, not their crew, their aircraft? ‘Peter’ will come back, surely? They’ve come down somewhere else . . . the crews are safe . . . even in Germany? Their years of experience tempered their hopes as the hours went by.

Tired and stricken crews came out of debriefing still in a fog of unreality, of being safe, of being among griends [sic]. Splintered images still flashed through their minds correcting or reinforcing their reports but too tired to care. Some thought only of their beds and a chance to shut their minds in sleep. More experienced crews went for their meal to give time for their minds to settle. Even so, and even though they had not eaten for 9 hours, few could eat. A few went to the bar where beer was surreptiously [sic] provided ‘round the back’. The constant re-telling of their stories as fresh faces arrived helped to ease them out of their shock. And they, too, eventually welcomed the time when they could blot it all out in sleep.

Molly had waited with her log of the Oboe run ready to hand it to Bob Palmer as he came in for briefing report – the first thing crews did on return. For with her report of the run Molly could give the bomb positions on the target and he would be very pleased with this one; it was perfect. Nat Bowman, the Navigation Officer, came in to her, “I shouldn’t wait, Molly. They’re not coming back.”

Molly couldn’t take it in. “Bob went down over the target. Eric, too.” Molly sat on. It wasn’t true.

Starkly alone were the scattered survivors of the fallen aircraft. Some wounded and barely conscious; some badly beaten by angry, frightened civilians on the ground. In confusion and shock they were alone amongst an enemy people.

47 homes around the world were about to receive a telegram: ‘We regret to inform you . . .’

Nothing stopped. 109 crews were preparing for take-off to Sieburg and Limburg in the Cologne area to lead Mosquito formations with their 105 colleagues. 582 had received orders to prepare for the next day’s operations and crews were working to repair the damage in preparation for it; it would mean working through the night.

Aircrew had a built-in excuse to release their tensions and there was some hectic drinking in the Messes that night. Less fortunate were those who had an emotional tie to their work or to the missing men themselves. Those in the Parachute Section who couldn’t resist wondering if their chutes had worked properly. Armourers wondered about their guns. The normally ebullient Ishy Moore was trying to calm and reassure the WAAF who had become pregnant by one of the missing men. ‘Tiny’ Joyce was with the Concert Party wondering whether they could find replacements; there was no doubt that they had to carry on.

Everything went on. The next morning the crews studied the Battle

[Page break]

Order. Some were yesterday’s survivors. Cradnell and Sheppard vividly recall the shouts of astonishment and dismay when Cologne was again displayed at Briefing. Oh, no! The Nippes marshalling yards across the city this time and at night but that was no relief. Bomb Aimers Denton and Belanger could not stop the mental anguish they felt as they lay before their bomb sights watching the TIs go down and the ground below become exposed to their view. Their friends were down there!

Opposition was slight and all turned for home safely. Fog, however, had closed Staughton; if only it had done so yesterday, thought Roy Last! All were diverted to West Raynham where “We drank their Mess dry. It was compulsive,’” said George Ward on recall. Christmas Day on a strange base, without kit.

At Staughton the traditional festival went on but few could rid themselves of the over-riding depression that surrounded them with more than 100 faces missing – a lack that was emphasised at the Mess Dance by the surplus of WAAFs to partners.

Boxing Day brought renewed hope. News came in that Terpenning and crew were safe and on the way home. Perhaps there were others? Even if he did report the finding of Campbell’s body, and another who couldn’t be identified?

Over the next weeks, news trick led [sic] in of men reported as POW. On 23rd February, Ted Swales died coming back from Pforzheim where he had been attacked during his role as Master Bomber. He died in trying to take his crew to safety. News of his award of a posthumous VC came in just after that awarded to Bob Palmer. On 28 April, Terpening was killed with his gunner Watson when they crashed in a snow storm at the pretty Northamptonshire village of Bulwick. Newman, who had flown with Milne for two tours survived fearful injuries. (The indentations made by the Lancaster in the banks of the Willowbrook is still used by the village children as a delightful paddling pool. None are aware of how it was formed.)

And, in April and May the POWs began to return to tell their stories. Some stayed on as part of 582, others received postings to new places and the Commonwealth lads went home. By July, Russ Yeulett was in the Pacific jungles with Eric Williams of “Wooden Horse” fame, searching for crash survivors hiding from the Japanese.

August brought to an end preparations for the Squadrons to go to the Pacific with ‘Tiger Force’; 2 atomic bombs had brought Japan to surrender. We who survived, breathed sighs of relief and thankfulness.

196 men of Little Staughton were in eternal peace.

[Page break]

[Underlined] COLOGNE/GREMBURG: A PERSONAL MEMORY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Gordon Musgrove [/underlined]

I have looked up the ‘B’ Form which does not shed any real light but I can put forward some suggestions –

[Underlined] ‘B’ Form Laid on for 22nd December Cancelled [/underlined]

1) IL Channel 12/35 + 1 Ch 12/105 + 8/35 at HO Double Yellow
2) IL Channel 13/582 + Ch 13/109 + 8/582 at H+I Double Red
3) IL Channel IIB/35 + 1 Ch IIB/105 + 8/582 at H+2 Double Yellow

Fighter escort will be provided. Rendezvous at 0500E on Track.

You will notice that Oboe was using three channels which probably meant they were using different ‘Cat’ stations. Perhaps they did not bomb in the ‘B’ Form order because they arrived at Point ‘A’ at different times.

It was deemed wiser to have an experienced Lanc. pilot to take the aircraft to within 10 minutes of the target run and take over as soon as the bombs had been dropped. The Oboe pilot took over for the run.

The track was curved and the pilot’s signals were like a bat beam. The navigator gave the pilot the course at the beginning of the run and at the end. Travelling to the target the pilot would progress down the beam in the Dot twilight zone to be in the centre of the beam at the target. Height was predetermined; too low resulted in an undershoot, and too high an overshoot. The last four minutes of the run had to be straight (within the meaning of the slight curve) and level because it was during that time that the aircraft’s ground speed was measured and the release time calculated.

Some navigators were not able to attain the rigorous standard necessary so if Palmer got to his ‘A’ first he would be the first formation to reach the target and not second.

There was fighter cover although I never saw any. Perhaps they were based on the Continent and so did not get into Bomber Command reports. I have a feeling that the zero hour was altered which may be one of the reasons why they did not appear soon enough.

Another interesting point – certainly not achieved in our formation – ‘Echelon to Starboard’; ours was in a ‘V’. We were stuck out to starboard with one enthusiast slinging lead at us, bursting just off the starboard wing.

I can’t complain too much, life and death were divided so finely. Had our formation been on time we should have had to cope with the fighters and, had Johnson not forced us out, we should have been just behind Rigby. Seconds after Johnson broke, the air behind Rigby’s Lanc was filled with flak, setting the Oboe Lanc on fire. Johnson had a lucky escape and so did we.

[Page break]

I witnessed the collision between Clark and Lawson and took the fix. We broke radio silence to inform Group and circled. Some parachutes were seen and although rescue boats were on the scene within 30 minutes and picked up five (I think) bodies, there were no survivors. If it had not been so tragic it would have been amusing – the Lanc which was catching up came alongside and waggled his wings. Unfortunately he was too close and tipped the other Lanc’s wing upwards and they crashed into each other.

The cloud cleared some 20 miles from Cologne which was enjoying some winter sunshine. Visibility was excellent, the cathedral stood out on the skyline and on one of the bridges spanning the river was a row of fire engines (six I believe) and as the bombs started to drop they drove off in single file.

The formations, flying straight and level, were sitting ducks for both light and heavy flak. Rarely had the ground defences seen such easy targets and at 17,000 feet and the crazy idiots were not even weaving. Such an opportunity comes only once in a lifetime and I doubt if they ever worked so feverishly to fire as many shells as possible in the shortest space of time. The track was thick with bursting shells. As an American, describing the flak they had to endure once said, “It was so thick when my Buddy’s B17 was shot down he walked on the flak right over to ours and climbed in.”

Palmer, not knowing the formation had broken, steadfastly maintained track fearful to drop his bombs too soon knowing the rest of the formation would be waiting to see his bombs go down as the signal to drop theirs. Carpenter, even braver (if possible) in my opinion, with one engine already feathered and three Me 109’s snapping at his heels, stayed with his leader, crashing close by his Lanc. Several bombers were shot down. The second and third formations broke away from their leaders because it would have been suicide to maintain formation.

[Underlined] COLOGNE/GREMBURG: A PERSONAL MEMORY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Les Millett [/underlined]

My own flying log book is in the customary sparse detail confirming to the lesson drummed into us early in our flying careers that careless talk costs lives. It reads:-

23.12.44 10.35 Lancaster Z PB 367 (TL)
S/L Harding with W/O Poley
6 crew 35 Sqdn.
Duty: Oboe operator
Ops: Leading formation 8 Lancs and one Mosquito (S/L Almond)
Forced landing at Manston.
Flying time 3.50

On two mornings prior to 23rd December we were called before daylight and driven to Little Staughton for a briefing, but each time the operation was postponed on account of the weather. (Not sure whether this was conditions over target or the density of fog over Huntingdonshire. Probably both.)

[Page break]

Was there a Fido installed at Little Staughton I seem to recall careering off into the lifted fog when we eventually got away? We were fairly soon above cloud but it took a little longer for the formation to ‘get fell in.’

Of the briefing, the only clear detail which stays in my mind (apart from the normal gen about the target, its strategic and tactical importance and the routine operational matters) was that the met. forecast was for about six tenths or more cloud above the target area.

When we got there the skies were almost clear for the Oboe bombing run.

Geoff Harding picked up his call sign on time (thereby leaving Harry Almond as a spectator). I got my ‘A’ and ‘B’ without too much difficulty although the signal was burbling right from the start. I think I got the ‘C’ but by that time the interference was severe and it was quite impossible to identify ‘D’ although it was obviously due because I could see the marshalling yards just ahead of us.

Geoff saw that I was having trouble and promptly pulled the plug. In the few split seconds available it had been rushing through my mind that I could juggle the drift-wire bomb sight, but not having the required data it was impossible especially with eight Lancs sweating it out behind us waiting for a signal!

After bombing it was every Lanc for itself, to get away from flak and fighters. As soon as we were on course for the coast we did our checks and found we still had some bombs on board- Geoff and Poley were also having difficulty in trimming the Lanc. We guessed that some controls had been damaged by flak.

Over the sea we set about getting rid of the bombs and then on instructions from base, due as far as I can recollect, to thick cloud and fog down to the deck over most of East Anglia we set course for Manston. It seemed to us later that half of airborne Bomber Command was doing likewise. We were on our landing approach (rather faster than usual due to damaged controls) when someone shouted over the intercom that another aircraft was landing towards us. But it didn’t seem to matter as the moment we touched the runway the port tyre burst and we slewed off to the left.

