Proceedings of Court of Inquiry or Investigation

MMcCronSLW191097-170817-12.pdf

Title

Proceedings of Court of Inquiry or Investigation

Description

RAF Form 412, the report into the crash of Sam McCron's Wellington, LN167.

Date

1944-12-01

Temporal Coverage

Language

Format

Eleven printed sheets with typewritten annotations

Rights

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Contributor

Identifier

MMcCronSLW191097-170817-12

Transcription

[inserted] 512 [/inserted]

ROYAL AIR FORCE
R.A.F. Form 412 (Revised Aug., 1943.)

PROCEEDINGS OF COURT OF INQUIRY [deleted] OR INVESTIGATION [/deleted] opened on (date) 1.12.44. at (place) R.A.F. Station, Ossington by order of O.C. 93 Group, Bomber Command
with instructions to inquire into the FLYING ACCIDENT on (date) 30/11/44
at (place) Crow Park Farm (nearest town) Sutton-on-Trent.
*Here insert any special terms of reference and whether recommendations are called for.
and (I) To establish the facts called for in the Findings set out below.
(II) To inquire specially into*

COMPOSITION OF THE COURT (OR NAME OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER)
[a] Rank [b] Name [c] Unit

President . . . [a] A/S/L [b] J. B. Sayers [c] 93 Group
Members . . . [a] A/F/L [b] E.M. Espley [c] 27 O.T.U.

In attendance(a) . . . [a] F/L [b] Kay [c] A.I.B. (Fire) Newark

LIST OF WITNESSES
[a] Rank [b] Name [c] Unit (if civilian say so)

[a] F/L [b] Grout [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] A/F/L [b] Smith M. [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] S/L [b] McIntyre [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] LAC [b] Whitehouse [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] LAC [b] Richmond [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] LAC [b] Marlow [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] F/O [b] Inglis [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] W/O [b] Crabb [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] LAC [b] DODSON [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] AC1 [b] Davies [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] F/L [b] Jenson [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] Sgt. [b] Sinstead [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] Mr. [b] Goodwin [c] Civilian
[a] F/L [b] Carr [c] 30 OTU (Att 82 O.T.U.)
[a] F/O [b] Waughman [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] S/L [b] Harris [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] Cpl [b] Parkinson [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] LAC [b] Buchnell [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] F/L [b] Atkins [c] 82 O.T.U.
[a] W/C [b] R.M. Cox [c] 82 O.T.U.

FINDINGS (b) OF THE COURT OR INVESTIGATING OFFICER
(NOTE. – THE COURT OR INVESTIGATING OFFICER MUST REFER TO A.P. 837, SECTION 51.)

1. Description of aircraft.
[a] Type, Mark and Number [b] Dual or single control [c] Damage to Airframe (c)
[d] Engine(s) Type and Series [e] Engine Number(s): A.M. No. / Makers No. [f] Damage to Engine(s) (d) [g] Whether aircraft was fit for the Flight

[a] Wellington MK X LN 167 [b] Dual [c] TOTAL [d]Port Hercules VI [e] 270929 / 855473 [f] Serious [g] Yes
[d] Starboard. Hercules VI [e] 377042 / 3510062 [f] Serious
[inserted][signature] 30/1/45 [/inserted]

2. Description of Occupants.
[a] Service Number and Name (e) [b] Rank [c] Unit [d] Duty, e.g., Pilot, A.G. etc. [e] No. of aircraft in which he was occupant [f] Where seated [g] Extent injured (f)

[a] J.41261 ROWE J.G. [b] P/O [c] 82 O.T.U. [d] Pilot [e] Wellington X LN167 [f] Presumed in normal crew positions [g] Fatally
[a] J.43567 SMALLWOOD J.A. [b] P/O [c] 82 O.T.U. [d] Navigator [e] Wellington X LN167 [f] Presumed in normal Crew positions [g] Fatally
[a] J.45515 FARLETTE, J.R.G. [b] P/O [c] 82 O.T.U. [d] Air/Bomber [e] Wellington X LN167 [f] Presumed in normal crew positions [g] Fatally
[a] R.191097 McCRON [b] SGT [c] 82 O.T.U. [d] WOP/AIR [e] Wellington X LN167 [f] Presumed in normal crew positions [g] Fatally
[a] R.278665 MORRIS [b] SGT [c] 82 O.T.U. [d] A/G [e] Wellington X LN167 [f] Rear Turrett [sic] [g] Fatally

