Evidence in Camera Vol 4 No 5

Evidence in Camera Vol 4 No 5

A magazine of aerial photographs covering aerial views of tanks, the Eder dam after the attack by 617 squadron, Kiel, Trondheim and Heroya harbours under attack, industrial areas in Hanover, railway centres, Italian airfields and aircraft, a dummy factory at Wilhelmshaven, Bari port and oil refinery, the island of Nauru, air to air combat images and an image to be guessed, featuring sand dune stabilisation.

1943-08-09

One 28 page booklet

This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.

MMcDermottC1119618-161216-05

VOLUME 4 – NUMBER 6 – AUGUST 9TH 1943

[Inserted] [underlined] F/Lt Skinner [/underlined] [/Inserted]

EVIDENCE IN CAMERA

[Inserted] [underlined] FWH Hall. [/underlined] G/C. [/Inserted]

[picture]
[underlined] Gorring [/underlined]

ISSUED BY AIR MINISTRY A.C.A.S. (1)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[page break]

EVIDENCE IN CAMERA

1. This O.U.O. document may be issued to Officers' Mess and Station Reference Libraries. (K.R. & A.C.I. 882.2236(c). 2287.)

2. The only legitimate use which may be made of official documents or information derived from them is for the furtherance of the public service in the performance of official duties.

3. The publication of official documents, information from them, reproduction of extracts or their use for personal controversy, or for any private or public purpose without due authority is a breach of official trust under the OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS, 1911 and 1920, and will be dealt with accordingly. (K.R. & A.C.I. 1071, 1072, 2238).

4. Copies not required for record purposes should be disposed of as Secret Waste in accordance with A.M.O. A.411/41.

SEE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF COVER.

[page break]

KNOW YOUR M.T.

phipps '43
[cartoon]
Personnel-carriers (Mks. I & II) Parked at Tactical Rendezvous.

121

[page break]

AIR PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALLIED AND ENEMY TANKS

[photograph]
[inserted] Pz Kw I
Sd Kfz 222
CHURCHILL
PZ KW III [/inserted]

[photograph]
[inserted] Pz Kw III
Pz Kw I
AUTOBLINDA
Pz Kw II
Sd KFZ 222
Pz Kw III [/inserted]

These two pages of oblique photographs taken by Fighter Command at a tank demonstration show examples, from various aspects, of Allied and enemy A.F.V.'s.

[photograph]
[inserted] SHERMAN
AUTOBLINDA
Pz Kw I
CHURCHILL
Sd Kfz 222
Pz Kw III [/inserted]

122

[page break]

[photograph]
[inserted] CHURCHILL
Sd Kfz 222
Pz Kw III
Pz Kw I
SHERMAN [/inserted]

[photograph]
[inserted]
Sd Kfz 222
SHERMAN
Pz Kw III [/inserted]

TYPES OF A.F.V.'s

Allied – Churchill.
Sherman.

Italian – Autoblinda 40 (armoured car).

[photograph]
[inserted] SHERMAN
AUTOBLINDA
Sd Kfz 222
Pz Kw III
Pz Kw III
CHURCHILL [/inserted]

German – Pz Kw I
Pz Kw II
Pz Kw III
Sd KFz 222*

*Four wheeled armoured car.

123

[page break]

PREPARATIONS FOR REPAIRING THE EDER DAM

[photograph]
Reconnaissance photographs taken two months after the attack (17.5.43) on the EDER DAM show that the reservoir is now completely dry and the water carried by the river is drained through Number Two Power House (A). Preparations are apparently being made to repair the dam and in these early stages a light railway (B) has been constructed and there is a new hutted camp (C), probably for workmen.

124

[page break]

[photograph]
This enlarged area from the same photograph seen on the preceding page shows further detail in the dam. It is now estimated that the breach is 96 feet deep, 245 feet across the crown and 123 feet along the base.

125

[page break]

DAYLIGHT ATTACK ON KIEL

[photograph]
KIEL was attacked by aircraft of U.S.B.C. on 25.7.43. Part of the attacking force concentrated on the Kriegsmarine Werft (above), where U-boats are built and repaired. Many bursts can be seen and direct hits were scored on the Power Station and also on the quays near the fitting-out basin. A smoke screen was in operation during the attack.