After an uncomfortable twenty-four hours in the crowded quarters at Manston and having only our flying clothes as worn on take-off, with a little cash advanced by the pay office and a railway voucher we eventually go to London on Christmas eve – Geoff to his family at Northwood and I to a friend at Hampstead. A slow train took me to Cambridge on Christmas afternoon and the duty Waaf had difficulty in finding a driver sober enough to drive out and fetch me.

I never had any further contact with the brave and patient young aircrew who had sat there at action stations while we did our Oboe run in their Lanc. They had ample time to see what was going on around. The formations in front took a hell of a plastering.

Geoff Harding died in the early Fifties, the night following a medical inspection which passed him fit for flying. He was with the Hunter Group on charter flights around the Middle East.

[Page break]

The Oboe operators were down in the bomb aimer’s compartment with their sets beside them. On an Oboe run pilot and navigator needed absolute concentration on their signals from beginning to end . . . the pilot to stay plumb on course and the navigator to get his bombing signal.

The Germans had had plenty of time in which to learn how to frustrate Oboe bombers. I think our signal failures were due to enemy jamming. Even though our transmitters were operating from mobile bases with not too much time to acquire the degree of reliability we were used to.

The three formation leaders were obeying briefing instructions in making their Oboe bombing runs. It is probable that by the time the release signal ‘D’ would have been given to Palmer’s navigator, their Lanc was being shot down. Peacock following close behind and with the target visible just below him would have given the order to bomb to avoid overshooting.

Had the ops planners been given a confident met forecast to clear weather over target they would have probably opted for Oboe runs anyway. Bombing on Oboe had been proved more accurate and reliable than the old drift-wire technique. The latter depended on a number of calculations and judgements made in the air by one man under pressure. Oboe ground controllers could not only predict more accurately and make corrections during the run, they could produce within seconds after the release the bombing error, measured in compass bearings and distance in yards. Just before D-Day I was getting errors 66, 100, 60, 45 and 32 yards, which from 28,000 feet was considered accurate enough.

Visual bombing was the only option left when Oboe signals became insufficiently readable for navigators to identify their release signals. Or, as in Jordan’s case, when the aircraft behind closed in on him during the run and he couldn’t make any necessary flying corrections without risk of collision, his bombing error could have been considerable even if his navigator had picked up a true release signal.

[Underlined] COLOGNE/GREMBURG: A PERSONAL MEMORY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Gordon Baker [/underlined]

The trip is still quite vivid to me. I was supposed to be in the middle of the second formation in aircraft ‘O’ but my mid-upper slept in (the only time it ever happened). I waited a few moments for him in dispersal and then taxied out without him. However, this delay threw me out of my proper position in the line-up on the runway. Being on the tail end came in handy later when doing evasive action.

My most vivid memory of the trip to the target is a close-up of the rear gunner’s face in the Lanc ahead of me. (Two night trips later, on my way to Nuremburg, in a similar position a rear gunner in a Lanc ahead put six bullets in my Bomb Aimer. He survived but was in hospital for months).

On approaching Cologne Gremburg the flak was what you might describe as extremely intense. I felt there was no way a close formation like ours could possibly get through unscathed. It was all around us and close. Our leader

[Page break]

must have felt the same way because he gave the order to bomb on our own.

Immediately broke formation and being at the back, I was able to jinx around at will, which probably did not make it any safer but it made me feel better. The remaining aircraft kept on in formation so the leader repeated his order. This is the reason I feel it was our second formation leader who gave the order. With that repeated remark the whole formation broke up. I had a very good view of them from the back. About this time I noticed a Lanc spinning straight down trailing smoke. I presume now this was Palmer’s aircraft. I saw no parachutes.

After leaving the target I made a bigger orbit of the city than most to clear the flak. The only Lanc I could see nearby was about 300 yards straight ahead. I was just starting to relax when I saw an aircraft diving on it from 10 o’clock high. It turned out to be an FW 190. It passed between our two Lancs at high speed. The large black cross on its side brought me wide awake. I banked to my right and watched him start to curve back up towards us. I called to my Australian WOP, George Ruddick, who was now in the mid-upper position, to shoot off a distress flare. We had not seen our escorts up to that time but three Spitfires suddenly appeared. Two formed on either side of us (a pretty sight!) and the other must have scared the FW off because I did not see it again.

The Lanc ahead took no evasive action and appeared undamaged. I suspect its crew like mine never saw the enemy aircraft. The rest of the trip was uneventful.

I felt this trip was just an experiment to try out Oboe on Lancs. I did not know it had been tried out before. I am sure those in charge never suspected that we would encounter such heavy opposition. And I feel the reason we did was because the Germans knew we were coming. We were briefed to go on this target a day or two before but the trip was cancelled.

In the final briefing all but one or two crews were on again. We wondered afterwards if someone had discussed the impending trip in the pub. An RAF chap who was shot down on this trip told us in our flight room after the war (S/L Brownell may confirm this) the Germans asked him on interrogation why we had not come on the other two days. Was it because of the weather? As an aside, this chap said they put him in a wooden jail in Cologne and on 30th December we came back and bombed again. He said it was a most unnerving experience.

[Underlined] COLOGNE/GREMBURG: A PERSONAL MEMORY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Alan Bourne [/underlined]

We had been briefed twice prior to our third ‘go’ at Cologne in daylight on a special ‘Oboe’ attack, composed of three formations of ten aircraft each. The C.O. advised that if opposition such as flak or enemy fighters looked too menacing we should break up the formation and attack the target independently. The main fear being that since twice in the previous two days the operation had been scrubbed at the last minute, due to poor visibility over the target, plenty of Jerry fighters were anticipated. On the third briefing, as a ‘spare’, I was switched with Tex Campbell to F/L Street’s crew as Mid-upper Gunner.

[Page break]

W/O Campbell had been posted with me on his second tour. We became casual friends and a week before this operation I had attended his wedding in London as best man. Little did I realise that the switch in crews saved my life and made a widow of the new Mrs Campbell in just two weeks – Tex Campbell did not return with F/L Thomas and crew in ‘J’ – Juliet.

The morning of the raid was overcast and raw but Met. forecast ‘bright, clear conditions’ over the target. At 10.45 hours we took off and formed up over Ipswich in the arranged formations of ten aircraft each. F/L Street ked the third formation, which took some time in forming, in pairs and stepped up in line astern, with the last pair well astern and 60 to 70 feet higher.

In the lead of the three formations was an Oboe equipped Lancaster and a Mosquito crew from 109 Squadron as well as the Lancaster crew. Their job was to bring us into the target from fifty miles out. While we were in bright sunlight with scattered cloud below, the target was clearly visible. Intelligence had warned of heavy ack-ack, low, medium and high to be expected as well as a good possibility of fighter activity over the target.

Approaching the target ack-ack became extremely intense and concentrated on our approach course. Both forward formations pressed home their attack and made no attempt to ‘break-up’ for independent bombing runs visually.

F/L Street gave the order to ‘break-up’ almost too late as signs of fighter activity and high flak became evident. As we ran into the target the two leading formations began literally to disintegrate before our eyes. All around us aircraft were breaking up and catching fire with bombs still aboard. Their crews scrambling to tumble out of the Lancasters one after the other, followed shortly by their billowing canopies. This happened as our last formation, now a loose gaggle, flew in to the target.

As the words ‘Bombs Gone!’ came over the intercom ‘H’ – How altered course out of the target as the navigator gave the new heading. Out of the corner of my eye I suddenly noticed two small specks, high on our port bow, sprout tiny wings. Obviously aircraft on a collision course for our group. Within seconds two FW 190’s with their tell-tale crosses on wings and fuselage came barreling [sic] down on us closing rapidly.

At approximately 600 yards I gave the warning “Fighter port bow up” and while still at my limiting range, with little hope of any accuracy, opened fire. Suddenly from out of nowhere two P 51’s of the USAF flashed into view slightly high and ahead and obviously with the FW’s in their sights. Seconds later the Jerries broke off by altering their attack in to a vertical dive with the Mustangs doing a fast ‘wing over’ to cut them off and with cannon firing. I shouted in relief at the top of my lungs at this quick turn of events and felt the cold sweat running down my back and inside my long-johns!

Our return to base was uneventful but I had a sick feeling inside thinking of the losses we had suffered. The total flying time for this operation, in broad daylight, was four hours and twenty minutes.

[Page break]

The full shock came at ‘de-briefing’ on our return to base with the estimate that only a third of the attacking force had returned. Rumours went around that probably only eight or ten aircraft made it back. Numbers weren’t exact since two other Pathfinder Force Squadrons participated. Captain Edwin Swales and crew reportedly landed in Belgium or Holland safely. He was later recommended for the DFC for his contribution. Little was said about this episode when I joined them on 1st January 1945.

Approximately 40 aircrew were reported missing at Little Staughton as a result of the raid. Christmas 1944 was pretty bleak at the Messes and half empty Nissen huts. Tex Campbell was lost with his whole crew. He had married an Irish girl and brought her to Staughton for Christmas. Group Captain Cribb stopped me outside the Mess that evening and requested that I inform her that Tex had been positively identified by his identity tags. I visited her at her little farm cottage where she had taken up residence and managed, after explaining that Tex was missing, that she would be better at home in London with her family. The following day, along with F/O Keith Walker, RAAF, we found ourselves driving her back to her family in London for Christmas.

True enough, I told a lie. Somehow I didn’t have the heart to tell her that her husband of two weeks was positively dead and would not be returning.

[Page break]

F for FREDDIE’S LAST MISSION by ALAN ROADE

The PERSONAL MEMORY of ROY SHIRLEY – THE OBSERVER 23 DECEMBER 1973

As Lancaster F for Freddie passed over Calais, Flight Sergeant Roy Shirley, the mid-upper gunner, revolved his turret through a complete circle. Beneath him the clouds were white – like a snowy Christmas card scene, he thought. He remembered it was 23 December, but there was no peace on earth below, and instead of goodwill the plane he was in (a Pathfinder in a daylight raid on Cologne) was carrying a cargo of eight tons of high explosives to shower on the Third Reich.

At that moment he saw the other planes in 582 Squadron emerging from the clouds about a mile to starboard. He flicked on his intercom and reported their appearance to the captain, Flight Lieutenant Reg Hock;y [sic], who acknowledged and banked F for Freddie down to close up on the formation (also taking part in the raid was 109 Bomber Squadron).

The round journey from their base at Little Staughton in Huntingdonshire to Cologne would take about 4 hors [sic]. Shirley settled himself down for a long wait. With the pilot, in the forward section of the aircraft, were navigators David Spier and Tony Smith, wireless operator Pip Parratt, and engineer Ken Hewitt, who was also the bomb aimer. They would all be fully occupied. But while the plane was not actually under attack from enemy fighters, he and rear gunner Vic Jehan were virtually passengers.