NOTES. – (a) If present by reason of Specialist qualifications, nature of these to be stated (vide A.P.837 S.51, para. 1360 (iii) ).
(b) The Findings must be based on and supported by the recorded evidence.
(c) and (d) Indicate as "Total," "serious," "slight" or "no damage."
(e) If more than one aircraft involved, insert here first, in order, names of occupants of aircraft entered first above. Captain of each aircraft to be stated.
(f) Classify as "Fatally, missing, seriously, slightly or uninjured."

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2

3. The purpose of and instructions for the flight(s) were as follows:

[a] Aircraft Type and Number [b] (i) Who authorised the flight(s)? (ii) For what purpose? (iii) Special instructions (if any). (iv) Was instruction being given? If so, by whom?
[a] Wellington MR. X. LN.167
[b] (i) F/L A.C. Grout
(ii) Practice High level bombing.
(iii) None
(iv) No.
(v) N/A

4. The aircraft took off as follows:
[a] Aircraft Type and Number [b] Time [c] Place (from which) [c] Weather conditions (including strength and direction of surface wind) at the time and place of take-off.

[a] Wellington MR X. LN.167 [b] 1015 [c] Ossington Airfield [d] Visibility 2800 yards. Low Cloud NIL (/10 total cloud Surface wind W.S.W. 15 M.P.H. (Fitness figure 6 airfield weather GREEN)

5. The accident occurred at the place and on the date set forth on the front page of this Form. Further details are as follows:

[a] Time [b] Exact location of crash, including height (g) where relevant [c] Weather conditions (including strength and direction of surface wind, condition of light, etc.) at the time and place of accident.

[a] 1130 hrs. [b] Field adjoining Crow Park Farm Map reference of exact location 241860 Sheet 46 Ordnance Survey 1" to mile (2nd War Revision 1940) [c] Visibility 2800 yards. Cloud 5/10 at 6000 feet. Total clouds 10/10. Surface wind S.W. by west 15 m.p.h. (Fitness figure 6 airfield GREEN)

6. The flying experience of the pilot prior to this flight was:

PILOT(S) (h)
Name, Age, where trained, and how assessed.
ROWE J.G. J.41261
No. 20 E.F.T.S. Oshawa Ontario, Canada.
No. 91 S.F.T.S. Centralia. Ontario, Canada.
No. 20 A.F.U.
No. 82 O.T.U.

Within 6 months prior to accident
[a] Type of aircraft including type quoted in para. 1. [b] Day and Night – Dual/Solo [c] Night (j) Dual/Solo
[a] Oxford. Wellington. [b] 42.20/75.35 [c] 06.25/13.25

[d] Total solo (Day and Night) – On type quoted in para. 1/On all types [e] Total solo (Night) (k) – On type quoted in para. 1
[d] 27.05/203.50 [e] nil/21.40

[f] By Instruments (l) [g] Hours on Link Trainer (m)
[f] 45.55 [g] 50.00

NOTES – (g) Give (i) height (above sea level) of ground at scene of accident; (ii) Height above ground of any obstacle struck by aircraft before impact with the ground, as applicable.
(h) Include all pilots involved in accident except any whose flying hours it would serve no useful purpose to quote.
(J) and (k) Only to be quoted if accident occurred at night.
(l) and (m) To be quoted only if loss of control occurred at night, or in bad visibility necessitating instrument flying, or while flying artificially blind.

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3

We (I) have examined the following aircraft, engine, flight authorization book, and pilot's flying log books and also Form 700 and have ascertained:
[a] Description of book and form [b] Remarks, including material facts supplementing or confirming evidence of witnesses and whether all necessary inspections were carried out prior to the flight.

[a] Authorisation Book [b] In order.
[a] Pilots Log Book [b] Confirms flytimes at para. 6. In order.
[a] Form 700 [b] In order.
[a] Aircraft Engine and airframe. Log Book. [b] In order. The Port engine Log show the engine as having done 344 hrs.
[a] Flight Crew Order Book. [b] No order found relating to teaching of right hand circuits (S/ELanding prior to date of accident.
NOTE. – If any of these Documents have not been examined, this must be stated and reason given.

