1
25
31
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2251/40652/PBirdJH18010038.2.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2251/40652/PBirdJH18010039.1.jpg
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bird, JH. Photo Album
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-15
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Bird, JH
Description
An account of the resource
The album contains images taken during his service in Italy and includes target photographs and descriptions of bombing operations.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Award for the Best Photographs for August
Description
An account of the resource
Sergeant Bird's crew award for the best photographs for August 1944. The artwork comprises a drawing of a Wellington with Bird and his crew, Boulton, Bentley, Dean and Beckett named below, set against a circular ribbon with the words: 'THE BEST PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THE MONTH OF AUGUST WERE RETURNED BY THE CREW' Some laurel leaves surround the ribbon and below is written: '104 SQUADRON'. On the reverse is handwritten 'also for June & July'.
Creator
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104 Squadron
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-08
Temporal Coverage
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1944-08
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Language
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eng
Type
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Artwork
Format
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One printed sheet
Identifier
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PBirdJH18010038, PBirdJH18010039
Contributor
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Andy Fitter
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Conforms To
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Pending text-based transcription
104 Squadron
aircrew
arts and crafts
rivalry
Wellington
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/558/8825/PStempJ1502.1.jpg
cfe10a514ff45b328abec6f3cbbb1c5e
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/558/8825/AStempJE151016.2.mp3
732c55fd46196ec43670b0ef9903c0ee
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stemp, Joe
Joseph Ethelbert Stemp
J E Stemp
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stemp, JE
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Joe Stemp (1602809 Royal Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 578 and 77 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
AS: This is an interview with Joe Stemp, a navigator on 578 Squadron and later on 77 Squadron. My name is Adam Sutch and the interview is being conducted at Upton St Leonards, Gloucestershire for the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. Joe, thank’s so much for agreeing to the interview. I’d like to set the scene by asking you to describe your life before joining the Air Force. A little bit about your home, your parents and brothers and sisters, that sort of thing.
JS: I had a very happy boyhood really. I had one brother and one sister and I’ve always been a very independent guy. I’d always earnt money and done jobs on the side. I was actually working full time in an advertising, not an advertising, a housing agency at sixteen and doing quite well. And I suddenly realised, a friend and I, that we’d like to join the Air Force. So, we went to Oxford University and did that exam over a weekend there. And out of the thirty people who were there, ten straight away were cancelled, scrubbed, because they were colour-blind. That left twenty of us and we had this serious examination. When we finished they called us in, one by one. My friend went in before me and he came out nearly in tears. I said ‘Why?’, ‘He wasn’t the type of pilot we need, he hadn’t got the right attitude’. I said, ‘Why?’, ‘They asked me what I was doing when Mr Churchill said “Every man, woman and child should do something”’, ‘What did you do?’ Well he couldn’t do anything ‘cause he didn’t want to give his age away. So that was it, well I followed him in and they asked me the same question. But being this cocky bugger I used to be I had an answer for. ‘Well Sir, you can see I did pass the exam but I’ve had to study a lot at home in the evenings to make sure’. ‘Good lad, that’s the spirit.’ I’m in the Air Force, I’m in the RAF Association [laughs] and I never saw him after I joined. He was shot down actually eventually in Burma flying Spitfire, Hurricane. But I never saw him again, we were great mates but it was just one of those things. And so I joined straight away then.
AS: What did your parents feel about you joining?
JS: They didn’t say a word, I was most surprised. Now my father, who would have had a go, didn’t even complain. My brother was sixteen years old. He was doing an ITW course at sixteen years old and he did a dinghy drill course down into Torbay harbour. A bloody dinghy fell over, he went in, and in the water it was all the oil from the boats around, got into his ear and caused trouble in his ear. Eventually he had to have it operated on and he lost the hearing of his right ear. They gave him the option. You can stay in the Air Force and everything will be alright but you’ll never fly again, or you can leave on a pension. No answer to that. He left on a pension, got a great degree, ‘cause he was a clever bugger anyway. But, all those, he died last week, ninety years old.
AS: Oh, I’m sorry.
JS: But I was always surprised my father allowed us to go and do this.
AS: And you were under age as well?
JS: I was seventeen.
AS: And when did you leave school? Did you get matric?
JS: No, I didn’t stop on for it, I left the school at sixteen. I should have stayed on ‘cause I went to Ealing Grammar School and I was doing alright but I just suddenly thought ‘I must get on’. I wanted to get on and do something and there didn’t seem to be. We moved the school, the younger children went, were evacuated. We went to a school in Ealing which was girls as well as boys and it was a waste of time, we spent most of our time mucking about with the girls. [inaudible] it was ridiculous, I left and I’ve worked hard ever since and I’ve always been very independent.
AS: What year was this we’re talking about when you joined the Air Force?
JS: Oh, ’40, ’41.
AS: So, you’d been in Ealing, or London, when the Battle of Britain was going on?
JS: Oh yes, yeah.
AS: What was that like, the?
JS: It wasn’t so bad in Ealing but London was awful. I remember going to confession one Saturday night with some friends of mine, we were in Ealing, in South Ealing, and we looked up towards London ‘cause there were bright lights in the sky and it was the time when the Germans came over and had those terrible raids they did on the East End London, they really did. But because it was bad for morale they never talked too much about it did they, they kept it a bit quiet. They mentioned there was a bit of, a bit of bombing. They did terrible things the Germans. You didn’t have to be a navigator you got yourself on the end of the River Thames came up and you’re there!
AS: Glinting in the moonlight?
JS: Absolutely, yeah. [laughs]
AS: So, in those days I suppose Ealing was separated from London?
JS: Well Ealing’s always been a, always a very private sort of borough, queen of the suburbs style of thing you know? They’ve always fancied their chances and it was a very nice place to live really. I went to work for this Barrett and he was as drunk as a lord and his sons had gone in the Army and he couldn’t run the business so. I know this sounds silly but I was sixteen and I was running his business for a year. Then after that I asked for a rise and he gave me about half a crown or something, so I told him to stuff his job and I joined the Air Force.
AS: That was how you came to join the Air Force?
JS: Yeah. [laughs]
AS: Why the Air Force?
JS: I always fancied being a pilot. Because when I was a lad I used to go to Heston and, Heston airport in those days, and I used to love, and I always wanted to be able to fly. It was one of those things that I wanted to do, it was something that really I took on. But do you know why I wasn’t a pilot?
AS: No.
JS: I did the whole course, and they cancelled and blew me out. This is the honest truth, we did during the final course, and we took off and he told me what to do. And he said ‘Do you know where you are, son?’ And I said ‘Yes’, ‘OK.’, and we carried on and he said ‘Do you know?’ And I suddenly realised, I hadn’t a bloody clue where I was and I wasn’t really worried. But I was enjoying being up there. And at the end of the course he said to me ‘You’ve done very well’. he said, ‘but there’s only one thing wrong, you haven’t known where you’ve been from the moment we took off’. And he was right. And they scrubbed me and what did they make me? A navigator. Isn’t that typical of the Air Force?
AS: That’s a wonderful story and it doesn’t surprise me.
JS: No.
AS: A bit. Can you rewind a little? You, where did you sign on?
JS: Um, good question. I think it was Regents’ Park, I think. It was up at Regents’ Park area I know.
AS: OK.
JS: Because those hotels up there, aircrew were all based up there, trainee aircrew.
AS: Oh, this is Arty Tarty is it? This is the aircrew reception centre?
JS: Yes, that’s it. Yes.
AS: And everybody went there?
JS: They all went there regardless at one time and from then on, we just followed on. I finished up actually leaving there and going to South Africa, you mentioned South Africa, and I actually got my wings in South Africa. I enjoyed my South African trip I was out there for some months and thoroughly enjoyed it. Flying every day of course ‘cause the weather was suitable. I was looking through my logbook last night, ‘cause I haven’t looked at the logbook for years, at the amount of flying we did out there.
AS: So, you signed on and they sent you to Regents’ Park?
JS: Um.
AS: And then what happened between then and going to Oxford for this exam? Could you tell me about the exam that you took?
JS: Oh, the exam was before then.
AS: Ah, OK.
JS: Oh, that was the exam that we had the weekend. Thirty people turned up at Oxford University, the object being they were going to check us out ‘cause they were looking for pilots. Well, as I told you the first ten straight away were colour-blind, so they scrubbed them, leaving twenty of us. And it was quite a severe examination afterwards you know, mental examination. I managed to finish all right, I wasn’t that special. My friend was brilliant and he came top. So, he went in first of all for what they called the commanding officer’s interview or something. And the officers sat round this table and asked questions of the guy. And it was a shame really ‘cause they caught him on the hop really, and then they finally said to him ‘You’re not the type of person we want as a pilot, you haven’t got the right spirit at all’. And he was in tears, he came out and sat beside me and said ‘What do I, what do I do Joe?’ I said ‘I can’t believe.’ [inaudible] So I thought ‘Christ’. So I went in about two hours later and they asked me the same questions but I was a bit quicker on the mark than he was. I said ‘As a matter of fact sir’, I said ‘if you noticed I have passed the exam? Not desperately well but I passed because I studied a lot each evening to make sure I did pass your’. ‘Good lad, that’s the spirit.’ I’m in. [laughter]
AS: Excellent. So, you passed at Oxford?
JS: Um.
AS: Did you then go home and await some sort of call up or?
JS: I went home and waited and I was called up within about two or three weeks.
AS: As at that stage, PNB? Volunteer reserve?
JS: Yeah. Volunteer reserve.
AS: As a pilot navigator bomber? Bomb aimer?
JS: Yeah. A PNB yeah.
AS: Front of the aeroplane, executive office?
JS: [laughter]. Yes.
AS: OK, you’re called up and then presumably they had to try and make an airman of you, did they?
JS: Well they did. I enjoyed it really except that when I was first flying, I was OK and even the instructor that took me on the final check, he said ‘You fly well, son’. He said ‘but what’s the bloody good of having you up there if you don’t know where the hell you are?’ Which is true. When you’re seventeen years old you’re so excited you don’t care about where you are. [laughs] And it was as easy as that.
AS: Picking up on the excitement.
JS: Um.
AS: Do you think that the RAF knew you’d lied about your age and didn’t worry about it?
JS: Oh yes, I’m sure they did. I was seventeen, and I’m sure they, my brother was sixteen. When he left the Air Force with this pension, he was seventeen years old when he left, and he went straight to university, got a good degree, eventually finished up in Australia. He died last week, he was ninety, but he’d had a pension since he was seventeen years old. Isn’t that amazing?
AS: Turned out nice then didn’t it?
JS: Um.
AS: OK, so you were, you were in the Air Force starting pilot training, in this country was it?
JS: Yes.
AS: Whereabouts was that, and what were you flying?
JS: Tiger Moths. Reading. There was an airfield at Reading, we used to pass it on the motorway going down, can’t think what it’s called. Theale is it?
AS: Yeah.
JS: Theale I think it was, and we would train there, it was a pilot training school.
AS: And this was 1941?
JS: ’41. Um, yeah, long time ago.
AS: So still this was before the great move, the move to take pilot training abroad I suppose?
JS: Yes, yes and no it was, they were picking up people they wanted, particular people. Even the guy who, instructor, who interviewed me at the end on the final flight, even he said ‘You fly very well, I’m very pleased the training has been good, you fly very well, but what’s the bloody good of having you up here if you don’t know where you are?’ Which is absolutely true and when you’re seventeen it’s all exciting, you don’t, you don’t even worry whether you’re going to get down again or not you know? Yeah.
AS: You wanted to be a pilot, what sort of pilot? Fighter pilot?
JS: I wanted to be a fighter pilot, I didn’t want to get anything to do with bombers. I was a little disappointed. I ended up, as you know, I did a tour with 77 Squadron but, it wasn’t what I wanted but then that’s the way life works.
AS: So, you did, you soloed, did you solo?
JS: Yes, oh yeah.
AS: Marvellous, how many hours roughly did you do?
JS: I don’t know, I don’t honestly remember now. I quite enjoyed flying, it was, it was much easier than I thought it would be. The thing, it’s exciting really. You’re seventeen years old and you’re flying. And honestly, it’s nothing to, you can’t get over it really. It’s amazing.
AS: Superb. So, when you were told that your pilot training was going no further, what did you feel like, what?
JS: Heartbroken. I used to say that’s the day I started drinking. But anyway, I waited around a lot and I did all sorts of odds and ends, waiting for another course, and the other course was in South Africa. So, I went to South Africa to do my navigator course.
Unknown: Interruption.
JS: Went to this hotel at Harrogate. All the groups, gunners, wireless operators, pilots, navigators, all in this big room, talking to each other, and we meet each other and if we fancy somebody and start talking, the way like I’ve met you today, they’d say ‘We could be alright together’. Then they met somebody else, so I met the rear, the mid-upper gunner was a Scot, nice guy, and the flight engineer was a Welsh guy, that’s the chap who had to become into aircrew or else. Now the three of us got on so well. They, in turn, had friends, before I knew where I was I’m one of six. The next thing is we’ve got Henley, this is the skipper, wandering around looking for. And he picks, out of the blue, you know. [inaudible] I thought perhaps, I’d heard about crews in the past, how they all get on. They don’t. But of course, you can get a group, I mean it’s very difficult to say seven blokes getting on together, isn’t it?
AS: Um.
JS: But we did, three of us did very well. And we managed with the others, we didn’t fight or anything. But I told you I wasn’t a friend of the skipper’s and I never was going to be.
AS: But in the air you were a disciplined –
JS: In the air, we were good, in fact in the air only two of us carried on talking. We had no conversation in the air unless it was necessary. The only person to converse with him, me, because I’d have to, the others only if they had too. There was no common chat amongst us. I’ve been listening to other people and they said they talked all the time. They didn’t in my crew, my crew only spoke when they had to. I think possibly it was a good idea, I don’t know. I know that, put it this way, I never felt afraid. It wasn’t, or upset, it wasn’t until old Charlie Whatsisname blew up in front of me that I suddenly thought ‘Christ Almighty, it’s dangerous up here’. And it was a bomber, do you know it was a Lancaster dropped the bombs?
AS: Um.
JS: And after that I was a bit wary, a bit wary.
AS: And the Lancasters were flying higher than you obviously, yeah?
JS: Um. Do you know something? Think about it there were, there were seven of us obviously in the crew, and you could often get such difference in seven people.
AS: Did you see this on, on other crews that?
JS: Yes, I did. Some crews I remained friendly with until the end, and when we retired they were coming up for their finish. You had to do thirty, you had to do thirty ops. Well I done eighteen with 77, 578 and I had twelve to do and I signed up with 77 and everything went fine from then onwards. They liked us. I never forget going to the first meeting and the navigation leader said ‘Now look here’. he said ‘I’ll tell you new lads what’s happening’. So I said ‘Well we might be new lads but we do know’. He said ‘I’ve done twelve ops already’, I said ‘Oh, aren’t you clever?’ I said. ‘I’ve done twelve, I’ve done eighteen’. I said. ‘Oh.’ So in other words don’t give us any bullshit ‘cause we know what it’s all about. [chuckles]
AS: Can I wind you back a bit and cover the period from leaving OTU to joining the squadron? What happened when you joined the squadron? What was that process like?
JS: That’s a good question. It was very good because there were about five squadrons in this billet and I didn’t realise it, but they all knew each other and they’d all been flying together. But after we joined them everything, not because of us, but everything seemed to go wrong and we ended up with just two. They lost three.
AS: Three crews?
JS: Just didn’t come back, you know?
AS: Wow.
JS: But when we first went there everybody was, I mean, give you for example. Oh, I must tell you this, the first night I’m there I go to bed and I was a Catholic.
AS: Um.
JS: And you had to put your name on the back, it told you what religion you were, on the back of my bed. Well I went to bed about eleven o’clock time, going off to sleep. I was woken very severely about an hour later by a chap who’d obviously been drinking and said to me ‘That’s the other man’. He said to me, ‘You a Catholic?’ I said ‘For Christ’s sake man’, I said ‘It’s gone twelve o’clock, what are you worried about?’ ‘Are you a Catholic?’ So, I said ‘Yes’. So with that, he opens his pocket and he throws a little, you know, brown leather wallet, that big. He threw it to me and he said ‘Here are, you better have it. My old lady gave me this, what a lot of bullshit’. I said ‘For God’s sake, what is it?’ So I opened it up and inside was a Sacred Heart and one or two medals that his mother had given to him. I said ‘You can’t give that away’. ‘Why not?’ he said. He was a bit pissed anyway, I said ‘Because frankly your mother gave you that, it’s for you to keep’. ‘I don’t want to know about it’. So I said ‘Look’. He said ‘I’ll chuck it on the fire’. ‘Don’t chuck it’. Those fires in the middle of the room.
AS: Um.
JS: I said ‘Don’t chuck it, leave it, we’ll talk about it tomorrow’. So in the morning, when I woke up, he was fast asleep of course, I waited until he got round, came round, and I went up to him and I said ‘Look, this was silly last night, you must be sober now. You were pissed out of your mind last night, you didn’t know what you were talking about. Talking about your mother that way, and throwing that and giving this’. ‘I told you, I didn’t want the bloody thing. I don’t know why she give it to me. It’s an embarrassment’. I said, ‘What are you saying?’ I said. He said ‘Do you want it?’ ‘Well rather than do what you said’, I said ‘yes’. So I kept it. That night, he and his crew disappeared and were never, ever seen again. Isn’t that amazing?
AS: It’s, it’s amazing, but not unexpected. Do you, did you see other examples of that, of crews that knew they weren’t going to come?
JS: No.
AS: Back?
JS: I have seen people say that to me, they had a feeling. ‘Cause I’ve heard people say ‘Our leave is due Friday, let’s hope to Christ we don’t have anything between Wednesday and Friday to stop us going’. And they say, and that was always a bit of a dangerous time because it happened so often, that your leave was going to be on Friday, Wednesday night you don’t come back. The times I’ve seen it happen. You’re always glad when it’s done and when you’ve been and then you’ve got some more to come. Just waiting for one day off, very tricky. But I never forget him and the next day I took it to him and I said ‘Look, I still feel you should have this’, I said ‘ because I don’t feel right to have it. I know what it means to lots of people, apparently it doesn’t mean anything to you’, I said ‘but the fact is your mother gave it to you, would have made you change your mind and seriously’. ‘Don’t talk a lot of bleeding nonsense’, he said. I said ‘You’re sure now?’ He said ‘I’ve told you, that’s it. I don’t want to hear about it’. So, OK. And that night they went out and they were never, ever seen again. We don’t know whether they were kept, well we know they weren’t prisoners of war. They were blown out of the sky, it’s as easy as that. And so, I thought ‘Christ Almighty, I wonder if it’ll be better for me’. So it got that way and when I told my crew about this, before we took off, every time before we took off, they all went. And once, on one occasion, ‘Oh Christ, I left it in my best blue’. ‘We can’t have that’ they said. So, I had to get a WAAF quickly to bring a jeep round, rush round to my place to pick it up otherwise they weren’t gonna go, they said. It’s amazing, isn’t it, how these things happen? I think people do have such things as lucky charms and they rely on them you know? [inaudible] insist that everything is alright.
AS: Yeah, I think, I know you’re absolutely right. Did you as an individual, and you as a crew, always feel that you were going to come back?
JS: I did, yeah. I did. I never gave it a thought, I always thought I would come back. Even on a Friday night when I’m due to go on leave. I always felt it’s a bit tricky but I’m going to make it. Because the only thing was that I had a dread of being shot down in the water. Because I was the only swimmer in my crew, and we did a couple of tests, and it was absolutely ridiculous. As I was the only swimmer, I was the main person. I had to get up on the diving board, suit on and boots off, jump in the water, find the dinghy, turn it upside down to the proper way, then try and pick the others up who were hanging around the edge of the bath. Well I did this and got one or two of them but the skipper, he would not get off the wall. And the instructor who was doing the swimming said, he said ‘Get in there’, and he pushed and he went in the water. He went like mad, my skipper, nearly bloody drowned me, and in the end the instructor realised that I was in trouble. So the instructor jumped in beside me, between the two of us we managed to get the bugger out, and I thought if ever anything happens and it’s in the sea we’re finished. We’re finished. No case of, can you swim? We’ll be finished.
AS: So, this was dinghy drills in a swimming pool?
JS: In a swimming baths, yeah.
AS: Yeah, OK. What about drills on the aeroplane? Did you, as a crew, really practice those things, evacuating the aeroplane things like that?
JS: No, no, never. No, never. I, that’s a good question. But when you think back, I was never, I don’t recall, we ever worked on how we would get out should there be an incident. I don’t think we thought there would be an incident. I think we were going to be lucky. They always said as long as they got him with us, meaning me, we’re going to be alright. But the only time I never flew with that crew, the doctor said I mustn’t fly for twenty-four hours, nothing’s going to happen I thought, but something did. And that meant to say that they had to go with a spare and they went mad, they got shot to pieces. Honestly, I’m not exaggerating. I waited until the last aircraft had come back in the early hours of the morning and I thought ‘Christ’. We hadn’t even heard a message then suddenly, in a very dim way over the line, came a call to say they are coming but they’ve been badly damaged and they might have trouble, but they were hoping to make it, and they did. They made it and the next thing I was worried about was would the bloody thing turn over when they landed, like it often does. So the WAAF and I waited, and they landed, and everybody stood by, and it landed and it stopped. And we all rushed out there, and the crew, apart from the skipper who was panic stricken. He couldn’t move, he was panic stricken. But the crew come out, lit the old fags up. ‘If he don’t come, we’re not going.’ [laughs] And we had a terrible problem. I was the lucky charm, without me they said they wouldn’t have managed. Silly of course but that’s –
AS: Well it isn’t is it? It’s a really good insight to the crew as an organism. The fact that you didn’t necessarily get on, that you were the charm of the crew.
JS: Another thing, the fact that I was a Catholic. I said ‘That’s got nothing to do it with it, the fact that I’m a Catholic’. ‘Well you don’t fuck about the way we do’, they said, which I didn’t. I drank with them but they were shagging all over the place, my crew, they were terrible. And the skipper was the world’s worst. I told you they thought I was queer. That’s why they called these awful women, and they’d introduce those awful women to me. Why I never forget one girl, it was a shame. She was as thick as two planks and they introduced her to me and said ‘Joe’s alright, he’ll look after you’. She said ‘He’s a nice bloke, you’ll like him’. I didn’t want to know her, and she insisted I go home and meet her parents, and I thought ‘That’s the last thing you want to do’. And I kept. [laughs] As I say my, my crew were awful in that respect.
AS: How about the local population? ‘Cause Burn is, is in the part of Yorkshire where my family come from.
JS: Yeah.
AS: So, you have Goole, Selby, all around there.
JS: Burn.
AS: Yeah, what were the local population like to the aircrew?
JS: Very good, very good. The only thing that used to upset me was they had a lot of Italian workers in the fields.
AS: Prisoners?
JS: Um.
AS: OK.
JS: And I remember standing one night, finishing a fag and watching these Italians working, and they were watching us taking off, and you can imagine what they were thinking. ‘Where the hell are they going, who are they going to bomb?’ you know? And I had to go into hospital for a couple of days and while I was in there they, this Italian guy came in and he was in a very, very bad way, and his mates used to come and visit him and he said to me, one of his mates, his English wasn’t bad. ‘Are you a Catholic?’ And I said ‘Yes, I am’. ‘You couldn’t have words with him, would you?’ So I said ‘Surely’, I said. He said ‘He’s not going to go home you know, he’ll never go home again. We don’t know what to say to him, perhaps if you talk kindly to him, he might take it from you’. So I said ‘I’ll try’. So I did when the chap passed, before he passed out, I said to him ‘Look I’m sorry you’re like this, it’s such a shame because you look like a nice guy and you could make quite a world of it’. But so, I said ‘The best thing to do is do what they say and carry on because the war won’t last forever and then you can go home’. But he died about a week later.
AS: Wow.
JS: He just died and I felt bad about it. In fact, I even went to the funeral. I know I shouldn’t have done but I felt bad about it ‘cause he seemed such a nice guy. When you think about it, it’s very serious really.
AS: They’re people. Under the uniform we’re all people aren’t we?
JS: Um.
AS: So, whereabouts locally would you go from Burn as a crew, you know, for drinking or socialising?
JS: Oh, in York.
AS: In York, Betty’s Bar?
JS: Um. There was a, there was a pub in Burn but it was packed. We had our own pub in York which we used to attend and we used to keep, it was very wrong of us really, we used to keep the Yanks out. ‘Cause the Yanks tried to get in our pubs and we said ‘It’s not on, this is for British staff only.’
AS: Which pub was this in York?
JS: I can’t think which one it was but I know that, ‘cause the girls used to follow us rotten you know? In York ‘cause most girls wouldn’t have a lot to do with aircrew. Most regular girls as I call it, because they couldn’t guarantee, as they said, that you’d be here tomorrow, so we used to get all the tarts really. Well the lads didn’t mind, but I did. [aughs]
AS: Yeah, it’s an interesting slant on wartime. So, when you finished OUT, did you get a big notice up on the wall posting you to a squadron? What happened, what was the process?
JS: I cannot remember.
AS: OK.
JS: I think there was a group of us that had started at the same time, but we didn’t all go to the same squadron. I think, if I recall, we were posted to different squadrons. One here, two there and so on and so forth. ‘Cause in Yorkshire, Yorkshire was the home of the Halifax.
AS: 4 Group, yeah.
JS: And all the crews in it, that was Yorkshire, the Lancasters were lower down. So, what we did was, we all knew each other as crews, we used to meet and have a chat. There was quite a bit of rivalry between them and quite good humour too, between some of the crews. When I look back now it was a very difficult situation, because if somebody was killed or whatever, what did you do? We had this big joke, you’ve probably heard it, ‘Can I have your breakfast if you don’t come back?’ And that’s the way they were looking at it, ‘cause there was no other way of doing it. You couldn’t cry your eyes out about it ‘cause it could be you the next time. So, you had to get on with it, that was the way it was. ‘Could I have your breakfast tomorrow if you don’t come back?’ Um.
AS: Was, I know you talked about leave. Was there much contact, did you go home on leave? Did you have contact with family or?
JS: I was lucky I always went home on leave. I had money in my pocket, a good family who were dying to see me and I enjoyed it. But one of my crew, it was really silly, he’d been shagging around and leave came up and he got a dose. And I said, I went to hospital with him, and we sorted it out. And they reckon, he had a week in hospital and then he had to take it easy for a month or something and that was the way it was. And in the middle of all this he got involved with this girl again and I said ‘Look, Tom, you mustn’t do this’. I said, ‘What’s going to happen when leave comes round, you’re surely not going to go home and start on your own missus are you?’ He said ‘What else can I?’ I said ‘Well can’t you tell her some yarn about the fact that you’ve had trouble and that you can’t use it, but it’ll be alright in the future?’ ‘Um, I’ll try’, he says. So he did. So off we go on leave, when I got back after the weeks holiday he had my motorbike and he was waiting at the station for us. I said ‘When did you get back?’ He said ‘Oh, don’t tell me Joe, I’ve been home a week’. I said ‘Why?’ He said ‘I realised straight away when I got home that she knew there was something wrong. I had a terrible conscience, I didn’t tell her, and we just didn’t get on, and I sent myself a telegram to say “Return immediately”’. ‘Oh Christ’, I said. He said ‘What else could I do?’ I said ‘Well, I suppose you’re right, it’s a fact because you didn’t want to give it to your wife.’ Yeah.
AS: So, when you turn up on the, on 578, what happened then? You’re allocated to a flight? Or do you go on ops straight away or?
JS: Yes, more or less. When we realised the squadron was breaking down and we were going to be posted, we weren’t all posted to the same squadron. We were posted to 77 Squadron and when I got there, there were only two other crews came with us. So I should think the rest of the crews were split around the group ‘cause it was 4 Group. And I remember going in, I think I said a moment ago, when they had their first check up and the navigator was telling us new ones what to do and what it was like up there. And we said to him ‘How many ops have you done?’ He said, ‘I’ve done twelve’. And we said ‘That’s nothing’. [laughs]
AS: Get some in.
JS: ‘We’ve done eighteen’. But no, it was, it was difficult. I feel that on reflection it made one very hard. You had to be hard, it’s no good crying your eyes out is it about it? ‘Cause it could happen to you any time or anyone you were with.
AS: Doing the job when you’re, whether it’s 578 or 77 Squadron. Could you take me through a typical operation from waking up in the morning until it’s all finished?
JS: Well sometimes we’d wake up in the morning like today. And the navigators and the pilots would be called down, and we’d go to a meeting and they’d say ‘There’s going to be ops tonight, we haven’t got conditions at the moment but we’ll be calling an order about four o’clock.’ So we thought ‘Right that’s it, we’re on ops tonight’. And about four o’clock we used to go, and initially only the pilot and the navigator went and we listened to the place where we bombing, what we were trying to achieve, and so on and so forth. And with that we then opened the door and let the rest of the crew in and told them where we were going and what we were going to do and that’s how it was.
AS: So how did?
JS: It could only be hours before we took off.
AS: So, when did you do your flight planning?
JS: Well, flight planning. On the spot really.
AS: So was that after your pilot, nav briefing. Or after everybody had had the briefing?
JS: Well after the pilot, nav briefing we had an idea what we were going to do and where we were going to go, but how we were going to get there wasn’t ever discussed. It was never discussed. In fact, it wasn’t until just prior to going that we would talk about it. They used to discuss which way we would mostly take off and get to Reading, and at Reading it turned on to our target. I know it sounds silly but we were going anywhere until we got to Reading then we made for the target through Reading. That was our group you know?
AS: So 4 Group would fly across England, presumably avoiding London?
JS: Yes.
AS: And you’d have worked out your flight plan by then?
JS: Oh yeah. I tell you what did happen to me one night. We’d had a very long trip and we were very tired and coming back across France, I started to fall asleep. And I did just for a second or so and when I woke up, I looked around the aircraft, the gunners had undone their guns, everybody had heads down, including the skipper who was fast asleep. And we were over the, we were over England, but nobody knew where, ‘cause they were all asleep and didn’t care and I looked around and thought ‘Christ Almighty’. So I woke Ken up, he was the skipper, I said ‘Look, Ken, I don’t know how long you’ve been like this’. I said. He said ‘Oh it’s alright, it’s been on automatic pilot’. I said ‘I know it’s been on automatic, but how long is it supposed to be on for? Where are we, do you know?’ So he said ‘No, I haven’t a clue’. I said ‘That’s marvellous isn’t it?’ So I looked around, we woke the crew up and I thought ‘This is terrible, we could be anywhere, I know we’re heading north’ and then the Wash suddenly came into view. I could not believe my luck,. ‘cause as soon as I saw the Wash we knew where we were. But if we hadn’t have seen the Wash and it had gone on we could have been Scotland, run out of fuel and all had to bail out. That’s happened before as well.
AS: To you?
JS: No, no.
AS: To others on the squadron?
JS: I’ve had friends that it’s happened to, they just run out. Twice or three times – [knocking]
AS: So, Joe, back to a discussion on a typical mission if there is such a thing. You’d get briefed, did you air test the aeroplanes in the morning?
JS: I was only thinking that the other day when I looked at my book. We did very few air tests, very few air tests. I looked in here the other day. It’s amazing really, you’d have thought we’d have done more wouldn’t you? Because things were wrong with the aircraft and the ground staff, used to, when we got back, immediately jump on them to put it right. Nothing worse than an aircraft going wrong in the sky, you can’t do a thing about it you see, it’s got to be right when it leaves.
AS: Was that always the case with you, did you have issues in the air?
JS: Not really. I think I told you about, in there. [rustling of paper]
AS: But not mechanical issues? You didn’t have mechanical issues?
JS: Look at some of these. Silly things. Have you read this?
AS: No, not yet.
JS: Just have a quick look at it.
AS: OK. So, Joe, we’ll pick it up again, we’ve just had our tea. We were, we were talking about air tests. The fact that the aircraft, you didn’t test the aircraft very much so you had complete faith in the men?
JS: In the maintenance crew.
AS: Did you, did you used to socialise with them as well?
JS: Yes and no. Difficult. They all lived on the site which was miles from anywhere, outside and they used to live out there, virtually the maintenance crew.
AS: With the aircraft?
JS: Yeah. Awful. I’ve been out there sometimes in the winter, when they’ve asked us to come out, where we’ve had to sweep the snow off the aircraft to get it to go off and up, you know? The Halifax was a nice aircraft, I thoroughly enjoyed it. I’ve only ever once been in a Lancaster, I didn’t like it particularly, you had to climb over lots of beams and things to get to where you fly. But with the Halifax there was plenty of room inside. And we had also, on a couple of occasions, Ken said to me ‘You better check that bugger’, meaning the American that we’d got, or Canadian that was the mid-upper gunner, the turret under the aircraft, little turret.
AS: OK.
JS: And they used to fly on there, but they didn’t. I mean I never said anything, I didn’t drop them in it. But I’ve been back and they’ve been lying there half asleep having a smoke. They never went out of the turret.
AS: So, the Halifax’s were fitted, your Halifax’s were fitted with?
JS: Some of them were yeah.
AS: OK, yeah. Did you mostly do navigation or was bomb aiming your speciality?
JS: Bomb aiming was my speciality with 77. Actually, I was going to get an award. Well I got the award but because of a silly incident at Scarborough, I lost it. I didn’t realise it but they took away my DFM and they took away his DFC, very unhappy he was. My fault.
AS: So, you’d been recommended for?
JS: Oh, before then I was, on one occasion, I forget which one it was ‘cause I never made a fuss in my logbook. Some people wrote things in the logbooks but I never did. On one occasion I went in and I was a bomb aimer and I dropped the bombs so badly to the ground that it started one end of the rail centre, right down the line, through the station, out the other side, and ruined. I cut the whole bloody railway out of the business. No, I had a letter from them to express, to express you know what a good job I’d done. The next thing I know is, I’m recommended for the DFM. Oh, OK. But after the incident at Scarborough it wasn’t quite the same, um. I’ve seen some funny things happen to other people. They didn’t talk about it very much but you obviously know about LMF?
AS: Yeah.
JS: And we had, at one period, quite a lot of LMF. Except for one guy and he was, he came from New Zealand and his skipper came from New Zealand and he used to be a nice guy, bomb aimer. And I got friendly with him but he was very religious, and he’d done about sixteen ops and he turned to me one night and said ‘I can’t do this anymore, Joe’. I said ‘What’s up?’ ‘I can’t do this bombing business anymore’. I said ‘Well what can you do about it, you can’t say I don’t want to do it’. ‘Oh, I can’. I said ‘But’. He said ‘Well what am I going to do?’ I said ‘I don’t know. Think about it, think about it’. Well he did. He complained that he didn’t want to, and he explained that he didn’t want to fly anymore, and I thought they would go for him but they didn’t. They said ‘Look sunshine, you’ve done over eighteen ops so far, what are you worried about?’ And they stopped and took him off and they sent him home. So he was a very lucky guy.
AS: This was on 578 or 77?
JS: On 578.
AS: So, what happened to some of the other guys who, as you say, went LMF?
JS: Oh God, terrible. When I first joined 77 I was walking down towards the Sergeants’ Mess and I saw a gang of airmen that did all the dirty work, clearing up. And in charge was a bloke who’d obviously been a sergeant ‘cause they’d ripped the sergeants stripes and you could see where they’d been, in charge of this dirty gang. And as I got up close to him I realised it was a friend of mine called Sandy Mount, and I said ‘Hello Sandy, what’s?’ ‘I don’t know you Joe’, he said. Funny thing to say, ‘I don’t know you Joe’. And off he went with his gang. I went into the Mess, I’d only just joined the squadron, and I said, I mentioned it. ‘Oh, don’t talk about him’. I said ‘What is he doing?’ ‘He’s waiting to be sent away to the LMF place down on the coast where they really give you a bad time’. I said ‘Why?’ Apparently the first time he said there was something wrong with the aircraft so they cancelled it. The second time something else went wrong and he returned early, the third time, on the fourth time they realised that he didn’t want to do what he was doing, and they said he’d got to come off flying.
AS: And punished?
JS: And they took him off, called him LMF and put him in charge of all the blokes doing the shit [inaudible]. There was this New Zealand guy that I knew he done about sixteen ops and he turned to me, he was very religious, and he turned to me one night and said ‘Joe I can’t do this anymore. I don’t know why we’ve got into our states with this war, it’s not on’. I said ‘Well you can’t do much about it now, you’ve got to wait until you finish your tour’. ‘Oh, I don’t think I could’, he said. Well his pilot, who was also a New Zealander, went up to the CO and they explained the situation and the CO was very good. He said ‘I can’t say LMF, I can’t blame him ‘cause he’s an extremely good navigator’, he says. ‘but we can’t have this sort of thing ‘cause if anybody else starts doing what he does, what do we do?’ So, they sacked him but they sent him home.
AS: Lucky man.
JS: Which was the best thing they could have done. He wasn’t a coward, it wasn’t that, he just said ‘I can’t do this anymore. What are we doing, all this dropping bombs on people and killing them?’ He said ‘It’s not on, this isn’t warfare is it?’ His skipper actually, terrible part about [unclear} it was, I must tell you this, hell of a nice guy, they only had one or two ops left to do, the crew, not him ‘cause he’d gone. And they went missing. Never seen. So the skipper was killed, obviously the aircraft disappeared, isn’t that amazing? But he didn’t go with them ‘cause he’d gone home to New Zealand.
AS: Premonition or something.
JS: Isn’t it strange, this world how it works isn’t it?
AS: Absolutely. You mentioned he, the navigator, bomb aimer couldn’t go on bombing. What was the feeling in the country, say in 1944/45 about the bombing, what?
JS: We were heroes ‘cause we were doing a great job, we were knocking them about something awful. This is what it said about Bomber Command, there’s a big article coming out soon. 1944 we were heroes, marvellous, good lads, 1945 we were villains, bombing these poor Germans. That’s true, mind you we were bombing them. God forbid we gave them quite a hounding. I remember going to Essen twice, I remember Hagen twice and each occasion it was a write off. Because when the war was over we took some of our ground crew and the WAAF’s on a visit to see what we’d done and I was absolutely flabbergasted at some of the damage we did out there. God, terrible.
AS: And most of the time you’d been the bomb aimer?
JS: Yeah.
AS: And somebody else was doing the navigating?
JS: Um.
AS: Yeah.
JS: I worked, I, navigation’s a funny thing. It got easier as the time went on because we had a lot of equipment to help us. It was much easier than when we first started.
AS: What did navigation involve when you first started, when you were navigating a trip?
JS: They used to call it, there’s a name for it. Well, it means pencil and paper and get down to it, you know?
AS: Dead reckoning?
JS: Yeah, dead reckoning. Didn’t always work out either, had a lot of trouble with it. When I look back on some of the guys that I flew with and lost, it was very difficult really. You never knew, well I knew I was going to come back, which is the most important thing, but a lot of them began to lose confidence. When you find that you had not one awful trip but two awful trips and then you lose the bloody way and everything goes wrong. So you realise what can happen, and does happen, but it never happened to me. I was very, very fortunate.
AS: And, generally, were the ones you saw losing confidence, were they the ones that didn’t come back?
JS: Oh yes, yeah. Yes, it was a shame because, don’t know how to explain it. I used to like to dance and I used to go to dances as lot and one or two of the lads I was with came. Most of the crew didn’t go for the dancing they went for the booze and the girls and they never turned up until the last knockings to find a bird to take home with them. But some of them I met, and we lost them. It seemed sad to think we wouldn’t see them again but it was just the way it was. My crew were funny really in that respect. When I look back on old Henley, he was a terrible man, a terrible man, I didn’t treat him as an officer above me in any way whatsoever, ‘cause I hadn’t got that much confidence in him and I hadn’t got that much respect for him either. If I had I would have shown it but I couldn’t show him ‘cause I didn’t think he was that sort of a guy.
AS: In, did you used to go to the cinema and watch the news reels?
JS: Um.
AS: What did they say about Bomber Command?
JS: Well they maintained the fact that we were doing a very good job and that it was necessary. I don’t think it was towards the end of the war as necessary as they made it ‘cause we did some terrible things you know? We really did towards the end of the war. We really did tear the place apart.
AS: And did?
JS: I went to Hamburg one night and we made a terrible mess of it. Bugger me, two nights later, they sent us back again to finish it off. And we did, burnt it down. It was a, you get to a stage where you don’t care, it was as easy as that.
AS: It’s just a job?
JS: Um.
AS: But the excitement of flying that you talked about before, did that stay with you?
JS: Oh yeah, yeah. [chuckling]. I’ve had some good times in the air. When we first, when I first went onto Dakotas I loved it. Oh God we had some fun.
AS: So how did that, you were in 77 Squadron?
JS: Um.
AS: You finished your tour did you, you did thirty trips?
JS: Um.
AS: And this would be after the war, or just?
JS: No, it’s in there.
AS: Just as the war was finishing. So –
JS: Chevrolets. We were going to the Far East you see? So, we all trained, were trained to fly these twin-engine things, Chevers.
AS: OK. So, this is in May, end of May 1945?
JS: Yes.
AS: So –
JS: The war was over here.
AS: Yeah, so ops to Nuremberg in April, ops to Heligoland. Your last op was Heligoland in April?
JS: It was an island in the middle and it was the last. And I’ll tell you a strange thing, you mention that, only a few of us were there, about twenty, and I watched this happen. I watched a ‘plane above drop his bombs on the ‘plane below and blow two others out of the sky with him. Five aircraft - ‘Bang’. Honest truth. And I looked there with my skipper and I said ‘Has anybody got out?’ and he said ‘I can’t see a sign’.
AS: No ‘chutes?
JS: I don’t think anybody survived. This is bloody night, the last day of the war you know, isn’t that awful?
AS: And that’s what you see in daylight. The same thing must have happened at night time?
JS: Um.
AS: And 5 Group used to fly higher than you?
JS: Oh, they did yes. I, I’ve, we’d been extremely lucky with the aircraft that we had ‘cause some of them were beginning to get very worn out. In fact, I told you the one I was flying had done it’s hundredth op. This was its hundredth op when these Germans came. We’d been warned for weeks, ‘Watch out’. What was the word they called?
AS: Intruders?
JS: Intruders, yeah, yeah, intruders. What happened was, as soon as we crossed the coast this side the gunners undid their guns. The, everybody sat down, even the skipper. Set the target on automatic and went to sleep. Out of the blue, these bloody aircraft were with us and we never saw them. And they shot down twenty over where I was. One of my mates he was, he was in a terrible state. They tried to land but nobody would take them on, ‘cause as soon as they went into land the Germans would come and they would shoot the place up. But they did bail out and he landed in a tree in a churchyard and it was a big tree right up high, and his ‘chute got caught in the top so he was hanging there swinging. And he gets his fags out and he puts his fag in his mouth, and he gets his lighter out and drops it. [laughter], and he sat there, hour after hour, waiting for someone to come in the early hours of the morning. Nobody turned up until about ten o’clock to see him stuck up a tree. He was alive at least anyway. He got away with it.
AS: Yeah. As your tour progressed and we, you got H2S and G, was there a feeling that it was becoming more professional with a bigger bomber stream and more aeroplanes?
JS: I think so. I think it was the numbers that were telling, it was big. They couldn’t hit us back, we were too big. In fact, they couldn’t touch us with all their guns used together. The only thing they used to have were these intruders. They used to have jets and they used to come up from nowhere when the jets first started, but they were going so fast they used to fly past us and couldn’t hit us. By the time they turned round, we’d gone. But I’ve seen some very bad incidents, very bad incidents. When I look back on it now we used to joke and we used to laugh about things but it was a very serious business you know? When I think of all the chaps I’ve known that used to be mates of mine that have gone. We used to come home on leave and my brother Tony was there at the time of course, and he used to say ‘Why the hell you went into Bomber Command I’ll never know’. I said ‘Well, you must remember Tony, you didn’t intend to go the way you went. Life has its own way of going and there’s nothing you can do to stop it’. He ended up, as I say, deaf in one ear with a pension. Amazing isn’t it? Last week he died, ninety years old, ‘cause he put his age up about three years. He um, I could never understand why my Dad gave me such a bollocking for what I did.
AS: Tell us about that. This was when you went home in? He knew you were in Bomber Command?
JS: Um.
AS: And you were welcomed when you went home on leave?
JS: I finished my tour and I went home to finish. I told him I’d finished and Mum I wouldn’t be bombing anymore and Dad said ‘You shouldn’t have done it in the first place. What the devil you’re up to in there’. I said ‘This is what war is all about’. I said ‘You seem to forget Dad, that they bombed us first you know’. ‘I don’t recall that’. I said ‘I know you don’t ‘cause you weren’t here, you were in London, you were in the north of England’. I said ‘But they dropped bombs on us, it was just, we didn’t drop the bombs first, they did’. He said ‘Joe, all I can say to you is if you close your eyes and think back on all the people you must have killed you must have a terrible conscience’. I said ‘Well to be honest Dad, I’ve never given it a thought, but now you’ve put it into my mind I probably won’t forget’. Which I didn’t, and [inaudible] But what can you do about it?
AS: But he’d known you were in Bomber Command when you went home on leave?
JS: Yeah, I didn’t talk about it at all.
AS: OK.
JS: I never talked about flying when I was home. Never said a word. Never said I was flying ops or anything. Never said what I was doing. I just said that, they asked why do I get leave so regular. I said ‘Because that’s the way it goes’, you know. When I look back on it now it was regular then. But then you might as well take it ‘cause you didn’t know when the next one was going to be.
AS: And as crews disappear you go up the leave ladder?
JS: When I look back you know, God I lost some guys. I was thinking about you, I’m glad you came today, and I’m sorry that I carry on so, because I don’t ever talk about the Air Force, I certainly couldn’t do it at home. And my Dad, or even now at home with people. My girls don’t seem to realise and they don’t take any notice. I’m not bragging to be some sort of hero but I don’t really get involved in talks about it. Have a bit of a laugh sometimes with some of the funny things that happened, some of the songs we used to sing and some of the things we used to do.
AS: Can you still remember any of those songs?
JS: All of ‘em, yeah.
AS: OK.
JS: 77 has their own one.
AS: Yeah.
JS Then 578 was, started off – ‘We’re the pilot, otherwise Joe, we take him wherever we go. Berlin or [inaudible] wherever they send ‘em, it’s all the same to him. We’re the gunners, Dawson and Rear,[inaudible] with the flight engineer. It appalled us when they called us, we’d rather go on the beer. Navigations what I do, at least that’s what I tell the crew.’ [laughter] And things like this you know? The other one was, ‘77, 77 though we say it with a sigh. We’d rather work for Mr Bevan then we’d never have to fly’. And we had all these songs, and it was cheerful, it took your mind off what you were doing. We drank a lot and they knew we drank a lot and nobody corrected us. Because they used to say ‘The poor buggers they can’t guarantee they’re going to get any more drink’, you know? Whether they’d come back. We did lose so many guys.
AS: Yeah.
JE: We did lose so many guys.
AS: Yeah.
JE: And it wasn’t until after the war on my own I sat down and thought about it. And I’m not going to argue with my Dad, I’m not going to talk about it, I’m not even going to mention it to anybody. So, I didn’t say I was in the Air Force. I thought if I don’t say it I won’t have to talk about it or worry about it. Because some people thought I was a hero but some people thought we were villains.
AS: And this was quite quickly after the end of the war that things changed?
JE: Um. When I look back on it now, what a time to live eh?
AS: Well, it’s an experience. I mean did you ever think you’re getting airborne with two thousand gallons of fuel and twelve thousand pounds of bombs it was a bit dangerous?
JS: No, I didn’t, yeah.
AS: Did you?
JS: I tell you on one occasion, odd occasion this, we had a two-thousand-pound bomb hung up in the bombing rack, and the bloody thing wouldn’t go. Well, I was the smallest member of the crew, so I went, they hung me by my legs into the bomb bay with a hammer. And I had to ‘bang, bang, bang’ at the group until the bloody thing went. And it went, and after it went, didn’t it go with a bang? Christ Almighty! And the other time, of course, was definitely was my fault. Where we dropped the bombs on Scarborough. We should never have done them really, but we wanted, we were getting so close to the sea and yet we didn’t seem to be getting there. I thought if we don’t get there in a minute we’re going in. So, I pressed the wrong tit at the wrong time.
AS: I think dropping them live was what probably upset them, Joe.
JS: Oh my God, the rear gunner said, ‘Christ Almighty, what’s going on Joe?’ He said. There was a terrible bang and then another one and of course they were all going off. Actually, I, we were lucky we didn’t blow ourselves out of the sky really.
AS: Yeah.
JS: Crazy thing to do.
AS: There’s a minimum height for.
JS: Um.
AS: You also dropped lots of bombs safe didn’t you after the war? Tell me about that.
JS: We used to load the aircraft with bombs. Fly outside of Hull and drop them in the sea. Just unload the whole bloody lot downward, go back and get another load. There were so many bombs in the bomb dump and we said ‘They won’t be used again. We want them out of the way’. So, on the floor outside of Hull are literally hundreds of bombs that were dropped there during the war. The next job after that was the aircraft. We had to fly them up to Newcastle. We took anything that was necessary off, flew them up there and they burnt them and broke them up. This was after the war.
AS: Soon after the war?
JS: Yes, not many weeks after the war, ‘cause by that time I’d then gone onto Dakotas you see? And Ken and I had to learn to fly Dakotas, I enjoyed that, they were good fun.
AS: Did you surprise Ken with how well you could fly? Did he know about your previous experience?
JS: Oh yeah, he knew initially that I could fly, because rare occasions, very rare occasions, he’d let me fly the Halifax. Only when he wanted to have a slash or have a break, then I would take over you see?
AS: On ops?
JS: Um.
AS: Gosh.
JS: When I look back on it now I was glad I wasn’t a pilot. I wouldn’t have wanted to be a pilot anymore. Different if you were a Spitfire pilot or a Hurricane pilot, which is what I originally went in to do. That’s alright but not sitting at the [inaudible] of the bloody thing.
AS: Bus driving.
JS: Bus driving yeah.
AS: Well they call them don’t they? Driver air frame mark one?[chuckling].
JS: Yeah.
AS: So, you stayed on 77, and the idea was they’d re-role 77 to be a transport squadron?
JS: Um.
AS: And you became a second pilot sharing the flying with Ken?
JS: With Ken.
AS: So, you didn’t stay in the UK, what happened?
JS: Went straight out to the Far East.
AS: Did you take any sort of test as a pilot? Qualification as a pilot?
JS: We both had a test before we left. I spent a bit of time, we both were capable of flying and it was known, but he was the pilot obviously and I was the second pilot. But the aircraft, some of them were quite good, some of them were rubbish. They had them too long and they should have been scrapped but we used them occasionally. Um.
AS: In training or?
JS: Um.
AS: And then you went with Dakotas overseas?
JS: Um.
AS: What was that all about, ‘cause the war in the Far East was still going on was it?
JS: Yes, we went out for the invasion of Japan. We were going to act as the taxis for the people who were going to invade Japan, but they dropped the bombs on Japan completely, well it was fantastic bombs they dropped on Japan. And the war finished immediately. So after that we did every job that could be, was necessary for an aircraft to do. We brought the prisoners of war back home, we did all sorts of interesting things.
AS: You set off the 27th of September to Sardinia? That’s one leg, Libya, Karachi this took you?
JS: Took about ten days.
AS: Amazing. Delhi via the Taj Mahal.
JS: Um.
AS: Carried VIP’s. What was that all about?
JS: We took some. You see we had all sorts of jobs. Oftentimes somebody’s generals and admirals that had to go and we took them. We had a special aircraft which had seats, ‘cause a lot of the aircraft hadn’t got seats, had to sit on the floor. But we had lots of aircraft fitted for important people, and we took them to various places. I did a tour once, oh that was it, I did a tour once with them, with a concert party, and we had the concert party with all the extras in the Dak. And we used to fly every night we’d fly to a different place, and then they’d do their trip. Well then they finished, towards the end they said to us ‘What do you think of the show, Joe?’ I said, and I felt embarrassed, I said ‘Actually’, ‘Oh, go on’. ‘We’ve never seen the show’. ‘Good God man’ they said. I said ‘Well, there’s always’. ‘We’ll give you a performance tonight’. So some of them did. There were two brothers, they dressed up as young females. They were so good.
AS: You’ve been out East too long. [laughter]
JS: And I finished up with the tour at Bombay and we realised that we had a couple of days over, so I said to Ken ‘Can’t we get hold of some money and stop here for a couple of days?’ So he said he would see what he could do, and he got some cash out of somewhere. And we stopped on for a couple of days extra. And I liked Bombay, I learned to swim underwater in Bombay, ‘cause they had a beautiful pool there.
AS: And that’s where in November 1945, at Palam, you set off on your last flight with 77 Squadron?
JS: That’s right yeah.
AS: Tell me about finishing flying, was that planned or?
JS: No. I didn’t think he was going home that quickly, ‘cause he wanted to get home anyway. And his number came up long before mine, and I could have carried on with somebody else, but I suddenly thought ‘I’ve been flying for four years, I’m the luckiest bloke I know, perhaps I can even get an early journey home’. Well I went to see the CO and he said he realised that I had had a good innings but he couldn’t let me go yet, it wasn’t down. He said ‘There’s a nice little job coming up in the post office’. I said ‘oh’. He said ‘I think you’d like it you know, you’re in charge’. So I said ‘OK’ so I took it on until such time as it was due to come home. When I look back on it now, India was going through terrible internal problems. I was bloody glad to get out of India. They were killing each other wholesale. One against the other. Just before the break up, because that’s, if you look at the time, dates, that’s when they finally broke up, India and Pakistan.
AS: I think also there was some trouble in the Air Force wasn’t there? What they called the 1946 RAF Mutiny?
JS: Oh yeah.
AS: What was that about?
JS: That arrived it was the first time I went out there. It wasn’t ’46, it was ’45 I think, could have been ’46. What had happened was, all the guys, the ground staff guys, had been out in the Far East, some of them for four years, never been home. And here was the war over in England and all their mates were leaving and getting good jobs and there’s them stuck out there in India. And it got worse and worse until eventually there was a desertion and then a –
AS: A mutiny?
JS: Yeah, it really went mad. I thought there might even be a bit of violence but there wasn’t. But some of the chaps who were actually in charge, and they were officers, they were in trouble, they were jailed. But, and I can see their point, lots of them had been out there for four years. All their mates had gone home in England and finished the war and were getting jobs, nothing for them.
AS: So, what happened to Joe Stemp then? You’re running a post office?
JS: Yeah.
AS: You told me earlier you taught yourself to drive on a big truck.
JS: Yeah.
AS: How did you end up from India?
JS: My time came up to leave.
AS: OK.
JS: And I went up, I flew home. [inaudible] what I’m going to do and my father said to me ‘I’ve saved you a position in the works’. He said ‘You can start next Monday’. I said ‘Hang on, I’ve been away. I wasn’t going to start work straight away, I thought I’d have a break’. ‘Why?’ I said, ‘Because I’ve been away and I want a break’. ‘I don’t know about that’ he says, ‘I’ve kept a job for you here’. So I said ‘OK’. So I started and I hated it. And after a few weeks a mate of mine got in touch with me and we went and had a drink together. And he worked on the paper that the, Times no?
AS: Financial Times?
JS: Financial Times.
AS: The pink one.
JS: And he said ‘How would you like a job on the Financial Times?’ ‘Oh, not half’. I said. ‘I’ll see what I can do’. And the next thing I know is I’m offered a job by them. I went up, saw them, they liked me, I liked them and I went to work for them, and it was up and up from then onwards. I went out on the road eventually, had a good job as a rep and eventually went out on the road and did very well. Maxwell.
AS: Yeah.
JS: My first client, I’ve told you haven’t I? Three months I gave him his work. Did lots of [inaudible] for him, never got a penny. When I went to get money from him he was rude to me and told me to get stuffed and all sort of things. So I said ‘That’s it, we’re finished with you’. And we did but I carried on and I had some very good clients in the end and they liked me and also the women liked me, so I had lots of women clients. And they all liked Joe and I was getting more money. Before I knew where I was I was doing very well and over the years I’ve done very well.
AS: How did you meet and marry Pat?
JS: On a train. I was flying, it was just before I went to the Far East when I was still flying Dakotas, and I went, I took a couple of days off. And a mate said to me ‘Let’s go down the coast for a couple of days and have a break’. So I said ‘What a good idea’. And my Dad didn’t want me to because he knew that I’d go boozing. I said ‘So?’ Anyway, I went. We get to the station, we get to the train, there isn’t room to spare. We walked right the length of the train [inaudible] and in the last carriage, eight women were in there, but nobody moved. So, we stood outside all the way to Plymouth and at Plymouth two got out, and we went in and used their seats. And I took one look at this woman opposite me and I fell in love with her, now I did. I know I’m a romantic but there and then. So, the next day I looked and saw she had a wedding ring and an engagement ring. I thought ‘Bloody marvellous, every time I fancy some girl someone else has got there first’. So the next day we were talking casually and she said she was a widow. Oh, lost her husband shot down over Poland flying the aircraft [inaudible]. So on the third day I asked her to marry me. She thought I was crazy. ‘Good God man’. She said. ‘I don’t even know your name, never mind marry you’. I said ‘Would you marry me?’ She thought about and she said ‘Put it this way, I’ll think about it’. I said ’Look, I’m going away any moment now, like tomorrow or the day after, to the Far East. I don’t know how long I’m going to be going but I’ll be gone probably about a year. And I’d like to know’. She said ‘I’m not going to say anything. I’ll think about it’. So she wrote to me during the first year and when I came home I asked her again, and we got married. So, I did well didn’t I? [laughs]
AS: Absolutely.
JS: She said something to me about two years ago. She’d wet herself in the home down the road there, and I went to change her knickers for her and I changed her knickers in the toilet and I whispered in her ear ‘What a good job I love you to death’. Do you know what she said to me? ‘Joe, I’ve loved you from the moment I first saw you’. Christ I was nearly in tears.
AS: On the train?
JS: Um. So I said ‘You’re a funny girl’. I knew see, and of course we got on very well over the years but she used to write me nice letters. Even when the Queen sends us a card. There’s a certain period of the year when the Queen sends us a card. Because we’ve got some connection with them. And she usually writes in the Queen’s letter or card a nice letter to me. Always a nice letter saying how much she loves being married to me and what a marvellous life she’s had. And that was how it went.
AS: And did you ever talk about the war and the flying between you?
JS: No.
AS: Because she’d lost her husband?
JS: We never did. Only time she said something was when I did say at one time, ‘I should have stayed in you know Pat?’ ‘What do you mean you should have stayed in?’ I said ‘All my mates who stayed in did a great job, doing, working for Europe, buying stuff in Europe and coming over after the war you know? They were making a fortune on the side.
AS: It’s called smuggling Joe. [laughter]
JS: It is just that. So I said, she said ‘Joe, I’ve told you I lost one husband and I’m not going to take another one, it’s up to you’. I said [inaudible] So we were married. Sixty-five years we were married.
AS: Good lord.
JS: Never had a cross word with her hardly in all that time. My girls could never understand it. ‘You and Mum’ they said ‘You get on so well’. I said ‘Well, that’s what life’s supposed to be like, getting on well.’ Well now you know a lot about that book.
AS: I’d like to photograph the book in a minute Joe. Just one final set of thoughts really, perhaps? That we talked about your father’s attitude to the bombing.
JS: Oh yeah.
AS: The public’s attitude through the fifties and sixties and the seventies, I think was, in many ways, was much against the bombing although you didn’t talk about it.
JS: No.
AS: Did you feel it was unfair? Did you shout internally about it or?
JS: They felt that we were taking advantage of the fact that the Germans were in trouble with Russia and when they were in their worst state we were taking advantage and bombing them badly. Which we did. I never discussed that, it never gave me a thought. When you fly you’re told what you told, you go where you’re told to go, and do what you’ve got to do. And that’s all I can say. I couldn’t say to them ‘Oh I’m not going to bomb there, I’m not going to go there’. You do what you’re told. I didn’t even want to belong to Bomber Command but once you’re are, you’re there aren’t you?
AS: And you had no choice about where you went?
JS: No.
AS: When you were flying, this has just occurred to me, did you have a lot of, I mean the enemies were the flak, the fighters and the weather. Did you have a lot of trouble with the weather?
JS: No. If the weather was bad we didn’t go. [inaudible] Our raid were also worked on how the weather was going to be on the way and on the way back,. ‘cause we had to get back from Germany, it wasn’t like round the corner it was a six hour trip sometimes. And basically we did well. Occasionally we did come unstuck. In which case we had to find somewhere to land as soon as we hit this coast. Which we did, we went to a smaller ‘drome in south of England.
AS: OK.
JS: Went in there on two or three occasions. I’ve been down there and found the place full of Halifax’s, and bombers and all sorts that had run out of fuel.
AS: So, is it fair to say that the weather reports you were given, or forecasts were pretty good most of the time?
JS: They were very good.
AS: OK.
JS: I think I mentioned this. Just before I joined the squadron, I met some mates of mine who were in a similar squadron but they were flying Whitley’s and Wellingtons, and they hated the flying so what they did was, and this is an absolute truth, there used to be a song. ‘Bomb holes in the roof tops, instead of craters in the sea’. What had happened was, they’d be having a drink and the skipper would come in. ‘Don’t have any more drink lads, we’re on tonight’. ‘Oh, sod it, have we got to go?’ ‘Yes’. ‘Oh, alright.’ They’d take off, get half way across the coast then they’d say to each other ‘Let’s have a go’. So they’d all have a go at the skipper. ‘Have we got to go? This is bloody silly, really isn’t it? Why can’t we dump our bombs here and go back home? The navigator can cook the log’. Which he could, so they did. And it went on and on. At that period there were more bombs dropped in the bloody sea than ever dropped over there. And then they found out what they were doing, ‘cause the next morning they’d go down and they’d say ‘That’s funny, they reckon they dropped all the bombs, where did they drop them? We can’t find any bomb holes anywhere’. Spitfire would go over. They decided they must do something about it so they fitted a new attachment like that, to a camera, to the bomb tit. So when you pressed the bomb tit it showed you where the bombs were going. So you couldn’t get away with it anymore. [laughs]
AS: So, this was automatic, so many seconds after the bombs went?
JS: Um. But there was an awful lot of it. And when you think of the aircraft, they were pathetic aircraft, you know? You didn’t stand a chance really with them. At least with our aircraft we had good aircraft. I mean the Lancaster and Halifax were both fantastic bombers. And well looked after, well good.
AS: Can you remember still, and I don’t expect this, but can you remember the drills you had to do as the bomb aimer as you’re approaching the target?
JS: Any?
AS: The drills. Did you have to set the wind up or? Too long ago?
JS: No, as I recall, I did most of it, I didn’t do them all. But we had to get, as I recall. We used to lay on our stomach and we got our bomb sight lined up with where we had to drop the bombs. And generally speaking I was either very lucky, not always so clever, but very lucky. Consequently, I had some very, very good results and we got a big reputation. I told you, on the bombs on that railway, I blew the station from one end to the other. Right down the line, blew everything out of the way. And so I got congratulated on it. And on a number of occasions I was, I personally was congratulated, which was such a shame when I hit the Scarborough bit. [laughter]
AS: OK. I think we’ve had a really good go at this Joe, I’m –
JS: Haven’t we, I’m sorry.
AS: No, I’m so grateful for you. And perhaps we could resume another day?
JS: Yes.
AS: When maybe some more memories will come back.
JS: Next time I’ll take you out to have something to eat. It’s been nice, I’m not giving you bullshit now. It’s been nice to meet you, you’re exactly as I thought you would be and I’ve enjoyed your company. And if you ever want to come again, not necessarily to chat even, you’re always welcome here with me.
AS: That’s very kind and I will.
JS: Sorry.
AS: This is the second reel of interview with Joe Stemp. Joe, I think we paused at the point when we were talking about your disappointment at –
JS: At losing. Yes. Scrubbing my pilot’s skills.
AS: Did they. What happened next? Did they give you the choice of being a navigator or?
JS: Not really, I don’t know. All I know is that for some months I did odds and ends around and the next thing I know is I’m at Blackpool, going out to South Africa to do this navigation course.
AS: What sort of odds and ends did they have you doing?
JS: Oh, I did all sorts of things for them, I was most surprised they let me do it really. I quite enjoyed it, it was quite enjoyable. I was up at Blackpool for some time and, you know, I quite enjoyed the Air Force. I had intended to go for a pilot’s course, another one, and try again but I realised that they’d got all the records and I would never have got away with it.
AS: So, you’d come out then and enlist under a different name or something?
JS: Yeah.
AS: OK. So, after they’d had you doing odds and ends, you’re in Liverpool, presumably going to South Africa by ship?
JS: Yes, we did.
AS: What was that like?
JS: Marvellous. I found a lot of good friends out there. East London was where I trained and the people of East London were very good to us. Families would adopt us so at the weekend we always had somewhere to go. And I was adopted by a family and they liked me and we had good times together, the Carter family. I had a very good time in South Africa, I thoroughly enjoyed it. The only thing that ever got me was she had a lot of other children, they weren’t hers. She had seven people working for her. She had people working for her, a family of seven and they lived in a rough old shack down the bottom of her garden. Well if I treated her children to sweets I treated their children. And she found out and I got a real bollocking. I mustn’t, she said ‘You don’t seem to realise, Joe, there’s more of them then us’. I said ‘It’s got nothing to do with it’. But, and I’ve always had this thing about it, the way they treated them.
AS: Was there any, did you encounter any anti-British feeling in South Africa?
JS: No, not really no. Not really. ‘Cause funny enough the Air Force weren’t very popular in South Africa, they weren’t very popular at all. I don’t know why, amongst the South African’s this is, I wasn’t unhappy to leave on that score. The course was very good, very interesting and we flew nearly every day. The weather was so good you could, you see We flew nearly every day.
AS: So, you were there doing a specific navigators course or an observers course?
JS: An observers course really. I was doing navigators and bomb aiming too. I did bombing as well. In fact, it was a brilliant – by the time I joined my crew on the Halifax I was the most experienced member of the crew really, although I was the youngest. It’s amazing isn’t it?
AS: So, you’d had training on navigation and bomb aiming? What else did you manage to pick up?
JS: Pilot training as well, you see, when I started, you see.
AS: Of course.
JS: I always remember when the war was over, I came home, and my skipper arranged to meet me in Ealing and we’d have a drink together. And we got terribly drunk and then got into trouble because we really let go. And I swore, I said ‘I’m not going to argue with you anymore. We’ll leave it to another time and finish this conversation’. And I walked out and left him. And I never did see him again, and I never did see him again because a couple of years later, out of the blue I found out he died early, so I never did get to see him.
AS: Can you discuss what the argument was about?
JS: Well first of all, I said the crew came to me at one period during our tour and said ‘You’re the best person to talk to him. Can you tell him that we are not here for the ride? We are part of this crew and we all have our jobs to do. Every time we say anything he completely ignores us’. So I said ‘In what –‘ So one of the gunners said ‘I told him, dive starboard’. I said. ‘How we got missed, I never know’. And all this sort of thing, he said ‘He never, ever listens to what we’re saying’. So I said ‘OK, I’ll have a word with him’. Because only the pilot and the navigator went into the main briefing. When the main briefing was over then the whole crew came in, and they all came in and after the briefing he went outside and he said ‘I believe you’re all upset with me?’ ‘Oh no’. And I stood there and I thought here I am, eighteen years old, I’ve learnt a lesson for life. Don’t talk up for other people, let them do it themselves. And I never. [laughs] And they all virtually. [inaudible] He said ‘Ha’. And I said ‘I don’t give a [inaudible], you either don’t want to know or you do, and I don’t care now’. We carried on, and in fairness he was a good pilot. And we had incidents as one does when one’s flying but basically I was very happy and we did a good job. I don’t think, I never wanted to go into bombers anyway. But as I say he was a funny guy. We went from there, as I told you, onto Dakotas, and the two of us were flying, learning to fly Dakotas at the same time. And then we flew out to the Far East with the object of the invasion of Japan, but they dropped the bomb and fortunately for us we didn’t have to invade Japan. So we ended up by doing anything out there that they needed. For example, we picked up most of the prisoners of war, our prisoners of war, and brought them back to India. Anywhere to get, you know? And we did all sorts of jobs with the Dakota. I always remember getting a whole group of these ex-prisoners. They were like, oh God it was awful, six stone some of them aAnd they didn’t want to get on the aircraft. They said ‘No, we’re going to get killed’. I said ‘We’ll be flying the bloody thing’. Anyway they got on, no seats, we just sat them on the floor. ‘Anyway, it’s only a couple of hours or so and then you’ll be out of here and on your way home’. But we did some very good jobs out there, I enjoyed it, but when he finally went home I didn’t want to fly with anybody else so they put me in charge of the post office in Karachi of all things.
AS: But it sounds like a fascinating marriage almost.
JS: Um.
AS: One hears of crewing up and how the crew is terribly tight knit.
JS: Um.
AS: Doesn’t seem really –
JS: It’s not true.
AS: To have been the case for you.
JS It’s not true. I know so many crews that were good and they were crews. They mixed together, they went out together, they worked together, they were part of a team. But my crew lasted, there were three of us, were good friends. The flight engineer and one of the gunners and I. The three of us were great friends. The flight engineer was a regular airman and he was coming, and he didn’t ever want to be in aircrew, and he was coming out with a load of stuff on his bike one day and just for a joke the guy on the desk said ‘What have you got there?’ And he’d got half a joint. He said ‘Where are you going with that?’ He was taking it to the Officers’ Mess. He’d nicked it from somewhere. It got into a big battle between him and the CO and they virtually said ‘We’ll give you an option. You can join aircrew and we’ll drop the charges or else’. And he didn’t want, he was scared. I’d been with him when poor old Tom. And I’d seen him gripping hold of the thing and I said ‘Don’t worry, we’ll be alright’. But he never did like flying. He was a good, he was a good flight engineer, but he hated flying, he was petrified.
AS: But still did his job?
JS: He did his job. When we finished the tour for some unknown reason, we all disappeared. Even he did you know? But he turned up again to say to me that he was going on Dakotas and he wanted me to come with him. So I did. As a pilot he was good, he knew what he was doing. As a man I wasn’t happy with him at all.
AS: Was he an officer? Was he an officer?
JS: He was a flight lieutenant.
AS: Do you think this was part of the issue with the crew?
JE: No, no. He was, he always fancied his chances. I had a feeling that he thought he was a bit cleverer and brighter than the others but actually, when it came down to it, he lived just round the corner from where I lived at home. Alright, I lived in a council estate and he didn’t, but he was nothing special and he had a very nice wife who he, I thought, treated abominably. Because there had been times when I was with him when we’d have awful rows. Because we’d be out, well I didn’t mind the other boys shagging around all over the place, but I did object to him doing it. And we’ve had so many rows over this over the years. When he, I, so for years went by and I was down in Guildford and I was sitting there and I got hold of the directory. And I looked there and there was his name in the directory. And I said ‘Good God, I’ll ring him up’. So I rang him up and a voice said, a very posh voice said ‘Hello, who’s that?’ I said, ‘It’s Joe Stemp’. ‘My God man, that’s’s going back a bit, my God’ she said ‘Fancy that’. And she kept going on and on but she didn’t mention him. I thought ‘She kicked him out, she must have done’. But she didn’t, he died a couple of years after, after I’d separated from him. With a heart attack.
AS: Lot of strain, lot of stress in operational life.
JS: It was yes, yeah.
AS: You raise an interesting issue actually about sex in wartime.
JS: Um.
AS: I think, yeah, my generation thought they invented sex. Every generation thinks they invented sex. [laughter] It’s not something one hears a great deal about.
JS: You know why don’t you? They didn’t like aircrew. The girls would not, did not, like going out with aircrew ‘cause they said you could never guarantee he was going to be there on Friday, which happens. They’d fall for one and then the chap just wouldn’t appear again. We lost so many men that women were very careful about who they went with, especially flying men. So I’m told. I never had a girlfriend, I didn’t really worry. I found a girlfriend at the right time when it was all over.
AS: But amongst your crew mates there was a lot of?
JS: Oh God, they used to take me with them. It was, I was embarrassed. And they used to, they started off first of all thinking I was queer because I didn’t want to know, then to stir things up they always got somebody for me. Some awful woman that they’d dump, and I’d get left with this. Oh God, yes they were always after me. The thing was I wasn’t very old either when you think about it was I? Only about eighteen.
AS: I won’t ask you who you were more terrified of, the flak or the ladies?
JS: [laughter] We had lots of incidents when I was flying but I’ll tell you a story. I didn’t do many daylight trips, mostly night trips, long night trips. I was on this day trip and the rear gunner said to me, called over, and we didn’t have a lot of chat when we were flying. And he called over the tannoy, ‘Joe, look ahead of you. See that Lanc, that Halifax on the right, that’s old Charlie Whatisname’. So I looked and I thought ‘Dunno’. I thought ‘Perhaps he’s right, yeah’. I said, ‘I think it’, and before I could say another word he disappeared into little bits. A Lancaster above dropped his bloody bombs on the. Honestly, and it blew him out of the sky. And I turned round to the crew and I said ‘I’d never really got worried about flying, but this has done me in, I can’t believe what I’ve just seen.. Terrible.
AS: And not unique?
JS: No,it wasn’t, it happened a lot. Crashing into each other, bombs on each other. I mean, in some of these big raids where we had hundreds of bombers there was terrible mess ups all the way through you know?
AS: What sort of things?
JS: I’m a strange guy. People used to say ‘You’re an amazing guy. You don’t seem to realise it’s a dangerous job you’re doing’. I said ‘Well it’s quite exciting really’. And that’s the way I saw it you see? It wasn’t until I watched him go and I suddenly thought ‘Christ, it’s dangerous up here’. But I was never nervous and I was never scared, honestly, because we had a job to do. I was quite happy. But he was, we’ve had, I had lots of problems with him, the skipper. When we flew together out in India different story entirely. I did a lot of flying with him.
AS: As a second pilot were you responsible for the navigational duties as well or did you carry a navigator?
JS: We had a navigator.
AS: So, you were sharing take offs, landings and the flying?
JS: In fact, the guy who was our navigator at that time with the Dakotas, I have to tell you this story. We were flying out to the Far East, we’d done two legs when suddenly the aircraft got into trouble. So we put it in at Tel Aviv in Israel and they said they’d examine the aircraft. While we were there two days we met a couple of girls. Just chatted normally, we took them out and had drinks and enjoyed their company and that was it. Thoroughly enjoyed it, ‘Bye, bye, see you some time’. Years later, I went to see this navigator, and I had a feeling that it wasn’t right ‘cause when I rang him his wife used to give him the information what to say, and I had a feeling he didn’t know. I think he had Alzheimer’s, I think he didn’t know what he was saying. So anyway, I went down to see him and we had quite an interesting visit. And I did a silly thing, I said to him ‘Do you remember the crash in the Wellington?’ And he looked at me all surprised, and his wife was standing behind him going. So, I thought ‘OK, stop it, that’s it’. He obviously had forgotten, one doesn’t forget crashes. So, I said ‘That’s it’. So when I left I get into my car, he had a posh house in Torbay, he came rushing down the thing and banged on the window. ‘Here, Joe’ he said, ‘Do you remember those two girls we met in Tel Aviv?’ and I said, ‘For Christ’s sake’. We had a terrible crash and I don’t know how we ever got away with it and he says, he’d forgotten that and he was talking about two girls that we met just casually. Isn’t that amazing?
AS: The memory is a funny thing. What was the crash as a matter of interest?
JS: I tell you what it was. And it was, my skipper wasn’t at the helm. We’d done a navigation course at which I was working and we ended up somewhere outside, that island, between England and Ireland.
AS: Isle of Man?
JS: Isle of Man. We parked in there and we were taking off to go back home, and we’d only been in the air about ten minutes when the operator came up and said ‘I’ve got a message, Joe, to be passed through’. The message was ‘Return to the Isle of Man because the weather in the North, in Scotland, is so bad they won’t take us in’. So I gave this to my pilot who gave it to the other man who was flying, the flight lieutenant we don’t know him. ‘Sod that’ he said. ‘I told my wife we’re going home tonight and I’m going home tonight’. Well we had no answer to this, he was in charge, he was the skipper, so off we went. When we get there it is foul. Lossiemouth, Kinloss, none of them would take us in. So we went to a little place called Elgin and he decided he’d go in there. Instead of going into wind he went downwind, took the bloody barbed wire fence with him. I watched it pull all the skin off the aircraft as I sat there, and eventually it ended on, there’s a, they used to raise dumps and put the grass round, you know, and it was a bomb dump. And as soon as we managed eventually to stop, there was nobody rushing to our aid, they’d all buggered off, running away ‘cause they thought. [laughter] I’ll never forget it. So I caught them up and we finished there and he wasn’t a mid-upper gunner because we hadn’t got a mid-upper turret. But we were keeping him for when we went onto heavies. And he went up to this officer and he walloped him. And of course everybody grabbed him. And I thought, said to my gunner ‘Joe it’s [inaudible]’’. Anyway, they didn’t. I think he lost his commission. I think he was charged ‘cause he was definitely told he mustn’t return. How the hell we got away with it I’ll never know.
AS: So, this is when you were back in England?
JS: Yeah.
AS: Crewed up?
JS: I’d crewed up but we were crewed up on Wellingtons you see?
AS: OK, whereabouts was that?
JS: I can’t think now.
AS: Doesn’t matter. This was what OTU?
JS: Like an OTU yes. This is where I first met my pilot and the other crew got together. We were crewed up as a crew. We had a strange crew. Lots of crews I’ve met over the years have been ideal. But there were some strange crews.
AS: Strange in what sense? How did you, how did you meet and fall in love as it were? How did you crew up the?
JS: They put us all together in this big hangar with drinks to follow, and you had the chance, people would come up and say, if they fancied you ‘Are you crewed up?’ ‘No’. ‘You’re not looking for an engineer?’ ‘Yeah, yeah’. It was all, you know, we ended up with, they were quite a mixed crowd really. Some of the crews were great, they got on so well together. They were a real team. But we couldn’t say that with Henley, ‘cause Ken Henley was an arrogant bastard really. I –
AS: Who was, can you remember, who was in charge of the crewing up? Did he take the lead? Did you take the lead?
JS: No, I did meet, I met two chaps who were talking together and I said to them, I liked the look of them you know? And I said to them ‘Are you crewed up?’ ‘No, not yet’.[inaudible]. He and I had just met, his gunner and his engineer had just met, and I said, ‘You haven’t got a crew?’ ‘No’. I said ‘Oh, could I join you?’ They said ‘Yeah, sure. Who are you flying with?’ And I said ‘Well I’ve got a skipper but I don’t know whether you’d like him or not?’ But they said ‘Oh sod him, we’ll have you’. And that’s how we got together. There were funny things happen with crews during the war. Very funny things used to happen.
AS: What sort of things?
JS: Well, my skipper for example was, he was a terrible womaniser in every possible way. And also he, what he said the crew agreed. In other words the crew used to say ‘He thinks he’s the only one on board. I don’t know why we all go with him ‘cause he doesn’t bother, you’d think he was the only one. He forgets there should be seven of us’. He did, and he did do this and I used to say to him ‘You must be more careful, Ken, with their feelings’. ‘I mean’ I said ‘When the other night’. One of the operators did something and he virtually turned him down. ‘He was absolutely right and you know it was’, I said, ‘Through him and through you ignoring him, we were five minutes late’ I said ‘We ended up that we would have reached the target five minutes after the other buggers had left’. I said ‘It wouldn’t have been a lot of fun’. And it got worse and worse and the nearer we got to the target, they kept coming up to me and saying ‘Joe, for Christ’s sake, tell him’. So I did. I mentioned ‘This is stupid. There’s no point on going on like this, we’re going to get shot to pieces in a minute, ‘cause we’re going to be the only ones up here’. And he at last agrees so we dropped all the bombs and we came home on our own. But it would have been awful.
AS: Going back to your accident up in Elgin. Were you ever aware of an organisation called the Training Flying Control Centre on the Isle of Man? That -
JS: No.
AS: That sent all these signals?
JS: No.
AS: My mother worked for them.
JS: Really? Good Lord.
AS: Yep. ‘Cause you and lots and lots of aircrews were training over the Irish Sea and they used to fly into mountains and fly into the sea. So they started this Training Flight Control Centre and they would be the people probably who sent you the recall message.
JS: Yeah.
AS: So, you were crewing up and learning the art of operational flying on Wellingtons? What were they like as kites? Were they new or old and clapped out? What were they like?
JS: Wellingtons?
AS: Yeah.
JE: Loved it. Loved ‘em. Oh, I was very keen on the Wellington. I liked the Wimpey, we all did. In fact, I was sorry when we started first of all on the Halifax. My, I must tell you this chap, one of my crew, the engineer he hated flying, he was absolutely scared stiff. But he had to, I think I told you because of an incident. But there were so many things. He was a professional airman too. He’d been in the Air Force before the war, the last thing he wanted to do was fly. But he was threatened so he had to start flying. And I used to try to comfort him because he I found he used to get so, so upset. I can see him standing there, holding onto things. He hated it, he hated ops. But he didn’t like upsetting us so he came with us. It wasn’t an easy job you know at times. We went out in some awful weather and did some awful trips, long trips. We were coming back from that big one, where we should never have dropped the bombs, we did because of the Russians.
AS: Dresden?
JS: Yes. And I said to my crew, ‘Now look’ I said. ‘Don’t for Christ’s sake put this in your logbook, ‘cause the time will come when you’ll be most embarrassed to know, or anybody else know, that you actually bombed here, like we’ve done’. ‘Well’ they said ‘All we’ve done is drop’. We didn’t drop explosive bombs. So, I said, I said ‘The best thing to do is forget all about it’. Because, I mean, fifty yards from the target, I looked back and the Americans had come in and they decided to bomb, and there was a lot of bombing going on. It was awful.
AS: So even, even as, you were carrying incendiaries? Even as you were over the target what made you think not to put it in your logbook? Just the?
JS: The fact that we realised we shouldn’t have been there anyway. I didn’t feel we should have bombed there. They said, they said ‘It’s the Russians, we’re doing it to please Russia’. Perhaps we are, but nobody seemed happy about it. None of the crews that I flew with that day said to me anything. They all had a bit of an indiscretion, they all felt a bit bad about that one.
AS: This was after the briefing?
JS: Um.
AS: What did they say then, just that it was to help the Russians, at the briefing?
JS: Well they said it would help the trouble on that front, you know? The following day the Americans went in but they didn’t have incendiaries, they had high explosives, they blew the place apart.
AS: Before we got to your operational missions, you were, how long did it take on the Wellingtons, on the OTU? What sort –
JS: A long time.
AS: What sort of things were you doing?
JS: A lot of training on the Wellington. I loved that on the Wellingtons. Apart from the crash we had a great time. I thought it was a lovely aircraft, always did. This guy who was flying it he was, he’d had a flat near the ‘drome, and he promised his missus he was going home, regardless of us. Regardless of [inaudible] that the weather was bad or that they weren’t going to take us into Kinloss or Lossiemouth. And he still carried on. Well, he was in charge, we weren’t. So, you just do what you’re told don’t you?
AS: So he was a staff pilot from the OTU?
JS: Oh yeah, yeah. I think he lost his rank, I think he lost his job. I don’t remember afterwards anything happening. All I know is that we were. We didn’t realise why people were running away from us, not coming to our aid. Because we were on the bloody bomb dump that’s why.
AS: So, I imagine that it wasn’t quite the same then nowadays. Did you get leave and counselling or anything like that?
JS: Well, when we were flying on ops we had leave about every month. We had a week off and not only did we have a week off but Lord, was it Nuffield?
AS: Nuffield yeah.
JS: Used to give us extra money. Did you know that?
AS: Yes.
JS: For aircrew, most unusual. And I used to always have a white fiver to give to my Mum. And when I used to go home I used to give my Mum the white fiver, she used to rush up the stairs and hide it. And years later, couple of years, she gave it all back to me to put in the Crusader Rescue. I said ‘I’m not going to do it. It isn’t for the Crusader Rescue, it’s for you’. But no we had a, we did quite well, we had leave quite regularly.
AS: After your accident did they give you leave? Or just put you in another aeroplane?
JS: No. After our accident we were flying a different ‘plane the next day to make sure we were all alright, ‘cause they thought perhaps you know we’d not want to fly again.
AS: At this time when you’re flying over England, over Europe, I’m told it was very different from flying in South Africa. How did you find it, did you pick up the navigation in Europe very quickly?
JS: Yes. Lots of room. Lovely weather, lots of room. The pilots actually that were training with us were South African Air Force pilots. And one in particular he’d got a couple of girlfriends. And he used to bugger me up because I’d be on a navigation trip and he’d say ‘I won’t be long, Joe, I’m just going to pull off for a bit’. And off he’d go off to up where his girlfriend lived. Then we, then I wouldn’t bloody know where we were, and I’ve got to find out. No, it was a bit of a headache with him. He was a nice enough guy but he was mad.
AS: During your training, it was all. What sort of navigation did you learn?
JS: I don’t know, it’s hard to say now.
AS: Astro and?
JS: Yes, yeah we did the lot you know.
AS: Astro Course
JS: It was a very good course. Navigator. And of course in the end we had H2S and these things on the aircraft too.
AS: In South Africa?
JS: Oh no. When we came home.
AS: Yes.
JS: Um.
AS: So, you’d done your training. Did you come back by ship?
JS: Yes, I did.
AS: What was that like on the ship?
JS: Hated it. I was taken ill actually and I spent most of the way home in the sick bay. And I was put in a hospital when we first arrived home. I forget what was the matter with me but I know I wasn’t right. I always remember we came home on one of those famous liners we used before the war, you know?
AS: Queen Elizabeth or Queen Mary?
JS: Yeah, that sort of thing, yeah.
AS: Wow.
JS: Amazing.
AS: And can you, can you remember the trip? Were you in convoy or?
JS: Yes, that was the trouble. When we were going out we had huge convoys. It took ages, it took about three weeks to get to South Africa. And also, another time, I remember flying alongside in North Africa. There were tremendous problems out there. It was, you always made a convoy around you to keep you safe, you know? So many of these things I’ve forgot but it was quite an interesting time.
AS: Yeah. It’s a long time ago, forgetting is not surprising. But when we talk it’s surprising how much comes back I think. You came back, did you come back into Liverpool from South Africa?
JS: Yes.
AS: OK.
JS: And we stopped also, I always remember. We went to a very posh place and stopped there. All aircrew and we were crewed up, we crewed up there. I have met some really nice guys in aircrew during the war. I was unhappy about my bloke but the thing was you couldn’t afford to be. When you’re flying with someone you’ve got to get on and do what’s going. So we did the best we could. He was a good pilot, he was a bit nervous. On one occasion only did he panic. We had an explosion underneath us and he called out to me ‘Joe, Joe, they’ve shot my arse away’. So I said ‘What are you talking about?’ So I went up to him and he said ‘Look, blood, blood!’ And I said ‘For Christ’s sake’. So we got a torch out of the engine, they hadn’t shot his arse away, they had shot underneath, and in doing so they he had, it wasn’t blood it was oil! And he was panic stricken ‘cause he had a handful of oil and he thought it was blood. But he was alright generally but I wasn’t happy with him. I would never have anything to do with him in private life ever.
AS: But you were an extremely effective crew?
JS: Yes. We were a good crew. We were a good crew. The only thing that we did wrong was the end of my tour and I bombed Scarborough.
AS: I was born in Scarborough.
JS: Were you really?
AS: Yes. I take great exception to that Joe, tell me about it.
JS: We took off, aircraft was a deadbeat aircraft, full load of bombs. Got in the sky and he said to me ‘Christ, Joe, we’re in trouble’. And the next thing is, one of the engines packed up. I said ‘For God’s sake, Ken, let’s get out of here’. We had a load of bombs, let’s. I said ‘Make for Scarborough and we’ll get to the beach and we’ll drop the bombs in the sea there’. So he said ‘OK’. So we got to Scarborough and got lower and lower and lower, and then suddenly he said ‘Look we’ve got to get.’ So I pressed the tit. I pressed the tit that would send them down ‘live’ instead of ‘safe’, and they nearly blew us out of the sky. The poor old rear gunner was nearly. And there was a terrible incident there. ‘Joe Stemp bombs Scarborough’. Christ. So when we got back we explained what had happened and they, he didn’t exactly help me. So I had to go on a switch drill campaign, just to embarrass me really you know. I thought perhaps they’d stop us but we carried on just the same afterwards, but I always remember that. We didn’t do much damage, it wasn’t too bad. But they always joked about Joe Stemp the bloke that bombed Scarborough.
AS: So what were you, as a nav, doing with the bombs?
JS: I don’t know. I don’t know how it happened, it was panic stations that day.
AS: You just don’t like Yorkshiremen do you?
JS: [laughter] Lots of things I don’t remember. But we had, the crew weren’t too bad as a crew I suppose but I wasn’t terribly happy.
AS: Well, I’m, I’m interested actually about the ropey kite. Did you have your own aircraft as a crew mostly for the tour?
JS: Yes, well we had an aircraft. And it had done a hundred ops..
AS: What was her letter?
JS: I can’t think.
AS: Doesn’t matter.
JS: Anyway, the night of the hundred ops. The big arrangement there were lots of people turned up, we were going to have a big celebration, but something went wrong. Unbeknown to us, in the group coming back, was about thirty German fighters. And they didn’t make themselves known until they got over here. And when we got to Yorkshire they opened up and shot twenty of us down.
AS: Oh, this is Operation Gisela is it? Yes.
JS: Um.
AS: Were you attacked?
JS: Um. So my skipper said. I said ‘Well we better get down’. So he went to land and they tried to put him off landing, but he said ‘Sod it, we’re going in’. Well as we did and as we went there was an aircraft chasing us, shooting at us as we went down. We dived under the aircraft. Stupid our aircraft [inaudible] but of course the incidents, all the festivities forgotten. So the hundredth op just passed by. But it was a bad night, we lost a lot of aircraft. Lost a lot of aircraft that night and then the squadron broke up. And I had to join 77 ‘cos I think I’d done eighteen ops and I needed twelve more and so we joined 77 and finished the twelve with 77.
AS: As a complete crew?
JS: Yeah.
AS: Why did they break the squadron up, because of the losses?
JS: Yes, I think so. It was 578 the squadron was. It broke, they just closed it down.
AS: Good Lord. So, a very, very short existence?
JS: Um. I can’t imagine now why. I’ve often sat there when I’ve been on my own trying to think, ‘cause we had lots of fun on the station. Aircrew were always jolly chaps and we had singing and drinking and driving. And I had a motorbike and sidecar you see, I used to take them into York.
AS: The whole crew?
JS: Yeah. Well not him, not the skipper, but we’d get the rest on there. And the Police used to think, we used to think ‘They’re gonna nick us’. But I think the Police used to say ‘Poor buggers, might as well enjoy it, might not be here tomorrow’. So they let us get away with it. Oh, I drove yeah.
AS: Were there generally a lot of losses on 578? Not just that one night?
JS: No, there were a lot of losses. Um.
AS: Yeah. I know it’s a long time ago but can you remember how you felt at the time about that, about people?
JS: No, I can’t, honestly. I’ve thought about, ‘cause Emily is the journalist who was involved in their magazine and she went into it in a big way. But I can’t, I was too young and too excited to worry about what was happening. I was very excited about what we were doing. I never minded going on ops. I never worried. I said the only time I really got upset was when old Charlie Whatisname blew up out of the sky in front of me. And that really did upset me. I thought ‘For Christ’s sake. That’s in the middle of nowhere, here he is ‘Bang’. but no.
AS: Shall we pause and go and have a spot of lunch?
JS: Yes. I’d like that. I do go on a bit.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Interview with Joe Stemp
Creator
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Adam Sutch
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-16
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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AStempJE151016, PStempJ1502
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Format
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02:12:37 audio recording
Description
An account of the resource
Joe was a navigator with 578 Squadron and later with 77 Squadron, flying Halifaxes and later Dakotas. Joe has a sister and a brother. His brother ended his service with the Royal Air Force after an accident on a dinghy drill course left him deaf in one ear. Before joining up, Joe was working full time in a housing agency and he was just 17 when he signed up for the Royal Air Force, wanting to be a fighter pilot. Joe tells about his training in South Africa, and how he crewed up, as well as his uncomfortable relationship with his pilot. He also tells of how he did his planning – on the spot. Joe remembers seeing the lights in the sky at Ealing from the bombs falling during the battle of Britain. He also tells of his encounter with a man who gave away his sacred heart that his mother had given him, and how that man’s crew failed to return after. Joe talks about how he was always sure he was going to return after an operation. Joe also tells the story of seeing another Bomber Command aircraft blowing up in front of him and also of watching as Lancaster aircraft dropping its bombs onto other aircraft below. He also tells of the effect that lack of moral fibre had on the unit he was with. Joe was a bomb aimer with 77 Squadron, and was due to be presented with a Distinguished Flying Medal, however it was taken away from him after he dropped live bombs on Scarborough instead of safe ones into the sea. Joe talks about the heavy losses suffered by Bomber Command, his feelings on the bombings later on in the war including the bombing of Dresden. He was also involved in Operation Gisela, which led to 30 German fighters shooting down 20 Bomber Command Aircraft. Joe finished the war after completing 30 operations. He met Pat after meeting her on a train and they were married for 65 years. He asked her to marry him before he headed off to the Far East. Joe ran a post office in India and took a job with the Financial Times newspaper.
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--London
England--Yorkshire
England--Scarborough
South Africa
Germany
Germany--Dresden
Contributor
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Vivienne Tincombe
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945
578 Squadron
77 Squadron
aircrew
bomb aimer
bomb struck
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
C-47
coping mechanism
crewing up
Distinguished Flying Medal
entertainment
faith
fear
Halifax
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
love and romance
navigator
recruitment
rivalry
superstition
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Lapham, Rosemary
R Lapham
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Lapham, R
Description
An account of the resource
100 items. An oral history interview with Rosemary Lapham, the daughter of Roy Chadwick, family correspondence, congratulations on being honoured, personal documentation as well as photographs of family, acquaintances and aircraft. The collection also contains a thank you letter from Barnes Wallis to Roy Chadwick and a note from Arthur Harris to Robert Saundby about the in-feasibility of the Eder Möhne and Sorpe operation, some conceptual aircraft drawings and other mementos.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Rosemary Lapham and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-22
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
A short personal observation of life as an engineer at Rolls Royce during the war; as they watched the designer of the Lancaster, Roy Chadwick and later Barnes Wallis, who designed the bouncing bomb, work towards what was to become known as the “Dam Raids.”
[Heading] Roy Chadwick at Scampton RAF Station on the Night of the Dam Buster Raid. [short shaky line]
This is an account which I am [underlined] most [/underlined] delighted to receive; from a Gentleman who knew Roy Chadwick and who was with the “Lancaster’s” designer at Scampton, on the night of the Dam Buster raid. [underlined]Mr C.E. Brennan of Littleover, Derby.[/underlined]
I was seconded to A V Roe [sic] at Woodford, late in 1940, where I was to spend the next, most enjoyable 2 years of my working life.
How well, and with what affection I think of those wonderful people – of the long but rewarding hours we spent together. I think of my first flight with the late Captain Thorne; of the Rugger Club we formed and how we would play, at Poynton playing fields under the tutelary eye of the manager, Mr Ainsworth; that is, when we were given that brief tot [sic] of time off.
I think of how your Father would come, now and again, to see if his boys were beating the Rolls Royce boys; and of our sessions in the (Thieves[sic] Neck) or to give it its [sic]correct name, I believe, “The Devonshire Arms”; across from the factory.
At this time I saw Mr Chadwick almost every day, as he came to see how the line of aircraft was progressing and, of course, how promptly they were rolling to the FLIGHT SHEDS for the attention of Captain Thorne.
Later I was to spend more time travelling between Woodford, and what was then, RINGWAY – this was quite a business because the Paratroop [sic] was there, and there was quite a palaver to get in past the sentries.
Our Rugger sessions came to an end when the first Americans to arrive in England were stationed on our beloved pitch at Poynton. However we did have one session at Sale, which your Father came, especially, to watch.
[page break]
I remember too, with great affection, a lady who worked in the canteen at (AVRO) Woodford who had a wonderful singing voice. Her name was Hilda Green. She was known as the Gracie Fields of Stockport, and she really did have a remarkable voice. I had a signed copy of Gounod’s AVE MARIA which she gave, and which I have now lost; along with my youth. I believe this lady died, no more than five to six years ago; & she was in her eighties.
Of course there was at times, the odd bit of conflict between the R.R. men, and the A V Roe men; but no more than pride on both sides, in our respective ...? [sic] but no more than bitter sweet; and never anything serious, - although it was known to both sides that Mr Chadwick was to be avoided if he came to the factory in the early morning.
It was rumoured that he suffered with his stomach*[sic] and was to be avoided until 10AM at least!! But with all the worry that goes with running such a large empire and under wartime conditions, it is no wonder his stomach troubled him at times. Also, of course, in those days, it was nothing to be working until 10pm - 11pm, and many times all through the night, and on the next day. This applied to A V Roe [e may not have been in original] men, to management and of course to we Rolls Royce men too.
Despite this the camaraderie between us all in our task, was fantastic.
All this was to come to an end in early 1942. Because of my experience on the beautiful old “Lancaster”, I was seconded to 5 Bomber Group in Lincolnshire, and spent my time travelling around 16 Aerodromes sometimes being on 2-3 aerodromes in one day.
[Short shaky line]
at [sic] one point in the late 1930s, I think, my father went on a Breakfast diet of Egg, beaten in milk, because he had this pain in his stomach. But I do not think that he suffered from any serious trouble. It would be the nervous tension of his working life. Hidden otherwise [initialled MD]
[page break]
I stayed at whichever aerodrome we finished work. So, from then on, there was very little time for the social life we had enjoyed at Woodford.
It was at this time, that we had one session of about 3 weeks at Scampton; modifying, and bringing all the 'Lancasters' up to scratch. It was a really hectic time. We would often see, what we would call “Boffin” around; who would occasionally call “good morning”, but never get into conversation. We were later to discover that this was the great “Barnes Wallis”.
On the night of the “Dam Raid”, and having watched “Take Off”, after supper, we repaired to the Mess; still not knowing for certain the destination of the departed “Lancs” only rumours at this stage. -
We wondered why there were so many “Brass Hats” in attendance? – But then, thats [sic] how it was in those days.
Later in the night: I believe around 11pm, I spotted Mr Chadwick among the “Brass Hats”. I caught his eye, and he came across and asked how I was, and did I miss dear old Stockport. We had quite a conversation.
I left the mess about 2.30AM; Mr Chadwick was still there, and I was to see him no more.
Later that year, having tried and been stopped by Rolls Royce, to Join the FLeet AIR ARM, and the MERCHANT NAVY, as an engineer – I Joined [sic] the Royal Engineers as an Engineer on Landing Craft – and have never been able to return to dear old Woodford again. So I think I had a pretty full war.
But despite all, they < The AVRO years > [initalled MD] were and always will be the happiest years of my life.
C.E.Brennan
[page break]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Roy Chadwick at Scampton RAF Station on the Night of the Dam Buster Raid
Description
An account of the resource
A personal account of life of an engineer, C E Brennan, who was seconded to A V Roe at Woodford and Ringway who saw Roy Chadwick frequently. He talks of comradeship, playing rugby and listening to singer Hilda Green. Mentions the sporting rivalry between A V Roe and Rolls Royce and Roy Chadwick's character. Continues with his secondment to 5 Group and travelling around all their airfields as well as preparing aircraft for the Eder Möhne and Sorpe operation. Talks about the night of the Dams attack and talking to Roy Chadwick. Eventually he joined the Royal Engineers on landing craft and never returned to Woodford.
Creator
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C E Brennan
Format
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Three page handwritten document
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
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BBrennanCEBrennanCEv1
Coverage
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Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Greater Manchester
England--Stockport
England--Manchester
England--Lancashire
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-05-16
1943-05-17
617 Squadron
bombing
Chadwick, Roy (1893-1947)
Eder Möhne and Sorpe operation (16–17 May 1943)
Lancaster
RAF Ringway
rivalry
sport
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1093/11552/PRichardsHJ1807.1.jpg
e9d3ee17efe52dc06e2593c9249ef399
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1093/11552/ARichardsHJ180219.2.mp3
bd7288acde305764a090df198fd0dad8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Richards, Harold James
H J Richards
Description
An account of the resource
Six items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Harold James Richards (1922 - 2020, 1451874 Royal Air Force) photographs and his log book. He flew operations as a navigator with 297 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Harold Richards and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-19
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Richards, HJ
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
CB: This interview is being conducted for the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. The person being interviewed is Harold James Richards. Also known as Rick to his family, and Harry. The interviewer is myself, Cathy Brearley. Also present is Marion Giddings who is Harry’s neighbour. And the date today is Monday the 19th of February 2018. This interview is taking place at Harry’s home in Lincoln. So, first of all Harry I’d like to thank you for giving us this interview. And please could you begin by talking a little bit about your childhood. Where you were born and where you grew up and about your family and your early years.
HR: I was born in Lincoln. A couple of miles from here. And I lived in Lincoln all my childhood really. And moving around various parts in that sort of area. In the centre. The centre sort of in Lincoln. And then I did my schooling in Lincoln. And eventually left school when I was eighteen which was fast approaching the outbreak of war.
CB: Yeah. What line of work was your father in? And your mother if she worked?
HR: What?
CB: What line of work were your parents in?
HR: My father was a printing operator. Operated some sort of printing machine for one of the local papers. Mother didn’t work of course because I had a sister and two brothers. All older than me. I was the babba of the family. And [pause] well, my normal school life came to an end when I was sixteen actually. And I went and started my first job in the National Health Service. Well, it wasn’t the National Health Service then but it was a health service. And —
CB: And what was that you were doing?
HR: Clerical. And I stayed in that until I decided it was getting a bit — time for call up. So, I made the decision that I would volunteer. And at that point I volunteered for the air force having had previous training with the Air Training Corps and things like that. Sort of local interests with the airfields local. Scampton and Waddington you see. They were all on the go in those days. And eventually in oh would it be ’41 I was called up to [pause] Well, I joined up. Let’s put it that way.
CB: Yes.
HR: I can’t remember where I went to. I know where I went to but I can’t remember the name.
CB: Yes. Yes.
HR: And eventually one of the places I went to in my call up area was Lord’s Cricket Ground in London. Stayed down there and then ultimately I was brought into the service. Joined up. And joined up as a trainee aircrew and did my training. Part of which was in Scarborough. And eventually, having finished my, that sort of training I was then joined a flying school. Flying training. But I didn’t do very well at that. I wasn’t a blue eyed boy there and eventually I was told that they could do a lot better without me so I had to re-muster. And at that stage I was in Carlisle I think and my next move actually was on board ship. And I was sent to South Africa to [pause] not complete but to start a new period of training. And I did precisely the same in Bulawayo as I’d been doing in Scarborough. Slightly, the temperature was slightly different [laughs] And eventually I moved up the ladder there and finished my elementary training and was then signed on for air observer. And at that time I went to [pause]
[recording paused]
CB: So it was near —
HR: Near Pretoria.
CB: Right. Ok. Can I just ask you a few questions about some of the information you’ve already given?
HR: Yeah.
CB: When you went to Lord’s Cricket Ground how long were you there for and what happened there?
HR: A flying visit [laughs] Not really a flying one but in and out. There was no training or anything there. It was merely a sort of attestation. That type of thing, you know.
CB: So that’s the enrolment paperwork.
HR: But it sounds good in your —
CB: And did you have a medical somewhere?
HR: Yes. I would have had the medical in the first one I went to which was the main [pause] the main joining up place. I can’t think of the name of it. That’s my trouble.
CB: That’s ok. And then flying school in Carlisle.
HR: Yeah. Well, that was just —
CB: Tell me about Carlisle. What happened there? How long were you there for?
HR: About two months. I was flying. Part of my sort of my pilot’s training course but that that was I found I got my final papers from them. And as I say it finished up on the boat out to South Africa.
CB: And what aircraft did you fly on your training?
HR: Magisters .
CB: Sorry?
HR: Magisters.
CB: And then you went on the ship to South Africa.
HR: And then we went on ship to South Africa.
CB: And how long did that journey take?
HR: Not very long because we went sort of on our own and — no. Sorry. We went with an escort. We were in a — what did they call it? Convoy. Went in a convoy. So it took us about three weeks I think.
CB: Right.
HR: And then we landed in Cape. When we landed in Cape Town we got on board the train which took us up, all the way up country to Bulawayo in what was in those days Rhodesia.
CB: So, what happened during those three weeks on ship?
HR: Nothing. Apart from just keeping yourself occupied really. As far as I remember. I suppose we would have had talks and lectures and things like that. They’d obviously have to keep up the, the appearance.
CB: Of training.
HR: [laughs]
CB: So when you got to Bulawayo —
HR: Yeah.
CB: What happened there?
HR: I did a — I went back to elementary training. Nothing to do with flying. I went back on to the same as I’d done in this country. And I did that course and then it was from there that I moved over to Pretoria and started my [pause] Well, I suppose in those days it was air bombing course.
CB: And how long did that last?
HR: Can you leave that? I’ll get it but it’ll be in the —
CB: It’ll be in your logbook. Yes. Ok. Yeah. Yes. So —
HR: And after that it was a question of coming back to this country and eventually I was posted to the squadron which was 297 Squadron. And it was posted, it was at a place called Stoney Cross in Hampshire. This was just a — I suppose a temporary thing. And the peculiar thing was when I got there I realised that it was partly an army camp. But I didn’t make the connection at that stage. It was only later that I sort of realised the connection between 297 Squadron and the army which I’ll tell you about later.
CB: Yeah. Yeah. Well, you can tell me now whilst we’re talking about it.
HR: Well, I mean eventually when I got on the squadron we used to do quite a bit in the way of cross country trips and sometimes we used to take paratroops with us. And at other times we used to take gliders. So there’s the army connection coming in like sort of at the beginning.
CB: And what was the aircraft you were in at that time?
HR: Albemarle.
CB: That was — and you were bomb aimer and navigator.
HR: Well, I was trained as a, as a navigator and a bomb aimer which you see in the logbook. But there I tended to be more on the bomb aiming side because I spent quite a bit of the time map reading. And by that I mean we used to do a lot, an awful lot of what we called cross country’s. And we’d go off in a, in an aircraft with either troops to drop at a dropping zone or pulling a glider with troops aboard which was similar to a DZ. A dropping zone.
CB: Yes. So what were your early thoughts when you first arrived on squadron and were in aircraft?
HR: Well, to be quite shattered. Well, to be quite honest I was shattered because Stoney Cross was miles away from anywhere. It was about fifteen miles from Southampton and I think about ten from — I’m trying to think of the name of the other place in the other direction.
CB: Portsmouth.
HR: No. It was only just a smallish place. But I mean any place was was home for, from the camp, you know.
CB: So, you were quite a long way from home weren’t you really?
HR: Quite a lot. Well, I mean we were more or less just outside Southampton in effect. Which was a fair distance.
CB: Do you remember getting much leave to go home and see family?
HR: Well, yes. I suppose we had. We had quite satisfactory. I didn’t, didn’t concern — didn’t concern me much actually. I was courting at the time but I wasn’t married so it, I hadn’t got the claim to be getting home at every touch and turn sort of thing.
CB: So, was your girlfriend in Lincoln at the time?
HR: Sorry?
CB: Was your girlfriend in Lincoln at the time?
HR: In Lincoln. Yeah. She lived up at — on the Nettleham Road in those days. So —
CB: What about written correspondence? Letters. Were you a good letter writer?
HR: Oh, we had them. Just the same as everybody else really. We didn’t have any, any problem. But as I say we spent quite a lot of time in the air. In fact I had one of my pals he couldn’t stand the pressure and he had to give it up. Well, had to give it up. He was medically unfit to carry on so you can imagine that it was pretty hectic at that time. Well, that more or less carried on then right the way through until we got to the sort of D-Day.
CB: And what were conditions like at, on base?
HR: Well, they were Nissen huts. Nissen huts right out in the country.
CB: Was it cold in winter?
HR: No. I don’t think it was. I can’t ever remember it being sort of snowy. It was somewhere in the middle of the — is it the New Forest down there? Is it the [pause] You could tell it was a bit isolated.
CB: What about other nationalities who were there?
HR: We didn’t have any. They were all —
CB: All British.
HR: As far as I recall, apart from the Scots and Welsh and that sort of thing we didn’t have any foreign. Not that I’m aware. I can’t remember to be quite honest. I don’t even remember my own. My own crew. I mean I remember them basically but if you asked me to describe them or say what nationality they were I wouldn’t know.
CB: Ok.
[recording paused]
CB: So you went on a trip in to the village.
HR: Well, it was not a, not planned at all. It, it was just that I was so I suppose isolated at the time. It was fairly early on. I thought oh damn it. I’m going to have a walk down to the village [laughs] or to a village. I wasn’t sure quite where. So, I walked down this, the camp road and got to the main road at the bottom and before I’d done a lot of map reading I turned left. I walked about, oh a mile along that road. Nothing happened. I thought I’ll turn around and go back. So I went back. I thought well I’ll go on. A bit further on. And that’s when I went to Ringwood. And that was when I, I didn’t actually buy the ring at that time but I spied the ground at that time.
CB: For your wedding ring.
HR: For my wedding ring. Not necessarily but I saw there was a jeweller there and so that was it. But that was the sort of isolation that I felt at that time.
CB: And did you choose your wife’s wedding ring from the same place?
HR: Sorry?
CB: Did you choose your wife’s wedding ring from the same place?
HR: I could have done. I don’t recall actually. I definitely remember doing this. But no I think she probably came with me when I, when I bought that because — well actually we didn’t get married until what, two years after I came out of the air force. So that would put us up to 1948. So, it was a bit early then. We’re talking now about, I suppose ’42. Something like that. ’42 ’43 when I was down there.
CB: Can you tell me something about the navigational aids that you used? Either in training or in flight.
HR: Yeah. Basically in my training I tended to do the normal. I can’t remember the technology now. The normal one where you had ordinary — had to do it all by maps and plotting and things like that. I mean these days they’ve got things. Not these days but later on we had things called Rebecca. Which was a type of homing signal. And of course there was what they called Gee. That was another one.
CB: I’ve heard of Gee.
HR: You’ve heard of Gee have you?
CB: Can you explain how it worked?
HR: It’s, oh don’t ask me how it works. No. No. I’m afraid that was a bit beyond me. I, because by that time I was more or less concentrating on the bomb aiming side of it. Other than the navigational map reading which was obviously necessary in these SOE cases.
CB: So, where did you go to after being down near Southampton?
HR: Stoney Cross. I’m a bit vague as to where I, where I was stationed other than I remember a station some time up in Yorkshire. I think it was Hutton Cranswick or, oh Linton on Ouse. Linton on Ouse was one that I was at. But that was later on. I can’t remember. I was also at Brize Norton for a while. But those tended to be later on. I think there must have been some earlier ones. I think there was one called Hutton Cranswick or something like that. That was up in Yorkshire.
[pause]
HR: But those all tended to be later on. I can’t think. I’ve been trying to think of what, what camps I was on but I think I was basically at Stoney Cross most of my early time. Unfortunately, my logbook doesn’t show it you see other than I could probably work it out by the trips we went on. Because I always put on the logbook the actual route that we were taking.
CB: So, how did you come to be involved with the SOE operations?
HR: Well, it must have been from the start. I wasn’t aware of it other than the fact as I say that we’d got army connections. That was the only thing that made it any different from these, these places up here. Of course the other thing is that whenever one went on an op you went on your own. I mean, you didn’t, you didn’t go up in a flurry like they do for the Bomber Command. You see they go up and there’s probably twelve aircraft go off at the same time. Well, we used to just sneak off at all sorts of different times.
CB: And how much notice would you get?
HR: We would know on the day we were going. They would tell us in the morning you see. And then probably we’d have some sort of a briefing in the afternoon. Wouldn’t be a great deal because obviously they wouldn’t know a great deal. They’d just say you go across the Channel and then when you get get there then you just find your way from there sort of thing. That’s how it used to work.
CB: And was most of this work done at night? When you were doing the drops.
HR: Oh it would all be at night. Yeah. There was no, well there were a few, a few day trips but they weren’t I remember one day trip we had to to Oslo. But that’s the only time I can ever remember that we went in the daylight.
CB: And I’ve read that it was often the drops, the night drops were often scheduled around the phases of the moon and so that you would have some light.
HR: Well it could. We had nothing else you see.
CB: Yeah.
HR: You see, you imagine when we, that the the practice was that one would take off from your ‘drome, go across the Channel at about what? Three hundred feet. Very low anyway. Before you got to the coast you’d start to climb to make sure that you were sufficiently high enough to get out of the range of the guns or whatever and then of course when you got the other side you had to drop. And the rest of it you see was at about what? Three hundred feet. Well, there’s nothing. You can see nothing at night at three hundred feet. I mean you can’t look for trains or bus stations or things like that you see. It’s a question of looking for places where there was, well forestries or woods. That was another darker sort of area you see that you would find on your maps and —
CB: So, it’s quite dangerous then isn’t it?
HR: Well it wasn’t, it wasn’t —
CB: Rather than obviously open spaces.
HR: Although we were lucky actually because whenever they gave you somewhere it was usually in a reasonably unbuilt, not built up area because obviously you see these people were having to come out to receive you as it were. So, you could only really go in the moonlight where you would get the moon, picking up or picked up by the water if there was any lakes or rivers. That was another thing. If you got on a river you were alright because you could follow it you see.
CB: And did the people on the ground use torchlight to help you?
HR: They did. They did but it was a slow sort of situation because obviously they were careful and so were we. So I mean when you got to what you thought was roughly where you should be you just had to look and see if there was any, any possible lights. I mean these lights were given at a certain signal to give which we would be informed of. They’d be saying, well they’d be flashing out whatever. The signal. And then at that point then you could start doing, offloading your containers or whatever you were taking.
CB: So, it would be a different signal each time. What sort of —
HR: Oh yes. It wasn’t general. No. It was just a—
CB: And what sort of a signal might it be? Was it based on Morse code signalling at all?
HR: Oh yeah.
CB: Yeah. So would it be a code word maybe?
HR: It could have been a code word. It could have been anything really as long as it was something that wasn’t easily sort of dis well not discernable but able to work it out quickly.
CB: Do you remember any of the signals that were —
HR: No. I don’t. No.
CB: Particularly given.
HR: Actually it used to be the job of the gunner to flash the signal but — or the navigator often did because I was, as I say I was busy trying to locate what we called the DZ. The dropping zone.
CB: And I imagine it was a mixture of dropping agents as well as sometimes supplies.
HR: Well, we didn’t have any agents dropping. They were, they were a completely different concern as far as we were concerned because obviously they used to fly from Tempsford on the north, Great North Road there. That was their, their headquarters.
CB: I understand.
HR: And they had their own squadron there actually. In fact if you look at this book they’ll tell you that 138 Squadron was, was their actual, the squadron that did all the —
CB: The agent drops.
HR: Taking the agents. Plus of course the Lysanders. They used to do a lot. You’ve seen these funny little Lysanders. Well, they used to do a lot of that sort of thing.
CB: I see. Yes. Yes, the —
HR: No. Ours was completely material. We used to drop containers which contained all sorts of things.
CB: Yes. The book you refer to is a book that both Harry and I both have called, “Forgotten Voices of the Secret War,” by Roderick Bailey. Which is about SOE operations. So, what sort of supplies would you be dropping?
HR: Well, frankly we wouldn’t know. I I don’t know anything that I dropped other than the fact that it was a container.
CB: What sort of size container was it? In feet for example.
HR: Well, it always liked a coffin but it was obviously bigger than a coffin. But that type of thing along. Well, have you seen them in these books? That’s the type of thing. And they had all sorts of things that —
CB: They must have been quite robust to have withstood being dropped from —
HR: Oh yeah.
CB: So high.
HR: Well, we used to drop about what three hundred or something like that you see. And it was on soft soil hopefully. If nobody was in the way.
CB: Would you have to go around for other drops or would you be able to —
HR: Oh no. It would be one drop and off. Oh yes it was, it was paraphernalia to do all. Get the aircraft in position and get it with the, with the wheels — well some. Most of the time they’d put the wheels down to give you more resistance and the flaps and all sorts making it as easy as they could. Comparatively so. So, of course as soon as you dropped them everything was brought up. Wheels up and the flaps up and we were off. But it was just one. One trip around.
CB: And would you typically fly with the same pilot and other aircrew?
HR: We had our own, we had our own crew. Yeah. The crew was, was more or less fixed. In fact I had one. I had one, one fella well you’ll see in the logbook for about half my period and then I had another one. Changed me over.
CB: Do you remember the names?
HR: Yeah. Shortman, Flight Lieutenant Shortman was the first one. And the other one was Millnoy.
CB: Mill —
HR: Flight Lieutenant.
CB: Millroy.
HR: Millnoy.
CB: And the aircraft?
HR: I only remember them because I’ve got them in my logbook you see.
CB: And what was the aircraft you were using for that?
HR: Albemarle for that one. I’ve got a photograph actually but you can’t see a great deal of it.
[recording paused]
CB: So, can you tell me about how you went around the country in the aircraft showing them to other RAF bases.
HR: Well, prior to the invasion we had the task of going around the different areas of particular defences that might be involved in any sort of attack. Either by the Germans or us going over there. And these aircraft were specifically being used. All the British and all the, the allied, all the allied aircraft were marked with this particular white marking on the fuselage. And we went to Linton on Ouse in Yorkshire. We went up to Turnhouse in Scotland. And I think we went to another place in, in Hutton Cranswick. I seem to remember that. That was up in Yorkshire. But operationally I don’t think we moved from Stoney Cross. I can’t ever remember, except moving to Brize Norton and that was specifically for the D-Day and Arnhem and the crossing of the Rhine. I think we went from Brize Norton for, for those. But in turn we went from Brize Norton to the one on the coast in, in Kent. Oh God, what’s the name of it now? Well known one. Right on the tip of the coast there.
CB: Not sure.
HR: Well, that was the one we actually went from for those three. On those three occasions.
CB: So tell me about D-Day.
HR: Not much to tell. No. We were unfortunate that we lost a glider. How —?
CB: Did that ditch in the Channel?
HR: Oh. We got over the coast. Oh we were virtually there. Well, sort of midway between the water and the, the battlefield as it were at that time. So we were within a matter of miles but it just disappeared. Unfortunately.
CB: Yes. Yes.
HR: I never heard anything about it but then naturally one wouldn’t.
CB: And Arnhem.
HR: Similar. Similar.
CB: Similar loss.
HR: But we didn’t get as far there. In fact, when you see the logbooks you’ll find that I think we did an hour and a half on D Day and an hour to Arnhem. Something like that.
CB: And the Rhine?
HR: And the — we crossed that alright. Yes. We did that. Five hour journey. Five. Five hours seventy five I think it was. Something like that.
CB: And that, was that dropping supplies?
HR: That was taking, that was taking troops. We took gliders. Those were glider. Glider towings. So we lost the glider which was the annoying part because we don’t know what happened to the men. But what happened? I’m not suggesting anything.
CB: That indicates the degree of difficulty of the actual role.
HR: I mean it could have been something that broke. Could be a, you know sort of the rope. The rope. The wire between plane and glider broke. Came undone. No idea.
CB: So how many troops would fit in a glider typically?
HR: Oh not a lot. About ten to twenty I should think. Something like that. They’d be just like, just like, you know what an aircraft looks like inside. You know, forget all about the driver and his sort of area and I mean you’ve got the whole of that because there wouldn’t be anybody there. There would be a pilot. A couple of pilots you see with a glider pilot with a glider. And they would take over you see once the thing was released. But they’d just be pilot on either side. Probably about, there might be about seven or eight on either side of the fuselage. It depends on the size because you had, you had two types of glider at that time. We had the Hamilcar which was the big one. And then we had the smaller one which was the [pause] oh my God what did they call that?
CB: I’ve heard of Horsa gliders. I’ve heard of Horsa gliders.
HR: That’s right. Horsa. Yeah. Well, they were the smaller ones. But the bigger one was the [pause] was the other one.
CB: Do you know if that’s something that men would volunteer for? To go in a glider. Or would they be ordered.
HR: It would be part of their training. Part of their duty. I mean they didn’t mind which way they went as long as they went. These lads. They were [laughs] as we call it muck and nettles [laughs]
CB: And I imagine there’s a lot of risks in safely landing a glider as well.
HR: Well, providing the, the area is right to land there shouldn’t be any difficulty because after all you take them to what they called the dropping zone and that’s, that’s perfectly clear. The difficulty is that if it gets in to rough territory then it gets difficult because I mean there’s no engine or anything like that to help them land. So it was just a question of going into the ground really. Trying to get a long clear run.
CB: And what sort of height would you be at?
HR: Oh not very high. When we were towing them we’d only be about fifteen hundred or something like that.
CB: And the Rhine operation was a more successful one.
HR: I don’t know much about that because we went straight there and straight back. I’ve got no idea what happened there.
CB: Was that lots of gliders went at the same time on that one?
HR: Would have been. Yeah. Yeah. It would have been quite a sight I would think from the ground.
CB: What sort of number?
HR: Hmmn?
CB: What sort of number?
HR: I honestly don’t know. I honestly don’t know because obviously it’s something that we would look upon it as a normal sort of process I suppose but —
[recording paused]
CB: So are there any other particular events or moments that you recall for any reason? Either humorous or particularly dangerous or near misses.
HR: I can’t think of any near misses. I mean the procedure was — on an ordinary operation the procedure was quite simple. We, we would have a briefing. But again unlike Bomber Command we went in singles. We didn’t, we didn’t go in, in loads. And then the idea would be flying sort of very low over the water and climb up to keep out of the way of ack ack stuff. And then immediately you got over there, drop and then it would be a question of map reading yourself to wherever you were going.
CB: I imagine you were kept fairly busy during —
HR: Well, I didn’t do anything other than map read the whole time that I was once I got to the coast that was it. I mean I was immediately confined to the nose and that was it. And I would sort of help the navigator if he was in any sort of trouble. If he sort of said, ‘Can you, can you see anything down there?’ And it would be a question then yes or no. And then we would be praying that somebody would be coming out to meet us. We would aim to get to a particular place. We’d know where it was. We’d get what they — a map reading reference. And we’d, they’d be aiming for that. They’d have picked a course to get there. And then it’s a question of looking. Trying to see something as you went past.
CB: Did you typically go to France?
HR: Oh yes. Yes. I had I think about three journeys there from what I can recall.
CB: Where else did you go other than France?
HR: Oslo.
CB: You mentioned Oslo.
HR: Just those four places because my ops actually only totalled, I think about ten. Something like that. And that included some of these aborted ones. So I didn’t have a great deal of experience on that.
CB: What sort of things were you able to see from the air that you could use as landmarks other than obviously rivers and train lines?
HR: Well, just rivers really. And, and trees. The forests or parks or anything that gave a darker sort of appearance from I mean because you’ve got to remember you were whizzing along at about three hundred miles an hour. Two hundred and fifty. That sort of speed. So you didn’t have a lot of time to see anything. But I mean you just set, set course from a particular point and then that was it. Well, then once you got to what you thought was a sort of vicinity of where you wanted to be it would be all eyes out trying to find this lamp that you’re supposed to be looking for. And then of course once the lamp was sighted then you would do a couple of circuits probably just to make sure that it wasn’t somebody just going to see the cows or something like that. Just to see that they were the right sort of people. And, and then it, once you got agreement I mean there would be signalling between us and the ground. Once you got communication as it were then it would be as I say preparing the aircraft to make the drop. You’d have to find out which way the wind was coming. Obviously to be going into the wind to drop it. To, you know, make it that much easier. And once they, once the people on the ground started to collect they’d make a line for you. And the idea would be to drop the containers on that line of lights. And if everything went ok well then it would be a question of putting the aircraft back into flying mode and off.
CB: And over the time you probably flew in a lot of aircraft. A lot of different aircraft as part of your training and operations. Which was the first aircraft you ever went in?
HR: I should think it was probably when I was flying pilot. Tiger Moth. And then a Magister. And then I started on the, the other navigational ones and they were things like Oxford. Oh I’ve got a list of them somewhere. I don’t know whether I can —
[recording paused]
CB: So you flew in a lot of different aircraft and you have a list there of all the aircraft you flew in.
HR: I have. Well, prior to re-mustering I was on a pilot’s course and I flew then in Tiger Moths and Magisters. And then when I was removed [laughs]
CB: Relocated.
HR: I was scrubbed [laughs] and I went navigator/bomb aimer and I flew in Albemarle, Halifax, Wellington, Stirling, Whitley. Or as part of my training on, at navigation school I was in Ansons and Oxfords. I’ve just turned up a little note here. Operations. All I’ve done with this is that I’ve made a note of the time. The duration. And there’s one, two, three, four, five, six. There seems to be six of these that we’ve been talking about. These special deliveries. And then there’s one to Norway. I’ve said that. I don’t know what happened to that. I don’t remember very much of it. It was six hours anyway. And then I’ve got D-Day an hour. Then there was a trip when we did forty minutes. The aircraft was defective. And then there was one. The Arnhem one which was another hour. And the Rhine crossing — 5.25. So that, that was the operations.
CB: That’s a lot of different aircraft. Do you remember how, how different they seemed from each other? Obviously there’s a big difference between a Tiger Moth and a Halifax for example, isn’t there? What were they like to fly in? The different aircraft.
HR: I don’t think there was much difference frankly. Other than the fact that the, as I say some of them were faster than others and some were more defensive then others. More. Not that we ever were attacked. Although the funny thing was, I’ll tell you this, one of my pilots — are we on?
CB: We are.
HR: One of my pilots had a thing with his friend who was another of the pilots of the squadron of who could be attacked the most on these trips. And they used to have an examination when they returned to base to see whether there were any bullet holes anywhere. But that’s, that’s the sort of thing that you get. But that was my first pilot. Shortman. Flight Lieutenant Shortman. But the other one I didn’t do so well with him. He was the one that did all my failings.
CB: Did you have any lucky mascots that you took with you?
HR: No.
CB: I know some people did, didn’t they?
HR: Oh I’m sure they did. No. I’m afraid I was very fatalistic about it, you know. If it happens it happens.
CB: I was going to ask you if you were frightened. Or thought about it.
HR: No. I don’t think — I think the only time I felt a bit scared was as I say when we went to Norway it was — I was going to say a new country and didn’t quite know what might, might happen. And I got a feeling that there was other planes in the sky at the same time as us which I hadn’t had before. And I was a bit, wasn’t too happy then. I was pleased when we came away. Because we’d done an awful, we’d done six hours, you see which was about another two hours on top of our normal trip. But no. No. It’s just one of those things really I suppose.
CB: Did you have any particular rituals or habits or things you did?
HR: No. No.
CB: Do you remember others having those things?
HR: I can’t say that I do.
CB: And then the war came to an end.
HR: Yeah. Well, of course when the war came to an end it was, as far as I was concerned it was the end of the, of my career in the air force. Although I could have stayed on. For a time anyway. But of course it wasn’t. I already had a job. I’d got a job with the Health Service in those days.
CB: Did they keep your job for you, after the war for you?
HR: Oh yes. I was told that when I came back it would be there. So I came back and of course the pending wedding at that time of course because we got married in ’48. So, it was only sort of two years later. And so I, I decided that that was, that was the end. And I think that’s the end of my story.
CB: And what was your wife’s name?
HR: Vera.
CB: And then you remained in Lincoln ever since.
HR: Oh no. No. I’ve, when I, when I started up sort of back at hospital there I spent — well I was forty four years in the National Health Service. Or rather that and its predecessor. And I had a, funny thing I was going to show you this Marion.
[recording paused]
HR: Yes.
CB: So, you went back in to the Civil Service and you were in St Albans.
HR: I did. And I spent a total of forty four years in the National Health Service and the prior service. And eventually came back to, to Lincoln. And that’s really the story of my wartime I suppose.
CB: Was it usual for people’s jobs to be kept for them until after the end of the war?
HR: Well, mine was because I specifically, specifically asked whether it would be. And when I was told I obviously took advantage of it. But had they said no, well then I would probably have stayed on in the air force. For a time anyway. Because I’d got up to warrant officer by then you see. So it was far as I could, I could get without going in for a commission. Which I probably would have gone in for, you know. If I’d stayed in.
CB: Was that something that the NHS typically did was to hold everybody’s jobs for them or was there only certain jobs.
HR: I suppose. I suppose it was actually.
CB: What about people in other lines of work? Were they, did their employers keep their jobs for them?
HR: Oh I don’t know, that I can’t, that I can’t. I wouldn’t like to say.
CB: And are you in contact with any other people that you served with?
HR: No.
CB: Or part of any of the RAF Associations?
HR: No. Funnily enough after, well at the Spire when they had that function on the, in January that Marion was talking about I met somebody from [pause] I think it was somewhere sort of Northampton or somewhere like that. He had something to do with a group of people called — I can’t think what they called them now. I’ve got a letter from them. They want me to go and join them at some function [pause] I think its October.
[recording paused]
CB: So, is there anything else can you think of that you would like to talk about?
HR: I don’t think so. I think you’ve got a — we seemed to have spent quite a long time and I think you’ve got something to write about even if it’s, doesn’t get to the top of the class. It’ll be something to include in your list.
CB: Well, thank you very much for your time Harry. It’s been an absolute pleasure to meet with you and it’s been very very interesting. Your memories. And in particular because they are slightly different from other interviews and oral histories that have been collected because your role was a specialised role. And in that way was slightly different from others that we have interviewed. So thank you ever so much for your time.
HR: It’s been a pleasure.
CB: You’re welcome.
Dublin Core
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Title
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Interview with Harold James Richards
Creator
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Cathy Brearley
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-19
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ARichardsHJ180219, PRichardsHJ1807
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Pending review
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Format
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01:00:49 audio recording
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
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France
Great Britain
Norway
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe--Bulawayo
Description
An account of the resource
Harold Richards from Lincoln was working in the health industry before he volunteered for the RAF. After trying to be a pilot he trained as an observer. He was posted to 297 Squadron at Stoney Cross where he and his crew dropped supplies to the Special Operations Executive and Resistance in occupied France and Norway. They then took part in glider towing during D-Day, Arnhem and the crossing of the Rhine. Harold flew in a number of different aircraft including Albemarle, Halifax, Wellington, Stirling, Whitley, Anson and Oxford. After operations one of his pilots used to compare bullet holes in the aircraft with his pilot friend as a competition.
Contributor
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Julie Williams
Temporal Coverage
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1944
1945
297 Squadron
aircrew
Albemarle
Anson
coping mechanism
Halifax
Hamilcar
Horsa
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
observer
Oxford
RAF Stoney Cross
rivalry
Special Operations Executive
Stirling
training
Wellington
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/228/3373/AChattertonM160331.1.mp3
27703bd93c161251ba90d18d3a7a735b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Chatterton, John
John Chatterton
J Chatterton
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant John Chatterton Distinguished Flying Cross (1031972, 159568 Royal Air Force). Included are his logbooks, a letter of condolence and letter to be passed to parents of a deceased crew member, mounted copy of entries to the logbook of Pilot Officer A Baker, 44 Squadron Operations Order book, and an oral history interview with Mike Chatterton (b. 1953) about his father, John Chatterton, and piloting the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight's Lancaster. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.<br /><br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning Peter Lees. Additional information on Peter Lees is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/113761/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.</p>
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2016-03-14
2016-03-31
Identifier
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Chatterton, J
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
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MC: Carry on with my RAF career a bit at a time?
DE: Ah yes.
MC: Alright.
DE: OK. So, I’ll just check it’s recording, yes. This is an interview for the International Bomber Command Project, my name is Dan Ellin, I’m interviewing Mike Chatterton, it is the 31st March 2016 and we’re at Riseholme, also present in the room is Shelley the dog. So, Mike could you start please by telling me a little bit about your early life and how you grew up?
MC: Yeah OK. Well I grew up in a farming environment always and farming was always destined to be my future career I guess but I was always aware that father had been a Bomber Command pilot in the war and that was always a side-line of interest. I think I used to consider farming to be quite hard work and long hours and dirty and grubby and it didn’t seem to appeal to me that much so I used to not be devoted to that line of thought. Anyway, I suppose Airfix models are the main thing that started me off in aviation. Initially watching Father make them for me, and then after a little while getting involved and adding a few bits on myself and of course the good old Airfix models of fifty years ago was where they gave you all the precise names of the various bits so you learnt an awful lot about the aircraft at the same time as opposed to nowadays where it’s just lots of diagrams and arrows. But I think that was where my interest in aviation sort of came to fruition in all the models I used to make, and there were a lot of them, all over the house, and also I recall as I say initially getting Father to make them and he’d slowly let me do some of the easy bits and after a while he’d supervise me whilst I did the slightly more awkward bits, and after a while I slowly got to realise that actually I could do it better than Father could. I then got impatient with him trying to do it and just wanted to do it myself. That’s another, I suppose, idea of growing up, but didn’t actually hear a great deal about Father’s war time environment. I think for me, and I tell people that the highlight of the year for me wasn’t necessarily Christmas or my birthday, but the highlight for me was the Finningley airshow, and if you’d like to say religiously, I suppose you could say that, and as long as the, it wasn’t coinciding or contradicting with the harvest time, which was even more important to father, the Finningley airshow was one of the main events of our annual calendar. Along with my uncle, Uncle Will, Father’s brother, we’d go along in some battered old pick-up or something, join the queues, get to the air show and then follow the routine of going round the ground statics before the actual flying displays started, and then we were stuck in one place and watching the aircraft fly past, and of course in those days it was some wonderful old vintage aeroplanes, Shackleton’s and Varsity’s and some of the early jets and things like that. But for us the highlight was always the Lancaster, if there was a Lancaster airworthy at the time, if it was going to take part then that would be the main event. And of course, I’d then start asking Father a few memories about what he recalled, and used to get some of the fun, get none of the personal details at all, just some of the technical details, some of the fun activities he got up to I suppose, but none of the personal details at all. And so that was life as a kid, I think he then encouraged me to join the Air Training Corps which was a thing I’d never actually thought of much before. I used to love the airshows and I used to get very jealous of all the RAF people wandering around in their uniforms thinking I wish I could do that, but never actually thought about the idea of joining the air force, I thought there’s no way I’m ever going to get in the air force, and the way my academics were going I was sort of working towards being a draughtsman or something like that. I used to have a sort of natural tendency towards the drawing side of it but not the academics. And so I think a friend of mine said ‘How about joining the Air Training Corps?’ when we were about, quite late on about fifteen years old, and I said ‘Yeah, OK’ and we went along to the local squadron and joined, quite late on, because of, we were a bit older than normal joining age then things like gliding courses became available because you have to be a certain age for this. I think I went away on a gliding course and got my wings at Hemswell flying gliders. Where I then heard some more stories from Father about when he’d flown aircraft, Lancaster’s, at Hemswell and then whilst I was in the Air Cadets say things went on, because I’d got gliding wings I made a corporal, because I was made a corporal I got to be an instructor and because I was an instructor I got to be put forward for a flying scholarship etc., etc. It just sort of went on and on, and in the background there with Father always working away at the farm, helping with Father, I was aware that he was a member of various squadron associations because he was with 44 Squadron Association, so I used to be aware that every so often he’d go off and do that, but work I think, farming for him took all his time up and there was very little to do with aviation really apart from, as I say, the annual air show and occasional Airfix model, and I suppose then the Air Cadets were the turning point for me because obviously the idea is to get you air minded and the staff were very good and they used to encourage me to think about an idea of an RAF career which I say I’d never considered before, they were good for my confidence by the fact that I managed to achieve various different stages through the Cadets, I suppose that helped my confidence as well and so they persuaded me to actually give it a try and try and join the RAF as a pilot, which was a bit of a shock, but I went along I think in my sixth form and applied, went down to the selection centre at Biggin Hill and went through all the various processes which were pretty scary because you were having to sort of take part in discussions and then lead physical activities and then have little problem solving things and got called into the interview room at the end and they said ‘Not quite up to the standard we need but we like your enthusiasm so think about applying again in a couple of years time’. So that took me through school, and the air force had always said we prefer people with degrees, this is back in the ‘70’s, so I thought right I’ll get a degree and then I’ll apply again.
DE: Um.
MC: Well I’ll start a degree, and with Father’s background and my life on farming we decided to go for agriculture engineering and because of Father’s background as farming and also in the academics, because we’ll talk about Father later I guess, but he’d gone from the war back up to university and then gone straight, having finished his university course, to be a lecturer so he was involved in all the academics of that. So, he still knew a few people in the academics world of agriculture and so that helped I think to get me into the university course. Got some, scraped some A levels, I remember hearing that my A level results had come through whilst I was actually loading bales on a trailer, so combining the two together, the farming and the future air force. So, got to university and then applied, fairly quickly, because the university had university air squadrons and that was one of the requirements about where I was applying to go to, that they had a university air squadron which taught you to fly, although with no commitment at the time, and moved on. I think applied as soon as I could, got in there, so got a start being taught to fly the Chipmunk aircraft which again brought a few stories back from Father because it was one of the last aircraft he had flown after the war, and I suppose I didn’t get to hear much more from father about his flying time at that stage, it wasn’t really I suppose until quite a few years later on where having gone through my training, I got onto multi-engine aircraft and eventually got onto the Lancaster, and what I say to people is that I didn’t hear so many stories from Father about his activities but I heard having met a lot of the old veterans, a lot of the guys who knew Father, who would tell me some of the stories of what Father got up to, which he would never actually necessarily mention himself because they probably bent the rules rather a lot, and because of this, because of the contacts I made then I managed to find out and do some more digging. We’d always been encouraging Father to write his biography because we used to have all the little snippets but no sort of general put together information and so whilst I was at flying with the BBMF, flying the Lancaster and meeting so many people that knew Father from those days, I think Father was turning not towards retirement because you never actually retire as a farmer but he was in a mode where he was trying to do a little bit less and so he got more involved with the squadron associations, I think he became the secretary of 44 Sqn Association, so he was involved a lot more, spent a lot more time with that so again I got to hear more about what he was doing and what he had done in the war until, I say I was on BBMF, and then for us father and son idea I suppose the first time we actually flew together was in a Lancaster, so for me that was very, very special, taking him flying, I was only a co-pilot at the time so I didn’t have much say in what was going on but we got him on board anyway and flew around for a little while with him down behind me in the sort of wireless ops/navigator seat and then as my time on BBMF progressed I got to be captain then with the extra responsibility you get a bit of extra pulling power as well so not long after I got made captain of the Lancaster I managed to get Father back in the aircraft again and this time managed to get him in the right hand seat and me in the left hand seat so the Chatterton crew were airborne again. And what was very nice about that is, not only did I manage to get Father airborne but managed to get also three of his war time crew with us as well in the Lanc at the same time. That was the bomb aimer, the rear gunner and the flight engineer, so we all flew in the Lanc together. And I think Father used to really enjoy the fact that I was flying the Lanc, he spent far more time involved with the associations as I say and following what I was doing and every time I came back at the weekend I had to give him a full report of all the flights I’d had that week, at that time and he used to absorb it all and whenever I was flying around Lincolnshire, which was obviously quite a lot of the time as we were based at Coningsby, but if ever I was in the right direction I would always come back via Father’s farm and give him a bit of a flypast, so as I say he wasn’t used to seeing me much above four hundred feet or so doing that sort of thing. I think that sort of covers basically the connection between me and Father.
DE: Um. How does it make you feel flying with your Father and members of his crew?
MC: Um, when I was flying as captain you, lot of people ask me what it was like, what you’re thinking about when you’re flying the Lanc and I think my rather bland answer is that when you’re flying an aircraft like that you’re concentrating, or any aircraft to be honest, you’re concentrating on getting that job done, you’ve always got a job to be at a certain place, at a certain time with your mind set up to go and do a display or whatever so often at the actual time you’re not thinking too much about the importance of it, it’s only afterwards when you’ve landed and it’s all been successful, you can then allow your mind to wander back over what you’ve just achieved, on those occasions with Father, when I was flying with Father, it was just fantastic, absolutely marvellous, very, very, proud to watch them all. I know when, the first time I took them flying I was slightly wary of the rear gunner because he’d been the old man on the crew when the guys flew together, so I knew he was not very able but he, when we met them at BBMF, he had his, the rear gunner had his, I think grandson and grand-daughter with him, he walked with sticks and looking, you know, not very capable of clambering in the Lanc and so I was a bit concerned about how on earth am I going to say that having got this far it was going to be too dangerous to take him on board because he was going to be a sort of liability to himself and the rest of the crew? And I was thinking about this and they went out to have a look at the aeroplane first and he hobbled over towards the rear steps. He then dismissed his grandchildren, dismissed his sticks and ran up the stairs and in the turret before we knew it. So, there were no complaints, no problems there my fears had gone away then. Somehow, and it often happened with the veterans when we took them on board, I suppose that was one of the highlights of their lives, and so the youth just returned, and as I say even though they approached the aeroplane on sticks and walking frames somehow that just got thrown aside and they remembered lives when they were in their late teens and things like that. And whether the body itself may not have been willing but the spirit certainly was and we often used to see that, and the same as at East Kirkby it was getting the old boys on board and it was fantastic how they were so nimble again. The other thing, digressing there again, is when you got groups of these old boys together, in their eighties as they were, some nineties, is how they used to speak to each other. And again, they’d go back all those years, the sense of humour would be quite sharp, quite cutting but always well natured and you could see what a band of brothers they were I suppose.
DE: Did they include you in that as a pilot of the Lancaster or?
MC: I think we were embarrassed as the crew because if we used to go to these gatherings where they came to the aircraft at Coningsby or whether we landed the aircraft and had the old boys come round us we used to be embarrassed by the sort of celebrity status we had you know, and they were all asking for our autographs and asking what it was like to fly the Lanc, because there were quite a few of them in those days and it just seemed all wrong to me, really embarrassing you know that they were treating us like heroes and celebrities and yet they were the ones who obviously flew these aircraft for real as I say. Nowadays I think the veterans are treated with more due respect and things like that but twenty years ago when I was flying there was quite a lot of them around and they weren’t necessarily treated in the same way. But as I say that was what I used to recall is the embarrassment of them treating us like celebrities, but it was great meeting them as I say they used to fly these aircraft for real.
DE: Um, I think we’ll come back to that in a bit, could you tell me a little bit more about your career in the RAF?
MC: OK yeah. So, RAF wise, didn’t get in the first attempt at school, got in the second attempt with at university, so in my one of three years my university course was agricultural engineering, as I say it came from the RAF background, came from the farming background, the RAF just wanted a degree, they didn’t care what subject you had they just wanted a degree. So, we thought with my life at that point then agricultural engineering would be the best chance of getting through so we did. So, university where we got to learn the Chipmunk, and we flew that and I think I must have got about seventy hours or so, it was sort of every weekend, occasionally during the week, but mostly weekends so my university life was either working academics during the week and unlike a lot of people who sort of let their hair down at weekends, because I had hair in those days, we used to just go off to the RAF camp and fly. They’d have the RAF social life but generally not sort of the mad student social life. So, from university then the destiny was to go to Cranwell where we were trained to be officers, I think about sixteen week officer training, initial officer training course, usual sort of running around, carrying pine poles, leadership exercises and air warfare studies and general service background stuff, oh a lot of marching of course. I think my uniform fitted me better than average so I was made parade commander for Cranwell so again huge, huge pride in being the parade commander in front of the RAF College at Cranwell but as I say at the same time very, very busy concentrating on what you were doing and then again when it all finished and hopefully went successfully, huge sigh of relief and just realised what you’d just done, what you’d just achieved, anyway. Having finished officer training then went off to do pilot training, going to back step a little bit now because I finished university at the end of the academic year, sort of July time and then my entry at Cranwell wasn’t until, I think, quite late in the following year. So, I had about nine months, I had nine months holding before I started at Cranwell and that nine months was great fun because I just went and held on various different RAF stations. I went out to RAF Germany for a while and held at Gutersloh and were flying, associated with the Pembroke squadron there. The Pembroke’s used to fly all over Germany a sort of communications aircraft and then at the back of the hangar was a Pembroke with curtains over the windows, never used to move, I never used to see it move, anyway occasionally it wasn’t there, and then it was there, we never used to see it going in and out and that was the one that used to go off to Berlin and recce the corridors and things like that, but whenever I used to ask about it people just denied it was there so I found it very strange, rather than telling me what the truth they just denied its existence altogether. Anyway, that was one posting and that was very interesting going to Berlin for the first time and being given a guided tour of all the various parts of Berlin that had been affected by the Cold War and my Father’s war, imaging Father up there in the air above. Another holding post I think was at Farnborough where I was used as a guinea pig basically. So, Farnborough is the Institute of Aviation Medicine and so some days we’d be boiled in hot water and see what reaction we had, sometimes we’d be frozen, sometimes we’d be squashed, sometimes we’d be stretched. Spatially our average human bodies were trying out different, to see what the reactions were as far as various protective clothing and escape equipment and things like that were, so that was painful but interesting. Yes, so go back now, went and joined Cranwell, did pilot training that was on the Jet Provost and I found most of the way through training it was quite hard work for me. I never, ever sort of aced anything, I was always very middle of the road on all the things but we were quite aware that each flight it was quite high pressured because if you sort of failed one particular exercise then you’d be given another chance but after that they’d be looking at you quite closely so there was always quite a lot of pressure I remember about that and I always used to have in the back of my mind what would I do if I didn’t get through pilot training? And along the way we’d lose colleagues through getting washed out so you were always very much aware that the fact that it was possible that you wouldn’t be fulfilling your career or aim of flying. But I got through Cranwell alright and then we were going to go to the next stage which was the work up for what is called group one, phase one, which is basically you were working up to go onto the world of fast jets because at that stage of the air force, of the RAF, and this is talking mid-seventies there were no more people going to the multi-engine world they didn’t require any pilots, it was all cut backs and so there wasn’t any requirement for multi-engine pilots anymore and so the only option was either fast jet which I didn’t have much faith in me surviving the course or helicopters. So I opted to go helicopters, so I went up towards helicopters, and initially it was on very old helicopters like Whirlwinds which were quite nice and straightforward to fly and then progressed onto things like the Puma which was quite a difficult aeroplane to fly, very unstable, I never got on particularly well with that and after a while progressed through to the conversion unit but never feeling particularly comfortable with it and eventually had a mutual agreement that I wasn’t going to progress any further on the helicopter world and fortunately, for me, the multi-engine world had started up again at that point so there were positions available. So I remember going for an interview with the station commander at Odiham where I had been doing my helicopter training and saying that I’d like to go on to be a multi-engine pilot and he said ‘Well what are you going to do if you don’t get to be a multi-engine pilot?’ and I said ‘I’ll try to be an airline pilot then, I’m going to fly’ he said ‘Well I’ll cautiously recommend you for multi-engine on the grounds that I don’t think much of your loyalty, because you’d rather go and join the airlines rather than stay in the air force as an engineer or something.’ So, I thought, weird, anyway, for me that was perfect because that was what I’d always wanted to do multi-engine. So, I went and did multi-engine training on the Jet Stream it was in those days at Leeming and this was quite fun now because it was an aeroplane where you were doing , wasn’t doing wacky aerobatic stuff, you were doing procedural flying which was flying on instruments, going places so you were working out how to get from A to B and stuff which seemed far more applicable to my sort of way of life and abilities. And so it came towards the end of the Jet Stream course and they said ‘Right you can put down what you want to go onto next’ and in those days the options were Vulcans, Victors, Hercules, VC10’s, flight check Andover’s and Shackleton’s, and nobody wanted to go Shackleton’s because you were going back in time about two decades but I knew of course, dear old Dad and his Lancaster, my best chance of getting anything like a Lancaster was to go and fly a Shackleton which is the grand-daughter of the Lancaster.
DE: Sure.
MC: So I thought well I’ll go and volunteer for that ‘cause it would give me a chance to know what Father’s flying was like. So, I volunteered for Shackleton, they said ‘Are you sure?’ Not many people did that so I got my choice and went to Lossiemouth to convert to the Shackleton which was, it was quite a step back in time, because the Jet Stream I had been flying was the most newest aircraft in the Royal Air Force inventory, and the Shackleton was the longest, oldest one I think. It was a step back in time as far as the technology of the aeroplane and the procedures and things but an interesting job. We used to have an airborne early warning radar under the nose of the Shackleton so we’d go off north and try and chase, well not chase, but go and spot the Russian aircraft coming down from the north, most of the Russian aircraft went a lot faster than we did so we had to get sent out in good time in order to try and spot them before they cleared off and went back again. But interesting job, flew out as a co-pilot for about two years and then they said ‘Right time to move on‘ so we’re going to replace the AW the airborne early warning Shackleton with an airborne early warning Nimrod, we’re going to get a Nimrod, we’re going to put a radar on the front of it and another one on the back of it, it’s going to be very high tech and it’s going to do the same sort of job as a Shackleton but much better. So, go and get some Nimrod time first and you’ll be able to come back onto the AW Nimrod. So I went off into the maritime world, so I was only just moving down the road to Kinloss and did a conversion unit at St Mawgan onto the Nimrod and those six months at St Mawgan were basically, as I recall, forty knot fogs, because that was what the weather was like down in that part of the world over winter, often foggy and the fog moved very rapidly which was unusual so quite a lot of frustrations with the weather but got through the Nimrod conversion and then got posted back up to Kinloss as expected ‘cause I had a house up in that part of the world and then went onto the Nimrod, arrived in quite an exciting time ‘cause I arrived at Kinloss in 1982 which was the Falklands War time. So, Nimrods were heavily involved in that and what was supposed to be a about two-month conversion onto a slightly better version of the Nimrod, a mark two Nimrod, which had more modern equipment was a bit more capable, instead of it being two months it was two weeks. So, we very rapidly rushed through this course and then went straight onto a squadron where the squadron were preparing to get sent down to Ascension Island where they were going to provide cover for all the aircraft carrying on all the way down to the Falklands themselves. So all these new equipment they brought in was quite interesting they, for the Nimrod which as I say had just been basically a converted Comet with regular engines and a bomb bay, all of a sudden because they realised the capacity or the capability of this aircraft could have, we were given air-to-air refuelling so we could extend the range of the aircraft hugely, we were given the ability to drop one thousand pounds bombs from a Nimrod which was fairly unusual, and the idea of that was we were to tax some hopefully defenceless shipping, some Argentinian shipping, wouldn’t send us against anything to shoot back I don’t think but the idea was that we would be able to do that, so we hadn’t actually had a go at bombing and when we saw the bombs in the hangar beforehand I’m sure they had 1945 written on them, so I think there were some of Father’s leftovers that were still kept airworthy, or whatever the word is condition. So, I was very proud of the fact that I went and dropped one single thousand-pound bomb and then a stick of three, I thought wow this is certainly following in Father’s footsteps, that was up at the ranges at the north of Scotland, and I think I actually hit the target as well which is quite nice, ‘cause the co-pilot had to actually release the bomb whilst the pilot was busy flying. And also we got air-to-air anti-aircraft missiles so we actually had anti-aircraft missiles fitted under the wings of the Nimrod which was pretty wacky and because it was war time ish so all these things just got put in and put on without too much paperwork and bureaucracy. The idea of that again was that we were going to try and shoot down the Argentinians 707’s ‘cause there’s no chance of us ever going against a fighter or anything like that but all these modern toys and clever bits were put on and then I was really miffed because our crew had a date to go down to Ascension Island and start flying that area between the Falklands and Ascension Island and then we had a crew farewell party, so we all got together to have a party to say ‘We’re going to be off now for a few months’ and I was really miffed because the bliming Argentinians went and surrendered that weekend. So, we never got to go, it was really frustrating, we’d done all the training, all the work-up for it and then a huge let down. I think, people said ‘Were you not worried about the fact that you could have been shot down or hurt or damaged?’ and it’s interesting reflecting on that because having done so much training we all wanted to get on with the job. There was one guy, I think he was a bit older, who sort of thought I’m not sure about this it could be a bit dangerous, but generally we all wanted to go down there so it was all a bit embarrassing when we didn’t go, quite miffed. So anyway carrying on with the Nimrod world, and I think by this stage the Nimrod AW had been attempted and they’d realised that it wasn’t going to work, they had too many problems with the technical side of getting the radar at the front to talk to the radar at the back, and so it was shelved and so basically I was on Nimrods I was going to stay on Nimrods, so I carried on and at Kinloss the idea was that you’d do a ground tour so you’d maybe be in a simulator as an instructor checking the guys going through and then you’d go on a flying tour and having done it for a while you’d go onto another ground tour so I was in ops doing plans, planning future flying, and that’s the way it used to work generally you’d alternate between the two between a flying tour and a ground tour and then I think around about ’89 ish I got a ‘phone call, I used to talk to the posting man every so often, he would sort of discuss what we wanted to do and what he wanted us to do and the posting man said ‘Would you like to go and fly the Lancaster?’ Stunned silence, ‘What?’ he said ‘The pilot of the Lancaster at the moment is finding the extra workload a bit much for him and he wants to get another pilot.’ So absolutely astounded said ‘Oh yes please, rather!’ So got all set up for leaving Kinloss and going down to join BBMF and whilst all this was happening the paperwork was all going through I discovered slowly but surely that actually you can’t get a posting to BBMF, ‘cause all the jobs on BBMF are done by people who have a job in the local area who then volunteer to go on BBMF, so I found myself going down towards a ground job at Coningsby I was going to work in ops at Coningsby, and then I’d have to apply to join BBMF so I felt a bit miffed at that I’d been sort of tricked into it almost to go down to do this ground job without the certainty of BBMF but I knew Paul Day who was on BBMF who used to come shooting on the farm with father and so got down to Coningsby, got established in my ground job in ops and went and kept on battering on the door of BBMF until they let me in. So the situation was it didn’t quite turn out as expected, they had the captain and then they had two co-pilots flying the Lanc and they’d never been the idea that there was going to be another captain flying the Lanc just the one and that was OC BBMF so the chap in charge was the one who flew the Lancaster and he was the only full time member of the aircrew on BBMF, all the other aircrew members were, had jobs elsewhere so the fighter pilots would be instructors flying the Tornado, the navigators on the Lancaster would be probably in a ground job either at Finningley where they were training navigators or at Coningsby itself, the flight engineers would all come from Finningley where they would be training other flight engineers and I was there in ops so I got to fly as co-pilot although it was a pretty big secondary duty as we called it and it would be every weekend and it would be during the week as well. So, we then had the sort of battle between my primary job which was in ops and the fairly high profile requirement to be on BBMF and I had a squadron leader boss in ops but his boss was OC Ops and OC Ops was also in charge of BBMF so if it ever came to a battle between my normal day job and BBMF then BBMF used to win fortunately which I was very pleased about and my ops squadron leader was a bit miffed. So, onto BBMF. So that was in ’89 I joined BBMF and of course that was the 50th anniversary of the start of the second world war so my time on BBMF was highlighted by all these anniversaries of events of the fiftieth anniversary various events throughout the second world war. Initially, as I say, as co-pilot on the Lanc, so simply flying the Lanc was brilliant, absolutely fantastic then as time went by the army decided they wanted to fly, or jump out of a Dakota. The army wanted to jump out of a Dakota to celebrate D Day plus fifty and Arnhem plus fifty and all those sorts of things so they’d heard about this Dakota which could be made airworthy or brought back to be being airworthy, the powers that be in the RAF said ‘There’s no way the army are going to fly that, we’ll let the RAF fly and if it’s going to be flown by the RAF it will have to go to BBMF’. So the Dakota arrived on BBMF, they didn’t give us anymore ground crew to cater with the extra aircraft type so the support aircraft we’d had before that a Devon, which is a lovely little aeroplane a two engine forties type design aeroplane a transport design aircraft, it only carried about seven or eight people, but ours was a VIP fit so it was a very comfortable aeroplane to fly around, so the Devon which the multi-engine pilots used to fly was taken out of service because there weren’t enough ground crew to look after all these aircraft and the Dakota came in. And the boss, so we had to have a captain for the Dakota and so the boss of the flight who had been the Lanc co-pilot decided he was going to fly the Dakota as captain therefore we needed another Lancaster captain, wee hee, there I was volunteering. So ’92 I got to fly as captain, then initially just as sort of transit and doing odd fly pasts and then fairly quickly I got display authorisation. To display an aircraft you’ve got to go through an extra sort of set of hoops, it’s got to be approved at a fairly high level, so we had to work up to that and then get approved to do that, it’s a thing that happens at the beginning of every year, so there I was fully fledged Lancaster captain display pilot and that’s when I started, managed to get Father flying and taking Father off to various events. So, I could talk about BBMF for hours and hours and hours but basically say all the fiftieth anniversaries you get to do things with that aircraft that you wouldn’t be allowed to do with another aircraft so if I fly down the Mall at five hundred feet, dropping poppies on the Queen’s head everyone cheers, if I’d have done that in a Nimrod I’d have been out of the air force very quickly. So, it’s not only a wonderful aeroplane to fly it’s the stuff we were allowed to do and also the way you got treated you were a celebrity as far as the airshow fans were concerned, equivalent to popstars and royalty and all that sort of stuff so you got treated really, really well. Life was quite good in those days, the air force had a bit of money I suppose so whenever we used to go away at weekends we were normally staying in hotels and on allowances and things like that which was all quite generous, it’s all slowly cut back over the years but even so it was very good at the time. And then initially I was sent to BBMF for two years, or to Coningsby for two years, to fly. After two years it was review time I was having a great time I could see that the captaincy was going to come up after two years, I was captain of the Devon, so I said to them ‘Can I possibly, you know, stay another year?’ so they said ‘Oh OK, it’s not doing your career any good to stay on a ground tour’ I said ‘I don’t care about that I want to carry on flying’. So did that and I think that might have happened about another year later on so reviewed again and stayed on BBMF again and interestingly I got to captain then and that was a point actually as well where as far as my RAF overall career came to a decision point whether I wanted to leave at that point or stay on, that’s one of the option points, most of my old Nimrod and Shackleton colleagues were all leaving to go off to the airlines so that was the obvious option for me but decided well here I am, I’ve got you know, the likelihood of flying the Lancaster for a few more years as opposed to going off and being air airline pilot, so there was never any battle, never any decision for me I was going to stay where I was so I lost that opportunity to go out there really but with no regrets at all. So, carried on flying the Lanc, so after a couple of years say they asked me and I said ‘I’ll stay on’ after a couple of more years I think I probably said the same thing again and interestingly then after about four or five years they said ‘Would you mind staying on because we can’t find anyone to replace you?’ so they actually started asking me to stay on flying BBMF so that was even nicer. Because I think the reason was that the job of a BBMF pilot then you had your own normal Monday to Friday, eight to five routine, and then BBMF in theory was in the bits that were left. So normally on a Friday from say March through to October time November, yeah October, you’d either get airborne on a Friday afternoon, go away or get airborne early Saturday morning and you’d be away all weekend and then landing back on the Sunday evening, possibly Monday, so with all that the family didn’t get to see a great deal of you, and I’d got young daughters growing up and they weren’t seeing very much of me either so it was an interesting contrast from being away at the weekend where you were a celebrity and treated with all this pomp and circumstance and then you’d get back you’d land the Lancaster, maybe the kids would be there to meet you, the wife would sort of hand over a child, say ‘Right, these are yours, the grass needs cutting and the decorating needs doing’ it was down to earth, literally as well as physically so it was an interesting comparison. But it was a lot of time away so I think that was why they had a job finding people, people of the right sort of background ‘cause there were no Shackleton’s flying anymore so they hadn’t got people of a Shackleton background, Hastings was the other aircraft type they used to like people with background of and there were none of them around so they were a bit short of supply for Lancaster crew pilots and so they couldn’t actually find anybody for a year or so they couldn’t find anybody to come and replace us and so they eventually found one guy who came along quite happily, another Shackleton experience, and he was also senior to me as well so I could see my nose being a little bit out of joint now, he was senior he was qualified as an instructor so he was going to have a higher training position but then curiously he was crook almost for about two years with various family problems and injuries and things like that so it actually meant that rather than getting pushed to one side I actually got all the Lancaster flying, so for two years it was my Lancaster which used to annoy Paul Day no end. So, all the high profile and low profile stuff I got to do. I think the Lanc used to fly about ninety-four hours a year and I used to get about ninety of those ninety four hours so life was very good. But then the chap came back in fully trained up senior to me, so the writing was sort of on the wall for me. You can either stay on for a little bit longer as a junior or time to move and I reckoned after nine years I maintain that I’d achieved everything I’d wanted to do in a Lancaster, legally and illegally, one way or another so it was probably time to move on and the air force by now was sort of saying ‘Time to get back to a proper job’. So in ’97 sadly I left BBMF and I expected to go back to Kinloss to the maritime world up there to fly the Nimrods again with all the associated problems of being so far away and having a fairly detailed time that they told you when you were going to have your leave and not have your leave and fortunately I think in rather a strange way that happens with the air force there’d been an accident with a Bulldog, where a chap had been killed, so they needed to replace him and the chap who replaced him had to have a Nimrod background so he was taken from 51 Squadron, who were flying Nimrod’s at Waddington, so a slot appeared on 51 Squadron at Waddington and with me at Coningsby obviously it was ideal. I knew a few people on the squadron, they said ‘It was a pretty good way of life, what they do’ so managed to get a posting to Waddington. So, in ’98 I had to go on a quick refresher back at Kinloss on the Nimrod and then to Waddington, and the aircraft there was a Nimrod again but an electronic reconnaissance version, so a very different aircraft to the one at Kinloss, not maritime at all. Basically aircraft used to go up high level and listen to all the electronic transmissions, whether they be verbal or whether they be radars and things like that radio emissions, and again interestingly from a sort of medals point of view I think I think about that, I used to go along to all the Remembrance Day services and having been in the air force all those years had a very bare chest compared to all the old boys who had lots of jangling medals, and because of the role of the reconnaissance Nimrod we were over the Balkans, we were over later on we were over Iraq and Afghanistan and so I seemed to collect medals almost once every six months or so, so I thought ‘Hurrah’ now I’ve got all my medals I can go to these Remembrance Day parades and bravely wear my medals proudly, and then you think about it and actually most of my medals were awarded for being in the right place at the right time and with the aircraft we flew if ever there was any hint of danger we’d run away very quickly, so most of the people we used to fly against there wasn’t much of a threat to us but if ever there was a significant threat then having a high profile aircraft like ours we were just told to run in the opposite direction.
DE: Um.
MC: So I used to think then, well these guys got their medals for getting airborne knowing they were going to fly against fighters and flak and all the problems of darkness, and a lot of them wouldn’t even get any medals for doing that, whereas I was getting airborne and you know my medals were for drinking excess red wine and pizza’s in Italy and things like that so it used to sort of bring it home the value of them all but anyway Father liked to see all these medals. Obviously, Father was quite disappointed I think when I left BBMF but there was nothing we could do about that because he’d been very much involved in watching me go along and towards the end he was involved in lots of press interviews and things like that and so went to the reconnaissance Nimrod and then did that job, very enjoyable job, again flying lots of interesting places we went to, the flying itself wasn’t that exciting because we were just sort of flying around in big orbits at thirty thousand feet but the job we were doing was pretty interesting, and then we heard that the Nimrod was going to be taken out of service, and I think just before that in fact, again a lot of the multi-engine guys were going off to the airlines and they were concerned they were going to run out of Nimrod pilots so I was approaching my fifty five year point which is where you normally leave, and wondering what to do at fifty five because it was quite a strange age to start a new career, hoping maybe you know the airlines again because I thought maybe I’d get an airline job at fifty five but wasn’t sure and then the air force surprised me by, I was called into the boss’s office and said ‘Would you like a five year extension beyond fifty five?’ I thought what another five years of living in Portakabins overseas in the desert, not sure about that. But when I actually sat down and worked out all the financial side of it as opposed to the unknown of going off to the airlines it seemed like an easy decision so decided to stay on up to the age of sixty in the RAF flying the Nimrod, and then not long after I’d made that decision we then heard that the Nimrod was going to be taken out of service. So we were all very concerned about that ‘cause we thought we were doing a pretty good job with the Nimrod and it was being very much appreciated around Libya and Afghanistan by the army guys on the ground who we were helping but I think when Libya kicked off all of a sudden we got an extension of about three or four months with the aircraft otherwise we were all expecting to go off to other jobs, and on the Nimrod squadron, 51 Squadron if you had more than five years to go in the RAF then they were going to retrain you onto the American equivalent which we were going to get ourselves eventually but if you had less than five years they went off any other sort of job and because I didn’t have long left, I only had about two and a half years left in the RAF, they decided that they weren’t going to give me a flying job it would be a ground job, so I ended up working behind a desk as flight safety at Waddington which I can’t say I enjoyed at all with all the frustrations of a ground job. And then the age of sixty arrived and I left the air force and have had a wonderful time in retirement ever since.
DE: Ah ha.
MC: Now, I’ve not given up flying totally, I now I’ve joined the AEF, Air Experience Flight at Cranwell, so I fly cadets every weekend or whenever I want to basically. We fly cadets in a little single-engine training aeroplane so that’s great fun. I also fly, got a PPL, so I just fly friends around in a little four seater and the best thing for me just recently is I’ve taken, starting flying a Tiger Moth, which is an old pre-second world war training bi-plane and I do my presentation about my time in the air force I like to finish it off by showing pictures of the Tiger Moth because my Father, the first aircraft he flew in the RAF was a Tiger Moth and he went on eventually to Lancaster’s and then he ended up flying Chipmunks with the university air squadron at Nottingham and when I first joined the RAF, the first RAF aircraft I flew was a Chipmunk, then went onto Lancaster’s and ended with a Tiger Moth. So, the whole sort of circles gone all around together, that’s me.
DE: And you also do taxy runs in ‘Just Jane’?
MC: Yeah, so when I was flying on BBMF Lanc I’d always known about the Panton brothers at East Kirkby, Panton’s and the Chatterton’s, so my father and the Panton’s had known each other for quite a few generations. My father had been born on the site of where East Kirkby airfield was later made so he also had a sort of family connection with the area but the Panton’s and Chatterton’s have known each other for years so long before I got involved with the Lanc the families had known each other and we’d known that the Panton family, Fred and Harold Panton they’d had an older brother called Christopher and he had been a flight engineer on Halifax and he was lost on the Nuremberg raid which was one of the worst of the war and that had always been a very sore point to the family, the Panton family yet Father Panton found that his best way of dealing with this was to sort of black it out, blank it out. So, he’d never allowed, the boys were never allowed to go across to Germany to look at the grave, never allowed to not quite talk about him but never allowed to get involved or anything with what actually happened to him. So, it wasn’t until the father died that Fred and Harold could then do some exploration and find out a bit more about their brother and what had happened to him. They went over to Germany, Durnbach cemetery, where they found his grave and they sort of wanted to do something back home rather than sort of just a gravestone. They wanted to something rather more vibrant and so they started a museum at East Kirkby just basically in his memory and they wanted to get hold of an aeroplane. They couldn’t get hold of any Halifax’s ‘cause they weren’t any Halifaxes around and so they’d heard about a Lancaster for sale up at Blackpool so they acquired the Lanc, well they didn’t acquire it initially, when they were first interested in ’72 it had been bought by somebody else and it went to the main gate at Scampton this aircraft, NX611, and it had spent quite a few years there and whilst it was there the owner who’d bought it decided he didn’t want it anymore so put it up for sale again. So in ’83 the Panton’s successfully bought the Lancaster but had nowhere to put it so left it at the main gate at Scampton, but slowly but surely got their plans together and on part of the old airfield at East Kirkby which they’d acquired for chicken farming, they acquired the area around the control tower, they had half a hangar built on one of the old hard standings where the hangars had been, they had half a hangar built just big enough for a Lancaster and in ’88 the Lanc was dismantled at Scampton again, because it had been dismantled at Blackpool and moved to Scampton, then it was dismantled again moved by road with the help of the RAF to East Kirkby and reassembled. So, it arrived there and was reassembled in ’88 and looked magnificent and of course we all went along there and admired it tremendously and they had quite a few events there, reunions and things and it all looked very good. We could see that Fred and Harold were not satisfied with this and I think when I was on BBMF at the time they’d said ‘Do you think, do you know of anybody who could you know have a look at the engines, see if there was any chance of getting one of the engines running?’ There were a couple of guys, or one guy in particular who had been an engine man on BBMF who I knew called Ian Hickling and he had left the RAF at his due point and had gone off to do various jobs involved with aviation companies but I knew he wasn’t particularly happy with it so I said to Ian ‘You ought to speak to the Pantons ‘cause they’re interested in getting one of these engines running. He said ‘Yeah, yeah I will do, I will do, yeah’ and whenever the Panton’s spoke about it I said ‘There’s a chap called Ian Hickling, he’s very interested in getting involved, you ought to give him a call’, they said ‘Oh yeah, we will do, we will do’. Used to get really frustrated, for goodness sake, so eventually I got them speaking to each other, so Ian was taken on and within about seven months of starting on the Lanc he actually got one of the engines running so ’94 they got the first engine running at East Kirkby and before long they thought about starting another engine and then they approached me, I’d never been very far away, I was still flying the Lanc at Coningsby and said ‘Would you consider coming and taxying the aeroplane for us?’ So yes, certainly very happy to. It was all very tentative to start with but they made sure the hyd, the pneumatic brakes were working, the basic flying controls were working, the hydraulics were working and then in ’95 we struck the inboard engines up and released the brakes the aircraft just moved forward a little bit, the user brake stopped it again, so for the first time in many years anyway a Lanc was operating at East Kirkby again. Having got the first two engines going it wasn’t long before they got the third engine and then the fourth engine going and then they started offering taxy rides to people.
DE: Ah ha.
MC: So they started charging people for a ride around the airfield, or a little bit of the airfield. Things then moved on, sort of developed all the time. They then started doing night runs which I thought were the best of all because it’s atmospheric to have a night Lancaster night bomber operating in the night in the dark on a Lancaster airfield. Very, very, very, very moving I think that was and quite difficult as well, it used to give me, it was alright to taxy the Lanc in the daylight, but we operated in a fairly confined area but then when we first started doing the night runs it was also in a confined area, and it was, I was amazed how difficult it was because you’d lost sort of sight of the ground, all you had were peripheral views of lights and people with marshalling wands and things like that and again it gave me great respect and admiration for the people that had done this throughout the war in all weathers, very impressive from that point of view. Took people, so we took people for rides in it, I think the next sort of stage of development there was the BBC approached the museum with a view to doing a drama documentary. It was going to be a story about a wartime crew, present day, this was in 2000 but with flashbacks. They wanted to do some Lancaster filming, they couldn’t use the one at Coningsby because the RAF aren’t particularly enamoured with film companies and things like that and they won’t spend any excess time with film companies, so the film company came to East Kirkby instead and said ‘Is there any chance we could get the tail airborne?’ which is quite a major ask [acknowledging laug]) so the engineers again went down the back and tightened up a few of the bolts and put a few extra cables and fasteners in, and we took it out to an extension area. East Kirkby had been a standard three runway airfield, with a six thousand and two four thousand foot runways but after the war the Americans had moved into the airfield and extended one of the four thousand foot runways, east/west runway by an extra four thousand feet and so you had this eight-thousand-foot runway that they’d used. The old airfield had been reduced back to taxy ways and agriculture but that four thousand foot extension the Americans built was still there. And so, it was quite an adventure getting the Lanc from the hangar onto this four thousand foot extension. It involved some ingenuity in putting metal temporary runway covers down into the grass, it was an area where there just wasn’t enough space between some chicken hutches to actually get the wing span through so someone came up with a very clever idea I thought, they actually put a pile of sand by one of the chicken hutches so that as the Lanc was moved the wheel went over the sand, the wing went up over the chicken hutch and down on the far side. Very, very clever. Got it out there, got it onto this extension and very cautious to start with, so without any film cameras around, we just ran the aircraft down the runway, checked the brakes out ‘cause we’d never done more than walking speed before, so went a bit faster, checked the brakes out and next time went faster, checked the brakes out again, we found some fluids coming out of various places, I think it was just corroded water, and things like that, but we assured everything was alright, the brakes seemed to work, they seemed to work evenly so we got quite brave, said ‘Right we’ll go for it’ so this time at the end of the runway, put the power on, this time I put the stick forward and the tail came up quite beautifully within just a few yards of gathering low speed we roared off down the runway. The battle then of course was to keep the speed on enough to be able to keep the tail up but not go so fast that there was any chance of getting airborne, that was the last thing we wanted. We played about with the power and found that out, did it a second time and then a third time I think and then happy that we could do it the film cameras arrived a few, about a week later on the base, with all the paraphernalia that a film crew involves, the thing I remember the most is the catering wagon which was a converted double decker bus, it served wonderful food, anyway. We did all the film work and again got the tail airborne, sometimes with actors on board, sometimes with actors on the outside and it all worked really well, and so a great success. The BBC had kept the public at a sort of distance really, they didn’t want too much publicity about all this, I suppose it made a bigger impact in the film or TV programme when it came out and so having known this had all gone on there was quite a lot of clamouring from the public saying ‘Can we you know do it as a regular event? Can you get the tail up again?’ Well by this time they’d lost access to that runway extension and anyway it was a long way from the museum, so the thought was to acquire a bit of grass not very far from the museum area and get it well flattened down and rolled a few times and then look at the possibility of actually getting the tail airborne on that. And so, we did, we tried it a few times, it was much shorter distance so the tail only went up for a few seconds and then down again but there are some very nice pictures around of the Lanc on the grass with the tail airborne as we roared off across the grass. I think the family sort of thought about the risks involved and decided not to do that as a regular basis, ‘ cause if they’d have been a problem then it could have ruined the whole of the Lanc. So, we didn’t do that very, we didn’t do that many times, a few times and it was very spectacular. And then so the Lanc just went back to the regular routine now of providing passenger runs and they do it on a very regular basis, I think two days a week and bank holidays as well, and they take about ten people on board for not a small fee but I know it’s very, very popular and they’re booked up for about a year in advance so it’s a very popular pastime. If you think about it it’s the only way, only place in the world you can get a ride in a real live Lancaster on a real live Lancaster airfield, it’s the only place in the world you can do that so it’s very special, so no shortage of people queueing up to do it. Whenever I talk about the Lanc people always ask me ‘Well will it fly, is it ever going to fly again?’ So I knew that the public, the family, the Panton family have declared in the press that they do intend to get the aircraft airworthy again, it’s all very exciting. You don’t see a lot of evidence of it at the museum but in the background there’s quite a lot of work going on. They’ve got um, they’ve paid for, acquired airworthy engines, a lot of the work they’re doing now is up to an airworthy standard so any bits they change [unclear] airworthy but still a long way to go. Obviously, they’ve got to have money, it’s going to cost a lot of money, it’s going to be a technical problem although I’m sure it is feasible and the other thing is it’s a decision they have to make. If that aircraft becomes airworthy then the museum loses their centrepiece for a lot of the time when the aircraft’s away earning its living, it’s not going to cost money just to get it airworthy, it’s going to cost money to keep it airworthy so the aircraft will be away displaying and things so a lot of the time it won’t be at the actual museum itself. There’s always a risk of course of losing the aircraft as well so that’s another thing to consider, so there’s sort of three decisions; one is the finance if they can do that, one is the technical side of it and they reckon they can overcome that, so the big one is the decision, do we really want to do this? You know and I think to my mind while we can get actually get people in the aircraft doing these taxy runs, they probably wouldn’t be able to do that when it’s airworthy, to my mind whilst the one at Coningsby is flying and that obviously must come to an end at some point, when the great British tax payer decides it’s not going to pay for it anymore or whatever then that might be a cue for the East Kirkby Lanc to get airborne, don’t know, we’ll see.
DE: Do you think, do you think that they should then?
MC: I’m in two minds. I think I would love that idea of flying that aeroplane although it might be beyond my age scale now, and it would be great to see it flying, but it is very nice for people to be able to clamber over it now and actually get first-hand experience of what it was like to be in a Lanc so I like the idea of keeping it on the ground for now yeah.
DE: Ok, when we were talking earlier you spoke about flying on three. Could you tell me a bit about that?
MC: Yeah, OK. Often see pictures of, looking out over the wing of a Lancaster with the propellers feathered or one or two propellers feathered. One of my Father’s stories which I’ll recount is, as an instructor ‘cause he did his ops survived his tour of ops with 44 he went to be an instructor with 5LFS, 5 Lanc Finishing School at Syston where it was then. He spent quite a lot of time there about a year I think, and he says that’s when he really got to know the Lanc and love it even more so than the operations he was doing so he actually got to be an instructor officer there and he was very keen to pass on that confidence in the Lanc to other people so when he was doing the conversion with them, he didn’t have many flights only about seven or eight flights to convert people on the Lanc, but on one of the early ones he would get airborne, a nice good height, and he would show how capable the aeroplane is. So, he would shut one of the engines down and show the crew you just need a bit of extra power on the others, you can trim the aircraft out and it will fly quite happily on three, as we know people carried on with bombing missions on three engines all the way there and all the way back. He’d then shut the other engine down on the same side, so you’d have two engines on one side, two on the other, so that gives you quite a lot of yaw so you’d have quite a lot of trim on you’d probably have a bit of boot of rudder as well to keep the aircraft straight, but the aircraft would maintain height, you’d get rid of the bomb load if that was the case but the aircraft could still maintain height on two engines. Interesting to land but it could be done, he’d then shut another engine down and so you now had one engine running and where he was, at fairly high level at fairly light weight, then he’d sort of say ‘Yep the aircraft will still just about maintain a slow rate descent so you could probably get the aircraft back’ and then he used to surprise them, he tells me he’d surprise them, by shutting that engine down as well. So, it would be very quiet, have no engines running at all and the aircraft would glide and he’d show mid glide at a fairly good rate. And then he’d just think of the consequences he’d just punch the feathering button to restart the engine and they’d start up straight away and you’d put the power on and the aircraft would climb away. So that was always in my mind, not that I was ever going to do that in my case, but it was always a thought about four engines and there was a healthy rivalry on BBMF between fighter pilots and bomber pilots, a good little bit of rivalry, and we always used to maintain that we had nice, four nice reliable engines and they only had one so whenever we went over any water or built up areas then they would be quite nervous, you could see them trying to get higher and higher to give them a chance to either find a suitable field or parachute out, whereas we had a good solid four Merlin engines. But of course when you’ve got four engines you’ve got more chance of possibly having problems with them and my, when I first started flying on BBMF the chap who was in the charge at the time, the captain, was quite a nervous individual and he didn’t really like practising problems, practising emergencies on the grounds that if they had more problems with aircraft like Canberras, they had more problems practising emergencies than they actually had dealing with emergencies, so we never used to do any emergency training with him. Then he was replaced by a chap called Andy Tomlin who had come from a training background so he was far more used to the risks of training and practising and so he regularly used to teach us the co-pilot, me and the other co-pilot, he’d show us and we’d practise engine failures, shutting an engine down and then dealing with the remaining three engines and then bring the aircraft back into land and the various yaw problems associated with it. Then it turned out that on my very first flight as a captain, we went off down to Boston to do a quick fly past and come back and we had a problem with one of the superchargers to I actually had to shut the engine down so my very first trip as captain I came back on three engines. And then you look out over the engine, over the wing, and you see that stationary propeller and think that’s not right at all but again you concentrate on what you’re doing, so you concentrate on getting it done properly and then when you land you think whew, a sigh of relief. Curiously the next time it happened to me was when I took my Father flying with his crew. Managed to get him airborne and some of his wartime crew and again we got airborne we went off down south and came back again, and I thought a special treat then we’ll do a touch and go, so we landed the aircraft, put the power back on and take off again. And this was with Father’s rear gunner in the rear turret, a dour Scotsman, we’d landed and put the power on to go off again and he couldn’t understand this. A perfectly good landing, Father’s landings weren’t that good all the time, so perfectly good landing so why have we gone off again? I explained we were just going to do it for practice and then just, he said ‘There’s a great pillar of smoke coming out of number four engine’ and the crew looked at the engine and it was, there was no fire but it was just smoke, I think one of the cogs had broken up inside which was pushing out oil. So again, we went through our rehearsed drill, shut the engine down and feathered it so we’d got a stationary propeller which looks very odd and Father who’d now been moved back to sort of the operators’ area, he just couldn’t help himself but came out with a few sort of comments, because when you take the power back, you’ve got the aircraft trimmed down with power on three but not on one so when you bring the power back it has the effect of sort of turning the aircraft the other way. So, Father from down in the depths was saying ‘Don’t, you know remember about the trip you’re on power off’ ‘Yes thanks Dad, thank you very much’. You could see his years of training as an instructor and also the fact that he was my Dad he wanted to sort of help out as much as he could. So, I think I wasn’t too curt with him but I think I said ‘Yeah thanks Dad OK, let me get on with it’. We landed safely and took the aircraft back in again. So, the crew photographs we had afterwards were with one engine feathered, that was quite interesting.
DE: How did that make you feel having that experience with your Father?
MC: Delightful. Very, very proud after all those years where we’d been to the airshows together, seen the Lancaster flying and paid due reverence to it and all that sort of thing to actually go flying in the Lanc with him well there’s nothing better really, with all the various things I did in the Lancaster, legal and illegal, most definitely the best was to take Father flying in it as well.
DE: What illegal things did you do?