The whole force of 9 Lancasters and 1 Mosquito climbed to 17,000 ft. leaving beneath them the clouds that had caused the postponement of the mission on the preceding four days. Finally it was decided that the thick fog and ground mist over the whole of southern England could no longer be allowed to hold up the operation. In the Ardennes Field Marshal von Rundstedt’s counter-attack against the Allied Armies was going all too well and Intelligence reports indicated that his forces were being supplied through Cologne Gremberg marshalling yards. The fog, they were warned, meant that there would be no fighter cover – fighters could not carry sufficient fuel to enable them to return to fog-free bases in the North of England. The one consolation was that the weather would give them a certain amount of cover over the target.

Gradually Shirley became aware of the intense cold and he revolved the turret. At that height the oil in the hydraulic system that operated the turret could become sluggish, and frostbite, too, was always possible for a gunner in an unheated turret. He clapped his hands to get the circulation going. Under his leather gauntlets he was wearing a pair of silk gloves and over them a pair of woolen [sic] gloves, and still his fingers felt like sausages.

He began to think affectionately of the Nissen huts back at base, with its central stove and the chimney pipe protruding through the corrugated iron roof. Earlier in the week he had helped put up the decorations in the Sergeant’s Mess and on Christmas Day the Sergeants and the Officers would be exchanging jackets and serving the aircraftmen with lunch. He couldn’t help remembering it was his thirteenth mission of his second tour (he was still only 20), and he had ho[missing letters and word] to be flying over the Christmas period.

Over the [missing word], interrupting his thoughts, came the report that they were [missing word] the town of Duren. Somehow, he never thought of the towns they [missing word] to bomb as anything other than targets. They were just dots on a map in the Ops Room linked to Little Staughton by red tapes. There were good targets, which meant easy ones, and bad targets, which meant flak. Nor did he ever think of himself as killing, and he could never get used to the idea that other people were actually trying to kill him.

[Page break]

2

Then, no more than twenty miles from the target, the cloud broke up. Visibility was perfect. It was a beautiful day and below he could see snow-covered fields. As if by appointment, the anti-aircraft defences opened up and Lancasters began dropping almost lazily out of the sky.

The aircraft ahead was piloted by Master Bomber, Squadron Leader Robert Palmer. When its bomb doors opened, Hockley would open his, and when the Master Bomber dropped his high explosives, so would Hockly [sic]. Puffs of black smoke were all around them as they began their bombing run. Suddenly the aircraft ahead disappeared. There could be no weaving or evasive action from here on.

Shirley could hear the bomb aimer’s calm instructions to the Skipper. ‘Left . . . left . . . right a bit . . . steady . . .’ They seemed to be steady for an eternity. ‘For Christ’s sake, why doesn’t he get rid of them,’ Shirley thought. At that moment a Messerschmitt 109 came at them from underneath and straight ahead, so close that Hockly [sic] could see the pilot’s face. The German’s fire raked the port wing, which burst into flames; the undercarriage dropped uselessly. The plane lurched, and Shirley thought they’d been hit again, but then realised it was the bombs leaving their bays. He waited for them to hit the target. Even at that height you could feel the blast when they burst.

Shirley swung his turret round just in time to see a Focke-Wulf 190 coming in from the port quarter. One moment it was quite small in his gunsight, the next it seemed to fill it. He gave a burst as it swooped below and then became aware of firing, not from an enemy fighter, but from another Lancaster beneath them whose gunner was intent on hitting the same FW190. That moment the illuminated gunsight inches from Shirley’s nose shattered and more 109s tore into the wrecked formation.

Hockly could see the entire wing turning into a sheet of flame. Navigator Dave Spier ordered a 285-degree turn to head the Lancaster for home. Hockly tilted the control column but there was no response. It was as much as he could do to keep the aircraft on an even keel. There was still a lot of fuel in the prot [sic] wing’s tanks and he knew the whole show could go up at any moment. There was nothing for it. He gave the order ‘Emergency Jump . . . jump . . . jump.’

First out through the emergency hatch in the floor of the cabin was the flight engineer, Ken Hewitt. Navigator Tony Smith waited as Hockly battled to hold the aircraft level. They needed just five minutes – the Allied lines were only 20 miles to the west. Then Spier shoved him out and followed him immediately. By now the Skipper was standing at the controls. The heat was becoming intense. He called over the intercom: ‘All gone?’ There was no reply, and he stepped out into 18,000 ft of space.

The noise inside the stricken aircraft was deafening. Suddenly Roy Shirley was aware that he had not heard a word over the intercom for what seemed an eternity yet was probably only a few seconds – the bullet that did for his gunsight must have put the intercom out of action. Panic seized him. He began flashing his emergency call light to flash another in the pilot’s cockpit, but there was no reassuring flash in reply.

He dropped down into the fuselage. Twisted spars and shredded wires lay at his feet. There was smoke everywhere. He tried to clip on his parachute, but his hands were shaking so violently that he could manage only one of the two hooks on his harness. At that moment Pip Parratt came crashing through the bulkhead towards him. His voice was inaudible but the message of his lips was unmistakeable. ‘Get out . . . Get out . . . Everyone has gone.’ Rather than join the queue for the forward escape hatch, Parratt had made his way to the rear door. It was still locked, which could only mean that the mid-upper gunner had not jumped. Perhaps he was injured and needed help. Better take a look.

[Page break]

3

All gone? Shirley stood rooted to the spot as Parratt clawed his way back to the exit. Then, suddenly, he had only one thought, to get out of this blazing coffin pitching crazily about the sky. He followed Parratt headlong through the shredded fuselage. By the time he caught up with him Parratt was already clawing at the door, but it would not respond. Shirley grabbed an escape axe from its clip on the wall and suddenly the door opened. The axe went spinning out into space. Parratt was about to leap out when F for Freddie went into a flat spin. The centrifugal force slammed the door shut on the two would-be jumpers and hurled them onto the floor. Parratt was on his back, his heel trapped in a tangle of twisted wreckage. Shirley was on his face. The two of them were rivetted to the floor in their grotesque attitudes. It was impossible to move a muscle against the giant force that held them. Parratt passed out. His foot was all but wrenched from his ankle.

In a moment of strange clarity Shirley seemed to be detached from his body; outside himself as he had never been before. He could see two men two men [sic] lying in that stricken Lancaster and knew they weren’t going to get out. If that chap doesn’t do something soon, he thought, he isn’t going to make it. Through the shattered fuselage he could see the snow-covered earth swirling up towards them. A blood vessel burst in his eye and his vision was flooded with red. Then evrything [sic] went black.

Dangling 5,000ft above Cologne, Tony Smith had time to count the parachutes that had emerged from F for Freddie. He knew that Vic Jehan was one of the five who had made it because he could distinguish his bright yellow flying suit not very far away. But that left two unaccounted for. Smith watched with horror as the plane spun down towards the marshalling yards. Then it crashed. In doing so, by a million-to-one chance, it struck the last truck of an ammunition train a glancing blow. The rear section of the plane was sheered off and blown sideways across the snow by the first of a chain reaction of explosions as the ammunition, bound for the Ardennes, went sky-high. No one on board could possibly have survived.

But the trapped pair, against all the odds, had survived. When he opened his eyes again Shirley was lying on his back in the snow. He was vaguely aware, high above his head, of railway locomotives and trucks cartwheeling across the grey skies like Hornby train models. ‘Christ’ he thought ‘Don’t let them fall on me.’ Parratt was spreadeagled painfully on top of the tail section of the Lancaster, which had overturned. Not far from his head a truck was blazing.

Shirley was not entirely certain he had survived his descent form [sic] 18,000 ft. He was splattered with blood and he could not move his legs. He felt himself gingerly to find the extent of his wounds, but the blood that was caking with the falling snowflakes on his face was not his. It came from Parratt, who was obviously suffering intensely.

Then as dusk fell, Shirley became aware of a ring of angry faces looking down at the two of them. The citizens of Cologne had suffered greatly at the hands of British and American bombers and there had been stories of kangaroo courts and lynchings. Things were looking bad.

A couple of German soldiers were struggling to keep onlookers at bay, but how long could or would they bother to protect two

[Page break]

4

terror bombers? Just then a middle-aged man in uniform pushed his way through the crowd and knelt beside Shirley. He spoke English. ‘What is your name?’ he asked. He was, he said, a doctor. He had been captured by the British at Cambrai in 1917 and they had treated him well then. Now he would look after two enemy fliers. He moved to Parratt, who was suffering stoically, and returned quickly. By now Shirley was frozen almost stiff and he could not have moved even if he had wished to as the doctor pushed the needle of a syringe into his chest. He succumbed to the blackness willingly.

When he next awoke he was in a bed at the end of a ward in Cologne’s Hohenlinde Hospital. At the other end was Parratt. One of the walking patients whispered to Shirley that the two of them had been extremely fortunate. One of their comrades, he said, had been hanged from a lampost [sic] just around the corner at the height of the raid. Later a boyish figure in Luftwaffe uniform appeared at the bottom of his bed. He had been flying one of the Me109s that had attacked them yesterday, he said. Nine Lancasters from 582 Squadron alone had been shot down. ‘No’, Shirley mumbled. That couldn’t be true. It was true, the young pilot insisted, and went off saying he hoped Shirley would soon recover.

The young pilot was not boasting. Many of the survivors were taken to the Luftwaffe detention centre on the outskirts of Cologne, and when Reg Hockly arrived there, he saw so many faces from 582 that it was like being back at Little Staughton.

How severely the British aircrew were treated depended on how near they landed to the centre of ruined Cologne. Hockly himself had parachuted into a suburb. Before he could get to his feet he was set upon by about a dozen old men and women. One burly younger man hit him straight through a hedge and dived on top of him. Then soldiers arrived and they too beat him up.

As Tony Smith neared the ground he could see people emerging from the ruins and running towards him. Eager hands clawed at him as he swung to the ground. Someone grabbed his escape kit containing glucose, benzedrine tablets and bandages. The bandages would have been useful. When he regained consciousness after the beating they gave him he had a gaping wound in the scalp and one of his eyes, which had been kicked, was swathed in a toilet roll.

Dave Spier almost landed in a reservoir. At that temperature he knew it would have been the end for him. He struggled with the harness and guided the chute towards a ploughed field. By the time he had taken his harness off, an alsatian dog led by an aging Home Guard volunteer was barking at his legs. As if all this was not enough for the shocked survivors, the next day for the first time in their lives they were on the receiving end of a British bombing raid.