8. We [deleted] (I) [/deleted] have [deleted] have not [/deleted] visited the scene of the accident before [deleted] after [/deleted] aircraft was [deleted] were [/deleted] removed and have found the following material facts:

Aircraft Wellington X. LN.167 struck the ground a fairly flat angle, low speed, broke up partially, and took fire. Wreckage distribution as at sketch (Appendix F) indicating port wing struck ground first followed by impact of Port Engine, Nose of aircraft which broke away. Aircraft finally slewed round and burnt out almost entirely, outer starboard wing and tail unti [sic] being unburnt. Bomb door handle was located and was at SHUT. Front petrol cocks were found in correct position. Engine controls although badly damaged appeared to be consistent with port engine failure. Two practice bombs were found, one intact.

9. We (I) have been unable to obtain the evidence of the following material witnesses:
[a] Name [b] Rank [c] Unit [d] Reasons precluding obtaining of evidence [e] How concerned with accident

[underlined] 10. CONCLUSIONS. [/underlined] Under this Heading the following should always be included:
(a) Brief description of the accident and its attendant circumstances.
(b) Diagnosis of cause or causes including all contributory factors.
(c) Recommendations, if called for by the convening authority.

(a) Aircraft Wellington X LN 167 took off on a Bombing detail at 1015 hours on 30/11/44 (2nd Witness) next heard of over Rufford Range where one bomb was dropped. Engine was heard making abnormal noises at 11.06 hrs. Aircraft was next seen at very low height (about 300') approaching airfield from Easterly direction (Range lies to West) in a dive. Aircraft levelled out made part right hand circuit of airfield disappeared to north of airfield, was next seen below the top level just prior to crashing. Aircraft flew round airfield in a very nose up attitude and was in a similar attitude immediately prior to crash. Crash at field adjoining Crow Park Farm (Map ref. 241860 Sheet 46 1" to mile) was immediately preceded by dropping of port wing.

(b) (i) [underlined] Primary Cause of death. [/underlined] or Pilot Officer Row [sic] and crew (except rear gunner) was multiple injuries and burns, cause of death of Sgt Morris (rear gunner) was multiple injuries only, all the result of accident to Wellington MR.X LN.167 on 30/11/44
(ii) [underlined] Primary cause of accident [/underlined] to Wellington MK.X.LN.167 was loss of control by the pilot while flying at very low altitude on one engine.
(Note:- Loss of control may have been due to a stall in attempting to avoid tree (Marked T at Appendix F) or may have been due to pilot attempting to turn to port at low height against the failed engine in an effort to avoid obstructions).

[underlined] Secondary causes of accident were:- [/underlined]
Engine failure followed by loss of height before an airfield was reached.
Note:- 1. In view of the time elapse between leaving the range (10th witness) and reaching airfield (2nd & 9th witnesses) and the request for D/F assistance using a priority it is apparent but not proven that the pilot became lost. In view of the loss of height during this interval it is also apparent that the pilot's ability to fly on one engine was poor. The loss of height may also have been due to the pilot not concentrating on his flying owing to being lost. The fact that Balance Cock B was found closed indicates that the full drill for manipulation of fuel cocks in event of engine failure had not been carried out.

/continued

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4

10. (Continued)

Note II. The fact that the instructions in force regarding teaching of single engine landings, had not been complied with is not considered to have any bearing on the accident since the pilot was not in a position to make a right and [sic] circuit and landing once he had lost height to approximately 80 ft. The fact that he dived towards the airfield may have been an attempt to crash land thwarted by obstructions (aircraft in dispersals) but this cannot be proven.

The court consider that the weather was a contributory secondary cause in that it prevented the pilot from seeing the airfield from a distance (2nd witness, R/T Log} but that for normal flying the weather was satisfactory.

Note:- The court do not consider that the failure of the watchkeeper in Flying Control to receive and pass on the information relating to use of a priority in the request from Wellington LN. 167 for Q.D.M's to have any bearing in this case on the accident since every assistance was given by Flying Control from the time of sighting of the aircraft at 11.23 hours, the priority first having been received by the D/F Operator at 11.21 hours.