MC: [Laughs] Could talk about it now I suppose. It was just [high jinks?] generally. Whenever I used to, if there were any events on at East Kirkby on a Sunday afternoon wherever I was coming from I used to sort of manage to get the aircraft over East Kirkby somehow. And in the Monday morning I’d normally be summoned to OC Ops office to explain why I’d been wasting Lancaster hours. And then various heights, there was one time, I’d always wanted to fly down the Derwent Dam because everyone knows about the Dambusters and all that stuff and they’d flown in their rehearsals, the Dambusters themselves when they were rehearsing had flown over the Derwent Dam, and when they’d done the film they’d spent a lot of time flying over the Derwent Dam so it was always something I wanted to do. I was co-pilot for the fiftieth anniversary which was very highly publicised and lots of press but wasn’t allowed to touch the controls because again the guy was a bit nervous about the height we were going to go down to. He kept far too high as far as I was concerned, so when I got my captaincy it was something I always wanted to do is fly over the Derwent, always, always, always. But every time I’d asked because everything a Lanc does is approved at fairly high level and every time I asked they’d said ‘No, no it’s too high profile to do that sort of thing’. Eventually it was a rather sad occasion that one of the ground crew who been a great friend and a great help of mine had left BBMF and then died very suddenly of a heart attack not long afterwards and his family had always been associated with the Derbyshire area and they had permission to put a little plaque on the Derwent Dam just in memory of Terry Shaw. So, the family had got in touch with me and said you know ‘Is there any chance of giving us a flypast?’ I thought this sounds good, so approached the powers that be and put it in all the right phrases and good public relations and stuff like that and I think the response I got was ‘OK but one pass and no publicity’ and so that one pass actually because of where we were we got there a little bit on the early side and we weren’t too sure if the family were there going to be all ready for us so I went round twice anyway so that was slightly illegal, and the height we came down to was definitely illegal. [Laughs]
DE: Wonderful, OK thank you. Again, before we started the interview you told me a little bit about Peter Lees and a little bit about your Father’s book, do you?
MC: Yeah, when Father’s crew were assembled in the usual ramshackle way of who knew who and what friends got on with who they ended up with seven bods obviously and the bomb aimer had, called Pete Lees, the bomber aimer had come from an RAF background where the rest of the guys had just sort of come in for the war, Pete Lees had been in a little bit longer and so he had a bit more experience and therefore was a little bit I think miffed with the casual attitude of these brand new shiny sergeants who only, hadn’t got anytime time in so to speak. But he was a very conscientious bomb aimer and at times when they were over the target and he wasn’t actually happy with the set-up he told the crew to go around again which they weren’t obviously too happy about the idea of in the middle of a target, but he had the, he was a perfectionist, he wanted to get the job done properly if you were going to go all that way. And one night quite early on in Father’s tour after he’d been on ops for about a month they were selected to be a standby crew, and a standby crew on a squadron on 44 as all the other stations they were the crew that would provide any spare bods if somebody was needed for another crew. So if any one member of a crew that was going to fly that night went sick then a standby crew would provide the spare, unless I think if it was a pilot. If it was a pilot that went sick then the whole crew were replaced. But on this occasion, I think it was 23rd November ‘44, chap called Buckle was captain and his bomb aimer called Mantle-Scott was sick and I’m not too sure why but I do think that it must have been very late notice because I believe that Mantle-Scott’s equipment was all on the aeroplane at that point because it was subsequently lost and he had to claim for it, so it must have been quite a last-minute call he went sick. So, my Father’s bomb aimer Pete Lees was called and he had to go in his place with Buckle and as often happens on these occasions the crew didn’t come back. It was a trip to Berlin I think as well, crew didn’t come back and so quite a blow for Father and the crew having just sort of started off on ops for that to happen and there are some quite poignant little ideas that Father wrote to the parents of Pete Lees to explain, well you couldn’t explain, but to just give their sympathies and hold out hope and it’s interesting that in Father’s letter he says you know ‘From the number of people shot down there’s quite a large percentage alive as prisoners of war’ which I think is twisting the truth a little bit unless that is what Father genuinely believed but he was trying to keep the spirits up. And so, for a little while they flew with odd other bomber aimers, whoever was spare at the time, and eventually the sick bomb aimer joined Father’s crew and they were delighted with him he was very much more of sort of in their ilk and fitted in with the crew very well so they were very pleased with him, Mantle-Scott. So, they all finished the tour and they all went off and went off to be training instructors and things like that later on. But much, many years later, when I was involved with East Kirkby I had a call I think initially it was from the relations of the family of Pete Lees who were, were getting in touch and met up with them, met them at East Kirkby and they brought the memorabilia they had of Pete and it was in a brown suitcase, an old brown suitcase, and it turned out that this was the old brown suitcase that my Father had posted and gone through all Pete’s stuff when he was lost, had actually posted it back down to his parents along with the letter that he written to him and they’d bought all this stuff back to show me. So, the brown case, the letter that Father had written, I’d never seen before but had heard of and various other memorabilia that Pete had had. And we took the families, took the family, and showed them round the Lancaster at East Kirkby and then we showed them the spot at Dunholme Lodge where we think Pete would probably have flown from, where the last time he’d been on the ground so to speak alive so obviously it was very important for the family and quite moving for them and not long after that I had another ‘phone call again from East Kirkby by another person who had approached the museum trying to get hold of me and it was a lady called Jen Scott, Jennifer Scott. Jen Scott was the grand-daughter of Mantle-Scott the bomb aimer who’d joined Father’s crew and it turns out she was at Newcastle University doing a history degree and she’d decided to do her dissertation on Bomber Command and I think the media, how the media reported Bomber Command, and she just wondered if I could help her a bit with some of the research she needed to do. So of course, we got her down to East Kirkby, took some photographs in the nose of the Lanc where her grandfather had been and took them to also look round the Lancaster at Coningsby and also out to Dunholme Lodge again to the spot there. So this is quite moving for us and the family of course and I just kept remembering the fact that if her grandfather hadn’t gone ill that night then she probably wouldn’t exist ‘cause he’d probably have gone down with the Buckle crew, so quite poignant and she was very grateful for all the help she got and we kept in touch and she knew about the family of the bomb aimer that had been lost and on one occasion she went to visit Berlin for something else and was going to go and visit the grave of the chap who was lost and contacted, through me contacted the family and we came up with a nice little plaque which they produced and she went and laid it at Peter’s grave. I thought this was very, very poignant that the grand-daughter of the chap who survived, because he had a cold that night, went and put a little plaque by the grave of the chap who hadn’t survived. All down to a cold.
DE: Are you still OK?
MC: Yeah, [laughs].
DE: Can you, can you tell me a bit about your Father’s book? You said earlier that he wouldn’t talk about it, how did he come to write it all down?
MC: Yeah, so Father didn’t speak much about the horrors of the war he used to talk about the flying and he’d talk about his love of the Lancaster and that sort of thing and obviously, there was a lot of other parts of his life, when he’d been a student beforehand and growing up as a kid and then after the war when he went off to be initially a lecturer and then a farm manager. Lots of little stories he’d tell us, he was great at telling stories but he was no, and they used to get bigger each time of course like the length of the fish, but they got bigger and better each time. And I knew that with my memory and the family’s memories etc., etc we’d lose all these unless we wrote them down so we used to say to him ‘Will you write them down?’ He said ‘Yes I will when I retire I’ll write these little stories down’ and we knew that was never going to happen ‘cause you never retire as a farmer. And it sort of came by chance that often you used to get sort of fan mail and things like that into BBMF and one letter was written by a chap called Richard Underwood who worked for the Council down in Bourne, I think he was a planning officer or something, and he was going to write a little article about Father and I for the Parish magazine or the Council magazine I think it was. I think he was going to plan about two sides of A4 in this and so he asked if it was OK, he asked our permission to do that. And as always with these things we used to pass them onto Father and he’d replied ‘Yes sure that’s fine’ so Richard wrote down a couple of notes, or a couple of pages of notes that he’d gained from Internet and magazines and things and gave them to Father and Father had changed a few bits, corrected a few bits, added a few little notes and added a couple of interesting stories and sent it back to Richard said ‘There you go ’and Richard was so impressed by this, said ‘Oh that’s really good, if I incorporate those can you have look at that again and if you’ve got any other little stories ‘ and he used to go to and fro for about two or three years getting bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger until he got the whole story covered and there was a lot of discussion about the name of the book but eventually they decided to call it ‘ Ploughshare and Shining Sword’ based on Harris’ opinion that the Lancaster was his shining sword, and that ploughshares were converted into Lancaster’s and after the war converted back to ploughshares I suppose. Anyway so the book was slowly, and it was a slow process getting it together, and then I think they had quite a while trying to find someone to publish it as well, and eventually it went through all the publishing and corrections, etc., etc. and illustrations and things and then came the day of the, we knew the date of the publication was getting close, but father was getting iller and iller with various heart disease and things like that and it turned out that father had actually seen everything of the book but had actually passed, had died six days before it was actually published so never got to saw the final finished version but as far as I was concerned I think they had about a thousand copies made and the proceeds went off to the Linc’s and Lancashire Association, but as far as I was concerned I just wanted one copy with all those stories recorded forever which is what I’ve now got so very happy with it.
DE: Smashing. How, it’s another big question, but how do you, what are your thoughts on the way Bomber Command has been remembered?
MC: Yeah, I guess I have been in an environment of Bomber Command for quite a few years now and obviously everyone in the environment I’ve been has been very pro Bomber Command and everyone I’ve met has been very pro and you do realise obviously there’s the other side of the story as well and every so often I just sort of quietly reflect on the fact that the Lancaster was designed to destroy and wonder why it’s got such a wonderful following everywhere, because wherever I go everyone raves about how wonderful the Lancaster is and sometimes depending on the environment you sort of say ‘Well the aircraft was designed as a machine of destruction’ and then see what sort of a reaction you get but most people say ‘Yeah but it was necessary at the time’ that sort of thing so I suppose you’re testing the water a little bit. I follow the general line that the guys at the time were all doing their job and I know sort of from personal experience if you’re trying to put together an operation where you’re trying to have one particular aim of getting an aircraft whether its bombing or whatever over a particular place at a particular time there’s so many different factors involved that there’s nearly always something that goes wrong. So, you have to sort of try and allow for all these things that are going to go wrong and achieve what you can at the end of it, occasionally everything goes wrong like the Nuremburg? raid and very little is achieved and they lose a huge amount of aeroplanes and then on the other occasions very few things go wrong and the target gets devastated like Dresden. And so that’s my sort of form of explanation as to why things like Dresden happened. It wasn’t that they, it was just [unclear] made a special effort to kill as many people as possible, just that all these factors were involved every night and occasionally it all came together and occasionally it didn’t. But for the crews themselves I think because of all the armchair experts after the war and the fact that they never got a sort of campaign medal and things like that, an awful lot of people did just withdraw into themselves and didn’t keep quiet about the war but I think they were reluctant to talk about what they did. So probably again with my Father he’d tell me about the Lancaster but didn’t tell me much about the actual raids or the things he saw and went on. So yeah you feel a bit mad really that they were cheated out of it in a way, everyone else got the recognition for it and yet what they did they should have been recognised for it as well. So, I suppose I, fairly standard sort of line that you maintain and yes there’s recognition nowadays but it’s just annoying it’s too late for so many people.
DE: Do you think that lack of recognition is somehow led into the way the squadron associations were created in their little individual memorials on stations and things?
MC: Yeah, I guess that’s a good point, and I think the associations seemed to sort of blossom, I guess it tied in with most peoples’ retirement so when they were busy working they didn’t really have time for things like that and when they’d stopped working they had a bit more time for reflection and thinking about it. They’d think about the characters they’d worked with and the friendships they’d made and sort of try and re-live some of that and when they did get back together again they’d talk about what they’d done and they’d find that this feeling of reluctance to talk about what they’d done in the war was a mutual thing and sort of because they were in the environment they were in they could talk about it, they could talk about the bad times as well as good times. And therefore I think the associations were a good thing because it got all these individuals who had their own private thoughts together to realise they shouldn’t be ashamed of what they did, it was, they were doing their job etc. and stuff like that. So, I think the associations are a good. Sadly now we’re at the point where most of the old boys, the veterans, are either not with us any more or at a point where they can’t sort of get together so the associations are slowly dwindling away.
DE: Do you feel that your job flying the Lanc gives you any special insight too?
MC: I think it gives you responsibilities almost in a way. I think flying the Lanc and taxying the Lanc at East Kirkby is sort of representing all the guys that flew the aircraft as I say for real so I think it’s important that we do tell the story of them and keep the memories alive and I’ve got a little presentation that I give called ‘The Tale of Two Lancs’ it’s normally to sort of Womens’ Institute and groups like that in the back of the village hall, and I finish that presentation having spoken of all my Lancaster experiences and the fantastic opportunities I’ve had by just putting up the badge of the Lancaster and the badge of BBMF, the Lancaster is to remember the many and then the BBMF is lest we forget and I think that is an idea that when I do my talk I just want to bring back and bring and highlight the memory of all these guys who were lost or carried on and sort of died naturally but with the, that sort of sometimes that idea haunting them all the time behind, but just like to make sure that the memory of what they did stays alive.
DE: Smashing. I think I’ve gone through all the questions I’d jotted down. Is there anything else that you can think of that you’d like to?
MC: Just talk a little bit about the Lanc at Waddington.
DE: Ah ha. Sure.
MC: When I was at Waddington flying my Nimrods I was surprised to find one time that I was asked to go and taxy a group at East Kirkby that were all from Waddington which is where I was based and I was quite surprised, why am I, do not know about this group? And it turned out that this was a project, force development project, force development was an idea the air force developed about ten, fifteen years ago, they realised that some of the young airmen in the RAF actually had no idea about the history of the air force or what the air force had achieved. So, there was a certain amount of resources and energy put into educating the young folks about the history of the RAF, and also encouraging them to develop their own personal abilities as well. So, a project started up at Waddington which was to research an aircraft that had crashed in Scotland and I got involved with this. This group that I had offered to do a taxy ride for were the group that were involved in this project, and it turned out that a Lancaster Mark I which had the registration PD259, which had got airborne from Waddington on 31st August ’44 on a training flight and the crew on board were Australians ‘cause it was 463 Squadron and they were an Australian squadron although they had a Scottish engineer flight engineer. And we’d heard that the aircraft had crashed up in the highlands of Scotland not very far from Aviemore and nobody really knew why, but I was surprised that I didn’t know anything about this because I thought I knew quite a lot about Lancs and the ones that were left, but I didn’t know anything about this one at all. So, did some investigating and joined this little group at Waddington and in 2008 there was an expedition organised to go and visit the crash site, and I wasn’t too sure about it because it involved four hours of walking from the nearest bit of road on the A9 up to the crash site, and the nearest town I think is Kingussie and the crash site as I say was up in the peat bog highlands and was about a four hour walk from the nearest bit of civilisation. So was very much looking forward to it, got out there, had seen some photographs of what was out there, got out there and was amazed to find the state of the bits that were there, the wreckage still perfectly good markings, you could see the squadron letters on the side of it J, O, G, you could see bits of the roundels and lots of the markings on the aircraft that had been sat out there in this environment of plus 20 in the summer to sort of minus 30 in the winter of snow and ice and hail and survived over sixty cycles of this was still in such good condition, amazing. So obviously very fascinated and also very daunting to wander round the crash site of where these seven young men had been killed thinking that’s the spot where these guys were killed, and that was just sort of a visit to the site initially. Got back absolutely full of enthusiasm thought it would be really nice to get some of those bits back to Waddington. The land owner had been a very good chap, he’d been very protective of the site because it wasn’t a burial site because the guys had all been returned to, or been recovered, bodies had been recovered and buried in Cambridge War Graves Cemetery, apart from the engineer who was buried in Scotland. But he was very protective of the site, didn’t want sort of pilferers and people pinching stuff ‘cause it was quite significant to him but he when we explained what we were trying to do he was very pro very much onside and with a bit of wrangling managed to get hold of a helicopter on a training flight in the local area and with a specialist team that were involved in under-slung loads you have to be quite careful about what you put under a helicopter of course, all these experts came along, all of this came together and I was very impressed about how it came together and we actually managed to recover some of the parts of the aircraft in the under-slung load down to by the main road, by the A9, and then back to, ferried back to Waddington. We did two events like that one in 2009 and one in 2010. So, we’d now got some very significant parts of this aircraft recovered back at Waddington and with the help of the Lanc at Coningsby some engineers have made an internal frame just the same size as the inside of a Lancaster so we’ve actually managed to attach some of these sections that we’ve recovered onto this frame sort of almost like a reconstruction of a Lancaster although we haven’t actually got enough room to make a full-size Lancaster. So, it’s quite significant now and it achieved the aim of the people at Waddington who can now actually put the hands on something that if they’re ground crew their forebears did, were involved in seventy years ago. So, it’s quite tangible to see something of a real live Lancaster and we were very impressed, this aircraft was only three weeks old when it crashed, so I call it a brand new Lancaster which amuses people when you see the state of it now. It was a brand new Lancaster, three weeks old, it had still achieved seven, carried out seven operations in that time, six or seven operations and one of the pilots who’d done three of those operations, a chap called Bill Purdy had heard about our project even though he was in Australia and he’d come over to see his old Lancaster and gave us some wonderful tales about the stories of how it had been involved in his general life as well and so we thought as a nice idea we’d present him with part of the Lancaster to take home. So, we found one of the exhaust stubs, there were quite a few of those scattered over the hillside, we found an exhaust stub, rather bent, but we gave it to him to take back. On the grounds that we thought it might look rather suspicious going through the scanner at the airport security we gave him a sort of signed certificate to confirm it was his property and that we’d presented it to him and the significance of it. So, he went back very happy with that. Didn’t expect to see him again but he’s a very adventurous chap and he’s been back to the UK several times since then and come to visit and see the progress in our project. But because when you take bits off a crash site you have to have a licence to take bits off it when you, the licence has to be in somebody’s name so it’s in my name, and so when I recover bits I have to send a full report of all the bits I’ve taken off the crash site and then the MOD come back with a letter, a standard format letter, saying the RAF and the MOD have no longer any interest in these parts, they now belong to you. So, all these Lancaster bits belong to me so I’ve got my own bits of a Lancaster which I’m very proud of, and the visitors centre is open to members of the public by prior arrangement.
DE: Smashing. Well thank you very much again.
MC: Good stuff.
DE: Unless you can think of something else you want to add that will.
MC: I’ll check my notes, things I thought about. Covered it all really. Pete Lees, PD259, my Father’s stories and the two Lancs presentation I do, yeah, brilliant. Yep, so do you, would you want copies of Father’s stories?
DE: I’d love to yes.
MC: Yeah, electronically on there if you wish.
DE: Oh brilliant, that’s fantastic I’ll get those sorted.
MC: Yeah.
Dublin Core
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Identifier
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AChattertonM160331
Title
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Interview with Mike Chatterton
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Type
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Sound
Language
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eng
Format
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01:24:28 audio recording
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Pending review
Creator
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Dan Ellin
Date
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2016-03-31
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Civilian
Description
An account of the resource
Mike Chatterton grew up on a farm. His father, John Chatterton was a Lancaster pilot during the war, before returning to university and becoming a lecturer, then later becoming a farmer. Mike joined the Royal Air Force from university in the 1970’s and flew Jet Provost, helicopters, Shackletons and Nimrods. On posting to RAF Coningsby he joined the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight where he progressed to Captain the Lancaster. He was able to fly his father and some of his crew. Mike also carried out taxy runs on ‘Just Jane’ at East Kirkby and assisted in the recovery of parts of Lancaster PD259 from a crash site in Scotland to RAF Waddington.
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Contributor
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Dawn Studd
44 Squadron
aircrew
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
final resting place
Halifax
killed in action
Lancaster
memorial
perception of bombing war
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranwell
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Hemswell
RAF Kinloss
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Waddington
rivalry
Shackleton
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/53/684/EBoldyDABoldyLMXXXX19-0001.1.jpg
1660e2155347b4f768540dd276dbbaf0
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/53/684/EBoldyDABoldyLMXXXX19-0002.1.jpg
c6911758869ce3c54d671907b1141b85
Dublin Core
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Title
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Boldy, David
Dave Boldy
D A Boldy
Description
An account of the resource
334 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant David Adrian Boldy (1918 – 1942, 923995 Royal Air Force) and consists of his school reports, letters from school and photographs of family and locations in India, letters from training and service, and photographs from his social life and time training. It also includes newspaper cuttings and letters about him being missing in action. David Boldy was born and attended school in India and studied law at Kings College London. He volunteered for the Royal Air Force and trained as an air gunner in South Africa. He flew operations in Manchesters and Lancasters with 207 Squadron from RAF Bottesford. His aircraft failed to return from an operation to Gdańsk 11 July 1942. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by David Boldy and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.<br /><br />Additional information on David Boldy is available via the <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/102182/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
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Boldy, DA
Transcribed document
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[RAF Crest]
923995 A.C.2
Boldy. D.A.
Squad 22, Hut 25
No. 1 Squadron, No. 1 Wing
R.A.F. BRIDGENORTH
SALOP
Sunday, 19th
Mum darling,
We were up at 5 a.m. yesterday. We went to Paddington then came on here to Bridgenorth. The town itself is very dead but our Camp is good. The quarters are [deleted] new [/deleted] new and modern. The food is damn good. So good in fact that some of us had a second share today. We are only staying here a week – others stay about 3 or 4 weeks but Air Crew is rushing the whole course through in a week. We had quite an amazing journey. We played a bit of Pontoon at which I made a few shillings. We also persuaded three girls to join us even though the
[page break]
carriage had R.A.F. only written on it. I don’t know where we are going after this place. We have busy lives here. Up at six and work goes on with a couple of breaks till 6.30 p.m.
The address of the place is exactly as I have written it above. The last day you can write to me is Friday as it causes inconvenience if letters arrive after we move to another station.
The Pilots at Uxbridge were glad to be rid of us & we of them. They messed up our beds when we arrived back on Friday. Anyway they had a lovely surprise in store for them when they came back from breakfast as we left the bed clothes which had been made; all over the place, also their brushes etc. made the room look like Hampstead Heath on bank holiday.
No more to-day. Love to Steve
Love Dave.
Dublin Core
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Subject
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World War (1939-1945)
Bombing, Aerial
Description
An account of the resource
Letter from David Boldy to his mother. Explains that he was staying at Bridgenorth for that week, whilst they rush the course. His crew had a rivalry with another the pilots at Uxbridge, which integrated various pranks.
Creator
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David Boldy
Format
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Two page handwritten letter
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Correspondence
Identifier
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EBoldyDABoldyLMXXXX19
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Shropshire
England--London
Contributor
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Janice Waller
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Title
A name given to the resource
Letter from David Boldy to his mother
RAF Bridgnorth
RAF Uxbridge
rivalry
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1049/11427/ANewhamDF170727.2.mp3
4317e63f3920f92373f45d230b14638c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Newham, Douglas Frank
D F Newham
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Douglas Newham DFC (1921 - 2022, 1337797, 156440 Royal Air Force). He flew operations as an observer with 156, 150, 10 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-07-27
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Newham, DF
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
GT: Now, I’m with Mr Douglas F Newham LVO DFC and Doug welcome and thank you for agreeing to be interviewed for your history and for the history of what you did with Bomber Command to be put forward for the Digital Archives. So, please tell us your story.
DN: Right. My name is Douglas Newham. I was born 13th of November 1921. Consequently, ninety five years of age at the moment. I started my life in, in the RAF by volunteering in 1940/41 and did my first operational tour as a sergeant with a serial number of 1337797. I did my training in the UK. I consider I was very fortunate to do, to do that because right from the word go I got used to flying in weather such as we have over here rather than in the blue skies of South Africa or Canada. So right from the word go I got used to crap weather. Any rate, I did my training in the UK as a navigator observer which was what I always wanted to do. I had no wish to be a pilot. I saw the duties of a navigator as more challenging. Any rate, I did my flying first of all on the dreaded Botha. The Blackburn Botha. And then very quickly they were grounded and we were on Blenheims. The short nosed Blenheim and the long nosed Blenheim for navigation. And my navigation training was from Jurby on the Isle of Man. And most of our navigational exercises were all up and down the Irish Sea and off the west coast of Scotland in glorious, glorious scenery and quite challenging from a navigational point of view. Having finished my navigation, bombing and gunnery training at Jurby, we were then moved up to Kinloss in Scotland, near Inverness. This time flying Whitleys. The old Armstrong Whitworth Flying coffin which looked like a coffin at least. And we finished there our navigation training up there prior to being posted to a Wellington Squadron and that would have been in the tail end of 1941 the beginning of ’42. Strangely enough we were first posted to 156 Squadron which was then still on Wellingtons. And it was the forerunner of one of the Pathfinder Squadrons. As a result of that at a very early stage I was given excellent training on the navigational aid Gee which I loved for the rest of my career. However, that was just as Pathfinder course. 8 Group was being formed and as a consequence of that our crew were posted from 156 to 150 Squadron down in North Lincolnshire. Again on Wellington 3.
GT: Ok.
DN: We stop.
GT: Yeah. Doug, where did you crew up? And who was your skipper and crew please? Could you, can you remember?
DN: Right. We crewed up at our Operational Training Unit at Kinloss in Scotland and I crewed up with a Canadian pilot, Bill Harris. Several years older than, than I was. As a mild diversion at the moment several years after the war I met his sister and married her. So I married my pilot’s kid sister from Vancouver. But that is another long story. Any rate Bill and I and our crew we started our first tour of operations on Wellingtons operating from Kirmington. I remember the first couple of trips were down the north west coast of France. Mining. Dropping sea mines in the channels used by the U-boats. And we dropped mines at probably something like oh five or six hundred feet and encountered a few flak ships. They were very very steep learning curves. I do recall that my [pause] somebody, somebody had suggested to my pilot that unbeknownst to me that it would be safer to do an asymmetric weave. Never to do a regular weave because that could be predicted but to do little bit one way a little bit more that way and then perhaps back. But nothing regular. Well, unbeknownst to me Bill tried this on our first operation. Suffice to say that I think we toured the whole of northwest France but we did find exactly where we wanted to drop mines. Did so and found our way back by which time they thought we were, we were gone because we were about two and a half hours later than we should have been and we were getting a bit short on fuel. Any rate, we carried on. Proceeded with our first tour with further mining operations and then bomber operations over western Germany. Still on the dear old Wellington. Our maximum load was four thousand pounds and we, we had one aircraft that did carry a four thousand pounder. It didn’t even have any bomb doors. It just had an open space and the four thousand pounder was pulled just, just up inside. Any rate, all was going reasonably well there and then there was the allied invasion of north west Africa. Of Algeria. And to our great surprise half the Squadron was sent on this invasion. So we, we flew down to Cornwall. And then from Cornwall down to Gibraltar. And then Gibraltar to an ex-French Air Force airstrip about thirty miles from Algiers. And we had, I think it was twelve aircraft. And our targets were mostly the German ports of Tunis and Ferryville. Then bounced back down the Tunisian coast or over to Sicily. Maybe up to Sardinia. But in the central Mediterranean we were fortunate on one of those operations that we were carrying our four thousand pounder and I did manage to get a direct hit on one of the lock gates at a German port called Ferryville which put the port out of action. Which was rather fortunate. Anyway —
GT: So from that point Doug you’d moved from Bomber Command through to the Mediterranean Command.
DN: Yes. To the North West African Strategic Air Force which consisted of, I think twelve aircraft. Yeah. And our command, commander in chief down there was Jimmy Doolittle who did the Tokyo raids off the carriers. Anyway, so we had started our tour in Bomber Command and then towards the end we went over to, well went down to, posted at away from the UK down to Algiers and moved in to the North West African Strategic. Anyway, came home. Finished there by which time we had lost, well our aircraft was the last remaining aircraft of the twelve that went out there. Most of them I must admit were either accidents or bad weather. Some being shot down. The casualty rate was considerably, considerably less than it would have been had we stayed in Europe. Very much. I mean, we were operating mostly between five and ten thousand feet. We were subject to a lot of light flak but compared to what it was like over Europe in those early days we were extremely fortunate. And recognised it. Germany had a few night fighters out there. Nothing like subsequently developed in Europe. Anyway.
GT: Yeah.
DN: Back to the UK where the crew were dispersed. I was dispersed to Abingdon which was an Operational Training Unit with Whitleys and I was in a Navigation School doing, trying to convert the navigators from their, their early theoretical navigation practices into more realistic operations. Training. Training flights and then more realistic of what it was like over the other side. Now, for some reason, and I have no idea why I was selected to go to the Central Navigation School for a staff navigator’s course. I have no idea why I was picked out. I get to this school and I find that I am the only NCO on the, on the course. They were mostly flight lieutenants and there was one wing commander and I was the lonely sergeant. As a result of that my social life was nil because they were all in the officer’s mess. I was in the sergeant’s mess. So I had, really had nothing else to do but study and I was absolute. I mean I I loved the course. I had, had always hoped as a youth that maybe I might get to university but that was not on in those days. But here I was on what was virtually a university course on navigation and everything to do with it. Astronomy, compasses, radio, tides, astronomy, huge amount of mathematics. And I loved it. I had got nothing else to do. Then I became an absolute bookworm and a swat and it got a bit embarrassing when the only sergeant on the course came out top and I was not very popular with my other course mates. But anyway my commission came through just as I finished that course and I went back to my Operational Training Unit only to find out that one of the conditions of such a course, the staff navigator’s course was that you were obliged to stay in a training position or a staff position for at least a year before you could go back on operations. Any rate I tried to wriggle my way around that and I very nearly got to the Mosquito Met Reconnaissance Flight but it was cancelled at the last moment and I was obliged to stay for that year. However, on the three hundredth and sixty fifth day after finishing the course I was called down to Group Headquarters and offered a job of navigation leader on a Squadron of Halifax aircraft up in 4 Group. So I grabbed that and from, from Abingdon, from my Operational Training Unit went up to Melbourne, just outside York on Halifax 3s. Initially I was not a member of 8 Group and I could only put myself on operations if somebody, somebody went sick. But then one of the flight commanders lost his navigator and he and I then lined up together. That was Squadron Leader Bill Allen who was on his second tour. And Bill and I hit it off precisely. We both had the same view on flying duties. We both trusted one another implicitly and equally the rest. Trusted the rest of our crew. He was a flight commander. I was the nav leader. We both had similar views on our administrative and leadership duties. Bill, for example would always ensure that if there was a new pilot he would never send a new crew up on a long distance difficult flight as their first operation. Whereas some of the other, other flight commanders would take a brand new crew and stick them on anything. I mean I’ve had a little bit of a tussle with one flight commander and indeed with my Squadron commander because we had a brand new crew and they put them on Leipzig which was a ten hour flight. And I objected to this for a new crew. I got overruled and they operated and the crew concerned did a bloody good job but that was, that was lucky. But any rate my own skipper he and I had very similar views and we would not infrequently take lame ducks with us. And any rate we Bill would too, too frequently choose the rough targets rather than the easy targets. But he, he believed in leadership in its, in its true sense. We did, on one occasion towards the end of the war lead a three hundred. I think it was three hundred and fifty or four hundred raid of Halifax aircraft. We were the lead aircraft on a German oil target north of the Ruhr. But in the end we got separated because we were operating more frequently then Group thought we should. They wanted us to stay so that we would remain in our admin capacity for a longer period. Frankly we didn’t give a damn about that. We operated when we wanted to. As a result of which Bill was promoted to a wing commander and moved elsewhere and I was disciplined. However, Bill, I’d say he was a bloody good pilot. He ended up with a and DFC. And any rate I then finished my spell with 10 Squadron during the ’39/45 European war. I would fly with anybody who needed a navigator and chalked up my operations. Anyway, the end of the European war came and the Squadron was immediately, I think it was the second day after the, after the European war was declared over if I remember correctly we converted to Dakotas for glider towing and paratroop dropping for the Malaysian invasion. Well, they wanted to put me in a staff post somewhere but the Squadron was going out on operational duties so I managed to pitch it that I stay with the Squadron. And we went out with, well we converted to paratrooping and glider towing down in Oxfordshire. That was quite entertaining too. We were towing gliders. Let’s see what it’s like to fly in one. These troop carrying gliders that have, I mean they had a descent angle like a brick. They had flaps as big as barn doors. You came down at a hell of an angle. And on the flight I was doing in a glider and we, we disconnected from the tug and the glider pilot stuck the nose down. I was standing behind. I lost all sight of the sky. All you could see was the patch of ground where eventually you hoped you were going to land and he’d get each flap as I say like two bloody great barn doors and very low altitude pull the stick back into his stomach and you’re down. I tried to have a go at seeing what it was like to join with the paratroopers who were, we were dropping. But I got down to the dropping zone and unfortunately the surface wind was too strong so we had to call that operation off. Otherwise I would have had a go at that. Anyway —
GT: Doug, before we leave the European theatre for you just quickly going back to the Halifax. It seemed to be always the third cousin of the four engine heavies. To you guys and where you flew it was she as good as the Lancaster? How did you guys feel?
DN: We on, on the Halifax, we frankly loved the aircraft and thought it was better than the Lanc. We believed it was tougher. It could take more damage than the Lancaster. It couldn’t, it’s true it couldn’t carry the same load and it couldn’t fly at the same altitude but we certainly in the last, the last few months of the war until the Halifax 3 came in with the uprated Hercules engine we were certainly below the Lancasters and we couldn’t as I say we couldn’t carry the same bomb load. Later however in the later marks of Halifax we were damn nearly as good as the Lanc in those respects. It wasn’t as convenient an aircraft for a crew. I mean the wireless operator was sitting almost underneath the pilot’s seat. Feet. In the nose of the aircraft. And the navigator was sitting in front of him. So, to get, if you wanted to get back or even get up towards the pilot’s compartment I had to get out of my seat, walk past the wireless operator and up a couple of steps. So as I say you were way down below the pilot’s feet. It wasn’t as sociable shall we say but I think those of us who were operating on Halifaxes had every much as faith in our aircraft as a Lancaster. There was always rivalry between Lancs and Halifaxes. I still say I’d just as soon fly in a Halibag as I would in a Lanc. Sadly, I never flew in a Lancaster. In fact I never even, no I’ve never even been on board a Lancaster. You know. On the deck. But a Halifax yes. I enjoyed that and had great faith in it. Yeah.
GT: Many of the crews I’ve talked with have talked of how corkscrewing with the Lancaster or the Stirling was was a special art and and most pilots managed it. Some did not. How did the Halifax deal and did your pilot master the art of corkscrewing?
DN: Yes. The early Halifaxes had significant problems in that they, they could get in deep trouble by stalling the rudders. That was when the Halifax had a kind of defect. A fin. And then later, it was in the later Halifaxes it was made into a rectangular fin which overcame the problem of stalling of the rudders. But Bill could certainly corkscrew the Halifax and throw it around the sky like nobody’s business. And he did [laughs] No. I say the Halifax did not have as good a reputation. Bomber Harris for example disliked the Halifax and would have, all his memoirs and books about him indicate that he would, he would have sacrificed a year of production of Halifax aircraft if the factories could have been turned over to Lancasters. But that was not agreed and the Halifax did not, never did have the same reputation. I think a bit unjustified but it was based primarily I think on the fact of it had less bomb load and less range than the Lancaster did. But as far as the attitude of the crews and the confidence in the crews in their aircraft it was certainly equal. Equal to the Lancaster.
GT: Now, Doug it has been made mention that if they lended total production to the Mosquito that having thousands more Mosquitoes and not the four engine seven man bombers they could have saved a lot more air crew but still achieved the bombing of Germany. What’s your opinion on that?
DN: It, I mean statistically it’s true. You’d have had to have had a lot more. A lot more Mossies. It was questionable whether we’d got, whether we got enough airfields because obviously you’d have to have three or four Mosquitoes for every Lancaster or every Halifax. You might not have had some of the precision of the mass bombing that the Lancs and the Halifaxes achieved although with [pause] with Oboe and some of the other navigational aids the Lanc — the Mossies were capable of accurate bombing but I can’t see the big mass raids being conducted by what would achieve the same bomb load per raid as the, as the Lancasters and the Halifaxes. I mean a raid comprising just of Mosquitoes would have been at most six seven of four thousand or five thousand pounds so you’d have had to have had two or two and a half times as many aircraft. And then there would have been the problems of concentration and mid-air collisions and the density of traffic. Have you got enough runways and aircrews in the UK to do that? So no. I think we probably had it about right. Although the Mosquito, Mosquito was a very fine aircraft. Again, I would have loved, I would have loved to have gone in those. But no. My own job as a navigator in a heavy bomber I I really loved it. I think I was good at it. My navigation aids of Gee and H2S and Air Position Indicator. I was paranoid about accuracy. Way over the top and quite unrealistic. I admit that. But I used to fix my position either by Gee or by H2S every six minutes. I had my Air Position Indicator and I was working to the nearest decimal of a minute. So I was working to the nearest six seconds and I was fixing every, every [pause] every six minutes. The reason being if I did it every six minutes I didn’t have to work out how many miles or knots I was doing in an hour. Just moved the decimal point. So I had a, a very very strict navigation procedure and discipline for myself which a number of others on the Squadron followed. I mean if you did a ten hour, a ten hour trip and you were fixing every six minutes, you know. That, you’d be doing ten fixes, ten calculations of ETA and track and distance of track I’d say every six minutes. They’d do that ten times in an hour. If you’re on a ten hour flight you got a hundred. It was a bloody high workload. However, I loved it. That was my job and I loved it. Yeah.
GT: Yeah. Yet the Americans obviously were pretty thick to the last couple of years of the war in the air during the day and I was also made aware that most of the flights of the American bombers only had a navigator aircraft. And so most of the aircraft didn’t actually have a navigator.
DN: Yeah.
GT: Did you have contact with the Americans in any way? And what’s your thought on the fact that they went in with one aircraft with one navigator for a bunch? With your experience on the Halifax there.
DN: I think that was probably misguided. But their whole technique was very different from ours. I mean, we were operating at night because, well we had to. We could not defend ourselves by day against the Germans fighters. We had difficulty doing so at night. I mean we were very near, I believe Bomber Command was very nearly overwhelmed by the German night fighters. Witness Nuremberg. The number we lost there. But the only way we could operate during most of the war was certainly at night where obviously you had to have one navigator per aircraft. When we were operating by day once we got air superiority and I mentioned the occasion that we led a three hundred and fifty or four hundred aircraft on on this oil target it’s true that the others could have followed us. I think it would be, it would be foolish to do so because you had no, no insurance policy. If that one aircraft got clobbered the others would be in trouble. I, I was of the opinion that most of the American aircraft had at least a second pilot was able to to have a fair bit of expertise at navigation but to be honest I’m, I’m not adequately familiar with what the Americans could do. We certainly had, well, to me navigation was an art and I loved it. Yeah. Very different for tactical if you were on tactical target by shall we say smaller aircraft like the Boston or the North American. That would have been a lot, a lot different from my type of navigation. It would have been a lot more map reading than. I mean I was doing mostly, would be by Gee and H2S and traditional DR navigation. Occasionally, very occasionally you’d resort to a bit of astro but Gee and H2S were my, my two main nav aids.
GT: And were they cutting technology for the time? Was, was that, was that really awesome designs and futuristic equipment that they gave you to work with?
DN: I think so. I mean there was other stuff coming along later. The Americans used Loran and I believe some of, some of 8 Group and 5 Group used Loran. They also used GH which I didn’t use. But certainly H2S was, I believe pretty cutting, cutting edge stuff. And they, I mean even in my time they, they got working to shorter and shorter wavelength. They, we had introduced gyro stabilised standards so the aerial scanner was, was stabilised. So you could move the aircraft and the, the Gee pitch, the H2S picture on your screen didn’t change because the scanner itself, the rotating scanner was gyro stabilised. We had variable rates of scan so you could change the speed of scan to take better definition or better accuracy. So we were getting better accuracy because the frequency reduction has got shorter wavelength. We had various variable speed scan and gyro stabiliser and those, those modifications were being introduced while we were operating. So I think that, I mean much of that stuff went on at Malvern which was a kind of centre of, one of the centres of research. And I think they did a bloody good job of keeping up to date. I mean there’s been a lot of criticism about navigational ability and bombing inaccuracy in the early part of the war and there was a government, government inspired survey of this. And results were pretty horrible. I can’t remember the details now but it was less than a fraction of our bombs were getting within kind of five or twenty miles. And I think that was justified but they were in the early days of the war and then at the same time there was a lot of development work going on with new compasses, gyro stabilisers, distance reading compasses, with H2S, with Gee, with the Air Position Indicator. There were lots of developments that were coming along in those early days of the war and kept coming along. And I think the development guys were doing, you know a brilliant job all the time in trying to improve things. Perhaps we in 4 Group didn’t see as many of those clever things that perhaps 5 Group or 8 Group but I think there was a lot. A huge amount of credit due to those guys who were in the development. Equally, on the, some of the radar counter measure stuff which is another one of my interests on how we, how we tried to fox the German radar and the German night fighters. Ok. They, they out foxed us with their upward pointing cannon and Schrage Musik and it was on, but it was on a programme with the BBC some years ago about the see-saw activity that was going on. The Germans would introduce something. We would either counter that or better it. And it didn’t matter whether it was radar or weaponry or tactics it was, it was a swings and roundabouts, see-saw developing, changing all the time. And if you look at some of the, I’d say the German radar and the systems of Fighter Control while they were changing that we were introducing new measures to detect their fighters to make life difficult for them. I mean, we, you probably know we had, we had microphones in the engine nacelles of our aircraft. So if we were over the other side our wireless operators would tune in to the frequencies used by the German fighter controllers. Then blast the noise of the engines on that frequency to drown out. The most brilliant thoughts of all were the Germans realised that we were doing our damndest to mess up their radar and their fighter control system and they suddenly introduced women controllers. So the German night fighters only took notice of a woman controller because they didn’t whether it was a German controller or a British controller. And at one stage we were carrying German speaking radio operators in 100 Group aircraft who would come up on the same frequency and German speaking Brits who would direct them to return to base. The weather was closing in. Or don’t take this vector take another vector. And they were, putting it bluntly they were trying to bugger up the fighter control system by using German speaking Brits. So the Germans overcame that by suddenly introducing women controllers. So the German night fighters only took notice of a woman controller. And within forty eight hours we had British German speaking women who were taking over and issuing conflicting instructions to the night fighters. I think the brilliant thinking that our own people had thought this was what they might do so we’ll be ready for it. And that kind of see-saw of activity and counter activity went on. Well, it wouldn’t have been just in aviation it would have been in anything else. But I found it fascinating.
GT: The crashed aircraft must have fallen into German hands. Do you think that, that Oboe and H2S and similar equipment the Germans managed to analyse that and better their own from it?
DN: Unquestionably. I mean all of those equipment had explosive devices in them with crash switches so that if the aircraft did crash there was an inertia switch inside which would set off the explosives and destroy the critical part of those bits of equipment. But inevitably that didn’t always work and the Germans did get at our stuff and were trying to, well they got certainly got into H2S and discovered, you know the frequencies in use and produced Naxos. I don’t know whether you know they was a, they had a session with the BBC some years ago. There was a German night fighter operating, operating out of Denmark, got itself lost. It hadn’t, it flew south west rather than north east and landed at Woodbridge, one of our emergency airfields down in Suffolk which was virtually running out of fuel. The German pilot and observer radio guy had got themselves completely lost. Our scientists got at it and found that it had got an equipment which was code named Naxos which could home onto our H2S. So the German night fighter could be directed by his ground controller in the general vicinity of the bomber stream and with this Naxos equipment he could home right in on our H2S. And anyway we then developed equipment to home on to Naxos. So some of our night fighters could home onto their night fighters. And it was this, and it’s a fascinating topic this see-saw in technical developments. Fascinating. Yeah.
GT: Now, the, the Schrage Musik.
DN: Yeah.
GT: The upward firing cannons —
DN: Yes.
GT: Of the German night fighters to, to, because the Halifax, Lancaster and Stirling didn’t have a, well —
DN: Yeah.
GT: Ball turrets.
DN: Yeah.
GT: As the B17s, and I’ve been made aware that some Lancasters had belly guns. Did any of the Halifaxes ever been modified with such?
DN: Yes. Yes, but you couldn’t have an H2S at the same time. And they were called Y aircraft. And they had, they, the blister with the rotating scanner that of course was removed and there was a half inch, a single half inch calibre gun on a hand mount with a gunner sitting there freezing his whatsits off. Just looking down.
GT: So, so there was an eighth member of the crew then. Deliberately.
DN: Yeah.
GT: An eighth member.
DN: Yeah. Yeah. And in fact one of my books over there on 10 Squadron operations and I’ve got one or two sample crew lists of before an operation and you’ll find here and there will be a Y aircraft with an extra crew member known as an under-gunner. But it’s not a power operated turret. I never operated on one of those. We always had upper turret, rear turret and H2S. Not that we had a choice. That was allocated by somebody I don’t know. But what my skipper used to do was he would every so often he would drop a wing one way and then drop a wing the other way so particularly the mid-upper could peer over the side and get a better view. And with the rear gunner and the upper gunner cooperating with one another and knowing that the Schrage Musik was around and they could come up from underneath you and with the wireless operator looking at Fishpond and some of the other devices which could detect other aircraft coming towards you. What with that and a bit of extra vigilance as I say. Rolling the aircraft. Somehow we managed it. But it was a very deadly weapon was Schrage Musik. Two bloody great cannons and right underneath you.
GT: With the aircraft and the streams did you ever encounter any aircraft above you that you managed to avoid?
DN: Yeah.
GT: Bombs dropping on you?
DN: Yes. I’ve been underneath an aircraft and looking up into his bomb bay where he probably wasn’t more than twenty feet above us. And you look up there and you could see everything but the kitchen sink up and he’s got his bomb doors open. Edging in to get on to target. And your bomb aimer was down in the nose telling the skipper left left or right and you’d be looking up and seeing a Lanc or another Halifax above you with his bomb door open and everything but the kitchen sink in there. The navigator. The bomb aimer would be saying, ‘Left. Left.’ And you’d tap the skipper on the shoulder and say [laughs] No. And there were, there were a number of occasions of course and the operational research people had worked out what the expected rate of bombs dropping on our own aircraft. In fact, do you know, have you ever heard of Bill Reid? Bill Reid was the last Victoria Cross and a good friend of mine. And Bill got his Victoria Cross on on an early operation and then went back later on a second tour. And he was hit by bombs being dropped from a Lancaster above him and managed to bail out and spent the rest of the war in a POW camp. So I mean it did happen. We knew it. We knew it would happen inevitably. The flight engineer and, and the mid-upper gunner and occasionally the pilot but certainly as a navigator once I had handed over to the bomb aimer I would be up there looking. Adding another pair of eyes. Trying to keep out of the way.
GT: So, in the bomber streams did you, you were in formations of Halifaxes and Lancasters?
DN: No. No.
GT: No. You were just all a mix.
DN: No. You [pause] you had each, each Squadron, each flight, almost each aircraft, not quite, you had a time span when you were, it was your turn to be on target. The raid might be forty minutes in length shall we say? Thirty to forty five minutes depending on the number of aircraft. And each Squadron had its own height band and its own duration on target. So it would have perhaps eight minutes on target out of a total of forty five. And each Squadron would have that. And each Squadron would have its own height band. So you knew darned well and of course the Halifax not having the performance of the Lanc it was generally the Halifax who would be at a lower level. Which would prompt you to keep a good look out. But I mean there were occasions when the aircraft, there might be an aircraft two thousand feet above you and you wouldn’t have a hope in hell of seeing anything coming down. But yes not only mid-air collisions but being bombed by your own aircraft was a known and anticipated factor but again the operational research people, the whizz kids with their mathematics and probabilities way beyond the Squadron activity did work out what was an acceptable risk and consequently worked out what was an acceptable density of a bomber stream. If you got it too dense then yes you’d be increasing the chance of mid-air collision. You’d be increasing the chance of being bombed by somebody above you. And they would adjust the density of the bomber stream to meet those parameters.
GT: What, what was the likelihood of you getting out of the Halifax if it was going down?
DN: Well, I had an escape hatch immediately under my seat. So if I had to get out in a hurry I had to stand up, lift up my, fold up my seat, get my parachute pack and clip it on my chest and kick open the door and just go straight out. Unless, which I’m sure would have happened you were checking. I mean there were four of us in the front end. There was the bomb aimer, the navigator, the radio man. Well, the flight engineer into there. And the pilot. And we were all in a pretty, pretty congested area. And then we, there was an escape hatch above the pilot and this one which was underneath my seat. I don’t know.
GT: Now, Doug, you mentioned earlier about the actual accuracy of the bombing raids. And you likened it with the navigational equipment you had. But the bomb aimer’s role was to direct the aircraft to drop their bombs on target. So was there a correlation of equipment between the navigational and the bomb aiming equipment? Did they combine together or were they totally separate items?
DN: On the actual bombing it was either one or the other. In the early days it was entirely visual and that was from a relatively, relatively rudimentary bombsight where you would, where the bomb aimer would make adjustments for the height of the aircraft and, and the anticipated wind. And then he would look down and get two pointers in line with whatever the target was. Now, later on later developments of the bombsight had gyro stabilised bombsights where much of that mattered. Many of the parameters that were essential for bomb aiming were undertaken automatically. The height would be fed in from a, from an altimeter computer. The speed would be fed in by the same system as would register on the airspeed indicator. And as I say some of those parameters would be fed in automatically. Nevertheless, you would be the bomb aimer and this is what one hoped for pretty well every time was that the bomb aimer could see the target markers, target indicators on the ground and would be instructing the pilot which way to turn in order to get that cross right on that player and then push the tit. Now, if the weather was crap and there was no direct vision then it would be the navigator who would do so either through Gee or more likely and preferably through H2S. And I had my H2S set here and I could, I could, for example if there were a lake or an open space, a known open space in the centre of the city and you, your aiming point you would have calculated back to what was given you at briefing. If you can’t see, get a direct visual sight on the markers then aim for, for one five four degrees, three and a half miles from this park. And if you could identify that park on your H2S which frequently you could do if you were a good H2S operator then you could. You could get yourself to that position in the right direction and then you, the navigator would push the tit. And then it would probably come up, that method probably twenty thirty percent of occasions because so frequently you get over land the bomb aimer couldn’t see the markers. So we had, we had the means of dropping on either H2S or on Gee. Gee was a bit different. But the navigator would, I’d say swap over with him. The bomb aimer ideally, and this would happen in a good crew the navigator would train the bomb aimer to be able to operate the Gee or the H2S as accurately as he could himself. So the navigator could, well could supervise the thing and, and refine it whilst the, whilst the bomb aimer would be following it on on the radar.
GT: Now, you’re initial navigation training. What was that like compared to when you went back as an instructor yourself? Had, had they progressed in those years? Did they move forward with the new equipment? And, and how did you feel then becoming the instructor?
DN: Well, when I trained in the early days it was, it was pretty basic. We were flying Blenheims and you were doing ninety percent of it by visual pinpoints or by bearings or a bit by radio. Perhaps, not very much, by astro. When I went back as an instructor by then Gee had come in. H2S was just coming in. The Air Position Indicator was just coming in. So your techniques were changing. And one of the things I, I did when I was an instructor down at Abingdon was to devise exercises that were, as I saw it, much much more realistic. That reflected the kind of situations and procedures that one would encounter in the nav, in the real. You take, you take a crew or a crowd of navigators through and then you’d say and now you have H2S has gone u/s. What do you do? You know. And [they didn’t really know] [laughs]
GT: And what was the, what was the result? Did they come up with the right —
DN: Well I, I’m pretty damned sure that, that I ended up as an instructor exposing my pupils to a much more realistic situation. In fact, two or three of my my old pupils had said and I’m not trying to spread my own bullshit, did say that, you know, ‘You introduced us to practical navigation.’ I mean, I did, I did love navigation in every aspect and if I wasn’t operating I I think I became a good instructor because I enjoyed it.
GT: So your instructing role actually made, made you a far better navigator then you would have if you’d have just done one tour and then gone away.
DN: I think so. Yes. I say I, my, my period as an instructor was not in the final stages of training of a crew but in a fairly advanced. Advanced stage of their training. And I tried to make that as realistic to the real thing as I could.
GT: So how long did you actually serve with Bomber Command?
DN: How?
GT: How long did you actually serve with Bomber Command in the end?
DN: Well, that would have been nineteen [pause] 1941 until ’45 with, with a break of a few months when I was down in North Africa. But in that period I was still, as an instructor I was still in Bomber Command. Yeah. And I didn’t really come out of Bomber Command until I went out to to India to do glider towing and supply dropping and other silly things. Yeah.
GT: And by the end of your Bomber Command time you had accrued operations. Forty odd. Thereabouts.
DN: I did thirty on my first tour. Then I did my second tour. We had, with my skipper a number that didn’t necessarily go in the logbook. Yeah. My eyesight without going through my logbook over there I can’t tell you exactly how many. But I guess it was somewhere around about sixty five.
GT: And the Squadrons you flew on in Bomber Command?
DN: 156, 150 and shiny 10.
GT: And where were they based at that time please?
DN: 156 was at Warboys. W A R B O Y S that’s in what became 8 Group. 150 Squadron was in Kirmington which is in North Lincolnshire. And then out in a place called Blida in Algiers. Then 10 Squadron was at Melbourne. Just outside York. And then, and then out to India. India and Burma. Yeah.
GT: So —
DN: Oh, and Abingdon was where I did most of my instruction. Yeah.
GT: So your Bomber Command time was up and you received new posting orders. Did you seek something new or was that just the next thing on the rack for you? Where did you move to from there?
DN: Mostly accepted that that’s what was on, you know. In later years I got to get bloody awkward and would challenge it. When I, when I finished on the Halifax they wanted to, because I got my staff navigators qualification when I went to the staff nav school I mentioned earlier they wanted me to go to some unspecified staff post. And for some crazy reason I said, ‘No. I want to stay with the Squadron on operational duties.’ A bit bloody stupid in retrospect but [laughs] one was like that occasionally. Yeah.
GT: So you headed off to Burma then. Was that the next step after Bomber Command?
DN: Yeah. Yeah. Well, we were in India on general transport duties because although you went out there to participate in the invasion of Malaysia and we, we knew all about or knew some about glider towing and supply dropping and paratrooping that was off the cards then. But we, we did have a period up in northern Burma where we were supply dropping to some Burmese tribes. When the Japanese, I mentioned where I went with Bomber Command when the Japs were in northern Burma to a large extent they lived off the land and they stole their food, or requisitioned it from the locals. And a number of the British political, political agents who had been in the Burma Civil Service were parachuted into northern Burma and persuaded the locals to burn their stocks of rice which made, made life difficult for the Japanese who then had of course to provide their own food for their troops. So when the war was over the Burmese tribes concerned having burned much of their stocks of rice including their seed rice were on the point of starvation. So obviously the Brits were morally obliged to re-supply them. Well, the army did a lot of this with trucks but in some of the high mountain regions in the extreme north of Burma where the Kachin tribes lived, K A C H I N, it was way beyond the ability to get trucks and there were no railways. So the decision was made to supply them, supply, re-supply them with rice by air which is where we came in. And the terrain up there is very very difficult terrain. The mountains. Some of the mountains go up way over eighteen, twenty thousand feet. But the lower ranges you still had to if you want to get into some of these areas you’ve got to get up to about eleven thousand, twelve thousand feet. And the villages are generally built on the ridges. On the spine of the ridges. They had to go over, go down, spiral down, do your supply drops, climb up and out. And we were flying in Dakotas and we had the rice in sacks. No parachutes. Rice in sacks. In three sacks. One inside another so that we chucked them out of the door, or toppled them out of the door. And when they hit of course the inner sack might burst and the outer sack might tear. The chances of all three going were pretty remote. So we would, we would fly to the area, circle down and then we would stack the sacks of rice up in the — no door. Take the door off the Dakota. Put the sacks up. My favourite position was to stick a sack of rice on the floor on the starboard side and get my shoulders against it and feet against these sacks of rice. And while the co-pilot and the pilot and co-pilot would bring the aircraft down, normally you would come along the ridge. Never go across it because you could never judge the, judge the approach altitude accurately enough, so you would come along the ridge, getting lower and lower and honestly you’d only be twenty or thirty feet above the trees until you came over to the, the centre of the nominated village and a light would change above the door and you’d heave and pop the sacks of rice out and then go around again and do this. And we were engaged in that for about a month. Living in tents on an old Japanese airstrip at Meiktila. And then one particular sortie to a new, new grid, never been there before. There were four of us. Four aircraft and we were number one. So we flew, let down, did our drop and climbed up again and then went back to an advanced base to pick up some more rice and we saw number two aircraft starting to circle down. Any rate, to cut a long story short number four aircraft, we don’t know what happened to him. He never came back. And numbers two and three didn’t come back from their second drop. So out of the four aircraft who was the lucky one? Yes.
GT: And that was 10 Squadron you were with.
DN: Yeah.
GT: And they converted to C47s to go out.
DN: Yeah. Yeah.
GT: To the Burma time.
DN: Yeah.
GT: Ok.
DN: And that, details of that is in the latest 10 Squadron booklet.
GT: Marvellous. So, how long were you in that area for? In Burma.
DN: Came back in ’46. Yeah.
GT: And you carried on in the RAF?
DN: No. No. I would have carried on in the RAF but they would only offer me a short period and I wanted to go. If I was going to go in I wanted to go in for a career and they were hanging up on me. I think it was something like four years. And I said no thank you. So I then applied as a navigator with BOAC. The forerunner of British Airways. And they said, ‘Ok. But wait ‘til you get — ’ I applied while I was in India. So when I came back I applied and they said , ‘We don’t need any more navigators.’ However, I did stay with BA. With BOAC, BA for the next thirty five years in operational posts on the ground out in, oh Cairo, Khartoum, Basra, Kuwait. And then back to this new airport called Heathrow. And then from a series of luck and luck believe you me from what I’ve already told you luck played an extremely important part in my life in the RAF and my survival. Anyway, luck played a bloody big part in post-war and I stayed in British Airways, BOAC, British Airways for the rest of my career and ended up as general manager operations control in charge of minute to minute operations worldwide. If everything went alright I didn’t have a job. If anything went wrong I did have a job. So it didn’t matter if it was crew sickness, aircraft unserviceability, somebody digging up a runway running short of fuel, a war, a bomb warning, a hijacking then that was mine. Which was very exciting. It called on all of my experience and all I knew and I loved the job and I stayed there for the rest of my career. Wonderful job. Best job in the airline. Very exciting. All, if anything went wrong it was mine and I enjoyed it.
GT: What were the airliners that were about at that time when you were? The airliners that they were flying for BOAC at the time.
DN: Well, we had Concorde and we had the Jumbo. I mean when I started it was the flying, the old Flying Boats and the Lancastrians and converted York which was a development of the Lancaster. I mean, by, by agreement during the war the Americans took on the development of civil aviation and a definite agreement that Britain would not do that. So when the war ended we did not have a civil aviation industry. So we adapted the Lancaster to the Lancastrian. We modified it to make a York. We had the Halton which was a development of the Halifax. But the Lancastrian would take, I think it was nine passengers. And we did a cannonball service from Sydney to London and it landed, I think nine times. With nine passengers. And that was the crème de la crème of British civil aviation. I mean we had Flying Boats. Well, you had TEAL. TEAL had Flying Boats down, down under. And we had those when I was in Basra. But it took a, took a long time. And, and Britain didn’t have the money. Didn’t have the dollars to buy American aircraft. Quite a long time before we managed to get ourselves on our feet with, with decent aircraft. But when I left we, certainly we had the, we’d gone through the Britannia. We’d had that. We’d gone through the VC10 and we had by then the Jumbo which was after 707 and then the Jumbo and then Concorde. But that was before we had any of the [pause] what do you call it? The French manufacturer. Anglo French manufacturer.
GT: Aerospatiale.
DN: Yeah. Yeah. Before that had really got, got in to many of the civilian aircraft like the Airbus.
GT: Did you have anything to do with the Berlin Airlift? Being involved.
DN: No. No. No.
GT: Not with the airlines you had there.
DN: No.
GT: What about family then Doug? How did you get on with family? You got married. Did you have children?
DN: Yes. Two sons. One who you spoke to and an elder one who lives in London. The younger one he’s lived a very unconventional life [laughs] Has spent more time in the Antarctic than anywhere else with the British Antarctic Survey. More in the Arctic. And the elder one much more conventional. He’s an accountant. Or was an accountant and he now is a senior executive with a manufacturing company. And I mentioned that I had married the kid sister of my, the first pilot I had. So, so we had a [pause] I’ve had a bloody marvellous life. Luck has played a huge, huge amount. Opportunities that have arisen. Sheer luck.
GT: I understand you had some time with the royal family.
DN: Yeah. One of my jobs in BA was any time royalty was travelling for example if the Queen was coming out to New Zealand then I would get a phone call saying now we’ve got a flight coming up for the Queen to wherever. Give me the date. ‘How many?’ ‘Oh, about the usual crowd.’ [laughs] Allow for seventy five and seven and a half tons of baggage. Which way do you want — well for example going to New Zealand, ‘Which way do you want to go? Do you want to go east about or west about? ‘ ‘Well, you know a bloody sight more about that than I do so come up with some suggestions.’ And I, I had, I’ve got a list of over two hundred and fifty flights that I did for members of the royal family. I mean if it was the Queen then [pause] then I would decide which way. What kind of range do we want? Do we want a long range aircraft to do it in a minimum number or perhaps a smaller aircraft? And then gut the inside of the aircraft and divide it up with bulkheads to provide a lounge area, a dining area, a sleeping area and what have you. And all of the arrangements. I mean, it was good fun. And I had a fairly small team who who would get involved in that and we all took it as a challenge. So we had a lot of those.
GT: These were BOAC aircraft that you would do that to —
DN: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
GT: The queen did not have a Queen’s Flight at that time.
DN: No.
GT: Of her own aircraft?
DN: No. She had a number of small aircraft. They were mostly, well in the latter years they were Vickers or, anyway twin engines. Small. I can’t remember it. The old mind. But they weren’t, their own aircraft on the Queen’s Flight were essentially for use within the UK or within Europe. Or if they were going to do a big tour we would position them out there. I mean, I remember we did one where we took the Queen out to New Zealand and then she went from New Zealand to Oz and then up through the Solomon’s and what have you. And the Queen’s Flight I think positioned some of their smaller aircraft for flights between the islands. And then we went then and brought her back. That was, that was quite amusing. Before they went I said to the captain of the Queen’s Flight, ‘Well, what happens if while you’re away there’s an election?’ Because we were in a ghastly political uncertainty at the time. He said, ‘Oh, don’t worry.’ Queen Elizabeth, err Princess, ‘Princess Margaret is authorised to dissolve parliament.’ I said, ‘I’m not worried about that but if while you’re away there’s an election we’ve got to get the Queen back in time to appoint the new prime minister.’ And I remember Archie, Sir Archie Winskill who was captain of the Queen’s Flight, ‘Good thinking, my boy.’ [laughs] So I said, ‘If the election is on the Thursday as it always is you let me know where you’re going to be every Wednesday,’ which included the Cook Islands and Solomons and what have you. I said, ‘You let me know where you’re going to be every Wednesday and I will develop a plan to get home.’ So, anyway I developed these plans. Labelled each one of them with an identification letter. I said, ‘You have a copy in your briefcase and I’ll have a copy in my briefcase so at least we’re ready for it.’ And it was, oh it was a long tour. I remember it was a couple of weeks later I get a phone call. I was at home at the time but I was working on my wife’s rust bucket of a Morris Mini and my wife came and said, ‘There’s Buckingham Palace on the phone.’ And the message merely said, ‘Plan Sierra.’ And Sierra being the identity of when we were going to get her back. And we didn’t exchange another word but on the day there was our aircraft waiting for her and brought her home. And that was the kind of [pause] if you like it was good fun and everything was different. Yes. It was important and you get in trouble if you got it wrong. But no. I’m, it was a very nice simple airline job wasn’t it? Rewarding and it was exciting in a different way as my RAF time. I mean, I was extremely, extremely lucky.
GT: How long, how long were you working with the Queen’s Flight for? Or for the royal family.
DN: For really twenty four years.
GT: And I understand you received an award for your time.
DN: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
GT: And that award is?
DN: That was the Royal Victorian Order. I’m a lieutenant of the Royal Victorian Order.
GT: And the letters are?
DN: Does it do me any good? No.
GT: And I understand also you were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.
DN: Yeah.
GT: Can you please describe what that was for? And when?
DN: Well, that was for really for my second tour. Not for, not for any specific operation. For whether the citation refers to the standard of the whole Squadron. Navigation standard. The whole Squadron. And gives me credit for that. And and for leading. Leading the whole of the group on one or two operations like the one when we went for the oil target and I do, I can assure you that we were going over the Channel and my skipper said, ‘Doug, come back here.’ So I come from my little compartment in the nose. He said, ‘Put your head up in the astrodome and have a, have a look behind.’ And of course there’s three hundred and fifty bloody aircraft following me. I said, ‘I don’t want to know. Don’t remind me [laughs] Just shut up.’ [laughs] Oh well. No. I was extremely fortunate. I had lots of, lots of good friends. Lots of excitement. But the, I’d say one of which experiences was the way, the way these challenges seem to come out of nowhere and I enjoyed them.
GT: Bomber Harris, your boss at the time came in for a lot of criticism.
DN: Yeah.
GT: Specifically for carpet bombing and for that of bombing major cities.
DN: Yeah.
GT: That’s potentially weren’t strategic targets.
DN: Yeah.
GT: What’s your take on that? From, from being with it.
DN: We were in a situation of total war. It wasn’t a question of tit for tat. We were [pause] it was either them or us. And by then it was obvious that as far as Hitler was concerned he didn’t give a damn about what was right and what was wrong. Whether you should bomb civilians or not. And we were in total war and I for one accepted that. I know that there were times when I pushed the bomb tit and there would be grandma and grandad and the kids down below. Ok. Sorry. We were at war. I have, I regret having to do that kind of thing. I’m not ashamed of it. And if it happened again I’d do it again. I think towards the end Harris, what Harris did think he could do he could do it on his own. And it went, proved that he couldn’t. Nuremberg for example. The Nuremberg raid demonstrated very clearly that we were [pause] that German night fighters got their act together and we were, we were up against it so. But in the, in the perhaps slightly earlier days when we were really clobbering Germany city after city after city yeah. ok. War had descended in to that and I, I have no regrets. No conscience. And I think under the circumstances Harris was right. It cost many many many many of my mates. And others as well. But sorry. That’s war.
GT: Could they have done it any other way?
DN: I don’t think so. No. I don’t think so. We couldn’t, we, the army couldn’t have done it. And we didn’t have the capability of being that precise that we could pick out targets.
GT: Some have said that without the war happening and the methods and the designs of many things in aviation aircraft and your navigation equipment that that the world actually paced forward five years.
DN: Oh.
GT: Very quickly.
DN: Unquestionably. Certainly electronics, communications, navigation aids. A lot of, oh mechanical things must have developed at a hell of a pace. Plastics. Zips. You know, you can think of a billion things that came about through war. Stimulate. It did stimulate development. God, you’re up, you’re up against it. I mean, before I, before I joined the RAF I was in a UK government research, communications research laboratory, and funnily enough developing part of the radar. The ground. Ground defences radar that we had. So as a, as a youth I was exposed to that kind of development stuff pretty well soon after I left school. Yeah.
GT: In your later years you’ve been involved with Air Force Associations. Can you tell me something about the ones that you were associated with and the titles you’ve, you’ve ended up with?
DN: Well, I was very busy with the Bomber Command Association when I was living down near London and near Oxford and I was on the Executive Committee and we were very involved in the, in the Bomber Command Memorial in London. But then when we moved up here that was impractical and I joined, well I was in the RAF Association. So I joined the local branch where we have about [pause] we had I think twenty nine members when I joined the branch. And we now have sixteen. And [pause] we don’t do very much. That’s probably Brian. Is that you Brian?
Other: Yeah.
[recording paused]
DN: When I came up here I joined the RAF Association up here where we had a very small number of members and saw even fewer. And we’re, we’re now up to about seventy members. We, we rarely see more than about a dozen of them. So we’re not able to provide much in the way of social activity and as a result most of, most of our activity is connecting, collecting for the RAF charity. The RAF charity or the RAF Benevolent Fund. So I’ve done my stint of tin rattling. And as I say we have a very small band of loyal, very loyal volunteers. And we’re trying to, desperately trying to make it more active. To get ex-RAF people up here to participate more. We’re, we’ve got a website that will be up and going in the next few weeks. We’re on Facebook. And as I say one of, one of my problems is we collect money for RAF charity. We have problems in finding local people who need it or who will accept help. And it’s a pleasure if we’re, if we can, we can find somebody who, whom we can help. So much of the money goes into an overall pot and yet up here I’m sure there must be ex-RAF people who need help. And one of my ambitions has been to try and get those people to come out of the wood work and let us know they need a bit of help. I’ve found one or two but the number of, out of our seventy members we don’t have more than about ten or twelve people who between you and me get off their backsides to do much. So there we are. Anyway, that’s it.
GT: So currently you’re the president of the Royal Air Forces Association Cockermouth Branch.
DN: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Correct. Yeah.
GT: And I believe thank you for your services.
DN: You’re welcome. Yeah.
GT: Is in order. Doug, it has been a pleasure talking with you today. Thank you very much for allowing me to add to the IBCC’s Digital Archive. Specifically of your Bomber Command history and experience, and, and no less at all your experiences before and your time after. And so thank you very much for that.
DN: You’re welcome.
GT: And this —
DN: It has been a crazy life you must admit. Yeah.
GT: And you’ve obviously had a time and your, your willingness to sit and chat with me is —
DN: Yeah,
GT: Is very special. Thank you. On the 27th of July 2017 I’ve been talking with Doug Newham and he, from his house here in Upton Caldbeck in Cumbria this is Glen Turner from the IBCC Archives in Lincoln and the New Zealand 75 Squadron Association secretary. And we’re signing off now. Thank you very much, Doug.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Douglas Frank Newham
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Glen Turner
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-27
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ANewhamDF170727
Conforms To
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Pending review
Pending revision of OH transcription
Pending OH summary
Format
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01:33:33 audio recording
Language
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eng
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Burma
Great Britain
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Yorkshire
Description
An account of the resource
Douglas Newham enjoyed his career as a navigator. Over his career he saw the development of technology in his chosen field. He and his crew spent some of their time as part of North West African Strategic Air Force. Following time as an instructor at an Operational Training Unit he started a second tour in Europe. He then went on to operations over Burma dropping supplies. Post war he enjoyed a very interesting career in aviation working for BOAC and BA.
Contributor
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Julie Williams
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
10 Squadron
150 Squadron
156 Squadron
aircrew
Blenheim
bombing
Botha
C-47
Elizabeth II, Queen of Great Britain (1926 - 2022)
Gee
H2S
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Lancaster
Lancastrian
military service conditions
mine laying
navigator
observer
Operational Training Unit
RAF Abingdon
RAF Kinloss
RAF Kirmington
RAF Melbourne
RAF Warboys
rivalry
training
Wellington
Whitley
York
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27295/EAdamsHGAdamsBHB441107.2.pdf
b882958e880e97ffa9322b2580f7c657
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
820734
TO:- MRS B. ADAMS,
“SPRINGFIELD,”
MENDOORAN. N.S.W.
AUSTRALIA.
Sender’s Name & Address Aus 424504 F/Sgt Adams HG. AUSPO. Kodak House, Kingsway. London.
Tues 7/11/44.
[underlined] No 34 [/underlined].
Dear Mum,
Not a lot to write about again this time. The weathers been very cool & windy the past few days – not much effort to stay in camp & go to bed early. Had a couple more ops in, have twelve to finish now. Scottie Gall finished his tour a couple of nights ago which we found a good excuse to spend a night on the beer down at the local pub – nearly all the navigators were there as well as Scotties crew. The old Bushie from Tooraweenah was there too making up the trio from the district out home. Bushie’s crew are in the same room as us & although they arrived here a week before us we’ve had the same number of ops. done & there’s great rivalry to see who gets the lead – we had one on them for a few weeks but they got even a few days ago & look like staying that way now for a while. Bert Howard’s crew were shot down over there a few nights ago – bad luck. They may have parachuted safely but it seems a bit doubtful from what we’ve heard. He was going to marry a girl from Newcastle on his next leave which was due in a fortnight. Betty told you I suppose that his girl at Dulwich Hill walked out on him and married a Yank a couple of months ago. Betty told me you got the cushion cover OK. Gosh I’d been carting that around a while – really been places. Glad the wool turned out OK. Bad luck for Alwin with his lambs though wasn’t it. Cheerio. Love to all at home Bert XXXX
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Letter from Herbert Adams to his mother
Description
An account of the resource
Writes that the weather was cool and windy an that he had done a couple more operations and now had twelve to finish. Mentions recent night out with navigators and other crews at local pub. Comments on rivalry with another crew to see who got into the lead. Writes of another crew that was shot down and seemed likely they did not survive.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
H G Adams
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-11-07
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One page handwritten letter
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Correspondence
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
EAdamsHGAdamsBHB441107
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Australia
New South Wales
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-11-07
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
bombing
rivalry
shot down
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/316/3473/PPennLE1701.1.jpg
824abb2c2b7f455b204aa46be93d7f9a
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/316/3473/APennL170622.1.mp3
0620d580b7438a89e75829dd538816b6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Penn, Lawrence
L Penn
Description
An account of the resource
Six items. An oral history interview with Lawrence Penn (b. 1922, 413929 Royal Australian Air Force) his log book and photographs. He flew operations as a pilot with 226 Squadron part of the Second Tactical Air Force.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Lawrence Penn and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Penn, L
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
JM: This interview is being conducted for the International Bomber Command Centre. The interviewer is Jean MaCartney, the interviewee is Lawrence or Lorrie Penn. The interview is taking place at Mr Penn’s home in Mosman, New South Wales, on the 22nd of June 2017. Also present is Mister Penn’s wife June. Ok, Lorrie, I’ve look at some details on your background and I see you were born in Cremorne.
LP: Yes, I do.
JM: And indeed as we were having a little chat to start with before we started the interview, you mentioned you were born in Cremorne,
LP: Cremorne, yes.
JM: In Murdock Street,
LP; In Murdock Street.
JM: In what street, yes, so that was obviously at home
LP: It was a proper hospital in those days but not now of course
JM: A proper hospital back then, was it? Right. No, ok, and that was in December 1922?
LP: That’s right. 27th, two days after Christmas, it was a dreadful time to be born.
JM: Indeed, indeed. And, did the family live round here so that you then went to school around here?
LP: Yes, I did at Cremorne initially then we, after about six years of age we went to Adelaide and then we went up to Cairns and then down to Coffs Harbour so I had, it was after I came back from Coffs Harbour that I had a couple of years at Trinity College and then went to Shore for three or four years,
JM: Right.
LP: And finished my education there.
JM: Finished at Shore, ok. In moving around, quite a bit of the countryside there in just what you’ve said, how did you find different parts of Australia? Do you have any particular memories that stand out for you in your early years of going around the countryside at all?
LP: Oh, I enjoyed it all, perhaps that’s where I gave them my interest in overseas, finding out what was going on overseas.
JM: And did you keep any friends at all down the track from those early years or?
LP: No, probably, as a country down from the other states but from Shore School lifelong.
JM: Right, yes.
LP: Just about, I outlasted them all I was [unclear]
JM: Yes, I guess that would be getting almost to the case now and so you did your intermediate at Shore.
LP: Yes, I did.
JM: And then
LP: And then left Shore and went into a bank as a bank clerk there until the war began.
JM: Right. Did you do leaving certificate as well?
LP: No, no.
JM: Just intermediate.
LP: Just intermediate.
JM: Intermediate, right, ok. And so you left, well before we go into your banking role, were you involved in sports or?
LP: Usual things.
JM: School.
LP: Yeah. Football and cricket. The main, think I did a bit of tennis.
JM: Bit of tennis, yeah. And around where were you living with you going to Shore were you sort of in this area or?
LP: Yeah, yes.
JM: Yes.
LP: Still Cremorne, Southern Street. Cremorne.
JM: Cremorne, ok. And so, did you then go to scouts or Air League or anything?
LP: In the school cadets, school cadets and after I left school I didn’t join, I just did tennis club after school.
JM: Tennis club, right, ok. And then into, let me think, so then you would have been probably started work being then in the Depression years.
LP: It’s been about 1938, ’37, ’38 when I left school and went straight into getting a job with the bank.
JM: Ah, yes, that’s true, that’s true, yes, so you were still at school in the Depression years potentially.
LP: I was in Coffs Harbour I think during [unclear].
JM: Coffs Harbour, right. Ok.
LP: My father was a theatre manager.
JM: Oh, ok, so.
LP: That’s why we went from state to state virtually and then when he retired, he finished up writing The picture show man, his experience because his father was also started off producing, not producing films, but showing films all around the rural areas up the North Coast there.
JM: Right, right.
LP: And my dad wrote a résumé of what happened to his youth and so forth and they made a movie out of it, they called The Picture Show Man.
JM: That’s right, that’s right, indeed. Uhm, so that would have been, picture shows would have been very much a discretionary expenditure so with the Depression that would have been quite a tough going for your father.
LP: It was tough going, yes. He was educated mainly in Tamworth there, in Tamworth, lovely town up the North Coast.
JM: Indeed. So, then when you, the family, your father retired, then is that when you came back to Sydney?
LP: Yes, well, Dad entered the army when the war started out, entered the army as a private and finished up as a Major, going through Lieutenant Colonel when he was finally discharged and Dad had a bit of trouble, just trouble and he had, he was medically discharged then.
JM: Ok. And, so then you went into the bank when you left school?
LP: Yes.
JM: And which bank was that?
LP: It was called the English Scottish and Australian Bank then,
JM: Yes.
LP: But it’s the ANZ now.
JM: ANZ, yes, the Esanda, wasn’t it its original name, the Esanda?
LP: That’s right.
JM: Yes.
LP: Yes.
JM: Yes, that’s right. Ok, so, you were, whereabouts were you based in the bank? Were you in the city or just?
LP: The first job was at the Spit Junction.
JM: Spit Junction?
LP: Yes [laughs] Very handy.
JM: Oh, ok, very handy, very handy.
LP: And then I went to the hill office after a year and a bit, to King George Street in the city of Sydney and did a little bit of relieving going to different banks when they were on holiday, the South was on holidays. I wasn’t very high up in the bank at all.
JM: Oh, you were only fairly young at this stage, I mean, Goodness gracious!
LP: [laughs] But, no, it is a dreadful thing to say but it was a fortunate thing for me was that the war started really because it made such a, I wouldn’t have met June.
JP: No. [laughs]
JM: Well, I think there are a lot of
LP: Because I met June in New York in, June was a child evacuee from England and she was only seventeen when I met her and I was nineteen and I just got my wings in Canada and we went to New York on leave
JM: On leave, yes.
LP: And met her there. Well, she met me really, because she picked me out a crowd of
JP: I was having lunch in this Hotel Edison and they asked me, the management, who would I like from that group of airmen over there, who could just come and have lunch with us. And I looked at all the faces and I picked Lorrie.
JM: Oh my Goodness gracious!
JP: He was invited over to have lunch with us
JM: Oh my goodness!
JP: We were both [unclear] management.
LP: We had only about a week to leave in New York. Then I went over across to England on the Queen Elizabeth then and of course won the war [?] over there but of course we didn’t have any correspondence between us for two years. It was just by accident that I met June when they, [unclear] girls were brought back to England after being evacuated.
JM: Right. We will come to a bit more detail about that shortly let’s just, you’ve got a little bit of to, we’ve got to go from your, when you were with the bank and then the war started and so then you enlisted, in September ’41, I see,
LP: That’s right.
JM: So, where, at Bradfield Park, I can see this, so that’s the normal enlisting place for most people there?
LP: Yes.
JM: So, and you did nearly three months at Bradfield Park.
LP: That’s right.
JM: But perhaps before I go a bit further, what made, was there any particular factor that caused you to actually go into the, choose the Air Force to enlist into or?
LP: I was always interested in flying. I remember Dad showed me a free joyride trip to an aircraft that was doing some pleasure flights around Manly and we went up there and that
JM: Sparked your interest.
LP: Sparked my interest.
JM: So that would have been what, do you remember how old you were when that was? Fifteen or so? Maybe earlier?
LP: It would have been earlier than that.
JM: Earlier than that?
LP: It would be about ten, I would say.
JM: Oh my goodness! So that didn’t prompt you to join the Air League at all?
LP: No, because I was still in Shore, at the Shore Grammar School and in the cadets, the cadets were mainly interested in the uniforms and these rifles, they would take their rifles home and all that sort of thing.
JM: And did you do any sort of like officer training in the cadets or?
LP: Yes, but I didn’t advance [unclear], no.
JM: You didn’t advance. Ok. And so, you had, so when came time to join up, then obviously Air Force was going to be the one that you were going to.
LP: Yes, I was going, definitely wanted to join the Air Force.
JM: Right, ok. And so, off to Bradfield Park and then off to
LP: Narromine.
JM: Narromine for your Elementary Flying Training.
LP: That’s right. Went solo there.
JM: Yes.
LP: Twenty courses and there were fifty of us on twenty course and there was only two of us left.
JM: My goodness me, yes.
LP: And this, do you know Tony Vine at all?
JM: No, I don’t know Tony.
LP: Anyhow, he is an ex naval submarine commander actually and he does a lot of commentating on Anzac Day for the ABC over the year and he took an interest in me and he rounded up and got all the stories of the whole twenty, I will show you the book afterwards that he’s written, released that only a couple of months ago.
JM: Right, right.
LP: Down in Canberra.
JM: Right, very interesting, I’ll have a look at it afterwards, yeah. So, Narromine, then back to Bradfield Park for
LP: The Japanese just came in then.
JM: Ah, about 40, yes
LP: We were all ready to hop on the ship and go to San Francisco, the war came in, they didn’t know what to do with us at the time so we went back to Narromine.
JM: Narromine.
LP: Where we refreshed the course. Things got straight and out what was going to happen and we went back and joined the ship and went to San Francisco, as First Class passengers, wonderful [laughs].
JM: Yes. And you were actually in Sydney then when the Japanese came into the harbour?
LP: I think I was still in Narromine.
JM: Still in Narromine, right, ok.
LP: Yes, still in Narromine waiting the war, so.
JM: Right.
LP: With the Japanese.
JM: But when the submarines came into the harbour at [unclear], you weren’t in Sydney.
LP: I wasn’t here, still in Narromine, pretty sure, yes.
JM: Ok, so off you went to, uhm, to San Francisco and.
LP: Yes, and we went by train up to Vancouver, a lovely, quite an eye-opener how lovely it was that trip and then from Vancouver to Edmonton.
JM: Yes.
LP: And we were held there for oh, four to five weeks I think in Edmonton, Canada.
JM: Ah yes, about four weeks looking at the dates here in your logbook, here at the record of service, yes, it was 9th of May until the 6th of June.
LP: That’ll be right, yes, that’ll be right.
JM: So, so what were you doing, any training there in?
LP: No, no, we were just being held there to. We had the medical, the Canadians were very keen to get the medical condition of whatever arriving there so we had dental and all sort of things, x-rays and things like that. Sports.
JM: Yes, a bit of sports to keep you active, I suppose.
LP: Keep us fit, yes. Waiting on a posting to a service training school.
JM: Right.
LP: Which was Dauphin, Manitoba.
JM: Whereabouts?
LP: Dauphin was just north, northwest of Winnipeg.
JM: Right. And how, was that another train trip?
LP: Yes, it was. Over the Rockies and a wonderful trip.
JM: And that would have been quite an experience then to see some of that scenery.
LP: Oh, it was. It was then.
JM: Yeah.
LP: Jasper and up very, many thousand of feet we had to go through the Rockies to and then down on the plains, from then on east of there of course it was flatter than a pancake until you got to the East Coast of Canada pretty well.
JM: Yes, yes, and what training did you do at Dauphin?
LP: At Dauphin? That was a service training school, and that’s where I got my wings, we had to, we were there for [unclear] several months and it was quite hot in Canada in summer.
JM: Yes, that’s right, June through to almost the end of September, so, you’ve got peak summer conditions, so, I guess therefore it was not dissimilar to Australia in that regard.
LP: Yes, in that regard it was.
JM: And how, how did the training go over there, was there?
LP: Oh yes, It went very well,
JM: And there were Canadian instructors presumably [unclear]
LP: Yes, I had Canadian instructors, we were training on the [unclear] aircraft, twin-engine aircraft and very nice aircraft.
JM: Right, and so, you did, you were flying with the instructor and then finally I presume you did your solo flight to get your wings?
LP: Yes. That’s right.
JM: Yeah. And how was that experience? What was your?
LP: Ah, it was wonderful, it went very well, went very well.
JM: Good. And that completely confirmed for you then that you were doing what you wanted to do.
LP: Oh, just, they wanted to because I topped the flying amongst our group. Then they wanted to send me to Prince Edward Island to go onto Sunderland flying boats and I, cause I wanted to get onto Spitfires and I went and saw the CO and set my foot and he more or less agreed that, alright, we’ll take away the Prince Edward Island job and commission went with that too but when I went to the other, when I went to the other service training school, the commission didn’t go with that posting [unclear] but we were posted to the Saint John, to a near field, Pennfield Ridge it was called and that was near Saint John, near the East Coast of Canada onto Venturas.
JM: Right.
LP: Now, these Venturas were twin-engine, like a big Hudson aircraft.
JM: Right.
LP: And, they were a bit heavy handed [laughs], heavy to handle but did alright but in the meantime they were, can I go on to what happened to Venturas?
JM: Yes, you can.
LP: Because they started off on, in England they were sent across, on operations and the first sortie over the English Channel into France that was then [unclear] two boxes of six and one Ventura came back out of the tour. Now, what really happened was normally was daylight bombing and normally bombing between ten and fifteen thousand feet because we were after the V1 sites mainly then [unclear] hours but normally we had a fighter escort Spitfires and Hurricanes which would be up about twenty thousand, twenty five thousand feet looking after us but they, the escort didn’t turn up, so the German fighters had a pretty good
JM: Picnic.
LP: Pretty good go at the Venturas.
JM: Venturas
LP: And that’s why after we got to England we did a conversion onto Mitchells, B-25s,
JM: Right. Ok, so.
LP: We’re getting ahead of.
JM: We just try, I find it easier if we can sort of keep it in sequence in that way, bearing in mind sort of when other people are listening, you know, at other times, it makes it a little bit simpler for them. But that’s not say that if you suddenly think of something we can’t accommodate that because it’s better to get it all. But, so, the Venturas, so you were training on these Venturas and at Pennfield Ridge, and then, as well as that, you followed that on with some about a month and a bit at Yarmouth.
LP: That’s right, at Yarmouth, in, we had to cross the Bay of Fundy to go down to, Yarmouth was still in Canada. There is a Yarmouth in England too.
JM: Yes, that’s why
LP: That’s why my parents thought that’s we’re gone to.
JM: Yes, that’s why a bit, wanting to just clarify what that, yeah, so, there’s Yarmouth in Canada and so, what did you do down in Yarmouth, more Ventura training or?
LP: Yes, more Ventura training.
JM: Ventura training. So, did you actually crew up at this point?
LP: Yes, when we got to Pennfield Ridge we crewed up.
JM: You crewed up there. So, how many because I’m totally unfamiliar with the Ventura, how many were on your crew on a Ventura?
LP: I had to choose a pilot and an observer who was not a pilot, a navigator and bomb aimer. And wireless air gunner and straight gunner.
JM: So, in terms of a Ventura, is it like, did they have, was it like a mid-upper gunner or rear gunner or?
LP: Mid-upper gunner.
JM: A mid-upper gunner. Right, ok. And
LP: Oh, sorry, it was only the straight air gunner was on the Mitchell and he was on one of those gun positions [unclear] down below
JM: Oh, like, down below
LP: Down below and underneath
JM: A lower, right
LP: The Ventura didn’t, it only had the top turret.
JM: Top turret, right. So what did wireless operator run that as well as the radio?
LP: As a gunner
JM: As a gunner
LP: As a gunner, and
JM: Wireless
LP: Wireless man, too.
JM: Wireless, right, ok. So, you had one, two, three, four, five crew on your Ventura.
LP: Ehm, one, two, three, four, actually, three, four because we didn’t have the straight air gunner.
JM: So you had a pilot, observer, navigator
LP: Who was all, observer, navigator was all, all one
JM: All the one, ok. So, pilot, navigator, observer, bomb aimer and wireless air gunner.
LP: Yes.
JM: Yes. Ok. And so, how did you go about your selection of your crew? Did
LP: They were all brought into the hall and we’d just say, would you like to come with me and you’d pick somebody if they were agreeable and that was it.
JM: And were they all, what nationalities were they?
LP: My observer, who was also the
JM: Navigator
LP: Navigator, was a New Zealander.
JM: Right.
LP: There’s with him and the straight air gunner, no, not the straight air gunner, the wireless air gunner
JM: Wireless.
LP: Was a Canadian
JM: Right. And bomb aimer?
LP: That was the observer’s job also. The observer was a navigator and bomb aimer.
JM: And what was he? Ah, he was New Zealander.
LP: He was a New Zealander and the wireless air gunner was a Canadian.
JM: And, so, that was your crew, you went then as a crew to Yarmouth.
LP: To Yarmouth.
JM: And did your additional training
LP: Yes.
JM: In Yarmouth.
LP: Yes.
JM: So then you got after that, any particular memories that, any particular experiences any of these training flights that stand out, any near misses or any interesting visit, interesting side trips as a result of [laughs]?
LP: Not really. I was lucky, the Venturas had the most powerful engine going at the time in the Air Force at two thousand horse power, a radial engine, and had a habit of catching on fire. Luckily I didn’t have that experience myself but we did a lot of formation flying at Yarmouth too, and we’d go out, ehm, select one doing the [unclear] for about half an hour and then change over so. The [unclear] Grant-Suttie was the captain of the leading aircraft I was formating on him and he had an engine failure and we were on a steep turn at the time and I, because he reduced speed because of the engine failure, I pulled off, I suppose I could so but our, my left wingtip hit his tail plane and my left wingtip came up like that, bent right up
JM: Bent right up
LP: Bent right up and of course when I landed and they asked about the other aircraft, the other aircraft, alright, I said, as far as I know, yes, Captain, I’m [unclear], he’s still ok, and I saw him land then and never got into any trouble, I don’t know whether he got into any trouble enough but
JM: But still the engine failed, I mean.
LP: The engine failed and it was down that they weren’t very good engines.
JM: Gosh, well that was an experience to
LP: Yeah, that was an experience.
JM: And again sort of required your resources to manage your way out of it, so.
LP: When you’re in a [unclear] like that and he wants to bank further because the engine fails
JM: So, probably more than forty-five degrees you’re talking about, judging by the position of your hands there, yes.
LP: Is very, I couldn’t do anything except try and sort of get my speed behind his, and we were very lucky that all this more or less still kept together and my wingtip hit his tail plane and, well, it squeezed up against, you say, because there wasn’t any big collision, we were so close anyhow.
JM: Close anyhow.
LP: So.
JM: Gosh! So, that was that experience and that was probably about the only one that you had.
LP: That’s the only one I had.
JP: Bird strike. The bird strike.
LP: Oh no. That’s way.
JM: That’s further down the track, is it? Ok.
LP: Way down the track. This is in the Air Force, I’m still training in the Air Force [laughs]
JM: We’re still, we’re back in Canada here. But whereabouts to sort of go to Halifax and uhm, I presume that’s probably but some of your experiences that’s at Yarmouth and then. So you moved both to Halifax and [unclear] and that was
LP: That was like a holding.
JM: Holding.
LP: Holding spot there and then we actually went by train down to New York
JM: Yes.
LP: To get on board the Queen Elizabeth. Right next door was the French one that was caught on fire.
JM: Fire.
LP: What was the name?
JP: Oh, that French ship. Yes, I remember that.
LP: About the same size as the Queen Elizabeth. Huge French.
JP: It wasn’t the Normandy?
LP: Normandy. That’s it! Good one! Is the Normandy, yes.
JM: Yes.
LP: It spend quite a long time in the New York wharf area.
JM: But when you went down to New York is when you had a week’s leave and when you.
LP: We had the weeks’ leave from Dauphin. That was where I did the [unclear]
JM: Oh, from Dauphin, ok, so whilst you were in Dauphin that had you the week’s leave, right.
LP: That’s right, isn’t it?
JP: Yes.
LP: From Dauphin.
JM: Dauphin, so
LP: [unclear] I got my wings, it wasn’t [unclear], no, because we didn’t have leave and we came before we went on board the Queen Elisabeth. Some memory?
JP: I can’t remember.
LP: You can’t remember, I can’t remember.
JM: No, that’s alright, well that’s
LP: Got in touch with you when I went to New York. No.
JM: No, so was probably around August or something that you had your leave in ’42, went down from Dauphin down to New York so
LP: I don’t think we were allowed so when we were embarking or anything like that.
JM: Right, ok, so that and how did you find your week in New York?
LP: Well, initially.
JM: Yes, that initial.
LP: With June.
JM: Yes, with June.
LP: Oh, we had a lovely time. We saw
JM: So, you met June at the beginning of the leave as opposed to
LP: Yes
JM: So, you had the whole week together basically
JP: I was just having lunch and he was the guest of management and I was guest of management.
JM: Guest of management, yes, no, but it was basically towards the, more as at the start of his leave so you then had a week, more or less a week together. Oh, that was wonderful.
LP: No, not all the time. But I went down to this hotel called [unclear] and the other one, he got his wings too, and we both went to this hotel Edison in New York because we could have two meals for the price of one [laughs]. And, oh, we were looking forward to it, we weren’t flush then.
JM: Oh, that’s right. Exactly, you were payed.
LP: And that’s when June sorted a group of airmen and said, oh, I’ll pick him.
JP: Pick him [laughs].
LP: So it’s all her fault.
JM: It’s all her fault, that’s right. And so, I guess, how long had you been in New York at that stage? June, you had some idea?
JP: Oh, I’d only been in New York probably about a year.
JM: A Year. But still at least you had some knowledge, say you were able to take
LP: You were fifteen, didn’t you?
JP: Fifteen, going, closer to sixteen.
LP: Ah, were you?
JP: Much closer to sixteen. Yes.
LP: June was about the, she was more of us in charge of the other girls going over
JP: That’s right.
LP: And she did three years, they been and she’s been living in New York about a year.
JM: A levels, you did your A levels.
JP: I did the leaving that took everybody four years, I did it in fifteen months.
JM: My Goodness me!
JP: And how I did it was that, where I was as a like a primary school but we had, the older ones, we had a separate cottage and this cottage, these lovely ladies would come and
LP: The Gool [?] Foundation
JP: The Gool [?] Foundation and they’d come and you know they talked me up when I wanted to do my homework for night now where was I? Uhm, what was I about to tell you?
JM: Well, we were just saying that you had, you’d been there about twelve months so that you had some idea about, you know, where to take Lorrie and
JP: Where to take Lorrie and everything and they just sort of got somehow round that we got in touch with each other
LP: When? After.
JP: I don’t know how we did it, whether it’s through my mother.
LP: No, no, no, I happened to be, this is after a two year period after I got to England.
JM: England.
LP: When we first left each other, I think I wrote one letter saying how lovely
JM: [unclear]
LP: I got one letter back, nothing for two years, I happened to be on leave in London and [unclear] officer by then and reading the paper and there was a little part in the paper that said, a lot of these girls were returning as they had been evacuated and gave the address of the headquarters there and I thought, oh, I might go, see if June [unclear] maybe and maybe I might pop in and see and she happened to be there at the headquarters when I popped in.
JM: At that particular time that you went and visited. How a coincidence.
JP: I was getting my papers to get on entertaining the troops had to join ENSO, which was Entertainments National Service Association.
LP: Join the straight, part of a straight play.
JP: Part of a straight play. And, you know I just had this, getting all this information and when Lorrie walked into the building and here you go.
JM: Well, there you go!
JP: Meant to be.
JM: Meant to be, that’s right. And so you became part of the entertainment, troop entertainment.
JP: Yes, I was always in, so, I went to a theatre school as a child through [unclear] and then we went to New York and then I had a very good, I had the best drama teacher in the world at that time called Frances Robinson-Duff and she gave me a free scholarship to attend her school and from there, well, I went back to England, the best way for me to use what I knew in theatre was to join the Entertainment National Service Association, which was a group that entertained troops in straight plays and things like that all over England and Scotland.
LP: You went up to the Orkneys at that time.
JM: Gosh! Yeah, so you, well.
JP: Unfortunately everybody would have been in the newspaper and I would have been in the [unclear] but Noel Coward who was like in charge of us, he was very conscious of keeping our privacy, he didn’t want that for us so he stopped that otherwise I would have had, you know, newspapers galore on what I was doing. It’s a shame.
LP: If June had stayed on , Noel Coward would have made sure that she had a good part.
JM: Gosh!
JP: No, he was like a father to me. Was fabulous.
JM: Amazing, yeah. Ok, we’ll come back to that because that obviously fits in with the story a bit further down the track, uhm, at the moment we just got you into England [laughs]
LP: Queen Elisabeth [unclear], because no escort at all
JM: You had no escort for [unclear], no.
LP: And one night, the Queen did a very quick, one hundred and eighty, three hundred and sixty degree turn because they knew there was a submarine, they were told there was a submarine after them, so I’m glad they had plenty of speed.
JM: Yes, that’s right. So you just did a massive turn around, you didn’t go by, there was one, I must check that, yes, there was one trip that actually went via Greenland. But because again a submarine concerns so did you either on this, on the Elisabeth did you meet, some of the chaps did watchers, did you do any, bridge watches or?
LP: Not on the Queen Elisabeth. But going from Australia to San Francisco, they loaded up guns and [unclear] as well because the war, looked like the Japanese could have come down from there on our way.
JM: But you didn’t do any bridge watch, some of the chaps did bridge watchers from the bridge. But no, so you just did some gunnery work, gunnery preparations on that over to San Fran, right, ok. So you ended up, from Halifax you ended Myles Standish, Bournemouth.
LP: Myles Standish, wasn’t that?
JM: That’s the departure before you went to
LP: Boston, wasn’t it?
JM: That be Boston, yeah, when you got onto the Elisabeth.
LP: Boston, we were held there for a few days and then went to New York onto the Queen Elisabeth.
JM: Yes, just, and so then into Bournemouth.
LP: Yes, held there for quite a while.
JM: About nearly two months basically in Bournemouth, so what sort of things were you doing in Bournemouth?
LP: Mainly parade and get a sport but we were bombed here.
JM: Really?
LP: We were bombed from the low level Focke Wulf, they got under the radar, they just fly over the water and it was a Sunday. If it hadn’t been a Sunday, half of us wouldn’t have been here because the parade ground was bombed. [unclear] my friend there, he got, [unclear] damaged, one thing or another, quite a few killed, civilians were killed at Bournemouth. Sunday the hotel was bombed, they couldn’t, they didn’t rescue anybody out there for a couple of days or two but they were having a great old time down the cellars [laughs].
JM: Down the cellars, well, at least they were safe, I suppose. And so, did your crew that you had been with, your New Zealander, your Canadian, they were all, they came across with you together on the plane, on the boat to Europe? And you’re at Bournemouth together?
LP: Yes, yes, no, I may have, my memory, I’m not too sure now whether it was just my observer and myself together and the wireless air gunner and the straight air gunner, we might have got together after the conversion onto Mitchells, I can’t quite remember that now.
JM: That’s alright, that’s ok. And.
LP: So, after we went after to Bicester.
JM: Towards had, no had two western first?
LP: Sorry?
JM: Tour western? Two western?
LP: Yeah, that’s right.
JM: Two western?
LP: Close to Bicester.
JM: Yeah well, in your entry you had two western then Bicester.
LP: Conversion onto the Mitchells [unclear].
JM: Mitchells.
LP: Two Western.
JM: And how did you find the difference between the Mitchell and the Ventura?
LP: Ah, beautiful aircraft, compared to the Ventura there’s no, hard to compare, the Mitchell was a beautiful aircraft.
JM: It was.
LP: I got a good one too, no, the aircraft varied but mine
JM: There were still two engine, weren’t they?
LP: Still two engines, yes.
JM: Yes. And what, you say they were beautiful aircraft, in what way?
LP: Well, we did a lot of formation flying again there and they were very responsive, very steady, fully aerobatic, not that we did any aerobatics with a bomber but they were capable of doing it. And Liberator, do you know the Liberator at all?
JM: No, not really, no.
LP: That’s a four engine.
JM: Four engine. Had another American one.
LP: The same that made the Liberator
JM: That made the Liberator
LP: Made the Mitchell
JM: Mitchell.
LP: And they are very similar, very similar. Matter of fact, those that went on to Liberators first went on to Mitchells to get the feel. Must show you, there probably a bit out of order but.
JM: Well how about we come back to that later on.
LP: Yeah, we’ll getting a bit thirsty
JM: Oh, ok, we will have a little bit of a.
LP: I mean, you, you must.
JM: No, no, I’m fine but we will just pause while you. We shall just continue on now with Lorrie has just shown me the book that Tony Vine has written on the history of the group of
LP: Group 20
JM: 20 course at Narromine.
LP: There were 50 of us.
JM: 50, so I’ll come, so I’ve seen the chapter on Lorrie which I will come back to afterwards. So, you were at
LP: [unclear]
JM: At Bournemouth.
LP: Yes.
JM: Sorry, then you went to Two Western and you were onto your Mitchell training here now.
LP: Yes, conversion onto.
JM: Yes, so, do you remember your crew there?
LP: Same.
JM: Same. Did you pick up an extra chap now?
LP: That’s where I think where I got the straight gunner, which was Starkey, he was another Canadian.
JM: Another Canadian.
LP: So I finished up with a New Zealander and two Canadians.
JM: Yeah, right, ok, and so from there, any particular experiences that come to mind when you were doing your conversion to your Mitchells?
LP: No, I think they, just the instructors started climbing up to twenty thousand feet and he wanted to demonstrate without our oxygen masks on and most of the chaps sort of passed out but I was very whizzy but I didn’t actually pass out. But, that’s one of, just off the top of my head, [laughs] not worth mentioning really.
JM: Right. Still showed you what would happen if you
LP: If you didn’t have your oxygen mask.
JM: If you didn’t have your oxygen mask, that’s right. So from there, uhm, off to Fulsome
LP: Swanton Morley?
JM: No, Folsom, briefly to start only three days, so, it was just a transit by the looks of the dates and from there Swanton Morley, so, Swanton Morley was you first posting, that was your when you were posted to 226 Squadron.
LP: That’s right.
JM: Yeah, so this was.
LP: Which is an RAF Squadron.
JM: An RAF Squadron, yes, that’s right. And so from, so you arrived at 226 in August ’43.
LP: That’d be right.
JM: August ’43, August ’43, ok and that’s when you started your operational activities?
LP: Yes, from Swanton Morley.
JM: Yes, ok and so, uhm, so mostly your ops were over Northern France, sort of?
LP: Yes, northern France, Holland and, mainly on the V1 sites, we didn’t know, they didn’t tell us what we were actually bombing, cause a big secret at the time. It just what they called a V1 bombing and nothing else, other things too but because these launching sites were right on the coast, crossing over, the flak was very heavy, just hop in and hop out as quickly as you could, drop your bombs.
JM: And so here you had, how many, need to go back to your, we go to the
LP: Operations?
JM: Operations, here, what sort of missions, ops?
LP: Well, as I was saying, they were mainly V1 we were
JM: V1.
LP: We were doing daylight bombings.
JM: Daylight bombings, yes, good, ok, so, any, how many times, do you have?
LP: Thirty ops was a tour.
JM: A tour, yes, that’s alright.
LP: A tour and at the end of the thirty ops I was asked to, would I do another ten ops, which I volunteered to do.
JM: Yes. So, that’s your assessments there, September, yes, so your first ops, your first ops started on the 19th of September basically by the looks of that and through there, lots of flights in between time affiliation flying and then November you really started doing, you really started into the ops, that’s 20th, 23rd, 25th, 26th, yep, 40th operation cooling [?]. So, what’s, any particular ops stand out in terms of, uhm, where, you know, little bit of flak here, we see in January, cloud over target did not bomb, so, French coast, cloud, what sort of, what sort of memories do you have of those ops there?
LP: There, only the amount of flak that was put up to just like the black cloud [unclear]
JM: Black cloud.
LP: And I got hit quite, my observer got shrapnel in his knee from the flak and my straight air gunner, he was up in the top turret and he, quite a big thing hit him behind but luckily it was the flat end that hit him, if it would have been the sharp end the side of, he probably would have been
JM: He probably would have been into trouble.
LP: Yes. Luckily the captain’s seat had armoured plating about that thick [unclear] at the back
JM: Right, so you were reasonably protected from.
LP: Yes, and we always wore a normal helmet, not helmet, see, metal hat, you know, we called it, we didn’t wear a cap so
JM: No, no.
LP: But, the ordinary ground soldiers a metal thing because of the flak, it might help us if a bit of metal came in.
JM: That’s right, and the injuries of those two chaps sustained, were they?
LP: They were in hospital
JM: They were in hospital, I say, it didn’t cause them to miss any ops or one or two ops that you had a substitute crew for or?
LP: No. [unclear]
JM: No, they didn’t miss
LP: We kept the same crew all the way through.
JM: All the way through, right, ok. And, did you have escorts? You said there was lots of flak, so did you still have escorts to provide you a bit of protection or?
LP: Well, as I said, the escorts were [unclear] fighters up to twenty thousand feet, we were bombing between ten thousand and fifteen thousand feet. Daylight bombing and so the escorts could see us from, but that be about ten or fifteen thousand feet
JM: Between you
LP: Between us and if any German fighters showed up they, with the height advantage,
JM: They would be able to come in down over the top of them and try to pick them off
LP: Yes. Keep them. They were herding us along quite nicely. But unlucky with that first Venturas when they didn’t show up and they eleven out of twelve were shot down.
JM: That’s right. So, how bigger Squadron was 226?
LP: It was quite a big squadron and there were about three or four at different stations, airfields, and for instance this called Halliday, was when I met June at the hotel, he was at another airfield, I can’t remember the name of it now, about three or four, there was even a Polish squadron, they made part of our wing, what they called our wing, and they were dreadful in that, they didn’t believe in, they flew straight in and low [laughs] all the time, because, you know, we were told, and it’s pretty true, that if you kept on a straight level flight for ten seconds or a little bit more than ten seconds, without changing your course or your height, you‘re bound to be knocked down. So we did a lot of course changing and height changing.
JM: That’s right. And whilst you were at the base there, uhm, what, at Swanton Morley, you would have some leave, what sort of things did you do whilst you were on leave at Swanton Morley?
LP: We were lucky that there was an organisation that, I’m trying to think of the organisation there that offered to take you into different homes in different parts of England and myself and a good friend of mine, Jack Barrel [?], who is another pilot, we both decided on going up to the Lake District and we loved it, we met a magnificent family up there, he was a soldier from World War I and he at the Battle of the Somme he had a leg shot off and his wife was a lovely Hewardson missy, Hewardson.
JP: They were lovely people.
LP: And that’s where we went up for our honeymoon, up to Kendal, Lake District, and we went and visited them, we just stayed at that hotel at Kendal in Lake District.
JM: Right. Gosh! And did you get back to them a couple of times?
LP: Yes, yes.
JM: So whilst you were at Swanton Morley, so having made the contact with this family, the Hewardsons, did you say it was?
LP: Hewardsons.
JM: Hewardsons, yes. And they, so you then went back.
LP: Very much [unclear] like part of the family up there. Made us very welcome, looked after us magnificently.
JM: Yes, yes, it’s interesting how these bonds did form and how much someone else has commented to me that you know how what an unknown contribution those families really made because of the support and the care that they gave, the service chaps was.
JP: It was amazing.
LP: Of course, something like Miss Macdonald and something about [unclear] and somewhere on the [unclear], was quite nice people, didn’t know them at all but that’s what the organisation was called.
JM: Right, so then you continued to
LP: We left Swanton Morley and went down to Camberley in tents. We were just about to go, D-Day was just about to come up.
JM: Yes, that’s what I’m going to say. What about D-Day, yes?
LP: Well, actually I just finished my tour, they called it, there’s a tour and a half but they called two tours tour because it went on to the extra ten ones, so I was on leave on D-Day.
JM: Right.
LP: In London I think.
JM: Right.
LP: But I then went on to the second [unclear] communication Squadron from there.
JM: Right. Right. So, so you finished your tour at, in beginning of June, before June basically, wasn’t it? It’s the tour the eleventh, that’s May 23, was basically the last op you did there? That when you and then you had your, you’ve been given your assessment on the 11th of June, which of course is after D-Day, so that’s why you were on leave for, well, on D-Day, so, yeah. So, you went, where did you have your leave? Were you down in London or were you up, up north?
LP: London, London on D-Day.
JM: Right, right. And were you in London at that point, June, or?
JP: I think so.
LP: Must have been.
JP: I must have been, yeah. Yes, I must have been, yes. We must have been together.
LP: I don’t know whether you had come back from America at that stage, do you remember what month it was that you came back? It wasn’t, I think it was after June that we met up again.
JP: We had a patch of two years so we didn’t see each other.
LP: Yes.
JM: Right, right, ok. So, could have been as part of that time there. Yes.
LP: Because I know what I mean, we got married on January the 4th, I remember that.
JP: 1945.
JM: Right.
LP: 1945.
JM: January 4th 1945 we were married.
LP: And we weren’t, it took a while before I [unclear] enough courage to ask her to marry me [laughs].
JP: Yes. And we were [unclear] together like three months before that. And before that I was in, I must have been in America.
JM: Yes, yes, yes.
LP: And I was at, based at Northolt.
JM: Yes. Because you, in June you switched to Ansons so did you do a conversion course to the Ansons or was it similar to, from the?
LP: No, hardly necessary. Just another [unclear], the two on the Ansons, the Anson was twin engine, but is only used as a communication aircraft really.
JM: Right, ok, so this was the start of your other Squadron posting, was it?
LP: Yes.
JM: And what was that Squadron called?
LP: 2nd TAF communications squadron.
JM: Right, and so that was Northolt.
LP: They had [unclear]
JM: Yeah, ok. So, that was. So actually you were at 226 moved to Hartford Bridge from Swanton Morley.
LP: Yes, that’s right, yes, that’s right.
JM: So, you’re still flying there, you’re still flying ops at that stage.
LP: Yeah.
JM: It’s just that you change bases there.
LP: Yes.
JM: Yeah, ok. So, with the TAF on communication, what was that involving?
LP: Mainly, flying quite higher people from on aerodrome to the other. Ten days after D-Day I was flying across the Channel with generals and
JM: You were attached to Montgomery’s headquarters.
LP: Yeah, but [unclear] you’re getting too far ahead, June.
JP: Am I? Ah, but that’s what you were doing.
LP: But we were doing a lot of work based in Northolt, flying to different airfields in England, mainly carrying VIPs from one place to the other, carrying some mail from one place to the other, but I think I ran about the tenth, ten days after D-Day which would be, what, 16th? I was flying across the Channel with VIPs.
JM: Right.
LP: And then shortly after the whole communication squadron went across [unclear] and we were based in the beachhead, close to the beachhead, beachhead.
JM: Right. So, that was, yeah, so you were in France and then Belgium. So, from, in August, you had one month in France.
LP: Yeah.
JM: And then three months in Belgium.
LP: That’s right. Yeah. And during that three months, a part of, got three or four weeks, myself and two other pilots were attached to Montgomery’s headquarters and do take his majors up to frontline and get information back and bring that back too.
JM: Right, so. That, August, yes, so, looking at your logbook again, yes it doesn’t quite give us the details it, just tells that you went like in August you went to a whole pile of interesting, Elson [?], Chartres and in another flight you had Reims, Saint Mo [?] and return, so you were obviously visiting forward posts in there to pick up information and then drop staff and that sort of thing there, so, yes, how was that as an experience compared to your fighting operation shall we call?
LP: It is virtually called a rest period, rest period really but we were open to enemy attack at any time.
JM: Did you have any escorts at that time? How many of you were, you just a single plane?
LP: A single plane.
JM: A single plane, so didn’t have any escort or anything like that. You and your rescue were on your own resources in terms of keeping watch for anything.
LP: Yes, well, I didn’t have a crew then.
JM: Oh, ok, you were only.
LP: When I left the squadron, finished the operations, that was the end of the crew.
JM: Right, ok.
LP: So, it was just you.
LP: And other pilots, they were all.
JM: Just a mix of second pilots, just like a two, two men crew running.
LP: Well, wasn’t even a two men crew. We were flying lighter aircraft and it was the one crew flying the passengers virtually.
JM: Oh, ok, so you didn’t actually even have like a second pilot or anything, was just you as the pilot and the passengers that you were ferrying.
LP: Even the Anson which was twin engine thing, you just flew that by yourself. I even accepted that the time I had Prince Bernard [?] in Canada he, we were in Brussels at the time, and he wanted to go to Eindhoven and I was chosen to fly him there in the Anson and he and his couple of aids there and general, a couple of generals there and they sat down in the back and he wanted to sit up alongside of me and Prince Bernard [?] and took off and the old Anson in those days, you had to wind the undercarriage up and it took off and he said, oh, I’ll do that and he wound the undercarriage up for me [laughs]. Very nice chap.
JM: And did you ever meet Montgomery?
LP: I can’t say that I actually met him. No, it’s a wonder I didn’t because as I say there were three of us with these light aircraft attached to his headquarters and one Sunday morning, it must have been a Sunday morning and the English Townsend, Johnny Townsend, were having a bit of a rivalry amongst us and we went up, and we had a bit of a dogfight, you know, [unclear] treetop level and we were doing [unclear] and having a real good older, I won by the way because I and he admitted that I was coming inside him on the turns [unclear], we landed and very shortly after there was a VIP attached to Montgomery that came up and said: ‘What have [unclear] I had a lot of trouble, you’re in a lot of trouble because there was, Montgomery was very religious type of chap and he was carrying out the church parade and of course we were flying [laughs].
JM: The church creating a racket.
LP: And disturbed his church service and we weren’t very popular then [laughs].
JM: Oh dear, oh dear.
LP: So, that’s one incident that happened.
JM: And so, it was quite a different experience than for you to be doing.
LP: We [unclear] as a rest period, weren’t nearly in so much danger really, except we often had to keep our eyes open all the time because we were as far as the aircraft went, we were very much on top of the Germans, from D-Day on the German Air Force didn’t trouble us very much.
JM: So, what, you had quite a number of flights in that capacity. So you went through until December ’44 was the end of Belgium and then from there you were down to Brighton and obviously you had some leave at that point because if you then went and got married in January, beginning of January ’45, your time in Brighton was December ’44 to February ’45 so you had some leave and you got married. Where were you married, in London?
LP: Yes. West Hampstead, wasn’t it?
JP: West Hampstead.
JM: Right. Right. Very good.
LP: And then we had the honeymoon up in Kendal, in the Lake District [laughs].
JM: Back with the Hewardsons again.
JP: Yes.
LP: That’s right.
JM: Yes, so that [unclear] marvellous and so, then you came back on the Rangitiki.
LP: Rangitiki, New Zealand ship.
JM: And did you come, you wouldn’t have come as well?
JP: [unclear] travelled.
JM: Travelled together.
JP: It was terrible because English [unclear] was good. But not the Australians. It was terrible.
JM: No.
LP; A well, I can tell you something about that. The Australians they couldn’t take their wireless back with them, but the New Zealanders did and when we got on board, and the New Zealanders were there [unclear] I was very hurt about that. Yes, would have made a big difference.
JP: [unclear] went first, it was several months before I was pregnant which he didn’t know about.
LP: I didn’t know about [unclear].
JP: Until I saw him again and it was terrible for me cause I had to wait in England for months.
LP: And June was very lucky to be allowed to travel being pregnant.
JM: Yes, well, there was a cut-off time before they.
JP: I got
LP: June had the influence of her grandfather.
JP: My grandfather he was head of the [unclear] shipping company.
JM: Oh, ok.
JP: And only through him did a get a birth I mean cause they’d never allow somebody expecting a baby on the ship anyway during the war.
JP: There were a couple of others that I know of that came through as pregnant, when they were pregnant but yes.
LP: But June was, Richard was born in October.
JP: Several months when I came.
LP: By the time we landed in Sydney, you were what? Seven months pregnant?
JP: Yes, seven months pregnant.
JM: Yes, seven months. And so then you were finally discharged, so you came through on the Rangitiki and then you were discharged
LP: October.
JM: October ’45. Yes. Just saying a bit of note here that is going to sort of jump out of sequence here which but when you were in 226, so you finished up in June, June ’44 we said, wasn’t it? That was your last op, yes, that was last op ’44, so were you, which plane were you on one plane only when you were in 226 or did you fly two or three different planes?
LP: No, only Mitchells, I only flew the Mitchells there and I had my own aircraft.
JM: You had your own aircraft, yes. No, it’s just that I noticed when I was looking up 226 to try and find out a little bit about 226 because I’d never come across 226 previously and one of the notes there said that there was a P for Peter, was a distinguished plane in 226 because it was the only Mitchell that completed one hundred ops. And I didn’t know whether you had ever flown on P for Peter or whether you would, if you’d happen to remember any one who might have flown on P for Peter.
LP: I can’t quite remember either. Does it tell you the aircraft?
JM: It probably does if I actually go back and have a look.
LP: When I was on leave towards the end in my tour, while you are on leave somebody else couldn’t fly your aircraft.
JM: Yes.
LP: And somebody did and the undercarriage didn’t come down when it went in to land, so he landed without a nose wheel, because Mitchells had nose wheels, he did a, he got his crew to go down the back and he finished his landing alone and he kept the nose off the ground all the time, got the ground crew to come out to pull the nose wheel struck down and they did but they didn’t [unclear] and when they were towing it away it came down
JM: Collapsed.
LP: It crashed. Oh, I was so annoyed. I did get another aircraft, a newer aircraft with newer engines, but it wasn’t nearly as nice to fly as the, H for Harry, I’ll bet you’ll find those.
JM: Well actually no, you, all you got is numbers so, I haven’t got any letters unfortunately.
LP: I’m sure there’s H for Harry anyhow.
JM: H for Harry, was it, there you go, no, there’s no letters, there’s just numbers, so. But anyway that’s alright.
LP: H, I’m sure there’s H, wasn’t Peter.
JM: Wasn’t Peter, right. So, back in, you were discharged as we said in December.
LP: October.
JM: October ’45, sorry, and because you arrived, which is a long time after you arrived back, cause you arrived back in March ’45 so.
LP: Yes, we refreshed the course [unclear]
JM: Oh, did you?
LP: Yes, on Oxford and then we went down to East Sale to do a pre endorsement on Beauforts.
JM: Right, because I suppose at that stage they were concerned about, you might have been going off to Asia, were you? For
JP: Yes.
LP: Yes, but before that I was going to go from the Beauforts on to Mosquitos at Williamtown.
JM: Right.
LP: And then the war ended.
JM: Ended.
LP: I wanted to get on to Mosquitos to [laughs]
JP: Yes. That was his love.
JM: Right.
LP: Yes, well I, yes, initially it was Spitfires but at the end, towards the end Mosquitos were lovely aircraft.
JM: Right, right. So did you actually fly?
LP: Mosquitos?
JM: No.
LP: I didn’t even get the posting to Williamtown.
JM: No, no.
LP: East Sale, you know where East Sale is?
JM: Yes, down Victoria.
LP: Victoria. That’s where the beau fighters were.
JM: Beau fighters were.
LP: No, not beau fighters, Beauforts, Beauforts.
JM: Beauforts, Beauforts. Right.
LP: And I did finish the course there and as I say the war ended then. [phone ringing] Thanks June.
JM: So, yes, so, well, that’s interesting that you had all that extra training [unclear]
LP: Excuse me, I gotta, he’s gonna call me back.
JM: Go back, so, then having done all these extra bits of training it never came to anything as such and the war ended so you were finally discharged in October ’45.
LP: Yes.
JM: And by which time June had arrived I assume, yes, yes.
LP: Yes, produced our son.
JM: Yes, your son.
JP: I had him at October 9th 1945.
JM: Right, right, so that was just before you were discharged, ok, uhm, and you were in Sydney here at that point.
JP: Yes.
LP: No, no, you were up at Burrell.
JP: Up at Burrell? Oh, sorry, I, when you said Sydney I meant Australia. Yes, I was up at Burrell.
LP: No, my parents were retired in a place up at Burrell, near [unclear], Gloucester Way.
JM: Ok, right, so there.
JP: So basically I was when I had the baby.
JM: Right, right, ok, so, that would have been a bit of a shock to the system and the whole country town there.
LP: It was, no telephone,
JP: I got on the phone and said to people in England and New York, I said, well look I’m up here, there’s no phone, no electricity, no toilet inside [unclear] [laughs].
JM: Dunny is down the back.
LP: Was a bit of a shock.
JP: [unclear]
LP: But I had told her what to expect.
JP: Oh yes, I wasn’t, you know, [unclear], I did it with fun.
JM: Yes, yes.
LP: Was lovely, June settled in there beautifully.
JP: Oh yes, no, they were lovely to me. When I first arrived, of course being a little English girl, I was all white,
JM: White, that’s right.
JP: And just, they went, ah, [laughs], who’s this? Where does she come from? [laughs]
LP: And June could make up beautifully and she looked lovely anyhow but all the local girls [unclear]
JP: Who’s this? [laughs] Where did she come from?
JM: That’s right, yes.
JP: What planet? [laughs]
JM: Yes, exactly. And so, when did you start your chartered business? You showed
LP: The air taxi.
JM: Air taxi out of Bankstown.
LP: Yes.
JM: Was that the first thing you did after the war?
LP: The first job that I went into, organized setting up the air taxi. I met a chap, a country chap that he and his wife looking for something of interest, they were pretty well off and we got on very well together and we went down to Canberra and saw Dragford [?], who is a politician and he managed to get two light aircraft from the RAAF at Richmond. So we got hold of [unclear], picked one up, all [unclear] up nicely and start to operate from then.
JM: So did you, whereabouts in Sydney were you living at this point? Were you out near Bankstown or were you travelling out there?
LP: Yes, yes, there was another airport chap that I got to know, at Dauphin quite well, and his parents were living at Bankstown at the time
JM: Right.
LP: And they put us up there until their daughter was born and then
JM: Yeah, right.
JP: [unclear] was born.
JM: Right, right.
LP: Yes, very kind of them.
JM: Yes, yes. So, and you, I think you said three or four years did you have your charter business for?
LP: Ah, about a year and a half.
JM: Year and a half was it? Right.
LP: It was all, because before we went broke.
JM: Right.
JP: Did the guard man threaten to put out some cost, which would put us out of business?
LP: Yes, I said we’re gonna charge [unclear] in air mile
JP: And then they were gonna put it up. And that would have put us out of business. So we had to give it away.
LP: I interviewed [unclear] and Mr Butler, whose Butler Airlines at that stage, he thought we could combine quite well but as [unclear] couldn’t carry on. I even took a couple just to keep this going in, even took a couple of jobs with [unclear] I think it was and the other place, in George Street down the hill.
JM: Down the hill?
LP: Down the hill from George Street near central.
JM: Oh, Mark Foyes?
LP: No, in George Street.
JM: Oh, George Street.
LP: George Street, was a well known
JM: Hordens?
JP: Hordens? Anthony Hordens?
JM: Anthony Hordens?
LP: Anthony Hordens? Yes, I was in, I didn’t smoke, so I got a job in the smoking factory.
JM: Oh, in the tobacco section.
LP: Selling cigarettes and so. Because they always had their battered up tins of cigarettes, fifty, used to be the old fifty tins in those days. And any ones that got battered, they virtually sold them and at this stage I was keen to get into Qantas so I used to do, every week go down to the recruitment place in Qantas and with my tins, battered tins of cigarettes and the recruitment officer, he was a smoker and he bought these battered tins from me every week which is quite [unclear]
JM: Had a little bit of a discount.
LP: Yes, a big discount. So, I think that helped me get into Qantas.
JM: Nothing like a little bit of encouragement.
LP: Exactly, exactly.
JM: For favourable, to view your credentials favourably.
LP: Yes.
JM: Well I mean, you did have the right credentials, let’s face it, so, I mean, that, yes.
LP: There were so many ex Air Force men who wanted to get in
JM: Yes, but they had the pick of the whole field, really.
LP: They did, they did.
JM: So, yes, yes. So, you joined up into Qantas in?
LP: Yes, 28th of March I think it was, 1948.
JM: Right, ok. So, then you started, you were doing domestic or international?
LP: No, international. At the same I was applying to TAA at the same time and they both came and said, come and see us. But the idea of just flying up Sydney, Melbourne, Sydney, Melbourne didn’t really appeal to me.
JM: Taxi run.
LP: And Qantas sounded a lot nicer to me. Don’t say good for June I suppose. Because overseas
JM: Because overseas, periods of absence, yes.
LP: We got two, sometimes three up to Japan because the Korean War had started then. And we took on the Skymaster DC4 we used to fly up to there and the troops landed there and their air force up there, [unclear], and you’d be up to three weeks away, probably because you had to wait for [unclear] ex-service people.
JM: Right. And so how long were you with Qantas for?
LP: Thirty years.
JM: Thirty years. Gosh!
LP: Yes. Thirty years with Qantas.
JM: So, you would have seen quite a number of changes in that time. Obviously, with different planes and
LP: Start off on the DC3 and then went on to the Skymaster DC4, the Superconny, Super Constellation, wasn’t very long and then went on to the 707, Boeing 707 and then the last five years I was on the Jumbo 747.
JM: 747, yes. And have you flown on the A380s at all?
LP: Yes. I have, as passenger.
JM: As passenger. Yes, yes, well that would have been a change again. From the 747.
LP: Like going to [unclear] on the [unclear]. Amazing.
JM: That’s right. And so, once you retired from Qantas in ’78, anything, did you do anything in particular after?
LP: Oh yes, I bought a farm. [laughs]
JM: Bought a farm, right.
LP: Yes, that’s why we just sold, that’s why everything in the dining room down there is chock-a-block. My son also owns another property out in the country and he’s had a big shed that with nothing in there and that’s chock-a-block.
JP: That’s chock-a-block. We’ve got stuff out there that [unclear] what we’re gonna do.
LP: And my son also has a place at [unclear] that’s painting off
JP: That’s his [unclear]
JM: Oh, it’s beautiful.
LP: Two people there during the night.
JM: Oh my goodness!
LP: Great grandchildren.
JP: The artist just did that for us.
JM: Lovely!
JP: That’s the back of the house.
LP: We’ve got the others to go down there and paint it.
JM: Paint it, gosh!
LP: Oh, he’s got a beautiful place!
JP: Oh, it’s beautiful.
JM: And whereabouts is your farm?
LP: At Burrell, near [unclear].
JM: Oh, back in, family, back in where your parents were, so, right.
LP: What happened was in about 1977 [unclear], no ’74, was that Dad came, he said, why don’t you buy the land around us, it was off the sale but 160 acers all together and buy that and when we go, it looks like they were going to go fairly soon, we will leave you the little house and leave you, make a nice little property for you when we go. So that’s what we did. I’m just about to buy a lovely home at Lake Macquarie.
JM: Oh, ok.
LP: Wangi Wangi.
JM: Wangi Wangi, yes, yes.
LP: It’s a waterfront [unclear] a little pathway.
JM: Yes, yes.
LP: People like to use the pathway on the other side of this bay and Dad came up with this offer and I can see we could help them at the same time and we changed over.
JM: Lovely. Oh, that’s a beautiful area up there I mean.
LP: It is.
JP: Magnificent.
LP: My mother came from this little township called Burrell, [unclear] Newcastle.
JM: Yes, that’s right. So, you had a very varied and interesting life.
LP: Very much so.
JM: And during, from your wartime experiences would you say there’s any one sequence of events that stays with you perhaps more than others or? One event or?
LP: Can’t say, can’t say. No, can’t say anything. I, we, the CO just before at the end of the tour recommended me for a DFC and then when he left the new CO came in, he called me and he said: ‘Oh, look, here’s this recommendation for a DFC, he said, well, I don’t know anything about you, but can you tell me what you did so we can write up a citation with, I said, I couldn’t think of anything, really [laughs]. And he said: ‘You write what you think might be the best thing in [unclear] the DFC, I said, oh, I thought is not a war to go on yet and I said, just leave it. And he wrote in and I got mentioned a special [unclear] left at then. But an AFC, an Air Force Cross I could have written down something and then because, you know, in formation with head boxers and six, I don’t know if you had, one leading aircraft had one formation on this side and then another one over there and then another one down here with two chaps, you’d have six aircraft all in one box of six, you’d re following me there?
JM: Yes, I am.
LP: And if you went up through cloud then, the idea was everybody to alter course 30 degrees for [unclear] and then climb up through the cloud and break through the clouds up and open it all the aircraft all over the place there and form one again [?]. Well, we had one chap, a fairly high air force official came to our squadron, he said, you know, the fighters, they four made up the fighters coming a lot closer and they form up and they go through the cloud in formation so the CO heard about that and he got a flight Lieutenant and said, give it a try and I’d hear about this and so the next time this went up through the cloud and I stuck in and kept formation all the way up through there and the other chap, that, this flight Lieutenant, he couldn’t do at the end the breakaway so I came up, oh, I was the only one that kept in formation. Well, [unclear] I could have written up something about that, an AFC. That’s the only other experience I can pass on to you.
JM: And what about down the years, did you manage to stay in touch with your New Zealand and Canadian crew chaps or?
LP: Not the Canadians, the, we went to a holiday, a bit of a holiday over in New Zealand and I met up with my observer then. Oh, by the way that business of flying through the clouds, after they found out that it could be done, after that all the operations, that they went up through cloud, we all formed up and went through in formation.
JM: You stayed in formation.
LP: After [unclear]
JM: So you brought about a change of procedure so to speak.
LP: Yes.
JM: And so the chap, Dennis, Dennis
LP: Lez Witham.
JM: Lez Witham.
LP: Lez Witham was my observer.
JM: Right.
LP: He was at Duneaton [?].
JM: And so you managed to keep in contact with him a little bit.
LP: A little bit.
JM: Post war.
LP: He became a, bonds, he was a
JM: Stock broker.
LP: Stock broker, yes, he became a stock broker.
JM: Right. Interesting.
LP: [unclear] when you get old, you can’t remember names [unclear].
JM: We’re talking about so long ago and so many thing have happened in the years [unclear] that’s quite, But the fact is that, you know, those experiences, the nitty gritties of the experiences stay with you and while some of the finer details may not necessarily be there, the whole overall experience is very much still part and parcel of you.
LP: But names of people [unclear] I mean you can’t and June is even worse than I am, terribly [unclear]. I told you about five times I don’t take milk in tea and I like milk in my coffee and but she asks me every time [unclear]
JM: Ah well, she is always planning for a change of taste, that’s what it is. [unclear] And did you keep in touch with any of, like training type people that you were trained with or did you make up, come because of being in Qantas you would have met up with a lot of service personnel, did?
LP: Not Air Force,
JM: Not Air Force.
LP: But of course, except my wireless air gunner, he married and we had a few [unclear] from her and sometime years ago now and she used to correspond a bit [unclear] and as I say, the observer, New Zealand observer we but the straight air gunner, no, he didn’t, didn’t hear anything from him. He was a character, he was only a short stocky Canadian, he was a real toughy [unclear], he was a good air gunner, [unclear] I liked the chap, I liked him.
JM: Well, that’s what you want, you want someone who is good at, everyone had to be good at their own jobs. That was part and parcel of the survival of the crew, I think, wasn’t it?
LP: Yes.
JM: Yes, so, and that you may not necessarily be best of buddies but you were able to work together and have that cohesion that was required to be a good team, to survive.
LP: I never had any trouble with my crew at all so very good, very good.
JM: I know it’s hard work so I do appreciate you were sharing some memory, many memories with me.
LP: It’s hard work trying to remember [unclear] no, I enjoyed it because it brings to day sort of [unclear] quite a few [unclear].
JP: Lovely memories.
LP: I wish I had this Mitchell, we had the whole squadron in front of a Mitchell and where that photo is.
JM: It’s in one of your boxes. You’ll find it one day, it will turn.
LP: Tony Vine has got, he took a lot of photos
JM: Photos
JP: We’ve got a lot of boxes in there.
LP: Yes, but he took a lot of photos to
JM: To put into the book.
LP: Yes, to put into the book.
JM: Well, if nothing else, we might wrap up then if there is anything else, unless there’s anything else that you can think of, that you want to mention.
LP: Can you think of anything else, June?
JP: No, no.
JM: So, we’ll wrap it up as I say and I.
LP: June wants to bring up the bird strike business with the Qantas of course but.
JP: Oh, not really. We’ll leave it.
LP: Ok. You brought it up, you brought it up.
JP: I know, but, definitely yes.
LP: We had a bird strike on a Jumbo Jet taking off from Sydney and it looked like we lost two engines on one side, during take-off. Luckily, number 4 engine came good again, otherwise it looked we were going to ditch in Botany Bay.
JM: Interesting.
LP: We came good [unclear] jettison, we were going to Singapore at the time, with about 300 passengers on board. So, we dumped our fuel and while we were dumping our fuel, of course that takes some time, [unclear] on the ground and engineering and they prepared another aircraft while we were dumping to go on to London eventually and Philip, Prince Philip, he’s been a night.
JM: Have you been sick?
JP: Yes, he’s been in hospital. For two days.
LP: And actually in 1963 we had a basing with Qantas, a four year basing in London to fly from London to New York and in 1963 the Commonwealth Games were on and he opened them, but I flew from London to New York.
JM: Oh good!
LP: And there’s a photograph over there that he gave to me heading up on the flight deck landing into New York.
JM: Into New York, he was like that,
LP: Yes.
JM: Even though he was a naval man. But he, I think he was very interested in
LP: He had a helicopter, so I [unclear] fly a helicopter, I asked him, when I first saw him, was I asked him, how as it like to fly a helicopter, he said it was like rubbing your head in [unclear] or vice versa. He was very down to earth, very down to earth, Prince Philip.
JM: That’s interesting, yeah, so, obviously you landed successfully back in Sydney and by which time the plane, the new, the replacement plane was ready so you just walked off and did you then crew that, fly or did they say that you’d done enough hours, that you had exceeded your hours by the time?
LP: I’d flown him from, you’re right, I’d run out of flight time. Actually we’d flown from London to New York and then [unclear] arrival on the minute and they reported right back to the CO to London, couldn’t imagine, can’t imagine how I came from London to New York and arriving on schedule to the very minute.
JM: A feather in your cap then for managing to do that, yes, that was wonderful.
LP: So there’s one of the things that come to mind.
JM: Mind, yes, so, four years in London would have been an interesting experience, so you
JP: Ah, it was wonderful. It was really possibly one of the best times of our life, with young children [unclear] growing up.
LP: We had a lovely double story home in [unclear] Water,
JP: [unclear] Water.
LP: Near the park.
JP: Pardon?
LP: Near the park.
JP: Yes.
LP: What’s the name? Buckingham, not Buckingham.
JM: St James?
LP: Windsor Park.
JM: Windsor Park. Right.
JP: Near Windsor Park. Ah, it was absolutely beautiful. We had the most wonderful four year posting, and the kids were the right age, weren’t they?
LP: Yes.
JP: Just entering their teens.
LP: And we would take them on holiday, over to, over to Europe.
JM: Over to the continent. And around and they gave you a chance to see your family again, I presume.
JP: Oh yes. No, it was absolutely fantastic. Couldn’t have asked for a better posting than that. No, we loved that.
JM: Would have been a lovely time for four years.
LP: I could have extended that posting for another two years except that our son and daughter, our son was eighteen and our daughter was
JP: Sixteen or something.
LP: Sixteen or seventeen. I thought that if we stayed another two years, they’ve never gone back to Australia.
JP: Back to Australia. You know, they would have got [unclear]
JM: Yes.
LP: So we came back and of course my parents weren’t very well.
JM: Very well by that stage, so [unclear]
JP: We did the right thing because it was for your parents mainly. Yes, no, it was the right thing to do.
LP: Yes, so, all. No, could we offer you a bit of afternoon tea now?
JM: Thank you, we will just wrap up here though, and just formally say once again thank you Lorrie very much and June for your contributions, it’s been so thank you indeed.
LP: It’s lovely talking to somebody that’s interested.
Dublin Core
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APennL170622
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Interview with Lawrence Penn
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Sound
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eng
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01:48:11 audio recording
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Pending review
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Jean Macartney
Date
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2017-06-22
Description
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Lawrence Penn grew up in Australia and worked as a bank clerk before he volunteered for the Air Force. He flew 40 operations as a pilot with 226 Squadron. After the war he had his own air taxi company and also flew for Qantas.
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
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Australia
Canada
Great Britain
United States
England--Norfolk
New York (State)--New York
New York (State)
Contributor
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Peter Schulze
Temporal Coverage
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1943
1944
1945
226 Squadron
aircrew
B-25
bombing
crewing up
love and romance
mid-air collision
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
RAF Hartford Bridge
RAF Swanton Morley
RAF Turweston
rivalry
Second Tactical Air Force
training
V-1
V-weapon
Ventura
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/339/3504/ATaylorJ150916.2.mp3
f76e00dfb7d0f9819f6a843d7b85b955
Dublin Core
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Title
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Taylor, John
J Taylor
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Flight Lieutenant John Taylor DFC (1923 -2021). He flew operations as a navigator with 50 Squadron.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-09-16
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Taylor, J
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
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MY: This interview is being conducted for the International Bomber Command Centre. The interviewer is Malcolm Young and the interviewee is John Taylor. The interview is taking place at Mr Taylor’s house in Sale in Cheshire and the date is the 16th of September 2015. John, if we could start. How did you come to join the Royal Air Force?
JT: Well, at the, when I was young I’d got two sisters closest to me. I was the eldest of seven. And I’d got a, I had a scholarship to the Grammar School and reached the fifth year in 1939 and so I was about to go into the sixth form when the school was evacuated into Lincolnshire. No. Gainsborough. North Nottinghamshire. I didn’t want to go. They were doing half time, you in somebody else’s house. So, I left and went to work.
MY: Yes.
JT: And I went to work as an assistant analytical chemist at Boot’s factory on Island Street in Nottingham. And I was sixteen at the time. I joined the air raid, ARP — the Air Raid Precaution people as a first aid party. I had training and days when we — mock incidents and things. Every time the sirens went I had to put my overall on, put my tin hat on and cycle to the warden’s post. And, and I got sick of this. But I found out that working as an analytical chemist — it was a reserved occupation and one day, cycling home I saw a poster “Reserved men. You can volunteer for flying duties with the RAF.” So, I thought, that’s for me. I was seventeen then and I went around to the recruiting office and they seemed delighted to see me [laughs] and signed up. And then I went home and told my parents who were not overly pleased. Proud perhaps. But not overly pleased. Then of course, I had to go through all the medicals and especially the eyesight things. It was rather funny when it came to the eyesight thing because you know, they closed one eye and you had to read the letters. And when I’d finished the examiner said, ‘Now let’s see what a mess you make of your other eye.’ The other eye 6/6. Perfect. So, right, both eyes 6/6 [laughs] Obviously, they wanted people. And then of course I was sent home to wait. And it was, nineteen four — all this happened in 1941. And in 1942 just six days, three days after my nineteenth birthday I was called up. They’d sent me a list. Razor, shaving brush. I’d never shaved at that time because I was very fair and smooth. And all the rest of the clobber. And I got it all together in the suitcase and off I went to report to St John’s, London. No. Lord’s Cricket Ground. Cricket ground. And on the train down there was a chappie sitting opposite me. Dark, a rather big nose, suitcase and he said, ‘Are you going to Lord’s Cricket Ground?’ ‘Yes.’ And so, I met Vic Page who became quite a friend. So, it wasn’t too bad. The two of us together. We got to Lord’s Cricket Ground. They formed us into uneven lines and then, to my horror told us to strip naked. We were under the stands. Where the stands go up there’s a space underneath. Of course I was brought up with two sisters and so, a virgin of course, anyway.
[that’s my son in law to collect the — ]
[pause]
JT: That was my first FFI.
MY: Yes.
JT: Free from infection. After that we shambled around somewhere else. They were decking out uniforms. And then we went to a block of flats in St Johns Wood. They were very posh apartments but of course, everything had been stripped out. But we were in a, a room for three. And although we got the iron beds and the biscuits — those were square [pause] I don’t know what they were filled with. Horsehair or something. And, to my surprise — sheets. I didn’t expect to have sheets with I joined the forces. And we also had our own ensuite. But we were told by the corporal that we’d got to keep that clean and we weren’t given any cleaning materials. It was up to us to keep the bath and basin and everything clean. And we spent three weeks there at the Initial Receiving Centre or whatever they called it. My first time in London but it wasn’t Vic’s first time.
Other: Sorry to just interrupt. I can’t see —
[recording paused]
JT: Yes. In London. We were allowed, after the first week when we’d had drill every morning and been shouted at more than I’d ever been shouted at in my life. And the corporal in charge of our flight of thirty of us and it was the, I think they must have all been taught from the same script, ‘If you play ball with me, I’ll play ball with you.’ But they weren’t bad. They weren’t bad. And everywhere in London they marched us around and we saw other flights being marched around. All to the different places. And every morning stopped for break at some sort of café and we could get a scone with butter and a cup of tea for about a penny ha’penny. And you could see the corporal sitting at a table at the side. They got theirs free I think [laughs] for the perks of taking us to this café. And [pause] but quite early in the afternoon we were let off, especially in the evenings and weekends and so we went to the Opera House. And they’d taken all the seats out and boarded over at a level with the boxes that went around. Covent Garden Opera House. And there were dances.
MY: Oh.
JT: So, we went to dances there. And another time we went to travel by tube because it was convenient and cheap. Went to Max Miller to see Max Miller perform. And I thought it isn’t all bad being [laughs] in the forces. Because you feel, you know you’ve got such anticipation. Another time they took us to the Rudolph Steiner Hall by coach and showed us some training films. Horrendous things that can happen to you if you don’t take protection [laughs] when you have sex. I’d never had sex anyway. And then [pause] that must be a difference from today’s nineteen year olds. And then they put on a lot of little filler films. So, I was sitting in the warmth of the cinema, in the upper circle there and I think there were orchestral rites, “The Rustle of Spring.” And I thought [laughs] I didn’t think being in the air force was like this. But of course, the other side of it was parade every morning. Inspection. And the sergeant would come down and the old script, as I say, I think they were all taught, ‘Am I standing on your hair?’ ‘Am I,’ no, ‘Am I hurting you?’ ‘No sir.’ ‘I should be. I’m standing on your hair. Get it cut.’ You had to go off to the station barber, pay sixpence and they took nothing more than an inch. No hair on your head more than an inch. Two days later, on parade again, ‘Haircut.’ ‘But sergeant I had it cut.’ ‘Never mind. Get your hair cut.’ You’re really being taught that you don’t question orders. You just do what you’re told without thinking. Totally opposite from Bomber Command. But we went through this initial training but at the same time we had classes on Morse. We had to reach twelve words a minute in Morse which I found fairly easy because you got the rhythms of it. As long as you didn’t concentrate and just let it flow you could, because it was all blocks of letters or numbers. And they taught the Aldis lamp. Now, that was difficult. When we saw that light flashing from the Aldis lamp I found it very hard to distinguish between the long and the short flashes. But I struggled and reached the five words a minute which was the minimum to pass. And then having had three weeks of being knocked into shape and beginning to look like airmen although we were AC2s [laughs] and we were allowed a weeks’ leave. Made a big fuss of at home. And then we were posted down to Torquay for the Initial Training Wing. I think it was Number 1 Initial Training Wing, Torquay. And there again we were in a hotel. The Hotel Regina which overlooked the inner harbour at Torquay. Very nice big room, stripped bare. With just four beds in it, I think. Or five. And a very nice crowd. Very nice crowd. And you know, talk about the rude and licentious soldiering. We got an Irish guy there from Southern Ireland. Got a beautiful lilting voice and he could sing. And we used to ask him to sing for us and he’d sing all these Irish songs like “Mother Machree” and all. And again, not what you’d, not how you see soldiers or — [pause] Our regime there was to run in PE kit up to the top of Rockend which is at one end of Tor Bay. Do an hour’s PE, run down again and then do an hours drill. Change and do an hours drill and then go to lessons. And at the end of that time I was as fit as I’ve ever been before or since because I wasn’t a games player at school. I lived, you know, over a furniture shop. My father was a furniture dealer. With sisters. So, games were not my forte. But that was probably why I wasn’t commissioned until much later. Because I didn’t fit their idea of an officer. Any rate, we quite enjoyed, I quite enjoyed it but I mean one weekend we invited my sister and her friend down. I was very popular then with the boys wanting, and they stayed in a boarding house near and so that was rather nice. I had a girlfriend I later married. Much later. Now, at the end of ITW we had a riotous party at a hotel where I was drunk for the first time in my life and felt awful the next day because I’d only just started drinking beer. The next stage was then off to [pause] Eastbourne. The Grand Hotel. And there we were again in a room with a ensuite but the usual beds and you had to put the sheets, the blankets just exactly three inches and then the sheets exactly one inch and then — so you’d got a sandwich of blanket, sheet, blanket, sheet, blanket. And the corporals would come around and look at them. Throw them all on the floor and say, ‘Do it again,’ if they weren’t exactly right. And you’re, we all had gas capes. The only time we ever used them was when they were testing us by going into a gas filled room. But you had to hang them up exactly where the seams were flat and the bit where your back went you had to pull it out so it was standing out straight. All that sort of thing. Looking back, I realise the whole idea is to take away your civilian identity and make you service. But of course, among the lectures not only did we get lectures on navigation but lectures on the history of the Royal Air Force. And we went on route marches. The discipline at Eastbourne was not as harsh as before because our sergeant was a ex-flyer, an air gunner who’d done his tour of ops so, we were a bit in awe of him and he was very easy going. We’d march out of camp and a bit down the road he’d say, ‘All right. Fall out for a smoke.’ Which I didn’t. I didn’t smoke. But we’d rest and then he’d say, ‘Alright, we’re marching back. Bags of swank as you go in,’ [laughs] We’ll do our route tomorrow. Although as route marches sometimes they got quite, quite pleasant. The rhythm of swinging along and somebody would start singing and then others would pick it up and they were the most raucous and rude songs I’d ever heard. But we were all singing with gusto when we were out of sight of the camp. So, I think they [pause] after we went overseas. That’s right. Because they’d started the Empire Air Training where they were training aircrew in Canada, South Africa and America. Although at that time in America they just wore grey suits. Everybody knew who they were of course. They were all in grey. Identical grey suits. Because America wasn’t in the war at that time. And I was posted to New Zealand err to South Africa. Yes. I was just looking to see where it started.
[pause]
JT: Looking in my logbook at the moment.
[pause]
JT: About November 1942. 41 Air School, South Africa. But before that, of course we’d been, had a horrendous sea journey from Liverpool on a converted cargo ship where they’d put extra decks in and three thousand troops on the ship. And it was a big convoy with an aircraft carrier and two cruisers and about four destroyers and there were several troop ships like ours. Some of them were going to Singapore. You know, we were going to South Africa. And you were sleeping — some slept under the tables, the mess tables. Some slept on the mess tables. And some slept in hammocks above the mess tables. They were advantages and disadvantages in all because if you slept on, in the hammock you would either have cockroaches falling on your face if it’s something over the ceiling and you had to stow it up ship shape every morning. And of course, if you slept on the bottom tiers you were liable to have people being sick on you because of all the seasickness. Terrible. But after the first three days I felt ok. I got my sea legs and, but the ship was crowded. You were allowed one pint of beer a day and you had to queue right around the ship deck to get it and it was warm. And you had to sit with your back against the, I don’t know what you call it, some rails at the side of the ship, to drink it. They asked for volunteers to serve in the sergeant’s mess. Now, I know they tell you never volunteer for anything but I thought this might be alright. So, my pal and I, we volunteered and enjoyed it very much. Our job was to collect the food from the galley, carry it. Two plates on each arm to the sergeant’s mess and then we’d wait on the sergeants if there was anything else they wanted and everything. And then when they went back to duty, we produced the food. The food we kept to one side.
[recording paused. Phone ringing]
JT: Aircrew people.
MY: Oh.
JT: He calls himself Ivor the Engine and he does all the research and I put it in the air newsletter I produce every month that goes — send these out to all the people who are in the Aircrew Association but can’t get to meetings.
MY: Yes.
JT: So that keeps them in touch. So, oh have we started again?
MY: Yes.
JT: Oh, I didn’t realise [laughs] I was saying about after the sergeant’s had gone to duties I and my friend, we produced the food we’d put on one side. Which was the food for the sergeants. Much better quality than what we were getting in our mess and we sat down in the sergeant’s mess and had it. And then we were free until lunchtime and of course we’d missed all the drills and parades that they had so, we thought it was a good number. And this went on for two weeks. Perhaps three weeks. And suddenly we were called before the colonel in charge who said, ‘I’m afraid you can’t do this.’ ‘Why sir? Why sir?’ ‘It’s because you’re potential officers and you can’t wait on the NCOs.’ And so that skive finished and they got squaddies from the army to do the job we’d been doing. I was sorry about that because the trip took twelve weeks because we had to go right down into the South Atlantic to be out of the reach of the U-boats. Almost to the coast of Brazil before we swung around, came down below Cape Good Hope. Landed at Durban. And on the way, I think, I don’t know whether we’d got dysentery on board and we were queuing up for the toilets and they’d got no doors on. Just cubicles. And as the ship rolled all the water on the floor rolled towards us and we lifted our feet up as it rolled back. Oh dear. Oh dear.
[telephone ringing recording paused]
JT: I’ll talk about, we’d got this dysentery and so you queued because you knew that you had to go to the back of the queue because by the time you got to the front you’d need to go again. But we survived all that and landed in Durban and it was paradise. Lights were on. No blackout. You could go into the Red Shield Club or the NAAFI but the Red Shield Club was very good. The Salvation Army ran it and you could get egg and chips and things like that and plenty of it. And the attitude towards us was very good from the English that lived in Durban. Cars would pull up with a couple of girls in the back and the father in the front. He’d say, ‘Boys. Are you going anywhere? Would you like to come for lunch?’ And we’d hop in and go for lunch. We were entertained. And then after an initial time in Durban where we were in tents for the first time in my life we moved to [pause] I’m lost for words sometimes. East London. We were stationed at East London which was the, oh like I said that was 41 Air School. From there we did dead reckoning theory, dead reckoning plotting, compasses, meteorology, maps and charts, instruments, reconnaissance photography, ship recognition, aircraft recognition, signals, astro navigation and it was interesting. I was very interested. We were flown. It was the first time we’d flown because this was the first time we’d actually come in contact with an aeroplane. And they were the Avro Anson. They called them, “The flying classroom.” And three navigators came up with a South African pilot. We had the first navigator who actually did the navigating. The second one, I forget quite what he did. And the third one, there was no seat for him so he sat on the parachutes at the back and it was his job to wind the undercarriage down. It was quite an arduous task. And then we rotated. And I quite enjoyed that. I remember we did a square search. And that’s where you, if you’re searching for something. Let’s say a ship that’s been reported in distress. So that you don’t go over the same ground twice or miss it there’s a pattern of going out there and then turning at certain ways and making squares. Ever increasing. So, you covered the whole thing. And then at the end of that time and you were over the sea with nothing in sight you have to plot a course back to base. And so, it was all dead reckoning. But you, you could look at the waves and turn an instrument around until it was aligned with the wave caps and then you got the wind which was at right angles. And of course, it was important to find the correct wind because otherwise your calculations didn’t amount to much. At any rate, as we set off for base we passed right over the town and the South African pilot said, ‘Well done. You’re spot on.’ And I felt very chuffed about that. And East London was equally fascinating. It got dark at 8 o’clock but that didn’t matter because it was warm. Although we wore khaki during the day, we wore our blues in the evening. And quite early on somebody had come to the camp and offered to put us up — two servicemen for the weekend. So, I volunteered for this. And it was Mrs Butler. Her husband had a farm at a little village called Berlin [laughs] About twenty miles from East London. And she’d got three daughters and a son and I was quite fascinated. And in fact, I was so fascinated I went back every weekend. Caught the train from there and became one of the family as it were. And she was like a mother to me. And then in the evening we’d sit on the stoop, as they called the veranda. Drank pink gin. And sometimes they’d have, the native workers on the farm would have a bonfire, sit round drinking kaffir beer and we would join in and sit around on the outside drinking pink gins and it was very enjoyable. But one weekend we got a shock because they said we were going to have a church parade. Of course, that would kibosh your chances of going to Berlin for the weekend. So, Jimmy Elliot and I who were pals, both trainee navigators, we set off for a walk after lunch on the Saturday and after a little while we had a terrific thunderstorm. The rain poured down and we thumbed a lift from a passing lorry. The only lorry we’d seen in ages. And he gave us a lift and we travelled through the rain until it stopped and we said we’ll have to get off there because we’d got to get back. So, we got off and he left us. We said, well we seem to have come around in a semi-circle in a way. There was a bend. If we cut across it would be the shortest distance back to camp. So, we set off marching across the veld. Quite an experience because the grasses were above our heads almost and you got queer insect noises buzzing at you and a bit of trepidation there. And it was getting dark and we came to a river. And we thought well what do we do now? Do we go all the way back to the road? It’s taken us all this time. Or do we try and get across it? We decided to try and cross it. So, shoes and socks off, tied around our necks. Shorts pulled up as high as they could go and we started off wading across this river. The river came up to our thighs but luckily no further. And we managed to get to the other side of the river but we were confronted with a quora. A village of beehive huts and the women sitting outside pounding maze and things. And there were natives standing there on one leg, the other leg against it. Holding spears. What do we do? Well, we’ve got no choice. Just go straight ahead up that track and don’t look at them. So, we set off up this track. The women picked up their babies and hurried inside the huts. And then another black girl came down the track, a blanket wrapped around her. ‘Oh, master John.’ ‘Oh,; I said, [unclear] Missy farm?’ I didn’t know what to say. And Missy Butler, ah. And she pointed back up the track. It was the house girl at, who had looked after us while we were — so we went up there, and of course Mrs Butler was very pleased and surprised to see us because we’d said we couldn’t go. But we were made very welcome. And of course, Jimmy Elliot, he’d never been in so we introduced him to the Butler household. And nobody to this day ever believes it wasn’t deliberate. And yet it was pure coincidence. Pure accident. Some of the things I remember about going to Berlin is that you could go down into the village, which was about two miles away and you could buy sherry. And the best sherry cost a half a crown a bottle. So, we could make a contribution to the parties. Mrs Butler used to play the piano. Used to roll the carpet up, invite neighbours in and they’d have parties and dance and sing. I learned the Afrikaans songs of course. The family next door, well when I say next door, next farm, were Afrikaans and so and they were living amicably together. And then they used to have auctions for — to raise money for warships and warplanes and the boys up north. Fighting in North Africa. And it was a Dutch auction they used to have where they started high and came down until somebody bid. And they asked me to be the auctioneer. Mrs Butler said afterwards that when I left they still asked where the little auctioneer had got to. When we left, when we finished our course, done all our flying and had the exams we were posted to Cape Town. Ready to go home. We went by train and we were very touched because Mrs Butler and the two, two of the three girls walked the two miles down and stood at the railway track. As we passed the farm — waving like made to us. Further on there were black girls that waved like mad too. Pulled their jackets up to show their breasts which met with whoops from the troops. Now, Cape Town of course we were just waiting. And on the way out on the boat I told you the sergeants had their own mess and the officers had the upper deck to themselves and the nurses. And so we saw how the other half lived. Every gangway was out of bounds to other ranks. So, we thought well we’re sergeants now. We’ve had a passing out parade. We’ll go home in style. Not a bit of it. We went home on an American ship where they didn’t recognise ranks as such. You ate at long tables and they gave you tin, metal plates with indentations for the bacon and the eggs and porridge. All slopped in. And you ate it standing up at these tables. They were standing up height. The Americans mixed everything up and then took a fork and they did a rotary movement with the fork to shoot the food in to their mouths. And the whole meal was over in five minutes, and we were given guard duties. We were given to guard the Poles who were also on this ship. And we had to stand guard to stop them going. Leaving their quarters. Never knew why because they were supposed to be on our side. And so, we came back to England.
[pause]
JT: What’s the time? Crikey. You’ve got me talking.
MY: If you move forward to when you were being streamed into Bomber Command. How did, what, how did that selection process work?
JT: Well, we went through OTU, which was. I can’t think of what it stands for now.
MY: Operational Training Unit.
JT: Operational Training Unit. Yes. And the first thing they did was to put us all in a big hangar and say, ‘Find yourself a crew.’ Pilot, navigator, wireless operator, engineer. We didn’t know anything about any of the others. It was pure luck. But a little Australian air gunner came up to me with a New Zealand pilot officer in tow and said, ‘This is Jack. Would you like to be our navigator?’ And I thought Jack looks a pretty dependable guy so I said yes. So, he said, ‘This is John but John said to me, ‘Well we can’t have two Johns in the crew. You’d better call me Jack.’ I thought that was very magnanimous of him [laughs] because he’s the skipper. And then Butch had made friends with an Irish wireless operator. And so we assembled the crew like that. And it was amazing how well we got on with each other. And of course, the [pause] I was driving a car by that time because in 1942 we’d had a mid-upper gunner who’d been a car, used car dealer and the pilot didn’t like him and got rid of him. But before that happened, he’d sold me a car. A 1938 Hillman Minx. Black with red seats. And so, I was very popular because I could take people into town and that sort of thing. I remember when I, I lived in Nottingham. I was born and bred in Nottingham. When I went to record everything and do my insurance and I said I only want fire and theft, ‘What happens if it catches fire next week? What do I get?’ And they said, ‘About two years in jail,’ [laughs] But the beauty of these airfields in Lincolnshire was that they were all within about forty miles of Nottingham where I lived and where my girlfriend lived. And so, every chance I got I went down the Fosseway to Nottingham. And of course, they got used to seeing me. But then I took members of the crew with me because coming from New Zealand and Canada and Ireland they couldn’t get home.
MY: No.
JT: So, they came home with me. Mother put mattresses on the floor. And I don’t know how she made the rations stretch. We helped because Butch and Paddy always made friends with the ugliest girl in the cookhouse and flattered her and everything. And they’d go around to the back door and get extra supplies of butter and stuff, bacon which we’d take with us to help my mother feed the crew. And we all went down to the local where my father used to, where my father and mother used to go. So, we became their crew.
MY: Which OTU were you at?
JT: I’ll tell you in a minute.
[pause]
JT: You forget the numbers and things.
[pause]
JT: That’s AFU. AFU came after OTU didn’t it? Because that’s Advanced Flying Unit.
[pause]
JT: And then EFTS — Elementary Flying Training School.
[pause]
JT: Well, do you know, I can’t remember.
MY: Which airfield was it on?
[pause]
JT: Names escape me. Names escape me.
MY: Well it’s not that important. We can look at that later. How long was it before you actually got on your first squadron?
JT: Do you know, nearly two years. Two years of training.
MY: Right.
JT: Because after we came back from South Africa we were posted to Harrogate. And they didn’t know what to do with us, you know. Whatever. Just holding while another course moved out. Put us on flying Tiger Moths around the Lake District which was very good. Anyway, get back to ops. We, you finish, we went on to Stirlings. We went on to Stirlings for the final stage of our training. Four-engined. We did Wellingtons at OTU and they were very comfortable. Very good aircraft, the Wellingtons. And then the pilot of course wanted to go on to, had to go on to four engines so we went on Stirlings which were the height of luxury with all the controls, beautifully coloured enamels, everything. But they couldn’t get above twelve thousand feet which was their downfall. And then we finished up at Advanced Flying Unit at Syerston which is near Nottingham and that was where you were introduced to the Lancaster. We lost a Lancaster there on training because he flew into a cumulonimbus cloud. You got whirled right up and broke to pieces which gave us a very stern lesson on not to fly into cumulonimbus clouds. And then because at the end of my training some people were selected to be commissioned. I wasn’t, although I was a good navigator because my background didn’t fit. Son of a furniture dealer. Went to Grammar School. Didn’t play games. Not officer type at all. So, we were posted to Skellingthorpe which is two miles from Lincoln. Waddington, I think was the base station. We were satellite. Although at one time in our training we had been to Scampton for a few weeks. I remember that because we missed the last bus one night and had to walk all the way back from Lincoln to Scampton. Now, Skellingthorpe. We shared an airfield with 61 Squadron. We were one side. They were the other. We had the record of dropping the most bombs and they had the record for flying the most sorties. It was sort of friendly rivalry across the airfield. Now, one or two things. The first trip we went on was to a target right in the south of France and we had to fly right down through the coast. Avoid, and then fly inland and find, find the target. And our bombs hung up. We had to return and we’d already fused the J type canisters. Do you know about those there?
MY: Yeah.
JT: Incendiaries set to go off at a thousand feet. So, our dilemma was if we landed, tried to land, with these on they’d go off when we got down to a thousand feet. So, we tried every manoeuvre. The wireless op and the mid-upper gunner had come down and were trying to open the floor and get at the bombs and dislodge them. And then the pilot was doing a lot of jinking about. Anyway, we managed to drop them in the sea and we saw this big flame as they went down and think thank goodness. But as it happened that operation was a failure anyway because what they thought was a German troop camp was a refugee camp which they’d bombed by mistake. So, we all had to go back the next night. This time we got, they weren’t expecting us I think the second night. So, we were [pause] I can’t go through all the ops and things but one or two stand out. First of all, there’s the people say, ‘Were you frightened?’ I say, I don’t think so. You grew with this knowledge that you might be living on borrowed time so you made the most of every moment. The girls and the beer and everything. And me being an imaginative type, as I walked across the fields in the June evening every blade of grass, every leaf on the tree seemed bright and vivid.
MY: Yes.
JT: Because it might be the last time you saw it. But you didn’t show any fear even if you felt it because you’d be letting down the other members of the crew. And you were worried about what they might think. They were the ones. Your crew were like your family and we worked very well together and played very well together. About the fourth trip we went to, I think it was that one, we went to Mailly-le-Camp where they’d German troops or something. And something went wrong with the communication between the master bomber and us. So, the first wave that went in bombed successfully. Came home. But we were in the second wave and we couldn’t hear any instructions from the master bomber. So, we had to circle and as we circled it gave time for the fighters from the Ruhr to arrive. Oh, and a massacre. You could see Lancaster, fighter, Lancaster, fighter, Lancaster, fighter. And we lost forty three aircraft and seven people in each aircraft. And the rear gunner Butch who’d been a plantation manager in New Guinea, he was yelling and yelling because he’d got a grandstand seat. I wasn’t so bad because I was in a cabin with a curtain I could draw. I could see out by standing up and putting my head in to the astrodome.
MY: Yes.
JT: And you could see from there. What I saw I didn’t like so I went back in again. Now, Butch didn’t fly with us on the next trip because of the experience he’d had. But the next trip was to Brest where the battleship in the harbour or something and we were coned over the target. Now, that means that the master searchlight has caught you and then all the other searchlights that are automatically linked to it all latch on to you at once. Can you imagine what it’s like to have seven or eight searchlights all focused on you? It was brighter than daylight inside the cabin. In fact, it was so bright you could hardly think. And you knew that the next thing to happen were the guns that were automatically aligned to these searchlights.
MY: Yes.
JT: Would open up. Sitting target. So, Jack just dived. Pushed everything forward. Dived almost vertically. Screaming down. I sat in my cabin watching the altimeter go around and around, down and down. Then I saw we’d dodged the searchlights and then the pilot and the engineer who sat next to him they were pulling back on the stick for all their worth. And we thought this is it. And we levelled out at two hundred feet and came back at two hundred feet over the Channel. And Butch never flew again. He [pause] was determined. He had a mental breakdown. If he’d been in the RAF they’d have said lack of moral fibre and they would have stripped him of his stripes, put him down to AC2 and put him to clean the latrines. Because he was in the Australian Air Force he was invalided home. He was sick, you know. Which is, you know, a much kinder way of dealing with this. On the other hand, I can see the reasoning behind the RAF because if people had been able to say I don’t like this after they’d done twelve ops they wouldn’t have an air force.
MY: No.
JT: So, they had to have something very worse than this to make you keep flying. I was thinking we went on, D-day was the next, next thing. We didn’t know it was D-day because — we went to briefing. They hadn’t said this is the invasion but they said you must keep from that part of the Channel because there are American warships and they will shoot at anything. We knew that from experience. Now, keep away from this area because there’ll be gliders being towed. And after he’d gone through all this list of dos and don’ts we realised that it was something big. And our job was to fly at dawn and bomb the naval guns at Cherbourg on the Cherbourg peninsula. And they’d given us a cine camera as well. But we flew and there wasn’t all that much flak although there was a lot of things going on all around us. So, it was a fairly easy trip until we got there and of course the coastal guns and everything go up at you. But we bombed. We couldn’t take a picture because it wasn’t light enough. You took your usual picture with your own flash. But as we turned around dawn had broken, the sky was getting lighter and there was scattered cloud and I looked down onto the sea and I saw all these little boats. All coming up to the beach. And that’s when I realised there was an invasion going on. We got home. Because we’d been flying two nights consecutively, we were given the night off and went to Nottingham. In the pub, in the pub they got the radio, ‘Tonight our troops landed in Normandy.’ And they said, ‘What about you lot?’ ‘We were there this morning,’ [laughs] Which got us a lot of beer.
MY: I bet.
JT: Now, after, after we’d finished our ops which were more or less the same. Those were some of the highlights. None of us got scratched. Although our most exciting trip perhaps was, we were going to the, is it the Saint Cyr Military Academy near Paris? Where they’d got troops, German troops being trained there. Officers. And we were going on daylight because it was so near to Paris. We were not used to going daylight. And so, as we set off some fighters, German fighters got among the stream and you saw them breaking, sliding all over the place. Dodging. They should have kept a light on the gunners. And I saw one aircraft, one Lancaster just slide down, slantingly and take the tail off another one. Which was quite awful to see. We passed the zone like that. I was navigating and trying to keep midway between the two zones that told us where the ack-ack was worst. And the fighters went away of course. You know, they only had about a twelve minutes and had to go back to refuel. Beautiful June evening. The sun was out still and all of a sudden I stood up in the astrodome to have a look. A stream of white smoke coming out of the starboard outer engine. And as I looked suddenly that smoke turned to flame and the whole engine went up in flames because we had been hit several times by flak on the way in.
MY: Yes.
JT: And of course, the engineer and pilot pushed the fire extinguisher button and the fire went out. But it meant we were only on three engines. The port inner engine, the engineer reported was running rough so we were losing power. Anyway, we went on and bombed. All, as I say on the run into the bombing run as we were swinging around I saw the Eiffel tower and realised that was Paris under there. I’d never been but there it was. And [pause] am I taking too long?
MY: No. I’m at your service, sir.
JT: So, we’ve got to [pause] yes when we’d finished our ops. Now, I’d been called up to the group captain at Waddington some weeks before for —recommended for a commission.
MY: Yes.
JT: And asked a few question. He said, ‘Well, these people say quite nice things about you. Who am I to disagree,’ [laughs] Right? And that was it? But it didn’t come through until the actual end of the tour, it coincided. I’d already gone to the training as a lecturer when it came through. It would have been nicer if it had come through while I was still back at the squadron. 50 Squadron. And of course, nobody really knew me there. They just took it for granted. But of course, I was moved because they move you straightaway.
MY: Yeah.
JT: So, I was moved to Chipping Warden as a course shepherd. That’s where they put you in charge of a course and men to make sure of their welfare and everything. No training. No training at all for an officer. No teaching how to use your knife and fork or anything like that. But they must have thought I was [pause] and, and then to my surprise they announced that I’d been awarded the DFC.
MY: Oh no.
JT: And that came as a great surprise to me. And so had my pilot and the bomb aimer. In those days you only had the one ribbon. So they made a great fuss of me at home and in the local newspaper. But then I went home [pause] but after a while of course you were between tours. Just because you’d done the tour of ops doesn’t mean that’s it. So, they posted me to Transport Command for my second tour. We were on Dakotas and we were going to bomb the Burma Railway in Burma. Not to bomb them. To push out supplies. So, I was posted to Baroda in India and that again was a culture shock. But looking back, to think that a nineteen, twenty year old bloke had all these experiences. We’d, the Maharajah of Baroda. They’d taken over, or he’d given us his cricket ground and so we were stationed — myself, my pilot and the other crews in what were the dressing rooms. All around veranda in front and then the open space of the cricket ground. And we didn’t have Indian food. We had a caterer and we had an officer’s mess and we could have anything as long as it was eggs. You could have scrambled eggs, boiled eggs, eggs on toast. Then some funny vegetables. And there was no drink. It was a dry state. The high point of my time really was when we were picked to go to Lahore to collect beer. Supplies of beer for the mess because you could drink it in the mess if you could get it. So it was put down as a training flight. And that was about the only time I’d really been treated as a proper officer. Because we flew to Lahore. Put up at the Faletti’s Hotel in Lahore and my pilot and I were waited on by six waiters with big turbans and cummerbunds. White everything. Before you could think of anything, they’d thought of it for you. We had a meal there and the next morning while we were waiting for news that our plane had been loaded up, sitting on the terrace and there were a lot of civilian ladies and gentlemen all doing the Times of India crossword puzzle – ‘What did you get for number eighty across?’ ‘Number eight across?’ ‘Oh, good show.’ I thought this is the life. We could stay here [laughs] We could stay here. But unfortunately, we couldn’t. And you know we went back to the mess. Took it back. And it was all gone in two days. But in Baroda we did flying from the Maharajah’s own airfield. We did trips around. My pilot, who was a Scotsman from Kirkaldy, he’d been a slaughterman in a slaughterhouse. He had been an officer before but he’d flown under a bridge and been broken down to PE. Corporal PE. And then he’d come back when the shortage of pilots — come back and worked his way up to flying officer again. And he’d got the DFC. Which is probably why he picked me when we were crewing. He was a mad so and so. You know, if he saw somebody with a flock of cows below, he’d swoop down and then laughed like mad when they all scattered. I thought, I’m going on ops with him. Heaven help me. But we never got to that stage because the Japanese war finished.
MY: Right. What to ask?
JT: Yes. You know [pause] we were getting to the stage where they were demobbing.
MY: Yes.
JT: Because VE day had passed so we weren’t fighting the Germans anymore. And my pilot’s demob number came up because he’d been in before me and so they brought the whole crew, a crew of three on a Dakota, back to England. And I’d still got six months to go before my number came up.
MY: Right.
JT: So, they sent me to Wheaton Aston. In Shropshire as well isn’t it?
MY: Yes.
JT: And I know it’s near Stoke [pause] as a flying control officer. Now, a flying control officer needs six month training course which seems a pretty waste to me if you are going to leave in six months’ time. So, I used to say to the flying control office, ‘You don’t need me, do you?’ ‘No.’ ‘Ok.’ Hitchhiked to Nottingham. And when it came to be demobbed you had to last of all go to the CO to get him to sign after you’d been to all the departments. He didn’t even know me and I’d been on his station six months. Oh dear. You couldn’t get away with it now. Or perhaps you could. Perhaps you could. But then of course I got demobbed and I got married in 1945 at the end of my tour of ops. So, I was married all the time I’d been in India.
MY: Yes.
JT: And then I got home and we started the house. At my mother in law’s I had a room at my mother in law’s house. And Boots had promised me the job back so, I went back to Boots. Yes, they gave me my job back — at the same rate of pay I’d left it at. Four pound fifteen a week. I’d been spending six pound a week in the mess alone on drinks and stuff. So, I thought this is not going to be right for me. And people I’d trained to use the instruments in the lab were now seniors and I’d still gone back as an assistant analytical chemist. So again, I saw an advert for teacher training. Emergency teacher training. And I thought that’s for me. So, I applied. Went to a centre and given maths tests. Wrote an essay. And was accepted for training at Danesthorp College, Ranskill. Near Ranskill and it was like being back in the service. All these people were ex-service. They still talked about their [unclear] and things and the cutlery. And the teachers were very good I thought. And we did a whole course sandwiched into thirteen months. Of course, you didn’t have the long holidays.
MY: No.
JT: In thirteen months, three teaching practices and they let us loose. And my, my job, I applied to Nottingham and to Nottingham County because they were separate. Nottingham City offered me a job. And their practice was to have a pool of teachers and then they sent them to the appropriate schools.
MY: Yes.
JT: So, I didn’t know what school I was going to until I was told to report to this Secondary School. The name’s gone for a moment. Now, in my education I’d done all the sciences as separate subjects so I’d done biology, physics, chemistry. I’d been interested in science. I’d done navigation which is a lot to do with science. Theory of triangles and things. So, I thought I’d be a science teacher but no. Headmaster said, ‘We’ve got a science teacher. I’d like you to take over the history.’ I dropped history at third year. At any rate I said I was always one for thinking things from first principles. And I think I must have done quite well because [pause] searching for the name of the school it was originally built as a primary school. At a time when everything was [affluent?] and the classrooms were built in a semi-circle with the windows that went right back to expose it to the open air, facing south and a terrace outside. And then there was a woodwork room and a music room. There was no staff room so the staff used to meet in what was a storeroom that they’d emptied and put a table and chairs in for the staff. I don’t know what the designers were thinking of but it was very nice. I got interested in theatre and especially marionettes. I’d made marionettes at college and we’d gone around giving marionette shows. So, I started a marionette club. And the very sympathetic woodwork master made us a beautiful stage with a bar that about four children could lean on and we’d put shows on. I wrote the script and then got the teachers to read the parts. Had great fun reading different parts and then the children manipulated the marionettes and of course they recognised the teacher’s voices in these marionette characters and it was quite a hoot. I enjoyed that. And from that I was given Head of English post. And I had been up for Deputy Head at another school but when the Headmaster wanted me in, I’d had a good recommendation he discussed all he wanted to do but the Director of Education said, ‘Mr Taylor can’t be appointed as Deputy Head. He has no degree.’ So, I settled for Head of English at another school. A bit resentful. And I found it also involved being head of the library. In charge of the library and in charge of drama.
MY: Yeah.
JT: And expected to put on a production every year. I borrowed costumes from the playhouse theatre that had just opened in Nottingham. They were for the two little cats that were the centre piece of this play, “The Magic Tinder Box.” And we put that on for three nights and that was a great success. And all the time of course I was applying for Deputy Headships at this time. Time I moved on. And I applied to Cheshire. There was a job came up. And so I drove up there. No. I went on the train, that’s right. And walked. I was interviewed and apparently the post had been earmarked by the Head for his Head of English department so it had been careful. It had been written for him. English. They wanted English. They wanted knowledge of using recorders. Tape recorders. Because he had a tape recorder. School hadn’t got one but he had. And after the interviews apparently, I found this afterwards, they were tied. So, it was a dead heat and it was left to the casting vote of the chairman. Now, the chairman had taken a dislike to the Head because he was, old man Cunliffe was a true blue Tory. And the head had stood as a Liberal candidate in the autumn. And so, when it came to the casting vote, I got it. I was called back in. And the chairman said, ‘And by the way Mr Taylor, congratulations on your DFC.’ I thought perhaps that might have been a little bit of a weight.
MY: Possibly.
JT: So, I came up here in 1964 and was the Deputy at the school down the road which was Sale Moors Secondary Modern. The head was a very dynamic bloke, John Hartley. And he said, ‘John,’ he said, ‘Usually I keep my people several years before I give them promotion but in your case, you know, you’re a bit older. I’ll have to do it more quickly.’ At any rate I was rung up one weekend to say Mr Hartley had died. This was within a year of joining. He’d had a stroke in his car over the weekend. I went to see his widow and she asked me to arrange the funeral and everything. And I did this, went to school the next morning, called a staff meeting. Told them. We made arrangements for certain sections of the pupils to attend. And order of service and everything. And then I found myself sitting in front of this big polished desk and the feeling that struck you [laughs] I’m in charge. There’s nobody to tell me what to do. I’ve got to tell them. And I wasn’t altogether pleased with the way things were arranged because there were, at that time it was six form entry. Sixth forms came in every year and they tried to bluff by calling them A upper, A lower, B upper, B lower, C upper, C lower. Everybody knew that C lowers were really ABCDEF.
MY: Yes.
JT: It didn’t fool anybody. And I was given four C lower as a penalty. Probably by that Head for because he wanted [delete] to be head. Although [delete] was a very nice man and we got on well. And I made some changes. I divided the school into two halves so there were only three tiers in each half. A bit of timetabling of course you could put one half against another. But the staff accepted this. And then I decided that the important maths and English — you might be good at maths and poor at English. Or vice versa. So, let’s have them set so you could be in a top set for maths and a bottom set for English.
MY: Yes.
JT: Or vice versa. So, I introduced that. And we had a governors meeting three times a year at the end of every term. And they still hadn’t advertised the job. And so, I got to know the governors very well. When they arrived for governors meetings I offered them sherry all around. My secretary was very good and made them feel very much at home. And my wife was very good at supporting me and getting to know the governors and telling me, ask him about — he keeps rabbits. He’s very interested, ‘Oh hello [delete] I hear you’re interested in rabbits.’ Anyway, it was two years before, before they advertised the job and they’d got six candidates. Three were existing heads. And three were deputies like myself. And the existing heads of smaller schools because of course this was a big school with sixth form entry. And at the end of the interview, now let’s, I’ve gone back a bit. At the same day as my interview I’d got an interview as Head of Sale West which was a new school recently opened. But it was group six. This was a group 8. And it was in the morning. So had the interviews, it went very well but they appointed somebody else. I drove home for lunch and said to my wife it’s no good if I can’t get a group C school, no hope of getting group A. In the afternoon they had interviews again. Same governors. Same people. And I got the job. And the chairman of governors said to me afterwards, ‘We wanted you to be head,’ because they’d known me for two years.
MY: Yeah.
JT: But we were a bit worried in the morning about giving you the headship of Sale West because somebody might have come along in the afternoon so blinded us with science. We had to take the risk of not appointing you to Sale West. And that’s how I got the job as Head of the school I’d been deputy at. In fact, it was a school I stayed at as Head because it grew under me. It grew to eight form entry and had new buildings. A very good drama studio. Good music studio. I was very happy there and I’d got a very happy staff. And we had parties after school in the evening. And the cook was very co-operative. Chintz tablecloths on the tables in the hall that we sat around. Brought our own drinks. I always said staff that drinks together stays together. You know they’re not allowed to have drink in school now.
MY: No.
JT: Not allowed.
MY: No.
JT: Lots of things are not allowed. So, I was at that school for about twenty three years because there was no point in applying anywhere else because a Group 8, six, twelve hundred pupils was in the top five percent of headships. And so short of going to Eton College or somewhere I couldn’t see, but it must have got a good reputation.
MY: Yeah.
JT: Because when the High Master of Manchester Grammar — he was made a governor of a Secondary Modern school and he asked the Director of Education, he said, ‘I know nothing about Secondary Moderns. What shall I do?’ And the Director of Education said, ‘Go to John Taylor’s and have a look at his school.’ So, he spent the day with me and no doubt learned something about running a school. Anyways, I’ve talked long enough haven’t I?
MY: Well we’ve actually managed to —
Dublin Core
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Identifier
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ATaylorJ150916
Title
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Interview with John Taylor
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Type
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Sound
Language
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eng
Format
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01:52:13 audio recording
Creator
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Malcom Young
Date
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2015-09-16
Description
An account of the resource
John Taylor grew up in Nottingham and was evacuated before he went into sixth form. He left school and started working as an analytical chemist at Boots and although this was a reserved occupation he volunteered for aircrew. After his initial training he went to South Africa to complete his training as a navigator. On his returned to the UK he flew operations as a navigator with 50 Squadron from RAF Skellingthorpe. On one operation the incendiaries had not dropped and they feared carrying them back to base but it took several attempts before they dislodge them before finally succeeding. On an operation to Mailly-le-Camp the rear gunner was devastated at the losses he was seeing around him and it was his last operation. He suffered a breakdown and was invalided home to Australia. On another operation the aircraft was coned and in order to escape the pilot went into a steep dive. The pilot and engineer fought to bring the aircraft back under control a matter of a hundred feet from the ground. After the war he became a teacher.
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France
Conforms To
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Pending review
Pending revision of OH transcription
Contributor
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Julie Williams
Temporal Coverage
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1939
1941
1942
1945
50 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
C-47
crewing up
demobilisation
entertainment
incendiary device
Initial Training Wing
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
physical training
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Torquay
recruitment
rivalry
searchlight
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lett, Gordon
Gordon Lett
Ernest Gordon Appleford Lett
E G A Lett
Description
An account of the resource
56 items. The collection concerns Major Ernest Gordon Appleford Lett, DSO (1910-1989, 50112), a British Army officer and partisan leader in Italy. He was taken prisoner after the fall of Tobruk and detained in different camps in Italy. After the September 1943 armistice, rather than re-joining Allied forces, he took to the mountains and established contacts with Resistance forces active in the Apennines between Liguria and Toscana. Lett founded and led the Battaglione Internazionale, a multinational unit that successfully engaged Black Brigades and German units. Later, when reliable lines of communication were secured, supplies were dropped by air and the Battaglione was supplemented by Special Operations Executive personnel. Gordon Lett was relieved by Major John Henderson in March 1945. After the war, Lett was awarded the DSO and received the Medaglia Argento al valor militare.
The collection consists of a selection of Gordon Lett's papers and official correspondence with key figures of the local Resistance movement. They include Colonnello Mario Fontana (‘Cossu’, or ‘Turchi’), Comandante Luciano Scotti (‘Vittorio’ or ‘Gonzaga’), Commissario Politico Anselmo Corsini ('Ambrosio', or ‘Max’) and Mario Fortelli, a lawyer acting as liaison officer with the local Allied Military Mission.
Documents consist of military assessments, notes on air drops, a ciphers book, a draft of a radio message sent via clandestine radio operators, and a request for tactical bombing. The collection contains notes on an aircraft crash, the military funeral and the subsequent burial of the aircrew. A specific subset includes correspondence, plans and reports about the construction of an improvised landing strip for Allied aircraft operating behind enemy lines.
All documents were deposited at the La Spezia City Council and then re-housed in 1972 at the Istituto spezzino per la Storia della Resistenza e dell’Età Contemporanea, where they have been preserved ever since. The selection published here has been curated by Tiziano Vernazza.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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Caro Fortelli,
gli avvenimenti si succedono uno dopo l’altro a tutti a forti tinte da grad guignoli. Strano a dirsi tutte le volte tu ti trovi rivolto nelle vicende.