The warning sounded and when they looked through the cell window they could see the ominous marker flare hanging in the dark sky. Every Pathfinder knew what that meant. As they cowered together in the corner of the cell one near miss blew the heavy wooden door off the hinges, but no one made a move to escape. Then a guard scurried back in and told them if they gave him their word they would not attempt to get away they could join them in the slit trenches outside.

In his hospital bed Shirley was only vaguely aware of the raid.

[Page break]

5

From time to time, a sister in a nun’s habit hurried past the foot of the bed, but the presence of the greatcoated guard at the end of the ward made it unwise to talk. In the evening one of the sisters came shyly towards his bed and, mumbling something in German, she pressed a small parcel into his hand. He unwrapped it. Inside was a toothbrush and some nuts. What could it mean? It was 24 December. He groaned. What a way to spend Christmas.

When he had recovered sufficiently to travel, he was atken [sic] to F [sic] Frankfurt, where he was interrogated by German Intelligence Officers. In accordance with the Geneva Convention he disclosed only his Service number, rank and name. His life was threatened and one day he was pointedly allowed to see outside his window a stark execution post standing before a wall of sandbags. Again he refused to cooperate and he was told he would be handed over to the Gestapo, but when he was moved it was to Stalag Langwasser 13 on the outskirts of Nuremberg.

He became aware that there were two views of the ‘Boys in Blue’ as the newsreels used to call Bomber Command aircrews as they chalked chirpy slogans on their bombs and set off to teach Herr Hitler a lesson he wouldn’t forget. One morning the prisoners were paraded on the square and addressed by the Camp Commandant. They were, he told them, cowards and killers of women and children, and it was the German Army’s reluctant duty to protect them against their f [sic] former victims, who would, if they could, wreak revenge for their sufferings.

In the months that followed Shirley, the onetime Pathfinder air gunner who had taken part in nearly 50 operations over enemy territory, began to experience Allied bombing from ground level. It was not at all like the cinema. No one stood up and shouted, ‘Give the Jerries hell!’ Imperceptibly, attitudes changed. One day an air raid alert sounded just as Shirley and his fellow prisoners were about to eat. The soup wasn’t good, but they were hungry and reluctant to leave the tables for the shelters. Suddenly one of the others pointed out of the window and exclaimed, ‘It’s all right. It’s only one of our [sic].’ It was a Ju 88 swooping over the camp.

With the approach of the Allied armies, the inmates were marched south towards Munich. On the first day of their trek Shirley and three companions escaped. It was April 1945. By the 23rd he was back in Britain and ready to return to active service. Just 15 days later the war in Europe ended.

Until we tracked him down last month he had not seen or met the survivors of F for Freddie since they parted company over Cologne 29 Christmases ago.

[Page break]

COLOGNE / GREMBERG: A PERSONAL MEMORY
Russ Yeulett

I remember it as though it were yesterday; yet nearly 40 years have gone by and yet, I’m at a loss at finding the words to explain what magnificent blokes they were.

We had been briefed for the operation on several occasions but due to adverse weather conditions it was scrubbed each time. I remember a distinct feeling of distrust about these cancellations – would Jerry get to know and be waiting for us? This was the general feeling of those at Briefing. At the last Briefing the Met. officer told the assembled crews that it would continue to be cloudy over the U.K. with a possibility of slight clearing over the Continent.

How was that to change and what a significant part it was to play in the lives of so many of the bomber crews.

Our old crew had done some 50 ops together but their [sic] were changes just prior to Cologne, partly because of our Oboe work. Left were F/L Owen ‘Skip’ Milne, pilot; F/S Bert Nundy, Wop; Sgt. Bill Lanning, Engineer. We had lost Bruce Hutchinson, Bomb Aimer; Tex Barron, Mid-upper Gunner; and ‘Pinpoint’ Newman, Navigator. Into their places had come S/L Bert Carter, Navigator; David Mansell-Pleydell, Bomb Aimer – except he wasn’t down for this trip; and odd AG’s for the mid-upper. New for this operation were S/L Bob Palmer of 109, pilot, and F/L George Russell, Navigator. They were from 109 to work the Oboe over the target. Carter, I think was ‘B’ Flight Navigation Officer. F/O Bill Dalgarno, ‘B’ Flight Gunnery Officer, filled the mid-upper.

Unfortunately, Palmer and Russell operated on a separate intercom system and I, and the remainder of the crew, had no idea of what went on between them. I also remember that the rest of us did not have communication between us. This made things very difficult and lonely.

At about 10.00 hours our Lancaster ‘V-Victor’ moved from the dispersal point closely followed by the remainder. The weather was low and murky as we wandered our way around the peri-track to the main runway.

The aircraft, in a staggered pattern, stood together on the main runway – something we had never done before.

From my rear turret I watched it all! The aircraft behind, the mobile control vehicle, the dozens of people standing around looking up at us, waving. And then there was the ‘Green’. As we started to roll forwards others appeared, and I could see them in the mist and murk outside the Squadron buildings far off.

Airborne, in formation crossing the coast, the weather was clearing and in a short while there was not a cloud to be seen. No cover, no hiding place; all was blue and sunny. It was very cold in my rear turret as the winds eddied through the open rear end. No word from the rest of the crew; no ‘Are you still with us, tail gunner?’ from Skip as there normally would be. I swung my guns around – looking – looking.

Behind ‘Victor’ in close formation on the starboard quarter was the Mosquito – what, a 100 feet away? Behind him on the port

[Page break]

2

quarter was the first of the Lancasters and so it continued to the last one – all tucked in – lifting and dropping, but still in a pretty good formation.

As we approached the target, maybe ten minutes to go, the flak, heavy flak, was coming up at us – you could hear it, and see not only the black puffs but the red molten masses, and feel the buffeting.

I looked over at the Mosquito, so close to me. We waved as we smiled at each other and I stuck my two fingers up at them. Next moment – a big mass of black nothing and the Mosquito had gone. One minute there, next minute gone! Fighters were in the area but I think his 4,000 lb ‘Cookie’ had gone up. Flak continued and from then on things started to go against us.

First, I think it was the Port Outer engine that went because my turret wouldn’t work and I tried to crank it round. Smoke started to form and a few moments later, a big bang . . . the Port tailfin and plane had gone. Then the Port Inner was finished. We lopsidedly limped on.

We were on the final run and as I looked back I noticed that all the other Lancs appeared to be weaving about and had opened up the formation somewhat but still, I think, in good shape.

For the first time – voice sharp with concern – the mid-upper gunner, ‘What shall we do? . . . Shall we get out?’

We seemed to crab on with the port wing lifting; nothing was level anymore.

It was then that the second voice came through – the voice of my Skipper, Owen Milne. ‘Emergency! – Jump! – Jump!’ The Lancaster then went over onto its back and fell away.

What happened after that I can only speak of myself. At first, panic. A fighting frenzy to get out of that turret, which I couldn’t do. The turret was part way to port and jammed; the doors wouldn’t open. And everything was turning over. One moment I was pressed face down against the roof of the turret, the next I was with my face forced into the guns under my nose. Thoughts went through my head about my family, home; all was whirling round and I was ready to give up. I remember telling myself, ‘Relax, let yourself go unconscious. It’ll soon be over.’

Somehow I didn’t do it. I continued to bash and batter at those doors – a hard thing to do when they are behind you and you are in bulky flying clothes restricting movements.

A few thousand feet fell by, and the aircraft broke up into two. I believe Dalgarno went out at this point, without his chute (and was reliably confirmed later on). It seemed much quieter but still head over heels all the time. I did not see the front section of the aircraft at all.

Finally, the turret broke away from the bulk of the fuselage. I was able to get a shoulder partly into the slipstream and was, I believe, yanked out by the wind. As I slid out, the pilot-type chute – worn for the first time and exchanged for the observer-type only hours ago at the instigation of Skip – seemed to slip

[Page break]

3

off and I had that panic feeling of having lost it. Oh, what a panic! I recall finding the chute still there when I felt for it. I do not recall going for the ripcord, or pulling it. Maybe I didn’t; who knows?

When I looked down, the City of Cologne, houses, railway lines, etc., were below me. I was fairly low, swinging about AFRAID to look at the canopy in case it all came apart. Telegraph and H.T. wires seemed to rush up at me. I pulled hard on the shroud lines and went through the roof of a small greenhouse at the bottom of a garden, flattening it completely. I lay on my back amid pots, plants, broken glass, and in some pain.

Two German chaps came in – holding rifles with bayonets fixed on them. I suddenly came to, realising my position and going for the chute release. Too suddenly, I suppose. One chap thrust his bayonet at me, the other parried it and only my side was caught – saved by my Irvine jacket. A crowd of people appeared and I was belted by a few blokes. Then other Army types appeared and held the crowd back.

I was made to climb over a wire fence, catch hold of the dinghy that had inflated and was lying in the road close by and drag it off with me.

I was down, alive. The rest of the boys didn’t make it. How did I know? I have to go on to tell you. I was taken into a road. There were trenches broken in the ground. The crowd had grown and I was afraid of losing my life. I was directed to get down into a big hole. You know what I must have felt. Then others got into the hole with me. There were more explosions – most probably delayed time bombs – I don’t know.

I was finally taken by truck a few miles to what I believe was an airfield. My Irvine jacket and suit had been taken from me and I had only one flying boot on and nothing on the other. That had stayed in the turret when I got my foot jammed. (Oh, yes. I forgot to disengage my oxygen gear and intercom before leaving the turret – and have suffered for it ever since.)

At the airfield I was taken to the hospital where I was being patched up when a Jerry flier was brought in with a damaged arm. I was slid off the table and he took my place. During his treatment the sirens started and everyone vanished. We – he and I – decided to do likewise and I remember the two of us going down a wide staircase into a shelter where other people were gathering. We smiled at one another, he gave me a cigarette, and he indicated that we had fought one another that day above Cologne.

I was taken later to the guard house where I stayed till they came for me about 9pm. An American pilot with head and arms completely covered with bandages after burns also arrived. I called him P 38 for obvious reasons. We travelled by carm [sic] maybe an hour or so, and arrived at the front line hospital at Hoffnungstahl, between Bonn and Sieburg, on the Rhine, later that night.

Hoffnungstahl wasn’t a hospital as you would imagine. It comprised an area maybe 100 yards square. Around the outside was a

[Page break]

4

high wire fence with one main gate and a keep. Inside and around the fence were lines of wooden huts and in the centre of the compound was a big lav. – if you can call it such. A big concrete slab, it had round holes. There were raised footprints of concrete upon which one stood, or rather, crouched. Not far away was a wooden hut with ‘Verbanzimer’ printed on the outside; whatever was cut off inside was simply thrown away outside. – I found an arm.

I was palced [sic] in a hut along with a few American Army blokes and an Irish chap, Neil Cardwell. He and I were the only British in the camp. I shall never forget him, or the others and what they did for me.