126

[page break]

U.S.B.C. ATTACK NORWAY IN DAYLIGHT

[photograph]
During daylight on 24.7.43 aircraft of U.S.B.C. attacked targets in Norway. The photograph below shows the attack on TRONDHEIM in progress. A large concentration of bombs can be seen in the Ladehammeren Basin area where the U-boat shelters are situated, and damage was caused to workshop, gasworks and the Lade Airfield. Left: Reconnaissance photographs taken later show the workshops severely damaged and still burning. A 'Narvik' class destroyer (arrow) appears to have been damaged at her stern, and several small vessels have also been damaged, one being down by the bow.
[photograph]

127

[page break]

IMPORTANT NORWEGIAN TARGET ATTACK

[photograph]
The important Magnesium, Aluminium and Nitrate works at HERØYA were also attacked during daylight on 24.7.43. Extremely accurate bombing resulted in a heavy concentration of bursts on the target. This area had recently been developed considerably and was one of the leading industrial centres of Norway.

128

[page break]

THE A/S NORDISK LETTMETAL WORKS AT HERØYA SEVERELY DAMAGED

[photograph]
This photograph, taken the day after the attack, shows severe damage to the works. Few buildings escaped damage altogether; among those hit were the Power Station (A), Gas Producer Plant (B), Washing and Carbonisation Building (C), Main Store of Finished Fertilisers (D), Forge (E), Chimney and Fan House (F) and Phosphate Crushing (G).

129

[page break]

HANOVER ATTACKED IN DAYLIGHT

[photograph]
During daylight on 26.7.43 ninety bomber aircraft of the U.S.B.C. penetrated as far as HANOVER to bomb important industrial targets, which include the largest rubber factory in Germany. The photograph above shows a great column of smoke caused by a violent explosion, in the vicinity of the CONTINENTAL GUMMIWERKE A.G. Vahrenwalderstrasse, where tyres, tubes and other rubber equipment are produced. See also next page.

130

[page break]

HANOVER RUBBER TYRE FACTORY DAMAGED

[photograph]
Right: An early stage during the attack showing the accurate concentration of bomb bursts on the Continental Gummiwerke (rubber factory) and the main goods yard.

Below: Severe damage has been caused to multi-storeyed buildings, boiler house and other smaller buildings of the rubber factory. The main building of the Guter Bahnof Nord goods yard has received several direct hits which have destroyed over 5,400 sq.yds. of the roof.
[photograph]

131

[page break]

REPEATED ATTACKS ON HAMBURG

[photograph]
Left: When bombers of U.S.B.C. attacked HAMBURG in daylight on 25.7.43 they found the city covered by a pall of smoke from hundreds of fires caused by the great R.A.F. raid on the previous night. The attacking Fortress aircraft can be seen flying in formation over the target with three enemy aircraft attempting to intercept (bottom right). Several bursts of flak can also be observed.

Below: Hamburg was again attacked in daylight the following day. Smoke from fires was still drifting over the city and port. Heavy damage to the city area is apparent through the haze, while an incomplete liner has capsized over on to the quay at Blohm & Voss. A concentration of bombs can be seen bursting on the Howaldts Shipyard and a second wave of bomb bursts is developing on and around the Neuhof Power House.

132 and 133

[page break]

[photograph]
This photograph shows the important SCHLESISCHE Station (D) with its surrounding yards and buildings, which is in E. Berlin; it is an important centre for forwarding supplies to the Eastern Front. The disused Ostbahn Station (A) has had the tracks removed and stores sheds have been erected (B), while foundations for further sheds are visible at (C). The Goods Yards are at (E and E1), with the Postal Dispatch Depot at (F), the Underground railway station building (G) is of a standardised design, while the Wriezener Station (H) is used for suburban traffic.

134

[page break]

[photograph]
INNSBRUCK. This important railway centre in Upper Austria is situated where the main route from Germany to Italy (via the Brenner Pass) crosses that following the Inn Valley to Switzerland. (A) Passenger Station, (B) Goods Station, (C) Locomotive Depot. The trucks seen at (D) are carrying M.T., while on the far side (E) flat trucks are carrying tanks and guns are being loaded at (F).

135

[page break]

AIRCRAFT OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

[photograph]
Left: The Savoia-Marchetti S.M.84 is a modified version of the standard torpedo-bombers of the I.A.F. S.M.84s (A) with C.R.42s (B) and a French LeO 45 (C). The Fiat C.R. 42 is a biplane fighter, but many are still in service.

Below: The Re2001 (A), one of the best Italian fighters, has a German Daimler-Benz engine, while (B) is a B.R.20.
[photograph]

Right: S.M.84s (A) with Fiat B.R.20s. The B.R.20 (B) is an obsolescent twin-engined bomber.
[photograph]

136

[page break]

Right: The S.M.79 torpedo-bomber (A and B) has been one of the standard I.A.F. types throughout the war. Two Caproni Ca.313s (reconnaissance bombers) are also seen here (C and D). The obsolete high-wing monoplane (E) is a Ca.III, originally a bomber and now used for general purposes.
[photograph]

[photograph]
Below: S.M.84 torpedo-bombers.