(c) The court recommend that the recent extension to the engine life of Hercules Engines from 300 hours to 360 hours be reviewd [sic] by higher authority.

11. This accident [deleted] is not [/deleted] is being investigated by the Accidents Investigation Branch. A.I.B. Newark (FireBranch)

Signature of President (or Investigating Officer) J.B. Sayers S/L
Signature of (Member of Court) R.W. Espley F/LT
Signature of (Member of Court)
Date of signing

REPORT OF COMMANDING OFFICER
File Ref. No.

I concur with the finding except that there is no evidence to prove that the pilot's ability to fly on one engine was poor, owing to his loss of height. The 9th witness saw him approaching the flying field in a dive that was levelled out at approximately 80'. It would appear that he hoped to crash land or carry out some manoeuvre, contrary to his instructions.

Signature of C.O. H.I. Dabinett G/C
Date of signing 12.12.44
Commanding R.A.F. Station Ossington.

REMARKS OF GROUP COMMANDER File Ref. No.

I concur with the causes of the accident as set out at para 10 and I consider the notes in that respect to be an intelligent and constructive attempt to "visualise" the circumstances of the accident. While not contributory to the crash, I consider the Flight Commander, S/Ldr Harris to have shown a lack of interest and supervision of the execution of Flight Orders and I have advised the Unit Commander to that effect and called for appropriate action.

Signature (Sgd) G.W. HAYES G/CAPT.
Date of signing 23rd December, 1944 No. 93 Group

FORWARDING REMARKS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF File Ref. No. 8375
Concur with the findings and the remarks of the Group Commander.
The recommendation referring to the restriction of engine life is not agreed. Statistics show that the extension to 360 hours has been more than justified.

Date of signing 24.1.45.
Signature H.G. BRAIN S/L (SGD) FOR A.O.C. in C. Bomber Command.

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[underlined] 1st Witness. [/underlined]

I, J17559 F/L A.C. Grout am deputy Flight Commander "A" Flight at 82 O.T.U. Ossington. On 30.11.44 I authorised J.41261 P/O J.G. Rowe and crew to carry out a high level Bombing practice over RUFFORD range. I obtained a weather forecast at 0750 hours and later at 0900 hours for the local area including the range area from the duty meteorological forecaster. In my opinion, based on the forecast and my own observations from the ground, the weather was fit for the exercise.

(signed) A.C. Grout. F/L.

[underlined] 2nd Witness. [/underlined]

I, 147387 A/F/L. M. Smith am a flying control officer at R.A.F. Station, Ossington.

On 30.11.44 I was duty flying control officer. Wellington MK X. LN.167 took off for RUFFORD Bombing Range at 1015 hours on 30.11.44. Between 11.20 and 11.26 the aircraft (Wellington MKX.LN167) was reported as having been given four Q.D.M's (course to steer to reach base) (see extract of Watchkeepers log at Appendix D). No priority was requested and the request for D/F assistance (Direction finding assistance) was not considered abnormal. At 11.23 hours I observed Wellington MK.X.LN 167 South West of airfield making a right hand circuit at an estimated height of 150-200 ft. and distant from the Watch Office, where I was located, about 1.1/2 miles. Two minutes later the aircraft called up on T.R. 1196 (Radio Telephone) requesting permission to make a right-hand circuit, stating that his port engine was u/s (unserviceable) (see extract R/T Log at Appendix E). Simultaneously I observed a RED verey cartridge fired from the aircraft. I ordered rockets and mortars to be fired in order to assist the pilot in keeping the airfield in sight. The pilot stated (over Radio Telephone) that he was at 100 feet requested continuation of firing of pyrotechnics which was complied with. He further said that he could not see airfield after being given unqualified permission to land on any runway he could reach. Rockets were fired until some time after aircraft disappeared from sight and broke off two way Radio Telephone communication. Position at which I first saw the aircraft is marked as Point A on sketch map at Appendix A. At 1135 Wellington X LN861 was allowed to take off to look for Wellington MK,XLN167 which I suspected had crashed. The pilot of this aircraft F/L A.H. BATTERSBY of 93 Group Screened Pilots School located and passed the position of the crash and fire tenders and ambulances were promptly despatched.
(sgd-) M. Smith F/Lt.