The remains of my crew were brought and laid out on the side of the road a few hundred yards from the camp. They remained there in the snow for several days – the ground was too hard to dig. I could see them, day by day, from my hut.

Neil went out to see them and bring back Identification tabs or something of them for me. I was asked by the Germans to go myself. I wasn’t well, but above all I wanted to remember them as they were. I didn’t want to see them all hurt as I could tell they were. The crew were buried where they lay, not in a church, but on the side of the road under the trees. Before I was moved down to the Interrogation place at Franfurt [sic] they put me on my honour not to escape and allowed me to say my farewells to the boys. Alone.

Since then I have visited their final resting place, and will go again.

There is always more to tell, thoughts never come in a coherent, consecutive whole. Bits sneak in and out of your mind evry [sic] now and then. One thing – if Skip hadn’t told me that my turret had been converted and to change my chute, I’d never have made it. Most of what followed from Hoffnungstahl concerns just me and this should be about them.

Whilst at Interrogation at Dulag Luft Franfurt [sic] I was being taken from my cell one day and coming towards me with his guard was David Mansell – Pleydell. We looked at one another but made no acknowledgement for obvious reasons.

[Page break]
Image 42 of 65
[Underlined] FROM GERMAN RECORDS [/underlined]

12.52 Cologne-Bonn Mustang Maj. Hackl Kammandeur 11/JG2S

12.54 Cologne Lancaster Maj. Hackl Kammandeur 11/JG2S

12.56 Cologne/Munchen Gladbach Mosquito Maj. Hackl Kammandeur 11/JG2S

12.57 Cologne-Bonn Lancaster Ofhr. Schulwitz 11/JG26

12.57 Cologne-Bonn Lancaster Oblt. Radener 11/JG26

13.01 N.W. Cologne-Bonn Lancaster Oblt. Radener 11/JG26

13.00 Outskirts of West Cologne Lancaster Ofhr. Heuser 11/JG26

Major Anton Hackl: 192 victories (32 four engined).
Holder of Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords.

Oberleutnant Waldemar Radener: 36 victories (16 four engined).
Holder of Knight’s Cross.

[Underlined] FROM RAF AIR HISTORICAL BRANCH [/underlined]

PB 120 ‘P’ F/O Reif: Crashed Oppiter, Belgium (a)
PB371 ‘V’ S/L Palmer: Crashed Hoffnungstall
PB 523 ‘J’ F/L Thomas: Crashed Raum near Munchen Gladbach
PB 141 ‘F’ F/L Hockley: Crashed Ehrenfeld near Cologne (b)
PB 558 ‘A’ F/O Terpenning: No record (c)
ML 998 Mosquito F/L Carpenter: Juchem Market Place

(a) Almost certain the crash was at Rodenkirchen opposite side of river to target.

(b) Ehrenfeld is in the city on the opposite side of river to target. The a/c split in two.

(c) Baled out 5107N 0540E about 16 miles south of Oppiter, Belgium. Terpenning reported seeing the body of W/O Campbell; it is hardly likely that he would have seen it at Raum in Germany. It seems likely that Thomas crashed at Oppiter, not Raum.

[Underlined] WALT REIF AND CREW [/underlined]

F/L Arndt Walther Reif RCAF Pilot
P/O Kenneth Harry Austin RCAF Navigator
P/O Peter Uzelman RCAF Bomb Aimer
F/S George Owen Wireless Operator
F/S Jack McLennan RCAF Mid-upper Gunner
F/S Robert Pearce RCAF Rear Gunner
SGT John Paterson Flight Engineer

[Page break]

[Underlined] OPERATIONS WITH 101 SQUADRON, 1 GROUP, BOMBER COMMAND [/underlined]

Evreux M/Y
Le Havre E Boat Pens
Boulogne E Boat Pens
Oisement V1 Site: Bombed Gee
Villeneuve St Georges: Engaged Me109
Vaires M/Y: Hit by flak over Paris, Stbd Outer, Gee U/S
Revigny M/Y: abandoned by M.B.
Vaires
Caen: German troop concentrations; heavy accurate flak.

[Underlined] OPERATIONS WITH 582 PATHFINDER SQUADRON, 8 GROUP PATHFINDER FORCE [/underlined]

Russelheim Opel Factory
Normandy Tractable Target 22
Stetting
Bremen: Bombed on DR; Heavy flak
Kiel: Bombed on DR
Castrop Rauxel Synthetic Oil Plant: Badly damaged by flak
Sterkrade Synthetic Oil Plant
Saarbrucken: Illuminator
Essen: Supporter
Homberg: Supporter
Cologne: Visual Backer Up; Hit by predicted flak, approx. 150 holes. Two Starboard engines hit and feathered. Turrets and Y U/S
Dusseldorf: VBU
Bochum: VBU
Gelsenkirchen: VBU
Julich German Troops and Defences: VBU
Castrop Rauxel: VBU
Heimbach Dam: VBU. Aborted by M.B.
Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant: VBU
Ludwigshaven: Visual Centerer
Cologne/Gremburg M/Y: Missing.

Reif, Austin, Uzelman, Owen and Paterson were officially listed as being KILLED IN ACTION

They were initially buried near where the aircraft crashed at Rodenkirchen, Cologne. They were later interred at the British Cemetery, Rheinburg, Germany.

[Page break]

WALT REIF AND CREW (2)

A similar telegram was sent to all next-of-kin:-

REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT YOUR SON F/SGT GEORGE OWEN IS MISSING AS A RESULT OF AIR OPERATIONS ON THE MORNING OF 23rd DECEMBER 1944 LETTER FOLLOWS STOP ANY INFORMATION RECEIVED WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU IMMEDIATELY PENDING RECEIPT OF WRITTEN NOTIFICATION FROM THE AIR MINISTRY NO INFORMATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS – OFFICER COMMANDING No. 582 SQUADRON RAF

On return to Canada from his period as a Prisoner of War, Jack McLennan wrote to Mrs. Owen:-

“Dear Mrs. Owen,

In answer to your letter which my mother received today, I am writing in the sincere hope that this letter will ease your mind.

I am very sorry I could not get up to see you when I was passing through England on my way home, but the lack of leave made this impossible. I was very fond of George and it grieves me to give you the only information I can.

Our target was Cologne on the 23rd December. We got there at one o’clock in the afternoon and met very heavy opposition from both flak and fighters. The operation was a very ticklish one and many men gave their lives but not in vain, for it had a terrific effect on the main German spearhead that at that time was advancing towards Antwerp.

Just after we released our bombs on the target, we received a direct hit in the open bomb bay which caused a fatal fire. Almost at the same instant we were shot up by attacking Me 109’s. The front of our aircraft was smashed up pretty badly and I am afraid it was this that killed some of our crew. Walt gave the order to jump as soon as the flak hit us and he stayed at the controls in the hope to steady the aircraft enough for us to jump. I went to the rear door and baled out. The rear gunner also got out and he told me he saw our aircraft crash into the centre of the city with a terrific explosion. None of the other members of the crew were seen to bale out.

I was taken prisoner along with the rear gunner and we were held at Stalag 1.

I have a photograph of the crew which I will send as soon as I get a copy.

Please write me and ask any questions you have as it will make me very happy if I can answer them for you.

Yours in friendship,

Jack McLennan”

[Page break]

[Underlined] CONFIDENTIAL [/underlined]
24 DEC. 1944

[Underlined] IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION REPORT No K3465 [/underlined]
[Underlined] LOCALITY: COLOGNE – GREMBURG M/Y [/underlined]

[Underlined] PERIOD UNDER REVIEW [/underlined]

These photographs cover damage to the target between 1420A ]sic] hours on 18 November 1944 and 1430A [sic] hours on 23 December 1944 and include an attack by aircraft of BOMBER COMMAND on 23 December 1944. The attack is reported to have taken place in clear weather.

[Underlined] PROVISIONAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE [/underlined]

Moderate damage has occurred in the eastern half of the yard where the locomotive depot turntable has been damaged and tracks have been cut in about 18 places.

Details of damage are as follows:-

[Underlined] FACILITIES [/underlined]

The turntable of the locomotive shed is damaged by two very near misses.
The shed is 40% U/S.
The signal box above the burrowing junctions has been damaged.

[Underlined] M/Y SIDINGS [/underlined]

The southbound forwarding sidings have received four hits on tracks and are 25% U/S.
The northbound receptions sidings have received two hits on tracks, one of which has destroyed parts of three trains.
This siding is 20% U/S.
The southbound sorting sidings have received two hits on tracks and are 20% U/S.

[Underlined] LOCOMOTIVE AND ROLLING STOCK [/underlined]

About nine trains have been damaged.

[Underlined] THROUGH RUNNING LINES [/underlined]

The double track through line for passenger traffic has had one track cut and is 50% U/S. Other through lines are undamaged.

[Underlined] OTHER DAMAGE [/underlined]

Embankments are damaged in two or three places.

[Underlined] REPAIRS [/underlined]

Damage of previous raids appears repaired and damage from this attack (1 1/2 hours before photography) is actively under repair.

[Underlined] LOADING [/underlined]

Loading is heavy.

This report is subject to correction and amplification from a more detailed assessment.

[Page break]

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY: 13 Squadron
SORTIE: US7GR/3701
MEANTIME AND DATE: 1430A Hours on 23 DEC 1944 [Inserted] A [/inserted]
SCALE: 1/13,000 approx. (F.L.24”)
COVER AND QUALITY: Complete, good quality but small scale.
LAST REPORT: K.3362 of 11 NOV 1944
COMPARATIVE SORTIE USED: 106G/3556 dated 18 NOV 1944
PRINT DISTRIBUTED: 4065 (to follow when available).

[Underlined] CONFIDENTIAL [/underlined]
A.C.I.U.
ASNP/KOY

[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION No.23C [/underlined]
505 copies

[Underlined] FROM THE NEWSPAPERS . . . . [/underlined]

EVENING STANDARD:

Palmer, V.C’s 110th Mission: He Scorned Nazi Attacks
HIS HEROISM BEYOND PRAISE

Wing Commander R. Cobbe, his flight commander, paid this tribute to him:
“He was the type of officer whom every squadron commander wants to have in his squadron, but few have the good fortune to find.

His personality and energy led him to take an active part in all the various activities of Service life and made him popular and respected by all ranks. The interest he took in his work and his loyalty to his squadron, coupled with his eagerness to engage the enemy, made him an outstanding captain.

The climax of his service career was reached when by his courageous action he refused to be beaten and pressed home his attack against overwhelming odds on the last operation.

Nevertheless, it is certain that, having released his bombs his greatest concern was for the safety of his crew, who so magnificently supported him on his last sortie.”

The Rev. S. Lister, headmaster of Gravesend County School, said: “Palmer was a boy of fine character, quiet and determined.”