Cerchiamo di riepilogare il succedersi di questi fatti.
I°) Il 27 del mese di dicembre ricevo dal Maggiore Gordon una comunicazione riguardante i lanci di paracadutisti. =Questi lanci come quelli dei materiali avvengono in zona di Rossano [indecipherable word] e non sul Picchiara. =Per aver scartato il Monte Picchiara sono in perfetto accordo con il Maggiore Gordon; per aver scelto Rossano come sede dei lanci No perché come volevasi dimostrare buona parte del materiale va a finire a tutti meno che alle formazioni.= Di ciò ne avverto il Maggiore Gordon ed egli lo riconosce al punto che d’accordo con l’Ufficiale di Col. della 5a Armata si stabilisce che i Campi saranno ripartiti per Divisione ed anche per località e si precisano i Campi di: Casoni, Vezzanelli, S [indecipherable word] Pasquale.=
I primi due per rifornire la prima Divisone il terzo per la Cento Croci.
L’ufficiale di Colegamento inglese considera con me anche l’eventualità di un campo di riserva a Monte Mallone. = Tutto è tranquillo e sereno tanto che il Maggior Gordon mi assicura che io sarò messo al corrente dei segnali dei campi.=
Devo premettere che io sarei partito per Porciorasco il giorno 26 e che sono rimasto invece in quella zona sino al 2 proprio per invito del Maggiore Gordono Lett.=
Il girono 30 lo stesso Maggiore mi fa conoscere alla Pieve gli Ufficiali Inglesi e con lui parliamo delle operazioni da svolgere. Io gli faccio rilevare che non bisogna essere troppo affretati [sic] e riesco ad ottenere che le prime azioni avvengano nell anotte tra il 31 e [undescribable] l’uno. Noto tra parentesi che una pattuglia di paracadutisti inviata da Rossano per particolari compiti in altra zona è stata catturata e questa è la riprova che interritori [sic] nuovi bisogna agire secondo le indicazioni dei conoscitori della zona.
Il giorno I mattina mi trovo ancora con il amggiore Gor(d)on ed egli mi scrive dalla Pieve il biglietto dicendomi che si trasferisce per qualche giorno verso Arzelato ma che il 6 o il 7 sarà a Varese con tutti gli uomini.=
Io raggiungo Varese requisisco un albergo per accogliere gli amici inglesi e........ il giorno 4 mi vedo recapitare una lettera incui mi si dice che per ragioni varie – alcuni delle quali indipendenti dalla responsabilità del Comando dei Patriotti-il Rossanese è dichiarato zona militare Alleata.=
È chiaro che ho [sic] si è voluto tenermi all’oscuro della faccenda oppure ci sono delle ragioni per le quali il Comando della 4° Zona non è ritenuto all’altezza del compito.
Nella stessa lettera si parla dell’avvocato Fortelli quale rapp. Della 4° Zona; del Ten. Franco quale Comandante di reparti speciali che presto entreranno in azione; del Ten. Ermanno che quale rappresentante del presidio militare italiano collaborerà con il Comando Alkleato.= Tralascio di parlare del Ten. Branco che viene posto a servizio dello stesso Comando togliendolo dalle sue normali funzioni.=
A questo punto chiunque si domanda:
1) – Se solamente un determinato gruppo di persone collaborano con il Comando alleato, cosa rappresentano gli altri Comandi di Patriotti.
2) – Come può esistere un Comando di Zona responsabile quando le operazioni vengono decise dal Comando Alleato del Rossanese=
Evidentemente il Maggiore Gordon non ha saputo riconoscere in molti mesi di riconoscenza il; Comandante Col. Turchi, ne si è reso ben conto che i Patriotti sono inquadrati in formazioni forse sufficientemente stracciate ma pur sempre degne di considerazione.=
E a me pare che sia un po’ ingenuodi pensare a far la guerra solo con quei pochi paracadutisti senza tener conto di tutti gli altri uomini, a menochè l’appetito non venga mangiando e non si cerchi con questa prima mossa di guadagnare ulteriore tereno.=
Ora se ciò può anche essere una leggitima aspirazione del Maggiore Gordon vi è da tener conto che a termine di tale diritto gli italiani che sono sui monti dovranno rispondere delle loro azioni di fronte ad altri italiani e che s e anche vi sono
[page break]
2
Putroppo degli uomini che si possono comperare con la sola promessa di qualche futura ricompensa ve ne sono anche altri che al di fuori e al di sopra di ogni cosa tengono alla loro dignita. Tu mi hai chiesto di rimanere presso il Maggiore Gordon? Per parte miamom ho nulla da obbietare [sic] perchè come a quest’ora avrai saputo io non mi considererò più comandante della 4° Zona operativa nei riguardi del Comando Alleato.=
Durante l’estate e nell’autunno Gordon ed io abbiamo fatto tanta strada insieme.=
Speravo di poter giungere alla fine conlo stesso sentimento col quale si [sic] siamo incontrati ed èper questo che sono rimasto prima stupito e poi avvilito per quanto è successo. Tinei bene presente e ti prego di dirlo al Maggiore Gordon Lett che quanto egli desiderava sarebe stato facile se me ne avesse parlato; tieni pure presente e questo consideralo pur un vaticinio che cessando di essere io il centro di queste formazioni tutto andrà a scatafascio ed allora? Con risultato è veramente magnifico e me ne compiaccio con l’ideatore.= Come uomo posso rammaricarmi che vi sia così poca [undecifrable] acutezza di vedute.=
Ad ogni modo “Alea iacta est” e vedremo come finirà.=
Assicura il Maggiore Gordon che a parte queste vicende io sono e resto nelle migliori disposizioni di animo verso lui, ma fagli anche capire che la persona del Col. Turchi è di altra stoffa da quelle con le quali [undecifrable]ino ad ora ha potuto trattare.=
La famosa radio che il maggiore Gordon mi ha detto lanciata per il Comando di Zona il giorno 13 a Boschetto, esiste effettivamente, ma il curioso è che Alfonso dichiara che proprio il maggiore Gordon gli hadetto di trattenerla per la missione. Ed allora?....
Per quanto riguarda la tua posizione tinei presente che se tu vuoi rimanere nelle file patriottiche e come tale essere considerato hai il dovere di seguire gli ordini che ti vengono impartiti dal Comando Italiano e questo di pure al Ten. Franco.
Io non vogilio creare il caso Ellas [undecifrable] nemmeno che si getti da parte tutto il lavoro svolto con tanti sacrifici da quei pochi onesti che vivono sui monti.= Se c’è quindi una via di accomodamento essa va ricercata da aprte del maggiore Gordon Lett [undecifrable] mia ne del Comando di Zona; se c’èqualche prospettiva di incamerare altri reparti per allargare poco alla volta la zona di competenza alleata, è bene si sappia che vi saranno altre zone nelle quali patriotti italiani continueranno a combattere anche senza divise e senza scarpe, mangiando come hanno sempre fatto sacrosanta paton anazionale.=
Rude ti metterà al corrente anche di altre questioni. Per quanto riguarda l’amico Grossi ti mando la lettera che credo però lascerà il tempo che trova.
Cordiali saluti
9/1/45, Cossu
Dublin Core
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Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Italy
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Correspondence
Language
A language of the resource
ita
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
British Army
Civilian
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Title
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Report from Mario Fontana to Gordon Lett
Description
An account of the resource
Colonnello Mario Fontana reports to Major Gordon Lett through Mario Fortelli. Mentions Allied personnel being parachuted behind enemy lines and discusses air drop zones in the La Spezia area. Stresses that zones must be changed, since most items were not picked up by their intended recipients. Mentions difficult coordination and ongoing rivalry between Partisan units.
Format
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Two-page typewritten report (two copies)
Contributor
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Tiziano Vernazza
Creator
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Mario Fontana
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-01-09
Temporal Coverage
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1945-01-09
Rights
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This content is property of the Istituto spezzino per la Storia della Resistenza e dell’Età Contemporanea which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
isrlaspezia AMb4f3 324
isrlaspezia AMb8f3 1001 BIS
Resistance
rivalry
-
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127f75d875563164a3ceb15110f8de91
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Marshall, Syd. Album
Identifier
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Marshall, S
Description
An account of the resource
77 items. The album contains wartime and post-war photographs, newspaper cuttings, and memorabilia assembled by Warrant Officer Sidney Charles Marshall (1924 - 2017, 1594781 Royal Air Force). Syd Marshall was a flight engineer with 103 Squadron and flew operations from RAF Elsham Wolds.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Marshall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-05-08
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
ELSHAM WOLDS’ GREAT PART IN BOMBING CAMPAIGN
Four Years of Magnificent Effort
ELSHAM Wolds began to operate with R.A.F. Bomber Command in July, 1941. The airfield was not quite completed when No. 103 Squadron arrived from Newton on July 11, but the Squadron soon settled in and has remained there ever since.
In nearly four years Elsham has built up a high reputation in the Royal Air Force. There was little delay before the airfield was placed on an operational basis and the Wellingtons were out on July 24, from 11 a.m. to 6.45 pm., attacking the battle cruiser “Gneisenau” at Brest.
Before long the Germans knew of the new bomber station, and in August, 1941, enemy aircraft attacked it. They did no serious damage. They tried again several times in later years, though never in strength.
The “Wimpeys” held the fort while the factories got busy with the production of the new four-engined bombers.
On September 10, 1941, Wellingtons flew to Turin for the loss of only one aircraft. By the end of December, Elsham was able to record as many as 17 Wellingtons airborne on a single night.
On one occasion two sergeants brought back their aircraft after four of the crew had baled out; a flare had caught alight in the rear fuselage.
AMONG THE 1,000
After taking part in the May and June 1,000 bomber raids in 1942, there was a lull.
Halifaxes began to arrive and in August made their first sorties from the station, against Dusseldorf. Hardly had the engineering staff accustomed themselves to these aircraft when there was another change, this time to Lancasters. By November 21 the Lancasters had replaced the Halifaxes and were doing excellently.
On the night of May 23-24, 1943, No. 103 Squadron put up 27 Lancasters, which at that time was a Command record.
The Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, G.C.B., O.B.E., A.F.C., visited the station in September and addressed the crews.
One of the flights of No. 103 Squadron was transferred to No. 576 Squadron, which was being formed at Elsham. This left 103 a two-flight squadron. The two squadrons were together in close association and friendly rivalry until October, 1944.
OVER BERLIN
No. 103 Squadron had 30 aircraft over Berlin on the night of November 26-27. Elsham became a base station from December 1 and controlled the airfields at Kirmington and North Killingholme.
The wild weather of January, 1944, made life at Elsham what the R.A.F. call “pretty raw,” but the ground staff worked wonders in clearing blocked roads, and runways.
During the spring the Base Commander, Air Commodore Ivelaw Chapman, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., was shot down over France and taken prisoner. He has recently returned to this country. Air Commodore F.R.D. Swain, O.B.E., A.F.C., who broke the altitude record some years ago, took over from Air Commodore Chapman.
In June both squadrons at Elsham dropped a thousand tons in a month for the first time, and kept this up for some time. In the summer people in the neighbourhood were able to realise the full power of Bomber Command. Daylight operations against V sites, railway centres, and in close support of the Army enabled them to see the sky full of four-engined aircraft day after day.
In October, No. 103 Squadron dropped 1,277 tons, and 86 aircraft of both squadrons operated against Duisburg within 24 hours. On October 31, No. 576 Squadron left Elsham for Fiskerton. With 103 Squadron they had dropped 5,748 tons in the previous five months.
BOMBER COMMAND’S PRIDE
Elsham was the home of Lancaster “M.2,” the pride of Bomber Command. Its long life showed what a high standard of maintenance had been kept up. “M.2.” first flew on operations on May 4, 1943, to Dortmund, with 103 Squadron. It was later transferred to 576 Squadron, and had been on 103 operations by the beginning of 1944. It was retired with 144 trips to its credit, 97 of them to Germany and 15 to Berlin.
During the last winter everyone at Elsham was working at full stretch, and the Lancasters were fully employed on targets like the Ruhr, Ludwigshafen, Nuremburg, Munich, Chemnitz, and Dresden. Many mines were laid in enemy waters.
For the last month of operations No. 103 Squadron was joined by No. 100 Squadron from Waltham (Grimsby), and both were in the attack on Berchtesgaden on April 25.
When there was no more bombing to be done, large convoys of Army vehicles began to drive up to the station. They carried food for the Lancasters to take to Holland. Another task was to bring back hundreds of freed prisoners of war from the Continent.
Many Elsham names will go down in history for acts of heroism. On May 4, 1944, an aircraft of No. 576 Squadron, captained by Pilot-Officer Reed, of Wellingborough, Northants, landed with the flight engineer helping Reed to hold the control column and the air bomber clinging to the rudder pedals. The Lancaster looked a total wreck. It had been shot up by a fighter over Mailly-le-Camp; it had caught fire, a large hole was knocked in the floor, electrical and navigational instruments were smashed, the rudders and elevators were damaged, and the rear-turret was hanging by a threat.
Two Lancaster from 103 Squadron were each attacked by two fighters on July 29, 1944, when bombing Stuttgart. All four of the enemy were destroyed in a couple of minutes.
Another 103 crew shot down a Ju. 88 over Karlsruhe on April 25, 1944, but sustained serious damage. The pilot had to ditch, and the crew were on the Goodwin Sands for seven hours before being picked up.
Just before the end of the war one of Elsham’s aircraft came back with a 250lb. bomb embedded in a wing. The pilot told the crew to bale out, and the baled out himself near base.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Elsham Wolds' Great Part in Bombing Campaign
Four years of Magnificent Effort
Description
An account of the resource
A history of 103 Squadron's operations at RAF Elsham Wolds.
Format
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One newspaper cutting on an album page
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMarshallS1594781v10031
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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France--Brest
Italy--Turin
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Dresden
Netherlands
France--Mailly-le-Camp
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Karlsruhe
France
Italy
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
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1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Contributor
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Govert J. van Lienden
100 Squadron
103 Squadron
576 Squadron
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
ditching
Gneisenau
Halifax
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Ju 88
Lancaster
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operation Manna (29 Apr – 8 May 1945)
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Kirmington
RAF North Killingholme
rivalry
Wellington
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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To be inserted in folder when returned by S/L Lynch. [Underlined] Intelligence [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
[Waddington Central Registry Stamp]
SEPTEMBER 1943. [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 14.
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
This Group now carries a weight of incendiaries which, if concentrated on any target, could not fail to burn it out. Unfortunately analysis of night photographs continues to reveal a spread of incendiaries which, if it continues, can only result in a needless prolongation of the War. It is common for incendiaries to cover an area measuring five to ten miles in length and this is true even on some of the most successful attacks. Large areas of Hamburg have been burnt out and I have no doubt that crews who took part in the main attacks are satisfied with what was achieved, yet it is unfortunately true that of the bombs which left this country only 30% fell in the built-up area of Hamburg, the remainder in open fields outside. That is equivalent to only one crew out of three achieving the object of bombing Hamburg. Luck, was, however, on our side and the city caught fire, but luck has not been on our side in many recent attacks, and results have been disappointing because the density of the incendiary attack has not been sufficient to start a conflagration.
I believe that one cause of this spread is that crews have difficulty in appreciating the area which is covered by incendiaries. Invariably they uber-estimate distances and report a concentrated attack when subsequent photographs show it to have been spread over seven or more miles of country. The belief that the attack is concentrated and, therefore, that it does not matter a great deal where the bombs fall provided they are within the area in which incendiaries and T.I’s are lying is at the root of much of the trouble. As a guide to distance the ordinary target indicator, by the time it hits the ground, covers an area of quarter of a mile, while a single incendiary load has a spread of about half a mile. From operational heights it is hard to appreciate these distances.
The solution to greater concentration lies in a determination by the bombing team, Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber and Instrument Repair Staff, that the bombs will fall on the precise spot aimed at. This calls for constant practice and training, and the full analysis of results obtained on the bombing ranges.
It is sometimes said that practice bombing bears little relation to the requirements of operations, but this is not so. Turn to the table showing bombing results achieved by Squadrons last month. You will see that one Squadron with 22 details had an average error of 475 yards. Another Squadron with 32 details an error of 152 yards. Which of these two Squadrons is likely to achieve the better results on operations? An error of 475 yards under practice conditions, can only be a result of failure to maintain the sights in proper condition, coupled with failure on the part of crews to give the necessary time, thought and energy to the problem of accurate bombing. The moment carelessness creeps in there is no limit to bombing errors. An error of 475 yards on the practice range may be ten times that amount on operations, whereas an error on the practice range of under 100 yards demonstrates
(Continued on Back Page Col. 3)
[Boxed] ROLLS ROYCE AND THE MERLIN [/boxed]
PART II.
[Rolls Royce Logo]
Some idea of the complexity of the modern aero engine can be obtained from the fact that in the Merlin engine there are approximately 11,000 separate pieces, and of these, 4,500 are different. As would be expected, owing to the fundamental necessity for keeping weight down to the minimum, the maximum possible use is made of light alloy metals, and of the total engine weight almost one half is aluminium. All the metals used have been especially produced for the particular purpose for which they are used, and give the maximum strength in combination with minimum weight. Some parts are called upon to operate under exceptional conditions of heat, other parts to rotate at enormous speeds continuously; the valves, for instance, must work at 850 degrees Centigrade, the temperature of the wire in an ordinary electric radiator, and the impellor in the supercharger must revolve over 30,000 times every minute.
The aero engine of today is a highly complex piece of mechanism which must be capable of functioning under widely different conditions of temperature, and it must not falter when the machine in which it is installed is climbed, dived, rolled or flown upside down. During fighting manoeuvres the pilot’s life depends upon the response of the engine to its controls, it must not fade or cut out when he changes direction or altitude suddenly to avoid enemy attack, it must be immediately responsive to his will when he himself is attacking. Apart from the fact that it must function equally satisfactorily in climates as far opposed as Russia and the Middle East, it is subject to very quick temperature changes every time it climbs to altitudes. On a summer day in England, the pilot can leave the ground in the sweltering 90’s and climb straight up to, say, 7 miles high, where the temperature will be down to 100 degrees of frost.
Apart from the quick temperature variation encountered when climbing to altitude, there is one other natural effect which is all important, and this is rarification of the atmosphere; the higher the distance from the earth the less dense the air becomes. Air, in combination with petrol in the correct proportion, is the main factor, which determines how much power the engine is capable of giving, the more air and petrol that can be consumed by the engine in a given time the greater is the power developed. The higher the machine flies, the more difficult it is for the engine to obtain sufficient air due, of course, to the rarified atmosphere. Arrangements have to be made therefore to compensate for this effect, and in order to do so a supercharger is employed. A supercharger is in effect a pump which supplies air to the engine under pressure; this device is usually associated in the minds of most people with racing cars on which it is used to force as much air as possible into the engine, and so obtain the maximum power from a small sized engine. On the aero engine, this is a secondary consideration, and its main object is to compensate automatically for the gradually decreasing air density as the aeroplane climbs to altitude. The power output of an engine without a supercharger rapidly decreases as it climbs and at a height of 4 miles the power is less than half of what it was on the ground. By using a suitable supercharger it is possible to maintain the ground level power up to 40,000 feet or more. This has to be done automatically so that the pilot does not have to worry about working any controls.
The aero engine must also be as small and compact as possible, so that it offers the minimum wind resistance when installed in the aircraft, it must also be as light as it is possible to make it – power also is of course all important.
The Merlin engine produces more power than a modern express train engine, yet its weight including the propeller is only 1/84th. of the locomotive. All this colossal energy is packed into a space no bigger than that occupied by a single bed.
At the outbreak of war the fighter aircraft of the R.A.F. were exclusively powered by Merlin engines, it was the only engine used in all the fighter machines which so successfully defended our country in the Battle of Britain. In Spitfires and Hurricanes it is still the mainstay of our fighter attack and defence. It is employed in Defiant and Beaufighter night fighters, and the Fleet Air Arm use it to good effect in the Fulmar. In bomber aircraft also the Merlin is extensively used; the Battle medium single engined bomber which gave such good service in France prior to Dunkirk is now relegated to training use; the twin engined Whitley bomber famous for leaflet and bomb raids far into enemy territory in the early days of the was still does yeoman service defending our Atlantic convoys. It is used in Wellington bombers, and was more recently chosen as the motive power for the four engined Halifax heavy bomber, and also for the Lancaster, acknowledged the most effective bomber in the World, and which made its glorious debut in the daring Augsberg raid by 97 and 44 Squadrons
(Continued on Back Page Column 2 )
[Page break]
[Boxed] SIGNALS [/boxed] EFFORTS FOR IMPROVED TR.1196 PERFORMANCE BEARING FRUIT.
Our efforts towards improved performance from the TR. 1196 have advanced during the month. RAE are trying out two mods., one on a Conversion Unit aircraft – aimed at permitting good intercom. undisturbed by “blot out” from neighbouring R/T. An extra R – RA switch is fitted for the convenience of the instructor. Initial reports from the staff auger well. At Waddington the ground TR. 1196 has been modified to give better modulation and also provision of a manual volume control for use by the R/T operator. Tests are in progress.
A thorough vetting of Local Flying Control TR. 1196 frequencies has just been completed at all airfields. The present practice of accepting a maximum R/T range of only a few miles has rather fogged the issue. Range tests are now being carried out and all pilots are thanked in advance for the co-operation we are sure they will give. Remember our aim is to help you safely down immediately you arrive in the circuit and the greater the R/T range the nearer we shall be to attaining our object.
[Boxed] SIGNALS FAILURES [/boxed]
Helmets icing up and oil on the slip rings of the mid-upper turret are adding their toll of failures. Here are a couple of tips to help overcome them:-
Fit the oxygen mask snugly to the face and blow hard at regular intervals both before and during flight. This action prevents the valve adhering to the composition holder and so moisture cannot collect in the mask and freeze at high altitudes.
W/OP. A.G’s always carry a piece of material (4x2 is good stuff if the Gunnery Leader isn’t looking!) to clean the oil from the top of the mid-upper turret slip ring cover.
[Boxed] FAILURE SUMMARY [/boxed]
The percentage of failures against sorties detailed for operations is as follows:-
49 SQDN NIL 106 SQDN. NIL. 207 SQDN NIL
467 SQDN NIL. 57 SQDN. NIL. 61 SQDN .95
50 SQDN 2.13 44 SQDN. 2.74 9 SQDN 2.99
619 SQDN 4.25 617 SQDN 4.54
It will be noted that the figures for 617 and 619 Squadron appear unduly high: in the case of 617 it will be appreciated that due to the comparatively small number of sortied, the multiplicity of equipment carried and the nature of their tasks, the percentage represents only a small number of failures. In the case of 619, it is felt that this is due to very consciencious [sic] reporting of component failures particularly. It will be realised that the reporting of failures involving the breakdown of an individual component which, whilst not affecting the operational success of a sortie, does provide details which help considerably towards preventing their recurrence.
[Boxed] FLIGHT PLANNING TELEPHONE NETWORK CONFERENCE FACILITY [/boxed]
The conference facility has proved a great boon for flight planning purposes since its inception. To improve its efficiency and smooth workability, steps are being taken to have Base and Station installations standardised as soon as possible. This will mean that at a Base where the flight planning equipment is in the Intelligence room, this equipment will be transferred to the Operations room. Stations and Satellites provide a slight headache in this respect, because they by no means conform to a standard layout themselves.
A second aspect of the conference facility is its use as an intruder warning channel, which is not working satisfactorily. Local re-arrangements have just been completed at Group and it is hoped that a really efficient scheme has been evolved. The Teller and the Controller are now able to sit side by side, in full view of the plotting table, and each with a separate flight planning telephone. Flying Control “hook-up” will be set up whenever weather conditions or intruder activity make it necessary. Both Teller and Controller can then speak to Stations, the one to pass the intruder activity the other to order any necessary diversions.
[Boxed] MONICA [/boxed]
Our girlfriend Monica is still giving us all grey hair. The experts have now been at work for several weeks and are finding the problem far more difficult than at first expected.
In spits [sic] of this the serviceability has increased, and the faults in the sets are being cleared, slowly but surely.
A method of accurately testing the sensitivity of the Rx has been found preventing a fighter from getting into range without warning.
Some sets may give a fighter warning, but not respond to test. Crews are inclined to think these sets serviceable, but they must remember that such sets are on the borderline, and may not warn in every case. It is this drifting of the Rx gain that we are trying so hard to correct.
The aerials are a further source of trouble, partly caused by personnel using them as step ladders. A bent aerial will often make the set unserviceable.
In spite of all these difficulties, Monica has proved its usefulness over and over again, as many satisfied customers will testify. It is the only warning system we have, it can be made to work, so all concerned must keep at it until the answer is found.
[Boxed] GEE [/boxed]
As usual the GEE ranges vary from sortie to sortie. The serviceability, however, is very good from a maintenance and component viewpoint. Manipulation failures are too frequent, and every opportunity should be made to prevent these RF unit and aerial lead manipulation failures.
W/Op. A.G’s are now applying their GEE knowledge and are getting fixed on the return journeys.
[Boxed] SIGNALS SECURITY
Not many of us liked the new phonetic alphabet and the changeover was allowed to be gradual. However the time has now arrived when our Berties and Freddies should be discarded for ever. Squadrons which persist in the use of the old alphabet are labelling themselves to the Hun. [/boxed]
[Boxed] TRAINING [/boxed] WEATHER RETARDS OUTPUT.
A NEW TRAINING VENTURE.
[Illustration] MY LANDING ARE WIZARD
FAMOUS LAST WORDS Due to bad weather and shortage of Lancaster aircraft, the high output of over 100 crews per month could not be maintained by Conversion Units, and the figure dropped to 82 crews trained during the month. To overcome the temporary shortage of aircraft, it was necessary for Squadrons to loan aircraft during the stand down period to the Conversion Units and it is hoped that, given good weather, next month the deficit in crews will be more than made up.
[Boxed] THE NEW TRAINING VENTURE [/boxed]
The Conversion Base started on a new venture with a short course for Flight Commanders. All the Officers attending benefited by the course, and it is thought that at least three of the instructional staff have learned a great deal as well. Courses will continue during the coming months with, it is hoped, beneficial results.
[Boxed] TOTAL FLYING HOURS FOR THE MONTH WERE – 5481 FOR TRAINING UNITS [/boxed]
[Boxed] CREW SAFETY [/boxed]
The number of ditchings by Lancasters continues to go up. Most crews pay sufficient attention to this vital crew drill to ensure that they can leave the aircraft safely. However, constant practice is necessary to keep yourself up to the mark. In one unfortunate ditching it is known that complete panic ensued and all the crew simply leapt out of the nearest escape hatch straight into the water with fatal results excepting one man.
[Table of Link Trainer times per squadron]
[Table of Squadron Flying Times – Day and Night]
SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 2.
[Page break]
[Boxed] GUNNERY. [/boxed] FEWER SORTIES – MORE COMBATS: THE VITAL NEED FOR PERFECT RECOGNITION.
Although the number of sorties during the month was considerably less than August, the number of combats for September was 133. 14 Enemy aircraft are claimed as destroyed and 27 damaged. Enemy aircraft marked “C” in “This Month’s Bag” are those confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command at the time of going to press.
Unfortunately instances are still occurring of Lancasters being engaged by other Lancasters and it would appear that sufficient care is not taken to identify the other aircraft before pressing the trigger. This problem of identifying aircraft is extremely difficult under certain conditions and this statement is supported by night fighter pilots with considerable experience, but the only solution is Aircraft Recognition of a 101 per cent quality and Squadron Gunnery Leaders should keep this problem in mind always and Air Gunners should be classified on their ability and a scheme instituted whereby the Gunners who are weak in this respect are given exercises daily until the required standard of 100% is reached.
Instances are still occurring of early return due to turret doors not locking, no excuse can be accepted for this, as turret doors should be checked on N.F.T. and again when the crew go out to the aircraft for take-off. It is again stressed that Gunners should check as far as possible guns and turrets immediately on arriving at the aircraft prior to take-off; this practice has frequently enabled the ground staff to put right minor troubles. Any Gunner who is not 100 per cent satisfied with the operation of his turret and guns is to request the Pilot to run the engine and a test then carried out on the turret which is suspect.
[Boxed] MODIFICATIONS AND NEW EQUIPMENT [/boxed]
Experiments with an F.N. 50 Turret are being carried out by 1660 C.U. in an attempt to improve the visibility, metal is being replaced by perspex in the Cupola and much of the metal in front of the Gunner is being removed. A new bulb for the reflector sight is also being tested by this unit. 50 Squadron are carrying out tests on a reflector sight with most of the material from the hood removed, this precludes the sight being used in bright sunlight, but it is hoped to produce an attachment to overcome this difficulty.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
NO. 64 COURSE
P/O HUGHES – 61 SQDN – 13TH, PLACE CAT “B”
NO. 65 COURSE
F/O ARMSTRONG – 9 SQDN – 10TH. PLACE CAT “B”
F/O BUCKLEY – 617 SQDN – 17TH. PLACE CAT. “A”
NO. 66 COURSE
P/O BLACK – 1661 C.U. – 2ND. PLACE CAT “B”
F/SGT. VAUGHAN – 49 SQDN – FAILED CAT “D”
[Boxed] WAR EFFORT [/boxed]
[Table of Group aircraft statistics by Squadron]
[Boxed] This Months Bag [/boxed]
[Cartoon]
DESTROYED
ENEMY A/C AIRCRAFT LETTER SQUADRON DATE
ME109 F “C” 207 3/.4.9.43.
S.E. B “C” 44 3/4.9.43.
S.E. Z “C” 9 5/6.9.43.
ME110 C “C” 106 3/4.9.43.
S.E. R “C” 9 5/6.9/43.
S.E. U 467 23/24.9.43.
ME109 V 467 23/24.9.43.
JU88 K 61 23/24.9.43.
ME109 Z 207 27/28.9.43.
ME109 T 57 27/28.9.43.
JU88 N 57 27/28.9.43.
JU88 P 50 27/28.9.43.
ME109 X 44 29/30.9.43.
FW190 P 207 29/30.9.43.
DAMAGED
ME210 A 207 31/1.9.43.
ME100 J 49 3/4.9.43.
JU88 O 207 3/4.9.43.
T.E. X 44 3/4.9.43.
T.E. K 44 3/4.9.43.
FW190 K 49 6/7.9.43.
JU88 A 50 5/6.9.43.
FW190 C 619 6/7.9.43.
JU88 H 57 22/23.9.43.
JU88 X 57 22/23.9.43.
ME210 P 50 22/23.9.43.
JU88 ED944 57 23/24.9.43.
ME109 Z 207 23/24.9.43.
ME109 J 207 23/24.9.43.
ME210 D 106 23/24.9.43.
JU88 H 44 27/28.9.43.
ME109 Q 61 22/23.9.43.
ME109 F 61 22/23.9.43.
JU88 A 61 22/23.9.43.
ME210 C 207 23/24.9.43.
JU88 J 207 27/28.9.43.
ME109 K 61 23/24.9.43.
ME109 A 61 27/28.9.43.
DO217 L 44 29/30.9.43
T.E. X 44 29/30.9.43.
FW190 J 61 29/30.9.43.
JU88 R 61 5/6.9.43.
[Boxed] The Gunnery Leaders’ Conference was held at Waddington on the 27th. September. The minutes of the Conference have been circulated together with information on several points raised at the Conference which have now been clarified. [/boxed]
[Boxed] ACCIDENTS. [/boxed] INCREASED FLYING HOURS BRINGS SLIGHT RISE IN ACCIDENT RATE.
There were 17 accidents listed as avoidable for September, an increase of three on last month’s total, for an increase of 378 flying hours.
Flying hours for September – 13,520
Flying hours for August – 13,142
The summary of avoidable accidents for September is as follows:-
TAXYING – 2: HEAVY LANDINGS – 5: SWINGS – 2 (One on landing the other on take-off): OVERSHOOTING – 2: ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT – 5. The errors of judgement consist of:-
1. The pilot started the three engined overshoot at 20 ft., but was caught out by the swing resulting from three engines being opened to full power. The aircraft swung completely round from 180° and came to rest in the River Trent, luckily without fatal results. As a contributory factor the Navigator was not calling Air Speeds on the approach. As a result of this accident the Captain’s log book was endorsed in red for not ensuring that his own and his crew drill was correct. MORAL – TAKE CARE OF YOUR CREW DRILL.
2. Another instance of carelessness occurred at the end of last month when an aircraft crashed through taking off with four engines switched to No. 2 tanks which were empty, and were known to be empty by the Captain and Flight Engineer. Luckily the crew were not fatally injured.
3. At 23,000 ft. the pilot passed out for lack of oxygen and it was later found that he had inadvertently nipped his oxygen tube in his harness, cutting off the supply. The aircraft went into a steep dive and was only pulled out by the Navigator and Flight Engineer in unison, after losing 15,000 feet. The terrific stresses set up rendered the aircraft Cat. AC. MORAL – TAKE CARE OF YOUR OXYGEN TUBE.
4. On return from a long sortie the crew of a Lancaster decided they had enough fuel left to reach Base, but on approaching to land three engines cut out for lack of petrol and the aircraft crashed. Attention of all aircrew especially Pilots and Flight Engineers, must be drawn to the fact that a rigorous check of fuel consumption must be kept with the untrustworthiness of fuel gauges always kept in mind. Fuel consumption calculators have been issued to all Units MORAL – KEEP YOUR FUEL CONSUMPTION CALCULATOR HANDY ON ALL FLIGHTS.
5. On return from operations a Lancaster hit the sea with the altimeter reading 160 feet. MORAL WHY COME SO LOW AS THIS?
6. On a low flying exercise a pilot took his hands off the controls to adjust his goggles, and the aircraft hit a tree. MORAL – IF LOW FLYING, DON’T LET YOUR ATTENTION WANDER.
All these accidents are entirely due to carelessness on the part of aircrew and the cost to the country is appalling. Remember, every Lancaster lostthrough [sic] your “clottishness” is one less Lancaster to drop bombs on the Hun.
[Boxed] NEARLY A GOOD RECORD [/boxed]
1660 Con. Unit’s excellent record was marred this month by a swing on Landing but there is a gratifying decrease in all Con. Units this month. In all training Units there were five avoidable accidents for a total of 5481 flying hours.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
[Boxed] AIR BOMBING. [V Group drawings] [/boxed]
[Boxed] PRACTICE BOMBING ON THE SQUADRONS [/BOXED]
[Boxed] [Table of Practice Bombing exercises carried out by each Squadron] [/boxed]
[Boxed] Weekly returns have not yet been received from 49 Squadron and 1654 Conversion Unit, consequently leaving the monthly table incomplete.
617’s results were obtained using the S.A.B.S. Mark IIA.
5258 Practice bombs were dropped (excluding 49 Squadron and 1654 Conversion Unit)
The high level bombing average on Squadrons (from date available) was 218 yards at 10,000 feet and 308 yards at 20,000 feet. In general, results were a slight improvement on August, but the Group error was adversely affected by the high average error of 44 Squadron.
Great credit id due to 1660 Conversion Unit who achieved a Mark XIV Grouping Error better than that of any Squadron. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE [/underlined]
During September, exactly 5,000 bombs were plotted at Wainfleet Sands, although all targets were unserviceable for part of the month.
GOOD BOMBING
The number of details with average error less than 100 yards was greatly increased
SQUADRON PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR
617 (Using SABS)
F/O. CLAYTON P/O. WATSON 43, 59, 71.
P/O. BROWN SGT. DANCIA 72, 86, 75 (Twice)
F/LT. WILSON SGT. BARROW 94, 70, 61, 78.
F/LT MUNRO F/SGT. CALY 88, 41, 60, 94, 87, 65.
S/LDR. MARTIN F/LT. HAY 51, 82, 71, 64, 82.
F/Lt. MCCARTHY F/O. DAVIDSON 80, 49, 76.
619
P/O. JOSS F/O. ANDERSON 91.
F/O. MORRISON SGT. ALLEY 85.
F/LT. SANDISON F/O. WILKIE 81.
F/LT. SANDISON F/LT. SALMSLEY 95.
F/LT. SANDISON W/CDR. ABERCROMBIE 64.
SGT. THOMAS SGT. FONTAINE 70.
F/O. O’SHAUGNESSY F/O. KENDRICK 26.
S/LDR. CHURCHER F/O. MACDONALD 84.
F/O. FOX F/O. BRAID 77.
106
P/O. CALLAN SGT. GOMERSALL. 94.
P/O. COOPER F/SGT. CHRISTMAS 88.
P/O. STORER SGT. HACKETT 97.
P/O. YACKMAN P/O. MOREY 94.
467
F/LT. FORBES P/O. GRIME 79.
P/O. RILEY SGT. VALASTIN 90.
57
SGT. YATES P/O. WANGLER (PILOT) 86.
50
SGT. DURHAM SGT. BROCK 76.
61
F/O. PITCH P/O. LYONS 92.
1654 C.U. SGT. HOMEWOOD SSGT. WALKER 93. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
F/O. Murtough and P/O. Wonham, both of 1661 Conversion Unit assume command of the Bombing Section of 44 Squadron and 1668 Conversion Unit respectively.
The following have passed the Bombing Leader’s Course :-
GRADE “A” F/O. HAZELL (44) F/O. STANISLAUS (9) F/SGT. RUMGAY (207)
P/O. PRICE (1654) P/O. WONHAM (1668)
GRADE “B” F/SGT. LOWANS (49) F/O. TOOGOOD (106) F/O. BOSWELL (619)
SGT. TELFORD (467) F/O. McROBBIE (57) F/O. HARDEN (1660)
F/O. ASTBURG (1661)
P/ . Wonham was 2nd. on No. 63 Course and F/Sgt. Rumgay 3rd. on No. 66 Course.
WELL DONE BOTH! [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Despite a record number of details only 3 Squadrons qualified for this competition.
619 Squadron are to be congratulated on winning the competition for the third successive month, and in so doing obtained by far the best average yet returned although the errors include vector error and are application errors.
[Table of Squadrons and bombing results]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
Only two entries were received, F/Lt. Walmsley improving on his winning score of the previous month.
LEADER PILOT HEIGHT ERROR
F/LT. WALMSLEY F/LT. SANDISON 10000FT 95 YDS
S/LDR. BEACH S/LDR. PARKES 10000FT 280 YDS [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Diagram]
From 20,000 feet the Mark XIV graticule covers a width of 540 yards and a length of 3,100 yards on the ground at the moment of release.
If the centre of your graticule is only two graticule lengths from the aiming point, you stand a grave chance of missing even quite a large city. Remember, one T.I. has a diameter of 300 yards ! [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] ‘BIGCHIEF’ COMPETITION [/underlined]
BIGCHIEF PILOT ERROR AT 10000 FT.
W/CDR. ABERCROMBIE S/LDR. SANDISON 64 YDS
G/CPT. CHRISTIE S/LDR PULLEN 94 YDS
W/CDR. PENMAN P/O. EAGER 123 YDS
G/CAPT. CHRISTIE S/LDR. PULLEN 142 YDS
W/CDR. BURNETT S/LDR. BUNKER 238 YDS
It will be noted that representatives of 619 Squadron won all three competitions. Is this the result of bombing analysis ?!
A hot pace has already been set for October, several details have already been carried out, among them two by the A.O.C. who achieved average errors of 42 yards and 48 yards respectively – the latter was actually at 18,000 feet. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
[Underlined] V GROUP NEWS NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943.
SUPPLEMENT.
AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The month of September was notable for a complete revision of bombing training policy.
In the days of the A.B.S. only application bombing was possible and analysis of results was haphazard and involved considerable guesswork. Now that we are rapidly becoming equipped with Mark XIV bombsights, it is possible to carry out a full analysis by means of bombing grouping which reveals clearly where bombing faults lie.
These faults may be classified in three categories (a) bombing errors due to bombsight inaccuracies or unserviceability (b) vector errors (c) errors of pure bombing attributed to the pilot/air bomber team and caused by inaccurate flying, faulty bombsight settings and bombsight levelling, imperfect co-operation on the bombing run and various other personal factors.
The errors under (a) can be discovered by careful analysis of grouping exercises and must be eliminated completely. Those under (b) are now the joint responsibility of pilot and navigator. Flying for windfinding must be completely accurate and every care is to be taken by navigators to ensure the calculated wind is as accurate as conditions permit. Analysis has proved that in almost every exercise faulty windfinding is largely responsible for the bombing errors obtained.
After (a) and (b) have been removed we come to the Grouping error (c) which can be steadily reduced by a thorough understanding of bombing problems and true co-operation on the bombing run between pilot and air-bomber.
With the present percentage of Mark XIV bombsights in Squadron aircraft, it should now be possible for all competition details to be carried out with that sight, and the results of all such details in October are to be submitted as Grouping errors, in either of the following categories:-
(i) CLOSE GROUP
(ii) As open group if bombsight error is directly attributable to mechanical fault in the Bomb Sight which could not be detected by the Bomb Aimer in his pre-bombing check.
N.B. Bombs forming an OPEN GROUP pattern around an M.P.I. where the error from M.P.I. to the inner radius of the open group is attributable to Bomb Aimer’s negligence in N.F.T. check.
e.g. Drift de-synchronisation
Wring T.V. setting
Incorrect Level Readings etc.
MUST be returned as CLOSE GROUP error being from M.P.I. to inner radius of CLOSE GROUP pattern.
Now that all Mark XIV exercises in which four or more bombs are dropped are to be carried out as Grouping exercises, the following points are to be borne in mind:-
(i) All crews must carry bombing pro formae for bombing details
(ii) The position where bombs fall is to be estimated by the air bomber and plotted in pencil on the plotting rose.
(iii) On landing, the bombing leader is to plot the position of the bombs from the quadrant readings, and transfer the plots
/to the plotting rose…
[Page break]
to the plotting rose of the bombing pro-forma in coloured pencil.
(iv) Pilot, Navigator, Air Bomber and Flight Engineer are to take the form and make an analysis of the exercise.
(v) This analysis is to be checked and amended as necessary by the Bombing Leader and Bombing Officer.
(vi) The captain of the crew is to keep all pro-formae used for future reference.
The results submitted in weekly returns are to be the Grouping errors (c) on all MKXIV exercises, but when a wind velocity is found by the Navigator his vector error is to be noted in a book and kept for future reference. Similarly, bombsight errors are to be noted and rectified where necessary by the instrument section.
The results given in the bombing training table are not a true representation of bombing in the past month, as grouping and application errors are inextricably intermingled and in many cases incorrectly compiled returns failed to differentiate between the bombsights used.
Next month’s ‘News’ should give a true picture of the training carried out. Already we are discovering where our bombing failures lie, and it is only by rigid adherence to the new system that we can hope for a tangible improvement in the operational success of our bombing sorties.
[Boxed] [Underlined] STOP PRESS GUNNERY. [/underlined]
All aircraft claimed by the Group for September have now been confirmed by Headquarters,Bomber Command. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Boxed] DECORATIONS. [/boxed]
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE AWARDS WERE APPROVED DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1943. [/underlined]
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. McGUBBIN. DFC
44 SQUADRON
F/O. A.E.H. PARSONS. DFC
F/O. G.G. PASCOE. DFC
F/O. L.W. PILGRIM. DFC
F/O. H.J. BARLEY. DFC
P/O. H. ROGERS. DFC
106 SQUADRON
SGT. N.L.E. GALE. DFM
SGT. A.J. SARGEANT. DFM
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWINF NON-IMMEDIATE AWARDS WERE APPROVED DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1943. [/underlined]
9 SQUADRON
W/CDR. P. BURNETT. DFC
F/LT. C.A. PATTERN, MBE. DFC
F/O. C.A. HALE. DFC
P/O. J. BOCZAR. DFC
P/O. J.P.H. CARRERE. DFC
SGT. R.V. PIPER. DFM
SGT. J.W. VINALL. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/LT. R.D. ROBINSON. DFC
F/O. A.A. ST.CLAIR-MILLER. DFC
F/O. D.F.H. WALKER. DFC
F/O. W.J. HILTON. DFC
P/O. H. DUTTON. DFC
P/O. J.O. PENNINGTON. DFC
P/O. HEWITT. DFC
SGT. D. MORRISON. DFM
SGT. L.B. HAYWARD. DFM
SGT. G. HOMEWOOD. DFM
49 SQUADRON
W/CDR. P.W. JOHNSON, AFC. DFC
F/O. S.H. MANSBRIDGE. DFC
F/O. R.C. MUNRO. DFC
F/O. T.D. TAYLOR. DFC
F/O. L.R. HASTINGS. DFC
F/O. L.H. TOLCHARD. DFC
P/O. J.T. TAYLOR. DFC
P/O. B.C. DREAVER. DFC
50 SQUADRON
F/O. G.B. MURTOUGH. DFC
F/O. R.M. METHIESON. DFC
F/O. C.F. BONEFIELD. DFC
F/O. T.E. TANDLE. DFC
P/O. J.O. CHRISTIE. DFC
P/O. H.C. BERNARD. DFC
F/SGT. A.C. PARSONS. DFM
F/SGT. A.J. CORK. DFM
SGT. A. BRANSON. DFM
SGT. G. CABLE. DFM
SGT. W. MOONEY. DFM
57 SQUADRON
F/LT. J.C. ANDERSON. DFC
F/O. F. CARTER, DFM. DFC
F/O. E.W. PATTERSON. DFC
F/O. E.W. ADAMS. DFC
F/O. C. SHAW. DFC
2ND. LT. J.E. RUSSELL (USAAF). DFC
2ND. LT. R. WRIGHT (USAAF). DFC
P/O. C.A. MACDONALD. DFC
W/O. J. TOUGH. DFC
W/O. E.T. ENGLISH. DFC
F/SGT. R.W. LORELL. DFM
F/SGT. A.B. WELFORD. DFM
F/SGT. R. ROBERTS, DFM. BAR
SGT. S.J. MONDEL. DFM
61 SQUADRON
W/CDR. W.M. PENMAN. DFC
S/LDR. S.A. BENJAMIN. DFC
F/O. R.H. WILLIAMS. DFC
F/O. J. CRAVEN DFC
[Missing] FROST. DFC
[Remainder of page corner missing]
61 SQUADRON (Continued)
SGT. C.D. TOWSE. DFM
SGT. A.C. MULLINS. DFM
106 SQUADRON
F/LT. R LODGE. DFC
F/LT. W.D. BROWNE. DFC
F/O. G.T. HARDEN. DFC
P/O. J.A.C. MUNRO. DFC
P/O. J.E. CAMPBELL. DFC
W/O. T.R. KWILL. DFC
F/SGT. G.N. FELTHAM. DFM
F/SGT. G.W. CHRISTIE. DFM
207 SQUADRON
F/O. K.H.F. LETFORD. DFC
F/O. K.T. KNIGHT. DFC
F/O. F.G. SPANNER. DFC
P/O. F.M.H. FISHER. DFC
P/O. C. SUTTOR. DFC
SGT. E.D. LUCAN. DFM
207 SQUADRON (Continued)
SGT. G.T.C. BASSFORD. DFM
SGT. R. NUTTON. DFM
467 SQUADRON
S/LDR. E.K. SINCLAIR. DFC
F/O. R. McCURDY. DFC
F/O. G.D. CURRIE. DFC
F/O. T.W. HOPPETT. DFC
F/SGT. W.H. WHITE. DFM
SGT. S.R. ANDERSON. DFM
617 SQUADRON
W/CDR. G.P. GIBSON, VC, DSO, DFC. LEGION OF MERIT. (DEGREE OF COMMANDER)
619 SQUADRON
F/SGT. W.L. VADER-DASSON. DFM
SGT. D.J. COOMBES. DFM
[Boxed] PHOTOGRAPHY [/boxed] TECHNICAL EXPERT
DECLARE WAR ON “SMOKE OBLITERATION.”
Successful ground photographs, which were of immediate operational value, total 204 this month. Whilst there is a slight reduction in the percentage of success it is still good when it is considered that the presence of cloud and smoke over targets provide conditions which are anything but conductive to good night photography.
It is ironical that the very subject which has done so much towards the improvement of bombing should now be the one which is suffering from its effects.
Obtaining good night pictures of ground detail over targets is now almost impossible when large numbers of incendiaries are used, but the camera remains the one and only proof of bombing concentration. Fire track pictures, coupled with a few ground detail photographs, provide a very true picture of a bombing attack and from these fire track pictures, those responsible for assessing operations are able to gain a very good idea as to the degree of success of a particular raid.
In the meantime research is being made to combat the factor of smoke obliteration. Every effort is being made to improve the technical equipment so that ground detail is recorded despite the adverse conditions over the targets. We have already done much in the past few months towards this aim. For instance, the introduction of the American clockwork fuse which has proved so accurate and has permitted the reduction of “open frame time” in the camera from a second to within the region of three seconds, has solved the problem of fire track obliteration
From the analysis of results this month it will be observed that there were comparatively few actual technical faults. Other than the small percentage of flash failures and camera maintenance faults, the chief cause of failures spears to be unsatisfactory bomb firing button. This button has now been modified, but it is still necessary for the Air Bomber to press the button as far as possible to ensure positive contact for camera operation.
Manipulation faults on the part of Aircrews have again decreased in number, but there are still far too many failures due to camera leads being out at the time of bombing. As mentioned in last months’ NEWS it would greatly assist if Air Bombers would check all Cameraleads [sic] and any which are out of sockets should be replaced and upon return from operations the fact should be reported. In this connection a modification is now being produced which will prevent camera leads from the control being removed accidentally.
[Table of Analysis of Results by Squadron]
[Boxed] [Cartoon] QUINTUS QUINCE THE V GROUP ACE SAYS:- “MY GUNNER IS A [underlined] HUMAN [/underlined] ‘MONICA’” [/boxed]
PAGE 5.
[Page break]
[Boxed] ENGINEERING. [/boxed] INSPECTION DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME BY HARD WORK.
All Squadrons being well below establishment in aircraft find it difficult to stagger inspection, as in many cases 100 per cent aircraft are used for each operation. This obviously brings the inspection round rapidly, and three or four more inspections become due at one time. This has made planning very difficult and Squadrons are to be congratulated on the manner in which the work has been carried out. Although the aircraft situation is improving, a somewhat similar state of affairs will exist for the most part of October and we are relying on Squadrons to keep up the good work and even intensify their efforts where possible to produce the effort in spite of the aircraft shortage. Due to certain Squadrons outside this Group re-arming it has meant Squadrons being allocated old aircraft thrown up as a result. This is never a pleasant position, as new aircraft are always more acceptable than old, but the way Squadrons have “tightened their belts” and got down to rendering these old aircraft serviceable to our standards without any undue complaint, reflects a very good spirit. Certain ex-Cat B which have had to be accepted put a great strain on the maintenance personnel, but it is hoped that there will not be many more of these unless they are fully modified prior to receipt.
With the lengthening of the nights and the aircraft being diverted or landing away from Base, it is often long after midday by the time the aircraft returns to its parent unit. This leaves very little time to prepare it for operations again that night. This cannot be helped and so speed is absolutely essential.
Often aircraft are damaged by enemy action and land away from Base. They may be Cat. ‘A’ or ‘AC’. Wherever possible, Engineer Officers are to send a representative down to examine these aircraft with a view to carrying out temporary repairs to fly them back to Base for the completion of the repair. So much time and labour is saved by carrying out the repair at the Parent Unit whether it be Cat. ‘A’ or ‘AC’.
[Boxed] ENGINES [/boxed]
Exhaust stud failures are not on the decline and further sets of trepanning tools are being made available. This is obviously only a palliative: the answer lies in the fitting of a more suitable type of stud and it is hoped that before long we will have the 3.5 per cent nickel steel stud which has given very good service on its trials.
All Lancaster III’s with Merlin 28’s and 38’s and Lancaster I’s with Merlin 22’s are now modified to Mod. 1087 and adjusted to 14lbs. boost for take-off. It is pleasing to note that power plant changes are being speeded up generally throughout the Group and it is only by quick thinking and speedy organisation that repairs and power plant changes can be accomplished in quick time.
[Boxed] MAN POWER [/boxed]
All Squadrons are now working much below establishment and this calls for most economical use of the man power available. The sending of a ground crew to dinner at 1230 while their aircraft is in the air is an example of how N.C.O’s i/c Flights can employ their resources more usefully.
All Electrical Officers will by now have become acquainted with the Mk.XIV Bombsight Group Servicing Van. It has already proved its usefulness and has cleared the few minor snags so far encountered on the A.P.I./A.M.U. and the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
The fitting of the Mk.XIV is proceeding in a very satisfactory manner and only 44 aircraft remain to be fitted. Every assistance should be afforded to the fitting parties in order to finish these aircraft before the end of the month, since the training of Air Bombers on the A.B.S. has ceased.
Most of the available A.P.I./A.M.U’s have now been fitted and are giving very satisfactory results. The accuracy of this aid to Navigation and other instruments depends to a large extent on the D.R. Compass, the maintenance of which must be kept on “top line”. Resistance units for the D.R. Compass Master Unit are coming through slowly and it is hoped that all Units will be supplied to their requirements in the near future.
[Boxed] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY [/boxed]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Squadron] [/boxed]
[Boxed] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Unit] [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
[Boxed] ARMAMENT. [/boxed] GOOD NEWS OF HANDLING TACKLE.
With the increased weight of bombs it has been apparent that a means of handling these heavier type weapons had to be accomplished. The rolling technique was introduced and up to the present has not proved successful compatible with the speed of handling required. The super type lorry crane known as the “COLES” is in limited supply and its use divided between all Branches on Stations.
All available forms of lifting and handling tackle were recently demonstrated at R.A.F. Station Binbrook, and at the meeting held following this demonstration it was agreed that some form of crane was a necessity and it was not imperative that it should be a prime mover. It was decided that a type known as the Neal Rapid Mobile Crane Type N. would satisfy Armament requirements and a trial was immediately arranged for one of these type cranes to be put on one week’s trial at East Kirkby. This trial has proved entirely successful and we now await further supplies.
[Boxed] SBC FILLING, HANDLING AND STORAGE [/boxed]
With the introduction of the heavier type of SBC known as the Mk. VA (150 x 4lb.) certain preparation and loading problems have arisen. The man handling of the SBC weighing some 657 lbs. when filled, presents a difficulty likewise does the filling. It is apparent that a standardised procedure is a necessity. Several schemes showing promise are at present being investigated on Units within the Group, details and results are eagerly awaited.
[Boxed] BOMB LOADS INCREASED INCENDIARY [/boxed]
Standard bomb loads giving all the necessary details of Bomb Stations, Pre-selector settings, Peg Hole and time interval and false height settings are in the course of preparation and their issue to all Units will be completed early in the month.
[Boxed] “WHITLOCK” TWIN ADAPTORS [/boxed]
Production of the “Whitlock” adaptor is progressing slowly but surely and a limited number have been diverted to this Group by Headquarters No. 1 Group. It is anticipated that with the commencement of production by other manufacturers all Units within the Group will be equipped by the end of this month, thus ensuring that a standard bomb load can be ordered for all aircraft.
[Boxed] CAMOUFLAGE STATION BOMB STORES [/boxed]
This type of camouflage has been the “headache” of Armament Officers for some time past, and authority has been received for its removal in bomb stored at the discretion of Station Commanders.
[Boxed] AFTER ESCAPE HATCH [/boxed]
The fitment of flare chutes, H.2.S., F.N. 64 Turrets and the .5” under defence gun, all centre around the bung.
Aircraft fitted H.2.S. are being fitted tricell as the modification parts become available, whilst the armoured chute remains fitted to non H.2.S. aircraft. With the introduction of the .5” under defence gun the single flare chute will take a new position to be decided after trial installation. In all Squadrons except three 75 per cent F.N.64 Turrets are being withdrawn.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “BOMBFOOLERIES”. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH HANG-UP. [/underlined]
Air Bomber failed to select switch.
[TURRET DOORS FAILED TO CLOSE [/underlined]
Rear Gunner damaged door runner.
[Underlined] ARTICULATING PIPE [/underlined]
Fracture – due to obstruction. [/boxed]
[Boxed] FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failure types by Squadron] [/boxed] [Bottom right hand corner missing]
The monthly Armament Conference was held at Waddington. Minutes have been circulated. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943.
[Page break]
[Boxed] NAVIGATION [/boxed] MINIMUM GAIN FOR BEST RECEPTION
BREAKDOWN OF D.R. AFTER LEAVING TARGET
VALUABLE GROUND TRAINING.
This month’s Navigation on the whole was satisfactory, although the general standard was not as high as the preceding month’s. D.R. Navigation and allied calculations showed a considerable improvement but concentration and accurate timing at turning points did not move in parallel. On the homeward journey the chief cause of spread when reaching GEE Range is found in the initial stages after leaving the target. Most navigators do not take full advantage of the target as a pin-point. The trouble begins after “Photoflash Gone” when for the next few minutes there appears to be a complete disregard of courses and true air speed flown. This means that over 5 or 6 minutes, an aircraft may be 20 or 30 miles away from its intended position at that time, and thus the initial error creeps in. The first 5 -10 minutes flying out of the target are most important in Navigation, and if concentration and track keeping is to be maintained, the Navigator must ensure that an accurate timed run is made from “Flash Gone” to the turning point. The average indicated air speed and course flown during this run must be carefully watched, and the next course set from D.R. position - initial displacement of position after leaving the target is certainly responsible for aircraft being out of concentration and off the prescribed track when out of GEE coverage.
[Boxed] TRAINING [/boxed]
During the month’s training period most Navigators put in some good ground work and were able to brush up on certain navigational problems. It is hoped that when these training periods are arranged all Navigators will do their utmost to increase efficiency and apply the ground training to this end. You are primarily concerned with the problem of keeping the aircraft on the prescribed track at the right time, and supplying the Air Bomber with an accurate bombing wind – this requires constant practice and, above all, accuracy in calculation.
[Boxed] WIND FINDING FOR PRACTICE BOMBING [/boxed]
Until recently most Navigators were not fully alive to the fact that they are vital members of the bombing team. In the past, many approximations and inaccuracies have been made by the Navigator when finding a practice bombing wind - this has had a corresponding effect on bombing accuracy. Simple appreciation of bombing errors will prove the necessity for accurate wind finding. If an inaccurate wind is set on the bombsight, the Air Bomber’s difficulty in tracking on to the target is increased, and bombing errors will result out of all proportion to the wind vector error. The Navigator is responsible for navigating the aircraft, [underlined] and [/underlined] for providing an accurate wind to the Air Bomber, if the aiming point is to be hit. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO INCREASE OUR BOMBING ACCURACY.
[Boxed] SPECIAL MENTION [/boxed]
F/Sgt. Lawes,C.M. of 207 Squadron, produced excellent work during the month and particularly on a recent mining sortie in the Baltic. On this occasion F/Sgt Lawes produced no less than 18 good wind velocity checks, six good Polaris position lines, and one 1st class Astro fix. This log and chart have been forwarded to H.Q.B.C. for potential publication. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Your W/T, R/T, I.F.F. and TR.1196 are all U/S. What radio facility is still available for contacting ground ?
2. What is the maximum shift in wind direction over likely to be experienced at 15,000 feet when flying over a distance of 50 miles ?
3. In what order from South to North should the following be placed:-
Hull, Hamberg, Wilhelmshaven, Manchester, Stettin, Dublin, Bremen.
[Missing] which airfield in 5 Group does the Greenwich hour [missing] equal the local hour angle ?
[Missing] on the D.R. Master Unit compensated [missing P.I.
[Missing] be set at night if the [missing] U/S and all radio [missing] [/boxed]
[Boxed] FLYING CONTROL.
[Table of aircraft landing times after operations by Station]
MONTHLY AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP – 3.67 MINUTES
Syerston still lead the Group in landing aircraft quickly after operations. It is hoped, in the near future, to put to practical test several quick landing schemes which are now in preparation. Suggestions from Stations, on the question of quick landings, will be welcomed. [/boxed]
[Underlined] A.P.I’s [/underlined]
During the month, many Navigators became proficient in the operational use of A.P.I. – this instrument is already proving the value of knowing an aircraft’s true position. Interesting analysis is being carried out on certain Squadrons showing the discrepancy between the plotted, and actual air positions. In most cases the fault seems to lie in the Navigator’s faulty computation of true air speed, and his failure to check the true course, and indicated air speed more frequently. One suggestion is, that the latitude and longitude of 2 A.P.I. readings be plotted about 6 minutes apart and compared with the D.R. calculations. This method will give the true air speed and true course flown, on which E.T.A’s and Ground speed can easily be calculated.
[Boxed] THIS MONTH’S NAVIGATION “PRUNERY” [/boxed]
During the month a sortie was abandoned for the following reasons:-
1. THE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR THOUGHT THEY WERE FLYING ON A STATIC VENT AIRCRAFT – THIS WAS NOT SO !!!
2. THE NAVIGATOR APPLIED COMPASS DEVIATION IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION AND GAVE THE PILOT TWO COURSES TO STEER WHICH AFTERWARDS PROVED TO BE 6 DEGREES OUT.THE COMBINATION OF THESE ERRORS RESULTED IN A LARGE ERROR BETWEEN THE PLOTTED AND ACTUAL AIR POSITION – THIS MEANT THAT WIND VELOCITIES WERE FOUND TO BE OVER 100 MILES PER HR.
If these careless mistakes had not been made this Navigator would have found a wind velocity of 255 degrees 70 miles per hour which was in agreement with the post-met winds.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
During September very varied results have been received on different raids. The exact difference in ranges on different dates are now difficult to assess owing to the new method used in reporting. It is certain that GEE is still providing the most valuable aid to Navigators.
The enemy is now concentrating on transmitting “noise” which is proving as much a nuisance as the previous sine waves and railings. Some noise is always present if a gain has turned up over England, but a special transmitting grass would appear with low gain. This means that over the jamming areas, signals all tend to disappear into the grass as the distance from the transmitters increases. To combat this the Navigator is tempted to increase the gain so as to increase the signal strength. Instead of increasing signal strength, the result is increased grass which swamps all signals.
It is not necessarily weak signals which limit range but the grass signal ratio – if this ratio is kept low then the range will increase – and it can only be kept low by working with the lowest possible gain. Therefore, as a general rule always use [underlined] minimum gain [/underlined] and keep the focus and transference adjusted to meet the reduced gain.
[Boxed] [Underlined] LATTICE CHARTS [/underlined]
Command have decided that the I/M Miniature Lattice Charts shall become available for the Main force aircraft. These will not be issued immediately, for charts are not yet printed in quantity. When they are issued all charts for Series 2, 3 and 5 will be contained in one book conveniently folded. (Series 4 Charts which are rarely used in this Group will continue to be issued as large sheets). Each Navigator can then carry his own book of charts covering all likely areas, and it is thought that this system will be more convenient to use in the air.
The similarity of scales between Lattice and Plotting Charts will make the transference of a fix from one to the other much easier. [/boxed]
GEOGRAPHY Few of us liked Geography at school because so much of what we had to learn had no bearing on our lives. We knew of the Alps as a mountain range somewhere North of Italy, but did they ever become real until that night when we staggered back through cloud on three engines and silently prayed that we were on track ? What were the islands of Holland until we passed over them and joyfully put the nose down for home ?
War has made us all place and name conscious, but do we make the most of our opportunities ? Every sortie should add to our knowledge of Eurpoe [sic] and beyond: the shape of the land, its mountains, its rivers and lakes, its cities. Develop a habit of studying the earth over which you fly. Try to memorise your topographical maps. Your knowledge may come in useful if you ever have to walk back. [boxed]
PAGE 7.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS BAD WEATHER INTERVENES
NAZI WAR MACHINE SLOWING DOWN.
The month’s total of sorties (915) shows a very considerable decrease on last month’s record figure of 1507. This was entirely due to circumstances which are always beyond our control – a bad patch of weather from the 7th. to the 22nd. of the month, which limited the number of sorties to 28 of which 8 were recalled before reaching the target. The number of targets attacked during the month is, therefore, not an imposing one, but we are doing our best at the present moment to make up for lost time. In passing it may be of interest to recall our own experience in 1940/41, that the return of large scale bombing after a lull has an even more depressing effect on morale than an unbroken “Blitz”.
[Boxed] INDUSTRIAL TARGETS [/boxed]
Apart from one attack on Berlin, a special small scale operation in Southern France and two nights of Gardening, the month’s targets have all been industrial centres in Western and South Western Germany. Mannheim and Hannover were both attacked twice, Munich and Bochum once each. The percentage of successful attacks (89.1) is again very satisfactory; the percentage of lost aircraft (4.4) rather higher than usual, though it may be noted that four raids alone counted for 77 pre cent of our casualties.
[Boxed] BERLIN [/boxed]
The raid on Berlin on 3/4th. was a good one: the luck of the weather was with us and a providential gap in the clouds enabled a concentrated attack to be carried out. Once again the Western and South Western parts of the city suffered the most, and while the excited and extravagant accounts of neutral reporters must be taken with a large amount of salt, there is no doubt that severe damage, most of it industrial, has been inflicted on the areas of Berlin roughly corresponding to Hammersmith and Wandsworth and a severe shock has been administered to the Berlin morale at the end of the first round of the Battle of Berlin: one of the most important results of this is that a large scale evacuation of the city, which started after the raids on Hamburg, has been considerably speeded up.
The raid on Mannheim on the 6/7th. was carried out in excellent visibility, and a strong attack developed. Photographs taken on the 7th. and 9th. show that severe damage was caused on both sides of the river, and that several important factories were hit. The weather for Munich the next night was not so good, but after a scattered start two good concentration of fires were started and particularly large explosions reported.
[Boxed] A SPECIAL OPERATION [/boxed]
On the night of 16/17th. 5 Group were entrusted with the task of attempting to destroy the viaduct at Antheor near Cannes, which carries one of the main railway lines between France and Italy. At the same time, other aircraft of Bomber Command struck at the marshalling yards at Modane, where the other French-Italian line enters the Mt. Cenis tunnel. It was hoped that by this double blow to impede the flow of reinforcements to the Germans in Italy at a time when they might most desperately be needed. The viaduct was n extremely difficult target and well defended by Nature against air attack, and in spite of the most careful planning and organisation , and the close proximity of some of the bombs, only slight damage was done to the target.
[Boxed] GERMAN WAR PRODUCTION REDUCED [/boxed]
After another lull the month finished up with a series of large scale attacks. Hannover was attacked in great strength on the night of 27/28th. On neither occasion did the full weight of the attack fall on the centre of the city, but two important factories on the outskirts received very severe damage. Mannheim was strongly attacked on the night of 23/24th., the weight of the attack falling on the Southern parts of the city and Bochum on the night 29/30th. got a good hammering. All these attacks were pressed home in the face of very determined opposition, which however, never succeeded in upsetting the pre-conceived plan of attack, in spite of German claims to the contrary, nor in preventing the major part of the bomber force getting through. Already German war production is about 25 per cent below normal as a result of our air attacks, and if the present scale of attack is maintained it will soon drop to a level, below which, so the economists say, the German war machine will no longer be able to function. With every raid that day grows closer and closer.
[Boxed] [Rolls Royce logo] ROLLS ROYCE. (CONTINUED)
[Circled] From Page 1 Col. 1 [/circled]
94 of them more recently took part in the 5 Group daylight raid on the Schneider Works at Le Creuset far into the heart of France, 93 of them returned, 376 Merlin engines, well over half a million reliable horse power. It has also been chosen for use in the Mosquito reconnaissance bomber, which made it bow to the public following on the spectacular daylight raid on Quisling’s Headquarters in Oslo.
It is not, of course, possible to divulge particulars of the numbers of Merlin engines being produced. It is an established fact that during the last War the Derby Rolls-Royce factory was responsible for the output of more aero engine horse power than all the remaining British Manufacturers combined. The same spirit and quality of product is very evident during the present conflict, and the total Merlin Horse power produced so far has already reached the staggering figure of over 54 millions. [/boxed]
[Boxed] GARDENING:-
On 2nd. September, 15 Lancasters planted 90 vegetables off the Frisians. The operation was uneventful but was a useful contribution to the plastering of this area, which is going steadily on, and which, together with the strafing of shipping by Fighter and Coastal Commands is making life a misery for the enemy’s convoys and steadily cutting down his available tonnage.
Gardening has always produced the highest yield of casualties in the Baltic. It is the only way in which we can get at the enemy’s shipping there and also at the U-boats in their training grounds. Most of the German fleet, except those ships in Norway, is also in harbours in the Easter Baltic. On this occasion it was appreciated from previous sighting reports that the Lutzow was due in the area from Norway. As usual, we shall have to wait to hear the results but there is no doubt that the perseverance of the crews in making the long trip and getting mines down in the right spot in the face of considerable opposition caused great alarm and despondency as an immediate effect and the Admiralty expressed great satisfaction at the success of the operation. [/boxed]
FOREWORD by A.O.C. (CONTINUED.)
well-trained and determined crew whose errors on operations may be little greater.
Every crew in this Group must think bombing, talk bombing and practice bombing until it has an error from 10,000 feet of less than 100 yards; and there is no reason why this standard should not be achieved provided:-
1. The Air Bomber takes a personal interest in the sight and ensures that any bombing errors due to faulty adjustments in the mechanism of the sight are immediately put right by the instrument repair staff.
2. Pilot and Navigator work together so that the wind velocity found by GEE fix has a vector error not exceeding 7 miles per hour. They must study and apply the new 5 Group instructions on wind finding by GEE fixes.
3. Pilot and Air Bomber take the aircraft over the target without skid, bearing in mind that at 20,000 feet one degree of skid introduces an error of 100 yards, and there are many pilots who are unable to make small turns without skid.
4. Finally, the Captain exercises supervision over the bombing team and insists that every bombing detail is fully analysed and the causes of errors understood and rectified. That means hard work and enthusiasm.
I repeat that a crew who, with practice bombs, can achieve an error not exceeding 100 yards from 10,000 feet has shown that it takes bombing seriously, and there is no reason why, with normal luck, it should not achieve similar results on operations. Every trip by this crew will contribute to victory.
When the whole Group can put down its bombs with this accuracy the spread of the attack will be no more than the spread of the T.I’s and should be less because the aiming point is the centre of those T.I’s which are visible.
The spread of the incendiary attack must be reduced. I give that as No. 1 problem facing the Group. If it can be solved – as I believe it can – it will represent the biggest single contribution to Victory of which the Group is capable. The first step is to realise that good bombing is the result of good team work un which Pilot, Air Bomber, Navigator and Instrument Repairer all play essential parts. The second that precision bombing means precision work by each member of the team. The third is that there is no time to waste.
B.B.C. VISIT TO 5 GROUP – “AN OUTSTANDING BROADCAST.”
On the night of the 3/4th. September, Mr. Vaughan Thomas and Mr. Reginald Pidsley, both of the B.B.C., made a recording of the raid over the German capital.
How ‘F’ for Font, the Lancaster in which they were flying was attacked by a fighter over Berlin with the result that the gunners of the recording aircraft shot down their opponent, is well known to listeners all over the world.
Within three hours of landing, the B.B.C. men were speeding back to London with their precious discs.
The recordings of the trip were broadcast three times in the English programmes and on innumerable European and Foreign transmissions. It is interesting to note that the Blue Network in the United States cancelled its prog [missing] to have this recording on Sunday, [missing] described as the outstanding [missing] war.
This month [rest of this page corner is missing]
GROUP NEWS. No. 14.
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V Group News, September 1943
5 Group News, September 1943
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Five Group Newsletter, number 14, September 1943. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, an article on the Rolls Royce Merlin and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, operations, and a BBC broadcast from 5 Group.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1943-10-13
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Anne-Marie Watson
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10 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-21
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Mannheim
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1943-09
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
106 Squadron
1654 HCU
1660 HCU
1661 HCU
1668 HCU
207 Squadron
44 Squadron
467 Squadron
49 Squadron
5 Group
50 Squadron
57 Squadron
61 Squadron
617 Squadron
619 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
ground personnel
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
propaganda
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
take-off crash
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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[Underlined] 53 Base Commander [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
JANUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] [indecipherable] * NUMBER 18
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The final battle of Germany has now been joined. The enemy has been forced to concentrate two-thirds of his whole fighter strength for the protection of his citied, thus providing a classis example of the way in which air superiority, contrary to popular opinion, is won as much by the bomber as by the fighter. Crews should know that the superiority which the Russian Air Force enjoys on the Eastern Front, with all that this means to Russian military operations, is largely their doing; and the same is true of the Italian theatre.
This massing of the German fighter strength in an attempt to stop our attacks and those of the U.S.S.A.F.E. calls for serious thought on our part. In the long run the effect of the combined R.A.F. and American attacks will reduce the German fighter production so that they will be unable to support their present first line units, and the force will slowly diminish, but this is not a result which can be expected immediately, and much hard fighting lays ahead.
Bomber attacks are planned to reach the target having encountered as little opposition as possible. This is achieved by taking advantage of weather which will keep fighters on the ground, or involve them in great hazards if they take off; by careful routeing; by feint attacks; and by the full use of the radio offensive which prevents orders reaching the German pilots. In spite of this planning, scheming and foxing, a proportion of fighters are bound to get into the bomber stream. It is then that the tactics of the individual crews win or lose the battle.
There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand it may be considered that the sole duty of a crew is to reach the target and bomb it. Therefore, it is said it is imprudent to become involved in any fighting, and a crew should do its best to avoid combat and only open fire if directly attacked, and then only after failing to shake off the fighter by manoeuvre. On the other hand, while accepting that it is the object of the bomber to reach the target, refusal to engage in combat, while possibly safeguarding the individual, may by no means be the best for the force as a whole.
The German night fighter pilot must pray fervently that crews will adopt the first policy, for then he can cruise in the bomber stream unconcerned, except to find and stalk an unsuspecting prey. He will not be shot at by a bomber, which he has failed to see below him or to one side, and he can devote his whole attention to manoeuvring for the final shot. In other words he has a job almost free from the hazards of war, and as a result he will grow fat, and gain in skill and experience, and, therefore, in his ability to do us harm.
Now consider the other policy – to shoot at every German aircraft within range. About that policy I will say this. Firstly, that it is in general the duty of every combatant officer and man of any of His Majesty’s Forces to attempt by every means in their power, to destroy such of the King’s enemies as come within range. Secondly, that execution of this duty will aid the security of the bomber force as a whole, and, therefore, of the individual crew.
The matter is not, however, entirely straightforward, and there are two situations which have to be considered. Firstly, one in which a crew sees an enemy fighter not in a position to attack them but attacking, or about to attack, another bomber. They should be prepared to go in and shoot it down. At the foot of this foreword will be found some selected combats in which crews have acted in this way. They acted rightly, and deserve the congratulations of all in the Group, for they saved the lives of other crews, and rid us of pests who, if not destroyed, will quickly become adept at the art of killing at night.
The second situation is more complicated. A crew know, from their early warning device, that a fighter is nosing after them, and will soon be in a position to attack. Should they continue on their course until it is within range, and then attempt to shoot it down? Emphatically no – because the fighter in these circumstances has certain advantages which will give him temporarily the upper hand. The crew should carry out the standard corkscrew, remembering that this is designed to give the Gunners a standard deflection shot, known to them but not to the fighter pilot. Hence the importance of keeping to the exact standard speeds, rates of turn, loss and gain in height etc., set out in 5 Group Tactical Notes. Any other manoeuvre executed in the heat of action will provide the Gunners with deflection shots which, with present equipment, they have no means of calculating, but which the fighter pilot will find no more, and probably less, difficult to assess than the corkscrew.
Thus, while the standard corkscrew can be used as a manoeuvre for disengaging from enemy fighters, it is also a manoeuvre – and in fact the only manoeuvre – which we can employ and at the same time shoot accurately. Different speeds or rates of turn, or any skid or slip, may cause the Gunner to miss by 40 feet or more. In particular, too high a speed on the downward legs will lessen the rate of turn and, therefore, provide an easier shot for the fighter.
The policy outlined above was first set out in June, 1943. Over the following four months the Group shot down 58 fighters, but recently the numbers have been less, because I believe some crews are in doubt as to the correct action to take.
There is one final point; there must be no firing at an aircraft unless it is identified beyond any reasonable doubt. There have been instances in the past of Lancasters firing on other Lancasters, and there can be no justification for this.
To sum up, every crew in the Group should know that weather – routes – spoof targets and all other devices at the disposal of Bomber Command – are used to out-manoeuvre the German Fighter Force. It can only be out-fought if every crew in the Group is ready to “FORCE HIS WAY IN AND FIGHT HIS WAY OUT”. By that means we shall reduce the power of the German fighter to do us harm, to our own lasting advantage.
Need I add that the Air Gunners are playing a more and more vital part in the success of the bomber offensive. It is their quickness of eye and hand which determines success or disaster – but they are gravely handicapped if the pilot does not keep to the standard corkscrew, and may be caught unawares if the Wireless Operator relaxes his watch on his Monica or Fishpond tube. Such, then, is the team on which we rely to defeat the enemy fighters.
[Underlined] 23/24th August, 1943. J/207. [/underlined] Twin-engined enemy aircraft attacking another aircraft at 800 yards range. Rear gunner opened fore at 700 yards. Enemy aircraft broke in two and hit the ground in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 22/23rd November, 1943. P/619. [/underlined] Rear gunner saw ME109 attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster “P” turned starboard and Rear Gunner opened fire at 200 yards range and scored hits. ME.109 reversed and dived violently to port, emitting flames. Enemy aircraft disappeared in the cloud, after which an explosion was seen. ME.109 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 26/27th November, 1943. Z/44. [/underlined] Rear gunner sighted ME.210 flying to attack another Lancaster ahead. Lancaster Z corkscrewed and both gunners opened fire at 800 y ards [sic] range. Enemy aircraft followed the corkscrew and fired a burst which went well above [sic] Both gunners kept firing short burst, registering hits. Enemy aircraft seen to disintegrate by another crew, and ME.210 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 16/17th December, 1943. A/44. [/underlined] ME.109 sighted 600 yards range parallel, following another Lancaster. ME.109 opened fire on another Lancaster who did not return fire. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits. ME.109 burst into flames and disintegrated. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 30/31st January,1944.U/44. [/underlined] Over target area Rear Gunner sights ME.210 800 yards down attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster U was corkscrewing on a Monica IIIA indication. Rear Gunner opened fire and strikes were observed. Enemy aircraft dived away with port engine on fire. Last seen entering cloud in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographs with plottable ground detail obtained during January, was 73; these were almost entirely due to the conditions prevailing during the Stettin raid. For the remaining raids, the presence of heavy cloud caused the majority of technical successful exposures to be placed into the Target Conditions category.
Failures for the month were 58, which represents 5.4%. These failures can be reduced considerably if the personnel concerned will make the necessary effort, and it is suggested that still more co-operation is needed between the Bombing Leaders, Electrical, Armament and Photographic personnel in tracing the causes and ensuring that failures are not repeated. The first step in film fault analysis is to decide the ‘bombing frame’; failure to do this correctly will normally cause the investigation to be abortive and a complete waste of time.
There is reason to think that insufficient care is being exercised when setting the fusing time on the Type 35 Control. It is of the utmost importance that the fuse setting and the Type 35 Control are identical. Squadron photographers must realise that the setting is extremely critical, and even a small misadjustment of the Control Setting Knob will normally be sufficient to cause the flash illumination to be misplaced, and may therefore be considered a ‘pick-up’, resulting in a theoretical failure.
A new method of Night Photography is being tried out by Nos. 44 and 49 Squadrons. This is the use of Kodacolour film on frames Nos. 3 and 4 and H.S. night film on the remaining frames. The object of this composite Colour and Black and White is to photograph any T.I’s and Sky Markers in colour and at the same time to procure ground detail on Frame 5 by the illumination provided by the photo flash if conditions permit. The Photographic Section, R.A.F., Scampton, have undertaken to make up and process the films, and with full co-operation of the Station Workshops, have produced some very fine work.
It is too early to forecast whether this new method will generally be adopted. Much depends on the value of interpretation, supply of Kodacolour and technical equipment, but so far results are very promising.
[Table of Photographic analysis results by Squadron]
[Table of Photographic failure analysis results by Squadron]
A.S.R. (CONTINUED)
(Continued from back page Col. 1)
follows :-
(i) 256 aircrew lost their lives when other members of their crews were saved, which gives a strong indication of incorrect dinghy drill being carried out.
(ii) 23 lost their lives after having been sighted in dinghies – weather and lack of knowledge of searching procedure were the main causes for this.
(iii) 663 are known to have come down in the sea but no S.O.S. signal was transmitted making search almost impossible.
(iv) 280 disappeared over the sea without word or trace.
The above figures show that aircrews generally have a very sad lack of knowledge of what to do in the event of an emergency over the sea, both as regards W/T procedure and dinghy drills. A tremendous amount of money has been spent building up the Air Sea Rescue Service, and in providing safety equipment for aircrews, all of which can work satisfactorily with the full co-operation of the aircrews for whose benefit they have been designed.
When you bale out over enemy territory, your future welfare depends on your own initiative [underlined] after [/underlined] you have come to earth, but the reverse holds good in baling out over the sea or ditching. Emergency incidents over the sea depend for their success on full crew co-operation and knowledge of W/T procedure and dinghy drills – all of which must be gained [underlined] before [/underlined] the incident occurs.
One hour a week spent on the study of search procedure, emergency and S.O.S. W/T procedure, and dinghy drills, is sufficient to ensure that you will never be caught unprepared in case of emergency over the sea.
[Underlined] HELP A.S.R. TO HELP YOU [/underlined]
OPERATIONS
It would perhaps not be inopportune in the first month of the New Year, to reflect on one of the most valuable technical inovations introduced this time last year, and which is to-day largely instrumental in waging the Battle of Berlin with unabated vigour. It was just a year ago that blind bombing was first on trial and an analysis of its success or otherwise was anxiously awaited. This month, with the aid of this technique, we were enabled to conduct seven raids on Berlin, and one each on Brunswick and Magdeburg. Stettin alone, to its everlasting regret, was cloud free. 1341 sorties were flown, of which 89% were successful in attacking the primary. Increased fighter activity and the long range at which targets were attacked perhaps accounted for the rather higher loss rate of 4.6%.
At the beginning of this month, Hitler declared “The Winter may be difficult. Its blows, however, cannot hit us harder than last year”. The month was not out before this illusion was shattered by a sustained series of attacks on the Nazi capital, bringing the tonnage dropped since the beginning of the Battle of Berlin, to over 24,500 tons. One is perhaps best able to appreciate the magnitude of this figure when it is borne in mind that 50,000 tons would “Hamburgise” Berlin. The latest reconnaissance to secure photographic evidence of the raids up to and including 2/3rd January, was made on 4th January, but only poor quality photographs of parts of the city (excluding in particular the centre) were obtained. These however revealed important industrial damage in the Johannisthal district to the South East, with severe damage to several less important business and residential areas. It is interesting to note that in a statement issued by Transocean on 7th January, it was estimated that the damage sustained up to that date would take some 7 1/2 years to rebuild.
Little is yet known of the remaining 4 major attacks of the month against the Reich capital on 20/21st, 27/28th, 28/29th and 30/31st, except that reports suggest they were concentrated. Ground information points to the significant fact that with the possible exception of the North Eastern outer suburbs of the city, not a district in the capital has escaped. Impressive as this picture is , it really affords no index to the scale of administrative dislocation which must be a most acute problem for the Nazis; added to which the paralysis of the focus of German was industry and transport, together with the ever increasing influence of the raids on that intangible factor, morale, would also appear to promote a depressing effect on the Hun’s capacity to wage war.
The attack on Stettin on 5/6th January, provided adequate material for our reports. The blanket of cloud, which for some time past has shrouded the continent, was absent at the target, enabling the snow outlined town to be clearly identified. The resultant attack was well concentrated, and P.R.U. cover indicates severe damage in the Southern half of the town centre, extending into the West and East basins of the dock area. Ten buildings of the large military barracks to the South of the town have been gutted, and fairly heavy damage was sustained by business and residential property. The same night a
(Continued on page 4, col. 1)
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT RATE INCREASES
Halfway through January, it was apparent that the excellent accident figure for December was not to be repeated, and the number of avoidable accidents, of all kinds, by the end of the month was nearly doubled – 18 against 10.
This month’s total is made up as follows: Ground collisions – 9; Overshoots on landing – 3; Heavy landings – 1; Swings on take-off – 1; Other errors of judgement – 3.
In spite of all that has been done and written about “ground collisions” there has been no decrease whatsoever in these avoidable accidents. This month there were again 9, and they follow much the same patter as those of December, with this difference:-
Two aircraft were damaged in dispersal while being run up by ground crew, through chocks slipping on greasy surfaces. In both instances the aircraft swung round and collided with obstacles.
It has been a long time since an accident of this type occurred in the Group. The remedy is obvious. Ground crews must examine all chocks for serviceability, keep dispersals well sanded, and, above all, never start to run up engines until the dispersal is clear of obstructions. It is the old, old story of a little foresight paying a big dividend.
During this month a taxying incident occurred in which a major contributory factor was the failure of a captain of aircraft and of ground crew to notify Flying Control quickly that a Lancaster was obstructing the perimeter track. The aircraft had become bogged in soft ground just off the track at night, and was struck by another Lancaster taxying, without an aldis lamp, and at excessive speed.
Flying Control, had they known, could have taken immediate steps to have the aircraft marked as an obstruction, and could have warned other captains of its position.
This accident adds emphasis to the warning in last Month’s News that ground crew should make every effort to let pilots know of obstructions. The captain of this particular Lancaster showed bad captaincy in not notifying Flying Control, and also in leaving his aircraft in charge of ground crew when he knew it was in a dangerous position.
Needless to say, the pilot of the moving aircraft had his log book endorsed in “RED”.
The 3 “overshoots on landing” this month bring out the usual pilot error – too fast an approach in bad visibility and failure to go round again. If the various factors of height, speed, cockpit drill etc., are not correct, it is no use “hoping you’ll stop in time”. It might be all right nine times out of ten, but the tenth means another Lancaster in a heap at the end of the runway.
One crash occurred again this month on a 3-engined overshoot. The pilot was an experienced captain with many Lancaster hours to his credit, yet he [underlined] failed to keep in trim for 3 engined flying [/underlined] on his approach. When the engines were opened up to full power, the inevitable swing caught him unawares. Result was a bad crash with fatal consequences.
Drills and instructions are not issued by this Headquarters just to be read and forgotten, so if there are any you are not sure about, now is the time to brush up your knowledge. [Underlined] You [/underlined] will reap the benefit.
Conversion Units had a bad time this month. The total of nine “avoidables” exceeds the total of all the Squadrons put together. Winthorpe had four. 1660, 1654 and 5 L.F.S. had one each. 1485 Flight had two taxying accidents.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
FRESHMEN
1. Remember the lowest fuel consumption is not obtained when you are flying at the lowest possible speed. With the increased angle of attack of the wings at a low speed, you get increased drag and consequently require a greater power output. Neither maximum endurance nor maximum range will be obtained by flying as slowly as you can, so don’t “waffle” around the sky hanging on to your props. If you are getting short of petrol and have got a long way to go, try 2000 revs + 3 boost. That will give you a healthy airspeed, economical petrol consumption and excellent range.
2. You know why you can expect climbing difficulties on warm nights? The air is thinner at a given aeronoid height and so increases the true air speed at which the aircraft must be flown and the power required to fly it. The thinner air also reduces the charge drawn in to the engine and so reduces the power available.
3. Don’t sheer off track because you see pinpoints of flak dead ahead. It may be anything up to 100 miles away and as you get closer you will find that your route will probably bypass the flak area. Flak which explodes with a large orange coloured flash is within 15 mls and is quite harmless. It is only when you can hear or feel it that it is within 250 feet and getting dangerous. If you SMELL it, well get cracking.
[Cartoon]
4. Always take a note at Briefing of the times of the other waves in the attack in case you strike trouble on the way and cannot make good your T.O.T. Aim to make good the T.O.T. of another wave. It is safer to be bombing with bags of company.
5. Give your Navigator as good a platform for his Astro shots as you give your Air Bomber for his bombing run. Hand over to “George” if your instrument flying is not 100% and let the Navigator know the moment you consider the aircraft is as stable as it is likely to be.
6. If you use Caffein tablets it is a good plan to take one as you leave the English Coast outward bound. That will see you to the target. Take another when you are clear of the defences to see you home. Never take any just before take-off. Once upon a time there was a mid-upper gunner who took four tablets 10 minutes before take-off. The “Op” was scrubbed. The gunner wasn’t seen for 24 hours after he eventually went to sleep about noon the next day. Then he was posted !
VETERANS
1. Don’t get out of touch with existing orders. You have read them once, but only by constantly referring to the Flight Order books can you be sure that you have got them buttoned up. Just one example – never take off rudder bias on the approach for a 3-engined landing. You can easily control any tendency to swing after landing, but if you have to overshoot on 3 engines, the bias is the only thing that will enable you to control the immediate swing towards the dead engine at full power. If the swing is not controlled the result is fatal.
2. Another word on overshoots. You can still overshoot even though you are in the green of the G.P.I. and the airspeed is O.K. This circumstance may arise if your initial approach has been too low and you have used the extra engine to get back into the Green. Don’t forget once you have made good the undershoot throttle back again and get your angle of descent right.
3. Don’t attempt to raise flaps after landing when you have “pulled the bottle”, because there is a danger of bursting the header tank. If in an emergency you have to raise flaps in the air after pulling the bottle, do so slowly and in stages.
4. If you have to jettison fuel, close the valve while there is still 75 to 100 gallons in each tank. It is a precaution against fire, because the last 30 gallons of jettisonable fuel runs out slowly and splashes over the airframe. Never jettison if you are going to do a wheels up landing when there is any likelihood of fire.
5. Never take off flap during an approach if you suddenly decide you don’t want flap in a very high wind. The lowering of the flap increases the lift coefficient of a wing and any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the stalling speed being increased above the approach speed.
6. Get together regularly with the other members of your crew behind a hangar or in the crew room and exchange ideas on your recent trips. There’s bound to be a few points in crew routine that need patching up. Don’t wait until there is a party in the Sergeants’ Mess before you find out that the crew have a thing or two on their minds.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 3.
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SIGNALS
WIND MESSAGES
Bomber Command Signals Staff Instructions commence with an “Order of the Day” by the C.-in-C. which says that :- “The tradition of the Signals Service is that the safety of aircraft overrides every other consideration and every other interest…The Signals Service aspires never to lose an aircraft”.
Since this message was originated, many and varied aids have been introduced falling within the purview of the Signals Service which attain towards the achievement of this objective.
It is generally agreed that losses in the main bomber force may be considerably reduced if a high degree of concentration of aircraft during the route to and from the target, and at the target itself, can be effected.
Radar/Navigation aids fitted to many aircraft now make it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy, the velocity and direction of winds at the height and in the area of the main force. The means of communicating this to the Meteorological staffs on the ground, and of passing to every aircraft on the force the assessment of accurate winds on their route, is the responsibility of the Signals Service.
This method has been in use since towards the end of the Old Year, and, from the signals aspect, has been successful. The method used has been for wind-finding aircraft to transmit their winds to the Base D/F Station, and the ground staff to transmit the wind assessment to the main force on Group operational frequency.
The transmissions by Wind Finders to Bases gives an increase on the number of channels, with a better spread over of the volume of traffic at any one time. To ensure that every message which can possibly be received, is received, an additional watch is maintained at each Base on a normal receiver, and a watch, on each frequency in use, at Group Headquarters. The watch at Group Headquarters serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables received winds to be in the Meteorological Officers’ hands in the minimum time, and secondly, provides an additional check on the Base D/F frequencies. Any Wind Finding aircraft unable to establish satisfactory communication on its Base frequency, reverts to the Group operational frequency, and by these means we have been successful in receiving almost 100% of wind finding messages transmitted. There have been two occasions when conditions on the 3 to 4 m/c band made communication rather difficult, and in order to provide an additional channel should this re-occur, an allotment of a frequency in the 7 m/c band has been obtained. The results of this frequency on similar occasions, should they arise, are awaited with interest.
The reception of the wind assessments by the main force has been good, but could be improved. Generally, the number of messages missed has been in the region of 2.5% of the total which should have been received.
The loop aerial has proved a reliable selectivity device, and it should always be tried when other efforts to get rid of jamming fail.
GEE
The introduction of new equipment leaves Radar Sections less time for standard Gee maintenance. It is gratifying to note that, in spite of this, the serviceability remains high. There are however, numerous unnecessary faults, which render the equipment difficult to use, or completely unserviceable. Great care should be taken to prevent slipshod D.I’s, and faults such as leads off etc. Many Squadrons are still reporting divider trouble, indicating that the necessary modification has not been completed. If this is due to a shortage of equipment, ask the Equipment Officer to expedite.
AURAL MONICA
Aural Monica is slowly disappearing. Many crews would, however, like to keep Monica, even though they now have Fishpond. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the Radar Sections to maintain both installations in all aircraft.
VISUAL MONICA
This installation remains a most effective and valuable Radar aid. Serviceability is high in comparison with other equipment, but to be a first class warning device, 100 per cent serviceability is required. Switch motors have caused nearly one third of Visual Monica failures, but it is hoped that this trouble will soon be cleared, since the correct type of grease has now been found. Next month should show a large increase in serviceability. Unfortunately, there is no more equipment available, so squadrons must ensure that no sets remain unserviceable, or are destroyed, through careless maintenance. Many crews already owe much to Visual Monica. Don’t let the lack of serviceability spoil a first class device.
H 2 S
The fitting of H 2 S is greatly retarded by the shortage of scanners. It is impossible to fit all H 2 S aircraft in the existing squadrons, and so there is little likliehood [sic] of fitting new H 2 S squadrons for some time. Last month’s problem, freezing scanners, appears to have been corrected by use of anti-freeze oil and repositioning of the scanner heater. A new snag is now appearing in the slowing down of the repeater motors. Radar Sections should contact Instrument people for information regarding the correct type of oil to use on the motor bearings. A new pulse transformer has been designed and trials are being conducted. It is hoped that a large percentage of the very numerous H 2 S failures will now be prevented.
FISHPOND
Fishpond fitting still continues slowly, hampered by the connector shortage. Trained crews are getting very good results, but it is necessary to emphasise that Wireless Operators should spend considerable time on the Fishpond trainer. A few extra minutes learning to use the set correctly may well save many an unpleasant trip.
MONICA AND FISHPOND TRAINING
Now that all available sets have been fitted, a drive has started to eliminate preventable failures. Aircraft are being deprived of the protection of a tail warning device during entire sorties, simply because one plug is loose, or a fuse blown. We must make full use of every available set and to do this, Operators must be given a greater insight into the workings thereof. Fault finding tables – with sketches of what the CRT shows for various faults – are being prepared.
Various synthetic training schemes have been evolved, including a series of cards showing typical “blip” pictures with the appropriate patter printed underneath. A similar set of cards without the patter is used to test the Operator’s reactions.
An epidiascope is being used by one Squadron, and lifelike “blips” are introduced up and down the time base, and shown on the screen for brief intervals.
Which squadron will produce the best synthetic training device?
Signals and Radar officers – are you getting that occasional flight? (See A.M.O. A.1323/43). You should all have flown with Monica or Fishpond by now. Don’t forget to enter your trips in the old log book.
WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR)
[Underlined] (CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO LOOK) [/underlined]
The article on wind finding from the signals aspect, which heads this Section of the News, should be read and digested by all Wireless Operators.
The Group W/T Exercise has improved this month, but Section I are definitely superior to Section II, and should any Operators of Section II doubt the truth of this statement they may like to do a little eavesdropping. After all, the ether is free.
This month’s three star effort for air operating was the performance by Wireless Operator Sgt. Barnes Moss of No.61 Squadron (formerly of 1661 Con. Unit and 16 O.T.U.), on the night of 5/6th January. The aircraft “J”Jig was severely damaged over the target, the port outer engine being rendered unserviceable, resulting in a loss of the Gee facilities. Sgt. Barnes Moss rose to the occasion and managed 12 fixes, 1 bearing and 1 message, keeping a good log, and also receiving the odd Group broadcast at the same time. It would appear that this Wireless Operator set about his job with calm determination, and was partly responsible for the safe return of his aircraft to this country, and in doing so proved a credit to his Squadron, captain and crew.
(continued on Page 12, Col.1)
(Continued from Page 2, Col.3)
small force of our aircraft successfully laid mines.
Although for the moment we are without precise information as to the result of the raids on Brunswick on 14/15th, and against Magdeburg and Berlin on 21/22nd, preliminary reports show promise of impressive returns. These attacks will contribute to the nomadic population of the Reich, and provide a tinge of irony to the announcement in a Frankfurt paper that “Evacuees are not gypsies but Germans”.
Thus ends the first month of our “decisive year, boasting a new record tonnage dropped on Germany itself – a portent of the scale of future operations.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 4.
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AIR BOMBING
It was at the beginning of May, 1943, that the initial drive on greater accuracy in practice bombing was commenced throughout the Group. Very good co-operation by the Squadrons within the Group led to most intensified training, so much so that in the months of May, June, July and August a grand total of 23,310 bombs were dropped. This total almost equalled the number of bombs that were dropped in the preceding [underlined] 4 years. [/underlined] However, one fact emerged, namely the average error was remaining at approximately the same figure, and that this figure, 220 yards, was still much too high.
September heralded the introduction of bombing analysis. F/Lt. Cooper, an expert analyst was attached to us from No. 25 Group and travelled from Squadron to Squadron to implement the Group’s very scanty knowledge of assessment of bombing. Thus, slowly we learned the way bombing errors are split into certain definite categories. The first major item which was tackled was the bombsight maintenance, which had contributed no small portion of bombing errors; and by the end of November, errors directly attributable to bombsight defects were almost eliminated.
We next learned that the main error, called Crew Error, had two components. The error caused by the failings of Pilot and Air Bomber, and the Vector Error, that is the error due to the use of faulty wind velocities.
The Pilot and Air Bomber’s error was tackled with considerable vigour until, by the end of December we were really getting down to very small proportions. 106 Squadron for instance, dropped 182 bombs from High Level during December for an average Pilot/Air Bomber error of 78 yards, an astonishingly good achievement. 619 Squadron with 101 yards, 467 with 115 yards and 50 and 463 Squadrons with 116 and 117 yards respectively were close behind.
However, and now we come to the major bombing problem, our Crew Errors were still too large because our average Vector Errors were much too high.
November/December and January has shown the gradual appreciation of this Vector Error problem, and in the Squadrons where bombing is accepted as the be-all and end-all of 5 Group (and their number is ever-increasing) the problem is a matter of real concern. The Group’s average Vector Error for November was 169 yards at 10,000 feet, in in December 162 yards, and these figures convert to roughly 13 m.p.h. A good Vector Error is considered to be 5 m.p.h. (that is 60 yards at 10,000 feet) and it is to this figure Crews must make their way.
When this is achieved, and it will come only with the greatest flying care by the pilots and the most accurate plotting, timing and computing by the Navigators, then a crew will be able to take up 6 bombs, drop them in a close group of less than 50 yards radius with the Mean Point of Impact less than 70 yards from the target. Then, and not until then, can we call ourselves BOMBER CREWS.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt.Walmsley) submits the following “Stop Press” news on the Vector Error problem.
(continued in next column)
“ F/O. Ingleby, a Navigator of 619 Squadron has spent a great deal of time on trying to find out why such large Vector Errors occur. He back-plotted a navigator’s bombing wind, [underlined] to a much larger scale, [/underlined] and discovered that a 15 seconds error in timing over 6-7 minutes gave a Vector Error of 10 m.p.h., that is 130 yards at 10,000 feet. “
The wind found, in the words of the Navigator, brought us from Nottingham to Base on E.T.A. “
Agreed that such a wind would, because an error up to 300-400 yards in track and 1/2 to 1 second in time is almost unnoticeable, but it is such small and apparently insignificant Navigation Errors that cause displacement of bombs from the target to distances up to 200 to 250 yards away.
COMPETITION BOMBING
A much better show was put up by the Squadrons this month in the Competition, the results of which are as follows:-
Pilot & Air Bombers Navigators
1st 106 Sqdn – 58 yds 1st 630 Sqdn – 87 yds
2nd 619 Sqdn – 82 yds 2nd 106 Sqdn - 124 yds
3rd 630 Sqdn – 92 yds 3rd 619 Sqdn – 183 yds
4th 57 Sqdn – 118 yds 4th 57 Sqdn – 264 yds
Further entries with less than [underlined] 8 [/underlined] qualifying exercises.
5th 50 Sqdn – 74 yds 5th 467 Sqdn -110 yds
6th 463 Sqdn -129 yds 6th 50 Sqdn – 119 yds
7th 61 Sqdn -145 yds 7th 61 Sqdn -163 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -158 yds 8th 463 Sqdn -165 yds
9th 207 Sqdn -165 yds 9th 44 Sqdn -176 yds
10th 44 Sqdn -221 yds 10th 207 Sqdn -220 yds
No entries were submitted by 9 & 49 Sqdns. Next month we want a TOTAL all-out effort!
[Table of High Level Bombing Training by Squadron showing Error Rates]
[Underlined] OUTSTANDING BOMBING DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 10,000 ft.
[Underlined] 9 W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined] F/O. Prior P/O. Gall 66 yds
[Underlined] 50 F/O. Robinson [/underlined] F/O. Lavery Sgt. Sanderson 84 yds
[Underlined] P/O. Dobbyn [/underlined] Sgt. Jackson F/O. Horner 66 yds
61 P/O. Wallis Sgt. Pardoe F/Sgt. Tozer 67 yds
F/O. Fitch F/O. Lyons. F/O. Jennings 86 yds
106 F/O. Latham F/O. Martins F/L. Williamson 89 yds
P/O. Lee F/Sgt. Hoyland F/Sgt. McKie 81 yds
P/O. Gibbs F/O. Cramp F/Sgt. Appleyard 75 yds
F/Sgt. Rosser Sgt. Goss F/Sgt. White 61 yds
F/O. Lee F/O Beven F/O. Langrish 95 & 72 yds
P/O. Pezaro Sgt. Greenwood Sgt. Wade 63 yds
[Underlined] 463 P/O. Saunders [/underlined] Sgt. Govett Sgt. Falconer 84 yds
[Underlined] F/Sgt. James [/underlined] F/Sgt. Bowes F/O. Pettitt 92 yds
630 W/Cdr. Rollinson F/Sgt. Rosser F/L. Ehrman 88 yds
1654 C.U. F/Sgt. Page F/O. Braithwaite F/Sgt. Fair 99 yds
F/Sgt. Perry Sgt. Duncombe Sgt. Hather 84 yds
Sgt. Paterson Sgt. Hall Sgt. Rice 90 yds
1661 C.U. F/Sgt. Falsted F/Sgt. Hancock Sgt. O’Connor 95 yds
617 Squadron obtained 11 exercises with less than 100 yards average error, and the following :
S/Ldr. Suggitt F/O. Davidson W/O. Gordon 30 yds
[Table of Additional Bombing Training by Squadron, including bombs dropped, error, A.M.B.T. hours, infra-red exercises, traces and T. & D. runs & indirect attacks]
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 5.
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AIR BOMBING (CON)
“GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS
[Underlined] 61 Squadron’s [/UNDERLINED] (F/Lt. McDonald) bombing figures for December failed to include the month’s best week of bombing because the return affecting that week was mislaid. 15 exercises were carried out, 77 bombs being dropped for an average Crew Error at 10,000 feet, of 177 yards. Vector Error averaged 126 yards and Pilot’s and Air Bomber’s error was 129 yards.
Congratulations to the Bombing Staff off [underlined] No. 5 LANCASTER FINISHING SCHOOL, R. A. F. [/underlined] Syerston, who, under the guidance of W/O. Linnett, constructed an excellent small instructional display of ‘Paramatta’ and ‘Wanganui’ attacks showing the danger of incendiaries “creep-back”.
Group Captain Evans-Evans, R.A.F. Coningsby, has pointed out that [underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Walmsley) in the first two weeks of January AIMED 36 day and 54 night Practice Bombs and not one of these 90 bombs were “aimed” below 8,000 feet.
To quote the Station Commander – “a real effort on all crews’ part to bomb as near operational height as possible.”
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S., R.A.F. Syerston [/underlined] (F/Lt.Wonham.) reports the most creditable attainment of 12,300 feet average height for all practice bombing during January. This is what we want !!!
[Underlined] 467 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. McCarthy) reports yet a further “Mod” to the Bomb Aimer’s compartment.
To quote :-
“The stationary lights do not supply illumination to points where they are needed, i.e. the lamp on the bombing instrument panel does not afford enough light to read the pre-selector box and no light is in position to check camera leads. A “wander” light has been installed above the selector box and will supply any part of the nose for any job including map reading”.
5 Group will seek permission to make this modification general as soon as possible.
Thank you, 467 !!!
It is pointed out that [underlined] 49 Squadron [/underlined] are doing a considerable amount of bombing training which does not appear in the normal returns.
This training is in the form of blind bombing using H2S, which is achieving considerable success.
[Underlined] 617 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Hay) reports that average bombing error for December was 90 yards – on one [underlined] operation [/underlined] during January the Squadron’s average error was 94 yards from 12,000 feet. Enough said !!!
In column 2 will be found an article by F/Lt. Hay on the “617” bombing team, as promised in the December issue.
“GEN” FROM WAINFLEET
Despite 8 days and 15 nights unfit for bombing training, Wainfleet plotted [underlined] 2398 [/underlined] bombs dropped by 363 aircraft during the month. All Squadrons used the range for night training, special mention being made of 617, 106, 207 and 619 Squadrons who aimed 155, 60, 51 and 50 bombs respectively.
[Boxed] LATE ENTRY FROM 49 SQUADRON FOR COMPETITION
Bombing Error – 156 yards
Navigator’s Error – 124 yards [/boxed]
THE SECRET OF 617 SQUADRON’S HIGH STANDARD OF PRACTICE BOMBING.
The S.A.B.S. – Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber Team.
The excellent results gained by crews of 617 Squadron using the SABS have only been achieved by the fullest, most practical use of the “Bombing team”. Before any bombs are dropped some four hours training on the specially adapted A.M.B.T. are carried out by the Pilot and Air Bomber to give manipulation practice to the latter, and to familiarise the pilot with the B.D.I. (Bombing Direction Indicator). The Navigator is trained to carry out compution of true height and airspeed, and settings for a given course of attack with the instruments and computers at his disposal. Some 2 - 4 hours are then spent in the air doing “dummy runs”, firstly on objects “on track”, and then choosing targets and “turning on”, and finally on to targets and setting up sight in accordance with settings computed from known navigational data. The sight is only accurate when correct height above target is set. Thus the pilot must fly at the indicated height he states he will be at, the Navigator must correctly compute this to the true height above target, and the Air Bomber set this accurately.
True height is dependent upon :-
(i) [Underlined] Sea Level Pressure at Target. [/underlined] This is gained by setting aerodrome height for practice bombing or, operationally, from Form 2330. It is the Q.F.F. which is set.
(ii) [Underlined] Indicated Height above Sea Level. [/underlined] All 617 Squadron altimeters have been accurately calibrated for every 1000’ for 140 and 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. and from the appropriate card the Navigator allows for this error, which may be up to 300’
(iii) [Underlined] Temperature. [/underlined] “Thermometer, Air, Direct Reading, Mk.I”, now fitted, does not give an accurate reading for temperature of the outside air, as (a) the stem is heated by cabin temperature, and (b) the outside air bearing against the bulb is under pressure varying with airspeed. Both factors tend to give a “warmer” reading than true. Again the Navigator computes from a special computer to get an accurate air temperature.
With these factors and the use of an ICAN computer, true height (c) can be computed. True height above target will need a deduction of target height above sea level, and there will be a further allowance (addition) to be made where stick bombing is being used.
When the pilot advises IAS with aircraft trimmed and bomb doors open, the Navigator computes a T.A.S. which is used against a Trail scale for the appropriate bomb number. Errors of + or – 5 m.p.h. make negligible ground errors. Most errors in range can be traced to (1) flying at other than the indicated height stated by the pilot, (2) incorrect compution of height and/or T.A.S., by the navigator, or (3) by incorrect settings or bad manipulation, by the Air Bomber.
The sight will automatically correct for Drift and Ground Speed if switched on with the target in the graticule, and held there by proper manipulation of the sight by the Air Bomber, and by the pilot following the direction of his B D. I., until such time as the point of release is attained. Those who remember the A.B.S., and who used it to its utmost efficiency, realise that the length of run could be considerably decreased if settings were applied before the run. As the heading of attack is generally known, the navigator just prior to the run, can pass a drift and G/S setting to the Air Bomber. So, after practice, the Air Bomber need only wind his sighting head back for a 25 second run, whereas 40 -50 seconds may be required without these settings.
Let us listen to a typical 617 Squadron bombing run :-
Pilot. “Turning on to a heading of 250°”
Nav. “250° - drift 4° port, G/Setting 17”
A/B acknowledges, directs pilot on and calls “Run stated”, at the appropriate moment. After 30 seconds of concentration, but silence, by Pilot and Air Bomber, we hear :-
A/B. “ Bombs gone, good run here, drift 3° port, G/S 16.5 “, and after time of fall “ Bomb plotted, 10 yards overshoot “.
Pilot. “Sorry, my fault, I was 120 ft. high!!
When results are received from the Range, the team assembles about the plotting table to further sort out factors causing any errors.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
A hearty welcome to F/Lt. Lowry ex 3 Group who has arrived in this Group to become Bombing Leader to 44 Squadron, R.A.F., Dunholme Lodge.
F/O. Jacombs (463 Squadron) was 1st and F/O. Abbot (106 Squadron) was 3rd, both with “A” Categories on No. 74 Bombing Leaders’ Course. This is a particularly good show on the part of these two Officers. F/O. Jones (49 Squadron) obtained a “B” category on the same Course, being 15th.
[Cartoon of two WAAFs] Dot and Dark – the immaculate W.A.A.F’s – “… and don’t you suggest he made the first Begin Approach…”]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 6.
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NAVIGATION
Concentration, track keeping, and Navigation generally improved during the month. This was largely due to the efficiency of the selected wind finders and to the working of the Wind Finding Scheme as a whole. The selected wind finders’ results have been carefully analysed and it is now possible for the Met. Section at Group Headquarters to place certain degrees of reliability on the information which is passed back from individual crews. Special mention is made here of F/Lt. Townsend – Pilot, and F/O. Haxby, Navigator, of No.57 Squadron who have proved to be most reliable as wind finders; they have consistently sent back accurate wind information which was used as a basis for future winds transmitted to all 5 Group aircraft. It is hoped that all crews selected for this special duty will reach a 100% reliability standard, and send back wind information which will not only be of great value to non-wind finding crews in the Group but to many other crews in the Command.
It has been suggested in some quarters that transmitting winds from aircraft over enemy territory renders the aircraft more susceptible to Freya and Wurtzburg plotting, and therefore to greater danger from vectored fighters, flak and searchlights. As far as the losses in this Group show, there is absolutely no foundation in fact for this belief, so that crews need have no qualms about using the W/T transmitter. They should regard their transmissions as a valuable means of helping all the other aircraft to keep to the planned route.
It was particularly emphasised in the December Monthly News that all Navigators must continue to find winds whenever possible and to check accuracy of their wind finding with broadcast winds. Many crews are not doing this, but are content to use all broadcast winds without checking their accuracy. This practice is a dangerous one, and can easily lead a crew into trouble. Assume that the Navigator has rechecked his calculations and is satisfied that the course and airspeeds flown are those for which he is calculating. The winds found by this Navigator are the only ones on which a revised wind could be based should the aircraft get into difficulties as a result of using the broadcast wind. It is imperative, therefore that all Navigators check, and re-check, the wind velocity whenever a good air position and fix are obtained simultaneously. Your ability to find accurate wind velocities may mean that you will be selected as a Group wind finder, and that in consequence, the main force concentration and track keeping will be directly affected by your efficiency.
5 GROUP SPOOF ATTACK 21/22ND JANUARY
Reference must be made here to the Spoof Attack carried out by 22 aircraft of this Group on BERLIN. Theirs was not considered a desirable mission, and the success of the attack makes the job they did all the more noteworthy. It seems that this small attack drew off the enemy fighters from the stream of the main force aircraft which attacked Brunswick at the same time, and the combats recorded on the two routes bear this out.
The return from this raid was flown over 10/10ths cloud almost the whole way. Route Markers were dropped by our own aircraft along this route and winds were broadcast by 57 “C” for the assistance of the rest of the force. Only one aircraft failed to return from this attack, which emphasises the general quality of the Navigation and the careful pre-flight planning employed.
A.P.I.
Supplies of A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have now been received in the Group and they will be sufficient to equip all H 2 S aircraft. Any surplus A. P. I’s will be distributed to the non-H 2 S Squadrons. This method of distribution was decided on so that the maximum assistance in windfinding would be available in certain Squadrons. Their help will be to the benefit of all non-H 2 S squadrons.
Fitting is going on as rapidly as possible in all squadrons.
M/F FIXES
In the past many Navigators have considered that to request a fix from the W/Op means an admission of defeat in their job as a Navigator. If the security of the aircraft is in danger and the Navigator is temporarily uncertain of his position when returning from operations, then he should not hesitate to obtain a fix.
This of course must only be resorted to in emergency, otherwise aircraft which urgently require W/T assistance are unable to receive from the M/F Station until it has dealt with the first aircraft. Recently a fix was requested from Heston, (Section D) by an aircraft returning from the South from operations. This was not obtained, although a position line was given instead. (The significance of this was not appreciated by the Navigator). If a line bearing is received in reply to a request for a fix, it normally means that the aircraft is in transit with the base line of the M/F Stations. This Navigator should have requested another fix about 15 minutes later from the same M/F Station, or better still should have asked the W/Op to change over to Section N.
STRAIGHT FROM THE O R S’s MOUTH
A system of Raid Assessment has now been in operation in 5 Group since May, 1943. The system has progressed, and ways and means to improve it are considered daily. The objects of the system are (i) to try to discover [underlined] quickly [/underlined] what went right or what went wrong with each attack, and (ii) to consider over a period what lessons can be learnt. In this way, it is hoped, future attacks may be conducted with greater precision and reduced casualties.
Each Station has a copy of the teleprinted O.R.S. (R) form – the information on this form, the additional data on raid reports and the details of combats, will enable Stations to draw their own conclusions. Finally, the Group Raid Assessment Report, the statistical Chart and track keeping diagram, furnish as complete a picture of each attack as is possible at the moment.
The consideration of the salient features of each assessment means that the plans for each subsequent attack can be more carefully prepared. Aerial warfare has now become a highly scientific affair, and as with all scientific ventures, rapid future progress depends on intelligent deductions from a fund of accurate and ‘up to date’ facts.
Aircrew will, therefore, realise that the navigational and other ‘gen’ which is collected from them at interrogation is not just another ‘bind’. This ‘gen’ is of the greatest importance, and must be given with the utmost accuracy which the conditions under which it is obtained permit.
GEE
Range on Gee increased on the raids towards the end of the month, particularly on the Berlin operation of January 30/31st when fixes were obtained of XF frequencies up to 8 E, with position lines still further. If this excellent reception continues, there should be a marked improvement in concentration and timing. With regard to position lines, these may be the means of keeping within the 10 mile band of concentration, particularly if the track runs parallel to the Gee lines, and Navigators should endeavour to make the utmost use of Position Lines wherever possible.
From reports sent in after each operation it appears that some navigators are relying solely upon the XF frequencies on the RF unit 25 and not attempting to use the RF unit 24. When reception fades on the unit 25 navigators should insert the Unit 24, and at least endeavour to find out whether reception is better on this or not.
Whilst the usual technical failures still occur due to deterioration of components, serviceability on the whole has been good, but unfortunately the odd manipulation fault crops up now and again, and every effort must be made by navigators, (particularly those on H2S Squadrons) to remain proficient in the operation of the set, and in the correction of simple faults. (See the Navigation Quiz).
With the introduction of miniature lattice charts, errors in the plotting and transferring of fixed should be reduced to the minimum. However, these charts do not cover certain areas and navigators must carry the large charts for those areas until miniatures are published.
It is hoped that a North Eastern chain will be available within a month, to cover the present blank areas of the Western North Sea.
[Boxed] [Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. J.H. Evans, D.F.C. – H.Q. No.5 Group to 49 Sqdn. as Flt. Commander.
S/Ldr. J. Vivian, D.S.O., D.F.C. – No. 57 Sqdn. to H.Q. No. 5 Group as Group Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. R.H. Schofield, (H2S Instructor) – H.Q. No. 5 Group to Fiskerton. (Stn.Navigation Officer)
F/O. W.T. Haxby, D.F.C. – 57 Sqdn.to H.Q. 5 Group (Radar Nav.)
F/Lt. P.F. Bailey. – 1661 C.U. to 619 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. P.M. Materkeyn – 93 Group to 44 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. B. Asson, D.F.C. – 44 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to 10 O.T.U.
F/Lt. M.J. Baud. – 207 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to SPILSBY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/Lt. W.M. Burnside, DFC. – No 5 LFS. (Sqdn Navigation Offr.) to BARDNEY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/O. Parker. 44 Sqdn. to 207 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/O. R.O. Beattie. 207 Sqdn. to 5 L.F.S. SYERSTON [/boxed]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
Navigation (Cont.)
H 2 S
Training on H 2 S has progressed satisfactorily during the month, but once again bad weather and cloud have prevented much blind bombing, and until this training is given, crews cannot be considered fully trained.
Serviceability during this month has been quite up to standard considering the difficulties of replacement and our main worry at the present time is failure due to bad manipulation. Failures such as these can only be overcome by constant practice both in the air and on the ground. Ground training is essential, and with Ground trainers now installed at 1660 and 1661 Con. Units, and 49 57 and 630 Squadrons, there should be less reason for manipulation failures in the future.
Intelligent use was made of the H 2 S in operations this month, and many operators are finding it a great help in avoiding defended areas. Navigational fixes are being obtained up to 40 and 50 miles by some operators, but still 17% of the fixes are wrongly taken or plotted. With the advent of broadcast W/Vs there is even greater need for accuracy in D.R. and the navigator must work in close co-operation with the Air Bomber if they wish to make the most of H 2 S.
A few simple rules such as the following should result in greater accuracy in navigation with H 2 S :-
(i) Pre-flight planning must be looked upon by the Navigator and Air Bomber as an essential part of the operation, and they must work in close conjunction with each other. The Navigator should point out to the Air Bomber all features from which fixes are likely to be required, and their Flight Plan E.T.A’s. The Air Bomber must draw in the tracks on a Mercator Plotting Chart, clearly ring all recommended H 2 S landmarks and mark in their Flight Plan E.T.A’s.
(ii) This close co-operation must be maintained in flight, and the Navigator must inform the Air Bomber from time to time of the aircraft’s D.R. position and alterations in E.T.A’s, which he must mark on his chart. The Air Bomber must be allowed time to take a fix and the Navigator must cross check all fixes used. To save time and unnecessary chatter over the inter-com. the Air Bomber could be taking fixes and entering them on a log form giving time, place, bearing and distance, or, the Bomb Aimer can make a track crawl on a chart of his own, so that the Navigator will be able to choose any suitable fix at any time.
Remember, it is the reliability of fixes that matters, not the quantity.
The reliability of H 2 S is dependent upon the accuracy of the D.R. Navigation, and conversely without frequent reliable fixes the D.R. becomes increasingly inaccurate. The H 2 S must, therefore, be used to increase the accuracy of the D.R. navigation.
GARDENING
On 5/6th January, 49 Squadron provided 6 aircraft fitted with special equipment, to plant vegetables in the approaches of SWINEMUNDE. This force was detached from the main stream (bound for STETTIN) close to the gardens, and re-joined shortly after planting. This operation was the first of its kind to be carried out entirely with special equipment, and one of the first from high altitude (12,000 feet). Five out of six aircraft planted successfully on a timed run from the pinpoint. The sixth was unable to pinpoint due to failure of special equipment and descended to the lowest permissible height as briefed; being still unable to pinpoint visually, due to cloud, the vegetables were correctly jettisoned in a previously ordered position. The importance of the sea routes here is their use for supplying the Russian front – and by the look of things on the Leningrad front – for repatriation purposes. There is every indication that the vegetables went into the right “hole”, but definite information on the results is hard to come by from such distant places.
The raising of the maximum height for dropping mines to 15,000 ft., has made gardening possible, with reasonable safety, in many areas hitherto immune, and where the presence of mines will present an even worse problem to the enemy than hitherto.
The Bombing Development Unit has carried out trials which prove conclusively that, contrary to expectation, the mine has an extremely consistent flight, and figures for drift due to wind have also been found.
Allowances for Forward Travel and drift due to wind can, therefore, easily be made.
The Command planted 1100 vegetables during the month – 3 Group were responsible for 833. Gardens visited were many and varied, the most densely sown being those off the ELBE, WESER, and EMS; KIEL BAY; the FRANCH COAST U-BOAT BASES.
-“Where angels fear to tread”
In seemly and imposing state, th’elect of God conferred,
The operations staff did hang upon their spoken word.
Save which, the room all silent was, and deathly as the tomb,
(Though sound of trotting horsed permeated through the room)
Tranquility [sic]was shattered as a vulgar voice did rant
“Connect me please with Swinderby, for Swinderby I pant”
The Lords of all creation ceased. A frozen silence fell;
The D.S.O. was seized, and cast into a dungeon cell.
And there without a trial doth the poor wretch meditate,
The sins of other people, for whose crimes he’ll meet his fate.
Let those who keep the watches now resolve they never will
Repeat th’offence, the cure for which is published in the drill.
ANON. CIRCA. 1944.
LINK TRAINER
[Table showing Link Trainer use by Squadron]
ASTRO COMPASS
The astro compass is a precision instrument for checking courses against any heavenly body. In this Command, however, it is rarely used, and even then only for sights on the Pole star.
The Astro compass in its present form is a precision and somewhat complicated instrument, and it is suggested that a much simpler instrument should serve the purpose equally well. This Headquarters is experimenting with a very simplified Astro Compass, and as soon as it is ready for trials, Squadrons will be informed and asked to give their criticisms.
The DR and P4 Compasses should be checked approximately every 15 minutes, and also after every major alteration of course. If these two compasses agree within 2 degrees, then it is not considered essential to check them by use of the Astro Compass. If however, they do not agree within these limits an immediate check should be made of the D.R. Repeaters and the Master Unit. If the compasses still disagree, then a check should be made to ascertain which is correct.
NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ
1. What is the safety height over :-
(a) North Yorkshire.
(b) S.W. England.
(c) Lincolnshire.
(d) West Scotland.
2. What M/F Sections would you use if you were approaching Cornwall (a) from the Wexford region, (b) from the Cherbourg region?
3. Which is the shortest distance from Berlin – Lincoln or Leningrad?
4. Assume your aircraft is engaged on a dinghy search. The W/Op receives an S.O.S. on 500 K/Cs. What immediate action should be taken by the Navigator.
5. If none of the 6 pin sockets on the V C P give a proper picture on the screen, two separate actions can be taken by the navigator. What are they? (N.B. The V.C.P. light is on all the time.)
6. What is the recommended method of search to be used when engaged on dinghy search?
Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
TRAINING ON SQUADRONS
Checks carried out recently reveal that the standard of knowledge on tactics and the corkscrew among Air Gunners is well below the high standard required. It would appear that insufficient time is being allocated to “vetting” air gunners on arrival, and ensuring that their knowledge is retained by constant practice and instruction. It is a simple matter to get the gunners together and hold a quiz on these subjects; naturally some will be on leave, others flying or sick, but if this is carried out regularly all the gunners will receive checks.
This check can be carried out whenever gunners have a few minutes to spare and requires no equipment. All that is required is to ensure that every gunner on every Squadron knows automatically the sequence of the corkscrew manoeuvre, the correct deflection and how to give a clear picture to the remainder of the crew of what is going on during an attack. Squadron Gunnery Leaders recently attended a two day course at R.A.E. Farnborough. This was primarily concerned with the function of ice in oxygen equipment, and should have been passed on to the gunners. It included quite a few valuable tips on the care of this equipment and how to keep it working in severe icing conditions.
FIGHTING CONTROL EXERCISE
An excellent scheme for carrying out the Fighting Control exercise at night on the ground is contained in the February issue of “TEE EMM”. It will be found on page 274; it requires little equipment and can be carried out on the aerodrome, and also gives good practice in night vision training.
10 DAY SIGHTING COURSE AT NO.1 A.A.S. MANBY
This course has recently been started with the object of providing expert sighting instructions, with particular emphasis on the assessment of Gyro films.
During the first few courses it was found that adjustments to the syllabus had to be made, and now the course has settled down to what might be termed an advanced sighting course; the subject is covered more thoroughly even than the C.G.S. course, and any prospective candidate should ensure that he has a thorough knowledge of the G2 notes, as a lack of preliminary knowledge has caused the downfall of several air gunners who have attended the course.
The vacancies on this course are very few, and only gunners who are keen on sighting and have already proved their worth as instructors, should be submitted.
FLYING CLOTHING FOR AIR GUNNERS
During the two-day course which the Gunnery Leaders attended at Farnborough, a discussion was held with the officers responsible for the design and production of clothing and oxygen equipment, and most interesting “gen” was obtained. Here are a few of the new items to be produced :-
New type Oxygen Mask (H) which is much smaller, lighter in weight, causes less obstruction to downward vision and houses a much smaller microphone.
(Continued in column 3)
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBATS – 155
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 K 2/3.1.44. ME.110
61 J 2/3.1.44. ME.210
207 D 5/6.1.44. JU. 88
49 U 5/6.1.44. ME.109
49 K 14/15.1.44. TE/EA
[Underlined] 463 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 W 21/22.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 T 28/29.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 467 T 30/31.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
44 U 30/31.1.44. ME.210
[Underlined] 50 X 30/31.1.44. TE/EA [/underlined]
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 O 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 L 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 V 1/2.1.44. JU. 88
44 A 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 R 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 M 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 G 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 K 2/3.1.44. Unidentified
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
49 H 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 P 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 467 C 5/6.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
106 V 5/6.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 R 5/6.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 J 14/15.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 F 14/15.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
49 M 14/15/.1.44. JU. 88
630 Z 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
44 L 14/15.1.44. ME.110
207 M 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
207 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190
49 H 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 9 T 21/22.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 G 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 J 21/22.1.44. ME.109
207 K 21/22.1.44. ME.210
207 K 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 K 21/22.1.44. ME.109
57 O 27/28.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 M 27/28.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
49 J 28/29.1.44. TE/EA
106 G 28/29.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 B 28/29.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
49 J 30/31.1.44. ME.110
DAMAGED (Continued)
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 L 30/31.1.44.JU.88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 D 30/31.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 P 30/31.1.44. ME.109
630 P 30/31.1.44. T/E
57 G 30/31.1.44. DO.217
All except G/106 28/29th and G/57 30/31st have been confirmed by Command.
OMITTED FROM LAST MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
44 Z 16/17.12.43. T/E E/A
(confirmed by Command)
The type “E” heated lining is to have more heating elements in the knees and seat, heated gloves are to have extra heating elements, and the high wattage socks to have the heating slightly reduced.
A new glove with all the heating elements in the back to give better grip and a more positive control over the equipment when handled with the gloves on, is on the way.
A silk glove, which has had the finger tips dipped in Latex to give a coating of rubber and enable even small articles to be picked up with ease, has been experimented with.
A flap has been attached to the neck of the flying helmet in order to exclude draught; this flap is made to go inside the flying suit and form a seal around the neck, which keeps the draught out and the heat in.
With the introduction of the new oxygen mask and microphone, the inter-com lead is taken round the back of the helmet, this making for more freedom of movement.
Production on the Taylor Suit has ceased but as there is still a large number in service, the new suit will not be seen for some time.
STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER
The first of these trainers to appear in the Group is being erected at Fiskerton and by the time this “News” reaches the Squadrons, it should be in working order. The trainer provides for deflection practice and range estimation, aircraft recognition, zone sightings and also produces tracer simulation. The trainer will shortly be adapted to take the Mark II Gyro Sight as 49 Squadron have been fortunate enough to be selected for the installation of this sight. The sight is similar to the one now in use as an assessor in the Group, but has a range component which enables the range to be fed into the sight by means of foot pedals operated by the gunner. It is a reflector sight with much improved dimming controls on the graticules; in short, all the gunner has to do is to make settings on the sight for height and airspeed, place the moving graticule on the target, estimate the range, and he cannot miss.
Considerable practice is required in the manipulation of this sight, and the free gunnery trainer has been installed for that purpose.
(Continued on page 13, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.18. JANUARY, 1944. PAGE 9.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
GUNS AND TURRETS
Guns freezing, combined with sluggish turrets, due to the extreme cold conditions experienced on operational sorties, sets a problem which is, at present, being tackled in several ways.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined] The exclusion of moisture from the moving portions will, it is considered, be ensured by the fitting of gun ejection slot seals which have been issued to all units in the Group.
There is little point in fitting ejection seals if guns are being tested or cocked after being fully loaded for operations, as the ejection seal will be broken. After the seal is broken, moist air entering the ejection slot is sure to freeze under certain conditions, and a cure for this cannot be found by the application of Anti-Freeze oils.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined] From reports received, turrets appear to give various troubles, when subjected to extreme cold. Various hydraulic media are being tried to overcome these troubles, but it is the Air Gunner who can tell the Armament Staff what actually happened.
First hand information from Air Gunners to their Gunnery Leaders or Armament Officers is of vital assistance in the investigation of all suspected freezing troubles. The Air Gunner is the man who experiences the trouble, and he is the only one who can give the required information on the actual failure and the conditions prevailing at the time. A remark made, and later entered on a combat report such as “Guns would not fire during combat”, does not help in any way.
An Armament representative is always present at Interrogation, and any information passed to him there and then will greatly assist the investigation to be carried out at once. This information will surely help to diagnose the cause of the trouble.
See to it, gunners, that you give full details of all troubles experienced with either guns or turrets, to your Gunnery Leader or Armament Officer. They cannot get a story from anyone but you. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU TELL THE ARMAMENT OFFICER. He cannot reproduce what you experienced under the same conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHIC FAILURE
A small percentage of photographic failures have, on investigation, been attributed to Armament causes. It was hoped that with the introduction of the Mk.111 fuse those failures, however small in number, would disappear. A very careful analysis of the film gives indication that a certain discrepancy exists between the timing of the camera control and the E.111 Fuse. The importance of setting this clockwork fuse correctly cannot be too strongly emphasised, and all Armament Officers can help stamp out this type of failure if they ensure that all fuses M.111 are set correctly.
NEAR ENOUGH IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH
Liaison between Armament and Photographic Sections is essential. Try it and see – who knows, it might reduce the number of failures all round, and so produce vitally important plottable pictures of the target area.
SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS
The preparation of the ever-faithful S.B C. has been, and still is, the immediate concern of all Armament Sections. To prepare the bomb load and bomb up aircraft for an operation is, with the S.B.C’s now available, a matter for organisation. Difficulty can, however, be experienced on the second day when these S.B.C’s have to be filled in the limited time available.
The introduction of Conveyor Rollers has undoubtedly relieved this arduous task, but there is still room for improvement. These rollers can be put to untold uses, and with this in mind, numerous schemes are at present undergoing trials, which will, if applied in the correct manner, enable bomb loads to be prepared for the second sortie in quick time.
Full details of these schemes will be distributed to all Units in the near future. When the new equipment is received it should be subjected to a fair trial according to storage conditions available.
BOMBING RANGES
The lighting of Targets at Wainfleet Bombing Range is causing grave concern, owing to the ingress of salt water into the electric light fittings. Every effort is being made to keep the targets serviceable for night use, but after high tides, faults appear which may, therefore, make it necessary on occasions to declare certain targets unserviceable.
Representatives have been made to obtain an improved type of electric light fitting. In the event of it becoming necessary, improvised lighting has been arranged at EPPERSTONE Range.
FENTON BOMBING RANGE
A further Bombing Range, to be known as Fenton, has been allotted to the Group, making five ranges in all. Work has already commenced on this range, and when complete it is to be administered by R.A.F. Station, WIGSLEY.
FLYING CONTROL
In the table below will be seen two average landing times. The first is calculated by dividing the total period occupied by landing, from first to last aircraft, by the number of aircraft landed. This does not take into account any allowance for the time when the circuit was empty. The adjusted time shows the nett period, that is with allowances made for spasmodic return of aircraft, and the final average is the average time per aircraft based on this adjusted time.
From these two averages can be seen that whereas most Stations have got accustomed to the circuit drill of the landing scheme, there is still scope for improvement in the arrival of aircraft at the airfield.
However, the averages of 3.49 and 2.66 indicate that all Stations have really got down to the problem of landing aircraft quickly, and from reports to hand, it is encouraging to note that the scheme has met with the full approval of the aircrew. Some Stations who, at present, house only one Squadron, are not giving the results they might; this would seem to be an indication that on account of the limited number of
(continued on page 12, Col. 3)
JANUARY LANDING TIMES
[Table showing the Number of aircraft, Time, Average, Adjusted Time and Average by Station]
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Gun Turret Failures and Bombing Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
SPORTS
[Cartoons]
FOOTBALL – THE MATZ CUP
The first round of this annual knock-out is now complete, except for one match, Strubby v Scampton. In the Preliminary Round, Waddington held Scampton to “2 all”, but lost the replay. Without being too partisan, may we wish good luck to the Strubby “giant killers”.
PRELIMINARY ROUND
WADDINGTON 2 SCAMPTON 2
WADDINGTON 0 SCAMPTON 2
(re-play)
ROUND ONE
WINTHORPE 1 SYERSTON 0
WIGSLEY 0 SWINDERBY 11
BARDNEY 0 METHERINGHAM 10
DUNHOLME 2 FISKERTON 0
WOODHALL SPA 1 CONINGSBY 3
SPILSBY 2 EAST KIRKBY 3
SKELLINGTHORPE 3 H.Q. 5 GROUP 1
Scampton are again holding second place in the Lincoln League, Division 1, having won 7 out of 9 games. They were runners up in the League last year, and winners of the Matz Trophy – a fine record.
Dunholme had a busy soccer month, winning four out of five games, in addition to their Matz Cup game with Fiskerton.
Syerston, like Scampton, are all out for the Newark and District League championship. They have, to date, won six out of seven games. Intersection competition produced 12 matches during the month.
Skellingthorpe and Bardney have been busy with both inter-section games and weekly Station matches.
Metheringham lost only one out of four station games, and in inter-section matches, Squadron Armoury won all their games decisively.
Coningsby soccer has been notable for a duel between 619 and 61 Squadrons. Each Squadron has won one game each and the decider should be a real blood match.
Swinderby Station team won four out of five games, losing to O.C.T.U. Newark. Judging from their Matz Cup score, they have some big guns in the forward line.
Winthorpe had four Station games, and were unlucky to win only one, but although losing 5 – 2 to Syerston, they pulled off the Matz Cup game. There was much inter-section activity.
Wigsley were unlucky to have two Station games cancelled. Of the remaining two, they won one and lost one. The R.A.F. Regiment had several games in the inter-section matches.
RUGGER
LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE COMPETITION
It has unfortunately proved impossible to complete the squadrons knock-out phase of this competition by January 31st. To date, only 9 Squadron have completed their finals, F/Lt. Hadland’s crew beating P/O. Glover’s crew in the final by 11 – 3. Nineteen teams took part in the competition. Within 53 Base alone, 61 matches have been played and the competition has become increasingly popular as it has progressed. All squadrons are urged to play off their matches as early as possible, so that the date for the Inter-Unit competition can be re-arranged. There will be some magnificent rugger in the final games, so get cracking squadrons, so we can arrange the big play off.
Syerston Rugger side is now considerably stronger than its early season form, and won three out of four games during the month.
Metheringham played two games, beating Bardney, and losing to 7 K.O.S.B.
Coningsby beat the 9th Field Regt. R.E.D., and the S. Staffs. Regiment in no uncertain manner.
Swinderby suffered their second defeat of the season against R.C.A.F. Digby, losing 6 – 0. Several Canadian Football mannerisms crept into the game, such as the referee putting the ball into the scrum, players “blocking” their opponents, and an occasional forward throw. All of which served to fox the Swinderby team.
Winthorpe lost to Syerston, but beat both 93 M. U. and Newark R. F. C. The Winthorpe pitch has, unfortunately, been “put to the plough”, necessitating all away matches.
HOCKEY
Swinderby can put out a very strong team, and only failed to win one game, which they drew with O.C.T.U. Newark, 4 – 4.
Syerston played 7 games in all, including two mixed and two all W.A.A.F. games, winning six of them.
Coningsby played four Station games, of which they won one.
Scampton, Metheringham, Winthorpe and Wigsley, all had Station matches. Metheringham hope to have their new hockey pitch ready in a few days.
H.Q.5 Group played its first match (mixed) against Syerston on February 6th, losing 2 – 1 a very promising start for a team that has only a half-sized pitch to practice on, until permission is obtained to fell a few trees.
It is hoped to promote a Group mixed Hockey knock-out in the very near future.
CROSS-COUNTRY
Wigsley, Skellingthorpe, Dunholme Lodge and Coningsby have all had successful runs during the month. 619 Squadron took over a hundred bodies about four miles from the camp by coach and released them. S/Ldr. Churcher was first man home. Feeling fit and frisky after their first gamble, 619 now challenge all cross country teams to battle.
SWIMMING
The stations around Lincoln make good use of the baths, and it should be possible to promote an interesting gala.
FISHING
Syerston has a thriving Anglers’ Club with facilities in the River Trent and in the lake at Flintham Hall. The club boasts over 40 “line shooters”. Other Stations please note. (What about a Strubby Wild Fowlers’ Society?)
MINOR GAMES
A most popular game at Bardney is Skittle Ball, played daily inside or outside the Maintenance Hangar at Tea Van time. A P. T. I. arrives with the van, and the fun begins. 20 – 40 men take part, and it is a most enjoyable and stimulating way of spending break.
It is regretted that some Station Sports summaries are not to hand for inclusion in the News, and it is requested that all Stations will despatch their summaries to reach H.Q. within two days of the end of the month.
TRAINING
STIRLING TRAINED CREWS GOING TO SQUADRONS
The first of the Stirling trained Conversion Unit crews went to Squadrons by way of 5 L. F. S. during the month, and the new training policy is now in full swing. A total of 35 crews were posted to Squadrons from 51 Base in January. 45 crews went from Conversion Units to No.5 L.F.S.
The weather was fairly good, and had no great adverse effect on flying, but many unfamiliar technical snags with the Stirling had to be overcome. Serviceability was affected by the carrying out of Acceptance Checks, but these have now been nearly completed, and improved serviceability is expected during the coming month.
Three fatal accidents, involving Stirling aircraft at night, are at present under investigation. Two occurred during Bullseye Exercises, and one during local night flying.
The standard of crews coming from O.T.U’s was maintained. High Level bombing training was very much improved throughout 51 Base, and heights up to 20,000 feet were recorded on night details. H 2 S training suffered owing to an initial shortage of instructors. The aircraft position earlier in the month was also acute, and H 2 S aircraft were being employed on normal training commitments.
The majority of the Squadron crews attached to No. 5 L.F.S. for a short refresher course during the month, completed the syllabus despite some restrictions by weather, and much valuable information was obtained from this mid-tour check.
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD)
There are, however, a few entries on the other side of this month’s balance sheet, such as the two Wireless Operators who, on the night 27/28th January, when briefed to use M/F D/F Section “N” on return from operations, obtained LINE BEARINGS from Hull and Heston. The question arises, what were the Captains and Navigators doing to allow the Wireless Operators to be so dim? Then there is the Wireless Operator who, when sending an early return message, spelt the word STARBD in Bomber Code, when there exists a code group for the word. When questioned, he admitted that he “was in a bit of a spin”. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened to any of these Wireless Operators AND THEIR CREWS (Captains please note), had they been in the position in which Sgt. Barnes Moss found himself, and confronted with a big job to do. Consider then, and note well, ye who do wear the badge of Sparks, that when trouble cometh, it doth not come after friendlie warning, but is swift and sudden, and never forget – it might be YOU.
Now let us consider the question of the Wireless Operator being in the astrodome over the target area. It is difficult to see any advantage that captains gain by having him there. In fact, if they take care to study a few facts, they will see that placing the Wireless Operator in the astrodome only gives a false sense of security and endangers [underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined]
Firstly, the Wireless Operator has very little night vision, having been employed during the three hours previous in gazing at a cathode ray tube or magic eye. Just ask yourselves how you feel when emerging from a cinema into the night –“Hell, I can’t see a thing”. Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that if your Wireless Operator is off Tinsel, one of your own aircraft may be shot down by an enemy night fighter free to operate because you have cleared the obstacle out of his path. Thirdly, the majority, but not all, of the Wireless Operators in astrodome incidents, come from squadrons fitted with Monica III, where the operator would see a fighter so much plainer on the CRT than in the flesh, in spite of all the blips made by friendly aircraft. Captains who make a habit of doing this are invited to reconsider their views in the light of the above remarks.
MOVEMENTS FOR JANUARY
F/Lt. Andrews, No.467 Squadron, has completed No.4 Signals Leaders Course, and is to be congratulated on being the first Signals Leader in this Group to obtain an “A” categorisation.
F/O. Rademeyer has taken the post of Signals Leader with No. 44 Squadron, F/Lt. Barrett having completed his operational tour.
P/O’s. Worthington, Thomas and Freeman should now be installed, and working to full pressure as Fishpond Instructors at East Kirkby, Fiskerton and Metheringham respectively, and Squadrons are invited to make full use of their services.
The visits to O.T.U. by Signals Leaders are in full swing, and squadrons should benefit from the move at a later date.
Now, here is an open invitation for any Signals Leader, Deputy Signals Leader or Wireless Operator (Air) to visit the W/T cabin at this Headquarters on an operational night. The only thing you need to do to take advantage of this offer, is to give a few hours notice on the telephone (extension 54).
TACTICS
EFFECT OF WINDOW AND COUNTERMEASURES
The enemy G. C. I. system continues to be subdued by Window. To retain maximum effect, however, there must be no slacking off in the rates of dropping. The times and rates of dropping laid down for each operation must be rigidly adhered to, and Window dropping must never be regarded as just another ‘bind’. These rates have been carefully calculated, and the individual who is “too lazy” or “forgets” is jeopardising not only his own safety, but that of the whole force. The Window dropper’s slogan must be “Not too much, not too little…..”
It is interesting to study the development of the enemy’s reaction to Window, and the results of our countermeasures over the past few months. That the highly mobile fighter force controlled by HF and V.H.F./RT, organised after the initial success of Window, could be a serious menace, was soon appreciated by the planning staff, who set to work to devise new tactics. As this fighter force was being directed to target areas being attacked, the first essential was to delude the enemy as to the areas to be attacked. Spoof attacks by Mosquitoes and small forces of “heavies” were attempted, and the main force was routed to within 20-30 miles of defended areas before turning to attack another target. These spoof attacks and feints have undoubtedly drawn a number of fighters away from the main targets. A more recent attempt at delusion was to move the whole force by ordering all aircraft to alter course simultaneously at a predetermined time, so as to displace the main stream suddenly. The unprecedented manoeuvre undoubtedly upset the enemy controllers’ calculations.
Not the least important of our countermeasures are the radio jamming devices. These are many and varied, and have produced very marked results. Special Tinsel is rated highly amongst the successful jamming devices, thus Wireless Operators must comply with Tinselling instructions on all occasions. Information on the work of the Radio Countermeasures Group must obviously be guarded, but a report on the results achieved by Ground Cigar, Ground Grocer, Corona and other H.F. and VHF. countermeasure schemes, is set out in a paper BC/S.31009/Sigs., dated 3rd February, 1944, “Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command”. Aircrew should read this report, which is available in all Intelligence libraries. The extract quoted below is typical of the confusion that arises, and shows the measure of success achieved. In fact, jamming has been so complete as to force the enemy to use his National Broadcast wavelengths to get orders through to his fighters. This new step should present no difficulty to our Countermeasure Experts, who are continually a step ahead of the enemy in radio jamming.
[Underlined] “Corona (HF) [/underlined]
This countermeasure continues to annoy the enemy Controllers and harass their pilots, and on occasion has been known to lead to unprintable ruderies being addressed to the efficient young W.A.A.F. officer who frequently plays the controller’s part for us. However, one of the methods of judging the success of Corona is by noting the enemy controller’s reaction to it over the air, and it is considered an unsuccessful night if we do not succeed in drawing at least one crack which is worth recording in the line book.”
TAIL WARMING DEVICES
With the advent of Monica IIIA and Fishpond, the duties of Wireless Operator have been still further extended. It is unfortunate that the sole attention of a crew member cannot be diverted to these devices, but for the moment the Wireless Operator has under his control something which, when properly used, can have immeasurable success against enemy fighters. A high degree of training in the manipulation of the set and interpretation of the P.P.I. and cathode tubes, is called for, and a drive must be made for the Wireless Operators to have as much air practice as possible with the sets.
MONICA IIIA
Several squadrons have now had experience with Monica IIIA, and have proved that for the set to be of any value at all, certain factors are essential. A detailed knowledge by the Wireless Operator of the suppression and gain settings to give well defined blips which can be followed in to a minimum of 250 yards range, a standard reporting patter by the Wireless Operator, and a knowledge of the interpretation of blips by pilots and gunners so that there is perfect crew co-operation whenever an enemy blip is sighted. The exact procedure for using Monica IIIA is set out in an instruction which is available in all Signals Leaders’ Offices. Gunners, pilots and Wireless Operators should be given an opportunity of reading this instruction.
FISHPOND
57 Squadron, from an investigation into Fishpond results, estimate that out of 80 Fishpond sorties, 9 combats have been avoided by utilising the early warning given by Fishpond. Their knowledge and experience will shortly be made available to other Fishpond Squadrons in the form of a tactics instruction. To get a good P.P.I. picture, liaison between Wireless Operator and H 2 S operator is essential, as is also a knowledge by the Wireless Operator of H 2 S manipulation and P.P.I. settings. Captains must remember that Fishpond does not record fighters attacking from above, and should therefore see that their gunners never relax the normal crew search procedure.
[Underlined] Continued from page 10, col.1) [/underlined]
aircraft no great need for quick landing is felt. Those Stations should remember that a second Squadron is always liable to be posted in at very short notice when, under these conditions, the average landing time of two minutes per aircraft, for between 30 and 40 aircraft, would be a godsend.
The Landing Board, originally designed by R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, has been improved on by many Stations in the Group. It is gratifying to note that new suggestions and modifications are continually being submitted. They are a big help, let’s have more of them.
No. 5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 12.
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
[Drawing]
HEADQUARTERS NO. 5 GROUP
A/Cdre. H.V. SATTERLY, D.F.C. C.B.E.
HEADQUARTERS NO. 53 BASE
A/Cdre. A. HESKETH, O.B.E., D.F.C. C.B.E.
R.A.F. STATION, SCAMPTON
F/O. C.F. GIBSON. M.B.E.
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. GLOVER. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. A. LYNCH, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. K.L. HOWARD. D.F.M.
F/O. E. MERCER. D.F.C.
P/O. A. WRIGHT. D.F.C.
P/O. V.D. PURVIS. D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. J.G.DAY. D.S.O.
Sgt. A.E. KEELING. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
A/F/Lt. G.H. LAING. D.F.C.
F/O. W.T. HAXBY. D.F.C.
61 SQUADRON
F/O. J.W. EINARSON, D.F.M. D.F.C.
W/Cdr. R.M. STIDOLPH. D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
P/O. D.C. HARVEY. D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
F/O. N.E. WESTERGAARD. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.E. BROOKES. D.F.M.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/Lt. C.J. BRAIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
9 SQUADRON (Contd.)
P/O. R.W. CORKHILL. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
P/O. R.L. ASH. D.F.C.
F/O. C.R. SAVAGE. D.F.C.
F/Lt. B. ASSON. D.F.C.
Sgt. L. UNWIN. D.F.M.
F/Lt. D.A. BARRETT. D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
A/S/L/ W.F. PARKS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
Sgt. J.E. HEATH D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.W. THOMPSON. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.R. POLLOCK. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. JOSLING. D.F.C.
P/O. S.G. TOWNSEND. D.F.C.
P/O. A.R. KNOWLES. D.F.C.
F/O. R. McROBBIE. D.F.C.
P/O. R.J. GOOCH. D.F.C.
P/O. J.A. KIMBER. D.F.C.
P/O. E.J. HOWES. D.F.C.
P/O. F. NORTHCLIFFE. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.B. HUGHES. D.F.M.
P/O. W.H. SIDDONS. D.F.C.
Sgt. D.J. GRIFFITH. D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
A/S/L. E.A. BENJAMIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.F. EMERSON. D.F.M.
106 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. R.E. BAXTER. D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
Sgt. T. GEDLING. D.F.M.
F/O. J.E.F. MITCHELL. D.F.C.
P/O. J. KIRKWOOD. D.F.C.
W/O. H.F. CONELLY. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.C. METCALFE. D.F.M.
619 SQUADRON
P/O. T.A. PEATFIELD. D.F.C.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J. SIMKIN. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.T. PAGE. D.F.M.
[Page break]
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
[Tables of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Total] 25 18 5 26
WAR SAVINGS
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved. £. s. d.
H.Q. (UNIT) 5 GROUP 51.4 10.0 95. 7. 6.
£2935.2.0.
[Page break]
GUNNERY (CONTD)
(Continued from page 9, col.3)
Now 49 Air Gunners, this is the biggest thing that has hit gunnery in 25 years, and it is up to you to take every opportunity of make for 100% proficiency in the use of this new equipment. Great things will be expected from you, losses should go down and E/A destroyed go up; so go to it, and make the life of the Hun fighter short and sweet!
CENTRAL GUNNERY SCHOOL RESULTS
No. 72 COURSE
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit. Category. Exam. Results. [/underlined]
P/O. Gross “B” 90.4%
Results of No. 73 Course not yet to hand.
SQUADRON AND FLIGHT GUNNERY LEADERS
Below is a list of Squadron and Flight Gunnery Leaders at present in Squadrons and Conversion Units.
44 Squadron F/Lt. McCurdy
F/O. Neison
49 Squadron F/Lt. Cork
F/O. Hamilton
463 Squadron F/Lt. Moorhead
F/O. Kirkpatrick
467 Squadron F/Lt. Nordon-Hare
9 Squadron F/Lt. Armstrong
50 Squadron F/Lt. Gray
P/O. Beale
619 Squadron F/Lt. Howard
P/O. Hammond
61 Squadron F/Lt. Breakey
617 Squadron F/Lt. Rodger
F/O. Buckley
F/O. Chandler
106 Squadron F/Lt. Sullivan
630 Squadron F/Lt. Stead
57 Squadron F/Lt. Taylor
F/O. Ward
207 Squadron F/O. Moore
F/O. Harper
1485 Gunnery Flight S/Ldr. Undery
F/Lt. Leonard
F/O. Mills
1660 Con.Unit F/Lt. Clark
P/O. Gross
1661 Con.Unit F/Lt. Gray
1654 Con.Unit F/Lt. Hoad
F/O. Simister
No. 5 L.F.S. F/Lt. Cass
P/O. Black
Aircrew School SCAMPTON F/Lt. Patten
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
On taking an analysis of a large number of flight engineers logs a considerable discrepancy has been noticed between the fuel consumption of different aircraft. This discrepancy is not due to the varying consumptions inherent in the engines of any particular aircraft. In most cases where an aircraft has had a high fuel consumption on a specific operation, the subsequent operation with a different crew proves that this aircraft has a low consumption. This all points to manipulation.
There are many cases where far too high revs are used at too low a boost and it is apparent that many flight engineers are not paying sufficient attention to the boost and revs required for the most economical conditions.
It is not economical above full throttle height and boost below E.C.B. to reduce I.A.S. by throttle manipulation. I.A.S. should be controlled on propellor speed only, and if you are at an altitude where the ‘S’ blower is in operation, by controlling I.A.S. on the throttles you are merely strangling your engine. To quote one instance, an extract from one flight engineer’s log shows that 2850 r.p.m. was used at + 2 lbs boost at 15,000 feet in ‘S’ gear. This is an obvious case of engine strangling, and had the throttles been open to + 4 boost E.C.B. to take full advantage of the engine power available at that altitude, then the r.p.m. could have been cut down to maintain the required I.A.S. with the resultant decrease in fuel consumption. The consumption in the particular case quoted averaged 66 gallons per hour per engine which speaks for itself. Flight Engineer Leaders must bring home by means of lectures to their flight engineers instances such as this. Such manipulation may cost you an aircraft and maybe the crew, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the fuel consumption of a Lancaster is in the hands of the flight engineer, and where the flight engineer knows that incorrect revs and boost are being used for any specific condition, then he should advise the pilot accordingly; if this advice is ignored, the cause of the high fuel consumption should be reported on return. Many more instances such as that quoted have been found, and space does not allow to quote them all. Efforts are being made at this Headquarters to find other reasons for high consumption in each case, but so far high consumptions have been caused solely by incorrect engine manipulation.
EARLY RETURNS
In The case of an oil pressure gauge failure which causes quite a few early returns, this can be diagnosed quite easily. If the oil pressure drops off suddenly, and coolant and oil temperatures remain normal, the oil temperature should be watched closely, and if this remains normal, together with the coolant temperature the gauge is definitely suspect. Flight engineers should watch this sort of thing and advise the pilot accordingly.
Many early returns are caused by so called generator failure, and the following notes will be of interest to all flight engineers, and should go a long way to preventing unnecessary early returns due to this fault. These notes will be circulated separately to flight engineers.
1. [Underlined] The Voltmeter [/underlined] is the most important of the three instruments on the main control panel. In flight it normally indicates between 27 – 29 volts.
2. The Ammeters merely indicate how the generators are sharing the load, and as long as they both give a positive reading, even though unbalanced, the circuit is O.K. (i.e. +55 and +5). If the degree of unbalance is above 15 amps this matter must be reported to the Electrical Officer.
3. If one of the ammeters shows a negative reading, i.e. a discharge”, then before switching off one of the generators, reference must be made to the voltmeter. If the voltmeter reads 29 volts or under, switch off the generator giving the negative reading. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts, switch off the generator giving the positive reading.
4. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts the accumulators are being overcharged. In this case switch off the generator showing the higher current. If the voltmeter still indicates over 29 volts switch off the other generator and all non-essential loads to conserve the accumulators. The pressure head heater [underlined] must [/underlined] remain ‘ON’. After a short time, say 5 minutes, [underlined] one [/underlined] generator, preferably the one giving the lower reading, may be switched ‘ON’ again, but a careful check must be kept on the voltmeter. Both generators must [underlined] not [/underlined] be switched ‘ON’ again after they have been switched ‘OFF’.
5. [Underlined] Never [/underlined] disconnect the cables from the accumulator in flight, otherwise it may cause an explosion. If the accumulators become overheated and are gassing excessively, turn the “Ground-Flight” switch to “Ground”.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, col.3) [/underlined]
from service sources does not appear to fulfil our requirements. Coningsby has produced a most useful piece of apparatus, and details of it will be circulated to other Bases and Stations. It will be to the advantage of Electrical Officers of other Units if they pay a personal visit to Coningsby to see this test rig for themselves. Further, it is suggested that visits to other Stations will enable the best ideas to be incorporated in all instrument and electrical sections. So far as is known, the many excellent schemes which have been produced by local initiative have not been patented.
In the last month the incidence of oxygen failure has increased, but in many cases no technical fault has been found. This indicates that more “gen” in the use of oxygen must be passed on by Electrical Officers to members of aircrew. The introduction of the microphone heater and the Mk.I jet has produced very favourable results, and steps have been taken to obtain further supplies of heaters for the use of all gunners.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table showing the serviceability of aircraft by Conversion Unit and Lancaster aircraft]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
Look after your ‘K’ type dinghies, you may find them very useful one day – F/Sgt. Groves of 50 Squadron did, on the night 29/30th December. The aircraft of which he was rear gunner had been damaged on operations. The pilot could not close the bomb doors, and due to lack of petrol the captain of the aircraft, while still over the sea, was forced to decide whether to ditch the aircraft or to bale out his crew. The captain eventually had to give the order to bale out using ‘K’ dinghies, having first sent out an S.O.S. and received fixes.
F/Sgt. Grove was the first out of the aircraft and the only one saved. The indications are that at least one other member of the crew was prepared to abandon the aircraft but no more was seen or heard of the crew or the aircraft after F/Sgt. Groves had left. F/Sgt. Groves suffered considerably from exposure while in his ‘K’ dinghy, but has since recovered.
It is possible to ditch an aircraft with open bomb doors, and it has been successfully accomplished on more than one occasion. In any case the doors are liable to collapse on impact with the water, and where this has happened, crews have managed to clear the aircraft without too much trouble. While no blame is attached to the pilot of this particular aircraft, this fact should be borne in mind, and pilots should resort to the ‘K’ type dinghy only as a last resort – e.g. should the aircraft be on fire, or in danger of breaking up in the air.
Successful ditchings, in seemingly impossible sea and weather conditions have shown that, provided you have practiced your emergency procedure and dinghy drills you should have no worry in making the decision to ditch. The days are over when a successful ditching was something to be marvelled at. To-day they are a common occurrence, and experience has shown that ignorance and stupidity are to blame in almost every case of failure.
A summary of Air Sea Rescue incidents for the six month ending 31st December, 1943, show that of a total of 3271 aircrew involved, 1,078 were rescued and brought back to England; most of the remainder fared as
(continued on page 2, col 2)
ENGINEERING
The operational effort for January was very high considering the bad weather periods which were encountered during the month. The squadrons were all down in aircraft strength, but in spite of this a high total was achieved; this, of course, was only possible by many squadrons operating 100% each night. With the man power shortage it requires very hard work and long hours to maintain this effort, and now that squadrons are almost up to full strength on the new establishment, the load will be even heavier. Due, however, to the efforts of the ground crews, February should see the biggest effort ever put out from this Group.
No.54 Base, Coningsby, which formed on 1st January, 1944, is already making itself felt as a formidable and efficient formation. There is still much to do to bring the various sections up to the peak of perfection, but as these were started on sound lines, there is no doubt of their ultimate efficiency.
All operational bases and R. & I. sections have been kept extremely busy on acceptance checks recently, and as a result certain other work has had to be left. This is only a passing phase, and it is hoped that once the squadrons are up to full strength, the task will be easier by dealing with the normal replacements. The many high speed enemy action repairs which have been carried out in time to get aircraft ready for ops on the second night, including many power plant changes, which are carried out immediately the aircraft lands during the night, are so numerous that it is difficult to single out individuals for praise; it all points to the splendid morale and staying powers of the ground crews.
There are many early returns and cancellations which could be avoided and Engineer Officers must keep on with the drive to eliminate these entirely, as far as is humanly possible; they are responsible for the non-delivery of a very large tonnage of bombs when calculated over a month.
The number of failures of exhaust studs has been considerably reduced where 3.5% Nickel steel studs have been fitted, and results so far are very pleasing. When further experience has been gained it is hoped to go over to this kind of stud completely.
The introduction of the 30 lbs pressure type relief valve on the header tank in place of the thermostatic valve is gradually taking place throughout the Group, and a marked improvement is noticed by the smaller number of failures due to engines being “cooked”.
WEIGHT SHEET SUMMARIES
A new weight sheet summary as applicable to 5 Group has been issued to all Bases. Stations and Squadrons, and the use of this with the bomb load chart which accompanied it should dispel any further doubts as to what can and what cannot be carried at an all-up weight of 65,000 lbs.
CONVERSION UNITS AND NO.5 L.F.S.
The Conversion Units commenced a Stirling programme early in the month, and although the results of the first month’s work were good and called for a colossal amount of work, it is anticipated that with certain improvements, the February figures will be much higher. Great credit is due to the C.T.O’s and men under them, who have tackled this task and overcome their setbacks in an admirable manner. The programme which has been set for No. 5 L. F. S. calls for good organisation and planning on the technical side, and so far the job has been done well.
FLIGHT ENGINEER LEADER
A very necessary addition to the Group Headquarters staff is the establishment of a Flight Engineer Leader. This post has been filled by F/Lt. Gottwaltz, and Base Engineers and C. T. O.’s are requested to afford him every facility to assist in attempting to solve the carrying fuel consumption problem. A column elsewhere in this News has been allocated to Flight Engineers.
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS
It is most important the Command Modification No. 57 is completed on all aircraft fitted with A.P.I. and A.M.U. at the earliest opportunity, to eliminate errors due to inefficient cooling.
The test rig for the instruments issued
(continued on page 13, col.3 )
WAR EFFORT
[Table containing details by Squadron of averages and numbers of sorties, tonnage dropped, operational hours and losses as well as ratings]
ORDER OF MERIT IN THE FOREGOING TABLE IS BASED ON THE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED PER AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON CHARGE
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944.
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V Group News, January 1944
5 Group News, January 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 18, January 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, tactics, sports and operations.
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1944-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-22 jan 44
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
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England--Lincolnshire
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1944-01
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
ground personnel
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
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Base Commander [Initials]
Base Int:
V GROUP NEWS V
FEBRUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] * NUMBER 19
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The German night fighters have once again been forced to change their night fighting tactics, and this change has increased the importance of accurate flying, especially as regards airspeeds. Until recently, German fighters were sent to orbit over the city which the German Command thought was the one to be attacked. Owing to the ingenious selection of routes for the Bomber Force these tactics proved a failure and the Germans have now gone over to a new method, which is to give the fighters courses to steer which will intercept the bomber stream.
It is obvious that the greater the length of the stream the greater will be the chances of the fighters coming across some portion of it and it is, therefore, of the utmost importance that that all Captains should maintain the most accurate timing from the concentration point to the target. The aim should be never more than plus or minus 2 minutes from the times laid down. This standard is very far from being reached at present and a proportion fail to achieve better than plus or minus 10 minutes. If some are 10 minutes early and some 10 minutes late the effect is to spread the Lancasters over a distance of 60 miles greater than that planned, i.e. it nearly doubles the length of the bomber stream and increases in this ratio the chances of interception.
Until recently time keeping was beset by many difficulties. Each Navigator was responsible for finding his own wind vectors and from these calculating new ground speeds and E.T.A’s. The majority of aircraft were not equipped with H2S and, therefore, had little chance of finding accurate winds when outside Gee range.
This problem has now been solved by the use of the Command wind broadcast to all aircraft and by the newly introduced moveable T.O.T. In future, provided crews leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered, and fly at the speeds and heights laid down in the Flight Plan, they will arrive at the target at the correct time to commence their attack. Should they encounter winds different from those used for timing the operation, a new T.O.T. based on the new winds will be transmitted by wireless.
Responsibility for time keeping therefore, devolves primarily to the Pilot, who must not only ensure setting course from the concentration point at the right time, but must thereafter keep rigidly to the speeds laid down. In view of the enormous importance which timing has now assumed, a special drive is being undertaken to improve results and to eradicate those errors which still cause aircraft to arrive early or late, or to stray off track.
A report analysing a number of recent operations has been circulated to Squadrons and I hope this will be read by all Captains and Navigators. It shows how apparently trivial mistakes can build up into serious errors and illustrates the need for extreme care and accuracy in every stage of navigation.
Two key points are :-
(i) Captains must leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered.
(ii) They must maintain heights and speeds decided at Flight Planning.
TACTICS
[Underlined] TACTICS AND PLANNING [/underlined]
A new type of attack was introduced this month, whereby the main force and P.F.F. were divided into two forces to attack the same target with an interval of 2 – 2 1/2 hours between zero hours. It is not possible to form conclusions from the limited evidence obtained from the two attacks which were carried out, but two advantages of this scheme are obvious:
(i) P.F.F. Marking of the second phase should be accurate – observation of the location of the first phase M.P.I. providing an opportunity for visual markers to correct any apparent displacement of the attack.
(ii) A carefully timed interval may increase the difficulties of the enemy fighter force, compelling them to refuel either before or during the second phase attack.
Assessment of the results of the Schweinfurt attack, 24/25th February, points to the probable achievement of both these aims. Losses for the second phase were less than the first, although the number of combats was greater in the second phase; the M.P.I. of the attack was in fact nearer the aiming point than the first phase attack. For this type of attack to be successful, however, the temptation to bomb the centre of the fires from the first attack must be strongly resisted, and implicit faith placed in the second phase marking, whether it be coincident with the first attack or some distance away.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
Bullseyes routed North-East towards Denmark have been very helpful to the bomber force on two occasions during the month. Shielding the bombers’ Southerly courses to Schweinfurt and Augsburg, Bullseye aircraft drew many fighters from South Germany to the North, and comparatively low losses on both those night were undoubtedly partly due to this well planned diversion. Accurate timing on the part of Bullseye aircraft is essential however, if they are to simulate a concentrated bomber stream.
It is thought that Units taking part in Bullseyes are not deriving as much benefit from these exercises as is possible. The need for a more precise interrogation of crews into types of manoeuvre taken against fighter and searchlights is obvious. This Headquarters is examining the various fighter and bomber crew reports available, and endeavour will be made shortly to issue a collated summary of interceptions for each Bullseye, for tactical discussions at Stations.
The following incident which came to light a few days ago reflects the general attitude of crews towards Bullseyes:-
A Polish fighter pilot made three attacks on a bomber during a Bullseye exercise, flashing three “kills”. The fact that there was no response from the bomber during any of the attacks aroused his interest and he finally closed right in with landing lamp on, and this revealed – empty mid-upper and rear turrets.
No accusation is made against crews in this Group, but this sort of thing is most discouraging to the fighter boys, and certainly does not stimulate their interest in bomber tactics. More than this, it shows a stupid lack of interest on the part of the bomber crew. Remember that 50% of a bomber crew’s job is to bring the aircraft and themselves back safely to fight another day. This can hardly be expected if gunners throw away the only chance they have of seeing a fighter attack at night, before meeting a real Hun which flashes cannon shells instead of its landing light.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The enthusiasm of Squadrons in Monica and Fishpond training is welcomed, but there is still room for improvement. Wireless Operators must not relax until they are able to interpret the cathode tube from a mere glance. Remember that whilst you are thinking whether to report a blip or not, you can be shot out of the sky. Interpretation and reporting must be immediate and accurate. If you know your drill you can get away with it. Here’s someone who did :-
“At 2127 in the target area Monica indicated a fighter closing rapidly at 1,800 yards. Lancaster corkscrewed at 750 yards. Enemy aircraft then opened fire but tracer went above the Lancaster. Later gunners identified JU.188 at 100 yards range as they fired, tracer ricochetted [sic] off the nose of the fighter. JU.188 claimed as damaged.
[Underlined] Conclusions [/underlined]
(i) The fighter’s burst would obviously have been fatal if the Lancaster had not corkscrewed.
(ii) A standard patter was carried out throughout the attack and a corkscrew was started at the correct range on Monica.
Do [underlined] you [/underlined] know the standard patter and tactics? If not, study 5G/34/Air dated 4th February, 1944 (Appendix “A”) until you talk Monica language in your sleep.
[Underlined] TAILPIECE [/underlined]
The following is quoted without comment with apologies to A.A. Command Intelligence Review :-
“On 24 Feb. according to the Berlin radio, American bombers flew over Switzerland. This radio conversation is then stated to have been exchanged between Swiss A.A. gunners and the USAAF :-
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “Look out, you are over Switzerland.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “If you don’t turn back we shall shoot.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
(Swiss guns open fire)
[Underlined] USAAF “Your A.A. fire is about 1,000 feet too low”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “We know!”
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NAVIGATION
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
Concentration this month was, on the whole, better than last month. Timing with the exception of the raids on LEIPZIG (19/20 February) and SCHWEINFURT (24/25th February) was very good. This is the combined result of the excellent effort of the Windfinders and the good use made of the broadcast w/v’s by all the Navigators.
We still have a long way to go however. Many simple mistakes are being made by Windfinders, e.g. incorrect plotting of air positions, wrong computions, errors made in measuring the w/v, messages wrongly coded, to mention a few. It will be appreciated that if plotting and compution errors are made, incorrect w/v’s will be the result, and therefore, the Senior Met. Officer at H.Q. 5 Group cannot forecast the correct w/v for use of other aircraft. Windfinders have a great responsibility and must make every effort to obtain accurate w/v checks.
The same mistakes are also being made by the rest of the force. A recent O.R.S. report stated that errors in compution are reaching a phenomenal figure. Every effort must be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate this fault. Compution of true airspeeds presents a big problem to many Navigators , the average error is approximately 5 m.p.h. Calculation of courses is another stumbling block, the average error being 2° or 3°. The combination of these errors has an adverse effect on concentration, besides nullifying much of the good work done by the Windfinders. Watch computions and calculations carefully, Navigators. Also check each calculation at least once.
One word about interpolation. The w/v’s broadcast are those applicable to the mean height band. Therefore, if you are at the top or bottom of the band, the broadcast w/v is not accurate for your height. Interpolation is the answer. Consult the Form 2330 and note the forecasted change in the wind speed and then interpolate and apply the correction to the broadcast w/v. There have been instances of the wind speed increasing by 15 m.p.h. for an increase in height of only 2,000 feet.
Many Navigators do not use the broadcast w/v’s correctly. Some do not use the corrected w/v if it is “within a few degrees and a few miles per hour” of the previous forecast w/v. There are still a few Navigators too, who do not seem capable of applying the corrected w/v when it is given to them. A plotting method to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s has been described in A.S.I. Nav/14, issued 14.2.44. All Navigators must make sure they are fully conversant with this method. Any suggestions of criticisms are welcomed.
One final word to Windfinders, you did an excellent job last month, the record achieved being 153 w/v on the night of 15/16th February, a very fine effort. Keep this up!!!
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
Many A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have been issued to the Group during the last month, and we are now in the happy position of having 100% A.P.I’s, though all are not yet fitted.
There is an inherent error in the A.P.I. This is caused by the heating in the Navigator’s cabin. A modification is now being fitted to all A.P.I’s which should reduce the error to less than one percent. It is hoped all aircraft will be fitted with the A.P.I. and the modification by the end of the next moon period.
Con. Units are also being supplied with A.P.I’s; Navigators will soon be arriving at Squadrons fully trained in the use of this instrument.
Trouble is still being experienced when re-setting the Air Position Indicator. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must have a drive on this procedure. Several Squadrons have suggested methods to be adopted when re-setting the A.P.I; any other suggestions will be welcomed.
[Underlined]LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
The present system of log keeping and chart work involves unnecessary duplication of effort. If a Navigator’s chart work is done correctly, less detail is required in the log, and the Navigator can devote more time to his primary object of navigating the aircraft to the target and back to base.
The following entries are considered by some Navigators to be superfluous because the detail already appears on the chart, (a) Position and time of all fixes, pinpoints, D. R. positions and air positions, (b) all w/v’s obtained, tracks made good and position lines.
If these entries were omitted from the log approximately 10 minutes would be saved hourly. Moreover, the Navigator’s attention would not be constantly distracted by having to refer to the log each time a fix, D.R. position etc was obtained. This scheme has been tried successfully by several Navigators in this Group.
All Navigators should consider this suggestion carefully and discuss with the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION “BLACK OF THE MONTH” (No names no Packdrills) [/underlined]
A very good example of what can happen if a Navigator boobs and there is little co-operation in the crew, occurred on a recent sortie in this Group.
The crew in question set course from Base for Position “A”, and arrived there early. It was decided to carry out a dog leg and return to Position “B” (the South Coast). When the dog-leg was almost completed as Gee fix was obtained and course altered for Position “B”. This is where the mistake was made. The Navigator gave the pilot a course to steer of 024°(M) instead of 064°(M). The Navigator then decided to “try his hand” with the H2S. It was his second operational sortie. He was hoping to pick up the English Coast line, but this did not appear. Just before E.T.A. the Navigator decided that “something was wrong”, and obtained a Gee fix. This placed the aircraft a great many miles North of Position “B”. The mistake was immediately realised and course altered for Position “B”. The aircraft arrived at this position 19 minutes after the latest time, and so the sortie was abandoned.
Apart from the glorious “boob” of the Navigator, the pilot should have realised that the course of 024° (M) was greatly in error. This is a warning to all pilots and navigators. Had the pilot studied his “Captains of aircraft” map, he would have spotted the error in the course given. Pilots should always check a course with the Navigator if it sounds “phoney”. The Navigator [underlined] must always [/underlined] recheck all his calculations and computions.
ASTRO COMPASS
It was stated in last month’s News that the Astro Compass was being modified. This has now been done with the result that only the Pole Star can be used for checking the aircraft’s course. The advantage is that the instrument is very much simpler to use. No calculation is necessary, the observer merely rotates the bearing plate until the Pole Star is in the sights, and reads off the aircraft’s course against the Red pointer.
Trials carried out by No. 49 Squadron, Fiskerton, have proved successful. The compass was found very simple to use. The checking of the aircraft’s course is now a very simple task, and can be done by any member of the crew, as no calculations are necessary.
The difficult task of finding a good position for the Astro Compass still remains however; numerous trials have been carried out but with little or no success. Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] help to solve the problem? Remember the Astro Compass can also be used for obtaining bearings, so bear this in mind when you are hunting for a new position.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What part does the Navigator play in (a) Emergency procedure, (b) S.O.S. procedure?
2. If you are 10 miles or more off track by how many degrees would you alter course to regain track?
3. What is the procedure for obtaining a Gee fix if either the “B” or “C” Strobe is missing?
4. You are not certain of your position and suddenly red flares are seen ahead of you. (a) What does this mean? (b) What immediate action would you take?
Answers to last month’s Quiz
1. (a) 3500 ft. (b) 2500 ft. (c) 1000 ft. (d) 5000 ft.
2. (a) Section “E”. (b) Section “N”.
3. Lincoln!! (by approx. 100 miles)
4. The Navigator should immediately co-operate with the W/Op, and attempt to home on to the dinghy. (The W/Op. on hearing the S.O.S. will listen for an acknowledgement from the ground listening station, and if this is not heard he will pass the intercepted message on to M/F Section “J”, saying that it has been picked up and giving his own call sign etc but not his position (this will be known by Section “J” from the aircraft’s own transmission)).
5. (i) Change the fuse. (ii) Check [underlined] all [/underlined] leads.
6. The creeping line ahead method of search is best under all conditions (see Appendix “A” to A.S.I. Ops.1/18).
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. H.C. Lobb – B.N.O. Swinderby to 8 Group P.F.F.
S/Ldr. H.L. Creeth – Radar/Nav 5 Group to B.N.O. Swinderby.
F/Lt. N.W. Mould, DFC – 57 Nav.Offr. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/O. J. Simms, DFC – 57 Sqdn appointed Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. G. Crowe, DFC – 106 Nav.Officer to S.N.O. Metheringham.
F/Lt. W.J. Beeston – Attached to 5 Group O.R.S. posted to Flying Trg. Command.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 2.
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AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] CALLING ALL PILOT BOMBING OFFICERS ! [/underlined]
The following paragraphs are the precis of an address by Air/Cdr. Patch, C.B.E., to the first Conference of Bombing Officers :-
The post of Flight Bombing Officer was created to improve bombing in 5 Group. Enthusiasm of such officers is essential, and should be directed to keeping bombing in the forefront by constant pressure on Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders. The Squadron Bombing Leader is able to deal with the bombing problems of the Air Bomber but he has difficulty in convincing pilots that their ability should be shown in bombing flying rather than aerobatics. In 4 engined bomber aircraft, Pilots should concentrate in the first place on flying accurately over a given point on the ground. Next, Pilots must appreciate that on any given heading the bomb must be released from one point in the air. It requires most skilful flying to direct the aircraft through this point. Analysis of bombing errors showed that, excluding Vector Errors, 90% of the errors were due to bad flying, in particular in tracking and aircraft “skid”. The Mark XIV Bombsight has been designed to give tactical freedom but it is essential that a steady approach be made, accuracy depending on the final steady run. There must be no sudden alteration of aircraft attitude, no skidding, and complete accuracy of tracking.
Flight Bombing Officers must think over these practical points and decide how best to put it over to the Pilots. They must point out to Pilots that their aircraft are, in reallity [sic], sighting platforms from which, with the help of a complicated piece of mechanism – the Mark XIV Bombsight – they are to direct a tremendous bomb load against an enemy target. The conception of “area bombing” has caused bad bombing flying. If we can attain precision, not only against small targets but also large cities, we can reduce the number of raids required to obliterate Berlin and those other vital targets we must destroy.
Under operational conditions now being developed, and with the help of improving P.F.F. technique, we should be able to achieve greater accuracy at night in attacking a point of light, that is a T.I. or Wanganui Flare. The Bombing Officer’s job was to make Pilots “think bombing”, “talk bombing” and “fly bombing” until the time is reached that over the pint of beer in the Mess the main conversation is bombing accuracy.
[Underlined] N.B. [/underlined] The first Bombing Officers Air Staff Instruction was issued 11th January, 1944, No. BL/15.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Why should incendiaries not be dropped by the Main Force before Zero Hour on a Newhaven attack?
2. If an engine cut on take-off, and it was necessary to lighten the aircraft quickly, what action could the Air Bomber suggest concerning the bomb load?
3. If you were carrying a 1000 lb bomb on No. 5 Station, and it was not pre-selected on the Connell Pre-Selector, would it be released by Jettison action?
4. Why should the camera [underlined] NOT [/underlined] be operated before bombing?
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET) [/underlined]
[Table of Bombs dropped and errors found by category and Squadron]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES FOR FEBRUARY
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 ft.
9 P/O Blow F/Sgt Smith Sgt Hurrell 131 yds
44 P/O Charlesworth Sgt Frederuck F/Sgt Hill 148 yards
P/O Butt Sgt Whiter F/O Sparrow 143 yds
49 W/O Jones Sgt Blackham F/Sgt Stevenson 123 yds
61 P/O Nixon F/Sgt Garrett F/Sgt Devenish 140 yds
106 P/O O’Leary F/Sgt Snowden F/Sgt Williams 142 yds
207 P/O Briggs F/O Bujac P/O Murray 147 yds
P/O Barnett Sgt Hazel F/O Anderson 61 yds
463 P/O McKnight F/O Johnson P/O Isham 140 yds
619 Sgt Wadsworth Sgt Bengston Sgt Shenton 72 yds
1660 Sgt Newman Sgt Outram Sgt Ratner 132 yds
F/Sgt Riddle F/O Larsen Sgt Glulow 140 yds
1661 Sgt Grantham Sgt Young Sgt Hobbs 145 yds
F/Sgt Monaghan Sgt Wand Sgt Philpott 147 yds
617 Squadron obtained 18 exercises, error less than 150 yards, the best 3 being
F/Lt Wilson F/O Finlay F/O Parkin 55 yds
F/Lt Kearns F/O Daniels F/O Barclay 60 yds
P/O Knight F/Sgt Bell W/O Giller 57 yds
ADDITIONAL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of Training exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, 619 Squadron, made the only, and most creditable, effort in the Leader Competition, his Bombing Error at 20,000 feet being 79 yards!!! Congratulations.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 3.
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AIR BOMBING (CONT)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
8 Squadrons qualified in this month’s competition, with results as follows, all errors being converted to 20,000 fett.
[Underlined] Pilots & Air Bombers Navigators [/underlined]
1st 106 Sqdn – 88 yds 1st 207 Sqdn -108 yds
2nd 50 Sqdn -125 yds 2nd 619 Sqdn -138 yds
3rd 61 Sqdn -141 yds 3rd 61 Sqdn -169 yds
4th 619 Sqdn -147 yds 4th 467 Sqdn -170 yds
5th 9 Sqdn -157 yds 5th 9 Sqdn -174 yds
6th 44 Sqdn -166 yds 6th 50 Sqdn -188 yds
7th 207 Sqdn -189 yds 7th 106 Sqdn -216 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -201 yds 8th 44 Sqdn -231 yds
9th 630 Sqdn -175 yds 9th 630 Sqdn -170 yds
(630 Sqdn completed [underlined] 5 [/underlined] exercises only)
The following Squadrons completed 1 exercise only.
10th 463 Sqdn -86 yds 10th 463 Sqdn – 95 yds
11th 49 Sqdn- 90 yds 11th 57 Sqdn -162 yds
12th 57 Sqdn-245 yds 12th 49 Sqdn -291 yds
Congratulations to 106 Squadron who have now won the Bombing Competition for 3 successive months. Nos.9, 50, and 61 Squadrons have all improved their positions considerably but 619 have relinquished their customary “runners up” place in the table. We expect a maximum entry for March and a keen effort on all Squadrons part to topple 106 from the top.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The following news items are provided by the Range Staff at Wainfleet.
1. It is emphatically denied that the entire Night Staff applied for compassionate posting after a night programme carried out at maximum height by No. 5 L.F.S.
2. [Underlined] Heard over the R/T [/underlined]
R/T Operator – “Hullo ----- Please give me a TT.”
Pilot of A/C – “Time over Target 22.26.”
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined] A TT is a tuning transmission.
3. [Underlined] Advice to Crews. [/underlined]
(i) Conform to the established R/T procedure.
(ii) Be sure you burn the correct Downward Recognition Light during NIGHT exercises.
(iii) Pass times of strike and headings QUICKLY after the exercise.
(iv) Wait for silence on R/T before calling the Range.
(v) When you query errors given by the range REMEMBER please that a Direct Hit from 20,000 feet gives the Range Staff as much pleasure as it gives you !!
4. [Underlined] A Thought for the Month. [/underlined]
DO make sure you know which target you are to bomb !! (Many Wainfleet workmen have of late doubled their insurance).
P.S. A certain Mosquito from a certain well-known Group dropped a practice bomb which hit a lorry standing in front of the Range Headquarters. A 3,500 yards error.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) have introduced the Pilot’s Miniature Route Chart for the use of Air Bombers. Thus a single map of the complete route is available and the defended localities and route markers can be recorded. Its use is primarily for dark nights when map reading using the topographical maps is difficult.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DF.C.) has originated an excellent scheme with the use of operational 3073’s. After each operation a chart is made out which shows on one sheet of paper each Bomb Aimer’s picture of the markers bombed. The full sequence of marking in the order of the times of bombing is thus available to each Air Bomber who can compare his attack and estimation of distances with the other Bomb Aimers in the Squadron.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Walmesly, D.F.C.) states that of the 300 practice bombs dropped this year, not one has been aimed below 5000 feet. Further they claim to be the only Unit in the Group (yea, verily, even in the Command) with such a record.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Keates) reports that training was concentrated on to H2S and Gunnery. Blind Bombing with H 2 S had taken a prominent part in this training.