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[underlined] 3rd Witness. [/underlined]

I, S/Ldr M. McINTYRE, Chief Technical Officer at 82 O.T.U., Ossington state:- On 30.11.44, I arrived at the scene of the accident to Wellington X LN.167 approximately fifteen minutes after the accident had happened. I found the aircraft burning, medical personnel were endeavouring to remove the bodies. The aircraft was almost totally destroyed both engines and mountings having been torn away from the aircraft. The port engine was about 30 yards away from the main wreckage, the propellor was feathered. There was no sign of fire on either engine. I removed the scavenge oil filter from the port engine and found particles of metal together with pieces of piston ring in the filter. On further inspection of the engine at R.A.F. Station Ossington the following defects were found:- All the front cylinder connecting rods were fractured – all front sleeve drive cranks were fractured and the sleeves seized – the front big End and bearing had run – the pistons in the front bank of cylinders had disintegrated. It is suggested that the primary cause of the engine failure was due to failure of the front big end bearing with consequential oil starvation of the front bank cylinder assembly. Lack of oil pressure would render the spray jet (housed in cranshaft [sic] front balance weight) inoperative leading to seizure of the sleeves through lack of oil and overheating. On examination of the wreckage balance cock A was found to be closed. I also noted that Balance Cock B was closed and C P and C S (Main wing tank cocks) were open.

[signed) M. McIntyre. S/Ldr.

[underlined] 4th Witness. [/underlined]

I 1735050 LAC. Whitehouse, aero engine fitter employed in Maintenance Rectification Unit at R.A.F. Ossington state:-

On 29.11.44 at 0800 hours I carried out Daily Inspection on the port engine of Wellington MK X.LN167. The engine was in my opinion fully serviceable.
(signed) A. Whitehouse.

[underlined] 5th Witness. [/underlined]

I, 1201874 LAC Dodson F, aero engine fitter employed in Maintenance Rectification Unit at R.A.F. Ossington state:-

On 29.11.44 at 0800 hours I carried out Daily Inspection on the starboard engine of Wellington MK.X.LN 167. The engine was in my opinion fully serviceable.

(signed) F. Dodson.

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[underlined] 6th Witness. [/underlined]

I, 1414893 LAC Richmond, Flight Mechanic (Airframe) employed in Maintenance Rectification Unit at R.A.F. Station Ossington state:-

On 29.11.44 I carried Daily Inspection on Wellington MK.X.LN.167 The airframe was in my opinion fully serviceable.

(signed) W.J. Richmond.

[underlined] 7th Witness. [/underlined]

I, 1484466 LAC Marlow, armourer employed in Daily Flying Unit at R.A.F. Ossington state:-

On 30.11.44 I bombed up Wellington MK.X.LN 167 at approximately 0745 hours with eight 11 1/2lb practice bombs. I did not remove safety pins from bombs.

(signed) F. Marlow

[underlined] 8th Witness. [/underlined]

I, 140493, F/O G.A. Inglis, am a ,eteorological [sic] Forecaster at 82 O.T.U. Ossington. I was duty forecaster from 0800 hours to 1900 hours on 30.11.44. The forecast issued at 0800 hours for the local area was circulated to Flights and flying Control (copy attached at Appendix C). I answered subsequent telephonic enquiries confirming no marked alteration in issued forecast.

(signed) G.A. Inglis. F/O.

[underlined] 9th Witness. [/underlined]

I, 365402 W/O T.K. Crabb an Engineer Officer Daily Flying Unit, 82 O.T.U. On 30.11.44 I was on duty at my dispersal area located adjacent to the S.W. end of runway 32 point B sketch map at Appendix A. At approximately 11.25 hours on 30.11.44 I sighted Wellington MK.X.LN 167 approaching with port engine propellor feathered at about 300 feet from the east. The aircraft was in a dive towards my position levelled out at about 80 feet, crossed the south side of the airfield turning to starboard around the airfield [missing letter]oundary and flew at a very low height towards the north and was lost to sight behind the hangers. The aircraft was flying in an extremely "nose up" attitude estimated at almost 45° to the horizontal, apart from the short period when it was in a diving/attitude

[page break]

attitude. I saw two red verey cartridges fired, the first on the aircraft's initial approach about a half mile from the airfield, the second while the aircraft was almost above my position.