“A shy boy – very much liked by everyone, but very, very quiet and reserved,” was how Mr. Frank Jennings, Chief Clerk in the Borough Engineer’s office described the new V.C. “He came here straight from school at the end of 1936 as a junior clerk and actually he was my office boy. We were all fond of him.”

“He talked aircraft and airmen ever since he could stand outside the airport near his home at Gravesend. He would listen enthralled to his father’s stories of flying in the last war.” Says Mrs. Palmer of her family: It’s flying, flying all the day,”

[Underlined] DAILY MIRROR [/underlined]

At 24 he was ‘tough jobs’ ace.

The V.C. – 134th of the war – was always selected for operations where desperate danger had to be ignored to get results. And last night his parents still [missing words]

[Page break]

DAILY MIRROR (Cont.) [Inserted] A [/inserted]

His father said: “He came through so many times before. My wife and I refuse to give up hope that he will come back again – smiling as always.”

Mr. Jennings, Bob’s chief clerk said: “The nicest thing you could say about him wouldn’t be too good. He would never talk about his exploits in the RAF. He came into the office one day with a rather nasty scar on his chin, and I said: ‘Hullo, what’s been happening to you?’ He replied with a perfectly straight face: ‘Well, as a matter of fact, I took another fellow’s girl out and he happened to spot me.’ His young brother, now a sergeant pilot, told me later that Bob had narrowly escaped being killed in a crash.”

[Underlined] DAILY EXPRESS [/underlined]

PALMER, V.C., BOMBED AND SAID NOTHING

Of many Royal Air Force men it can be said that they are quiet, shy even, and that they like their flying tough. But the man to whom they drank in RAF messes last night was more reserved than most . . . A good type, they said of him . . .

So the man who never talked much took his Lancaster straight in through a blanket of flak, through the German fighters’ bullets . . .

[Underlined] ROBERT ANTHONY MAURICE PALMER [/underlined]
[Underlined] No. 109 Squadron [/underlined]

Extract from “The London Gazette” of 23rd March 1945.

“Acting Squadron Leader Robert Anthony Maurice Palmer DFC (115772), RAF(VR), No. 109 Squadron (Missing).

This officer has completed 110 bombing missions. Most of them involved deep penetration of heavily defended territory; many were low-level ‘marking’ operations against vital targets; all were executed with tenacity, high courage and great accuracy.

He first went on operations in January 1941. He took part in the first 1000 bomber raid against Cologne in 1942. He was one of the first to drop a 4000 lb. bomb on the Reich. It was known that he could be relied upon to press home his attack whatever the opposition and to bomb with great accuracy. He was always selected, therefore, to take part in special operations against vital targets.

The finest example of his courage and determination was on 23rd December 1944 when he led a formation of Lancasters to attack the marshalling yards at Cologne in daylight. He had the task of marking the target, and his formation had been ordered to bomb as soon as the bombs had gone from his, the leading aircraft.

The leader’s duties during the final bombing run were exacting and demanded coolness and resolution. To achieve accuracy he would have to fly at an exact height and air speed on a steady course, regardless of opposition.

Some minutes before the target was reached, his aircraft

[Page break]

came under heavy anti-aircraft fire, shells burst all round two engines were set on fire and there were flames and smoke in the nose and in the bomb bay.

Enemy fighters now attacked in force. Squadron Leader Palmer disdained the possibility of taking avoiding action. He knew that if he diverged the least bit from his course, he would be unable to utilise the special equipment to the best advantage. He was determined to complete the run and provide an accurate and easily seen aiming point for the other bombers. He ignored the double risk of fire and explosion in his aircraft and kept on. With his engines developing unequal power, an immense effort was needed to keep the damaged aircraft on a straight course. Nevertheless, he made a perfect approach and his bombs hit the target.

His aircraft was last seen spiralling to earth in flames. Such was the strength of the opposition that more than half of his formation failed to return.

Squadron Leader Palmer was an outstanding pilot. He displayed conspicuous bravery. His record of prolonged and heroic endeavour is beyond praise.”

[Underlined] THE AMERICAN AIR OFFENSIVE 23 DECEMBER 1944 [/underlined]

[Underlined] US8thAF [/underlined]

B17 (Fortress): Ehrang M/Y, Kaiserslautern M/Y & R/J, T/O. Despatched: 304. Effective: 291 Screening Force: 6

B24 (Liberator): Junkerath C/C, Arhweiler C/C, Darlem C/C Despatched: 152, Effective 106

P51 (Mustang) Escort Duties
Despatched: 433. Effective: 409

P51 (Mustang): Fighter Sweep Bonn Area.

P47 (Thunderbolt): Fighter Sweep Bonn Area.
Despatched: 203. Effective: 183

LOSSES: Two Liberators. 15 Fighters.
Two Fortresses collided over Thurleigh on return circuit.

[Underlined] US9thTAF [/underlined]

C47 (Dakota): Supplying Bastogne
Despatched: 16. Shot down by flak: 8.

A26 (Invader):
B26 (Marauder): 624 on morning sorties; 200+ afternoon Sorties. Targets in Ardennes Battle Area.
LOSSES 40.

[Underlined] TOTAL AIR LOSSES 23 DECEMBER, 1944 [/underlined]

R.A.F. – 9. USAF – 67. LUFTWAFFE – 63

“Bomber waves and fighter formations flying to and fro had become a daily event in the lives of the population of the

[Page break]

area between Aachen and Cologne, but the drama that was enacted on 23rd December over the bleak, snow covered slopes of the Eifel looked like the first act of a tragedy. Never had these country folk seen so many aircraft drop out of the sky.”

Lieutenant-General Adolf Galland, the commander of Germany’s fighter arm said, after the war, that it was in the Ardennes that the Luftwaffe received its death blow.

Although the incessant Allied air attacks destroyed some tanks and guns and other equipment and lowered the fighting spirit of the German soldiers, it was the almost complete disruption of communications which did most to halt the Ardennes Offensive.”

[Underlined] THE CRUEL PRICE [/underlined]

A flight leader of six B26 Marauders of 322BG couldn’t locate his Primary Target of Zulpich R/J but at 3.26 pm in the gathering gloom he thought he was over Lammersum six miles to the northeast. Each dropped thirteen 250 lb GP bombs from 12,000 feet into the centre of the town below. They had bombed the Belgian town of Malmedy 39 miles away; civilians and American soldiers died by mistake.

[Underlined] GERMAN FIGHTER LOSSES 23 DECEMBER 1944 [/underlined]

[a] UNIT [b] KILLED/MISSING [c] WOUNDED [d] TOTAL [e] AIRCRAFT [f] LOCALITY

[a] I/JG1 [b] 1 [c] 1 [d] 2 [e] FW190-8 [f] Bocholt
[a] III/JG1 [c] 1 [d] 1 [e] Me109-14 [f] Dortmund Wesel
[d] 3

[a] I/JG2 [b] 2 [d] 2 [e] FW190-8/D-9 [f] Aachen Bastogne

[a] II/JG2 [b] 3 [c] 1 [d] 4 [e] Me109-14 [f] Marienburg
[a] III/JG2 [b] 5 [d] 5 [e] FW190A-8/D-9 [f] Meckenheim Sieberg
[d] 11

[a] I/JG3 [b] 1 [d] 1 [e] Me109G-14 [f] Adenau Meckenheim

[a] III/JG3 [b] 1 [c] 1 [d] 2 [e] Me109G-14 [f] St. Vith
[a] IV/JG3 [b] 2 [c] 3 [d] 5 [e] FW190A-8
[d] 8

[a] I/JG4 [c] 1 [d] 1 [e] Me109G-14
[a] II/JG4 [b] 6 [d] 6 [e] FW190A-8 [f] Nurburg, Roth
[a] III/JG4 [b] 3 [c] 3 [d] 6 [e] Me109G-10/K4 [f] St. Vith, Trier
[a] IV/JG4 [b] 3 [d] 3
[d] 16

[a] I/JG11 [b] 6 [c] 5 [d] 11 [e] FW190A-8 [f] Adenau,
[a] II/JG11 [b] 3 [c] 3 [d] 6 [e] Me109G-14 [f] Gillenfeld
[a] III/JG11 [b] 7 [c] 3 [d] 10 [f] Kaisersesch, Coblenz, Mayen, St. Vith
[d] 27

[Page break]

German Fighter Losses 23rd December 1944 (cont.)

[a] I/JG26 [b] 4 [c] 2 [d] 6 [e] FW190A-8 [f] Duren,
[a] III/JG26 [b] 1 [c] 1 [d] 2 [e] FW190D-9 [f]Cologne, Nettersheim

[a] II/JG27 [b] 2 [d] 2 [e] Me109G-10/G-14 [f] Bonn, Rheinmain, Villip
[a] III/JG27 [c] 1 [d] 1 Me109K-4
[a] IV/JG27 [b] 1 [d] 1 [e] Me109G-10
[d] 4

[a] II/JG53 [b] 1 [c] 2 [d] 3 [e] Me109G-14AS [f] Rastatt,
[a] III/JG53 [b] 1 [d] 1 [e] Me109G-14 [f] Wagshurst, Weissenburg
[d] 4

[a] IV/JG54 [b] 2 [d] 2 [e] FW190A-8 [f] Villip, St. Vith.

[a] I/JG77 [b] 6 [c] 2 [d] 8 [e] Me109G-14 [f] Altenahr,
[a] III/JG77 [b] 2 [c] 5 [d] 7 [e] Me109K-4 [f] Houverath, Lessenich, Neuenahr.
[d] 15

TOTALS [b] 63 [c] 35 [d] 98 (Inc. 1 Staffel Leader Killed)

Between 450-500 German fighter pilots took part in operations. (Taken from “Six Months to Oblivion” by Werner Gerbig).

Amongst them was SWO Heinrich Bartels of IV/JG27 who had made his 99th kill, a Thunderbolt P47, just before he was shot down himself. Holder of the Knight’s Cross his A/C was not found until almost exactly 24 years later.

The only loss attributed to the RAF is of SWO Titscher of II/JG by a Spitfire.