The Squadron Bombing Leader has compiled a graph consisting of nine curves on one sheet, which shows the forwards travel in yards and seconds of groundspeed of all bombs with T.V. between 420 and 1900 feet per second, for specific heights and groundspeeds. The groups apply to the selected heights 15000, 20000 and 25000 feet and the curves in each group cover height and groundspeeds 200, 210 and 220 m.p.h. Any other combinations of height and groundspeeds could be used. All information has been extracted from 5 Group Armament Training Notes, Part 1.
The advantage of this graph is that all information is contained in one graph and considerable time and labour is saved in calculating time intervals or compiling or checking preselector figures for any kind of load within the limitations of T.V., heights and speeds selected.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
F/O Billington has succeeded F/Lt Bray as Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
F/O. Astbury, D.F.C., moves up to F/Lt. Bombing Leader, 617 Squadron, and is joined by F/O. Harden, D.F.C., and F/O. Walker, Bombing Leaders from 1660 Conversion Unit and 61 Squadron respectively.
Congratulations to F/Lt. Bell (9 Squadron) F/Lt. Wake (106 Squadron) and F/Lt. Walmsley (619 Squadron) on the award of D.F.C’s.
Congratulations also to P/O Ball (1661 Con Unit) 3rd on No. 76 Bombing Leader’s Course with an “A” category and P/O Watford (1661 Con Unit) on gaining 1st place on No. 27 A.B.I’s Course.
F/Sgt. Coates (9 Squadron) obtained “B” category on No. 76 Bombing Leaders’ Course. F/O Lyons (61 Squadron) was 9th on No. 75 Course with a “B” Pass.
GARDENING
Despite February weather, the Command planted no less than 1647 vegetables, the second highest total for any month. As all Lancasters were busy discomforting the enemy by more direct methods it fell mainly to the Stirlings of 3 Group, followed by Halifaxes of 4 and 6 Groups and, on a smaller but useful scale, Wellingtons of 1 Group, to achieve this mighty total.
KIEL BAY received over 35%. The French U-boat bases about 20%, and the Western German Estuaries, the Kattegat and Channel also received good measure. Small numbers were planted off the French South Western Iron Ore Ports and in Oslo Fjord.
A Swedish newspaper reports the closing of the ports and shipping channels as an immediate result of 4 and 6 Groups’ visits to the last named. Photographic evidence is already available of the effects of the great effort on Kiel Bay. It shows one 6000 ton liner sunk and lying on her side, and also great congestion of shipping, indicating beyond doubt that traffic has been stopped for a time. It is hard to over estimate the importance of Kiel, which is the focal point of all German traffic in Northern Waters; the annual turnover is 29,000,000 tons of war material, nearly one half of which is iron ore imported from Norway and Sweden. The amount handled [underlined] DAILY [/underlined] would fill 12 1/2 miles of railway trucks. One effect of heavy and sustained mining against this traffic would be to force the enemy to use the sea route to the West of Denmark down to the Elbe and Ems. In hard winters this is done for us by ice in the Baltic, but this winter we have been let down by this ally.
Two interesting points arise from the month’s work. First, nearly all of it has been carried out from high level with great success. A variety of techniques have been used including:- The use of P.F.F. methods (both by aircraft of that force and H 2 S aircraft from the other Groups, marking pinpoints for those not so fitted); the use of the Mark XIV Bombsight when visual means have been possible; and dropping entirely on H 2 S. Secondly, a start has been made in the mining of the enemy’s inner harbours.
We have the task in 5 Group of studying and keeping up to date with the new methods which are still in an experimental stage, and therefore, subject to frequent changes, so that when the call comes for either a small or large gardening effort we can carry it out with our traditional efficiency.
49 Squadron have already been informed of the success of their accurate attack from high level with H 2 S on the 5/6th January.
[Boxed] [Underlined] PILOTS – TAKE IT EASY! [/underlined]
Use your throttles LEISURELY at all times. Do not open up with a rush. You won’t get off the ground any quicker if you “ram” the throttles open, and you are more liable to swing. Make any correction with engines smoothly. There’s no such thing as a “short burst” of engine in proper flying. Make your maxim “EASE your throttles open. EASE your throttles back”. That applies to all aircraft including the Stirling, Lancaster and the Tiger Moth – if your Station Commander lets you get your hands on it. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 19. FEBRUARY, 1944. PAGE 4.
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SPORTS
Bad weather rendered most sports pitches u/s during the last few days of February, but there has been a full quota of matches played in spite of this. Attention is again drawn to the desirability of each Station submitting its sports resume two days or so before month end, to allow ample time for publication in this News. Several Stations have not submitted resumes this month, and so the picture is necessarily incomplete.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] proved unbeatable during the month, playing six games of which they won four (including two Matz Cup matches). However, Lincoln Rovers held them to a 2 – 2 draw, and Waddington to a 3 – 3 draw. Both these games were in the Lincoln League, Division 1, and Scampton could ill afford to drop these points since the League Championship is a neck and neck finish between them and Lincoln Rovers.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] had four Station games of which they drew one home game with R.A.F. Wickenby. The inter-section competition is now in full swing.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] beat Fiskerton at home, but lost to Ruston Bucyrus, A.V. Roe and R.A.F. Wickenby. Four games were played in the Inter-Section League.
[Underlined] EAST KIRKBY [/underlined] beat Spilsby but lost their Matz Cup game against Skellingthorpe 5 – 1. The Section League produced 5 games, and in addition there were 7 ‘friendlies’, the aircrew cadets team winning all three of their games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] Inter-Section games were plentiful. The outstanding match of the month was the Matz Round One win against Woodhall. This has been followed by a 3 – 2 victory against Dunholme, taking Coningsby into the Semi-finals.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] scored a sweeping 10 – 0 win against Bardney in the Matz Cup Round One. They proved it no fluke by holding Waddington to a 2 – 2 draw. They now boast a “Reserve XI”. In the Inter-Section events, 5 games were played. “A” Flight have a strong side and should go well towards winning the trophy generously presented by S/Ldr. Whattam.
[Underlined] SKELLINGTHORPE [/underlined] had 5 Station games and 9 in the Inter-Section events, while there were a further 3 games restricted to aircrew personnel.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] XI beat Winthorpe and Wigsley, and were unlucky to lose 3 – 5 to Scampton in Round Two of the Matz Cup. It was a splendid effort at “giant killing”.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] had 3 games of which they won two, including a 4 – 0 win against a R.A.F. side from Fulbeck.
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The second round saw Coningsby, Scampton and Skellingthorpe emerge as semi-finalists, defeating Dunholme, Swinderby and East Kirkby respectively. Winthorpe and Metheringham have still to decide their event. The semi-final draw is as follows:-
WINTHORPE [underlined] or [/underlined] METHERINGHAM v SKELLINGTHORPE
CONINGSBY v SCAMPTON
Both matches will be played on neutral ground at dates to be announced in G.R.O’s.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined] now boasts a strong side. They beat the Air Crew School 6 – 3, and ran up an astronomical total of 68 – 6 against Lincoln Home Guard. The Home Guard did better in the second game and held them to 18 – 6.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] were unlucky in having to cancel all Rugger games due to flying.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] completed only one out of four games, losing 5 – 0 to 7th K.O.S.B. after an extremely hard game.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] won three out of three games. A hard struggle with their old rivals, 93 M.U., produced a 3 – 0 win, and Winthorpe and Lincoln Home Guard were beaten 14 – 3 and 18 – 0 respectively.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] XV is doing well and won all three games played, Magnus School and Newark R.F.C. 9 – 6, and Rufford Home Guard 24 – 6.
[Underlined] LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDES [/underlined]
This competition is fast developing into a 53 Base monopoly. 9, 463 and 467 have all concluded their Squadron events now, producing F/Lt. Hadland’s team, P/O. McKnight’s team and P/O. Simpson’s team as the respective winners. In these three Squadron events, 65 crews took to the field. 50 Squadron are following suit, and three games have so far been played. Other Squadrons please note and “get cracking”! A complete Squadron event can be decided in two afternoons, and the physical “uplift” is amazing – try it and see.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] won three out of four games, suffering their only defeat at the hands of 5 Group in a “mixed” game.
[Underlined] EASY [sic] KIRKBY [/underlined] had one station event, losing to Spilsby Town. The Aircrew Cadets “A” and “B” sides fought two very close games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] lost to the Green Howards, and held K.O.S.B. to a 3 all draw.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] mixed side beat 5 Group 7 – 3. The Station side beat Lincoln Home Guard, but lost to Wigsley.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] lost 2 – 4 to O.C.T.U. Newark, but won a mixed game versus Winthorpe R.A.S.C. by 3 – 1.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] mixed side defeated Wigsley 7 – 5 on Swinderby ground, lost to Swinderby 3 – 7, and enjoyed a 3 – 2 win against Scampton.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
49 Squadron now allot one afternoon per week to physical “fitness”. Wood-chopping, country walks (pubs out of bounds) and gardening are all featured. Swimming at Lincoln is laid on each Tuesday, and for ground staff on Sundays. All that is needed now is the completion of the “gym”.
Dunholme R.A.F. Regiment keep up their water worthiness by attending Lincoln Baths.
Coningsby gym is now in full swing for badminton, boxing and gymnastics.
Metheringham gym will open this month for badminton, boxing, fencing and P.T.
[Underlined] COMPETITIONS [/UNDERLINED] The Wines Rugby Cup Competition has been launched, also a new event in 5 Group –“5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy”. There should be some keen games in both these events. New events need new trophies. Two are needed – a Lancaster seven-s-side trophy, and a Mixed Hockey Trophy. Benefactors please contact F/Lt. Stott, Headquarters 5 Group (Ext. 54)
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
Spring brings the cuckoo and cricket, a 5 Group Cricket League is being formed. It is hoped that every Station will enter a team. Details are being circulated.
TRAINING
Training on Stirlings and Lancasters in 51 Base pressed on during the month and 66 crews were posted to Squadron.
The Stirling programme has a few teething troubles and but for this there would have been a larger output of crews. Ignition and electrical failures were particularly troublesome and infectious.
The snow fall at the end of the month involved all available man and machine power on a new and unwelcome form of training – shovelling snow – and prevented a last minute spurt in training.
The incoming crews judged by ground training standards are quite good, and the Aircrew School at Scampton did a lot of the spade work in giving them a sound basic knowledge of 5 Group tactics and operational procedure.
H 2 S training has been reorganised in the Base. The present aim is to train selected crews during the ordinary Conversion Unit course. Ground training is being given, and an initial demonstration flight arranged as early as possible in the course so that the cross country exercises (day and might) are flown using H 2 S as a navigation aid. No practice bombing is now being attempted. Air Training has been held up by the unserviceability of the H 2 S Stirling.
The Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston has so far done no H 2 S training, but a synthetic trainer has been promised by Bomber Command. When it is installed crews will be able to keep in practice by dry swims before passing out to H 2 S Squadrons.
With the disbandment of No.1485 (Bombing and Gunnery) Flight, the training of Air Gunners has been incorporated in the normal Conversion Unit Course. When No.1690 (Bomber) Defence Training Flight begins its work it is hoped that the former high standard of training can be maintained.
Flight Engineers are passing through the Stirling Units twice to give them the maximum possible flying time before going to Lancaster Finishing School. This ensures that they are well experienced in the air by the time they reach their operational Squadrons.
Crews under training took part in a large scale Command Bullseye which was laid on as a diversionary feature for the operation against Stuttgart on the night 20th February. The diversion achieved the success hoped for and attracted a large proportion of the weight of the German Fighter Force away from the area in which the Squadrons were operating.
5 Group News. No. 19 February, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
H 2 S
H 2 S training has progressed favourably during the month, but unfortunately once again training in blind bombing has been held up due to bad weather and cloud over targets. Good use is being made of synthetic trainers now installed at 49, 57 and 630 Squadrons and 1660 and 1661 Conversion Units. Navigators and Bomb Aimers should look upon this ground training as an essential part of their syllabus, and endeavour to make as much use of the synthetic trainer as navigational and blind bombing aid in the limited time they have.
It is gratifying to note that many crews are becoming increasingly aware of the value of H 2 S as a navigational aid and should realise the amount of work that is carried out by the Radar Sections for their benefit. Many set operators can help to decrease this work by reporting all faults personally to either the Radar Officer or one of the Radar Mechanics, and not merely to one of the ground crew who pass it on in hushed tones to the Radar Section, but with no explanations regarding unserviceability. You, the set operators, are the ones to let the section know the faults experienced and their symptoms. It may mean the difference between a “ropey” or good set on the next flight. Cultivate this habit of personal contact and you will earn the gratitude of the Radar Section and probably pick up some useful tips.
Some operators are having trouble with poor reception. This is a complaint particularly common amongst crews under training. Like ourselves, components of H 2 S have age limits, and their deterioration may cause poor reception; but remember the set can easily go off tune and it is necessary to check tuning whenever doubts arise regarding the quality of reception.
Cupolas are also liable to give trouble with reception. Extraneous matter which has a habit of collecting in the cupola will materially affect reception, giving rise to a mushy picture. Set operators are advised to see that the cupola is clean both inside and out before every flight.
Does this happen in YOUR aircraft?
[Cartoon] GREMLIN’S GARDEN
N.C.M.
Plotting charts are now being revised every three months to give the H 2 S operator as accurate a view as possible of the shape of towns from which he should receive responses. Every set operator can help in the revising of those charts by noting any peculiarity in town shapes and passing the information to this Headquarters by means of the usual report made at interrogation.
Know your Landmarks. The following are well known H 2 S landmarks on the continent.
Can you identify them?
[Three drawn outline maps]
FLYING CONTROL
Coningsby tops the list, with Waddington a close second; it is encouraging to note that landing times of all Stations are getting more consistent, and the overall landing time of 2.75 minutes is an encouraging improvement on January’s figures. It is hoped to see, each month, a further reduction so that the Group can record an overall average of below two minutes per aircraft.
In planning operations it can now be assumed with confidence that 5 Group aircraft, sometimes in excess of 200, can be landed within one hour of the return of the first machine. Compare this period of landing with that of 12 months ago, when smaller numbers of aircraft were concerned, and when a landing hook up often used to last 80 or 90 minutes. This reduction in the landing period has meant greater safety for the crews, less fuel to be carried, and a greater tonnage of bombs available for delivery.
Reports from Eastern airfields indicate that aircraft are not adhering strictly to lattice line approach procedure. This is essentially a part of the quick landing scheme and rigid compliance with this part of the scheme must be stressed to all crews.
[Underlined] FEBRUARY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of landing times and averages by Station]
GEE
Rather poor range on Gee was experienced in operations this month, and once again XF transmissions were little used by Navigators. However it is apparent that there are still a few navigators who endeavour to get the best out of their sets and try all available means to secure fixes at maximum range. Success in track keeping and timing is the result of their efforts.
Other Navigators seem more concerned with finding reasons why ranges cannot be improved without endeavouring to improve them. This attitude is more effective than any jammer that the Hun can produce. It is therefore, up to every Navigator to use Gee to its actual and not its apparent limits. Plots of fixes made on the last three operations show the distance between the worst and best fixes to be 200 miles or more. Many of the worst ranges come from non-H2S Squadrons in which Gee is the sole navigational aid. Gee Trainers and Jammers are available on all Squadrons and Conversion Units and, therefore, it is up to every navigator, whether on Squadron or Conversion Unit, to carry out maximum training in Gee, particularly in the reading of signals through jamming.
One general complaint is that the Series3, Southern Chain miniature lattice charts do not afford full coverage and many fixes cannot be plotted. Charts covering such areas are to be issued in the near future, but in the meantime the remedy is in the Navigator’s own hands. Continue your lattice lines in pencil along the margins of the those charts you have, covering areas where fixes might be obtained, but no chart coverage is available.
With the constant lack of interest in XF transmissions, enquiries have been made, and many Navigators complain that they find it difficult to insert the XF unit into the receiver and use it in its present position. If this difficulty is arising now, it will be even greater when the new RF unit is issued, because of the attention required to secure maximum results. A little perseverance now may help in the future. However, how about a few ideas on the repositioning of the Gee receiver to obviate this complaint? They will be welcome at the Headquarters providing they are practicable.
Navigators of 630 and 57 Squadrons visited a Gee transmitter station during the month, and were given an idea of the ground organisation necessary to provide so valuable a navigational aid. The visit was much appreciated by all concerned, and it is hoped that other Squadrons and the Conversion Units will take advantage of this facility in the future.
[Underlined] FLYING ACCIDENTS [/underlined]
(Continued from page12 Col 3)
investigations into them are not yet complete. One aircraft dived to avoid another and crashed in the funnel. Another failed to get airborne by the time it reached the airfield boundary. The undercarriage hit the hedge and the Lancaster crashed. Another hit a hill while the pilot was flying low in bad weather. In others the causes are still obscure.
15 avoidable accidents occurred in 51 Base during February, of which 8 were taxying accidents. This means that more than half of the avoidable accidents in the Group occurred at Conversion Units and No.5 L.F.S.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
January’s low percentage of photographic failures was not maintained during the month of February, and the following increases occurred:-
Photographic + .02%
Armament + 2.1%
Electrical + 1.07%
It is curious that a large number of failures occurred on the first raids following the stand down period. It is expected that technical efficiency should then be at its peak, as ample time is available to effect thorough maintenance and servicing of camera equipment etc. That this is not so, points to the fact that this period is not being used to the best advantage.
During the stand down period N.C.O’s must ensure that everything possible is done to produce Type 35 Controls and camera gearboxes which are without fault. Particular attention must be given to timing the camera sequence – control contact strips – gear box spring teeth and film measuring roller needles; this applies particularly to newly issued equipment.
Photographic film processing and printing is taking [underlined] far too long to accomplish [/underlined] and NCO photographers are to check the internal section organisation. Delay always occurs when numerous Ground Detail photographs are obtained, indicating that the organisation is based on having a minimum amount of printing instead of the maximum. Station Intelligence Officers need prints to plot with a minimum of delay. Printing should therefore, be arranged to allow the S.I.O. to have the prints in batches instead of waiting to complete the whole of the work.
Every photographer must realise the importance of carrying out his tasks, with the [underlined] utmost speed and efficiency [/underlined]. The aircrews have completed their tasks, but delay in producing photographic evidence of the effect of the raid is comparable to sabotaging their efforts.
The use of Composite film (Kodacolour and H.S. Night) was carried a stage further during the month and it is hoped that in the near future other Squadrons will be using this method of recording attacks.
The problem of operating the camera when the bomb doors are opened prior to the bombing run is now considered to be solved. Aircraft of 44 Squadron are carrying out final tests which have so far been successful and the advantage of the circuit now under trial is that it does not impose exacting Drill upon the pilot and Air Bomber.
[Table of Photographic Analysis including Target Conditions and Failure Analysis by Squadron]
HONOURS & AWARDS
The following immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. G. PRATT. DFM
W/Cdr. R.L. BOWES, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. P.A. DOREHILL, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. C.D. WIGGIN. DFC
P/O. R.M. HIGGS. DFC
Sgt. R.W. JOY DFM
50 SQUADRON
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
61 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. BURGESS. DFC
207 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. GALLAGHER. DSO
F/Sgt. C.E. STEWART. DFM
463 SQUADRON
Sgt. W. HOLT. DFM
The following non-immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
9 SQUADRON
P/O. K. GILL. DFC
P/O. G.E. LOCKEY. DFC
F/Sgt. T.C. OVEREND. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/Lt. S. BURROWS. DFC
Sgt. R.W.T. TUCKER. DFM
P/O. A.G. SMYTHE. DFC
F/Sgt. J. CUSHION. DFM
F/O. S.H. LETLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON
F/O. R.E. HIDDERLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON (Continued)
P/O. L.A. COXHILL DFC
P/O. J.B. WARWICK DFC
F/O. J.D. HARRIS DFC
W/O. E.M. WEBB DFC
W/O. E.L. JONES DFC
P/O. G.P. GEORGE DFC
P/O. K.O. BARNES DFC
W/O. T.P. JUBB DFC
Sgt. G. BOAG DFM
Sgt. T. TYLER DFM
F/Sgt. J DORRIAN DFM
F/Sgt. G.A. EDY DFM
F/O. F.E. WHITTMER DFC
50 SQUADRON
P/O. J.F.C. BROWN DFC
F/Lt. K. RUSKELL DFC
F/Lt. J.A. EDWARD DFC
F/O. W. BODEN DFC
F/O. L.T. PRITCHARD DFC
F/Sgt. R.V. POOLEY DFM
F/Sgt. S.J. PROCTER DFM
W/O. E.T. McLEOD DFC
F/O. D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/Sgt. H. BROWN DFM
F/O. J.M. DICKS DFC
P/O. J.B. BLOTT DFC
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY DFC
Sgt. C.H. BROWN DFM
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. KING DFC
F/Sgt. W.L. BELL DFM
F/Sgt. J.A. THOMAS DFM
61 SQUADRON
F/Lt. N.D. WEBB DFC
106 SQUADRON
F/Lt. J.G. CLARIDGE DFC
F/O. V.L. COLE DFC
P/O. W.R.P. PERRY DFC
F/Lt. L.R. HARVEY DFC
F/O. J. FORSYTH DFC
P/O. L.G. BERRY DFC
F/Lt. R.L. WAKE DFC
207 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. P.N. JENNINGS DFC
F/Lt. J.F. GRIME DFC
F/Lt. M.J. BAUD DFC
F/Sgt. G. BROADHEAD DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. BROWN DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. JAMIESON DFM
F/Lt. W.C.T. BRAY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
467 SQUADRON
P/O. W.J.O. GRIME DFC
P/O. J.G. SIMPSON DFC
619 SQUADRON
F/O. H.W. KEAN, DFM. DFC
F/Lt. J.A. HOWARD DFC
F/Lt. P.J.F. WALMSLEY DFC
W/O. J.H. MASON DFC
630 SQUADRON
F/Lt. D.S. PATERSON DFC
P/O. A.E.A. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. A.H. GIBSON DFC
P/O. J.H. WORTHINGTON DFC
F/Sgt. J. MARTIN. DFM
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
[Underlined] RADAR WORKSHOPS [/underlined]
Although none of the Radar Workshops in this Group have quite reached the stage depicted in the picture on the opposite page, it does show what can befall a section if it is left to sweep itself out after you have all packed up for the day. It is surprising what a few minutes at the end of the day can do if everyone pitches in before leaving for town. It also helps to ward off that hopeless feeling one experiences in the morning on entering a section which looks as if our bombers had got a bit off track (Gee u/s?).
Odd pieces of timber can be scrounged on the Station (NOT packing cases – which have now supplanted the gold standard), and with these can be built trays for spare components which we trust you have saved from detonated sets and other salvage material.
Test equipment should be treated with the greatest respect and kept in its proper place when not in use.
An up-to-date serviceability and fitting board in the office or workshop can save no end of trouble and time for all concerned when information is required at short notice. It keeps all mechanics posted too, and they will add that extra little drive which helps to make the picture the board portrays a rosier one.
General interest diagrams – excluding polar diagrams of Dorothy Lamour and other homing devices – should be neatly displayed on notice boards and walls.
The use of lino is nullified if the mud is not left outside, so get hold of those foot scrapers and door mats which the equipment section will be only too pleased to provide.
So let your aim be to keep your Radar workshop clean and reasonably tidy, so that the priceless equipment you have the privilege of handling may have the best chance of ensuring more bombs on the target.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATIONS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Codes [/underlined]
The month of February saw the last of our old standby, the “X” book, and in its place comes the A.P.3026. This will be easier to understand if Wireless Operators (Air) take the trouble to study its contents during the odd spare moment.
The new edition of C.D. 0250(16) should also receive a little of your attention, as the contents have been enlarged and the spare groups decreased. Remember that any time spent in studying these new editions might well save a frantic turning over of pages and a panic in the air.
Tests will be carried out on the Group W/T exercises, embodying the additions to the C.D.0250. Operators are reminded that this is an excellent means of getting up to date with anything new, and if you are not on the exercise you can always learn something from the logs of those who were taking part.
[Underlined] Finding Messages [/underlined]
All Wireless Operators (Air) are to be congratulated on the splendid work done during the month in connection with the “wind finding scheme”, especially on the night 15/16th February when 153 wind messages were received from aircraft. There was great joy and jubilation in the Signals Cabin at this Headquarters, for the “Back Room Boys” are always in the show.
[Underlined] Tail Warning Devices [/underlined]
Training in the use of the various early warning devices should now be standardised throughout the Group, but there are Squadrons who have not sent to the Group Signals Leader their version of the synthetic training cards. These cards are the best method of obtaining a quick snappy reaction to what is seen on the screen. The combined efforts of O.R.S., T.R.E., B.D.U. and the Radar “Kings” produced a piece of equipment designed to aid the bomber crews to beat the Hun when he is met in the air. Are [underlined] you [/underlined] tackling the job with the enthusiasm it deserves? Remember, TRAINING is the only answer.
A fault finding table for Visual Monica has been prepared and will be issued to Squadrons for inclusion in the current fault finding booklet carried by all Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] Lighting of Operator’s Cabin [/underlined]
Quite recently the old complaint of lighting in the Wireless Operator’s position has cropped up again. Now, at this present stage of the war, it is quite impossible to start producing modified lighting on a large scale, and it must be left to the initiative of the individual to produce something for himself. The maintenance section of No.50 Squadron produced and excellent lighting system for the T.R.1154 and are working on the R.1155. Come along fellows, don’t leave it to one – try saving your breath on complaints and using it up on some action.
[Underlined] “Brace up” [/underlined]
Now for a final word to all airborne “key bashers”. Things are likely to get cracking in the very near future. Can you say with a clear conscience that you are ready to meet any emergency? [Underlined] If [/underlined] not, now is the time to GO TO IT INT QRL QRV K 2359
[Underlined] Stop Press [/underlined]
A tip from No.630 Squadron. Switch on your T. R. 1196 when going in on your bombing run, and then, should your intercom. go unserviceable, the change-over can be effected immediately.
SIGNALS FAILURES
There has been an alarming increase in the percentage of Signals failures during February and whilst it is true that almost 50% (13 out of a total of 29) were due to definite failures of components in the equipment, it is felt that this number could have been reduced, particularly those of a recurring nature. Special attention should be paid to the starter relay contacts in the Power Unit type 35 pending the introduction of the new type with silvered contacts in a more accessible position. Faults in the switch type 170 in the fighter warning circuit are nearly always due to an insufficient allowance of slack in the connecting cable exerting a pull on the switch during the rotation of the turret, causing a displacement of the switch contacts. This results in a point contact and an intermittent high resistance connection.
There were six failures reported in which no fault could be found. Five affected intercom, four of which were contributory to early returns. Every member of a crew can assist in diagnosing obscure intercom faults by remembering the details and symptoms of the failure and passing them on to the Signals Officer.
The object of reporting failure is to ascertain the reason why the failure occurred, and if possible to originate a modification or maintenance instruction which will tend to eliminate the type of failure. This object is defeated unless all failures are conscientiously reported, and the number of failures reported by a Squadron does not reflect upon its maintenance efficiency, but rather indicates a conscientious devotion to detail, in an effort to reduce the number of failures and increase the delivery of goods to the customer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee remains one of the most serviceable of all Radar devices; out of 1115 sorties flown, 94% of the sets were completely trouble free. This is a very good effort, but with all the experience obtained on this equipment there is no reason why the figure should not be far higher.
Another R. F. Unit is about to be introduced; these units are not, however, to be available in large quantities for some time. It is probable, therefore, than [sic] non H 2 S Squadrons will receive them first. In this connection it is of interest to learn that the Lancasters will soon have a stowage provided for the units not in use.
Authority has at last been obtained for lino to be laid on Radar workshop floors; many enterprising Squadrons have already had their floors covered, and were repaid by increased serviceability. It is hoped that no time will be wasted in so equipping all workshops.
Air Ministry has now ruled that detonators need no longer be fitted; although this will present the Hun with a considerable quantity of Gee equipment, it will be a great help to Squadrons, as many men were necessary for the fitting and removal of detonators.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The serviceability figures for H 2 S are very unsatisfactory. Last month only 68.8% were serviceable for the whole trip; the one blessing is that most of the failures occurred after the target. Main causes of failures are filament transformers, power units and manipulation. An oil filled filament transformer is now being tried, and this may be the solution to our main cause of unserviceability.
Manipulation is confined only to U/T crews but is assuming alarming proportions. Some Squadrons are still troubled by freezing scanner, and repeater motors. Bomber Command is trying to get approval for a new method of heating, but meanwhile the existing heater elements should be repositioned forward of the scanner motor.
The equipment situation is considerably improved, and with the Group Pool now at this Headquarters, Squadrons will have little difficulty in obtaining the main units of H 2 S.
(continued on Page 9 col 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
[Cartoon of Workshop]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 19. February 1944.
- Maurice levell –
IS THIS [underlined] YOUR [/underlined] RADAR WORKSHOP?
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] GUNS AND TURRETS [/underlined]
The month of February shows a notable increase in the number of gun failures still being attributed to freezing. Rare reports have been received where conclusive evidence is available that guns have frozen, while instances have occurred that gunners have attempted to operate the breech blocks by operating the triggers. Attempts have also been made to release the breech blocks by means of the manually operated rear scar release units with little or no success. It is considered that the hydraulic media in the rear scar pipes becomes either frozen or congealed, and that trouble is not brought about by ice in the breech blocks.
To provide conclusive evidence that this is so, trials have been arranged whereby a percentage of gunners operate their breech blocks at intervals of 30 minutes, with guns at “safe”, throughout the operational sortie once operational height has been gained. A percentage of guns are also to be tested during the return, and by this means it is considered a valuable comparison will be obtained.
[Underlined] GALLEY HEATERS [/underlined]
A turret heater known as the “Galley Heater” is shortly to be introduced. The first 10 heaters are being delivered to Skellingthorpe for installation in aircraft of No.50 Squadron. The inside temperature of the turret is raised by means of a steady flow of hot air via air ducts, the ducts being so arranged as to spray the air on to the guns and turret components most susceptible to freezing, and re-bounding on to the gunner’s face.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet Bombing Range. [/underlined] Extreme difficulty has been experienced during recent weeks in keeping targets and their lighting fully serviceable at Wainfleet Range. This has been due to the heavy tides experienced, causing the ingress of salt water into lighting fittings, and resulting in a depletion of vital bombing training. An all-out drive is being made which, it is hoped, will ensure one hundred percent serviceability at all times.
[Underlined] Owthorpe and Epperstone Ranges [/underlined] are available for both day and night bombing, target illumination being effected by flares.
(continued in next column)
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURE [/underlined]
It can be seen from the failures table below that certain Squadrons claim to have had comparatively few, if any, bomb or S.B.C. failures during the month; it is known from Raid Reports received that this is not a true representation of the month’s failures. It is once again emphasised that all Armament failures are to be signalled in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Part I, Section S, Leaflet No. 2, Issue No. 4.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
An Armament Officers’ Conference was held at Base Station, Scampton, on Friday, 11th February, 1944, and afforded an excellent opportunity for the Command Armament Officer, Air Commodore Bilney, to meet all Armament Officers within the Group. Minutes have been circulated.
[Underlined] MINES “A” – MKS. I – IV [/underlined]
With the introduction of numerous types of new assemblies, it has been found that the personnel who carry out the testing and preparation, need instruction on all these later assemblies. To meet this requirement, courses have been arranged and allocated to all Units within the Group.
[Underlined] FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D= TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
Link Trainer Hours
[Table of hours spent on the Link Trainer by Pilots and Flight Engineers per Squadron]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(continued from page 8 col 3)
[Underlined] VISUAL MONICA [/underlined]
Serviceability of this equipment has still not reached a satisfactory figure; last month it was approximately 81% serviceable. A large percentage of the failures were due to switch motors seizing. A great deal of time and trouble has gone into this switch motor problem, and it is hoped that the solution is close at hand. All Units will have received information regarding the Manufacturer’s methods of setting up, and soon a report will be issued summarising the findings of a local ball bearing works which has been testing these motors. In the meantime the 2-way Pye sockets will allow the Wireless Operator full coverage even though the switch motor stops.
The biggest headache is still the shortage of equipment. Many Squadrons have managed to “acquire” bits from here and there, and in this manner fit more aircraft. This unfortunately, appears to be the only way in which replacement can be maintained at present.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond, unfortunately, depends on H 2 S serviceability and manipulation by both the Navigator and Wireless Operator. In such circumstances one would expect the Fishpond serviceability to be bad, and such is the case. In spite of this general low serviceability, Squadrons which have trained their crews well are now very pleased with the results obtained, and indeed managed to show a figure of 73% serviceable.
[Underlined] A. I. [/underlined]
Trials have been going on for some time with Mark IV A.I. It is believed that this equipment will make a good “Tail Warning Device”.
There are many snags yet to be cured before both elevation and bearing can be obtained.
It is expected however, that the experts will find the answer soon, and once more 5 Group will have pioneered a first class “Tail Warning Device”.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of amount saved by Base and Unit]
TOTAL 4170.10.9
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Unit]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
You should always have a clear picture of each leg of the route in your mind. Study your track throughout briefing. Your [sic] can’t overdo this. It will prevent you accepting a completely wrong course from your Navigator. They have been known to give airspeeds for courses! It will help you as a rough guide to your track make good to take approximate bearings on defended areas each side of the route. But [underlined] don’t [/underlined] pinpoint on flak. One gun site can seem like “Happy Valley” if you are getting its undivided attention.
Always trim forward after bombing. The Lancaster becomes appreciably tail heavy after the bombs have gone. One pilot didn’t trim forward. He was a trifle shaken when the “wizard prang” he was giving all his attention to suddenly took off and orbited him. It was a sadder and wiser man who finally recovered from a stall some 8,000 feet nearer the ground.
Watch the “George” auto-control on take-off, especially taller pilots. It is possible during powerful movements to knock the auto-control lever to “In” and though “George” can fly straight and level, he can’t cope with a take-off, and you may not either with his unwanted co-operation.
By the way, when did you last do a proper Link Trainer exercise? Did you blank off the artificial horizon and carry out recovery from more extreme attitudes by use of the turn and bank indicator, A.S.I. and rate of climb? Or did you just fill in time?
If you have to “queue up” for take-off, don’t leave your engines idling. The plugs may oil up if you have long to wait. Run each engine up against the brakes to about 1600 revs. This will be sufficient to clear them, and it will also prevent overheating.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
A Pilot in this Group did his take-off drill the wrong way round. He left the boost cut-out till the end of his checks. When he did pull it down, his heavily gloved hand knocked the port outer fuel cock off, Fortunately his Engineer noticed it. He may not have done!
Keep your beam flying on the top line. Don’t just switch it on to test it on N.F.T’s Fly down the beam and do an approach each time. It’s a good scheme after training flights and N.F.T’s to find the aerodrome yourself on your own and other beams in the area.
Have you got your drills for using portable oxygen bottles weighted up? If you have any doubts at all- which you shouldn’t have – read 5 Group Aircraft Drills, No.12. Do you know how long the supply will last?
On your next N.F.T. carry out a dummy drill for an emergency. Have your Flight Engineer and Wireless Operator go down and lift the Rear Gunner out of his turret and carry him to the rest bed, using portable bottles. One pilot we know had three of his crew unconscious on the rear turret cat-walk just as he was approaching the target. They knew how to use the bottles, but had never practiced it!
Don’t wear signet rings on operations, however well dressed you may feel. You may regret your elegance. It increases the danger of frostbite if you have to bale out at altitude. It is also difficult for the M.O. to treat you for hand wounds or abrasions. Either the ring comes off – or your finger does!!
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
All Flight Engineer Leaders in the Group must have a drive on their Squadron in log keeping. So much valuable information is lost because details of small defects the recording of airspeeds, and the time of descent are omitted. It is difficult to keep a good log when the Flight Engineer is to “Window”, but if we can instil more keenness in the keeping of these logs, Flight Engineers in the long run, would benefit from the research which is given to all operational flights.
There is much discrepancy in the duration of flight from these logs. In future the time from airborne to landing must be taken from the Watch Office records and entered in the log.
This month at least one early return was made that should have been avoided. On the outward trip, the port engine showed a higher temperature than the other three; it was decided to return. On the check the next day it was found that this temperature was within the limits laid down for this type of engine; the Flight Engineer should have known this and advised the pilot that there was no danger. Another case was one engine feathered because the oil temperature gauge dropped to zero, yet both the oil pressure gauge and the coolant temperature gauge remained normal. On check it was found that the gauge was faulty.
[Cartoon] Dot and Dash – our immaculate W.A.A.F’s
“- and you needn’t say I’m jealous of this Monica of Bill’s – “
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The Group operated five times only during February, and these five operations produced 1000 sorties; to achieve this an exceedingly high percentage of aircraft held on charge flew on each of these operations, the outstanding feature being the first operation of the month, when 226 Lancasters took off from this Group. Further comment on this achievement is unnecessary as it must be obvious to any person who knows the difficulties which have to be overcome to get such a large force off the ground, what work was entailed.
March should see an even larger effort than did February, but we still have our cancellations and early returns which do not appear to reduce by very many in spite of all our efforts. The technical defects which cause early returns and cancellations are not of a recurring nature; that is why it is so difficult to overcome each single case, but in spite of these individual faults, the numbers of early returns will be at least reduced if we persevere.
Much discussion has taken place during the month on the salvage of equipment, and one point which affect all Engineer Officers in this connection is that they must make sure that full use is made of the Base facilities for the repair and testing of technical equipment. A very frequent check should be made on R. & I. stores, and station equipment sections, to ensure that items of equipment have not been returned for subsequent return to the R.E.D. when these items can be repaired within the Base facilities.
During March it is intended to review the Maintenance Schedules for both Lancaster and Stirling aircraft; committees will be set up for each type and each individual inspection item will be checked both for the Daily and Minor Inspections; as a result it is hoped to cut out many items which exist in the Daily Inspection which are unnecessary, similarly with the Minor Inspection. Many hours are at present expended inspecting items which happen to be shown as requiring inspection by the schedule where, in fact, no defects were ever found. At the same time that the schedules are being revised, the card system will be introduced which will assist greatly with carrying out inspections, and it may be no longer necessary, once the scheme is introduced, to put aircraft unserviceable for longer than a few hours for inspection purposes.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Underlined] STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Conversion Unit]
LANCASTER AIRCRAFT
[Aircraft Serviceability for 5. L.F.S.]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] HARMONIZATION [/underlined]
Standard diagrams for each turret in Lancaster aircraft for harmonization at 100 yds and 25 yds have been issued to all Squadrons (5 Group letter 5G/237/2/Trg. Dated 1st Dec. 1943). These diagrams show all dimensions including the height of boards above ground, colour scheme for the gun spots and size of gun spots. The Mid Upper Turret is harmonized on the PORT beam and in all instances the distances are measured from a point vertically beneath the gun pivots to the board. The Tail turret is harmonized with the board dead astern and the nose turret with the board dead ahead.
A good tip is to strip each gun in turn, and not have four breech blocks laid around the rear turret at the same time, as instances have occurred of the breech blocks finding their way into the wrong gun, with the result that the Gunner has had a little difficulty in getting all the guns to fire. It is essential to check the harmonization again after the gun has been trained on the gun spot and the locking device screwed tight as the gun sometimes moves slightly during the locking procedure. The best type of board is the solid wooden one, fitted with a handle for carrying, and the best place to keep the boards is in the Gunnery Office and NOT laid about the dispersal points, remember somebody else may want the board after you and will expect to find it in its proper place. The guns should be harmonized at 100 yards and the 25 yards board used only for checking, it will be realised that the danger of harmonizing at 25 yds is that a slight error at this range is a large one at 400 yards, and although it is often easier to use the short range, don’t get into the habit of doing it every time.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
These reports are showing a tendency to become very brief and a lot of valuable information is omitted; this may be due to the gunners not giving the information at interrogation, or the duty gunner not including everything that is laid down in Appendix “A” INT. 1 and 2 to Air Staff Instructions, it is not easy to remember each item in this Appendix, and it is suggested that a copy is made and used at interrogation to ensure that all the information required is obtained from the crew.
All gunners should realise that the gun freezing bogey is still very much in existence and gunners should do everything possible during the trip when freezing is suspected, to find out where the trouble is; this is not simple, but if the guns won’t fire with the firing gear, the manual release should be tried. This may not cure the trouble as the breech block may go forward and stay there, instances have occurred of the firing gear taking some few seconds to function after the triggers have been pressed. These points and the presence of ice on guns should be noted by the gunners and stated at interrogation. Will all air gunners, therefore, do their utmost to help the technical staff to solve the serious and difficult problem.
[Underlined] MARK II GYRO GUNSIGHT[/underlined]
The Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Fiskerton is being modified to take the Gyro Gunsight and training of gunners will commence as soon as this modification is complete. Considerable practice is required with this gunsight before the gunner becomes proficient in following the target accurately, due to the slight lag produced by the gyro on the moving graticule. It is found at first that when following a target which changes direction, the gunner is apt to overshoot with the sight, as the graticule carries on after the turret has stopped, and this, coupled with the foot pedals which are operated to feed the range into the sight, are both innovations which are new and must be mastered before accurate shooting can be expected.
The turret in which these sights will be installed is the F.N. 121 which has an electric motor to operate the servo mechanism, which eliminates any inter-action of trigger and turret movements. The control characteristics in the valve box have been modified to give more positive control for small turret movements at the cost of a slight reduction in the speed of the turret. No information is available at the moment regarding the speed with which the remaining Squadrons will be equipped after 49 Squadron is complete, but it is expected that the rate will be speeded up after the first Squadron has been completed.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO.73 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FINAL EXAMINATION RESULTS [/underlined]
P/O. Sandford – 467 Sqdn. – 79.2% - Cat. “A”
P/O. Powell – 619 Sqdn. – 67% - Cat “C”
[Underlined] NO.74 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE [/underlined]
F/O. Williams – 463 Sqdn. – 74.8% - Cat “C”
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn. A/C Night Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 M 19/20.2.44. DO.217
49 D 19/20.2.44. JU,88
207 F 20/21.2.44. ME.110
49 C 24/25.2.44. T/E.
463 S 25/26.2.44. FW.190
207 K 25/26.2.44. ME.410
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
50 B 15/16.2.44. JU.88
44 J 15/16.2.44. DO.217
50 H 15/16.2.44. ME.210
207 C 15/16.2.44. ME.110
9 C 15/16.2.44. T/E.
44 A 19/20.2.44. ME.210
50 J 19/20.2.44. JU.88
106 M 19/20.2.44. ME.410
619 B 19/20.2.44. ME.109
44 Y 20/21.2.44. ME.210
49 G 24/25.2.44. JU.88
49 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.210
57 P 24/25.2.44. JU.88
207 P 24/25.2.44. S/E.
9 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.100
9 S 25/26.2.44. JU.88
630 G 25/26.2.44. FW.190
All these claims have been confirmed by Command.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.19. FEBRUARY, 1944 PAGE 11.
[Page break]
M.T. & FLYING ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ‘YOU’VE HAD IT’ [/underlined]
Reporting an M.T. accident, even filling up Form 446, is easy enough if the driver does it straight away, but it gets more difficult every day he puts it off.
In the end you will find that he doesn’t report it at all, but don’t be misled; the other man will and A.D. Claims then start the ball rolling from the other end, and you will find that you are in more trouble than ever, and it’s quite a big snowball by the time it reaches you.
Will M.T. Officers and N.C.O’s i/c Transport try to impress their drivers with the necessity for keeping the following rules.
(i) If you hit an aircraft or an aircraft hits you – REPORT IT – Everybody will; it’s a BLACK, but Training are dealing with this more fully.
(ii) If you knock someone’s wall down, or even bend it, --REPORT IT – the owner may quite like it, and he’s sure to be watching out of the window.
[Cartoon] E.M.P.
(iii) If you bump a car in the blackout – REPORT IT – the owner values his car much more than you think; usually more than it’s worth.
(iv) If you knock his daughter down – REPORT IT – injuries get so much worse if no one calls to sympathise from A.D. Claims. By the way, don’t call to sympathise yourself, however pretty she may be; this is against the rules, A.D. Claims have all the luck! A.M.O. A475/42, paragraph 17 lays down quite definitely that you must not approach the civilian involved in an accident. If you can get yourself invited to tea after the whole thing is settled – well that’s different!
Very few MT accidents now require more than F.446 action if they are reported at once. Page.16 of the AMO tells you all about this.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENT RATE ALMOST TREBLED IN 3 MONTHS [/underlined]
DECEMBER - [/underlined] 10; [/underlined] JANUARY – [underlined] 18; [/underlined] FEBRUARY – [underlined] 27. [/underlined]
The exalted position held by this Group for the past three months in the Bomber Command Accident Ladder will certainly not be held for the month just finished. It has been the blackest month from the accident point of view for a long time, and the most prevalent type, viz. [underlined] Ground Collisions [/underlined] has contributed to a greater extent than ever to the long list of damaged Lancasters and Stirlings in the Group. THESE AVOIDABLE, UNECESSARY AND EXPENSIVE ACCIDENTS MUST CEASE.
The “taxying” record for the past 3 months reads as follows:-
December – 9; January – 9; February – 11.
When it is realised that at least half of the aircraft involved were [underlined] CAT. AC. [/underlined] the effect on the war effort from this type of accident alone is immediately apparent.
So much has been written in these notes recently that it is difficult to avoid repetition, but it is hoped that the new instructions issued in February have the desired effect. However, the exercise of care and foresight on the part of everybody, especially pilots, is essential at all times when taxying an aircraft if the number of accidents in this category is to be reduced. There is no doubt that if ground personnel and aircrew do their very best, taxying accidents can be brought to within reasonable limits.
Manpower, paper, time and tempers can be saved by getting your report off quickly and giving AD Claims a chance to settle the case at once.
A great deal depends on M.T. Officers ensuring that their drivers report accidents promptly. If the drivers was not at fault he will not be punished (Not often!!! Editor), but he may be if he doesn’t report it at all.
Of course it saves an awful lot of trouble not to have the accident at all. It’s worth trying!
An unusual accident occurred at a Station in No.51 Base this month. An aircraft had landed and was slowing down towards the end of the runway, when the rear gunner called up the captain and told him an aircraft was landing beside him. The quick landing scheme was in force , and just prior to the gunner’s warning, Flying Control had advised the pilot to clear the runway quickly. As a result of these warnings, the captain thought the aircraft was close behind him (it was still in the funnel) and accelerated. He had too much speed on turning off the end of the runway, and broke his undercarriage. Rear Gunners should pay particular attention to give their captains precise information as to where an aircraft landing behind actually is. If it is still in the funnel they should definitely say so.
The month’s total of all kinds of avoidable accidents is made up as follows:-
Ground Collisions- 11; Heavy Landings – 4; Overshoots on Landing – 3; Swings on take off – 3; Crashes on Overshooting – 1; Other errors of judgement – 5. Of the aircraft which made heavy landings, two were Cat. A. and two were Cat.A.C. Three of these occurred at night. In one of them the pilot was prevented from using engine [sic] to recover from the first bounce because the Flight Engineer still had his hands on the throttles after ensuring they were fully closed. He was thrown off balance and held on to the throttles. This is a point which must be watched. Another occurred after an operational trip, when the pilot was caught unawares by his flaps only partly lowering. The flap gauge must always be checked.
Investigation of 2 of the swings on take off shows that either the wrong procedure for take off was used, or the wrong action taken when the swing started. Every pilot should ensure that he thoroughly understands the 5 Group Drills on swinging.
The accidents classed as errors of judgement were almost all of a serious nature, and the
(continued on page 6 Col. 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
SELF HELP
A recent letter from Air Ministry impressed upon Command Group and Station Commanders the critical shortage of labour and materials that exists today. Notwithstanding the evidence of this on Stations in the shape of current establishment deficiencies and shortage of equipment, very few people realise how serious the position really is.
In effect, the allocation of labour for constructional work has been considerably reduced. This labour will be required to cover minor Works Services, as well as larger schemes.
[Cartoon] P/O Snooks will Help Himself any time! EMP.
Therefore, the available labour must only be used on those schemes that are essentially of an operational necessity and this can only be done at the expense of day-to-day minor services. If the minor Work Services themselves are to be carried out, it will only be possible to implement them by a “Self Help” scheme.
Now the expression “Self Help” should not be taken too literally. It does not mean that it can be taken as a good excuse to knock down the local guard room, or to pull down the intervening wall between the W.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Dining Room. A “Self Help” scheme is done by Service labour, and as such must be organised as a Service for the benefit of the Station as a whole, and not to satisfy the whim of any individual. There still seem to be a number of people who, being accustomed to “Having jam on it” in the shape of the excellent facilities normally available at a R.A.F. Station of peace-time design, think that the provision of any little extra convenience for anyone connected, however remotely, with the many activities involved in running a flying station, can justifiably be regarded as “operationally essential”. This, of course, is nonsense – ask some of our fellows who have served overseas.
The problem is, therefore, how to get a fuller effort from the available R.A.F. man and woman. There is, no doubt, very many R.A.F. personnel who are not doing the full amount of work of which they are capable and quite a lot of them have not yet grasped that they ought to do more than they are doing. Quite a few regard the acquisition of as many late passes and “forty eights” as possible as their chief aim in life, with unofficial extension to such periods of absence as a minor hobby. Quite a number of these might well contribute a few hours to “Self Help” each week, without suffering any grave hardship.
There are, on the other hand, a considerable number of individuals who continuously work to the limit of their capacity and sometimes beyond that limit (“Not you Adj. – sit down”). Everyone should feel a strong personal urge to give of their utmost to their Service tasks and to put no limit to the amount of effort which should be demanded of them. As we have now reached the stage when national resources are inadequate to provide us with every facility we need just when we want it, this extra effort must be organised and well led, to help ourselves as far as we can. This extra effort can be used on Station Maintenance, to replace broken windows, re-painting quarters and firming up paths and standings.
But, in conclusion, remember the buildings etc., on the Station are Air Ministry property so don’t knock down that Guard Room without first obtaining authority from the higher formation – it is really quite embarrassing to stand on Pay Parade and find you have no money to come.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, Col. 1) [/underlined]
It is not done at all even thought the men drown. Recently in Lincoln Swimming Bath an aircrew member who couldn’t swim took the precaution of providing himself with a Mae West and took care to fasten it properly; he then jumped into the bath from the top board – and wasn’t seen for a long time, he eventually came up shouting for help and on being pulled out immediately started blaming his Mae West, only to find that he hadn’t inflated it – it goes to show!!
[Underlined] Note for Gunners. [/underlined] If your Buoyant Suit has no pocket for a floating torch don’t take it that this means you are not to have one – have a pocket fitted. If no pockets are available, you can still wear the torch round your neck inside the suit. Similarly make sure that there is an attachment for the lanyard of the K-dinghy on your suit – if you don’t know then make enquiries [underlined] now [/underlined]
IN “Air Sea Rescue” the proverb is:-
[Underlined] “YOU CAN BE TOO LATE TO LEARN”. [/underlined]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] CARE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As one goes about the Stations, it is obvious that equipment in general is not being cared for as it might, or rather as it should. There is no doubt whatever that at the present time, especially owing to the shortage of materials, we must make the best use of that which has been given to us. There is a feeling that the Government is a good firm and that “there is plenty more where that came from”. That may be true in certain respects, but as this war goes on, demands will increase, but whether the material will be there to meet our needs is another matter; so it is up to everyone [sic] of us to safeguard, handle and use articles of equipment entrusted to us as though they were our own and we had paid for them. Can you imagine yourself buying an expensive article and then after a short time throwing it away because perhaps a small component of it had become unserviceable! Of course you wouldn’t, you would get another part and make it serviceable. Why should you not, therefore, treat Government property in the same way, and thus save materials, manpower, man-hours and money?
[Underlined] REPAIRABLE EQUIUPMENT [/underlined]
Have you read, thoroughly digested and understood AMO A.736/43? This order gives in great detail the method for disposal of repairable equipment. Amongst the many important things one has to do, none is greater than the labelling of an unserviceable article correctly, for if this is not done (i) you are likely to get it thrown back at you by the Equipment Officer – which may mean humping a heavy article back to where it came from, or (ii) you will have to wait for the new article in exchange for the old until you present it in its proper form; thus considerable manpower and time has been unnecessarily expended. Again, if the label does not state the reason for unserviceability of the item, when it gets back to the R.E.D. many more man-hours are lost investigating the cause and extent of its unserviceability, whereas had the label borne the exact cause of failure, the mechanic at the R.E.D. whose job it is to repair such equipment, could have repaired it with the minimum of delay. Special labels are available for this type of equipment (see A.M.O. N.1174/43) – ensure you have a plentiful supply, and use ‘em.
WHO?
Thoroughness is a virtue which we view
With envy, and with admiration too;
And we, in common fairness must agree,
That rarely in a fellow man have we
Encountered such tenacity and drive
As led him on a recent day to strive,
And show his humble tyros how ‘tis done
To fly an aircraft properly, and shun
The common errors that all pupils make.
Enthusiasm prompted him to take
An aircraft up, and as they turned he spoke
“A broken undercarriage is no joke,
And if you swing on take-off you will find
Your legs will go; you’ll sit on your behind!”
Then as he spoke he swung to demonstrate
And proved his words.
……….he met his forecast fate!!
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR * SEA * RESCUE
A man suffering from shock or the after effects of great mental strain usually behaves in a most peculiar manner, as his brain has become numbed and does not function properly. It is on this account that it is necessary for aircrews to practice dinghy drills and have a sound knowledge of safety and rescue equipment carried in their aircraft and also of the equipment that might be dropped to them in the sea.
A crew of this Group was recently forced down in the sea and an airborne lifeboat was dropped to them – they dug about and found the sleeping suits but did not use them as it was considered that, in the crews wet state, these would not be of any use; similarly because the “Everhot” bags had been immersed they did not attempt to use them, thinking that they would be useless! Normally these men are not the “dim clots” you are now calling them – they are an outstanding example of how dim your brain can become after a climax of mental strain, and also of how insufficient knowledge of equipment can be the cause of much unnecessary suffering. Imagine it – wet through, at sea in a small boat on a cold winter’s day, and the means of warming themselves discarded as useless!
In addition, this same crew showed abysmal ignorance of the ditching stations to be taken up – the two gunners ditched with their [underlined] backs [/underlined] to the flap jack and the flight engineer was badly out of position with his back to the rear spar. As this aircraft broke its back at the rear spar, it is logical to suppose that each of these men, had they taken up their correct stations would have been alive today – the flight engineer should have been on the rest bed and the two gunners probably broke their backs on impact, they should have been facing the other way round with their backs on the floor, and “buttocks to flap jack with feet over it”.
Many flying men still seem to have the idea that fully inflated Mae West makes escape through the upper exits of an aircraft difficult. This is not true and tests have shown that the biggest and smallest members can easily “evacuate” Lancasters and Stirlings with a fully inflated Mae West. Inflate your Mae West when your Dinghy Drills provides – experience has shown time and again that unless this is done at the proper time
(Continued on Page 13 Col. 2.)
OPERATIONS
Until the moth was half spent and the “fighter” moon had been allowed to wane, the Group was unable to stage a major attack, although 617 Squadron found two opportunities to add further to their history. Nevertheless, the 1000 sorties mark was again achieved of which 89.7% were successful in attacking the primary targets, with 3.3% casualties. The lull in operational activity, however, was not allowed to pass unprofitably, as can be evidenced in the record figure of 226 aircraft airborne on the 15/16th.
With the progress of the month it became clear that the immediate objective of the Allied Air Command was to strike and crush Germany’s air strength at its source, by a sustained and co-ordinated air offensive against factories associated with aircraft production. To this end LIMOGES featured as the Group’s first assignment on the 8/9th. Until that night, memorable as indeed it must be to those “locals” who were fortunate enough to remain spectators, The Gnome and Rhone aero-engine factory was producing in the region of 50 engines per month for the Axis. Immediate assessment of the results was greatly facilitated by excellent night photographs and a particularly impressive cine film which was eloquent testimony to the accuracy of the marking. It is now apparent from P.R.U. cover following the raid, that of the 48 bays comprising the factory, 7 only have escaped destruction or serious damage – a considerable part of the machinery being wrecked and production brought to a standstill.
On 12/13th February, ANTHEOR again bore a charmed life, and escaped with no direct hits from an attack pressed home in the face of increased opposition. A few very near misses were recorded, from which, however, the Viaduct sustained no apparent damage.
Having husbanded her main bomber strength until 15/16th., Command directed a record effort against the Reich capital. The weight of the blow appears to have fallen to the South of the city and the West of the Potsdamer Railway Station, where extensive damage can be observed.
Continuing the offensive against the enemy’s aircraft industry, LEIPZIG was singled out for a 2,300 ton raid on the 19/20th. Within a few hours of this attack, made in conditions of 10/10ths cloud, American heavies returned in daylight with yet another load for the battered city. Photographic confirmation of the results is awaited with interest.
The night following, viz 20/21st. STUTTGART received a damaging blow – the attack being carried out against an apparently weakening Luftwaffe, since little enemy fighter activity was experienced by our crews. Heavy smoke rolling South Westwards away from the target obscured the Central, South and South Western areas of the town, hindering photographic cover the next day, but fires still burning, apparently unchecked, in the Northern outskirts, gave rise to the impression (later confirmed) that severe damage had been suffered.
The strain on the German night fighter and ground defences was further aggravate on 24/25th by a two-phase attack on the important ball and roller bearing plant at SCHWEINFURT, which originally contributed something approaching 50 per cent of the total production available to Germany. This attack followed closely in the wake of a heavy daylight assault by the Americans. Guided by fires started by their predecessors, later aircraft were able to continue the bombardment which largely wrecked the group of factories as a war time centre.
The month’s activities wound up with a double blow at AUGSBURG on 25/26th. The targets included the Messerschmitt plant and experimental establishment (believed to be engaged in the production of the Me.410) and the M.A.N. Diesel Engine Factory. Following the precedent of the previous day, this important aircraft centre had been attacked in daylight a few hours before by the Americans, and the evidence of night photographs taken during the raid indicates that enormous fires were left burning throughout the area, with a vast pall of smoke shrouding the stricken city.
It is true to say that never before has the enemy’s war production been so heavily bombed, or their defences subjected to such continued strain as that imposed during the sustained attacks of the last nine days of the month, which in themselves exemplify the crushing might of the Allied co-ordinated offensive.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft, hours flow, bombs dropped, sorties carried out and results by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944.
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V Group News, February 1944
5 Group News, February 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 19, February 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about tactics, navigation, air bombing, gardening, sports, training, flying control, H2S, Gee, photography, honours and awards, signals / radar, armament, link trainer hours, war savings, flight engineers, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, engineering, gunnery, motor transport and flying accidents, self help, equipment, who?, air sea rescue, operations and the war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-02
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Anne-Marie Watson
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-23
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
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1944-02
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
civil defence
control tower
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Scampton
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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Base Commander.
Base Int: [Stamp]
MARCH * 1944* CONFIDENTIAL * NO * 20
V GROUP NEWS V
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
March proved a record month for 5 Group, with a total of 1720 aircraft despatched, and a bomb load of 7200 tons. The month also showed a lower figure for early returns at 4.01%, and a missing rate well below the average for the past six months.
Outstanding during the month were the series of attacks on small targets, by individual Bases. These were well undertaken and caused much damage to the French aircraft industry, which is engaged on sub-contracting and repair work for the G.A.F. – work which is of increasing importance as the major factories in Germany are obliterated by the U.S. .A.F.
These attacks call for exact marking, accurate bombing and good signals communications. Much training is still necessary before every operation runs smoothly and can be undertaken with equal success on dark nights, by the aid of flares instead of the moon. That such attacks are possible is shown by the success achieved by No. 617 Squadron, who in this respect are acting as pioneers and gaining invaluable experience of a type of attack which is of growing importance.
The success which this Squadron has achieved was rewarded by a special visit from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the United States Strategic Air Forces, and General Doolittle, Commanding the 8th Bomber Force, who came to see for themselves the methods which are employed.
Further evidence of the wide interest which is being taken in these attacks can be found in the Air Intelligence Summary of the United States Strategic Forces in Europe, for the week ending April 2nd.
An article headed “R.A.F. Precision Attacks by Night”, after describing the results of many of the recent attacks, including those undertaken by all squadrons in this Group, continues as follows:-
“Relatively small formations of Lancasters, manned by experienced and carefully trained crews, are responsible for the success of these missions, an outstanding feature of which has been the economy of force used to produce the desired result. Expert navigation followed by pin point marking of the target by a single aircraft at low level, has permitted visual bombing with a precision comparable to the best results obtained in daylight.”
This praise, coming from the United States Air Force, is indeed welcome, for we recognise the magnificent results which they are achieving by day. If we think that precision bombing by night is not only possible, but in some respects easier than precision bombing by day, as well as being more economical, it is up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that our conviction is right by the only valid method – that of results. I hope that during April we shall have an opportunity of gaining further experience and providing further proof of what can be done.
With so much activity in front of the Group a heavier load than ever will be placed on the Training Base. It is going to be hard work for everyone, but it is only through their efforts that we have been able to carry out these damaging attacks. I congratulate all ranks in the Base on having achieved the full planned output of crews throughout the winter months, in spite of great difficulties of weather and an unexpected change in the type of aircraft used for conversion training. The requirements from now on are for the maximum number of crews who can be trained with the available resources.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION
For the first two years of the war, the policy of operational navigation was controlled by individual Station and Squadron Commanders. Routeing, timing, heights to fly and recommendations of the best Navigational aids then available were decided locally.
As the Command effort increased, and the enemy night defences grew stronger, it became necessary to route aircraft in concentration; thus, routeing was taken over by Bomber Command. The concentration achieved was still poor, however. There were several contributory factors:-
(i) Lack of Navigational aids which would enable all aircraft to establish their positions when over enemy territory.
(ii) Inaccurate flying of courses by Pilots due to weaving, evasive action, etc.
(iii) Inaccuracies in calculations and computations by navigators.
(iv) Due to the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, the inability of the Navigator to determine the correct wind velocities.
A concentrated drive was then made to remove these shortcomings. Gee, and later H.2.S. was introduced to enable Navigators to determine their position over enemy territory. The introduction of the A.P.I. which maintains an accurate air plot, gave the Navigator a method of recording inaccuracies of the aircraft and of the pilot which would normally pass unnoticed. Weaving was forbidden. More attention during the Navigator’s training, was given to computations and the elimination of careless mathematical errors.
H 2 S and the A.P.I., however, were not available to the entire force, and the average Navigator was still unable to determine correct wind velocities. An analysis of many raids proved that a certain number of experienced Navigators, with the required aids, could find accurate winds, and it was decided to let the whole force benefit by the experience and capabilities of these crews. The scheme was pioneered by this Group on several occasions, and the results were very successful. It was then adopted by Bomber Command for general use. The procedure is as follows
15/25 crews from each Group flying in aircraft equipped with H 2 S and A.P.I. are detailed as “wind finders”. The Navigators of these aircraft obtain wind velocity checks as often as possible, and transmit to Base all wind velocities found.
Before the operation, the Senior Met. Officer at Group prepares a chart illustrating the route, the meridian code and the estimated position of aircraft at broadcast times. Attached to this chart is a list of the wind finding aircraft. As each wind is received, it is entered in the column allotted to the particular aircraft.
The wind signals from aircraft are intercepted at Group Headquarters by the Signals Section, who keep a monitoring watch on all Base frequencies. From the time of breaking enemy R.D.F. cover, signals runners are constantly employed delivering wind messages to the Met. Office.
There is a hook up between all Group Met. Sections within the Command, and winds received from the entire force are collated. The Met. Officer sits with one eye on his chart and one eye on the clock, and five minutes before the next broadcast is due, a forecast wind is issued, and, if necessary, a corrected past wind.
As the raid progresses, and the chart fills up, so the look of satisfaction grows on the Senior Met. Officer’s face. Sometimes there are blanks when aircraft cannot obtain a wind velocity check, due to u/s equipment, or because aircraft have returned early. At other times a wind velocity obtained is not transmitted by the aircraft until long after it has left the area to which the wind velocity applies. In both instances, this gives the Met. Staff so much less information on which to base their corrections and forecasts. There have been instances when they have had no more than two or three wind velocities over a detailed area, and even then there have been large discrepancies. A good example is the Berlin raid of 24/25 March, 1944, when only 9 wind velocities were received, homeward bound, from the target to the enemy coast – 2 1/4 hours flying! In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult to give you accurate forecast winds. Crews now realise how important it is to obtain as many wind velocity checks as possible, and pass them to Base immediately. Even if the wind velocity obtained differs considerably from the forecast on the Form 2330, then providing you are confident of the fix used, send back the w/v you have found. If you have “boobed”, then the Met. Staff can, and will, see this, and no harm will be done. There will be no “strips” for the crew concerned. If, however, you obtain a w/v and [underlined] DO NOT [/underlined] send it back, then you are withholding vital information which may affect the safety of the whole Bomber Force, including your own.
The Group Met. Staff have had considerable experience of this scheme, and they are getting to know the various windfinders. One often hears a remark in the Met. Office “Old Snooks is flying in “F”57 tonight, we shall get some reliable winds from him” – and they do!! They know that each wind “Old Snooks” sends back will be reliable, and his messages are greatly treasured.
A Navigator is employed in the Met. Office whose duty it was in the past, to present to the Air Staff the effect of the corrected w/v’s on track and time keeping, and whether aircraft would arrive at the target early or late. All went well until the attack on Leipzig on the night of 19/20th February, when it was obvious from application of the broadcast winds that aircraft would arrive at the target 10 – 15 minutes early. We all know the result – 79 aircraft lost.
The obvious way to tackle this problem was to adjust the zero hour, and since we were obtaining from aircraft reliable information of true winds over enemy territory, a scheme was devised whereby the zero hour could be amended if necessary. The Duty Navigator in the Command Met. Office ascertains from application of the corrected w/v’s, whether the aircraft will arrive at the target early on time, or late, and consequently whether the zero hour needs amending. All H 2 S wind finders in this Group transmit the times at which they pass two datum points on the route. It is obvious, however, that both calculations will be valueless unless all aircraft [underlined] do [/underlined] leave the concentration point [underlined] exactly [/underlined] on time, and fly at the speeds laid down at the Flight Planning Conference. It must also be obvious to the reader, that unless wind information and times at the datum points are sent back by aircraft immediately, then there will be neither sufficient information on which to base an amendment to the zero hour, nor time in which to take necessary action.
Accurate time keeping, good concentration and correct timing of the attack, in short the success of the operation, depend on every wind finder knowing and doing his job. It’s up to you.
WHERE TO LOOK
A.O.C’s Foreword. Page 1
Aircrew Volunteers. 6
Air Bombing. 7
Air Sea Rescue. 8
Absence. 11
Accidents. 14
Armament. 15
Bombing, Air. 7
Decorations. 6
Engineering. 14
Equipment. 11
Flying Control. 5
Flight Engineers. 6
Gardening. 4
Gee. 5
Gunnery. 9
H 2 S. Page 5
Link Trainer Times. 10
Navigation, Progress of. 2
Navigation. 13
Organisation. 14
Operations. 16
Progress of Navigation. 2
Photography. 4
Public Relations. 10
Signals/Radar. 3
Second Thoughts for Pilots 10
Sports. 12
Tactics. 6
Training. 11
War Effort. 16
War Savings. 6
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
March was not the best of months from the Aircrew Signals point of view, and it is to be hoped that Signals Leaders will make every endeavour to effect an improvement in the coming month.
You may not have any connection with the following examples but is that because you know all the answers, or is it that you have not been caught out.
There was once a Wireless Operator (Air) who after 14 operational sorties, used the spelling table of CD0250 for the following – REQUEST Q.F.E. – a total of 5 Groups where 1 Group would have covered the situation. Five minutes instruction per day would prevent any unnecessary waste of ether time.
Once upon a time (in March) a Wireless Operator (Air) gave out the wrong Bomber Code, which all the simpletons in his section accepted without a murmur. It is said at this Headquarters that all the murmuring came from the Duty Signals Officer – I wouldn’t know. In days gone by (March again), a Wireless Operator (Air) did not know where to find the fuse of his Visual Monica equipment, and the aircraft had no Early Warning Device – a congratulatory message from the Luftwaffe is expected any day. Talking of Early Warning Devices, the writer knows of two Operators (no names, no Grade 1) who did not know how to cope with simple fault finding.
Now we can do better than this, and it is suggested that every Signals Leader has a daily session with all the Wireless Operators, just ten minutes every morning will pay handsome dividends.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The new system of reporting the performance of Early Warning Devices by pro-forma is working very well, thanks to the co-operation of all concerned. This is going to save a lot of time and unnecessary telephone calls, which ultimately will help the war effort. Since the last News, a new instruction on the use of I.F.F. when circling dinghies or crashed aircraft, has been brought into force, 5G/S.4403/50/Sigs, of 23rd March, refers.
On Flight Planning for Thursday, 30th March, the Air Officer Commanding outlined the danger to the Bomber Force caused by selfish captains trying to but [sic] a little extra security for themselves at the expense of their fellow captains, when they order their Wireless Operators into the Astro-dome. It is hoped that this point has now gone right home, and that there will be nor further occurrence of this practice.
Just one more item that requires the attention of all Airborne Signals types. The constant back tuning that goes on during every operation, and the passing back of wind messages during the normal transmission times. When you read the first part of these notes again, as it is hoped you will, add a reminder about back tuning and listening out, to your daily session.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
Two good points stand out for the month; they are both from No.57 Squadron.
P/O. Bracker, on the night of 24/25th did some quick thinking to get his R1155 working and receive the broadcasts.
On the same night, Sgt. Robinson saw on his Fishpond screen, two aircraft close together. He reported this, and gunners reports a combat taking place. The aircraft joined in the fight, drew the enemy aircraft’s fire and eventually shot it down.
This is an excellent example of the intelligent use of Fishpond – a good show by the W/Op and his crew.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt. Stevens, Signals Leader of No.57 Squadron, on obtaining an “A” category on No.5 Signals Leader’s Course.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures for March is considerably lower than for February, being less than 50% of the February figures. No Signals failure was responsible for a cancelled sortie, but out of the total of 24 failures reported, four were the reason for, or a contributory cause of, early returns.
The very small percentage contribution to early returns for March 0.235% against 1.30% for February is a welcome indication of a general drive to eliminate the possibility of Signals contribution in any way to a cancelled or abandoned sortie.
This does not mean that failure reports generally show a decrease. On the contrary, the conscientious reporting of any type of failure whatsoever, irrespective of whether it affects the success of the sortie or not, or even appears on the raid report, is essential.
A perusal of the details of failures for March, shows that one Squadron reported ten failures, none of which caused an early return; but they do provide the information required to enable action to be taken to institute modifications which will, in time, make failures almost impossible. The more attention which is paid to reporting failures the sooner will the improvements be incorporated.
We do not wish to take part in any competition between Groups for the lowest number of reported failures, but we must show the lowest percentage contributing to cancellations and early returns.
[Underlined] COUNTERMEASURE MANDREL [/underlined]
The fitting of Mandrel is proceeding satisfactorily. The great hold-up has been due to so many new aircraft arriving with the downward vision blister, thus denying us our original aerial position. However, Bomber Command have now authorised the removal of these blisters and, as a result, the aerial returns to its original position.
We still manage to fly a high proportion of the Command Mandrel effort.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
During the month there occurred an outstanding example of loss of security on an operation through injudicious use of R/T. Take-off was 18.13, the route was northerly, and W/T silence was not to be broken until approximately 20.45. At 19.09 an early return called up his station, stating that his instruments were u/s, and requesting permission to land after jettisoning petrol. On being told to stand by, the E.R. stated that although he was aware that boomerang procedure was to jettison the cookie, he didn’t want to fly around much longer, and suggested jettisoning the petrol and landing with cookie. The ground station then requested details as to what was wrong with the aircraft instruments. After replying, the aircraft requested instructions again, and was told to jettison incendiaries safe, and pancake. This instruction was repeated, the aircraft carried out the instructions and returned, making a final reference to his cookie as a warning to ground crews. The entire conversation lasted 23 minutes, by which time any doubts the enemy might have had of the hostile intentions of the force plotted by his long range Radar must have been completely dispersed. “It is to be assumed” say Bomber Command, “that every time a word is spoken, it is heard by the enemy”. So, on this particular night, we gave him one hour’s prior notice of the attack and that is a luxury we can’t afford.
After many representations, the British Joint Communications Board have now conceded that for INTER RAF WORKING ONLY, J – Johnny may be used in lieu of J-Jig. For combined and joint working, J-Jig must still be used. This latter point is important. The probability of joint and combined working is imminent, and strict observance of the alphabet and standard procedure will play an important part in ensuring the smooth working of our forces.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee remains high, and shows a slight improvement over February. A total of 1201 Gee sorties were flown during the month, and in 96.7% of them the equipment was completely serviceable. It is hoped that a further increase can be shown next month.
Three new Radar Workshops have been completed during the month. All squadrons now possess their own building, which should help considerably to increase serviceability.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
H 2 S serviceability improved slightly during last month, but it is still far from satisfactory; the percentage serviceable to the target and back was 76%.
The new Filament Transformers, which have now flown up to 50 sorties, give every indication of being the solution to the main causes of unserviceability; unfortunately, production difficulties will cause considerable delay in a changeover programme. The arrival of a drier season should prevent a further source of unserviceability that has been caused by dampness. It is felt that a considerable percentage on non-reproduceable faults were due to such dampness.
Manipulation failures due to lack of experience with the equipment, still assume too high a percentage, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. A new switch procedure has been drawn up and put into force which, if strictly adhered to, should result in greater serviceability.
The repositioning of the Scanner Heater
(Continued on page 4, col.3)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Failures from all causes totalled 109, equalling 6.9%; this represents a decrease of 1.4% on the month of February. These technical failures remain persistently at 6-7% and there is no doubt that many of them can be avoided with more careful inspection and maintenance.
Instructions have been issued by Eng/Elect Branch to modify all Lancaster aircraft camera circuits; this is a return to bomb door operation of the camera. Briefly this circuit is wired through the Mk. XIV bombsight panel, and incorporates a relay which safeguards the camera from premature operation through deliberate or accidental movement of the pilot’s bomb door selector arm, provided that the bombsight graticule is not switched on. Once the bombsight graticule has been switched on, the circuit from the selector arm is “live”. Therefore, when the bomb doors are selected open, the camera winds over one frame; when the Air Bomber releases the bombs, the normal camera cycle commences. During the period that the Type 35 Control motor is running, the pilot’s selector arm circuit to the camera is “dead”, and should the doors be closed before the camera cycle is completed, the frame sequence remains uninterrupted.
An effort has been made to produce an ideal circuit, and the modification now being introduced is as near to the ideal as possible; for instance, switching on the graticule late i.e. after the bomb doors have been opened, would result in the loss of the first frame, and would bring the bombing frame into position at No.6 instead of No.7. This will be bad enough with ordinary H.S. night film, but with composite colour in use, the probable loss of ground detail on the bombing frame would be serious.
The introduction of this circuit does not mean that technical failures in Type 35 Controls and camera gear boxes are overcome. Careful inspection, testing and thorough maintenance, are the only cures. It is evident from failure reports that insufficient care is being taken to ensure that camera equipment issued from the Equipment Section is entirely satisfactory before installing it into operational aircraft.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadrons]
GARDENING
The Command planted 1,472 vegetables this month, 76% being distributed off the East Frisians, in Keil Bay and the Fehmarn Belt and off the French U-boat bases; the remainder in the Channel, off Holland and on the Spanish Iron Ore Routes. 3 Group planted over half the total 6 Group nearly 400 and 4 Group nearly 300.
This is the third month of intensive high altitude gardening and reports of results now coming in are proof of its success. So far this year the casualty rate due to Bomber Command’s mining is 5 ships sunk or damaged per week, but latest reports show that this has now increased to a rate of [underlined] 1.4 ships per day. [/underlined]
The most encouraging report has come to hand from a source now in this country, who, up until recently, has been obliged to sail the German North Sea Convoy Routes, and who had to “swim for it” at least once. “Minephobia” is so acute that whenever minelaying is even suspected, all traffic is stopped for 24 hrs. The crews of mine sweepers after a six months “tour”, now get three months leave, most of which is spent in hospitals specialising in the cure of neurosis.
Now that the various methods of high altitude mining have had fair operational trial, it is possible to lay down standard rules, and various orders lately issued will be consolidated. A point which stands out from the last three months work, is that the success of high altitude mining outside Gee range has been dependent on H 2 S aircraft being available either to mark for those not so fitted, or, in restricted gardens, to do the laying.
Undoubtedly the ideal method is a D.R. run from a visual pinpoint using the Mark XIV bombsight and aided by H 2 S, but weather conditions which will permit visual pinpointing unaided by markers are the exception rather than the rule.
Commander R. A. McDonald, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Vernon, explained to aircrews of 49, 57, 630, 207, and 106 Squadrons some of the pleasant little surprises that our mines spring on the enemy’s shipping and mine sweepers (and the devices which prevent them from being sprung on our own Armament staffs). He was unfortunately prevented from visiting other Squadrons, by operations.
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from page 3, col. 3)
has been practically completed, and during the last month no scanners have frozen where this modification has been incorporated. Bomber Command is also issuing a modification covering heating of Scanner Motors, and repositioning of the Scanner Heater Switch.
[Boxed] FISHPOND [/boxed]
This device also showed an improvement during the month, but here too a great deal of work remains to be done. The serviceability percentage for March was 78%.
W/Ops and Navigators still lack the training and co-ordination required to derive the full benefit from this Warning Device. It is to their own advantage to become fully proficient in its operation. A shortened maximum range has been experimented with, and those Operators who have used it express complete satisfaction. Bomber Command have been requested to approve this modification for general installation.
[Boxed] VISUAL MONICA [/boxed]
Serviceability continues to improve, and last month reached 89.5%. It is felt, however, that this figure may still be improved.
The amount of work spent on the Switch Motors has paid great dividends, and the old theory that the Motor was to blame has been refuted. In this connection, the changeover plugs for the aerial leads have proved very valuable on the few occasions when Switch Motors have stopped.
The introduction of Mark IV A.I. as a Tail Warning Device has made available from 54 Base further supplies of Visual Monica, with which it has been possible to almost completely equip the Group with Visual Tail Warning Devices, and thus eliminate Aural Monica.
[Boxed] A.I. [/boxed]
The new addition to Bomber aircraft has now seen considerable operational work, and shows the qualities of a fine Tail Warning Device. Serviceability was 78% for the two weeks it has been in operation. This will, without doubt, be raised week by week as personnel become fully conversant with the equipment.
Operators find the equipment easy to use, due to previous experience in Visual Monica, and are very enthusiastic. The elevation part has worked very satisfactorily in No. 617 Squadron, and a general installation programme is now in hand for the other A.I. squadrons.
[Underlined] SPORTS (Contd. From page 12, col. 3) [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUTURE EVENTS [/underlined]
RUGBY – No. 1 Air Landing Brigade is of the opinion that its Brigade Rugger side can put paid to a 5 Group representative team. The challenge is being joyfully taken up; the result should be a first class game.
CRICKET – It has, unfortunately, been impossible to obtain transport for a ‘straight’ Group Cricket League. The next best thing, a Group Cricket Knock-out, is being run. Full details will be forwarded to all stations. It [sic] the meantime, stations are advised to look up friendlies as usual.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
GEE
Ranges obtained on Gee this month were average on all major operations. Many Navigators however, obtained quite remarkable fixes on special operations, and in a number of cases over the targets. Single position lines from strong signals were intelligently used, and in a few cases Gee was used by Navigators as a means of homing to the special targets.
The mere fact that signals begin to fade into the jamming appears to act as a deterrent to many navigators who forget that jamming can occur in certain local areas on the continent. Once through a local jamming area fixes may again be obtained and under no circumstances should a Navigator neglect to check the Gee Indicator to see if this is so. If a local jamming area is encountered report it at interrogation for the benefit of others.
“Coding” does not appear to have caused any serious trouble and is reported to be phased and timed accurately. However, now that further instructions have been issued, navigators and wireless operators are warned to take greater care in reading the indicator to prevent serious mistakes being made. If you are uncertain of the present day instructions check up at your section now.
Don’t forget that the Southern and South-Eastern Chains are now on a new frequency. This recent changeover should solve the problem of break through pulses which have been reported recently.
The new North Eastern Chain is now operating daily for test purposes and reports on transmissions are requested. Navigators and Wireless Operators, this chain has been provided for your benefit, let us have these reports; in doing so you are helping the technicians to provide a better facility for yourselves. It is hoped that charts to cover this chain will be issued this month.
One word about descent through cloud and the correct homing procedure to Base. Air Staff Instructions lay down the procedure to be adopted for descent through cloud and homing to Base on Gee and these instructions must be followed. Navigators should ensure that the captain follows the correct procedure. Descent through cloud must be made between the correct lattice lines and along the correct homing lattice line applicable to base. Remember – individual lattice lines have been chosen for each airfield to prevent the risk of collision, and these are to be used like railway tracks. Follow the Green Indicator to safety.
H 2 S
H 2 S training on Squadrons this month was confined mainly to the Bombing Competition, and although a considerable number of aircraft were detailed, few obtained photographs owing to unsatisfactory target conditions. Of the results received to date, the majority are within one mile of the aiming point, reflecting great credit on the crews taking part. It is hoped to publish a summary of results in the next issue of the “News”.
Training at Conversion Units is improving and many crews are now completing 10 – 15 hours air training, which should prove of considerable benefit to the squadrons.
Full use is being made of the ground trainers both as navigational and bombing aids. Emphasis must be placed on the use of H 2 S as a navigational aid, particularly in the early stages of training, and trainer cross countries should be carried out with this point in mind. Navigators and Air Bombers must aim at a high standard of efficiency in both the taking and plotting of fixes, particularly as the whole of the Bomber Force depends on this aid for accurate broadcast winds.
An investigation has been carried out this month into all manipulation failures since the beginning of the year, and it is noted that they occur during the first 20 hours of air training and are mainly due to incorrect tuning. To overcome this, Aircraft Drill No.14 was issued setting out the correct H 2 S switching, tuning and re-tuning sequences and operators are to follow this procedure at all times. It is of no practical use to switch the set on, tune and leave it whilst Gee is in range, then commence trying to identify responses when out of Gee coverage, without re-tuning. Tuning varies with the height and time the set is on, so recheck frequently.
Bomber Command intend issuing in the near future a list of faults which can be remedied in the air. However, it is pointed out at this stage, operators are still failing to check fuses when the equipment goes unserviceable. This fault is the easiest which can be remedied in the air and failure to do this is inexcusable.
As always, practice makes perfect, and to overcome manipulation failures, operators should endeavour to spend considerable time tuning and re-tuning the bench set, following the procedure laid down in the drill. This applies to trained and untrained crews alike.
H 2 S and Fishpond are inter-dependent; consequently a manipulation failure on H 2 S leaves a crew without an essential warning device. This point alone easily outweighs all other arguments which may be brought up regarding manipulation failures. H 2 S operators and Wireless Operators must therefore realise that by spending a little time in training to keep efficient on both H 2 S and Fishpond, they are contributing to the safety of their aircraft and crew.
FLYING CONTROL
33 AIRCRAFT LANDED IN 45 MINS:
March has seen a further improvement in landing times, the average for the Group for the month being 2.13 minutes per aircraft. There is still, however, room for improvement in Single-squadron Stations, and Skellingthorpe has shown that the Landing Scheme can produce a high landing rate with small numbers of aircraft; on the night 18/19th March they landed fifteen aircraft in 25 minutes; the fact that a station only has one squadron to land is no excuse for poor landing times. If all single squadron stations follow Skellingthorpe’s example, then we can look forward to an overall Group average of well below the two minute mark.
Some excellent performances have been put up by Stations in this Group during the past month. Below are some figures which are the result of good flying discipline and good airmanship. They are not “peak period” figures, but are taken over the total period.
[Table of selected Aircraft recovery times by Station]
A conference was held at this Headquarters early in the month to review the landing scheme, and improve where necessary. One point raised was the difficulty in persuading pilots to adhere to the airspeeds laid down for return from the last concentration point. If you are one of the unfortunate ones, and are allotted one of the lower airspeeds, make up your mind to stick to it, for it does eliminate that tedious and highly dangerous orbiting of the airfield on return. There are many aircraft using a small piece of sky, and although we are not often troubled with intruders yet, one Hun fighter operating around 5 Group could do a deal of damage. If you rush back, you will certainly have to waste time before landing, so why not waste it peacefully over the sea, rather than be told to go for a short cross country in a congested area.
On reviewing diversions over the past six month it is obvious that standard R/T and control drills are lacking. As the result of a conference held at Headquarters Bomber Command, a standard method of control and R/T procedure has been agreed and will be issued shortly. It is to be used when aircraft are diverted away from Base and the 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme consequently not in operation. It is important that pilots have this procedure at their fingertips. Diversions are never a pleasant end to an operational sortie, but if you can get down at your diversion airfield with the minimum trouble, it makes the task an easier one for all concerned.
FOG DISPERSAL
The fog dispersal apparatus at Fiskerton was responsible for the landing of 14 aircraft during the month. The total number of aircraft landed to date, using this installation is 48. On the 17th March, when five aircraft landed, visibility before lighting up was only 200 yards, with fog estimated to be 800 feet thick. In sixteen minutes visibility on the runway had improved from 15 – 2,000 yards. Again on the 24th, 5 Group aircraft were able to use Fiskerton, and visibility was increased from 100 yards to 1500 yards in 12 minutes. Fog Dispersal is there for your use and your safety. Landing Notes have been issued to all Units and pilots must ensure that they are fully conversant with the use of the Fog Dispersal Installation. We will shortly have another installation serviceable at Metheringham, and perhaps the day
(Continued on page 8, col. 3)
MARCH LANDING TIMES
[Table of March Landing Times by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
DECORATIONS
The following immediate awards were approved during the month.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ W.D. ERVINE D.F.C.
A/W/Cdr E.L. PORTER, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt F.H. PHILLIPS. D.F.C.
P/O H.N. DAVIES D.F.C.
A/F/L I. RADEMEYER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.B. HEALEY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L/ L.A.J. McLEOD D.F.C.
R/O T.H. BLACKHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT J. BRADFORD D.F.M.
F/SGT D. LIGHTFOOT D.F.M.
A/F/L C.J. SPRIGGS D.F.C.
A/F/L W.M. WALTON D.F.C.
P/O S.F. ATCHESON D.F.C.
A/S/L M.I. BOYLE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L E.H. MOSS D.F.C.
F/Lt B.C. FITCH D.F.C.
F/O T.D. HALLIWELL D.F.C.
SGT A.E. HARRIS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O V.H. TRIMBLEE D.F.C.
SGT G.R. PRICE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ I. WHITTAKER, DFC. Bar to D.F.C.
A/S/L H.B. MARTIN, DSO, DFC & Bar. Bar to D.S.O.
F/O L.W. CURTISS, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
F/O T.D. SIMPSON D.F.C.
F/O B.T. FOXLEE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O K. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT G.C. KING D.F.M.
F/SGT D. SCHOFIELD D.F.M.
F/SGT G.E. HEXTER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L J.C.W. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT R. PARLE D.F.M.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £7299.2.0.
TACTICS
The ill effects of weaving in the bomber stream have been recorded by an experienced Flak Liaison Officer, and his opinions are set out in 5G/1/41/Air, sent to Stations on the 27th March, 1944. All crews should read this letter.
Since the introduction of early warning devices, more attention than ever must be paid to flying straight and level unless attacked. In this connection there is a point about weaving which is perhaps not fully appreciated. A weaving aircraft is continually closing range on other aircraft in the stream and is likely to confuse Monica and Fishpond operators, who may interpret the resultant blip as an enemy fighter closing in to attack. The consequencies [sic] may then be serious, particularly on a dark night, when gunners have been known to mistake four engines for two. In these days when all crews are conscious of some collision risk, the sighting of an aircraft crossing their line of flight is, to say the least, upsetting, and in any event, is unfair to gunners who can ill afford to waste time in identifying friendly bombers which behave in a suspicious manner.
Further, the straight and level policy is enforced to enable crews more easily to keep to the track laid down. The dangers of straying from track and the concentration are known to all. All the old hands at the game have realised that weaving is out of date and leads to trouble, and are now following the straight and narrow. Why not you?
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Two points of interest have been sorted out from an investigation into combats for March. They are:-
(i) Enemy fighters rarely fire more than one burst during each attack.
(ii) Period between opening fire and breaking away is a matter of seconds.
It is clear that many enemy fighters are opening fire at about the same time as they are identified by gunners or before a defensive manoeuvre is started. Night fighters as a rule depend on surprise and accuracy of their first burst, and if this fails, there is no doubt that the advantage passes to the gunners. The main problems are therefore:-
(i) To see the fighter and recognise it before it opens fire, and
(ii) to convey the information to the pilot immediately.
Problem (i) can only be met by energetic use of early warning devices, constant recognition practice and efficient night vision by gunners.
Problem (ii) can be solved if gunners report sightings immediately to the pilot, using the standard reporting code. A second’s delay in identifying the attacker before reporting it may mean the difference between eventually shooting it down, or your sustaining damage before you have that opportunity. Remember that a defensive manoeuvre, although designed to give gunners a known deflection, is also intended to evade the fighter’s fire; therefore, in view of the apparent short duration of combats, if an aircraft is flying suspiciously, gunners should not wait to identify it before ordering a corkscrew, particularly if the suspected aircraft is within firing range.
Flight Engineers
The most important job of the Flight Engineer is to help in getting his aircraft to the target and back, in the most efficient manner possible. But there us another side of his job that must not be forgotten; it is of the greatest importance. He must assist in keeping his machine up to the best standard of serviceability.
He can only do this id he is a keen, conscientious worker. He must pay every attention to the smallest detail in his aircraft, both when he is flying and on the ground; he should be with the ground crew whenever he can while they carry out their daily inspection.
He is the “Flying Spanner”, but firstly he should be the engineer on the ground, and know that the aircraft is tuned up to the last ounce. How can he know this if he only visits his dispersal about one hour before he goes on “Ops”?
Delay has occurred many times in the rectification of defects through an aircraft landing away from the parent station; this must be altered. It must be impressed upon Flight Engineers that it is their responsibility to report to the C.T.O. of that Station any defects or trouble which have developed during flight, and which may prevent them returning to their Base at the earliest moment. It is no good to be interrogated, have a meal and go to bed forgetting to report to the C.T.O. until the next day. The report must be given in person to the Engineering Officer on duty that night; he should also be told if petrol and oil is required, and the approximate time the aircraft will take off.
In the past, aircraft have been delayed through wrong information being passed on, and so it is essential that the Flight Engineer reports all known defects to the C.T.O. Confusion and incorrect information is caused by too many inexperienced people handling the message.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BOMBING [/underlined]
March was a varied month for the Bomb Aimers in the Group, the highlight from the bombing point of view being the precision attacks by Bases on special targets deep into France.
On the whole bombing was accurate, severe damage being done by Nos. 52, 53 and 54 Bases. It is apparent therefore, that our continuous practice has not been wasted. However, no one who studies the stick craters on the P.R.U. photographs can possibly feel complacent. Many crews missed!!!
The question immediately raised by these misses is whether or not the bombsight was serviceable. It is an intricate bombsight, but anyone who doubts its capabilities should study the long list of bombing errors less than 150 yards at 20,000 feet, given on this page. It must be serviceable, though, and it can only be proven serviceable though use. Therefore you must, at every opportunity, carry out practice bombing with your sight. Whenever you fly, carry out the established N.F.T. checks – report any failings you discover in the bombsight to the Instrument Section, and when you get crew errors of 100 yds or less, thank the instrument section who have helped to make it possible.
Finally, treat all practice bombing as precision bombing – the Air Bombers in 106 Squadron have reason to be proud. In teamwork with their pilots, they won the Squadron Bombing Competition against all-comers in the Group for 3 successive months, and were runners up in March. There is a great gap between the top and bottom errors in the Competition – there should not be! It should be a neck-and-neck struggle with only a few yards separating the Squadrons in the Group.
Are [underlined] YOU [/underlined] bombing your best for your Squadron?
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Bell, D.F.C.) reports the construction and issue to all Air Bombers of a hook as per diagram.
[Diagram]
This device is used for manual release of any H.E. hang-ups, and is of a length that ensures the linkage can be raised. Further, it can be used on No. 13 Station to make certain the “Cookie” has actually left the aircraft, a visual check from the nose being impeded by the incendiary containers.
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) has had the illumination bulbs in the Mark XIV Bombsight Computor [sic] painted red to counteract the glare. This ensures minimum effect on Night Vision.
[Underlined] 1654 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Morgan) has completed the installation of the complete Mark XIV Bombsight in the A.M.B.T.
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.) have nearly completed installation of A.M.B.T. Mk. XIV, several clever modifications being introduced. Excellent co-operation has been provided by the Armament and Electrical Officer and their staffs.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS IN YARDS, CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training and Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units, with averages]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES DURING MARCH
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
44 P/O Levy Sgt Peck F/O Fox 82 & 130 yds
P/O Hobbs F/S Scott F/S Fenwick 144 yds
F/L Dorehill F/S Deacon F/S Wright 116 yds
W/O Barton F/S Barnes F/O Sparrow 125 yds
F/L Wiggin F/O Marshall F/O Maury 112 yds
50 P/O Lundy F/O Bignell F/S Jordan 125 & 145 yds
Sgt MacFarlin Sgt Ball Sgt Elliott 108 yds
57 F/L Munday F/O Evans P/O West 120 yds
106 P/O Rossel Sgt Goss F/S White 140 yds
F/O Clement F/O Gautschi F/O Wilkinson 82 & 120 yds
463 F/S Page F/O Braithwaite W/O Fair 84 yds
619 W/Cdr Jeudwine Sgt Booth Sgt Gosling 79 yds
S/L Whamond F/O Kennedy F/O Marshall 135 yds
F/L McGilvray F/O Baker F/O Drake 140 yds
F/L Moore F/O Butler F/O Wood 123 yds
F/S Schofield F/S Hexter F/S Withinshaw 147 yds
630 F/L Roberts Sgt Davies Sgt Jeffreys 140 yds
W/Cdr Deas F/O Barker Sgt Wright 120 (twice) and 143 yds
S/L Calvert F/S Hogg F/S Beaudoin 148 yds
P/O Hill Sgt Allen F/S Stancer 120 yds
1654 S/L Bloom-Jones F/O Foulkes F/L Martin 148 yds
F/O Murray F/O Towers F/S Keeble 144 yds
F/S Ayres Sgt Charteris Sgt Airey 114 yds
P/O Spencer Sgt. Gordge Agt Hugh-Games 122 yds
1661 S/L Jones F/O Seibal F/O West 140 yds
5 LFS F/S Horne Sgt Johnson F/S Shipley 88 yds
Sgt Patterson Sgt Hall Sgt Rice 121 yds
Special mention is made of W/Cdr Deas and crew, 630 Squadron, who achieved Crew Errors less than 150 yards on [underlined] three [/underlined] exercises this month.
617 Squadron obtained a total of 26 exercises in the “Less than 150 yards” category the best three being:-
[Underlined] PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR [/underlined]
F/O Kell F/O Morieson 47 yards
F/L Cooper F/O Harden 68 yards
F/O Willsher F/S Everitt 75 yards
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION
In a month where 9 Squadrons qualified in the Competition it fell to 44 Squadron to wrest the leadership from 106 Squadron who headed the table for the three months December, January and February. 44 Squadron have set a very high standard and are to be congratulated on rising from the 6th position to the top of the table.
57 Squadron have shown notable improvement in rising to 5th place, which they share with 207 Squadron.
It is expected that April will bring maximum qualification by all Squadrons in the Group and a really close struggle for the top position.
[Underlined] PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS [/underlined]
[Underlined] ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET [/underlined]
1st 44 Squadron – 85 yards 1st 630 Squadron – 120 yards
2nd 106 Squadron – 98 yards 57 Squadron – 120 yards
3rd 619 Squadron – 108 yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 134 yards
4th 630 Squadron – 119 yards 4th 44 Squadron – 138 yards
5th 207 Squadron – 141 yards 5th 207 Squadron – 154 yards
57 Squadron - 141 yards 6th 467 Squadron – 181 yards
7th 463 Squadron – 169 yards 7th 463 Squadron – 197 yards
9 Squadron – 169 yards 8th 9 Squadron – 223 yards
9th 467 Squadron – 196 yards 9th 106 Squadron – 253 yards
The following Squadrons failed to enter the necessary 8 qualifying exercises:-
10th 61 Squadron – 132 yards (5 exercises) 10th 61 Squadron – 143 yards
11th 50 Squadron – 90 yards (4 exercises) 11th 50 Squadron – 123 yards
12th 49 Squadron – 89 yards (1 exercise) 12th 49 Squadron – 92 yards
ADDITION BOMBING TRAINER
[Table of Trainer Activity by Squadron]
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
Two entries were received this month:
W/Cdr Porter 112 yards (Errors include bombsight error)
G/Cpt Pleasance 289 yards (Error of 98 yards)
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley – 122 yards
How about some competition, Bombing Leaders?
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What is the theory of Wanganui technique and what are the correct bombsight settings?
2. If the Bomb Doors were open, but the Bomb Release Test could not be extracted from the positive Fusing Device, what check would you make before manually releasing?
3. Where is the type “H” Jettison Button and when do you need to use it?
4. Why do you set [underlined] indicated [/underlined] Wind Speed on the Mk. XIV Computor. [sic]
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
F/Lt Allan has left Scampton and is passing through the Conversion Units in order to return to operations for his 2nd tour. Good Luck!
F/Lt Gibson has become tour-expired and moved to Scampton to superintend the Bombing Section of the Aircrew School.
F/O Abbott has moved from 106 Squadron to 49 Squadron. We now expect to see [underlined] 49 [/underlined] Squadron top of the Bombing Competition!!
F/O Toogood (106 Squadron), tour-expired has moved to 92 Group for Bombing Leader’s duties.
P/O Duck who obtained 14th position with “B” pass on 77 Bombing Leaders’ Course has moved from 619 to 617 Squadron.
F/O Falgate (463 Squadron) and P/O Hulland D.F.M., (1654 Con. Unit) were 8th and 12th respectively on No.78 Bombing Leaders’ Course, with “B” passes.
AIR SEA RESCUE
For two months now there has been no ditching in this Group, which shows a deal of consideration for the Air Sea Rescue Officers in the Group, but at the same time it is wondered whether crews generally have increased their knowledge to an equivalent extent – have you got all your A.S.R. gen and equipment buttoned up?
In addition to giving swimming instruction P.F.O’s are now lending a hand with dinghy instruction in the South Park Girls’ School Swimming Baths. Now that summer is almost here, this should be a real attraction, and every effort must be made for regular attendance. As a further attraction some stations have periods during the early evening so that, with the co-operation of the M.T. Sections, an evening out in Lincoln should be enjoyed by all – after the instruction is over.
[Cartoon] EMP.
It is hoped that “Q” type dinghies (which will replace the “J” type fairly soon) will shortly be available on the scale of one per Squadron for instructional purposes. This dinghy is quite a complicated bit of work, and crews should take every opportunity of getting in sailing practice on local stretches of water (remembering that the depth of water must be at least 4 feet, owing to the depth of keel). Some good fun should be had these long summer evenings – when you can afford time off from obliterating the Hun.
[Underlined] HINT TO USERS [/underlined]
The floating torch has a nasty habit of lighting at awkward moments – why not pad the torch pocket in Mae Wests and Buoyancy suits with some light-damping material, so that the light will not shine through? Whatever happens, don’t go flying over the sea without your floating torch.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL (Contd. From page 5, col. 3) [/underlined]
is not far off when an operation will be planned and will depend solely on Fog Dispersal Installations for landing of aircraft.
There will be, therefore, three Fog Dispersal airfields situated in a comparatively small area, LUDFORD MAGNA in 1 Group, FISKERTON and METHERINGHAM. The identification of these airfields as night presents a problem, for you if you mistake another airfield for your own and are listening on your local airfield frequency, there is no means of contacting you by R/T. It is essential therefore, that darky frequency is used for all R/T control at Fog Dispersal airfields.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER [/underlined]
The trainer at Fiskerton is now equipped for training with the Mark IIC Gyro Gunsight, and training of the squadron gunners is going ahead under the supervision of F/O Johnson-Biggs, ex 619 Squadron, P/O Collingwood, ex 50 Squadron, and Sgt Kennedy of 49 Squadron. The trainer is housed in a spacious blister type building equipped with a large screen on which the target aircraft is projected, together with the fixed and moving graticules which are a feature of the new sight. An F.N. 16 turret is used for manipulation, and this is fitted with all the controls of the gunsight. Very realistic conditions can be reproduced, although until a trainer is produced which will introduce conditions like the Link Trainer with its “Bumps” attachment, the gunner is still operating from a rock steady platform which does not give a true indication of his ability to hold a target in the sight. A demonstration stand is housed in the same building which has a complete Gyro Gunsight with all controls and fittings. This is used for introducing gunners to the sight during initial instruction, and enables one gunner to operate the sight on the stand whilst another gunner is operating the turret on the trainer. A new type of film is available for use with the trainer; this gives a light coloured aircraft on the screen with a dark background, differing from the film in general use for aircraft recognition training on the Jurby trainer, which project a dark aircraft on a light background.
[Underlined] FUTURE INSTALLATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Swinderby [/underlined] is the next station to have the trainer installed. This will be housed in the standard spotlight trainer building, which at present is being modified by removing the steelwork situated on the front of the screen. All the equipment is available and installation should commence within the next two weeks.
[Underlined] Winthorpe [/underlined] have received part of the equipment and the construction of the building has been commenced.
[Underlined] G.2. GUNNERY NOTES [/underlined]
On the 6th January, 1944, a letter (BC/S.24636/Trg.) was issued from H.Q.B.C. stating that the G.2 Notes were available in large quantities, and intimating that they could be demanded on the following scale.
[Underlined] Instructors’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per instructor or Gunnery Leader not already holding one.
[Underlined] Students’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per Air Gunner not already holding one. This would appear to be a straightforward matter, but certain Units within the Group are still without these very important notes for a variety of reasons; units who demanded the notes as instructed received their demands promptly, but any unit who has not received these notes may obtain single copies by contacting the G.G.O. As these notes form the basis for all instructions on sighting in the Command, it is of paramount importance that all Gunnery Leaders instructors and gunners be familiar with their contents. It has been discovered that gunners attending the Specialist Sighting Course and Air Gunner Instructors’ Course at Manby have been handicapped by a lack of preliminary knowledge of sighting due to the failure of Units to obtain the notes when the instruction was first issued.
(Continued on page 10, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
THIS MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
49 Sqdn “D” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
619 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “L” 18/19 March, 1944. ME109 c
61 Sqdn “K” 22/23 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “R” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109
106 Sqdn “N” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109
PROBABLY DESTROYED
619 Sqdn “T” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “S” 24/25/ March, 1944. ME109 c
463 Sqdn “Q” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88 c
DAMAGED
207 Sqdn “G” 1/2 March, 1944. T/E c
467 Sqdn “F” 1/2 March, 1944. FW190 c
61 Sqdn “W” 15/16 March, 1944. FW190 c
619 Sqdn “P” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
207 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. ME109 c
50 Sqdn “M” 18/19 March. 1944. ME109 c
467 Sqdn “J” 18/19 March, 1944. ME110 c
207 Sqdn “O” 18/19 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “D” 22/23 March, 1944. JU88 c
467 Sqdn “Q” 22/23 March, 1944. ME109
50 Sqdn “U” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
49 Sqdn “K” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
44 Sqdn “J” 24/25 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “H” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109 c
57 Sqdn “M” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
463 Sqdn “G” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
44 Sqdn “U” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
57 Sqdn “B” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
50 Sqdn “Z” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109 c
Claims annotated “c” have been confirmed by Command. Other claims have not been confirmed owing to late rendition of combat reports.
It is intended to publish in the “News” a table showing the amount of air training carried out by Units each month. This will chiefly consist of Fighter Affiliation exercises and air firing, and provision is made for tabulating the Fighter Affiliation under three headings, i.e. “Camera & Gyro”, “Camera only” and “Without Camera”. This table is standard throughout the Command.
To ensure that a standard method is used throughout, a fighter combat exercise is to be considered as a “Combat” between a fighter and one air gunner in a bomber aircraft. Thus, if both Mid-Upper and Tail turrets are in use two exercises would be carried out. In future monthly training returns are to state the number of exercises as defined above. It is hoped that future tables published will include attacks by fighters on “Bullseye” exercises.
[Underlined] C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Course No. 75 [/underlined]
F/O Spilsbury – 5 LFS – 82% - Cat. “A”
Sgt Boardman – 49 Sqdn – 77.2% - Cat. “C”
Gunnery Leaders are reminded that they are invited to attend the Assessment Committee held at the conclusion of each course, and Gunnery Leaders who have gunners taking the course should make an effort to attend this board and obtain first hand information of their pupil’s efforts.
Gunnery Leaders desirous of visiting the C.G.S. for this purpose are to contact the G.G.O. who will make the necessary arrangements.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING – MARCH [/underlined]
[Table of Gunnery Exercises by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHT FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Stick rigidly to your lattice lines when homing to your airfield. There was a regrettable accident during the month when a pilot in the Group arrived at the airfield on the wrong side of the circuit and crashed when he was forced to dive to avoid an aircraft on the circuit. The lattice lines are your “right of way“ in the sky.
Don’t get careless about your flaps, and remember the Lancaster flaps provide maximum lift from 25° to the fully up position. From the 25° stage to the fully down position, lift is decreasing and drag is increasing. So, remember, take your flap off in two stages and exercise great care in taking off the last 25°. Trim as you do it.
If you make a “sighting” and you are orbiting a ditched aircraft or a dinghy, switch your I.F.F. on to “distress”. Do not change height while orbiting otherwise your plot will fade and you may give the impression that you have ditched. This new Signals Instruction is to enable R.D.F. to plot you, and thus double check your position, and the position of the sighting.
Don’t get off hand about reporting defects after flight. Record any defect on Form 700. Let the ground crew or Flight Commander and the N.C.O. know. Keep them all in the picture, the Security Officer won’t jump on you for that.
By the way, when did you and your crew last go through the bombing up procedure with the Armament types? There might be a day when you have to do your own bombing up.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
If you are unlucky and get fire in the air, do not dive your aircraft in the hope of putting the flames out. It will make them spread more, making it difficult to abandon aircraft, and will produce structural strain, causing a more rapid break up as the fire develops. The “gen” for fire in the air is in the 5 Group Aircraft Drills.
You can now land from West to East as well as from East to West at Woodbridge. The landing is from East to West at all times except when you see smoke generators burning at each end of the main runway. So watch for the smoke, and then land towards the sea.
Inspect S.D. 158 periodically. It is a secret document, and therefore you won’t find it lying around the Flight office; Ops/Flying Control will oblige. Note the instruction to burn resin lights above 8,000 feet at night.
Pay the closest attention to the latest “gen” about the moveable T.O.T. and remember the importance of sticking to the air speed laid down. 5 m.p.h. either side of the specified air speed it not good enough.
Have you dropped any practice bombs yet? It is the duty of every pilot to try his hand at bombing. Team up with another pilot in your flight, and see who gets the best result.
Public Relations
[Underlined] SIX STATIONS ON THE AIR [/underlined]
No.5 Group entered the radio world in earnest during March, no fewer than six stations being visited by B.B.C. recording units.
Though the resulting broadcasts did not hit the high lights in home programmes, they were given many times, and in many languages, all over the world. They reminded our overseas troops that the R.A.F. is still doing big business!!
First, a five day visit was paid to Skellingthorpe by F/Lt W Caverhill, of the broadcasting branch at Air Ministry, accompanied by B.B.C. engineers. They prepared scripts and made records of 18 R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel, who gave short talks to be included in the B.B.C’s overseas programme “Radio News Reel”.
Bardney was visited on the night of March 18/19th by a B.B.C. recording unit, and more than a doz en [sic] records were made of the station’s contribution towards the night’s attack on Frankfurt. This picture of R.A.F. life was broadcast in both short and long versions on the General Forces programme, as well as overseas.
The success of the Bardney broadcasts prompted the B.B.C. to make a return visit to record the operation against Berlin, on the night of March 24/25th. This time, the famous commentators, Mr. Robert Dunnett and Mr. Stewart MacPherson, brought a recording unit to Coningsby. On the way, the unit stopped at Metheringham as the aircraft were taking off and filled one disc with an interesting description of the scene.
At Coningsby a number of members of ground crews and station personnel came to the microphone and described their work. Further recordings were made in the Operations Room.
Owing to weather changes, the party beat a hasty retreat from Coningsby and went to
(Continued on page 11col.1)
Negotium Perambulans In Tenebris
The Meteorological Gremlin has spectacles and grey hair,
And his mysterious lair
Is very jealously guarded;
And must be regarded
With suitable awe, by all except
The few adept.
It is chiefly a nocturnal beast, and is often found
Prowling and prowling
(Like a host of Midian)
Searching for a datum or perhaps a meridian.
In this it is frequently assisted by a tiny female mammal whose chemical formula is PA2AOC,
Whose small scurrying figure you will often see
Bearing winds to the Gremlin. It is easy to please
With an airy zephyr, or a balmy breeze
Which it consumes with avidity, and that is why
It is able to prophesy!!
ANON (Circa, 1944)
Link Trainer
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
[Underlined] GUNNERY (Continued from page 9 col 1) [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY [/underlined]
The object of this course, which lasts for 10 days, is the training of sighting instructors and instructors capable of assessing cine gyro films. Originally only Conversion Unit or Gunnery Flight personnel could attend but this restriction has recently been removed, and all Units may now nominate gunners for this course; they must show an aptitude for sighting and must have passed well in this subject on a Gunnery Leaders’ Course or Air Gunner Instructors’ course. One vacancy only is allotted to the Group per month.
[Underlined] THOSE SQUADRON GYROS [/underlined]
The Gyro Assessors held by squadrons have in some instances been leading a very quiet life tucked away nicely in the Armoury or on a shelf in a cupboard. Numerous reasons are put forward for not using the Gyro during Fighter Affiliation exercises; for instance, aircraft not modified, not enough notice given to Gunnery sections, Photo. Section unable to process film, etc., etc. None of these reasons is really serious , and all can be easily overcome by a little more co-operation from the sections concerned. Modification on the aircraft is simple, consisting of enlarging the port inner gun port in the rear turret, and can be done in half-an-hour. It is not, repeat not, necessary to blank off the servo motor, and the gyro assembly can be installed in half an hour at the most. All the electrical gear is mounted on the gyro rig and after the rig has been fitted to the gun cradle only three things remain to be done:-
(i) Connect electrical cable to supply in turret.
(ii) Connect rear sear release pipe to gyro rig.
(iii) Harmonize gun sight to camera.
All Photo. Sections CAN process the film, and there is no shortage of magazines in the Group. At 51 Base, a Corporal Armourer is available to give assistance on gyro assessors. This N.C.O. has constructed all the Gyro Assessors in use in the Group, and the present compact and efficient rig is his product. Units requiring his services should contact 51 Base Armament Officer. The Gyro Assessors are not to be left in aircraft which are engaged on night flying as two assessors have already been lost through aircraft with gyros fitted, crashing on night flying.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] M.T. SPARES [/underlined]
Concern Is being caused by the unserviceability of M.T. vehicles in general, and every effort should be made by Equipment Officers to review establishments and ensure that demands are raised regularly to keep stocks of the generally used items up to maximum. It is impracticable and uneconomical to hold stocks of the many parts which not only vary with the make of vehicles but also with the diverse models of each make of vehicle, which again vary according to the year of manufacture. Therefore all M.T. Officers must anticipate requirements for inspection overhauls and other contingencies where certain parts are known to be badly worn and will need replacement in the near future. [Underlined] At least two weeks’ [/underlined] notice of these requirements should be given to the Equipment Officer, and Forms 674 should not only state for what purpose the spares are required, but the approximate date the replacement is required; the chassis and engine number of the vehicle MUST in all cases be quoted. Demands will then be raised in accordance with A.M.O. A.481/43.
[Underlined] A.E.C. TANKER FUEL HOSES [/underlined] (Stores Ref 4K/2009) have for some considerable time been in very short supply, and the chief cause for this is the difficulty in the manufacture of sufficient protective coverings. Bomber Command have now agreed to accept these hoses without this covering and as a result it is anticipated that the supply position will improve considerably within the next two months. In the meantime, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for the repair of these hoses by the manufacturer, under Station local purchase powers.
It is understood that Messrs. Zwicky of Slough (telephone: Slough 23776) are prepared to sell these hoses to the Service, but stations are only to resort to local purchase in extreme cases, where operational efficiency is directly affected and supplies cannot be obtained through Service channels.
A meeting of Base and Station Equipment Officers was held at this Headquarters during the month, when points of mutual interest were discussed, with a view to giving even better service than in the past, to all and sundry.
Before closing the meeting, the A.O.C. spoke highly of the service given by the Equipment Branch. This, naturally, was most gratifying, for sometimes we feel that quite a lot of people look upon us as mere “dogsbodies”, and give no thought to the time, patience and methods (sometimes very unorthodox) adopted in an endeavour to produce the goods.
(Continued from page10, col. 2)
Fiskerton, where the return of aircraft was described, and aircrew were interviewed.
Dunholme received a short visit of the Hon. Herman Hodge, of the Colonial Office, and a B.B.C. recording unit, on 21st March.
Press visitors during the month included representatives of “The Star”, Sheffield, to the Sheffield Squadron at Fiskkerton, on March 15th, and Mrs K. Wilson of the “Sydney Morning Herald”, to Waddington on 31st March.
TRAINING
The Stirling is becoming slowly but surely a nicely house-trained creature. It can be taken out for long or short trips with few difficulties that delay training and rend the tempers of Lancaster loving instructors. The lurid language of February, which produced a glow like unto many batteries of sodiums, is scarcely remembered. Perhaps ‘tis Spring and everything is set for an ideal world.
The L.F.S. at Syerston achieved great success with 93 crews passed out to Squadrons and the H.C.U’s were in no way overshadowed, for they passed on 98 crews for Lancaster training. The outlook for April is therefore fairly good, and squadrons may look forward with confidence to a reasonably early increase in crews, weather permitting.
It is a matter of real regret that accidents have marred an otherwise good month, and may have dragged 5 Group to the bottom of the ladder. A promise has however, been extracted from all and sundry, that 5 Group shall move to the top in April and there will be no avoidable accidents in 51 Base. The heavy snow fall, and the resultant snow banks were chiefly responsible- or perhaps it was the determination to get on with flying and crew output, despite the snow banks.
The April programme is optimistic indeed. There is a measure of quiet confidence about, and if results come up to expectation a new high standard will have been set for Conversion Bases. The results will be seen in better trained and more experienced crews, and we hope the squadrons will not be reluctant to pay the Units a visit and express their appreciation.
Fighter Affiliation Training is now being carried out in Units with detachments of 1690 Flight (1485 regenerated) and an improvement in Gunnery standards is expected.
Synthetic Fishpond training has been introduced, and is likely to be adopted generally.
Recent changes include Group Captain Vintras to command Wigsley; Wing Commander Baxter (106) to Chief Instructor, Swinderby; Wing Commander Jennings (207) to Wing Commander Training, 51 Base; Wing Commander MacFarlane (51 Base) to Chief Instructor Wigsley, and Wing Commander Hallows (5 Group) to Chief Instructor, Winthorpe.
Squadron Leader Osborne (1660) is training Lancaster instructors at Syerston, and also Wing Commanders “Ops” from operational Bases. Squadron Leader Shields and Flight Lieutenant Wyness (1654) are training Stirling instructors at Swinderby. Both “Academies [sic] are doing well.
ABSENCE
ENEMY AGENTS – ABSENTEES
During the coming months, the Allied Forces are likely to be called upon for a maximum effort on land, sea and air, to defeat the enemy.
No. 5 Group will certainly be expected to take its full part in this effort, and there can be no doubt that at heart every man and woman serving in the Group would agree that he or she was going to do it. In spite of all these good intentions there are still far too many absentees, aircrew and ground staff alike. Not long absences, just a few hours or a few days, but absences just the same, at a time when the manpower position simply cannot afford absentees. There isn’t a Tom there now to do Dick’s work while he slips off to see the Dog-races, and there isn’t a Joan there to drive that van while Mary goes off to her sister’s wedding.
[Cartoon] WFW
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE
Of course those two extra days at home in the garden with the wife were well worth two days pay, and even a bit of C.C. as well, and that special party was well worth a day’s pay and a rep., but that isn’t the point. It’s to have days at home in the garden and special parties that we are fighting this war. There might very well not be a garden or wife at all if the Germans laid down the orders for us, and we should certainly not be the ones to enjoy any parties that were arranged.
There is this special point for aircrews to remember too. You work together as a team and your captain has to have complete confidence in each one of his crew or he cannot give his best to his job. If you have let him down by going absent once or twice during training is he going to have that confidence and is he going to feel quite certain that you’re not absent(minded) in that rear turret? It might make all the difference!
If you’re absent on the ground, you’re quite likely to be absent in the air; it’s all a matter of self-discipline, and that’s the same in each case.
In this war, no-one in the services can be a neutral; if you don’t do a day’s work for the Allies, you are doing a day’s work for the Axis, and at the end of the war your Form 121 will show just how many days you put in fighting [underlined] for [/underlined] Hitler. If you put it that way, that day’s absence doesn’t look so good, so cut it out and [underlined] don’t be an enemy agent. [/underlined]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The semi final between Coningsby and Scampton was a tremendous affair. From the kick off, Scampton’s attack went all out, and Coningsby’s defence is to be congratulated on the way they held them. Coningsby’s attack improved, and the game swung from goal to goal. Ten minutes before half time, Coningsby centre headed a goal from a corner kick. After the break, Scampton forced the pace and equalised after ten minutes with a shot that gave the Coningsby goalie no chance. Both sides were all out in an endeavour to snatch the lead. Coningsby left wing repeatedly broke away and centred, but nobody could connect. By three quarters time both teams were slackening as a result of the terrific pace; both defences, and especially the goalies, were coping brilliantly. A draw seemed inevitable. Then came the turning point; Coningsby attacked, their left half was well up the field, and instead of the usual pass to the wing he made ground, then shot hard and true for the top corner. The last 15 minutes of the game saw repeated Coningsby attacks, and five minutes from time they got a third goal. It was a magnificent game, and Coningsby are to be congratulated on entering the final via such a tremendous obstacle in the powerful Scampton team.
Round two produced a hard fought duel between Winthorpe and Metheringham. Two draws were played, 1-1 and 3-3 after extra time in each game. In the third game Winthorpe won 4 – 1, and are now due to play Skellingthorpe at Swinderby in the semi final.
[Underlined] THE LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE RUGGER COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has been a failure as a Group competition, but has been an immense success in 53 Base where 86 teams in all have taken part. Very few casualties have resulted in the large number of games played, the most serious being a broken collar bone, which is undoubtedly more than could be claimed for a Soccer competition boasting a equivalent number of entrants. The event must now be considered a 53 Base monopoly, since in spite of many appeals from this Headquarters, no other squadrons have got cracking. The inter unit play off will be at Waddington within the next few days (to be signalled to all stations) and it is hoped that Stations will provide transport for as many of their aircrew personnel as possible to witness the play off.
[Underlined] THE WINES RUGGER TROPHY [/underlined]
Round two of the competition saw Winthorpe beat Scampton 14 – 11 in a hard fought game. Dunholme beat Swinderby 8 – 0, so these two teams pass to the semi final. Round two games still undecided are – Waddington v Metheringham/Woodhall and East Kirkby v Fiskerton. It is hoped those Stations will complete the events within the next few days.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
Swinderby are now in the semi final, and the outstanding matches are – Waddington v Metheringham. Syerston v Scampton and East Kirkby v 5 Group. These three games should be decided within the next week.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played six station matches with the very fine result of 4 wins. Their only loss was with Coningsby in the Matz semi-final. They beat A.V. Roe 5 – 4 in the 3rd round of the Lincoln Amateur Cup, and drew 0 - 0 with R.A.F. Wickenby in the semi-final of the Amateur Cup.
DUNHOLME had a busy but rather unsuccessful month. They lost their 3rd round Matz Cup game 2 – 3 to Coningsby, and their 3rd round in the Amateur Cup by the same score to R.A.F. Wickenby.
CONINGSBY – The highlight of the Coningsby month, indeed to quote 54 Base excellent “GEN” – of the season, was their MATZ Cup victory over Scampton. Intersection league games were fewer than usual owing to the bad weather. 619 v 617 and 106 v 61 are also games due this month in the Base Commander’s “All Sports” Trophy.
METHERINGHAM – The duel with Winthorpe in the 2nd round of the Matz Cup was most notable. Weather caused cancellations of no fewer than 10 games, but five inter-section games were completed.
BARDNEY played 4 station matches, playing the 1st Border Regt. twice (1 win 3 – 2, 1 draw 1 – 1), beating Metheringham 3 – 2 and losing to Coningsby by the same margin. 5 inter-section games were completed.
EAST KIRKBY Station XI played 4 games, and won all four, beating Kirkby and Spilsby R.A.F.R. teams and two Field-Craft Airborne Units. In the seven inter-section events, 630 – B Flight were most successful.
SPILSBY had seven games during the month. Their R.A.F.R. Squadron beat East Kirkby R.A.F.R. Squadron 7 – 2, and the local Suffolks 9 – 3, losing 4 – 2 to Kirkby and 3 – 2 to R.A.F. Skegness.
H.Q. 5 GROUP – The Group side are still only able to play away fixtures. In March they had three games, losing to a Scampton team 2 – 3, to Skellingthorpe 0 – 4, and holding their old opponents 93 M.U. to a 2 – 2 draw.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON had only the two games completed due to cancellations by opponents. They lost to Hemswell 0 – 3 and to Winthorpe 11 – 14 in round two of the Wines Cup.
DUNHOLME have a really strong side led by F/L Waterhouse. They overwhelmed Bardney 33 – 0 in round 1 of the Wines Cup, and have since beaten Swinderby 8 – 0 in round two.
METHERINGHAM list 0 – 27 to Waddington, and were unlucky to have six games postponed, their opponents including Digby, Bardney and Coningsby.
BARDNEY had only one station game, in which they were unlucky to meet Dunholme on top of their form in the Wines Cup, and suffer a 33 – 0 defeat.
EAST KIRKBY had three games, a 630 Squadron A and B practice game, and a 57 Squadron A and B practice, followed by a station A and B trial. In spite of this preparation they were unlucky enough to forego their Wines Cup round one as Wigsley could not raise a side. They are now waiting to play Fiskerton in the second round.
HOCKEY
SCAMPTON had four games of mixed hockey, beating Spilsby 6 – 1 in round one of the Group competition, and Foldingsworth 5 – 0. They lost 2 – 3 to 368 Searchlight Battery and 1 – 5 to Rose Bros. In the second round of the cup they have now to play Syerston.
DUNHOLME had only one mixed hockey game, v Scampton in the Group competition, which they lost 1 – 4.
METHERINGHAM played a 2 – 2 draw with Waddington on their new aerodrome pitch. They are now due to play Waddington again in the Group contest.
BARDNEY neat Dunholme 4 – 1 in the Group contest, and later registered a 4 – 1 win against Waddington. They were finally knocked out of the trophy by Swinderby (5 – 1).
EADT KIRKBY had four games, three inter-station and one (a 1- 1 draw) with Spilsby G.S. They are now waiting to meet 5 Group at home in the contest.
SPILSBY played Scampton in the Group trophy, but were defeated 6 – 1.
[Underlined] ICE HOCKEY [/underlined]
54 Base boast a Canadian Cougars’ team that is certainly 100% full blooded, judging from the “GEN” account of their 5 – 4 victory over Digby Dynamites.
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
F/Lt. Rodgers (Gunnery Leader 617) now has a Woodhall Soft Ball team that challenges all comers. Roll up, roll up, and have your money ready!!
(Continued on page 4, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
Dot and Dash, the immaculate WAAFs.
“…OPERATIONS? I’VE ‘AD ‘EM!”
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Navigation generally has been of a high order this month. There is still room for considerable improvement however. A good many of the Navigators’ Charts still look very bare. Although all aircraft are equipped with Air Position Indicators, a few Navigators still do not “keep an air plot”, in that they do not plot their Air Position regularly and obtain a D.R. position. This is most important and must be done. A standard Navigational procedure to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s, has been laid down (see Air Staff Instruction Nav/14). We are constantly striving for concentration, and for obvious reasons the concentration should be on the planned track, it is therefore imperative that you constantly obtain your D.R. position by intelligent use of the broadcast w/v’s. If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, then alter course immediately and regain track.
The A.P.I. has been modified, and the error in this instrument is now very small. If the windfinders obtain accurate fixes on their H 2 S, the resultant w/v should be almost perfect. Navigators should, therefore, have every confidence in the broadcast w/v’s and make the fullest possible use of them.
Whilst track keeping is very important, it must be remembered that timing is equally important. This does not seem to be fully appreciated, and a few Navigators still persist om leaving the concentration point with “a few minutes in hand”. Other aircraft inadvertently leave the concentration point a few minutes late (possibly due to late take-off, etc.) with the result that the stream of aircraft is very much longer than it should be, and the chance of success by the German night fighter is increased. If it is calculated that the aircraft will arrive at the concentration point early, then dog-legs [underlined] must [/underlined] be carried out before reaching this position. All Navigation Officers are to check the time at the concentration point of each aircraft, and they must insist that no aircraft leaves this position with any time in hand.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
All aircraft of the Group are now equipped with the A.P.I. fully modified. Several tests have been carried out to ascertain the accuracy of this instrument now it has been modified, and the results have shown that the error is now very small, and of the order of 3 or 4 m.p.h. We must, therefore, make every use of this valuable instrument. It is considered by a few Navigators that errors arise when resetting the A.P.I. Mechanically this is not so, and any errors are due to incorrect setting by the Navigator. If the A.P.I. is reset every 30 minutes, as it should be, then the amount to be subtracted or added to the counters should not be great, and would not generally be more that 30-35 minutes of latitude or longitude. For ease and simplicity, the A.P.I. should not be reset until the latitude or longitude counters are showing an even number of minutes, e.g. 10, 20, 30, etc. It should then be a simple matter to add or subtract say 25 minutes of latitude or longitude.
It is advocated by a small section of the “Union” that the A.P.I. should be reset as little as possible, e.g. at the last Gee fix, the target, and first Gee fix, etc., but this method has several disadvantages. It will become cumbersome after a long period of D.R. e.g. the Berlin raid 24/25 March, 1944, when the wind vector from target to Enemy Coast was approx. 230 miles long. There is as great a risk of error in plotting this vector as in resetting the A.P.I. Another disadvantage is that the Air Position may run off the chart in use. This would necessitate carrying several charts.
The Air Position Indicator is a valuable instrument if correctly used. Navigators are urged to experiment with the A.P.I. in the various methods of use, and discuss with their Station Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
March was a mixed month for broadcast w/v’s. The wind finding and resultant track keeping was good, with the exception of Berlin and Nuremburg. The last two mentioned raids have been investigated, and the results are worthy of special comment.
[Underlined] Berlin. [/underlined] Average forecast w/v from Base to Target at 20,000 feet was 350/60. Average w/v transmitted was 350/90. Average true w/v was approximately 350/105. It will be noted that the winds transmitted by Aircraft were, on average, 15 m.p.h. under strength. A large percentage of windfinders obtained the accurate w/v, but only a few transmitted it. The remainder either did not send it, or, not believing there could be such a large error in the forecast w/v’s, “watered it down” and sent that. This procedure is very dangerous. Navigators must send back all w/v’s they obtain, providing they are confident the fixes used are accurate.
Another feature of the Berlin raid was the delay in aircraft sending back w/v’s. All the difficulties experienced by aircrew are fully appreciated, but every effort must be made to get the w/v’s back to Base as soon as possible.
[Underlined] Nuremburg. [/underlined] The investigation into this raid has not yet been completed, but the one outstanding feature is that the wind direction at and above 20,000 feet backed by 15° - 20° and this was a contributory factor to the Northerly trend on the return journey.
[Underlined] LIAISON VISITS [/underlined
Only a few liaison visits have been completed during the month. It is very difficult for operational Station and Squadron Navigational Officers to visit the Con. Units or Scampton Aircrew School, but every effort should be made. Make a note of all the deficiencies of Navigators, your suggestions, criticisms etc., then go and discuss them with the Con. Unit or Scampton. More good can be done by paying one liaison visit than by writing a hundred letters. Con. Unit, L.F.S. and Scampton Instructors must also pay regular visits to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
During the month, one Navigator from each Squadron was detailed to experiment with Log and Chart work. Each was asked to work almost entirely on the Chart, making only a very few log entries. This method has proved very popular. Full reports are not yet to hand, but an analysis of all reports will be sent to Stations and Squadrons in due course.
1. If the D.R. Compass topples, and the repeater rotates, what action would you take to maintain the line of flight marker on the H 2 S correctly orientated?
2. What action would you take to tune in the ground returns and set up the height marker on the H 2 S equipment if the trace on the height tube were missing?
3. You are using broadcast wind velocities, and the Bomb Aimer gives you a pinpoint which is “off track”. What two actions would you take?
4. You have received an amendment to the zero hour, but, having applied the correction, observe that you still have several minutes in hand. How and where would you lose this time?
5. In which countries are the following towns: Strasbourg, Aix-le Chappelle, Flensburg, Ghent, Pilsen, Charlattenburg?
6. Which is the shorter distance – Stuttgart to ROME or Stuttgart to LONDON?
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. (a) Passes to W/Optr. On paper (1) Course, (2) Height, (3) I.A.S., (4) present position, (5) estimated time of ditching, (6) reason for ditching. ( )
(b) Obtain a Gee fix and pass to W/Op., on paper, the Gee co-ordinates and time of fix.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Few crews carry out correct procedure, which is – the emergency procedure when ditching is considered unavoidable, S.O.S. procedure when ditching is imminent within 15 minutes.
2. 30°
3. If B strobe is missing. Line up signals in usual manner, and take “C” reading. Then reverse signals so that B signal is on the C trace, strobe the signal and take the reading remembering to subtract 30. If “C” strobe is missing, reverse above procedure and add 30 to the “C” pulse reading.
4. (a) It means that you are heading for high ground.
(b) Turn on reciprocal course and obtain a check on your position. If no reliable aids are available in the aircraft, the Navigator should request W/Op. to obtain an M/F D/F fix.
Lines to those who went on leave on April 4th.
For you the birds tra-la do sing!
For me the heavens do glower and rain!
For you buds burst like anything!
My buds ‘gainst blight do strive in vain!
The reason’s simple why I grieve,’
And why my downtrod soul doth pine;
For you continue with your leave,
But I’ve just heard that I’ve had mine!!
ANON (Circa 1944)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ANOTHER BAD MONTH [/underlined]
The [underlined] Avoidable [/underlined] Accident Summary for March again makes bad reading – Squadrons had 9 and Training Base had 33. These figures speak for themselves, and they use pretty strong language. As a result of these accidents, 4 aircraft were CAT “E”, 6 were CAT “B”, 20 were CAT AC” and 12 were CAT “A”. Bear in mind these were only avoidable accidents. Technical failures are not included in this list. Details are as follows:-
Ground collisions (including taxying) – 15; overshoot landing – 3; crashes on 3-engined overshoots – 3; swings on take off – 5; swings landing – 4; errors of judgement landing – 5; heavy landings – 3; maintenance – 2; taking off – 1; other errors of judgement – 1: Total [underlined] 42 [/underlined].
The snow period at the beginning of the month was directly responsible for 14 of these accidents, all within 51 Base. Had there been no hard snow banks, no damage would have been done to these aircraft. The hazard had to be accepted, and no action was on these “snow” accidents. Under this heading there were 5 taxying, 7 swinging and 2 landing. This however, still leaves 19 avoidable accidents in 51 Base, in the usual categories, and 9 in squadrons – total 28, as under:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined] – Ground collisions – 3; overshoot landing – 2; maintenance errors – 2; other errors of judgement – 2.
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined] Ground collisions – 7; swings – 2; overshoot landing 1; heavy landings – 2; other landing errors – 4; crashes on 3 engined overshoots – 3.
Collisions on the ground (10) still account for more damaged aircraft than any other category. There were two more M.T. collisions this month, both due to careless driving by ground personnel, in spite of the recent drive to eliminate these costly entirely inexcusable accidents. One aircraft was damaged during compass swinging at a squadron, and two more were damaged on dispersal. In the others, only a very slight degree of carelessness was shown by aircrew. They were more unfortunate than anything else. Apart from the M.T. collisions, there has not been an instance this month of down right careless taxying, which is a step in the right direction.
The swings were by inexperienced pilots, both of whom took the correct action after the swing developed. This action avoided serious damage. One of the heavy landings was made in difficult wind conditions, the other only accentuated damage which had been started as a result of previous heavy landings; both pilots were under training.
Three aircraft crashed on 3 engined overshoots – two Stirlings and one Lancaster. It is hoped that the revised technique of dealing with three engined landings at Conversion Units will minimise these three engined accidents. The overshoot landing at Training Base was also made on three engines. The pilot hesitated between landing and going round again, decided on one, then changed his mind; he finished up in the overshoot area. Overshoots on the squadrons were made under extremely difficult circumstances. One was made on two engines, and in the other, visibility was practically nil.
(Continued on page 15, col. 3)
ORGANISATION
[Underlined] (MAY BE READ BY AIRCREW TYPES) [/underlined]
When the so-called “brained types” of the Royal Air Force are binding round the fireplace in the mess, they sometimes utter the most amazing theories on how the war can be won on a date earlier than that already forecast by Lindoe. But no one tries to make a note of what is said by these Fuehrers, except, maybe, to insert a few rude remarks in the local “Line Book”.
When, however, an observation is made that is clever and helpful, quotations are extracted and issued to the world at large. Such an extract is made in Section 1 of A.P.837 – “Principles of Administration”.
An extract from the Manual says “A good organisation requires competent management to produce satisfactory results”. In the Royal Air Force, this management of the [underlined] ORGANISATION [/underlined] is called Administration; it is the system whereby, in principle and in executive detail, the Service carries out its function ….TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY….!!!... and to work efficiently, co-operation is essential. (Co-operation, by the way, is something to which every member of a Service contributes).
Another famous quotation by Socrates, was to the effect that “A disorderly mob is no more an army than a “pranged” aircraft a fighting machine”. The bits and pieces must be [underlined] organised. [/underlined]
So, therefore, let’s have a look at organisation in action-theory is not sufficient, it must be applied.
With apologies to Tee Emm. here are a few “Do’s and Don’t s”.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] see that Orders issued are brief, complete and unambiguous. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] lay yourself open to being misunderstood. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that in your planning, you must always ask yourself who has to be consulted before you reach a decision, and who has to be informed of your decision.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] grasp the scope of the task, and foresee what it demands, with thoroughness and imagination. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] see with what other tasks run by other Sections, you must interlock. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] co-ordinate with your equals and underlings. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] plan until you are absolutely clear what is to be done. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] jump at the first solution. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] consider all the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] go off at half-cock.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] remember that in war, speed is nearly everything.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that ceaseless driving force and ceaseless supervision are essential.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] check and check again.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget, whatever your job, your ability to organise is every bit as important to the Service as a whole, whether you are throwing an aircraft about the sky, or writing Railway Warrants.
ENGINEERING
Early returns for the month of March were about average, and cancellations were much reduced. Cancellations for March were 0.98%, a considerable improvement on the 3.47% recorded for February. Early Returns for March were 4.01% for all causes, again, an improvement on February’s figures which were 6.5%.
Serviceability was generally good, the main causes of unserviceability being:-
1. Aircraft on acceptance checks.
2. Aircraft on minor inspection.
3. Aircraft landing away from base due to diversion.
The number of sorties flown by this Group is again a record, but still greater numbers will be expected during the coming months.
The maintenance statistics staff are still at Waddington and very soon experiments will proceed with a 75 hour maintenance cycle, using the revised maintenance schedule.
Much unnecessary engine running is taking place on the ground, and the method of some of the running is harsh and detrimental to the engine. C.T.O’s must ensure that all N.C.O’s and men who “run up” engines are qualified to do so, and that they have passed the necessary test.
Many cases have been noticed where on a ground run a mag drop has been experienced, and the fitter at the controls has run the engine up three or four times “hoping! It may clear. This is a waste of time, imposes heavy loads on the engine, and proves the man in the cockpit does not know his job.
Another point about ground running is that much damage is done on a ground test by inspection panels and turret covers not being secure, and being damaged by the slipstream. C.T.O’s must have a drive on this, and when they see it happening, check the man at the controls and the N.C.O. i/c aircraft.
[Underlined] RENDITION OF FORMS 765C [/underlined]
The remarks on Form 765C by the specialist officers are in many cases too brief and are of no assistance to this Headquarters in attempting to establish a cause, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the trouble which led to the forced landing or failure. This is liable to indicate, in the case of engine trouble, that the cause is not investigated thoroughly at the Station. As it is known that the cause is always investigated it is small trouble to insert more details in the paragraph provided in the 765C for Specialist’s remarks, and it will save a large amount of correspondence and telephone calls between Group and Stations. If a full technical report is to follow after rendition of the 765C then of course this should be stated in the appropriate paragraph.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Serviceability of Stirling and Lancaster aircraft by Unit]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 14.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
This has been a month of records, and on one occasion a period of sweat, toil, and almost tears.
To create a record with the existing power available, whether it be sprinting, car racing or bombing up, it is necessary to exclude wasted energy. As man power cannot be increased and new armament records must be realised, it is essential that this strive for maximum efficiency be closely investigated.
Wasted energy in the bombing up phase of operations is too often attributed to shortage of equipment, bomb trollies, small bomb containers, Whitlocks, Hampden twins, liners; even spanners. It is admitted that there is a shortage of some of these items; all the more reason why the few available should be kept serviceable; further, if failures and faults occur, an expedient system of repair must be instituted. A flat tyre on a bomb trolley, a few popped rivets on a small bomb container, small faults, easily remedied, but if allowed to accumulate they may easily cause a bottleneck in the repair section and eventually a complete breakdown.
A large percentage of the necessary repairs are caused by mishandling. Bombing up parties must not be allowed to model on the popular conception of a dockyard stevedore.
A release slip that fails is a bomb returned, and a stupendous effort is wasted, especially as it is necessary to cart the weapon back to the bomb dump. Do not therefore allow speed to interfere with the quality of workmanship.
Short cuts and new devices of local manufacture, such as tools and loading platforms save time, and time saved is man hours of effort that can be directed to raising the standard of workmanship, and thus increasing the tonnage dropped on the enemy.
New records will be set, so prepare now for every eventuality.
Load the [underlined] GOODS [/underlined] so that our colleagues the aircrew may deliver them.
[Underlined] WARNING TO WANTONS [/underlined]
A rumour is rife that by trial, a certain Group discovered that if the centre station release mechanism is plugged to the rear turret electric heating system, and the gunner turns on his heated clothing, the following incidents occur:-
(a) A large bomb goes through the bomb doors.
(b) The rear gunner is practically electrocuted.
(c) Pandemonium reigns in the aircraft.
(The Group and Unit concerned prefer to remain anonymous.)
[Underlined] FIREWORKS [/underlined]
To alleviate the somewhat chaotic state brought about by the increase in the use of target markers and indicators, and the need for an improved system of supply, it has been decided to form a pyrotechnical park at Woodhall. It is intended that this park should hold a quantity sufficient to supply any Station at short notice, and that any technical information regarding these new and unheralded devices will be available from that source.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
A word of appreciation is directed to the transport sections, who undertook many nocturnal journeys to ensure prompt deliveries of bombs in readiness for operations.
[Underlined] FAILURES [/underlined]
This month a total of 2 cancellations and 7 Early Returns were attributed to Armament. Although this represents a decided improvement on last month’s figures, it is still too high. The total of 9 abortive sorties were due to:-
(i) 3 Gunners’ “boobs”.
(ii) 1 aircraft returned early as a result of a sticky Palmer Firing Valve, the result of a tight gland nut on the valve spindle.
(iii) 1 aircraft was not bombed up in time for take-off and consequently cancelled.
(iv) 4 aircraft returned with unserviceable tail turrets due to defects in technical equipment, i.e.
(a) A broken ball bearing resulted in a seized vane oil motor.
(b) Spline shaft of the E.D.P. sheared.
(c) Pressure pipe union at the Engine Driven Pump fractured during flight – exit the last old type flex pipe in the Group.
(d) Collapsed gun ram washer.
From this analysis it can be seen that at least 5 out of 9 abortive sorties could, and should, have been avoided. After deducting the three gunners’ “boobs” and 4 failures due to defective equipment, Armament can say with satisfaction, that they were responsible for only two abortive sorties out of a total of 1720 sorties flown. (.116%) – Good show!! A record number of sorties flown, a record tonnage dropped on the Hun and an all-time low of abortive sorties.
There is, however, grave cause for alarm regarding small bomb container compartment hang-ups. Although a greater tonnage than ever before was dropped, so also was a greater tonnage returned to the bomb store, and unfortunately over 50% of the failures were caused by carelessness. Of 102 S.B.C. hang-ups there were 60 maintenance failures directly attributed to severed and trapped leads.
These maintenance failures cannot be accepted, and it is obvious that the present system of supervision during bombing up needs overhaul.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE + = H 2 S Squadron
ACCIDENTS
(Continued from page 14, col.1)
The other landing accidents occurred in 51 Base. They consisted of collapsing of Stirling under-carriages after touch-down. These have not yet been fully investigated.
The remaining “error of judgement” occurred in a squadron. The aircraft crashed in the circuit at dusk. The reason for this crash is still obscure, and has only been included because investigation at this stage does not suggest technical failure of any kind.
A fatal accident took place this month in the Waddington circuit. A Lancaster collided in mid-air with a 1 Group aircraft on its way home to base. Responsibility for the accident has not yet been allocated, but it brings home once again the necessity for keeping a thorough look-out at all times. The pilot of an aircraft is naturally preoccupied in the circuit with his cockpit drill etc., and it is up to the crew, especially the gunners to keep up a search all round. The natural tendency to look inside the circuit at the flarepath must be resisted.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 15.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The opening months of the year have each [missing word] noteworthy contributions to the Bomber Offensive, and this month has proved no exception. Not only have we established a new sortie peak of 1720, but our achievements also include the distinction of being the first Group in the field to drop over 1000 tons in one night on a single target. The high percentage of successes (89.7%) was maintained despite the set-back of two abortive operations, and losses remained a constant 3.37%.
The principal role of the Group, outside the main force “blitz” targets, has been the continuation of the offensive, commenced last month, against Germany’s aircraft production – an essential prelude to the establishment of a Second Front. This offensive has been rewarded by no mean success.
The attack on 2/3rd March against ALBERT resulted in the total destruction of the aero-engine factory of Cle Mecanique d’Albert, with the aircraft factory of S.N.C.A. du Nord more than half destroyed – an impressive result.
MARIGNANE, singled out for attack on the 9/10th, also sustained extremely severe damage, particularly to the assembly shop, heat treatment shop, offices, flight hangar, components’ store, garages, workshops and other buildings in the factory area.
The following night (namely the 10/11th), an ambitious programme was conducted against aircraft factories at CHATEAUROUX, CLERMOND FERRAND and OSSUN, and the Needle Bearing Factory at LA RICAMARIE. Interpretation of P.R.U. photographs provides evidence of the high measure of success which attended these missions. Thirteen buildings comprising the larger part of the workshops of S.N.C.A. du Sud-Ouest Chateauroux, have been destroyed or severely damaged, including the main assembly store, transformer house and other key buildings. The aircraft repair factory at CLERMOND FERRAND has received major damage throughout, including two large multi-bay buildings, compounding plant and power station – the latter now being observed to be inactive – OSSUN Factory airfield bears its scars in the form of severe damage to the two larger factory buildings and other ancillary buildings. The devastation at LA RICAMARIE is particularly acute. The eastern two thirds of the plant has suffered heavily, and every building, with one exception, has been either damaged or destroyed.
Three persistent attacks against the Sigma Aero Engine Works, LYONS, on 23/24th, 25/26th and again on 29/30th, terminated in sixteen out of the 22 buildings comprising the Factory receiving varying degrees of damage, in addition to which a neighbouring hutted encampment has been virtually destroyed.
A further two nights out of the month were devoted with great profit to the firing of Hun powder magazines. The results were impressive indeed, and upheld the high hopes of the crews. BERGERAC on 18/19th took the count in the first round. The east end of the plant is almost completely demolished, while the nitration houses and acid recovery plant are severely damaged, with evidence of severe blast throughout the Factory. ANGOULEME, attacked on 20/21st, was still burning the day following the raid, and severe damage throughout the target area, particularly to the nitro-cellulose plant, can be seen.
We, as a Group, also played a small, but nevertheless noteworthy part in the attack against the enemy’s communications supplying his Channel Ports. AULNOYE was selected as our target, and the ensuing attack on 25/26th resulted in the central portion of one of the carriage and wagon repair shop being damaged. Rather more than twenty direct hits have been secured on the tracks – and the locomotive shed to the south is half destroyed.
An outstandingly successful attack was made on 16/17th against the CLERMOND FERRAND MICHELIN PLANT – not a building of which escaped. Severe damage is displayed throughout the entire area.
Seven major attacks were undertaken during the month. STUTTGART was our first objective on 1/2nd and again on 15/16th. The heaviest concentration of damage from these attacks is seen to the North West and North East of the town centre, where many factories of high priority are situated. Throughout the town, scattered incidents to business and residential property are apparent.
FRANKFURT on 18/19th and 22/23rd, was spectacular, not only by reason of the success of the attack, but because the Group seized the unique opportunity of unloading bombs exceeding 1000 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the target. Some 12 hours after the second attack, columns of smoke were rising to 15,000 feet, and drifting southwards for at least 200 miles – a grave spectacle for dwellers in the South of the Reich. The principal damage is concentrated in the city centre, stretching a scarred arm northwards between the railway station and east harbour.
No month would be complete without an attack on the “Big City”. Limited cover only was available the day following the raid on 24/25th, but from the provisional report (which omits reference to the centre and the east), the potential results can be contemplated with some optimism. At the time of photography, fires were still burning.
For some months, rebuilding in ESSEN has been stealthily proceeding, and the night of 26/27th was selected as a favourable opportunity to disrupt this activity. PR.U. photographs are of poor quality, but fresh damage can be identified in many parts of the town, and in the workshops of Krupps. A full report is awaited.
The final bout of the month witnessed a bitter struggle with the enemy’s fighter defences throughout the deep penetration to NURNBERG on 30/31st, involving our heaviest loss so far recorded. Our aircraft, however, put up a spirited defence, shooting down a number of the enemy. The losses were not a small price to pay, even for a successful attack on this extremely important war production centre, but the casualties can perhaps be placed in their proper perspective, and to some extent minimised, when viewing the Battle of Germany as a whole. It is difficult to place any assessment on the raid owing to cloud conditions, and P.R.U. cover has not yet been obtained.
To speculate on the value of our contribution towards the opening of the Second Front is obviously vain, but there can be no doubt that the month’s activity has left its mark clearly impressed on the Reich.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of statistics on aircraft, sorties, bombing and training by Squadron]
ORDER OF MERIT in this table is now based on the number of SUCCESSFUL sorties completed, per average aircraft on charge, i.e. Total number of sorties minus Early Returns and Missing, divided by Average A/C on charge. No 617 Squadron, in view of their special task, are shown separately.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944.
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V Group News, March 1944
5 Group News, March 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 20, March 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about processes of navigation, signals/radar, photography, gardening, Gee, flying control, H2S, decorations, tactics, flight engineers, war savings, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, air sea rescue, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, public relations, link trainer, equipment, training absence, sports, navigation, accidents, organisation, engineering, armament, accidents, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-03
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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17 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-24
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France--Albert
France--Bergerac
France--Châteauroux
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--La Ricamarie
France--Lyon
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
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1944-03
5 Group
Absent Without Leave
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
FIDO
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Scampton
RAF Waddington
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Base [underlined] Int [/underlined]
Wadd 9
Skell 10
[Indecipherable]
Base 1
minuted
V GROUP NEWS V
APRIL 1944 [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 21
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Last month I said that it was up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that we were right in our view that night bombing could be made more accurate than day bombing. During April we have gone a long way towards furnishing the proof. The concentration of bombs which was achieved during some of the attacks, notably those on the marshalling yards at La Chappelle and Juvisy, and against some of the small aircraft factories, was outstanding, and probably represents the greatest weight of bombs in a small areas which has yet been achieved in this war.
By previous standards, therefore, our results have been excellent. But there is still much more to be done before we can afford to be satisfied. We can, however, say that the system of marking, which was pioneered by W/Cdr Cheshire and 617 Squadron, has been applied with success to larger operations, including the highly successful attack on Munich. Nevertheless, in all our attacks during April we inflicted less damage than could have been caused by the weight of bombs carried, and I want crews to think carefully over the reasons which I outline below and to take note of the remedies which are being applied.
[Underlined] Communications [/underlined]
On nearly all targets a proportion of the effort was misplaced due to a failure in communications. It is recognised that the T.R. 1196 operates on an unsuitable frequency and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the wireless link which, on occasions, has proved highly satisfactory, is not well suited to the transmission of anything except short instructions in a pre-arranged code. The solution to these communication problems is the introduction of V.H.F. throughout the Group and this policy has now been approved by the Air Ministry although some little time must elapse before all squadrons are fitted. In the meantime, Wireless Operators must ensure a very high degree of efficiency in handling communications.
[Underlined] Smoke [/underlined]
The smoke given off by the bombs has, on many occasions, obscured, or partially obscured, the markers and has made bomb aiming exceedingly difficult during later stages of an attack. Delay action fuses will soon be available once more and their use on certain types of target will ensure that the aiming point is clearly visible throughout the whole run up. An additional method of avoiding the smoke nuisance by aiming off, is described below.
[Underlined] Bombing Errors [/underlined]
There is no doubt that crew bombing errors are still too large and that the pattern of bombs plotted around these precision targets bears a remarkably close relationship to the pattern of bombs plotted around the practice targets at Wainfleet. A proportion of crews obtain good results up to the performance of the sight, which is well under 100 yards. Other crews seem content with results between 200 and 300 yards and a small proportion manage to drop bombs at even greater distances from heights of 10,000 feet or below. There are many causes for these errors but all can be remedied if crews determine that every load of bombs carried out of this country shall fall fair and square on the aiming point.
In the past, the majority of errors in practice bombing have been due to wrong winds, but this source of error should be virtually eliminated by the introduction of the A.P.I. wind finding method. This method will also be used by selected crews on operations so that the bombing winds transmitted to the main force should be more accurate than in the past.
A further source of bombing error has been unserviceable instruments and many Air Bombers are still failing to take the close personal interest in their bombsight which is essential if they are to obtain good results. Although the Instrument Repairer forms the fourth member of the bombing team, it is the Air Bomber who uses the instrument and who must ensure that any difficulties, however trivial, are immediately reported so that they can be put right.
A third main source of error arises out of the manner in which the Pilot flies the aircraft. I find that a number of pilots are still attempting to turn the aircraft flat when making their final corrections during the run up and I can only say to them that such action may easily throw the bombs off by 100 or 200 yards, and that every turn, however small, must be made with the appropriate angle of bank. Far better not to turn at all at the last moment rather than risk a sked. Even a skid of 2° or 3°.
Finally there are errors due to the Air Bomber. Errors which can only be avoided by constant practice in directing the pilot over objects on the ground on every flight; by learning how to adjust in plenty of time for a drift greater or less than that set on the sight. This will become of increasing importance with the introduction of the technique described below.
The accumulative effect of all these errors results in the employment of too many aircraft on each attack, or, put another way, we knock out too few targets each night with the force available. There are many targets which could be destroyed with the effort of a single squadron if the bombing errors could be reduced to 100 yards. These are targets which, at present, have to be attacked by a Base.
I have referred above to the new technique which is being introduced for attacks against small targets on which it is essential that the whole weight of bombs should fall. In the past we have endeavoured to put a marker on the aiming point and, if there were two or more aiming points to put down two or more markers. Examples are some of the railway marshalling yards, or the dispersed hangars making up the aircraft factories at Toulouse. There are several disadvantages in this method of marking. First, the markers often fall through the roofs of buildings and are consequently difficult to see. Secondly, they may be blown out by the concentrated bombing which follows or, if not blown out, obscured by smoke.
It is now proposed that the markers shall be laid by Mosquitos on the upwind edge of the target and that the bombs shall be displaced by the simple expedient of setting a false wind vector on the sight. Recent trials at Wainfleet have shown that a displacement of 300 yards does not unduly complicate the Air Bomber’s run up. If, therefore, the target is 1000 yards long or consists of scattered buildings, one aiming point will be put down and portions of the force will be given different wind settings which will offset their bombs accurately on to the various parts of the target which it is desired to erase. By this means, the target can be scientifically covered and improved results obtained from fewer aircraft.
Success depends, however, on accurate bombing and I would again ask all crews to tackle this problem and to determine that, during May, they will not be satisfied with a bombing error, whether on the practice ranges or against small precision targets, of more than 100 yards from the aiming point or the M.P.I. if a false wind has been applied.
Nothing can more quickly bring this war to a close than the regular achievement of bombing errors of this order.
The arrival in 5 Group of Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons on attachment from P.F.F. provides the Group with the means of marking targets with great accuracy and I consequently look forward to a steady reduction throughout May in the number of aircraft which have to be detailed for the destruction of these small targets, and by this means to a steady increase in the effective aid which this Group can give in the great offensive which lies ahead.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF SERVICING
One of the major problems of the Engineering Branch is to maintain large numbers of aircraft which are of very complex design, with a limited number of tradesmen and with the use of the minimum quantity of test equipment. At the same time, the serviceability state must be high; therefore the time taken over periodical maintenance must be short and the work efficiently carried out.
Early in the war the number of really experienced tradesmen was comparatively few. All the men were exceptionally keen, and to make full use of experienced tradesmen on jobs requiring the greatest amount of skill, a reorganisation of the system of aircraft maintenance was effected.
Originally the squadrons on a station worked as independent units, each squadron being divided into two or three flights according to the number of aircraft held. Each of these flights had its own separate maintenance “set up”, with all equipment required for minor and major inspections. Each of these flights also kept its own supply of spares and tools, and minor and major inspections on aircraft were carried out by the ground crew who remained with the aircraft for all purposes including daily servicing.
This was so obviously uneconomical, not only in equipment, spares and tools, but also in the employment of skilled men and expenditure of man hours, that the new scheme was brought into force very soon after the commencement of hostilities.
The maintenance layout then consisted of the Flying Flights and a Maintenance Flight. Squadrons were still maintained as separate units, but the detailed maintenance was carried out in “M” (Maintenance Flight), i.e. minor and major inspections, acceptance checks and engine or power plant changes, whilst in the Flying Flights, daily inspections, refuelling and rectification of petty unserviceability only was necessary. The man power was of course split up accordingly, the more skilled and experienced men forming the maintenance gangs, whilst the men with less experience were employed in the flying flights.
The economy was marked and as can be visualised, only one squadron store, one pool of ground equipment for aircraft inspections and one set of test equipment for the various ancilliary trades were necessary. The economy however which made itself felt as much as anything was the saving of man-hours caused by the use of highly skilled men on detailed maintenance in the Maintenance Flight, with the result that a generally higher serviceability state was achieved.
There was a certain amount of opposition to this scheme by those who though that flights would lose their identity and spirit. This did not happen.
At a later date a further change in maintenance organisation took place. This was the formation of Station Maintenance. The resources of all squadrons on a station were pooled, and a Station Major Servicing Section was formed, catering for all major servicing work for all squadrons on the station.
These two improvements were merely forerunners of the present Base Maintenance Organisation and the advantages from the aircraft maintenance point of view are manifold.
With this scheme, squadrons do not carry out any of the detailed maintenance, this being left to the Base Major Servicing or Repair and Inspection Squadron. All tradesmen with the exception of the daily servicing squadron are controlled entirely by the Chief Technical Officer, so that by far the greatest amount of maintenance work which goes to keep the squadron at a high serviceability figure is carried out by tradesmen who, whilst working for the squadrons may not be known by members of the squadron.
It would appear therefore that those who said that we would lose the Squadron spirit etc., stood a good chance of being correct. These fears were proved groundless; the spirit has grown to embrace something which was very rare in the early days of the war. Not only have we squadron spirit which has never been as strong as it is now, but we also have pride in the station and Base achievements, and progress of the Group has naturally followed.
An extract from a letter written by a Flight Commander to the Base Maintenance Staff at his Base is typical of the spirit which exists at present. The letter refers to certain aircraft which had been modified, and brought up to operational standard in time for a specific operation, and continues:-
“It is known that in order to have these aircraft ready for operational requirements it was necessary for the staff to sacrifice much of their leisure time and to work long hours without relief.
“Occasions such as this bring forcibly to notice the excellent work being performed daily by the ground staff, and show how necessary it is for us to have their co-operation.
“We member [sic] of aircrew know that we can rely on the ground staff to help in every way possible, and we hope that we can show our appreciation by carrying out the duties in our particular sphere with the same thoroughness, perseverance, and resourcefulness which we have learned to expect from the members of ground staff.”
GARDENING
Interrogation, Easter Monday:-
“That wasn’t a U-boast, it was me – low!”.
Thus, when 5 Group staged a large scale comeback to gardening, out of six aircraft specially detailed to mine a stretch of water in the Eastern Gardens about the width of a runway, 4 (3 of 106 and 1 of 49 Squadrons) were successful despite heavy opposition, and the remaining 2 (49 Squadron) after valiant attempts, during which good use was made of firing the front guns, correctly planted in another furrow. The remaining 50 gardeners put down 244 vegetables off ports in the Gulf of Danzig. Two were missing and one returned early after jettisoning safe in the North Sea. This operation took place almost exactly on the fourth anniversary of the opening by 5 Group of Bomber Command’s mining offensive. During the four years over 30,000 vegetables have been planted, and over 1,000,000 tons of enemy shipping accounted for.
On 18/19th April, and again on 23/24th April, the approaches to Swinemunde received a total of 125 vegetables.
These attacks in the Baltic fill what was a serious gap in the mining campaign in these waters. This year intensive minelaying has been carried out by the Command to the West of Pomeranian Bay with highly successful results. One effect of this, however, was to intensify the use of mine-free waters further east as:-
(i) Training areas for all types of Warships especially U-boats.
(ii) Supply routes for vital imports and military exports to Scandinavia.
(iii) Supply routes to the North Russian front.
Press reports describe very great congestion throughout the Baltic due to closing of ports and channels; P.R.U. cover of the Western Baltic shows some of this, but was unfortunately not obtained of the 5 Group Gardens. Ground reports of sinkings are hard to come by, and take time to reach us, so for the moment we must wait for the news – which will surely come providing our mines were well and truly laid in the swept channels.
The summary of the month’s work is as follows:-
Sorties 80
Successful 77
%age successful 96.25
Mileage flown 126,880
Total vegetables planted 388
The Squadrons responsible were:- 44, 49, 57, 630, 207 and 106.
The Command effort for this month resulted in the successful planting of 2,643 vegetables in some 40 gardens ranging from South West France to the Gulf of Danzig. About half this total was planted in the Baltic, a quarter in the North Sea and the remainder in the Bay of Biscay and Channel. This is easily a record – the previous highest total for one month being 1,869, in April, 1943. A German Naval Correspondent of Transocean, states that in the Channel alone it has been necessary to treble the mine sweeping effort, but discreetly does not mention the Baltic. The problem that faces the German mine sweeping effort is to cope with a great increase in mining spread over some 2000 miles of shipping lanes. The same correspondent complains that we sometimes use 12 different types of mines necessitating the use of numbers of ships fitted with different types of sweeps to clear the same patch, [sic] of water. In fact, the number of different
(Continued in previous column)
types of mine now in use is about four times that number.
A special word of praise is due to the Armament Staffs for their complete success in the unfamiliar work of preparing and loading the vegetables. In particular, East Kirkby’s effort on the 9th April, in sending off 108 in good order, was outstanding. In some cases the weekly stock return continues to be rendered incorrectly, chiefly due to confusion about the different types sterilisers for the new and old marks of mines. The correct use of these sterilisers will literally be a matter of life and death to any of our forces who may operate in areas where we use them, and now is the time therefore, to clear up any doubts as to exactly what types are held.
Station Tracings have proved something of a stumbling block, as have some of the details required in Raid Reports. Both are designed to answer the question – “where do those mines actually fall”, using all the available evidence. Naturally the planning and success of future operations, especially the “triphibious” variety, depend to a large extent on the accuracy of this information.
5 Group News. No. 21. April, 1944. Page 2.
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NAVIGATION
There has been a marked improvement in the navigation this month. Navigators are now realising how important it is to obtain constant checks on their position by intelligent use of either H2S or application of the broadcast w/v’s.
H2S navigators and bomb aimers are checking and cross checking all fixes they receive. If the navigator obtains constant D.R. positions along track, say every 15 minutes, and corrects these positions as ground speed checks are obtained, then it is impossible to obtain wrong fixes on the H 2 S. All Navigators should ensure that bomb aimers cross check every fix obtained, no matter how confident they may be. Also remember that a track made good, w/v and G/S check can be obtained from an unknown response. Very few operators make use of this.
The majority of navigators now use the broadcast w/v’s in an intelligent manner. There are a few, however, who [underlined] do not. ALL NAVIGATORS [/underlined] are to make a regular practice of obtaining a D.R. position by use of broadcast winds every 30 minutes – and do not forget to use the “Past” w/v!! If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, alter course immediately and regain track. Now that 5 Group operate alone, concentration is even more important. Station Navigation Officers must have a concentrated drive in this direction, and ensure that all H 2 S navigators are making the fullest possible use of their equipment, and also that the remainder are making full use of broadcast w/v’s, by obtaining constant D.R. positions checks on ground speed etc.
The importance of timing was discussed in last month’s “News”. We would do well however, to reconsider this subject seriously. Accurate timekeeping is more important now than ever before. The largest discrepancies in timing occur on the return journey. This is due partly to the fact that aircraft do not all bomb at the same time and therefore do not leave the target at the same time. To overcome this it may be necessary to establish a concentration point on the return journey, situated close to the target. It is obvious, however, that many navigators make no effort to achieve good timing; they merely carry on and get there “sometime or other”. There are a few pilots who consistently fly at greater speeds than those laid down, and consequently on the return journey are some 10 or 15 minutes ahead of the main force, By so doing they give the Hun a few extra minutes warning of the route home, apart from exposing themselves to individual interception. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must watch for and stem any tendency for bad time-keeping. Sufficient navigational aids are now available to ensure that you are on track and on time. Now it is up to [underlined] YOU [/underlined].
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
April has been a very good month for broadcast w/v’s, particularly since the Group began operating alone. Windfinders have been doing an excellent job. On two occasions this month more than 300 w/v’s were received from aircraft – an excellent effort. Windfinders are transmitting all the winds they obtain. If you note a sudden change in the wind direction or speed, then provided you are satisfied with the fixes used, send back [missing word] w/v immediately.
There are one or two cases, however of navigators chosen as windfinders not realising their responsibility. One navigator for instance, stated that he just couldn’t be bothered to send back w/v’s!! Another said that sufficient w/v’s were being sent back by other aircraft, so he didn’t bother either. Those few navigators who are chosen as windfinders must realise that the whole Group is navigating on the w/v’s they transmit to Base. We cannot afford to have anyone “not bothering”. So buck up chaps, the vast majority of you are doing an excellent job, but those few, who just “don’t bother” – well -- !!
Many experiments have been carried out on French targets to ascertain the most accurate and practical method of obtaining a bombing W/V, which must of course, be a w/v prevailing in the target area. The experiments have proved that the most accurate method is to use a datum point in conjunction with the A.P.I. It is hoped therefore that this method will be adopted on all future operations where practical. Any suggestions or criticisms on this subject will be welcomed.
[Underlined] ASTRO NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
It has been decided that Astro can no longer be considered as an essential aid to navigation. Much time has been devoted to teaching this subject to Navigators, but the results obtained do not justify this training. Therefore this training time is to be devoted to improving the general standard of navigation. More time is to be devoted to plotting and computing two of the weakest links in navigation at the moment.
This decision for not mean that Astro is now “dead” and can be forgotten by all., It is still a standby aid, and all navigators should keep themselves in practice. There have been isolated incidents where a Polaris shot or an Astro fix have been the means of saving an aircraft. You may find yourselves in such a predicament one night – so be ready.
All Astrographs and sextants are to be withdrawn from aircraft, but those navigators who are considered by the Station Navigation Officer as competent Astro Navigators may draw the equipment from the station stores.
[Underlined] SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS [/underlined]
(i) Many station and squadron navigation officers find it impossible to spend as much time as they would like in supervising the work of a new navigator, and teaching him all the things he should know. To overcome this [underlined] East Kirkby [/underlined] put each navigator under the care of a very experienced navigator whose responsibility it is to supervise the other at briefing, to check his log and chart the next day, and to pass on to him all useful information and “tips”. In short the senior navigator acts as a “father” to the “sprog”.
This scheme is working extremely well, and should be adopted by all squadrons.
(ii) Many navigators cannot remember to check compasses regularly. [Underlined] Dunholme [/underlined] have overcome this by marking red or green dots on the face of the Astro watch. This serves as a constant reminder to the navigator. It is recommended that compasses be checked every 20 minutes, and therefore the dots on the face of the Astro watch should be spaced accordingly.
(iii) [Underlined] Metheringham [/underlined] suggest that since Astro will no longer be used to any great extent that astrograph films should be treated and used instead of Gee charts. The procedure would be to mark on the film the lattice lines in the same way as on the Gee Charts. The film or films applicable for each night’s operation would be placed in the aircraft before take-off.
There are two great advantages:-
(a) Fixes would be plotted directly on the plotting chart, thus saving time and reducing the risk of errors.
(b) It would not be necessary to carry a large supply of Gee Charts as at present.
[Underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined]
We welcome the arrival of the 3 P.F.F. squadrons to this Group. There is no doubt that we shall be able to pick up from them many useful ideas and suggestions. These will be passed on to Squadrons as soon as possible.
It is hoped that all station navigation Officers will make a determined effort to visit these 3 squadrons whilst they are attached to the Group.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s Summary that one A.P.I. was being modified by having a “miles flown counter” fitted. This has been done & has been tested by No.617 Squadron on three 6-hour cross countries, undertaken at operational height.
The results are as follows:-
Miles flown registered on counter = 2927
Miles flown calculated by navigator = 2892
Percentage error = 1.2
These tests have proved conclusively that the over reading error in the A.P.I. is negligible.
Permission is now being obtained from Bomber Command for the fitting of the “air miles flown” counter to all A.P.I’s. The manufacturers state however, that the modification may not be retrospective.
There is still considerable difference of opinion as to the best method of using the A.P.I. One third of the Group prefer to reset, the remainder prefer the “graphical” resetting method. It is not necessary to lay down any one method of use but Station Nav Officers must ensure that all Navigators use one of the above two methods.
Station navigations officers are to discuss the use of the A.P.I. with all navigators. Any suggestions on improvements or methods of resetting etc. should be tried out immediately and if successful passed to Group Headquarters.
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Put the switch on the heading Control unit to “Manual” and by means of the setting knob adjust the line of flight marker until it corresponds to the true course as indicated by the P.4 compass. Maintain the switch on “manual” until the D.R. compass is functioning correctly, when you should switch to “Auto”.
(Continued on page 4, Column1.)
GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
(Continued from page 3 column 3)
2. To obtain ground returns, tune in brightest responses on the P.P.I. by means of brightness, contrast, gain and tuning controls. To obtain correct height set range drum at zero and adjust the range marker ring by means of the height control until it is on the first ground returns.
3. (i) Check the pinpoint yourself, visually and by the aid of D.R.
(ii) If pinpoint correct, alter course immediately to regain track by 30° if more than 10 miles off track, by 15° if less than 10 miles off track.
4. You would lose the time in hand by flying small dog legs, preferably either side of track, and of a maximum duration of 2 minutes. Dog legs to be completed before reaching a position 50 miles from the target. Navigator must use his own discretion as to the most suitable area in which to lose time.
5. (i) France (ii) Germany (French name for AACHEN) (iii) Germany (iv) Belgium (v) Czecho-Slovakia (vi) Germany (Part of Berlin).
6. Stuttgart to London.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Quinn, DFC. Sqdn Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn to Stn Nav. Officer, Skellingthorpe.
F/Lt Cunningham 50 Sqdn promoted to Sqdn Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Waterkeyn Sqdn Nav. Officer 44 Sqdn to P.F.F.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, DFM. H2S Instructor, Metheringham to Sqdn. Nav. Officer, 44 Squadron.
P/O Blackham 49 Squadron to H2S Instructor, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Bone, DFC. H2S Instructor Swinderby to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Murphy Sqdn. Nav. Officer No. 467 Sqdn. to No. 61 Squadron (with W/Cdr Doubleday)
F/O Abbott 467 Squadron promoted to Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Bonefield Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No. 9 Squadron – Missing.
F/Lt. Jones Nav. Officer, 1660 Con. Unit to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 9 Squadron.
S/Ldr. Georgeson, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer No.83. Squadron.
S/Ldr Stevens, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No.97 Squadron.
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.R. HEAD D.S.O.
[/Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. CHATTERTON D.F.C.
P/O R.T. MANNING D.F.C.
P/O J. BRADBURN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. A. WARD D.F.M.
SGT. R. MACHIN D.F.M.
SGT. R.A. FRIARS D.F.M.
P/O SANDERS D.F.C.
SGT. R.H. HUDSON D.F.M.
P/O A.W. SHINN D.F.C.
F/L. D. MILLER, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O J.E.W. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. LLOYD D.F.C.
W/CDR. A.W. HEWARD D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.S. LUDFORD D.F.C.
F/O F.A. THOMAS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. FARMILOE D.S.O.
F/O S. HALLIWELL, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O D. PAULL D.F.C.
SGT. P. MCGABNEY D.F.M.
P/O D.C. FREEMAN D.F.C.
SGT. L. CHAPMAN C.G.M.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F. GRIFFITHS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT T.W.J. HALL D.F.M.
F/O R.F. ANDERSON D.F.C.
P/O G.S. MILNE D.F.C.
F/O J.B. LATHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR. J.R. BALMER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR G.L. CHESHIRE, D.S.O. & BAR 2nd Bar to D.S.O.
S/LDR J.L. MUNRO, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/L C.K. ASTBURY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
S/LDR J.C. MCCARTHY, D.S.O. D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O W.G. BICKLEY C.G.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W. KELLAWAY, D.S.O. Bar to D.S.O.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR A.S. JOHNSON D.S.O.
The following non-immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.J. KNELL D.F.C.
F/O R.H. SMITH D.F.C.
F/L J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C.
F/O J.N.G. WYATT D.F.C.
F/SGT. K.J. DAGNALL D.F.M.
F/SGT R.N. BROWN D.F.M.
SGT. E. SULLIVAN D.F.M.
SGT. E.R. BAKER D.F.M.
F/SGT. E.G.B. COLE D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.F. PARSONS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J. MURPHY D.F.M.
F/O D.C. ARMSTRONG D.F.C.
F/SGT. A. HOLDEN D.F.M.
W/O G.A. WILKIE D.F.C.
P/O G.G. WHITEHEAD D.F.C.
F/SGT J.R. OSWICK D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. J. CHALONER D.F.M.
SGT. (NOW P/O [sic] A.E. BOASE D.F.M.
P/O H.C. DARNTON D.F.C.
P/O G. SERGEEV D.F.C.
SGT. R. JEFCOCK D.F.M.
F/SGT (NOW P/O) W.A. MOORE D.F.M.
F/L D.J. BACON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.C.B. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O E.C. WEATHERSTONE D.F.C.
P/O A. BEALE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W. FEARN D.F.C.
F/L R.V. MUNDY D.F.C.
F/L R.K. EGGINS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.H. PULLMAN D.F.C.
[/Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J. SEARS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O R.E. KNIGHTS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.C. GREENHALGH D.F.C.
S/LDR A.R. DUNN D.F.C.
F/SGT. M.D.J. PARKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT. L. BENDING D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.J. FLOWER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.O.P. BEATTY D.F.C.
P/O D.E. FREEMAN D.F.C.
P/O H. THOMAS D.F.C.
P/O L.W. MITCHELL D.F.C.
P/O C.M. LAWES D.F.C.
F/SGT. P. PULLAR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. ROBERTSON D.F.C.
P/O W.T. LOFTUS D.F.C.
P/O W. BOOTH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. R.W. JAGGS D.F.M.
F/O H. McDONALD D.F.C.
F/O C.H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O N.H. KOBELKE D.F.C.
W/O H. McCABE D.F.C.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
April has provided another milestone on our road to the fullest use being made of radiations and echoes helping to get more bombs on the target. V.H.F. R/T has been fitted to two more squadrons – W/T has provided almost 100% communication between Controllers and Main Forces – the serviceability of all Radar devices has improved.
We are grateful to all those outside the Group who have helped us so readily – particularly 92 Group and the Signals Schools with their special drive to train Wireless Operators to read morse through severe interference and to tune their W/T sets with one eye on a C.R.T.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
A hearty welcome to all those faces, both old and new, that have appeared within the Group since our last edition.
April 1944 will long be remembered in the history of 5 Group as a month of hard work, which was crowned with the success it so richly deserved. Wireless Operators (Air) played their part with the energy and determination that is always to be found when there is an extra job to be done, and a large slice of the credit for our recent achievements is due to them.
As usual, the “Back Room Boys” at stations and in our own W/T cabin at Headquarters gladly threw their weight into the fray, and we are indebted to them. Their keenness has always been an inspiration.
Several points have been brought out this month, first and foremost being the quality of morse emanating from the Controllers’ aircraft. There has been a noticeable difference between operators, which, if all past suggestions re training had been acted upon, should never re-occur.
It has been stressed time and again that ANY ONE Wireless Operator (Air) may be called upon to transmit control signals and the only way to ensure perfection is by constant practice.
In this connection, it is pointed out that the Group exercise is an ideal medium for improvement of morse (although not even a whisper of control code must be allowed to pass through the other), and during the coming month the exercise frequency will be closely watched.
Signals Leaders, get this fact thoroughly instilled into your flock – “The ultimate success or failure of future operations may depend on the ability of a Wireless Operator to send or receive signals”. Display it in your training room, convert it into morse symbols, give morse tests regularly each week for we have reached a stage in the conflict where every minute spent in training counts one hundred fold in the air.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following is a combat report from 619 Squadron for the night of 22/23 April:-
“The first indication was a contact by W/Op. on Visual Monica Mark V at 1,800 yards… E/A dropped back out of gunner’s sight and W/Op reported it 800 yards astern down… E/A broke away to starboard and disappeared from gunner’s sight, W/Op again reported E/A 1100 yards, closing slowly…E/A disappeared and was reported once again by the W/Op.”
The outcome of this combat was one JU. 88 probably destroyed. Sgt. Brady, Wireless Operator (Air) deserves the highest praise for his reporting.
You see, it can be done, and when handled in the proper manner not only SAVES YOUR AIRCRAFT but probably destroys a Hun, which reduces the total that can be put in the air against you on the following operation.
Once again, there is only one path to take to success, and that path is labelled TRAINING. Constant practice with your Early Warning devices will pay handsome dividends.
Points for Signals Leaders to include in their “daily ration” to the Section:-
(i) Spare Groups No.12 and 15 in CD.0250.
(ii) X114 and X623 are still being used by some careless operators.
(iii) Log keeping could improve (we have seen some good logs this month).
(iv) More practice – or has that been mentioned somewhere before?
F/O Cook, D.F.M., has gone to No.9 Sqdn., as Signals Leader.
F/Lts Gronow and Chambers, D.F.C. are the Signals Leaders of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons respectively, who are to be congratulated in accepting such a sudden change of procedure and dovetailing into the 5 Group system with the minimum of trouble.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
Facts and Figures about Failures
Out of a total of 2034 operational sorties during the month, 34 Signals failures were reported. Although these represent an increase over last month’s figure, this can be attributed almost entirely to the rise in Category 4 failures (miscellaneous). It is again stressed that Category 4 failures are most unsatisfactory. Most of the failures in this Category are of the type “Equipment reported u/s. O.K. on ground test. No fault found.” Every effort must be made to pin down any reported failure to some definite cause.
An investigation into failures in this Group over the past year reveals some interesting results. Apart from an unfortunate month in February, the percentage of failures shows a slight decrease over the year. This unfortunate February figure coincides with a large percentage of miscellaneous failures as well as a large percentage of T.1154/R.1155 failures. Category I (Equipment) failures show a general tendency to rise during the year. The other categories (2 and 3) have a see saw effect and no general conclusion can be made.
Intercom. failures over the year show a pronounced tendency to decrease, while T.1154/R.1155 failures show a corresponding pronounced increase. The reason for the former can be put down to the energetic drive which Signals Officers have kept up in their Squadron Maintenance Sections against this type of fault. The reason for the latter is not hard to find. During the past year the W/T installation has come into its own again and is an essential piece of equipment for the success of current operations. Whereas in the past unserviceability of the of the main W/T installation may have gone by unnoticed, now it cannot escape report.
[Underlined] THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH…. [/underlined]
Authority has finally been given for the removal of S.D.A. equipment from all Lancaster aircraft in 5 Group. This event has fortunately coincided with the partial introduction of V.H.F. (T.R.1143) installation. Command have agreed in principle that the fitting of V.H.F. is a necessity for the success of the type of operation now being undertaken by 5 Group, and every endeavour is being made to find sufficient equipment to fit all 5 Group squadrons. Careful thought has been given to the possibility of utilising the S.B.A. connectors as a small contribution to ease the very tight V.H.F. equipment production. The only small saving envisioned is the main receiver aerial and lead in; the length of the aerial will, of course, have to be shortened.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Last month saw a great improvement in the serviceability of all Radar equipment. However, before anyone relaxes and sticks his chest out, it should be remembered that the advent of warm, dry weather was a contributory cause. In addition, many sorties have been at lower altitudes than usual, which would eliminate many of those non-reproduceable faults.
(Continued on page 6, col.1)
Then and Now – and how!!
[Underlined] Then [/underlined] In Ancient times, the D.S.O.
Performed his duties staid and slow.
He did his routine work by day,
And dozed his duty nights away,
Untroubled save for threats of violence
‘Gainst those who busted wireless silence!
[Underlined] Now [/underlined] The aethor’s full of legal dope
Which we receive, (at least we hope!).
It’s also full of surplus dits
Transmitted by the brainier twits;
While brighter souls – misguided clots –
Originate redundant dots!
Amendments to a basic plan
Are never ending, and unman
The D.S.O. who, frantic, chases
Vital gen in awkward places;
And rubs – with bitter rueful tear –
His Port, or Telephonic, Ear!
Poor chap, how like a sponge his brain,
Which, like a sponge, he’ll learn to squeeze;
And fill it daily once again
With brand new gen – with practiced ease!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. APRIL, 1944. NO.21 PAGE 5.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from Page 8, col.3)
Having however, realised the existence of those contributory causes, it is possible to say that a considerable increase in serviceability was due to more efficient maintenance and manipulation. It is sincerely hoped that this improvement will continue.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 767 sorties was flown with H.2.S, with 99 defects for a serviceability rate if 87.87. This is an increase of 10% over March. With an extra effort, and the weather on our side it could be made over 90% in May.
There has been a noticeable drop in filament transformer failures, largely due to the weather and height conditions. It is not expected that we will see the end of filament transformer breakdowns until the new type is introduced. The same is true for the 2000v condensers.
The expansion of H 2 S training in Conversion Units should go a long way towards eliminating the alarming number of manipulation failures. Manipulation and maintenance failures can be eliminated by constant training.
The arrival of 83 and 97 Squadrons has given us a taste of equipment to come. These Squadrons have a few Mark III sets and every one is very pleased with their performance. To date, the serviceability of the equipment is 92.8% which is very satisfactory for a new set. In this connection a debt is owed to 8 Group for having pioneered so well and eliminated most of the teething troubles. We can now look forward to a general changeover to Mark III with confidence in our ability to maintain and use it.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond was 86% serviceable, an increase of 8% over March. This increase is of little value of W/Ops are not fully trained in the use of this equipment. The necessity for the Navigator – W/Op co-ordination cannot be overemphasised. Efforts have been made to reduce the minimum range below its present 600 – 800 yards. These have been unsuccessful, but it is believed the “back room boys” are now on the right track, so an answer should be forthcoming soon.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
As usual, Gee is top man when it comes to serviceability. In 96.5% of sorties, Gee was 100& serviceable. This reflects credit on both maintenance personnel and navigators, as it is an increase of 1.2% over last month. Gee could be made almost 100% serviceable; those last few percent are hard to get, but keep trying. The next few months of dry weather should give ample opportunity to break all records.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK IIIA [/underlined]
The expression “Ever Upwards” could be fittingly applied to Mark IIIA serviceability. This Group has watched Monica grow from an idea to a headache when the word “Switchmotor” nearly drove a Radar mechanic mad, and now to a reliable and efficient tail warning device. April serviceability was 91.6% out of 534 sorties, an increase of 1.3% on March.
An examination of combat reports provides innumerable examples of Monica’s capabilities in the hands of a trained operator. The fitting of 10 aircraft at 5 L.F.S. should relieve squadrons of a great deal of preliminary training.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK V [/underlined]
Another 5 Group “baby” (Lulu to some) is growing up, after a rather shaky beginning. Out of 299 sorties flown, 259 were trouble free for a serviceability rate of 86.7% - an increase of 5%. Now that the initial teething snags are over, it should be possible to make Mark V follow the footsteps of IIIA and push serviceability to 90%.