(signed) T.K. Crabb W/O.

[underlined] 10th Witness. [/underlined]
I, 2217323 AC1 Davies, G.V. am a member of the range party at Rufford Bombing Range. On 30.11.44. at 1101 hrs. Wellington aircraft MK X.LN167 (call sign Mopup S.Sugar) approached the range and dropped a smoke puff. At 1106 the aircraft dropped his first bomb. Almost immediately after I heard unusual spluttering noises from this aircraft. Wellington MK.X.LN.167 then was lost to sight. I am unable to remember the direction of his departure.

(signed) G.V. Davies.

[underlined] 11th Witness. [/underlined]
I, J17291 F/L M.G. Jenson R.C.A.F. am a pilot instructor in the Conversion Gang at 82 O.T.U. R.A.F., Ossington. On 4.11.44 I was detailed to carry out check dual circuits with P/O Rowe, a pupil pilot in "A" Flight. I gave this pupil flapless landing practice and left hand single engine circuit and landing practice. I did not teach this pilot right-hand circuits being unaware of instructions requiring right hand circuits (in simulating port engine failure) to be carried out. P/O Rowe was an average pilot showed no unusual tendancies [sic]. He was confident and a hard worker. I sent him solo after advising him on the procedure in the event of port engine failure. I frequently make checks of all orders and instructions and make every effort to keep up to date on them.

(signed) M.G. Jenson F/L.

[underlined] 12th Witness. [/underlined]
I, 452862 Sgt. Sinstead W.A.A.F. Watchkeeper (Flying Control) state;- I was duty Watchkeeper in Flying Control R.A.F. Ossington on 30.11.44. At about 1120 I was informed that Welling MK X LN 167 had requested a series of Q.D.M's (course to base). I passed this information to F/L Smith duty Contry [sic] Officer. I have no recollection of priorities being mentioned. The message was passed to me by telephone from D/F hut (Direction Finding by High Freqyency [sic] hut)

(Sgd, ) J.M. Sinstead Sgt.

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[underlined] 13th Witness. [/underlined]

Mr. John Goodwin (Junior) of Crow Park Farm, Sutton on Trent (Farmer) states:- I was working in the West field east of Crow Park Farm (Marked A on sketch) Appendix F. At about 1120 hours on 30/11/44 I saw a Wellington aircraft with one engine stopped flying in a circuit of Ossington airfield, this aircraft flew out of sight in the airfield direction. A few minutes later it appeared from the north west, to the right of Crow Park Farm and buildings below tree top level. The aircraft was then level laterally but his nose appeared to be up as though he was trying to climb. After crossing the boundary of the field in which he crashed his port wing dropped and the aircraft struck the ground, spun round and burst into flames. I ran over and assisted in rescuing the rear gunner.

(signed) J. Goodwin.

[underlined] 14th Witness. [/underlined]
I, F/L T.L. Carr Medical Officer states:- On 30.11.44 I was duty medical officer at R.A.F. Station Ossington. At about 11.30 I was warned that a crash was likely to occur and on further information a few minutes later proceeded to scene of the accident to Wellington MK.X.LN 167. On arrival at the scene of the accident R.278665 Sgt. Morris (rear gunner) had been removed from the rear turret to a point about 15 yards away from the crash by civilians. The remaining crew members were lying among the wreckage of the aircraft, having already died as a result of the multiple injuries and burns, the direct result of the aircraft crash. R.278665 Sgt. Morris died about half an hour later despite first aid treatment on the spot and subsequent treatment in Station Sick Quarters I hereby certify that J41261 P/O Rowe, J.G. (Pilot) J43567 P/O Smallwood J.A. (Navigator) J.45515 P/O Farlette J.R.G. (Air Bomber) R.191097 Sgt. McCron (Wireless Operator Air) all died as a result of multiple injuries and burns caused by aircraft crash (Wellington MK.X.LN 167) on 30.11.44 and that R.278665 Sgt Morris (Air Gunner) died as a result of multiple injuries as a result of the same aircraft crash. I was unable to determine the exact position of the crew members in the aircraft apart from the rear gunner who was removed from the rear turret. The other crew members were in the fore-part of the wreckage. I was not able to tell whether safety straps were used by the pilot owing to the extent of destruction of aircraft and the extensive fire.