[Underlined] SECRET [/underlined]
[Underlined] INTERCEPTIONS/TACTICS No. 318/44 DAY, 23rd DECEMBER 1944 [/underlined]

I. [Underlined] TARGETS AND SORTIES [/underlined]

[g] TARGET [h] GROUP [i] TYPE OF A/C [j] SORTIES [k] ATTACKED TARGET [l] MISSING

i) [g] COLOGNE [h] 8 [i] LANC [j] 27 [k] 23 [l] 5
[g] Gremberg M/Y [i] MOS [j] 3 [k] 2 [l] 1
[j] 30 [k] 25 [l] 6 (20%)

ii) [g] TRIER [h] 3 [i] LANC [j] 153 [k] 151 [l] 1 (0.7%)

TOTAL [j] 183 [k] 176 [l] 7 (3.8%)

[m] HEIGHT 000 FT [n] TIME OVER TARGET

i) [m] 15-17 [n] 1254-1303
ii) [m] 15-20 [n] 1428-1435

[Page break]

[Underlined] Interceptions/Tactics No. 318/44 (Cont.) [/underlined]

2. [Underlined] APPRECIATION [/underlined]

The small force of PFF Lancasters and Mosquitoes that was intercepted by enemy day fighters consisted of three formations of 10 a/c with fighter escort of three Mustang Squadrons. Rendezvous was made near Namur at 1330 hrs., at which time about 400 U.S. heavy bombers, with 570 fighters escorting were operating over the battle area and as far as Kaiserslautern. These American heavies had been closely plotted from 1000 hrs when assembling at the Suffolk coast. Between 1046 and 1115 hrs about 250 S/E fighters took off, crossed the Ruhr and headed for Malmedy, apparently to break up Allied fighter-bombers over the Panzer spearheads, but it must have been appreciated soon after take-off that the force could be better employed against the heavy bomber raid. There was a reinforcement from the middle Rhine area after 1230 hrs and some combats developed.

The small force of Pathfinders saw a number of S/E fighters in the Cologne area and three Lancasters of one squadron, in the second of the three formations, were attacked. One was first attacked by two Me109’s and a FW190 and claimed the latter destroyed and a Me109 damaged; then by two Me109’s, one of which was claimed damaged. A second Lancaster was attacked by a FW190, and a third, which landed in France, sustained eight or nine attacks from five B/A – four FW190’s and one Me109 – and was damaged. Whether any of the missing a/c were also shot down by fighters cannot be definitely determined.

Flak was moderate to intense predicted “seen” and was seen to account for two aircraft over the target. Two more were seen to fall over the Julich area, the cause being unknown, and two collided on the outward journey over the Channel. Most of the returning force were damaged by flak.

The Trier raid was plotted amongst all the other Allied air activity but was not opposed. The only a/c lost was shot down by flak in a known defended area N.W. of target.

Causes of loss: three a/c to flak; two to collision; two unknown (possibly fighters or flak).

3. [Underlined] ROUTES AND TIMING ORDERED [/underlined]

[Underlined] Cologne: [/underlined] Formations by various routes to 5030N O500E, then 0536N 0620E – Cologne – 5110N 0400E – Southwold.
T.O.T. 1300Hrs. Over Continent 1135 – 1345 hrs.

[Underlined] Trier: [/underlined] The Naze – 5040N 0320E – 4947N 0540E – Trier – 4940N 0640E – 4930N 0620E – Blankenburgh (700 miles).
T.O.T. 1430 hrs. Over Continent 1330 – 1527 hrs.

[Page break]

HEADQUARTERS PATH FINDER FORCE: 8 GROUP BOMBER COMMAND
OPERATIONAL RECORD BOOK

ATTACK ON COLOGNE/GREMBERG M/Y

Day 23.12.44 10.27 to 1503

In accordance with instructions contained in Form B No.394, 3 Mosquitoes and 27 Lancasters took off; 1 Mosquito and 17 Lancasters attacked the primary target; 1 Mosquito was abortive; 1 Mosquito and 5 Lancasters were missing; 5 Lancasters were outstanding. These aircraft were in the three Oboe led formations, but in the absence of cloud, and in accordance with instructions, the leaders broadcast for the following aircraft to bomb visually. The M/Yds were clearly seen and all except five aircraft bombed on visual identification. These aircraft bombed on the aircraft ahead. Bombing was very accurate, numerous bursts were seen on the M/Y, the Aiming Point being quickly obscured by smoke. Defences: moderate/inetense [sic] extremely accurate heavy flak, a number of aircraft being hit. Many Me109 and FW190 seen in the target area, the second formation being strongly engaged.

105 SQUADRON: CLOGNE [sic]/ GREMBERG M/YDS.
OPERATIONS RECORD BOOK

Lanc III PB372 F/L R E Jordan/ F/L J W Plunkett Up 1038 Down 1445 Last Resort Landed Manston

Lanc III PB367 S/L G W Harding/ S/L L W Millett Up 1036 Down 1440 Last Resort Landed Manston

Mos XVI 981 S/L H Almond/ F/O Challis Up 1040 Down 1424 No attack

Mos IX 922 S/L G Parker/ F/L G Musgrove Up 1040 Down 1413 Last Resort Bombed on Leader

Three formations of Lancasters each led by an Oboe Lancaster with an Oboe Mosquito in reserve, were detailed to attack Cologne at 17,000ft. The third formation was made up of crews from 109 Squadron. [inserted] 105? [/inserted] There was no cloud and ground detail was very clear. High flak was very intense and extremely accurate. In all cases the flak was directed at the Oboe Lancasters, with good results from the Hun’s point of view. [Underlined] One Oboe Lancaster (109’s) [/underlined] was shot down over the [inserted] ? [/inserted] target; the other two crash-landed at Manston, both being severely damaged with flak. F/L Jordan’s aircraft was on fire at one stage and also lost an engine; S/L Harding’s aircraft had all the hydraulics shot away. The Mosquitoes fared little better; one lost over the target (109’s); and F/L Almond’s hydraulics shot away, his bomb doors would not open, he lost an engine while circling base on return, and made an excellent single engined belly landing.

109 SQUADRON: OPERATIONS RECORD BOOK

H.1300 COLOGNE/GREMBEG [sic] M/D.

WEATHER: Nil cloud; good visibility
DEFENCES: Moderate to intense heavy flak- accurate. Predicted ‘seen’ flak on run in & across the target. 11 aircraft hit sustaining superficial damage. Many Me109s & FW190s seen in target area. A good concentration of bombing was achieved across the southern half of the marshalling yards.

LANCASTER III
F/L Palmer R A (Captain)
F/L Russell G & crew of 582 Sqdn.

Up 1027 Down –
Oboe formation leader. Formation was jumped by enemy fighters 4 mins before target & this aircraft was seen to be shot down. Bombed by A.R. 5513 although burning fiercely.

[Page break]

Mosquito XVI ML 998 E
F/L Carpenter E C (Captain)
F/O Lambert W T

Up 1031 Down –
Oboe Deputy Leader in the above formation. This aircraft was also seen to be shot down, one engine feathered, the other on fire & 4 fighters on his tail. After this attack which resulted in the loss of 3 more Lancasters of 582 Sqdn the rest of the formation split up & bombed visually.

SQUADRON LEADER ROBERT A M PALMER VC, DFC, BAR

OPERATIONAL SERVICE:

75 New Zealand Sqdn: 3 operations
149 East India Sqdn: 25 operations
20 OTU Lossiemouth: 3 operations

PATH FINDER FORCE: 109 SQDN: Marham:

32 Feb 3 1944 Krefeld SD 4 x 500 F/L Esler
35 10 Aachen SD 1 TIs 3 x 500
50 Ap 1 Krefeld SD 4 x 500

LITTLE STAUGHTON

51 Ap 9 Osnabruck SD 4 x 500 37,000
71 June 5 [Indecipherable word] Shore Battery Invasion Day SD 4 x T.I.
76 30 Hamburg SD [indecipherable digits] x 4000 Award of DFC
83 July 23 Mont Candon SD 4 x 500 Leading 8 Lancs 622 Sqdn.
85 28 Foret de Nieppe SD 4 x 500 Leading 16 Halifaxes 4 Group
100 Sep 10 Le Havre Troop Positions SD 4 x T.I.
104 28 Cap Gris Nes Troop Positions SD 4 x TI Last with S/L Esler.
105 Nov 23 Eisenbach R/Y SD [indecipherable digits] First with F/L Russell
107 28 Duisberg [sic] Tar Factory Formation LNSF
Dec 8 Award of Bar to DFC
111 23 Cologne/Gremberg M/Y Oboe Lancaster Formation Leader 582 Crew, Captain F/L C S Milne DFC
Failed to Return. Awarded Victoria Cross Posthumously

Total PFF Operations: 80
Bombing Operations: 29
Marking Operations: 31

[Page break]

ROBERT ANTHONY MAURICE PALMER

It is difficult for present generations, brought up on space sagas such as ‘Dr. Who’ and ‘Star Trek’, to understand the huge excitements raised by the early pioneers in their flimsy machines.

To men held in the mud of Flanders the new breed of hero soared above them in splendid freedom, however short their life. One such man was Robert’s father who had served long years with the Essex and the West Kent Regiments. In May 1918 he transferred to the Royal Flying Corps at the No. 1 School of Aeronautics at Easton-on-the-Hill, Stamford. He gained his wings and stayed on as an instructor until moving to Duxford in 1919. Then came the post-war cuts in the, now, R.A.F. and in September he flew his last aircraft to the breaker’s yard. He managed to retain the propeller as a souvenir and installed it in his new home at Gillingham, Kent, where he began his civilian life.

It was there that Robert was born on 7 July 1920 – followed by Douglas. Both lads were to imbibe their father’s love of flying. “It was flying, flying, all the time,” mused their mother. Their father’s stories were to be punctuated during their boyhood by the exploits of the pioneers – Lindbergh, Cobham, the Mollisons, Post, each a signpost of adventure and individual achievement.

The family moved to Gravesend where Bob received his education at the County School and later at the Gordon School. Scouting occupied much of his spare time from homework. In 1936 he took his first steps into adulthood by working in the office of the Borough Surveyor where consistency of effort and care for detail was an important ingredient of the work in which he was involved.

War clouds had spread from Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain and young men were now faced with the need to Register for Military Service following the Munich Crisis of 1938. ‘Which Service?’ was now the main topic of men facing Conscription. For Robert, it could mean the RAF only. On the 22nd of August 1939 he enlisted in the RAF Volunteer Reserve as a Pilot Cadet and began his training at Hastings on 25th September with the rank of Sergeant.

Training continued through the next 15 months and he passed each stage with above average grades. The element of consistency in his nature had been observed and he was deemed most suitable for the duties and responsibilities of a bomber pilot. His actual suitability had to be tested under operational conditions and he was posted to No 75 New Zealand Squadron at Feltwell, Norfolk. There, under the guidance of his 1st Pilot and Captain, P/O Morton he gained an insight of what it was to fly a Wellington bomber at night bearing the responsibility of a crew’s safety and operational efficiency.

His operational career as Captain of his own crew began at 149 Squadron at Mildenhall. It was his task to weld his specialists into an efficient team. It required more than simply choosing from a list, each had to engender trust in one another and be able to respond to him as Captain. It wanted more than technical ability, there had to be a ‘Crew Spirit’ if they were to work positively in the cramped and dangerous world they were to share; often it was the crucial factor for survival. Very little time was given for this aspect of aircrew life; it had to be earned under operational conditions and the Captain had to ensure it by example.