TACTICS
[Underlined] PRECISION ATTACKS [/underlined]
The big step made this month towards perfection of target marking, with its detailed methods of target illumination, initial marking, assessing, backing up, and controlling the force, although introducing many new ideas and problems, has brought little change in basic tactics. Indeed more attention than ever must be directed to tactics, particularly to precise orders and instructions given out for each operation. Special attention must be paid to timing and track keeping, adherence to allocated heights, compliance with instructions from the Controller and an exact knowledge of the marking method. These are dealt with separately.
[Underlined] TIMING AND TRACK KEEPING [/underlined]
The force employed on each target is now normally very much smaller than that in the past. This means that greater accuracy is needed in timing and keeping on track. It also means that if you stray a few miles off track with force of 150 aircraft or less, you are more likely to be singled out by G.C.I. than if you stray the same distance with a force of 800aircraft. Timing is vital. Only a limited number of target markers are dropped, and unless all aircraft are ready to bomb on time, these may be obscured by smoke or blown out by the bombs that drop before yours, and in any case may be difficult to locate.
[Underlined] HEIGHT BAND [/underlined]
The allocation of height bands to Bases, which means that each crew must fly at a given height, has been introduced for several reasons and entirely for your own protection. Firstly, it is intended to protect the force against a collision risk, mainly in the target area, where it may be necessary to do dog legs. Secondly, as a countermeasure against barrage flak. The Hun must now put up the same number of rounds into a very much larger area than before, thus decreasing the chance of individual aircraft being hit. Thirdly, combined with extremely accurate timing, the length of the stream can be very much shorter, and therefore less liable to interception by radio controlled fighters. To achieve the full advantage of this scheme, it must be accompanied by a drive by each Captain to make sure that Window is always thrown out correctly, particularly OVER THE TARGET AREA. If this is done, then there is no reason why crews at the lower heights need have any concern. It is, however, their duty to tighten up the normal crew search procedure and to be aware of fighters which may attack from above.
[Underlined] CONTROLLER’S INSTRUCTIONS [/underlined]
It is essential to comply strictly with the Controller’s instructions throughout the attack, and his decisions should never be questioned in the air. A wrongly timed load of incendiaries dropped whilst the Mosquitos are examining the roof tops to assess the marking, may upset the whole routine and possibly divert the main weight of the attack.
[Underlined] TARGET MARKING METHODS [/underlined]
All crews must be quite clear before leaving the briefing room of the colour of the spot-fires to be used, and the details of the controlling code. It doesn’t pay to be doubtful after you have taken off. You must be ready to carry out orders given over the target without hesitation.
(Continued in col.2)
TACTICS (Continued from Col.3)
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The fruits of good training in tail warning devices are borne out by the following Combat Report. Each month there are many similar instances of fighters which have been beaten off because the correct drill has been carried out. Each month there are also instances of fighter damage sustained, and the fighter that did it is not picked up until after the attack. It pays to practice the reporting code at least once a day!
“First indication was contact by W/Optr. on Visual Monica Mk.V, 1,800 yards, Port Quarter down. Pilot altered course and E/A followed and closed in to 800 yards. W/Optr. ordered corkscrew to Port, and at the same time E/A opened fire and scored hits on tail unit on Lancaster “G”. R/G sighted E/A at 500 yards, Port beam down 30° and opened fire. E/A fired again and missed Lancaster. W/Optr. reported E/A closing in slowly and R/G sighted it at 500 yards astern level. R/G opened fire and E/A broke away to Starboard Quarter up. Hits claimed on E/A which disappeared from Gunner’s sight. W/Optr. again reported E/A on starboard quarter up at 1,100 yards and closing slowly. Rear and Mid-Upper Gunners sighted E/A simultaneously at 500 yards, Starboard Quarter level. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits on E/A which broke away at 300 yards, diving to Port Quarter down with smoke pouring from both engines.”
The Station Commander’s comments are self-explanatory: “I consider that Mark V Monica saved this crew. The Wireless Operator’s commentary was excellent, and the crew co-operation of a very high standard.”
FLYING CONTROL (Continued from page 15)
play a part in the final choice. From the condition of the airfield right down to such small items as the cleanliness of the flare path party room will be reviewed, so if you want to top the bill S.F.C.O’s, start cracking the whip NOW.
[Underlined] BLIND LANDING EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
It has been decided by this Group to remove all S.B.A. equipment from operational aircraft and it is hoped that in the not too distant future other and better means will be introduced. The first piece of equipment which we hope to get is a P.P.I. which will be installed in the watch tower and on which will be indicated the positions of all aircraft in the circuit.
Other equipment such as Radar Landing Beam, coupled with a Radar G.P.I. Radar Homing Beacons will all follow in due course. These will naturally give Flying Control Officers more work and more responsibilities but with the increased safety of aircraft this work and the short training required will be well repaid.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
April has been a most satisfying month for the bombing crews of 5 Group. Numerous precision attacks have been carried out with a great measure of success. The front pages of the Daily Press made public the achievements of 5 Group when they printed the after-bombing photographs of the marshalling yards at JUVISY, South of Paris. Equal success rewarded the attacks at TOURS and LA CHAPPELLE. The raid on MUNICH was successful, and a fair measure of success resulted from the attacks on BRUNSWICK and SCHWEINFURT. Finally, further small factories near OSLO, BORDEAUX and CLERMONT FERRAND are now devastated.
[Underlined] HOW HAS ALL THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? [/underlined]
Firstly, of course, most credit is due to the marking success of 54 Base. The next main contribution to the Group’s success has been the intense practice bombing carried out by the squadrons for the last year.
Owing to the very limited time available for bombing training at Conversion Units the final co-ordination of the bombing team has to be carried out on the squadrons. Much credit is due to the Conversion Units for their efforts, and particular praise is due to the Lancaster Finishing School who have elevated the importance of crew practice bombing to the extent of averaging between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in all bombing exercises over the last three months!!!
However, the crews are inexperienced with both aircraft and bombsight on arrival in the squadrons and intensive training is essential to bring them into line with the precision our operations require.
[Underlined] THE MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT [/underlined]
This bombsight has proved its worth. Although it is by no means a perfect sight, it is true that provided it is expertly maintained by the Instrument Sections and carefully handled by the Air Bombers, it can put bomb loads on to a target.
Air Bombers should make sure that their bombsights [underlined] are [/underlined] serviceable. It is the most important individual item of equipment that your aircraft carried, and as such should be the most carefully maintained. Its best test is on the practice bombing range – 6 bombs aimed accurately on different headings should produce a CLOSE GROUP. If not, then SOMETHING is wrong – report it to the instrument section – help them to find out what is wrong and then test it again. It may not always be possible to get this test exercise in the air – if not you must do the next best – carry out the exhaustive N.F.T. check.
In every P.R.U. picture there are sticks off the main concentration – it is almost certain that these sticks are wide because they were aimed with an unserviceable bombsight – are they yours? Were you absolutely certain that on Juvisy, La Chappelle, Tours, Brunswick, Munich or Schweinfurt, your bombsight was functioning correctly – when did you last do practice bombing with it – did you give is a thorough check during your N.F.T. or Ground Check? Did you??
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined]
O.R.S. at Bomber Command have conducted a painstaking analysis of 5 Group’s practice and operational bombing. They report that
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING [/underlined]
(ERRORS IN YARDS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training achievements by Squadron and Conversion Units]
[Underlined] THE BEST RESULTS FOR APRIL. [/underlined]
In previous months all crew errors at 20,000 ft. of less than 150 yards were listed in this column However, in April [underlined] 103 [/underlined] such results were obtained and it is therefore impossible to record them all. The crew errors of less than 100 yards are shown this month but it is confidently expected that in future space will only permit inclusion of results of less than 75 yards. It is possible – the list below proves it – therefore it must be done!!!
Squadron or Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 ft
9 S/Ldr. Keir F/Sgt. Coates P/O. Lewis 54 yards
44 F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 99 yards
49 F/Lt. Adams F/Sgt. Underwood S/Ldr. Evans 84 yards
F/O. Edwards F/O W. Smith F/Sgt. Cavanagh 83 yards
50 P/O. Lundy F/O. Bignall F/Sgt. Jordan 90 yards
P/O. McFarlin Sgt. Ball Sgt. Elliott 75 yards
F/O. Botha Sgt. Thompson F/O. Bishton 95 yards
S/Ldr. McLeod Sgt. Price F/Lt. Cunningham 80 yards
61 P/O. Ascott F/Sgt. May F/O. Ward 98 yards
F/O. Jeavons Sgt. Graham F/Sgt. Dow 93 yards
F/O. Paul P/O. Cook P/O. Griffin 40 yards
W/Cdr. Stidolph F/O. Aley F/O. Dyer 71 yards
F/Sgt. Woolnough F/O. Ravenscroft F/O. Haggerstone 71 yards
467 F/Lt. Marshall F/Sgt. Borman F/O. Easton 96 yards
619 P/O. Roberts F/Sgt. DeViell F/Sgt. Lott 43 yards
P/O. Saunders F/O. Rosenfield F/Sgt. Greacen 84 yards
630 F/Lt. Roberts F/Sgt. Jeffery F/Sgt. Davies 75 yards
S/Ldr. Calvert F/Sgt. Hogg F/O. Beaudoin 95 yards
Sgt. Mallinson Sgt. Pomeroy Sgt. Nassau 73 yards
F/O. Joblin F/O. Beeson F/O. Lambton 80 yards
1654 F/O. McLaughlan Sgt. Leeson F/O. Phillips 90 yards
F/Sgt. Pethick Sgt. Wallace F/O. Baldwin 82 yards
P/O. Richards Sgt. Buckby Sgt. Fazackerley 93 yards
F/O. Long F/O. De Sautels Sgt. Thomas 88 yards
1661 Sgt. Marsh Sgt. Carr ? ? 98 yards
5 LFS F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 98 yards
617 F/O. Knights F/Sgt. Bell ) The best two 49 yards
S/Ldr. Munro F/Lt. Astbury ) exercises 53 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
APRIL has produced the first maximum entry for the Competition since its inception in June, 1943. Some excellent results have been submitted and hearty congratulations are due to 61 Squadron for their outstanding exercises. The results are as follows:-
PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS
1st 61 Squadron – 55 Yards 1st 50 Squadron – 59 Yards.
2nd 619 Squadron – 63 Yards 2nd 61 Squadron – 84 Yards.
3rd 49 Squadron – 71 Yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 96 Yards.
4th 50 Squadron – 80 Yards 4th 630 Squadron – 98 Yards
5th 44 Squadron – 81 Yards 5th 463 Squadron – 111 Yards.
6th (630 Squadron – 90 Yards 6th 44 Squadron – 125 Yards.
(106 Squadron – 90 Yards 7th 57 Squadron – 136 Yards.
8th 207 Squadron - 101 Yards 8th 467 Squadron – 141 Yards.
9th 9 Squadron – 112 Yards 9th 49 Squadron – 152 Yards.
10th 463 Squadron – 116 Yards 10th 106 Squadron – 163 Yards.
11th 467 Squadron – 125 Yards 11th 9 Squadron – 167 Yards.
12th 57 Squadron – 135 Yards 12th 207 Squadron – 188 Yards.
Group Captain Butler (R.A.F. Dunholme Lodge) produced a token cup to celebrate 44 Squadron’s victory in March. It is hoped that 44 will pass on the token to 61 Squadron.
It is noteworthy that the three Squadrons of 52 Base are all in the first five.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Only two entries were received this month:-
1st F/Lt. FARARA (630 Sqdn) – 85 yds.
2nd F/Lt. McDONALD (61 Sqdn) – 160 yds.
Congratulations F/Lt. Farara!!
(Continued from Page [sic]
our errors on both are similar – that means that 5 Group Bombing Teams achieve substantially the same results on German targets that they obtain at Wainfleet, Epperstone, Owthorpe and Bassingham Ranges, therefore, it merely remains to improve our results on the “home” ranges in order to obtain more hits on the “away” targets.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 106 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Wake DFC) reports that their descent from top position in the Bombing Competition is only temporary and is due to their best crews finishing about the same time. Other Squadrons are warned that 106 intend to be back at the top by the end of May.
[Underlined] 44 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Lowry) have constructed an effective Mk.XIV mock-up as follows:-
1. No suction used – Gyros are counter-balanced in Sighting Head and Computor.
2. All electric motor is used to obtain pressure.
3 Airspeed and Height operation is obtained by connecting two external sylphan tubes to the static and pitot heads of Computor Unit. Attached to sylphan tubes are adjustable thumb screws to enable airspeed and height indicators to be carried throughout their range.
This go ahead Bombing Section have also introduced the use of Navigator’s Log Books (an idea borrowed from 5 L.F.S Syerston) in which are posted all permanent information such as Bomb T.V’s Conversion of True to Indicated Wind speed tables, etc. and is also used to carry target maps and operational bomb load instructions.
[Underlined] 1661 Con. Unit. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Brewer, DFC.) have completed the installation of Mk. XIV bombsight complete, in the A.M.B.T. A really first-class job by all concerned!!!
[Underlined] 61 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. MacDonald) Competition winners for April, report that W/Cdr. STIDOLPH and crew set the pace with a Crew Error of 71 yds. This aroused competitive spirit to a marked degree in the Squadron. The following result was obtained:-
Crew Error ar 20,000 ft. – 40 yards
Navigator’s Error – 25 yards
Pilot & Air Bomber’s Error – 37 yards
The crew were:- Pilot – F/O PAUL
Air Bomber – P/O COOK
Navigator – P/O GRIFFIN
[Underlined] 9 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DFC.) reports the following excellent method of plotting crater positions from night photographs.
Plot the centre of the photograph on tracing paper pinned on to the target illustration. Mark the heading accurately from the compass rose on the tracing. Calculate distance between centre of the bombing photograph and centre of bomb craters commencing with position of bomb and flash release. The distance from this position to the centre of the photograph is the ground speed of the aircraft in feet per second multiplied by the flash setting; a deduction being allowed for the 5° aft tilt of the camera.
Forward travel of the bombs can be noted in A.P.1730A.Vol.1. to which must be added or subtracted the distance due to the wind component.
Plot this distance forward along track on the tracing paper and the approximate position of the centre of the stick is recorded. The stick length is known and should be drawn to scale. This method if accurate provided that:-
(i) the aircraft maintains heading and attitude from bomb release to explosion of flash (this can be checked by study of pre-bombing frames on the film)
(ii) There is only a small error due to cross trail - allowance can be made for this if necessary.
9 Squadron have found that their plots using this method are accurate to within 100 yards by subsequent comparisons with P.R.U. photographs.
[Underlined] 617 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/L Astbury, D.F.C) reports the following outstanding exercise:-
F/L Clayton, Pilot, F/O Watson, Air Bomber, carried out an application exercise from 20,000 ft. And averaged 73 yards. Two of the six bombs were DIRECT HITS!!
[Underlined] “G”N” [sic] FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
(I) [Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] – plotted 5,492 bombs aimed by 1,044 aircraft during April. Thus in one month 28 tons of practice bombs have been dropped at this range.
(ii) [Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] – plotted 990 bombs aimed by 200 aircraft.
(iii) [Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] – plotted 916 bombs aimed by 147 aircraft.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. What would happen to the Mk. XIV Bombsight if the Port Inner engine had to be feathered?
2. How would you use the Quadrant Plate and Pointer at 13,000 feet?
3. How could you jettison a load of incendiaries “SAFE” with reasonable certainty?
4. If the Pilot operated the Jettison toggle what would happen to your Jettison bars and what extra action is necessary to put them back to “SAFE”?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Abbott [/underlined] is now Bombing Leader at 49 Squadron. It is noted that 49 moved from hitherto unplaced position in the Competition up to [underlined] 3rd [/underlined] in April.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Stoney, DFC. [/underlined] (1660 Con.Unit) has moved to 97 Squadron for his 2nd tour of operations. Good Luck!
[Underlined] F/O Lowans, DFM. [/underlined] has moved from 49 Squadron to 54 Base where he is attached for Bombing Leader duties.
[Underlined] F/O Tibbs (207 Squadron) [/underlined] obtained “B” category on No. 79 Bombing Leaders Course.
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (619 Squadron) [/underlined] and F/O Martins (106 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on No. 80 Course.
[Underlined] P/O Ball, DFM. (1660 Con. Unit) [/underlined] has been attached to Headquarters, Bomber Command for Bombing Analysis duties.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place in H2S training during the month, the most notable being:-
(i) H2S training has been expanded at the Conversion Units to cover 12 crews per course, to meet increased demands of the squadrons.
(ii) To standardise training throughout the Group, a Ground Training Syllabus has been issued outlining the minimum amount of ground training to be carried out by H2S crews, whether trained on squadrons or Conversion Units.
(iii) Greater emphasis is being placed on the Navigational aspect of H2S to increase further the reliability of fixes and winds obtained.
A concentrated drive is being made by all Instructors to improve D.R. navigation by H2S, to ensure that failures due to lack of confidence and inability to interpret the P.P.I. are things of the past. The tendency to slur over H2S navigation must be overcome as a successful H2S bombing run is largely dependent on a correct navigational approach to the target. This does not mean however that blind bombing is to be relegated to a mere fraction of the training time; on the contrary a large part of training can be devoted to blind bombing technique when crews are able to navigate accurately by H2S and ensure that the target is reached at the correct time.
Manipulation failures still continue to be reported and every effort must be made by operators to prevent such failures being attributed to their neglect. Now that the Air Bomber is required to sit in the navigator’s compartment and manipulate the H2S equipment, manipulation failures should be on the downward path. Two heads are usually better than one and with the list of H2S faults and remedies, one of them should at least have some knowledge of the symptoms and their correction. The impression conveyed is that many of these manipulation failures are due to lack of understanding of the equipment. The Technical Radar Officer is always willing to part with “gen” providing questions are asked. Don’t be afraid to worry these officers because in the long run by asking questions about your equipment you are probably saving their time and yours.
Leica cameras are now being used to photograph the P.P.I. on training flights and several remarkable prints have been obtained. particularly [sic] on Edinburgh and London. Two squadrons are now equipped and it is eventually hoped to obtain further cameras for the remainder. With the advent of P.P.I. photography blind bombing can be carried out irrespective of cloud cover and accurate results obtained. Much information can also be obtained on the definition of built up areas and it is hoped eventually to relate individual bright responses with definite structures in these built up areas. It is therefore essential that the camera operator fills in the photographic interrogation report in a concise and accurate manner, enabling much valuable information to be obtained for use of H2S crews on future operations.
The results of the blind bombing competition have now been received and are published below. All crews who participated are to be congratulated on the excellent results obtained.
[Underlined] Final Order Captain Squadron Av. Error. in miles. [/underlined]
1 P/O Rogers 630 .33
2 F/S Canever 57 .38
3 P/O Manning 44 .42
4 F/L Smith 57 .46
5 P/O Ross 57 .46
6 P/O Higgs 44 .48
7 F/O Bayley 57 .49
8 F/L Healy, DFC. 49 .60
9 F/O Penman 106 .64
10 P/O Shinn 49 .65
11 P/O Jones, J. 49 .66
12 F/O Thomas 57 .87
13 F/L Kellaway, DSO. 630 1.12
14 F/L Roberts, DFC. 630 1.15
One point arising out of blind bombing on H2S which has been noticeable on operations during the last month is that many H2S operators who claim to mark blind are unduly influenced by the markers showing a lack of faith in the instrument. Complete confidence can only be built up by sufficient training in which advantageous use should be made of the synthetic trainer.
Talking about synthetic trainers, East Kirkby have introduced a modification to the trainer which gives correct crystal current movement and a tuning position, thus enabling operators to practice manipulation on the trainer. It is hoped to introduce this modification to other trainers in the Group as soon as the technical details are settled.
This month we welcome 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons into the Group. They have brought with them new equipment and methods and it is felt that as pioneers in H2S much can be learnt from them. It is hoped that all H2S Instructors will take the opportunity of visiting these squadrons and utilising the information gained to the benefit of their respective units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee range has improved considerably during the month and many navigators obtained fixes over targets attacked. However, there is still a tendency to neglect Gee when jamming appears.
Some navigators had opportunities of using the new North Eastern chain this month with gratifying results, many fixes being obtained further than 8° East, and off chart coverage. Providing navigators continue to give reports on the reception they receive outside the limits of the present lattice charts, something can be done to produce additional charts.
Coding has not caused any confusion, and the blinking of the “A” pulse appears to have been a success. There is one point, however, which must be borne in mind by all navigators and wireless operators regarding the use of coding in distress signals. All fixes passed for transmission during distress procedure must give the true lattice line values and therefore the coding figures must be deducted by the navigator from the indicator readings prior to passing the fix to the Wireless Operator. Watch this or you will be plotted miles away from your true position.
Manipulation failures are still too high and these can be overcome only by constant practice in setting up and correction of faults. Many navigators to whom manipulations faults have been attributed are still changing over alternator plugs with the set switched on resulting in fuses being blown. When changing the R. F. Units or alternator plugs, Gee must be switched OFF.
The following is an extract from a report on Gee which should be of interest to all navigators:-
“There seems to be a popular idea with navigators that XF’s necessarily give extra range. This is based on the fact that when they were first introduced, they gave extra ranges before the enemy had time to organise counter measures. The main advantage of XF’s is not to give extra range but to make the enemy spread his jamming over more than one frequency, tending to make it less intense on any one frequency”
Another point is that many navigators are using stud settings and RF Units which have not been detailed for the operation in question. There is even a case this month of a navigator using a chain which was not detailed, and he claimed far greater range though admitted the fixes were unpotable.
(Continued on page 14, col.2)
Link Trainer
The nil returns for 630, 617 and 627, and the very low return for 57 Squadron were due to the absence of Link Trainers at East Kirkby and Woodhall. Machines were, however, installed at these Stations at the end of the month and it is hoped these Squadrons will make up the deficiency by an increased effort next month. A revised Link Trainer Syllabus is being drafted and should be available to Units by the middle of the coming month. The amount of Link done on the squadrons still warrants improvement and it is hoped that the new Syllabus will assist in this.
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron and Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoons]
April, and the first few days of May, saw the last of the two Group Competitions – the Lancaster Seven-a-Side Rugger Trophy, and the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] The Lancaster Seven-a-Side Competition [/underlined] has had a very mixed reception. Although designed on a Group inter-squadron basis, to include every crew in each Squadron, and having a system of points that favoured squadrons fielding the greatest number of teams, no squadron outside 53 Base even began the competition. But within 53 Base it was an amazing success. 86 teams took part, and the resulting increase in fitness, and the keenness that developed, fully repaid the efforts of A/Cdre. Hesketh who originated the competition. Next season this is going to be one of the Rugger high-lights, with a smashing Boxing Day final meeting of all the squadron finalists, followed by “noggins for all” round “Ye Olde Yule Logge”.
[Underlined] The Matz Soccer Cup. [/underlined] Coningsby crowned a successful soccer season by beating Winthorpe 2 – 0 in the Matz final on the Lincoln City ground on 6th May. In their semi-final game, Coningsby met the Group “giants” – Scampton – at Waddington, and emerged successfully after a terrific duel. Winthorpe had to play three games with Metheringham before they got to the semi-final stage. Then they defeated Skellingthorpe 3 – 2, after being 2 goals down with only twenty minutes to go. The final was worthy of the competition, and produced a clean, hard fought duel, perfectly even in the first half, but with the Coningsby forwards more dangerous than their opposites in the second. Winthorpe goalie and backs are to be congratulated on their fight, they certainly kept the flag flying. Coningsby’s first goal came from a penalty, their second from a beautifully placed header into the corner of the net in classic “corner kick” style. Coningsby were minus their professional left winger, Colinridge, but his successor ably filled the bill, and the forwards were presented with many openings by a clever half back division. After the game, Mrs. Cochrane presented the cup in the stand, and the A.O.C., who had been a delighted spectator, congratulated the teams in the dressing rooms on their splendid show. Later the teams had tea together in Lincoln, and later again the Cup was christened with the traditional quart of “old and mild”, we hope.
[Underlined] The Wines Rugger Trophy. [/underlined] Dunholme are hot on the scent of this “pot”, and it will take a good side to stop them. Winthorpe are in the remaining semi-final with Waddington. It is proposed to polish off the semi-final and the final before the 14th, leaving King Willow in peaceful possession.
[Underlined] 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. [/underlined] East Kirkby reached the final by beating the redoubtable Swinderby on their own ground. It now remains for Metheringham to play Waddington and the winner to meet Scampton, to provide the other finalist. This competition must be polished off quickly, before hardening grounds make the ball a little too lively for all but the steel shinned types. This new competition has proved very successful and should provide a most interesting final.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played eight Station matches, during the month, of which they lost only one, 2 – 1 to R.A.F. Ingham. In the semi-final replay of the Lincoln and District Amateur Cup they defeated R.A.F. Wickenby 3 – 0. In the final with Lincoln Rovers on City ground they played magnificently for a 5 – 4 victory, finishing the game with only nine men. Now they are all out for the Lincoln and District League Championship. They have had a most brilliant season.
DUNHOLME had six games, of which they won four. Their two losses were to Scampton – 1 – 5, and to Headquarters 5 Group 3 – 4. Eight inter-section games were played off.
FISKERTON laid out two soccer pitches during the month and gained a considerable impetus in ensuing activity. The station team won its last three Lincoln League games. A combined league and knock-out competition is running with eleven teams competing. 49 Squadron has three teams entered. Two games per day is common; B.A.T. Flight v Echelon have already fought three pointless duels, playing extra time in the last two games. Which shows what a new pitch can do.
BARDNEY have a very strong team, and won six out of their seven April games, including Coningsby and Skellingthorpe, Matz winners and semi-finalists, among their victims. They challenge all comers to do battle! and they are keen, they even cycled to a match – and won!!
METHERINGHAM were unlucky in having three station games cancelled. They played three losing to Digby and 373 Battery, Woodhall, but beating Woodhall Spa 5 – 2. Inter-section fixtures (league and knock-out) produced 14 games, Squadron Armoury, the League champs, being knocked out by R.A.F. Regiment.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is building up steadily, the laying out of a pitch having provided a much needed stimulus. After winning the opening game against Wigsley, 3 – 1, on the new pitch, the Group lost to Skellingthorpe away. Six games yielded four wins, a draw with 93 M.U. the old rivals, and one defeat. In early May, there was much creaking of joints when an officer’s team emerged minus winter woollies and held the Group side to a mere 3 – 1 triumph.
RUGBY
DUNHOLME, finalists in the Wines Trophy, have a powerful side. They defeated Swinderby 8 – 0 in the Wines’ second round, defeated 2 A.A. Command School both away and at home, and Scampton 7 – 6 on the latter’s ground. They are all out for the Wines Trophy and beat Fiskerton 27 – 0 in the semi-final.
METHERINGHAM with a greatly improved side held Waddington to a 9 – 0 victory, and win one and lost one with R.A.F. Digby.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON certainly got in plenty of practice, with eight April games. They won five, knocking Syerston out of the Group Trophy, their victories also included Ingham, Faldingworth and 5 Group. They are in a strong position for the Trophy competition.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is most active. Through the generosity of Swinderby they hold “home” games there pending completion of their Morton Hall pitch. During April they played six games winning two, with one draw. East Kirkby proved their downfall in the Group Trophy. A friendly three game duel with Swinderby has produced one win each and one draw. It is hoped to continue hockey, even if only in inter-section “sixes” throughout the summer.
[Underlined] GENERAL JOTTINGS. [/underlined]
SOFT-BALL 0 Fiskerton have a team in the Lincoln area league. Metheringham are also running a team, playing in a Digby League. 5 Group H.Q. have a willing, if unskilled, nucleus who like to “play ball”. There should be some scope for friendly games within the Group.
TENNIS and BOWLING – Bardney and Metheringham are lucky in having village facilities available, and the games are in full swing.
CYCLING is popular in Bardney. The tough kind with a “cow’s horn” handlebar and a “tail up” racing crouch. Any ex “roadmen” are welcomed to compete in a friendly “25”. A perimeter track is the proposed venue.
CRICKET – The great concern of every captain’s heart is the pitch. The sacred sward where worms and birds both “fear to tread” is THE FOCUS OF ALL CRICKETERS THOUGHTS. May we remind stations that it will be appreciated if they will keep to the date schedule of the Group competition, and not insist on a too Velvet like patch before playing their first round.
WAR SAVINGS
FISKERTON are to be congratulated on another fine effort in National Savings this month. Last month’s increase of 143% to £884 has again been increased by 34% to £1185.
FISKERTON will doubtless be only too pleased to pass on details of their fruitful methods to other Stations – if only to get a bit of competition!!
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) Percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTALS 6309.13.4.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RECORD [/underlined]
The month of April showed a welcome drop in the number of accidents in the Group compared with March, but though there was a large increase in total flying hours, this accident rate did not improve in the same ratio, and is still well below the Group’s best standards.
In all 40 aircraft were damaged during the month, 19 of which were classed as “avoidables”. The remainder were classed as technical failures or obscure. The total of “avoidables” may be subject to alteration as one or two accidents occurring at the end of the month have not been fully investigated and are not included. At the moment they appear to be technical failures or entirely obscure.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE [/underlined]
The details of the avoidable accidents are as follows:-
Ground collision (including taxying) – 6
Swings … 2
Heavy landings …2
Low flying … 2
Overshoots landing … 2
Mid air collisions … 2
Errors of judgement landing … 1
Other errors of judgement … 2
TOTAL … 19
51 Base accounted for 11 and Squadrons 8.
[Underlined] M.T. COLLISIONS & TAXYING [/underlined]
There were again two M.T. accidents this month. In spite of strenuous efforts to stamp out this type of accident it still recurs. Next month [underlined] MUST [/underlined] be “M.T. Accident Free”.
Of the taxying accidents two occurred at night and two during the day. One of the “night” accidents was caused primarily by the pilot neglecting to use an Aldis lamp or taxying light. He struck an obstruction just off the dispersal lead in. In this instance his Flight Engineer was aware of the obstruction but did not warn his captain. Both log books were endorsed in RED.
A Lancaster pilot had just landed landed [sic] and was proceeding round the perimeter, when he told his Engineer to cut the outer engines. The Flight Engineer did so, but opened the starboard outer throttle fully before the propeller stopped turning. The engine roared into life and swung the aircraft off the perimeter. Again, the log books of both pilot and F/E were endorsed in RED.
[Underlined] SWINGS AND HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
Both Swings this month were on take off – one Stirling and one Lancaster.
In the Stirling the pupil pilot swung off the runway, throttled back completely as per drill, but did not stop before his aircraft struck another in dispersal.
The Lancaster pilot ignored all he had ever been told about take-off procedure, handed over his throttles too soon to the Flight Engineer, swung to port at “full power”, over-corrected and broke his undercarriage on a final swing to starboard. His bomb load exploded. Luckily the crew got clear before this happened.
This pilot made another mistake in running up to +4 lbs, 2650 revs. against the brakes.
Heavy landings were of the usual pattern. One occurred at Conversion Unit in unfavourable weather conditions. The other was the result of a Lancaster pilot levelling off too high and not using the engine to correct.
[Underlined] MID-AIR COLLISIONS [/underlined]
There have been four mid-air collisions in the Group in recent months – two in April. There are so many aircraft over this country both by day and night that crews must keep absolutely on their toes at all times. We hear reports of “narrow squeaks” almost every
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash, the immaculate W.A.A.F’s … “and I’d have been all right if that Stirling hadn’t backed into me”
day. The answer, of course, is to maintain a thorough look-out.
Don’t ignore the new “look-out” drill which was sent out this month. There should be no tendency to relax when an aircraft comes back into the circuit after an Op. or any other flight. The danger of collision is always present, and as the pilot is necessarily busy with his cockpit drills, it is up to the rest of the crew, especially gunners, to ensure the safety of the aircraft by keeping up a search and warning the captain of other aircraft.
[Underlined] OTHER INCIDENTS [/underlined]
A pupil pilot in a Stirling was out of line with the runway at 500’ on a good clear night. He landed anyway, off the runway, and knocked over the wind sock.
An Instructor in a Lancaster in showery weather, also found himself out of line with the runway. Instead of going round again he landed off the runway. His speed was excessive and he overshot. A deliberate ground loop placed the aircraft – CAT AC.
A Conversion Unit Mid-Upper Gunner was unloading his guns after a flight. One went off and fired a round into the “fin”. The fin had to be replaced. Gunners! make sure your guns are on “Safe” – all of them.
One Lancaster crashed this month in obscure circumstances. The aircraft was seen coming out of cloud in a high power dive. The tail fell off and then the aircraft broke up. The suggestion at the moment is that the pilot lost control in daylight in cumulo-nimbus cloud. The Accidents Investigation Branch may produce further evidence.
Further proof of the merits of the Lancaster came out this month. An aircraft returned on two engines after being badly shot up. On making an approach at a strange airfield, the pilot could not get his wheels down and went round again from a low height. Unfortunately on his second attempt the pilot overshot on a short flarepath and crashed.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Milne of 50 Squadron displayed exceptional airmanship, and also proved that the Lancaster can be flown on two engines even with a load. He lost both starboard engines while outward bound on ops., at 3,000 feet. Forced to return to Base, he jettisoned the fuel from the inboard tanks and effected a perfect approach and landing still carrying full bomb load.
F/Sgt Young, a pupil at 5 L.F.S., put up a good show which also reflects credit on his Instructor. Shortly after take-off on his first solo in a Lancaster, the starboard tyre burst. F/S. Young was diverted to Woodbridge where he made a successful landing without causing any further damage to the aircraft.
F/Sgt. White and F/Sgt Millikan, the Navigator and Air Bomber of a crew under training at Conversion Unit, set an example which would have done credit to an experienced crew. While on a high level cross country flight, their pilot passed out through lack of oxygen and lost control of the aircraft. F/Sgt Millikan regained control of the Stirling and under the direction of F/Sgt White who assumed the responsibility of captain, they flew the aircraft for 1 1/2 hours back to Base when the pilot had recovered sufficiently to land the aircraft.
The “Plumbers Union” have also distinguished themselves. F/Sgt Gledhill, a Staff Engineer of 1660 Conversion Unit, was a member of a crew of a Stirling. While the aircraft was taxying to dispersal, the port inner caught fire. The Graviner had no effect, and F/Sgt Gledhill promptly removed the engine cowling and extinguished the fire with a hand extinguisher, saving the aircraft from much more serious damage.
(Continued on page 12, col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING [/underlined]
F/Lt. Lucas of Flying Training Command visited the Group during April to advise on the subject of Clay Pigeon Shooting, this Officer is stationed at 54 Group Headquarters, and is responsible for Clay Pigeon Shooting in the I.T.W’s. It was obvious that we are getting little if any training value out of clay pigeon shooting at present, due to the lack of proper ranges and the fact that very few Gunnery Leaders have ever had instruction in the art.
A trap house was constructed at Waddington from sandbags, and seven firing points laid out; this work was done in two days. The lay-out in use at I.T.W’s has two trap houses, but this was not considered necessary for our purpose. A request has been made for an officer from Flying Training Command to be attached to the Group to give advice and instruction to all stations, and the possibility of constructing a sandbag trap house on each station is under consideration. A demonstration of the lay-out at Waddington, makes it obvious that clay pigeon shooting must be done on a properly constructed range under the supervision of an instructor; under these conditions it is an excellent quickening exercise and when gunners are proficient in hitting clays, they have confidence in themselves.
[Underlined] .5 UNDER DEFENCE GUN. [/underlined]
Six squadrons have aircraft fitted with this gun and squadrons have been asked for opinions on the value of the gun on operations, and if H 2 S is preferred to the gun, as the aircraft can obviously only have one or the other. Opinions given to date are not very favourable as several snags have been encountered during the trials carried out so far. With the gunner strapped in his seat it is difficult to follow the gun round on the beam; it is difficult for the gunner to get his head down behind the sight as it tends to push the oxygen mask upwards on the gunners face; and also considerable vibration is experienced on the sight when the gun is fired.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Combats for April numbered 81, resulting in 5 enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed, 1 as probably destroyed and 7 damaged. The maximum number for any one operation was 24 and this was on the 22/23rd April on Brunswick five claims being made on that night; 1 destroyed, 1 probable and 2 damaged. Combats on French targets were few, but these sorites are not to be treated lightly by air gunners and the most vigilant search is to be maintained at all times. Squadrons must include instruction on search during night vision training. Search from the rear turret is difficult as it entails the rear gunner standing or crouching in a most uncomfortable position for short periods to enable him to see below and astern; this must be carried out as the view below is very poor when the gunner is in the seat.
[Underlined] SELF TOWED DROGUES [/underlined]
This practice has not been carried out on the scale it was hoped for, due to a variety of reasons, the main one being the shortage of brackets for attachment to the aircraft. Some Stations have had difficulty in obtaining the material for the manufacture of these items and snags have been met in obtaining the quick release unit. Gunnery Leaders should press for this equipment to enable a consensus of opinion to be obtained on the value of the exercise. Self tow at night with the drogue illuminated is the best step and should present no difficulties when Squadrons are satisfied that the existing equipment is satisfactory.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO. 77 COURSE. [/underlined]
F/O Wyand – 9 Sqdn. – 83.8% - Cat. “B”.
F/O Fisher – 1660 C.U. – 77.8% - Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 14. [/underlined]
F/O Gross – 1660 C.U. – Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 17. [/underlined]
P/O Hammond – 619 Sqdn. – Cat. “A”.
Congratulations to P/O Hammond on obtaining first place on the course.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
49 Sqdn. “M” 20/21st April,1944 FW.190 C.
106 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 ME.109 C.
467 Sqdn. “N” 26th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “B” 29/30th April,1944 FW.190 C.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
619 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 JU. 88 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
44 Sqdn. “Z” 9/10th April,1944 ME.110 C.
207 Sqdn. “A” 22/23rd April, 1944 ME.210 C.
467 Sqdn. “W” 22nd April,1944 ME.109 C.
630 Sqdn. “J” 24th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “T” 24th April,1944 ME.109 C.
97 Sqdn. “Q” 24th April,1944 JU.88 C.
[Table of Air Training for April showing Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS (Contd. From page 11, col.3) [/underlined]
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
A Stirling made a crash landing last month and the only man injured was the rear gunner. He was also unique in that he was the only man not in his crash position.
A Squadron aircraft crashed in poor visibility. There were several diversion airfields available and the pilot was told to stand by and orbit Base. But he thought he’d come down to have a look!! He and two occupants were killed as a result.
Two aircrew baled out over the Wash. They did not take their ‘K’ type dinghy, and so threw away their last chance.
An experienced captain was recently forced to make an early return. His Flight Commander removed his pitot head cover for him when he landed.
Another “gen man” thought it unnecessary to await the ground crew’s signal to leave dispersal. He taxied into the tail of an aircraft in front of him. Both aircraft are CAT A/C!!
A very much sadder and wiser crew landed badly shot up recently. They explained they had lost the Concentration. The pilot had put red on black on one course. Yes it can still happen!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of April was 1635, of these 952 produced plottable ground detail, this increase being due to better conditions and the type of attack. It will be seen from the analysis that the percentage of failures is still excessive with a considerable increase in failures attributed to “no flash” illumination”. [sic]
There can be no doubt that, in the past, many flash failures were passing through as “flash muffled by cloud”, since it is impossible to assess bombing frames exposed by the light from fires on the ground when cloud conditions are 10/10ths. This is no attempt to draw attention to the high percentage of Armament failures; failures, whatever the cause, result in the loss of very valuable information and represent a loss in efficiency.
Photographic and Armament personnel must co-operate with each other to establish the [underlined] real cause [/underlined] of these failures; Type 35 camera controls and photo flash fuse settings must be identical with each other. It is not enough to set the control pointer to the required setting. Make sure that the timing of the control agrees with that indicated upon the setting dial before it is fitted to the aircraft; adjustments can be made to the pointer where necessary.
It is again necessary to stress that once the aircraft have returned from the attack, the production of the photographic results in the minimum period of time is essential to the Air Staff. The majority of the section personnel are aware of this fact, but improvement can be made by better organisation and attention to the following:-
(i) Ensure that everything is ready to commence processing as soon as the first magazines arrive (at one section seven minutes were lost between the time of the first magazine going into the darkroom and the lights being switched off).
(ii) The photographer detailed to receive the film magazine from the aircrew must obtain essential information and pass the first four or six magazines to the processing section in the quickest possible manner. (One section wasted valu-
{Continued on Page 14 Column 3)
[Table of Photographic Analysis Results by Squadron]
TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD MONTH FOR TRAINING BASE [/underlined]
During April, 51 Base flew more hours and passed out more crews than ever before in its existence. The Stirling Conversion Units produced a grand total of 5500 flying hours, and the Lancaster Finishing School a total of almost 1900 hours. The Lancaster Finishing School posted 109 crews to squadrons and 95 crews were posted into the Lancaster Finishing School for Lancaster training.
These results were achieved as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of maintenance personnel and instructional staffs throughout the Base, despite the fact that the first ten days of the month produced little flying owing to bad weather. The operational stations in the Group assisted by providing their airfields for circuits and landings when training base airfields were overcrowded.
With excellent co-operation between this Group and 10 and 12 Fighter Groups, Training Base flew Bullseyes on 18 nights. Crews also took part in Command Bullseyes, including three spoofs over the North Sea which, in addition to providing good D.R. practice for the Navigators, helped divert the enemy’s fighter strength from the operations against enemy centres in France.
The main concern during the month has been burst tyres on Lancasters and Stirlings, and every precaution is being taken to reduce these to a minimum, because it is fully appreciated that the minor mishap caused by a burst tyre can well lead to a serious accident. The overall total of accidents for the Base is still too high, and the staff is pressing forward strongly with an “accident reduction” drive.
The forthcoming expansion in Training Base by which 132 crews are to be produced each month, has led to a revision of the Ground Syllabus and the Flying Syllabus. The revised Flying Syllabus is not yet effective, but will come into operation during May. There has been an expansion of H 2 S training in the two Units at present equipped for this training, and when 1654 Conversion Unit at Wigsley becomes productive, the periodical shortage of H 2 S crews should cease.
AIR SEA RESCUE
It is a very easy thing, when ordered to practice Parachute or Dinghy Drills to go out to an aircraft sit around smoking for half an hour and then report back to the Flight Office “D.C.O.” These drills are the “Safety Drills” and the instinct of self preservation alone should make crews practice them until “Practice makes Perfect”.
Generally speaking parachute drills are carried out more conscientiously than Dinghy Drills, but in recent incidents in this Group it appears that even this drill is not receiving the attention it should. Note the findings of the investigating officer after a recent fatal accident. “It seems doubtful whether the crew had done the amount of parachute drill accredited to them in the “Flight Records”. In other words completed records may save you a lot of bother, but unless the records are true they are valueless and wasteful.
Let us face facts. Even [underlined] you [/underlined] may be shot down and bale-out or ditch some time or other. If you have just a rough working knowledge of the drills, some of the crew will probably save their lives, but, equally probably, some will lose their lives. If you and your crew are word and action perfect in the drill, you will live to fight again, and get a good spell of “Survivors’ leave” into the bargain. Most probably!
Saturday morning had now been set aside as the time when every available crew is to spend at least an hour on these Safety Drills. It should also be regarded as a suitable time to acquaint aircrews with the latest safety equipment and modifications. This period, however, should not be regarded as an excuse for not doing drills at other times. There’ll be the odd occasion when you are elsewhere on a Saturday morning.
One Base has issued instructions that crews are to be ordered at Briefing, from time to time, that they are to do these drills after landing from Operations – when tired and in darkness, when their physical condition is similar to that when facing a real “Bods out” or ditching, or baling our [sic] conditions. This is a very good way of doing things – you get the maximum benefit, as you are already in full flying kit, with the minimum of effort.
In March 36.9% of aircrews in all Groups who ditched in “Home Waters” were saved, while 397 lost their lives. The fact that 73 lives were lost in crews where other members were saved stresses the importance of drills. The Americans are still making better use of your Air Sea Rescue Service than you are.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT (Continued from Page 15 Col.2) [/underlined]
stations in the near future to service the F.N.64 turrets prior to their being returned to Maintenance Units – a step in the right direction at last. All Armament Officers can assist in speeding up this servicing process by ensuring that a hydraulic turret test rig and a complete set of tools are available for the party when they arrive. Don’t leave it until the day the party is expected, and so waste a day collecting the equipment from various dispersed points around the station. Do it now and ensure that the floor space at present cluttered up by these turrets is made available for more important equipment.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
A record number of sorties has been carried out during April and it was pleasing to note that note that the cancellations due to technical defects were: Early Returns .73% - Cancellations .69% - both being very definite improvements.
The number of engine failures which occur and necessitate change of an engine before the completion of its life are not decreasing at the rate we should expect now that a more reliable engine forms the bulk of our holdings. The Merlin 24 from which we expected such high performance is doing its best to produce this performance. It is however handicapped by the fact that paddle-blade propellers and AY/118 constant speed units have invariably been fitted to this type of engine, the results being that instances are occurring of over speeding and the odd case of engine disintegration. Action is in hand to fit modified C.S.U’s and this must go ahead with all possible speed.
The Merlin 28 and 38 still suffer from loss of coolant occasionally, and we still get failures due to fracture of the oil pipe to the dual drive, mainly due to the slow rate at which the modified oil pipe is being supplied.
It is pleasing to see the local improvements which are being carried out by C.T.O’s the improvement of technical sites on the “self help” scheme and the general clean-up and overhaul of equipment.
Although the introduction of a technical adjutant was mainly to allow the C.T.O. to be out amongst the aircraft more, there may be a tendency for the C.T.O’s to leave too much to the technical adjutant. This is a point which must be watched and although it is not the intention to pin the C.T.O. to his office, he must keep a tight control on correspondence, returns and technical reports and keep “au fait” with all leaflets and technical letters issued.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
It is gratifying to note that the maintenance of the Mk.XIV Bombsight improves month by month, as is evidenced by recent photographs of targets after a visit by 5 Group. Ground crews in general share in these achievements, but the instrument repairer deserves a special pat on the back for the hours well spent in tuning and levelling the Bombsights to produce these results.
The same degree of accuracy is unfortunately not apparent in the A.P.I./A.M.U. Cases are still being reported of “racing” of the A.M.I. despite the fitting of Command Modification No. 57. This “racing” can be attributed in most cases to incorrect tension of the relay spring and as no test equipment is yet available the fault cannot be laid at the door of bad maintenance. Efforts are being made to obtain the necessary tension gauges so that this fault can be cured. In the meantime units must make every effort to complete the manufacture of the Coningsby A.P.I./A.M.U. test bench, details of which were forwarded several weeks ago.
April witnessed the introduction of new equipment the responsibility of which rests on the instrument repairer. The most important is the nitrogen installation. It is not necessary to demand the ground charging equipment, but units must advise their Equipment Officer when an aircraft with nitrogen is received so that the necessary steps can be taken to obtain the charging equipment. At the same time the Group electrical officer must also be informed.
The other item of new equipment arriving in aircraft is the Mk.VIII Automatic Control, the introduction of which should ease maintenance problems. The Group servicing van has been round all operational stations to give preliminary instructions on the maintenance of this instrument and courses of three weeks’ duration will shortly become available to those personnel who have already attended the Mk.IV Control course. The question of the inferior luminous markings of the Mk.IA repeater has been brought to the notice of Headquarters Bomber Command, and it is hoped that an improvement will be made shortly.
The Electrical Sections – particularly those in Base major servicing units – continue to do a good job of work, despite the increasing number of modifications in which the Electrician is involved. Further modifications of an operational necessity are on the way, so electrical officers must give all future suggested modifications very serious consideration before submitting them to higher authority, if the electrical sections are not to be overburdened.
A word about Bumph. There appears to be a rooted objection among electrical officers to put pen, pencil or typewriter – if you can get one – to paper. Base and Station electrical officers must realise that it is impossible to get on without a certain minimum of paper work and promptness in replies is essential. If you are asked to reply to a question by a certain date make sure that your reply is one time.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability for Stirling and Lancaster]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV. (Contd. From Page 9 Column 3) [/underlined]
This dangerous habit must cease. Some navigators seem to use R.F. Units and Stud Settings as toys to be changed and switched about to see what fixes they can obtain; the result is incorrect fixes, and chaos. These navigators are playing right into the enemy’s hands, particularly if they obtain signals which do not emanate from our Gee Stations!”
All Navigators must realise the importance of the above points as it is possible that in future several operations per night may be planned with an XF possibility for each operation. If navigators persist in using XF’s which are not assigned to them and phased for their route, there will be multitudes of incorrect fixes, and possibly casualties as a result of careless navigation.
Flight Engineers
In the past the Flight Engineers have been selected from Group I or II tradesmen; having been in the R.A.F. for long periods they gained quite considerable experience of many types of aircraft and engines, and therefore the changeover to their new duties was easy.
To-day we are faced with the problem of having to train pupils who perhaps a few weeks ago, had never seen inside an aircraft. During their training in the early stages, many subjects are taught which would appear to have no bearing on their job as Flight Engineers; this must be done however, so that later in the course, when boost control, hydraulics and pneumatics are explained, the pupil will have the basic knowledge to understand them. This takes time, and as we must produce more and more Flight Engineers, time cannot be spared to train them as Fitters. They are trained as Flight Engineers but perhaps a few corners remain that can be “polished off” by the Flight Engineer Leader.
The Flight Engineer Leader in a Squadron is responsible for training new members until he is satisfied that after a personal check, they can carry out the duties as laid down in A.M.O. A.538/43. He must make them continue their practical training, and whenever possible let them be with the ground crews on Daily Inspections, or any other work on their aircraft. Only in this way will good aircraft familiarisation be gained.
The training to be carried out in Squadrons must consist of Daily and Between Flight Inspections, instructions on the electrical panel, log keeping and engine limitations. The last subject is most important; only last month an early return which could have been avoided was made by a crew in this Group. On this occasion the oil pressure dropped to 50 lbs. per square inch at 20,000 feet, but the temperature remained at 80°C. Engine limitations laid down in A.P. 2062C (Pilot’s Notes) are:-
Oil Pressure minimum 45 lbs. per sq. in.
Oil temp. maximum 90°C.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY (Continued from Page 13 Col.1) [/underlined]
able time in processing a batch of films which had not been exposed, for the simple reason that the bombs had been brought back. This was negligence on the part of the airman who took over the magazines from the aircrew.
The photographic N.C.O. is responsible for the first film analysis and must decide whether it is a success or failure. Despite repeated instructions, many instances still occur where films are sent to this Headquarters as successes when in fact they are failures, and failures which should be classified as successes. This wastes the time spent on correspondence and telephone calls. One N.C.O. stated that it was because everything was required in a rush; this is true. THE AIR STAFF MUST HAVE PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS as soon as they can be produced and in ensuring this there must be no reduction of effort. Once the prints have been despatched, all films should be carefully re-examined, to ensure that no mistakes have been made.
Now that Headquarters, Bomber Command have reduced the amount of photographic printing, an improvement in the printing quality is expected. Faint ground details which could be plotted is often lost through poor processing and printing.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
The expression “unable owing to pressure of work” has become the password for excusing a dirty and untidy bomb dump. A slovenly bomb dump is too often the hall mark of poor workmanship and the effect is cumulative until unstacked empty cases, broken trollies and transporters disposed at random are taken for granted.
It takes little longer during a fusing operation to stock the tail boxes when removing the tails, rather than strew them indiscriminately over a large area; the effort is not great but the resultant tidiness is surprising.
A scene reminiscent of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow can be avoided if only a few men are employed on cleaning up after a fusing detail. If the broken transporters, trollies and liners are not repairable, write them off for scrap metal – the country needs it.
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH [/underlined]
Nearly 7% of the total number of photoflashes carried in April have been classed as flash failure. The classification flash failure is given when:-
(i) There is no indication of illumination on frames 6, 7 and 8 (or 4, 5 and 6 in the old sequence) of the film.
(ii) The fusing wire from the fuse is brought back.
(iii) There is no indication of violent evasive action on any of the bombing frames.
(iv) The camera control is checked and found correct.
(v) The electrical circuit and release slip are found serviceable.
This figure of 7% is excessive and so much higher than any previous month that it must be assumed, as in many cases the same lot numbers were used over two consecutive months, that some of this 7% was, in fact, incorrect fuse setting and bad maintenance. Co-operation with the photographic section can solve this problem.
[Underlined] “J” CLUSTERS [/underlined]
Loading ramps and rollers for 500 lb “J” clusters should be spring cleaned so that the clusters which are now arriving in quantity may be loaded directly on the rollers, thus saving double humping.
[Underlined] SUPPLY [/underlined]
Owing to the present precarious supply position of certain weapons the C.O. and personnel of No.93 M.U. have been called upon to produce stores at a moment’s notice from nowhere. To the credit of 93 M.U. these stores always turn up, but it is realised how much extra work is entailed in meeting a rush demand.
The staff of 93 M.U. are extremely well informed regarding the requirements and difficulties of operational armament, but it is doubted if Armament Officers realise the difficulties of the M.U. who handled nearly 30,000 tons of bombs last month.
It is suggested that Armament Officers could spend a profitable day by accompanying an Austin to the M.U. and see for themselves how large scale humping is organised.
[Underlined] MANIPULATION FAILURES. [/underlined]
A marked increase in manipulation failures has been apparent this month resulting in a large number of bombs and pyrotechnics being returned to base. The more outstanding “boobs” are set out below:-
1. 2 S.B.C’s complete with contents returned to Base – distributor arm fouled by the quadrant peg card. No jettison action carried out.
2. The following stores were returned to Base due to non-[underlined] selection [/underlined]:-
2 x 4.5” photoflashes
2 x 250 lb Target Indicators
2 x 7” Hooded Flare Clusters
1 x 1000 lb M.C.
NO FURTHER COMMENT IS NECESSARY.
[Underlined] FN.64 TURRETS [/underlined]
The turret servicing party is visiting all
(Continued on Page 4 Column 2) [sic]
[Table of Failures by Squadron]
FLYING CONTROL
The high standard of landing achieved last month has been maintained during April. It is significant to note that SKELLINGTHORPE who pioneered this scheme when it was first introduced and in fact, carried out all the trials, have risen to the top of the ladder with an excellent average of 1.85 minutes.
The most outstanding figure for the month, however, is 30 aircraft landed in 36 minutes at Waddington. This is, in fact, the finest performance which has ever been put up within the Group and possibly within the Command. The following are some examples of really first-class performances for the month:-
[Table of Selected Flying Control Sessions by Stations]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
It is hoped to introduce shortly a competition embracing all Flying Control aspects. This will be judged on a quarterly basis and the condition and efficiency of every part of the Station Flying Control organisation will
(Continued on Page 6 Column 2)
[Table of April Landing Times by Station]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
Our brief this month was abundantly clear. With the Allied air offensive continuing almost uninterruptedly on a rising scale against communications targets and airfields, it appeared certain that our own role would be integrated in the common plan to wear down the Western Wall. To this end we have seen during the course of the month a revolution in our bombing technique confirming the undoubted accuracy of low level precision attacks.
The importance of hammering railway targets as a means of reducing the enemy’s capacity to meet a threat from the West was fully recognised. On 10/11th TOURS was effectively attacked, followed by JUVISY and LA CHAPELLE on 18/19th and 21/22nd respectively. The results in each case were impressive. At Tours an exceptional concentration with over 100 hits fell on the track disrupting all communications. A particularly high precedent was established at Juvisy. Here we achieved one of the greatest concentrations of craters yet obtained on a target of this type – the attack almost completely devastating the marshalling yards.
The attack on La Chappelle was no less successful. Damage is severe at the southern end of the Marshalling Yard which sustained the main weight of the attack. Large fires were still burning in the area the day following the raid, and it could be seen that tracks had been severed at several important junctions. The importance which the enemy attaches to keeping his railroads open, and the difficulties which he is experiencing in handling even high priority traffic is perhaps reflected in the fact that some 50000 Germans have now been transported into France to relieve the situation and, furthermore, German branch lines have been torn up to provide new tracks.
This wearing down process is also being applied with particular attention to the Luftwaffe itself, its sources of supply being very seriously threatened by repeated attacks on aircraft factories. On 5/6th, 605 tons of bombs were dropped on four plants at TOULOUSE. The S.N.C.A.S.E. Aircraft Assembly Plant has sustained serious damage to its three main buildings – the assembly plant, component store, and testing shop. At the A.I.A. Works, every building is more or less severely damaged, while the Aircraft Factory buildings are all damaged – amongst those completely destroyed being the components manufactory shop, components store, drawing offices, heat treatment and plate shop. The Montaudran Airfield is now without its three principal hangars, and has suffered damage to other unidentified buildings.
Coupled with the first attack on St. Medard-on-Jalles (reported later) was a raid on the KIELLER Airframe Factory near OSLO – PRU cover is not complete, but the photographs available indicate that damage is considerable in the North Eastern part of the target area, including heavy destruction in the Bayerische Motorenwerke.
It is perhaps interesting to note that following the attack on CLERMONT FERRAND Aulnat Aircraft Factory, the sick bay is almost the only building undamaged. It is open to some doubt as to whether this fact can be accepted as a tribute to our precision bombing, but whatever the position may be in this respect, it is manifest that this Repair Factory will not be available to the enemy for a long time to come.
The attack on the ST CYR Signals Equipment Depot on 10/11th was highly successful – resulting in the destruction of several of the principal buildings in the Depot.
Although the focus of attention was directed on rail centres and other special targets in the occupied zone, this concentration in policy did not imply that other forms of attack would be discontinued; still less that they were conceived independently of the supreme invasion task. In fact four “blitz” attacks were staged during the course of the month. AACHEN was singled out for attack on 11/12th. Throughout the city – particularly to the South and South West, industrial and residential damage has been fairly severe, while the Main Station and sidings, large Passenger Station, Locomotive Sheds, and Goods Depot Shed have suffered heavily. Reconnaissance following our attack on BRUNSWICK on 22/23rd is not complete, but from the photographs obtained, it can be seen that damage is considerable in the business/residential area South of the City Centre, with many hits in the South Eastern marshalling yards. A high measure of success also attended the attack on MUNICH on 24/25th.
[Underlined] RIDER [/underlined]
Until that date this Nazi birthplace had escaped serious damage, but it is now known that the town has suffered its first heavy battering. No interpretation of the reconnaissance photographs is yet available but even to the unpractised eye it is obvious that the target is severely hit. Widespread areas of devastation are apparent in the old city (which is 30 - 40% gutted) continuing in a wide sear from East to West up to and including the Main Railway Station. The Nazi Party meeting place Kreig Ministerium and Prinz Leopold Platz, to mention but a few of the important Municipal Buildings are either destroyed or severely damaged.
Fierce fighter activity was encountered in defence of SCHWEINFURT on 26/27th. Despite this violent reaction, however, the attack was pressed home, resulting in severe damage to all five ball-bearing plants, in particular to the Deutsche Star Kugalhalter where two thirds of the machine shops have been demolished. The adjoining marshalling yards have also sustained damage, and there are many incidents throughout the town.
No less important were our minelaying trips on 9/10th, 18/19th and again on 23/24th. These sorties probably lack the spectacle of a bombing attack, but their sinister loads will doubtless reap a very real contribution in the war harvest.
The culminating stage of the month was in the final raid on 29/30th against the Explosives Works at ST. MEDARD-on-JALLES. A pass had already been made at this same target the previous night, but had been frustrated by unfortunate weather conditions. So with redoubled vigour another attack was launched. On this occasion the weather chose to be our ally, and the opportunity afforded was seized to produce one of the most impressive pyrotechnic displays. For more than half an hour the target was in the throes of a succession of violent explosions. The greatest concentration of the attack fell to the North East of the works area extending across the centre of the works to the western border. A most heartening result and an inspiring conclusion to the month’s work.
The above achievements were contributed by 1950 Lancs and 84 Mosquitos – 88.6% of which were successful in attacking the primary, with 2.5% casualties.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Statistics by Squadron showing Availability, Sorties, Results and Points]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944
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V Group News, April 1944
5 Group Newsletter April 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 21, April 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about process of servicing, gardening, navigation, honours and awards, signals / radar, tactics, air bombing, radar / navigation, link trainer, sports, war savings, accidents, gunnery, training, air sea rescue, engineering, armament, flying control, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-04
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Anne-Marie Watson
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-25
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Tours
France--Toulouse
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
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1944-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Metheringham
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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V GROUP NEWS V MAY * 1944 * SECRET * NO * 22
[Stamp]
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The results achieved by the Group during May far exceed those of any previous month. They represent a full contribution to the great effort put in by the whole of Bomber Command which, it can now be seen, was a big factor in the safe arrival on French soil of the “Armies of Liberation”.
Not only did the Group carry out more attacks, but each attack was more effective than in the past. Throughout the month, the centre of the pattern of bombs averaged only 100 yards from the aiming point. A great improvement on previous results. This improvement has been brought about mainly by the steady development of the system of marking, and I wish to pay tribute to those pilots of No.627 Squadron who have gone in low to mark the target and who have not allowed their aim to the spoilt by the light flak defences. Their accuracy has been consistently of a very high order, far exceeding tat of any other system of marking so far tried.
The Group also owes a great deal to the Master Bombers who remain throughout the attack directing the marking and assessing the bombing. With better communications, their task will become easier, and I hope that, before long, all aircraft in the Group will be fitted with V.H.F. Crews will then be able to hear the orders which are given to the Flare and Marking Forces and will know what is happening, and the reason for any hold up. Without this means of communication, it is impossible to keep crews informed when things go wrong, with the result that they have often had to delay their bombing without knowing the reason.
In spite of these great improvements, half the bombs dropped against these small precision targets fell [underlined] more than 250 yards [/underlined] from the aiming point, where they were wasted. This percentage of bombs wide of the aiming point coincides almost exactly with the percentage which fell at similar distances on the practice ranges during May. These errors are too great for, not only is the bombsight capable of achieving errors of less than 100 yards from 10,000 feet, but errors below this figure are consistently achieved by a number of crews in the Group, not only on the ranges but also on operations.
If the bombing error of all crews can be reduced to the level of the best 25%, it will be equivalent to doubling the effective striking power of the Group.
I, therefore, make a special appeal to the bombing team for practice and yet more practice; in accurate flying; in executing the small alterations of course during the bombing run, and in the quick test of the sight to ensure that it is producing the correct sighting angle and is properly aligned. These may seem small matters, but it is on details such as these, that our efficiency as a Bomber Group depends.
I want every crew to realise that each stick of bombs which can be dropped even a few yards nearer the marker, will directly affect the duration of the war. At present, more than at any other time during this war, it is the effort and accuracy of each individual crew which can expedite or delay victory. If each crew can place their centre bomb within 100 yards of the marker, the result will be overwhelming. Individual effort for greater accuracy by each crew is the keynote now. This improvement will first appear in a marked reduction in crew errors on the practice ranges.
Let each crew check their own bombing error at the end of this month and see what progress they have made towards achieving this result.
Copies Sent: Wadd. 9
Skell. 10.
Bard. 6
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has recently been fully occupied with the introduction of target markers and the more general use of high explosive bombs within the Group. This has had a detrimental effect on the investigation of gun and turret failures and it would be folly to assume that the present decrease in gunnery failures is other than a temporary relief brought about by the milder weather conditions prevalent at this time of the year.
The gun ‘Bogey’ must be beaten before next winter, and with this end in view all new evidence must be examined and forwarded to those most qualified to analyse and correct the many small faults combining to cause major unserviceability. An appeal is therefore made to all Armament Officers, Gunnery Leaders and, above all, to the gunners themselves to report all faults, however petty they may seem.
A recurring fault is often accepted as a matter of course and not reported to a higher authority, as it is assumed that “everyone knows about it”. Unfortunately, those scions of industry responsible for corrective action are often office bound due to causes beyond their control, and a serious fault is only recognised by a number of units reporting the same defect.
The failure to report defects is attributed to the feeling of competition when comparisons are printed, and as a result false records are being received. These records are, in fact, printed to avail armament specialists of figures and facts normally reserved for higher formations, so they too may have data for research and modification. It is not intended that these tables should indicate the relative efficiency of units.
[Underlined] All defect reports are gratefully received. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GUN TURRETS [/underlined]
Yet another new turret failure has recently appeared, which requires the urgent attention of all Armament Officers.
Hydraulic pipe lines located in the leading edge of the Lancaster aircraft are being fractured, and preliminary investigation has shown that there are several factors contributing to this failure:-
(i) Pressure and return pipes are positioned too close together and, in some instances, the unions are actually touching.
(ii) Pipe positioning cleats are of inferior design and are not standing up to the job. This is aggravated by the fact that there are insufficient cleats, and those that are provided are badly positioned.
(iii) The packing between the cleat and the pipe line vibrates out of position, leaving the pipe to chafe against the cleat, resulting in a fractured pipe.
At present only three small inspection panels are located between the two power plants and it is impossible to inspect the full 13 feet of pipe lines through these small panels.
Recommendations have been made to Command for:-
(a) Additional cleats.
(b) Re-positioning of existing cleats.
(c) Re-design of pipe layout.
(d) More effective packing between pipe and cleat.
An early answer is expected.
In the interim, Armament Officers should make an immediate check of all turret hydraulic pipe lines, and so ensure that the possibility of a fracture is kept to an absolute minimum.
[Underlined] HYDRAULIC MEDIA [/underlined]
Trials have been carried out this month with a mixture of 70% DTD.585 and 30% DTD.472B and although these trials were only of a short duration, the unanimous opinion appears to be that this mixture seems to be the “best yet”. A definite decrease in leaks has been apparent turret functioning has been normal, and several squadrons are of the opinion that turret speeds have, if anything, slightly improved.
Requests have been made to higher authority for permission to fill all hydraulic systems with this new mixture as soon as possible.
(Continued on Page 17, col.3)
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) Percentage of personnel saving
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Unit]
TOTAL AMOUNT SAVED £7828.0.4.
An increase of £1,518.7s.0d. over April figures.
FLYING CONTROL
Once more the average landing times for the Group have been reduced and our target of two minutes per aircraft is drawing nearer. There are still the same one or two Stations, however, who seem unable to reduce their landing figures. Circuit drill is easy and causes no difficulty whatsoever to crews. The main fault lies in a straggling return and Stations must stress continually the need for discipline in maintaining the airspeeds on which crews are briefed. It is noticed from other Groups’ figures that they are not very far behind, and since we regard ourselves as the pioneers of quick landing, then we must hold our lead.
Below are the three best performances for the moth, but at the time of going to press, these figures have all been beaten and the new record will be published in next month’s News.
[Table of Best Landing Tines by Station]
(Continued on page 3, col.2)
MAY LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties undertaken by the Group achieved still another record, some 2254 sorties being carried out during the month.
The serviceability figure still remains high, although the number of engine changes which are carried out before the engine has completed its life is still far too high. This is due to defects which have been occurring now for a long period, the main being:-
1. Failure of oil pipe between the relief valve and the dual drive.
2. Flame trap failures due to blow-back.
3. Leaking cylinder blocks due to cracks on Merlin 22’s and 24’s.
The percentage of early returns due to defects in equipment controlled by Engineer and Eng. Elect. Was 0.8% and the aircraft failing to get off provided a further 0.5%
Now that a test crew is attached to each Base Major Servicing Section, full advantage should be taken of this crew for testing aircraft with any unusual flying characteristics which are reported from time to time by squadrons. Any adjustments found necessary should be carried out by experts in the Base Major Servicing Section and not by any gang who happens to be available.
No. 55 Base has now formed and all stations in 5 Group are under Base Organisation. 55 Base is not yet functioning as such in every respect, but everything is working in the right direction and it is anticipated that the results will be good.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNITS [/underlined]
Again a record number of flying hours has been produced by the Conversion Units, and No. 5 L.F.S., and the number of hours required to produce the crews necessary has not been exceeded. Major Inspections are progressing satisfactorily, and the organisation is such that the maintenance can keep pace with the amount of flying produced. The major troubles experienced with the Stirling during the month have been coring subsequent to going over to summer grade oil, and undercarriage pylon failures which occur usually when the undercarriage is being lowered prior to landing. It is hoped that the coring troubles will be cured by returning to the use of winter grade oil, together with the fitment of the approved blank.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
Within the next few days a start will be made to modify the bomb aimer’s panels of Lancaster aircraft, details of which have been issued to all Bases. A modification gang will be formed at Scampton to undertake the alteration to all Bomb Aimers’ panels in the Group aircraft. Panels will be issued in batches of 20 at a time, so that there will be no delay in the change-over. It should be the aim of Electrical Officers to remove the old panel and fit the new in all aircraft of a squadron within 24 hours. By good co-operation it will be possible to complete all aircraft in the Group within three to four weeks.
Recent precision targets demand that the accuracy of the Mark XIV Bombsights must be given absolute priority. We must aim at errors of not more than 50 yards at 10,000 feet in the immediate future. To achieve this, greater care must be taken in the tuning, levelling and lining up of the sights, and discussions with Bomb Aimers on the analysis of practice bombing results will also help. Base Bombing Leaders have realised the necessity for this co-operation, and Electrical Officers must do all in their power to reciprocate.
Trials have recently been carried out in all squadrons with a synchroniser for the two inboard engines. This permits synchronisation within 1 r.p.m. and flight engineers state that the device is very satisfactory, particularly from the point of view of crew comfort, since the severe periodic vibration which occurs when the engines are de-synchronised is entirely eliminated, and fatigue on long flights is reduced. There has also been a marked decrease in the incidence of instrument failure, noticeably engine speed indicators. Up to the present a single lamp has been used which merely indicated de-synchronisation and a method of trial and error is necessary to obtain synchronisation. A new indicator consisting of three lamps is being tested at East Kirkby which will give an indication of which engine is running fast. This indicator will be submitted to Bomber Command after further trials have been completed.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Stirling and Lancaster Training Aircraft Serviceability by Unit]
FLYING CONTROL (Cont. from page 2)
[Underlined] WOODBRIDGE [/underlined]
Crews are now aware of the facilities available at the emergency landing field at Woodbridge. The staff at Woodbridge are only too glad to see operational crews on ‘non-emergency’ visits. Although landing instructions have been circulated and (we hope) read by all aircrew, a visit to Woodbridge or even a run down there during N.F.T. to look at the lay-out from the air will provide a more permanent image of the landing drill required. One point which is to be particularly stressed is that crews must not attempt to turn off midway along the runway at night time. They must continue right along to the end of the runway where marshalling crews are ready to direct them to dispersal.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
All Stations are now reported to be getting down seriously to improving their airfields and Watch Offices for the competition which closes on the 31st July. S.F.C.O’s must remember, however, that although 31st July is the official date for closing, inspections by the G.F.C.O. can be expected any day.
Flight Engineers
When checking logs it is found that some Flight Engineers are filling in the details on the top of their logs before they examine the aircraft. Such things as “Hatched checked and found secure”, “Auto Controls out”, “Air Intakes cold” and many other vital checks are being taken for granted. This log is for the benefit of all the crew and the safety of the aircraft; therefore these checks must be carried out on dispersal just prior to start up, and only then recorded on the log.
The Flight Engineer Leader on each Squadron must check all logs returned, and bring to the notice of all pilots and flight engineers any bad engine handling; if no notice is taken, and such combinations of revs and boost as 2700 revs + 3 lbs boost or 2850 revs + 2 lbs boost etc., continue to be used, then the Flight Engineer Leader must take these culprits to task.
5 Group has laid down a drill for climbs and engine conditions to be used on operations; therefore until any amendments to this order are published, no alterations should be made unless in case of an emergency. The above drill is being taught by No.5 L.F.S. and must be stressed from time to time by squadrons; they should bear in mind that engineers who come on to operations now have spent most of their initial training on Stirlings; the engine handling differs greatly between the two types of aircraft.
The Flight Engineer Leader must have closer liaison with his C.T.O. and report to him any little snags that crop up from time to time, instead of what happens at present – Flight Engineers talking it over between themselves. Improvements can only be brought about by reporting any defects or peculiarities to the right person.
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash the immaculate W.A.A.F’s. …”if this is your idea of a domestic night, may I never marry!”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
GARDENING
On the 21/22nd of the month more vegetables were planted by any one Group than ever before. 5 Group were the authors of this horticultural masterpiece, in planting 382 out of 418 vegetables lifted. 298 of these were Mark VI’s – in which hitherto undreamed of depths of frightfulness have been reached, and some varieties of which were used for the first time this night. 4 and 6 Groups also took part in the operation, bringing the Command total for the night up to 501. Three 5 Group aircraft were missing.
The Armament staffs at the Stations concerned did a great job of work – not made any easier by having also to prepare bomb loads – and East Kirkby performed the unprecedented feat of loading 154 Mark VI vegetables.
The operation was carried out entirely on H2S. Only three failures of sets occurred.
Results? – So far the immediate effect of this attack has been fully up to expectations, namely complete paralysis of all sea-borne traffic in areas vital to the movement of both warships and supplies. Sinkings can be expected as soon as the enemy releases the shipping held up, which he is bound to do soon despite his known inability to sweep his channels clear. The link between this operation and the coming invasion is obvious and the final effects can only be seen in the light of future events.
Other Gardening by 5 Group during the month were as follows:-
48 plantings off the FRISIANS
30 plantings in the HELIGOLAND BIGHT
36 plantings at the Southern end of the KATTEGAT.
24 plantings at the Northern end of the KATTEGAT.
The last two of these are worthy of note, first for the excellent P.P.I. photographs obtained by three aircraft of 44 Squadron, which proved conclusively that their mines were right in the channel; and secondly the success of the long low level flight in daylight conditions by four aircraft of 57 Sqdn.
Facts and figures for the month are:-
Sorties 93
Successful 87
%age successful 93.5
Aircraft missing 3
Mileage flown 91,120
Total successful plantings 520
The total has only once been exceeded by the Group, in April, 1943, when the total was 543. A fine job of work, contributed to by the six H 2 S Squadrons.
Gardening by Command again broke all records, resulting in the planting of 2,749 vegetables plus a small but highly effective effort by Mosquitos of 8 Group. Bomber Command’s war against communications has, in fact, reached a new degree of intensity on land and at sea.
[Cartoon]
“THE VOICE THAT BREATHED O’ER WAINFLEET”
5 GROUP P.O.W. FUND
By now, everyone is probably aware of the formation, on a full Group basis, of the 5 Group Prisoners of War Fund.
The Fund has been formed with the object of obtaining monies for sending monthly parcels of cigarettes and tobacco to each 5 Group Prisoner of War and, where possible, regular consignments of musical instruments, gramophone records, sports equipment, books, etc.
Sending foodstuffs and comforts, such as jerseys, stockings, scarves, etc., is subject to restrictions and is only handled by the B.R.C.S. and the next-of-kin. However, it is not possible for the Red Cross to send foodstuff parcels to any specific person; they are, in fact, sent in bulk to each Camp and distributed evenly amongst all the prisoners. The Fund will, therefore, make contributions to the B.R.C.S. who are requesting the Captain of each Camp containing 5 Group Prisoners of War to put up a notice in the Camp to the effect that the parcels for 5 Group prisoners are being provided by the Fund. It will be appreciated by all that the calls upon the B.R.C.S. at the present time are enormous, and any help we can give by taking over the responsibility for providing the monies for these parcels will be greatly appreciated, and will release money for the other many calls on the Society. Similar contributions will be made to the Canadian, Australian and South African Red Cross Societies and the New Zealand Patriotic Fund.
The next-of-kin are being requested to inform this Headquarters of the type of gift they wish the fund to send and, if possible, their requirements will be met. The next-of-kin are also allowed to send four special parcels per year, and those parcels may contain quite a number of articles. Should the next-of-kin find difficulty in obtaining these articles, they may inform this Headquarters, who will lend assistance in obtaining them.
All parcels, such as cigarettes and those referred to above, originating from this Headquarters, will be marked that they are being sent by the Fund.
Each Base has taken on the responsibility of providing a certain sum of money each month. The organisation and running of the Fund is being undertaken by the Group Headquarters, in addition to their committed financial contribution. The amount of voluntary work entailed to make this scheme a success is large, and is being met mainly by parties of volunteers from all Sections of Group Headquarters.
It is hoped that every member of 5 Group will endeavour to assist the Fund by means of financial contribution. The amount of money required to ensure its success is considerable; any monies left in the Fund at the close of hostilities will be dealt with at the discretion of the Executive Committee, either to help prisoners after their return, or to send to the R.A.F. Benevolent Fund.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
The most disturbing feature of the month’s bombing is the continued high Crew errors in the summary of practice bombing. We have, over the last three months, made intensive efforts to improve our standard of bombing and the steady decrease in our bombing errors, both operational and practice, is reflected in the practice bombing figures and the P.R.U. pictures of shattered enemy targets.
However, we are not bombing as well as we MUST in order to ensure that the minimum number of bombs and aircraft are used to destroy the numerous targets awaiting our attention.
Now in what ways can we ensure that, instead of making a monthly decrease in our Crew errors of from 10 to 30 yards, we crack them down in one month by 100 yards and achieve the immediate goal of 150 yards at 20,000 feet.
The following points are designed to make practicable this target for the month:-
1. The last two weeks have seen the introduction of the A.P.I. and Datum point method of finding the bombing wind velocity. A marked decrease in Vector errors has resulted. This method of wind finding, detailed in 5 Group Aircraft Drills, will produce vector errors of less than 60 yards.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The Navigator’s Union must therefore concentrate on the perfection of this technique, and one of the main sources of bombing errors will be finally eliminated.
2. Bombsight Serviceability:- Large errors are still directly attributable to technical faults in the Mark XIV. 5 Group Aircraft Drills detail the pre-bombing checks that must be carried out by Air Bombers. Further it is important that the suction that goes into the bombsight is at least 4 1/2“. To ensure this, the reading on the ground of the gauge on the pilot’s panel, with the changeover cock at the Emergency or No.2 position, must be 5 1/2” or more when the inboard engine feeding the sight is run up to at least 1800 revs.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] It is essential that the Air Bomber teams up with the instrument man responsible for the serviceability of his bombsight. Discuss your bombing results with him, tell him whether your errors are in line, range or are random and go through the causes of particular types of error with him. Reference to paragraph 63, Chapter 9, of the Mark XIV Bombsight booklet held by your Bombing Leader will make you an authority on sources of error.
3. Flying for Bombing:- Much has been said about this most important subject. There is no other type of flying which calls for precision measured in yards, and therefore it is not something that comes automatically, but only with hard training.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Pilots must study both the services required by the bombsight and the limitations from which it suffers in its quest for the correct bombing angle.
4. Bomb Aiming:- Unless the drift is absolutely accurate and the pilot’s flying perfect, the target will not drift down the graticule length to the intersection. Therefore it will be seldom that you will have an
(Continued on page 6, Column 1)
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
(Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.)
The results of bombing for the period 28th to 31st May (inclusive) will appear next month.
[Table of Bombing Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR MAY
25 Results with Crew Errors below 100 yards at 20,000 feet.
Next month should see a record number!
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 feet.
9 W/Cdr Porter F/O Pearson F/O Logan 63 yards
P/O Campbell F/O Tyne F/O Bennett 72 yards
P/O Bunnagar F/O Isfan Sgt Henderson 93 yards
49 P/O Graves-Hook F/O Sinden F/O Johnson 92 yards
F/L Matheson F/O Matthews Sgt Launder 77 yards
F/O Hill Sgt Bell F/O Jones 78 yards
P/O Sullings F/S Haines Sgt. Christian 83 yards
P/O Green F/S Hinch F/S Neal 89 yards
50 P/O Oliver Sgt Leonard Sgt Morris 63 yards
61 P/O Street F/S Brown Sgt Waghorn 90 yards
P/O North F/S Jarvis F/S Crawley 96 yards
P/O Dear Sgt. Wray Sgt Reeve 65 yards
106 P/O Durrant F/S Buchanan Sgt Pittaway 87 yards
617 Lt. Knilans F/O Rogers ? ? 98 yards
619 P/O Aitken P/O Whiteley Sgt. Levy 85 yards
F/S Donnelly F/O Grant F/S Johnson 98 yards
F/S Bennett F/S Griffiths Sgt Lyford 53 yards
P/O McCurdy W/O Stern P/O Hawkes 23 yards
F/L Roberts F/S Deviell F/S Lott 29 yards
F/S Morcom Sgt Lebatt Sgt Whitehurst 91 yards
630 P/O Lindsay Sgt Cummings F/S Rayner 91 yards
1654 F/O Rabone F/o Bjarnason F/O Dilworth 86 & 96 yards
Sgt. King Sgt Harder Sgt Stevenson 78 yards
F/S Jeffery F/S Downie F/S Benson 90 yards
5 LFS F/S Rose Sgt Chatteris F/S Richards 38 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
(Continued from page 5, Column 1)
ideal run up to the release point. It is best to realise this and thus avoid these panicky last moment corrections which will upset the aircraft’s attitude at the vital moment of release. It is far better to accept a small error in line and note on your Form 3073 the amount the graticule was left or right of the target, using the known size of the target to estimate your error. Allowances can then be made in the analysis.
Further, Air Bombers must realise that it is quite impossible for a pilot to stop a 4-engined aircraft dead when making a turn in response to your corrections “LEFT, LEFT” or “RIGHT”. In any case it would be detrimental to the bombsight’s calculations.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Air Bombers must, by close co-ordination with their Pilots, develop a smooth unhurried technique on the run-up and correct inter-com patter will aid good team work.
5. [Underlined] TO AIR BOMBERS:- [/underlined] You are the men who actually fire the bomb release switch, and therefore the greatest responsibility is yours. Remember, however, that you are part of a large team, and when you reach the stage of scoring direct hits every time, remember the credit is due to
The Pilot
Navigator
Fitters and Riggers
Bombsight Maintenance Men
Armourers
And
YOU
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
Base Bombing Leaders have been appointed as follows:-
51 Base – F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.
52 Base – F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C.
53 Base – F/Lt Murtough, D.F.C.
54 Base – F/Lt Stoney, D.F.C.
55 Base – F/Lt Wonham, D.F.M.
Squadron changes are as follows:-
9 Sqdn. – F/Lt Quilter from 92 Group.
50 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Hearn, D.F.C.
106 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Morgan from 1654 Conversion Unit.
463 Sqdn. – F/O Kennedy from 467 Squadron
619 Sqdn. – F/Lt Ruddock from 6 Group.
Conversion Unit changes are:-
1654 Con. Unit – F/O McRobbie, D.F.C.
1660 Con. Unit – F/Lt Wake, D.F.C. from 106 Squadron.
1661 Con. Unit – F/O Price, D.F.C.
No. 5 L.F.S. – F/O Mercy.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Honig (57 Sqdn) and P/O Pinches (630 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on Nos.81 & 82 Courses.
Congratulations to P/O Page (1661 C.U.) on obtaining an excellent “A” category on No. 83 Course!
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
“Records are made to be broken” !! – an old saying, but very true this month. Firstly all qualifying Squadrons obtained errors below 100 yards, and secondly 619 Squadron, the stalwarts of the competition, are back at the top with a record low error.
[Underlined] PILOT AND AIR BOMBERS’ ERROR [/underlined]
1st 619 Squadron 42 yards
2nd 61 Squadron 53 yards
3rd 49 Squadron 59 yards
4th 50 Squadron 72 yards
5th 57 Squadron 80 yards
6th 207 Squadron 81 yards
7th 44 Squadron 83 yards
8th 9 Squadron 85 yards
9th 106 Squadron 86 yards
10th (630 Squadron 98 yards
(467 Squadron 98 yards
463 Squadron failed to qualify this month owing to lack of Avro Adaptors necessary to carry out 6-bomb exercises. The Squadron state, however, that they will not only qualify in June, but will win the competition.
Last month’s competition news stated that as 52 Base Squadrons obtained places in the first five. 54 Base have rightly pointed out that the 1st and 2nd places were held by Squadrons who had only just left that Base. It is interesting to note that the same two Squadrons are still on top, but have exchanged position.
Navigator’s Error has been left out this month. The Group Navigation Officer intends to run a wind-finding competition commencing in June.
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron (F/Lt Lowry) [/underlined] have now constructed a first-class bombing panel mock-up in the Bombing Office. It is of inestimable value in checking Air Bombers on panel drill and general manipulation. It is understood that great credit for both this installation and the Mark XIV mock-up referred to in last month’s News is due to F/Lt. Hodgson, Eng. Elect. R.A.F. Station Dunholme, and his instrument men.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt Walmsley) [/underlined] makes the following report on the Squadron’s bombing accuracy (see competition results).
(i) Every aircraft on the Squadron carried out at least one High Level exercise during the month.
(ii) Every morning and afternoon the N.C.O. i/c Bombsight maintenance visits the Bombing Office to report on investigations into previous bombsight failures and to interrogate Air Bombers on current ‘snags’.
(iii) As soon as possible after each operation Air Bombers assemble for their own private raid assessment. Useful suggestions that result are passed on to the appropriate authorities by the Bombing Leader.
Finally a word of thanks is due to Pilots and Navigators of the Squadron for greatly improved flying and wind finding, for bombing.
Publicity has already been given to the outstanding bombing results obtained by two 619 Squadron crews captained by F/Lt Roberts and F/O McCurdy, who obtained errors of 29 and 23 yds. respectively, converted to 20,000 feet. Special mention however, is merited by the exercise carried out at [underlined] Syerston [/underlined] by a crew doing only its first bombing detail in a Lancaster.
PILOT – F/SGT ROSE
AIR BOMBER – SGT CHATTERIS
NAVIGATOR – F/S RICHARDS
The average error for 4 bombs aimed from 12,000 feet was 29 yards – a most creditable performance!!!
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Billington) [/underlined] have introduced the following excellent scheme:-
From several 1;500,000 maps, a number of cuttings were taken of prominent and likely landfalls on the enemy held coastline. These cuttings measure approximately 5” x 5” and so cover quite an appreciable area of coastline. The landfalls shown were then painted black, with the exception of the towns and rivers or estuaries which are printed in red and blue respectively.
Each cutting was then orientated in a different direction and pasted on a large notice board. The various orientations made identification more difficult and provided useful practice in landfall recognition.
Each pinpoint was then clearly numbered and a corresponding number was attached to a 1;1,000,000 “area of operations” map in the vicinity of the pinpoint in question. At briefing, the route to the target was outlined with a suitable length of cord, and the bomb-aimers could see if the route passed over or near any of the pinpoints! The ‘numbers’ of such landfalls could then be referred to the notice board (as above). By virtue of the blacked out land masses, an impression of the landfall as it would appear either visually or on the H2S – P.P.I. tube, could easily and accurately be obtained.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
619 Squadron report that F/Lt. Buttar, a pilot, carried out an exercise as Bomb Aimer and obtained average error of 18 yards from 12,000 feet!!!!
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Where and how would you read the suction for the Mark XIV Bombsight?
2. What is the minimum suction on the ground for the Mark XIV and what minimum reading on the suction gauge is required to ensure the necessary suction for the bombsight?
3. What is the correct vectored wind velocity for the Mark XIV Bombsight for True Wind of 090°/30 m.p.h. bearing and distance of marker from Aiming Point 045°/200 yards at a height of 8,000 feet?
4. What are the T.V’s of 4 lb incendiary, 4000 lb H.C., 500 lb G.P. and 1000 lb H.C. bombs?
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
All operations this month, with the exception of two, have been of short range. Navigation has therefore been very much easier. Broadcast w/v’s have been used on only two occasions. The results were not very satisfactory in either case. On the Brunswick operation (23/24 May, 1944) nearly half of the windfinders detailed did not transmit a single W/V! Navigators in H2S aircraft must realise they are fortunate in being able to check constantly their aircraft’s position. Non-H2S Navigators are not so fortunate, and they [underlined] do need [/underlined] assistance from you luckier fellows. Bear this point well in mind, windfinders, and the next time we use broadcast winds, let us have 100% co-operation!
With the approach of summer and the consequent drop in “darkness hours available” night sorties will decrease in range. Navigation will therefore become much easier. We must [underlined] NOT [/underlined] however “slacken off” our efforts. Concentration, track and time keeping are still essential to the success of any operation. Station Navigation Officers must carefully check the work of each Navigator and curtail immediately any attempt to “slacken off”. We may be called upon to carry out long range operations at any time, therefore constant practice in the use of Broadcast Wind Velocities, obtaining D.R. positions, etc., is essential, particularly for those new crews who will be arriving at Squadrons during this coming period. To maintain and improve the present standard of navigation, it is suggested that short plotting and computation exercises (similar to those already forwarded to squadrons) should be completed two or three times every week. If they are run in a competitive spirit, they will cease to be a “bind”, and much valuable experience will be gained. Here again particular attention should be paid to the less experienced Navigator.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING [/underlined]
There has been a gradual improvement during the last few months in the accuracy of winds found on operations. The “spread” now experienced in approximately half that of 4 or 5 months ago. An analysis is being made of winds found by the wind finding aircraft on the night 24/25th April, target – MUNICH. The analysis is not yet complete, but a rough indication shows that the probable error in wind finding is now down from 17 to 9 m.p.h. A big improvement, but no one can say there wasn’t room for one! The “spread” on this raid was 60° and 30 m.p.h. 75% of the winds being within 20° and 10 m.p.h. – here again a slight improvement.
It will be seen from the foregoing figures that errors are still far too high. The main causes of such errors are as follows:-
(i) Inaccuracies in taking and plotting of Gee and H2S fixes.
(ii) Inaccuracies in reading and plotting of A.P.I. positions.
(iii) Inaccuracies in measuring the w/v.
These are elementary points and should have been mastered long ago. Nevertheless, they [underlined] do [/underlined] exist and [underlined] must [/underlined] be eliminated. This can only be done if navigators make a regular practice of checking and re-checking all their plotting. It is far better to obtain two Gee fixes and plot them correctly than to obtain four and plot them all incorrectly. There is absolutely no reason why three of four navigators flying in aircraft at the same height, place and time should find w/v’s differing by 40° and 10 – 15 m.p.h. – but this does happen – even when in Gee range. Stations and Squadrons Navigation Officers must check the winds found by all navigators on each operation, and find out what large discrepancies do occur.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
It is now a known fact that the most accurate method of finding a W/V is by the A.P.I. and datum point method. Instructions have therefore been issued that this method is to be used on all practice bombing exercises. The “vector error” in practice bombing has decreased considerably since this method was introduced. We still have a long way to go however. Not until the “vector error” is 50 yards or below can we claim to be doing our bit. This, therefore, must be our aim. It is not by any means impossible to achieve, providing we carry out the drill correctly and do not make stupid mistakes. Do not for example try and find a w/v over a period of less than ten minutes – it can’t be done!! Always see that you pass over the “datum point” on the [underlined] same [/underlined heading as the first time. This is very important, otherwise large errors creep in.
We now have available a method of checking the w/v’s found by navigators. Downham Market (near Skegness) obtain accurate w/v checks every 6 hours. They are accurate to within 5° and 2 m.p.h. These winds are forwarded to Base and Station Navigation Officers daily. It is hoped that full use is being made of this valuable means of checking navigators work. Navigators should also check with their Squadron or Station Navigation Officers the post-Met. Wind applicable for their exercise.
To foster the competitive spirit, the best 8 wind finders for each month will appear in the Monthly News, commencing next month.
Any criticisms or suggestions for the improvement of the present wind finding procedure will be welcomed. So, go to it, and let us have your opinions – now!!!
[Underlined] TRAINING BASE SUMMARY [/underlined]
During May 229 details were flown on Command and Local Bullseyes, and excellent co-operation has been forthcoming from Nos.12 (F) and 10 (F) Groups. These exercises enable navigators to practice Gee and H2S fixing and learn the troubles associated with defensive manoeuvres. Many special radar routes have been laid on especially across the coasts of Wales, N.W. England and Northern Ireland, and on several occasions squadron aircraft have come in on these exercises (one C.U. pupil on one such flight took no less than 146 H2S fixes – and plotted them!)
H2S training is being extended in the Base and Wigsley will be staring early in June. Preparations have gone on steadily all through May. A trainer, radar mechanics and a training staff are standing by waiting for the next course. At Swinderby and Winthorpe nearly half of each course is now being radar trained and it is hoped that squadrons will appreciate the trouble which has been encountered with aircraft serviceability and stress of other training. Like Gee in the early days, H2S has been thrust upon C.U’s with very little extra staff and inadequate equipment to cope with demands. The second Radar buildings will very soon be ready, and extra bench sets available, so the Group can confidently look forward to a greater number of H2S crews coming through during the summer.
Priority is being put on wind finding by A.P.I. on all exercises – particularly during bombing practices. Trouble is being experienced in fitting the complete modification to the new Stirlings, but this work is being pressed on with as fast as possible. There are now approximately 70 aircraft in the Base fitted with the A.P.I. so that most navigators will receive air practice during their course. Ground Demonstration sets are also being made for all units so that pupils may see the A.P.I’s working on the ground. They will also receive resetting practice. Coupled with A.P.I. instruction, a long D.R. plot using broadcast w/v’s is incorporated in C.U. training. Therefore navigators should be arriving on squadrons fully trained, and well “genned up”. If they are not, then let us hear about it!
The training staffs at H.C.U’s have changed considerably during the last three months. Predominance is now on youth – navigators fresh from Squadrons, and there is only a small percentage of instructors who have been off operations longer than six months. Several Instructors have lately gone to Mosquito squadrons while others have returned to operations in 5 Group and P.F.F.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Operational results on H 2S have been quite good this month, and its potentialities in gardening have at long last been recognised. In this connection, various methods of gardening with H2S have been used effectively.
Dunholme had the first opportunity of using Leica cameras for photographing the P.P.I. at the gardening areas, and proved without doubt that the vegetables were planted in the correct furrows. Unfortunately the shortage of cameras still prevents us using them on operations to any great extent. Training is also restricted to one Base.
This month we welcome 619 Squadron into our select band. It is hoped that they will prove as capable in the use of this new aid as they have in the past with Gee. The responsibilities of training are considerable, and crews in 619 Squadron will have considerable extra flying training to carry out to master H2S. It must be remembered that H2S is primarily a navigational aid, and this must be borne in mind during training; complete mastery of H2S as a navigational aid means better track keeping, better winds, and above all better bombing. By bombing I mean that crews using H2S will ensure arriving at the correct target on time.
Training at Conversions Units is improving considerably, and increasing numbers of crews are being turned out practically fully trained. Wigsley is now ready to commence training and have been fortunate in securing a synthetic trainer. This increase in H2S training reflects great credit upon all the sections concerned, and considerable benefit should be derived by the operational squadrons.
Bomber Command have recently issued a sum-
(Continued on page 8, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 7
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NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
mary on H2S navigation, proving that the most effective method of track keeping is by frequent fixing. Frequent fixing ensures a higher reliability of fixes, and in addition it has been found normal navigation is not neglected. This indicates that successful H2S navigation requires frequent checks on position (at least one fix every ten minutes) combined with the normal navigational procedure. It is realised that most H2S operators in this Group are taught to take H2S fixes every six minutes; however, this point is mentioned in order to prevent the failure of navigation by H2S due to infrequent fixing, which has occurred on several operations in the past.
Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are concentrating on blind bombing trials with H2S Mark III and he 184 Indicator, and it is eventually hoped to come to some conclusion regarding the errors of respective methods of blind bombing.
Whilst it is realised visual bombing is the most effective when targets are small and can be identified, H2S Squadrons must by no means relax in their blind bombing training.
In this direction, operators should practice bombing runs on suitable targets whenever airborne. Then the set operator can so tune his set that only the town, the course marker the range marker and the very faintest of ground returns can be seen, he can consider himself approaching proficiency. With this is mind, 55 Base have designed an extremely efficient poster of H2S Track and Ground Speed Bombing, and a copy of this is reproduced in this issue. It is hoped that Command will eventually issue this as an official poster for use on the Navigation Section of all H2S Units.
H2S photography has been rather disappointing this month. Instructions detailing the steps to be taken when photographing the P.P.I. are available on the Squadrons carrying out this training and they must be followed to obtain good quality photographs. Remember poor photographs reflect upon your set manipulation, and individual assessments of your operation of the equipment can be made from the photographs you obtain.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Operations this month produced no exceptional ranges on Gee, partly due to the fact that most targets were within normal range.
Certain discrepancies were noticed in the North Eastern Chain by navigators in this Group, and steps have been taken to ascertain the error to correct the phasing. Until such time as this is done, the error, although opinions differ as to its limits, will have to be accepted.
Instances have also occurred recently where lattice charts have been found to be inaccurate due to the colour plates slipping during printing. Whilst all Lattice Charts are hand checked, inaccurate charts have on occasions reached navigators, who have been at a loss to explain the difficulties experienced with the Gee chain.
Care is being taken to see that faulty charts are not set [sic] out to units, but in the meantime, every navigator should check his charts to see if the coloured registration crosses (either green, red, or purple) found at each corner of the printed map surface are superimposed one above the other. If one of these crosses is displaced, then the particular coloured lattice lines have been inaccurately positioned and the chart must be exchanged for a correct one.
Good D.R. navigation enabled both the above inaccuracies to be found out and one navigator actually assessed the error which he applied to all his fixes.
Against this we have the navigator who puts the whole of his navigation on to the box and this month a little story with a moral is printed. Acknowledgement for this is due to F/O Craven of 1660 Conversion Unit.
COX AND THE BOX
COX AND THE BOX
You’ve heard of Salome and Lulu,
They’re as well known as Nerve and Knox,
But listen to me while I tell you
The tale of young Cox and the Box.
For 12 months he’d listened to lectures
(Such a bind, and so orthodox),
But just at the end of his training,
An Instructor said “Now meet the Box”.
At the end of a few simple lectures,
He mused on his way to the Blocks;
“Damn the D.R. and the Astro –
Why work when you’ve got the old Box?”
Navigation henceforth seemed so easy,
Bang on! – Back to Base from Clyde Docks.
On return they repeated the warning;
“Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
On the Squadron, his first trip was simple,
From the time he heard “Out with the chocks”,
To the time that Control replied “Pancake”,
He chewed – and got round on the Box.
The next was to Essen – they bombed and came out,
But were coned, and took several hard knocks;
The kite had been hit, but what shook him most
Was to find he’d no joy on the Box.
The petrol was low, they couldn’t find Base,
But by now accustomed to shocks.
No D.R. – no air plot – he vainly looked up,
But still found no joy on the Box.
The sequel is morbid, and sad to relate,
It’s all filed away under “Cox”,
Read on if you will, and you’ll see what we say,
Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
“You had a son, in the Air Force,
In Aircrew I think, Mrs. Cox?
Well, he’s been pretty rapid and finished his trips.
And they’re sending him home – in a Box”.
EQUIPMENT
The present grave shortage of manpower is causing increasing difficulties to Maintenance Units and Station Equipment Officers should therefore ascertain by personal investigation whether all their demands are being correctly prepared. If all stations regularly raised their demands in the official manner, there would be considerable economy in manpower and time spent in satisfying demands at M.U’s. and numerous queries would be obviated. For easy reference, some of the salient points are set out as follows:-
[Underlined] Forms 600 Demands. [/underlined]
(i) Insufficient address. Units should always state full postal address, and it is important that the accounting serial number is clearly endorsed as part of the address.
(ii) Nearest railway Station muse [sic] be quoted directly beneath the address.
[Underlined] Urgent Demands (A.M.O. A.481/43) [/underlined]
(i) These demands must be placed together in a separate envelope, stamped in RED, “PRIORITY 1 C”.
(ii) Date for delivery must be quoted in all cases, and an interval of at least ten days should be given.
(iii) The endorsement must be initialled by the demanding officer.
(iv) Aircraft or engine type and serial number, or the purpose for which other items are required, must be quoted. In the case of M.T. the chassis number must invariably be given.
(v) Immediate despatch of all Urgent Demands to Equipment Parks by their transport or D.R.L.S.
[Underlined] A.O.C. or I.O.R. Signal Demands. [/underlined]
It is important that this type of demand be raised strictly in accordance with A.M.O. A.1312/42, as amended by A.M.O. A. 326/44. These demands are of the very highest priority and therefore it is essential that the method of raising the signal is uniform in every detail at all Units. Signals must be made out very clearly, and only one section may be demanded on one signal, and not more than 8 items of one particular section – and each of these items must be given a separate line (see A.M.O. A.604/40).
If all concerned comply strictly with the letter of the law in this respect, there is every reason to hope that the goods will be received with the minimum of delay with consequent reflection of increased serviceability and efficiency.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 10 Col.1)
New crews are now getting a thorough introduction to the Lancaster Dinghy and Parachute Drills at the L.F.S. and the dummy fuselage is paying high dividends. The record time for a dummy ditching at Syerston is 10 seconds. It was encouraging to hear a gunner remark as the crew stood on the starboard mainplane with their drill completed in 16 1/2 seconds – “That’s not good enough, Skipper, let’s have another go.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 8
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H.2.S TRACK & GROUND SPEED BOMBING
IDEAL BOMB
Set on Dalton Computer W/V and True Air Speed. From the measured track compute the course to make good this track. Make any alterations as necessary. Set Range Drum to 10 miles in order to know when to switch to 10/10 scale. [Diagram] No. 1
When on 10/10 scale make final corrections of heading to ensure correct tracking. Range marker is set to correct radius on range drum ground speed settings. [Diagram] No. 2
No. 3 [Diagram] Height pulse must be set against first ground return before ground speed is set on the Range Drum.
No. 4 [Diagram] Ground speed is found to be 200 m.p.h. Rotate range drum until 200 ground speed line is against range pointer. This pre-sets range marker ring to a set radius on 10/10 scale.
Note the time that range marker ring cuts response. 30 seconds plus time delay for real bombs from this time the aircraft has travelled to bomb release point. At this point bombs away. [Diagram] No. 5
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The 30 second delay release lines on the H2S range drum is calibrated for the ideal bomb. To ensure that real bombs strike the target, a time delay has to be added to 30 seconds. This time delay differs for different categories of bombs and will be given at briefing by the Bombing Leaders.
No. 6 [Diagram]
Point where range marker ring cuts response on 10/10 scale.
Distance denoting timed run of 30 plus seconds to release point.
Release Point. Bombs Away.
Forward trail of bomb carries it to objective from release point.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 9
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AIR SEA RESCUE
There was one known ditching in the Group during May. On the night 27/28th May, a Mosquito of 627 Squadron was heard to transmit “Engine on fire – ditching”. The aircraft was flying at low height over the sea after attacking the target, and later was sighted burning on the surface. Search on the following morning revealed aircraft wreckage off the enemy coast. Unfortunately no one was rescued.
This one incident does not mean that 5 Group crews are “Ditching free” or are unlikely to have to ditch in future. The most recent monthly analysis shows that 189 lives were saved from aircraft in all Commands which ditched in home waters. A total of 467 lives were lost, however, in ditchings – a high proportion of 71%. A majority of these losses occurred in ditchings when no W/T messages were received. This proves that sea crossings, even on short range targets, are still a hazard for aircraft which may have been damaged by enemy defences.
Regular practice of dinghy and parachute drills must continue. Saturday morning is the time for such practice. Several squadrons have got down to this very quickly, but others are not carrying out the instructions from this Headquarters in either the spirit or the letter.
Ten crews were tested during the month in the Safety Drill Competition. Generally crews has a good idea of what was required, but the majority revealed lack of practice. One Flight Commander provided a refreshing example. His crew drills were perfect. A Flight Commander is a busy man, and yet he and his crew made the time to set an example and give themselves a wide safety margin if ever they have to ditch.
(Continued on page 8, Column 3)
Results of the Safety Drill Competition for May are as follows:-
Place Dinghy Drills Parachute Drills
1 52 Base 55 Base
2 53 Base 54 Base
3 54 Base 52 Base
5 55 Base 53 Base
The best and worst crews were in 55 Base, and one crew with just over 50% of marks placed the Base last in order of merit. Details of Squadrons tested and marks gained are as follows:-
[Table of Safety Competition Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The Training Base Record for a Dinghy Drill is 10 seconds. The best Squadron time was [underlined] 18 seconds [/underlined], the worst [underlined] 43 seconds. [/underlined]
ENEMY AGENTS CARELESS WALKERS
With the lighter evenings and finer weather there is a great deal to be said for a country walk over the fields after working in an office all day.
You may not be interested in birds nests or flowers but even in flat country like Lincolnshire there is some amazingly pretty scenery if you will only walk to see it. If you are lucky, you may be able to take a pretty picture of scenery with you, which will make all the difference.
Do remember though, that when walking in the fields, you are really trespassing and owe a debt of gratitude to the owner or tenant of the land for letting you enjoy yourselves. Hardly any farmers will raise any objection wherever you walk, if you for your part will take just a little trouble to avoid two things,
(i) trampling on growing crops
(ii) leaving gates open.
The farmer is putting a great deal of very hard work into his land nowadays and suffering just as badly from the manpower problem as we are in the Service, perhaps even worse. You will see Mrs. Farmer nowadays doing much heavier work in the fields than many of us would care to tackle, and for very long hours too.
If you walk along the hedgerows or fence sides you will do no harm to crops; its [sic] the best place to walk too if you are interested in nature, but most important of all DO SHUT EVERY GATE you go through, even if its [sic] open when you get there. It was probably left open by someone careless ahead.
Gates left to swing in a wind soon break and farmers can’t get new ones nowadays. Cattle get through from the roadside or neighbouring fields; a flock of sheep in the wrong field can easily cause a loss of a hundred pounds or more to a farmer. He won’t want you in his fields at that price, and it’s no good blaming the sheep. The farmer’s doing a vital job of work in this war to provide our food, so help him as much as you can when you enjoy his fields and [underlined] PLEASE SHUT THAT GATE [/underlined] and don’t be a CARELESS WALKER.
ACCIDENTS
During May [underlined] over 50 [/underlined] aircraft were damaged in accidents within the Group – the majority seriously. At least 14 were written off completely, and 8 were [underlined] Cat. B [/underlined] The Cat. AC total will probably be 16, which leaves only about 12 aircraft which sustained minor damage. These are depressing figures, and are all the more regrettable because at least 20 of these accidents were “avoidable”.
Squadrons damaged 21 aircraft including six Mosquitos, and 51 Base damaged 29. One Spitfire of 1690 B.D.T.F. was also damaged.
Details of avoidable accidents during the month are as follows:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined]
Taxying…3
Swings…2
Overshoots on Landing…1
Mid-Air collision…1
Others…3
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined]
Taxying (M/T)…1
Overshoots on Landing…3
Swings…2
3 engined overshoot crashes…1
Maintenance errors…1
Others…2
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] TROPHY FOR ACCIDENT FREE SQUADRON [/underlined]
A Silver model of a Lancaster has been presented to the Group by Messrs. A.V. Roe. The Air Officer Commanding has decided to award this model Quarterly as a trophy to the Squadron or Training Unit with the least number of avoidable accidents. The first award will be made at the end of June for the period January to June and thereafter every three months. The Squadrons in the lead at the end of May are 49, 57 and 106 Squadrons.
[Underlined] TAXYING [/underlined]
Taxying accidents were fewer this month. It is notable that Training Base had only [underlined] one [/underlined] and this an M/T collision, which did minor damage, A most peculiar accident, which is classed as “Taxying” for want of a better category, occurred on a Squadron recently. A Lancaster pilot turned off the runway and stopped all his engines because of low brake pressure. He re-started his inners with the idea of proceeding to a position more favourable for towing and had just started moving when a ground crew N.C.O., entered the cockpit, grasped the throttles and commenced manipulating them. The Lancaster gathered speed, left the perimeter and finished up with a broken undercarriage when it hit an obstruction. As ground personnel are strictly forbidden to taxy aircraft this episode needs no further comment.
[Underlined] SWINGS [/underlined]
Mosquitos provided the two serious swinging accidents in Squadrons this month – one landing and one taking off. Both occurred in a cross wind.
One Stirling swung on take-off and sustained only minor damage when the tailplane struck some bushes. The pilot did the right thing after the swing started. A Stirling
(Continued on page 16, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1844. PAGE 10
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SIGNALS
[Underlined] INT QEF? [/underlined]
The R.1082/T.1083 W/T G.P. installation departed from Bomber aircraft about three years ago; with it went the crystal monitor, and we were all very pleased! Since then the Marconi G.P. installation has performed excellent service, and with operators who are kept in practice, has tuned to within a kilocycle of the required frequency.
When an aircraft is acting as W/T control for a large force, it is imperative that the W/T equipment is accurately tuned, otherwise the vital control messages are lost in the welter of interference which hems in all frequencies those nights.
On two occasions this month the control aircraft has been off frequency. This has necessitated the re-introduction of the crystal monitor as an essential item in aircraft carrying out the duties of Controller, Deputy Controller and W/T link, and good results are now once again being obtained. The crystal monitor is, however, a rather clumsy device and requires some skill. Thanks to the ingenuity of Ludford Magna we are trying out a crystal controlled T.1154, which eliminates – almost entirely – the human element. Ludford Magna id obtaining excellent operational results, which we intend to emulate. Thank you 1 Group.
[Underlined] WE HEARD [/underlined]
During the month we have obtained several excellent recordings of the intercom. and R/T in control aircraft during controlled attacks. These recordings, in addition to providing accurate minute by minute pictures of the course of attacks, have brought to light several technical difficulties and enabled them to be overcome. One, in particular, was the loud high pitched whine which had been accepted by crews as an unfortunate regular feature of V.H.F. R/T over the Continent. Thanks to the recordings this whine has been identified and almost completely eliminated. Arrangements are in hand to make permanent recordings for issue to Squadrons and training units. Main Force crews will then fully realise the many problems with which the Controller has to contend.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
As far as Aircrew Signals is concerned, the month resembled the old adage – “Came in like a lion, went out like a lamb”. And what a lion?
Nevertheless, we have derived much profit from our mistakes, and have emerged the purer for our trials, although it is to be regretted that our major “boob” occurred when our comrades from No.1 Group were helping us. We hope that on the next occasion we can prove to them that all is now well with our Operators. All Wireless Operators (Air) are fully aware by now of what is expected of a Controller’s Operator, and without any excuse for the repetition we would say [underlined] Practice makes for Perfection. [/underlined]
To improve the standard of speech throughout the Group, not only on V.H.F. but on R/T generally [underlined] and [/underlined] intercomm., it is hoped to install a Speech Training Section in our Conversion Units and at the Aircrew School at Scampton. Instructors have had a special short course a A.D.G.B. Headquarters where all Sector Controllers are taught the art of making themselves clearly understood without the need for repetition. The idea is not to produce an Oxford accent, but rather to give all crews the perfect “Mikeside Manner”, and if we can achieve this end, we shall be a step nearer to perfection.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS [/underlined]
All Signals Leaders by now will have had a copy of the schedule of equipment laid down for Signals Training Rooms. This is just one more step in the right direction, and it is hoped that all concerned have taken advantage and put in all the necessary demands.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
A few Squadrons did not produce their past form this month. Little points like not using the correct aircraft letters allocated to the Squadron, starting the exercise late, giving one message and then asking permission to close down. Now all Signals Leaders will agree that the Group exercise is an invaluable method for keeping operators on top line, and more attention must be paid to it in future.
[Underlined] RECALL SIGNALS [/underlined]
Why is it that Wireless Operators (Air) take so long to answer a recall signal? The need arose during this month to recall the few aircraft that had taken off for an operation, and considerable time elapsed before all aircraft had acknowledged the message. This state of affairs hardly ties up with Instructions in force about maintaining a continuous listening watch on Base. The Group Signals Leader would like to see an improvement, please.
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING REPORTS [/underlined]
There is another corner of the Signals Leaders’ domain that could stand a clean up with the help of our sister section, the Gunners (Bless ‘em). There is still a good deal of duff gen reaching this Headquarters on the Form “Z”. The Operator states that there were no sightings of enemy aircraft not picked up by the E.W.D; the Gunners sign that statement, but someone tells the Intelligence Officer a different story. You can help the war effort by vetting the Intelligence reports and preventing this duff gen from leaving your Station. It would save the writer’s telephone extension from overwork too.
Apart from these few moans, the general standard of Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is high. They are doing an excellent job, and playing a worthy part in the present battles. Make sure that we can continue this be profiting [sic] from our mistakes in the past, and training at every available moment.
[Underlined] POINTS TO NOTE [/underlined]
1. Has the new Bomber Command General Instruction governing attacks at night by aircraft in home and enemy waters been seen and read by all Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group?
2. M/F D/F Sections now send out an interval signal, if not already on the air. Are you au fait? Note – no DIT DITS in acknowledgement, by order.
3. Have you all met Monica’s baby brother Walter – by Pickup out of Her?
[Underlined STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt Cawdron, D.F.M., No.630 Squadron, who topped No.7 Signals Leaders’ Course.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failure percentage for the month of May has, regrettably, shown an increase over the previous month. Congratulations are however, extended to Signals Officers and their Maintenance staffs for having no maintenance failures in Sqdns throughout the month. It is interesting to see how the maintenance failure percentage has slowly decreased to zero, and it is hoped that during the forthcoming months this can be maintained. During May there were no cases of aircraft failing to take off on operational missions as the result of Signals defects. It is also gratifying to learn that there were only five “early returns” due to signals failures out of 2,254 operational sorties flown. Of the remaining 42 failures, approximately 90% of them are attributed to equipment defects. A good show, chaps – keep it up.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T FITTING [/underlined]
All stations have received during the month, a policy letter on the projected programme of V.H.F. fitting for the remainder of 5 Group Squadrons. The supply of all items of equipment, apart from connector sets, has been kept up to schedule. The first consignment of connectors is due, while the 26 Group Fitting Party should be with us any day. Fitting of 44 Squadron should therefore commence without much delay. All indications are that the flow of connector sets will be steady from then onwards.
[Underlined] RADAR CONFERENCE [/underlined]
The Radar Conference held during the month was attended by all Base Signals Officers and Radar Officers in the Group, as well as representatives of Bomber Command. The agenda
(Continued on page 12, Column 1)
ELEMENTARY MY DEAR WATSON
Flight Lieu-ten-ant Jo-seph Soap
Re-port-ed every wire-less slip
In the de-cent pi-ous hope
That R.A.E. might take a tip,
And fab-ric-ate su-per-ior mods
For fit-ing by main-ten-ance nods.
He viewd with sca-thing scorn-ful jeers
And wide su-per-ior smiles,
Dis-com-fit-ure of dull con-freres
Whose in-eff-ect-ual wiles,
And urg-ent eff-orts ne’er re-lax
To co-ver up their sec-tions’ blacks.
E-vas-ive ac-tion reaps re-ward
By kee-ping fail-ures down.
On hon-est men a-buse is poured;
Con-tume-ly is their crown.
A pa-ra-dox you must ad-mit.
The mo-ral’s there, dis-cov-er it!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
was long, and a great divergence of opinion was shown on many items. All agreed, however, that the conference had cleared up numerous points, and such conferences should be held more often.
The introduction of Base Servicing was the main item on the agenda. This subject was discussed in detail, and it was agreed that Base Servicing would be introduced when appropriate accommodation and test equipment became available. Some Bases have, at present, a system of Base servicing, and are of the opinion that it produces a great saving in time. The systems now in use, however, are not all-inclusive and to make them so, many changes will be necessary. Bomber Command is at present working out the final details of a complete Base Servicing system. It is probable that they will send representatives to each Base to study the accommodation position.
Another complicated issue was the standardisation of Daily Inspections. There has long been a requirement for some D.I. card, similar to the Form 700, to standardise Daily Inspections, and to ensure that nothing is forgotten. This was not thought necessary by many Radar Officers. However, some days ago, a check was made on man-hours spent in the daily inspection on various equipments, and it was found that Bases often differed by 100 per cent. This confirms our opinion that there is a lack of standardisation which may be responsible for some of our failures. Trials are now being carried out by all Groups on D.I. cards forwarded to Command by this Headquarters. Any suggested alterations will be made to Bomber Command, and a final card is to be printed and issued. It will then be up to the Squadron Radar Officers to ensure that these cards are correctly used. H.Q.B.C. is also preparing a Form 22E for major and minor inspections of Radar equipment. This form will be similar to the present Signals Form 22, and will cover inspections of Col.7 and Col.9 equipment.
[Underlined] H 2 S FITTING [/underlined]
The fitting of H2S in the Stirlings of out Heavy Conversion Units has now been completed. This provides 41 aircraft for training in H2S and Fishpond, with the resultant increase in the number of trained H2S crews arriving at Squadron. Metheringham and Wigsley received their synthetic trainers during the month, and there is a good chance of all H2S Squadrons being so equipped by the end of June.
The introduction of H2S to 619 Squadron is now under way, and it is expected that this squadron will be completely equipped by the end of June.
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
Last month’s forecast of an increase in serviceability was no doubt greeted with laughter. However, fine weather, short range targets and greater attention to detail have brought their reward with an increase in the serviceability of all equipments except H2S Mark III.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The short range targets attacked during May provided ample opportunity for Gee to regain much of its old glory.
Serviceability was the highest yet – 96.9% an increase of 0.4% over April. The other types of Radar equipment are, however, catching up rapidly, and it appears that there is a possibility of Gee losing its leadership in the coming month.
[Underlined] MONICA IIIA [/underlined]
This equipment came the nearest to overtaking Gee, with a serviceability of 93.5% out of 745 sorties. This is very commendable indeed, and it is hoped that squadrons can maintain this high figure when the weather and target ranges are not so favourable. Congratulations to 467 Squadron, who have completed their last 134 sorties without a single Monica defect. This is a record well worth beating.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II [/underlined]
May brought us to the end of the second round in our battle for increased H 2 S. Mark II serviceability. For the first time the Group serviceability for a whole month was 90.0%. This is good. Let us now try, during the third round, to bring it up to 100%. There still remains, however, a serious number of cases of switching off and flashing on the screen, which seems to indicate that the old sources of trouble still predominate, viz., filament transformers, and H.T. condensers. H.Q.B.C. are making every effort to divert the new type filament transformers from the production lines for retrospective fitting. They have been informed however, that it will be a few weeks yet before this can be done. Crystals and cases of no signals are also assuming a large proportion of the failures, and to combat this, improved versions of valves are being tested.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK III [/underlined]
Unfortunately a setback in serviceability of H2S Mark III was experienced during May. Out of a total of 75 sorties, there were 14 difficulties reported, giving a serviceability of 81.2%. Among these failures there do not appear to be any outstanding breakdowns, but considerable work remains to the done in clearing up the various minor snags which only become evident after considerable operational experience.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond has made a favourable advance in serviceability, with an increase of almost 3% over April. A total of 937 sorties was flown of which 89.1% were serviceable. As Fishpond serviceability largely depends on H2S, an increase in H2S serviceability will cause a corresponding increase in Fishpond. In last month’s V Group News, reference was made to trials to reduce Fishpond minimum range. The filter unit which was produced has proved unsatisfactory, and at present there are no signs of this problem being solved.
TACTICS
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following extracts from combat reports show again what Monica and Fishpond can do is properly used:-
(i) “The only indication of E/A’s presence was on Visual Monica which first indicated at 2,000 yards. The W/Op. gave running commentary until E/A closed to 800 yards – fighter not identified visually by either gunners. W/Op. instructed “corkscrew to port”, tracer from fighter then seen to pass on the starboard beam – gunners still unable to make visual contact.” (467 Squadron).
(ii) “After breaking away from first contact (this was indicated by Monica) E/A continued to shadow our aircraft until time of this attack, during the period between attacks the W/Op. reported contacts on Visual Monica but no visual was obtained owing to bad visibility.” (50 Squadron)
(iii) “Contact by Fishpond at 2 1/2 miles dead astern, and the bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards, visual by both gunners at 500 yards. Both gunners opened fire at 500 yards and strikes were seen on the fuselage, followed by a bright white flash. E/A did not return fire and broke away on the starboard quarter down.” (50 Squadron)
(iv) Contact on Fishpond at 2 miles port quarter. Bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards. Visual by gunners at 400 yards; both fired short bursts before E/A disappeared from view. No return fire.” (44 Squadron)
It appears from other combat reports that some crews are getting contacts quite early (up to 2000 yards), but do not corkscrew until the fighter is at a range of 600 yards, or until the gunners obtain a visual. The outcome in several encounters of this nature has been for a gunner to order “corkscrew” and the fighter to open fire at the same moment, often causing damage to the aircraft before the manoeuvre has begun. The moral is quite obvious. If you have adequate warning of an E/A go into a corkscrew at 750 yards. This technique has put fighters off time and again.
[Underlined] WINDOW [/underlined]
Frequent reminders have been seen in these pages in recent issues emphasising the necessity for dropping Window at the correct rate. If some people have taken note of these reminders, there are still others who have yet to realise the importance of launching Window correctly. A long and interesting paper has been produced by the Window experts and will be forwarded to units in a day or so. All crews must take the opportunity of finding out all about Window from this informative paper.
[Underlined] RECORDINGS OF CREW PROCEDURES [/underlined]
An excellent portable wire recording and reproducing unit, lent to us from the USAAF has supplied us with some interesting recordings of crew intercommunication and V.H.F. R/T procedure in Controllers’ aircraft during recent attacks. Experiments are being carried out to convert these recordings into permanent records for use in squadrons and training units. One point which stands out clearly is the reluctance of the bombing force
(Continued at foot of Column 2)
[Underlined] TACTICS (Cont. from Col.3)
to comply quickly with the Controller’s orders. After he orders bombing to cease there should be no delay in withholding your bombing run. Even a Mosquito which probably has to fly low and re-mark or back up, cannot cope with a shower of bombs falling on top of it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] TRAINING WITH CINE GYRO ASSESSORS [/underlined]
This training showed a very welcome increase during May, particularly in the 51 Base units, who have now got the scheme working smoothly, but could produce even better results is [sic] more gyro assessors were available. 20 more assessors have been asked for, and it is intended to distribute them within 51 Base to reduce the amount of fitting and removal in aircraft. This, at present, is considerable, and rapid changes have to be made each time an aircraft detailed for gyro work becomes unserviceable. With the increased allotment of assessors, more aircraft will be fitted, and less wear and tear imposed on the assessors.
Squadron training with gyro assessors has also improved, but there still remain several squadrons who are lagging behind. These Units should make an effort to exercise more crews during June, and aim at giving each gunner at least one exercise during each month. 97 and 83 Squadrons have now been equipped with assessors and will commence training early in June. Squadron Gunnery Leaders have been instructed in assessing the films, and all processing can be carried out on the spot. Instances have occurred when processed films have remained in the Photos. Section 24 hours after processing; this shows a lack of co-operation between Photos. and Gunnery; it is essential that films be shown as soon as possible after landing, while details of the exercise are still fresh in the gunners’ minds. All operational units are being equipped with an “Ampro” projector, for projecting cine gyro films, and all existing silent projectors will be replaced by the “Ampro”, which is particularly suitable for film assessing. Details of the issue and exchange are contained in Bomber Command letter BC/S.23964/E.4. dated 25th March, 1944.
[Underlined] SIGHTING CHECKS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
During May, personnel from 1690 B.D.T. Flight carried out a series of sighting checks on Squadron gunners; the results are given below:-
[Table of Gunners’ Test Results by Squadron]
Squadron Average 64.64
Gunnery Conferences were also held at each Base, and all Gunnery matters, particularly training were discussed; minutes of these Conferences have been circulated to all units. The suggestions put forward at these conferences are under consideration, and decisions will be communicated to Units shortly. The suggestions that each squadron should have a training aircraft was of particular interest to Gunnery Leaders, as it will ease the problem of gyro fitting and harmonising considerably.
[Underlined] FROSTBITE [/underlined]
After a period of warm weather, and medium height attacks, the return to high level attacks on Duisburg and Brunswick produced several instances of frostbite amongst gunners. Precaution against frostbite must be observed at all times. A recent examination of gunners’ helmets in one unit revealed that quite a number had not the metal parts of the harness covered with tape, thus increasing the risk of frostbite to the face. Both the use of Lanolin and the abovementioned precaution are vital if frostbite is to be avoided.
The use of Balaclava helmets has proved successful, and a request has been made to establish this a as a stores item; this will eliminate the necessity for relying on the local knitting circle and the Comforts fund as a source of supply. While we are very grateful for the efforts of those concerned, some units had difficulty in obtaining enough to equip all gunners.
[Underlined] CLEANLINESS OF PERSPEX [/underlined]
Units are reminded that “SINEC” cleaning outfits, stores reference 336/767, are available on a scale of one per aircraft, for cleaning perspex, and gunners should avail themselves of this equipment for cleaning turret cupolas. The outfit consists of three bottles of cleaning and polishing preparations together with cleaning rags. One squadron has twenty of these outfits held in the Gunnery Section, which are issued on signature to Gunners each morning when gunners are allotted aircraft for daily inspection.
[Underlined] MARK IIIN REFLECTOR SIGHT {Stores Ref. 83/2465 [/underlined]
The above item has been introduced in sufficient quantities to equip all rear turrets in operational aircraft, letter dated 21st May, reference 5G/618/2/Armt. gives full particulars of this issue. The sight embodies a new type dimming control and has no metal hood, which improves the search position. No sunscreen is fitted to the Mark IIIN sight, but special sights are available fitted with a sunscreen. Reports from gunners who have used the sight on operations are all in favour, and Gunnery Leaders should press for the fitting of this item.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Experiments are being made to ascertain the possibilities of using a pilot type parachute in the rear turret.
Fiskerton have received the first F.N.121 rear turret on a demonstration stand. This turret includes Mark 2C Gyro Gunsight, electric motor for servo feed, and improved valve-box.
Supply of microphone heaters is held up for three months, but an allotment of 100 has been received; these will be distributed early in June.
Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Swinderby is completed.
Squadrons are now being equipped with electric gun heaters in rear turrets.
1690 B.D.T.F. personnel at Swinderby are producing a synthetic trainer for teaching the corkscrew.
Tests with infra-red cameras in rear turrets against Hurricane aircraft at night, will be made during June.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
Congratulations to S/Ldr. Patten on appointment to the C.G.I. post at Aircrew School, Scampton.
F/Lt Hamilton will fill Gunnery Leader vacancy at Aircrew School.
(Continued on page 14, Column 2)
This month’s bag:
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Squadron. A/C letter Date Type of E/A
44 Y 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
207 X 3/4.5.44. ME.110 (c)
106 Q 9/10.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
61 P 11/12.5.44.. JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
630 Z 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
57 C 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
57 T 1/2.5.44. ME.210
97 N 3/4.5.44. ME.210 or 410
57 A 7/8.5.44. ME.410 (c)
97 E 7/8.5.44. ME.109
57 L 7/8.5.44. JU. 88
57 L 7/8.5.44. T/E u/i
619 A 7/8.5.44. DO.217 (c)
630 E 12.5.44. ME.110 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
619 G 21/22.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 Q 21/22.5.44. T/E u/I (c)
207 F 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 V 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 R 27/28.5.44. ME.110
The claims marked (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Cartoon]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Read paragraphs 1 to 3 for Freshmen. The same applies to you. The 90° test for the Mark XIV Bombsight is as new to you as to the freshmen, so get it buttoned up. It has been proved that experienced pilots who can fly accurately in normal flight, and keep the top needle of the turn and bank indicator central, develop a consistent creep as soon as they commence the bombing run. Are you one of the offenders?
Take an interest in the analysis of your practice bombing results. Take an interest in the technical staff who maintain your bombsight. Talk things over with your Air Bomber. You’ve probably some these things before, and you must concentrate on them even more from now on.
Don’t expect your navigator to get accurate pinpoints on H2S unless you are assisting him by flying straight and level. If you fly unsteadily, the images he gets will be blurred and indistinct.
There’s a landing ground at Fristen near Eastbourne which you may see homeward bound sometime. This is not an airfield with facilities comparable to Woodbridge and is now unsuitable for night landings. The airfield surface is grass and the longest run, 1650 yards, has a sheer drop into the sea. Don’t use this landing ground except as a last resort in a grave “emergency”.
If your hydraulics are unserviceable and you are attempting a belly landing or a ditching, don’t use the air bottle to lower some flap otherwise the wheels will come down as well!
If you have to land using Fido, turn on your internal cockpit lights. This will help to counteract dazzle from the glare of the burners.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Flying for bombing must be your main preoccupation from now on. You are attacking small targets and are putting night precision bombing on the map. First of all learn the limitations of the Mark XIV Bombsight, and the flying errors that can creep in.
Study the 90° method of testing the Mark XIV Bombsight in flight. Don’t leave this to your Air Bomber. You play a very large part in making this test productive.
Do correctly banked turns for correction on your bombing run. Keep the top needle of the turn and bank central. Don’t slip or skid. Practice correction with your Air Bomber, and when you get the “Steady” from him, come out of your turn in the normal way. Don’t hurry the recovery from the turn.
Several pilots got into difficulties last month through flying in or near cumulo-nimbus cloud. This type of cloud is dangerous for all aircraft, and the moral is – avoid it!! Get a copy of A.P. 1980 – “How to Avoid Flying Accidents due to Weather” – it’s well worth reading.
If you experience juddering after take off it is probably due to the wheels spinning as the undercarriage retracts. Apply a touch of brake to stop the wheels. Check your cowlings in case the juddering is due to other causes.
This is old “gen” but it is still ignored. Don’t rush your throttles open on take-off, just because you are on a short runway with a full load. Your airscrews will only be slipping, and you won’t get the thrust equivalent of the power used. Open up easily and gradually. You’ll “unstick” just as soon and you won’t swing.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.B.S.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS (Cont. from page 13 Col. 3)
F/Lt. Wynyard, ex 57 Squadron, will take over Gunnery Leader’s post at 49 Squadron.
F/Lt. Harper, ex 207 Squadron will fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 1660 Con. Unit) [sic]
F/Lt. Clarke, ex 1660 Con. Unit to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 467 Squadron.
F/Lt. Cleary, ex 27 O.T.U., Lichfield, to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 44 Squadron.
F/Lt. Gross appointed Gunnery Leader at 9 Squadron.
F/O Wyand posted from 9 Squadron to 619 Squadron.
F/Lt. Howard posted to Coningsby for special duties.
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of May was 1515, of which 1045 produced plottable ground detail; it will again be noted from the analysis that the percentage of failures remains high. Many of these failures should not have occurred.
Small stocks of Kodacolour films do not permit its extensive use, but a proportion of aircraft in all squadrons except No. 54 Base, have been detailed to carry composite film. It is still necessary to centralise processing at Scampton to economise in the use of special chemicals. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases have now undertaken the assembly of their own composite film, and it is interesting to note that no major difficulties have been experienced. It is, however, obvious that all photographers do not yet realise the extreme care that is necessary when dealing with composite film assembly. Senior N.C.O’s are directly responsible for studying the preliminary instructions issued from this Headquarters, and ensuring that he whole of their staff are trained and practiced; this is particularly important in respect of processing, and when sufficient chemicals and film are available, each Base Photographic Section will commence its own processing. No deviation from these instructions will be permitted.
[Underlined] H 2 S Photography, [/underlined] the small supply of miniature cameras has retarded progress, but an improvement is expected during this month. Results have been obtained with the few cameras at our disposal, but some of them were out of focus. This is thought to be due to the focussing device. Examine this item of equipment, and ensure that the matt surface, of the glass is [underlined] towards the camera lens and the packing piece between the glass surface and the screw locking ring. [/underlined]
It is necessary to draw attention to the curious fact that there are still some photographic personnel that imagine that their only duty is F.24 night photography, and that when new methods and equipment are introduced they should be attended by increases of staff. That this attitude should be obvious id an indication of poor control on the part of certain N.C.O’s; it is, therefore, necessary to correct this idea immediately. It does not matter what photography is undertaken, the photographic section on the Station and Squadron will treat each branch with speed and efficiency. There are no trade union hours in the R.A.F. and Senior N.C.O’s are reminded that the question of priority of work, should it arise, will be given by the Senior Intelligence Officer.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
The month is remarkable for the scarcity of station reports. The change-over from winter to summer games may have some bearing on this, but reports are essential if this column is to mirror the Group activities, so next month, chaps, please let us have it by the 2nd, missing nothing from the activities of the local trout-ticklers to the best figures of the station Henry Cotton.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON’s [/underlined] final game in the Lincoln League was with Avro. They lost 5- 3 to their “case hardened” rivals, but have put up the following significant record:-
Played. 52
Won. 38
Lost. 10
Drawn. 4
Goals for 193
Goals against 113
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] completed their season with two games, losing 1 – 3 to Waddington and beating Scothern 2 – 0 at home.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] football has seen a memorable rivalry in the knock-out competition, between “B” Flight and S.H.Q. These two teams have now played four games with extra time in the last two, and still no result. The winners of this Homeric duel meet B.A.T. Flight to battle for the cup.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] wound up their season with a 4 – 2 win over the 1st Border Regiment, leaving them with the following satisfactory season result:-
Played. 18
Won. 12
Lost. 3
Drawn. 3
Goals for 65
Goals against 42
RUGGER
[Underlined] WINES RUGGER CUP [/underlined] – The Wines trophy was finally won by Winthorpe in a hard tussle with Dunholme. The result was 11 – 8 for Winthorpe after a keen game with both sides going all out. In the second half some pretty passing was produced, and it was certainly anyone’s game until the final stages when Winthorpe got on top although their right three-quarter had left the field. Air Commodore Hesketh presented the trophy to the winning team. Winthorpe are to be congratulated on reaching the final of both the Wines Cup and the Matz Soccer Trophy – well done Winthorpe.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] would [sic] up their season with three games, all of which they won. A Men’s team beat Ingham 4 – 0 at Scampton. Their next two matches were the semi-final and final of the Group Mixed Hockey Competition. In the semi-final they beat Waddington 4 – 3 in a hard fought game, and defeated East Kirkby 5 – 3 at Swinderby in the final.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
The latter stages of this Competition were rather long drawn out, and East Kirkby stood patiently by, waiting for the other finalist to be decided. Scampton and Waddington met in the semi-final, Scampton winning 4 – 3 by a last minute goal. The final was played off at Swinderby. Scampton had a very forceful forward line and led 5 – 1 until Kirkby staged a rally and added two quick goals, leaving the final score 5 – 3 for Scampton. So Scampton became the first holders of the 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. This latest addition to the Group Cups has been purchased by the officers of 5 Group Headquarters, and presented for annual competition amongst the Group Stations.
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE GROUP COMPETITION [/underlined] is going well. Sections A and B have already produced finalists. In Section B two powerful teams are to meet in the final – Swinderby and Syerston. In Round 1, Swinderby beat Dunholme by 5 wickets; in Round 2 they beat Waddington without losing any wickets. Syerston scored 115 – 0 against Skellingthorpe’s 26 all out in Round 1. In Round 2 they beat Headquarters 5 Group side, scoring 70 – 10 against Group’s 52 – 9. This last game was quite a thriller. Group batted first on a well soaked wicket, and scratched together 52. The formidable Syerston opening pair (MacKenzie (Hants) and Warburton (Lancs)) soon rattled up 30, and looked set for the night. Then inspiration came to the Group’s change bowler. MacKenzie and Warburton fell in successive overs and Todd went on to return an average of 7 for 8. Group passes out of the competition, but got a tremendous moral fillip at having “shaken ‘em”. Even the fielders, floundering (and sitting), in knee high grass, felt the flush of near-triumph. Wigsley, in Round 1, were unlucky to lose to Group. The Headquarters side were all out for 102 and Wigsley made 94 for 5, not realising until too late in the game that the 15 overs were nearly spent.
In Section A, Metheringham beat Spilsby (62 – 8; 58 – 10), and Woodhall (33 – 4) beat Bardney (32-10). East Kirkby had a bye to the second round and Coningsby beat Fiskerton to become the other semi-finalist. Metheringham (95 – 8) beat Kirkby (79 – 10) in Round 2, the other finalist not yet being decided. It should be possible to play off the Section finals and the Group final before this month end, leaving the warmer (we hope) weather for more leisurely friendly games.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] played five Station matches during May, and in addition had several inter-section matches and W.A.A.F. games.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] managed three games, losing to Swinderby in the Group Cup, beating Scampton and playing a draw with De Ashton Schools. In addition five section games were played.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] were very industrious and laid two practice wickets and two pitches in a field adjacent to the camp, and practice wickets at Watch Tower, A and B dispersal, and B.A.T. Flight Hangar. There is no better way of ensuring a full and profitable season than this adequate provision of pitches – well done Fiskerton.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined played Border Regiment, losing 43 – 62; their second games was with Woodhall in the Group Cup. Woodhall, who field a powerful side, defeated them33 – 4 against 32 – 10.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] boast a cricket pitch with fielders’ amenities, in the form of trees within whose shade the more cunning deep slips lurk. The wicket is not so kind, and emphatically earns its title “sporty”, in true village tradition. The Group side beat Wigsley in Round 1 of the Cup, but lost to Syerston. An evening game v 93 M.U. at Collingham was marred by Home Guard charging about the field in their Salute the Soldier manoeuvres. A R.A.F. – W.A.A.F. game Is planned, the only limits imposed on the R.A.F. being that they bat left-handed, bowl underhand, and take catches one handed!
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
Fiskerton beat Skellingthorpe 25 – 2 in the first match in the South Lincoln Zone Competition. The game is arousing considerable interest among non-Canadian personnel. Any station that would like to field a team is invited to contact Fiskerton or Bardney.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Tennis, Squash, Swimming, Cycling, Golf, Badminton – every game has its enthusiasts throughout the Group. Sport is doubly important just now – it’s a duty to be “fit to fight”.
ECONOMY AND SALVAGE
DUNHOLME LODGE received a “special mention” for Economy and Salvage in the Bomber Command Bulletin No. 35 for May, 1944.
Most people in this country, and probably in many other countries as well, are keyed up for the biggest military operation in history, which is scheduled to begin on “D” Day.
There is no doubt that when the plunge is made, very great demands will be made on transport for some time, and the supply of materials will be a matter of first-rate importance.
“Ah, yes”, you say, “but the plans are already made, and sufficient materials will be available and provision made for their transport when the day arrives. Anyway, what’s that got to do with my job?”.
Just this. Each of us has the opportunity day in and day out, of effecting some economy, either by means of using less of certain things than we have become accustomed to, or by ensuring that minor repairs to equipment are carried out promptly, and so preventing major repairs or renewals.
Our first aim should, therefore, be to take care of materials and equipment so that their repair or replacement is reduced to a minimum, and, secondly, when things cannot be used any longer, they are disposed of as salvage.
The most important items are Paper and Cardboard, Heavy Ferrous Metal, Drums of all types, and used Oils.
The Scots have a saying – “Every mickle makes a muckle” which, being interpreted, means “A stitch in time saves nine”!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS (CONTD:)
also on landing, and damaged another aircraft in dispersal. This accident has not yet been fully investigated.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTS [/underlined]
A Squadron pilot made a wheel landing on a long runway in a Lancaster, and did not take into account his all up weight of 55,000 lbs. He was late in applying brake, and overshot. The undercarriage broke in a ditch. There was no wind at the time. Remember the slower rate of deceleration with a heavily laden aircraft!
Two of the Stirlings which overshot were on three engines. One pupil Pilot landed on a short runway in a light wind. He should have asked Flying Control to let him use the long runway, as three-engined landings on less than 2000 yards runways are forbidden in 51 Base. Details of the other three engined overshoot are not yet available, but it follows the usual pattern – an error of judgement by and inexperienced pilot who approached too fast.
[Underlined] OTHERS [/underlined]
One pupil in a Stirling crashed while attempting to go round again from a low height, with one propeller feathered. This accident is still under investigation.
A Lancaster pilot returned from an operation this month and forgot to lower his undercarriage before landing. Such accidents are fortunately few and far between on Lancasters. Sufficient to say that the log books of both Pilot and Flight Engineer have been endorsed in RED. This aircraft had a noisy TR1196, which probably accounted for the F/Engineer not hearing the order “Wheels Down”, but….
A Lancaster was taking off when the leading edge of the port wing came loose and folded back. With great difficulty the pilot got the aircraft in the air. He made a fast approach out of necessity but the resultant heavy landing wrecked the aircraft. The primary cause of this accident was faulty maintenance, but it must be remembered that when examining leading edges for security before starting up, pilots and Flight Engineers must get [underlined] under [/underlined] the wing and see that the panel is flush with the mainplane. It is no good just looking at the screws from the front.
Included in the other accidents (not classed as avoidable) are 7 caused by tyre bursts, 3 undercarriage pylon failures in Stirlings, and 4 obscure crashes. One Lancaster landed on top of another which was about to take off, and caused fatal injuries. This accident is under investigation.
[Underlined] HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
The ‘score’ of heavy landings this month is [underlined] nil. [/underlined] – first month for a long time. This is just as it should be. Keep it up!
GIVE ALL YOU CAN TO THE 5 GROUP PRISONERS OF WAR FUND.
(SEE PAGE 4 FOR DETAILS)
TRAINING
There was a record number of crews produced by 51 Base during the month. A total of 131 crews were posted to No. 5 L.F.S. and 136 passed out from 5L.F.S. to squadrons. The Base, therefore, produced eleven crews in excess of the commitment for the month. To achieve this, the Heavy Conversion Units flew 5,650 hours and the L.F.S. the exceptionally fine figure of 2,240 hours. The weather was exceptional throughout the month, and hard work by maintenance personnel provided all units with the aircraft necessary to meet commitments.
A high light during the month was provided by 1661 Conversion Unit which put up 21 Stirlings on the night of 24/25th May, on night cross countries, Bullseye and bombing exercises. There were 21 aircraft detailed, no cancellations, no early returns and no accidents. The take off was on Operational lines and the aircraft took off at about a minute and a half intervals.
Accidents, unfortunately, marred the picture. The problem of tyre creep and busts is still a major one. Undercarriage defects have involved extensive co-operation with the manufacturers. It is hoped that “coring”, which has been a chronic complaint, will be cured as a result of the month’s investigations. Experiments are being made with tractors to tow aircraft instead of taxying, to see whether braking during taxying is the prime factor contributing to tyre defects.
H 2 S training is expanding in quantity and quality with each week. The difficulty of keeping the necessary serviceability balance between H 2 S and non-H 2 S aircraft is a serious headache for engineers. The new radar buildings will enable extra bench sets to be installed and more ground training completed.
A new syllabus for ground training has been introduced to provide instruction on better crew co-operation lines. Lecture room accommodation is inevitably an associated problem. The Instructor check staff now fly more frequently with crews under training, and some improvement in al specialist sections is apparent.
[Underlined] COMMITMENTS FOR JUNE [/underlined]
The month of June will see the summer training programme in full swing. The commitment will be 132 crews per month from the 3 Heavy Conversion Units, and 128 from No.5 LFS. From 15th June, LFS. are scheduled to produce 132 crews per month. This should be regarded as the minimum, and all Units should endeavour to exceed their commitment without loss of quality.
To ensure that the demands of No.5 L.F.S. are not excessive, and that crews will get a maximum amount of supervised training a revised Lancaster training syllabus has been produced. This will give crews at L.F.S. a total of 11 hours Lancaster flying, of which 6 hours will be dual. The instruction is confined basically to conversion to type and all cross country and affiliation exercises will be done on the squadrons. Instructors have been detached from 51 Base to supervise squadron training which will amount to 11 hrs 10 minutes, not including an experience sortie. Careful organisation by Operational bases is essential to ensure the smooth running of the supervised training in squadrons.
(Continued from previous column)
H 2 S commitments are increasing steadily, and with the fitting of H2S in 619 Squadron, approximately 50% of crews under training will now be required for H2S Squadrons. This means that 15 crews going into our Heavy Conversion Units from now on should be ear-marked for H2S training.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING DRIVE [/underlined]
A drive on bombing, and the need for the most intensive application to bombing training is paramount. The night precision bombing which this Group is carrying out will receive its foundation of consistent accuracy in 51 Base. Crews at the Aircrew School must receive a thorough grounding in the checking of the Mark XIV Bombsight and its use on operations. On all flying exercises when practice bombs are carried, the correct bombing procedure and the elimination of error is to be regarded as the main object of the flight. The bombing exercises are to be thoroughly analysed after every flight, and the Base Bombing Leader must check the progress of the bombing drive in the Base. The motto is- Think bombing, talk bombing, practice bombing, analyse bombing and BOMB ACCURATELY.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Secker and Sgt Gillespie of 619 Sqdn. set a fine example of airmanship on a recent sortie. During take-off P/O Secker found the A.S.I. was unserviceable. He continued the take-off, however, and in spite of the unserviceable instrument, set a course for the target. Sgt Gillespie, the Flight Engineer, traced the fault to a stripped nut in a pipeline. He repaired the pipeline with adhesive tape, and the crew completed a successful sortie.
P/O Dunne, pupil pilot of 1661 Conversion Unit, was taking off in a Stirling when at about 50 feet the port inner engine caught fire. He feathered the propeller and made a safe three-engined landing. This was a good show which reflects credit on his instructor.
Quick thinking and decisive action on the part of Sgt. Spears, a pupil Flight Engineer of 1654 Conversion Unit, saved a Stirling last month. Due to faulty manipulation by the 1st Engineer, all four engines cut through lack of fuel. Sgt Spears, however, tackled this failure and managed to restart the engines when the aircraft had reached 600 feet.
P/O Monaghan of 106 Squadron, showed excellent captaincy and skilled flying under very difficult conditions. He was shot up over the target, and on his return to this country could only get one leg of his undercarriage down. He made a superb landing on the one main whell [sic] in 500 yards visibility at Carnaby emergency airfield, without causing injury to the crew.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 16
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. K.L. SUMNER D.F.M.
P/O W.A. STRATIS D.F.C.
S/L S.L. COCKBAIN D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
P/O G.E. BALL D.F.C.
A/S/L J.H. EVANS, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
P/O A.G. EDGAR D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
SGT. R.D. CHANDLER D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
P/O R.J. AUCKLAND D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
83 SQUADRON
W/O K.A. LANE D.F.C.
F/L N.A. MACKIE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
97 SQUADRON
A/F/L G.S. CHATTEN D.S.O.
106 SQUADRON
S/L E. SPRAWSON D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
W/C J.F. GREY D.F.C.
463 SQUADRON
A/S/L W.L. BRILL, DFC D.S.O.
F/O D.F. WARD D.F.C.
W/C KINGSFORD-SMITH D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
F/O J.A.C. KENNEDY D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
F/O P. KELLY, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/O L.J. SUMPTER, DFM D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
SGT. H.G. BRADY D.F.M.
P/O D.A. WADSWORTH D.F.C.
SGT F.H. JOY D.F.M.
SGT. J.H. MALTBY D.F.M.
W/C J.R. JEUDWINE, OBE D.F.C.
A/S/L W.N. WHAMOND, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/L J.A. HOWARD, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT L.J. BIRCH D.F.M.
627 SQUADRON
F/L D.W. PECK, DFC D.S.O.
630 SQUADRON
P/O R.C. HOOPER D.S.O.
A/F/L T. NEILSON D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/SGT N.D. OWEN D.F.M.
F/SGT J.L. ELLIORR D.F.M.
SGT. A. FIELDING D.F.M.
SGT A.G. DENYER D.F.M.
SGT. K. PACK D.F.M.
F/O C.P. NEWTON D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
F/SGT B.H. WHITE D.F.M.
SGT. H.R. PITCHER D.F.M.
F/SGT C.W. DIMBLEBY D.F.M.
P/O R.A. McKITRICK D.F.C.
F/O J. GOURLAY D.F.C.
SGT. V.F.G. LAKER D.F.M.
P/O Q. SNOW D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
F/L R.N. GIBSON D.F.C.
P/O L.F. TAYLOR D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
P/O J.M. LAING D.F.C.
F/O W.R. FRANCIS D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
F/O G.K. KING D.F.C.
SGT. H. JOHNSON D.F.M.
[Page break]
57 SQUADRON cont.
F/O H.H. CHADWICK D.F.C.
P/O J. SHERRIFF D.F.C.
P/O W.A. WEST D.F.C.
F/SGT W. DAVIS D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
F/L A. SANDISON D.F.C.
F/O C.E. LANCE D.F.C.
106 SQUADRON
F/O H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
F/SGT W.P. AHIG D.F.M.
F/SGT J. BOADEN D.F.M.
A/S/L A.H. CROWE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
SGT L.J.B. BLOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT A.G. MEARNS D.F.M.
207 SQUADRON
P/O C.M. LAWS D.F.C.
SGT H.C. DEVENISH D.F.M.
SGT G.H. CASTELL D.F.M.
A/F/L H.J. PRYOR D.F.C.
P/O S.V. SAFELLE D.F.C.
F/SGT A. BRUCE D.F.M.
SGT. A. BARKER D.F.M.
467 SQUADRON
P/O B.R. JONES D.F.C.
P/O R.M. STANFORD D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
W/O W.J. BENNETT D.F.C.
P/O W.G. RADCLIFFE D.F.C.
F/SGT R. BATSON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.G. DOWMAN D.F.M.
463 SQUADRON
F/O A.E. KELL D.F.C.
630 SQUADRON
SGT D.J. TAYLOR D.F.M.
F/O J.H. PRATT D.F.C.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONT.)
damage, although on a rather less severe scale can be seen at the Power Station to the N.E. The attack by a small force on Annecy on 9/10 was outstandingly successful. Apart from one small building in the S.E. corner of the factory, the whole target has been almost completely destroyed. On the 24/25th the raid on Eindhoven was abandoned owing to 10/10ths cloud, but this disappointment was to some extent compensated by a successful attack on the General Motors Assembly Plant on the same night. The main building group is about 75% demolished, while damage can be identified to dockside buildings and servicing tracks.
Sea mining was undertaken on five nights during the month.
A note of extreme optimism perculated into the month’s operations by the introduction of four coastal defence battery targets. The first to be attacked was Marselines and St. Valery-en-Caux, both on 27/28. The former battery received many near misses within 50 yards, but it is difficult to speculate on the resultant damage to the primary weapons. Some damage to personnel accommodation is, however, apparent.
St. Valery was more successful 208 craters can be seen in the target area, resulting in four of the emplacements receiving direct hits, with very near misses to the remaining two positions. The following night, 28/29, the battery at St. Martin de Varreville was attacked. An extremely heavy concentration of craters throughout the battery area was achieved, with obliteration of all but one of the emplacements. The coastal defence battery at Maisy, singled out for attack on the night of 31st, had 10/10ths stratus to thank for a quiet night.
Although the true Allied design is cloaked, and little can be gained from the study of the month’s air tactics, it can at least be tendered that our offensive is producing results which are measurable and progressive.
AIR TRAINING
There was a satisfactory improvement in the number of fighter affiliation details flown by aircraft of 1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month, Squadrons and Training Units trebled the number of Gyro Assessor exercises compared with the April figure.
The fighters carried out 440 hours day affiliation (over 1700 exercises) and 251 hours other flying, which included standing patrols for “snap” interceptions of Stirlings in 51 Base, night training, air tests and drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. The posting of five Hurricane pilots in a week towards the end of the month seriously handicapped Squadron affiliation and replacements are urgently required.
Hurricane pilots of the detached elements of the Flight in the Operational Bases who were out of touch with night flying, were given a short refresher at R.A.F. Station, Cranwell. No. 52 Base showed initiative and enthusiasm by completing their night Hurricane training during the month and doing some searchlight co-operation by arrangement with 50 A.A. Brigade (5 A.A. Group). They were all set to start night affiliation with their own bombers when two of their three pilots were posted. The other Bases have yet to complete night training. This must be done in the early part of June. The absence of flame shields and V.H.F. is no restriction; neither is essential.
The following table shows the details of air training in the Group, and the flying times of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING MAY
[Table of 1690 B.D.T. Flight Flying Times by Base]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
There is a slight increase from last month in the total number of hours Link practice carried out during the month. This was, however, due entirely to an increased effort by Flight Engineers, pilot times being slightly less than the previous month. This decrease was due mainly to operational commitments, but there is still room for improvement in Link Hours. Don’t neglect your Link practice, accurate instrument flying is essential for accurate bombing.
LINK TRAINER FLYING TIMES
[Table of Link Trainer hours carried out by Squadron]
ARMAMENT (Continued from page 2 Col. 2)
[Underlined] VISIT TO STEEL FOUNDRY [/underlined]
The Armament Brach at this Headquarters was fortunate enough to pay a very interesting visit to a Steel Foundry which is casting out 1000 lb M.C. bombs for us. It is understood that this particular firm were the pioneers of the new method of casting steel bomb bodies and consequently a very comprehensive story of the evolution of the 1000 lb cast steel MC bomb was obtained from the people who really know.
The visit was of about four hours duration and all stages of the process were witnessed under the watchful eye of a very competent guide. The visit was not without its comic side; the Group Armament Officer at one time was seen diving into a heap of wet sand as a very large crucible of hot molten steel swept smartly past his ear. Incidentally the crane carrying the steel was in the very skilful hands of a member of the fair sex, which may account for the C.A.O. not seeing the crucible a little earlier.
Efforts are being made to obtain permission for all Armament Officers to have the opportunity of visiting a similar foundry.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
There is at last news of the 30 cwt van for Armament Officers, and as it is now on the establishment, a daily visit to the transport section might prevent a mis-allocation.
The Army have provided 24 lorries and 50 men to assist in handling explosives – a duty new to them, which they are performing with great zeal.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The high light of the month’s offensive was the dropping of more than 37,000 tons of bombs by Bomber Command – the greatest weight of bombs ever dropped in a single month. Our contribution to the blue print pattern of the Second Front has been a rather varied one, including attacks on railway centres, ammunition dumps, military depots, aircraft factories and explosives factories. 2254 sorties were flown, with 3.2% casualties.
The campaign against the enemy’s aircraft production, commenced in April last, was continued with unabated vigour, culminating in five successful missions. The attack against the Usine Liotard Aircraft Repair Works on 1/2 set a particularly high standard for the month. Of the three main buildings comprising the works, two were completely destroyed and the third severely damaged. On the same night an attack was launched against the same S.N.C.A.S.E. aircraft assembly plant at Toulouse. The whole factory sustained severe damage, including in particular, the destruction of the three main buildings, the assembly plant, the testing shop and the components store.
The main weight of the attack on TOURS airfield on 7/8th was distributed among the administrative buildings and the N., S., and W. hangar areas. In the former, seventeen buildings have been more than 50% destroyed – only eight out of the 41 buildings in the area remain undamaged. Damage is also severe in each of the hangar areas.
Both the Airfield and Seaplane Base at Brest/Lanveoc-Poulmic were attacked on 8/9. All five hangars at the airfield were hit, causing serious damage. Other incidents can also be identified. The principal damage at the Seaplane Base is to the main hangar and officers’ quarters, which have sustained several direct hits.
Mobility, and the resultant power of rapid concentration, which the Hun no doubt hoped would assist in countering the invasion threat, has made transportation the objective of much of May’s 37,000 tons. This Group was detailed to attack the railway yard and workshops at Lille on 10/11. Photographs taken after the attack indicate that two locomotive sheds and a car repair storage shed have been destroyed – the transhipment sheds and other buildings being severely damaged. There are also numerous hits on the tracks. Cover of Tours following our attack on the marshalling yard on 19/20, shows particularly severe damage to railway facilities and the passenger station. The goods depot is more that [sic] 50% destroyed, while the locomotive workshops and depot are severely affected. All tracks are interrupted. Weather affected our effort on the Amiens marshalling yard on 19/20, although some aircraft bombed. P.R.U. cover is awaited. In the raid on Nantes on 27/28, only half the effort could be brought to bear owing to smoke obscuring visibility. Despite this, a total of at least eighty hits were secured on the railway tracks, causing considerable dislocation. The railway junction at Saumur was attached [sic] with some effect on the night of the 31st. On this occasion also, smoke tended to obscure the target, but not before rather more than half of the attacking force had bombed, securing hits on the tracks, railway station and sheds and causing damage to the road bridge.
Two main targets were selected during the month – Duisburg on the 21/22, followed immediately by Brunswick on 22/23. At Duisburg further damage has been caused to business and residential property, especially in the town centre, and also to important industrial targets, chiefly in areas south of the docks. Brunswick, unfortunately, continued its charmed life, and apart from a few incidents near the eastern marshalling yards came through its ordeal unscathed.
It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that already the German repair system is overtaxed to such a degree that no attempt has been made to repair much of the damage to his communications.
If evidence is required of the rapid approach of invasion hour, this can surely be found in the recent shifting od the main weight of attack to the methodical disorganisation of the Western Wall itself. Not only have coastal defence batteries commanded our attention, but also ammunition dumps, military camps and powder works. The attack on the Pouderie Nationale Explosives Works at Toulouse was outstandingly successful. Extensive damage has been caused, which has virtually written off the plant. Sable-sur-Sarthe on 6/7th was equally effective. Photos taken the day following the raid show smoke emitting from the remains of the ammunition dump. All the principal buildings in the ammunition filling installation have been destroyed or damaged – the site of the storage units in the central sector of the dump being marked by large craters. The Salbris Explosives Works and Depot attacked on 7/8th sustained severe damage. Of the larger of the two factory units not one building has escaped. Despite the dispersal if the storage depot, which consist [sic] of ten separate areas, five have been damaged, three particularly severely.
The tank training centre at Mailly le Camp received our attention on the 3/4. Some 5000 troops and between 50 – 60 Tiger tanks were believed to have been housed here. The results achieved by the attack were impressive. Not one building in the group of M/T and barrack buildings has escaped damage, 34 out of a total of 47 buildings being totally destroyed. In the remaining group of 114 barrack buildings, 47 were destroyed and many of the remainder damaged. Bourg-Leopold (11/12) the largest enemy barracks in France was a most attractive target, but again the weather was fickle, with the result that the mission was abortive. It is interesting to note that Command has since attacked this target, producing very heavy damage throughout the entire barracks area. Our agenda for the month included four more pre-invasion targets of a rather miscellaneous variety – namely the Gnome and Phone Foundry at Gennevilliers, the Ball-Bearing Factory at Annecy the Phillips Works at Eindhoven and the Ford and General Motor Works at Antwerp. Very severe damage can be seen throughout the Foundry and Stamping Plant at Gennevilliers following the attack on 9/10. The adjoining Electrical Engineering Works and Tyre and Rubber Works have also suffered. In addition
(Continued on Page 17, Column 1)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties carried out during June including awards by Squadron]
ERRATUM: In the above table 463 Sqdn should occupy fifth place, with all subsequent squadrons amended accordingly.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944.
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V Group News, May 1944
5 Group News, May 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 22, May 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about armament, war savings, flying control, engineering, flight engineers, gardening, prisoner of war fund, air bombing, navigation, equipment, H2S track and ground speed bombing, air sea rescue, enemy agents and careless walkers, accidents, signals, tactics, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, photography, sports, economy and salvage, training, recent good shows, honours and awards, air training, link trainer, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-05
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Anne-Marie Watson
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20 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-26%20may%2044
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Belgium
France
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Amiens
France--Brest
France--Gennevilliers
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France--Nantes
France--Sablé-sur-Sarthe
France--Saumur
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Duisburg
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
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1944-05
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
ditching
flight engineer
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
RAF Winthorpe
rivalry
sport
Stirling
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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Copies sent to:
Stns. 9
S Th 10
B 6.
[Indecipherable] 2
Base 1
[Stamp] Base Copy.
V GROUP NEWS V
JUNE * 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 23
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
June has proved to be a month of record achievements. For the first time in its history the Group despatched 3,000 sorties of which a very high percentage were successful. Much of this success is due to the flare and marking teams who are now getting into their stride, and there has been a similar improvement in bombing. For the first time the average crew bombing error from 20,000 feet for the whole Group is below 200 yards. If the reduction of 50 yards which was achieved during June can be repeated during July, the number of bombs falling on the average target will be increased by something in the order of 50. This can be seen by looking at any P.R.U. photograph and counting the number of craters which are shown in open fields on either side of the target.
I therefore ask all crews to continue with their efforts to reduce bombing errors in the knowledge that by doing so they will add to the striking power of the Group to an extent which could be achieved by no other means. The new orders for maintenance which have recently been issued should help the Instrument Section, upon whom so much depends, to improve the serviceability of the sight, and eliminate minor inaccuracies.
On two occasions during the month the Group came up against the main strength of the German Night Fighter Defences, and on both occasions suffered serious losses; although over the whole month the missing rate was below the average for previous months. Nevertheless these instances show the vital importance of gunnery and the need for improving results by every means in our power.
There is ample evidence that the combined power of the rear and mid-upper turrets will bring down enemy fighters if the aim is correct. As an example, there is the case of “M” of 207 Squadron whose crew on the night of June 9/8th destroyed two JU. 88 and one ME.110. Although results such as this will always remain exceptional, it should be possible to improve the accuracy of aim over the present general standard. Fighters are now available in 1690 Flight for affiliation exercises and every chance must be taken whenever the weather is suitable especially at night. The bombing team has shown how greatly it can improve its results by methodical training and analysis and I now look to the gunnery team to do likewise. I will do everything in my power to provide them with means and facilities for training, but much is a matter for each gunner. Night vision, methodical search, aircraft recognition, turret manipulation, clearing stoppages, can only be improved by hard individual work.
The effort which the Group has put in during the month had been made possible by the high standards of serviceability which have been achieved, and I congratulate all ranks who have helped to get aircraft and equipment into the air. The Armament sections have loaded a record tonnage of bombs while all other sections on each station have contributed their full share to the success achieved.
Finally, I congratulate No. 51 Base on completing more than 8,000 hours of training and passing out a record number of crews. In particular I would mention No. 5 L.F.S. who completed a month’s flying with no avoidable flying accidents.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] BASE GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
June has seen the establishment of a S/Ldr Air Gunner at each Base, and a list of the officers concerned is appended at the foot of this paragraph. Whilst these officers will be concerned with all Gunnery matters, their main functions is to improve the standard of training throughout the Group, as it has long been realised that with long periods of operations the Squadron Gunnery Leaders are fully occupied and can find little time for all the other aspects of Gunnery. The Base Gunnery Leaders will, therefore, be able to devote their time to improve training facilities and equipment, and to ensure that the equipment is available in sufficient quantity to ensure the maximum benefit being obtained from it. They will also be able to supervise the preparation of Gunners for Gunnery Leader, A.G.I. and Specialist Sighting Courses, to enable the candidates to have the best possible chance of passing these courses, thus avoiding wastage of valuable vacancies. The appointment of these Officers to S/Ldr posts offers more advancement for Gunnery Leaders, and is an indication that the importance of air gunnery is receiving recognition. We wish the officers concerned good luck in their new appointments, and hope that very shortly dividends will be paid by this new establishment.
51 BASE – S/LDR HIPKIN
52 BASE – F/LT McCURDY
53 BASE – F/LT BEALE
54 BASE F/LT HOWARD
55 BASE – F/LT BREAKEY
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
An error appeared in the Movement’s column for May, regarding 467 and 44 Squadrons, and is corrected below.
F/Lt Clarke ex 1660 Con. Unit to 44 Sqdn.
F/Lt Cleary ex 27 O.T.U. to 467 Sqdn.
Other movements are:-
S/Ldr Undery ex 1690 B.D.T.F. to H.Q. No. 5 Group.
F/Lt Cass, ex L.F.S. to 630 Sqdn.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
Considerable time is wasted in returning incorrect combat reports to Squadrons, through claims being made which do not conform to the standards laid down by Bomber Command, as issued to all Units. The Gunnery Leaders must ensure that information entered is correct in every detail and that all claims are submitted under one of the headings, i.e. “Destroyed”, “Probably Destroyed” or “Damaged”. Numerous incidents occur when information regarding Tail Warning Devices is incomplete, and it is emphasised that this is most important and must be included in combat reports. Combat reports could be forwarded to Headquarters 5 Group more quickly than at present; the standard pro-forma is now in general use and should help in the preparation of reports. Units should check that only this amended pro-forma is used for this purpose.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn. A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. ME. 410 (c)
630 “Y” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
44 “O” 9/10.6.44. ME. 109 (c)
97 “D” 9/10.6.44. DO. 217 (c)
50 “U” 15/16.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “F 21/22.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88
97 “Q” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “B” 24/25.6.44. ME 109
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
106 “G” 6/7.6.44. ME. 110 (c)
467 “X” 21/22.6.44. T/E.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
207 “J” 1.6.44. T/E (c)
57 “P” 1.6.44. JU. 88
50 “D” 6.6.44. ME. 410
9 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “V” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
97 “Q” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
106 “F” 14/15.6.44. FW. 190 (c)
207 “D” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A new type of two-piece flying suit is on trial in 53 Base, and the results will, in due course, be made available.
Replies have been received from all Units in the use of the Pilot type parachute for rear gunners and recommendations forwarded to H.Q. Bomber Command. With slight modification to the turret, this idea seems feasible, but may call for a revision in the type of clothing to be worn.
Ampro projectors are appearing in operational units for assessing Cine Gyro films. The establishment is one per station.
Units are again reminded that filters suitable for the Shadowgraph and 16 m.m. projector for use in night vision training are available. When requesting an issue of these filters from H.Q. 5 Group, units are to confirm that they have a [underlined] fully [/underlined] blacked out room for night vision training.
CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING
Instructions have now been issued to all Stations to construct a sandbag traphouse for clay pigeon shooting, and full details given for the layout of the range. Severn P.F.O’s are attending the Instructor’s Course on the 7th July, and the remainder on the 23rd July; these instructors will pass on to Unit Gunnery Leaders instructions for these practices, to ensure that at least two officers are available for conducting the exercises. Gunnery Leaders should press for the construction of the traphouses and ensure that all equipment is overhauled and ready for use.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JUNE.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
Fighter Affiliation Grand Total = 1493
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] ATTACKS ON LIMOGES MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined]
1,424 bombs were dropped. Of this total 844 craters have been counted on the P.R.U. photographs. We can therefore only consider 59% of the total number of bombs dropped.
The M.P.I. of all craters was established and a circle of radius 150 yards was drawn. Inside this circle the number of craters that could be counted totalled 152 and the remaining 692 craters were counted outside the circle. Therefore the Pilot and Air Bomber’s error for 692 bombs was greater than 150 yds.
With our 152 bombs inside the 150 yards circle we achieved 10 hits per acre and if we assume that of the bombs not counted, we obtained the same percentage inside 150 yards our hits per acre would increase to 17.
There were 211 bombs between the 150 yards and 250 yards circles. The maximum errors permissible for these bombs to get them into the 150 yards circle are:-
125 yards – average line error
160 yards – average range error
We all agree that these limits are reasonable and that crews should not have errors in excess.
Now, if the bombs had been contained in the limits of 125 yards line and 160 yds. range, our resultant average radial error about the M.P.I. would be 175 yards. This would mean that instead of sending the 96 aircraft to Limoges that we had to, we need only have sent 59 aircraft to achieve the same number of hits. We would then have had 37 aircraft free to attack the factory at ??? There were, of course, 330 bombs seen outside the 250 yards circle and great effort must be made to eliminate the errors that were responsible.
The Moral! – You must practice, practice and practice until you are a certain “A” category crew.
!!! [Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined] !!!
A+ Crews – 60 yards or less
A Crews – 100 yards or less
B Crews – 100 yds. to 150 yds.
C Crews – 150 yds. to 200 yds.
D Crews – Over 200 yards.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE: [/underlined] Plotted 1597 bombs aimed by 309 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE: [/underlined] Plotted 1510 bombs aimed by 319 aircraft.
[Underlined] WAINFLEET: [/underlined] Plotted 2056 bombs aimed by 440 aircraft.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of High Level Bombing Training Statistics by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR JUNE
In the April “News” it was threatened that owing to the improvement in Crew Errors, it may be necessary to lower the qualifying figure for the inclusion of errors in this column. June has produced the largest number of below 100 yards errors yet, and in consequence only those crews who have obtained crew errors of 80 yards or less, converted to 20,000 ft. can receive publicity.
Squadron or Con. Unit. Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
9 F/O Blackham F/O Elphick F/O Wenger 72 yards
44 F/L White Sgt Jenkins F/S Jones 66 yards
P/O Baxter W/O Young W/O Rutherford 50 yards
P/O Stewart Sgt Stubbs Sgt Wright 65 yards
49 P/O Appleyard F/S Jameson F/S Blumfield 78 yards
P/O Arnold F/O Dewar W/O Fleming 72 yards
57 F/S Clark Sgt Johnson Sgt Lugg 65 yards
83 P/O Meggeson W/O Franklin F/O Wicker 65 yards
F/O Kelly F/O Irwin Sgt Burleigh 58 & 64 yards
97 F/L Van Raalte F/O Arnold F/S Williams 52, 69 & 78 yards
S/L Ingham F/O Perkins F/L Chatten 69 yards
467 P/O Waugh F/S Southgate F/O Semple 67 yards
F/L Brine F/S Luton F/S Sutton 80 yards
617 P/O Duffy F/O Woods F/O Bell 42 yards
F/O Knights P/O Bell F/O Rhude 48 yards
P/O Jingles F/S Hazell F/O Beal 63 yards
619 P/O Johnson Sgt Vaughton F/S Tranter 79 yards
F/L Howes F/O Baker F/L Harrison 74 yards
1654 C.U. F/S Beharrie Sgt Dean Sgt Brownhall 74 yards
F/S McKechnie F/S Wallace Sgt Little 53 yards
1660 C.U. P/O Dyer F/S Howard F/S Lemaire 74 yards
F/S Millar F/O Banks W/O Wilday 70 yards
1661 C.U. F/O Franks F/O Orry Sgt Roe 78 yards
F/O Furber Sgt Le Marquand F/O Hassel 78 yards
5 L.F.S. S/L Smith Sgt Wallis Sgt Page 49 yards
F/O Edwards F/S Wallace F/O Nunn 54 yards
Congratulations to F/L Van Raalte and crew, 97 Squadron for the outstanding 3 exercises!!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 Squadron (F/Lt Hearn, D.F.C) [/underlined] report that to try and reduce bombing errors to a minimum a system of practice bomb plotting on small perspex covered boards is being inaugurated. The errors will be plotted on this board and the reason explained verbally to the Air Bomber, Captain and Navigator. In case of suspected instrument error the Bombing Section will examine the results plotted with the Instrument Section.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron (F/L Keats) [/underlined] report that a modification to permit the emergency jettisoning of smaller H.E. bombs only when a mixed load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried has been suggested by an Air Bomber and submitted for approval. An isolation switch would be incorporated in the circuit between the Connell Pre-Selector and No. 13 Station. This switch would be permanently wired down except when the special load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried, in which case it would be left up for take-off and put down by the crew when a height of 4,000 feet is reached. In the event of engine failure at take-off, the pilot could jettison the smaller H.E. bombs safe with the jettison toggle instead of the normal jettisoning of containers by Type H Jettison.
[Underlined] 52 Base [/underlined] report that [underlined] 12 [/underlined] aircraft took off between [underlined] 08.30 hours and 09.30 hours [/underlined] on 4th July to carry out High Level Practice Bombing. Early morning details can be sure of the best bombing weather!!
[Underlined] 106 Squadron (F/L Morgan) [/underlined] report the following outstanding exercise:-
Pilot:- F/O Meredith
Air Bomber:- F/O Mitchell.
As the port outer engine had to be feathered before completion of the cross country, bombing was carried out on only three engines. As Gee was thus u/s and as petrol was running short, no wind was found, but the wind velocity found on the last leg of the cross country was used for bombing. This wind velocity was found at 18,000 feet, whereas the bombing was carried out at 14,000 feet owing to having only three engines. Thus a fairly large vector error of 214 yards (Converted to 20,000 feet) resulted, but the bomb aimer’s error was only 16 yards at 14,000 feet, which is an error of 19 yards when converted to 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
Bombing Leaders in 54 Base are:-
83 Squadron – F/L Bedell
97 Squadron – F/L Rogers, D.F.C.
627 Squadron – F/L Mitchell
[Underlined] F/L Harris, D.F.C. [/underlined] has arrived from H.Q. 6 Group to take over Bombing Leader duties at No. 5 L.F.S. Syerston.
[Underlined] F/L Honnibal [/underlined] (ex 92 Group) has succeeded F/L Keats as Bombing Leader to 57 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/L Keats [/underlined] (57 Squadron) has moved to H Q 92 Group.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Clegg (44 Squadron), F/S. Booth (619 Squadron) and F/O Linnett (207 Squadron) obtained “B” Categories on No. 84 Course and F/O Nugent (61 Squadron) obtained “B” Category on No. 85 Course.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
The month of June was notorious for bad weather, numerous operations and stand-by’s. Hence the competition entries were fewer in number than of late. It has been decided to include the Conversion Units in the Competition under the same rules as for the Squadrons. It is realised, however, that they have an advantage over Squadrons in so far as they have considerably more qualifying entries from which to make selection. However it is hoped that squadrons will make determined efforts to beat the Conversion Units in July. Out [sic] congratulations are extended to 51 Base for their high standard, and their commanding positions in this, their first entry!!
PILOT AND AIR BOMBER’S ERROR AT 20,000 FEET
1st 1654 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd 619 Squadron – 62 yards
3rd 1660 C.U. – 68 yards
4th 1661 C.U. – 69 yards
5th 44 Squadron – 70 yards
6th 467 Squadron – 78 yards
7th 5 L.F.S. – 83 yards
8th 49 Squadron – 85 yards
9th 83 Squadron – 90 yards
10th 9 Squadron – 92 yards
11th (630 Squadron- 96 yards
(106 Squadron 96 yards
13th 463 Squadron- 107 yards
14th 97 Squadron – 109 yards
15th 207 Squadron – 116 yards
16th 57 Squadron – 124 yards
Non-qualifying Squadrons:-
17th 50 Squadron (6 exercises)- 106 yards
18th 61 Squadron (3 exercises)- 91 yards
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C. – 52 Base – 76 yards
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
G/Capt Johnson, D.F.C., A.F.C. – 88 yards
(R.A.F. Station, Syerston)
[Underlined] ? ? AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ ? ? [/underlined]
1. What can cause an apparent Vector error in practice bombing?
2. List the possible causes of Large Random Errors.
3. What errors in practice bombing will be caused by low suction?
4. If you set the wrong T. V. what kind of error will you get?
[Underlined] MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT – DO’S AND DON’T’S [/underlined]
DO:- (i) set Bomb T.V. (the TV’s of all bombs likely to be dropped should be recorded on the levelling card on the top right-hand corner of the computor).
(ii) Set Target height against Q.F.E. ([underlined] SEA LEVEL PRESSURE [/underlined]).
(iii) Set [underlined] INDICATED [/underlined] Wind Speed because Bombsight Computor works on Indicated Air Speed and indicated height (indicated wind can be found from true wind by SUBTRACTING 1.5% per 1000 ft of height).
(iv) Synchronise bombsight compass with Pilot’s D.R. repeater (by pressing in and turning the synchronising knob on the side of the Computor box.)
(v) Check that sufficient suction is reaching the bombsight gyros.
(vi) Remember to turn on air supply to the bombsight by means of the Bombsight Cock.
(vii) Be sure that the Pilot puts main control cock of “George” to OUT when Bombsight is to be used, or no compressed air will be available.
(viii) Keep the bombsight clean and check all the loads are correctly attached.
(ix) Liaise with the Instrument Section who maintenance [sic] your bombsight.
DON’T (i) Use the Emergency Computor until you have checked the bombsight and tried to correct the fault.
(ii)Touch the reflector glass of the Sighting Head when the gyro is running (the gyro is always running when the engines are running).
(iii) Forget to adjust the levelling scales for the all-up weight. (The Flight Engineer will know the A.U.W.).
(iv) Put any pressure on the reflector glass – even the edge of a map may lead to the toppling of the gyro when the engines are running.
(v) Let anything, not even your oxygen mask, press on the Sighting Head. (The upper part is supported on anti-vibration mountings which prevent the bearings of the gyro being damaged – the least pressure can make the alignment inaccurate).
(vi) Stow parachute, window, etc. near any of the leads to the Computor Box or Sighting Head.
(vii) Forget to liaise with the bombsight maintenance staff.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS (Continued from back page) [/underlined]
were daylight attacks) with varying degrees of success. Notable among these attacks were the operations in daylight against WATTEN and SIRACOURT on the 19th and 25th respectively. In both cases direct hits are claimed on the launching ramps involving damage which, it is hoped, will put them out of -commission at least temporarily.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
No long range sorties have been carried out during the month; in fact almost all the targets have been in Gee range. No Navigational difficulties therefore have been experienced. Broadcast winds have not been attempted during the month because of shallow penetration.
One major navigational “boob” was, however made during the month by a Navigator of No. 106 Squadron. The aircraft was detailed to attack a Ruhr target, and reached the enemy coast on track and on time. The Navigator then gave the next course to the pilot who in error steered 100° different from that given him. The Navigator was at fault in not checking the course with the pilot. The aircraft continued on the wrong course for six minutes until a Gee fix was obtained. The sortie was eventually abandoned because of the time element. This is another example of what can happen if you do not carry out the correct drills. Immediately the pilot says “on course” make it your first duty to check the true course steered.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
During the month an analysis of errors which may arise in windfinding has produced the following probable error:-
Probable Error
(i) Inability to read A.P.I. to nearest half minute of Lat. and Long. 1 mile
(ii) Inability to plot a position in Lat. and Long. accurately (e.g. Air Position and Gee fix) 1/2 mile (at least)
(iii) Inherent error in H2S fixes of at least half a mile. 1/2 mile
(iv) Inability to plot an H2S fix to within 1/2 mile because of mile scale limitations on chart 1/2 mile
(v) Probable error in synchronising of D.R. compass repeaters when airborne. 1 mile
(vi) Error in Compass swing of at least 1°. 1 mile
(vii) Probable error in measuring off length of wind vector, because of mile scale limitations, on chart. 1/2 mile
[Underlined] Total [/underlined] 5
Therefore if a wind was found over a period of 15 minutes it would be possible to obtain an error of 20 m.p.h!! Fortunately, of course, some of the errors will cancel out, but even then there will always be a residue which, multiplied by four, may still give a large error.
It will be noticed that careless errors in taking of Gee and H2S fixes, reading off A.P.I. co-ordinates, incorrect plotting etc. have not been mentioned.
The problem now is, how can we eliminate the above errors. Action has already been taken to eliminate points (iv) and (vii). Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are urged to discuss the above list with all Navigators on the Squadron, and submit any suggestions to Group Headquarters immediately.
Don’t be afraid to give us all your suggestions. Remember, the more accurate w/v’s we obtain, the more accurate the bombing, concentration and timing.
Referring back to careless errors, by far the largest of these are plotting and computing errors. A list of exercises to improve plotting and computation was forwarded to each S.N.O. some weeks ago. It is the responsibility of each S.N.O. to see that these exercises are completed at regular intervals. Short computation tests, lasting 15 – 20 minutes should be completed every morning if this is possible. There is always a spare half hour between assembly at the flights and commencing N.F.T’s. The plotting tests should be carried out at least once every fortnight, particular stress being laid on wind finding. Make it a point always that the tests are analysed immediately after completion, and the results made known as soon as possible.
Many Squadrons have adopted the above procedure, and are being well repaid. There are still one or two Squadron Navigation Officers, however, who say they are too busy to do such things. Don’t let this be your excuse – try it conscientiously and well for the next fortnight, and note the improvement in the work of your Navigator.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
All Navigators will now be conversant with the resetting modification fitted during the past months. It is hoped that maximum use is being made of this device, which should considerably simplify resetting.
Yet another modification to simplify resetting has been suggested by the Navigation Staff at Syerston. It is the fitting of a “winder handle” to the resetting knob. Only one handle need be used when resetting and, much more important, the time taken to reset will be reduced by at least 2/3rds. The above modification has been submitted to Bomber Command for approval, and as soon as this is obtained, all aircraft will be modified.
Several Squadrons have been persevering with the graphical resetting procedure, but this has not proved very successful. When the modification suggested by Syerston has been fitted to all aircraft, all objections against resetting regularly will have been overcome, and it will be possible to adopt the standard procedure of resetting the A.P.I. regularly.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
During the summer months it is hoped we may further the Navigation technique to such an extent that Navigation will be considerably simplified during the winter period. We must aim for simplification and standardisation in use of A.P.I., H2S and log and chart keeping. This will be of considerable benefit to the Conversion Units. At the present time a Navigator is taught one method at the Conversion Unit and another on the Squadron – consequently he is proficient at neither. Ideas are being collected from Squadrons and it is hoped to present to Squadrons and Conversion Units the ideal Navigation technique. Let us have your suggestions.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The results of the drive on practice bombing and wind finding have, on the whole, been satisfactory – but in certain cases they have been disappointing. The Conversion Unit Navigators have surpassed many operational Navigators. A vector error of less than 5 m.p.h. should be your aim.
Improvements have been made during the last 7 or 8 weeks, and the average vector error produced this month is 7 3/4 m.p.h. – a commendable effort on the whole but there is still room for improvement.
It was stated in last month’s News that a monthly Bombing Wind Finding Competition would be held. It was the intention to publish the best eight vector errors for the month, but so far there have been 14 instances where NIL vector error was obtained and a further 14 instances of vector errors of 2 m.p.h. and below! It has therefore been decided to issue the AVERAGE vector error obtained by each Squadron and Conversion Unit for the month. The order is as follows:-
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron]
[Underlined] Average Error: [/underlined] Squadrons – 7 m.p.h.
Con. Units – 8 m.p.h.
It will be noted that only one Squadron has achieved the ideal, i.e. a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Day, D.F.C. Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to Ops.II H.Q. 5 Group.
S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C. S.N.O. Dunholme to Base Nav. Officer, Scampton.
F/Lt. Bray, D.F.C. 207 Sqdn. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, D.F.M. 44 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Craven 50 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. R. Adams, D.F.C. 630 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Lascelles, D.F.C. 1654 C.U. Navigation Leader to be Squadron Nav. Officer No. 50 Squadron.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] A RECORD MONTH [/underlined]
The month of June produced two new records when a total of 3000 sorties was flown, resulting in 11,708 tons of bombs dropped on enemy territory, an increase of 3,000 tons over our previous record in May. All armament personnel can be justifiably proud of their contribution, particularly as this phenomenal tonnage represents only a fraction of the tonnage actually handled during the month.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL BOMBING GEAR [/underlined]
One drop of water in the wrong place may result in several thousands of pounds of high explosive failing to reach the target – a startling yet true statement. Bad weather has necessitated leaving aircraft bombed up for several consecutive days, and as no aircraft can be guaranteed waterproof, it is quite possible that some of our recent “summer weather” has seeped into the bombing circuit.