(signed) T.L. Carr F/Lt.

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[underlined] 15th Witness. [/underlined]

I, 171904 Flying Officer Waughman Flying Instructor in the Conversion Gang at 83 O.T.U. Ossington state:-

On dates between 31.10.44 and 4.11.44 I gave P/o Rowe dual instruction which included instruction in single engine flying and landing, and also slow flying. We did about three left hand circuit simulated single engine landings, and one right hand circuit simulated single engine landing. I formed the opinion that he was a very conscientious pupil but although average his reactions were rather on the slow side.

(signed) R.R. Waughman F/O

[underlined] 16th Witness. [/underlined]

I, S/Ldr C.E. Harris, Flight Commander of A Flight at 82 O.T.U. state:- Orders relating to training of pilots including single engine landing training, are normally published in the crew order book and are to the best of my knowledge carried into effect by the screened pilots.

The progress records of pupil pilots are supervised by the conversion gant [sic] instructors whose responsibility it is to ensure that they are adequately trained prior to being sent solo.

(signed) C.E. Harris, S/L.

[underlined] 11th Witness recalled.:- and the evidence of the 15th and 16th witnesses having been read to F/L M.G. Jenson in accordance with K.R. & A.C.1. para 1318.

I, J.17291 F/L M.G. Jenson further state:- When I sent P/O Rowe solo I was satisfied that he was competent to fly Wellington aircraft solo. Prior to the 4th November 1944 there was no order in the crew order book requiring right had [sic] single engine simulated landings to be carried out during dula [sic] conversion nor did I see any other orders to this effect.

(signed) M.G. Jenson F/L.

[outlined] 17th Witness. [/outlined]
I 966664 Cpl S. Parkinson Wireless Operator, state:-
On 30.11.44 I was on duty at the D/F hut at R.A.F. Ossington when Wellington LN 167 requested a series of Q.D.M.'s on P (important) priority. I instructed the telephone operator LAC Bushnell to inform flying control. I heard LAC Bushness inform flying control of the fact.

(signed) S. Parkinson.

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[underlined] 18th Witness. [/underlined]
I, 1232945 LAC J.W. Bushnell, telephone operator at the D/F hut R.A.F. Ossington on 30.11.44. During the morning at about 11.20 on instructions from Cpl. Parkinson, I informed the Duty Watchkeeper at Flying Control that Wellington LN.167 had requested a series of Q.D.M's using priority P. (Important)

(signed) J. Bushnell.

[underlined] 19th Witness. [/underlined]

I, F/L Atkins J.14000 Flying Instructor in the Conversion Gant at 82 O.T.U. state:-

Prior to 30.11.44 I had not seen any order requiring as many right hand simulated single engine circuits as left hand, to be carried out.

(signed) J. Atkins F/Lt.

[underlined] 20th Witness. [/underlined]

I, Wing Commander R.M. Cox, D.F.C., A.F.C., Chief Instructor at 82. O.T.U. state:- I gave instructions that the order referring to Single Engine landing training shown at Appendix G was to be passed to Flights for promulgation in Crew Order Books 3/9/44.

(signed) R.M. Cox. W/C

[underlined] 16th Witness recalled [/underlined] (and K.R. & A.C.I para 1318 complied with).

I S/L Harris state:- I cannot account for the order shown at Appendix G not being incorporated in the crew order book prior to 30.11.44. The order (at Appendix G) was, I find, issued as Crew Order No 65. As at that time a crew order No. 65 on a difference [sic] subject was in force I can only assume that the new order No 65 was not incorporated on that account.

(signed) C.E. Harris S/L.

Citation

Great Britain. Royal Air Force, “Proceedings of Court of Inquiry or Investigation,” IBCC Digital Archive, accessed April 26, 2024, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/36252.

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