[photograph]
Above: The S.M.82 is the most widely used Italian transport. S.M.82s are seen here at the Savoia-Marchetti factory at Vergiate/Somma Lombarda.

137

[page break]

[boxed] DUMMY FACTORY AT WILHELMSHAVEN [/boxed]

These photographs were taken during the daylight attack on WILHELMSHAVEN, 11.6.43, and show a dummy factory that has been built on reclaimed ground in an isolated part of the port. Note the chimneys (arrows) on two of the dummy buildings.

[photograph]
Above: At the beginning of the attack the smoke screen round the port has started though the decoy factory is not yet active.

Right: A little later the screen has increased and smoke can now be seen issuing from two dummy chimneys (arrows).
[photograph]

138

[page break]

[photograph]
While the attack on the port of WILHELMSHAVEN developed the decoy became fully active. Note that the smoke is darker than that of the screen generators, and less in volume. It is not designed to augment the screen.

139

[page break]

KNOW YOUR PORTS

[photograph]
[inserted]OUTER HARBOUR
OIL QUAY
NEW PORT
DESTROYER BASIN
PIZZOLI MOLE
S. ANTONIO MOLE
OLD PORT [/inserted]

BARI, a port on the Adriatic Sea in S.E. Italy, which in recent weeks has become one of the most important in the country. It deals mainly with merchant shipping, but naval escort vessels also berth in the port.

140

[page break]

A.N.I.C. REFINERY AND HYDROGENATION PLANT AT BARI, ITALY

[photograph]
This oil refinery at BARI was designed to deal with crude oil from Albania. It remained inactive for a long period, but has come into use since the heavy damage to the Leghorn Refinery. Distillation Columns (A), Cracking Plant (B), Boiler House (C), Hydrogenation Stalls (D), Tanks with floating roofs (E), Transformer Station (F).

141

[page break]

[photograph]

[photograph]
NAURU, one of the most important islands in the Gilbert Group, was a British mandate, but is now in Japanese hands. Its population is about 3,000 and phosphate digging is the main industry. The airfield was attacked by bombers of the American Air Force on 20.4.43; bomb bursts can be seen at the N.W. end of the runway. In the same raid considerable damage was done to the oil stores and phosphate plant.

142

[page break]

[boxed] FIGHTER COMMAND COMBAT FILM [/boxed]

[photograph]
[photograph]
[photograph]
During this attack hits from cannon shell and m.g. fire were scored on this Fw 56.

[photograph]
A Ju 52, with a mine detonating ring, flying over the sea.

143

[page break]

PROBLEM PICTURE

[photograph]
[photograph]

WHAT IS THIS?
Answer at Foot of This Page.

CORRECTION: Vol.4. No. 5 Page 115.
CHATEAULIN VIADUCT. The caption should read 49 meters high.

[boxed] ANSWER TO PROBLEM PICTURE ABOVE.
Esparto grass grown to prevent the sand from drifting. These photographs are of the same area west of HAAMSTEDE, on Schouwen Island, off the Dutch coast [/boxed]

144

[page break]

(4482) 51-9832, 2900, 9/8/43. 45.246.
C. & E. LAYTON LTD. London, E.C.4.

[page break]

EVIDENCE IN CAMERA

This weekly document will consist of a collection of illustrations varying in number in each issue according to the quantity of material of sufficient interest and suitable for reproduction that is received.

2. Requests for material to be included in this document should be submitted to Command Headquarters, who, after consideration, will submit them to Air Ministry, A.D.I. (Ph.). Any useful suggestions as regards contents will receive full consideration and will be welcomed.

3. Distribution is carried out by the Air Ministry (A.I. I) and any requests for fewer or additional copies must be made through Group Headquarters who will ensure the maximum possible economy.

4. Under no circumstances must any of the illustrations be reproduced by Units in the British Isles. Further copies can be printed from the existing blocks and independent photographic reproduction would be a waste of material and labour to the detriment of the National War Effort.

5. The distribution of photographs to the general public is carried out through the Press who are supplied with photographs which have been specially selected for their general interest and have been published after careful consideration by the Security Branch and by the Ministry of Information; it is therefore unnecessary as well as undesirable to communicate any of the contents of this document, either directly or by discussion in public places, to persons not enjoying the privilege of serving in H.M. Forces.

6. The document has not been officially graded as Secret or Confidential in order that the widest distribution may be given, but Commanding Officers should use their discretion to ensure that the appropriate information is available only to those whose work will benefit.

7. The necessity for security cannot be over emphasised, for although this document is not marked Secret some of its contents may occasionally be of value to the enemy. Every care must be taken to prevent such information being disclosed.