All Armament Officers are reminded if the correct procedure to be carried out when aircraft are left bombed up after the cancellation of operations, and a quick reference to Air Staff Instructions would not be amiss at this stage. Are your electrical circuits tested each day, and do you always remove pyrotechnics from the aircraft immediately after the cancellation? Check up on these and all other relevant points, and ensure that the [underlined] full [/underlined] load reaches its destination, and not just a small fraction of it.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN [/underlined]
The Bomber Command Armament Bulletin for June has now arrived and contains some very interesting and useful information, particularly the suggestions made for improving the condition of bomb dumps in general. Page 9 of the Bulletin refers to the difficulties encountered in the storage of cluster projectiles and introduces a new type of tracking which is intended form a temporary hard standing in bomb dumps which have no suitable storage space for this particular weapon. Supplies of this Summerville tracking have already arrived at some stations in the Group and although it is, as yet, too early to express an opinion as to the efficiency of this equipment, it is considered that it will prove to be a very great asset.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Types and Squadron]
A= MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
[Underlined] GUN FREEZING [/underlined]
Although the immediate danger of gun failures due to freezing has now passed, the problem of preventing such failures is still being very carefully investigated, and to assist in this investigation samples of hydraulic fluids have been taken from gun turret systems of operational aircraft for analysis by the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
A [indecipherable] of water in suspension in hydraulic fluid is sufficient to cause the oil to freeze at a considerably higher temperature, and consequently the importance of ensuring that oil containers used to fill gun turret systems are free from water, cannot be too strongly stressed. Results of this analysis will be forwarded to all Bases and Stations when received. We hope that they will be negative.
[Underlined] AMMUNITION [/underlined]
The repeated changing of ammunition from night to daylight sequence results in all ammunition bolts being handled several times a week. If ammunition is transported in suitable containers and handled carefully when being loaded into the aircraft, no misalignment should occur.
The necessity for ensuring that only correctly aligned ammunition is loaded into gun turrets should be brought to the attention of all armourers and air gunners.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The emphasis during the past month has been on wind finding for practice bombing, and we are pleased to say that Navigators on the Training Base have risen to the occasion and produced excellent results. The most notable performances have come from Winthorpe, where seven Navigators obtained a Nil vector error. This drive on wind finding has created a desire to find equally correct winds during Navigational exercises. The result has been a big improvement in track keeping and timing.
From time to time improvements on the A.P.I. are suggested. The latest suggestion comes from F/O Richardson of No.5 L.F.S., who has suggested a modification to facilitate re-setting. This modification, if adopted, will reduce the time taken to reset the A.P.I. by at least 2/3rds. Good work Syerston!
H2S training is getting into its stride at Wigsley, and 1/3rd of each course is now being trained. Only one trainer is available at Wigsley at the moment, but as soon as the second trainer arrives it is the intention to train 50% of all crews. Winthorpe and Swinderby Conversion Units are already training half their inputs. Pupils are receiving approximately 14 hours air training, and at least 20 hours ground training. When more aircraft are available it will be the policy to train more crews rather than increase the number of flying hours per pupil.
Bullseye exercises have been seriously interrupted by bad weather, but 10 and 12 Groups have co-operated to the maximum extent on every possible occasion, and several good exercises have been completed.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “OVER KEENNESS” [/underlined]
A Navigator on a cross country flight who was endeavouring to work the Swinderby system of obtaining six minute fixes and winds, experienced Gee failure. He immediately instructed his W/Operator to obtain a M/F fix every six minutes. The W/Op. found the ether rather congested, so he attempted priority fixes – much to the concern of the M/F Section, R.O.C, 5 Group and No. 51 Base!
Public Relations
Public Relations work during June has been rather confused owing to the altered nature of the Command’s operations, and the uncertainty of many circumstances. Only a few reports were issued to the press at any length by the Air Ministry News Service.
Three war correspondents have flown in Group aircraft on operations: Mr. Ronald Walker, of the “News Chronicle” who went over Caen with S/Ldr. Fairburn of 57 Squadron on June 12/13; Mr. R.J. Kiek, of the Netherlands Press Agency, who flew over a French target with his countryman, F/O Overgaadu of No. 207 Squadron, on June 16/17; and Mr. Kent Stephenson, B.B.C. War Reporter, who unfortunately failed to return with W/Cdr. Crocker of No. 49 Squadron on June 21/22.
(Continued in Column 2)
(Continued from Column 3)
Three parties came to our stations: June 1st, Dunholme, Mrs. Billingham (Reuters), Miss Tredgold (South African Argus) and Mr. Fletcher (Sport and General Press Agency Photographer) for the visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: June 17th, Waddington, Mr. W. Farmer, of the “Melbourne Herald”; and June 22nd, Waddington, Mr. Wilkins and Miss Elizabeth Riddell (journalists) and Mr. J. Warburton (Sport and General photographer), for the visit of the Duke of Gloucester.
A party of employees of the Firma Chrome Plating Co., of Sheffield, visited the Sheffield Squadron (No.49) on June 3rd.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
June was quite a fair month from the aircraft signals point of view, but improvement can and must be made. It is hoped every endeavour will be made by Signals Leaders to raise the standard of Aircrew Signals operating to a high state of efficiency.
Have all Signals Leaders read and digested 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13, and acquainted all their operators with its contents?
This instruction lays down the requirements for W/T Control Operators. Endeavour should be made to bring every Operator up to the standard required. Two Squadrons have already carried out air tests with quite satisfactory results. One important point – once an operator reaches the standard required, he must, by constant practice maintain that standard, and to ensure that he does, he may be required to do an air test with Group at any time, without previous warning.
[Underlined] DAILY INSPECTIONS. [/underlined]
Signals Leaders, do you ever take a quick run out to your aircraft and check over the “Daily” done by your W/Ops?
An aircraft of this Group took off on Ops one night, was only airborne a short time when the intercom. failed. Cause – faulty 2v 20 Acc! The W/Op did not carry out the correct drill for the use of emergency intercom. as laid down in 5 Group Aircraft Drill No.11, Appendix “A”. Result – one early return and one load of bombs the Hun did not receive. Was this the only dud 2v 20 Acc. airborne that night? Or was he the unfortunate W/Op. who, through his lack of knowledge or carelessness in carrying out his emergency drill, was found out? We wonder!! It would be worthwhile checking up on these accs. in the aircraft. Yes, there was a lot of truth in the film “BOOMERANG” !
The new Wireless Operators (Air) log has now gone to the printing press and should be available for issue very soon. We hope to see some very neat and fully detailed logs returned, just to show your appreciation.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
This month’s Good Show comes from 57 Squadron, by an operator who showed coolness and initiative in fixing up his broken dinghy aerial (fixed) and operating his dinghy radio, thus enabling the rescue aircraft to “home” on his signal.
The aerial mast was broken while erecting, and the operator fixed his aerial lead into the aerial part while other members of the crew took turns at holding the aerial aloft, by the insulated part which separates the aerial from mast.
This is an excellent example of cool and intelligent thinking under very difficult circumstances.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The co-operation of W/Op. and Gunner reporting on unserviceability of Early Warning Devices is improving, but there are still the few cases of discrepancy appearing in these E.W.D. reports and Combat reports. Just a little more drive in this direction will eradicate this, so Signals Leaders and Radar Interrogators, do your stuff.
Manipulation failures are still occurring, mostly due to lack of experience, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. Efforts are being made for every Squadron to have one Early Warning Device Instructor, and quite a few Squadrons have them already. Signals Leaders, get your W/Ops over to them for that little extra instruction which means all the difference between failure and serviceability of your E.W.D. and sends your Squadron percentage of serviceability soaring.
The cards, depicting combats on Monica, sent from this Group to Headquarters Bomber Command, are now in the process of being reproduced and will soon be available for issue to Squadrons and Conversion Units.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The alteration to the time of the Group W/T exercise has met with universal approval from all Squadrons, and there has been some good operating. The reallocation of Squadrons to Sections 1 and 2 should also help to make the exercise more interesting by eliminating the possibility of any two transmitters “blotting out” each other due to their close proximity.
[Underlined] VALETE ET SALVETE [/underlined]
Our heartiest congratulations to W/Cdr. Skinner on his promotion and his appointment as Officer Commanding No. 14 Radio School. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
Our congratulations also go to S/Ldr. Andrews on his appointment as Signals Leader, 92 Group.
Five Group are poorer by two very popular officers.
44 Squadron will welcome F/O Hughes (a former 44 Sqdn. W/Op) as Signals Leader.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failures percentage against total operational sorties has shown a great decrease during the month. There were 27 failures reported out of 3,000 sorties – the percentage being 0.9, the lowest figure for many months. The maintenance personnel are to be commended for repeating last month’s record of zero maintenance failures. Out of this enormous number of sorties, only two aircraft returned early as a result of signals defects. The number of component failures (equipment) was 14. Surprisingly enough, not one condenser or resistor defect was reported; R. 1155 output valves again proved troublesome.
[Underlined] V.H.F. FITTING [/underlined]
At the time of going to press, 200 aircraft are fitted with V.H.F. equipment. The speed of fitting has placed us well ahead of schedule. Units are reporting that they are receiving a considerable number of crystals which on test have been found inactive. R.A.E., Farnborough, have evolved a modification (R.T.I.M. No.629) employing a choke unit type 45, which, in A. D. G. B. aircraft has proved quite successful. When the choke units become available, units will be notified.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
There are two main reasons why the total number of Mandrel fitted aircraft in this Group has fallen. They are (a) supplies of Col.9 not forthcoming, and (b) large scale V.H.F. fitting drive, which has absorbed all available Signals manpower in the squadrons. It is emphasised, however, that squadrons must ensure that all their complete Mandrels are fitted as soon as possible. The Countermeasure Party is still available at Group Headquarters in readiness to offer assistance.
[Underlined] CARPET II [/underlined]
Contrary to many beliefs, Carpet II is in no way connected with Persian Markets. It is, however, a new radio countermeasure device fitted to the Illuminating Force aircraft of this Group. It is quite popular with the C.S.O!
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Base Signals and Radar Officers attended a conference at Group Headquarters on 16th June, to discuss the Bomber Command proposed establishment of Radar personnel. After considerable discussion and divergence of opinion the proposals were accepted. Some alterations were suggested in connection with accommodation and holdings of spare equipment, and these were forwarded to Bomber Command. It is understood that the proposals are now being considered by the Establishment Branch at Bomber Command.
[Underlined] BOOZER [/underlined]
Sufficient Boozer equipment became available during the month to enable fitting to proceed in our two Boozer squadrons. As this equipment is in very short supply, every effort must be made to make immediate use of all that is available. Test equipment is at the moment, difficult to obtain, but a proposed re-distribution of the total Command holdings should ease this situation.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
It has become increasingly obvious from scrutiny of combat reports that Tail Warning Devices are not being watched continuously by the Wireless Operator. Originally it had been hoped that with training and experience a W/Op would be able to carry out his W/T work whilst, at the same time keeping one eye on the Tail Warning Device, but this has been found to be very difficult. The possibility of repositioning the Tail Warning Indicator so that two of the crew can watch it, has been thoroughly investigated, and found impracticable. Experiments have been made to ascertain the possibility of using a second indicator. This repeater indicator is located adjacent to the Gee indicator. An indicator standard for both Monica IIIA and V, has been designed and tested by the Group Trouble Shooting Party. It has proved quite satisfactory and Bomber Command have been asked to arrange for its early introduction. The design of a simple Fishpond repeater indicator proved too great a problem, and it is now expected that a second standard Fishpond indicator will be the only answer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee was once again the leader in serviceability, showing a new high percentage of 97.77 out of 2,639 sorties. This was obtained in spite of the decrease in new equipment available, and a consequent reduction in the spare sets which squadrons were able to hold.
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 7
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SIGNALS (CONT.)
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 1249 sorties was completed by aircraft equipped with H 2 S Mark II, and of these 103 experienced difficulty; the remaining 91.76% were serviceable throughout the sorties. The fitting of this equipment to 619 Squadron has not yet been completed, but it is proceeding as fast as circumstances will allow. The movement of the Bomber Command Fitting Party to Dunholme will ease considerably the strain of fitting now being carried out by squadron personnel. The supply of fitted aircraft is keeping pace with the number of trained crews.
Mark III H 2 S has shown a decided improvement and the 76 sorties completed resulted in a serviceability of 92.11%. Supply of this equipment is still very grim, but does show signs of improving.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
As is to be expected, this equipment followed in step with H2 S, 92.72% of the 1236 sorties being free of difficulty. Training has shown very decided improvement and the operational reports indicate that W/Ops. are having increased success with this equipment.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA remained at almost the same level as May. 830 sorties were completed, and there were 39 difficulties reported. The remaining 95.31% gave completely satisfactory results. Monica V came closer than ever to overtaking its predecessor with a percentage serviceability of 93.91. The more prevalent causes of unserviceability have been almost eliminated, and the lesser difficulties will no doubt diminish as further experience is gained by Radar personnel. The supply position of both types of Monica becomes increasingly difficult, so squadrons must do their utmost to conserve their existing equipment, and to keep all sets serviceable. The delivery of a Monica Trainer to the Aircrew School at Scampton should help squadrons considerably in their training programme.
The serviceability figures for the month are very gratifying. They indicate a decided increase in the standard of training and workmanship of Radar personnel. In these days of intensive operations, it requires hard work to keep all our equipment serviceable, but the bombing results are more than worth the effort. With the introduction of the proposed establishment, and an adequate number of Radar vans, we should be able to meet the rain and altitude trials of winter on better than equal terms.
[Underlined] TELEPHONE EXCHANGES [/underlined]
Last month’s issue of the News contained a cartoon for which we, in Signals, accept no responsibility. We are delighted, however, to be given the opportunity to refute the allegation of inefficiency which was inferred by publishing the following bouquet.
Skellingthorpe has produced some surprising figures showing the number of calls handled by the Admin PBK during a 24-hour non-operational period. A total of 3,725 calls was handled during this period, and of these 3,143 were extensions – to – extension calls. The Station Commander comments – “My opinion of our operators, always high, has gone up still further”, and – “at Skellingthorpe we have an exchange staff second to none”. We hope that this latter remark will be accepted as a challenge by other exchanges within the Group.
[Underlined] TELEPRINTER TRAFFIC [/underlined]
In April of this year, this Headquarters Signals Office was handling about 9,000 teleprinter messages per week. A drive was then inaugurated to divert traffic to less congested channels, such as D.R.L.S., and our weekly total fell in five weeks by 4,000 messages!
Now that “D” Day has passed, however, the total is commencing to rise. This must be checked, since as the Western Front develops, our commitments increase – It’s often quicker by postagram – at any rate for Admin messages.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] LANCASTER SPARES [/underlined]
This month sees a changeover in our method of demanding spares for Lancasters. Instead of demanding straight on to the M.P.O. demands are now placed on No.207 M.U. who are in a position to supply.
Equipment Officers will help No. 207 M.U. provisioning to a great extent by keeping a close watch upon demands for Lancaster spares, and ensuring that demands are going to No.207 M.U. and not to the M.F.O.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS [/underlined]
A point to watch is the serviceability of mechanical sweepers. If these machines go u/s it means that runways cannot be kept clear of flints and stones, which means a rise in consumption of tyres. The aircraft tyre situation is still acute, and every care must be taken to get the maximum amount of life out of every tyre.
Equipment officers should therefore look into the holdings of spares for mechanical sweepers, and in conjunction with the M.T. Officers provision wisely on those parts which have a habit of going u/s. This will keep the sweepers serviceable and the consumption of tyres down.
[Underlined] WINTER CLOTHING [/underlined]
Now the English summer is upon us it would be wise to overhaul items of winter clothing such as overcoats, waterproof overalls, leather jerkins etc., and get them into good trim for the forthcoming winter.
It would be better to do it now instead of waiting for the winter when these items will be in great demand.
[Underlined] BLANKETS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred where it has been found that Stations have been holding blankets far in excess of their entitlement as laid down in A.M.O. A. 700/43. A quick check of stocks may mean the release of many blankets with a subsequent saving of man-hours at the factory which manufactures them.
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT (Continued from column 2) [/underlined]
[Underlined] OXYGEN TRANSPORT CYLINDERS [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters Bomber Command letter BC/S.21459/E.6, dated 30th June, 1944.
The scale of issue of these items is 32 per squadron. Equipment Officers should make every effort to reduce any surplus holdings and return these cylinders to the M.U.
GARDENING
5 Group’s gardening this month amounted to two small but useful operations by No.44 Squadron against two of the Biscay U-Boat lairs, on the nights of 6/7th and 8/9th. Planting was done in H 2 S from high altitude and some excellent P. P. I. photographs were obtained. A total of 30 vegetables was planted.
Although the record breaking figures of April and May were not reached, the Command planted the considerable total of 1772 vegetables, in some 20 gardens. Over 1,000 were directed against the U-Boats – off their bases and in their approach routes to the Western end of the English Channel. This, combined with vigorous and successful action by air and surface striking forces has brought almost to nothing the threat to our Invasion supply lines, in spite of the massing of the U-Boats to the West of the Channel in the first few days. Nearly 600 vegetables were laid in the Channel itself, to impede enemy surface craft – principally E-Boats – in their anti-invasion operations. (Here, we gratefully admit, we were helped more than a little by the wholesale slaughter of these vermin in their harbours by the bombers). Certain North Sea gardens received some 150 vegetables, and Mosquitos of 8 Group planted a small number in the Kettegat.
During the three months preceding “D” Day well over 7,000 vegetables were planted by the Command, 5 Group being responsible for 908. These figures show that in actual quantity we distributed about one eighth of the Command total. What they do not show is that nearly all our operations were special ones, involving either exceptionally long distances (DANZIG); exceptional accuracy from very low level (KONIGSBURG CANAL); exceptional weight of attack in one night (KEIL BAY) or gardening in daylight (KATTEGAT). We do little routine gardening, and so do not get regular practice, but our recent successes show the value of keeping up to date in slack periods.
Results are beginning to come through, but details of casualties still refer to at latest three months ago; in fact, in the latest list we discover that 5 Group sank a U-Boat in April [underlined] 1943! [/underlined] Fortunately some reports get through more quickly than that, and news of the tremendous indirect effects of the pre-invasion gardening is plentiful. We hear of the route from TRELLEBORG to KIEL (150 miles) being marked with a [underlined] WRECK [/underlined] buoy every 1 – 2 miles; of Swedes and Finns laying up their ships rather than risk out mines, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare states that the mining of the Kiel Canal, backed up by the mining which preceded and followed it in the Baltic and North Sea approaches to the Canal, caused an [underlined] IRRECOVERABLE [/underlined] loss of 3 million tons of overall imports/exports to the German War Machine.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 8
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AIR SEA RESCUE
June brought a record number of operational sorties and, at the same time, an increase in the known number of incidents involving Safety Drills.
A squadron aircraft disappeared over the Irish Sea on a navigational exercise with the loss of the entire crew. Four crews had occasion to use the Parachute Drill, two were successful; in the third, four members who baled out were lost in the sea; in the fourth the rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute, and a gallant attempt by the Air Bomber to share his own parachute was un successful.
[Underlined] 9/10th June. [/underlined] S/44 Squadron returning from operations, got out of control in bad weather. Its position was uncertain, and the captain ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Four members had jumped when the pilot regained control. They fell into the Thames Estuary and were drowned. The aircraft landed at base. None of those lost attached their K-type dinghies before jumping. [Underlined] MORAL [/underlined] – If in doubt about your position always take your dinghy with you.
[Underlined] 21/22nd June. [/underlined] Z/44 Squadron was hit in the starboard elevator from extreme range by a night fighter over enemy territory. The aircraft dived sharply with the elevators jammed, and when over the vertical the pilot considered he had no hope of recovery and ordered the crew to abandon. The Air Bomber was jammed against the rear of his compartment. The Rear Gunner was caught in his turret and trapped by piles of ammunition on his lap, caused by a runaway servo feed. Four members baled out and their parachutes were seen to open. The captain eventually regained control and flew the aircraft back to base, navigated by the Air Bomber.
S/630 Squadron was badly shot up by a fighter. Wings and fuselage were riddled, and the rear turret so badly damaged it was a wonder the gunner escaped injury. The rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute.
With the assistance of two crew members, the pilot flew the aircraft back to this country where, due to damage, he found he could not turn and so was forced to bale out his crew.
At the risk of grave personal injury, the Air Bomber allowed the Rear Gunner to attach his parachute clips to the “K” Dinghy ”D” rings of his (the Air Bomber’s) harness, and the two went out together. Unfortunately, his “D” rings tore through the webbing when the parachute opened and the Gunner was lost.
[Underlined] SUCCESSFUL DITCHING [/underlined]
A/57 Squadron on the same night was returning across the North Sea at 7000 feet when all engines failed, apparently through shortage of fuel. The Captain immediately warned his crew, and ordered the Wireless Operator to transmit S.O.S. The Wireless Operator switched I.F.F. to “Distress” and transmitted “S.O.S.” and the aircraft callsign about ten times before being ordered to his ditching station.
The aircraft ditched ten minutes later. The pilot made use of his landing light which helped him to judge his height, but having no power the aircraft struck the water very severely breaking off the tail. The Captain’s harness had not been tightened sufficiently and he was flung upwards, making a large hole in the perspex and cutting his face deeply. The pilot left the aircraft by means of this self-made hole. The Flight Engineer was also flung upwards and cut his nose on the fuselage roof. The gunners were flung over the flapjack but were uninjured, falling on top of the Air Bomber who was also unhurt, and the Navigator cut the back of his head.
Exit was made from the aircraft “except-
(continued on page10, col.3)
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Place Dinghy Drill Parachute Drill [/underlined]
1 52 Base 52 Base
2 53 Base 55 Base
3 55 Base 53 Base
[Table of Drill Results by Squadron]
No crews in No. 54 Base were tested during the month.
[Underlined] Points arising from Safety Drill Tests. [/underlined]
(a) A number of crews have not thoroughly read “5 Group Aircraft Drills”.
(b) Insufficient use of made of the intercom in practicing “Safety Drills” – the more use that is made of the intercom the more informed and less worried the crew will be.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined]
The monthly summary of Ditchings in Home Waters for May, 1944, shows that 508 airmen were concerned, of whom 242 (47.2%) were saved – a marked percentage increase in lives saved.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
An aircraft of No. 207 Squadron, flown by F/O Smart, collided over the target with another Lancaster which broke cloud above on the port quarter. In spite of the fact that the entire port fin and rudder were torn away and the port tail plane, elevator and aileron badly damaged, F/O Smart completed the bombing run and showing great skill, flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
By his prompt action, F/O Sanders of No. 463 Squadron averted what could have been a serious accident. He was taking off with full bomb load when the starboard tyre burst at a speed of approximately 90 m.p.h. Displaying great skill, he controlled the swing and made a successful take off, and after completing the sortie landed his aircraft in such a way that only minor damage was sustained.
P/O. Meggeson of No. 83 Squadron showed a fine example of airmanship. The port inner of his aircraft caught fire. Though he was unable to operate the fire extinguisher or feather the propeller, by maintaining a very low airspeed, he succeeded in controlling the fire and few his aircraft back to base, where he made a successful landing.
As a result of combat with an enemy fighter, and aircraft of No. 61 Squadron, piloted by P/O Passant, was severely damaged. The starboard fin and rudder were shot away, the fuselage and starboard main plane badly damaged, and the starboard tyre burst. P/O Passant displayed great skill and determination in flying the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
Whilst making a night approach in 7 miles visibility, and aircraft struck a tree 1000 yards from the end of the runway. When the aircraft eventually landed the Pilot stated he had had a successful trip but that the aircraft felt very heavy to handle. This was not surprising as he was still carrying full bomb load when he landed.
Whilst flying at 8000 feet, all four engines of a Stirling cut. The aircraft lost height to 600 feet before the engines were re-started. The First Engineer was changing tanks when the engines cut. They started again when the Second Engineer turned the petrol on!
In broad daylight, after a clear straight run of 200 yards, a pilot taxied his aircraft into an M.T. vehicle standing on the perimeter track.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties carried out totalled exactly 3,000; this constitutes an excellent effort when it is considered that this number of sorties affected serviceability very little and a much larger number could have been laid on had the weather permitted and circumstances required them.
A large number of acceptance checks had to be carried out during the month and some excellent work was carried out by the Group Servicing Section, and the very fine spirit which exists within the Group was made evident by bases which had few acceptance checks to carry out volunteering to accept aircraft for check from other bases. This greatly decreased the period which would normally have elapsed to bring this large number of Lancasters to operational standard.
1.003% of aircraft which either failed to take off or returned early were due to technical faults for which the Engineering Branch is responsible. This 1.003% includes defects beyond our immediate control and remedial modification action is being taken in respect of many of the defects. It is good to know that not one of these aircraft failed due to a maintenance defect, and squadrons are to be congratulated on this aspect. The following squadrons had no early returns or cancellations due to Engineering defects during June, and are awarded a “big hand”:-
44, 83, 97, 467 and 619 Squadrons.
Failures are still occurring of the now famous oil pipe from relief valve to dual drive, and it is hoped that all promises made during June will reach fruition during July.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The effort which is put in by maintenance personnel to maintain this high standard of aircraft serviceability has been increased on many stations to maintain a similar high standard of serviceability of ground equipment. It is pleasing to see the drive which is progressing to maintain these essential aids to serviceability. When a “set-up” looks efficient, it invariably is efficient. Nothing looks so inefficient as a dirty hangar with trestles, wheels, cowlings and any odd items lying around the floor in pools of oil, whilst engine platforms are oil saturated and the equipment generally filthy. This state of affairs does not exist at any station in this Group, but there is considerable room for improvement on certain stations. Once a high standard of efficiency has been achieved it can easily be maintained, but don’t sit back and maintain your present standard unless it is highly efficient.
Many grand jobs have been carried out during June to keep the serviceability high and it is very difficult to pick out any single base in this News.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
During the past month a drive was made to improve the maintenance of the Mark XIV Bombsight. Results have shown a marked improvement, but we will not be satisfied until every sight in the Group can be guaranteed accurate. Much more care must be taken in the levelling and lining up, as it is in these operations that most of the errors occur. The Mark XIV Bombsight is one of those instruments which requires plenty of liaison between Electrical officers and the Air Bombers’ Union, and it has been noted that this is now very effective.
Electrical sections deserve a pat on the back for the very intensive efforts they have put in during the latter half of the month. The list of modifications does not get any shorter, yet initial checks are still being completed in 24 hours.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Stirlings and Lancasters]
Flight Engineers
[Underlined] ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUTANTS [/underlined]
Many more administrative adjutants to the Chief Technical Officer are required; these adjutants will be volunteers from tour expired commissioned Flight Engineers. They will be responsible to the C.T.O. for the efficient administration of the Servicing Wing, and for the discipline and welfare of all the technical personnel on its strength.
Apart from this new post for Flight Engineers, there are also vacancies for administrative duties in the M.T. Section on Base Stations, and the duties will generally be the same as Adjutant to the C.T.O.
It will be seen that these posts have created quite a new avenue for Flight Engineers, but every facility will be given them to improve their engineering knowledge while undertaking administrative duties as their primary roles.
Flight Engineer Leaders must bring those vacancies to the notice of the commissioned Flight Engineers who are about to finish their tour of operations.
[Underlined] NON-COMMISSIONED FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
A course of instruction for newly screened N. C. O. ‘s commenced at St. Athan on 7th June 1944. The object of this course is to train screened Flight Engineers to take up their new duties as Instructors in Heavy Conversion Units and Lancaster Finishing Schools.
Revision and technical subjects are included in the syllabus, but the course is designed mainly to teach the technique of lecturing.
As this course is most important to new instructors, it is hoped that all Flight Engineers will be enthusiastic, for much will depend on their results if the standard of lecturing is to improve in our Conversion Units and Schools.
TRAINING
Despite the bad weather towards the end of the month, 51 Base flew a total of over 8,000 hours and produced 130 crews for Squadrons.
Twice during the month, 1654 Conversion Unit, taking a leaf from the book of 1661 for May, laid on “operational” take offs for aircraft on night exercises. They got 17 and 22 off on these occasions in almost as many minutes.
Re-organisation of the Heavy Conversion Units commenced in the last week of the month to ensure that training of crews under the summer output can be increased to the highest level. Under this new system intakes of 11 every six days will go into the Heavy Conversion Units and the Group target figure for the month is 160 crews.
Each Conversion Unit now consists of 3 large flights, each of which is sub-divided into two. The Stirling Academy has also been split up into three parts, each one becoming the nucleus of a small flight at each Conversion Unit.
The Base had a very much better month from the accident point of view, and tyre bursts are now the only chronic complaint left. Undercarriage pylon failures have been reduced and coring has slipped rapidly out of the Base vocabulary.
New appointments within Base include Wing Commander Derbyshire, D.F.C., as Chief Instructor, 1660 Conversion Unit, and Wing Commander Kingsford Smith as Chief Instructor 1654 Conversion Unit.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 9) [/underlined]
ionally quickly” and all the crew members were in the dinghy almost before they knew it. The kite container was lost in transit, but all other equipment was transferred to the dinghy – a parachute found its way in, but was afterwards lost in the excitement of getting clear of the aircraft which was keeling over and threatening to come down on top of the dinghy.
This crew merely got their feet wet in boarding the dinghy but later got the seats of their pants wet because of a small hole in the dinghy which was subsequently plugged.
The pilot was weak from loss of blood, and shock, so the Air Bomber took charge and bullied the rest of the crew into activity. They say this did the world of good. The aircraft floated for about 10 minutes.
The dinghy mast was broken when being stepped, but the Wireless Operator managed to connect the aerial to the dinghy radio and almost continuous transmissions were made with other crew members holding the mast erect. Some hours later they were spotted by 91 Group Wellingtons which brought in an A.S.R. Hudson. A Lindholme dinghy was dropped, but failed to inflate though the crew managed to collect three of the ration containers. About 14 1/2 hours later a Naval Launch picked up the crew and took them into Yarmouth.
This crew had done a practice dinghy drill on the day before the incident, and attribute much of the success of this ditching to that fact.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 10
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ENEMY AGENTS – CARELESS TALKERS
On the 30th January, 1942, there was published a document of some importance – to wit A.M.C.O. A.9 of that year.
It was important because it cleared the air of a good deal of confusion on the subject of security, and it achieved this by defining the functions of Security Organisation – thereby defining what is meant by the term ‘Security’ – and it laid down the organisation by which these functions were to be performed.
Security was by no means a new subject. Prior to the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, a vast number of thoughts on the subject had already made themselves felt, chiefly in the form of posters. They bore a slogan – “CARELESS TALK COSTS LIVES” – they sought to impress the truth of this slogan by representing pictorially such distressing events as ships being blown up, aircraft being shot down, and so on, all, by implication, the result of the wrong word being spoken at the wrong time in the wrong place. These were reinforced, in lighter vein, by coloured drawings, more or less amusing, of Hitler listening beneath a table at which, presumably, two people were discussing the future plans of the Allies; of Hitler repeated ad infinitum in the pattern of the wall paper; of Hitler looking out of the frames of otherwise harmless pictures: all of them indicative of the ubiquity of Hitler, and of the truth of that apalling [sic] statement “Walls have ears”.
And since the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, these pictorial exhortations to verbal discretion have been emphasised to us, in the R.A.F., by a quantity of printed matter in the form of lectures, bulletins, reports, instructions which, if expressed in terms of tonnage of paper they consumed, or if placed end to end, or on top of each other in one column, would, one feels sure, provide much indigestible food for thought in the shape of one of those totals which impress more by number of their digits than by any meaning they are able to convey to the ordinary mind. Add to this the number of words which must have been spoken in lectures on this subject since the 30th January, 1942, the countless man-hours devoted to the study and promulgation of this gospel of silence, and our total will become more astronomical and, therefore, more meaningless than ever.
Staggering as this total would be, however, it would never reach the dimensions of those our enemies could provide in the same field of endeavour, for the very good reason that they had been at it long before we commenced piling ours up. Japan, for instance, had been preaching the gospel of silence to her people for something like twenty years before Pearl Harbour. She taught it not only to her soldiers, sailors and airmen, but to the man in the factory, the woman in her home, the pedestrian on the street; with the result, as the writings of any of the foreign newspaper correspondents, some of whom had been in the country for years, will tell you, it was next to impossible to find out anything worth knowing about the country’s strength, or her intentions.
And what of Germany? Those Germans who were not born silent, or had not achieved silence by the time Hitler took them over, had silence so thoroughly thrust upon them that they really came to understand how and to know that even the walls of their own homes could grow ears. They were left in no doubt whatever upon the value of silence when it came to discussing either the affairs of the Party or of the Fatherland.
All of which surely points to the conclusion that silence in war-time, or, in other words, Security of Information, must be a matter of very great importance. Of course it is. You know that already. The meanest intelligence, you will point out, can grasp quite easily the simple truth that, if you prevent the enemy from knowing what you are up to, you place him at a serious disadvantage; you render him, so to speak, both deaf and blind, and, therefore, easier to deal with. Any fool knows that.
They [sic] why do people talk? Why do they write home letters full of chatty information about their stations? Why does one feel so certain that, were it possible to tap, at once all the telephone lines in the vicinity of our stations all over the country, one would become possessed of a mass of service information about all sorts of things and people – whither, why and when such a squadron is moving, who have finished their tours, where people are posted to, who didn’t come back last night, who the new C.O. is, and where he comes from, what the weather is like, what are the chances of a scrub tonight, how the R.A.F. is fed, clothed, housed, organised – and so on and so on? Not to be too depressing about it, let it be stated at once that one would probably, even certainly, gain much less information than would have been the case say two years ago; but who would like to bet that there still wouldn’t be plenty to be picked up?
So, why, after all the effort that has been made, all the money that has been spent, the paper that has been used, the words that have been spoken, should this be so? Now here, it is suggested, lies the root of the matter, and if this root can be dug up and examined, the apparently indestructible weed of Service Gossip, a weed which, while harmless, perhaps, nine times out of ten, can, on that tenth time, produce enough poison to be fatal to precious lives and expensive material, can be understood, and to understand any problem is the first step towards solving it.
Let us examine it then. People talk because that is the easiest and most natural way for them to express their thoughts. They talk their thoughts, they think about their daily lives; therefore, they talk about their daily lives. Now apply that formula to the R.A.F. and what do you find? You discover a service filled, for the most part, with very young people, a number of them still in their formative years. They talk their thoughts, they think their lives, their lives are, at the moment, the R.A.F; therefore they talk about the R.A.F. To go on from here; they are young people who have been brought up in countries in which free speech, outside the debateable limits of the law of scandal, is as instinctive as breathing. They have never had occasion to practice this habit of silence - a most difficult habit to acquire – and finally, they serve in a force which has been publicised, photographed and if one may use such a word, glamourised, more than any other organisation ever has before. Flying, as the R.A.F. flies, is a continual source of wonder to the lay mind. This business of lifting tons of explosive material off the earth at one spot, transporting it at phenomenal heights to another spot hundreds of miles away, and there dropping it in spite of such discouragements as flak, fighters, the weather, and so on, is something of a miracle to the civilian, and, naturally enough, he wants to know about it. The youngsters of the R.A.F. are, of course, the horse’s mouth, which is given every encouragement to open itself, and to remain open. And when a W.A.A.F. goes home on leave Mother wants to know what it’s all like – the food, the quarters, the station, what they do there and that gives her mother something to talk about to somebody who will pass it on to somebody else who will…..why go on?
It is, you see, a personal problem. There is no mass-produced solution to it. It is every man and woman for himself, and only he and she can deal with it. How? Well, try this recipe. Try writing home letters in which you never even refer to the Station upon which you work, beyond, of course, the address in the top left hand corner. Apply the same rule when you leave your Station, even when you meet another R.A.F. type. Regard every telephone you use as a menace because it is you who are using it, and finally, when you have finished your work for the day, don’t make conversation out of it in the mess or the canteen. Try these four riles as an act of self-discipline, and never relax, and you will solve all your problem and, what is far more important, you will solve one of the great problems which confront your country. Difficult? Yes, very. Impossible? No. It has been done. There is a station which once had the privilege of guarding part of a great and important secret. It wrote its letters by the thousand, it went to the nearest town, it went on leave. But never a word got out. No less than 12,500 letters from that Station were opened over a period of three weeks, and only two minor indiscretions were discovered in them, both after the great event. If you were a stranger, you couldn’t get very far on that station without being questioned; every rumour heard on or off it was faithfully reported – just in case. The result is history, not only because the event referred to was one of the best kept secrets and, therefore, one of the most successful undertakings of the war, but because it provided proof that, with the problem fully explained to them, the A.C.2. and A.C.W.2. can keep a secret, can keep their mouths shut and their pens discreet, and can do so as a matter of conscience, and as an act of self discipline.
Now if only the civilian could be persuaded not to make the R.A.F. talk……
(Continued from Col. 3 page 12)
(c) I.A.S. within 2 m.p.h. and height within 50 feet.
It’s practice which, makes perfect.
Gunnery is the order of the day for you and your crew again. Keep a banking search going. See that your guns and gunners are in first class condition. Check up on your corkscrew and patter.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
June was not a cricketers’ month; the weather was “flaming [sic] but not in the sense of the old adage. Fielders and batsmen alike quailed before wind and rain. As a cricketers’ month it was grand for Rugger. In spite of the weather, however, several stations got in a full programme.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] – This station managed to complete the amazing total of 25 games. In addition, W.A.A.F. personnel played four games. Any challengers for an inter-station W.A.A.F. game? The Aircrew School represented the Station in five of the games, and themselves played 10 inter-course matches.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] – had five station matches, one of which, with Woodhall, was abandoned after Fiskerton had knocked up 87 for 8. Their other games were as follows:-
V Dunholme at Dunholme – Fiskerton 72 for 7 Dunholme 68 all out
V Fiskerton Village at the Camp – Fiskerton 108 for 6 Village 29 all out
V Bardney at Fiskerton – Fiskerton 62 all out Bardney 22 all out
V Scampton at Scampton – Scampton 120 for 9 Fiskerton 71 all out
In addition to this successful record several inter-section games were played.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] managed five station games, and are now getting into their stride under the captaincy of F/Lt Wardle.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] had three wins, one draw, and one loss from five games. They beat 5 Group H.Q., Welton Home Guard and Scampton, drew away with 5 Group H.Q. and suffered their only defeat at home with Fiskerton. An inter-section knock out is in full swing, with 12 teams competing.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] had an unlucky month, with four postponed matches out of the six arranged. Against Coningsby, Metheringham scored 37 for 1 (Coningsby 179 for 7) before rain stopped play. The only completed game was with R.C.A.F. Digby, who hit 60 for 6 against Metheringham 56 all out.
Inter-section games produced some close results, viz:
Flying Control 55 for 7 V R.A.F.Regt. 50 all out
“B” Flight 60 all out V “A” Flight 36 all out
Servicing Wing Fitters 60 all out V Servicing Wing Riggers 65 all out
“B” Flight 43 for 5 V “A” Flight 39 for 9
In the Base Commander’s Trophy, 106 Sqdn dismissed 617 for 70 runs, but they could not bat and the game was abandoned.
[Underlined] 5 Group H.Q. [/underlined] played five games, four of them being away, since the 5 Group pitch has not yet “settled down”. They produced the following results:
V Dunholme, at Morton. 5 Group 148 for 8 Dunholme 89 for 8 (Draw)
V Dunholme at Dunholme. Dunholme 129 for 6 5 Group 64 all out (Lost)
V Swinderby at Swinderby. Swinderby 88 for 7 5 Group 83 all out (Lost)
V 93 M.U. at Collingham M.U. 77 all out 5 Group 84 for 6 (Won)
V Newark Town at Newark Newark 77 for 8 5 Group 72 for 5 (Lost)
There were two intersection games, in one of which the “Hall” beat the rest by 136 for 8 against 99 for 8.
[Underlined] GROUP CRICKET COMPETITION [/underlined]
Woodhall beat Coningsby in the final of “A” Section, so now Syerston (winners of “B” Section) meet Woodhall in the deciding game for the Trophy. The game will probably be decided on Saturday or Sunday (July 15th or 16th) at Woodhall Spa. Woodhall have taken over the town’s local ground, and with the addition of a score board and sight screens now have one of the finest grounds in the Group. The game will be one of the features of Woodhall’s “Wings for Victory” Week, and given good weather will be a highly successful event between two of the strongest Group teams. It is hoped that the A.O.C. will be able to present the handsome silver bowl to the winning side.
[Underlined] ATHLETIC MEETINGS [/underlined]
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] ran a highly successful Athletic Meeting on Saturday, 3rd June, when favourable weather for once coincided with a stand-down. Fourteen events were contested on an inter-section basis, the trophy being a shield presented by Corporal Ward, Instrument Section. The final placings of the teams were as follows:-
Winners: Navigators – 137 points
Second Pilots – 93 points
Third W/Ops. – 83 points
Fourth Rear Gnrs. – 82 points
Fifth Air Bombers – 78 points
Sixth Engineers – 63 points
Seventh M.U.Gunners – 43 points
Mrs. McKechnie presented the shield to F/Sgt. Croft, who assisted the Navigators by winning the 440, 880 and mile. Another outstanding performance was by F/O Gantschi (Air Bomber) who won the 100, 200, 220 and Long Jump.
[Underlined] 54 BASE INTER-SQUADRON SPORTS MEETING [/underlined] was on Saturday 17th June. 83 Squadron won the Base Commander’s Trophy, scoring 35 points, but 106 Squadron, with 33 points and 617 with 32 points, were good losers. 106 Squadron, feeling fit, provided winners for the 440, 880, mile, 3 miles and Long Jump. F/Sgt. Croft again had a field day, winning the 440, mile, 3 miles, and running second in the 880 yards. There was a big crowd at the games, and enthusiasm ran high. Lord Brownlow, Lord Lieutenant of the County, presented the prizes.
[Underlined] 93 M.U. SPORTS [/underlined] 93 M.U., whose work is so completely bound up with 5 Group, ran a highly successful Field Day on June 24th. Besides the usual athletic events, side shows, boxing and dancing made up an excellent programme. They plan another Gala Day, in aid of the P.O.W. Fund on August Bank Holiday Monday, and any personnel who can reach Swinderby will be sure of an enjoyable day.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Get down to crew Gunnery problems in July. Check your knowledge of the corkscrew, polish up your patter and do all the fighter affiliation you can.
Careful trimming of your aircraft ensures accurate flying. The correct sequence of action is:-
Fly the aircraft straight and level, trim the elevators, trim all load off the rudder and finally trim out any aileron load.
2.5° of skid at 10,000 ft. means an error of 250 yards on the ground. This common bombing error is often unconsciously caused by pilots sitting tense and rigid on the bombing run. Ensure the aircraft is properly trimmed and the [underlined] relax [/underlined] and fly the aircraft naturally and carefully.
If you find it difficult to read the instruments when coned by searchlights, get your navigator to call the airspeed. Make it a standing arrangement with him.
Here are the common faults in night circuits, don’t allow these errors to “creep” in.
(i) Edging in towards the flare path on the down wind leg.
(ii) Not allowing for drift on approach.
(iii) Failing to close the throttles when touching down.
(iv) Going too far across wind before the final turn in.
Should you have to land without flaps, remember to lengthen your downwind leg as the approach will be flatter and therefore longer. Start the final turn in earlier since the turn without flap will be wider, and approach at 125 m.p.h. Touch down as soon as possible and expect a longer landing run, and be prepared to use brake progressively.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Are you brake conscious? Brake efficiency falls off with rise in temperature of – brake shoes and drums. Avoid continual use of brakes, control direction by engine and release brakes as soon as possible to allow heat to go into the air and not up into the tyres. Never apply full brake at once. This induces tyre creep.
If you have to land in a very strong, gusty wind, use only 40° of flap and aim to do a wheel landing. Make a normal approach and when the wheels touch, ease the stick [underlined] slightly [/underlined] forward and keep it steady till the tail sinks on to the ground.
A word on Met; remember that forecast height of cloud base id always height above sea level. Bear this in mind if you are forced to break cloud at a diversion aerodrome, and allow for height of ground.
Have you and your crew an “A” category for bombing? You can have if you accept nothing less than these limitations;
(a) Course within 1° (b) Bank within 2°
(Continued on page 11 Col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
The award of the Silver Model Lancaster to the Unit having the best accident rate for the six months ended June goes to No. 106 Squadron. This squadron had one accident for a total of 6,848 flying hours. Nos. 49 and 57 Squadrons also had one avoidable accident, for a total of 6,743 and 6,294 hours respectively. These squadrons are to be congratulated on a splendid achievement, It’s up to the other Squadrons to dethrone the champions during the next three months. GO TO IT!!
Altogether there was a decided improvement in the number of avoidable accidents during June.
36 aircraft were damaged in the Group by causes other than enemy action. This is a reduction of 15 compared with May, and the improvement is also reflected in the avoidable accident total which stands at 16 for June as opposed to 20 in May.
Of the aircraft damaged, 12 were CAT A, 5 CAT AC, 5 CAT B, and 14 CAT E.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS – 51 BASE RECORD [/underlined]
51 Base are to be congratulated for the lowest number of avoidable accidents for a long time; 4 aircraft were damaged under this category. The squadron total of 12 for the month was an increase of 2 over May’s total. Details are as follows:-
Squadron – Ground collisions (taxying) 3; overshoots landing 2; undershooting 1; Swings landing 1; Flying into high ground 1; Collision in air 1; errors of judgement 3; TOTAL 12.
51 Base – Swings taking off 1; Swings landing 2; Taxying 1; TOTAL 4
[Underlined] ACCIDENT CAUSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Taxying. [/underlined] 3 of the 4 taxying accidents in the Group follow the usual pattern. One struck a trestle outside dispersal at night, and no taxying light was being used. Another hit an M/T van left unattended just off the perimeter track, while a third (a Stirling) broke its tail wheel when it ran off the perimeter track. The 4th taxying accident was caused by a Flight Engineer starting up the engines of a Lancaster without permission. Brake pressure was low and the aircraft moved forward and struck another parked alongside.
[Underlined] Swings [/underlined] Three of these occurred on landing. One was a Mosquito in which the pilot, flying a Mosquito for the first time, was not quick enough in correcting. The other two landing swings were by pupil pilots on Stirlings, and were due to inexperience more than anything else. They both knew the correct drill, however, but were slow to react. The swing on take off occurred in a Stirling, when a pupil pilot opened the throttles too quickly and failed to control the violent starboard swing which followed. The undercarriage collapsed.
[Underlined] Other Accidents. [/underlined] A Lancaster returning in poor weather descended through cloud and hit a hill 500 feet above sea level. This accident has not yet been fully investigated, but preliminary evidence indicates that the pilot lost height contrary to orders at briefing.
Another Lancaster on return from Ops. in good weather hit a tree 1000 yards from the runway on his approach. The wing tip was torn off but the pilot went round again and made a good landing on his second attempt. In this instance the bombs were still on board unknown to the pilot. His Air Bomber had told him that all bombs had gone. Air Bombers please note!!
Two Lancasters overshot on landing at strange airfields on return from operations. The bomb load exploded after one of them crashed.
A formation flying collision resulted in the destruction of two aircraft this month. Number 3 of a “Vic” formation knocked the tail off the Leader.
The two remaining avoidable accidents cocurred [sic] on operational flights. One pilot lost control in cloud on return and ordered his crew to bale out. Four of them left before control was regained. They had not been told to take their ‘K’ type dinghy packs with them and landed in the sea. The aircraft made a safe landing at base.
A Mid-Upper Gunner firing at searchlights on the ground damaged the port fin of his aircraft with a burst. The solenoid had jumped from its bracket. The gunner was at fault.
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Most operations were within normal Gee range and no exceptional results have been recorded. There has, however, been a substantial decrease in jamming which may be due to the increase in the number of frequencies now in use.
Non-H 2 S squadrons are now equipped with the new R.F. Unit 27 and have had several chances of using it during the month. As yet there has been no opportunity to test its efficiency at long range, but reports indicate the signal strength to be good with little or no interference. It is hoped that the supply position in regard to these new units will improve shortly and H 2 S Squadrons can then be equipped.
Several changes in Gee transmissions have taken place recently, and it would be advisable for all navigators and wireless operators to check upon these and make sure they are using the right frequencies and aerial loading stud at the right time.
One word regarding Gee homing. It is apparent from recent operations that navigators are not checking up with Gee on the position of the markers. There is little excuse for this, as most operations at the present time are within normal Gee range and subject to little or no interference. Navigators would be well advised to check up on their homing procedure now – because sooner or later the time will come when owing to weather conditions bombs may have to be released on Gee.
With regard to Gee training, a modification is being issued shortly which will enable navigators to carry out dry swims and Gee homing procedure with the trainer. The first will be issued to Scampton Aircrew School and should prove an interesting and invaluable “toy”.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The targets this month have been rather disappointing for the H 2 S operator, and H 2 S has been little used. Whilst Gee may seem much simpler to use it is essential for all operators to use H 2 S as much as possible on these short range operations to augment training. We may switch to the longer range targets with little or no notice, and if operators have been relying to a very great extent on Gee, some difficulty with H 2 S may be experienced.
Just a word to Captains; your navigator depends to a very great extent upon the bomb aimer and his efficient manipulation of the equipment. If you are keeping him in the nose the whole of the time on these short operations he is getting little or no H 2 S training. A.S.I. BL/17 dated 26th April, 1944, details the duties of Air Bombers in H 2 S aircraft and however short the operation, Captains must see that this instruction is complied with.
One word with regard to H 2 S training on operational squadrons. With the present commitments there is very little opportunity for air training, but this does not prevent operators from obtaining as much ground training as possible. Ground trainers are available at all Units and they are yours to use at will. Squadron Navigation Officers and H 2 S Instructors should ensure that all operators get at
(Continued in Col. 2)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Continued from col.3) [/underlined]
least 30 minutes practice every day and should make periodic tests to see that operators are remaining efficient.
H 2 S operators will be interested to hear that 54 Base have been carrying out some experiments in the assessment of a Paramatta attack, and conclusions reached show that assessments can be made to within approximately 1/2 mile of the correct position. If this assessing can be carried out on operations it may prevent many attacks from developing around T.I’s a considerable distance from the aiming point. Preliminary trials are now being attempted with regard to Wanganui attacks and it is hoped that something useful may be produced for next winter’s operations.
Training at Conversion Units is progressing satisfactorily and Wigsley is now producing H 2 S trained crews.
There are still a few people in the Group who are sceptical about the amount of H 2 S. training carried out at No. 51 Base and in fairness to the effort being made by the Conversion Units, it would be advisable to outline the training being carried out by them.
Up to June 1st this year, 111 H 2 S trained crews have been produced by the Conversion Units, of which only 6 were sent to non-H 2 S squadrons (of these crews, 3 were Flight Commanders and 3 Australians).
With the increase in the number of H 2 S squadrons it became increasingly apparent that more crews would have to be trained by the Conversion Units and instructions were issued to that effect.
Despite the fact that [underlined] extra time or aircraft [/underlined] are allowed for this training, the Conversion Units are now taking 50% of the
(Continued on page 14 col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.A. DOREHILL, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O McKENZIE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.H. BOTHA D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O R.E. WALKER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O T.T. SMART D.F.C.
F/O W. McINTOSH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.S. STOUT D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H. STEERE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/L R.F. DAVIES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ G.H. PROBERT D.F.C.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L L.C.A. HADLAND D.F.C.
F/O W.W.W. TURNBULL D.F.C.
A/F/L E.M. ARMSTRON D.F.C.
F/O M.J. MAY D.F.C.
F/O F.B. HALL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.W. GREENWOOD D.F.M.
SGT J. WATERHOUSE D.F.M.
P/O A.E. GILES D.F.C.
P/O B.G.L. ROGERS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O W.A. GALL D.F.C.
F/O J.A. PRIOR D.F.C.
P/O W.F. POSSEE D.F.C.
P/O F.G. HAYLER D.F.C.
F/SGT J. LEVER D.F.M.
F/SGT W.I. WILKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT J.C. DICKINSON D.F.M.
SGT D.E. LAYSHON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.H. McFERRAN D.F.M.
F/SGT F. LOMAX D.F.M.
F/SGT J. RYAN D.F.M.
SGT J.H. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT LOMAS D.F.M.
F/O D.H. PEARCE D.F.C.
F/O McMASTER D.F.C.
P/O J.D. DUNCAN D.F.C.
P/O S.W.A. HURRELL D.F.C.
P/O H. BLOW D.F.C.
F/SGT H.F. SMITH D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT L.J. HUMMELL D.F.M.
SGT F. GARRETT D.F.M.
P/O F.B. SOAPER D.F.M.
F/SGT K.R. BLUNDELL D.F.M.
SGT R.H. BATEMAN D.F.M.
A/F/L R. McCURDY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O T.W. BLACK D.F.C.
F/SGT E. BARTON D.F.M.
F/SGT P.A. DEACON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.C. WRIGHT D.F.M.
F/SGT E.D. PRATT D.F.M.
P/O A.C. BAKER D.F.C.
F/O R.H. MAURY D.F.C.
F/O A. RIMMER D.F.C.
SGT D. CHARLES D.F.M.
F/SGT A.J. GURR D.F.M.
F/SGT W.H. BARKER D.F.M.
SGT WILLETT D.F.M.
SGT R.H. TURRELL D.F.M.
P/O J.A.W. McCALLUM D.F.C.
SGT H.G. CAPPS D.F.M.
F/SGT H.S. TILLER D.F.M.
SGT J.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
F/SGT F.H. BARNES D.F.M.
SGT E. HEDLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT M.M. SCOTT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.H. PRYOR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O J.V. REDDISH D.F.C.
F/SGT S.E. STEVENSON D.F.M.
P/O C.R. ROANTREE D.F.C.
F/SGT D. ANDREW D.F.M.
P/O BLACKHAM D.F.C.
F/SGT M.R. PRICE D.F.M.
F/SGT V.F. PITCHER D.F.M.
P/O D. JONES D.F.C.
F/O W.J.V. HAMILTON D.F.C.
F/SGT J.J. PAGE D.F.M.
P/O G.M.E. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT J.A. KIRWAN D.F.M.
W/CDR A.A. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.J. LUNDY D.F.C.
P/O L. DURHAM D.F.C.
F/O M.J. BEETHAM D.F.C.
P/O P.E. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.R. MOSSOP D.F.C.
F/O K.W. ODGERS D.F.C.
F/O P.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
F/O A.H. BIGNELL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.C.A. RODGERS D.F.M.
F/SGT N. HORSLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT A.D.F. SPRUCE D.F.M.
F/O L. HORNER D.F.C.
F/O H.S. SHORTT D.F.C.
F/O R.G.G. PAGETT D.F.C.
F/SGT D.E. WESTERMAN D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. COLLINGWOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT C. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT R. STANWIX D.F.M.
F/SGT A.L. BARTLETT D.F.M.
F/O A.S. KEITH D.F.C.
P/O A. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O J.A. WILDING D.F.C.
SGT W.M. RUNDLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. REID D.F.C.
SGT J.C. EVANS D.F.M.
P/O E.A. DOWLAND D.F.C.
P/O C.J.M. MARTIN D.F.C.
SGT T. DAVIES D.F.M.
F/O J. SIMMS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. COLLINS D.F.C.
(Continued on page 15, Column 1)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Contd. From page 13 Col.2) [/underlined]
crews passing through and giving them full H 2 S ground training with 10 – 15 hours air training. This output will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all H 2 S squadrons. These crews should reach the squadrons by the middle of August.
In the meantime H 2 S squadrons will have to put up with a quota of non H 2 S crews and continue to train them.
To further ease the training commitments of both the Conversion Units and squadrons, it is hoped that H2S training will be introduced into the Scampton Aircrew School by the middle of August. This training will consist of approximately 5 hours lectures with further time in manipulation of the H 2 S synthetic trainer. It is to be appreciated that this training will have to be in addition to the present essential navigational training carried out at the School, and navigators and air bombers must be prepared to undertake some of it in their spare time.
PHOTOGRAPHY
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL £15,498 13 9
LINK TRAINER
The number of hours link practice carried out by pilots during the month shows an increase over last month’s total. There is, however, still room for improvement in the standard of instrument flying. This can only be achieved by close co-operation between Link Instructors and Pilots.
The new Link Syllabus was distributed to Stations in the middle of the month and should now be in use at all Units. It is again emphasised that this Syllabus is progressive and if full value is to be obtained from it, Pilots and Flight Engineers must ensure that they complete all exercises, and keep an accurate record of the exercises carried out.
[Table of Link Trainer by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
(CONTINUED)
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
SGT J.T.WATTS D.F.M.
SGT F.A. SIMMONDS D.F.M.
F/O G.S. JOHNSON D.F.C.
SGT F. ROBERTS D.F.M.
F/O R. DAVIS D.F.C.
F/SGT R.W. CLEARY D.F.M.
F/O K.D. SMITH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O E.A. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
P/O J.E.R. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
SGT L.G. BOLTON D.F.M.
F/SGT C. BALDWIN D.F.M.
P/O E.H. WALKER D.F.C.
F/SGT L.W. CROMARTY D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. BUNYAN D.F.M.
P/O W.C. MacDONALD D.F.C.
F/O N.F. TURNER D.F.C.
P/O D.E. TREVETHICK D.F.C.
P/O G.A. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT. W.A. LEE D.F.M.
P/O J. BARR D.F.C.
P/O C.A. HAIGH D.F.C.
F/SGT LYNCH D.F.M.
F/O S.J. BEARD, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT C.P. STEEDSMAN D.F.M.
SGT G.M. WARD D.F.M.
SGT McQUILLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT C. WILCE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.C. BELL D.F.C.
F/O A.F. POORE D.F.C.
F/O G.E.D. TOOGOOD D.F.C.
P/O A.E. BRISTOW D.F.C.
F/SGT J. GRAVES D.F.M.
F/O R.J. ELSEY D.F.C.
F/O R.A. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT V. LYNCH D.F.M.
P/O P.J. RICHARDS D.F.C.
F/O W.R. LEE D.F.C.
F/O J.H.S. LEE D.F.C.
SGT T.C. WALLER D.F.M.
F/SGT G.R. CARLILE D.F.M.
F/O F.M. MIFFLIN D.F.C.
F/SGT A.D.J. GROOMBRIDGE D.F.M.
F/O C.J. DUNN D.F.C.
P/O R.A. HINCKLEY D.F.C.
F/O D.L. CRAMP D.F.C.
F/O D.V. GIBBS D.F.C.
F/L C.J. GINDER D.F.C.
F/SGT D. PINCKARD D.F.M.
F/SGT F. MYCOE D.F.M.
F/LT W.A. WILLIAMSON D.F.C.
F/SGT F.L. HIGGINS D.F.M.
F/O D.A. PAGLIERO D.F.C.
F/O R.L. WAKE, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT R. APPLEYARD D.F.M.
SGT V.H. BLACKWELL D.F.M.
P/O J. O’LEARY D.F.C.
F/O A.V. WITHERS D.F.C.
F/O R.P. RAMSAY D.F.C.
F/SGT S.J. HALVORSEN D.F.M.
SGT J.G. LANCASTER D.F.M.
F/SGT E. CLODE D.F.M.
SGT R.F. LAWRENSON D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.G. MYERSCOUGH D.F.M.
SGT D. FRISKEY D.F.M.
F/SGT E.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
P/O C.W. BARNETT D.F.C.
SGT W.G. LAMONT D.F.M.
F/SGT J. SKELTON D.F.M.
P/O R.G. CAMPBELL D.F.C.
P/O D.R. DEARMAN D.F.C.
P/O K.L. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/SGT E.H. BUNN D.F.M.
SGT D.C. MARK D.F.M.
SGT F.H. HAZEL D.F.M.
SGT F.C. DOWLING D.F.M.
SGT R.M. GALLOWAY D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
F/LT H.L. McCARTHY D.F.C.
F/O D.S.P. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O C.T. HARPER D.F.C.
F/O A. HOLLINGS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. CURTIS D.F.C.
F/O E.R. FREEMAN D.F.C.
F/O A.E. VOWELS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BROOKER D.F.C.
P/O H.R. MAHON D.F.C.
F/O F.B.M. WILSON D.F.C.
F/O J.E.R. REES D.F.C.
F/SGT J.B. CHILDS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.F.S. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O F. MORRIS D.F.C.
P/O A.R.T. BOYS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. GOLDSTRAW, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O H.C. CHANDLER D.F.C.
F/O D.T. CONWAY D.F.C.
F/O J.A. COLPUS D.F.C.
P/O M.F. SMITH D.F.C.
P/O N.D. MARSHALL D.F.C.
F/O F.J. NUGENT D.F.C.
F/O H.S.L. CROUCH D.F.C.
F/O G.G. ABBOTT D.F.C.
P/O A.A. TAYLOR D.F.C.
P/O A.P. SPERLING D.F.C.
F/SGT G. NOBLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O P.N. BUTTLE D.F.C.
P/O P.E. PIGEON D.F.C.
P/O H.A. WEEKS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. CLAY D.F.C.
F/O E. WILLSHER D.F.C.
W/O J. DACEY D.F.C.
F/O J.S. WATSON D.F.C.
F/SGT McCLELLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT L. EATON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.J. HENDERSON D.F.M.
F/SGT APPLEBY D.F.M.
F/SGT W. HOWARTH D.F.M.
F/O R. ADAMS D.F.M.
F/O A. HILL D.F.C.
F/LT WILSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.G. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.L. VICKERSTAFFE D.F.C.
F/O W.E.D. BELL D.F.C.
P/O G.G. TAYLOR D.F.C.
F/SGT J.A. FEATHERSTONE D.F.M.
F/O N.B. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O B.T.J. HUCKS D.F.C.
W/O C.G. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT M.H.G. KING D.F.M.
P/O J.P. HIND D.F.C.
P/O J.I. JOHNSON D.F.C.
P/O E.K. ALLEY D.F.C.
P/O R.T. BOULTBEE D.F.C.
F/O P.H. TAYLOR D.F.C.
W/O R.A. WESTAD D.F.C.
F/O T. WILKIE D.F.C.
F/O JOHNSON-BIGGS D.F.C.
F/LT R. AYTOUN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT J.H. BRYANT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.C. BLOIS D.F.C.
P/O T. SMART D.F.C.
W/O L.H. TODD D.F.C.
P/O R.T. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O G.W. BRAKE D.F.C.
W/O D. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/O A.J. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/O K.R. AMES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O F.R.G.A. HIGGINS D.F.C.
W/O H. GLASBY D.F.C.
F/SGT T.H. SAVAGE D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
All stations are to be congratulated on the excellent landing times produced this month, in which the average for the Group is below the 2 minutes per aircraft mark. In particular, Waddington recorded consistently good times for each operation. One [sic] the night of the 24/25th June this Station landed 32 AIRCRAFT IN 31 MINUTES, the average being less than 1 minute per aircraft. This is a record for the Group, and probably for the Command.
One word of warning, however; recently aircraft from another Group were diverted and on arrival at the diversion airfield proceeded to use their own Group landing scheme, with which the diversion control staff were not familiar. It is sufficient to say that confusion followed, with extreme danger to the aircraft and crews concerned. A.S.I. FC/11 contains the standard diversionary control procedure and must be adhered to.
[Underlined] STONES, CONCRETE AND METAL [/underlined]
Every stone, every sharp edge of concrete, every spent cartridge or piece of metal, constitutes a menace to tyres.
During the last 3 month there has been a very high average of tyres changed on accounts of cuts – (25 per station per month). Recently, endeavours have been made on stations to overcome this menace, but the intensified clean-up of perimeters, runways and dispersals must be maintained.
FLYING CONTROL must ensure that not the smallest break in the perimeter track or runway is overlooked, that grading does level up with the perimeter track and runways, and that any looseness in the surface of the French drains is attended to at once. Station Admin and Clerks of Works must help to the utmost.
GROUND CREWS must assist by seeing that their dispersals are thoroughly clean, and AIRCREWS watch carefully that cartridges cease to be a menace to tyres.
TRANSPORT – keep the sweepers fully serviced and see that nothing is loose on vehicles employed on the airfield.
ARMAMENT, too, can assist by ensuring that the access roads to the bomb dump are clear of stones and that wooden chocks from bomb trolleys are recovered before aircraft move. A 4” x 3” block with nails in it is not healthy treatment for a tyre!
ONLY BY FULL CO-OPERATION CAN THE ULTIMATE AIM BE ACHIEVED-AN AIRFIELD 100% SERVICEABLE.
JUNE LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
At dawn on the 6th of this month, the first Allied troops landed on the Normandy coast. A contribution towards the success of this amphibious operation was no doubt made in the effective silencing of most of the shore batteries. During the last month and again on three nights prior to D – Day this was one of the Group’s tasks. The heavy railway gun battery at WIMERAUX was attacked on the 2/3rd and although the interpretation report embraces previous attacks, there is no doubt that severe damage was inflicted; a large number of new craters being seen around the target. Both the western turntables have received direct hits.
The coastal defence batteries at MAISY (4/5th), ST PIERRE DU MONT (5/6 th) and LA PERNELLE (5/6th) next received our attention. Little could be gleaned from photographic cover as to the precise damage to the targets, but their apparent failure to contest our landing bears testimony to the success of the raids.
Another pre-invasion target was the Radar Jamming Station at FERME D’URVILLE. This target was attacked on 3/4th and, to quote A.I.C.U. “The station is completely useless”.
Our beachhead having been secured, our bombing role turned to close support of the land forces. The 21st Panzer Division was moving into CAEN to threaten the British Beaches. Two road bridges in this town were accordingly scheduled for attack on the 6/7th; both bridges were hit, and the road approaches heavily cratered, presenting an embarrassing obstacle to the Hun. On the same night an attack was directed against the ARGENTAN Railway centre. This raid also was calculated to hamper the arrival of reinforcements, which object was achieved by the severing of almost all the tracks and the destruction of many essential buildings.
During the day of the 7th, elements of the 17th Panzer Division were concentration [sic] in the FORET DE CERISY, a number of ammunition dumps, fuelling points and tank harbours having been located in this area. This was our assignment for the night 7/8th, and although results were not spectacular, many bombs fell on the aiming point.
The battle of communications continued on 8/9th against targets south of the battle area, when the marshalling yard at RENNES and rail junction at PONTAUBAULT were attacked. Severe damage was sustained at the former target while at the latter, the tracks were cut at several points.
One of the outstanding operations of the month was against the SAUMUR tunnel on the 8/9th. Already the railway junction had been attacked on 1/2nd with excellent effect, but the later attack on the tunnel left no doubt that the line would be denied the enemy for some time to come. A direct hit on the roof of the tunnel at its southern entrance has probably caused a major collapse while the tracks and embankments are severely damaged.
Our attack on the railway junction at ETAMPES on 9/10th was rendered extremely difficult owing largely to adverse weather, although hits were scored on the electrified railway north east of the junction.
The possibility of the enemy using the PARIS/ORLEANS route to effect troop movements led to a request for the destruction of the marshalling yard at ORLEANS on 10/11th. The mission was successfully undertaken, all through lines being severed and further damage sustained to rolling stock railway depots etc.
The attack on POITERS on 12/13th in which very severe damage was inflicted on the railway facilities was designed to delay the 2nd S.S. Division, believed to be moving up from South France.
On the same night support was given to our troops advancing East and West of CAEN, by the further bombing of the town’s road bridges.
The Lehr Panzer Division is reported to have visited AUNAY SUR ODON on the same night as aircraft from this Group, namely, 14/15th. AUNAY is completely obliterated – speculation is rife as to the fate of the Panzers.
Photos taken the day following the attack on the LIMOGES marshalling yard (23/24th) indicate that fires were still burning in the area, and that all tracks in the sorting sidings have been blocked.
AT VITRY LE FRANCOIS on 27/28th damage was almost entirely confined to the west end of the marshalling yard where all the tracks have been cut. Other damage throughout the yard is apparent.
For 48 hours the spotlight of war turned from the battlefield to the sea, to the harbours of LE HAVRE and BOULOGNE where a powerful force of small craft had been assembled by the enemy with a view to menacing our supply lanes. It is now reported that as a direct result of the two raids on 14/15th and 15/16th no fewer than 80 vessels have been sunk or seriously damaged. Damage to port installations is also severe.
Oil targets have been attacked sporadically since the war began, but in the knowledge that the enemy is suffering from fuel shortage we returned on three occasions to attack his resources.
At CHATELLERAULT on 15/16th a fuel dump was raided, considerable damage resulting to storage units.
The attacks on WESSELING and SCHOLVEN Synthetic Oil Plants on 21/22nd were not, however, satisfactory and, influenced by bad weather conditions, were off the mark.
During the month two gardening operations were undertaken, on 6/7th and 8/9th.
In the concluding phases of June our attention was diverted from Normandy to the rather more immediate problem of combating the flying bombs which had commenced to operate over this country on 12/13th. On the whole, weather was exceedingly unco-operative, but, despite this, 10 missions were launched (three of which,
(Continued on page 4 Col. 2)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Operations with Sorties, Accidents and Stars Awards, by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, June 1944
5 Group News, June 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 23, June 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about gunnery, air bombing, navigation, armament, navigation training, public relations, signals, gardening, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, and shows not so good, engineering, training, flight engineers, enemy agents - careless talkers, signals, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, radar / nav, honours & awards, photography, aircrew volunteers, war savings, link trainer, flying control, operations, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-06
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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18 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-27
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
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1944-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--La Pernelle
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Paris
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Saumur
France--Vitry-le-François
Germany--Wesseling
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
5 Group
617 Squadron
627 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bomb dump
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
rivalry
service vehicle
tactical support for Normandy troops
tractor
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
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AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
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GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
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FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
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TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
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V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-07
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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22 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
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1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
searchlight
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS V
AUGUST 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 25
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
In August the Group set up several new records for operations and training, and Squadrons got more hours flying out of their aircraft than ever before. Top of the list is No. 61 Squadron with a total of 105 hours per aircraft on charge, and close behind are Nos. 50 and 44 Squadrons with 103 and 101 hours respectively. These are splendid figures which reflect great credit on the maintenance staffs. The total flying for the month was 34,000 hours with 3,600 operational sorties.
A high proportion of the attacks was directed against naval targets, more especially the six ships in Brest Harbour, including the battleship Clemenceau and the cruiser Gueydon, all of which were sunk, thus preventing the enemy from carrying out his intention of blocking the harbour.
Two highly successful mining attacks were also undertaken against the ship canals at Stettin and Konigsberg. At Stettin a dredged channel crosses a six mile wide lake between the coast and the docks, and it was decided that a complete hold up of enemy shipping could best be caused by laying a considerable number of mines in this Channel. The sides of the channel were marked at the two ends and in the middle by small towers intended for lights, and between these by a double row of buoys. For the attack the area was first lit with flares and in their light, three marker aircraft laid flame floats down two sides of the canal, using the buoys as their guide, so that the aircraft carrying the mines had a well marked line in which to put them. The marking was magnificently undertaken in the face of considerable searchlight and light flak opposition and the whole operation proved an outstanding success. The average height of laying was 300 feet. The operations against the Konigsberg canal a few nights later was on a smaller scale, but two aircraft succeeded in placing all their mines in the channel again from a very low height and in the light of flares. It was after these two attacks that all Swedish shipping was withdrawn from Baltic trade.
During the month valuable support was also given to the Army in the Falaise area, and many sorties were directed against the flying bomb sites. This commitment has now happily come to an end with the capture of the flying bomb country, but the following message from the Air Ministry to Bomber Command will show the considerable part which the Command played in reducing the scale of this menace.
“The continuous and heavy bombing of the experimental stations, production plants, launching sites, storage depots and installations, which has been carried out by your Command, not only imposed on the enemy a prolonged and unwelcome delay in the launching of his campaign, but effectively limited the scale of effort which he was able to make. This notable achievement has added one more to the long list of successful operations carried out by Bomber Command.”
The month ended with two attacks by the Group on Konigsberg, capital city of East Prussia. The first attack had all the elements necessary for a decisive success but the misunderstanding by a few crews of their briefed instructions, led to the attack, which was the most concentrated ever undertaken by the Group, being centred 2000 yards from the aiming point and doing relatively little damage. As a result a further attack had to be carried out in much less favourable weather. Happily this attack was successful and resulted in the almost complete destruction of the chief port supplying the German armies in East Prussia.
The success which has, in general, attended the attacks delivered by the Group over the past six months has been largely due to the system of low level marking by Mosquito aircraft which was first tried out by Wing Commander Cheshire with No. 617 Squadron. I am sure that all in the Group will join me in congratulating him on the award of the Victoria Cross in recognition of his great gallantry over 4 years of War and 100 operational sorties.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
The end of the season weather proved most unkind, and most teams found their last month’s activities very limited. Scampton completed three games, beating Rustons and A.A. Command but losing to R.A.F. Cranwell. Dunholme lost to Ruston Bucyrus away, beat Hartsholme away, and the local Cadets at home. Metheringham managed to complete only one inter-station game, and then operations caused them to field a weak side and they were well beaten by R.C.A.F. Digby. Metheringham have now completed eleven games in the season, won five, lost five and drawn one. The outstanding teams of the season were Woodhall and Syerston, both of whom were blessed with “stars”. It was fitting for them to meet in the final of the Group Trophy, and although Syerston were unlucky in having lost S/Ldr MacKenzie, Woodhall put up a splendid effort to add the cricket Trophy to 54 Base collection.
[Underlined] SWIMMING [/underlined]
Coningsby Squadrons took advantage of the last day of summer, and held the Inter-Squadron Swimming Trophy in the Open Air Pool at Woodhall Spa in the 13th August. Events were held in Free Style, Breast and Back Stroke over the usual distances, together with plunging and diving. No.83 Squadron emerged as winners, with 26 points, the next best being Metheringham with 22.
[Underlined] BADMINTON [/underlined]
Several Stations find the Badminton Court in great demand. Dunholme have just concluded a Doubles Tournament in which Cpls Pigott and Hurst beat ACs King and Wright by 21 – 19, 18 – 21, 21 – 17. Scampton have a Badminton Club. Here is a big field for inter-station friendlies, and it is hoped Stations will not miss the opportunity of taking Badminton teams to play away matches during the coming winter. Inter-station games do much to improve the standard of play, by giving players an opportunity of comparing themselves with entirely new opposition. Mixed Doubles is a successful Badminton event, giving the W.A.A.F. another opportunity of a vigorous winter sport. A combined Badminton cum Darts cum Billiards Inter-station tourney cannot fail to be successful.
[Underlined] WINTER SPORTS [/underlined]
On September 4th a Conference of Group P.F.O’s met at this Headquarters to discuss the winter programme. The starting dates for the three knock-outs were agreed as follows:-
MATZ CUP (SOCCER) – Early November
WINES TROPHY (RUGGER) – Early December
MIXED HOCKEY – Mid October.
In the near future invitation letters for the above tournaments will be issued, and a busy season is anticipated. It is hoped that as many Stations as possible will support the Mixed Hockey Trophy; mixed hockey is an enjoyable sport and provides, together with Netball, an excellent opportunity for the W.A.A.F.
[Underlined] VARIETIES [/underlined]
Winthorpe sport an enthusiastic W.A.A.F. Soccer Eleven. Any other Station that can produce eleven Amazons is invited to roll up and meet the Winthorpians in battle.
[Underlined] TRAVELLING [/underlined]
It is hoped to obtain an early decision from Command on the 5 Group suggestion that the limit for which a station can provide sports transport be increased from 5 to 20 miles (single journey). This measure will give an immediate fillip to all inter-station sport and alleviate the task of P.F.O’s in endeavouring to get variety into the programmes.
ENGINEERING
Another record number of sorties has been carried out, which entailed in turn a record number of flying hours.
The flying hours for aircraft on charge in the Squadrons has exceeded anything which has yet been achieved, and is proof of what can be done by good technical organisation and co-operation and the will to keep aircraft serviceable on the part of Officers, N.C.O’s and men.
It has been rumoured that the establishment of tradesmen was based on the assumption that a Lancaster should produce 40 hours flying a month. The hours actually flown per Lancaster on charge has varied between 80 hours and 105 hours in Squadrons for August. This means of course that the Maintenance Personnel have worked twice as hard as the Establishment Committee calculated they would. Many problems present themselves as a result of this high pressure flying, but one point is predominant: the flying has been done, and at the month end serviceability was still 90% of the U.E. aircraft.
Quite a number of aircraft are still operating although their flying hours are in excess of 1,000. The condition and work required on the 3rd major should be watched, and full advantage must be taken of 43 Group facilities for those aircraft which will require too many man hours to overhaul locally.
The increased periodicity between inspections has been approved at 75 hours for Minor and 600 hours for Major Inspection for Lancaster aircraft. This amendment will be issued within the next few days by Bomber Command.
Of the 3,600 sorties detailed 1.66% were unsuccessful due to engineering faults. This constitutes a slight increase over the July total.
No Squadron was entirely free from unsuccessful sorties, and No.52 Base are to be congratulated on having the lowest percentage.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability by Training Unit]
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Sorties, including Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617, and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the [missing] is divided between the two Squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
Compared with July, this month’s total of combats shows a big reduction. There have been a total of 70 combats for day and night operations; the claims being:-
7 destroyed
- probably destroyed, and
4 damaged.
During the daylight operation on Bois de Cassan on 6th August, 13 combats were reported, 2 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 enemy aircraft damaged. In this operation the enemy fighters exploited the old tactics of attacking out of the sun, and all gunners should take note of this and ensure that in future daylight operations they are equipped with anti-glare glasses. In one instance a Lancaster was attacked from below and seriously damaged, two members of the crew being killed and another seriously wounded. The first intimation of the attack was when hits were registered on the Lancaster, the first burst from the enemy aircraft neutralising both rear turrets. Search must be carried out assiduously to cover all sections of the sky, above and below, by day as well as by night.
As a trial, tracer has been removed from the first 300 rounds in each belt, and gunners’ views are required after having used this sequence in combat, as to whether sighting is easier without the trace or vice versa. Gunners must appreciate that success, the destruction of the enemy fighter, will only be achieved by the correct application of the sight.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
Night affiliation with Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight has been available to Squadrons since the beginning of August. Full information and details have been sent out to Bases and Units under reference 293/Trg. dated 3rd August, 1944, and it is encouraging to note that some Squadrons have already availed themselves of these facilities. In view of the advent of longer hours of darkness which means operations of longer duration, it is most essential that gunners’ night vision and practical experience of night interception be brought to the highest standard of proficiency by constant practice. From results of recent exercises, the fighter has not been observed until a range of 150 – 200 yards. The remedies lie in the more skilful use of Early Warning Devices and better night vision.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A 400 yards range will shortly be available to the Group and Dunham Cliff. Instructions will be issued shortly. It is hoped that another 400 yards range will be sited at Wainfleet which will be more accessible to those Stations in the Eastern half of the Group.
An Air Staff Instruction has been issued for Skeet Range Shooting. This is to be adhered to closely to obtain the maximum benefit from this form of training.
Details have now been issued regarding Night Vision Training Exercises in blacked-out gymnasiums. The maximum use should be made of this training which will combine fitness with night vision training.
THIS MONTH’S BAG
[Drawings]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
44 “A” 6.8.44. FW. 190
630 “L” 12/13.8.44. JU. 88
50 “L” 16/17.8.44. ME. 410
44 “F” 25/26.8.44. ME. 410
106 “B” 25/26.8.44. JU. 88
207 “K” 25/26.8.44. ME. 110
619 “G” 29/30.8.44. ME. 109
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
57 “U” 6.8.44. ME. 109F
57 “B” 6.8.44. ME. 109F
57 “D” 6.8.44. ME. 107F
9 “B” 12.8.44. JU. 88
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING AUGUST. [/underlined]
[Table of Training Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Units]
X 49 Squadron employed on special training.
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR AUGUST:- 2136
[Underlined] No. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined] Grand total 760 hours and 712 details.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
TRAINING
During August 51 Base produced 151 crews and topped the previous month’s record by one crew. This was achieved despite several days unseasonable weather. The Base is confident that it can improve on this total for September. No. 5 L.F.S. continued to take Lancaster Conversion in its stride and completed its third month with over 2,000 hours flying.
Final training in Squadrons was abreast of the time throughout, and the Base Training Pilots and Flight Engineers did a good job in getting the crews fit for operations without any hold up despite the increased number of crews passing through their hands. 10 and 20 sortie checks were also carried out. Gunnery categorisation is now forging ahead, and towards the end of the month categorisation of Navigators was introduced. This will be followed shortly by categorisation of pilots and Flight Engineers.
The detached elements of 1690 B.D.T. Flight, comprising Martinets and Spitfires, were withdrawn from 51 Base airfields and centralised with the Hurricanes at Syerston. This did not interfere with fighter affiliation training and 1690 B.D.T. Flight as a single Unit are now providing both day and night affiliation for the Group from one Station, and in addition are affiliating with No.49 Squadron for special training. The number of details flown and gunners exercised are dealt with elsewhere in the News.
The formation of 1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit and 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit also took place during the month, and 5 Group is responsible for the training up to the present.
No.1668 Conversion Unit is due to open on the 1st September, and 1669 later in the month.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] ECONOMY IN THE USE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The war has now entered its sixth year and although things are going better for us, Equipment Officers should still strive after perfection in economy of equipment. This is an old and well known subject, but owing to its importance, it cannot be rammed home often enough.
Only by frequent review of establishments can correct provisioning be maintained. If provisioning is good, then the Station will not want and Station Sections will cease to hoard.
Therefore, all Equipment Officers can, by good provisioning, plus foresight, and good liaison with the other Sections on the Station, make every item of equipment do its correct job and prevent waste.
[Underlined] A.M.O’s OF INTEREST [/underlined]
A.738/44 (Parts III, IV and V) Civilian Repair Organisation – Repair of R.A.F. Equipment.
A.759/44 Contract Washing, Procedure for. Articles of Service clothing and equipment in the U.K.
A.774/44 Introduction of new small F.600.
A.775/44 Preparation of Carriers’ Notes.
A.806/44 Removal of components from aircraft in Category AC.
N.828/44 Revision of Scale of Watch, Clock and Instrument repair tools.
N.846/44 Revised scale of issue of Testers Insulation resistance, types A, B, C and D.
N.873/44 Introduction of Lubricator sets for Type B Mechanical Sweeper.
PHOTOGRAPHY
Condensation has again been the cause of a number of failures, and it is now considered that the majority of instances are the result of conditions at Base rather than conditions at or en route to the target. Experiments are being conducted to determine whether it is practicable to remove the register glass in the camera. So far success has attended our efforts and results are being watched carefully. If this can be done, then one of the surfaces on which condensation can form will have been eliminated.
Composite film join failures are still occurring and it has been decided to use French chalk on the linen side of the tape in order to prevent this sticking to the register glass of the camera. Photographic N.C.O’s are to select the tape used for this purpose with great care, as the quality of different rolls varies considerably.
The titling of photographs often leaves much to be desired. Operational air photographs without adequate and readable titling are useless. N.C.O’s are therefore to watch this point carefully. The printing of films could be much improved in many cases. Whilst speed is essential in the production of results, do not let the result be marred by bad workmanship. A green, badly titled print is an offence to the photographer’s eye.
The use of Standard Day Panchromatic Film on Day Operations should make for better quality results with much finer grain, but will, however, necessitate more frequent magazine loading in the changes from Day to Night Operations. Very great care must be exercised in handling the film during these changes.
Standard Day Film is to be used whenever possible for day operations.
ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
GARDENING
Business has been brisk this month In all departments of the offensive, but the Gardeners have certainly had their share of the task, and excellent results have been achieved, in High and Low Planting. The Command Gardening, totalling 1587 vegetables has been divided as follows:-
(a) A constant stream of planters directed at the U-Boat Bases on the West Coast of France.
(b) Large scale operations in the Baltic area with the object of dislocating the enemy’s sea-borne supplies for the Russian Front, and of severing all trade with Scandinavia.
[Underlined] The U-Boat Offensive. [/underlined] 5 Group, represented by 44, 97, 619 and 57 Squadrons carried out 6 operations in these areas, laying accurately by H.2.S. with slight to moderate interference from Flak.
[Underlined] Results. [/underlined] At the time of going to press, it is believed that all West Coast bases have been closed to U-Boat traffic for some time. This is more than embarrassing to a frantic enemy endeavouring to check our advances. The U-boat command must now be at pains to form any systematic plan of control for their U-boats already on patrol in the Atlantic. Individual Commanders are certain to be confused, dissatisfied and hampered by the continuous stream of contradictory instructions issuing from their superiors, on the best methods and routes for their return. Offensive patrols – already minimised to a large extent – will now have to be reduced to even shorter periods through lack of fuel, food and water; in short, lack to the North Sea Bases they will have to go, and the days of the U-boats are numbered. In co-operation with out Gardening efforts in this sector, the most striking results have been achieved by the brilliant bombing of 617 and 9 Squadrons on the Pens and Berths in these Bases. Naval Patrols have also been most successful along this stretch of water, and the future reading in Weekly Intelligence Reports should contain some interesting home truths of our enemy’s state of mind.
[Underlined] The Baltic Offensive. [/underlined] Among the many and varied targets on hand during this past month, not the least were our long and hazardous trips far into the Baltic. The nature of these operations involved dangerous low flying through heavy and light flak, concentrations of searchlights, and surprise flak ships placed in the most awkward positions. On the 16/17th August, the first strike at Stettin took place, and a special Gardening operation was co-ordinated in the main attack. 23 Lancasters were detailed from 44, 106, 57 and 97 Squadrons to pounce on the Kaiser Fahrt Channel, 97 Squadron performing marking duties ad carrying two choice vegetables apiece.
Little was known of the garden to be attacked, the only guide being the Light houses positioned in pairs, every 3 1/2 miles along the channel 157 yards wide, by about 10 miles in length. Careful timing, concise intercommunication, and cool heads were the Orders of the Day. When the force arrived the Light houses were lit, and remained so for sufficient time to reveal the line of the channel. Down went 97 Squadron to mark at mast head height with lines of flame floats. The Controller was first to mark, and laid most accurately, which was quickly confirmed by his Deputy flying between the Lighthouses at the time. The Gardeners were then called in to lay at 200 feet, meanwhile the main bomber force went for the town of Stettin, and other Groups were planting furiously to seaward. Two Gardeners were unfortunately shot down in the area – including the controller after performing an excellent task – two more were forced to jettison through flak damage, three were forced to jettison and return early with engine trouble, and two were unhappily non-starters. Out of 81 vegetables carried, 61 were successfully planted. It is estimated that a very high percentage of these now lie gracefully in the narrow waterway, including two discreetly dropped 3 1/2 miles inside the canal itself by Z/106 Squadron – a very fine piece of work. It can therefore, be said that this enterprising evolution was carried out with highly commendable skill and determination on the part of all crews in the face of intense opposition, and their combined team-work has added a further page in the history, already outstanding, of the Group’s Gardening efforts.
On the 26/27th, a similar operation took place, but this time in the Konigsberg area. Extensive planting took place to seaward in the approaches to important Baltic harbours, in which 44, 106 and 630 Squadrons took part, while four selected crews from 44, 57, 106 and 207 Squadrons made for the Konigsberg inland canal.
Illumination was provided by the main force as they retired from their target area, enabling the Gardeners clearly to identify their target. Unfortunately two aircraft were seen to be hit by flak and did not return, but R/106 and E/207 pressed home their attack with great zeal, and skilfully planted 10 of the best in the waterway. A fine example of courage and airmanship.
The main force returned to this target again on 29/30th and this time opportunity was seized to back up the previous lays in the outer gardens. 10 Lancasters representing 44, 49, 106 and 630 Squadrons completed a 100% planting of forty Mark IV vegetables with little opposition using H 2 S from high altitude. Very good records have already been received from P.P.I. photographs.
[Underlined] All is not well in the Baltic [/underlined] – The Swedish Home Service stated on the 22nd August that the State War Insurance Board had decided to stop granting war risk insurance to German Baltic Harbours for the time being, on account of the prevailing conditions.
The following tribute to the efficiency of British mining operations was paid by Rear Admiral Gadow, the Naval correspondent of the Deutsche Alhgemeine Zeitung. He wrote that the mining of the shipping routes of the North Sea had reached such a pitch of intensity that it was putting the heaviest strain on the German minesweeping flotillas.
[Underlined] General Summary [/underlined]
Sorties – 65
Successful – 53
% Successful – 81 1/2
Aircraft Missing – 4
Nights operated – 8
Mileage Flown – 96,312
Total Planted successfully – [underlined] 260 [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVAL SUPPORT [/underlined]
In close connection with the general plan of denying the U-Boat Bases to the enemy is also the all important object of preventing the enemy from totally destroying or blocking these bases before they can be used by the Allies. With such enormous forces having to be maintained in Europe it is essential that we should have every available harbour working at full pressure for the off loading of stores and equipment from suitable big ship berths, rail and roadway centres. The enemy has been quick to realise this point, and has taken every step to bring about total destruction where he can, by the use of expert demolition squads, and the subsidiary use of Block ships in harbours.
Immediate steps were necessary, and taken, in the case of Brest, by allocating Block ship targets to 5 Group Squadrons. Great care and attention to detail wrought havoc to the enemy’s intentions, as one by one, the ships at anchor in the harbour were singled out for devastating attack, and successfully sent to the bottom by pin point bombing. The 11,000 ton tanker capable of completely filling the main entrance was the first to ‘settle’ safely in her berth, quickly followed by the aged French Cruiser “Gueydon”, a Sperbrecher berthed alongside the quay, and the half completed battleship “Clemenceau”. This stripped the saboteurs of any immediate facilities, but as they had previously disclosed their intentions by sinking one tanker and two small coasters near the entrance, the job was completed by satisfactorily destroying one large Merchant Ship and a large Sperbrecher undergoing repairs in the dry docks.
Such accuracy in bombing ships, for the sorties carried out, has seldom been reached before; the Squadrons involved are to be congratulated on their work, and helping hand given to the Royal Navy, which will greatly assist the common task of feeding our armies in the future.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED [underlined] £6,625.15.5. [/underlined]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
Longer nights and longer sorties make accurate flying more important than ever. Here are three occasions when accurate flying is essential if you are to keep “ON TRACK AND ON TIME”.
(i) On the short leg out of the target. An incorrect airspeed can make you overshoot and put you several miles off track.
(ii) During the banking search. If poorly flown, or done more to one side than another, you will also wander off track.
(iii) During the corkscrew. If carelessly executed you might get on a reciprocal. It’s been done before.
[Underlined] FLYING INTO CLOUD [/underlined]
It takes all pilots 5 to 10 seconds to “settle down” on instruments after changing over from visual flying. Always go over the instruments well BEFORE entering cloud, and avoid adding that unsettled feeling to other difficulties that you may encounter. Check pitot head “ON”, Suction on both pesco pumps, all instruments O.K., and note outside air temperatures.
[Underlined] NOTES ON PURE FLYING [/underlined]
(i) Look round before starting a turn.
(ii) In turns, correct slip or skid with rudder and keep the nose in the correct position on the horizon with the elevators, not rudder.
(iii) Aileron drag produces yaw, and it is most notable when a large amount of aileron is applied. The solution is in the rudder. Use it.
[Underlined] USE OF BOMB DOOR SELECTOR LEVER [/underlined]
If the bomb door selector lever is half-up or half-down, you will get a runaway film on the camera. So make sure the lever comes right down when selecting bomb doors OPEN. Avoid selecting bomb doors open until on the bombing run, as each time they are selected open an exposure is turned over in the camera. If you have to test the bomb doors ensure that the bombsight is switched off first.
[Underlined] FIRE IN THE AIR – DON’T DIVE [/underlined]
Diving an aircraft in an attempt to put out a fire is forbidden. It invariably leads to disaster because:-
(i) The increased air flow in a dive feeds and spreads the fire.
(ii) The risk of structural failure, if the airframe is weakened by fire, is increased.
(iii) Baling out is difficult, and in a violent dive almost impossible.
[Underlined] CREW AIRMANSHIP [/underlined]
Most new captains have at least 2 – 300 hours flying experience. The crews may not have more than 100 hours. Take practical steps to ensure your crew’s airmanship is as good as your own. Remember the old adage “A chain is as strong as its weakest link”.
(Continued at foot of col. 2)
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING [/underlined]
The length of landing run depends on many variables, including airspeed at touchdown, strength of wind, all up weight, amount of flap used and strength of brakes. The bar of white lights 800 yds from the upwind end of the runway, therefore, can only be used as a measure of distance and not as a safety limit before landing.
[Underlined] Motto for the Month:- [/underlined]
“IF IN DOUBT – GO ROUND AGAIN”
HONOURS & AWARDS [Drawing]
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/Ldr F.W. THOMPSON, D.F.C. D.S.O.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt B.H. BOTHA, D.F.C. D.S.O.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.H. GOLDING D.F.C.
W/Cdr H.Y. HUMPHREYS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/Ldr L.C. DEANE, D.F.C. D.S.O.
A/W/C G.F. GEORGESON, D.F.C. D.S.O.
W/Cdr J.R. JEUDWINE, O.B.E., D.F.C. D.S.O.
A/W/C J. WOODROFFE. D.F.C.
P/O R.R. ORMISTON D.F.C.
F/O N.O. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. ETHERIDGE D.F.C.
F/S D. BRYDEN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
Sgt R.O. NORFOLK D.F.M.
[Underlined} 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.W. CLAYTON, D.F.C. C.G.M. D.S.O.
A/S/L D.J. SHANNON, D.S.O. D.F.C. &BAR BAR TO D.S.O.
W/Cdr J.B. TAIT, D.S.O., & BAR, D.F.C. 2ND BAR TO D.S.O.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C W.A. DEAS, D.F.C. & BAR D.S.O.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O H.F. ROBINSON D.F.C.
F/Sgt J. MICHAEL D.F.M.
F/Sgt C.R. BOLT D.F.M.
P/O A.W.M. BIRCHENOUGH D.F.C.
F/Sgt BOWER D.F.M.
Sgt H.O. SMITH D.F.M.
F/Sgt W.E. MILLER D.F.M.
F/Sgt. C.E. BOWYER D.F.M.
P/O F.S. COLMAN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.J. REYLAND D.F.C.
Sgt J.B. COWAN D.F.M.
P/O J. WOULD D.F.C.
Sgt K. WOOLARD D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
P/O R.L. DAVISON D.F.C.
Sgt R. WOODWARDS D.F.M.
F/Sgt D.M. MURRAY D.F.M.
P/O V.G. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
Sgt E.C. WREN D.F.M.
Sgt H.L. ROBERTS D.F.M.
Sgt J.H. DAVIDSON D.F.M.
F/Sgt K.F. LETTS D.F.M.
Sgt J. MICHIE D.F.M.
Sgt W.H.R. CHAMPION D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. LETT D.F.C.
P/O J.C. MC.KAY D.F.C.
Sgt G.J.W. PARKINSON D.F.M.
P/O J.A. JONES D.F.C.
F/O J.H. SIMPSON D.F.C.
P/O R.H. EWENS D.F.C.
F/O K.S. STOKOE D.F.C.
F/Sgt J.R. PEAKER D.F.M.
F/O L.P. MAPP D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O L. CREED D.F.C.
F/Sgt S. BROWN D.F.M.
F/Lt F.W. CHADWICK D.F.C.
F/Lt A. HAWORTH D.F.C.
P/O J. WATT D.F.C.
F/O W.F. SWINYARD D.F.C.
F/Sgt F.E. BURTON D.F.M.
F/O A.H. CRAWFORD D.F.C.
Sgt D. GROSCOP D.F.M.
P/O D.S. RICHARDSON D.F.C.
F/O H.A. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O A.R. VERRIER D.F.C.
F/Sgt L.C. HOGBEN D.F.M.
Sgt C.A. HORN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt K. VOWE D.F.M.
W/O J. GRAHAM D.F.C.
P/O A.E. STONE D.F.C.
Sgt S. BILLINGTON D.F.M.
P/O R.A. GRIFFIN D.F.C.
F/O S.A. JENNINGS D.F.C.
P/O C.W.J. FRANKLIN D.F.C.
F/O J.C. HODGKINS D.F.C.
Sgt W. DACRE D.F.M.
F/Sgt O.H. MILLAR D.F.M.
A/F/O J.E. GIBBERD D.F.C.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A.C. HELLIER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O C.W. GRAY, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O M.A. ROONEY D.F.C.
P/O C.E. HAYNES D.F.C.
P/O C.E. ERICKSON D.F.C.
P/O F.A. MARDEN D.F.C.
P/O C.W. EARNSHAW D.F.C.
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE D.F.C.
F/O W.E. SIDDLE D.F.C.
P/O N.J. CORNELL D.F.C.
F/O C. BRUDETT D.F.C.
F/O R.E. FOSTER D.F.C.
W/O J.C. PARKER D.F.C.
W/O A.C. STRICKLAND D.F.C.
W/O E. PLUNKETT D.F.C.
F/O H.A. DICKINSON D.F.C.
F/O C.J. PURSEY D.F.C.
F/Sgt C. CASSIE D.F.M.
F/Sgt D.A. LAWES D.F.M.
F/Sgt M.J. BLOWER D.F.M.
Sgt F. WILDMAN D.F.M.
Sgt A.N. JONES D.F.M.
F/Sgt F. JOHNSON [sic]
P/O C.J. DUGGIN D.F.C.
(Contd. On Page 17 Col 2)
5 GROUP NEWS, NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] SIGNALS TRAINING [/underlined]
The month of August saw the start of controlled daylight formation flying, and again the Wireless Operator (Air) came in for a fair share of the work. The Master Bomber and Base Leader’s Wireless Operator had the task of transmitting instructions to the force, and reception of their transmission was very good.
From the W/T point of view, the control of operations during August was very good. The standard of operating by Controller’s Wireless Operators was good throughout, and the work of these operators is appreciated. It was unfortunate that, on the night on which both Link 1 and Link 2 failed to reach the target area, the primary W/T frequency was heavily jammed. We are now all well aware of the tremendous effect of “Jostle” – it really does amount to complete wipe out over a large band.
The initiative shown by the Link 3 Wireless Operator in taking over control, assessing the impracticability of the primary frequency for W/T control, issuing instructions to change to the alternative, and using this channel for W/T control, was very commendable. Also, in this respect, our congratulations go to the 97 Squadron Wireless Operator who, although not detailed as a deputy link, assumed the duties of one, and acknowledged all instructions sent by the Link3. A very good show by both Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS [/underlined]
No. 54 Base again led the field in the number of Wireless Operators who carried out successful tests as laid down in No. 5 Group Signals Instruction No.13. No.55 Base have now taken up the challenge, and very soon we hope to see a healthy competition between all Bases in carrying out these tests.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
Daylight operations during the month interfered a little with the Group W/T Exercise though some Squadrons made a good attempt to carry out every exercise. This is, perhaps, the best W/T Operating practice afforded to Wireless Operators while on the Squadrons, and every effort must be made to ensure that every Wireless Operator does take part. Some good exercises were carried out, but we still have a few offenders who will not listen out before transmitting; some still send VE before callsigns, and the proper use of QVU is not made. Signals Leaders please note.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The use of Early Warning Devices during the month was curtailed quite a bit by daylight operations, but, when required on night operations, they again proved their worth, judging by the number of contacts reported. Now that Squadron Signals Leaders are being given a three days course at the Bomber Command Tactics School, some very valuable information on the tactical use of Early Warning Devices and Radio Countermeasures should be gained, and passed on to the Squadrons, thus showing W/Op (Air) the value of his efforts.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
An outstanding example and inspiration to all Wireless Operators (Air) was given by F/Lt Bean, Station Signals Officer, Coningsby, on the night of 16/17th August. The Controller detailed for the operation that night was without a complete crew, and F/Lt Bean, who had been primarily responsible for the high standard of W/T operating carried out by the Controllers’ Wireless Operators on 54 Base, and who had himself passed the test laid down in 5 Group S.I. No. 13, was detailed to carry out the duties of Controller’s Wireless Operator (Air).
Whilst over the target, the aircraft was hit and set on fire. F/Lt Bean, who was already transmitting his Captain’s instructions for the attack, sent out in plain language to the force the message “Hit and on fire”. Immediately after this transmission, he transmitted further instructions to the force to carry on the attack.
F/Lt Bean set a very fine example of coolness and devotion to duty, and it is hoped that he and all members of his crew were able to make a safe landing.
Further good shows were the commendable efforts of the two 97 Squadron Wireless Operators already mentioned, and a Wireless Operator of 44 Squadron, who, while sending an immediate sighting report of a dinghy, switched his I.F.F. to distress while over the dinghy, informed the M/F section of his action, and when leaving the area again informed the M/F Section of time of switching off. This action enabled a good fix to be taken on his aircraft. It is to be noted that an aircraft crew were rescued in this area the following day.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures against the 3,600 sorties flown in August was 1.722. This is an increase of 0.32 per cent over the figure for July. There were no failures which prevented aircraft from taking off on account of Signals defects. Two early returns were attributed to Signals “equipment failures”. The remainder of the failures reported had no adverse effect on any of the operations.
Over 80% of the total defects were due to component failures, the others being under the category “Miscellaneous”. There were no “manipulation” or “servicing” failures. The result of five of the Signals defect investigations was “No Fault Found”. This is a most unsatisfactory type of report and every effort must be made to get at the roots of such reported defects.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
During the past month, replacement TR.1143 equipment has been in very short supply. It appears that the production of this equipment is decreasing whilst the requirements of A.D.G.B. are steadily increasing. As a result is has been decided to withdraw TR.1143’s and TR.1143A’s from all 5 Group aircraft, and refit the Group with the American version of this equipment, which is known as SCR.522. The problem presenting itself with this changeover is that a complete change of frequencies is also taking place. This means that a normal, steady re-equipping of, say, six aircraft per Squadron each day cannot be done, because all aircraft must be on the same V.H.F. frequencies, and TR.1143 crystals for the new frequencies are not available.
Full quotas of SCR.522 equipment have already been received by 53 and 54 Bases, and now 52 Base have received 75% of their quota. As the equipment arrives at the Squadrons, it is being set up to the new frequencies, modified and bench tested. This will ensure that, when sufficient equipment has been received to fit all Squadrons, a 100 per cent changeover throughout the Group can be effected upon receipt of the executive from this Headquarters.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
During August the disposition of Radar personnel underwent several changes. Radar Officers have been deleted from Squadron strength and placed on Stations as Station Radar Officers. A Radar Officer has also been allocated to R. & I. at Base Stations. Where two Squadrons are based on a Station, the Station Radar Officer controls the Radar servicing of both. The Radar mechanics are divided between the Daily Servicing Section and the R. & I. Section, and thus a division is made in the two maintenance aspects. This should improve the organisation very considerably. The decision to use Wireless Operators (Ground) to assist in Radar Servicing is now being implemented, and the advantage to be derived from this new arrangement will be self-evident.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Although the policy on the use of Loran has not yet been decided upon, the intervening period between now and its installation should be utilised to train the greatest number of Radar Mechanics possible on its maintenance. The six mechanics who attended the course at Headquarter, Bomber Command, were selected as evenly as possible from Bases, and now they, with the aid of those who have had previous experience with the equipment in America, will instruct personnel within their respective Bases. Sets of equipment have been distributed to all Bases for instructional purposes. All relevant technical literature available in the form of the Bomber Command Radar Servicing Manual, Section XIII and C.D. O.526-A, has been issued.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
Numerous unexpected delays have occurred in the production of these indicators, due to the great difficulty in procuring certain components. In some cases diversion orders had to be placed, and consequently temporary bottlenecks developed. Metal screens for the C.R.T. are extremely difficult to obtain, and in an effort to complete a sufficient number of indicators to equip the two Squadrons at Skellingthorpe, all redundant screens have been collected from Stations within the Group. It is hoped that by the time this summary comes off the press, this fitting will have been accomplished as well as that of the remaining Monica IIIA and V Squadrons. We take this opportunity of commending those concerned in 53 Base for their very fine work in constructing these units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee maintained its usual high standard, during the past month, although we did not succeed in boosting it much above July’s figure (.02% to be exact). When it is remembered that at times less Gee sets were held than aircraft, all sue credit should be given to the maintenance personnel for keeping the serviceability at this high level. There were a total of 3207 sorties completed, and out pf these 88 difficulties arose, giving an overall percentage of 97.26. The difficulty in the supply position appears to be due to the shortage of crystals, and so,
(Continued on page 8, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
bearing this in mind, all crystals should be returned to Group Headquarters for repair and re-issue immediately they become unserviceable.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II AND MARK III [/underlined]
Despite the new switching procedure used on two operations during August, the serviceability of H 2 S Mark II was slightly improved. For an increase in sorties of approximately 30% (1635 sorties), 90.52% were completely serviceable. Headquarters, Bomber Command, are analysing the effect of delayed switching of the modulator at high altitudes, and will, if found necessary, take adequate steps to counteract any adverse effect it may have. It would appear, judging from the last operation on which this procedure was used, that provided this switching is done at altitudes of 2000 – 4000 feet, there would be no decrease in serviceability.
Unfortunately Mark III serviceability dropped below July’s figure by 4.73%. Of the 172 sorties completed, 19 developed defects. The percentage free from defects was therefore 88.96. Two of the faults were due to enemy action, and amongst the remaining 17 there were no outstanding component failures. Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are almost completely fitted to Mark III now, and all replacements are of this same type. Several stabilised scanners have been received but at this stage it is difficult to assess their value and efficiency.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Last month saw a slight improvement over July in the serviceability of Fishpond. 1424 sorties were completed, and of these 90.52% gave very satisfactory results. The minimum range of this device is one of the major problems and is one which requires continual attention. Where any evidence exists that the minimum range is abnormally high, immediate steps must be taken to bring it down to the shortest range possible by replacing the defective units.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA resumed its normal position in serviceability during August. There were 36 defects out of 941 sorties completed, giving a percentage of 96.18 serviceable, or an increase of 2.36% over July. The end of the Monica IIIA supply has now been reached, but our first issue of Monica IIIC is being made from Headquarters Bomber Command early in September, to Waddington. Future replacements will be Mark IIIC, and should be in good supply at a very early date.
Monica V, by relinquishing second place, which it held in July, did not by any means experience a decrease in serviceability. Rather, an increase was obtained, and out of 649 sorties completed, 96.0% functioned in the most efficient manner. This fact adds further evidence that, regardless of the odds which may exist, no problem is insurmountable when the proper thought and energy is applied.
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMBING [/underlined]
Headquarters, Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, Issue No. 6, dated September 1st, covers many of the points which would otherwise have been raised in this News.
Special attention is drawn to the responsibilities of Armament Officers in connection with bomb aiming problems. There are two courses now running. The first is the Mark XIV Bombsight Course, at present conducted in No. 4 Group. F/Lt Rogers, the Armament Officer from Winthorpe attended the first course. It is hoped that the Group will have further vacancies on subsequent courses, and it will be possible in time to give all Armament Officers the benefit of such a course. The second course is the Mark XIV Bombsight Analysis Course now being run at Bruntingthorpe. The first few vacancies on the technical courses are being allocated to Base Electrical Officers, and subsequent vacancies will be allocated to Armament Officers.
[Underlined] CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION [/underlined]
Do you circulate your copies of the Armament Bulletin to other Sections who may be interested in the various items? This is particularly applicable to Issue No.6.
[Underlined] DE-BELTING AMMUNITION [/underlined]
It looks as though we have at last found a solution to that vexing problem of de-belting and cleaning ammunition. The machines referred to on Page 29 of the Armament Bulletin are now improved and working at R.A.F. Station, Swinderby, where the Base Armament Officer will be pleased to demonstrate this equipment. Owing to the pressure of operations it is difficult to lay down a time for a visit, but Base Armament Officers should contact S/Ldr Rowed, and make arrangements to see and copy this equipment.
[Underlined] BOMB CARRIERS [/underlined]
Credit is due to R.A.F. Station, Bardney, for producing a prototype Triple Adaptor for the Lancaster centre Stations, to take 3 x 500 lb H.E. bombs.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT QUIZ [/underlined]
Do you know what the letter “G” on a bomb trolley means? If not refer to A.M.O. N.1236/43.
[Underlined] GUNS AND GUNNERY [/underlined]
With the approach of winter, gunnery problems will become more acute. In your keenness to obtain gun serviceability, do not forget that gun aiming problems as well as bomb aiming problems are Armament problems.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION [/underlined]
Co-operation should extend beyond one’s own Unit, and when stores are required urgently for operational use by other Stations, any delay in delivery means inconvenience to other Units. If this Headquarters asks you to send stores immediately by road, make certain that any delay in sending them is reduced to a minimum, and if such a delay is unavoidable, let us know – in other words keep us in the picture.
[Underlined] WAR EFFORT [/underlined]
August has been a busy month, and all previous records have been easily surpassed by the totals of 3,600 sorties and 14,952 tons of bombs dropped.
Credit is due to all Armament personnel in having the goods ready for delivery to the place where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
In order to keep up the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Hun, Bomb Dump organisation must be still further improved, and every yard of storage space used to the best advantage.
ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Fifteen months ago our chief concern was whether the Navigational standard was sufficiently high to ensure that all aircraft would reach the target. With the increase in the number of aids available, this problem has solved itself, and our main worries these days are the finer points of navigation, i.e. rigid adherence to track and timing, and the finding, and the finding of accurate winds for bombing. The standard achieved in track keeping during the last two or three months does not leave much to be desired. We must now concentrate on the two remaining difficulties, i.e. Timing and bombing wind velocities.
If we are to achieve the concentration in timing necessitated by current tactics then all aircraft must arrive at each turning point en route and at the target within ± 1 minute. It is very hard to do this, but on the other hand it must be done. Constant checking of ground speeds and revision of E.T.A’s plus a change of air speed where necessary is the only way that really accurate timing can be achieved. Every Navigator must check and re-check his E.T.A’s as often as possible and must revise the air speed as soon as it becomes evident that revision is essential.
The finding of an accurate bombing wind in the target area is equally important. Here again this is only possible if those Navigators detailed as windfinders realise their responsibility, and work to the utmost limits of accuracy, e.g. do all the plotting necessary to find the target area wind on a large scale chart, plot air positions and fixes by use of dividers and finally check all computations and plotting again and again.
Station Navigation Officers are to concentrate on these two points during the next two months and are to make sure that all Navigators realise the necessity for accurate time keeping, and the finding of accurate wind velocities in the target area.
[Underlined] BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity procedure has been used on five occasions this month. In each instance the results have been very good. It is good to note that the majority of Navigators are transmitting every wind they find. This is of course essential if the Met. Staff are to note any sudden change in the wind velocity.
It would be wise to recall the Berlin raid of March this year, when the winds experienced were 50 miles an hour stronger than forecast. This change took place very suddenly and a vast majority of Navigators suspected their instruments and refused to believe the wind velocity could have increased by such a large amount. The result was that almost all of them “watered down” their wind velocities before transmitting. The Met. Staff, having no other data to work on, had to assume that the ”watered down” wind velocities were correct. At this time not many Squadrons in the Group were equipped with H 2 S, and also aircraft were flying over a continuous sheet of cloud. Consequently the majority of aircraft had to fly on D.R. using broadcast wind velocities for a period of 4 hours. At least 50% of the aircraft were 70 miles south on the return journey, and eventually passed over the Northern fringe of the Ruhr defences, without of course, realising where they were. The results were not as disastrous as they may well have been.
This must not happen again. Once again we repeat “[sic] If you obtain a wind velocity differing from the previous found wind velocities, then provided you are confident about the fix obtained and have checked the A.P.I. you must transmit that found wind velocity. If it is wrong it will be very apparent to the Met. Staff and no harm will be done. If, however, it is right and you do not transmit it, then a great deal of harm may well be done. Read this paragraph over again very carefully and digest it well.
Now to come back to a more cheery and less threatening note. The results obtained this last month have, as was said earlier, been very good. There are still, however, one or two points which are not entirely satisfactory. The chief one is coding and transmission of wind messages. A number of instances occur where the message is coded incorrectly and sometimes this is not very apparent to the receiver of the message. Also Wireless Operators make mistakes in transmission. In each instance the message is of no use. It is very annoying to think that you have worked so hard finding an accurate wind velocity, and then nullified its value by a small slip like wrong coding or transmission. Another point is that wind finders tend to slacken off on the return journey. It is realised that fatigue is partly responsible for this, but nevertheless the wind still blows and will still play tricks on you. So [underlined] DON’T [/underlined] slacken on the return journey no matter how great the temptation.
The best wind finders on each operation were as follows:-
1. BRUNSWICK (12/13.8) – F/O REID (106 Sqdn)
2. STETTIN (16/17.8) – F/O BAILEY (630 Sqdn)
3. DARMSTADT (25/26.8) – F/S KNIGHT ( 44 Sqdn)
4. KONIGSBERG (26/27.8) – F/O YOUDALE (619 Sqdn)
5. KONIGSBERG (29/30.8) – F/O McCAMM (630 Sqdn)
Good work – keep it up!
[Underlined] GENERAL HINTS IN NAVIGATIONAL PROCEDURE [/underlined]
(i) Don’t “flap” – ever!
(ii) Always work to a system, but see that the system is good. The cycle of operations, i.e. fix, air position, alter course if necessary, wind velocity, ground speed check, new E.T.A., should not be repeated oftener than once every 10 minutes nor less than once every 20 minutes.
(iii) Check every calculation at least once. If you are a slow worker, then to ensure you have sufficient time to check all your calculations, use a 15 or 20 minutes system.
(iv) When orbiting or dog legging, before setting course, keep the pilot informed of the number of minutes in hand, e.g. “5 minutes to go” – “3 minutes to go”, etc.
(v) Remember that an aircraft requires time to alter course. The heavier the load, the longer the time required. Make allowances for this, and so avoid overshooting any of the turning points, and subsequent displacement off track.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART WORK [/underlined]
Four months ago we began a drive on more work on the chart and less in the log. The initial trials were a success, and the method was adopted throughout the Group. It was decided, however, not to force it on to the more experienced Navigators who had been used to keeping a very full log.
The reason for reducing the log work was to have more time available for the checking and re-checking of all calculations, and to enable Navigators to obtain that extra fix or ground speed check which is so often vital. A few Navigators can do all this and still keep a full log. If they wish to waste their time by recording unnecessary details, then providing their Navigation suffers in no way, there is no objection. It has been noted, however, that a few Navigators are keeping a detailed log at the expense of accurate Navigation, and constant checking. This must stop immediately. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are to watch carefully for this, and must ensure that no Navigator is wasting valuable time writing a detailed log at the expense of accurate navigation.
[Underlined] A.P.I. ATTACHMENT FOR WINDFINDING [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s News that 5 A. P. I. attachments were installed in aircraft in this Group and trials were to be carried out. The trials have now been completed, and the results achieved have come well up to expectations. More than 20 windfinding exercises were completed, and the winds found were compared with the Balloon Sonde Winds issued by the Met. Office. In every single instance the difference between the two sets of w/v’s was negligible. Practice bombing was completed after 10 of these exercises, and the average vector error obtained was 3 1/4 m.p.h.
The attachments have also been used on operations with equally good results. It is not possible to state the vector error obtained on these sorties, but the winds found by all A. P. I. attachment windfinders were very consistent.
One or two instances of completely “phoney” winds found by the attachments have occurred, however. Investigation has proved that in each case the error was attributable to incorrect tracking over the datum point on the second run up. A displacement of the datum point from the graticule of 500 yards, or a tracking error of 15 °, would give a wind error of 6 miles per hour. Errors of such proportions cannot obviously be tolerated, otherwise the attachment loses all its value.
It is obvious, therefore, that very great care is to be taken on the second run over the target to ensure that the aircraft approaches on the correct heading and the datum point is on the graticule. Such accuracy as is required can only be obtained by constant crew practice, and in view of the fact that these attachments will shortly be distributed to all Squadrons, crews are urged to practice constantly until they can achieve the required accuracy on each run up to the datum point. Windfinding is the responsibility of the Navigators, therefore, it is up to you Navigators to ensure that your pilot and Bomb Aimer practice constantly.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 6.5
Average error of Con. Units – 6.6
(Continues on page 10, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTINUED)
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.4 m.p.h. This is very good. We must now endeavour to reach the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Errors ranked by Squadron and Conversion Units]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the third month is succession. Also 207 Squadron have jumped from 16th place last month to first place this month. A very creditable performance on the part of these three Squadrons.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Creeth Base Nav. Officer, Swinderby to be Squadron Nav. Officer 83 Squadron.
F/Lt Patchett 49 Squadron Nav. Officer to be Base Navigation Officer, Swinderby.
F/Lt Catty, DFC. No. 54 Base to be Squadron Nav. Officer, No.49 Sqdn.
S/Ldr. Mason, DFC. Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby, to be Flight Commander, 97 Squadron.
F/Lt Warwick, DFC. Radar/Nav. Officer, No.1661 Conversion Unit, to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/O Bennet, DFM. No.617 Squadron, to be Sqdn. Navigation Officer.
RADAR/NAV
H2S Operators were presented with numerous opportunities of using H2S to full advantage this month in view of the long range targets that were attacked. It is gratifying to note that after the slackening off in the use of H2S which was noticed last month, operators have at last realised they were neglecting excellent opportunities for obtaining valuable experience of the set under operational conditions. That H2S has been used to advantage has been shown in the number and accuracy of winds received back from windfinding aircraft particularly on this Group’s attacks on Konigsberg. Opportunity was taken to examine some of the Navigators’ and Air Bombers’ charts on these attacks, and they indicated that excellent use had been made of H2S pinpoints en route, and in addition, track keeping, timing and concentration were extremely good. It is therefore up to Navigators, Air Bombers and H2S Instructors to see that this standard is maintained on all future operations.
With the winter months coming along, and the possible increase in the number of stand-downs due to bad weather, more and more time will be available for practice on the H2S synthetic trainers. It is realised that certain inaccuracies inherent in the trainer mechanism, make exact D.R. navigation difficult, but providing the potentiometers on the control panel are matched daily, and the trainer is run for 20 – 30 minutes before each exercise, wind vectors can be found to an accuracy of ± 10° and ± 8 m.p.h.
Standardised routes have been issued as navigational exercises for the Zuider Zee, Hamburg – Bremen and Frankfurt – Saarbrucken trainer maps, and Operators should endeavour to carry them out at frequent intervals, as if they were real flights. Fixes should be made as frequently as possible, and winds found every 15 – 20 minutes. H2S Instructors should check each exercise for accuracy of winds found, ground speed checks, adherence to planned track, E.T.A’s and reliability of fixes. Whilst it is appreciated that both the Navigators’ and set operators’ reactions to H2S may be entirely different in the air, these exercises may help to iron out a lot of difficulties, and assist in forming an accurate assessment of the capabilities of the navigational team.
A system of categorisation of H2S crews has been issued for Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons. This system depends on complete analysis of all operational and training flights, and is being done to ensure the best set operators are matched with the best equipment. It will also ensure that the best navigational teams are chosen as blind markers.
If this system is successful at 54 Base it may be possible to extend it to other H2S Squadrons and assist in ensuring that only the best crews are chosen for the two marker Squadrons.
This month we had the first opportunity of attacking a target entirely blind on H2S equipment. Unfortunately, due to numerous factors, the attack developed over a large area, but many lessons were learnt by this experience and should serve to make another such attack successful. Whilst it may not be possible to carry out this type of attack again, crews are reminded that they must take every opportunity to practice blind bombing, both on the trainer and in the air. Why not make it a habit to carry out at least one practice blind bombing run on H2S every N.F.T? Even if photographs cannot be taken you are at least developing the technique.
H2S mining has been carried out on numerous occasions during the month, and from P.P.I. photographs it is evident that the vegetables were laid in the correct gardens. A considerable collection of excellent photographs of different H2S Coastal landmarks has now been built up, and it has been suggested to Command that slides be issued of these landmarks for use at briefing. Incidentally if your garden is situated at a position which is covered by your H2S trainer maps, why not carry out your H2S briefing in the trainer room with an actual demonstration incorporating the method to be used? Crews will obtain ideal indications of the picture they can expect, and the difficulties they may experience. If you haven’t the map coverage try making your own training maps of the garden areas likely to be visited.
P.P.I. photography still continues to give a few headaches, both to Navigation and Photographic Sections. However, an improvement has been noted during the latter half of the month, and Squadrons are to be congratulated on the quality of the mining photographs taken. 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph of the French Coast near CAEN, the details of which have been confirmed by Command.
When using P.P.I. Cameras, a good photograph depends upon the complete absence of light except that from the cathode ray tube. Watch your cabin lights and the blackouts, and above all see that you give the correct exposure for the type of camera you are carrying.
PPI Photographic Interrogation Reports are being loosely filled in. If you want to be plotted in the position you actually were at the time the photograph was taken, please see you enter correct details on this form. You are probably saving yourself from an investigation at a later date.
By examination of P.P.I. photographs, several manipulation errors have come to light, particularly:
(i) Operators are still having too large a 10 mile zero in the centre of the P.P.I. on the 10/10 scan. By manipulation of the 10 mile zero control this hole should be more of the size of a sixpence, not a half crown.
(ii) Operators are not paying sufficient attention to the correct tuning of the set. They are content with the initial tuning, completely ignoring any retuning at half-hourly intervals, and before carrying out blind bombing runs.
(iii) Too much or too little gain is being employed, and consequently the responses are completely swamped by ground returns or the responses appear too faintly to be recognised or photographed.
(iv) The Contrast control is not being used to advantage. Whilst it is not the usual policy to allow untrained operators to use the contrast control, experienced operators may obtain considerable benefit by slight manipulation of the contract control, particularly when land/water definition is essential.
GEE
During the month, navigators have taken full advantage of the extended ranges now being experienced on Gee with a resultant improvement in navigation.
(Contd. At foot of Col.1)
(Contd. From Col.3)
Excellent use is being made of the frequencies on the RF27 Unit, and many operators report that fading signals are the only restrictions on range.
The new Channel Chain has come into operation this month, and so far the only indications of its range have been obtained on one operation when the average was 0530E at 4900N. No jamming was experienced.
Gee Operators are warned that the practice of calling charts be Series Numbers has been abolished. Sheets which have been re-printed are identified by the name of the chain only. A block has now been inserted to the right of the top margin for operators to insert the number of identification blinks for each chain.
A reshuffle of Gee frequencies is likely in the near future, and Gee operators should take every precaution of checking studs and frequencies before every flight in case sudden change has been made.
Once again it is necessary to warn Navigators that XF frequencies not allocated for their particular targets are not to be used by them. Fixes taken from such transmissions are likely to be in error up to 15 miles. Always ensure that when an XF transmission is given to you that it is for [underlined] your [/underlined] target.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
In spite of very heavy operational commitments during August, twelve Squadrons qualified for the competition.
52 Base are to be congratulated on winning the competition for the fourth successive month (in June the Conversion Units were included and 619 Squadron were second to 1654 Conversion Unit).
49 Squadron have won the competition for the second successive month, and 44 and 619 Squadrons tie for second place. Next month all THREE Squadrons are fighting for 1st place. Any other opposition will be welcomed.
52 Base has also provided the three entries for the “Big Chief” Competition. Group Captain Weir improved his previous month’s result and won the competition.
Next month all crews must guard against larger errors, because we are now measuring all bombs from T.2. and [underlined] not [/underlined] from the C.M.P.I. If you are careless the errors will inevitably be larger. Air Bombers must take care to set on the bombsight the wind the Navigator gives him, and the Navigator must plot his A.P.I. wind correctly to avoid getting a reciprocal wind.
Are all Bombing Leaders aware that for competition purposes, only 5 bombs need be counted, but all 6 must be included in the weekly return?
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st – 49 Squadron – 71 yards
2nd – 619 Squadron – 78 yards
44 Squadron – 78 yards
4th – 9 Squadron - 84 yards
5th – 97 Squadron - 88 yards
6th – 83 Squadron – 90 yards
7th – 630 Squadron – 91 yards
8th – 106 Squadron – 104 yards
9th – 57 Squadron – 105 yards
10th – 207 Squadron – 106 yards
11th – 50 Squadron – 116 yards
12th – 61 Squadron – 117 yards
13th – 463 Squadron, completed only 5 exercises with 121 yards error
14th – 467 Squadron, completed only 2 exercises with 89 yards error
[Underlined] “BIG CHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st G/Capt. Weir (Fiskerton) – 69 yards
2nd W/Cdr. Millward (619 Squadron) – 76 yards
3rd G/Capt. Jeudwine (Dunholme Lodge) – 125 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st – 1661 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd – 1654 C.U. – 66 yards
1660 C.U. – 66 yards
3rd – 5 L.F.S. – 92 yards
Congratulations to 1661 Conversion Unit on winning the competition for the second successive month.
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
AUGUST’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS
Once again, owing to the number of crew errors below 100 yards, only those below 80 yards can be recorded.
Sqdn. or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 (in yards)
617 F/L Iveson Sgt Chance F/O Harrison 75 and 79
F/L Orum P/O Cole P/O Brand 79
S/L Cockshott P/O Booth F/S Gosling 80
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard Sgt Fish 74 and 49
F/O Hamilton F/O Atkinson P/O Jackson 71
97 F/L Parker W/O Carvell F/S Fripp 46-48-54
61 F/O Gibberd P/O Roberts F/S Michael 70
1660 C.U. F/S Atkinson F/O Coyne Sgt Kingston 73
F/S Eakins Sgt Wente Sgt Moulds 80
F/S Croscombe Sgt Devine F/O Reeves 66
1661 C.U. F/S Barratt Sgt Berry Sgt Towle 35
F/O Dow F/O Muddle F/O Orrell 55
F/O Findlay Sgt Hemmingway F/S Larkin 76 and 67
F/O Symes Sgt Bayliss F/O Smith 70
W/O Harrison Sgt Barnett Sgt Smart 69
1654 C.U. W/O Ross Sgt Finch W/O Hayes 66 and 76
F/O Jory F/O Pooley Sgt Craig 61
5 L.F.S. P/O Arndell F/O Porter ? 60
F/S Wiley Sgt Evans Sgt Verry 72
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Diagram] Fig. 1
[Diagram] Fig. 2
This article is addressed to ALL pilots, veterans and freshmen. At the top of this page will be found a plot of 15 bombs dropped by two pilots acting as Air Bombers. For reference purposes we will call the pilot who flew the aircraft for the first 9 bombs – No. 1 Pilot, and No. 2 Pilot flew the aircraft when 9 – 16 were dropped.
Now all fifteen bombs were dropped from the same aircraft, using the same bombsight, and wind velocity which was from 230°. The time taken to drop the bombs was seventy minutes. In other words, the aircraft did not land between the two exercises, not were any settings on the bombsight altered.
If we study the two groups of bombs for a few minutes, we see that there are two very definite groups. No. 1 Pilot (as Air Bomber) has obtained a much smaller group than has No.2 Pilot. [Underlined] WHY? [/underlined] – Can [underlined] YOU, [/underlined] as a pilot give an explanation? Don’t read any further for the moment; have another look at the plot (Fig.1). Now look at the bombs plotted on the same heading (Fig.2).
From these plots we see that there is a tendency for the Air Bomber to overshoot, but also present is a large pilot error. In short, the pilot who flew the aircraft for bombs 9 – 16 was steadier and flew more accurately, more relaxed if you prefer it. This was because No.2 pilot is an experienced Lancaster pilot, whereas No.1 Pilot has not yet mastered “The flying for bombing technique”.
Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] as a pilot, see just how important you are in the bombing team? Grudgingly as Air Bombers, we have to admit that [underlined] you [/underlined] are definitely responsible for about 75% of the success of a successful exercise or operational sortie.
Remember that “flying for bombing” is an art, and only constant practice will ensure you becoming a good bombing pilot.
Remember, also that, as a pilot, flying for bombing with the Mark XIV, your worst crimes are flat turning, skidding, side-slipping and crabbing. The bombsight is fully stabilised. That means that if you bomb in a turn, you [underlined] must [/underlined] apply bank and rudder. In other words, do a PROPER TURN.
If you fly your aircraft in the correct manner on every run-up, you can be sure that [underlined] you, [/underlined] as the pilot, are contributing a great amount to cutting out errors in line.
In short, if you, as a pilot, fly your aircraft correctly, and your Air Bomber aims correctly, you automatically look after “line”. Your stick length looks after “range”.
There is another error present in [underlined] both [/underlined] exercises, and the main clue to finding it is in the above article. Bombing Leaders, Bombing Analysis Officers and Air Bombers – DO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT ERROR IS??? The answer is in another column!!!
RESULTS OF COURSES
F/O Baker (207) was 10th on No.89 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Arkieson (630) was 6th on No. 89 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Wilkie (1661) was 6th on No. 90 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Thomas (617) was 7th on No.90 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Points (61) failed to qualify as a Bombing Leader, obtaining a “C” Category.
Congratulations to F/O Soaper (5 L.F.S.) and P/O Alley (1654 C.U.) on obtaining 1st and 2nd places respectively on No.37 A.B.I. Course.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
A+ = 85 yards or less. A = 140 yards or less
B = 210 yards or less. C = 280 yards or less
D = Over 280 yards.
Congratulations to 50 Squadron on obtaining the 2 A+ categories!
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/L Campbell, D.F.C. (9 Sqdn) [/underlined] reports that No. 9 Squadron is now fully equipped with Mk. XIVA bombsights, and intend to win the Competition in September. At present they are having “teething” troubles.
[Underlined] F/O Clegg (619 Sqdn) [/underlined] is commencing a photographic album, 18” x 18”, in which is to be inserted the best photograph on any operation obtained by any one crew. Alongside the photograph is written such “gen” as bearing and distance from A.P., bearing and distance of markers from A.P. and marking technique etc.
Apologies are due to A/Cdre Sharpe, 54 Base, who carried out a dive bombing exercise in a Lightning during last month, averaging 9 yards for 6 bombs. This information was inadvertently missed last month.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] plotted 4123 bombs dropped by 841 aircraft.
[Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] plotted 1397 bombs dropped by 242 aircraft.
[Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] plotted 1901 bombs dropped by 317 aircraft.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
S/Ldr Brewer leaves 1660 C.U. to take up duties as Bombing Leader at 83 Squadron.
F/Lt McRobbie takes over 1660 Base Bombing Leader duties.
F/O Kennedy (ex 100 Group) has joined No.49 Squadron’s Bombing Section.
F/Lt McCarthy (467 Squadron) tour expired, has moved to 1654 C.U.
F/Lt Woods has succeeded F/Lt Astbury as Bombing Leader to No.617 Squadron.
[Underlined] BOMBING “LADDER” [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a Bombing “Ladder”. Top positions this month are as follows:-
617 Squadron 627 Squadron
1st F/O JOPLIN & CREW F/LT BARTLEY & CREW
2nd F/LT ORAN & CREW F/O WHITEHEAD & CREW
3rd F/LT IVESON & CREW W/CDR CURRY & CREW
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. Your Computor [sic] Box Compass over-reads by 30 ° on all headings. What type of error would result?
2. A certain type of P.F.F. technique uses sticks of flares. Is it Musical Paramatta, Paramatta, Newhaven or Wanganui?
3. If you land away with your bombs fused with ?? you must inform the Armament Officer immediately. What fuses would be used to necessitate this procedure?
4. Some Squadrons have panels modified so that they have a 32 way distributor and [underlined] two [/underlined] pre-selector boxes. Your first pre-selector box reads:-
[Underlined] PRESELECTOR [/underlined] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16.
[Underlined] STATIONS [/underlined] 7,8,9,2,11,12.
You wish to drop 2 separate sticks of 3 flares; what selector switches would you use for each stick?
[Underlined] WARNING: [/underlined] This is not as easy as it first appears. It is vitally important that crews who have to carry out more than one bombing run, know the answer. SEE THAT YOU DO!!
[Underlined] WERE YOU RIGHT??? [/underlined]
The other error present in the two exercises plotted on the opposite page is a “Linear” error common to both exercises. This was caused by a sluggish D.R. compass.
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Exercises by Conversion Unit and Base/Squadron]
There was a slight increase in Pilot’s Link Times for the month but Flight Engineers dropped a little and the overall total was 20 hours less than July. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons were engaged on other special practices throughout the month and only Flight Engineers of 617 did any Link. It’s a point to note, however, that the Link flies well on a rainy day – there were several during August.
AIR SEA RESCUE
Two ditchings occurred in the Group during August. Both crews were saved. Neither ditching was “copy book”, nor were the drills up to the required standard, but in each instance, good use was made of the time available.
[Underlined] “G” of 1654 Conversion Unit. 14th August. [/underlined]
This aircraft was engaged on Air to Sea firing on the afternoon of the 14th, when the pilot found he was unable to maintain height at t low altitude because two engines gave trouble on account of fuel shortage.
There was no time to send out distress messages, but the pilot, seeing a trawler, ditched nearby. The ditching was very well carried out and no-one was hurt, though the Flight Engineer and the two Gunners had not reached their ditching stations and therefore were not braced for the impact.
No crew member inflated his Mae West before the impact and no emergency equipment was taken out of the aircraft. The crew was not aware of the existence of a locking pin in the Dinghy Manual Release and as a result of this and the failure of the immersion switch, the dinghy had to be forced out of its stowage.
The crew were picked up by the trawler within 20 minutes and after being transferred to an H.S.L. were taken to Grimsby.
[Underlined] “J” of 97 Squadron. 15th August. [/underlined]
This aircraft was returning from a daylight operation with the two port engines u/s due to enemy action. The Port inner engine failed to feather and its windmilling action together with other damage caused the aircraft to lose height until it ditched just off the Dutch coast.
W/T distress messages were sent out and the aircraft was in V.H.F. contact with the rest of the formation. It was also escorted by the Controller in a Mosquito.
The aircraft ditched successfully and no-one was hurt though the Wireless Operator stayed too long at his set and on impact was caught in the bulkhead doorway. Again in this ditching no crew member inflated his Mae West until after impact, and no emergency equipment was taken out of the aircraft.
Within two hours of ditching A.S.R. aircraft were on the scene and a Lindholme dinghy as well as an airborne lifeboat was dropped. The crew got the airborne lifeboat under way but because of the proximity of the coast, an H.S.L. was sent out an picked up the crew before they had gone very far.
[Underlined] POINTS TO WATCH [/underlined]
(i) Inflate your Mae Wests before impact.
(ii) Get to your ditching stations smartly on the Captain’s order.
(iii) Know where your emergency equipment is and take it with you.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Due to the fact that no emergency equipment was got out of the aircraft and that the crews concerned did not inflate their Mae Wests until after impact (some members were stunned in each case) both these ditchings might have had sadder endings had not weather and light conditions been so favourable.
For the sake of your own lives don’t be half-hearted about your Safety Drills.
PRACTICE IN SAFETY DRILLS IS MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS EXPENSIVE THAN LIFE INSURANCE.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
August started with three abortive attacks on Siracourt, La Beteque and Mont Candon. Unfortunately all three areas were cloud covered and aircraft brought their bombs home.
[Underlined] BOIS DE CASSAN – DAY, 2ND AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN 100 Lancasters were to attack this target visually using Oboe Markers as a guide on their bombing run. The majority of crews bombed visually and only a few reported seeing the Oboe markers.
RESULTS Partial P.R.U. cover obtained shows that the Northern half of the target was obliterated.
[Underlined] TROSSY ST. MAXIMIN – DAY, 2ND AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber :- W/C. Simpson
PLAN The target was marked by P.F.F. Oboe Mosquitoes. The 94 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes attacked in conditions of 3-7/10ths patchy cloud.
RESULTS P.R.U. and strike photographs reveal fresh damage in the target area, a large rectangular building partially wrecked, and a number of craters to the South and South East of the target area.
[Underlined] TROSSY ST. MAXIMIN – DAY, 3RD AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Porter (Lanc.)
PLAN The aiming point was marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and crews were to bomb visually using these as a guide.
RESULTS 1 Group attacked this target 15 minutes before 5 Group, and consequently the aiming point was difficult to identify, owing to thick smoke in the target area. P.R.U. cover showed the area to have been well plastered, and certainly one and possibly three of the tunnel entrances were blocked.
[Underlined] ST. LEU – DAY, 5TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe
PLAN The aiming point was to be marked by both Oboe and 54 Base Mosquitoes and 189 Lancasters were detailed to bomb visually using the markers as a guide.
RESULTS 6/10th cloud at the target made bombing difficult. The majority of crews made runs from land marks in the target area, and consequently bombing was scattered. P.R.U. cover shows further subsidence round the Southern entrance to the caves, and road and rail communications leading to the entrance were blocked.
[Underlined] BOIS DE CASSAN – DAY, 6TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN This Flying Bomb Storage target was to be marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and 101 aircraft were to attack the aiming point visually.
RESULTS This attack was unsuccessful due to the force running into heavy Cu.b. cloud on track about 20 miles from the target. The force became disorganised, and many aircraft returned to Base because they heard an order from the Master Bomber over R/T to do so. Considerable interference was present and the Master Bomber is missing so that it is impossible to check this order. 39 aircraft carried on and bombed the target which was clear. Fighter escort found their task extremely difficult with the result that more than 12 of our aircraft were attacked by enemy fighters in the target area. Two enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed and three damaged, while the fighter escort without loss, destroyed two and damaged two.
P.R.U. cover showed that what bombing took place was good and the storage units and buildings immediately South of the aiming point were hit.
[Underlined] SECQUEVILLE BATTLE AREA – 7/8TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN This target was planned to assist land forces. In all, five aiming points were marked by Oboe Mosquitoes. The first phase of the bombing went according to plan, but after five minutes the Master Bomber ordered crews back to Base as smoke was making bombing impossible.
RESULTS The attack, though generally concentrated around the aiming point spread to the North/North East for a distance of approximately 1500 yards.
[Underlined] CHATTELERAULT – 9/10TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe (W.A/P) W/C. Simpson (E.A/P)
PLAN On this attack two aiming points were allotted and a common marking point was selected. One force was to use an over-shoot and the second force a vector. Marking to be carried out by 54 Base.
RESULTS Marking was difficult and was delayed due to hazy conditions. The marking point however, was eventually marked with reasonable accuracy and both Master Bombers ordered their forces to attack as planned. After five minutes bombing the markers became obscured by smoke and further T.I’s were dropped; these undershot by some 20 yards, and fresh bombing instructions were given to each force, who completed their bombing.
P.R.U. cover shows storage areas around both aiming points to be heavily cratered. The effect of blast and fire is seen over a considerable area. This attack shows that although a minimum quantity of marking is necessary for a good concentration, initial marking should be adequate to ensure that it will stand the smoke caused by subsequent bombing.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 10/11TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN The aiming point was marked direct by Green T.I’s. Again there was some trouble from smoke and further backing up was ordered. Owing to crew manipulation error, incorrect switches were selected and the markers fell in a long stick, approximately 1,00 yards wither side of the aiming point. Bombing however, continued on the concentration of markers.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show the Eastern bank of the river to be heavily cratered and severe damage caused to an oil and petrol storage park and also to corn silos and warehouses. This is an occasion when bad drill on the part of a member of a crew can cause scatter to what might have been an extremely concentrated attack.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – DAY, 11TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe
PLAN The Master Bomber dropped yellow T.I. cascading on the aiming point. This was to serve as a guide for crews in the run-up. A visual vector point was selected and a vector wind broadcast by the Master Bomber.
RESULTS The attack went according to plan and a good concentration was reported, although P.R.U. cover showed little damage to the submarine pens.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 11/12TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- (Northern Aiming Point) W/Cdr Simpson (Southern Aiming Point) S/Ldr Owen
PLAN Two aiming points were detailed for this target.
(i) Marshalling Yard to the South (Red Aiming Point).
(ii) Junction to the South (Green Aiming Point).
On the Northern aiming point vector bombing was employed and on the Southern direct bombing of the aiming point.
RESULTS On the Northern Aiming Point some uncertainty existed about the accuracy of marking. The force was instructed to stand off for five minutes and instructions were passed to backers up. Backing up was not accurate and a large concentration of markers resulted. Master Bombers ordered the crews to bomb the M.P.I. of the markers, which formed a triangle with sides about 500 yards, with zero wind. The correct wind vector, however, should have been 214/13 m.p.h. on the Southern Aiming Point, but bombing was completed before the Deputy Master Bomber realised his error. The direct marking went according to plan and accurate bombing followed. P.R.U. cover shows that the attack was fairly successful and that damage was inflicted around both aiming points.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 12/13TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN This attack was of an experimental nature to determine the accuracy of blind bombing on H2S.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows some fresh incidents in the town but these are mostly scattered. There is one small concentration in the Northern part of the city.
[Underlined] RUSSELSHEIM – 12/13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN Approximately 200 aircraft of this and other Groups were to attack the Opel Works at Russelsheim. A Master Bomber was provided by P.F.F. and the aiming point marked by controlled Paramatta.
RESULTS The markers were rather scattered and although results were difficult to assess it would appear that bombing was not
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
particularly concentrated. P.R.U. cover shows that new damage was caused to the South West area of the target although fires spread to woods some three miles away and to residential property to the South East.
[Underlined] FALAISE – 12/13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 25 aircraft from this Group were called for at short notice, together with 85 aircraft of other Groups to attack land positions in support of our land forces. Musical marking was carried out by P.F.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. shows very heavy cratering around the aiming point, with very few loose sticks.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 20 aircraft of 53 Base were detailed to attack oil storage. There was no marking and all crews identified the aiming point and bombed visually.
RESULTS Although several sticks were reported to have straddled the aiming point and strike photographs show bomb bursts in close proximity, P.R.U. cover showed only minor damage to the aiming point.
[Underlined] QUESNEY – 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN This was a large scale attack in which Bomber Command gave support to our land forces. Aiming points were marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and as our troops were only approximately 2000 tards from the aiming point, accurate bombing was essential.
RESULTS Crews bombed either markers or the upwind edge of the area of smoke. Apart from one stick which appeared to fall about 600 yards North of the markers, bombing was concentrated. P.R.U. photographs taken show that the area was saturated and severe destruction inflicted.
[Underlined] BREST – EVENING, 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Shipping in Brest Harbour was the target for 130 aircraft of this Group. Targets were assigned as follows:-
No.52 Base – a hulk
No.53 Base - a tanker
Nos. 54 and 55 Bases – a cruiser
PLAN All crews were to bomb visually, no markers being dropped. The Master Bomber was to precede the force to the target and broadcast the direction and lie of the ships.
RESULTS Weather at the target was clear and all Bases claimed a proportion of hits on their aiming points. P.R.U. photographs taken on the 15th August at almost half tide showed that:-
(i) The hulk was still afloat.
(ii) The tanker was awash.
(iii) The cruiser had disappeared.
Photographs taken the following day show an object in the former position of the cruiser, which may be its wreck.
GILZE RIJEN AND DEELEN AIRFIELDS – 15TH AUGUST
These airfields were allotted to this Group with approximately 100 aircraft on each.
PLAN 54 Base Mosquitoes were to drop cascading yellow T.I’s on each aiming point and these were to be used as a guide to visual bombing. The aircraft were to fly in company, led by 54 Base.
RESULTS All crews were able to identify and bomb the target visually and heavy damage was inflicted on both targets.
[Underlined] STETTIN – 16/17TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN Approximately 450 Bomber Command aircraft were to attack Stettin with full P.F.F. Marking. The marking in the early stages was reported as accurate but as the attack progressed, the marking became more scattered. The Master Bomber controlled the operation as the situation demanded although bombing spread back on track and to some woods to the North West of the target.
RESULTS From P.R.U. photographs taken, devastation could be seen through a gap in the cloud, but the extent of this has not as yet been ascertained.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 18TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 25 Lancasters were to attack oil storage – all bombing to be carried out visually.
RESULTS The weather was clear but hazy. The attack was scattered due to accurate heavy flak, making a steady bombing run almost impossible.
[Underlined] L’ISLE D’ADAM – 18TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN 160 aircraft were despatched to attack a supply depot in the forest of the L’Isle D’Adam. Oboe Mosquitoes were to mark a point three miles from the target to assist crews on their run-up. Two aiming points were allotted which were marked by 54 Base Mosquitos dropping smoke bombs.
RESULTS All crews were able to bomb visually and P. R. U. photographs show the target area to be heavily cratered.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 19TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 51 aircraft of 53 Base were to attack oil storage installations. All bombing to be carried out visually.
RESULTS Cloud made target observation difficult and the attack was somewhat scattered, although some bursts were observed near the oil storage depot.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 24/25TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN This town was to be attacked by the Group in strength. A point in the centre of the town was to be marked and each Base to use a separate false vector so that bombing would be well distributed over the town centre, around the aiming point.
RESULTS Weather conditions were perfect, and flares, although doubtful at the time, were proved by photographs to have been dropped accurately. Difficulty was experienced by the visual markers in identifying the aiming point. This was eventually recognised but before the Mosquitos could manoeuvre into position and carry out marking, the last of the flares had died out. The Master Bomber had to return early due to failure of VHF and Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 were shot down before reaching the target area. The main force therefore arrived at the target without a Master Bomber. In the absence of any marking and control, W/T Link 3 took charge and ordered the force to bomb on instruments.
P.R.U. photographs show some incidents scattered throughout the built up area. Although there was no control at the target, and the main reason for failure of the attack was due to no marking being down; the weather was favourable and the flares were accurate, and this case proves that it is impossible to spend too much time on careful study of target photographs. The visual marker, has only at the best a fleeting glance of the aiming point and he must arrive at the target with a complete and real picture in his mind of the aiming point and land marks in relation thereto.
[Underlined] KONIGSBERG – 26/27TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroofe
Konigsberg was singled out for attention by 5 Group, 174 aircraft from all Bases being detailed. Weather at the target was clear, visibility good.
PLAN The normal 5 Group technique of illumination was employed, the aiming point to be marked visually and backed up if accurate. Crews were to bomb T.I’s direct.
RESULTS Illumination was punctual, three markers identifying the target simultaneously, and dropping their markers together. The first was 350 yards North West of the aiming Point, the second 1200 yards to the North East. The Master Bomber dropped his own markers about 500 yards East of the aiming
[Underlined] O.R.S. ANALYSIS OF RAIDS [/underlined]
(a) Percentage of loose bombs.
(b) Radius of 50% circle (i.e. half the bombs dropped fell more than this distance from the centre of concentration).
(c) Distance of M. P. I. from Aiming Point.
[Table of Analysis of Raids]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
point and midway between the two previous markers. He then ordered the backers up to back these up, but the first backer up disobeyed these instructions and backed up those which had fallen 1,200 yards to the North East, which he believed to be accurate. The Master Bomber was not aware of this misplacement of the concentration and once the bombing started he found assessment difficult due to glare. As a result the concentration of bombing fell to the North East of the aiming point. This failure proves two points, firstly that the technique of one aircraft marking and this marking being assessed is the only way to achieve success. The fact that three markers dropped their load together was the primary cause for the great spread in bombing. Secondly, had the backer up obeyed the Master Bomber’s instructions implicitly, then the attack would have been misplaced by some 500 yards instead of 1500yards. There must be one Controller only at the target, and his orders must be obeyed rigidly.
[Underlined] KONIGSBERG – 29/30TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C Woodroffe.
Another heavy attack was despatched against this target the following night, and it was hoped on this raid to make up for the failure of the previous raid. 8-10/10ths strato cu, base 11,000 feet was encountered at the target.
PLAN The marking force was allowed 12 minutes to illuminate and mark the target. On this attack a marking point was chosen, and was to be marked visually with Red and Green T.I’s. Each Base was allotted a separate heading of attack and release of bombs was delayed for varying time intervals, in order to get a good distribution of bombs around the aiming point.
RESULTS The attack went according to plan and P.R.U. photographs show that almost the entire built up area of the city has been devastated, except for two small areas. This area of devastation, almost entirely by fire, stretches nearly 3,000 yards from East to West, and 2,000 yards from North to South. This area is confined to the main built up area of the city and does not extend West of the railway bridge across the river.
[Underlined] ROLLENCOURT, AUCHY LES HESDINS, BERGENEUSE – 31ST AUGUST [/underlined]
Three forces of aircraft were despatched from the Group to attack the above three flying bomb targets.
PLAN In each case 54 Base Mosquitos were to drop smoke markers as a guide for visual bombing. Weather was uncertain and aircraft were instructed to orbit if the targets were temporarily obscured by cloud.
RESULTS Some orbiting was necessary, but all three attacks were carried out according to plan. Bombing on each target was fairly concentrated and P.R.U. cover gives evidence of very extensive damage.
The most successful attack of these three was on Rollencourt.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ETAPLES – 4TH AND 5TH AUGUST [/underlined]
617 and 9 Squadrons attacked the railway bridge at Etaples in daylight on August 4th. The weather over the target was clear although some patches of cloud were encountered on the run-up.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows that four direct hits were scored on the double track bridge, whilst the single track bridge also sustained damage.
This bridge was attacked by 9 Squadron on the following day, but although conditions were good the attack was generally disappointing. Due to a miscalculation on the part of the formation leader the actual bombing heading carried out was almost parallel to the bridge itself, and consequently 75% of the sticks burst to the West of the bridge. Although there are two possible fresh hits on the Southern end of the target, the attack must be considered a failure due to the wrong heading of approach.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On the 5th August 617 Squadron attacked the submarine pens at Brest with 12,000 lb. bombs. Aiming was visual and weather at the target was good.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover confirms at least five direct hits on the pens, of which three were definite penetrations.
[Underlined] LORIENT – 6TH AND 7TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On this attack 617 Squadron were supported by No. 106 Squadron and had submarine pens for their target in daylight. The 617 Squadron leader was to drop two red T.I’s as areas markers to assist visual bombing.
RESULTS It is believed that at least two direct hits were scored on the submarine pens with a number of near misses. P.R.U. photographs show four hits on the wet pens and further damage caused by 12,000 pounders between the wet and the dry pens.
617 and 9 Squadrons were detailed to attack this target the following day, but weather prevented visual bombing and bombs were brought back to base.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 9TH AUGUST [/underlined]
In this attack 617 Squadron were allotted the submarine pens whilst 9 Squadron were given adjacent oil installations. A 9 Squadron aircraft was to precede the main force by 20 minutes to find a bombing wind by means of the API attachment. All bombing was to be carried out visually.
RESULTS [Underlined] 617 Squadron. [/underlined] 12 x 12,000 lb. bombs were dropped and P.R.U. cover confirms that a direct hit or hits on the S.E. corner of the pens caused a collapse of the roof over an area of 240 feet x 120 feet. There were also three further direct hits with possible penetration.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] reported the attack to have been fairly successful although many under-shoots and over-shoots were reported. The storage tanks are not therefore thought to have received the full weight of the attack.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 11TH AUGUST [/underlined]
The submarine pens were again the target for 617 Squadron who were carrying 2,000 lb. A.P. bombs. Bombing was to be carried out visually from beneath 16 and 18,000 feet.
RESULTS The bombing was accurate although smoke tended to become troublesome towards the end of the attack. P.R.U. cover shows at least four hits although none of these appear to have penetrated the roofs of the pens.
[Underlined] BREST – 12TH, 13TH AND 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Continuing the attacks against submarine pens, 617 Squadron visited Brest in a daylight attack in which 8 x 12,000 lb bombs were to be aimed visually at the aiming point.
RESULTS Weather at the target was clear and only one bomb reported to be wide of the target. P.R.U. cover shows that two bombs penetrated the roof, one in the centre making an opening of almost 50 feet across, whilst a third has taken off part of a corner of the roof at the Western side. There are two other possible hits which have not penetrated the roof.
[Underlined] 13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On the following day 9 Squadron supported 617 Squadron in a second attack on the pens and shipping in the harbour. 5 x 12,000 lb. bombs were carried, the remaining loads being made up of 1,000 lb. A.P. bombs.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover reveals one direct hit which may have penetrated the pens, with two other very near misses close to the Northern wall.
9 Squadron were allotted a tanker in the harbour whilst aircraft of 617 Squadron were to attack the cruiser. P.R.U. cover showed that the cruiser was still intact, but that the tanker was awash at the stern and was resting on the bottom.
[Underlined] 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
The cruiser was the target for 617 Squadron whilst 14 Lancaster of 9 Squadron were to attack a hulk which had been towed into the harbour. Weather was clear at the target. Bombing was not as good as had been experienced in previous attacks and P.R.U. cover showed that both vessels were still intact and undamaged after the attack.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE, 16TH AND 18TH AUGUST [/underlined]
617 and 9 Squadrons were detailed to attack the submarine pens but 9/10ths cloud was encountered at the target and the attack was abortive. On the 18th August, however, the Squadrons paid a second visit in good weather conditions. 6 x 12,000 lb. bombs were carried, the remaining aircraft carrying 2,000 lb. and 1,000 lb. A.P. bombs.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows at least one hit and possibly two on the roof of the pens by the 12,000 lb. bombs, but no bombs
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 16.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
appear to have penetrated.
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 24 TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Enemy E and R Boat pens were the target for 617 and 9 Squadrons in a daylight attack when 12,000 lb. bombs and 1,000 lb. bombs were carried. The attack was carried out in clear weather.
RESULTS All crews were able to identify the aiming point and bombing appeared concentrated. P.R.U. cover shows one hit in the Western half of the pen which has penetrated into the pen and blown out a large portion of the rear.
[Underlined] BREST – 27TH AUGUST [/underlined]
A hulk and Sperrbrecher were detailed for 617 and 9 Squadrons respectively for a daylight attack. Weather at the target was clear with slight haze. All crews to bomb visually.
RESULTS Hits were claimed by both squadrons on their aiming points, and these are confirmed by P.R.U. cover, which was taken on the same day. This revealed that the hulk has disappeared and that there are signs of mud displacement around the position of this vessel. The Sperrbrecher is still afloat with much debris on the decks.
Wishful Thinking
I saw a Service switchboard,
A most amazing sight,
It filled me with deep wonderment,
And thrilled me with delight.
For dainty creatures fingered
Their cords with grace and charm,
And [underlined] rarely [/underlined] gave wrong numbers,
And [underlined] never [/underlined] lost their calm.
They all had silvery voices,
Melodious and untarnished,
And each had lovely finger-nails,
Not one of which was varnished.
Their speed was quite phenomenal,
Their tact a perfect joy;
Their supervisor sat at ease,
With nothing to annoy.
They never cut subscribers off,
They always saw calls through,
And never, never argued
With their clients as others do.
Their calm serene detachment,
No traffic could abate.
They scarcely ever faltered
Or were known to hesitate.
A vision so astounding
Pure phantasy did seem.
The shock it gave awoke me
And dispersed my precious dream.
Anon. (Circa 1944)
HONOURS & AWARDS (CONTINUED)
NON IMMEDIATE AWARDS (Continued)
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt E.F. CAWDERRY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O J.K. BELL D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BENTON D.F.C.
P/O J.P. DOWN, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.M. NELSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Lt C.B. OWEN D.F.C.
F/O W.G. WISHART, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt SMITH D.F.C.
A/F/O B.J. LINDSAY D.F.C.
F/O P.J. CRANE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A. ROMANO D.F.C.
F/O J.R. GLAZEBROOK D.F.C.
F/O W.G. SEYMOUR D.F.C.
F/Sgt J.V. BEVAN D.F.M.
F/Sgt A.M. McKIE D.F.M.
F/Sgt G. HOYLAND D.F.M.
F/Sgt R.A. SNOWDEN D.F.M.
Sgt J.S. WILLIAMS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.G. FURNISS D.F.C.
F/O G.R. ANDREWS D.F.C.
P/O F. COLLIS D.F.C.
P/O F.J.A. REDMAN D.F.C.
P/O V.J. GLANN D.F.C.
P/O A.G.R. UDSON D.F.C.
F/Sgt E.J. DAWISON D.F.M.
F/Sgt C. ALLSOP D.F.M.
F/Sgt R. EDWARDS D.F.M.
F/Sgt R.S.J. CAPON D.F.M.
F/Sgt G.J. SCUFFINS D.F.M.
F/Sgt F.W. LOGAN D.F.M.
Sgt C. GIDMAN D.F.M.
Sgt A.H. ALLISON D.F.M.
Sgt W.H.A. YOUNGS D.F.M.
Sgt H.G. HALL D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt D.A. BROOM D.F.M.
P/O A.R.S. BOWMAN D.F.C.
F/Sgt M.C.J. BARBER D.F.M.
F/O F.L. MERRILL D.F.C.
P/O J.F. FREEMAN D.F.C.
W/O K.F. FLUTE D.F.C.
Sgt E.F. MARTIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.W. COULSON D.F.C.
P/O W. MACKAY D.F.C.
P/O W.L. GIBBS D.F.C.
P/O G.B. QUARTERMAINE D.F.C.
P/O J.W. McMANUS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O P. BUTLAN D.F.C.
P/O L.J. WARNER D.F.C.
P/O J.C. DOUGHTERY D.F.C.
F/O F.C. SECKER D.F.C.
P/O F.L. CHIPPERFIELD D.F.C.
P/O R.W. OLSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. SAINT-SMITH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O G.B. HEATH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.W. HILL D.F.C.
P/O H.C. RODGERS D.F.C.
F/O F.D. SPENCER D.F.C.
F/Sgt A.W. JEFFREY D.F.M.
F/Sgt G.A. DAVIES D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
Successful trials at Dunholme Lodge of an addition to the present landing scheme have resulted in its introduction throughout the Group. The addition has been effected by bringing back the call-up point to the funnel and renaming the existing call-up point “CHECK” where the pilot does actually check his Stud ‘B’. This has entailed an amendment to the Plus 1/2 and Plus 1 position which are now defined as QDM of runway plus 90 degrees. The additional position gained by moving the call-up point has minimised stacking and given the pilots further time in which to adjust their positions. The major gain made by the move is, however, that at all airfields the call-up point is very definitely marked by the first lead-in light.
Experiments are being conducted at Waddington with “American High Lights”, located in the centre of the airfield to define the various positions on the circuit. These lights give a beam of 15°and are of the type now being installed at Winthorpe for runway lighting in conditions of poor visibility.
Following the success of Spilsby’s experiment of utilising the second Duty F.C.O. to “shepherd” the aircraft on the circuit, the practice is to be made general throughout Group. “Shepherding” has resulted in regular spacing with consequent greater safety margin and improved landing times. In effect, the F.C.O. “talks down” the aircraft. For weather protection, Spilsby have given the F.C.O. a m/u turret on the roof. Their lay-out and the method of control used are worth seeing and will well repay a visit.
Landing times can still be much improved. Aircraft are still arriving at irregular intervals. S.F.C.O’s must continue to impress on crews at briefing the essential point of a regular flow of aircraft on return. Spasmodic “bunching” and unnecessary delay break down the whole principle upon which the landing scheme is based. Crew drill can give the same regular flow to one squadron airfields as to two squadron airfields, and crew drill is solely dependent on discipline of the highest order.
One final point about overshoots. The airfield controller has a large responsibility in that final instructions to overshoot if necessary will emanate from him. Although the airfield controller will always err on the safe side, there are still far too many instances of aircraft being instructed to overshoot, when in actual fact they could land with safety. This is proved time again by the fact that the overshooting aircraft rarely overhauls the aircraft on the runway until is clearing the runway.
It is also realised that the airfield controller finds difficult to access the range of approaching aircraft solely by means of
(Contd. In Col.1)
(Contd. From Col.3)
navigation lights. To assist them therefore simple range finders will be provided.
S.F.C.O’s should point out to airfield controllers that an overshoot is not without a certain amount of risk, and that whenever possible aircraft should be allowed to land, and not just be given instructions to overshoot in order to be on the safe side.
[Underlined] AUGUST LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 17
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V Group News, August 1944
5 Group News, August 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 25, August 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about sports, engineering , war effort, gunnery, training, equipment, photography, gardening, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, honours and awards, signals, armament, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, air sea rescue, link trainer, operations, special operations, flying control, wishful thinking, tactics, accidents, and the Stirling.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-08
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Anne-Marie Watson
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18 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-29
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
England--Lincolnshire
France--Brest
France--Creil
France--Etaples
France--Falaise
France--Hesdin
France--La Pallice
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Lorient
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Siracourt
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Netherlands--Arnhem
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Tilburg
Poland--Szczecin
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Poland
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1944-08
1944-08-03
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
sport
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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[Picture]
V
GROUP
NEWS
No 26 SEPTEMBER 1944
Copies sent to Stns.
[Stamp] Base Copy.
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[Blank Page]
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FOREWORD BY A.O.C.
September was a most successful month and a reward for the hard work which all ranks have put in throughout the Summer. The Group secured two prizes for which many have striven since the early days of the War, the Tirpitz and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The attack on the Tirpitz was splendidly undertaken by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons and appears to have been highly successful in spite of a most efficient smoke screen. The attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal has earned the following message from the Secretary of State for Air.
“The War Cabinet have instructed me to convey to you and to all concerned their congratulations on the outstanding success achieved in the recent attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Pressed home with great determination against strong opposition and in difficult weather it constituted yet another major blow against German War economy.”
These two attacks have once more shown the remarkable efficiency of the 12,000 lb. “Tallboy” bomb when it hits the target.
The Group has achieved an equally high measure of success in attacks against German cities. During September alone, an area of nearly 3,000 acres has been burnt out. Such results can only be achieved if the marking is accurately placed and if the incendiaries are spread evenly over the whole area to be burnt. With a small force of Group strength there are no loads to be spared and if incendiaries go wide or are over-concentrated on certain sectors, it must be at the expense of the total area destroyed. Examples are Stuttgart where too high a percentage of loads fell wide of their sectors and Kaiserslautern where crews allowed themselves to be deflected inwards by the fires raging in the central sector, thus allowing the equally important areas on either side to escape.
I want to impress on crews that area bombing calls for every bit as much accuracy as attacks on the smallest factory or railway targets. In attacks on these targets during the Summer crews achieved remarkably small errors, and similar accuracy is needed on these large targets if they are to be burnt out from end to end leaving no gaps calling for an uneconomical return visit. Each crew in fact is given a small area of his own to burn and if his load falls on his neighbour’s patch, his own area may well escape destruction, and this has happened on some of our recent attacks.
The problems of lining up the aircraft on the correct heading after allowing for drift and of carrying out the overshoot procedure, are not easy to solve but instructions have recently been issued which should help crews in this matter. If an even spread of incendiaries can be achieved we should be able, with our normal effort, to burn out nearly 1,000 acres on each attack. This will represent a tremendous achievement, and one which will bring nearer the end of the War.
No.51 Base has also put out a great effort in training 161 crews during the month. This has enabled all squadrons to be kept up to establishment and had provided a margin from which new squadrons are already starting to be formed. I congratulate all concerned.
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[Drawing] OPERATIONS
[Underlined] BREST – 2ND SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Humphreys.
Operations in September opened with an attack on the dry docks and shipping in Brest Harbour by 67 Lancasters of Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, in daylight on September 2nd. There was no marking for this attack, which was carried out visually and according to plan. Officers who have since visited Brest say that the concentration of bomb craters around the two docks in such that it is almost impossible to get across this area on foot. Both ships are shattered by many bombs.
[Underlined] DEELEN AIRFIELD – 3RD SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
103 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, plus No. 106 Squadron, took off to attack Deelen airfield in daylight. Two Mosquitoes from No.54 Base went ahead of the main force to mark the target with smoke. One Mosquito fitted with an A.P.I. was detailed to find a bombing wind and pass it to the Master Bomber Two smoke bombs were assessed as being on the aiming point but no trace of markers was seen on strike photographs. No. 106 Squadron bombs were fused T.D. 0.025 while both 52 and 55 Bases carried a load of 1,000 lb. and 500 ln bombs all fused half an hour delay, with the object of avoiding smoke and thereby allowing each crew to have a clear run up to the target. This was the first occasion on which we have used the half hour delay fuse against an airfield target. Unfortunately there was much cloud so that the experiment was not conclusive.
RESULTS Only partial cover was obtained, but concentrations of bombs were seen to have fallen on the S.W. and Eastern intersections of the runways, and at least 60 craters are seen in the partial cover of the runways.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Wing Commander Simpson.
The United Stated Forces investing Brest were meeting stiff opposition from the defences around Brest. These enemy batteries were the target for 60 aircraft of No. 53 Base in daylight on September 5th. There were four aiming points, A.B.C. and D, to be marked by 7 Mosquitoes of No.627 Squadron. Crews were to bomb visually.
RESULTS All aiming points were attacked, a fair concentration being achieved, with the exception of some loose bombing on A. and B., several bombs falling as much as 400 – 500 yards to the West. A full interpretation from photographic cover was unobtainable owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the Lancaster and previous attacks.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH – 9/10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
Nos. 52 and 55 Bases provided 113 Lancasters to attack this target on the Western fringe of the Ruhr; in conditions of cloudless weather and good visibility.
PLAN For this attack, as area of the town was selected and a suitable marking point chosen, upwind from it. The marking point was to be marked with T.I’s dropped by Mosquitoes in the light of flares, after which the
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main force, tracking over the T.I’s on pre-determined headings through a sector of 90° were to aim their bombs at the T.I., but delay release for a certain number of seconds. The aircraft were divided throughout the sector and each division given its own band. In this way the incendiary load would be spread evenly over the selected target area.
Should the 54 Base Mosquitoes find it impossible to locate their marking point then they were to back up yellow Oboe T.I’s dropped in the centre of the target area by P.F.F. Mosquitoes, and the main force were to bomb the yellow and red direct, without delaying release. The Oboe T.I’s were dropped on time, but visual marking was delayed owing to the first and second flare waves dropping their flares too far to the South and South East over open country. The Master Bomber, therefore, ordered the third flare wave to drop their flares on the Oboe T.I’s, and by their aid, Marker II was able to identify and mark the marking point. The main force were then called in to attack.
RESULTS Photographs show enormous volumes of smoke coming from a very large number of fires scattered throughout the centre of the built up area of the town. Large new areas of complete devastation, mostly by fires, are seen all around the main railway station. This was a successful attack, but the Mosquito markers would have been aided had a more conspicuous marker point been chosen.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
Defences at Le Havre which were holding up the besieging Allied Forces were attacked by 108 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases in cloudless weather in daylight on September 10th. Aiming points were marked by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and the attack went according to plan.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that all areas have been heavily cratered in a widespread fashion. It was noticeable that there were no craters North of the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 11TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
A force of 101 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, plus 106 Squadron, again attacked the defences at Le Havre in good weather in daylight on 11th September. Here again the marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and P.R.U. cover confirms the success of the attack, showing that all aiming points were well covered. Once again no bombs were seen outside the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 11/12TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
The weather in the target area was clear with some ground haze.
PLAN The “fanning out” method employed against Munchen Gladbach was again planned for this attack, each Base being allotted a separate sector. On this occasion, leading aircraft of the flare force assumed the additional role of blind markers and, in addition to illuminating the target for the Mosquitoes, were to drop T.I. green in the centre of the target area. Mosquitoes were then to mark the marking point with T.I. Red, and the main force in their allotted height bands were again to aim their bombs at the Red, delaying release. To ensure the distribution of the incendiary load over the whole of the required area the first wave was to delay 20 seconds, the second wave 10 seconds, and the third wave 8 seconds. As on a previous occasion the green T.I’s from the Lancaster markers were to be backed up by the Mosquitoes, if the latter were unable to locate their own marking point, and the centre of
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these two sets of T.I’s was to be bombed direct by the main force. Flares were dropped accurately and on time, and the markers successfully dropped their red T.I’s on the marking point. The attack then proceeded according to the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographs show the main area of the city to be completely gutted. On the whole a highly successful attack but something went wrong with the Northern edge which has escaped devastation. Investigation into the reason is not yet complete.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 12/13TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
The target was heavily attacked by a force of 195 Lancasters from all Bases, in good weather on 12/13th September.
PLAN The target had suffered severe and wide spread damage from previous R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. attacks, and so a plan of attack was required to cover the remaining comparatively undamaged areas.
A marking point was therefore chosen, and sectors allotted to each Base in which bombing headings were to be evenly distributed, in order to cover the whole of the undamaged area.
No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the big railway yards with T.I. Red and Red Spot fires, with the help of illumination from the flare force.
Appropriate delays were ordered, and blind markers were again dropped by 54 Base Lancasters as an initial guide to the Mosquitoes, and as an insurance if the latter failed to locate their marking point.
Flares were dropped accurately and punctually. Marking was completed successfully and the attack was carried out in accordance with the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows new areas of damage round the aiming point, in the Bad Constadt district, and at Fueurbach to the North of Stuttgart, in addition to several important industrial works.
Plots show that, although a fair concentration of incendiaries was obtained within the sectors planned, the main weight in the later part of the attack tended to spread to the East and North. The reasons for this are being investigated.
[Underlined] BOULOGNE – 17TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Provided by P.F.F.
The garrison at Boulogne was putting up a heavy resistance against the Canadians attacking the town and harbour, and two forces comprising 199 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the specific aiming points.
PLAN All aiming points were marked by full P.F.F. Oboe marking. The first two forces were timed to attack in two separate waves, the first at 0830 hours and the second at 0940 hours. In view of the proximity of our own troops, crews were carefully briefed to make their run up from a well defined pin-point on the coast and use was made of the Navigator’s Master Bomber switch.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows well bombing concentrated around the aiming points.
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[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN – 18/19TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
207 Lancasters from all Bases and 7 Mosquitoes took part in a heavy and devastating attack on the town and harbour installations at Bremerhaven, in cloudless weather conditions, with good visibility.
PLAN There were five aiming points, lying in a rough direction from N.N.W. to S.E.E. on the Eastern bank of the river. Marking procedure for this target was to be similar to that for the preceding targets, but its shape restricted the use of sectors and it was therefore planned that part of the force would attack on defined tracks over the Mosquitoes’ T.I’s, with the appropriate delay in the release of the bombs, whilst others would aim direct at these T.I’s with a false wind vector applied to the bombsight. Illumination and marking was carried out without any hitches, and the attack was completed according to plan.
RESULTS The two most closely built up areas North and South of the harbour entrances have been completely devastated. Most of the warehouses and dockside buildings have been gutted. This was a model for an incendiary attack.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH AND RHEYDT – 19/20TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Gibson.
A further heavy attack was carried out on this target by 227 aircraft from all Bases in the Group, the intention being to complete the destruction of this enemy industrial centre.
PLAN There were three forces – Red (53 Base plus 106 Squadron), Green (52 Base), and Yellow (55 Base), each force being allotted separate height bands and its own Marking Point, each of which was to be illuminated by flares and marked with Red, Green and Yellow T.I’s respectively. The aiming point of the Red force was the primary target and was to be fully controlled. If the green or yellow targets could not be successfully attacked aircraft were to be ordered to attack the red target.
There was a hitch with the marking for the Red Force. In the light of accurately placed flares, the Master Bomber went in to drop his T.I’s on the Red Marking Point, but his markers hung up. He then called the markers to come in. Number one marker had trouble with exhaust studs and Markers 2 and 3 could not identify. As no Red markers were down, the Master Bomber ordered the Red Force to bomb the green T.I’s which were dropped on time. Later, however, Marker number one identified and marked his target. The order to bomb the green T.I’s was cancelled and the force were then ordered to bomb the red T.I’s. The yellow marking point was punctually and accurately marked, and the Yellow force completed their attack as planned.
RESULTS Considerable additional damage over the whole N.W. perimeter of the town is revealed adding to the already severe and widespread damage. This almost completes the destruction of the town. There is little additional damage in Rheydt.
Plots of night photographs and the incendiary plot show that although the incendiary sticks dropped early in the attack fell near the aiming point, a spread rapidly developed both to the South and W.S.W. and at the end of the attack, an area from S.E. to West was covered. No markers were plotted in these areas. No explanation for this wide spread beyond and outside the planned sectors has yet been arrived at.
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[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, HANDORF AIRFIELD AND MUNSTER – 23/24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Red Target: Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Green Target: Squadron Leader Owen.
A large force comprising 254 aircraft from all Bases in the Group was detailed to attack these targets, the first two being the primaries and the last, Munster, an alternative, should the weather present difficulties for marking and attack. Unfortunately 10/10ths cloud was encountered in the target area with base 8,000 ft.
PLAN No.53 Base plus 106 Squadron and 617 Squadron were ordered to attack the red target (Dortmund-Ems Canal) and Nos. 52 and 55 Bases the green target (Handorf Airfield). If the red target were not marked, the red force, excluding the Tallboy aircraft, were to attack the green target, or if the green target was not marked, the yellow target. Similarly, the green force were to attack the yellow target as an alternative.
RESULTS [Underlined] Dortmund-Ems Canal [/underlined] – Although the portion of the canal marked and attacked was some 7 miles North of the planned aiming point, a very successful attack ensued, and both branches of the embanked portion of the canal were breached. A stretch of 18 miles of the canal is now dry, and over 100 barges are stranded. A splendid result. Of the red force, 82 Lancasters attacked the primary, and 12 the alternative.
[Underlined] Handorf Airfield [/underlined] – The marker force experienced difficulty in identifying the target area, and after an unsuccessful attempt, the main force was ordered to bomb the alternative. 20 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes claim to have attacked the primary, and 61 Lancasters attacked the alternative. There was no new damage to the alternative.
[Underlined] CALAIS – 24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
30 Lancasters of 53 Base were ordered to attack defence positions at Calais in daylight on 24th September. Marking was to be carried out throughout the attack by Oboe Mosquitoes of P.F.F.
RESULTS Weather conditions were unfavourable, there being 10/10ths cloud, base between 2/3,000 feet. In view of this the Master Bomber cancelled the attack. This order was not received by 8 aircraft of the force, who carried out the attack visually having identified their respective aiming points.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE – 26/27TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Force employed – 216 Lancasters, 11 Mosquitoes. Weather conditions experienced over the target were 8 – 10/10ths cloud 6 – 8,000 feet.
PLAN In order that the whole weight of the attack should fall on previously undamaged areas of the town, a marking point was selected, to be marked with red T.I’s and each Base was allotted a sector or track, radiating from the marking point. Main force crews were to aim their bombs at the red T.I’s and delay for the detailed number of seconds. The usual blind marking technique was ordered to ensure against the failure of the Mosquitoes to locate and mark the aiming point visually.
Cloud conditions and poor visibility prevented the visual markers from identifying the marking point and consequently the secondary plan was resorted to.
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RESULTS P.R.U. photographs reveal a large area of gutted buildings extending over many blocks. This devastation spreads on both sides of the main East to West road through the city around the closely built up area, for a distance of 1,500 yards by 500 yards to 1,000 yards. There are many scattered incidents of destruction beyond this central area, and a large number of commercial and administrative buildings have been destroyed. This is a great triumph for the blind markers.
[Underlined] KAISERLAUTERN – 27/28TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
207 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes from all Bases in the Group were to attack the industrial centre and railway workshops. The attack was carried out in weather conditions of 2 – 8/10ths thin stratus at 3,000 feet and 10/10ths cloud at 7,000 feet.
PLAN The railway workshops were to be attacked with ‘J’ bombs using a false wind vector on the bombsight, and the town by the normal method of overshooting.
RESULTS The illumination and marking on both areas were accurate and punctual.
The damage inflicted on the town, confined chiefly to a narrow belt across the centre of the area id disappointing in relation to the number of aircraft used. Investigation shows that over 70% of the aircraft bombed on headings within a small sector, and were not evenly spread over the whole sector as planned, thus little damage was sustained by the Northern and Southern outskirts. Greater attention should be paid at briefing to explaining the details of the plan of attack, and the importance of aircraft adhering to their briefed bombing headings must be strongly emphasised. The attack on the railway workshops achieved a greater measure of success.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACK BY NO. 617 AND NO. 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ – SEPTEMBER 15TH. [/underlined]
Previous attempts made by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and midget submarines to sink the Tirpitz had proved unsuccessful. It was considered that a force of Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs and other special bombs would have a good chance of inflicting severe damage to the battleship, if not sinking her, provided the element of surprise could be achieved, so that aircraft could carry out their bombing run before the smoke screen, which was known to be capable of covering the ship and fiord in which she lay within 10 minutes, could be brought into operation.
On September 11th, 38 Lancasters and 2 Liberators took off and with the exception of one aircraft of No. 9 Squadron, which had to return to base, all arrived at Archangel or in that area. Weather conditions were appalling, with rain and low cloud, and some crews were unable to locate the advanced base and had to land on other airfields and even in open country. But for a very high standard of airmanship many more aircraft might have been damaged or lost.
It was hoped that by approaching the target from the South, the necessary element of surprise would be achieved. Tallboy aircraft were to attack first, as it was essential that they should see and aim at the Tirpitz visually. The aircraft carrying the special bombs did not depend on visual sighting of the target. A separate plan and aiming data were provided for them. The plan consisted of the selection of two clearly identifiable landmarks close to the target, at which the bomb aimers could aim, using false settings on their bombsights. Two lakes, one on either side of the fiord were chosen for this purpose. Each aircraft was given a separate track, with the intention of covering an area of 750 yards X 750 yards with the target at its centre.
The flight plan proceeded as detailed until the approach to the target area, when the Tallboy force had to make a last minute alteration of course, as they were west of track.
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The leading Tallboy aircraft saw the Tirpitz clearly when 8 minutes flying time away from it, but by the time the first bombing run was made, the smoke screen was already in operation, and later aircraft found the target area completely obscured. Some aircraft were able to aim their bombs before the last traces of the Tirpitz disappeared under the smoke screen, but others had to aim at the gun flashes and light flak seen through the smoke screen. Others, unable to identify the target, took their bombs back to the advanced base.
The six aircraft carrying the special load aimed their bombs at the planned aiming points, but were unable to observe any results.
The majority of bombing frame photographs are unplottable due to smoke but the release point frames of thirteen of the Tallboy aircraft have been plotted, and the calculated strike position of the bombs indicate that at least one direct hit, and three near misses are probable. Neither the bombing nor release point frames of the aircraft carrying the special load are plottable, as they are obscured by smoke.
Subsequent P.R.U. photographs show a large rent in the starboard side of the ship forward, covering much of the forecastle. Apart from this hit the explosion of some 6,000 lbs of Torpex at a depth of 60 feet within a few yards of the ship’s side cannot fail to have given her a severe shaking, and at least one of the near misses was very close.
This was a highly successful operation carried through in spite of considerable difficulties.
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[Drawing] GARDENING
The Group Gardening effort this month has been on a small scale, and has only called for two operations in which a total of 77 vegetables were successfully planted, although crews stood by for other operations which were cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions.
It is interesting to note that in our first operation this month, the Gardeners from 44 Squadron were co-ordinated into the main force attack on an important German Port, and planted visually by the light of the Flare Force, close to the docks in a channel 800 yards wide, from 12,000 feet.
The second operation, performed by 57 and 630 Squadrons, was a normal H 2 S high lay off the entrance to important German shipping channels where 53 selected vegetables were successfully planted. Unfortunately H/57 had trouble with H 2 S equipment after trying local repairs to within 20 minutes of the target, and then correctly returned with a complete load.
The Command effort totalled 748 vegetables, mostly planted in the Baltic and Kattegat area, with the object of continuing the present dislocation of enemy shipping routes, and preventing troop movements from Scandinavia to the mainlands of the European offensive.
It can be estimated that at present the figures for vegetables planted per ships sunk, stand at 47 to 1. This is an encouraging figure when taking into account the number of Gardening sortied made, and bearing in mind that this does not include the loss to war effort while sweeping measures are put in hand and completed in each area, or the number of ships that are severely damaged and can only be repaired under difficult conditions, or the all-important morale effect on those who “go down to the sea in ships”.
The following extract from the “News Digest” of 28th September reveals the present state of our enemy’s imagination:
“Norway – German fear of Paratroops. British bombers have recently flown over Oslofjord dropping mines.”
“…The Germans are nervous because they think that paratroops were dropped at the same time as the mines. After the first attack some weeks ago, Oslo harbour was closed to all traffic for two days. Since then many attacks have been made, and the harbour has been closed every time. Even the Bygde ferries have, at times, had to stop their traffic. Large-scale raids have been carried out in Cjelleras, and even as far away as Lillestrom there have been raids for paratroops”.
It is also reported that all ships entering narrow channels in the Kiel area have to place two strong cables round their bottoms, and so sail until they are out of the area. This is done in order to facilitate the salvaging of a ship by cranes or other salvage devices in case she is bombed or mined.
In other words, our enemy has developed the minephobic complaint to a very high degree, and with our present increase in stocks he will receive further innoculations [sic] as, and where, we may decide in the future.
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WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties, Tonnage and Hours by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
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[Drawing] TACTICS
The main tactical development of this month has been the withdrawal of early warning devices, i.e. MONICA and BOOZER, and the limitation in the use of H.2.S. It is now known that Hun night fighters can home upon these devices. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no alternative but to withdraw them. MONICA is in the process of modification and may be reissued eventually, but in its absence, crews must exert the utmost vigilance in their search.
It must be appreciated that, although German C.G.I. is getting very much shorter warning of an approaching raid, the number of targets to which a bomber force may be going is also decreasing, making the night fighter controller’s job easier. He also has his night fighter squadrons concentrated into a smaller area and their transfer from one area to another is consequently easier. Bearing these factors in mind, there can be no doubt that the German night fighter will constitute our main problem during the coming months. The following steps should be taken to ensure utmost efficiency in combatting the enemy’s defensive measures.
(i) [Underlined] Night Vision Training. [/underlined]
No opportunity should be lost of training crews in night vision. Night vision efficiency is something which can be improved with practice. Remember, with the withdrawal of the early warning devices, it is now your eyes and night vision versus the night vision aided by A.I. of the enemy night fighter. On the other hand, you have seven pairs of eyes where he has one. This advantage must be exploited to the utmost.