During that winter of 1940, Bomber Command lost 216 aircraft on operations while Palmer steered his crew through the dangerous first and last five missions of his tour. The average crew was lost during

[Page break]

those two periods or survived a mere 15 of the 30 needed to complete a tour. Palmer and his crew survived in the very quick time of 3 months.

Then came the time hated by most aircrew – the ending of their ‘togetherness’ as they were dispersed to training centres around the country, perhaps never to see one another again. Nor was it that training posts lacked the excitement of ops, they were also dangerous places. Almost a half of all Bomber Command casualties occurred during training.

Palmer was posted to No 20 OTU at Lossiemouth in February 1941 and to his chagrin stayed there for nearly 3 years amassing 1600 hours on instructional flying. He received a Commission and, during May 1942, he took part in the first ‘1,000 Bomber’ raids to Cologne followed by Essen and Bremen.

In the summer of 1943 a new Flight Commander appeared who was anxious to return to operations and understood Palmer’s need. Ian Bazalgette arranged for Palmer to go to the Path Finder Training Unit at Warboys in November 1943 where he converted to fly the Mosquito bomber. And in January 1944 he reported to No 109 Squadron based at Marham.

109 Squadron had pioneered the radar bombing aid that had come to be known as ‘Oboe’. It required pilots of absolute steadiness, capable of holding a constant track, height and speed for 10 minutes able to respond quickly and accurately to the navigator’s instructions. A good team could achieve target errors of only 50 yards with regularity.

After only 4 bombing raids to obtain operational experience with the Precision Device, Palmer went on his first target marking operation to Aachen on 10 February, 1944. His navigator was F/Lt Ray Esler DFC and together they flew on 77 operations until The [sic] end of September when an engine failed at take-off and Esler received severe back injuries forcing him off operations for a few months. Palmer’s injuries were slight but it was thought advisable for him to take a well-earned rest.

The pace of operations had been particularly acute in the build-up to D-Day on which day he attacked the Mauleate gun battery and the Argentan marshalling area. Not enough credit has been given to Bomber Command for the relative ease which the invading armies had in establishing themselves on the French Coast. Instead of thousands of casualties they had a few hundred because of the diligence of Bomber Command. And attacks against the V-Rocket sites again saved thousands of civilian casualties in England.

It was against such targets that the daylight formation attack using Oboe was devised and which Palmer played a role leading a formation of Lancaster of 622 Squadron against Mont Candon; others followed. The 30th of June was marked by the award of the DFC having completed 75 operations. A Bar was awarded on 8th December and he was promoted to Squadron Leader 2 days later. By now he was teamed with F/Lt George Russell DFC who had come from a tour of operations with No 4 Group flying the Halifaxes of 102 Squadron. They did 5 operations together as bombers, Markers and formation Leader. F/L Powell did the penultimate operation to Osnabruck then they were back together for Cologne.

Five long years of war, of patiently ‘doing one’s duty’, of being steadfast, ended performing his job with superlative skill making a ‘perfect cope’ in the most horrendous conditions.

[inserted] X [/inserted]

[Page break]

REFLECTIONS

The official records of the Gremberg attack are incomplete and what do exist are somewhat contradictory. Personal memories are not always clear as to what each person saw or what happened to them or its cause. So much happened so quickly that only fragments impinged on the mind and after 40 years they have faded into one another. What is indisputable is the impact it continues to have on all whether directly or indirectly involved.

I have tried to present the attack as it was represented in the various Squadron Record Books and the de-briefing reports, taking each aircraft and formation through from take-off to bombing. Yet even these, as can be seen, must be treated with care. PFF and Bomber Command HQ reports are insistent that it was the second formation that met with enemy fighters. If Palmer was supposed to lead the 2nd formation why did he take-off 10 minutes before the others? Or, why did the 35 Sqdn formation take-off and bomb last? Unfortunately, I have been unable to obtain any 35 Sqdn. participants in spite of appeals in the media.

Was the operation leaked? Probably not. The US8AF was airborne some time before us and German radar would have tracked them to the same general area. Indeed, our own radar had tracked the movement of E/A to the same area to meet them. German reports do not mention a preparation to meet our attack suggesting that the successes claimed by their fighters were as a result of an accidental meeting. Was fighter cover available? I have not found records to show that there was. Were the fighters seen by the 2nd formation part of the escort? Or were they aircraft from 2nd.TAF, who were ranging widely over the ‘Bulge’ area, an accidental meeting? I like the words of Jack Smith, gunner with Ted Swales. “Fighter escort? Of course we had them. Two dozen bloody Germans!”

The photographs taken an hour after the attack show that at least 25% of the yards were severely damaged which must have been a significant contribution to the battle raging below. It was achieved by a force of only 26 aircraft – the equivalent of 50 Fortresses or Liberators, or 70 Mosquitoes, or 80 Marauders, – under extreme conditions. Most bombs were well within the target area. Owen – Jones reported seeing some bombs fall short into the Rhine, but that represents an undershhot [sic] of only a couple of hundred yards; quite magnificent in the circumstances.

Yet, there is only one brief reference to it in the many books written about the ‘Battle of the Bulge’. Perhaps, in the scale of the fighting below, it was a minor event. I am inclined to believe, however, that had the Army made such a contribution it would have received better coverage, both then, and in retrospect.

There is one aspect of the attack which has not been adequately explained. Why was the attack made ‘Visual’ in the last stages? Oboe was demonstrably more accurate than visual means. In the time available most aircraft were ‘tied’ to their formation station with very little room for more than slight adjustment. Weaving was of very doubtful value. It must have been known that some aircraft would not receive the order. And they must have known that the Oboe Leaders would not receive it – indeed, only Jordan supposes that his formation has gone visual. In any case, the decision was not made on safety grounds. The reports are clear that each Oboe Leader made extreme efforts to fulfill [sic] their function and show how close the attack was to even greater calamity.

[Page break]

[Table]

I have included several ‘Personal Memories’ and I thank the contributors most sincerely for presenting them. They are a most important contribution for they remind us that war is fought in the last analysis by flesh and blood and not by machines and statistics. They contain errors of fact and memory but, by illustrating the impact upon them, we are brought face to face with it ourselves. Those who did not take part can now begin to understand what they all went through.

My own account is a mixture of the day itself and of happenings at other times with the object of presenting a kaleidoscope of pre-operational thoughts as I felt them or heard them spoken at the time. I hope it works.

The key to the Path Finder Force was its navigation and I am grateful to Bernard Johnson for providing his navigational log on which to base the narrative of the attack. And to those who, by letter and telephone, have discussed the attack with me.

Most of all, I hope that the account does credit to those who went and to those who died. My log book is marked ‘Missing Believed Killed’ and the Operational Record Book marks me down as a row of Question Marks. The one has made me appreciate every day since as a bonus; the other puts me in perspective!

Finally, I hope that it stimulates memories and will provide corrections and additions for the better account that the story deserves.

Bill Lanning. Wellingborough. 1984.

[Page break]

[Photograph]
Crew of Lancaster bomber F for Freddie, shot down over Germany 29 years ago today. From left: Flt-Sgt Shirley, Flt-Lieut. Hockly, Flt-Sgt Smith, Sgt Spier, Pilot Officer Hewitt. In front Sgt Carson, who missed the fatal mission because of an accident. His place was taken by Flt-Lieut. Jehan. Flying Officer Parratt was photographer. Below: Shirley’s prisoner of war identity card.

[Photograph]

[Photograph]
F/O Thomas

Viv Hobbs F/E
[Photograph]

[Page break]

[Photograph]
P/O George Baker & Crew at St. Neots station.

[Photograph]
Above: F/O Frank Lloyd & Crew

[Photograph]
Left: B. Johnson Nav. P/O Thomas Pilot R Wheaton Nav.
D. Fuller Wop. Lindsley B/Aimer V Hobbs F/E.

crew changes [symbol] At Cologne: Bourne was with Street; Johnson & Wheaton were with Swales. D. Archer joined Swales later

Below: A. Bourne, G Bennington, B. Leach C. Dodson. E. Swales, D. Archer R. Wheaton, A. Goodacre.
[Photograph]

[Page break]

[Photograph]
F/O Brownell & crew

[Photograph]

[Photograph]
‘P. – Peter’: I GO, I COME BACK.
Only known picture of 582 a/c in flight.

[Photograph]
F/O Walt Reif & crew who flew ‘P’ at Cologne

[Page break]

[Photograph]
Christmas Day 1944
Airmens Mess

[Photograph]
Sergeants Mess on Dance Night.

[Photograph]
In the Naafi

The Concert Party
[Photograph]

[Page break]

[Photograph]
S/Ldr. Robert Palmer V.C., D.F.C. and BAR

[Photograph]
No 3 ITW Hastings 1939

[Photograph]
No 7 EFTS Desford June 1940

[Photograph]
F/Lt. George Russell D.F.C.
Navigator

[Page break]

[Photograph]
[Indecipherable names] CARPENTER FELLOWES [indecipherable name] GARRATT [indecipherable names] LAMBERT LOCATELLI SIMPSON

MIDDLE ROW [Indecipherable names] FALKINDER LENDON LAW DOUGLAS [indecipherable name] WRIGHT FRASER HOFGART FRANKLIN MORGAN DRAY WILLIAMSON DENNANT BURT BOND MOUNTAIN SANDERS TRENERRY

FRONT ROW [indecipherable name] COX GREENHILL POWLES FUNNELL GILMORE BROWN MARRIOTT BURNETT ANGOOD GARNER PARKIN BEARDSALL LAING ROWLEY HENDERSON

[Underlined] ‘A’ FLIGHT 109 SQDN – OCT. 1944 [/underlined]

[Photograph]
Palmer’s 88th operation spot-on Rocket Site

[Photograph]
F/O W.T. Lambert DFM. Navigator

[Photograph]
S/Ldr. J. Foulsham DFC, AFC. K.I.A. 20 July 1944
Oboe formation leader of 109 Sqdn. flying 582 Lancaster

[Page break]

Russ Yeulett Bill Lanning Dennis Newman Bert Nundy Chas. Barron & Penny the rabbit.
[Photograph]

The target: Cologne/Gremberg M/Yds taken 1 1/2 hours after the attack.
[Photograph]

[Photograph]
F/Lt. Owen ‘Skip’ Milne DFC.

Hoffnüngstahl – S.E. of Cologne – where Palmer & crew were first buried.
[Photograph]

[Photograph]
F/O Bob Harvey, Matt McGrath, Ed. Nuttal & others taken after Cologne when joined by Bill Lanning (front)

[Page break]

NEWCASTLE TO PRAGUE
[Map]