(ii) [Underlined] Increased Banking Search. [/underlined]
Surprise remains the night fighter’s most important weapon. The only effective counter to surprise from behind and below is a constant banking search, and captains must increase the frequency with which they carry out this banking search.
(iii) [Underlined] Corkscrew. [/underlined]
The 5 Group Corkscrew continues to be a very effective fighting manoeuvre. A scrutiny of recent combat reports, however, reveals that there is little doubt that the Hun night fighters now expect the corkscrew and anticipate it. Out of 94 combats reported the enemy fighter opened fire only 37 times, and in many cases was seen to make a feint attack, sufficient to persuade the Lancaster’s captain to corkscrew, and then to hold off and wait until the manoeuvre was completed. The existence of a combat report proves that the corkscrew was successful, but it is considered that where no combat report exists, i.e. where the bomber has been shot down, the fighter’s tactics have been successful. In other words, he waited until the corkscrew has been completed and the aircraft has resumed course, and has then closed in and opened fire.
You are no longer safe in assuming, therefore, that one cycle of a corkscrew will throw off the fighter. Should the gunners lose the fighter in a corkscrew, a banking search should be carried out as soon as course is resumed, to ensure that he is not directly under the
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aircraft.
A new German night fighter, the H.E.219, is now known to carry two fixed astral guns, oblique upwards firing. It is believed that these fire at an angle of 65° upwards and forwards and are fired by the pilot. This adds further weight to the necessity for constant banking search.
To summarise:-
1. Learn how to use your eyes at night!
2. Carry out the correct search to find the enemy.
3. When you have found him – don’t lose him!
[Cartoon]
THE MAN WHO EMNTIONED THE TARGET AT FLIGHT PLANNING!
[Underlined] WITH APOLOGIES TO H.M. BATEMAN [/underlined]
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[Drawing] SIGNALS
[Underlined] W/T DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
On the night 27/28th. September, 217 aircraft of this Group attacked Kaiserslautern. In accordance with recent practice, very strict W/T, R/T and Radar silence was ordered en route to and from the target. Wireless Operators should have been well aware of the vital need for strict W/T silence on this occasion, in view of the unusual measures taken. In spite of this, however, five Wireless Operators of this Group broke W/T silence during the period 0114 to 0325. Their transmissions took the form of such senseless remarks as “INT WOP – HOW ARE YOU – BANG ON – IMI – GOOD SHOW – INT CUP OF TEA.”
What satisfaction these inane natterbugs got out of their efforts it is hard to see. The enemy, deprived of his usual means of detecting the stream, might easily have obtained bearings on these continuous transmissions, with the result that five brainless Operators would have been the direct cause of the loss of several Group aircraft and many of their comrades.
Despite energetic enquiry and investigation, it has not been possible – so far – to track down the culprits; they are obviously not the type who would own up. If they are found, however, they may rest assured that never again will they have the opportunity to jeopardise their comrades. That such incidents must never occur again has been made perfectly plain.
The Wireless Operators of 5 Group have had the privilege, since the attack on the Dams, of a fair amount of interesting W/T operating. This makes it all the more incomprehensible, therefore, that a few of them should adopt this culpable form of keybashing. It is known, however, that the vast majority of Wireless Operators are responsible men, who feel just as strongly about this “black” as does the C.S.O. It is hard that their good name should have been sullied by the action of so few, and all must now combine to ensure that such flagrant breaches of W/T discipline never occur again.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS. [/underlined]
The hope expressed in last month’s summary that a healthy competition between Bases would develop, has now materialised. In fact, it is almost a full time job for one man at Group Headquarters to book and supervise these exercises. Signals Leader should note that many a good exercise is spoilt by failure of the Operators to pay attention to detail. Before an operator takes part in any of these exercises, he should know 5 G.S.I. No. 12 backwards. In this connection, the main points to watch are:-
(1) The number of times call signs should be sent.
(2) How often the text of a message should be repeated.
In next month’s issue, it is intended to publish a table showing the number of exercises completed by Bases.
[Underlined] REGRADING. [/underlined]
The Group Signals Leader examined a large number of wireless Operators during the month, and claimed he was more or less up to date on regrading before proceeding on leave. Perhaps it is not generally known that the main purpose of this leave was to see for the first time Gilmour Junior – of the ‘transmitter’ variety we believe. It is known, however, that during the past fortnight quite a formidable queue of W/Ops Grade II has been forming, and every endeavour will be made to deal with these as soon as possible.
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[Underlined] GROUP EXERCISES. [/underlined]
These have taken place regularly throughout the month, and the high standard of operating maintained. They still reveal, however, that morse practice and more morse practice is essential. It is hoped that the recent quiet spell has been taken advantage of in this connection.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Signals failure percentage continues to increase, the figure for September being 2.459. Over the past 3 months the percentage has risen steadily. On reading through the defects summary however, it can be seen that over 90% of the trouble is still attributable to component failures. The long spell of no maintenance faults has broken, one Squadron having no less than three such failures. There are still quite a number under the heading miscellaneous – the “remarks” column being “No fault found”. This type of alleged failure must stop. There were two manipulation failures which could easily have been avoided, in one case an incorrect VHF channel was selected, in the other, the type 51 Junction box switch was in the wrong position.
It is most gratifying to see that not one failure of VR.101, i.e. output valve V8, was reported throughout the month. It appears that the recent glut of V8 failures can be attributed either to faulty manufacture or wartime materials.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
There have been many essential changes in the V.H.F. policy during the past month, the reason being, an operation on HANDORF airfield, night 23/24th September, when very heavy FREYA interference was experienced on the TR.1143 equipment. This setback made it quite clear that the series noise limiting diode modification had to be carried out on all the new SCR.522 equipments prior to their debut into 5 Group Lancasters and Mosquitoes. The modification is quite simple, the only difficulty being the realigning of the four I.F. stages and all Squadrons not possessing a suitable 12 m/c oscillator. It was decided, therefore, that the Americans be asked to incorporate the modifications for us, and this they most willingly agreed to. The result is, at the time of going to press, only 35 of the 435 SCR.522’s held, now require to be modified.
For 100% suppression of all noise, it has also been found necessary to filter the 150 volt Dynamotor output with a 5 uf electrolytic 200 volts D.C.W. Capacitor. If this equipment is readily available through R.A.F. sources, in such a large quantity the modification will be carried out locally. Failing this the U.S. Air Force has again expressed willingness to assist.
[Underlined] NOISE SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION. SCR.522. [/underlined]
Briefly the Noise Limiting modification functions as follows:- A double diode is inserted in series with the output from the 2nd Detector, one section of the valve is biassed by a portion of the average D.C. voltage developed by this detector. When normal speech is being received, the bias is such as to allow the diode to conduct, i.e. the diode becomes a low impedance. When any pulse waveform is impressed on the incoming required signal the diode anode is biassed more negative and cuts off; hence it offers a high impedance to the interfering pulse. The other half of the valve holds the A.V.C. to zero until the average D.C. voltage developed by the A.V.C. diode exceeds the delay voltage. The A.V.C. voltage, after the modification, is derived from the primary of the last I.F. transformer. Changes are also made in the I.F. Grid circuits, to reduce cross modulation effects caused by the grid current as the result of high noise voltage pulses.
[Underlined] BLIND MARKING – CONINGSBY’S SPECIAL RADAR EFFORT. [/underlined]
The story may now be told of the work done at Coningsby to improve the performance of MK.III H2S. During the latter half of July, it was decided that efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of our offensive Radar devices. Hs” MK.III was selected for particular attention, the main requirement was for an accurate Blind Bombing Instrument, and immediate steps were taken to improve MK.III H2S to enable it to perform this function. T.R.E. aided us in every way possible, to enable this commitment to be undertaken without impairing operational serviceability.
The greatest difficulty which had to be overcome was the tendency of the presentation on the screen to disintegrate or disappear at the shorter ranges. It was felt by T.R.E. that this was due to the inefficiency of the scanners, and therefore, scanners received the first attention. Those which had previously
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given the best results were carefully selected, and thorough checks made against specifications, at the same time the best Units of the equipment were subjected to a detailed and exacting overhaul for power output, tuning, and accurate calibration of height and range markers. When one complete installation had been fully tested in this manner, it was placed in an aircraft, and one of the most experienced crews commenced bombing trials on Wainfleet, and on several inland towns. The results obtained on these trials are compared here with results which were obtained previous to these experiments. The average error obtained at Wainfleet for 5 bombs was 316 yards as compared to a previous error of 1,193 yards. A second crew dropped 6 bombs with an average error of 1.6 miles with the ordinary Mk. III H 2 S equipment, and on using the improved equipment reduced this error to 800 yards. On inland towns the bombing results were similar to those on Wainfleet, an average error of 700 and 500 yards being obtained with the special equipment, whilst errors of 1,600 and 2,000 yards were obtained with the standard equipment.
It was decided from these figures that the experiments and improvements were making more accurate bombing possible, and a further 6 aircraft were similarly equipped, and the best Operators assigned to these aircraft. Further training and trials were carried out, and the results gave additional proof that the experiments were on the right road. The final assurance that all this concentration on improvements and selection of all Units and Operators was improving the bombing was soon forthcoming. The operations were conducted against Konigsberg, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe were most successful, the average error of the proximity markers being 550 yards.
These results do not by any means mark the successful conclusion of the experiments, but rather indicate that we are just beginning, and the coming few months will see an ever increasing improvement in both equipment and crews.
It is desired at this point to express our appreciation for the assistance which has been rendered by T.R.E. and H.Q.B.C. and for the close co-operation by all concerned at Coningsby without whose help none of this work would have been possible.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee maintained its usual high standard of serviceability through September. Of the 2386 sorties reported for the month, 62 difficulties were experienced for a percentage serviceable of 97.4 as compared with 97.26 for August.
The supply of Gee remains a very critical problem, although the position has eased up slightly. The new aerial loading unit is apparently becoming available shortly, and a few have already been received in new aircraft. The supply of R.F. Units Type 27 has also improved and an effort is being made to fit all Squadrons completely in the near future.
A modification which enables the simultaneous presentation of signals and calibration pips on the screen has been submitted by 617 Squadron, and forwarded to Headquarters Bomber Command for approval.
[Underlined] H 2 S. [/underlined]
Although for obvious reasons the use of H 2 S Mark II was restricted this month, a total of 819 sorties was completed and out of these 90.7 per cent were free of technical difficulty. A switch unit which allows the equipment to be switched on and off at altitude has been developed by T.R.E. This should soon be in production.
H.2.S. Mark III is not so badly affected by this restriction, and during September, a total of 135 sorties was reported. Twelve difficulties were experienced, which brings serviceability back to 91.2 per cent, an increase of 2.3 above last month. The work which has been undertaken on the H.2.S. Mark III at Coningsby has served to familiarise the Radar Mechanics even more with the equipment, and the benefits thus derived should bring the serviceability to a much higher standard from day to day.
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[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
Unfortunately Monica has had to be removed from all aircraft, but it is hoped only temporarily, pending the introduction of a modification developed by 53 Base and T.R.E. This modification is being pursued at T.R.E. with the assistance of a Radar Officer from this Group.
Before it was restricted, Monica IIIA reached its highest serviceability. Of the 139 sorties completed, only one defect was experienced, giving a percentage serviceable of 99.3. This provides a record which will require a great deal of effort if it is to be bettered on the re-installation of the equipment.
Monica V was, however, not far behind, for out of 99 sorties only one difficulty occurred, giving a serviceability of 99 per cent – another record which we will endeavour to equal.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond, due to the restriction on H 2 S, was also used to a lesser extent during September. Despite this, it rendered a very satisfactory service for 722 sorties out of 796 reported, a percentage of 90.7. Training of operators has increased the usefulness of the equipment, and every effort should be made to aid those operators in quickly interpreting the picture on the screen.
[Underlined] A. G. L. (T) [/underlined]
During the second week of September, A.G.L. (T) became operational and up to the end of the month 70 sorties had been completed. Of these, 20 developed difficulty which gives a percentage serviceable of 71.5. Nine of these defects were due to components in the A.G.L. (T) installation itself, whilst H 2 S, Fishpond and the power supply were responsible for the remaining eleven.
Although this standard of serviceability leaves a great deal to be desired, October should bring about an encouraging improvement, in view of the experience which has now been gained by servicing personnel. It is very gratifying to note the enthusiasm with which this new device has been received, on the part of both the air and ground crews. As it becomes increasingly familiar and serviceability steadily climbs, this enthusiasm will grow and the full benefit will be derived from it.
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[Drawing] AIR BOMBING
The month of September has provided some excellent results from the attacks on German towns, and despite adverse weather conditions on one or two occasions the determination of crews provided better results than were, at first anticipated.
Incendiaries formed the greater part of the bomb loads, and the previous difficulties experienced in aiming the 4 lb I.B. have been largely overcome by the use of the new wind conversion factors for bombs of low T.V. However, it is still very necessary for Air Bombers to adhere strictly to the “delay release” times supplied at briefing, and Bombing Leaders must ensure that the importance of this is stressed.
Another point which cannot be stressed too often is the necessity for not dropping any bombs until either the Controller has given the order to bomb, or ‘H’ hour has arrived and no instructions have been received from the Controller. You will be briefed to adopt the latter alternative is it has been decided that there will be no orbiting in the target area. The reasons for these instructions should be apparent; the difficulties of the Mosquito markers are greatly increased if a few stray ‘cookies’ are dropping while they are searching for the marking point, and a load of 4 lb. I.B’s can be very dazzling to the low-flying markers.
The destruction of towns and cities behind the actual battle-front will have a direct effect upon the results of the hard battles which the ground forces will have to undertake soon. The enemy will be denied the use of his most essential means of transport, shelter for his reserves, and what remains of his armament production in the previously attacked areas. To achieve this, all Air Bomber must make sure that their bombs hit the areas they are intended for, and that means constant practice, a thorough knowledge of all equipment, and the ability to conform strictly to the plan of attack.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
Although the amount of practice bombing has increased considerably during the past six months, there is still a large number of details being cancelled because of snags which could have been avoided.
Now that the winter months are approaching, and opportunities for bombing will decrease, it is essential that the best advantage be taken of every chance to complete an exercise.
Quite a large number of faults which cause an abandonment of an exercise could have been prevented if the air bomber had thoroughly checked his equipment before take-off.
First of all make certain that the auto-selector box on the Light series carrier has been reset to No.1. The ground crew will usually attend to that, but there are occasions when it has been missed.
Examine the bombs and change any that have damaged tail fins. At the same time see that the safety pins have been withdrawn.
Test your bombsight on the ground and make sure that you have an emergency computor [sic]. In the event of a bombsight failure you can still derive some benefit from the exercise.
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
The provision of Bombing Analysis Officers on Squadrons and Conversion Units has proved of great value during the past few months, ensuring speedy
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assessment of exercises and the abolition of inevitable errors which occurred when Bombing Leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to this very important duty.
However, there are still one or two points not receiving the attention required:-
(i) Crews must be given a detailed analysis of their exercises. It is not always possible to have the Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber present during the actual analysis, but they should see the plot as soon as possible.
(ii) Form 3073 must be completed, and the details supplied must be accurate. It will then afford the Analysis Officer, and the Bombsight Maintenance Staff, the maximum amount of assistance. It should be possible for the Squadron Commander to pick up a Form 3073 relating to an analysed exercise and thereby obtain a complete account of the bombing and any relevant comments from the Bombing Leader.
(iii) Do not forget that new crews have had very little experience in bombing from a Lancaster, and an accurate analysis will be of the greatest assistance to them.
(iv) When a bombsight fault has been discovered, inform the Instrument Section [underlined] immediately, [/underlined] and give them all the information you can. If necessary, produce the bomb plot and explain the errors. The Bombsight maintenance staff will appreciate all the assistance you can give them.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What action would you take if you obtained maximum starboard drift on the sighting head with zero wind set on the computor [sic]?
2. What is the procedure on landing at a strange airfield with 500 lb bombs (37 pistol) still on the aircraft?
3. Why is it essential to conform to the briefed air speed when making a “Wanganui” attack?
4. How does the Flight Engineer check the suction and what readings would you require to ensure that the bombsight was serviceable?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Mansbridge [/underlined] has left Group Headquarters and is now on a Staff Officers’ Course.
[Underlined] F/Lt Abbott [/underlined] (49 Squadron) is carrying out Group Bombing Leader’s duties.
[Underlined] S/Ldr Murtough [/underlined] (53 Base) has gone to Manby to take charge of the Bombing Leaders’ Courses.
[Underlined] F/Lt McCarthy [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) has gone to 53 Base and has been replaced by [underlined] F/Lt Kennedy [/underlined] (463 Squadron)
[Underlined] F/O Grime [/underlined] is doing Bombing Leader’s duties at 463 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt Harris [/underlined] (5 L.F.S.) has met with an unfortunate accident, and [underlined] F/O Wilkie [/underlined] (1661 C.U.) has taken over the Bombing Section at Syerston.
[Underlined] COURSES [/underlined]
The Group had three Air Bombers on No.91 Bombing Leaders’ Course, F/O Moreton (106 Squadron) was 6th, P/O Muhl (207 Squadron) 8th, and F/O Pyle (1661 C.U.) 10th, all obtaining “B” categories.
The bombing analysis courses are proceeding satisfactorily, and our
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candidates have all received excellent assessments. If any Squadron or Conversion Unit has not appointed a Bombing Analysis Officer who has completed the course, please apply for an early vacancy.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 97 61 yards
2nd 630 64 yards
3rd 619 71 yards
4th 83 74 yards
5th 467 77 yards
6th 207 81 yards
7th 9 89 yards
8th 49 90 yards
9th 463 93 yards
10th 61 113 yards
11th 44 114 yards
12th 50 117 yards
13th 57 118 yards
14th 122 yards
September has produced a 100% entry in the Squadron Bombing Competition and 97 Squadron are at the top with an average error, for 8 exercises, of 61 yards.
This is an excellent result and 97 are to be congratulated, more especially as quite a lot of their bombing was carried out by Flight Engineers.
With the exception of 619 Squadron, 52 Base have slipped down the ladder, but assurances have been received from 44 and 49 Squadrons that this is only a temporary lapse, and every effort will be made to return to their former positions.
106 Squadron are handicapped by having many unexperienced crews on their strength and consequently are at the bottom of the list. However, the keenness which is apparent on the station is sure to produce better results.
Competition should be very keen during October; 97 Squadron will be ‘all out’ to keep on top, and it will need a very special effort from the “Main Force” to depose them. Given suitable weather, all records should be broken.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1654 56 yards
2nd 1660 65 yards
3rd 1661 72 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 85 yards
1661 Conversion Unit, after leading for two successive months, have gone down to third place, and 1654 Conversion Unit have taken over the top position with an average error of 56 yards.
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
The only entry this month comes from 51 Base:-
G/Capt Coats (Swinderby) – 103 yards
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has only produced one entrant also:-
F/Lt Foulkes (630 Squadron) – 158 yards
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[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Errors by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
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[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
Wainfleet plotted 4945 bombs and 111 T.I’s dropped from 921 aircraft.
It is obvious that the Range staff have had a busy time, and to ensure accurate plotting, crews must conform to range procedure.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Wonham [/underlined] (55 Base) extends a hearty welcome to 44 and 619 Squadrons. The rivalry between the Squadrons, on Practice Bombing matters, is very keen and errors have shown a steady decrease during the past few months.
[Underlined] F/Lt Foulkes [/underlined] (630 Squadron) has equipped an excellent Bombing Analysis room. Points concerning Bombing, which need stressing, are emphasised by humorous cartoons, and the room itself is kept very clean and tidy.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
* Excluding 617 and 627 Squadrons.
A+ 85 yards or less.
A 140 yards or less.
B 210 yards or less.
C 280 yards or less.
D Over 280 yards.
The number of “D” category crews has decreased from 41 in August, to 15 for this month. This is a considerable improvement, but it is not good enough – there should be no “D” crews on an Operational Squadron, and Bombing Leaders must give careful attention to these errors.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
9 F/O Marsh F/O Carr - 78
44 P/O Evans Sgt Harper F/S Hunter 73
49 F/O Furber F/S Gentleman F/O Hassell 75
50 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 79
97 F/O Woolnough W/O Shearwood F/O Haggerston 57
F/L Shorter F/S Betts P/O Aveline 57 – 79
467 F/O Jones F/S Burns F/S Michelmore 74
617 F/L Knights F/O Rogers F/O Playford 74
F/O Levy F/S Peck F/O Fox 78
F/O Stout F/O Rupert F/O Graham 59
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard F/S Fish 70
F/L Hamilton F/O Rogers P/O Jackson 72
F/O Leavitt Sgt Oldham F/O Withams 73
619 F/O Cottman F/S Coster F/S Murray 71
1654 F/O Gray F/O Aitken Sgt Adams 62
F/O Denton F/O Goebel Sgt Kneebone 77
F/O Brammer Sgt White W/O Davies 69
P/O Dockworth F/S Quealy F/S Kenward 43
F/O Langridge F/O Cavanagh F/S Diggins 65
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OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS (continued)
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
1660 P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowen Sgt Ransom 56
Sgt Sargent Sgt Walters F/S Symes 67
Sgt Keen Sgt Hurst Sgt Fidler 62
Lt Evenson Sgt BJorcy P/O Carling 61
P/O Penman F/S Dash P/O Pointon 78
F/S Cox F/S Smitherwaite Sgt Taylor 68
F/O Downing F/O Harrison P/O Semark 64
Lt Howes Sgt Johnston F/O Butterfield 78
1661 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 78
F/O James Sgt Longhurst P/O Jeffreys 70
F/O Gillegin Sgt Jenden Sgt Elliott 58
P/O Smith F/S Scott F/O Sweeney 77
F/O Caryer F/O Arnett P/O Grassie 71
5 L.F.S. P/O Aryton Sgt Herkes F/S Bardsley 65
P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowers Sgt Ransom 78
Owing to the large number of crew errors below 100 yards, it is only possible to publish those below 80 yards. Congratulations are due to F/L Shorter and crew (97 Squadron), F/S Wonders and crew (50 Squadron) and P/O Le Marquand and crew (now of 49 Squadron) for their consistently good bombing during the month.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” BOMBING TROPHY [/underlined]
The “Lord Camrose” trophy remains at Skellingthorpe for another three months.
50 Squadron’s average crew error for the months of July, August and September is 148 yards at 20,000 feet. Well done 50 Squadron!
463 Squadron are the runners up with an average error of 153 yards at 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The complete summary of practice bombing results for the month of September provides some very interesting facts and comparisons.
The number of bombs dropped is the best ever, and 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their magnificent effort in dropping 789. However, it will be noted that 61 Squadron dropped only 96 and assuming the Squadron strength to be 25 crews, that gives an average of 4 bombs per crew for one month. This compares unfavourably with the other Squadrons in the same Base, and it is essential that crews have the maximum amount of bombing training permitted by operational commitments and weather conditions.
Crew errors have declined slightly this month, the average being 9 yards less than that of August. This is a step in the right direction and it is hoped that there will be a steady reduction in errors until we can get our average error down to less than 150 yards. It can be done, 50 Squadron have proved it by obtaining an average crew error of 148 yards for the last three months.
The number of bombsight errors has increased from 42 in August to 90 in September, but the proportion of bombsight errors to exercises completed remains the same. Close co-operation between the Bombing Analysis Officer and the Instrument Section will help to bring bombsight serviceability up to a satisfactory level.
Our practice bombing has improved considerably during the past six months, from 275 to 183 yards at 20,000 feet and this improvement is apparent in the results of the attacks on German targets. However, it is possible to reach an even higher standard of accuracy but it means constant practice on the part of every member of the bombing team.
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[Drawing] NAVIGATION
Almost all attacks this month have been on German objectives and navigators have done a good job on these longer range targets. Radar restrictions have necessitated flying considerable distances outside Gee range, and with winter approaching we must be prepared to fly even greater distances on D.R. alone. To achieve the high standard of navigation necessary for correct timing at the target, your D.R. navigation must be as sound and as complete as possible.
Mathematical accuracy, constant checking of D.R. positions and constant w/v checks, are the keynote of efficient D.R. navigation. Unfortunately very few navigators comply with all these points, and cases still occur of navigators not obtaining one D.R. position between their last Gee fix and the target.
Timing has been stressed frequently but on the coming long range operations it will be of paramount importance. By comparing forecast winds with winds found it is nearly always possible after the first hour’s flying to tell whether the aircraft will arrive at the target on time or not. If no moveable zero hour is being employed, then the earlier you can adjust your air speed, the easier it will be for you to arrive at the target at your scheduled time. During the winter months of last year it was not unusual to experience a spread of 15 – 20 minutes in the time over the target or along the route. With the concentration of enemy defences YOU CANNOT afford to fly in a bomber stream some 60 miles in length.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity scheme has not been used this month. Crews detailed to find correct bombing winds have put in some very good work, however, particular mention being due to 49 Squadron on the night 26/27th (Karlsruhe).
[Underlined] EXAMPLE OF GOOD “PILOT” NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
On the night of 27/28th September, 1944 (Kaiserlauten) F/O Nunns, Pilot of 630 Squadron gave an excellent example of “Pilot” Navigation. His aircraft was hit by flak on the return journey when some 150 miles inside France. He ordered the crew to abandon aircraft and was about to bale out himself when he managed to regain control. He decided to bring the aircraft back to base himself. Levelling out the aircraft and putting in “George” he went back to the navigator’s compartment and studied the log and chart carefully. From the information on the chart he was able to ascertain the aircraft’s present approximate position, and from the flight plan the courses to steer to reach base and the times on each leg. He flew the courses stated for the requisite amount of time and (strangely enough!) reached the base area. He was able to identify the beacons en route from the navigator’s flimsy and was thus able to “map read” the last few miles to base by this method.
This was a great effort and praise is due to both the pilot and also to his navigator who must have kept a complete and tidy chart to enable F/O Nunns to reach base the way he did.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF NAVIGATORS. [/underlined]
During the month of August it was decided to categorise navigators. Navigation does not lend itself easily to categorisation, mainly because it is impossible to lay down a procedure which will cater for every eventuality. It therefore will depend upon common sense and judgement of navigation officers.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
It is essential that all navigator’s operational logs and charts are thoroughly analysed immediately after each raid, and the results of that analysis made known to the navigation team as soon as possible, so that mistakes made will not be repeated. The analysis of logs and charts has always been the responsibility of Station and Squadron Navigation Officers; the present frequency of operations makes this an impossible task. It has therefore been decided to appoint one Navigation Analysis Officer to each Squadron, whose whole time duty it will be to analyse very thoroughly each log and chart.
By these appointments it is hoped to bring to light the errors and omissions of each navigator within 24 hours of completing a sortie. The Station Navigation Officer will thus be able to point out to each Navigator the “error of his ways” immediately, and will thus ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
Navigation Officers have a very big job in front of them and much hard work will be required.
[Underlined] APPROACH OF WINTER – WHAT IT MEANS! [/underlined]
Apart from all the well-known discomforts, the approach of winter means that OLD MAN WIND – the Navigator’s greatest enemy – will start hitting out again in force and will do all he can to land you in mischief. Low pressure systems are more prevalent in winter time, and therefore stronger winds have to be combated. Longer range targets means passing over territory which cannot at the moment, be too well explored by the Met. man, therefore you may pass over a front with a consequent wind change or run into a low pressure system which has not been forecast by the Met. Section. All this means that every individual Navigator must have a very thorough understanding of wind system. He must be able to interpolate for wind changes and must anticipate any sudden change of wind velocity. In last month’s summary attention was drawn to the Berlin raid of last Winter. We do not want this to happen again.
Get to know the wind system; visit the Met. man regularly and discuss the subject with him. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers should arrange constant lectures on this subject for the benefit of their Navigators. Wind is your biggest enemy.
[Underlined] O.R.S. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
A word about the O.R.S. information which is taken from you at interrogation. Numerous instances are occurring of incorrect information being forwarded to Group Headquarters. For example, an aircraft’s position is given as 4720N when it should be 4920N. These inaccuracies are obvious but other smaller inaccuracies are not so obvious. The concentration diagrams prepared from this information do not present a true picture of the situation, also many statistics prepared by O.R.S. are equally inaccurate and are therefore of no value.
All this O.R.S. information is collected and collated for your benefit and ultimate safety so do make sure that you give the CORRECT information and SEE that the Interrogator logs it correctly.
[Underlined] ATTACK ON TIRPITZ. [/underlined]
Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons had an opportunity during the month of showing their skill as “real” Navigators. The occasion was the attack on Tirpitz in Northern Waters and the landing at advanced bases in Russia. This operation, undertaken under difficult weather conditions and in total darkness, called for a very high standard of Navigation. It was anticipated that Gee would be received as far as 63° or 64°N; this was in fact correct. The remaining 1,000 miles over enemy occupied territory and enemy waters had to be tackled without the aid of Radar fixing facilities. Map reading was of course the most accurate method of fixing available, but this was very difficult over mountainous country studded with lakes and rivers. Nevertheless Air Bombers did some excellent work. Good use was also made of drifts
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and astro shots. Unfortunately the low pressure system which could not be accurately positioned by Met., was encountered over the most difficult part of the route. This meant that winds became much stronger than forecast and also a considerable lowering of cloud base. Nevertheless, practically all the Navigators noted this sudden strengthening and varying of the wind velocity and were able to combat it successfully.
It was anticipated that a little trouble might be experienced with the P4 Compasses in these Northern latitudes. Every precaution was therefore taken before the aircraft left this country, compasses were swung and as much deviation was removed before take-off for this operation. It was gratifying to note, however, that not one single instance of compass failure or excessive deviation occurred.
The Air Bombers and Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons did an excellent job on this operation, under the most difficult conditions. They brought back with them much valuable information on the performance of compasses, Northern chain Gee range at varying heights etc. – information which will be of considerable importance in the planning of future operations.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING W/VS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is shown below.
Average Error of Squadrons – 4.7
Average Error of C. Units – 5.0
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1.8 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.6 m.p.h. This is excellent and the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h. has been reached. Let us now try and reduce this ideal over-all to 4 m.p.h.
[Table of Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the fourth month is succession. A very creditable performance. There still appears to be little improvement in the errors obtained by the three Squadrons from 54 Base. Come along now, let us see them at the top of the list next month.
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[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. Mould, DFC – Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to be Base Nav. Officer, Syerston.
S/Ldr. Bray, DFC – Station Nav. Officer, Dunholme to be Station Nav. Officer, Strubby.
S/Ldr. Warwick, DFC – Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby missing on operations.
[Cartoon] “HERE IS THE BOMBING WIND – AND THIS IS P/O VECTOR READING IT!”
N.M.
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[Drawing] RADAR NAV.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The most outstanding feature regarding 2 S this month has been the severe restrictions placed upon its use for operations.
It is realised that with these restrictions of H 2 S, navigation is bound to suffer slightly, particularly during the autumn months as no one can be too certain of the ranges on Gee. Operators must therefore make the best of the limited use of H 2 S on each operation. This Headquarters will welcome any ideas on how to obtain maximum efficiency from H 2 S during the limited periods it is available.
There are one or two points regarding the restrictions which must be stressed at the present time. Firstly, operators, if they are allowed to use H 2 S on any part of the flight, must make sure that it is switched on below 6,000 feet or else circuit breakdowns may occur. Secondly, close watch must be maintained on the scanner position when turned off, as wander is likely particularly during tactical manoeuvres.
It must be pointed out that despite restrictions on H 2 S on operations, no relaxation in training can be allowed and every effort must be made to see that operators remain proficient in its use. Experiments are being carried out to develop some kind of sector scan and if successful, operators may be able to make use of H 2 S throughout the whole flight. Sector scan requires a high standard of proficiency in H 2 S particularly in the interpretation of the P.P.I., and although training in sector can cannot be given at the moment, operators may do well to bear the problem in mind.
Experiments are also going ahead with the Mark II H 2 S scanner to try and improve the bombing picture on the P.P.I. This is being done by altering the pitch of the scanner to concentrate the beam and alter the polar diagram. If successful it may be possible to modify other Mark II equipment gradually. This will only be done if the range is not seriously restricted and its navigational use is not affected.
Blind bombing technique in the Group has developed further in the past few weeks and considerable success has been obtained by 83 and 97 Squadrons on the last few operations. To indicate the high standard which these two Squadrons have attained, a resume’ of their flare and blind marking errors on operations is given.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 26/27 AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
This was the first operation on which the specially selected H 2 S Mark III equipment was used and F/Lt. Baker, Blind Marker crew of 97 Squadron dropped his marker 400 yds. south of the Aiming Point. Had the whole attack been based on this marker it might have been slightly more successful.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 29/30th AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
An extremely successful operation with the centre of the blind illuminating flares being plotted extremely close to the centre of the town. The blind proximity marker released by a crew of 97 Squadron was reported 600 yds. south of the aiming point although no photograph was obtained.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. 11/12th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
An excellent operation with highly successful blind illumination
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provided by 83 and 97 Squadrons. The direct release method of marking and blind bombing was used and photographs gave the following results:-
F/O TAYLOR 97 SQUADRON AIMING POINT.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O EATON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/LT. BAKER 97 SQUADRON 1.75 n.m.
[Underlined] STUTTGART. 12/13th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Blind marking was carried out by the direct release method with a G.P.I. check from PFORZHEIM. The following successful results were obtained:-
F/LT. AMES 97 SQUADRON 600 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,000yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. SHORTER 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds From Town Centre.
F/O. SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. LAING 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18/19th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A most successful sortie. Of the Primary Blind Markers F/Lt. Kelly of 83 Squadron dropped his T.Is. 500 yds. from the Aiming Point whilst F/Lt. Laing and F/Lt. Lines of 97 Squadron both had errors of less than 1 nautical mile. The Flare Force too was remarkably accurate, illuminating the target area to such effect that the Mosquito aircraft had no difficulty in marking the Aiming Point. The Flare Force photographs showed that F/O Gamble, 83 Squadron, F/O Price, 83 Squadron and F/O Canever of 97 Squadron had Aiming Points, whilst S/Ldr. Hatcher had an error of 1,400 yds.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH 19/20th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Technical failures prevented the plotting of many flare force photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows considerable damage in the target area, proving that the flare force illumination was of its usual high order.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE. [/underlined]
Cloud prevented the plotting of photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows very extensive damage in the most closely built up area of the town. P.P.I. photographs indicate that the accuracy of the blind markers was to the order of 1,000 yds. and 400 yds. respectively.
[Underlined] KAIDERSLAUTERN. [/underlined]
Using the direct release method with a G.P.I. check on SAABRUCKEN, W/C. Ingham of 83 Squadron dropped his flares 1,500 yards, F/Lt. Edwards, 83 Squadron 1.3 miles and F/O Simpson 1.25 miles respectively from the flare aiming point. By this illumination, the low level Mosquitos were able to mark the target accurately.
Great credit is due to the two marking Squadrons for the success obtained on these operations. The majority of the results were obtained on the specially selected and tuned up sets thus proving that not only have crews to be selected, but also the equipment. In addition, the results have been obtained only through particularly extensive training, and the enthusiasm of the crews carrying it out.
If we are to maintain these excellent results, the two squadrons must be provided with crews of a suitable type; Crews selected are carrying on high tradition and are directly responsible for the success of all future operations.
[Underlined] P.P.I. PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
The standard of P.P.I. photography has been raised slightly during the month and several good photographs have been received at this Headquarters. F/Lt. Dobbie of 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph
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of KAISERLAUTERN when on the operation to KARLSRUHE. This was of considerable assistance to set operators in their identification of this target on a later raid.
Very little gardening has been carried out this month. But so far the results received are up to the usual 5 Group standard. A paper on the plotting od H 2 S mining photographs has been received and copies are being sent to the gardening squadrons for their attention. This report supplements the report S.121 on the plotting of “Y” photographs and is based on data from No. 4 and 6 Groups who have carried out the majority of H 2 S gardening sorties.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Increased importance has been placed on the use of Gee this month due to the restrictions placed on the use of H 2 S. Thus the necessity for that very last fix is again well to the forefront. Operators must make every effort to read through the jamming and make maximum use of position lines where fixes cannot be obtained.
On the majority of operations during the month a considerable increase in ranges have been noticed due to the swift advance of the allied armies, capturing large areas of country in which Gee jamming equipment was sited. This at once extended the ranges obtainable over France and Belgium to the limits of the territory held, but no marked improvement was shown further north where enemy interference in Holland and N. West Germany, though varying in intensity from day to day, was nearly always at maximum intensity when heavy bombers were operating.
On the Eastern Chain it has been noted that the enemy has transferred a considerable amount of his jamming to the 27 unit and that greater range is being obtained on the Unit 25. Weakness of pulses only restricts range on the Unit 25.
The average range on the North Eastern Chain has been stabilised at about 6°E with the limiting factor being the weakness of the “A” pulse.
The Southern Chain appears to be giving the best results now that German jamming has ceased with fixes as far as 7°E. These ranges may drop during the Autumn due to meteorological conditions. The limiting factor on this chain appears to be the weakness of the “C” pulse.
There have been few reports on the Channel chain, but it would appear that the limits of its coverage are between 5 and 6° with little jamming. The general complaint on the use of this chain are that the topographical lattice maps suppled are unsuited for heavy bomber navigation.
Two Squadrons had the opportunity of using the Northern Chain at its extreme limits this month. The flight was carried out at low level and signals were received as far as 64 °N, but the small cut of the lattice lines did not enable fixes to be plotted accurately at that range. These results were as much as expected, and confirm the reports of Costal [sic] Command who do the most flying in that area.
The low level at which we are now flying over France may restrict Gee range somewhat but it is thought that the short ranges obtained by navigators on the operation on KAISERLAUTERN was due to the poor propagation properties of the atmosphere. These properties are most noticeable during the months of October and November, and it may well be that our Gee range on the present chains may be restricted to 5°E throughout these months.
However, to counteract this we have news of further chains which are being provided on the Continent and as soon as information is received at this Headquarters it will be passed to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Tests are still being carried out by Bomber Command as to the suitability of the use of the Homing and S.S. Chains for Bomber Command Navigation.
Until the results of these tests are known no action is being taken regarding the training of navigators.
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[Drawing] ENGINEERING
Large number of movements have taken place or about to take place which are liable to upset calculations, but it is apparent that the operational effort has not suffered as a result. 52 Base is about to leave the Group complete with R.A.F. Stations, Scampton, Fiskerton and Dunholme. The good work which we associate with such stations will now be associate with other stations within the Group. 55 Base now comprises as many squadrons as 53 Base, i.e. five full squadrons each, and No. 5 L.F.S., Syerston, comes within a Base Organisation.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL DEFECTS. [/underlined]
The operational effort was not quite so high as the previous month, but the aircraft were available had the weather given us a fair chance. The percentage of operational failures due to Engineer faults was 0.94 which is an improvement on the previous months. Out of this total, 0.24% were abortive sorties and 0.7% were early returns. Special mention must be made to No. 54 Base as a whole and they are given the ‘Big Hand’ for producing the record of having no operational failures due to matters concerning the Engineers during September. 49 Squadron also are to be congratulated for similar reasons.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE – 5 GROUP SERVICING SECTION [/underlined]
Appreciation of the efforts of No. 5 Group Servicing Section is recorded and the good work which is carried out by them under very often difficult conditions. C.T.O’s should realise the personal problems and difficulties of these mobile parties which are moved about at a moment’s notice to wherever the ‘shoe pinches’ within the Group. The sum total of the work carried out by these few men during the last four months comprises eight Major Inspections, thirty initial checks and 120 rebuilt power plants. During September two gangs were in operation as Major Inspection gangs solely for the first time, and their activities within the Group are apparent. Apart from the above work, four base hydraulic bays have been completed, two during the last four months. The instrument personnel have built and installed 110 second pilot’s instrument panels in Stirling aircraft of Conversion Units during the last three months.
[Underlined] FORMS 765C. [/underlined]
The remarks by the Specialist Officer concerned at para. 11 of the 765C are still far too brief and in many cases incomplete, and invariably give no indication whether relevant modifications are embodied or not. It is pointed out once more that care and thought in rendering Forms 765C will prove of assistance in attempting to establish the cause of failures and recommending action for preventing recurrences of such failures.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
Bombsight maintenance continues at a high standard throughout the Group, and accuracy of a high order is being achieved, mainly due to the effective liaison existing between Electrical Officers and Bombing Leaders. Bombing Analysis courses are now open to Base Electrical Officers, and two have, up to the time of writing, completed the course. The course has proved very valuable in assisting Electrical Officers in diagnosing the causes of bombing errors, particularly instrument errors, and we can now look forward to an even higher standard of accuracy. As it will be a long time before all Electrical Officers will be able to attend the course Base Electrical Officers should instruct their junior officers in the art of analysing a bombing plot.
Mk.XIVA bombsights are now arriving in large numbers and the Group Instrument Servicing Van is having a busy time in instructing personnel in
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the differences between the XIV and the XIVA. The new computor [sic] is not all that could be desired, the great majority of them (about 95%) needing retuning or the replacing of defective parts, and are generally requiring about twice the number of man hours to rectify. The matter has been taken up with higher authority and it is hoped that results of our ‘moans’ will soon be evident. In the meantime a thorough check must be given to every computor [sic] and 1022 action taken in every case of faulty design, or workmanship.
A word or two regarding defect action would not come amiss. Far too many defective items of equipment are being returned to stores without 1022 or 1023 action being taken. It must be impressed again on all officers that it is only by taking the correct official procedure that rectification action can be taken. It is of no earthly use just to tell the Group Specialist Officer that such and such is giving trouble if there is no 1022 backing. The Group Specialist Officer of course wants to know what is giving trouble but any report that he may make will be shot down if it is not supported by a 1022. A case in point concerns the low insulation of gun heaters. Only two cases have been reported to Command out of the hundred or so which have occurred. So let us have some more 1022’s.
After putting in a considerable amount of work in their respective sections the Electrical and Instrument personnel of 52 Base have had to evacuate their quarters and move to Syerston and start again from scratch. No doubt their experience will serve them well in producing even better sections.
Command Modification No. 74 is now completed throughout the Group and a word of praise must be given to those men who formed the Group pool to produce the modified bomb aimer’s panels. They worked long hours and did an excellent job of work. All Bases were represented so they will each have a good man to start their own modification gang cracking.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Training Unit Serviceability]
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Many applications have been made in the past by Flight Engineers to change over to Transport Command; This Command is now prepared to accept Flight Engineers for flying duties provided they have completed two operational tours and one tour of instructional duties. Flight Engineers who are eligible should make application through the usual channels at their unit.
Log keeping has improved throughout this Group, but it is noticed that many engineers do not record atmospheric temperatures and airframe serial letter and numbers; this has been pointed out before. Flight Engineer Leaders must insist that this omission is remedied.
Defect reports still come through showing the cause as manipulation trouble on the part of the Flight Engineer, in many cases these result in a cancellation or early return. Points for the Flight Engineer Leader to instruct on are as follows:-
[Underlined] Starter Motor burnt out: [/underlined] if correct drill had been used this would have been avoided.
[Underlined] Overheating of Engines: [/underlined] early returns are made because of supposed overheating; on examination, these temperatures prove to be within the engine limitations.
[Underlined] Misbehaviour of Engines: [/underlined] black smoke from exhaust; on this trip other crews reported same conditions but attributed this to atmospheric conditions on flying through cloud. Had this Flight Engineer checked all his gauges he would have been able to inform his Captain that engines were quite normal and this early return would have been avoided.
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[Drawing] AIR SEA RESCUE
With the liberation of countries in Western Europe, the flow back to England of aircrew who have been shot down is increasing – not only in numbers, but in speed. It is strongly rumoured that one, who was shot down on the outward trip, managed, with the assistance of a jeep and a flip from Paris, to arrive back before the Main Force!
These evaders tell amazing stories – some are good and reveal level-headedness, fine crew discipline and a sound knowledge of Safety Drills. Others are the reverse, and the following extracts from reports by 5 Group aircrew tell their own story.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 6th June, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “We’ve been hit kids, get out”.
“My parachute was only fixed by the right buckle”.
“Informant had known for some time that the left clip was loose, but had neglected to have it repaired”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 24/25th July, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “Get to Hell out of this as quickly as possible”.
“The informant did not leave his turret (Mid-Upper) very speedily as he experienced some difficulty in locating the footbar”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 3/4th May, 1944. [/underlined]
“The W/Op noticed as he passed, that the Navigator’s altimeter was reading 1,000 feet. He therefore pulled his rip cord while still in the aircraft. He gathered the canopy in his arms and went out head first, receiving a kick on the behind from the pilot”.
[Cartoon] DO YOU KNOW YOUR DRILLS? – OR DO [underlined] YOU [/underlined] HAVE TO BE KICKED OUT?? N.M.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 7/8th August, 1944. [/underlined]
“The Mid Upper Gunner was moving so quickly that he overshot the exit and fell against the rear turret. He returned with some difficulty to the exit, which he opened. He then took his parachute from his stowage and fastened it on”.
“The pilot had to go back from his seat for his parachute which the Navigator had failed to give him”.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR ESCAPE HATCH! [/underlined]
There have been too many incidents where the front hatch has
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jammed or taken a long time to open. The Air Bomber’s pre-flight drill calls for a check on this hatch. A check does not mean that the Air Bomber looks to see that the hatch is there, but means that he is to check its ease of release and that it is correctly fastened afterwards.
The parachute drill (5 Group Aircraft Drills) states that the hatch is to be JETTISONED, not pulled up inside the aircraft where it is liable to obstruct the exit.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR PARACHUTE! [/UNDERLINED]
An unfortunate incident occurred during the month when a Hurricane Pilot, not wearing his own parachute, collided with a Martinet and was forced to abandon his aircraft.
The pilot did not get clear until he was at about 3,000 ft. and, although he pulled the rip cord immediately, he was killed on impact with the ground.
An examination of the parachute harness also showed that it was far too loose for the wearer.
Each member of air-crew flying fighters or bombers, must check his parachute for serviceability and fitting before every flight.
[Underlined] EVASION [/underlined]
No less than 25 aircrew of No. 50 Squadron, missing since the beginning of May, are reported to have evaded capture and returned safely to this country.
Successful evasion depends upon:
(i) Your will to evade.
(ii) Your physical fitness.
(iii) An up to date knowledge of the military situation.
(iv) the latest advice which your Intelligence Officer will give you.
Consider these things beforehand and avoid Dulag Luft.
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[Drawing] PHOTOGRAPHY
The total number of failures on Night Photography has decreased to 5.93%. Failures on Day Photography amount to 4.07%. The decrease over the previous month in respect of Night Photography has occurred chiefly on the Armament side. The prevailing target conditions, when smoke from incendiary loads obscured the target, has made it impossible in many cases to determine whether a flash has or has not exploded correctly. This is a recurrence of conditions which existed during last winter. Manipulation failures have shown an increase in the last two months, in 83 and 97 Squadrons. In the past this type of failure has been very low in this Group, and it is to be hoped that the steps now being taken by the Bombing Leaders will eliminate them in these two Squadrons.
The supply of High Speed Night Film has now materially increased and Squadrons are to use this film on all operations. In view of the fact that we are now entering a period of the year when light conditions will often be poor, the use of this film will help to ensure sufficient exposure. It will, of course, save a lot of magazine reloading.
The supply of H 2 S cameras has grown considerably during the past month and promises to continue doing so. These cameras are not constructed for service work or to be handled by service personnel; great care will therefore have to be exercised in the handling and operating of them. A number of H 2 S photographs received have been unsharp and sometimes of poor quality. This poor workmanship will have to be remedied and a special effort by Photographic N.C.O’s in this direction is required.
No. 5 Group Headquarters now hold a K.20 camera for use on hand held obliques. Any station requiring the use of this camera is to inform the Group Photographic Officer who will make arrangements for the camera to be forwarded. Two days’ notice will be required.
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[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
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[Drawing] ARMAMENT
[Underlined] WINTER [/underlined]
Once more the annual reminder which you are no doubt tired of hearing, but a warning which must be even more carefully heeded this year than ever before.
Listed below are a few points which will require your personal attention during the coming months if an increase in failures is to be avoided.
[Underlined] Gun Heaters. [/underlined] Are all your aircraft fitted with gun heaters? The Electrical Officers are giving this matter their personal attention and the fitting of heaters is going ahead. Take a personal interest in this matter yourself, see that the Electrical Branch are given every assistance.
[Underlined] Duct Heaters. [/underlined] New aircraft are now arriving with ducted heating to both rear and mid-upper turrets. Have you any of these aircraft? If so, go and have a look at one and get the “gen” on how it works.
[Underlined] Browning Guns. [/underlined] Has your gun maintenance been allowed to slip during the summer months? If so, now is the time to tighten up. All new guns must be very carefully checked; all grease must be removed, particularly from the breach block, firing pin and spring, etc. and guns must be lubricated in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Pt.2, Section 14, Leaflet No.6, Issue No. 1.
[Underlined] Gun Covers. [/underlined] Have you an adequate supply of gun and turret covers? All Units should now have manufactured the cover for the Direct Vision Aperture in the F.N. 120. This Headquarters’ letter 634/4/Armt. dated 12th May, 1944 refers.
[Underlined] Cluster Projectiles. [/underlined] Wet Cluster Projectiles may cause functioning failures due to ice accretion on the mechanism or from rust. See that full use is made of all available tarpaulins. Recommendations have been made to Headquarters, Bomber Command for an increase in establishment of Covers, Water proof, Large and Small.
[Underlined] Bomb Trollies. [/underlined] Are all your trollies fitted with mud guards to prevent S.B.C. release slips from becoming splashed with mud and water during transportation?
[Underlined] Welfare. [/underlined] During Winter months Armourers will be working long hours in bad weather conditions. See that they are properly equipped with warm clothing, gloves, oil skins, and gum boots etc. A warm and contented man will work better than one half frozen.
[Underlined] SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS. [/underlined]
The month of September saw the return, after a long absence, of the Small Bomb Container. With the introduction of the Cluster Projectile, relief was felt by all Armament Officers as it was thought we had seen the last of the “very difficult to handle” Small Bomb Container. Unfortunately the shortage of Cluster Projectiles has necessitated our return to this item of equipment, consequently a large number of headaches have resulted.
With the introduction of the new Twin Adaptors the Incendiary load has been considerable [sic] increased and it is now possible to carry 20 S.B.C’s on the Lancaster. This increase in bomb load means that far more work is entailed in the preparation of the required number of S.B.C’s for an
[Page break]
operation and it has been found necessary to seek outside labour to assist in the filling. Unfortunately it is still necessary to fill the Mk. VA. S.B.C. by hand, but small numbers of 50 pack Incendiaries are now being received and it is hoped that in the near future the boxes of 30 x 4lb. Incendiaries will entirely disappear. This step will be welcomed by all.
[Cartoon] THIS – OR THIS?? N.M.
[Underlined]
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES – HANDLING. [/underlined]
The organisation for the handling of Cluster Projectiles still requires a lot of attention on some Stations. Quantities of Roller Conveyors are now held on all Stations and this equipment, suitably raised from the ground on tail unit boxes or cluster projectile cases, provides an excellent method for the handling and fusing of cluster projectiles.
This equipment, suitably laid out, can provide multi unloading, fusing and loading points, and can cut down the man handling required to the barest minimum, and the saving in time will be considerable.
[Underlined] SALVAGE. [/underlined]
The problem of returning salvage has now become a major one, and when one considers that approximately, 4,000 boxes of 4lb. Incendiaries are thrown up from one operation on a 2 Squadron Station, it is obvious that careful attention must be given to the organisation for the return of this salvage. All 2 Squadron Station have now been supplied with additional labour kindly loaned to us by the Army. This additional labour, if correctly employed, should prevent the accumulation of any large quantity of salvage. When lorries deliver explosives to you let your motto be “They shall not return empty.”
All smaller salvage, i.e. nose plugs, transit caps from tail pistols etc., should be placed in bins and not left lying around to form a permanent menace to bomb trolley tyres. Bins are easily obtainable and sufficient should be placed in the bomb store to enable an ample supply to be available at all fusing and handling points.
[Underlined] HEAVY TYPE TRANSPORTERS. [/underlined]
There is at present a deficiency of approximately 2,500 transporters in this Group, including those sent away under Bomber Command’s instructions, for modification. Bomber Command have promised that every effort is being made to expedite the manufacture of new type heavy transporters and early issues are expected. In the meantime, continual care must be exercised in the loading of cluster projectiles on to bomb trolleys to ensure that no tail units are damaged.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BOOBS – BOMBING LEADERS PLEASE NOTE. [/underlined]
Two boobs by Air Bombers this month were responsible for complete bomb loads being returned to Base.
1. Bomb Aimer failed to fully rotate the Distributor Drum Switch with the result that no contact was made – FULL
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BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
2. Bomb Aimer set drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo” – FULL BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
Eight other manipulation failures resulted in 8 photoflashes being returned due to the Isolation switch not being made.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
Is your A.P. 2264A fully amended? If so where would you find the information on the Bomb, Smoke, Aircraft, 100 lb. Mk.1?
[Drawing] WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
TOTAL: £5,722.14s. 3d.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – Manipulation. B – Maintenance. C – Icing. D. – Technical. E – Electrical. F. – Obscure.
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[Drawing] GUNNERY
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BAG [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“E” 630 11/12 Sept. T/E
“B” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“T” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“O” 83 23rd Sept. S/E
“R” 630 23rd Sept. T/E
“U” 207 26/27 Sept. ME410
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“H” 50 11/12 Sept. ME110
“D” 207 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“X” 467 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“J” 106 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“J” 61 11/12 Sept. ME.109
“Y” 9 26/27 Sept. ME.410
Confirmation of these claims, by Headquarters Bomber Command, is awaited.
There was a total of 119 combats during the month’s operations which shows a slight increase on last month’s figure. Of these 8 are claimed as destroyed 3 as probably destroyed and 4 as damaged. The largest number of combats occurred on the night 11/12th September, when Darmstadt was the target. Out of 39 combats the Group claimed 3 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 2 damaged – an excellent return. During the month, tracer was removed from the first 300 rounds, with a view to assisting the gunner in his sighting. Reports have since been submitted by Bases, and these are now under consideration. If the test has convinced gunners that accurate shooting can only be applied through the sight, it has certainly been worth while.
Early Warning Devices, with the exception of Fishpond, have been temporarily suspended, so once again the gunner has got to rely on his ability to see under night conditions and on his mental alertness. Even with the E.W.D. several instances occurred of enemy aircraft approaching and attacking unobserved, and without the E.W.D’s we must expect more instances of this. To arm ourselves against this, we must make use of every opportunity of training under night conditions, either at night with night affiliation, or simple exercises on the ground, or by day in the Night Vision rooms. Whilst on the subject of night vision, it is painful to have to record that two instances of Lancaster firing on Lancaster were reported during the month. In each instance the aggressor was identified as a Lancaster by the gunners. It was fortunate that no serious casualties resulted from these attacks, but it does stress the fact that more aircraft recognition under night conditions is called for.
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[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred of guns being fired in dispersals and seriously damaging other aircraft. Gunners must make certain that all guns are on “SAFE” before unloading or testing.
Instructions are to be issued shortly regarding the wearing of Pilot type parachutes by rear gunners. This will come into force when sufficient quantities of this type of parachute are available.
Fighter affiliation exercises with Gyro Camera have shown a big increase on last month’s figures, and Squadrons are to be congratulated. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future, to issue an extra Gyro Camera assembly to each Squadron.
[Underlined] SQUADRON GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
9 Squadron F/Lt Gabriel
50 Squadron F/Lt Mills
61 Squadron F/Lt Glover
463 Squadron F/Lt Winston
467 Squadron F/O Ellis
44 Squadron F/Lt Clarke
619 Squadron F/Lt Waterhouse
83 Squadron S/Ldr Poole
97 Squadron S/Ldr Sherring
106 Squadron F/Lt Sullivan
617 Squadron F/Lt Armstrong
57 Squadron F/Lt Taylor
630 Squadron F/Lt Cass
207 Squadron F/Lt Wardle
49 Squadron F/Lt Wynyard
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training by Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR SEPTEMBER:- [underlined] 2535 [/underlined]
* 49 Squadron employed on special training.
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[Drawing] TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD OUTPUT [/underlined]
This was the last month of the full Summer Training Programme, and the number of crews produced was the highest on record. A total of 162 pilots (161 full crews) was posted to Squadrons and provided ample surplus for the forthcoming expansion.
Weather was patchy towards the end of the month, but despite this and some difficulties with power plants and tyres, the Stirling Conversion Units flew an average of 2,000 hours each. No. 5 L.F.S. did a total of just over 2,000 hours. The accident rate improved for the third successive month.
No.1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit is getting into its stride and flew 700 hours. The first course is due to pass out early next month. No. 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit which also formed under the control of 5 Group, made rapid progress once the Staff had the airfield to themselves. The first course enters on 7th October.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION [/underlined]
Fighter Affiliation continued to increase and 1690 B.D.T. Flight gave day and night affiliation on over 1,000 details, exercising 2450 gunners compared with 2100 for August.
Night affiliation with Hurricanes is growing from infancy into a robust child. 1690 B.D.T. Flight affiliated with 60 Squadron crews at night, exercising 120 gunners, double the total last month. The Hurricanes averaged 41 hours per aircraft.
The monthly target for night affiliation from now on is 600 details. If 300 crews do two night details each, and 9 of the 12 Hurricanes average 3 details each on approximately 21 fit nights in a month, the results will be 600 details, 1200 gunners exercised, and a figure ten-fold greater than this month!
Incidentally, 1690 B.D.T. Flight packed its bags once again, and is now located at R.A.F. Station, Metheringham.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING [/underlined]
The provision of an instructor for each Squadron, instead of instructors allocated to Bases, will give Squadrons a greater opportunity of supervising closely all new crews, and picking up any deficiencies which arise because of the shortness of the course at the L.F.S.
It is essential that Squadron Training Pilots forward their reports on new crews through the usual channels to Base Headquarters so that the Base Air Staff Officer can submit to this Headquarters at the end of each month a summary of opinion on the standard of training and points requiring attention. 10 and 20 sortie checks are essential for all crews in Squadrons throughout the Group, and Squadron Training Pilots are to give them special attention.
No.106 Squadron now has a new function as the “Nursery” for the two P.F.F. Squadrons in 54 Base. Outstanding crews under training in 51 Base and L.F.S. are being selected for P.F.F. duties in 5 Group, and are posted to 106 Squadron for experience and training, after which they proceed to either 83 or 97 Squadron to provide the necessary experience and for supervising the new crews.
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[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base, Squadron and Conversion Unit]
GRAND TOTAL:- Pilots: 1463 hours
F/Engineers: 965 hours
There was again an increase in Link Trainer Times for the month by both Pilots and Flight Engineers. The Pilots went up by about 100 hours and the Flight Engineers by about 40 hours.
Every little helps, but 140 hours among 21 Units represents an average increase of about 7 hours per Unit.
It should be possible to increase this four-fold now that the more doubtful weather is approaching. Each Squadron in particular should get its Pilots’ Link times up to the 50/60 hour mark.
[Underlined] SPECIAL NOTE [/underlined]
Pilots and Link Trainer Instructors should take special note of the modification to topple the Artificial Horizon and spin the Directional Gyro, and make sure it is used on every exercise.
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[Drawing] ACCIDENTS
The 26 aircraft damaged during August gave us a rate of 7.3 per 10,000 flying hours, one of the best rates the Group has ever attained, and good enough to put us in second place in the Command Accident ladder.
September’s total is 23, made up as follows:- 6 Cat. AC; 5 Cat. B; 12 Cat. E. Quite a number of aircraft were damaged to a lesser extent and repaired more or less “on the spot”. They, happily, do not count against us, and the “rate” should be close to August’s good figures. Flying hours will decide.
11 of the month’s accidents were avoidable.
[Underlined] SQUADRONS: [/underlined] Overshoots landing – 2; Heavy Landings – 1; Miscellaneous – 2.
[Underlined] 51 BASE: [/underlined] Swings Landing – 2; overshoots landing – 2; Taxying – 1.
[Underlined] 1690 Flight: [/underlined] Miscellaneous – 1.
None of these accidents have any special features except perhaps the collision between a Hurricane engaged on affiliation with a Lancaster, and a Master of another Group. From details at present available the Hurricane pilot appears to have been “shooting away” the Master who was taking close an interest in the exercise. Both single aircraft engined aircraft crashed, but the Master pilot escaped by parachute. 1690 pilots take note. Extreme care is required when dealing with these other aircraft which very often have pupil pilots aboard, and do not always do what you would expect.
In addition to the accidents above, there have been 7 minor taxying accidents in the Group this month. In each instance the damage was soon repaired, but that is not the point. Each one was completely avoidable, and required a certain amount of valuable time and labour to put right. With the coming of the darker nights and poorer weather it is most important, yes, essential, that this tendency to careless taxying is stamped out. Last winter’s taxying story was a sorry tale. It must not be duplicated this year.
The period for the second award of the Silver Lancaster has just ended. As soon as all accident reports are forward the result will be published. It looks like another close race.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
The above table includes minor avoidable accidents which are not listed in the review above. The damage was Cat. A in each instance. 51 Base Units are not given STAR awards.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS for PILOTS
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take your place in the drive on instrument flying. Nights grow longer and you’ll be getting both dark take-offs and dark returns.
(ii) Give yourself 5 – 10 minutes on your primary instruments – Turn and Bank, A.S.I. and Altimeter – on every N.F.T. Cover up the artificial horizon and cage the gyro.
(iii) Practice the corkscrew on instruments. Its [sic] easy to “mock up” a hood for instrument flying in day-light. Fold a map, fit it on your helmet and draw goggles on to your forehead. The goggles and strap will hold the map in place. Don’t forget to have a member of the crew keeping a look out for other aircraft.
(iv) Get your quota of Link hours in. The new device to topple the artificial horizon and spin the gyro will put you on your mettle.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take things steadily on the ground. The autumn and winter in the past have always produced a sorry tale of bogged aircraft and taxying accidents.
(ii) Look up Air Staff Instruction F.C. 24 for the duties and responsibilities of all aircrew when taxying.
(iii) Use the landing light on the Lancaster and man the Aldis light. Modifications to the landing light are under consideration in an attempt to further increase its usefulness as an aid to taxying.
(iv) Remember you get the illusion at night that you are taxying slowly when you are in fact going fast. CO-OPERATION – CAUTION – CONTROL are the three principles to apply to taxying.
[Underlined] THE LAST 100 FEET. [/underlined]
(i) Wind velocity decreases proportionately from 1,500 feet to ground level because of the friction of the ground. This is most pronounced at night.
(ii) Its [sic] possible to have a wind of gale force at 1,500 feet and dead calm at ground level at night. Its [sic] also possible for the wind direction to be 50° different between 1,500 feet and the ground.
(iii) So watch your approaches. In a very strong wind, increase your air speed by 5/10 m.p.h. and check for drift. The last 100 feet can be difficult if you don’t appreciate the circumstances.
(iv) A word on landings. Your Check Landing Card is a valuable record for [underlined] YOU. [/underlined] Don’t wait until your crew complains your landings are not too good. Inspect your Check Landing Card once a fortnight and see that it is up to date.
[Page break]
[Drawing] FLYING CONTROL
This month has seen the introduction of a Bomber Command Standard Landing Procedure which aims to provide a simple and standard landing drill, and which will give reasonably good landing times. It is hoped that this procedure will be adopted by other Commands, and that it will eventually be used at every airfield in the British Isles. This Group, however, has been permitted to retain its two R/T channels of communication, and the landing procedure, previously employed by 5 Group, has been substantially modified to bring it in to line with the new Standard Procedure.
In the near future, it is hoped that a directif will be issued to all Flying Control Officers laying down a standard technique of handling aircraft. At present there are two schools of thought. One in which one officer in the Watch Office controls aircraft on both Studs ‘A’ and ‘B’. Secondly where one officer in the Watch office feeds aircraft into the circuit on Stud ‘A’ and a second officer controls aircraft on Stud ‘B’, and gives instructions where necessary should aircraft be too closely or too loosely spaced. Trials are at present being carried out on both these schemes and the details will be issued on which scheme proves itself to be the safest and most efficient.
One word here about flying discipline. At some stations in the Group, breaches of flying discipline in the circuit are reports to Squadron Commanders, who take immediate action with the aircrew concerned. No matter how good or how safe a landing procedure might be, if crews don’t play fair and obey instructions to the letter then one might just as well give up the idea of trying to speed up the rate of landing, and at the same time maintain an adequate safety margin. If every crew takes its turn, plays fair and used its common-sense it will be landed within the minimum time and with perfect safety.
[Underlined] Marking Circuit Points. [/underlined]
It is appreciated that in the past there has been some difficulty in determining when an aircraft exactly reaches the various points of call around the circuit. The problem of marking these points to suit all runways is not an easy one, and several experiments have been carried out as yet with little success. It is hoped, however, that the end is now in sight and that very soon “call-up” and “check” points for use with every runway will be marked around the circuit.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Page break]
[Drawing] EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] UNIT RETURNS. [/underlined]
Cases have occurred where serviceable equipment returned to the U.E.D. has arrived in an unserviceable state. In most cases the cause has been careless packing. Equipment Officers should realise that this almost amounts to sabotage as not only is time and labour wasted at the receiving end, but equipment, which has taken the manufacturers valuable man-hours to make, is useless to the service until more man-hours are spent in repair.
Therefore watch this and thus save labour.
[Underlined] Q. FORM. [/underlined]
The Q Form has been amended and the old “U” has been broken down into “U.1” (awaiting spares, work held up) and “U.2” (awaiting spares but work proceeding). Up to now this Group has had a good record, so Equipment Officers should continue to keep both “U.1” and “U.2” out of the Q Form.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS. [/underlined]
Instances are still occurring where Mechanical Sweepers are unserviceable for some considerable time owing to the delay in obtaining spares. Owing to the very acute rubber shortage it is essential that runways be swept regularly. All Bases should ensure that at least one set of brushes and other frequently required spares are held, and Equipment Officers should give the subject their personal attention.
[Underlined] SURPLUS FIRE CRASH TENDER. [/underlined]
Several Bases are holding one surplus Crash Tender for use within the Group in an emergency. When this is required it is frequently found that the vehicle is unserviceable and in consequence a Station is left with only one Crash Tender standing by, which is totally inadequate. It is essential that these vehicles are kept serviceable, and all demands for spares required to render vehicles serviceable are to be sent by I.O.R. signal and hastened where any undue delay occurs.
[Page break]
[Drawing] DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. R. HARTLEY CGM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.E.P. OXBORROW DFC
F/O. B.J. DOBSON DFC
F/O. J.E. WHITE DFC
F/O. W.C. FREESTONE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L. D.R. STUBBS DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. P. AINLEY DFC
P/O. A.C. MCKELLAR DFC
SGT. L.J. CHAMPION DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. M. MCNEILL DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
S/L. H.B. LOCKE, DFC DSO
S/L. S.M.P. PARKES DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. C.W. KIPFER DFC
F/O. H.E. SAYEAU DFC
F/O. W.N. REDMAN DFC
F/L. M.H. PARRY AFC DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. R.C. DAVIE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. P.N. HERBERT DFC
F/O. F.N. CHANDLER DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/S. C.H. STEWART DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C G.W. CURRY, DFC DSO
The following NON_IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. HANCOCK DFC
SGT. T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT. J.H. MCCREERY DFM
F/O. R.W. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. P.E. PLOWRIGHT DFC
W/O. R. LAWSON DFC
F/O. S.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/O. S.J. MANCEKIVELL, DFM DFC
F/O. J.S. MIDDLETON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. N.H. STEPHENSON DFC
P/O. E.P. BURDEN DFC
P/O. J. HALL DFC
P/O. J.S. DEAN DFC
P/O. W. FARADAY DFC
P/O. R.B. FARREN DFC
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
1st Lt. J.F. STEVENS DFC
F/O. A.V. PATCHETT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. E. BERRY
F/O. J.C.D. GUTHRIE DFC
F/S. L. HOWARTH DFM
F/O. D.T. WATKINS DFC
P/O. G. EARNSHAW DFC
P/O. J.L. BENDIX DFC
W/O. G.W. MORREY DFC
P/O. J.H. COLE DFC
F/S. R. VICKERSTAFFE DFM
F/S. N.F. BACON DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/Underlined]
P/O. A.E. NICKLIN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. ANDERSON, DFM DFC
F/L. J. BREAKLEY DFC
W/O. J.A. LEWIS DFC
W/O. T. DOWYER DFC
P/O. A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/S. E.A. DAVIDSON DFM
SGT. A. KANE DFM
[Page break]
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. J. HARRISON DFM
P/O. J.H. WILKINSON DFC
F/S. H.D.K. LEWIS DFM
P/O. J.W. SCOTT DFC
S/L. W.A.G. GALLIENNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L. C.A.S. DREW, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/S. B.A. MANNING DFM
F/S. F. COOPER DFM
S/L. J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
F/L. D.H. PIDDING, D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
W/O. C.A. RUSSELL DFC
F/L. R.W. WESTON DFC
F/S. N. MACHIN DFM
F/O. O. HALLIKAS DFC
F/O. A. DRINKALL DFC
F/L. J.N.C. WRIGHT, DRF. BAR TO DFC
P/O. G.K. CHAPMAN DFC
F/S. R.C.T. LODGE DFM
P/O. M. MACDONALD DFC
P/O. W WARBURTON DFC
F/O. G.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. W.M. REID DFC
F/S. R.C. WOOLLFORD DFM
F/S. D. BOLLAND DFM
F/S. H. TOWNSLEY DFM
P/O. G.D. HOOTON DFC
F/S. K.S. RANDLE DFM
P/O. C.W. LACY DFC
F/O. J.J. ROGERSON DFC
F/L. C.W. SHIRES DFC
W/O. J.T. STANTON, DFM DFC
F/O. R.L.C. LASHAM DFC
F/S. D.P. GANNINGS DFM
F/L. T.H. MACKEPEACE DFC
F/S. R.J. BOWEN DFM
F/O. B.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
W/O. E.K. PIERCY DFC
P/O. B.F. DURRANT DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.T.H. GIDDENS DFC
F/O. R.Y. KENYON DFC
F/S. D.A. DEAR DFM
F/S. W. CHARLESWORTH DFM
F/S. K.E. BOONE DFM
P/O. F.W. BLAKE DFC
P/O. C.A. SKINNER DFC
P/O. A.W. HALLAM DFC
P/O. S. JOHNSON DFC
F/O. R.K. ESSERY DFC
P/O. S.W. CARTER DFC
P/O. J.M. DENTON DFC
F/O. R.W. JEW
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined] (Contd.)
P/O. G.V. MALON DFC
P/O. D.G.J. GRIFFITHS DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.W. MUDDLE DFC
F/O. K. SCHULTZ DFC
F/O. E.T. PICKERD DFC
SGT. A.V. WING DFM
P/O. G.F. FLANAGAN DFC
F/O. J.D.H. BILLAM DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. H.C.J. BENTLEY DFC
F/O. B. HAWES DFC
F/O. A.T. YOUDAN DFC
P/O. J. WESLEY DFC
P/O. L.S. AINSWORTH DFC
F/O. D.L. HARRIS DFC
F/O. J.S.A. MARSHALL DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. D. RODGER DFC
W/O. A. RUSHTON DFC
W/O. R. SMITH DFC
W/O. J.W. HUTTON DFC
F/O. S.R. CLARKE DFC
F/S. W. HUME DFM
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. N.D. KENNEDY DFC
F/O. K.R. MAKIN DFC
F/L. S.E.J. JONES, DFM DFC
F/S. T. FLEETWOOD DFM
F/S. P.V.J. LOWEN DFM
P/O. J.G. NOBLE DFC
F/S. T. AITKEN DFM
F/O. R.W. WOOD DFC
SGT. H. WATERSON DFM
SGT. A. MCINULTY DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. L.C.E. De VIGNE DFC
F/O. A.E. RICHARDS DFC
S/L. R.F. ELLIOTT, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O. S.F. PARLATO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. R.O. CULVERT, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/L. E.R. BUTLER, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/O, A. KUZMA DFC
P/O. D.W. ALLEN DFC
P/O. A.J. PAYNE DFC
P/O. A.J. LUCAS DFC
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A TRIP TO RUSSIA
On the 11th September, 1944, Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons together with two Liberators attached from Transport Command, took off for YAGODNIK, an airfield near Archangel. The Liberators re-fuelled at Lossiemouth before leaving, and the hospitality extended by this Station was very much appreciated by the ground staff who were passengers in these aircraft.
The weather at first was good, but when about 150 miles from Archangel considerable low cloud and rain were encountered. Aircraft flew just above tree tops over the most desolate country imaginable – lakes, forests and swamps. Map reading was impossible; weather conditions alone made this too difficult, and in addition it was found that maps of the area were inaccurate – many villages and even railway lines being omitted.
The Archangel area was reached after about 10 hours flying, and with endurance becoming low and with no radio aids available, it was necessary for aircraft to land quickly. Some were fortunate enough to locate airfields quickly, whilst others searched through cloud and heavy rain.
Several aircraft landed at a small airfield named KEG ISLAND. Some of the crews of these aircraft originally thought they had landed at YAGODNIK and were unable to find out the whereabouts of the other aircraft. For some time they thought they were the sole survivors of the force. Later, however, all aircraft were located, though in all six had crash landed. In spite of this nobody was hurt and in the weather conditions it must be considered miraculous that no lives were lost. It was a great tribute to the skill of the pilots and navigators that so many masterly landings were made.
The Russians had originally expected some 250 guests but last minute alterations had increased this to 325. In addition, the crews of the crashed aircraft had to be located and collected from outlying districts.
In the circumstances the Russians performed wonders in giving all available help. A major diversion in this country often causes somewhat of an upheaval, but the Russians placed transport aircraft at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and even dropped a parachutist to direct the crew of one aircraft which had crash landed in a morass. In this particular case the “blind led the blind” for a while as the guide lost his way!
Eventually all crews and serviceable aircraft collected at Yagodnik where accommodation and re-fuelling facilities existed. Yagodnik is an island and is in the middle of the river Dvina, about 20 miles from Archangel It can only be reached from that city by air or river. The accommodation consisted of a paddle steamer which was moored to the river bank, and several underground huts. These huts provide warmth in winter but the absence of any kind of ventilation and the fact that a large brick fireplace forms a major part of the accommodation leads to a degree of stuffiness difficult to bear, and appears to form a breeding ground for various forms of life. The first few nights produced a large number of bug eaten victims until a form of insert [sic] killer, generously given by some American friends in the this country, was used.
Entertainment was provided by the Russians in the form of cinema shows, dances, etc., and on one occasion a lecture on a Russian composer which started 55 minutes late, lasted for 75 minutes, and was a complete mystery from start to finish to the British members of the audience.
The mush publicised football match also took place and proved a huge success. A football match in Russia produces much ceremony including the exchange of bouquets by the opposing captains before the start of game, and a tune somewhat similar to “See the conquering hero comes” has to be played each time the home team scores a goal. Apparently it is also possible for
[Page break]
the weary player to be replaced by a reserve – or was it the fear of possible repercussions that caused two members to retire from the game and be replaced by the Commanding Officer and the local Station Commander? The latter was so fed with passes by his triumphant tam that a glancing blow off his knee which scored a goal must have caused him considerable relief as it enabled the game to be continued under normal conditions! In spite of all this our Allies showed that they thoroughly understood the game and were indeed very capable players.
The major job of servicing and re-fuelling the aircraft for the operation was tackled by the maintenance crews in a whole hearted manner – they worked for 48 hours almost without a break and their keeness and cheerfulness was what one would expect of such a grand team. It was refreshing to see all trades helping where help was most needed. The following instances will give some idea of what difficulties were overcome. With bowsers available it took exactly 18 hours to re-fuel the aircraft alone. A spare engine was carried in the Liberators and as no crane was available to remove this from the aircraft, a ramp of trees with blankets on top had to be built so that the engine could be slid down.
Meantime a Mosquito had arrived in Yagodnik for P.R.U. duties and after a favourable report from the pilot the operation took place on the 15th September.
Both take off and landing were in accordance with the usual 5 Group high traditions, 28 aircraft taking off in 23 minutes and 27 landing in 30 minutes – one aircraft having flown direct to U.K.
The details of the operation are given elsewhere. As aircraft became re-fuelled and serviceable they returned to the U.K., until finally the two Liberators remained and they were held up for about a week.
While waiting for their aircraft to be re-fuelled some of the crews went into Archangel by minesweeper and were entertained by the R.A.F. Mission there. This measure of hospitality extended to them can be gained by the fact that one member on his return decided to jump in the river fully clothed, in an endeavour to return to the city. The sobering influence of the Dvina soon dissuaded him.
The final return to the U.K. was made under variable but much better conditions than the outward journey.
Finally a few impressions of this Northern outpost of the U.S.S.R. as seen in a fleeting visit may be interesting. It is of course, quite impossible to form balanced judgements, or to provide a real comparison between social and economic conditions seen in Archangel and those to which we are accustomed in Great Britain. After all, Archangel is far to the North of the vast land mass which constitutes the U.S.S.R., and was for some period cut off from the rest of Russia by the Finnish-German advances. Bearing all this in mind, it can hardly be described as a health resort. There was not a great deal of food, the clothing of the civilians was poor, and the roads, houses, sanitation and drainage, the latter where they existed, were far below anything generally to be seen in this country. However, we found that the organisation to provide the essentials of war was good, and all the technical teams we encountered were capable and willing workers. The system of privilege is apparent; extra food and clothing are the reward of rank in the armed forces and of position in civil works. But even in the inferior living conditions at Archangel we found among the Russians an intense patriotism, and a belief in the future of Russia after the war. All Russians’ energies seem directed towards the future.
Our hosts, with the limited facilities at their disposal, did all they could for our comfort, and for this we were all very grateful.
[Page break]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP NEWS” [/underlined]
The cover of this month’s News was designed by S/Ldr. N Floyd Wilson of Headquarters No. 5 Group. Each month the cover will be changed, and all artists in the Group are invited to submit specimen designs. The best design will be selected each month and will be adopted for the cover of the current issue. [/boxed]
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[Blank page]
Dublin Core
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V Group News, September 1944
5 Group News, September 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 26, September 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, war effort, tactics, signals, air bombing, navigation, radar navigation, engineering, air sea rescue, photography, armament, war savings, gunnery, training, accidents, second thoughts for pilots, flying control, equipment, decorations and a trip to Russia.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-09
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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56 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-17
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Le Havre
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway--Kåfjord (Troms fylke)
Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ
Temporal Coverage
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1944-09
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
fuelling
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Pathfinders
petrol bowser
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1315 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
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Foreword by A O C
October has seen a fine month’s work with many important operations successfully concluded. Several of these took place in difficult conditions, reflecting the improved standard of training which crews have reached before they go on operations.
As this month marks the departure of No.51 Base on its incorporation into the newly formed 7 Group, I would like to congratulate all in the Base on the fine results which they have achieved over the past 20 months. Although they now move to 7 Group they will continue to provide crews for this Group, and since the Stirlings with which they are now equipped, are shortly to be replaced by Lancasters, it will soon be possible to relieve squadrons of much of their training commitments.
While there has been a steady improvement in the efficiency of all members of aircrew there is one matter in which the standards are still deplorably and dangerously low. I refer to the problem of security.
I am certain that if I asked any member of an aircrew whether he would, of his own free will, give information to the enemy he would hotly deny the suggestion. Yet the names of no less than 17 members of 5 Group who are now Prisoners of War, appear on a list lately captured from an enemy Headquarters, which was over-run during the Army’s advance.
The list contains the names of individuals who had passed through the normal interrogation centre, and gives a precis of the information which the interrogating officer gleaned from each; some of it is of considerable value to the enemy. I do not suggest that the information was given with any treasonable intent, but the orders state that nothing may be said at interrogation except NUMBER, RANK AND NAME, and the individuals whose names appear on this list have flagrantly disobeyed these orders.
In the aggregate very great harm has been occasioned to the Allied cause by disclosures which have been made by Prisoners of War. Some were no doubt doing no more than airing their ideas, or repeating what they had heard, hoping, by appearing to give information, to appease the interrogating officer. Unfortunately, when faced with a skilled interrogator there is no “half way house”, either you say nothing and get away with it, or you start to talk and everything you know will be dragged out of you.
There is ample evidence to show that the German Interrogation centre is conducted along the lines specified in the Geneva Convention, and that no undue pressure is brought to bear on any individual who will not talk. If, however, a Prisoner appears to be of the talkative type he will certainly be interrogated at considerable length. Anyone who gives only the details of Number, Rank and Name and thereafter keeps his mouth firmly shut, will not only be respected by the enemy, but is unlikely to be further interrogated.
I suggest that members of aircrew who may have the misfortune to find themselves Prisoners of War, should bear in mind that the Allied
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] A. O. C’S FOREWORD [/underlined]
Armies are still advancing and that in their progress towards Berlin, they will no doubt capture other lists containing the names of Prisoners and what they have said. They should ponder on the sharp retribution which will overtake those individuals when they again set foot on British soil. But this retribution will not bring to life those of their comrades who have been killed because of their failure to carry out their orders.
Unfortunately, this unworthy giving of information to the enemy has its counterpart in dangerous talk in this country. Before the first attack on the Tirpitz on the 15th September, 1944, all crews taking part had to be briefed some days in advance. They were told that on no account must a word be breathed outside, and there were very good reasons for this special warning.
Yet, within 48 hours loose talk by members of certain crews in front of individuals in no way concerned with the operation, had spread the news to other Units in the Group where it was being freely debated. A number of individuals are about to face the consequences of their folly and I cannot, at present, refer in more detail to this episode. But it shows that there are still those who fail to realise their responsibilities.
A further form of laxity is the carriage of documents in aircraft. We know that diaries containing valuable and secret information have been taken by the Germans off Bomber crews; while the other night an aircraft of this Group which had been detailed to attack Bergen, landed at a diversion airfield where the captain dropped his copy of the complete briefing instructions which he had been given before take-off and which is expressly forbidden to take into the air.
Great harm is being done by this slackness in matters of security. It reflects on the standard of discipline of aircrew, and shows the lack of a proper sense of responsibility. We cannot afford to give information to the enemy, even on matters which may appear trivial; for we are up against a powerful and experienced defence which knows well how to turn information to good account.
I ask aircrew to give this matter of security the serious thought that it deserves, and ensure that they thoroughly understand the orders on the subject and obey them.
[Underlined] PONDER ON THIS. [/underlined]
A crew of No. 61 Squadron interrogated in April, 1944, gave the enemy details of the 5 Group method of attack including our technique of marking, the part played by the Master Bomber, and even such matters as the frequencies used in the control of the operation.
[Underlined] ALSO THIS. [/underlined]
Sgt. D. was extremely well drilled in security. For this reason he would say nothing, especially as the crew had been repeatedly warned against talking by the Intelligence Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] WILHELMSHAVEN – 5TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Operations in October started with a daylight attack by a force of 221 aircraft on the Great Naval base at Wilhelmshaven.
PLAN Although previously attacked by both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F., no great or widespread damage had been done, and on this occasion, the intention was to devastate the built-up area and suburbs of the town, rather than the dock area. The bomb load was 10 x 1,000 lb H.E. with only a small proportion of incendiaries, a change from our usual 80% incendiary load.
Two aiming lines some 4,000 yards long and running roughly east to west through the town, were allotted to Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, whose aircraft were to be evenly distributed over the whole length of both aiming lines. Nos. 49, 9 and 106 Squadrons were given individual aiming points in the north east sector of the town. No. 54 Base were to place proximity markers on the coast line to the north east, to aid crews in their run-up. Bombing to be direct and visual. Failing visual identification, crews were ordered to bomb on H.2.S., or (for non-H.2.S. aircraft) on bombs dropped by H.2.S. aircraft; or as a last resort, any built up area in Germany.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud was encountered over the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered crews to bomb on H.2.S. 198 aircraft attacked the primary target area, the remainder bombed last resort targets. Bombing was consequently very scattered, and only minor points of fresh damage are reported.
An H hour of 09.00 hours involved a dark take-off, and forming up was not easy. In spite of this, and of the unfavourable weather conditions, the fighter escort reported that this was one of the easiest operations they have yet had to cover.
[Underlined] BREMEN – 6/7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Bremen, frequently the target for both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. had suffered wide-spread damage both to harbour installations and industrial premises, but a large built-up area in the town itself, remained undamaged. A force of 237 aircraft of the Group was despatched on the night of October 6/7th to devastate this area, which was probably the largest the Group has yet had to tackle since it has operated as a separate force. Two aircraft from each Squadron carried H.E. bombs and the remainder a 100% load of 4 lb incendiaries.
PLAN Four areas were selected: two of them heavily built up, on opposite banks of the river, in the centre of the town, and the other two, rather larger but not quite so heavily built up, to the S.E. and S.W. respectively of the two areas lining the river bank.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
The large marshalling yard, some 1,500 yards to the north, was chosen as a convenient marking point. Three Squadrons were allotted to each of the four areas, three of which were divided into sectors, while the fourth was covered by a single track. All crews were ordered to aim at the marking point, delaying release for a detailed number of seconds.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather, with slight haze, and the illumination and marking went according to plan. The markers fell in a sector roughly NW – SW some 200 – 300 yards from the selected point. Photographs show that considerable damage has been inflicted in the areas selected for attack, and the devastation of the old town has been extended south eastwards, and is now almost complete. The part of the town on the West bank of the river is also heavily damaged. Nevertheless, an examination of the photographic and incendiary plots show that the concentration aimed at was not achieved, and that a large proportion of the bomb loads fell in areas previously devastated. Moreover, it is obvious that many incendiary loads were dropped short of the aiming point and although a certain amount of damage was caused in the housing estate to the north of it, this area was not included in the sectors selected for attack. Many loads have also fallen to the west, outside the planned sectors. The weather conditions for the attack were most favourable, and the marking was punctual and accurate, and no satisfactory explanation for the wide bombing spread has yet been arrived at. Two obvious possibilities are that:-
(a) the plan of attack is still not being explained to crews in sufficient detail and with sufficient emphasis.
(b) crews are not adhering rigidly to the tracks allotted to them nor carrying out the required delay when dropping their bombs.
Provided we can be satisfied that these conditions are being fulfilled, we can then begin to look elsewhere for causes which result in these incendiary attacks failing to achieve the saturation aimed at.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – OCTOBER 7TH. [/underlined]
The port of Antwerp had been in Allied hands for some time, but the facilities could not yet be used for unloading supplies for the invading armies, since Walcheren Island at the mouth of the Scheldt esturary [sic] was still held by the Germans, and the approaches to the port were under fire from enemy gun batteries.
120 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases were therefore detailed to attack two point either side of Flushing, the sea wall on the east and the Dyke to the West, with the intention of flooding the island and forcing the enemy to abandon his gun positions.
PLAN Each Base was allotted an aiming point, and each Squadron within the Base was to attack separately at 10 minute intervals, making individual attacks and bombing in line astern at right angles to the dyke. The bomb load consisted of 14 x 1,000 lb bombs fused half an hour or one hour delay. Two runs were to be made, half the load to be dropped on each run. Crews were to bomb visually, using a Red T.I. dropped near the base of the dyke, as a guide to the run-up. Particular stress was laid on the necessity for reducing line error to a minimum, in view of the nature of the target.
RESULTS The attack was successful. The sea wall on the east side
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of Flushing was broken in several places. The dyke on the west side was breached at one point only, but there were many craters along its crest. A few days later the water had penetrated as far as two miles inland in both areas.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 11TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Breaches were made in the dyke and sea wall during our attack on Flushing, but the process of flooding is slow. A further force was therefore detailed to help the process, this time by attacking the dyke at Veere, on the North East side of the island. No. 55 Base provided 60 aircraft for this attack, while a second force of 113 aircraft of Nos. 53 and 55 Bases was sent to deal with four gun positions in the dock area of Flushing.
PLAN Aircraft were ordered to make individual bombing runs in line astern against the dyke, and once again emphasis was laid on the importance of reducing line error to a minimum. A red T.I. was to be dropped as a guide to visual bombing. On this occasion too, the bomb load consisted of 1,000 lb. bombs with half an hour or one hour delay. No marking was used on the gun positions, and all crews bombed visually. The bombs for this target were fused T.D. 0.025.
RESULTS [Underlined] Veere Dyke. [/underlined] This attack was also successful, and on the following day an area approximately 800 X 250 yards was seen to be flooded. Several breaches were made, one of 200 yards, a second of 100 to 150 yards, three more small breaks and in addition, four more places where the wall was cratered which would probably erode into breaks.
[Underlined] Gun Positions. [/underlined] Although good concentrations were achieved round all four aiming points, many units being destroyed by direct hits and others affected by near misses, some of the casemated positions escaped damage. These guns are almost entirely screened from blast by thick mounds and only direct hits, or very near misses near the gun apertures, are likely to put them out of action.
REMARKS The plan of flooding the Germans out of their positions on Walcheren Island started with the breaching off the sea wall at Westkapelle by other Groups early in the month. This was followed by the successful breaching of the sea wall and dyke at Flushing, and later the Veere Dyke, on the N.E. of the island, by No.5 Group, which completed the flooding of substantially the whole of the low lying areas of the island.
The importance of eliminating line error was stressed on these attacks. Their success shows that this was, in the main, achieved, though too few bomb craters are visible on the photographic cover for an accurate analysis to be made.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Brunswick has proved an elusive target for the R.A.F. in the past although it has been attacked on numerous occasions both by the R.A.F. and by the U.S.A.A.F. It was last attacked some two months ago, and on that occasion was the guinea pig for an experiment in blind bombing, entirely on H.2.S. The results were inconclusive, and only scattered incidents of damage were caused, and the guinea pig survived. On the night of the 14/15th October a strong force of 241 aircraft took off to complete the destruction of this important industrial centre.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN The plan for this attack followed what has now become our normal procedure on targets of this nature, i.e. a suitable marking point was selected (the main railway terminus) and sectors between 345°T and 080°T measured from the marking point. Bases and Squadrons were to spread their aircraft evenly along tracks in these sectors and appropriate delays for bomb release were ordered. Separate height bands were given to each Base. Illumination and marking in the normal sequence.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather and was well controlled by the Master Bomber. Flares were accurately dropped, and the marking went according to plan. Bombing was somewhat scattered early in the attack, with a tendency to creep back towards the markers. This was later corrected, and a good concentration was achieved. A large area in the centre of the town, previously undamaged and containing the majority of administrative buildings and business premises, was devastated. On this occasion, the bomb load included a proportion of H.E., 4,000 lb, 2,000 lb and 1,000 lb H.C. and M.C. bombs, and in addition to the incendiary damage, large areas have been levelled by blast. On the whole, this was a very successful attack. A proportion of the bombing has fallen outside the westerly sector, and although considerable roof damage is visible in the easternmost sector, the destruction is not so concentrated as in the central portion. It appears probable that the displacement may have been caused by the difficulty in assessing the true position of the markers. It has not been possible to plot these on night photographs on account of smoke and fires.
REMARKS (i) Many crews reported having received instructions on R/T to delay H hour by 5 minutes, and giving a different wind. Fortunately, the attack was well under way and no-one was misled. This was at first attributed to attempts by the enemy to disrupt the attack, but was later found to be due to an 8 Group force operating on the same frequency. Action has been taken to prevent a recurrence.
(ii) Many crews reported a number of incendiaries jettisoned on track on the was back from the target. This shows gross thoughtlessness and lack of regard for other aircraft in the stream, particularly having regard to the low level return. This action is absolutely inexcusable, except in an emergency.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 17TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
A force of 50 aircraft was detailed to attack the sea wall of Westkapelle, with the intention of extending the existing breach southwards, and inundating German strong points.
PLAN Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s on a given point on the wall south of the existing breach, and crews were to aim their bombs at a position midway between the markers and the edge of the breach. Planned bombing height 5,000 to 6,000 feet. Each aircraft carried a load of 14 x 1,000 lb MC/GP bombs fused half or one hour delay. Two aircraft were detailed to find a bombing wind by means of flame floats and the A.P.I. attachment.
RESULTS Although many sticks straddled the target, most of the bombing appeared to overshoot the narrow strip of land, and fell into the flood water near the village of Westkapelle. One of the A.P.I. attachments was partially unserviceable, resulting in an incorrect bombing wind being used. This resulted in a slight overshoot, and no appreciable extension of the breach was made.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NUREMBURG – 19/20TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
A force of 270 aircraft took off to attack Nuremburg, a target which has escaped lightly in previous raids.
PLAN There were three areas to be attacked, two large and one small. A convenient marking point was selected, and the bombs were to cover the two large areas by means of the delayed release, while the smaller area was to be attacked direct, with a false wind vector set on the bombsight. Sectors were distributed between Bases and Squadrons in the normal way. The marking plan followed the normal sequence and provided for one additional alternative, i.e. Wanganui flares were to be dropped if cloud conditions rendered other methods Impracticable. There were therefore four alternative methods for bombing, the Master Bomber to decide upon the one to be used. Crews were ordered to bomb:-
(i) The red T.I. with delayed release as planned.
(ii) The green T.I. backed up by reds, without the delay.
(iii) The red T.I. direct (in the event of the greens dropped by blind markers being incorrect and the Mosquitoes being able to mark the centre of the town with red T.I’s).
(iv) The Wanganui flares.
RESULTS There was 8 – 10/10ths cloud over the target, but the Master Bomber decided that the red and green T.I’s would be visible through the cloud, and did not order Wanganui. The Mosquitoes were therefore ordered to back up with their red T.I’s, the greens dropped by the blind markers, and the main force ordered to bomb them direct. It was impossible to assess the markers accurately, and night photographs show no ground detail. Although there were reports of the glow of fires through the clouds, it is probable that the attack was scattered. Unfortunately, Nuremburg appears to have escaped once more.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – 23RD OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Three gun positions in the harbour at Flushing, not previously attacked by this Group, were the targets for 112 aircraft of 53 and 55 Bases.
PLAN Each aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 lb bombs, fused .025 secs, planned bombing height 6/7,000 feet, minimum 4,000 feet. Aircraft to identify targets and aim visually.
RESULTS Visibility in the target area was poor with 10/10ths cloud, base 4,000 – 5,000 feet, with rain. Most crews had to make several orbits before they could identify the targets and obtain a good run up. Many crews reported being practically over the top of their targets before being able to identify their aiming point. Although many sticks straddled the targets, many more are reported to have overshot. Photographs show at least 70 craters in the area of the gun positions.
[Underlined] BERGEN – 28/29th OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
With the loss of France, the Germans also lost their U-boat bases on the Atlantic coast, and since then, they are known to have been
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
operating from Norway. Reconnaissance showed that strenuous efforts were being made to complete U-boat pens at Bergen, and these were the target for 244 aircraft on October 28/29th.
PLAN Green T.I’s and flares were to be dropped in the target area, and by the aid of these the Mosquito markers were to mark the marking point with T.I. red. The Master Bomber was then to assess the accuracy of the markers, and to broadcast to the main force a false bombing vector to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Six aircraft of the Flare Force acted as wind-finders. In view of the small size of the target, all crews were warned against loose bombing, to avoid endangering the lives and property of the Norwegians, and were ordered on no account to bomb unless they had a steady run-up on to the red T.I’s.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud in layers from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet was encountered over the target, with haze and poor visibility below. Flares were dropped punctually in the target area, but markers found it difficult to locate the marking point. Eventually marker No.4 dropped his red T.I’s and assessed them as within 50 yards of the marking point. The Master Bomber called the force down to bomb from between 5,000 and 8,000 feet with the wind vector as planned, provided they could get a clear run. Only 45 aircraft attacked the red T.I’s. The remainder were unable to see them or were unable to make an accurate bombing run, and did not attack, according to briefed instructions.
The attack inflicted considerable damage on the pens.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- S/Ldr. Oakley and F/Lt. de Vigne.
[Underlined] Target [/underlined] – Four gun positions in the vicinity of Flushing and Westkapelle.
PLAN No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the exact aiming points with low bursting red T.I’s, the attacks to be controlled by a Master Bomber, also provided by No.54 Base. Six aircraft of No.55 Base were to find winds for each force. These were sent back to Group, and a bombing wind corrected for the bombsight, transmitted to both forces.
RESULTS {underlined] Flushing [/underlined] - Weather 7-10/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet.
[Underlined] Western Aiming Point [/underlined] – Bombing was carried out according to Master Bomber’s instructions. Believed that a fair concentration was achieved.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Crews had difficulty in identifying the target as it was almost entirely submerged, and markers extinguished as they fell. Those who attacked bombed visually aiming at the tops of the casements, which were above the water, with unobserved results.
[Underlined] Westkapelle [/underlined] – Weather 4/10ths – 7/10ths strato cu. Clear below.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking and bombing reported as accurate – No results observed.
[Underlined] Southern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking assessed as accurate, but the main force had difficulty in seeing the T.I’s, which were partly buried in the sand dunes. As a result, there was a tendency to overshoot.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] KEMBS BARRAGE – 7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
The Kembs Barrage, which lies 6 1/2 miles below Basle, governs the flow of the Rhine between the Swiss town and Strasbourg. Apart from its navigational importance to barge traffic between Strasbourg and the upper reaches of the river, the Barrage was a weapon in the hands of the enemy which they could have used to impede the operations of our land forces in the south eastern sector of France. The sudden release of a large volume of water from the barrage and the breaching of the river banks below it would result in the flooding of large areas. The Barrage is 180 metres wide, and consists of five bays, each of 30 m. span separated by piers 5 m. thick. Each bay is closed by metal sluices, operated electrically, on a principle similar to that of sash windows.
PLAN 7 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, fused T.D. 0.025 were to bomb from high level (8,000 feet or below cloud base, minimum 5,000 feet), and six aircraft with Tallboys fused 1/2 hour delay, from low level (500 to 800 feet, 500 feet minimum). The force was to be covered by three squadrons of Mustangs, one of which was detailed to deal with light gun positions near the target. The high force was to bomb first and the low force was timed to go in after the smoke from the high force bombs had cleared.
RESULTS Weather was clear at the target, with good visibility, and the attack was carried out as planned. The defences proved to be more formidable than had been shown on recent photographs, and intense light flak was experienced, mainly coming from the eastern bank of the river. Of the high force, several aircraft experienced bomb release trouble, and as a result there were several overshoots. Two bombs were dropped as much as 600 yards west owing to hang-ups. Of the low force bombs, one fell immediately beyond the barrage, and there were two overshoots of 40/50 yards. One bomb fell close to the westernmost sluice gate, and demolished it. Visual reconnaissance later the same day, reported that the water level 2 1/2 miles up stream from the target had fallen 11 feet 4 inches and that many barges were stranded. Later, photographs showed that the iron superstructure above the first and second pillars on the west side had been completely destroyed, together with the sluice gate.
[Underlined] THE SORPE DAM – 15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Railway communications between northern and central Germany and the Ruhr have become increasingly important to the enemy since the successful attack by 5 Group on the Dortmund Ems canal. These lines not only supply the Ruhr industrial area itself, but are also the life-lines to the enemy’s main front facing our forces advancing on the Ruhr. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would result in the flooding of a considerable area, including the Neheim-Schwerte railway, one of the three main lines serving the Ruhr from the east, and would thus add to the enemy’s communications and supply problems. It was therefore decided that the Dam should be attacked by 18 aircraft of No.9 Squadron, all carrying Tallboy bombs. No immediate results were expected, owing to the peculiar nature of the Dam’s construction, but it was hoped that direct hits from Tallboys would unbalance the retaining wall of the dam, resulting in gradual erosion, finally enabling the water to break through.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN 18 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, six fused 1/2 hour delay and 12 fused 11 seconds delay, were to attack the Dam from 14/15,000 feet. The attack was to be made at right angles to the face of the Dam, to obtain maximum penetration. Winds were to be found by six aircraft, using visual pinpoint and A.P.I. These were then to be averaged and a bombing wind transmitted by the force leader. Fighter cover was provided by seven squadrons of Mustangs. When 20 miles short of the target, the force was to divide into two formations, the first composed of the 12 aircraft carrying 11 second delay bombs and the second formation, of the 6 aircraft carrying the half hour delay bombs. Aircraft were to bomb in line astern, each aircraft to position itself 100 feet below and 200 yards astern of the aircraft in front. Bombs were to be aimed at the shore of the compensating lake below the dam face, and a false height setting applied to the bombsight, so that the bombs should strike a point 50 yards short of the crest of the dam. It was appreciated that the water level in the lake was somewhat low to be certain of success, but it was nevertheless considered that there was a reasonable chance of destroying the dam.
RESULTS 16 aircraft dropped their Tallboys. Two were unfortunate enough to be “jostled” during their run up, and were unable to bomb. The force flew over 10/10ths cloud to within a short distance of the target, but were lucky to find a clear gap over the target itself. Navigation winds had to be used, as visual pinpointing was impossible. Several direct hits were registered on the crest of the dam, one fair and square on the road running about 50 yards below the crest, and several on the dam face at its western extremity. In addition to these, several bombs slightly overshot the crest and fell in the water, and should have done their fair share of damage. There appears to have been a slight vector error, which resulted in the M.P.I. of the bombs (those visible on P.R.U. cover), being displaced some 200 yards 330 degrees from the aiming point. Although the dam was not breached, the enemy has been forced to lower the level of the dam to reduce the pressure on the water side. If the water had been a little higher the dam would undoubtedly have gone.
[Underlined] TIRPITZ – 29/30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Since the last attack on September 15th the Tirpitz had been moved from Alten Fiord, to an anchorage off the small island of Haak, 4 miles West of Tromso, and some 200 miles nearer to the British Isles than her previous berth.
Possibly this move was prompted by the Germans’ fear of the ship falling into the hands of the Russians, who were rapidly over-running the Petsamo area, or possibly because they wished to get her back by stages to a German base, where major repairs and a refit could be carried out.
It was decided that, by increasing the all-up weight for take-off, and with the addition of an extra fuel load, an attack from bases in the British Isles was practicable. To achieve this, Merlin 24 engines, giving + 18 boost for take off, were installed in all Nos. 617 and 9 Squadrons’ aircraft. This involved the changing of 120 engines, and was a magnificent feat carried out in a few days. One Wellington long range tank and one Mosquito drop tank were added, giving a total fuel load of 2406 gallons. The round trip totalled 2,252 track miles.
All aircraft carried Tallboy bombs. The take off presented no difficulties, and aircraft flew at 2,000 feet to within a short distance
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of the Norwegian coast, where a rapid climb was made to negotiate the high ground. A rendezvous point was chosen within a convenient distance of the target, and here both squadrons formed up, to attack the target in two separate forces, having made a rapid climb to bombing height. All went well as far as this point.
During the approach to the target, which lay along a fiord, all bomb-aimers obtained a good view of the battleship, which was lying in the briefed position. Unfortunately, at the crucial stage of the bombing run, cloud was encountered, caused doubtless by a wind coming in off the sea and striking the high ground surrounding the Tirpitz’s anchorage. The majority of crews were able to release their bombs, some after several runs, but four aircraft were unable to obtain a satisfactory run, and returned with their bombs.
There was without doubt, one very near miss, but up to the present there is no evidence, photographic or otherwise, to show that the battleship was hit.
Once again, these two squadrons were cheated of their prey, and this time by a trick of the weather which was wholly unexpected, and certainly undeserved.
With the exception of one 617 Squadron aircraft, which was hit over the target, and forced to land in Sweden, all aircraft returned safely with a reasonable safety margin of petrol, to advanced bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
All Group Gardeners returned to battle in excellent strength this month, and successfully planted 316 vegetables in 60 sorties, bringing our share to 39% of the Command total of 808.
The plantings were all made by H.2.S. and mostly confined to the Kattegat area, and continued the good work of dislocating the enemy’s shipping routes, by dropping over carefully chosen pinpoints and channel intersections through which the shipping is known to pass. Despite the long distances involved, with frequent icing conditions over target areas, and Bases often unfit for return, it is very satisfying to note that the high standard of efficiency and determination is being maintained by the Captains and their crews, and that the average load per aircraft has been kept to the maximum of six vegetables.
One of our largest operations for some months occurred on the 24th October, when twenty-five Gardeners set course to the Eastward and planted 149 vegetables. 10 loads were supplied by No.106 Squadron and 4, 4, 4, and 3 by Nos. 57, 630, 44 and 207 Squadrons respectively. The results of this lay were very promising, and as the crews sighted some twenty ships on this occasion within the vicinity, it is earnestly hoped that they did not all reach port safely.
To round off the month’s activities Nos.619 and 106 Squadrons had the honour to add to the ‘History of Mining’ by planting in a new and important Garden on the 28th October. It is early to anticipate results but as the enemy is bound to use this hitherto virgin piece of water, it will be interesting to see how he fares.
In the light of past experience, all Gardeners must now remain on their toes for the coming winter months are bound to offer excellent opportunities to strike hard at the enemy’s shipping organisation in every possible position, and to rapidly assist in his ultimate downfall.
A total summary of the value of this mode of warfare is unfortunately on the Top Secret list at this stage of the war, and is therefore unable to be disclosed. But when it is realised that the total sorties this year have already reached 14,457, as against 5,313 in 1943, some estimation can immediately be made on its degree of vital importance and effect. The area in which this offensive can be conducted has now diminished to a corner of Europe. But inside the limits of this area is contained an enemy who is feverishly pressing hard to retain his command of that sea, and so move his troops, stores, equipment and trade from Scandinavia to Germany. By the terms of the Russian-Finnish Armistice Germany has been denied the use of enormous tonnage in shipping. This means that their Merchant Fleet, Minesweepers and other craft already busily employed, will be forced to double their work to make good the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
requirements of a nation at war. Added to this distressing state of affairs, the enemy is now hurriedly building prefabricated U-Boats, and fitting them with every device possible in order to risk another strike at our forces. But each U-Boat is useless if she has not been ‘worked up’ by a highly trained crew for weeks, in a [underlined] safe [/underlined] area for practicing her ‘Torpedo Attacks’ and ‘Diving Trials’, or is unable to be completed at her building yard for the lack of some equipment that was to have arrived by sea transport and has been [underlined] sunk en route. [/underlined]
Whoever shall be so bold as to venture forth from this area for attack on our trade, will undoubtedly meet a hot reception from the Allied Navies and Coastal Command, but in the meantime let us delay, and if possible, prevent this, by the strong and penetrating effects of our Gardening effort.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Sorties Carried Out by Squadron]
[Underlined] GROUP VISITORS. [/underlined]
On the 2nd October, Rear Admiral J.H. Edelsten, C.B.E., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (U-Boats and Trade), paid a short visit to R.A.F. Station, Woodhall, to thank the Bombing and Gardening Squadrons for their excellent work and co-operation with the Royal Navy during the past months.
Rear Admiral Edelsten gave a short address stating the vital importance of this work, and strongly congratulated the Captains and crews who had taken part. He said that the results of the precision bombing had been most effective and successful towards the war effort as a whole, in assisting to force the U-Boats to retire to more distant bases, and that minelayers were performing a vitally important task in a thoroughly efficient and successful manner. Aerial mining is denying the safe passage of enemy shipping in their own waters, which for the time being were out of reach of His Majesty’s Ships.
Accompanying Rear Admiral Edelsten, were Rear Admiral E.D.B. McCarthy, D.S.O., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (Home Station), and Captain F.A. Slocum, O.B.E., Royal Navy, Deputy Director Operations Division (Intelligence).
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TEST. [/underlined]
One of the outstanding features in the Wireless Operators (Air) domain last month was the enthusiasm shown by squadrons in carrying out the W/T Controllers’ test. During the month 67 operators carried out the tests laid down in 5G. S.I. No.13, and out of that number 65 passed as suitable for W/T Link duties. It is hoped that this enthusiasm will continue, and all Wireless Operators (Air) will eventually pass this test of their ability in accurate tuning and operating of their W/T equipment under “target-area” conditions. The operators who passed the test during October were drawn from the squadrons shown in the following table:-
[Table of Numbers of W/Ops. (Air) Passing Test by Base and Squadron]
Now that the names of all W/T Link Wireless Operators are forwarded to Group Headquarters prior to each operation, it is possible to know exactly who are our first class men, and note how they perform in the crucial test of operating over the target area.
Next month it is hoped to publish the names of all Wireless Operators who have carried out Link duties during the month.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
During the month, this part of the Wireless Operators (Air) training was curtailed to some extent by daylight operations, but some good exercises were carried out. The introduction of an 18 and 20 w.p.m. test was well received, and still further changes in this training are impending. It is proposed that squadrons be divided
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
into four sections, and each section participate once per week. An alteration to the time of the exercise is also proposed.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS. [/underlined]
With the coming winter months, and the possible decrease in the number of operational and training flights, Signals Leaders must ensure that their training rooms are properly equipped and in good preparation for the extra ground training which will be necessary. All morse keys, headsets and equipment, should be checked over to ensure that full benefit can be derived from their use. Liaison between Signals Leaders and visits to neighbouring squadron training rooms should be encouraged.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES. [/underlined]
The curtailment in the use of early warning devices did leave the Wireless Operator (Air) with more time on his hands during an operational flight, and on many occasions the W/Op. did his watching from the astrodome when not required on the W/T equipment. It is hoped that in the near future these early warning devices will again become available, and with this in view training has continued at Conversion Units. Operators on the squadrons who may have let this training lapse should take steps to bring themselves up to the highest state of efficiency in manipulation and interpretation of these devices.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS. [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to four new Signals Leaders – F/O Cheshire, who has taken over Signals Leaders duties on 227 Squadron, F/O Chapman, 463 Squadron, F/O Tyler, 50 Squadron, and F/O Smith, 189 Squadron. We also take this opportunity of saying au revoir to F/Lt. Howarth, 50 Squadron and F/O Bulmer, 463 Squadron, who have now taken up other duties. We wish them every success in their new sphere.
[Underlined] SIGNALS’ WORKSHOPS. [/underlined]
The aim of all Base and Station Signals Officers must be to make their workshops into well laid out, comfortable, well lighted and warm laboratories. It is appreciated, that, with the type of accommodation available, this will not be an easy task, but it is certainly not an insurmountable one. Furthermore, this “pepping up” of workshops must take place before the full rigour of winter is upon us.
Every one must agree that mechanics will be far happier and therefore produce far more efficient work if their workshops are comfortable. In addition, workshops in which such delicate equipment as the T.R.5043 is being serviced, must be clean, tidy and warm, if the highest standard of serviceability is to be achieved.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
It is pleasing to record that throughout the past month not one operational sortie was cancelled, and only one aircraft returned early, as the result of a signals defect. The reason for this one early return is attributed to a flight engineer, who, in an attempt to repair a mid upper hydraulic leak, disconnected the intercom. wiring, allowing it to short circuit, thus rendering the whole intercommunication system unserviceable. Under classification ‘C’ (aircraft completing
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
mission) the failures were as follows:- W/T – 6; H/F. R/T – 9; V.H.F. R/T – 21; and intercom. – 9.
Of the V.H.F. defects, 50% were attributable to broken whip aerials. We are doing all in our power to overcome this breakage of aerials. The official view is that 20° backward rate could cure the trouble, but unfortunately to obtain this necessitates lowering part of the aerial beneath the aircraft skin, with the result that very severe interference is then caused to V.H.F. by the aircraft’s own H.2.S. equipment. We are endeavouring to obtain fighter type V.H.F. aerials – at least for the flare force and marking aircraft. Meanwhile, the application of de-icing paste and ensuring that the aerial is screwed right home, with no part of the aerial thread showing above the Rubber Lord mounting are the best palliatives. The necessity for units to report these defects in accordance with A.M.O. A.869/43 is again emphasised.
There were two servicing failures during the month. In both cases the T.R. 5043 receivers were off tune. Signals Officers must do all in their power to eliminate this criminal type of defect.
[Underlined] V.H.F. CHANGEOVER. [/underlined]
The month of October saw the quick and successful changeover from T.R.1143’s to T.R.5043’s in all operational aircraft of the Group. Apart from one dynamotor overheating and one selector mechanism being jammed, there have been no serious defects. This state of affairs is very promising. It is stressed, however, that G.P.O. keystops No.2 must be fitted on all controllers’ electric type 5003, and that when fitted there must be no “play” whatsoever in the T/R/REM switch – the tolerance of a few thousandths of an inch may result in the equipment going over to transmit. In this connection, all concerned are reminded that the type 170 switch in the transmitter H.T. lead is sealed in the “off” position prior to operational take-off.
Pilots are talking enthusiastically about the wonderfully clear, but sometimes too loud R/T now obtained. The audio pre-set control in the T.R.5043 should be set back to give comfortable volume, but it is appreciated that that will not cater for every taste. Rest assured, however, we are still trying hard to get a pilot’s manual volume control.
The efficiency of our new V.H.F. R/T equipment was well described recently by a main force flight commander who said how comforting it was when still miles away from the target to hear and recognise the calm voice of W/Cdr. Woodroffe talking to his markers and flare force, and to realise several minutes before the attack that the target had already been correctly located and marked.
[Underlined] SIGNALS HITS THE HEADLINES. [/underlined]
On the 1 o’clock news on Sunday, 29th October, the B.B.C. announced that the Tirpitz had been hit by a 12,000 lb bomb. This announcement was made approximately 3 hours before the aircraft which made the attack were due to return, and was based solely on two short W/T messages transmitted soon after the attack by a 9 Squadron aircraft, while that aircraft was still well over 1000 miles away from base.
These W/T messages were two of quite a number transmitted at ranges of up to and over 1000 miles, on this target.
This is an outstanding example of the ability of the present day Wireless Operator in long range daylight W/T communication. It is
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
all the more remarkable considering that the frequency in use was in the 8 mc/s band, and required spot on tuning to ensure any measure of success.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
There is a custom, now hoary with age, of prefixing ALL Bomber Code messages with the month and day of the code used in encyphering. This means that all Bomber Code messages are prefaced by a four-figure group, and the figures are NOT part of the encyphered text. This system has been explained slowly and laboriously to all users of the code, but for all that, a simple two group message, such as “2329 XY” was recently pronounced “unbreakable” by an officer who should have known better. Had the message been transmitted simply as “XY” he would have known it at once, and robbed himself of his present glory of the “Highly Derogatory Order of the Irremovable Digit”.
[Underlined] FLIGHT PLANNING. [/underlined]
The F.P.C. has now been in use for well over twelve months, and has proved to be a very reliable and efficient arrangement, which has contributed largely to the Group’s success. Despite its obvious efficiency, there are certain faults which cannot be eradicated without the complete isolation of all the circuits involved – a formidable task (involving 169 miles of cable for main circuits, and 185 miles for reserve circuits between Group and Bases alone), which cannot be contemplated. These faults mainly comprise overhearing teleprinter chatter and induced “ringing” tones, all of which are familiar to listeners.
There is another type of fault, which is not due to equipment, but which is traceable to users of the network. This can be stated briefly as a tendency to forget that the loudspeaker was designed to cater for an audience of two or three in a small room, and to speak too fast as though taking part in an ordinary telephone conversation. This speed, allied with the extraneous noises explained above, tends to mystify rather than enlighten the listener in a large room. Slower and more carefully enunciated speech, pitched somewhat higher than normal, but without shouting, will be found to produce more satisfactory results.
One last word. The conference is not secret for the reason, already given, that the conference circuits run in multi-pair G.P.O. cables, where mutual overhearing was always liable to occur. For this reason mention of the target by name, or of turning points with reference to altitude and longitude should always be avoided. Lest this warning should result in too obscure future plannings, it should be added that civilian conversations which are frequently overheard on conferences are amplified at this Headquarters, whereas civilians who overhear part of the conference do not receive an amplified version.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
Although operations completed by the Group during October were considerably fewer than in the preceding few months, there was no let up in the work being done by the Radar Sections.
With the opening of two stations at Fulbeck and Balderton, the transfer of the Base to Syerston and 49 Squadron to Fulbeck, there was plenty of work to be done. In addition to all this, two new squadrons have now been formed and moved to the new stations. The most critical problem arising out of the formation of these squadrons has
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1933 [sic].
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
been the furnishing of Radar Mechanics, and up to this date is still causing considerable inconvenience. In order to lighten the burden on those few already there, several mechanics were withdrawn from other Bases and posted to 56 Base. In the past few days, however, a number of mechanics have been posted into 56 Base from Radio Schools, and this should alleviate the situation somewhat. It is hoped that the remaining deficiency will gradually improve and will eventually be eliminated.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
The success of the trials and experiments on H.2S. [sic] Mark III is proceeding with a vengeance at Coningsby. To relieve the strain on those mechanics doing the valuable work, action has been taken to attach temporarily a number of H.2.S. II mechanics from 53 Base Stations.
In pursuance of this experiment, a new type of scanner was procured from T.R.E. Air Tests were made immediately, and results, to say the least, were encouraging. Arrangements have now been made to have several of these scanners produced, and the first should be available about the second week of November. In the meantime, further tests are being made with the existing scanners in an endeavour to raise their efficiency. Several different ideas have been investigated, the latest of which shows considerable promise.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK II. [/underlined]
The restrictions on the use of H.2.S. remained in force during October, and this was the prime reason for the decision to remove the equipment from 53 Base Squadrons. It was felt that the time being spent by personnel in servicing the equipment there would be more valuably spent if they were transferred to 54 and 56 Bases, where acute shortages in strength existed. Simultaneously it was decided to halt the fitting of H.2.S. in 227 Squadron, and to remove what had already been installed.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Right on the heels of the decision to withdraw H.2.S. from 53 Base, came the policy to equip 53 Base and some of the 54 Base Squadrons with Loran. This policy has since been altered to include all 5 Group Squadrons. Fitting is now going ahead, and it is hoped to see the whole Group equipped by the 1st December, and also to have a large number of radar and navigation personnel trained on the equipment. It is stressed, however, that the Bomber Command school cannot hope to train more than a nucleus of mechanics between now and December, and for this reason Radar Officers should ensure that the knowledge of those attending the course at Bomber Command is imparted to the remainder of their respective sections. To facilitate easier servicing of Loran, photostatic copies of circuit diagrams, which can be placed on the walls above benches will be made in the near future.
[Underlined] GEE MARK II. [/underlined]
Much to our regret, although it was forecast in September’s Summary, the supply position of Gee had gradually deteriorated, and even now there is no indication of it improving in the near future. Every possible effort is being made to obtain components which will enable sets, which at present cannot be used, to be made serviceable. This number has fortunately been greatly reduced during the last month. In view of this acute shortage of equipment, it becomes increasingly essential that all cases of component breakdowns are brought to the notice of Sigs.7 at Air Ministry, vide A.M.O. A.869/43. A reminder
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
is also given that if no reply has been received from Air Ministry within a month dating from the originating of the report, there is no need to hold the unit or component for investigation. Secondly, if operational requirements demand that the unit be used before the month has elapsed, a record to this effect should be kept.
[Underlined] GEE SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
As mentioned at the outset of the Summary of October’s activities, the number of sorties undertaken by 5 Group were fewer than for the preceding months. Gee was reported ‘bang on’ for 96.8% of the sorties, despite the most unsatisfactory supply position, and accordingly all due credit must be given to the radar mechanics who made this possible.
[Underlined] H.2.S. SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
For the very limited number of occasions on which H2S II was used an increased serviceability of .7% over September was obtained, to bring it up to 91.4%. The time is fast approaching when scanners will require careful attention with regard to lubrication and heating. Radar Officers should ensure that the modification has been completed in all aircraft, to eliminate the danger of freezing up, which gave us so much bother last winter. It is again stressed that A.M.O. A. 869/43 action is to be taken on all occasions when components break down.
H.2.S. III suffered a slight set-back in serviceability for October, and out of the 85 sorties completed, 10 developed difficulties, giving a percentage of 88.2 serviceable.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond maintained approximately the same degree of serviceability for September and October, being 90.7 and 90.8 per cent respectively.
[Underlined] SALVETE ET VALETE. [/underlined]
The 1st of November marked the loss to the Group of our old Radar I, S/Ldr. Tom Branson. He had been with the Group for over two years, and all will agree that it was to a large degree due to his guidance and whole-hearted support that Radar is playing such a successful part in the operations conducted by the Group. We wish him the greatest success in his new work, and at the same time, extend to S/Ldr. Perrin a most hearty welcome.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month has produced the unusual phenomena of heavy raids well into Germany with negligible losses from fighters. This has been due to the very short warning that the German defences now get of the approach of a raid, and a skilful combination of Window spoofs, the Mandrel screen and other countermeasures.
We have won the first round, but the Hun is bound to stage a come-back. With the lengthening nights and deeper penetrations his job will become easier. He has a highly developed Radar system, and it is now known that, in addition to the H.E.219, considerable numbers of the M.E.110 and J.U.88 are fitted with two upward firing 20 m.m. cannon.
[Cartoon] WHERE’S THAT FLAK COMING FROM?
I WOULDN’T KNOW – I’M ONLY THE REAR GUNNER
These fighters attempt to formate some distance below the bomber’s tail, and rake it. With the loss of early warning devices, the only answer to this form of attack is a regular banking search and an ability to see the fighter during the search. The first is useless without the second. Gunners must realise that to see a fighter underneath on a dark winter’s night is a very different proposition from d=seeing a fighter coming in level astern on a clear starlit night. The importance of efficient night vision and, therefore, night-vision training, cannot be over emphasised.
With regard to combat manoeuvres, the corkscrew is still the most effective provided the fighter is seen in time. On a dark night, however, crews must be prepared for sudden unseen attacks, to which the only answer is the diving turn. Captains must ensure that they have some form of emergency signal from their gunners and that they can act on it immediately. This does not mean violent mishandling of the controls. On pilot of this Group put up an ‘black’ this month by returning to base with a large number of rivets missing from the wings of his aircraft. He was lucky to get back at all. Two doses of such handling and even a Lancaster would have succumbed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER,1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TACTICS. [/underlined]
Two last points:-
(i) The Hun has started to use jet-propelled aircraft at night. They are very easily seen, and can only be considered a threat on bright nights. Gunners should remember, however, that due to the very high speed of these aircraft, combat manoeuvres should be started at increased range.
(ii) “Stepping Down” out of a target does not mean 20°of flap and everything closed. It is a series of dives at high speed with normal boost and revs, the idea being to get down quickly and also to leave the target quickly. Some figures for the guidance of crews are being produced for distribution.
[Cartoon] KEEP OFF THE GRASS
“Detailed – 15 Took off – 9:
E.R’s – Nil: Missing – Nil”
[Underlined] Cancelled – 6 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The night attacks on German targets undertaken by the Group were again planned to destroy sectors of towns and cities that had to a large extent, escaped major damage during previous attacks. However, incendiary plots show that quite a large proportion of the bomb loads did not fall on the section of the target area they were intended for. There were quite a number of early releases causing the “creep-back” it is so important to avoid, and aircraft not adhering to the briefed [underlined] TRACKS, [/underlined] scattered thousands of incendiaries on areas which had been burned out during previous raids. Cross-trail has been practically eliminated by the use of the wind conversion factors for various T.V’s, and additional time delay.
Now that the chances of a cloud-covered target are greater than during the summer months, the Air Bomber must be prepared for a sudden change of tactics a matter of minutes before the commencement of the bombing run. If he is not sure of the “Wanganui” procedure, and cannot make the necessary alterations to the bombsight in a short space of time, the opportunity for an accurate attack will be lost.
The Group has reached a very high standard of practice bombing and if German targets are attacked with this same degree of accuracy, every bomb will fall where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] THE LORD CAMROSE TROPHY. [/underlined]
The Air Officer Commanding visited R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, to present the Lord Camrose Trophy to No.50 Squadron who have won the competition for the second consecutive period of three months, with an average crew error of 148 yards at 20,000 feet, for all high level practice bombing during that period.
The A.O.C. congratulated the Squadron upon their success which had only been achieved by the close co-operation between all members of the bombing team and the high standard of bombsight serviceability provided by the Instrument Section.
The fact that practice bombing results provide an indication of a Squadron’s efficiency and accuracy on operations was also stressed.
In conclusion, No.50 Squadron were warned that other squadrons in the Group were making a great effort to defeat them during the next three months and it will need an even greater effort on their part to retain the trophy.
W/Cdr. Frogley, O.C., No.50 Squadron, thanked the A.O.C. and assured him that the Squadron were determined not the lose the trophy, despite increasing opposition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OCTOBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
The qualification for inclusion on this list is now 75 yards at 20,000 ft. instead of 80 yards.
SQDN. OR CON. UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
9 F/O Davis Sgt. Harrison Sgt. Ward 55 yards
F/O Tweddle P/O Singer P/O Shields 73 yards
44 F/O Lewis F/Sgt. King F/Sgt. Shearman 70 yards
49 F/Lt. Le Marquand Sgt. Boyce F/O Ransome 44 yards
F/O Rowley F/O Barlow P/O Deutscher 62 yards
50 F/Lt. Enoch F/Sgt. Hugh F/O George 73 yards
61 F/O Swales Sgt. Taylor F/O Saunders 56 yards
106 F/O Bowell F/Sgt. Plumb Sgt. Peterson 74 yards
207 F/O Dougal F/Sgt. Scowen Sgt. Stewart 70 yards
617 F/O Martin F/Sgt. Day P/O Jackson 58 & 58 yards
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly P/O McKie 62 yards
630 F/O Waterfall Sgt. Dixon Sgt. Kindler 68 yards
1654 C.U. F/Lt. Dagnon Sgt. Watson F/O Mayer 72 yards
F/Sgt. Eggins Sgt. Grady F/Sgt. Cahill 51 yards
F/O Gilmour F/O Burrington Sgt. Steadman 56 yards
No.617 Squadron report the following outstanding Mk.III Low Level exercise.
F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien
8 bombs – 400 feet – Average Error 9 yards.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
This month’s figures show a decrease in the number of bombs dropped within the Group, due to the limitations imposed by unfavourable weather conditions. The errors however, have decreased considerably and much of the credit must go to the navigators, the majority of whom now realise that the prime factor in an exercise is the obtaining of an accurate wind velocity.
The outstanding result of the month is that achieved by No. 61 Squadron. After a temporary fall from grace last month, they have, during October, dropped 522 bombs for an average crew error of 131 yards. An excellent start in the first round of the Lord Camrose Trophy competition.
Nos.9 and 50 Squadrons can also be congratulated on obtaining crew errors of 135 yards and 138 yards respectively.
The Conversion Units appear in this Summary for the last time, but it is hoped that we shall be able to publish their figures as a matter of interest to the Squadrons who will eventually receive crews trained in No.75 Base.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The following article has been contributed by S/Ldr. Wonham, D.F.M., Bombing Leader, 55 Base, and outlines a practical method of obtaining maximum benefit from the limited opportunities for practice bombing available during the winter months.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING. [/underlined]
With the coming of the winter weather, practice bombing on operational squadrons will be more and more difficult to organise, and the somewhat haphazard method of laying on the maximum number of exercises which has served during the summer months is going to prove very inadequate now that early take-offs and low cloud will limit the opportunities for high level practice bombing. It is felt that a definite system should be aimed at by Flight and Squadron Commanders.
The advantage of a regular and systematic method had amply proved itself in all manner of training from the creating of a rugby team to the organisation of the crew of a battleship. On first thought it would appear that the many difficulties entailed by practice bombing training in a squadron make it impossible to use one system, but a method is necessary, and if squadrons try to adhere to a form of training on the lines of that suggested, it would be found that in a few months errors would be reduced to an even lower level than at present believed possible with the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
Firstly let us consider as average squadron with 30 crews as a permanent strength, and an intake of about 10 crews per month. On the first of any given month the categories of the crews will probably be:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 5
CAT. B 18
CAT. C 6
CAT. D 1
The 10 new arrivals would have a bombing standard on Stirlings of:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 2
CAT. B 6
CAT. C 1
CAT. D1
In actual fact when bombing from Lancaster aircraft at first, these categories fall considerably, and it is usual that a crew on its first exercise on the squadron gets an error of about 240 yards. Experience has shown that on an average, with careful analysis and instruction, this error improves to 200x on the second exercise, and 160x on the third. Consider, therefore, the average new crew as in Cat. C on arrival and a potential B after the first three exercises.
In the same way we may consider the Squadron Crews (as apart from the new arrivals) who are Category C., as potential A’s and B’s after 2 exercises, and the Category D crews as potential B’s after 3 exercises.
The target, therefore, for a Squadron Commander should be to give during the month:-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
10 New Crews 3 exercises each – 30
6 Cat. C. Crews 2 exercises each – 12
1 Cat.D. Crew 3 exercises – 3
[Underlined] TOTAL – 45 [/underlined]
This appears to be quite a large programme to complete during a winter month, and as the Category A and B crews already on the squadron also need some bombing practice, the total number of exercises completed by the squadron would be in the region of 60 to 70.
If this is to be accomplished it means taking advantage of every opportunity provided by the weather and operational needs. Base Bombing Leaders must endeavour to avoid over-crowding on the range at their disposal, and crews can assist by being on the range at the times detailed.
[Underlined] DO YOU KNOW YOUR SWITCH DRILL? [/underlined]
An aircraft returned from an abortive sortie with a full bomb-load of H.E., and it was decided that a few of the bombs would have to be jettisoned in order to get down to the safe all-up weight for landing. On reaching the jettison area, the Air Bomber put the fusing switches to “SAFE”, turned the drum-switch to “SINGLE AND SALVO”, selected the appropriate bomb stations, then pushed the jettison bars over.
[Underlined] ITEMS OF INTEREST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1661 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Price) [/underlined] now have an excellent ‘mock-up’ of the Lancaster bombing panel including the camera. Several unusual and effective ideas are incorporated and thanks are due to F/Lt. Buckley, Station Electrical Officer, for providing this excellent aid to instruction.
[Underlined] 1654 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Kennedy) [/underlined] report that No.95 Course completed 30 High Level practice bombing exercises with an average crew error 138 yards at 20,000 feet. This is an excellent result and as nine of the Captains are Australians, Waddington should produce some A+ category crews very shortly.
F/O Mason (Pilot) and F/O Barker (Air Bomber) completed a very good exercise despite the absence of wind finding aids. Their aircraft had no A.P.I. and Gee was found to be u/s, so a three-drift wind of 286 degrees 24 m.p.h. was found, and six bombs were dropped using this wind. The resulting errors were:-
Crew 111 yards
Vector 85 yards
Basic 82 yards at 20,000 feet.
Another three-drift wind, 280 degrees 30 m.p.h. was found, and a further six bombs were dropped with even better results.
Crew error 61 yards
Vector error 42 yards
Basic error 46 yards
Both winds were checked by the 90° method and the results of the exercise are a tribute to the accuracy of both the Pilot and the Air Bomber.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1660 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Wake) [/underlined] report an example of perseverance on the part of F/O Howard and crew who were detailed to drop 12 practice bombs in indifferent weather conditions. The exercise took four hours to complete and two ‘A’ category results were obtained.
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Linnett) [/underlined] issue all Air Bombers with a height correction card to allow for the difference between the T.V. of the practice bomb, and the minimum it is possible to set on the bombsight. This has helped to bring the average crew error down from 238 yards to 160 yards.
[Underlined] East Kirkby (F/Lt. Hanniball & F/Lt. Foulkes) [/underlined] are endeavouring to equip a Station Training Room where Air Bombers will have all the available training equipment concentrated in one place.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 207 53 yards
2nd 83 54 yards
3rd 630 63 yards
4th 57 65 yards
5th 97 69 yards
6th 44 72 yards
7th 9 73 yards
8th 49 79 yards
9th 463 88 yards
10th 61 92 yards
11th 619 93 yards
12th 106 98 yards
13th 50 103 yards
14th 467 118 yards
No. 227 Squadron completed 5 exercises with an average error of 162 yards.
No.207 Squadron are the winners of the Inter-Squadron Competition with an exceptionally good average for eight exercises, only just beating 83 Squadron. The results obtained by both these Squadrons are highly commendable.
No.55 Base have staged a revival during the past few months and four of their squadrons are included in the first six, a careful study of these pages will provide a few of the reasons for their success.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1660 C.U. 60 yards
2nd 1654 C.U. 65 yards
3rd 1661 C.U. 75 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 145 yards
No.1660 Conversion Unit have done well during the month, and competition between the three Conversion Units remains very keen, but No.5 L.F.S. cannot do enough bombing to compete with them and consequently are once again at the bottom of the list.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The only entry for this month comes from 55 Base:-
G/Capt. Harris (Spilsby) – 136 yards.
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Campbell (9 Sqdn) – 92 yards.
F/Lt. Foulkes (630 Sqdn) – 120 yards.
There should be more than two entries for the Leader’s competition, and a 100% entry is expected for November.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
ӿ Excluding Nos.617 and 627 Squadrons.
X Plus 14 not categorised.
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
The number of A+ category crews is a record for the Group. All crews in this category demonstrate their ability to maintain a consistently high standard of bombing and it should be given the widest publicity within the squadron.
The crew bombing category is not applied to an individual, but to the combination of Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber and it should be every Captain’s duty to discover [underlined] WHY [/underlined] his team is in C or D category.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Price (1661 C.U.) [/underlined] has returned to operational duties as Bombing Leader with No.50 Squadron, and has been replaced at Winthorpe by F/Lt. Falgate (50 Sqdn.).
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (49 Sqdn.) [/underlined] is Bombing Leader with No.227 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Lewis (92 Group) [/underlined] has been appointed Bombing Leader at No.189 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Woods (617 Sqdn.) [/underlined has completed his tour and been replaced by F/O Rumgay.
[underlined] F/Lt. Gibson (A.C.S.) [/underlined] returns to No.49 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
No.617 Squadron also dropped 209 T.I’s with an average error of 58 yards.
No.627 Squadron dropped 308 bombs and 280 T.I’s with average errors of 60 yards and 151 yards respectively.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS OF COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Manos 50 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Palmer 57 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Krinke 619 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Woollam 44 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Goodwin 467 Sqdn ‘D’
F/O ALEY, 1654 Conversion Unit, obtained 1st place and an ‘A’ category on No. 94 Course.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
The following are the figures from the Bombing Ranges for the month of October, 1944.
[Table of Bombs and T.I’s Dropped by Range]
[Underlined] TOTAL 7626 [/underlined]
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Less than half the attacks this month have been on Germany, the majority being on short range targets at the battlefront. An interesting operation was carried out on Bergen at the end of the month, which gave some navigators their first experience of navigation on the Northern Gee Chain, undisturbed by the enemy’s defences jamming. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons attacked the “Tirpitz” again in Northern Waters, making a round flight of 2400 miles. (This operation will be dealt with in another paragraph).
The standard of navigation achieved throughout the month has been good – BUT NOT EXCEPTIONAL. It has been said that one must either progress or retrogress, but never stand still. At the moment the Navigation Union of this Group is standing still, inasmuch that our standard is not improving. We have reached a standard of concentration which is good but not yet good enough. It must be our aim to improve this standard to guarantee a concentration, at any time, covering an area of not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width – and we are a long way from this as yet.
Take the raid on Nuremburg, 19/20th October, 1944, as an example. The concentration plot for this raid one hour after bombing showed that the spread, in length, was 100 miles, and in width, 42 miles. No less than 43 aircraft were out of the “tram lines”, and this only 80 minutes after bombing! What are the causes of such a spread? The following are suggested:-
(i) [Underlined] Track Keeping. [/underlined]
(a) Navigators do not find an accurate w/v at the target on which they can set course on the return journey.
(b) Navigators do not obtain D.R. check positions, by use of A.P.I. and target w/v, every 10 or 15 minutes on the return journey when out of Gee range.
(c) In consequence of (b) G/S and E.T.A. checks are not obtained regularly when out of Gee range, consequently turning points are under and over-shot.
(ii) [Underlined] Timing. [/underlined]
(a) Corner are cut to make up or gain a little time.
(b) Captains [underlined] do not [/underlined] fly at the agreed speeds and [underlined] do not [/underlined] take any notice of navigators’ warnings of being early at turning points.
(c) Navigators “sit back” and do not inform the pilot that they are running ahead of time. (It has been noted that very few aircraft are behind concentration times on the return journey).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Of all the above suggested cases, it is known (ii) (b) is the most important and is the chief cause of the spread. Pilots are entirely at fault here, but navigation is primarily YOUR responsibility, so make sure that YOUR pilot sees this paragraph. If he doesn’t believe it, tell him to go and see your Station Navigation Officer and he will put him right. Also see that your pilot is shown every concentration diagram sent from Group, or better still, show it to him yourself. Get him navigation conscious, he is the captain of the aircraft and as such must realise his responsibilities.
Station Navigation Officers have already discussed this matter and have given their suggestions for combatting these failings. These are being attended to but meantime it is requested that all Station Navigation Officers, working in conjunction with Analysis Officers, give this problem their undivided attention. Discussions, with not only navigators but also pilots, should be arranged frequently until we have achieved our aim.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT. [/underlined]
We still have only five of these attachments in the Group – all there are in the Command! No.9 Squadron have two of these and have put them to good use on operation and training flights. In some instances they have obtained amazingly low vector errors. It is doubtful whether the large vector errors, which have been occasionally obtained, are attributable to the crews concerned, because it is known that one of the instruments does not always function correctly.
The remaining three attachments are installed in Mosquito aircraft of No.627 Squadron for trial purposes. To date 24 exercises have been completed and the results fully justify our demand for a large supply of these instruments. Approximately 100 w/v’s were obtained on these trials and were compared with smoke puffs and Balloon Sonde winds. This comparison showed that an A.P.I. attachment w/v had an average vector error of only 2.64 m.p.h. These results are excellent, and there is no reason why they cannot be repeated on operations. As soon as we have more of these instruments available, and are able to equip the Mosquito Squadron completely, we shall have solved our target windfinding problems. Everything is being done to obtain these extra attachments.
It is interesting to compare the above results with those achieved by (i) Lancasters fitted with A.P.I. attachment, (ii) Lancaster fitted only with A.P.I. To date 25 practice and operational flights have been undertaken by Lancaster attachment aircraft and their average vector error, computed as for Mosquitoes, was 1.75 m.p.h. The average practice bombing vector error for main force squadrons, using only the A.P.I. was 4.75 m.p.h. for the month of September, and 4.3 m.p.h. for the month of October.
The difference between the Mosquito and Lancaster attachment errors is probably explained by the fact that in a Lancaster aircraft the job is done by two men as against the Mosquito’s one, also the Lancaster navigator can work in comfort, bright light and in a spacious compartment. All these lead to greater accuracy in work.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
All analysis officers are now installed and have settled down to their arduous task. Already they are achieving some good results. There has been a noticeable improvement in the general standard of wind finding, log and chart work and computations. An improvement on the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
general standard so soon after appointing these officers was unexpected and augers well for the future.
The number of ‘A’ and ‘A+’ Navigators in the Group has increased from 101 in September to 142 in October; and the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Navigators has decreased from 61 in September to 33 in October. This is good, but the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Category Navigators is still far too high. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must do everything in their power to reduce this figure of 33 to nil.
The standard of navigation set by this Headquarters in the Categorisation Test, which is the basis of all analyses, is high. Analysis Officers must maintain this standard and must be strict in their marking. Only by adopting this attitude will you ensure that your analyses reflect a true picture of the general standard of navigation in your particular squadron. The predominating weaknesses of each navigator, so obvious from the analysis of his log and chart, must be passed on to the Station Navigation Officer immediately and definitely within 36 hours of completing an operation. He will do the rest. The information must be passed [underlined] quickly [/underlined] however, to ensure that the navigator in question can have his faults pointed out to him before he operates again.
One final word to Analysis Officers. You have much work to do which will keep you well occupied, but even so you should make a special point of liaising with your opposite numbers in other squadrons, preferably in another Base. Much can be learnt from the liaison visit, and you are bound to pick up one or two ideas better than your own.
[Underlined] SECOND ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ”. [/underlined]
The battleship “Tirpitz” was attacked a second time by aircraft of No.9 and 617 Squadrons. Navigators of the two squadrons were therefore given another chance to show their skill – and once again they came up to expectations.
The operation was carried out as a “night gaggle”, all aircraft burning lights until within 50 miles of enemy territory. Weather was poor over the first part of the trip, which was carried out at a height of 1,000 feet. This low altitude combined with the very heavy static in the cloud, restricted the Gee range to 62N 01E in most cases, although some fixes were obtained as far as 63N. After Gee coverage, cloud made the use of Astro very difficult, and the remainder of the route over the sea was mainly on DR. Due to a change of wind landfall was made some 15 miles south of track, but the moonlight made it possible to pinpoint very accurately, and no further navigational troubles were experienced from then until the target was reached.
The return trip was uneventful, accurate navigation was made almost impossible because of the lack of aids. From the target aircraft had to fly for a total of 3 1/2 hours on D.R. Navigation before they came into Gee range once again. Loop homing facilities were made available and good use was made of them. Gee re-appeared at approximately 62° north, and from then on it was all plain sailing.
The average duration of this trip was 13 hours, and the navigators have every reason to feel satisfied with their contribution to this operation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1844.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
It has been decided that the names of the eight navigators who submit the best work for the month shall appear in this Summary. The following navigators have been picked out for their consistent accurate and methodical work. This includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks, and checking of E.T.A’s, and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Ward – 467 Squadron.
F/O. Markham – 463 Squadron.
Sgt. Berry – 106 Squadron.
Sgt. Burns – 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Lengston – 630 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Latus – 619 Squadron.
F/O. Bailey – 49 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Searle – 227 Squadron.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TRAINING IN THE CONVERSION UNITS. [/underlined]
This month has seen little change in the training programme, with the exception that still greater stress has been laid on the importance of timing. Its importance is being stressed at every “verse end”; no doubt squadrons will appreciate this when the present lot of trainees are posted to them.
Every effort has been made to get crews up to standard in their Radar training. This has been most difficult because of the weather and a sudden “torrent” of aircraft unserviceability. However, crews are receiving plenty of valuable ground training and manipulation exercises on the trainers. It is hoped that this extra ground training will partially compensate the loss of a little air training.
The Conversion Units are carrying out experiments on practice bombing wind finding, using Gee co-ordinated as a datum point. The vector errors will be compared with those obtained using a visual datum point and a Mk.XIV Sighting Head. If these experiments prove successful, then, with the introduction of the new Continental Gee chains, it may be possible to use such a method on operations when cloud prevents the using of a visual datum point. The results are eagerly awaited.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all squadrons and conversion units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 4.3 m.p.h.
Average error of Conversion Units – 5.5 m.p.h.
These figures show an improvement for the squadrons of .4 m.p.h., but
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
a deterioration for the conversion units of .5 m.p.h. The over-all average is still below 5 m.p.h., let us now go all out for reducing it below the 4 m.p.h. mark.
[Ranked Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadrons and Conversion Units]
For the fifth month in succession Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons hold the first two places. There is no doubt that this excellent performance on the part of these two squadrons is due entirely to their hard work and great keenness. There is a noticeable improvement in the errors obtained by the three squadrons of No.54 Base. This is good, but we are confident that they can do much better. We hope to see them at the top of the list next month.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Williams, DFC, DFM – No.463 Squadron Navigation Leader – posted to No.1661 Con. Unit as Navigation Leader.
S/Ldr. Walker, DFC & Bar – Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall repatriated to Canada.
S/Ldr. Crowe, DFC – Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/Lt. Martin – No.630 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Hewitt – No.630 Squadron, to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Ayles, DFC, DFM – Navigation Leader, Aircrew School, to be Station Navigation Officer, Balderton.
F/O. Swinyard, DFC – Aircrew School, to be Navigation Leader.
F/Lt. Kilbey, DFM – No.1660 Con. Unit Navigation Leader, to be Squadron Navigation Officer, No.227 Squadron.
F/Lt. Ingram, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be Navigation Leader.
F/O. Booth, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be No.189 Squadron Navigation Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Once again much greater use has been made of this efficient little aid than of its bigger brother H.2.S.
Ranges on the primary Gee chains have been much similar to those experienced during September, but areas of intensive jamming noted in Northern Holland, along the Frisians and in the Ruhr and Frankfurt areas.
Opportunity has again been afforded for operators to use the north-eastern and northern chains. Both chains gave excellent cover, with the northern chain giving target fixes. The only “moan” being that the chart coverage of the north-eastern chain is insufficient, leaving a blank area at its northern limits before the northern chain comes in.
After much trouble with the siting of Stations, preparation of lattice charts and their distribution, the Ruhr and Rheims chains have at last come into being. So far the Rheims chain has proved quite satisfactory with little or no interference. However teething troubles are still being experienced with the Ruhr chain, mainly due to the fact that two of the stations are light mobiles. When these have been changed far better reception and coverage should be obtained, and charts are to be produced covering the North Sea, and Straits of Dover, thus cutting out the changeover of the R.F. Units over the Continent. Until this is done the eastern chain transmission on the R.F.27 is to continue.
Although little or no jamming has yet been experienced on the two new chains, it does not mean to say that the Hun will not devote his time to them. Operators are therefore reminded that much time can usefully be spent reading through jamming on the trainer. You may need this experience some day.
With the positioning of Gee stations nearer and nearer the Reich and probably on Reich territory, the possibility of Gee bombing again comes to the forefront. Every opportunity must therefore be made of practicing your Gee bombing. Homing to your airfield control tower is quite satisfactory, why not do it after every flight? (Don’t forget to keep above circuit height however).
A word about Gee homing with the advent of winter and possibilities of low cloud or drissle [sic] on return. The facilities afforded by Gee in order to reach your airfield are too numerous to outline here. You have your homing lattice lines and instructions regarding losing height. These have been provided for your safety – use them intelligently and avoid the repetition of many unfortunate accidents which occurred last winter.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Yet another navigational aid has made its debut this month in the form of Loran (Long Range Navigation). Whilst not so simple to operate as its older brother Gee it has one distinct advantage – its range. As Loran does not afford adequate homing facilities it has been fitted to aircraft in addition to and not in place of Gee, giving the navigator one more “baby” to care for. Let us see that we bring it through the teething stages without much trouble and use it as intelligently as Gee has been used in the past.
To help to counteract the teething trouble it might be as well to enumerate here the main difficulties which will be experienced with Loran by most operators during training.
(i) Difficulty in identifying the pulses, particularly the sky waves.
Ground waves are steady in amplitude.
Sky waves frequently vary in amplitude and are constantly changing their general shape. This is known as SPLITTING and usually the trailing or right edge only is affected. This is not particularly serious in the taking of readings.
(ii) DANGEROUS SPLITTING of the sky waves, causing the leading or left edge of the pulses to collapse and appear ragged. This does not persist for more than two or three minutes and operators should therefore wait until the normal pulse shape reappears before attempting to take any readings.
(iii) Interference from outside sources. Navigators are warned that Loran may be affected by many wireless transmissions, but patience must be exercised when this occurs. Wait until the interferences stop before attempting to take a reading. This interference is in no way to be confused with jamming, which is hardly likely to occur at the present time.
(iv) Blinking of the pulses, i.e. signals moving from side to side at regular intervals of about 1 second. This denoted the slave station is experiencing trouble in receiving the Master Station’s transmissions. Readings are not to be taken when blinking is on.
Training in Loran is to be undertaken by operational navigators trained by B.D.U. These instructors will be withdrawn from squadrons, trained at B.D.U. and returned on completion of the course. Each squadron should have at least one per flight in the very near future.
With the present operational commitments it is hardly possible that much time will be allowed for air training and the majority of training will have to be carried out on the ground.
Unfortunately air training over this country does not allow operators much chance to use the S.S. Loran chain and training flights over the Continent have therefore been organised. It is hardly likely that time will allow many of these flights to be made. Many navigators may therefore have to train whilst on operational sorties. With the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
difficulties that are experienced with Loran, this method of training may not appear too satisfactory, but every navigator can, by devoting a proportion of his time in the operation of Loran on each sortie, attain a good standard of efficiency.
Air Bombers too are to acquaint themselves with this new aid and give as much help to the navigators as they possibly can.
Very little is known about the reception of Loran over the Continent, and we are relying on every individual operator using this equipment to bring back as much information as possible. From this information better facilities may be provided in the future. It is up to each and every one of you to see that this duty is carried out.
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
Very little can be said of the performance of H2S Mark II on operations during the month due to the severe restrictions which have been placed upon its use.
However several gardening sorties have been undertaken with the use of H2S Mark II and results have shown no decrease in the efficiency of its operators.
It must necessarily follow that under present restrictions, the training of operators will take much longer than before. In addition, little opportunity is given to operators to study the appearance of European territory on the P.P.I.
To make up for this time lost, it is all the more necessary for even greater use to be made of flying time over this country and of synthetic training.
No N.F.T. or bombing exercises should be carried out without using the equipment either for practice blind bombing or navigational purposes. Every minute spent over this country making yourself familiar with the equipment may mean the saving of valuable time over the Continent, particularly if you have the full manipulation drill at your finger tips.
It has been noted that since the restrictions have been placed on the use of H2S Mark II, considerable lack of faith in the equipment has been expressed by many operators. This it is believed has been due to the various tales which have invariably spread amongst aircrew.
To counteract this lack of faith a report has been issued to all squadrons detailing the reasons for the restrictions and if operators spend a little time in reading the report it will do a lot to dispel these rumours. In addition they will feel more determined to obtain the maximum out of H2S on the various occasions it can be used.
The performance of H2S Mark II has been of its usual high order, 83 and 97 Squadrons again having carried out several successful attacks during the month.
Experiments have been going ahead to design a perfect scanner to eliminate the serious gap which has been occurring in the picture at 6 miles. This has been achieved and with equipment fitted with the new scanner it should be possible to bomb direct on the response with greater accuracy and less difficulty than with the present indicator. Good work 54 Base!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
P.P.I. Photography has been carried out on all operations during the month and several good photographs have been obtained by Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons. Whilst the present camera leaves much to be desired, operators must remember that it is the only check on the target area if cloud conditions prevail; every effort must be made therefore to obtain successful photographs.
If the photograph is not taken at bomb release, enter on your Interrogation form the number of seconds it was taken before or after release and you will be plotted correctly.
The excuse that both set operator and plotter are busy when in the target areas cannot be accepted. This is an operational photograph and it must be taken.
Experiments are being made by this Headquarters and at Headquarters, Bomber Command, to simplify the manipulation of the present camera and also to improve the quality of photographs obtained. It is realised that if sufficiently good photographs can be obtained, navigational and target approach strip maps can be produced for the benefit of all concerned. It is therefore up to every individual operator to see that these photographs are forthcoming.
106 Squadron are progressing favourably in the training of crews for the P.F.F. Squadrons. It is realised that H2S Mark II, whilst it gives a good idea of the basic principles of H2S, does not provide the facilities of the 184 Indicator and Mark III H2S. Despite this, every effort is being made by 106 Squadron to see that crews are fully aware of the basic principles of all H2S equipment before they arrive at 83 and 97 Squadrons, leaving only the finer points and intensive blind bombing training to be carried out by those squadrons.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] 51 BASE’S LAST MONTH. [/underlined]
This month was the last in which 51 Base was part and parcel of No.5 Group. On the 3rd November the three Heavy Conversion Units became No.75 Base under the administration of the newly formed No. 7 Heavy Conversion Unit Group. No.75 Base will, however, retain a direct affiliation with No.5 Group, and except in special circumstances will provide crews for No. 5 L.F.S. and No.5 Group Squadrons in the usual way. No.5 L.F.S. will remain within No.5 Group until Heavy Conversion Units are re-armed with Lancasters instead of Stirlings.
During their period in No.5 Group, 51 Base has produced 2,000 crews for Squadrons and has used Manchester-Lancaster, Halifax-Lancaster and Stirling-Lancaster combinations for four-engined conversion. The training organisation not only covered all the basic features of operational training but also embraced latest instruction in the rapidly developing Radar devices. Despite its many problems caused by using such a variety of aircraft types, the Base met all its Squadron commitments and, this last summer during the months July – September, produced 70 crews in excess of Bomber Command’s estimate. The formation of the two new Squadrons, Nos. 189 and 227, therefore presented no crew difficulties. The accident rate during this peak period of training also continued to improve steadily.
The pinch of the approaching winter was reflected in the hours flown during October and the Base logged just over 7,000 hours compared with 8,000 hours the previous month. The average hours per crew, however, were according to the syllabi and a total of 133 crews were posted from No.5 L.F.S. to Squadrons – one in excess of the estimate for the month. No.5 L.F.S. from now on is training on the winter rate, and investments have been made to produce 115 crews in November and 100 crews in December.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING. [/underlined]
Squadrons completed 4,500 hours day operational training and 1,500 hours night operational training during the month – 1,000 hours more than in September. The organisation for training new crews and for 10/20 sortie checks has been summarised in the Headquarters Air Staff Instructional Training/24 dated 26th October. This instruction includes a revised syllabus for initial crew training and a list of the duties and responsibilities of the Squadron Training Instructors. The last of the Squadron Training Instructors took up their duties during the month and particular attention to the details contained in the Instruction is essential to ensure the smooth operation of the squadron training scheme.
Of 133 new crews posted to squadrons, 113 completed initial crew training and were passed fit to operate. The average flying time for initial training by new crews in main force squadrons was 16 hours, which excludes No.49 Squadron on A.G.L.T. training. The syllabus in Air Staff Instruction Trg/24, Appendix ‘A’ lays down 11 hours 15 minutes,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
and every effort is to be made to keep close to this figure unless individual crews reveal deficiencies which require more flying. All Bases reported that the standard of crews from 5 L.F.S. was satisfactory.
The 10/20 sortie checks are not being regularly carried out. During recent weeks a total of 76 outstanding checks have been accumulated. A total of 32 were completed during the month – 30% - a sorry figure. 53 Base has 27 checks outstanding, 55 Base 38, and 56 Base 10. This aspect of squadron training requires immediate attention and Squadron and Flight Commanders are to assist the squadron instructors in clearing the 76 checks without delay. [Underlined] These checks are COMPULSORY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
No. 1690 B.D.T. Flight exercised 2116 gunners during 929 details. The Flight did 785 hours flying which included day and night affiliation, A.G.L.T. training and a small amount of drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. Pilots average 33 hours flying, the Hurricanes 38 hours, Spitfires 27 hours, and the Martinets 14 hours. These figures were slightly less than last month, but taking into account the weather, the Flight operated more intensively during fit periods.
October 17th was a record day for the Flight. It carried out affiliations with 103 crews including 17 night details, thereby exercising 240 gunners in 24 hours. Night affiliation again showed an increase for the third successive month and a total of 94 details, in which 200 gunners were exercised, was carried out. In addition to this squadron crews had other sources for night affiliation.
The opportunity still exists for more and more night affiliation as nights grow darker and longer as the Group is nowhere near the ideal of giving all crews two affiliation exercises in a month. The Flight also assisted 51 Base by providing 10 night details.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
There was another increase in Squadron times this month by pilots (49 hours) and Flight Engineers (150 hours). This is largely due to the good work put in by 54 and 55 Bases in increasing their total hours to 316 and 377 hours respectively.
56 Base has not been able to get off the mark properly owing to the shortage of Link trainers. However, congratulations are due to 49 Squadron whose pilots reached the 50/60 mark set in last month’s summary.
53 Base with a total of only 240 hours will have to put in some time this month to catch up with the leaders. Their pilots’ times in particular are very low at 61 hours.
All pilots should now have had some experience of the Artificial Horizon toppling device. This should help to improve their appreciation of the turn and bank indicator.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Training by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots…1367 hours. Flight Engineers…1127
[Drawing] SWINDERBY, WIGSLEY & WINTHORPE LTD
FINISHED CREWS A SPECIALITY 51
SUCCESSFUL TOURS GUARANTEED
UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT
Good Luck and Many Thanks!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. OCTOBER, 1944.
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second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “WINTER’S TALE”. [/underlined]
The best place for “Second Thoughts” is in the Flight Office before you go near your aircraft. It is not much good having them when you are bogged off the perimeter track in a foot of Lincolnshire mud with six other aircraft from your own Flight queuing up behind – five minutes to go to “last time of take-off” on a raw winter night and the tractor has broken down. It is warmer by the Flight Officer fire anyway, and you have three good books to read – 5 Group Aircraft Drills, 5 Group Air Staff Instructions and Pilots and Flight Engineers Notes, (that little blue book which looks brand new because it has been in the cupboard for the last six months).
You’ve never some winter operations before; but thousands have and there is nothing new to learn. It is a matter of remembering what you’ve been told. Check your personal clothing (you get cold in the feet and finger tips first so pay plenty of attention to your boots and your gloves). See that your crew are kitted according to scale, especially the Rear Gunner, and see that your oxygen masks and helmets are tested on the rigs in the cloakroom before you go to dispersal.
[Underlined] “BEFORE YOU LEAP”. [/underlined]
That hour before take off which you spend with your aircraft in dispersal is not a dreary one because you have got plenty to do. During the winter it is not always possible to do an N.F.T. and therefore a thorough check is more essential than ever. All the points to note are covered in the Check Lists provided at the Crew Stations in every aircraft. Take a special note of the condition of the dispersal surface when you tumble out of the crew bus. Don’t allow a dispersal to accumulate dirty oil, its [sic] slippery enough at the best of times and worse still in winter. Inspect the chocks closely to make sure there is no danger of them slipping during the run up, especially if there has been “freeze” beforehand and there is frost or ice about.
Don’t roar out of dispersal in a hurry with the Flight Engineer still busily stowing “Window”. Switch on the landing light, have the Flight Engineer manning the Aldis light, and follow the marshalling airman. Check your brakes as you move out of dispersal. Taxy slowly and take the corners easily. As you taxy round check your Gyro and Artificial Horizon to ensure that they are operating (you’ve already checked the suction on both Pesco pumps before you left dispersal), and see your Pitot head heater is ON.
[Underlined] “THE TEMPEST”. [/underlined]
You have got all the Met. information you need, and it is not much good having “Second Thoughts” about something you have forgotten if you are off the ground. If you have been warned of isolated Cu.Nims. up to 24,000 feet, keep clear of them. You know the icing level, and you know your critical temperatures for icing – between 0°Cent. and -8°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
Cent. for airframe icing, and between 0° Cent. and -30° Cent. for carburettor icing. There are of course extremes to both temperatures at which you can get icing, but it is not serious if you stick to the Flight Plan and know the symptoms.
Airframe icing is obvious. You can see it and sometimes hear it cracking off the airscrews and beating against the fuselage. If this occurs, climb out of the temperature layer, keep your flying controls free by moving them slightly all the time, and if you get the perspex icing up, use the de-icing spray to clear it. Carburettor icing makes the boost drop or surge. Fly in hot air for ten minutes and then return to cold air. Repeat this procedure whenever icing occurs and remember that hot air increases tour petrol consumption by 16%.
[Underlined] “THROUGH THE OVERCAST”. [/underlined]
Home strictly to your lattice lines and observe any special instructions you have received about where you break cloud on the return from the target. Do a proper controlled descent through cloud, 20° of flap, 400 feet a minute, and don’t be over anxious for sight of the ground. Check Q.F.E. and Q.F.F. When you clear the cloud base stay on your instruments until you are in level flight. Order your crew to keep a lookout, otherwise you may, at a low altitude, forget your lateral level because you are pre-occupied in trying to read beacons or see the ground. If you break cloud at the right point on your lattice line, there will be no danger of striking high ground. Incidentally, [underlined] never [/underlined] break cloud until you have fixed your position. You should know by now the instructions contained in 5 Group Air Staff Instruction, Trg./14, Safety Measures to Prevent Aircraft Flying into High Ground.
On the circuit give the precise order “Circuit lookout” to your crew as you prepare for the Quick Landing Scheme. This is most important in winter when cloud base might well be below 1,000 feet. Do not amble in with the intention of “Getting down this time” if conditions are difficult for landing. There is no shame in an overshoot and do not be satisfied until you are sitting comfortably in the Green of the Glide Path Indicator with your approach speed right and all your drills completed. Keep your speed down to 120 on the initial approach and get it down to 105 – 110 across the boundary. It is pointless to throw away valuable distance on the runway, especially as the brakes may be less effective than normal, because the runway is wet or freezing. “Second Thoughts” in the overshoot area are usually pretty cheerless.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “V” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88 c.
15.10.44 “X” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “G” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 c.
11.10.44 “Y” – 9 Sqdn. – FW.190
Claims annotated ‘c’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
The number of combats during the month’s operations shows a big decrease on last month’s figures. The total stands at 44 combats and of these two enemy aircraft are claimed as probably destroyed and two as damaged.
The majority of the attacks emanated from astern and above, due, no doubt, to the good conditions of visibility prevailing at the time. Now that it has been confirmed from P. of W. interrogation that upward firing guns are being fitted to the majority of the long range night fighter, attacks from astern and below must again be reckoned with, and good all-round search organised, with particular attention to the dark part of the sky.
With a night fighter breaking away below the bomber, make doubly sure that the Hun is not lying in wait below you, before giving orders to the pilot to resume course. One or two people have had very unpleasant surprises, by resuming course too soon and receiving a raking attack from below.
[Underlined] “Beware the Jetties” [/underlined] At the time of going to press no sightings of the jet propelled aircraft have been reported at night, but no doubt that has yet to come. Be prepared for their excessive closing speed when giving the order to corkscrew. The jet should be distinguishable on dark nights and the con-trail on light nights.
An account of the interesting exploits of 619/”W” on the night 4/5th is given below.
“Aircraft “W” of 619 Squadron was returning at 10,000 ft. heading 273T returning from Gardening on the night 4/5th October, and had reached position 5605N 0807E when the Rear Gunner sighted a JU.88 on the starboard quarter level silhouetted against the lighter part of the sky. At that time the bomber was flying in clear visibility with 10/10ths cloud below, tops 2000 ft. and thin stratus above 15,000 ft. The JU.88 attacked from the starboard quarter on a curve of pursuit and the bomber commenced a corkscrew when the fighter
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
reached 600 yards. The corkscrew took the bomber into cloud and the fighter was lost to view. On reappearing from cloud the F/E sighted a JU.88 below camouflaged white and Rear Gunner ordered banking search, the fighter imitated all the bomber’s manoeuvres, preventing the guns from being brought to bear. As the bomber resumed course another JU.88 attacked from Port beam with heavy calibre armament. The attack came from the dark part of the sky and was not seen by the Mid Upper Gunner. The first indication of the attack was when the bomber was hit. The strikes caused a fire amidships which exploded the ammunition in the rear turret tanks in the fuselage and disabled all the hydraulic and intercommunication system. The Mid Upper immediately vacated his turret and attacked the fire with extinguishers. The Rear Gunner saw the attacking JU.88 break away starboard quarter up and fired a long burst using manual rotation and operating one gun manually by the rear sear.
By this time the aircraft was on fire from cockpit to Elsan and the Mid Upper gunner was unable to control it on his own. The Rear Gunner, seeing the Mid Upper Gunner’s flying kit ablaze came to his assistance and with the aid of the Air Bomber, stripped him of his burning harness and placed it in the Elsan. The flames were spreading through the bomb bay and had burnt a hole in the bottom of the fuselage.
By using fire extinguishers, personal clothing and various other means, the fire was extinguished, but approximately 5 minutes later it flared up again at the rear of the ammunition tanks on the starboard side. This was extinguished by the Rear and Mid Upper Gunners.
The Rear Gunner then went into the Mid Upper turret and the Mid Upper Gunner went forward owing to lack of flying clothing which had been burnt.
The aircraft was crash-landed and on landing it was found that the Mid Upper Gunner had received extensive burns on hands and face and was suffering from shock, and the Navigator was burnet on his right hand.
It is considered that both gunners put up an exceptionally fine show in extraordinary circumstances as the hole burnt in the aircraft made any movement extremely hazardous.”
[Underlined] “ODD GOINGS ON”. [/underlined]
A Rear Gunner got repeated number one stoppages on all four guns. This continued through much “cocking and firing” until he suddenly remembered he hadn’t put the “Fire and Safe” units to “Fire”. Having completed this small operation the guns functioned perfectly.
A Gunnery Leader took a crew on drogue firing. He put the Air Bomber into the mid upper and told him to fire one gun only. During the exercise the Gunnery Leader got the impression that both mid upper guns were firing and on mentioning this to the Air Bomber, received the reply “Well, I’m only pressing one trigger!”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Roberts 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
P/O Danahar 44 Sqdn. Cat. ‘C’.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR OCTOBER:- 2190. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TABLES. [/underlined]
Though the total of affiliation exercises is below that of last month, the Squadrons’ totals are better, which is a very good sign. The night affiliation exercises with Hurricanes and Mosquitoes show an increase on last month, but whilst credit is due in this respect, it is hoped that next month’s total will be the equivalent to one night affiliation exercises per crew throughout the Group. Successful trials have been carried out by No.54 Base using infra-red film and instructions are being issued by this Headquarters in the near future.
Bomber Command have now approved the modifications to incorporate the hydraulically operated winch for self-towed drogue in the Lancaster, and this Headquarters’ letter 5G/3204/2/1/Eng. dated 25th October, 1944, refers. It is anticipated therefore, that next month that very barren column headed “AIR TO AIR” will blossom forth with digits.
Base Gunnery Leaders are warned that in all probability two extra Mark 1C Gyros will be allotted to each Squadron in the near future. It is suggested therefore, that they take immediate steps to have the necessary parts for the rig made in workshops and wired in a similar manner to their existing assemblies, so that there will be the minimum amount of delay when these Gyros arrive.
Up to date there have been two cases of frostbite in the Group due chiefly to the metal parts of the mask and helmet not being covered. This covering is very liable to have been torn and neglected during the summer months, so that now the cold weather is upon us, Gunnery Leaders would do well to check all helmets and masks immediately to see that they are in 100% fit condition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] oiling up [Drawing]
The perfect Air Gunner climbed out of his aircraft, and turned to the Armourer. “Those guns are good enough” he said, and his Captain and his crew heard and felt happy as they knew by “good enough” the perfect Gunner meant “very good indeed”. Two other Gunners, who were by no means perfect, also heard and remarked to themselves “Old Smithy must have been born with a gun in his hand, think of all the trouble you and I have had with that turret, yet Smithy goes up a couple of times, and everything is bang on. Either he’s just plumb lucky, or he’s got a gift that way. Yes, I think he takes to it naturally”. So saying, the speaker and his friend cautiously made their way towards the Mess, cautiously, in case their Gunnery Leader or Captain should catch sight of them, and acting on experience promptly put them on some sort of training. “After all” they used to argue “Why should we have to bind at aircraft Recce etc., just like any sprogs – we are almost the original operational types, we know the answers”.
“Hope the old skipper is in a better mood this evening, Bill, he seemed to be quite shirty with me after that Daylight yesterday. Called me a bloody fool and told me to pull my finger out. Me of all people. Me! Why I told him he was lucky to have two Gunners like us in his aircraft, but even that didn’t seem to cheer him up. After all, as I said, anyone might have mistaken those Thunderbolts for 190’s, and after all, he only did two corkscrews. I suppose he’ll be binding next about that turret, just because old Smithy gets airborne and it happens to work. Things always seem to work with Smithy”. The speaker pulled his chair a little nearer to the fire.
In the meantime, the perfect Air Gunner and the Armourer had finished cleaning the guns and were packing up. “It always seems to be the same when you take over someone else’s aircraft, doesn’t it”, said the perfect Gunner. “However, they begin to look a bit more like guns now, don’t they, and I don’t think we’ve much more to worry about, goodnight, and many thanks”.
The not-so-perfect Gunners, were still sitting by the fire in the Mess. “Hulloo, here comes old Smithy – Hi Smithy, how did you manage to make those ropey guns go this afternoon?”
“Well, as a matter of fact, we only gave the turret a good D.I., and all the guns a thorough cleaning, and everything went like clockwork. There’s nothing much wrong with those guns”.
As one not-so-perfect Gunner said to the other “Old Smithy may be lucky, but he’s a secretive sort of bloke, keeps things to himself you know – just cleaned the guns and they worked my foot – why they’ll be saying we don’t know our job next – you and me!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
Throughout the year this Group has steadily climbed the Bomber Command accident ladder until in September we reached the top with a rate of 7.9 aircraft damaged for every 10,000 hours flown. This goal was achieved with 23 aircraft damaged and was largely due to a drop in the number of crashes during non-operational flying. 51 Base therefore, can feel they have pulled their weight in the struggle for accident reduction, especially as October figures again stand comparison with the squadrons.
Unfortunately it is unlikely that we will remain in that exalted position at the top of the ladder. There is every indication that the rate for October will have increased, particularly as the total number of aircraft damaged rose to 31: 10 were totally destroyed, 7 were Cat.B., and 14 were Cat.AC; in addition there were 6 Cat.A(R), but these will not count against us. The [underlined] avoidable [/underlined] accidents against which every drive is concentrated, rose in proportion. October’s figures read:-
[List of Avoidable Accidents by Squadrons, Conversion Units and Other Flights]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL – 25 Avoidable Accidents. [/underlined]
It may be argued that the number of avoidable accidents during October is merely an indication of the seasonal rise in accidents as a whole. This is probably true, but the danger lies in passing this rise off as inevitable. It is up to pilots to combat the additional difficulties of winter flying by such means as more concentration on instrument flying, increased care when taxying, and a demand for full support and co-operation from their crews. With regard to taxying, you will note that accidents in this class continue to hold a notorious position in the Summary. Read and digest the notes on taxying given under another heading in this News. A typical example from the month’s records will emphasise
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the inexcusability of such accidents. Can you find any mitigating circumstances in this one:-
(i) In broad daylight a pilot was following another aircraft round the perimeter to take off point. The leading pilot stopped, naturally, at the taxy post to do his pre-flight checks. He was immediately struck from behind by the following aircraft, the pilot of which simply states that “he did not know the other aircraft had stopped until too late”.
[Underlined] EMERGENCY AIR. [/underlined]
A “new” accident occurred in October, and details are given here so that a pitfall may be avoided. Briefly, a Lancaster pilot had to use the “emergency air” to lower his undercarriage on landing. He left the lever in the [underlined] “up” [/underlined] position, made a perfect landing and taxied to dispersal. A few hours later the undercarriage collapsed. Now, wheels can be lowered by emergency air with the lever in [underlined] any [/underlined] position, but take another look at Pilot’s Notes (Latest) and there read that the lever should be fully [underlined] down. [/underlined] Now you know!
The other accidents do not provide any special features.
51 Base now passes from 5 Group to 7 Group. The accident rate on Stirlings has been steadily reduced since January, and reflects creditably on the way Stirling problems have been tackled. At the risk of repetition, this is best shown by October’s “avoidable” figures. For the first time 51 Base total is less than the total for the squadrons. In 1654 Conversion Unit only one aircraft was damaged during the whole of the month, and even this was only damaged to a slight extent, namely Cat.A(R). A commendable effort.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Squadron with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was only one known ditching throughout the Group during October – “R” of No.467 Squadron ditched 50 miles North of Terschelling on 5th October. First the port outer engine failed at 1500 ft. followed by the port inner at 900 ft. on the outward flight to the target. The Pilot incorrectly thought that he could not jettison his particular load below 2,000 ft. and turned for home, at the same time firing a red Verey cartridge to let the concentration know that he was in trouble. The port inner engine failed at 900 ft. and not until this happened was the Wireless Operator ordered to institute W/T S.O.S. procedure. These signals were transmitted at 200 ft. and naturally were not received.
Fuel jettisoning action was taken, but the jettison cocks were not closed again the the [sic] aircraft ditched with a full bomb load and little or no buoyancy from the fuel tanks. It ditched successfully but sank in 1 1/2 minutes. The Flight Engineer did not brace his back on the rest bed and the shock threw him upwards and forwards. His head splintered the bulkhead door but he was not injured, and the inrush of cold water brought him round from his temporary stunning. (Hard heads are necessary for an awkward situation!).
All members of the crew reached the dinghy without difficulty and although the mast was broken it was repaired and erected. A sail was made from silk escape maps and with a North Easterly wind the dinghy sailed about 27 miles towards the English Coast before it was located by air.
An airborne lifeboat was dropped and the crew, transferred successfully, started the engines and set course for home. The mast was slipped without releasing the whip aerial and before this was noticed, the sea had freshened, making it impossible to rectify the mistake. As the covering aircraft lost contact with them on three occasions this mistake might easily have had more serious consequences.
The crew was finally rescued by a Naval launch after 36 hours in their dinghy and almost as long in the lifeboat.
This ditching should prove a lesson to those disbelievers in transmitting “Emergency” messaged on the failure of one engine.
Though the Rear Gunner of another aircraft saw the distress cartridge being fired, no sighting report was transmitted, nor, due to a misunderstanding, was any notice taken of the report at Interrogation. W/T silence does [underlined] not [/underlined] apply to aircraft in distress or sightings of aircraft in distress unless specifically ordered at briefing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
What have now become common errors were again made by this crew:-
(i) The dinghy radio was released from its stowage prior to ditching and was lost on impact.
(ii) Mae Wests were not inflated until after impact.
Two interesting new Air Diagrams have been issued:-
Flying Control and A.S.R. Services – A.D. 3970, Issued June, 1944.
Air Sea Rescue Services – A.D.3971, Issued June, 1944.
The Lancaster Static line parachute drill has been amended. The new diagram is numbered 3011A issued May, 1944. Note those helping the wounded man should wear their parachutes – just in case.
[Drawing] THIS
OR
THIS?
PILOTS & REAR GUNNERS –
Have YOU drawn YOUR seat type parachute?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] Flying Control Competition [/underlined] – The second quarterly Flying Control Competition has now ended and the award goes to METHERINGHAM. It is only fair to Skellingthorpe to say that they have not fallen behind but have been surpassed. Sections have, in many cases, taken serious steps to bring up to scratch the surrounds of Watch Offices. The tidiness of the grass surrounds, the layout of the car park, all raise or lower the value of Control in the eyes of visitors.
The heavy winter months ahead with their problems of snow, ice and water, will demand from every Flying Control Section the maximum serviceability of portable equipment. Night Flying Equipment should be thoroughly examined to bring it up to 100% efficiency. All lamps and accs. should be tested and necessary replacements made. Never let the responsibility for a “bogging” or a taxying accident be laid on your shoulders because equipment was unserviceable or inadequate for emergencies.
[Underlined] V.H.F. Landing Trials [/underlined] – Waddington are carrying out VHF/RT trials for Command, more particularly on the control side. The policy is a “long term” one, attempting to meet future requirements of all Commands, and future layouts of Watch Offices. Preliminary trials will probably occupy a month, after which “visitors will be admitted”.
[Underlined] Rangefinder Attachment [/underlined] – Details of a ranging instrument for the Airfield Controller have been issued to stations, to ensure that at night the A.F.C. knows whether an aircraft is inside or outside the 2000 yards safety line. The adaption consists of the insertion in the inner ring sight of a metal “thimble” in which is cut an aperture of .1225 inches, equivalent to the wing span of a four-engined bomber at 200 yards.
[Underlined] Circuit Marking [/underlined] – Trials are to be carried out at Metheringham to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions on the circuit. It has not been possible to instal [sic] permanent lighting which will cater for marking the circuit points when each runway is in use. A compromise has been effected, however, to concentrate on the main runway. The “ball-up” point and the “cross-wind” position are at present marked with the identification letters of the airfield, and it is proposed to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions by means of a bar of three lights across the outer circuit.
Bases will be informed when this installation is complete at Metheringham, and Flying Control Officers should fly over there at night to inspect and report on the efficiency of this system of marking.
In saying goodbye to 51 Base on their translation to 7 Group, one must express our best wishes for their continued good work in their new “orbit”. All three stations have recently made vast improvements in their airfield conditions. Control work at Conversion Units is much heavier than on operational units and the zeal of Control Officers at those stations to bring control conditions into line with operational stations, is to be commended.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
Landing times for October refer in the main to daylight times and an improvement has again been shown over the previous month’s average. The new form of monthly return of landings to meet the requirements of Headquarters, Bomber Command, will be used to compile future returns for these records. The return should be compiled day by day and not left to the end of the month.
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Underlined] AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP 1.59 MINUTES PER AIRCRAFT. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COAL AND COKE. [/underlined]
The fuel situation this winter is going to be very difficult [sic] This is due, of course, to the fact that we will be supplying most of the liberated countries, until they can produce their own fuel.
Equipment Officers should therefore make their stations more fuel conscious, and try to save every pound of coal and coke they can.
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT TO U.E.D. AND R.E.D. (A.M.O. A.736/43). [/underlined]
Many letters have been written upon the necessity of following the instructions laid down in A,M.O. A.736/43.
Headquarters, Bomber Command, have now dealt us a bitter blow. A list has been sent to this Headquarters, showing all stations who have not carried out the instructions, and practically every station in the Group is named.
This is a bad state of affairs, and we hope in future stations in this Group will do much better and make certain equipment is returned to the right place.
[Underlined] RADIATORS. [/underlined]
The radiator pool at Coningsby is working satisfactorily, and since it has been going, the flow of radiators to the squadrons has been better, though, of course, we could do with a lot more.
We now hear from Command that this system may be stopped, and the normal demand procedure put in its place. This matter is being dealt with between Command and Air Ministry, and we can only hope that the present system is retained.
[Underlined] DEMANDS. [/underlined]
Units should take more care making out their equipment demands; cases have been reported where, either the unit serial number or the nearest railway station has been omitted. A further point is that stations are not using the rubber stamp in the Consignee’s Block.
Equipment Officers must scrutinise their demands, before signing them, and see that the demand is made out correctly. If the section has not got the rubber stamp then it should be demanded from the Orderly Room at once.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During October, 56 Base formed, and two new squadrons were built up. With the formation of 56 Base much hard work has been entailed in the organising of Base sections once more, but these are coming along very nicely and will soon be up to the desired standard. Balderton and Fulbeck, which are sub-stations to 56 Base, provide a heavy task in themselves to bring them up to the standard of airfields which were vacated by 5 Group. It is “self-help” with a vengeance. However, even in the short time that the airfields have been occupied by 5 Group units, the improvement is most noticeable.
An interesting feature of the month is the manner in which Bases have helped each other with acceptance chekes [sic] modifications and engine changes where necessary. Acceptance checks for the new squadrons were split evenly through the Bases.
Good reports are being received as a result of pilots and flight engineers of the Test Crews at Bases attending the Test Pilots’ Course at A.V. Roe’s. All Base Major Servicing Sections are enthusiastic about the testing of their aircraft and consider that greatly improved handling is given to aircraft passing out of B.M.S.S. as a result of the excellent reports submitted after these test flights.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
Since starting the drive on improving the condition and maintenance of ground equipment and the general cleanliness of hangars and dispersals, a big improvement has been noticed throughout the Group. The cleanliness of hangars is far more important than some C.T.O’s realise. However busy a servicing section is, it can always find time to keep the hangar and its surrounds clean and tidy if the will to do so is present. The mechanical sweepers which have been issued throughout the Group have proved an asset in keeping the hangar floors swept, but we still have the odd C.T.O. who allows his maintenance hangar to get into a filthy, oily state, and complains that pressure of work is the cause. Pressure of work is never the cause of this state of affairs as it is usually due to lack of interest in this aspect of maintenance over a long period. Once a hangar and its surrounds have been made to look clean, neat and tidy, this state can be maintained by just a small amount of work daily. It is again repeated that if a Servicing Wing looks neat, well organised and tidy, it invariably is also efficient.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FAILURES. [/underlined]
Engineer faults which prevented the successful completion of operational sorties totalled 1%. This is a slight increase over the previous month, but is still a general improvement. Only one of these defects could be attributed to faulty maintenance; unfortunately
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
this maintenance defect occurred in a squadron which would otherwise have had a clear sheet. 54 Base gets the “Big Hand” this month, with only two engineer operational failures. The following squadrons are to be congratulated on having no engineer operational failures during October:- 9, 50, 83, 227, 617 and 627 Squadrons. This is a very good start indeed for the first month 227 Squadron appeared as an operational squadron.
[Underlined] 51 BASE. [/underlined]
With the passing of 51 Base, complete with Wigsley, Swinderby and Winthorpe and maintenance staffs, go many engineer officers and maintenance personnel who have worked hard for 5 Group for a very long period. The type of work which they have been carrying out has been arduous and we are very reluctant to see them pass to another Group; to the newly formed No.7 Group such officers and maintenance personnel who have worked so loyally for 5 Group will be a great asset.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Conversion Units]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ENGINE HANDLING. [/underlined]
Much controversy has taken place since Air Ministry has cleared Merlin 22’s, 24’s, 28’s and 38’s at +7 lbs. boost for cruising. It is thought by so many pilots that this extra 3 lbs. boost is something for nothing, that petrol consumption at 2650 r.p.m. and + 7 lbs. boost will be the same as 2650 r.p.m. and 4 lbs. boost; this is not the case. This is what has taken place – before the modification was incorporated, the S.U. Carburettor richened when the boost was increased above + 4 lbs. and the Stromberg Carburettors richened with boost above + 3 1/2 lbs. With Mod.582 both these carburettors will now be progressively weak throughout their range up to + 7 lbs. boost.
In all cases for economical flying it is necessary to fly at a given optimum R.A.S. This optimum R.A.S. is governed by the all-up weight of the aircraft, so crews should always attempt to obtain the I.A.S. for which they are briefed.
Boost of + 7 lbs will only be obtained up to rated altitude, this will be approximately 9,000 ft. in ‘M’ gear and 17,000 ft. in ‘S’ gear. Therefore if an I.A.S. of 170 m.p.h. is required at 8,000 ft.,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
to fly economically the boost would be increased to + 5 or 6 lbs, but the revs must be reduced below 2650; the only advantage in this case is, the throttles would be fully open. If, however, the revs were left at 2650 using + 5 or 6 lbs. boost petrol consumption would increase. A case in point – a Lancaster in this Group was fitted with flowmeters; at 10,000 ft. using 2650 + 4 the R.A.S. obtained was 200 m.p.h. and petrol consumption 228 galls/hr. The same aircraft when using 2650 + 6 at the same altitude obtained an R.A.S. of 215 m.p.h., but the petrol consumption increased to 271.2 galls/Hr. As can be seen, for the extra 15 m.p.h. the consumption was out of all proportion.
The advantage of + 7 lbs. boost will be found in the climb. When climbing at 2650 + 4 with a fully laden aircraft, the R.A.S. should be 157 m.p.h.; if this speed cannot be maintained or the aircraft becomes “heavy” to handle, the boost can be increased over the + 4 lbs. setting to obtain the optimum R.A.S. of 157 m.p.h.
If the general rule of high boost and low revs together with the optimum R.A.S. is carried out on all flights, the petrol consumption will always be good.
[Underlined] WINTER FLYING. [/underlined]
To overcome many of the “snags” of winter flying due to the inexperience of crews, a list of the most important points are set out for the guidance of Flight Engineer Leaders who must instruct and advise all Flight Engineers in their section.
1. Special care and instruction on the use of oxygen, care and maintenance of masks, and the use of the extra 12 ft. oxygen tube carried in all aircraft.
2. Have each Flight Engineer work the Dead Man’s release of the rear turret.
3. Make certain each Flight Engineer knows how to use the hot and cold air valve, and under what conditions this should be used.
4. Use of de-icing fluid for windscreens – how to operate the pump. Advise each Flight Engineer to have a can of de-icing fluid in his aircraft for use inside the cabin. [Underlined] Danger [/underlined] – this fluid is inflammable.
5. Check clothing. Warm but not bulky, electrically heated waistcoat and socks are a great advantage.
6. Care to be taken when running up – see that chocks cannot slip.
7. Check “storm window” for freedom.
8. Pulsometer pumps must be switched “ON” at 17,000 ft.
9. All Flight Engineers to know 5 Group Drill No.12 “Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill”.
10. Flight Engineers to inspect the de-icing paste on the leading edge of the control surfaces; care must be taken that this is evenly applied.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
On the 25th October a meeting of Base Armament Officers was held at Headquarters, No.5 Group, when a very lengthy discussion took place covering almost all the points affecting armament work and organisation. Every effort is being made to provide more man power, more supervision and more equipment, but all armament personnel should bear in mind the vital need for careful planning and organisation of work to eliminate unnecessary handling of stores. In this connection, a tidy and well planned bomb store will always be able to handle a greater tonnage of bombs for less man hours of work (i.e. a reasonable number of days off for everybody), than a bomb store which is allowed to become disorganised and congested, thus entailing handling stores two or three times.
To run a bomb store in this ideal way calls for clear thinking and planning by the Officer i/c and an appreciation of the work and handling schemes in use by N.C.O’s.
The new heavy transporter referred to in our last issue has at last made its appearance but unfortunately only in very small quantities. Reports from the station fortunate enough to receive the first issue show that this piece of equipment is a great time and labour saver, and in addition, ensures that the tail units of 4 lb. incendiaries carried in S.B.C’s are not damaged when loaded on to bomb trolleys.
One station, not content to sit back and wait for the arrival of these items, has produced its own transporter. The transporter has been constructed from a portion of the M.7 cluster mechanism suitably modified with two small angle brackets to slip under the drop bar of the S.B.C. This transporter has been in issue for some time and has proved entirely satisfactory and easy to handle. Details of this modification are being forwarded to Units, and Armament Officers should take the opportunity of constructing as many of these transporters as possible for use prior to the introduction of the improved type heavy transporter.
No doubt many of you can think of more and possibly better methods of simplifying the handling and transportation of clusters and S.B.C’s, so get your heads together and see what you can produce. To a great extent this problem will have to be solved by ourselves, so don’t be content to sit back and wait for someone else to find the answer. You are the people who know what is required and are in the best position for finding the solution.
[Underlined] REPORTING OF DEFECTS. [/underlined]
Many instances have occurred during the past months of Armament Officers failing to carry out the correct procedure for the reporting of defects of ammunition, explosives and their components or ancilliary equipments.
The correct procedure is laid down fully in A.P. 2608A, Appendix 12, and it is suggested that a few minutes spent with this very valuable publication would benefit the majority of Armament Officers.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “BOOBS”! [/underlined]
On two occasions this month Bomb Aimers omitted to select the isolation switch with the result that the photoflash was not released and no photographs obtained.
Two full bomb loads were returned to base, one due to the Bomb Aimer setting the distributor drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo”, and the other due to the failure of the Bomb Aimer to ensure that his Master switch was wired in the “ON” position.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The total number of operational sorties for the month of October was below previous months’ figures and details of the photographic results are shown in the analysis.
[Underlined] Technical Failures [/underlined] were not high, but it is an undeniable fact that many of those which did occur could have been avoided – Photographers, Instrument Repairers and Electricians responsible for the maintenance and testing, and Photographers who process the films should make a special effort to reduce the number of failures which occur through insufficient maintenance testing and processing.
A percentage of failures also occurs because the Bomb Release Key Switch sometimes releases the bombs but does not make a positive contact to operate the camera. Headquarters, Bomber Command, have stated that a new type of key has been designed and will be issued in due course; until the new key is fitted bomb aimers must remember to depress the key fully.
[Underlined] American K.24 Camera [/underlined] is now rapidly taking the place of the F.24; despite certain criticisms there can be no doubt that the camera will give good results, provided that a few minor details are attended to. Owing to the unbalanced weight, mainly due to the motor position, this camera is not to be stood upright on the lens cone, but is to be laid on its side; furthermore, the camera should not be lifted by the motor, otherwise there is every possibility that the motor gear will become mis-aligned. Air Ministry have been asked to provide muffs which will fit the K.24, but it is not known when these muffs will become available. However, owing to the rubber film roller, brittle film should not prove very troublesome since the main cause of torn film in the F.24 camera is the measuring roller needles.
[Underlined] Composite colour [/underlined] is now in standard use, and it is hoped to increase its use but, before doing so, Photographic N.C.O’s should ensure that all photographers are trained in making up and processing the film. It is necessary to stress once again the importance of temperature and time; failure to bear this in mind will produce out of colour balance results, A different type of colour film, called the “Ansco” has been tested by No.56 Base , but the results were inferior to those produced by Kodacolour.
[Underlined] H.2.S. Photography. [/underlined] The number of cameras now available for this type of photography has materially increased, but there is much to be done before it can be claimed that the results produced are as good as they should be. The best H.2.S. Photographic results can only be obtained by correct set operation and good quality processing and printing. It has been reported that Photographers are not sufficiently informed on the working of H.2.S. to get the best out of the results. Therefore, it is hoped that the Radar/Nav. officer will arrange demonstrations in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
[Page break]
Education [Drawing]
During October, many airmen began study, which it is hoped will be continued during the winter months. The suggested programmes and facilities drawn up by Station Education Officers were widely circulated on most stations and the response on the whole has been satisfactory. The most popular demand has been for classes at the local Technical Institutes – indeed, the Lincoln Technical College was quite unable to cope for a time with the numbers of students who wished to attend. Most of the requirements appear to have been catered for now, however. It should be stressed that the college authorities have taken considerable trouble to accommodate R.A.F. personnel and we in our turn must attend as regularly as possible to make the work they have put in worth while.
Organised study is difficult in view of the uncertain hours of duty. One solution to this problem is the correspondence course method, which does give the chance of doing the work at the student’s own convenience. A full list of courses cannot be enumerated here, but there are roughly 500, and they cater for almost all the professions as well as individual subjects. The cost is only 10/-. Your Education Officer will show you what is available.
About 700 people have enrolled for correspondence courses in this Group during the past few months, and some stations have over 100 airmen attending local evening institutes each week. These are the people who are looking to the future, and there must be many hundreds more in the Group who would benefit from something of this kind. After all, its [sic] your future, so it is up to you to prepare for your return to civilian life.
Do you ever visit your Station News Room? If you do you will realise the tremendous amount of work put in to keep it fresh and up to date, and usually the Education Officer is doing the job himself. He would welcome any suggestions and ideas for improving the room, and any practical help towards putting the ideas into practice. About half a dozen airmen who are interested, can make a great difference to the freshness and appeal of the News Room.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME
[Drawings] IS HIS NISSEN
Due to the long hours of blackout, bad weather and general deterioration of living and working conditions, all of which affect the health of personnel, operational efficiency may be reduced during the winter unless strenuous efforts are made by all concerned to offset its effects.
If initiative is used NOW to plan essential precautions, this Group can be fully prepared to operate during the winter months at an even higher pressure and even more efficiently than during the last few months.
Instructions to all Base and Station Commanders have already been issued by the Air Officer Commanding, summarising instructions which have already been issued. Indication will only be given in this article of those additional jobs we may be called upon to do which are not of a routine nature, and which merely involve the use of average common-sense.
There is an old saying that “An Englishman’s Home is his Castle”. However, the true sense of this saying is, unfortunately, not fully established during war-time, as the majority of our lives is being spent in Nissen huts or, for the more fortunate (?), in rooms shared with many others, who have various ideas of conditions in which one should eat and sleep.
A balance, therefore, has to be made and the foundation for our “War Castles” should be waterproof rooms, clean approaches to living quarters, well-prepared food, hot water supply, good entertainment and ample warm clothing, together with the sensible use of camp amenities which are provided for all and not for any one individual.
In the first years of war, ample labour and material were available for ensuring that the above conditions were met, but due to the withdrawal of labour and material to priority work in the South of England, each and every one of us will be called upon to perform duties which, hitherto, have been implemented by “Specialists”. Take, for instance, that leaking roof. It’s all very well saying that it’s about time Works and Buildings repaired it; the fact is that Works and Buildings have not the labour to meet all the requirements of daily maintenance on a present-day Bomber Station. Therefore, instead of sitting back and waiting for somebody else to do the work, we shall have to do it ourselves. Material, and technical supervision will be provided and we shall have to initiate our own repairs in our “spare time”.
If we were back in our own homes, we wouldn’t need to be told to implement maintenance or to redecorate rooms which have become shabby. We would take off our coats after our day’s work and do all within our power to make it as comfortable as possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] “AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME IS HIS NISSEN”. [/underlined]
Similarly, in peace-time, when we called at the local for “one for the road” and, due to bad navigation we encroached on the muddy part of the front garden, we wouldn’t dream of entering the house without wiping our feet or scraping the mud off. This should be kept well in mind when returning from the N.A.A.F.I., or the Mess back to our quarters, or to the places where we work.
In this respect, mud can be one of the chief factors of lowering the morale during the winter. Mud is usually introduced on to the concrete roads on stations, primarily by mechanical transport being driven off perimeter tracks and from concrete roads on to the airfield, and by certain types who will insist on taking “short cuts”. This practice must be stopped; by so doing, we shall also improve the appearance of our airfields.
In regard to clothing, facilities exist for the exchange of worn clothing which would not provide proper warmth during the winter months and would, therefore, result in health conditions which seriously affect the manpower question during this particular time of the year.
Personnel working in exposed conditions are entitled to draw protective clothing consisting of a variety of items which may be obtained on request. In Civvy Street the wise man ensures that his clothing is in a constant state of good repair and although the responsibility is usually shelved on to our mothers or wives, in war-time it is up to each individual to fend for himself.
With a little bit of research “someone” can always be found to do the necessary darning, and to execute the necessary repairs if the individual has not the maternal instinct.
To deal with all the troubles would involve writing at some length and it is again repeated that average commonsense [sic] must be used. If the powers-that-be are to be believed, this is going to be the last winter of the European War. Everyone should make a supreme effort to ensure that our living and working conditions are such that our operational efficiency is not affected, and that all precautions are introduced in time to meet the trouble which they are intended to cure.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. DUNNE DFC
P/O R.F. ADAMS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. AMEY DFC
SGT G.W. LANE DFM
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.F. GRAY, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O F.T. GRIFFIN DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.H. STEWART DFC
F/SGT R. CALOV DFM
F/SGT D.J. MORLAND DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.J.B. WILSON, DFC DSO
F/O P.H. MARTIN DFC
F/O W.A. DANIEL DFC
F/O J.A. SANDERS, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/CDR J.B. TAIT, DSO, 2 BARS, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT F. WEBSTER DFM
P/O D.H. STRACHAN DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT R.E.W. OAKLEY, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT D.S. MORGAN BEM
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
A/Cdr. A.C.H. SHARP, ADC. DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.H.B. LUCAS DFC
F/O J.E. LOGAN DFC
F/O J. CHADDERTON DFC
F/O D.A. KEEBLE DFC
W/O R.P. ALLEN DFC
F/O C.H. CALTON DFC
P/O D.D. McLEAN DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.A. MILDRED DFC
P/O N.H. LLOYD DFC
P/O A. AIREY DFC
SGT W.J. ROBINSON DFM
F/SGT A. WILSON DFM
P/O A. DICKEN DFC
F/SGT M.J. STANCER DFM
F/O K.A. MATHIESON DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.J. ORAM DFC
P/O H.M. MILNE DFC
F/SGT W.J. BEESLEY DFM
F/SGT D.P. PIERSON DFM
SGT A. DARBY DFM
F/SGT J. SHORT DFM
W/O G.F. GRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.V. HAZELDENE DFC
F/O H.B. MacKINNON DFC
P/O H. WELLAND DFC
F/O J.C. LUMSDEN DFC
F/SGT P.S. BAKER DFM
F/O C.S. PATON DFC
F/O G. POW DFC
F/SGT R.A. HAMMERSLEY DFM
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.S. TURNER DFC
P/O E.W. HALLETT DFC
S/LDR J. WOODROFFE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.T. REID DFC
F/SGT J. MORAN DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/O J.A. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L T.W. BLAIR, DSO, DFC.BAR TO DFC
W/O R.G. GOODWIN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.J. HEGARTY DFC
F/O J.A. KELLY DFC
A/S/L G.A. WATSON, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT C. BAUMBER DFM
A/F/LT J.L. COMANS, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/F/LT W.T. GEE DFC
F/SGT G.H. WIDDIS DFM
P/O M.J. BRIDGMAN DFC
F/O D.H. SHORTER DFC
P/O T.W.L. LEAK DFC
P/O J.A. PEARSON DFC
F/O J.F. THOMSON DFC
F/O J.W. NEDWICH DFC
P/O J.W. MULLER DFC
F/O R.D.H. PACKER DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/LT J.E. TAYLOR, DFM DFC
P/O C.E. THOMPSON DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.G.S. SCOTT DFM
P/O N. OWEN DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.J.C. CASSELL DFC
P/O C. JAMES DFC
F/O J.H. DECHASTEL DFC
F/O A. WILLIAMS, DFM DFC
F/O P.R. PETTIT DFC
P/O E.A. MUSTARD DFC
P/O B.W. WEBB DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT P.E. McCARTHY, DFM DFC
F/O R.O. FULLER, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT E.N. CHANDLER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O T.R. DAVIES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O G.A. CHALMERS, DFM DFC
F/LT F.G. RUMBLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O E. TWELLS DFC
F/O D.A. BELL DFC
F/O H.B.R. RHUDE DFC
P/O J.R. BELL DFC
F/O R.E. WOODS DFC
F/SGT P.W. DERHAM DFM
F/O H.V. CORNISH-UNDERWOOD DFC
P/O J.R. GURNEY DFC
F/O J.K. STOTT, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT L. HOPE DFM
P/O A. WHITELEY DFC
P/O G.F. WILSON DFC
P/O F.S. GARSIDE DFC
SGT A.J. GRIFFEE DFM
SGT H.D. CAMPBELL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT N.W. MacKENZIE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.G. GREY, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT N. LEWIS, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J. MARSHALLSAY DFC
F/LT E.F. NELLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.R. GOODMAN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT N.A. RANSHAW DFM
F/LT A.J.L. HICKOX, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W.Q. CONNOR, DFM DFC
F/O K.G. CHAMBERLAIN DFC
F/O L.N. RACKLEY DFC
P/O W. MOONEY DFC
F/SGT W.E.J. COX DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO, 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of Savings by Station]
TOTAL:- [Underlined] £3,635. 7. 6. [/underlined]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP CREST [/underlined]
Many designs for a Group Crest have been received at this Headquarters and have had continued close scrutiny and study. Due to the high standard of work produced it has not, as yet, been possible to select the winning crest, but it is hoped to do so in the near future. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Flying Hours by Squadron]
ӿ New Squadron – formed 7th October, 1944.
Squadrons are place in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
All Lancaster Squadrons are above establishment and therefore flying hours are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Boxed] The cover of this month’s News has been designed by S/Ldr. N. Mould, D.F.C., of Headquarters, No. 56 Base. All personnel with artistic tendencies are requested to submit designs for covers of future issues. So far only very few have been received, and it is hoped that during the coming month the editor will receive an increasing flow of specimen designs. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
October 1944 Secret No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1325 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, October 1944
5 Group News, October 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 27, October 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, signals, tactics, air bombing, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, oiling up, accidents, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, engineering, armament, photography, education, an Englishman's home is his Nissen, decorations, war savings and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-10
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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75 printed sheets
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-19
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Konstanz
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Sorpe Dam
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Bergen
Temporal Coverage
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1944-10
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Master Bomber
military living conditions
military service conditions
mine laying
navigator
Nissen hut
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS
NOVEMBER 1944 No 28
[Drawing] [9 and 617 Squadron Crests] TIRPITZ
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A.O.C.
In sending Christmas greetings to all ranks of 5 Group, I do so with the greater pleasure because through their combined efforts over the past months, the hitting power of the Group has been raised to a new high level, and greater harm inflicted on the enemy than ever before. In November the Group completed the destruction of the Tirpitz, an event which brought in messages of congratulations from all branches of the Service and from many of our Allies. In November also, the Group again cut the Dortmund Ems and Mitteland canals thus ensuring that an overwhelming burden of traffic should continue to be thrown on the German railways. While to ensure that this task should be made even more difficult the Group also took part in the general campaign against railway centres, achieving highly satisfactory results.
These results were made possible by the steady improvement in the efficiency with which attacks are undertaken, and in the greater numbers of aircraft available. To give two examples of this improved efficiency. In November last year, the average Squadron error in practice bombing from 20,000 feet was 310 yards; this November it is 160 yards. This means that the number of bombs which may be expected to fall within the central area of a target is now four times as great as it was a year ago, and this is borne out by photographs. Similar improvements in airmanship and crew discipline are shown by the reduction in landing times and in the lower accident rate. A year ago the average interval between aircraft landing at night was 3.18 minutes, and the best Station in November, 1943, only achieved 2.56 minutes. These times have now been halved, with a consequent reduction in the hazards of landing after an operation in conditions of poor visibility or low cloud, or when intruders are active.
Improvements on a like scale have been achieved in all other branches and sections and the serviceability rate is now higher than ever before, while the percentage of technical failures leading to early returns has been halved. These are most gratifying results deserving the highest praise; yet in no branch of Group activity have we yet reached the summit of our abilities or fulfilled our maximum expectations.
It is clear that the War will not now be over by Christmas although we can be fairly confident that this will be the last Christmas of the War in Europe. What is required therefore is a firm resolve to do everything in our power to reduce the number of days during which the War will continue to drag on. As a start I would ask air crews to aim at a reduction of the bombing error from 160 yards to 120 yards, and ground crews to determine that no aircraft shall remain on the ground if it can possibly be got ready in time to take off on operations. Although the ultimate release of the bombs is the province of the aircrew, the scale of their effort depends
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FOREWORD BY A.O.C. [/underlined]
upon the exertions of everybody on each Station, and it is to everyone, aircrew and ground crew, that I send this Christmas message urging them to put forward their every endeavour so that in spite of all that winter weather means, we continue to increase our pressure on the enemy, and thus hasten on his collapse.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [Drawing]
That moment when the Admiral Von Tirpitz was suddenly enveloped in smoke and flame and spray, from a cascade of Tallboy bombs was not merely the T.O.T. of an operations; it was the culmination of two months planning, training, toil and patience. After the abortive attacks on 15th September, and the 13th October, there was universal determination to try again. Statistical analysis of bombing results showed thatthree [sic] hits, and several near misses, could be anticipated, if the Bomb Aimers could get their graticules on the ship; the designers and users of the Tallboy were confident that the weapon would sink any battleship.
Time and the weather were the chief adversaries. Tromso is in the Gulf Stream, and the prevailing Westerly wind causes persistent Stratus cloud. The sky is only clear when the wind is Easterly, and about five such days could be expected in November. The end of November was the expiration of the time limit for a daylight attack this year. On the 26th of November, the sun does not rise above the horizon, and for a few days after, there would be enough twilight at mid-day to bomb. After that there would be no light until the Spring. It was obvious that there was a nice problem of long range weather forecasting, and that the slightest opportunity could not be wasted.
On the 5th of November, there was a false start, because the fickle weather set fair, and then deteriorated, but on the 11th the force once more flew to its advance bases. As this was the third week-end in succession that this avalanche had descended upon them, the inhabitants if the advanced bases had mixed feelings, which they courteously concealed. The force consisted of 36 Tallboy Lancasters, the Film Unit Lancaster, a meteorological reconnaissance Mosquito, and Transport aircraft. The Lancasters had been specially modified for the previous attempt. After the experience of the Russian operation, it was clear that the all up weight could safely be increased to 70,000 lbs. Merlin 24 power units, and extra tanks in the fuselage to bring the petrol capacity up to 2,400 gallons, had been installed. Mid-turrets, and every removeable item of equipment not needed for this operation, had been taken out. The all-up weight for take-off was then between 68,000 and 69,000 lbs. This was a most formidable striking force - - - 36 aeroplanes which could attack a target 1100 miles away, with 12,000 lb bombs.
The force took off to attack the Tirpitz for the third time at 03.00 hours on 12th November. The preliminary forecast had been poor, threatening convection cloud over the Norwegian coast, with a low freezing level, and high icing index, while there was no guarantee of the target being clear of Strato-cumulus, the meteorologists’ hoodoo. The met. reconnaissance Mosquito landed at Lossiemouth two hours before take-off, and improved this forecast, but not much. There was no convection cloud, but there were patches of Stratus. Remembering how they were cheated by the weather on the previous occasion, crews were determined, but not optimistic.
The flight plan was to fly low, less than 2,000 feet above the water, to a turning point at 65.00N 06.47E, then turn due East and climb to cross the Norwegian mountains, then lose height and turn North, flying
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
East of the mountains. It was expected that this would prevent detection by the German radar system along the Norwegian coast.
The weather was fine and clear for take-off, in pleasant contrast to the previous occasion, when it had poured with rain. This was to prove an omen. The force was distributed over three airfields to avoid congestion, and aircraft set course without delay for the rendezvous point at North Unst. All aircraft burned navigation lights to assist keeping together, and flew at 185 R.A.S., the most economical cruising speed for the first part of the flight. The engine settings were 1800 R.P.M. and about 4 1/2 lbs boost, giving a consumption of almost exactly 1 A.M.P.G. The route was studded with flame floats, which crews were using diligently for checking drift.
It was twilight at the Norwegian coast and map reading, after a long period of D.R. navigation, soon put all aircraft back on track. By the time the mountains were crossed, it was broad daylight, and large areas of Strato-cumulus were depressingly evident, while every lake was covered with Stratus. Map reading in the mountains, particularly when they are snow-covered, and the lakes are frozen, is tricky. The rendezvous, Akka Lake, was only recognisable because the sheet of cloud which covered it conformed exactly to its shape. The first view of Tromso therefore, with no cloud and no smoke, and of the Tirpitz in her anchorage, massive, black and unmistakeable, was better than any crew had dared to hope for, and the job was then as good as done.
Flak was plentiful but inaccurate, and there were no fighters. The only impediment to the bombing was the smoke which hung, black and brown over the ship from the first bomb strikes, and the guns. It was impossible to be certain of results through that smoke, but fairly late in the attack, a plume of white smoke shot up two or three hundred feet like a jet. The last aircraft to leave watched the ship heel slowly on to one side. The Film Unit aircraft was able to take photographs of the ship throughout the entire action, and the last photographs showed that the attack had been a complete success, and that the Tirpitz had capsized. This was confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft, less than two hours after the attack, who reported the bottom of the ship just above the water.
Why the Tirpitz was not adequately protected by fighters, the only protections against high level bombing, can at present be only a matter for conjecture here, and may be being more thoroughly investigated by the German High Command. The ship must have been aware of the approach of the force, at least half an hour before the attack, once the climb to bombing height was commenced from the rendezvous. It may be that the German Navy did not rate the bombing accuracy of the Royal Air Force as high as it does now, or that fighters were despatched to intercept, but too late. After the attack, which was delivered by 29 aircraft, 18 of 617 Squadron and 11 of 9 Squadron, all aircraft dived towards the sea, and until well out of range of Norwegian fighter bases, flew low. No fighters were seen at all on this operation, or for that matter on the two previous ones. All aircraft landed without incident with the exception of one, of which the crew is known to be safe.
Thus was brought to an end the inglorious career of one of the largest and most heavily armed and armoured ships afloat.
The following gives a brief outline of the career of the Tirpitz:-
(i) April 1st, 1939. Launched at Wilhelmshaven.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
(ii) March, 1942. Attacked off the Loften Islands by Naval aircraft of H.M.S. Victorious. (Unserviceable for four months)
(iii) July, 1942. Attacked by a Russian submarine. (Undergoing repairs at Trondheim until December).
(iv) After a complete refit, the earlier months of 1943 were spent in trials, cruises, and the training of the crew for naval operations.
(v) September 9th, 1943. Tirpitz raided the Island of Spitzbergen in the face of negligible opposition.
(vi) September 22nd, 1943. Midget submarines of H.M. Navy attacked and badly damaged the Tirpitz in Alten Fiord. (Next six months spent in Alten Fiord undergoing repairs).
(vii) April, 1944. Tirpitz once again ready to go to sea, when she was attacked by Naval aircraft and once again sent into retirement.
(viii) July 17th, August 22nd, 24th and 29th, 1944. With signs of completion of repairs, Tirpitz was once again attacked by Naval aircraft, this time by Barracudas, and was again rendered unseaworthy.
(ix) September 15th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters flying from Russian bases. Damaged by at least one hit.
(x) October 29th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters. On this occasion cloud over the target rendered the attack inconclusive.
(xi) November 12th, 1944. Attacked in clear weather by Lancasters of No. 5 Group carrying Tallboy bombs, and capsized at her berth West of Tromso.
The coup-de-grace was delivered without the loss of a single life of the attacking force. The success of this attack cannot be measured in terms of the thousands of gallons of fuel used, hundreds of hours flown, or the number of 12,000 lb bombs dropped. The mere existence of the Tirpitz in her Northern berth has threatened all our convoys to and from Russia and North Atlantic shipping, and has cost the lives of a number of Fleet Air Arm crews who have attacked her, and has tied down a not inconsiderable force of the British Home Fleet in Northern Bases.
As the Commander-in-Chief himself has said, there was no doubt about the ultimate fate of the Tirpitz once the crews were able to draw a bead on her, and those who took part have received many congratulations on their magnificent achievement.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gardening
German Ports and their approaches have been the main target for our Gardeners this month; the remainder of the Command effort continued to be directed against the Kattegat area.
Penetrations to the enemy’s door step were evenly shared by all squadrons, and P.P.I. photographs reveal neat patterns of well planted vegetables in their allotted positions. 126 vegetables were successfully laid, and it is already known that great disturbances were caused off a certain German harbour; shipping came to a stand still for several days, while the local harbour master was at pains to find a safe channel “out” or “in” for his concentrated shipping traffic jam.
No.627 Squadron have now joined the Group Gardening Force, and were most unfortunate in their first sortie, owing to unexpected weather conditions in the target area. But like true Gardeners they returned to base with their valuable load. Well done, and better luck next time.
[Tables Showing Command and Group Summaries of Vegetables Planted]
[Underlined] NEWS EXTRACTS OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST SHIPPING. [/underlined]
Some German captains of coal ships are reported to have opposed successfully attempts to make them sail to Western Norwegian ports from Oslo. Colliers sent from Germany cannot be unloaded – as the coal dumps in the Oslo area are full, and therefore lose valuable time while waiting for discharge. This shows weakness in administration if ships are in fact allowed to leave Germany for places where coal is either not wanted or cannot be discharged.
It is reported that in various ports, Norwegian crews have refused to sail, and in some cases foreign crews have left their ships.
The enemy has been short of crews for his merchant ships for some time. There is little chance of his being able to find substitutes for crews which refuse to sail. If these reports are true, then dislocation to shipping must be considerable.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HOMBERG – 1ST NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith
Operations opened with a daylight attack by 226 aircraft on the synthetic oil plant at Homberg, a few miles to the North West of Duisburg.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] By the time the main force reached the target area, the target itself was covered by a layer of 10/10ths cloud, 8,000 – 10,000 feet. Gee reception was poor, and the wind-finding was consequently not up to the usual standard. The first wave arrived over the target about two minutes before the Wanganui flares went down, and were unable to attack. This illustrates the importance and the difficulty of accurate timing when marking is by Oboe. They brought their bombs back. 158 main force aircraft bombed the sky markers, which were reported as scattered. 54 were abortive, and twelve bombed alternative or last resort targets.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] (i) The chances of success of this operation were still further prejudiced by an aircraft which had its V.H.F. transmitter switched on during the entire period of control. The Master Bomber’s orders were jammed, and very few crews were able to hear his instructions. The pilot of the aircraft concerned, was gripping the press-to-speak switch continuously in the target area. Arrangements are now in hand to substitute the bombing switch on the control wheel for the existing press-to-speak switch. The bombing switch cannot possibly be operated accidentally.
Incidentally on each occasion on which intercom. has been inadvertently radiated during an operation, much unnecessary chatter has been heard, and the crews have addressed each other by their Christian or nick-names. This not only displays a low standard of crew discipline, but is also contrary to Ni.5 Group Air Staff Instruction TRG/18 which reads as follows:-
“To obviate the risk of confusion over the aircraft intercommunication system, members of aircrews are to address each other according to their duty in the aircraft, viz:-
Captain
Navigator
Bomb Aimer
Wireless Operator
Engineer
Mid-upper
Tail Gunner”
(ii) Fighter Command reported that the formation was good, reasonably compact, and easy to escort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DUSSELDORF – 2/3RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
187 aircraft of the Group took part in a combined Command attack on Dusseldorf, the chief administrative centre of the Ruhr. An undamaged portion of the built-up area on the eastside of the Ruhr was selected for attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. using both ground and skymarkers. Crews were to use their own navigation winds for bombing. A mixed load of H.E. and incendiaries was carried. Possible cloud cover of as much as 6/10ths – 9/10ths cu. and strato cu. was forecast in the target area, and crews were given separate aiming instructions for attacking the Wanganui flares.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather over the target proved to be clear, with the normal industrial ground haze. 177 aircraft attacked the primary target, aiming at the ground markers. Marking was reported as accurate, and the bombing was believed to have been well concentrated, with the exception of a few aircraft whose photographs showed that they bombed short. The sorties of these crews have been cancelled. Reconnaissance has revealed that a very heavy concentration of bombs fell in the Northern suburbs which were the target, and the whole area was virtually destroyed. This practically completes the entire destruction of Dusseldorf. In addition, all the important industrial plants in this area, including the large Rheinmetal-Borsig armament works, were severely damaged, and scarcely a building has escaped either complete destruction or heavy damage.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – 4/5TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr Smith
Deputy:- S/Ldr Churcher
The importance which the Germans attach to the Dortmund-Ems Canal as one of their main transport arteries was amply demonstrated by the fact that both branches of the canal, breached and emptied by the 5 Group raid on 23/24th September, were repaired within less than six weeks, and in full working order. The same stretch of canal was therefore attacked for a second time, by 176 main force aircraft on 4/5th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point, on the narrow island separating the two branches of the canal, was to be marked direct by Mosquitoes of No.54 Base with Red T.I’s. All aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 G.P’s and crews were ordered to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the red T.I’s.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] There was no cloud in the target area, and visibility was good. Illumination and marking was punctual, but the markers fell some two hundred yards N.N.E. of the marking point and these, together with the T.I’s dropped by the backers up, formed a concentration at which the main force aimed their bombs.
The resulting concentration was the best the Group has yet achieved. An analysis shows that all but 5% of the bombs are contained in a circle radius 530 yards about the M.P.I. This works out at 25 bombs per acre per 1,000 bombs dropped around the M.P.I. and far exceeds any previous results. Both branches of the canal were once again breached and drained, and where the eastern arm crosses the river Glane bombs have penetrated through the bed of the canal.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This attack pulverised the Eastern subsidiary channel but only the fringe fell over the Western area with the result that the damage was soon repaired. It draws attention to the serious effect of even a slight vector or marking error when attacking such small targets.
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – 6/7TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith.
This canal, which joins the Dortmund-Ems canal at Gravenhorst, connects the Ruhr with Osnabruck, Hanover, Brunswick, Magdeburg and Berlin. A section of it near Gravenhorst was selected for an attack by 248 aircraft on 6/7th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Mosquitoes were given a point to mark up against the embankment on the Northern side of the canal. A tolerance of 200 yards to either side of the embankment was allowed. Winds were to be found by aircraft of the flare force, and a vector broadcast to the main force by this Headquarters, to shift the bombing some 300 yards along the canal to the North East. With a surface wind from the West, it was hoped to lay a lozenge shaped concentration across the canal at an angle of approximately 30°.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Owing to a combination of unforeseen circumstances, this attack was abortive, and the Master Bomber ordered the force to return to base with their bombs. This operation is an example of how things can go wrong, in spite of careful planning. The snags encountered are listed below:-
(i) There were 7 H.2.S. failures amongst the aircraft of the Blind Marker and Flare Forces, an altogether exceptional number.
(ii) The target area winds were found to be much stronger than forecast, although accurate in direction. The flares were consequently scattered and too far to the East, and although two Mosquitoes found the canal junction there was insufficient illumination for them to identify the marking point.
(iii) One of the Mosquito markers eventually identified the marking point, and succeeded in dropping a Red T.I. close to the bridge nearby, but it unfortunately fell into the canal, and was extinguished before any backing up could take place.
An additional cause of confusion was the choice of Green T.I’s for both the route markers and the Primary Blind Markers, and in future different colours will be used.
[Underlined] HARBURG – 11/12TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
A force of 245 aircraft was despatched to attack the oil refinery and storage installations and the town centre at Harburg, on the South side of the River Elbe, opposite Hamburg.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] There were four aiming points, A, B, C, and D, the first three in the dock area to the North-West of the town and the fourth (D) in the town centre. All aircraft were to approach on a heading of 143° T. Approximately 70% of the force carried on H.E. load: (those attacking the oil plant) and 30% an incendiary load (for the town area).
A suitable marking point was selected, upwind of the target area. At H – 11, blind markers were to drop T.I. Green on the target, these were to be followed by flares, in the light of which Mosquitoes were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point.
[Underlined] Primary Method. [/underlined] Aircraft on aiming points A, B and C were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I’s releasing without any delay. False vectors were to be applied to the bombsight to bring the bombs onto the aiming points. Aircraft on aiming point D were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I. Red, on the ordered heading, delaying the release for 26 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather was clear, except for a thin layer of stratus at 8,000 feet, and the Master Bomber decided on the primary plan. The flares were rather late, but they were dropped accurately, and Marker 2 dropped a Red T.I. estimated as 80 yards West of the aiming point. These were backed up by further Red T.I’s in positions assessed as 200 yards North and 200 yards South. The actual positions of the markers cannot be identified on the night photographs. The main force was instructed to attack the resulting concentration of Red T.I’s according to plan. Bombing in the early stages was reported as rather scattered, but a good concentration developed later, and at the end of the attack, both target areas were well alight.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Both these targets had previously been attacked on daylight by aircraft of the U.S.A.A.F. on three recent occasions previous to the 5 Group attack, and although considerable damage by H.E. is seen in the oil refinery area, and damage to residential and business property, and the marshalling yards in the Northern half of the town, no precise statement of the damage inflicted by this night attack can at present by [sic] given.
[Underlined] DUREN – 16TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber provided by P.F.F.
Duren lay on the main road between Aix la Chappelle and Cologne, and therefore on the direct route of the Allies’ advance to the Ruhr in that sector. The entire town was a fortified area containing troops, munitions and other supplies. A force of 214 aircraft, was despatched to destroy the buildings, their contents, and the defences, and in addition to block the roads and crossings. No.1 Group also provided a force of over 200 aircraft to attack the same target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] In view of the weather conditions en route, Bases were ordered to form up in “gaggles” on a time basis, and a leader was appointed for each pair of Squadrons. Marking for the attack was controlled musical parramatta, provided by No.8 Group. Primary markers were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I’s and other P.F.F. aircraft were to keep the aiming point marked with T.I. Red and Green throughout the attack. If the T.I’s became obscured, the Master Bomber was to give aiming instructions with reference to the upwind edge of the smoke.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
In view of the proximity of American troops, very strict orders were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless:-
(i) The T.I’s could be clearly seen.
(ii) The target could be positively identified.
(iii) A timed run could be made from a positively identified position not more than 3 miles from the target.
The Master Bombing Switch was used on this occasion, as an additional precaution against the premature release of bombs. Aircraft were also ordered to home on Gee along the ‘B’ lattice line on the last leg into the target, with the release-point co-ordinated set up.
[Underlined] RESULTS [underlined] The weather was clear over the target, but there was ground haze and smoke from a previous attack. The attack was carried out according to plan. Marking was accurate and the bombing very concentrated; crews bombed either the T.I’s or the upwind edge of the smoke, according to the instructions of the Master Bomber whose controlling was reported to have been excellent. The centre of Duren was entirely devastated, only a few walls being left standing. To the South and East, scattered buildings were largely gutted or destroyed, and all roads were rendered impassable. The town marshalling yards, previously damaged in a U.S.A.A.F. raid, received a further severe mauling.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – LADBERGEN – 21/22 ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were making strenuous efforts to repair the damage inflicted on this canal by 176 of the Group on 4/5th November. It was decided to attack this target in the same place once again, to prevent this repair work from being carried out and if possible to add to the damage caused in the previous attacks.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Illumination and marking in normal sequence. Mosquitoes to mark aiming point with Red T.I. Main force crews to aim the first bomb of the stick at the Red T.I. or as ordered by the Master Bomber. Bomb load maximum load 1,000 lb. A few aircraft carried 6 X 1,900 lb G.P. bombs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 123 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes attacked. The weather in the target area was 6 – 9/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet, with good visibility below. Flares were accurate and on time, and the Mosquitoes were able to identify and mark the aiming point. The Master Bomber called the main force in to bomb as planned and the attack was concluded without a hitch.
A very satisfactory concentration was achieved round the markers, and subsequent reconnaissance shows that very great damage has been done. Both branches of the canal have been breached where they cross the River Glane, and both arms have once again been drained, flooding considerable areas of surrounding countryside, and leaving many barges high and dry. The Western embankment of the main canal has been breached in one position for about 150 feet. The subsidiary arm of the canal has been so heavily cratered that its outline can scarcely be recognised. Once again a long stretch of this important canal has been drained, many barges have been destroyed, and others lie with their cargoes high and dry on the canal bed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – GRAVENHORST – 21/22ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
The Mittelland canal, which runs from East to West from Berlin to the Ruhr, joins the Dortmund-Ems canal (which runs South to North, to connect the Ruhr with the North Sea) a few miles East of Rheine. A section of this canal, just East of its junction with the Dortmund-Ems, was selected for attack with the intention of severing both these important arteries.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A bridge across the canal was selected as the aiming point and a suitable position near the bank some 500 yards to the S.W. as a marking point. The illumination and marking plan was as usual, but in this case the markers were not to be attacked direct, but crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s dropped by the Mosquitoes, and a false vector set on the bombsight was calculated to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Ordered bombing height was 8 – 9,500 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Illumination and marking were punctual and accurate, but 8/10ths to 10/10ths strato cu, base about 4,000 feet, was encountered in the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb below cloud. 137 Lancasters and 6 Mosquitoes attacked. A good concentration developed, but there was some undershooting, which was inevitable owing to the change in height and the difficulty of vectoring when so low. Nevertheless, the canal has been breached on the West side for a distance of some 50 feet immediately South of the bridge, which was the aiming point. The canal itself has been almost emptied in this stretch and many barges are stranded. In addition many barges have been damaged by direct hits, and both banks of the canal have been heavily cratered.
[Underlined] TRONDHEIM – 22/23RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
A force of 178 aircraft took off to attack the submarine pens.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected near the pens. The usual blind marker and flare sequence was ordered, and in the light of the flares, Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s to mark the marking point. A false wind vector was to be used to shift the bombs onto the aiming point. Bombing heights, 9,000 to 12,000 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather conditions favoured a precision attack such as this: the target area was located without difficulty, and flares and two blind marker Green T.I’s were dropped accurately. Unfortunately the enemy was able to put a smoke screen into operation, which effectively obscured both the marking and aiming points, and the Mosquitoes were unable to mark. Unfortunately the target lay immediately outside a Norwegian town, thus precluding blind bombing, and the Master Bomber was reluctantly obliged to order the force to return to base with their bombs.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 26/27TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Weather conditions over the target promised to be ideal for an attack on Munich, during the night of 26/27th November, so a maximum
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
effort was ordered. The weather at bases and en route was very tricky, and the decision to go ahead with the attack was not made until the last possible moment. 278 aircraft took off, many with a visibility in the region of 1,000 yards and cloud base 600 feet. A fine achievement.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two major sectors of the town were selected, one radiating between 019° T. and 060° T, from the marking point, and the other between 081° T. and 150° T. The aircraft in the first sector to carry 1 X 1,000 MC/GP plus maximum ‘J’ incendiary clusters, and those in the second sector 4 lb incendiary clusters, with 50% of them carrying 1 X 4,000 lb bomb.
The two major sectors were sub-divided, and sector headings and appropriate delays were allotted in the usual way. No. 9 Squadron aircraft each carrying 1 X 12,000 lb H.C. bomb were spread throughout all sectors.
Illumination and marking in the normal sequence, bombing heights 16,000 – 20,000 feet.
With freezing level at 2,000 feet and a front lying approximately over the English Channel with tops generally at 20,000 feet, with occasional cu. nimb. Up to 25,000 feet, the flight plan presented a difficult problem. It was eventually decided that, after take off, aircraft should fly South over England below 2,500 feet, maintaining this height until the front had been crossed. Aircraft were to fly over the top of the front on the homeward route, losing height behind it.
The route to the target was chosen to give the enemy as little warning as possible: it lay South of Switzerland, crossed Lakes Maggiore and Como, and then went N.N.E. to the target, across the Alps. This plan was entirely successful, and the defences did not come to life until the attack was well under way.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The Master Bomber was delayed taking off, so Marker I, who was the deputy, conducted the opening phases of the attack. Illumination and blind marking went as planned. At H – 7 a Red T.I. was dropped, and assessed as almost on the marking point. At this moment the Master Bomber arrived, assumed control, and confirmed the accuracy of the Red T.I. Backers-up were called in, and marking was completed by H – 1. One Red T.I. which was assessed as wide to the North was cancelled by a Yellow T.I. The main force was then ordered to attack as planned.
Pilot’s reports were very enthusiastic about the success of this attack, but a large proportion of the night photographs plotted show ground detail to the South of the target, and it is now clear that the point marked was some 2/3,000 yards too far South. Nevertheless at least half of the attack went into the town and Southern suburbs and considerable damage should have been caused.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This was the first occasion on which the Group as a whole has used Loran, and the results were very satisfactory. The concentration on the return route showed a marked improvement on the degree of concentration previously achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATOR (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] CONTROLLED OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
W/T operating by the W/T link operators throughout November maintained a fairly high standard, and reception of their transmissions by the Main Force operators was also of a high order. 54 Base again supplied all the W/T link operators and both squadrons are to be congratulated on their efficiency. This result has been accomplished by hard training.
Two interesting incidents which took place on the night of the 11th and 22nd respectively are worthy of mention. On the night of the 11th, four minutes before the first bombing wind was due to be transmitted back to Group, sever ‘jostling’ was experienced on the frequency. Prompt action by the C.S.O. enabled this frequency to be cleared just in time for controlling to commence. We again realise just how effective this countermeasure is. On the night of the 22nd propagation conditions were such that reception at all the Group Ground Stations was practically impossible, yet when crews returned it was found that ait to air reception was perfect and 100% reception accomplished.
The Link 1 and 2 operators who carried out control duties during the month were:-
Night 4th F/O Booth 83 Squadron Link 1
F/O Chapman 83 Squadron Link 2
Night 6th F/Sgt Manderson 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Whitehead 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 11th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Utting 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 12th F/O Ward 617 Squadron Link 1 )Tirpitz
Sgt Morgan 9 Squadron Link 1 ) attack
Night 22nd Sgt Smith 97 Squadron Link 1
Sgt Moroney 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 27th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 2
F/Lt Summerscales 83 Squadron Link 3
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During the month 61 Wireless Operators took part in the test as detailed in 5G.S.I. No.13 and out of this number 54 passed as fit for W/T Link duties. Tabulated below are the number of operators per squadron who took part in these tests.
[Table of Numbers of Wireless Operator Tests by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during last month was disappointing, due to a number of squadrons not yet having all their equipment installed in their new training rooms, Signals Leaders are asked to exert pressure in the right direction to hurry along the completion of these training rooms so as to enable advantage to be taken of this organised and highly profitable training. We extend a hearty welcome to the Heavy Conversion Units of No.75 Base to take part in these exercises, and hope they will find the exercise interesting and of instructional value.
[Underlined] POINTS FOR SIGNALS LEADERS. [/underlined]
During regrading tests throughout the month it was distressing to find that very few Wireless Operators (Air) knew anything at all about the V.H.F. equipment TR.5043. Now this is definitely Signals equipment, and all Wireless Operators (Air) should know at least sufficient about the installation to enable them to rectify any simple fault which may occur in the air, such as the replacing of fuses, power leads, aerial connections etc. Particular instruction should be given to the drill for checking whether the set is on transmit or receive.
The introduction of the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule has filled a long felt want, and will be much appreciated by all Wireless Operators (Air). Like all other publications it will only fulfil [sic] its rightful purpose if it is always kept amended up to date, and the responsibility for amending all copies lies with the Signals Leader. He should ensure that all “Wilmot” signals are received and any amendments to the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule are embodied immediately.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The total percentage of Signals Failures against sorties flown for the month of November, was 1.82 which shows a decrease of 0.497 against the figure for October. It will be seen from the Signals Failure Monthly Circular that there was also a decrease during October, the percentage decrease for both months being 0.619. This achievement is really outstanding when one realises the unfavourable weather conditions the servicing personnel have encountered over this period. It all goes to show that IT CAN BE DONE – good show chaps!
There is also a bouquet this month for the Wireless Operators (Air) – there were no manipulation failures; an excellent state of affairs.
During the month not one sortie was cancelled (Class A) as the result of a signals defect. How many realise that this record has been maintained over the past 5 months?
[Underlined] I.F.F. COURSES. [/underlined]
Five courses involving 57 Wireless Mechanics drawn from all stations in the Group were held at Morton Hall during the month. Great keeness [sic] was shown and the instructor, Sergeant Ryder, reports very favourably on the standard attained. The Chief Signals Officer took the opportunity of discussing with each course the problems connected with aircraft servicing and was able to obtain some useful ‘gen’. The fact that a vast majority of our Group 1 tradesmen are still looking forward to an early return to civilian occupations was once more confirmed, and was countered by a graphic description of life in the peace-time airforce which it is hoped may have the effect of changing some of their minds.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T – TR.5043. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
The TR.5043 gave good serviceability during November, there were ten failures reported against more than 2,000 sorties. Four of the failures (all in one Base) were “NOTHING HEARD – NO FAULT FOUND”. Are Signals Officers doing all in their power to prevent this type of defect? There were two cases of Aerials Type 147 breaking; this is a decrease in comparison with the figure for October.
During the month, exhaustive experiments were carried out at Metheringham by 3 R.A.E. specialists in connection with aerial breakages. The result of these experiments is, that [underlined] all [/underlined] Lancaster aircraft TR.5043 aerials (including H.2.S. aircraft) can safely be fitted in strict accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10.
[Underlined] VOLUME CONTROLS. [/underlined]
Three different types of volume controls for operation by the pilot are now undergoing test in various Lancaster aircraft in the Group. Results to date are somewhat varied, some pilots stating that the new control in ‘bang on’ whilst others aver that the minimum position still permits incoming V.H.F. R/T Signals to interfere with intercom. We are determined to find the ideal before launching a general fitting programme.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T COURSES. [/underlined]
No.1 Radio School, Cranwell, has undertaken to give all Signals Officers in the Group a four-day course on the V.H.F. R/T set TR.5043.
The first two courses report enthusiastically on the efficiency with which this course is being run and they thoroughly enjoyed the brief opportunity to be immune from telephone calls and other diversions whilst learning all there is to know about this interesting set.
[Underlined] INADVERTENT RADIATION ON INTERCOM. [/underlined]
Yet another case has occurred of crew intercom. being radiated on V.H.F. R/T in the target area. This resulted in serious inconvenience by jamming to some extent the R/T traffic. It had been considered that all possible action had been taken to prevent this sort of thing happening. All Main Force aircraft have a switch fitted in the H.T lead to the V.H.F. Transmitter, and this switch is locked in the ‘Off’ position prior to take off. All aircraft which may be called upon to transmit on their V.H.F. R/T, have this switch in the ‘On’ position, but are equipped with a Neon light indicator positioned near the navigator which lights up whenever the V.H.F. set is transmitting. In spite of these precautions, however, an aircraft of the illuminating force inadvertently radiated intercom. on V.H.F. It seems that it will be necessary to reposition the neon indicator, and also make use of the pilot’s bomb release switch in lieu of the existing press-to-speak switch which unfortunately is in such a position on the control wheel that it can be gripped, and pressed, in the ‘On’ position accidentally. The Pilot’s bomb release switch is fitted on the control wheel in such a way that it cannot possibly be actuated accidentally.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The closing days of the month saw the final stages of the Loran fitting programme. This fitting programme almost brought back reminiscences of the Monica Mark V days, and much credit must be accorded to the wholehearted efforts of the Engineering and Radar personnel who installed the bracketry and equipment in double-quick time.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
The successful use of the equipment on the Munich operation on the night 26/27th gave a very useful fillip to enthusiasm, and effectively squashed the mutterings of the “doubting Thomases”. The serviceability figures, in view of the usual manipulation troubles and initial “bugs”, are promising. It has been found that the indicator becomes unusually temperamental when damp, but waterproof covers should clear this trouble.
Shortage of the main boxes and lack of spare components were sources of complaints, but both will be cleared almost directly.
[Underlined] A.G.L.(T). [/underlined]
Despite the spring tides at Fulbeck which threaten to engulf the Radar workshop, the A.G.L.(T) situation is well in hand. No physical success has been claimed, and the shortage of equipped aircraft is acute, but much useful data has been brought to light, which should do much to assist the final development of this device.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
Progress at Coningsby is steady. The scanner trouble has been cleared, gaps in the polar diagram have been filled in by a simple modifications [sic] which consists of strategically mounting a 16” X 6” sheet of perspex on the mirror. We [underlined] know [/underlined] it does the job all we want to know is [underlined] how [/underlined] it does it. Improvements to the scanner testing equipment have effected considerable economy in flying hours.
[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
The addendum to Monica to defeat the Hun, reached its flying trials this month which were very encouraging, and earned official sanction for the Group to experiment with Monica. All credit for this device must go to F/O Tovey of 53 Base. His prototype made all Walt Disney’s conceptions look very ordinary but he continued to work on the idea tirelessly and patiently, and with T.R.E. assistance brought forth a very workable unit, of which we hope a lot more will be heard.
[Underlined] SECURITY. [/underlined]
This month has seen the introduction of the long awaited Bomber Command Diversion Schedule. As the tag has it “The mountains shall labour and bring forth a ridiculous little mouse”. In this case at least, an eighteen month gestation has produced a noble offspring. There is one note of ridicule, introduced we imagine by some frolicsome “printer’s devil”, and this defect in the Schedule required one of the three following ‘mods’ for its eradication:-
(i) The Schedule to be mounted on a bracket and swivel fixed to the W/Op’s (Air) table.
(ii) All W/Op’s (Air) to be fitted with swivel vertebrae above the shoulders.
(iii) The even numbered pages of the Schedule to be printed “the other way up”.
The last of these three ‘mods’ has been requisitioned, and until it appears we wish you good luck and happy diversions.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED. [/underlined]
The Field Security Police have a multitude of duties,
And amongst other things these precious beauties
Sit in post offices and monitor calls,
And lap up every word that falls
From the lips of Service folk;
This is by no means a joke,
Though it may seem to be at first.
The police laugh simply fit to burst
Whenever they hear some solemn voice say,
“This is an Ops. circuit so we needn’t scramble, heh?”
And the other bloke
Says, “Oke!”
When this happens you might guess,
They take it down in shorthad, [sic] (more or less),
And after a court-marital –
To which they’re very partial –
The perpetrators of the crime
Do “time”,
Or they may, it is feared,
Be cashiered!
It all depends upon the rank,
AC Plonk or Flight Lieutenant Blank.
The moral is by now quite clear, I’m sure.
NO circuits can be trusted as secure.
When secrets must be spoken, your preamble
Must always be the magic words, “Please scramble!”
Ops. circuits only give you what you need,
And that is NOT security but Speed!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] WHAT ARE THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD NAVIGATOR? [/underlined]
A good navigator may be summed up as one who works hard all the time, uses his intelligence constantly and makes a conscious effort to be on track and on time throughout every operation.
Do you think you fill that category? To assist you in answering the first question, below is a self analysis chart for you to complete. Be honest with yourself in answering these questions.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUESTIONS. [/underlined]
(1) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] work to a system, and a regular time interval?
(2) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] make a “snap” alteration of course immediately you ascertain you are off track?
(3) Do you check your ETA’s [underlined] regularly [/underlined] every 15 minutes?
(4) When coming into Gee range to you [underlined] always [/underlined] believe the first Gee fix you obtain and act on it?
(5) When no fixing aids available, do you [underlined] always [/underlined] obtain a D.R. position every 15 minutes?
(6) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] “home” on your Southern or Eastern Lattice lines as instructed.
(7) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] check your compasses every 20 minutes?
(8) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] find a w/v over the ideal period of time, i.e. between 15 and 40 minutes.
(9) When necessary to you [underlined] always [/underlined] dog leg or alter IAS so as to arrive at each turning point exactly on time?
This is by no means a comprehensive list, but if you answer all the questions frankly, you will obtain a good assessment of your own ability. If you can say “Yes” to only 70% or less, you are below average; 80% you are average; 90% ad above you can consider yourself a good navigator.
Make a note of the points on which you lose marks, then rectify them [underlined] immediately [/underlined]. Further lists will appear in the next two summaries, so keep a note of your results on this test and by January you will have a complete assessment of yourself.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
The importance of finding accurate w/v’s, [underlined] and using them, [/underlined] has been stressed constantly for the last five years. One would therefore think that, as a result of all this “binding” every Navigator would now realise the importance of windfinding. BUT, unfortunately this is not so, Why?
We now have four “gen boxes” given us to assist in finding really accurate w/v., i.e. Gee, Loran, H.2.S. and A.P.I. All these instruments have been tested very thoroughly and have been proved accurate. All Navigators acknowledge the accuracy of these instruments and trust individual fixes and A/P’s obtained, but when it comes to joining two of these positions together, i.e. fix and Air Position, and obtained a w/v, many Navigators automatically become dubious. If the w/v obtained agrees fairly well with that forecast, or the last few w/v’s found, it is considered accurate. BUT, on the other hand if it differs by any appreciable amount, then in 7 out of every 10 instances a Navigator will say he got a “duff fix”, or else the A.P.I. is overreading!! In other words many Navigators just haven’t the confidence in themselves. Are YOU one of these? If you are, then reform yourself!
It is not generally appreciated that, even with a so-called steady wind the direction is never constant to within 30°, and the speed is never constant to within 10 or 15 miles an hour, so how can you expect to find idential [sic] w/v’s, and in any case how are you to know that there hasn’t been a sudden wind change caused by an unpredicted front or other reason?
Therefore in future, do not mistrust your fixes, A.P.I. readings and resultant w/v’s. Take great care in obtaining these readings and in plotting them accurately, but once you’ve got them treat them as correct – and [underlined] USE [/underlined] the resultant w/v!
[Underlined] COMPASSES. [/underlined]
Do [underlined] YOU [/underlined] always check your Compasses every 20 minutes? This question has been asked already, but it will bear repeating. There are now 3 instruments dependent on the serviceability of the D.R. Compass, namely H.2.S., A.P.I. and Mk.XIV Bombsight, besides of course the safety of the aircraft itself. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the D.R. Compass is fully serviceable all the time.
A recent analysis showed that very few Navigators ever pay sufficient attention to their compasses. Are YOU one of these people who take the Compasses for granted, or do you carry out your checks methodically. Do you for example, ever go out to your aircraft and assist in the swinging, or do you even ask the Compass Adjusters on their return how your compasses are? Do you always carry a compass key in your pocket? Have a look and make sure before you answer the last question. Are you thoroughly conversant with the symptoms of a toppled gyro, and do you know the procedure to be adopted to correct the gyro? [Underlined] But above all, [/underlined] do you know that you should never return early because one of your compasses is unserviceable?
An analysis is carried out after every Group concentration plan has been completed to ascertain why certain aircraft are off track. On every occasion the answer for [underlined] AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT [/underlined] is that vague phrase “COMPASSES U/S”, which, on further examination, means nothing more than “Compasses desynchronised”.
The safety of an aircraft and its crew was therefore jeopardised because the crew [underlined] forgot to check their compasses! [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Longer range targets will be the the priority this Winter and that means deep penetration into a heavily fortified Germany. Accurate Navigation will therefore be absolutely essential and this is directly dependent on the accuracy of your compasses. Be compass minded then – learn all you can about them, know your drills and manipulation procedures off by heart – and above all [underlined] CHECK YOUR COMPASS REGULARLY. [/underlined]
Use the Astro Compass when there is any discrepancy between the P.4 and D.R. Compasses.
Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must continue to drive hard on this subject, checking all new crews on their arrival See that they are thoroughly conversant with the drills, faults, remedies and manipulation procedures, and make it clear to them that on no account do they return early if one compass is unserviceable.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by the squadrons this month is 3.8 m.p.h. This is excellent. This figure shows a decrease of .5 m.p.h. We have achieved our goal of an average vector error below 4 m.p.h. Can we now possibly reduce this error to below 3 m.p.h.? If we can then all navigators can truthfully say they are contributing to very largely to the high standard of bombing we are achieving. Go to it! and see what records you can break this month.
[Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadron]
It will be noted that three squadrons of No.53 Base occupy the first three places this month, the two “old faithfuls”, Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons, still retaining their lead on the rest of the Group. No. 56 Base Squadrons are all down towards the bottom of the list. They can, and have, done very much better than this. Com on No.56 Base, let us see you at the top next month!
Apologies to No. 57 Squadron for last month. Their average vector error was inadvertently shown as 4 m.p.h., whereas it should have read 3.5 m.p.h.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators who submitted the best work this month as [sic] set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track-keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks and checking of E.T.A’s and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/O Hart – No.467 Squadron
P/O Briggs No.83 Squadron
F/O Martin No.106 Squadron
F/O Skinner No.189 Squadron
P/O Searle No.227 Squadron
F/Sgt Shapman No.207 Squadron
F/O Kay No.630 Squadron
F/Sgt Murray No. 50 Squadron
Note that P/O SEARLE appears for the second time. Good work SEARLE – keep it up!
[Underlined] TIMING. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary a long article was written on the slackness of timing on the return journey. Three causes of this “timing spread” were suggested and you were asked to eliminate them and so bring about a much needed improvement in the return journey concentration. Base, Station and Squadron Commanders and Navigation Officers were also asked to have a “drive” in this direction. Only one operation has been carried out since this letter was sent, and on this raid there was a very big improvement. In fact the concentration on the return journey was better than that going to the target!! This is good, keep it up, and make it your aim to achieve the concentration we desire, i.e. “an area covering not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width” – and no more.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Markham – No.463 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Martin – No.61 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Bennett, D.F.M. – No.617 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall. (now S/Ldr.).
F/O Bayne, D.F.C. – No.617 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. De Boos, D.F.C. – No.627 Squadron Navigation Officer, tour expired, posted to No.7 Group.
F/Lt. Tice – No.627 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
S/Ldr. Kelly, D.F.C. – Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck, missing on operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
This new navigational aid has only been used to any great advantage on one operation this month. Despite the difficulties in training and the short time since the introduction of the Loran equipment, operators made full use of the facility it affords, and it has proved without doubt a useful addition to our navigational equipment. The fact that to the present time no interference has been encountered which would make fixing difficult does not imply that the Hun will not attempt to jam the equipment and with this fact in mind every possible operator must use Loran to its fullest advantage whilst it is still possible.
There are one or two points which have arisen in the manipulation and use of this equipment which must be stressed. They are:-
(i) Loran operators are not spending sufficient time in the recognition of signals – particularly differentiation between 1st and 2nd Hop E sky waves. Perseverence [sic] and close watch of the signals on Sweep Speed 3 will ascertain whether the signals are the correct ones. It is appreciated that very little, if any, training can be carried out on the S.S. Loran Chain and operators must endeavour to use time on operations for sky wave training. If you are uncertain as to the appearance of sky waves your obvious remedy is to visit the Radar Training Room after 1630 hours any day and you can get all the gen on the sky waves by using the S.S. or North Eastern Loran Chain on a bench set. Why not make this a nightly feature until you are sure in the identification of all signals.
(ii) No system of taking position lines at regular intervals is being followed. It is no use taking a position line from one rate and keep transferring it along track for an undeterminable number of times to give you fixes with position lines from the other rate. Try taking position lines at regular intervals of say 10 minutes e.g.:-
Rate 4 at 2010 and 2020 and so on.
Rate 5 at 2011 and 2021 and so on.
(iii) The time base readings are easily upset by movement of the fine strobe control during the switching of the Sweep Speed Control through position 5, 6 and 7. Watch this carefully or else you are going to get false fixes. If necessary use your left hand for switching the Sweep Speed Control.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
(iv) Several operators reported the four dividers out of alignment but a few using commonsense [sic] and initiative correctly aligned the dividers and obtained full use of the equipment. As the dividers, particularly A, B, C and D are very critical, alignment checks must be made:-
(a) After switching on procedure has been carried out.
(b) Every two hours when LORAN is in use.
(c) After any large changes of temperature or pressure.
An Aircraft Drill has been produced and is available at all units, detailing the alignment procedure. Loran operators must know this procedure fully and screwdrivers have been made a general issue to all navigators in order that alignment corrections can be made in the air. It is important, however, that operators should know the symptoms of incorrect alignment before they attempt any correction at all. Loran Instructors or Radar Officers will supply all the “gen” on this.
A slight modification to the Loran set is being introduced shortly which enables operators to change the basic rate so that the new North Eastern Loran Chain can be used. This North Eastern Loran Chain the details of which will be available shortly, gives coverage over the whole of the North Sea and should be very useful on Northern trips. It is, however, emphasised that as this Chain is not as accurate as the Norther Gee Chain, Gee must be used to the limit of its coverage. The present charts are to a scale of one to three million and therefore hopeless for Bomber Command navigation. Representations have been made for larger scale charts and these will be distributed as soon as they are received at this Headquarters.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Welcome changes have been made this month in the Continental Gee Chain frequencies with the intention of giving far better facilities from the Ruhr and Rheims Chains. However emphasis is placed upon the correct setting up of the R.F.27 tuning dial to obtain the best reception. Great care is therefore to be exercised in setting the dial correctly when changing from one frequency to another.
The Rheims Chain continues to give excellent results with ranges reported as great as 0930E. Interference is slight and on most occasions non-existent. On the Munich operation the Chain could have been used to considerably greater advantage if suitable charts had been available in time.
The Ruhr Chain is still producing disappointing results and below the standard of the Rheims Chain. A and C Station signal strengths are fairly good. The B and D signals are weak limiting the operational value of the Chain. Sine wave jamming and Heavy Grass has been reported in the Brunswick and Cologne areas.
The Eastern Chain gave excellent results on the Harburg operation, many operators obtaining fixes in the target area. This indicates either the meteorological conditions were favourable for Gee that night, or that the enemy has transferred his jamming to other frequencies.
Representatives have again been made for the production of miniature lattice charts for the Continental Chain as the navigator nowadays has to carry no less than eighteen topographical lattice charts if he is to be prepared for any emergencies. The total area covered by these topographical lattice charts can be reproduced on approximately four miniature lattice charts.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
H.2.S. silence is still being maintained on the Group with total restriction on the use of H.2.S. Mark II and part restriction on H.2.S. Mark III. With the risk of early warning of operations, and until the efficiency of the enemy night fighter equipment is definitely ascertained, it is the policy of this Group to give the enemy as little help from H.2.S. sources as is possible.
H.2.S. operators are reminded that although the use of H.2.S. Mark II is almost totally restricted it may be possible that at some future date consent will be given to its use again. H.2.S. Mark II can be used from the enemy coast on the return journey. This relaxation of the restrictions is intended for training purposes and operators should make the best use of this time to raise their standard of efficiency. H.2.S. is and will remain the most efficient navigational aid over enemy territory because it cannot be jammed efficiently, and with the introduction of new Marks it will again come into general use. All Marks of H.2.S. are manipulated in a similar manner and thorough knowledge of Mark II will ensure more efficient use of the later Marks.
54 Base still continue to make great strides in the use of H.2.S. Mark III as an efficient bombing aid and trials are continuing to ascertain the accuracy of individual sets of H.2.S. equipment by means of ground Radar plots at positions of bombs gone on various targets. Complete analysis of every run is being made to ascertain the errors due to equipment and to the human element. Those due to the equipment can be eliminated. It is up to the individual operators to eliminate the inaccuracy due to human error.
H.2.S. Photography is proceeding satisfactorily throughout the Group, although all main force photographs, except those from 106 Squadron, are of landmarks in this country. From these training photographs it is evident that the standard is improving, and operators are taking a little more time in the manipulation of the camera. There are, however, still one or two unsatisfactory details which can be overcome:- For instance, some operators still persist in having a 10 mile zero as big as a half crown thus distorting the photograph obtained. Remember is should be the size of a sixpence. Others persist in having lights on or letting the daylight into the compartment when taking the photographs thus wasting negatives and printing material. If you persist in making these mistakes during training, far more may be made during an operational sortie due to operational stress. 54 Base have produced some excellent operational photographs, particularly those taken on the operation to Munich. These photographs show the lakes and valleys in the Alps as clearly as on a relief map. The photographs also indicate that the target and lakes nearby are very well defined on the H.2.S. Mark III P.P.I. and will no doubt prove useful for any future attacks.
Squadrons of 55 Base and 106 Squadron have carried out several mining sorties during the month, the results of which have been excellent. The importance of this work cannot be too highly stressed and H.2.S. training on these squadrons is being carried out with this type of operation in mind. There are several convenient landmarks on the East Coast which can be used for mining runs and the number of P.P.I. photographs which have been received indicate that some operators are making use of them during training. The important fact is that all operators on these squadrons must be able to release mines accurately on H.2.S. We cannot afford to lay them outside the normal channels, where they may be a danger to our own shipping.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month the German Night Fighter Force has again failed to offer effective opposition to Bomber Command’s night offensive. The German fighter controllers have been bewildered by the profusion of Window spoofs, Mosquito raids and Intruders, combined with the main attacks, and have failed to intercept the bomber stream with an effective number of fighters. Night fighter are, however, still the biggest danger, and there is no reason to suppose that, once they have contacted the bomber stream, they are any less efficient than they were last Winter. A night fighter, particularly if equipped with upward firing cannon, is a formidable adversary, and a crew must be on the top line to combat it successfully. Good crew discipline is essential. In particular, intercommunications between the pilot and gunners must be clear and concise. Idle chatter and the use of Christian names on the intercom. may mean attending interrogation at Dulag Luft instead of Base.
There are indications that the enemy may, in the very near future, send up fighters against our daylight attacks, particularly on the deeper penetrations we shall be making in the coming months. The fighter escort will deal with what it can, but crews must be prepared for small formations of enemy fighters to get through the escort. This will provide a quick and decisive answer to the ever recurrent problem of stragglers. The enemy may well use jet fighters for these attacks, but crews should remember that, although their speed is very high, there is nothing miraculous about these aircraft. In an attack they behave like conventional fighters and should be treated as such. Although they are armed with 30 m.m. cannon, these have such a low muzzle velocity that, for accurate shooting, they are not effective over 400 yards, which will give gunners a good chance of shooting back.
A final warning. A case has come to light recently where a captain admitted letting his rear gunner leave his turret over France and the sea when returning from the target. This is criminal. German night fighters are often ordered to follow the bomber stream across friendly territory, and well out to sea, and captains must remember that an operation finishes in dispersal, and not a moment sooner.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The activities of the Group in the operational sphere have mostly been intended to destroy small targets rather than to bomb areas of large cities.
Despite unfavourable weather conditions on frequent occasions, the results have been reasonably satisfactory from the Air Bomber’s point of view and the necessity of maintaining a high standard of precision bombing must be apparent. Obtaining the best possible results on precision targets at night, when visual identification is impossible, necessitates a thorough knowledge of the tactical plan and the ability to carry it out to the letter. The plots of the incendiary attacks on sectors illustrate that the majority of Air Bombers are doing their best to guide the aircraft over the marking point, but it must be realised that after the dummy bombing run on to the marker, it is essential that the aircraft should be on the briefed track as quickly as possible. As soon as the marker comes into the intersection of the bombsight graticule and is reported by the Air Bomber, the immediate reactions of the bombing team are as follows:-
(a) The Navigator commences to count off the required number of seconds consistent with the basic delay plus the delay for the incendiary bombs.
(b) The Pilot turns on to the course given by the Navigator prior to reaching the target area, and confirms that he is on the correct course.
(c) The Air Bomber does a last minute check of the bombing panel and releases the bombs on the executive word from the Navigator.
The correct observance of this procedure will ensure that the required incendiary concentration falls in the areas where the maximum amount of damage can be caused.
Now that Winter has arrived, all Air Bombers must be prepared for icing in the bomb-bay. The only preventative measure that can be undertaken is to see that the release slip heater for No.13 station is switched on at take-off, but by a careful examination of the bomb-bay after landing, it will be possible to see if any incendiaries have fallen from the S.B.C’s on to the doors and the ground crew will know what to expect when they open the bomb-doors. A careful examination of the bomb-bay after the aircraft has been flying below freezing level for some time will help to prevent any accidents on the ground after landing. It should be remembered that there will be no indication of bombs hanging-up due to icing, when the Air Bomber does his lights check.
The importance of switch drill, and accuracy in bombsight settings, must be frequently stressed by Bombing Leaders at every possible opportunity. An error of one or two degrees in bombsight levelling will give a large error on the ground, and despite the difficulty in setting the correct levelling figure on the computor [sic] box, every effort must be made to see that it is correct to the nearest degree. Constantly check your switches and bombsight on the way to the target, and remember that your target is not a town or city, but a small area in that town or city, and to hit is successfully you must be accurate as if bombing a practice target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOVEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS. [/underlined]
9 F/O Newton F/Sgt Flynn F/Sgt Grant 71
F/L Marsh F/O Carr F/Sgt Haydon 66
F/O Coater F/Sgt Boag F/Sgt Black 57
F/O Williams F/Sgt Gold Sgt Lockerbie 53
50 F/O Jones Sgt Jarmy Sgt Davis 77
F/O Ling F/Sgt Howard F/O Rutland 68
83 F/O Inniss F/O Morrison F/Sgt Dormer 73
F/L Weber Sgt Summers Sgt Thorn 76
97 F/O Greening Sgt Nutt F/Sgt Cairn 72
F/L Brooker F/O Pearce F/O Brown 42
F/O Ryan Sgt Kirkby F/O Sabine 56
F/O Royston-Piggott W/O Bate F/Sgt Madley 73
106 P/O May Sgt George F/Sgt Barling 61
207 F/O Rose Sgt Weaver Sgt Bell 75
617 F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien 63
F/O Gingles W/O Hazell F/Sgt Johnson 70
F/L Sayers P/O Weaver F/O Strom 73
F/O Martin F/Sgt Day F/Sgt Jackson 54 54
F/O Joplin F/Sgt Hebbard F/Sgt Fish 71
630 F/O Baker F/Sgt Leyden F/Sgt Taeuber 66
F/O Miller F/O Banks W/O Wildey 74
F/O Martin and crew, No.617 Squadron, have for the second successive month, obtained two crew errors of less than 60 yards at 20,000 feet. These results are obtained only by concentration on the part of Pilot and Air Bomber and are commendable efforts.
F/L Brooker and crew, No.97 Squadron, obtained the excellent result of 42 yards using the Mark XIV Bombsight.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
P/O Willmot, No.49 Squadron, obtained fifth place on the Bombing Leader’s Course, being awarded a “B” Category.
There have been no changes in the squadrons during November.
All Bombing Leaders are asked to make a point of seeing that their returns are forwarded to Group Headquarters as soon as possible after the end of each week and month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING . [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE ERROR [/underlined]
1 9 65 yards
2 ) 97 70 yards
2 ) 619 70 yards
4 630 71 yards
5 49 72 yards
6 83 73 yards
7 44 74 yards
8 207 86 yards
9 463 87 yards
10 57 88 yards
11 50 100 yards
12 467 114 yards
13 106 124 yards
14 61 125 yards
15 189 126 yards
The top place in the Group Competition has again changed hands, 9 Squadron having improved on their last month’s entry by 8 yards, and they are well ahead of the next six Squadrons who submitted entries all within 6 yards.
No. 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their excellent bombing and it is hoped that they can hold their place against the strong opposition which will be provided by other squadrons during December.
No.55 Base have repeated their recent consistently good bombing and all five squadrons are included in the first ten, 619 Squadron showing the greatest improvement with a decrease of 23 yards on their October result.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three practice bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
No. 627 Squadron dropped 409 bombs at heights lower than 1000 feet with an average error of 71 yards.
172 T.I’s were dropped producing an average error of 191 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. If you find you are getting no air supply after switching on the air control what is the first thing to check?
2. Which pistol is liable to operate even though the bomb has been released “SAFE”?
3. What is used to indicate the presence of Allied troops during close support attacks on targets near the front line?
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The two entries received in this competition have both been sent in from Strubby.
G/Capt. Jeudwine – 138 yards at 20,000 ft.
W/Cdr. Milward (619 Sqdn.) – 205 yards at 20,000 ft.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The solitary entry for this competition came from 55 Base.
F/Lt. Linnett (57 Sqdn.) – 104 yards.
F/Lt Rumgay (617 Sqddn.) has completed several excellent exercises using the S.A.B.S. which unfortunately, cannot be included in the competition.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The total number of practice bombs dropped during November shows a considerable decrease when compared with October’s figures (2577 against 3898). Adverse weather conditions made practice bombing impossible on many days during the month, but some Squadrons made maximum use of the available opportunities.
The average crew error, although slightly higher than last month, is very satisfactory and special mention must be made of 9 Squadron’s efforts which produced and average error of 122 yards.
There are occasions when considerable congestion has been caused at Bombing Ranges because of the large number of aircraft attempting to bomb at the same time. It is only possible to allocate two targets to each Base and this congestion should be reduced with closer co-operation between Squadron Bombing Leaders, and the staggering of Bombing times allocated to each aircraft.
Bombing Leaders are also reminded that night practice bombing programmes should be transmitted to Ranges before 1800 hours if possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
incendiary attacks
[Underlined] BRUINSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER [/underlined]
It is probable that with the limited time available before an operation, crews may not appreciate the complete picture of the plan of which each squadron forms a component part. It is proposed, therefore, to take one of the incendiary attacks which this Group has carried out, giving in broad outline the intention, plan and execution of the attack.
The target chosen is Brunswick, which was selected for attack by this Group on the 14/15th October. Appended is a P.R.U. photograph of the town of Brunswick, showing the damage inflicted by the attack, bounded by the red line. The smaller areas bounded by green lines represent damage prior to the 14/15th October. The attack was highly successful but nevertheless illustrated how even small deviations from the agreed plan can jeopardise success.
[Underlined] INTENTION. [/underlined]
Brunswick has always been an important communications centre due to its position on the trade route from Hamburg to Southern Germany and its importance increased with the development of inland waterways and railways. Its pre-war major industries were swiftly placed on a war footing to supply the German armed forces and the beginning of the war also saw the rapid development of major aircraft and engineering industries in the town, particularly in the Northern and Southern suburbs.
It is not surprising therefore that this town, lying as it does within range of bases in Great Britain, has received regular attention from the Allied Air Forces. Since the strategical bombing of Germany began, a total of 6129 tons of bombs have been reported as dropped on the town by Bomber Command alone. But in common with a few other towns, like STUTTGART and FRANKFURT, it bore an unusually charmed life. While bombing depended upon visual methods of target finding, this was partly explained by the lack of good water landmarks near the town, but the difficulty of finding and bombing the target persisted after the introduction of RADAR aids, as will be seen from the following summary of major Bomber Command raids this year, including two by this Group, which left the town almost unscathed.
14/15th January – 472 aircraft
22/23rd April – 256 aircraft
22/23rd May – 211 aircraft
13/14th August – 350 aircraft
These raids are additional to several A.S.A.A.F. raids directed specific factories which were in the main successful.
[Underlined] PLAN. [/underlined]
There are two main alternative methods of carrying out an incendiary attack on a town of this nature. The first is to put the T.I’s on the centre of the town and to bomb these direct. This method
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
has a number of disadvantages the most important being that T.I’s in a built up area will seldom show up as brightly as those dropped on open ground, so that any markers which may be wide of the target will almost certainly attract the bombing. This occurred on the first attack on Konigsberg. Moreover, as soon as bombing starts the markers become obscured by incendiaries and smoke, and have to be continually backed up, this adding to the risk of inaccurate markers falling outside the town.
The alternative is to select a marking point which us likely to be easily recognisable by the marker force and located somewhere on the upwind side of the target. Provided visibility is reasonable all markers should fall within 300 yards of the marking point. If each crew is then given a heading on which to fly and a number of seconds to delay the release of bombs, the whole target area should in theory be covered with an even density of incendiaries and thus be totally destroyed.
It should be noted that this system entails the most precise bombing by each crew otherwise some areas will receive too many incendiaries and others will be left unburnt. The method by which each crew is to pass precisely over the markers and thus get on to the exact heading is laid down in Air Staff Instructions, and must be known to all.
[Underlined] NARRATIVE [/underlined]
(i) [Underlined] Weather. [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear with slight ground haze.
(ii) [Underlined] Marking. [/underlined] At H – 11 the first green T.I. dropped blind as a proximity marker, went down followed almost immediately by the first flares. At H – 8 the second flare wave dropped and by this time three more green T.I’s had gone down. Mosquito Marker No.3 gave a “Tallyho” and went in to mark, his T.I. being assessed as 200 yards to the North of the marking point. The Master Bomber ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up 200 yards to the South. The backing up eventually resulted in 2 T.I’s roughly on the marking point, one 300 yards S.E. which probably fell in water and quickly went out, and one wide marker 800 yards to the West. This error was due to a variety of causes of which undue haste was probably the major. At H – 1 the markers were ordered off the target and the main force instructed to attack. The illustration shows the positions of the Red T.I’s in relation to the marking point as assessed from night photographs.
[Diagram]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS. [/underlined]
(iii) [Underlined] Main Force Bombing. [/underlined] The attack went mainly according to plan although the Master Bomber had to instruct crews to steady down as there were some wide sticks in the early stages. These few loose sticks are a regrettable feature of all attacks, and it is hard to understand crews who have carried their loads all the way to the target can allow themselves to release them in open country on the edge of the target when a few more seconds would enable them to be placed on the aiming point. At H + 8 the main force were instructed to complete bombing and return to base.
[Photograph – missing] This photograph is a still from film shot by a 463 Squadron Lancaster equipped with cine apparatus. The photograph was taken six minutes after the main force bombing started, and can be clearly picked out on the P.R.U. cover as the North East corner of the sector allotted to Nos. 50 and 61 Squadrons.
[Underlined] DAMAGE ASSESSMENT [/underlined]
The greater part of the central core of the town was contained in the central sector shown on the tracing overlay. The two boundary sectors also contain a portion of this central core, all of which was fully built up and therefore highly vulnerable to incendiary attack. Whilst the primary intention of the raid was to destroy the central core of the town, two squadrons were allotted to an area to the East and North East which is less fully built up, as a trial to see what damage could be achieved by a small force.
An examination of photographs shows that of the three markers remaining after Marker D had become extinguished, only A showed up clearly, and that markers B and C became covered by incendiaries from a load released short, and may not have been clearly visible to bomb aimers. This left the extreme Westerly T.I. clearly visible throughout the attack and as a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Photograph]
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[Photograph with Overlay Showing Bombing Sectors] BRUNSWICK 14/15 OCTOBER.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
result all incendiary loads had a tendency to fall in the Westerly part of a central sector or else in the Western sector, or even West of this. There was also a tendency for loads to overshoot rather more than planned. As far as it is possible to estimate from available data about 90% of the loads other than those which were dropped loosely outside the area, fell within the central core of the town but only a few scattered sticks on the N.E. area. This was clearly due to crews using the Westerly marker as their datum point, thus shifting the whole area of attack some hundreds of yards to the West.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
It can be seen that the greater part of the central core of the town has been completely destroyed, and that there has also been some damage in the more Northerly sectors. Damage in the North East sector is slight due to the shifting of the marking point. The attack therefore illustrates the manner in which any marker wide of the concentration will draw on itself undue attention. It also illustrates the harm that can be done by loads of incendiaries dropped on the markers thus making them difficult to see. Apart from these two points the attack was extremely well carried out, timings were accurate, winds found were excellent and the great majority of aircraft attacked exactly on the headings laid down. Incidentally one reason for the marker which went wide was the tendency on previous attacks for some crews before H hour. As a result of experience the Mosquito markers who are marking from below 1,000 feet like to be clear of the target with a minute or two in hand. It is obviously essential that the markers should not be hurried in their task and crews must on no account bomb before H hour unless the Master Bomber calls them in earlier.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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war effort
[Table of Sortied Carried Out with Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
Squadrons above establishment are calculate on an establishment of 20.
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
During the month the scheme for the Categorisation of Heavy Bomber pilots in the Group was issued. Full details are contained in this Headquarters’ letter reference 209/Trg. dated 18th November, 1944. The success of this scheme depends on co-operation between Squadron/Flight Commanders and the Squadron Instructors to see that crews are available for their initial and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks so that a Category can be awarded or revised.
The Squadron Instructor has a vital responsibility. He must be thoroughly familiar with Pilots’ Notes for the Lancaster, relevant Air Staff Instructions and in particular No.5 Group Aircraft Drills. Some Squadrons have already completed a number of Category Tests, which incidentally are done in the New Crew Check and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks. No separate test is necessary.
A preliminary examination shows that some of the Category Test Proformas have been completed accurately, others show a definite tendency to overmark. An [underlined] A+ [/underlined] Category should not be lightly awarded because it amounts to an “Exceptional” assessment. One proforma showed 100% marks for Captaincy! Section No.8 requires special care. A pilot scoring full marks for Captaincy must be faultless (and we’re all human).
The number of pilots categorised in the ten days following the introduction of the scheme is as follows:-
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
A total of 177 New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks were done during the month (including the Category tests in the above table), leaving 101 checks outstanding. Nearly half the outstanding checks were in 56 Base, where a temporary shortage of aircraft, absence of dual sets and a deficiency of a Squadron Instructor, gave the Base more than its share of problems.
Total squadron training hours amounted to 4,000 hours day, and 1,300 hours night – about 700 hours less than the previous month. (We blame the weather again). Now that the Winter is on us the old skeleton (“No training – aircraft are bombed-up”) is rattling its ancient bones. Lock it up. We’ve heard the jingle before. If the Met. gives half a chance of training, get a couple of aircraft per Flight de-bombed as soon as the operation is cancelled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION AND 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
Fighter affiliation results are encouraging. Squadrons did a grand total of 1105 exercises on 500 details – nearly two exercises per gunner in the Group.
Night affiliation by squadrons continues to climb to higher figures. This time it totalled 314 exercises of which 76 were done with 100 Group Mosquitoes, and the remainder with 1690 B.D.T. Flight. This was the fourth successive month to show an increase.
1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month was reduced from 26 aircraft to 12 by the withdrawal of the Spitfires and Martinets. It continued, however, to assist No.7 Group with day and night details for 75 Base, and a few night details for 72 Base. The Flight flew 560 hours on 670 details. Pilots averaged 23 hours, the Hurricanes 33 hours, the Spitfires 16 hours and the Martinets 9 hours.
Night affiliation by the Flight was the highest ever, rising from 94 details in October to 139 in November, thus exercising nearly 300 gunners in the hours of darkness; (a first rate performance bearing in mind the persistent bad weather).
It is satisfying to hear on the hook-up that on one night the Flight booked 33 night details. They were not all done owing to the weather, but on the night of 28th November, 22 details were completed – a record night for the Flight. On five nights on the last week of the month, 89 details were done. This shows what can be achieved when the weather is fit. Incidentally, the moon was up. Bear in mind that affiliation on dark nights provide the real test.
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S. TRAINING. [/underlined]
Unusually bad weather during the month affected No.5 L.F.S. Only two days during the month were fit for full flying, but despite this, and repairs to the perimeter track, full advantage was taken on of every opportunity and 5 L.F.S. completed the training of 92 crews for squadrons and had 11 crews within a day of finishing their course at the end of the month. The total of 92 crews was 6 crews in excess of Command estimate.
The Unit flew a total of 1344 hours. The average hours flown per aircraft on charge was 48. There were two avoidable accidents during the month. The rigorous policy of “quality and not quantity” is being followed and three crews have already been put up for disposal on the grounds of poor captaincy.
The crews posted during the month averaged 12 hours 35 minutes training at the Unit, nearly 2 hours more than the previous month. This was largely due to extra time being given to the short cross country exercise to give additional navigational instruction. Loran training has also been introduced and crews are getting 7 hours ground training on their course.
12 Instructors were recategorized by E.C.F.S. during the month. Two obtained A2 Categories and the remainder B Categories ([Underlined] Note: [/underlined] These Categories have no relation to the Pilots’ Categorisation Scheme introduced by 5 Group). The Examining Flight expressed the opinion that the standard of instruction at 5 L.F.S. was slightly above the average for Four Engined Training Units.
The next month’s commitment for 5 L.F.S. is 100 crews, less wastage. If the weather is reasonable, the Unit can do it as it always has in the past.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING (LINK). [/underlined]
[Underlined] NEW EXERCISES. [/underlined]
The exercises in the Instrument Flying Syllabus on the Link are being revised to include exercises designed to cover operational procedure, and to practice more thoroughly and stimulate the pilot’s interest in keeping his I.F. up to scratch.
[Underlined] NEW LINK TRAINERS. [/underlined]
When installation of the new Link Trainers is complete, there will be one available for each squadron in the Group. This will put the ideal squadron monthly total times for pilots (50 – 60 hours) within reach of every squadron. Many squadrons will have double the amount of Link Time available. This extra time can only be used efficiently if a Link Trainer Programme is organised and kept going by the officer detailed by the squadron for co-ordination of I.F. and Link Training (Air Staff Instruction TRG/3 refers).
[Underlined] PRIMARY OBJECT OF THE LINK TRAINER. [/underlined]
Units whose Flight Engineers have done double the time of the Pilots seem to have lost sight of the primary object of the Link Trainer; that is to keep pilots in constant practice in all forms of instrument flying. The ideal is for pilots and flight engineers times to be equal.
[Underlined] LINK TIMES. [/underlined]
Squadron Link hours generally are improving. The total pilot times were [underlined] DOUBLE [/underlined] the previous month. There are, however, still weak places in the chain, which are easily visible from the training return. Two squadrons in both 53 and 54 Bases and one in 55 Base have done less than 20 hours pilot time per month.
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots – 742 hours. Flight Engineers- 764 hours. Other Aircrew – 101 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED. [/underlined]
2.11.44 – “D” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
2.11.44 – “D” – 227 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
4/5.11.44 – “L” – 227 Sqdn. – 2 Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 630 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “J” – 467 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 227 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED. [/underlined]
4/5.11.44 – “S” – 207 Sqdn. – ME.109 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined]
6/7.11.44 – “B” – 189 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
Claims annotated ‘C’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
From a total of 84 combats during the month, 7 were claimed to have been with jet propelled aircraft of which 5 were claimed as destroyed. The other claims stand at 4 destroyed, 1 probably destroyed, and 1 damaged, all of which have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. The correct identity of the reported jet aircraft is now under consideration by the experts and no claims are being considered until a decision has been reached as to whether these phenomena are in fact jet propelled aircraft or some form of jet projectile.
Two aircraft were surprised by under attacks. The first warning being when the aircraft was hit by cannon fire. In both cases the aircraft were extensively damaged and casualties to the crew incurred. The answer to these under attacks is 100% crew co-operation and correct and frequent “Banking Search”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
W/O HANSON 97 Sqdn. Cat. ‘B’
F/O KETHRO 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT. [/underlined]
[Tables of Fighter Affiliation Results by Squadron]
Note: Figures in the above table represent “Points”.
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR NOVEMBER:- 1105. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
The Order of Merit will, in future, be based on a points system, points being allotted as follows:-
Night Affiliation with Camera and Infra Red Film 10 points
Night Affiliation without Camera 8 points
Day Affiliation with Gyro and Camera 5 points
Day affiliation with Camera 3 points
Day Affiliation without Camera 1 point
The total of night affiliation exercises continues to increase and it is hoped that the Gunnery Leaders will co-operate with Squadron and Flight Commanders to ensure that the maximum number of details are flown whenever operations and weather permit. The importance of this exercise cannot be over emphasised and the aim of every Squadron should be to achieve at least one exercise per crew per month.
It is apparent from the training returns that certain Squadrons are not making the maximum use of their Gyro camera assemblies during day affiliation exercises. These assemblies must be fitted on every possible occasion. Gunnery Analysis Officers are now established on each Squadron and it is their duty to assess the films taken during these exercises and to keep a proper for future reference for categorisation etc.
No. 53 Base are to be congratulated on setting the pace as regards outdoor night vision training. Each Squadron within the Base has fitted up a simple obstacle course which has been in use regularly by Squadron gunners. Other Bases would be well advised to follow the lead of No.53 Base in this simple, but very effective, practical form of instruction.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
Leave it to Smith [Drawing]
“Pass over yesterday’s fighter affil. reports will you Bill, and let’s see how some of those new crews are panning out. – Correct directions given – Range usually 800 yards – Range O.K. corkscrew appeared slow – Range 700 yards, corkscrew very good – Ranges generally good 600 to 650 yards – Range good – Range varied from 300 to 900 yards – gunners poor – corkscrew good. Who on earth was flying ‘N’ Nuts yesterday Bill – with two clueless gunners the crew can’t be anywhere near fit for operations?”
“One moment Dick – ‘N’ Nuts – that Clarkson – a new crew with only a Mid-Upper, but we put old Smith in there as Rear Gunner as he wants to get finished and since his old skipper went sick he’s had no crew; he only needs a half dozen to finish his second tour.”
“Smith always seems to have wads of clues, he’s certainly been operating for ages without getting himself bumped off. Quite a lot of the time as a spare too – the pilots seems to like to have him in the aircraft.”
“I suppose Bill, that Smith is O.K. Somehow we always seem to have taken it for granted. I must say he seemed very rusty when we gave him that Sighting test, didn’t he, but as he said, he’d only just come out of Sick Quarters and wasn’t feeling at all himself. We were going to give him another shot later on but somehow we never have. Let’s do it right away and clear our consciences. See if you can find him in the Gunnery Section as he’s not down for D.I. this morning, and as you go you might hand down the questions!”
Bill put his head into the Gunnery Section, W/O Smith, who was sitting by the fire greeted him enthusiastically. “Good morning, Sir, anything doing today?”
“Haven’t heard of anything as yet Mr. Smith, but in the meantime the Gunnery Leader wants you in his office.”
Mr Smith entered the Gunnery office not quite so enthusiastically. “Good morning Mr. Smith, come in and sit down. It seems a good morning to give you that sighting test again, but before we start that, what on earth happened in your fighter affil. show yesterday? – Look at this report – Range varied 300 to 900 yards. It’s appalling, isn’t it Mr. Smith?”
“Very bad indeed Sir, very bad indeed. I’ll go and chase up that new gunner in the Mid Upper right away, tell him to pull his finger out, Sir. You leave him to me Sir, I’ll see he’s ‘bang on’ in a few days.”
“But you know, Mr. Smith, he got a very good report from his Gunnery School, really a very good report. Of course, I know none of the crew have had any operational experience as yet, but that wouldn’t affect his range estimation would it?”
“Well Sir, you know how they turn them out these days, they’re not trained like us old stagers were. You leave him to me, Sir – a couple of ops and he’ll be quite O.K., in fact if you don’t mind, Sir, I’d like to start on him right away, no time like the present, Sir!” – Brr - Brr – Brr – Brr –
“One moment Mr. Smith while I answer the ‘phone” – “Gunnery Leader speaking – What – Maximum effort tonight – Flight planning at
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] LEAVE IT TO SMITH. [/underlined]
twelve. Right you are, thank you. Sorry Mr. Smith, I’m afraid you’ll have no time to teach your other gunner to-day as your crew is sure to be on the battle order and I’m afraid we’ll have to leave your sighting test over to another day as well, as I’ve got plenty to get on with at the moment.”
“Sorry about the sighting Sir, I was feeling just in the mood for a bit of sighting this morning. I’d have surprised you, Sir. Oh, and about that Mid Upper Sir, don’t you worry. I’ll be there myself Sir, and I’ll look after them all. You leave it to me, Sir. ‘N’ Nuts our aircraft again, Sir?” “Yes.” “Thank you Sir.”
‘N’ for Nuts was homeward bound. Her crew was feeling elated. They had bombed – they were well on the way back. The coast line showed ahead and beyond it the sea, pale in the moonlight.
“O.K. Mid Upper?”
“O.K. Pilot.”
“O.K. Rear Gunner?”
“On the job skip.”
“Good – we’re trusting to you Smithy if we get in trouble!”
“Skip, in this visibility, I could see a Jerry take off. Just leave it to me.”
‘N’ for Nuts was overdue. ‘N’ for Nuts was missing. In the Gunnery Section someone said “Poor old Smith, all the ops he’s done and then gets himself bumped off by flying with a sprog crew.”
Far away Unterleutnant Hans Hoffman was buying beer. His Gruppen-Fuhrer was pleased with him. He stood in front of the fire, a tankard in his hand. “Three time before I chase Lancaster, Lancaster see me coming, Lancaster corkscrew, I fire, I miss. Lancaster fire back, sometimes he hit me, sometimes not but always I miss. I am sprog. But last night things different. I see Lancaster, I chase, range 800 yards, 600, 500, 400, 300 yards, Lancaster still no corkscrew, no nothing. I press the button, I cannot miss – Lancaster go ‘pouf’. Lancaster fall in the sea. I feel I am no longer sprog. Lancaster sprog. I give my Lancaster a name to remember it by, I think of an English name, very English, I call my Lancaster ‘Schmidt’.”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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Second Thoughts for Pilots
YOUR CHARTER AGAINST ACCIDENTS – 7 GOLDEN RULES
I TAXY CAREFULLY – use the landing lamp at night.
II ON TAKE OFF – open the throttle slowly, easily & smoothly.
III NEVER BREAK CLOUD WITHOUT A FIX
IV AVOID CUMULO-NIMBUS CLOUD – it’s the hazard of the overcast.
V BEFORE LANDING – always get a corrected Q.F.E.
VI WATCH THE APPROACH ACROSS THE BOUNDARY – 105 – 110 m.p.h. without bombs – 115 m.p.h. with bombs.
VII DON’T HAVE ACCIDENTS – [/underlined] OF ANY KIND!! [/underlined]
CUT THIS OUT & PIN IT UP IN YOUR FLIGHT OFFICE
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[Blank Page]
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[Drawing] accidents
26 aircraft were damaged in accidents in the Group during November. 11 were totally destroyed, 4 are CAT. B, 7 CAT.AC, while 4 were only CAT. A. There is the possibility that two of these aircraft were lost as a result of enemy action, but out of the remainder, 21 were either destroyed or damaged [underlined] in accidents which were avoidable. [/underlined] L.F.S. damaged 2, leaving 19 to be chalked up against the squadrons. October produced 14. The Group, therefore, damaged 7 more this month. Bad weather or not, this is going the wrong way.
Here is the month’s list of avoidable accidents. Some of these accidents damaged more than one aircraft, so that the accident and damage totals do not tally:-
[Tables of Accidents for Squadrons and L.F.S.]
[Underlined] Q.F.E’S AGAIN. [/underlined]
Last winter a number of Lancasters crashed on return from long trips because pilots took no account of the dangers attending a large drop in barometric pressure after take off. Altimeters not reset to the lower pressure engendered a false sense of security and the aircraft either hit the sea when returning at low heights or undershot in bad visibility. Consequent upon these accidents Air Staff Instruction FC/19 dated 17.1.44 was issued, but what was thought to be a bogey well and truly laid has popped up again this month. Two aircraft were damaged, one in fact totally destroyed, in accidents of this nature.
One returned to a diversion airfield in very bad weather and crashed 300/400 yards short of the flarepath. The pilot says that just before hitting the ground his altimeter was reading 400 ft. He had tried to get a Q.F.E. by R/T but bad reception nullified his efforts. He then proceeded with his approach and good fortune alone prevented a fatal crash. No use was made of W/T to obtain the necessary Q.F.E., which on this particular night had dropped many millibars in a short time.
The other aircraft hit the water while making a long sea crossing on return from an operation. The pilot had been briefed that at certain positions the barometric pressure would be much lower than at the target or at base, and details were given. He came down low beneath cloud (contrary to orders at briefing which stipulated a return height
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
of 2500 ft) and hit the sea, with his altimeter still indicating some hundreds of feet. The pressure at the target was still on the instrument.
Read Air Staff Instruction FC/19 and get this Q.F.E. business buttoned up. Remember that falling pressures spell trouble. Talk to the Met. Officer anyway. You can’t know too much. Incidentally, the second of these two accidents again shows the danger of ignoring the flight plan.
[Underlined] COLLISIONS IN THE CIRCUIT. [/underlined]
Two aircraft from the same airfield returned from operations one night last month, and collided at the entrance to the funnel. – Fourteen lives were lost. The evidence put forward at the subsequent investigation was sufficient to show that the aircraft which called up first either made a very wide circuit or contacted Flying Control before reaching the call up position. The second pilot likewise, called up at the wrong positions and, further was at the wrong height when he did so. These digressions led to tragedy. The moral needs no pointing. 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme must be followed [underlined] to the letter, [/underlined] and any pilot who disregards this instruction in any way is a menace to his colleagues, who are just as keen as he is to get down to “bacon and eggs”. The importance of good flying discipline on the circuit cannot be too strongly impressed on pilots. Keeping a good lookout until the aircraft is safely back in dispersal with engines stopped is part of it.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
It is apparently impossible for a month to go past without a serious taxying accident. A feature of such incidents recently has been the failure of pilots to warn Flying Control that they are about to leave dispersal. Consequently, as happened in one particular incident this month, Flying Control did not have the chance to control the traffic on an airfield at night. This, allied with disobedience of taxying instructions and the absence of taxying lights or aldis lamp led to a bad collision at night. Sever disciplinary action is bound to follow accidents of this kind. There can be no excuse.
[Underlined] OBSCURE ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
There are four obscure crashes this month still under investigation. At present there is insufficient known about them for the cause to be commented upon.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below gives details of avoidable accidents by squadrons for November. This table is not final. It only contains those accidents which are known definitely to be avoidable. A few will remain undecided till the results of investigations now in progress are known.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] A VISIT TO FRANCE. [/underlined]
An account of the visit of a representative of this Headquarters to France will be of interest to all Armament personnel. This item under the heading “The Proof of the Pudding….” will give Armament personnel a very good idea of what devastation is wrought when bombs are delivered to the right place.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN. [/underlined]
The Armament Bulletin of December contains much valuable information, not only of interest to Armament personnel but also to Air Bombers and Air Gunners. In fact this issue contains much of particular interest to Air Bombers, so circulate your copy.
[Underlined] BOMB STORE – SUPERVISION. [/underlined]
Tour expired Aircrew Officers have become available for supervision work in bomb dumps. These officers have undergone a course of training and should be of great assistance to Armament Officers, and a further improvement in the general condition of the bomb dump is expected.
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STORE HOUSE. [/underlined]
The trials with the large incendiary store house which are being carried out at East Kirkby are now almost completed, and in the near future details of the most satisfactory lay-out will be available to Units.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Armament failures table would have shown considerable improvement had it not been for Col. ‘C’ – ‘Icing’. Col. ‘F’ – ‘Obscure’ is however, still far too popular. An improvement has been shown over last month with 23 as against 29 obscure failures. These obscure failures are causing more concern to the armament staff at this Headquarters than failures which are classed under other headings, because steps can usually be taken to remedy a known fault, whereas if the fault remains obscure it may well recur frequently before it is finally diagnosed. It is, therefore, essential that greater efforts be made to obtain all possible information regarding these obscure failures, thus tracking the “gremlin” to his lair where he can be dealt with. Column ‘A’ tells its own tale and is a matter which should be brought to the attention of Bombing Leaders.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION. [/underlined]
The armament staff at this Headquarters are always out to help the armament staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but it is felt that many of the questions passed direct to this Headquarters concerning equipment and transport etc. could well be dealt with by the appropriate branch at Station and Base level. The equipment chapter of this number of well worth reading.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE.
[Page break]
the proof of the pudding….
We assembled at Headquarters, Bomber Command, for a final briefing on the programme we were going to carry out. The object of the visit was to examine French targets which had been subjected to concentrated bombing by Bomber Command aircraft.
The targets visited included the following:-
ISLE D’ADAM – storage site.
ST. LEU D’ESSERENT – flying bomb storage site in limestone caves.
WIZERNE – storage and probable firing site for flying bombs, situated in a chalk quarry.
WATTEN – probably intended for the storage and manufacture of hydrogen peroxide.
MIMOYECQUES – site tunnelled into solid chalk and probably intended for V2, or some other unknown weapon.
JUVISY – Marshalling yard.
TRAPPES – Marshalling tard.
From Le Bourget we travelled to Paris by road in two cars which had been put at our disposal by S.H.A.E.F. and which were to remain with us for the rest of the visit. Our first job in Paris was to visit the Army Headquarters and obtain sufficient rations to tide us over for five or six days, since we were not permitted to purchase food from French cafes or restaurants. We then travelled to a very comfortable hotel situated near the Arc de Triomphe, where we were to be the guests of the American Forces for our first night in Paris, and although the majority of buildings in France are without any form of heating we were lucky enough to be billeted in a hotel which had all the comforts of home. The following morning at 0930 hours we loaded our kit in the cars and set off for Isle d’Adam.
[Underlined] ISLE D’ADAM [/underlined]
This site consisted of a number of wooden storage huts with reinforced brick chimney stacks and situated in thick woods. The huts were sunk approximately 12 to 15 feet below ground level and the surrounding earth had been reinforced with sloping brick walls.
The whole site had been subjected to concentrated bombing with medium calibre bombs, all huts having been severely damaged. The majority in fact were completely demolished apart from the brick chimney stacks which were still standing. Approximately 3/4 of a mile from the storage huts was a large chateau reputed to have been used by the German officers controlling the site. This chateau had also received damage from several 1000 lb. bombs and although not entirely uninhabitable, a great deal of damage had been done to one side of the building exposing a maze of twisted steel girders and blasted concrete. The woods in which this site was situated were dotted with numerous one-man foxholes sunk approximately 4 feet deep, carefully boarded up to form a small firing aperture and provided with a small and very uncomfortable wooden seat. Having satisfied ourselves that no above-surface storage huts
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
could withstand concentrated H.E. bombing, we ploughed our way back through the mud, and set off again for St. Leu d’Esserent.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT. [/underlined]
This site had been constructed some years ago by tunnelling into the limestone and had been cleaned up in recent years and used for the storage of flying bombs. The whole cliff area had been excavated to form two main tunnels and numerous intercommunicating passages and storage bays covering many hundreds of yards. So complicated was the layout inside these tunnels that the Hun had found it necessary to number all passages and bays, and to paint arrows on the walls to prevent anyone from becoming lost; in spite of this, we did experience a certain amount of difficulty in finding our way into daylight again.
Bomber Command’s attack had resulted in three separate subsidences of the tunnel roof, one by a Tallboy hit which had completely sealed one the main tunnel and crushed two flying bombs complete with warheads. The remaining two had apparently been caused by multiple hits with 1000 lb. bombs. Unfortunately it was not possible to make a complete examination of the damage due to the presence of mines.
Many bomb trolleys and hydraulic jacks were found, the majority of which were badly damaged although there were some serviceable items. The entire area between the caves and the River Oise had been very heavily hit by H.E. and French labour was being employed in clearing up the devastation to railway lines, roads etc. The empty case of a 250 lb. Red T.I. was seen approximately 50 yards from the railway lines between the railway and the caves. Unfortunately the village of St. Leu d’Esserent was very close to the site and as must invariably happen, had received considerable damage.
Having decided that we had seen enough for one day we set off again for Amiens where we were to be billeted for the night. The procedure for obtaining a billet is very simple. Each town in France has its Town Major who is responsible, amongst other things, for the billeting of all troops either staying in or passing through the town, and it was he who furnished us with the necessary chits to obtain a night’s lodging in the official hotel. Unfortunately Amiens is one of the towns without heating and those of us who had brought additional blankets found that they came in very useful. At first we were billeted two in a room and each pair had to toss up as to who would be the lucky one to sleep in the bed, the unlucky one having to spend the night on the floor!! Fortunately several rooms were vacated later in the day which enabled us all to spend the night in comparative comfort. No food was provided at the hotel and once again we had to resort to the use of our tinned rations – hash, meat and beans.
We left Amiens at 0900 hours intending to visit the sites at Wiserne and Watten and push on to St. Omer for the night. On the way to Wizerne however, we came across a temporary flying bomb launching ramp at Crepy only 20 yards from the main road, so we took the opportunity of checking up on this structure. The ramp had been bombed and badly damaged by H.E. and, in addition, the Hun had taken the precaution of demolishing the loading end of the ramp. Nevertheless, it was possible to get a very good idea of what the finished job looked like. The ramp itself was approximately 2ft. 6 inches wide and mounted on small steel girders at an angle of approximately 35° to 40° to the horizontal. The ramp had been snapped in the centre and it was not possible therefore, to estimate to what height it had originally projected. A large crater some yards from the end of the launching ramp was mute evidence of a flying bomb which had “returned early” and two incomplete flying bombs were also seen some yards from the launching ramp.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] WIZERNE. [/underlined]
The Wizerne site situated in a chalk quarry, is reputed to have been constructed by several thousand prisoners assisted by Italian labour and work was commenced in the Summer of 1943. The centrepiece of the site is a large concrete dome approximately 300 feet in diameter and 12 feet thick on the circumference. This thickness was undoubtedly greater in the centre of the dome, and at the time of his departure, the Hun was in the process of dumping an additional layer of soil on top of the dome. Around the circumference of the dome was a collar approximately 25 feet wide reinforced by huge concrete buttresses. It is not known whether these buttresses supported this collar round its entire periphery or whether they were utilised as additional supports at the front of the quarry where the collar protruded slightly over the quarry edge. Three such buttresses were, however, plainly visible as the result of a Tallboy hit on the face of the quarry just below the collar, and which had brought down part of the cliff face.
[Photograph]
Just below and slightly to the left of the dome is a concrete structure (pointing in the direction of London) which was presumed to be a launching ramp as its vertical walls were grooved for the mounting of launching rails. This launching tunnel has been canted over several degrees by the Tallboy hit referred to above.
A series of tunnels approximately 18 feet across, had been cut through the chalk and extended inside the quarry for approximately 500 yards. These tunnels formed the workings, the main entrance of which was along the railway track below and to one side of the dome at normal ground level. At the end of these tunnels a vertical shaft approximately 100 feet deep extended to the surface. This shaft was permanently reinforced with timber and may probably have been intended as a lift shaft.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
It was in the neighbourhood of this shaft that a Tallboy had hit the edge of the quarry face and buried several hundred workers. Royal Engineers, who were making a survey of this site, were faced with the difficulty and unpleasant task of removing tons of rock and chalk to ascertain whether the bodies inside contained any useful information.
The whole area outside the excavations, which was littered with railway lines, machinery, cranes and subsidiary buildings, had been very badly damaged by H.E.
It was interesting to note that the concreting of the tunnels was in sections and no effort appeared to have been made to interlace the various sections. Consequently a hit by a 1000 lb. bomb upon the entrance had penetrated and blown one complete section of tunnelling (approximately 12 feet thick) several feet away from the rest of the tunnel.
One member of the party was fortunate enough to have paid a previous visit to this site and was able to take us to a cottage nearby where the good lady heated up our rations for us and also provided a very welcome bottle of beer with our lunch and the usual bowl of black coffee.
[Underlined] WATTEN. [/underlined]
We left Wizerne soon after lunch for the site at Watten, a building which produced one of the biggest mysteries of the trip and provoked much argument as to its intended use. The site consisted of a reinforced concrete building located at the edge of a vastly wooded forest. The building is approximately 50 feet wide and contains four floors each divided into numerous rooms, and storage bays all heavily reinforced with concrete. The whole structure is built around a skeleton of steel girders supported internally by the numerous dividing walls.
One Tallboy hit on top of the main structure had dislodged a huge piece of concrete reputed to weigh approximately 300 tons and had dropped it on to a small concrete outbuilding. Attempts had been made to repair the damage caused to the roof by this Tallboy hit, and the majority of the concrete had already been relaid. A Tallboy crater whose edge was only a few feet from the main building and which was approximately 100 feet in diameter, had apparently caused no damage to the structure.
This site had to be approached on foot and the devastation on the way to the target was indescribable. Hundreds of trees had been torn up in the forests and large areas had been completely cleared of the timber as a result of this concentrated bombing.
It was interesting to note that the Hun had made some effort to camouflage the entrance of this site, particularly over the rail track.
We arrived at St. Omer in the early evening and once again the Town Major did his stuff and found us a billet in a French hotel, again without heating. Our first job was to hand over our rations to our landlady who served these up for us on a large table in the centre of what in this country would be the public bar, the locals sitting around in their chairs taking a very great interest in all that was going on. Our entertainment that evening was provided for us at the hotel, as luckily a dance had been laid on. We were amazed to see how much the French idea of dancing differs from ours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOULOGNE. [/underlined]
On Sunday morning we set off for Mimoyecques but made a slight detour on the way and inspected the docks at Boulogne. Destruction in the dock area was very heavy, some of which had been caused by bombing, but the majority by demolition. In spite of this several large unloading points had been established. The town of Boulogne was also very badly hit, presumably by shelling, and whole areas of the town had been completely flattened. Several concrete pill-boxes were seen in the dock area, all of which were marked with a large red cross and it was believed that they were used for the German wounded.
[Underlined] MIMOYECQUES. [/underlined]
Our next target, Mimoyecques, consisted of one main tunnel approximately 1000 yards long which runs from S.E./N.W. into the chalk hillside, and running throughout the full length of the tunnel is a railway track. Lateral tunnels branch off from this main tunnel at regular intervals, all of which are approximately 16 feet wide and have cemented dome shaped roofs. These lateral tunnels join up with a further passage parallel to the main tunnel and from this passage several inclined shafts led up to what was presumed to be the firing platform. On top of the hillside are six vertical shafts descending to the bottom floor, two of which had received direct hits from small calibre bombs (the tail unit of a 500 lb G.P. was found nearby) The general appearance on top of the hill was that of a ploughed field and it was almost impossible to define individual craters. Several Tallboy craters were, however, seen, one which had pierced and blocked the tunnel in which the labourers had been working.
Here again the Major in charge of the surveying party informed us that several hundreds of workers were known to have been trapped in the tunnel, thinking that the safest place during a raid was this “bomb proof” excavation.
Engineers had just commenced to survey this site and were busy collecting all papers etc. which had been left by the Hun. One of the papers discovered was a roll of personnel employed on the construction of the site and included Russians, Flemish, French and Spanish workers and it is understood that large numbers of Russian women were employed as slave labour on this site. Several of the rooms in the hillside had been used as dormitories and heavy locks on the doors suggested that some of the workers had been locked in at night to prevent their escape. A further room had been set aside for use as a sick quarters and it was interesting to see that crepe paper bandages had been in use.
Our next two targets being Juvisy and Trappes marshalling yards both in the Paris area, we decided to return to Paris direct from Mimoyecques and not, as had previously been intended, to spend a second night at St. Omer. The fact that night life in Paris was in full swing and that our comfortable hotel was still at our disposal had nothing, of course, to do with our decision.
[Underlined] JUVISY AND TRAPPES. [/underlined]
Our first impression on visiting the marshalling yards at Juvisy and Trappes was that both targets had been very much saturated by bombing and it is impossible to give any idea of the complete devastation of the entire areas covered by the marshalling yards. It is estimated that it will take the very minimum of 12 months to bring any semblance of order into either of these targets. Locomotives had been hurled one on top of the other, lines had been turned up and flung against rolling
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Photograph] JUVISY MARSHALLING YARDS
stock, repair sheds, engine rooms and other buildings had been severely damaged. The French were rather annoyed to think that we had attacked the yards at an angle, resulting in severe damage to a neighbouring village, and not up and down the lines. Our French not being particularly good we did not make any effort to teach them the theory of bombing.
The following day we were due to return to this country but were able to spend a few hours in the morning shopping in Paris. This may sound attractive but on looking at prices in the various shops a few thousand francs did not go very far. If one wishes to purchase any small gold object such as a brooch, it is first necessary to surrender the equivalent amount of gold by weight before the purchase can be made; thus you pay a very high price for workmanship involved and not for the quality of the gold.
Transportation throughout France is very difficult. No issue of petrol is made to civilians and what few cars are seen all provide their own fuel (producer gas), and it is a common sight to see a car pull up and the driver get out and stoke up the fire before proceeding!! Taxis in Paris have completely disappeared and have been replaced by cycle taxis and handsome cabs, the cycle taxis consisting of a home made carriage of numerous designs and towed by a bicycle.
Many of the famous monuments in Paris, including the Arc de Triomphe are badly bullet scarred from snipers who held out after the city had been occupied and several incidents of street to street fighting would be seen at several points.
At 1530 hours we took off from Le Bourget for Croydon. This time the trip was far more interesting as the weather was comparatively good and we were able to get a final aerial view of bomb scarred France.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
Two known ditching incidents occurred this month – a Lancaster of 83 Squadron accidentally struck the sea in the Wash and finally came to rest on a sandbank, the crew of six being saved; a Mosquito of 627 Squadron having contacted Sundburg airfield in the Shetlands, on V.H.F. disappeared without trace.
The Operational Research Section at Bomber Command Headquarters has been studying the incidents of ditching within the Command, and a copy of this report has been sent to each station under cover of letter reference 5G/251/26/ASR dated 20th November, 1944.
The report, on very sound arguments, draws the conclusion that the proportion of Command’s losses over the sea to the total can be as high as 26%. It is clearly shown that many more rescues have been made of crews who have used radio than of crews who have not, but at the same time it is pointed out that more rescues could have been effected had the crews concerned carried out the [underlined] correct [/underlined] W/T procedure and started this procedure at the [underlined] first sign of trouble. [/underlined]
The waste of valuable crews will continue until captains of aircraft realise the necessity of quick radio action when in trouble (this can always be cancelled should the emergency pass) and the need for more and more Dinghy Drill practice.
There are no grounds to suppose that aircrew are any more prepared for emergency abandonment by parachute than they are for ditching, so that a large number of casualties must also occue [sic] through lack of practice in Parachute Drills.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
American Hight Lighting is now installed at 15 U.S.A.A.F. stations and at a few stations in Bomber Command. It is essential that aircrews should be acquainted with the lay-out of this “high intensity lighting for low visibility”. Senior Control Officers should ensure that the information is given to aircrews at lectures, in case any station with the installation uses it on diversion.
On this matter of diversion, keep up your lectures on the Bomber Command Standard procedure. There are still occasions when diverted aircraft are said to use “any method except the Standard procedure”. Local divergences create hazards. If even one reply on R/T is varied, if some unusual auxiliary lights are laid, if the Airfield Lighting is misused, hazards are created for visitors, and even greater hazards for your own aircrews. They become so accustomed to the local variations that, when they are diverted, a standard lay-out “foxes” them, reduces landing times and may even imperil other aircrews if the visibility is clamping down. Overhaul the whole of your local lay-out, ensure that it complies with A.P.3024, and Air Staff Instructions, and above all, see that even if it does comply, it has not little local “extras” which will deceive a visitor.
If you have any ideas that, in your opinion, would help, submit them, but do not put them into practice until a test has been agreed upon. Remember, that however good and practical your idea may be [underlined] for local application [/underlined] it may be unsuitable for universal use and may be turned down on those grounds alone. Remember, too, that almost all existing lighting and power circuits are loaded to capacity. A few extra lights here or there may not seem much, but may turn the scales sufficiently to impair the use of the operational teleprinter at your Headquarters.
Landing times for November, set out below, are based on returns received from Stations. “Dead” times have already been deducted in accordance with instructions from Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR NOVEMBER [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT AND HOW TO GET IT. [/underlined]
Once upon a time, a man, who laboured in the town of Wadd and was named Serg Armt, finding he lacked something for the machine he worked with, straightaway sent a message to his superiors at Wadd, his Overlords at Mort and the Kings of Wick, asking for this something which his machine lacked.
But alas! – all Serg Armt received was a message from the Kings of Wick, saying “We are not a Maintenance Unit”.
Nevertheless, the men at Mort, who received the original message, immediately spoke words to Equip of Wadd who as once went and gave Serg Armt the something he required. Thus the machine had been repaired before the message from the Kings of Wick arrived at Wadd.
[Underlined] MORAL. [/underlined]
They say two sides of a triangle are together longer than the third. So in future ask the Station Equipment Officer first. That’s why he’s there.
[Underlined] RADIATOR SUPPLY. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers will see that the Radiator Group Pool system is to continue. We hope now that Command have control of issues the difficulties in getting radiators will be lessened.
[Underlined] URGENT DEMANDS. [/underlined]
A.M.O. A.481/43 has been added to by A.M.O. A.1109/44. Equipment Officers should draw the attention of all Specialist Officers to this new A.M.O.
[Underlined] NEW REGISTERS. [/underlined]
This month sees the introduction, at two Bases, of the new Manifold Voucher Registers. It is too early to give any comments on these Registers, but we hope by the end of the year to sum up their usefulness, and to overcome any faults. Base Equipment Officers should keep a watchful eye on their use, and report to Group any major difficulties that might arise.
[Underlined] LAUNDRY ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIRMEN ON POSTING. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of unnecessary discomfort is being given to airmen who have been posted without their laundry. Equipment Officers are to make sure that an airman, when posted, has been issued with kit to replace items at the laundry. Bomber Command letter BC/3000/13/E.2 dated 18th August, 1944, deals with this type of issue in detail.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
November 15th was the date by which the Air Officer Commanding required Discussion Groups to be “in full swing”. Most stations have reorganised their teams of Group Leaders which had been allowed to become somewhat out of during the Summer. It is on these leaders that the success or failure of the schemes depends, since, properly led discussion groups are popular. So often does it happen, that an officer claims that meetings are regarded by the airmen and airwomen as a ‘bind’, - when really it is his own inadequate leadership that has made his group a failure.
Leaders must make some effort to find out what the scheme sets out to do, and the best way of achieving its aims. A great deal has been written about the object of the scheme, and if officers are still in doubt about how to set about running their group, they should contact their Education Officer and find out, rather than grope blindly into the work and only obtain average results. To new group leaders – your group will improve as they get to know you, and you learn by experience how to handle them, so don’t be discouraged if your first attempt is not as successful as you would have wished.
On December 16th, there is a Group One Day Course at the Usher Art Gallery in Lincoln on “National Insurance”. Speakers are men and women who have theoretical and practical knowledge of the scheme and should provide a great deal of useful information. Leaders, apart from those detailed, are invited to attend providing they give their names to their Education Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During the month of November only an average number of sorties was carried out by the Group but the hours flown were quite extensive, as also was the work carried out by the maintenance staffs.
The outstanding achievement of the month was the manufacture and fitting of the necessary parts for the fitment of Loran, all aircraft being completed within three weeks.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FIALURES. [/underlined]
C.T.O’s are reminded that the signal reporting failures must be sent off the day following the operation, and when the signal stated that the defect is under investigation, this must be followed up by a further signal when the cause of failure is known. If C.T.O’s do the reporting correctly, much telephoning will be avoided.
The operational failures increased over the previous month and were 1.77%.
The ‘Big Hand’ goes to Nos.9, 50 and 617 Squadrons for having no operational failures due to engineering during November, this being their second trouble free month is succession.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
An improvement is noticeable throughout the Group in the maintenance of Group Equipment, though in some instances the equipment is still far short of the desired standard.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
The introduction of the Gyro Gun Sight into general service has necessitated the training of Instrument Repairers in the maintenance of the sight. A short course was instituted at Fulbeck which was attended by representatives from all Bases who profited well from the experience gained by Fulbeck personnel during the past 3 – 4 months. Details of the test equipment necessary for efficient maintenance has been circulated to all Bases and Stations, and these test sets must be manufactured locally as they are not yet available from Service sources.
The high light of the month was the sinking of the Tirpitz, and this cannot be allowed to pass without a special word of praise to those Instrument Repairers of Bardney and Woodhall who have tirelessly maintained the Bombsights. They can fell that they played their part with the aircrews in achieving this success.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
In the near future all Flight Engineers will be categorised on their ability in the air and on the ground. It is hoped that by this categorisation the standard of Flight Engineers will be improved.
The categorisation will be divided into two parts – Air and Ground. The first part, Air, will consist of the 5 Group Lancaster Drills, log keeping, a technical examination and an examination on airmanship.
The second part, Ground, will be a practical test on refuelling aircraft, Daily Inspection Airframe and Daily Inspection Engines. It is appreciated that many Flight Engineers have not had the opportunity to learn as much about their aircraft from the technical aspect as would be desired; to overcome this, instructions on Airframe and Engines will be given in each squadron. When Flight Engineers have completed the second part they will receive a Certificate of Proficiency.
Keen competition is anticipated and it should be the desire of every Flight Engineer to obtain at least an ‘A’ pass; no doubt many will get the maximum – an ‘A+’ pass.
Instructions have been issued by Headquarters, Bomber Command, with regard to the flap operation of a Lancaster. Now that a standard drill has been laid down, Flight Engineer Leaders must instruct all their Flight Engineers to use this drill on all occasions, at the same time advising them always to check the flap gauge when flaps are selected fully down; if there is a tendency for flaps to creep back, the flap control should be brought back to the neutral position, and then reselected to the fully down position. Under no circumstances should the flap control be taken to the “up” position on the final approach as this may cause the aircraft to sink.
[Boxed] [Underlined] INTER-BASE SQUASH COMPETITION. [/underlined]
A/Cdr. Pope, D.F.C., A.F.C., Base Commander. 56 Base, has very kindly offered a silver challenge cup to be contested for within the Group in an Inter-Base Squash Competition on the American system.
Details of this latest 5 Group “Racquet” have already been circulated around the Bases, and it is hoped that the battles will be well under way early in the New Year, to decide who is to wrest the Trophy from the clutches of 56 Base.
In the meantime decision of the Competition is in the lap of the Gods. But there is no doubt that, as the bridegroom said some years later “The Best Man always wins”. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The failures this month for night photography increased to 13.18% as compared with 4.92% for the previous month. This is a serious increase and while it is fully appreciated that inclement weather, particularly the incessant rain, is bound to have caused a certain number of failures, it cannot be stated that the increase quoted above entirely resulted from this cause.
During Winter months it is imperative that maintenance is thorough, and that efforts are made to eliminate all causes of technical failures, particularly those which are known as “avoidable”. Every photographer must bear in mind, that cameras are carried on operations for one purpose only, that is, to being back film which has been exposed over the target, and which, when processed, will result in plottable ground detail photographs from which the success of the raid can be assessed. Photographic personnel whether engaged upon camera maintenance or processing can, if they will make the necessary effort, reduce the number of technical failures to a much smaller figure.
In vetting the photographic failure reports which pass through this Headquarters, it is noted that when aircraft have not operated for several days there is always an increase in the failure rate immediately after a Stand Down period; furthermore, there are still too many unexplained failures, and in many cases the report is so obscure that it is of little value, mainly because the photographic personnel have failed to assess the evidence of the film correctly. This results in misleading other specialist officers to whom the film is passed. It should be the effort of all concerned to produce a photographic result which will be useful to the Air Staff, and when failures occur, get down to the proper cause and report it accurately.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Failures by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/L C.D. KEIR, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O D.T. IBBOTSON DFC
F/SGT S.W. WALTERS CGM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L C.B. OWEN, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.E. FAWKE, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.F. MALLENDER DFC
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L R. REEVE DFC
F/O M.E. ANDERTON DFC
P/O G.A. SANGSTER DFC
F/O H.F.S. MITCHELL DFC
SGT C.L.S. WILLIAMS DFM
P/O H.O. REDMOND DFC
F/O A. BOSWARD DFC
F/O H.C. CLARK DFC
P/O H.T. FORREST DFC
SGT T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT W.F. BELBEN DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C.E. BINION DFC
P/O F.G. DAVEY DFC
F/SGT F.W. STROUD DFM
F/SGT A.O. KENNEDY DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.E. DICKSON DFC
F/O D. BRADY DFC
F/O W.F. EDWARDS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.H.F. WHYTE DFC
F/O J.D. MOUAT DFC
P/O S.H.K. EYRE DFC
F/O A. SLYWCHUK DFC
P/O D.A.T. MILLIKIN DFC
P/O L.W. PETHICK DFC
F/SGT F.B. KNOTT DFM
F/O R.H.W. LAWRENCE DFC
F/SGT J.E. TAYLOR DFM
F/O A.N. FRANKLAND DFC
F/SGT K.H. SNEDDON DFM
F/O D. EGGLESTON DFC
F/O G.S. PYLE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J. CASTAGNOLA DFC
F/SGT G.P. GAUWELOOSE DFM
P/O E.C.W. ANDERSON DFC
S/L D.I. FAIRBURN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.L.P. DUNSTONE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.K.W. GLOVER DFC
F/O B.M. ACOTT DFC
P/O F. NORTON DFC
P/O R.A.E. DEAR DFC
F/L W.E. JEAVONS DFC
P/O D. STREET DFC
P/O J.F. MILLS DFC
SGT G.R. GILBERT DFM
SGT D. BOOTHBY DFM
F/O R.B. WARD DFC
SGT P.T. HADDON DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L C.P. McDONALD, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT S.R. LAMBERT DFM
F/O D.A. JENNINGS DFC
F/O A.K. IRWIN DFC
A/F/L D.W. WOOLLEY, DFM DFC
W/O A.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/L A.R. GALBRAITH DFC
F/O W. FITCH DFC
A/F/L G. ROBINSON, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
A/F/L F.P.L. BROOME DFC
F/SGT K. FORREST DFM
F/SGT H. WILSON DFM
A/F/L T. CAMPBELL DFC
F/O J. PEDEN DFC
W/O J.J.H. MAXWELL DFC
P/O W.R. DORAN DFC
P/O C.A.P. THOMPSON DFC
W/O E.H. HANSEN DFC
P/O A.P. BOULTBEE DFC
P/O A.J. TINDALL DFC
F/SGT S. OSBORNE DFM
P/O E.J. WATSON DFC
P/O W.A. REFFIN DFC
P/O W.D. KNOWLES DFC
P/O C.W. HOWE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.A. HARRIS DFC
A/F/O P.C. BROWNE DFC
A/F/O A.R. KITTO DFC
A/F/O P.A. FYSON DFC
F/O P.R.J.M. MAVAUT DFC
A/F/O J.G. THOMPSON DFC
A/F/O H. ARCHER DFC
W/O R.E. CARMICHAEL DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L S.E. PATTINSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.M. GRANT DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.A. BUCKHAM DFC
F/O A.B.L. TOTTENHAM DFC
F/O N.W. SAUNDERS DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L L.C. DEIGNAN DFC
P/O L.G. BURDEN DFC
F/O T.C. TAYLOR DFC
P/O H.R. GOODWIN DFC
P/O J.W. WAUGH DFC
F/O J.L. SAYERS DFC
F/O E.G. PARSONS DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. MARSHALL DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.D. BRIBBIN, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
NOTES: In column (a) above, A indicates the number of pence saved per head of strength.
B indicates the percentage of personnel saving.
and C indicates the total amount saved through the Unit Savings Group.
In column (b) above, the sum indicated as saved by Syerston, also includes the savings by deduction from Pay Ledgers for Fulbeck and Balderton.
In column (c) only stations with Class ‘A’ Camp Post Offices are included.
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR NOVEMBER: £7,843, 17.10d.
[Page break]
[Drawing] volte face
For day after day, and for year upon year
Of this utterly futile inordinate war
We’ve fought the unspeakable Gremlin;
From aircraft and engines, wherever they were,
We’ve harried and hounded and chased them galore,
And prevent the brutes from assemblin’.
Our aim was unvaried and clearly defined,
No quarter or mercy was ever displayed;
No cavilling, fear, or dissemblin’.
Undeterred by defeat, in our ranks you would find
A resurgence of effort – the foemen were made
To cower in their shelters a-tremblin’.
Yet with ultimate victory looming in sight,
The powers that rule us have altered their stand
And ordered a truce with the Gremlin;
And the tribe’s C.in C. is respectably dight
As a uniformed “wingco”, an officer grand,
(Or something quite closely resemblin’).
ANON. (CIRCA 1944).
[Boxed] The cover for this month’s News has been designed by Sgt. Morley of this Headquarters. Suggested designs are still invited from all personnel within the Group. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, November 1944
5 Group News, November 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 28, November 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on the end of the Tirpitz, gardening, operations, signals, navigation, this month's bouquetes, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, incendiary attacks, war effort, training, gunnery, leave it to Smith, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, armament, the proof of the pudding, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, education, engineering, photography, decorations, war savings, and volte face.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-11
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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75 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Photograph
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-20 nov 44
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Creil
France--Juvisy-sur-Orge
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Mimoyecques
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Soligny-la-Trappe
France--Watten
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Norway--Tromsø
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
1944-11
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS
[Stamp]
No 29. December, 1944
[Page break]
V GROUP NEWS
No 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
Foreword by the A.O.C.
In this foreword I say Goodbye to 5 Group after two years of command, covering a period when the Group, in common with the other Groups in Bomber Command, has seen much hard fighting and very great damage inflicted on Germany. In particular, the Winter campaigns of 1942/43 and 1943/44 will be looked back upon in future years as outstanding examples of sustained courage and endurance on the part of the crews, some of whom made 12 or more attacks on Berlin alone. In those days neither the training organisation nor the factories could maintain a sufficient flow of crews and aircraft to keep pace with losses, and Squadrons were often 25% below establishment; but it was those campaigns, with the parallel campaigns by the U.S. forces, which were then arriving in strength, which finally put Germany on the defensive in the air. They forced her to turn over her production from bombers to fighters and to draw off for the protection of her industries many hundreds of aircraft which she badly needed to support her battle fronts. They marked the beginning of her decline as an Air Power.
During 1943 the new equipment which was beginning to come along was still far from perfect. There were no A.P.I’s to watch over course keeping; Gee and the D.R. Compass were still being introduced, and H.2.S. was yet to come; while systems of target marking were in their infancy. The past two years have, therefore, been periods of development and training which have had to be continued while a major campaign was in progress. In spite of the hard knocks which the Group has had to take, progress has been steady until, nowadays, targets are seldom missed when conditions are reasonably satisfactory.
The special technique against small targets which has been built up in this Group, based upon low level marking and off-set bombing, has achieved results which, in terms of bombs per acre over the target area, are unsurpassed by any other bombing force in the World. For this state of affairs, all in the Group share the credit – the aircrew for having down to a heavy training task at a time when they might hope that their period of arduous training lay behind them – the ground crews who have never failed to get an aircraft into the air if it was humanly possible to do so – the specialists in every branch for their ingenuity in servicing highly complicated mechanisms – and finally the whole body of personnel whose determination that the Group should never pull less than its full weight has been a great incentive to me personally and I believe to all the other senior officers throughout the Group.
It is, as a team, that the work has been done, and in saying Goodbye to its members, I include every officer, airman and airwoman in the Group. I thank you all for your extraordinary exertions over two difficult years and ask you to accept that the honour, which H.M. The King recently bestowed upon me as Air Officer Commanding, is a tribute to the growing list of targets destroyed and thus to the work of everyone in the Group.
I wish you all Good Luck.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
December has been marked by the first serious attempts by the G.A.F. to intercept Bomber Command aircraft in daylight. On two separate occasions formations of 30 to 40 ME.109’s and FW.190’s attacked bomber gaggles and succeeded in destroying several bombers before the fighter escort came to the rescue. The enemy fighters showed a marked disinclination to attack the main gaggles which tightened formation when attacked, but concentrated on picking off stragglers and aircraft in the thinly spaced parts of the bomber stream. Although corkscrewing by stragglers proved effective in some cases, the main gaggles carried out no combat manoeuvres. Several fighters were claimed destroyed or damaged, including a claim by one mid-upper gunner of two destroyed – a good effort.
Although during these attacks some bombers fired a few Green Verey cartridges the fighter escorts never saw them. Crews should therefore in future continue firing Greens until it is obvious that the fighter escort has seen and engaged the enemy.
German night fighters are still expending considerable energy and fuel without achieving much success, and have again failed this month to offer effective opposition even to deep penetrations. There are signs, however, that the lack of success over Germany may tempt the enemy to resume intruder activity over this country. With the large number of aircraft now operating and with no IFF in use it will be very difficult to detect intruders returning with the main stream, particularly if the return route to the Group area is from the North Sea. Suitable action is being taken to deal with this danger, but crews must remain on the alert over this country, particularly when circling the airfield lights preparatory to landing, and should view with extreme suspicion any twin-engined aircraft seen, even if it is burning navigation lights.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HEILBRONN – 4/5TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- Town - W/Cdr. Smith
Marshalling Yards – W/Cdr. Shorthouse.
A force of 292 aircraft took off to attack the town and marshalling yards. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and 106 Squadron were detailed to attack the town. Aircraft were spread over an 85° sector, and crews were to aim at the red markers, delaying release as ordered.
No.56 Base was to attack the marshalling yards, which were to be marked with Yellow T.I., aircraft to aim at the T.I. and delay release dor4 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] Weather over the target varied between no cloud and 5/10ths alt. cu. at 12/14,000 feet. Illumination and marking went according to plan, and the marking was assessed as accurate. The markers cannot be plotted on the night photographs. An initial tendency for the bombing to undershoot was corrected by the Master Bomber, and a good sector attack developed. An area of 2000 X 1500 yards has been wiped out, and on the West side damage is severe and widespread. Only the outermost suburbs to the South and West have escaped lightly.
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] One Yellow T.I. was assessed as 100 yards South of the Marking Point, but the Master Bomber was unable to distinguish it from flares burning on the ground, so did not issue any instructions. Crews also had difficulty in identifying the marker, and approximately 50% attacked the town instead. Subsequent reconnaissance has revealed only limited damage to the yards.
[Underlined] GIESSEN – 6/7TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Target – Marshalling yards and town some 35 miles North of Frankfurt. Force 265 aircraft, the majority on the marshalling yards.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Normal marking and illumination were used. The marshalling yards were 1 1/2 miles South of the town, thus presenting a difficult marking problem. The solution was to select a common marking point to the South of the yards, and issue the marshalling yard force with two false wind vectors calculated to spread the bombs up the centre of the yard. The force on the town was to carry out normal overshoot procedure on a common heading.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Blind marking and illumination were good. One Red T.I. dropped visually is known to have been placed accurately on the marking point, while another has been plotted about 1 1/2 miles East of the town. It is apparent that the majority of crews attacked
“V” GROUP NEWS. No. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the accurate T.I. while a small minority (which proved to be inexperienced crews) were attracted by the inaccurate marker. Photographs have shown that two sticks of incendiaries fell across the accurate T.I., one in the early stages of the attack, and another later. Only careless and slipshod bombing drill and failure to adhere strictly to briefing instructions could have been responsible for this.
Fortunately these loose sticks did not obliterate the accurate marker and a good concentration developed.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] A heavy concentration fell on these yards, which almost entirely destroyed the round houses, and cause very considerable damage to rolling stock. At the Southern end of the yard, three tail bridges over the roadway were destroyed or very badly damaged, as were also the important fly-over bridges. The standard of concentration was equal to that on French marshalling yards.
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] The town has suffered heavily throughout, the main city area to the North being almost completely devastated by fire. Included in this devastation were a rubber works, the arsenal, the gas and water works, engineering works, and the power station.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 8TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The Urft Dam lies a few miles south of Duren. In the event of an enemy withdrawal, he might well blow up the dam and flood the surrounding country, thus seriously impeding Allied ground forces.
206 aircraft were despatched in an attempt to breech the crest of the dam overflow, and so forestall any action by the enemy at a critical period. The dam itself was too strong to be destroyed even by ‘Tallboy’ bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The main force were to attack in pairs of squadrons at five minutes [sic] intervals. Crews were to bomb visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Unfortunately 6 – 9/10ths cloud at 6 – 8,000 feet was encountered over the target, and only 128 aircraft identified and bombed. Due to weather conditions bombing was scattered and although hits were claimed, the dam was not breached.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 11TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
This target was again attacked in daylight by 233 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Similar to previous attack, though the overall T.O.T. was shorter. Aircraft carrying 12,000 lb bombs were to attack last.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Once again the weather for bombing was bad, cloud being 5 – 9/10ths at 6 – 8000 feet. 176 aircraft bombed through gaps in the cloud, and claimed hits. Army ground reports claim six hits on the spillway, bit the hoped for erosion had not taken place, although some reduction in the water level was apparent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 13/14TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Sixty-one aircraft of No.54 Base were detailed to attack enemy shipping in Oslo Fiord. The chief target was the cruiser Koln. It was known that this ship had been very active recently, but the chief difficulty lay in locating it, as it returned to different berths after each operation.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] No.54 Base provided their own illumination and marking. In the light of flares, Mosquitoes were to mark a selected position near the supposed anchorage of the ship, and the Lancasters were to aim visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The target was reported to have moved North from the briefed position. This made visual identification extremely difficult, and bombing results were not observed. The force started to bomb in the vicinity of the proximity markers. On instructions from the Master Bomber, bombing was shifted to a large merchant vessel in the centre of the harbour. A little later, a cruiser believed to be the Koln was identified lying some two miles West of the marking point, and those crews who had not already bombed were ordered to attack the new target. Bomb splashes were observed round the cruiser, but no damage has been established.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 17/18TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
289 aircraft took off to attack this very important target, determined to atone for the last attack which was only partially successful. The illuminating and marking plan was normal, except that the visual Red T.I. were to be backed up with a White T.I. flashing ‘V’. The attack was to be in two man sectors, and bombing on the Red markers with overshoot as ordered.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear with good visibility. Marking and illumination went according to plan, and a good concentration of Red T.I. was achieved. Except for an initial stick of incendiaries which fell across the markers, crews reported good bombing and a successful sector attack. Although the town is of more substantial construction than other targets attacked successfully by this Group, day cover shows very considerable areas of severe damage spreading out from the main station, and covering the old centre of the town.
[Underlined] GDYNIA – 18/19TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
This large Polish port is the main base for what remains of the elusive German Fleet, and at the time of the attack all except two of the larger operational units were present, as well as a large concentration of U-boats, and merchant shipping. 227 aircraft attacked the target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was out of range of Mosquitoes, so all marking was carried out by Lancasters. The target was to be illuminated blindly, and by the light of these flares a picked force of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the best bombing crews were to attack the pocket battleship LUTZOW visually. Marking for the main attack was to be a stick of Red and Green T.I. dropped visually at the South Western side of the docks. The Master Bomber was to select the most accurate of these T.I’s and instruct the main force to bomb it with a false wind vector.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, but with moderate visibility and a smoke screen late in the attack. A few crews identified the LUTZOW and bombed her, and the remainder joined in the main attack. Illumination and marking was good, and the most Southerly T.I. was accurately backed up. Due, however, to an error of calculation before take-off (a reciprocal wind was used), the Master Bomber’s navigator issued a strong wind vector, and the main weight of the attack fell to the North and West of the berth where the main naval units were lying. Although day photographs show no damage to the main fleet, and old SCHLESIEN class battleship is down by the stern, and damage is visible to warehouses, floating docks and merchant shipping.
Instead of an outstanding success the Group achieved some slight damage incommensurate with the weight of the attack. This attack affords a good example, which all should note, of the far reaching effect of small mistakes.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 21/22ND DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
207 aircraft took off to attack the synthetic oil plant, one of the most important and most heavily defended targets in Germany. It had already been attacked by American heavy bombers, but was back in full production at the time of the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked blindly with Yellow T.I. and White flashing ‘V’. In the light of flares, the marking point was to be marked with a stick of Red and Green T.I. The Master Bomber was to pick out the most suitable T.I. and order main force to bomb it with a false wind vector set on the bombsight.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at the target was clear, but an extensive smoke screen was in action which made visual identification of the target very difficult. In addition to this, a number of flares did not light until they struck the ground, and others ignited just above the ground. These were confused with the Yellow proximity T.I. and added still further to the difficulties of the Master Bomber and visual markers. Nevertheless, Marker I, identifying what he considered to be the marking point, dropped his stick of Red and Green T.I’s. The Master Bomber called for an assessment, and three separate and independent assessments were made, two of 200 yards North, and one of 200 yards N.E. On the basis of this, the Master Bomber instructed Link I to work out a wind vector assuming the T.I’s to be 300 yards North of the marking point. This was then issued, and the main force called in to attack.
Night photographs show that the markers were centred some 2,000 yards North of the target and the main weight of the bombing was displaced accordingly.
The bomb aimer of the marker aircraft which dropped the stick of Red and Green T.I’s claims to have identified visually the marking point in relation to three well defined pin points, and there is no evidence to show why the markers fell so far North.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ST. VITH – 26TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
The target was a concentration of armour, troops and supplies inside the salient made by the new German thrust on the Western Front. Conditions for take-off were bad with very poor visibility, and only 26 aircraft took off for the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target was to be marked by Oboe aircraft with Red T.I, backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. Bombing was to be direct on the markers, or as ordered by the Master Bomber.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Crews reported marking accurate and on time, and bombing was well concentrated.
[Underlined] RHEYDT – 27TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
44 aircraft took off in conditions of poor visibility to attack the marshalling yards South of Munchen Gladbach, which were handling a large volume of military traffic for the German thrust on the Western Front.
[Underlined] PLAN] [/underlined] The method was controlled Oboe ground marking. The aiming point was to be marked initially with Red T.I., backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. A Master Bomber was to direct the bombing.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, and the first wave had no difficulty in identifying visually. The target was soon covered in a dense pall of smoke which tended to obscure the markers, but all crews reported a good concentration of bombing. P.R.U. cover shows severe damage in the yards, with a slight spread of bombing into the town area.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 28/29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers: S/Ldr. Benjamin and W/Cdr. Petty.
Two forces totalling 67 aircraft took off to attack shipping in Oslo Fiord. The larger force had for its target the cruiser Koln, lying off Horten on the West side of the Fiord, and the secondary force was to bomb any shipping seen off Moss on the Eastern shore.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Due to the very bright moon it was decided to dispense with flare illumination. The marking force was to drop Wanganui flares and Flame Floats near any large vessel seen, and the main force was to attack visually, running up-moon.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, but a thin layer of cloud at 15/20,000 feet diffused the moonlight, and made deceptive shadows on the water. Neither force could identify shipping clearly, but several large ships were bombed with unobserved results. One large merchantman off Moss may have been damaged by several near misses, and a small ship seen on the early night photographs had disappeared by the close of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 30/31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was a concentration of enemy armour, troops and supplies concentrated In and around a village a few miles North of Bastogne. 156 aircraft took off for an attack in the early hours of the morning.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point was to be marked with Red T.I. by Oboe aircraft, and crews were ordered to bomb direct. Due to the proximity of friendly troops, crews were ordered not to bomb unless the Red T.I. were positively identified.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 5 – 8/10ths cloud was encountered at the target, and only 90 aircraft bombed, reporting a good concentration of bombing around the markers. The remaining aircraft were unable to identify the Red T.I. so brought their bombs back to Base, as ordered.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A force of 28 aircraft took off in search of shipping, especially the cruiser Koln, in the Fiord, including 12 aircraft of No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marker aircraft were to illuminate the area and mark the ships and cruiser with Wanganui Flares and Flame Floats. Bombing was to be visual in the light of further flares. The Tallboy bombs were fused .5 seconds delay so that they would explode 100 feet under water. The remaining aircraft carried 1000 lb MC/GP bombs fused TD .025.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, and the cruiser, together with several merchantmen were claimed as identified. The cruiser was under way during the attack, which made marking and bombing very difficult. Results of the attack on the cruiser were unobserved, but a near miss on a large ship by a Tallboy swung her 90° to starboard and brought her to a standstill.
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 15TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was the concrete E/R boat pens, and was attacked by No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs. Hits were obtained and the pens suffered further severe damage.
[Underlined] ROTTERDAM – 29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.617 Squadron carried out another precision attack with 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs, the target being the concrete E. boat pens. Crews reported concentrated bombing, and P.R.U. cover confirms a heavy concentration of craters on and around the target, and two out of the three sections of the pens have been severely damaged by direct hits.
[Underlined] OSLO – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.627 Squadron celebrated New Year’s Eve by a pinpoint attack by 12 aircraft on the Gestapo Headquarters in Oslo. The attack
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
was carried out in two waves of six aircraft, and all the first wave reported successful bombing. The second wave was hampered by smoke and dust from the bomb bursts, but two aircraft identified the target and bombed. Flak was intense and all the aircraft were hit, but returned to base safely. Rumours current in Stockholm suggest that the attack was highly successful.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Diagram] gardening
Unfavourable weather caused many operations to be cancelled at the beginning of the month, but when conditions improved on the 14th December the Group Gardeners ‘set to’ at such a pace that our previous record of 520 vegetables was in danger of being beaten before the end of the year.
Reviewing the month’s activity, all Gardeners have been most decidedly successful in planting 415 vegetables by 84 sorties in little over a fortnight. This total, 35.6% of the Command effort (1162), places 5 Group well in the can of Gardening operations, and is a commendable achievement befitting the end of a hard but memorable year of war.
[Underlined] 55 BASE [/underlined]
55 Base evenly distributed their effort by most Squadrons operating nine sorties each, visiting a selection of Kattegat and Eastern Baltic areas. On one occasion this was combined with a Group bombing force on an important Naval Base, which, in conjunction with 106 Squadron’s lay, a few days before, produced some highly satisfactory results, denying the use of the Port to the enemy and closing his Exercise Areas for U-boats and surface craft outside. Southern Norway also received attention in co-operation with other Groups, directed primarily against the movement of troops and material for the Wehrmacht from Norway to Denmark. There is conclusive evidence to show that shipping in the Fjords was seriously held up. The closing of the main ports and the consequent dislocation of traffic, had an even greater importance than the actual number of casualties caused.
[Underlined] 54 BASE. [/underlined]
54 Base have surpassed previous records by the excellent performance of 106 Squadron and the Mosquitos of 627 Squadron.
[Underlined] Fine Work by Metheringham. [/underlined]
R.A.F. Station, Metheringham, have repeatedly succeeded in lifting eleven maximum loads under difficult conditions, and on one occasion raised their record to fifteen Gardeners loaded at short notice and ready by ‘take-off’ time. These results cannot be obtained without the co-operation and hard work of the Ground and Armament staffs, who are to be congratulated on a fine month’s work.
[Underlined] 174 Vegetables Planted by a Single Squadron. [/underlined]
106 Squadron have had the busiest month of any Gardening Squadron on record, and have successfully planted a total of 174 vegetables for 36 sorties.
[Underlined] An Outstanding Operation. [/underlined]
Quite the most outstanding operation performed by 106 Squadron was their lone visit to the Eastern Baltic in the Privet and Spinach areas, when 15 Gardeners delivered their loads off an enemy port on a round trip of 1810 miles. Taking into consideration that no other Gardeners were in operation on this night, it stands as one of the greatest Squadron penetrations, and all who took part are to be congratulated on their effort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Mosquitos. [/underlined]
627 Squadron were able to perform their first operation with Mosquitos on the 29th December, when Gardeners were briefed for an important river target, high on the priority list. Four Gardeners were very successful in planting their vegetables in the correct area without opposition, while three others unfortunately had difficulty in the area and returned with their loads. This unusual method of Gardening promises well for the future, as specially selected areas can be planted where it is bound to cause the greatest inconvenience and damage to enemy traffic. The results of this small scale planting were most effectively obtained for the cost of eight Vegetables. Time, opportunity and weather permitting, will tell its own story with regard to the menacing effects of Mosquito Gardening in the forthcoming year.
[Underlined] SQUADRON SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Gardening Sorties by Squadron]
[Underlined] 5 GROUP CALENDAR – 1944. VEGETABLES SUCCESSFULLY PLANTED [/underlined]
January 25
February Nil
March Nil
April 388
May 520
June 30
July 64
August 260
Sept. 77
October 316
November 126
December 415
[Underlined] Total Planted – 2221 [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP MONTHLY SUMMARIES – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.5 Group 415
No.6 Group 232
No.1 Group 212
No.3 Group 168
No.4 Group 135
[Underlined] GARDENING POINTS. [/underlined]
(i) Only one Vegetable had to be jettisoned “Safe”. This was done in the correct manner.
(ii) All Gardeners unable to pin-point their target by H2S or ‘Visual’ returned with their load in the correct manner, or laid in Secondary Gardens.
(iii) 97.4% of the Vegetables dropped were planted successfully.
(iv) 12 Gardening areas were visited this month, covering a mileage flown of 98,230 miles in 7 nights.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION. [/underlined]
Although it is difficult to appreciate the results of our efforts without conclusive proof of sinkings or damage, it is firmly believed that many plantings have brought great success. It is estimated that at present the rate of sinking and/or damage, to enemy ships stands at 46 Vegetables per ship. It can therefore be satisfactorily assessed that, by planting 2221 Vegetables in the past twelve months, 5 Group alone have accounted for no less than [underlined] 48 ships SUNK [/underlined] or [underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined] This figure gives at least one ship per week, and does not take into account the dislocation of shipping caused through closed ports, ships waiting to be discharged, extensive minesweeping operations and heavy
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
repair work, combined with the feeling that it will be for ever unsafe to travel at sea until the bitter struggle ceases.
In conclusion it may be safely be said that it has been a splendid Gardening Year, and that all Gardeners have indeed maintained their high standard of efficiency; let us continue to do so, and face the year of 1045 with ever increasing zeal to destroy and annoy our enemy’s shipping.
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. [/underlined]
A German steamer was mined and sunk five miles SW of South Langeland about 15th November, 1944.
German BRYNGE was mined and sunk in Kalundborg Fyord in Summer of 1942. This ship was reported as mined in July 1941.
German MAGDELINE VINNEN (4594 G.T.) was in dock in November, 1944, for extensive repairs after mining.
German TELDE was under repair after being mined. This ship was reported as mined on 13th October, 1943.
Danisg VIBORG (2028 G.T.) was mined (i) on 1st September, 1944, (ii) on 17th September, 1944. The vessel reached port under her own power and as far as can be seen she is undamaged.
A Danish broadcast of 13th December, 1944, reported that wreckage of the motor vessel GRETE (51 G.T) was found North of Laeso in the Kattegat.
The Danish PHONIX (895 G.T.) struck a mine and grounded off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
An unidentified German vessel was also damaged by a mine off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
The German steamer CONSTANZA was heavily damaged by a mine off Kullen on 1st December, 1944.
Several overlapping reports give the following casualties in Oslo Fjord during November, 1944:-
(a) A tug mined and sunk in Horten Inner harbour on 29th November.
(b) The SVEIN (119 G.T.) damaged by a mine off Gulholmen on 16th November.
(c) Two M.T.B’s sunk by mines in the harbour at Horten on 29th November.
(d) A small merchant ship mined and sunk near Veslos, Horten.
An unidentified Finnish vessel of about 1000 G.T. was damaged by a mine in Oslo Fjord on 14th December, 1944.
A Swedish broadcast on 18th December reported that the Norwegian EGORVUS arrived at Bergen on 4th December. The ship was badly damaged aft, probably by a mine.
A German ship HERMINA was sunk by a mine in Stettiner Haff on 19th August, 1944.
The German S.S. ARION (2297 G.T.) was damaged by a mine near Nordenham in the Weser estuary during October, 1944.
The German hospital ship MONTE ROSE (13,882 G.T.) arrived Moss in Oslo Fjord on 12th November following repairs at Akers to make good damage caused by mining.
The Norwegian NINA (1,487 G.T.) was damaged by a mine off Schultzegrund on 27th October, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
1944 was a memorable year in the Signals life of the Group, and we can look back with satisfaction on such accomplishments as the general installation of V.H.F. R/T equipment and Loran into all aircraft in the Group; the improvements obtained by the Coningsby Radar Development Party in the performance of H2S Mark III; and the evolution of the ideal technique of W/T control in the target area. Let us take each of these four items in turn, and see if there are any lessons to be learnt.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
When No.617 Squadron were carrying out training for their famous attack on the German Dams, it became obvious that the existing bomber R/T (T.R.1196) was incapable of providing the efficient inter-aircraft R/T communication required, owing to severe interference experienced at night on the frequency band used. The V.H.F. R/T set T.R.1143 was therefore fitted, and gave excellent results. V.H.F. R/T was used by 617 Squadron for several other special operations. In April, 1944, 5 Group began operating as a separate force on special targets – carrying out their own marking and controlling. It was decided that aircraft of the Illuminating and Controlling team should be equipped with V.H.F. R/T and the remainder of the force be controlled by W/T.
[underlined] H2S Interference. [/underlined]
All Lancaster aircraft of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons were, therefore, equipped with T.R.1143 V.H.F. R/T sets. This was the first occasion on which V.H.F. R/T sets had been fitted to aircraft carrying the H2S equipment, and on the first operation it was found that very severe interference was caused to the V.H.F. R/T by the H2S. Test proved that the interference was being picked up by the base of the V.H.F. aerial which protruded through the aircraft skin near the H2S set. All V.H.F. aerials were immediately mounted outside the aircraft skin and this cured the trouble.
[Underlined] Main Force Fitting Programme. [/underlined]
In June 1944 it was decided to fit all the remaining aircraft of 5 Group with V.H.F. R/T, and by the end of July this fitting programme was completed – thanks to the good work of a small 26 Group fitting party, and to the enthusiastic support of individual Squadron Signal Sections.
[Underlined] Removal of S.B.A. [/underlined]
To ease the burden on these sections and to put an end to much useless waste of energy and material, S.B.A. equipment was removed from all 5 Group aircraft.
[Underlined] Inadvertent Radiation of Intercomm. [/underlined]
Airborne R/T equipment is normally operated by the pilot, and he must be able to change from receive to transmit with the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
minimum of trouble. A small “press to speak” switch is therefore mounted on the control wheel, the mere pressing of which actuates a relay which causes the V.H.F. R/T to radiate. Occasionally relays come out of adjustment and occasionally pilots squeeze the “press to speak” switch unknowingly. It is not surprising, therefore, that we soon had cases of crew intercomm. being radiated continuously in the target area – almost completely ruining the control R/T. The ease with which the unwitting culprits were tracked down by their nicknames indicated a somewhat lax crew discipline.
The first countermeasure was an order to the effect that all transmitter crystals were to be removed from main force aircraft. This action proved to be an effective cure, but placed an added burden on the Wireless Mechanics. Bardney produced the answer – the fitting of a simple switch in the transmitter H.T. circuit – accessible from inside the aircraft. In all main force aircraft this switch is sealed in the off position after each D.I. check. In aircraft which may have to transmit the switch is placed in the on position. This scheme still left 20 or 30 aircraft liable to radiate intercom., and in spite of careful briefing and especial care of relays, the inevitable occurred and another operation was nearly ruined by one of the Illuminating Force radiating intercom. throughout the attack. Woodhall Spa produced the cure this time in the shape of a neon indicator which illuminated the words “Check VHF” everytime [sic] the V.H.F. R/T set was in the transmit condition.
[Underlined] Enemy Freya Interference. [/underlined]
During an attack in September, unusually severe interference was experienced from enemy Freya transmissions occurring on our V.H.F. R/T frequencies. With the prospect of an increasing number of operations over Freya Territory, this interference constituted a serious threat, and Headquarters, Bomber Command, made immediate arrangements for R.A.E. Farnborough to find a cure. Tests soon proved that the inclusion of a simple device known as a “series limitor” would completely eliminate Freya interference.
[Underlined] All aircraft change over to American SCR.522 sets. [/underlined]
Fortunately for 5 Group this modification coincided with the decision of higher authority to refit all our aircraft with the American V.H.F. R/T set SCR.552. This new set was already fitted with the series limitor. During the night of the 16th October the colossal task of setting up and changing 350 aircraft V.H.F. R/T sets was accomplished without a hitch. All pilots expressed themselves as highly satisfied with the excellent performance of the American sets, but there was a general complaint regarding the fact that the incoming V.H.F. R/T signals tended to swamp crew intercom. We were told to adjust the pre-set volume control in the set!
[Underlined] Effect of Icing on V.H.F. R/T Aerials. [/underlined]
The advent of winter and resulting increase in icing risks was brought home on the night 19/20th October when a large number of V.H.F. R/T aerials broke off. Our friends at R.A.E. once more came into the breach and quickly produced a modified form of mounting for the whip aerials so that they really could whip and thus prevent ice accretion. All aircraft are now being so modified as fast as the necessary parts arrive.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Pilots’ Manual Volume Control. [/underlined]
No matter how carefully the pre-set volume control was adjusted it was found that it was impossible to cater for all requirements, and pilots continued to complain of the loud V.H.F. R/T signals jamming vital crew intercom. As a result of a unanimous demand from Bases made at the November Group Signals Conference, a number of volume controls were received for trial. These trials resulted in an immediate plea for general fitting throughout all Group aircraft, and this was acceded to.
[Underlined] R/T Speech Training. [/underlined]
The best R/T equipment – like the ordinary trunk telephone must be met half way with properly articulated speech. The average airman does not possess a natural telephone voice but the excellent R/T speech training unit at Woodlands, Stanmore, soon remedies this. During 1944 [underlined] 140 [/underlined] pilots of 5 Group have benefited from the instruction given by this School.
[Underlined] FINALE. [/underlined]
The closing days of 1944 thus found the final chapter of our V.H.F. R/T story completed – a pilots’ volume control – no more inadvertent radiation of intercom. – no more Freya or H2S interference – no more broken aerials – just perfectly clear R/T at a strength to suit all pilots.
It has been an interesting story and it is hoped that those about to sample the joys of V.H.F. R/T in bomber aircraft will benefit from our experiences.
[Underlined] THE DEVELOPMENT OF W/T CONTROL TECHNIQUE. [/underlined]
At first sight it would appear to be a simple matter to arrange for one aircraft to control 250 other aircraft in the target area by W/T. The T.1154/R.1155 W/T equipment carried by our Lancasters is very efficient and easy to manipulate, and the W/T frequencies available to the Group are as clear of interference as one can expect these days. It was found by grim experience, however, that the accuracy of tuning by the average operator was below the standard required for control purposes. On more than one occasion, we regret to say, the control operator was as much as 30 kc/s off frequency – with the result that few aircraft received the control signals.
[Underlined] Crystal Monitor. [/underlined]
It was found that the only certain way of ensuring that the control operator was precisely on frequency was to resurrect the crystal monitor type 2, and make him tune the transmitter by plugging his phones into the crystal monitor and tuning his transmitter to the dead space.
[Underlined] Crystal Controlled Transmitters. [/underlined]
This scheme proved a complete cure, but was rather cumbersome and profiting by Binbrook’s experiments, a number of Controllers’ W/T transmitters were modified for crystal control. All that was necessary was to plug the appropriate crystal into the master oscillator grid circuit. This certainly simplified the tuning problem, but deprived the operator of listening-through facilities, and also his ability to hear his own morse. This latter failing resulted in the transmission of poor morse, so the scheme was abandoned and we reverted to the crystal monitor.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Transmission of Perfect Morse. [/underlined]
The job of finding W/T operators capable of transmitting perfect morse under rather nerve wracking conditions was slightly more difficult that the problem of accurate tuning. Operators who produced copy-book morse in the Squadron Training Room were sometimes found to possess nerves when they remembered that 250 other operators and several ground stations including Group Headquarters were hanging on every dot they made. A special test for Controller Operators was therefore introduced, covering morse, tuning ability, and correct procedure. During 1944, a total of 170 W/T Operators in the Group successfully passed the rigorous test, and many of these operators have since proved themselves on actual controlled operations.
[Underlined] Control Procedure. [/underlined]
To ensure that all aircraft W/T receivers are accurately tuned, the control operator transmits six callsigns a few minutes before target time. This transmission also enables the deputy control operator to check the tuning, and also to take over control if the transmissions are not heard. Thereafter throughout the attack, the control operator transmits two callsigns every minute unless control code signals are being handled. This scheme was evolved to enable W/T operators to concentrate on their tail warning device without missing any W/T signals.
[Underlined] Control Code. [/underlined]
To ensure speed and security, a special three-letter code covering all eventualities likely to arise during the illuminating, locating, marking and destroying of targets was evolved. A new code is used for each operation.
[Underlined] Deliberate Enemy Jamming. [/underlined]
To counter possible attempts by the enemy to jam the control frequency, an elaborate system of alternative frequencies and W/T guards is laid on for each operation, but happily, so far (touching wood) we have only been ‘jostled’ into doing this on two occasions and each time the scheme worked satisfactorily. We now realise just how effective 100 Group’s Countermeasure ‘Jostle’ really is!
[Underlined] Enemy Spoofing. [/underlined]
The Hun is quite capable of attempting to spoil a controlled attack by putting out spoof transmissions on our frequencies. To counter such attempts operators are reminded of the challenge procedure used with SD.0182 verification tables. No such attempt has, however, ever been made.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
With the experience of 170 successful controlled attacks behind us in 1944, it can be said that we now have a system which is guaranteed to produce excellent morse, precisely on frequency and at the exact time required. It has resulted in the birth of a brand of wireless operator of an efficiency far exceeding that attained in the old days of perpetual W/T silence. The never failing manner in which diversion signals, wind messages and ‘target attacked’ signals are handled reflects the effect which the 5 Group Signals procedure has had on its wireless operators. Their morale was never higher and their keenness never greater. They are a credit to the Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units who produced them. May they keep it up in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
In August, 1944, it was decided to exploit the blind bombing potentialities of H2S Mark III to the full, and resultant action took two parallel courses, viz:-
(a) An intensive training programme for set operators, with the object of thoroughly familiarising them with the equipment.
(b) Considerable cleaning up of the equipment to obtain increased accuracy, improved presentation and high sensitivity. This latter programme consisted of the selection of the most efficient units from the available H2S equipment and their embodiment into one aircraft installation, coupled with a detailed bench setting procedure.
This work naturally clashed with the prevailing shortage of Radar Mechanics. This was overcome by attachments from the Headquarters, Bomber Command, Radar Development Party, and from No.53 Base, as a result of a decision to curtail the fitting of H2S within that Base. Bench and workshop accommodation was extended in sympathy with the manpower increase.
Flight tests and H2S photography soon demonstrated that the scanner was a definite weakness in the equipment. Severe gaps appeared in the P.P.I. presentation, which made an accurate bombing run exceedingly difficult. Two mechanics under T.R.E. direction constructed a scanner tester with which the scanners could be tested on the ground. The gaps in the polar diagram were filled in by means of a sheet of perspex mounted on the face of the mirror, the ideal position of which was fond by trial and error. This treatment was successful with approximately 50% of the scanners.
[Underlined] The Perfect Scanner. [/underlined]
At this time a perfect scanner was loaned to Coningsby by T.R.E., and flight trials soon demonstrated that the adjective “perfect” was not an exaggeration. As a result, action was taken with our local manufacturer to cast a mirror to the perfect mirror. Trials with the cast mirror were carried out with the resultant paradox that the polar diagram was an improvement over the original. The production of cast mirrors was extended, and operational results proved that the presentation obtained was the best ever.
This labour reaped its dividends in no uncertain fashion; the ability of the operators to obtain best results from the equipment under operational conditions, coupled with the increased efficiency and accuracy of the equipment, were producing remarkably low bombing errors. Figures of a 300 yards error on the live bombing range were by no means uncommon. A still more satisfying substantiation, of course, came from the raid results.
[Underlined] H2S MARK IIIE. [/underlined]
In parallel with this improvement programme, two mechanics have been attached to T.R.E. to construct two sets of H2S Mark IIIE under T.R.E direction. Their work was completed in November, and the equipment transferred to Coningsby, where flight trials proved that it was vastly superior to H2S Mark III, and possessed the added advantage of requiring a less detailed setting up procedure. It is hoped to continue this story at a later date.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
As the operational policy of ‘evasion’ developed, Radar transmissions became more and more restricted, and as a reult [sic] it was decided to install Loran in all aircraft of No.5 Group. This was a bold decision, because the equipment had not been adequately proved operationally, and the prospects of jamming were menacing.
The fitting was carried out in two phases, as equipment became available. Firstly in Nos. 53 and 54 Bases, and finally in Nos. 55 and 56. Each programme was completed rapidly as a result of excellent co-operation between the Engineering and Signals Branches.
[Underlined] Teething Troubles. [/underlined]
Initial results were not so good; Loran required longer manipulation than Gee, and while targets were within Gee coverage, the new equipment did not offer much temptation. Furthermore, the divider circuits were temperamental and suitable areas for training were too far away to allow training flights to be carried out. However, a successful raid on Munich proved the worth of the equipment, and instated it as a very necessary aid outside the limits of Gee coverage. Each navigator was issued with a screwdriver and was instructed in the art of setting dividers in the air.
The trailing aerial was a nuisance. One very vicious specimen, which brought matters to a head “collected large lumps of Window, which jammed the aerial when the wireless operator attempted to wind it in when approaching the target. He succeeded in cutting it away whereupon it jammed the bomb doors; it was cut loose again and it wrapped itself around the rear turret”. Experiments were carried out, as a result of which it was found practicable to use the 27 ft. forward suspension of the T.R.1196 aerial and a suitable loading unit. This modification has been passed to Bomber Command.
A similar aerial was developed for Mosquito aircraft, for which the internal aerial for Loran had proved unsatisfactory.
H2S interference has been experienced. A modification to suppress the receiver during the H2S transmissions has been found successful on the bench, and is undergoing air tests.
[Underlined] Prospects. [/underlined]
It is a simple device to maintain, and in these days of acute shortage of Radar Mechanics, that is an important factor. It does not radiate any energy and is therefore quite safe to use on our deepest penetrations. We look forward to doing great things with Loran in 1945.
[Underlined] TELECOMMUNICATIONS. [/underlined]
1944 saw the final completion of the Base organisation, and the resolution of all queries concerning the positioning of Ops. switchboards and the occupation of Secon huts – both of which caused a considerable amount of heartburn and one time or another. The year saw only one new change, and this was the introduction of a new scheme to speed up the passing of operational information to Bases and Stations. New? We were told that we were going back to 1939 by introducing this scheme but whether new or old it has served one purpose very well.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
Prior to January, 1944, all operational “gen” had been passed by “scrambler” to Base or parent stations, and passed on by the latter to stations or satellites, and a very cumbersome and doubtful method it was. On at least one occasion the omission of the word “if” nearly wrecked an operation. Delays were excessive and the whole system needed a thorough overhaul.
It was decided, therefore, to enlist the aid of the teleprinter network, and the first move at Group was to put an ops. teleprinter in a specially built cubicle adjacent to the Ops. planning room. Bases and Stations were then asked to take similar action, which by hook or by crook they speedily carried out. The final step was to arrange for a simultaneous broadcast to all Bases and Stations and this presented some difficulties, because half the Group was still in the parent/satellite stage. Nevertheless, the difficulties were soon overcome, and the scheme became a working proposition.
The advantages have been manifest from the outset. Messages are handed to the teleprinter operator as soon as they are written out, and are teleprinted at once. The broadcast remains set up as long as planning continues, and handles no other traffic; it is strictly unidirectional. The moment messages are received at Bases and Stations they are handed into the Ops. Room. Thus the overall delay has been cut to the absolute minimum. At the same time speech circuits and “scrambler” phones have been relieved of a tremendous load, and are free for conferences and for the passing of sudden changes of planning detail. In addition to these points, the broadcast network has proved so efficient that operations can now be laid on at extremely short notice, e.g. thirty minutes between time of laying on and time of Flight Planning, a state of affairs quite unthinkable more than 12 months ago.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
Now that the Hun has lost his radiolocation network in France and the Low Countries, it is more than ever necessary that the maintenance of R/T, W/T and Radar silence should be strictly applied in accordance with briefing instructions. He must also never be allowed to note the difference between an operational and a non-operational day. In this connection, the following inadvertent radiation of intercom. on H/F R/T was actually heard by Waddington during a recent daylight operational take off:-
First Dim Wit: “What is going on down there?”
Second Dim Wit: “It is an Ops take off.”
First Dim Wit: “Where are we?”
Second Dim Wit: “Waddington.”
First Dim Wit: “I suppose their satellite is u/s.”
Needless to say, callsigns were not employed in this tea-time chatter otherwise there would have been most serious repercussions for someone.
[Underlined] CODES AND CYPHERS. [/underlined]
1944 saw a radical change in the cypher policy in Bomber Command. In January all cypher facilities were withdrawn from Stations, and Group assumed the responsibility for this traffic, transmitting it to Bases in plain language either by “scrambler”, teleprinter or postagram.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
This released two Section Officers from each Base, who were replaced by one Flight Officer, who became a librarian of all secret and confidential publications.
Early in the year R.A.F. Cypher Sergeants were posted into the Group to gain experience before overseas service, and they are now doing vital work in our forward communications in the battle zone.
Life went on uneventfully at Group until shortly before ‘D’ Day, when only the chosen few and the cypher officers knew the actual time and date of the invasion.
And then again, from early in September until the sinking of the Tirpitz, the Group Cypher Office enjoyed a spell of heavy traffic. After some difficulty in obtaining speedy transmission of messages, direct communication was obtained with Archangel, thus making it possible to deliver in Russia deciphered messages within one hour of origination.
It is occasions like these that relieve the dull monotony of a Cypher Officer’s life – the perpetual routine messages and amending and checking of documents – and make them feel that they are perhaps of some slight use.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
Throughout December a large decrease in the number of W/T Controllers’ tests, due to adverse weather conditions, has shown that every available opportunity must be taken by the wireless operator (air) to carry out these tests. This requires good co-operation between the Signals Leader and the Squadron and Flight Commanders, and Signals Leaders must ensure that they carry out their part in placing all their requirements before these people, who will do their best to meet these requirements.
During December, 20 tests were carried out, and of these, 16 passed as fit for W/T Controller’s duties. The Squadrons who carried out these successful tests were:-
83 Squadron – 4
97 Squadron – 1
44 Squadron – 2
57 Squadron – 4
630 Squadron – 2
227 Squadron – 1
50 Squadron – 2
Controlled Operations.
Reception of W/T messages transmitted by the W/T Links was again very satisfactory. The standard of operating by the Link operators was quite good, though there is still room for improvement in procedure. Study of 5 Group Air Staff Instructions Sigs/1, and constant practice will eliminate these small mistakes. The transmission of the “Target Attacked” signals presents no problems to our operators, and we are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
happy to state that up to date there have been no failures in this respect – keep it up.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise. [/underlined]
Despite the re-arranging of sections and times of this exercise, the results are far from satisfactory. Signals Leaders must have a drive on getting every Wireless Operator (Air) in their squadrons to take part in at least one exercise per month. The number of crews per squadron are such that, even if they have been operating the previous night there should still be available a quota of operators to carry out these exercises the following morning. If they are being detailed for other duties, point out the requirements of this exercise to your Squadron Commander. He will co-operate.
[Underlined] Points for Signals Leaders. [/underlined]
During the past year, Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group have shown that they can carry out most duties assigned to them, but a summary of the year’s work reveals that there are still a few loopholes in their work which require filling up. For instance, the number of manipulation failures for the year was 20. Now this is a very small percentage of the sorties flown, but it can and must be reduced until in 5 Group such a thing as a manipulation failure ceases to exist. Never let it be said that the equipment is better than the man. Also, the reception of, and action on, diversion messages still leaves much to be desired. These, and other weak points can only be overcome by proper instruction and practice.
[Underlined] Categorisation. [/underlined]
Now that the majority of Squadrons have an Analysis Officer attached for categorisation duties, the results of their labour should soon be forthcoming and all Wireless Operators categorised when they arrive on the Squadron, and at their 10, 20 and 30 sortie checks. The standard categorisation paper has met with universal approval and it now rests with the Signals Leader and his assistant to ensure that these tests are carried out as instructed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] REVIEW OF NAVIGATION FOR THE YEAR, 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months many innovations and improvements in Navigation have been initiated by No. 5 Group. The most notable of these are:-
(i) Introduction of the A.P.I. attachment, which ensures more accurate windfinding for bombing.
(ii) Introduction of the A.P.I. and A.P.I. attachment windfinding drills.
(iii) A reduction in the practice bombing vector error from 9 m.p.h. in January to 3.4 m.p.h. in December as a result of (i) and (ii) above. Also a corresponding decrease in the operational bombing wind finding errors, although this fact is difficult to determine for obvious reasons.
(iv) New log and chart work procedure, in which all duplication of work is eliminated.
(v) Introduction of the Categorisation scheme.
(vi) Appointment of Navigation Analysis Officers.
(vii) Reduction of the “Spread” of aircraft on operations from a concentration box 100 miles x 50 miles in January to a concentration box 50 miles x 25 miles in December. (Room for still more improvement here).
(viii) Elimination of Astro and a consequent increased amount of time available for teaching more essential subjects.
The most notable of these new activities were the Categorisation Scheme, coupled with the appointment of Analysis Officers and the monumental decrease in bombing wind finding errors. They have greatly increased the standard of navigation and bombing accuracy.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated. Suggestions as to how the present standard and technique can be further improved will be welcomed. So, go to it, and don’t be afraid to voice your opinions and suggestions – and make sure that 1945 is a year of Victory.
[Underlined] IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE TRACK KEEPING AND TIMING. [/underlined]
The general standard of track keeping and timing which was achieved on the shorter range operations is still being maintained on the longer range sorties we are now undertaking. There are [underlined] STILL, [/underlined] however, a few STRAGGLERS. No matter what is said or done either by Group Headquarters or the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers the percentage of stragglers still remains the same. A few of them are unavoidable, e.g. genuine compass failure, late take off, failure of all Navigation instruments combined with sudden wind change; but the majority are due either to poor and indifferent navigation or else a lack of understanding of modern tactics.
Aircraft in the concentration enjoy first the protection afforded by other aircraft, second the protection of “Window” and
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
third the protection of the countermeasures provided by No.100 Group aircraft. It is therefore impossible for a fighter, once he has got into the stream, to home on to an individual aircraft in that concentration. On the other hand, it will be very simple for the fighter to home on to any straggler, because that aircraft will be isolated from the concentration and will therefore stand out. This applies to aircraft who are out in timing, as well as off track.
Concentration in both track keeping and timing is also a safeguard against flak. It is obvious that a compact mass of aircraft will completely black out a Cathode Ray tube, and make it impossible for any one aircraft to be singled out for attack. Also it is equally obvious that the chance of being hit is considerably diminished as all aircraft are passing through the defended area in a very short space of time.
So now you know!! Keep on track and on time throughout the whole operation and minimise tour chance of being shot down.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly. This figure is an increase of .2 m.p.h. on last month’s figure. It is only fair to state, however, that much of the practice bombing this month has been done by the new crews, and this fact may account for the slight increase in the vector error. Remember the goal we set ourselves last month – an average vector error of below 3 m.p.h. Can we achieve it? The answer is YES – but only if EVERY navigator does his very best on every exercise. Let us start the New Year well and achieve our goal in the first month.
[Table of Average Practice Vector Errors by Squadron]
97 Squadron have been rising rapidly in this table and have now reached second place. Well done, and it is hoped that your ambition does not end there, but that you will go on and beat 9 Squadron, who have held the lead for seven consecutive months.
No.56 Base are still in the bottom half of the list. Next month we hope to see all their squadrons at least six places higher. What about it, No.56 Base?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and ETA checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Leigh – 106 Squadron
S/Ldr. Burnside – 97 Squadron
F/O. Reeves – 61 Squadron
F/Sgt. Edwards – 467 Squadron
F/Sgt. Treadwell – 189 Squadron
Sgt. Smith – 49 Squadron
W/O. Rose – 619 Squadron
F/Lt. De Friend DFM – 57 Squadron
P/O Searle, 227 Squadron, who has appeared in the last two summaries and W/O Murray, 50 Squadron, who appeared in the last summary, have both again submitted work of an exceptionally high standard. This is an excellent performance on the part of these two navigators and we congratulate them.
They have been omitted from this month’s list however, so as to give the remainder of the Group a chance!
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. De Friend, D.F.M. – No.57 Squadron Navigation Officer, to be Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck. Now S/Ldr.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS AND CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
The Navigation Analysis is going very well. Analysis Officers on all Squadrons are doing an important job in a very efficient manner. Theirs is a tiresome and tedious job, but, if it is done conscientiously and well, it will pay handsome dividends in the form of better and more accurate navigation. It is to be hoped that all navigators are taking advantage of this extra service and are liaisoning [sic] with the analysis officers. Listen to what they have to say, note where you lost marks on your last sortie, and then follow their recommendations, and those if the Station Navigation Officer.
Lack of system is causing an appreciable loss of marks to some navigators, this applies particularly to the new crews. Working to a system will halve your navigational difficulties. The time to complete each cycle of operations is left for you to decide, but it is always best to work on an easy fraction of an hour, e.g. 10, 12 or 15 minutes. No system should have a time interval of more than 15 minutes.
The categorisation scheme has been in operation for 4 months
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
now and is well established. It is interesting to note that over this period, the number of “A+” and “A” category navigators has risen from 116 (12 Squadrons) to 203 (14 Squadrons), and the number of “C” and “D” category navigators has been reduced from 63 (12 Squadrons) to 28 (14 Squadrons). These figures are very encouraging. We should, however, have NO “C” or “D” navigators in the Group. Station Navigation Officers and Analysis Officers must concentrate on these crews until they reach at least the “B” category.
[Underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined]
It has often been said that a really first class briefing is half the operation. Whether that statement is strictly accurate or not is difficult to say, but it is a fact that a well briefed crew has a far better chance of completing a successful sortie, no matter how adverse the conditions, than a badly briefed crew.
One or two navigation briefings which have been attended during the last month have been below the standard required. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must pay particular attention to this aspect of their work. The most noticeable faults of briefing officers are:-
(i) Speaking too quickly;
(ii) Not raising their voice;
(iii) Speaking with a cigarette or pipe in the mouth;
(iv) Rushing through important details and not repeating them at least once;
(v) Failing to give a little advice on navigational details, particularly to the inexperienced navigators.
Navigation officers, do any of these faults apply to you? If so, then remedy them immediately, and give your navigators a chance. Squadron Navigation Officers should detail two deputies and train them to give a good briefing, so that a high standard will always be maintained.
Navigators do you always get the most out of each briefing? Do you listen to all the valuable information and advice given you and do you use it, or are you one of those people who knows all the answers and just don’t listen to the briefing officer. If so, then revise your ideas immediately. No matter how rushed you are, always listen to the Briefing Officer and make notes of all the important points. That extra 10 minutes attention in the briefing room will save you many a headache on the operation. Once you are airborne it is too late to remember something which you forgot to ask in the briefing room.
[Underlined] SAFETY HEIGHTS. [/underlined]
With the present tactics of flying low over parts of the Continent, it is essential to know the safety heights along the route. Do YOU always note the safety heights along the track and also for a distance 20 or 30 miles either side of track, just in case? Mark the spot heights in feet, on your plotting chart. This will act as a double check.
Several reports have been received from crews in recent weeks of aircraft crashing into high ground when flying low. None of these reports have yet been corroborated, but they may be true. So take warning and don’t end your days on the side of a mountain. It’s too cold this weather anyway.
Remember that spot heights on a topographical map of the Continent are always given in metres, with the exception of the Straits
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
of Dover sheet. All spot heights for Great Britain are given in feet.
[Underlined] SELF-ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the second analysis chart fir you to complete. If you missed the fist one for any reason look it up now and answer those questions too.
(i) Have you read and do you know all the Air Staff Instructions and 5 Group Drills which apply to YOU?
(ii) Do you know all your compass drills?
(iii) Do you know the maximum coverage of each Gee chain and which is the best chain to use over (a) North Western Germany, (b) Southern France, (c) Frisian Islands, (d) Paris area, (e) North West Denmark?
(iv) Do you know the maximum height at which H2S should be switched on?
(v) Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation, from which you are allowed to relax your timing? Do you know why you are allowed to relax timing from this position, and why this position was chosen?
(vi) Do you know [underlined] all [/underlined] the Group flight plan speeds for climbing, diving, straight and level flight, with and without a bomb load?
(vii) Do you always fill in your Form 2330 correctly and hand it to the Me. Officer on return?
(viii) Do you always pass the drift to the pilot after each alteration of course, especially on the run up to the target?
(ix) Do you always check your altimeter with the pilot’s when descending, and do you regularly check your A.S.I. with the pilot’s? When there is a discrepancy between the two A.S.I’s which do you take as being accurate?
(x) Do you always make allowance for time of turn when altering course, e.g. 1/4 minute before E.T.A. for turns up to 30°, 1/2 minute between 31° and 60°, and 3/4 minute between 61° and 100°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] REVIEW FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months considerable strides have been made by No.5 Group both with the introduction of new Radar navigational aids, and in the use of those that existed prior to the beginning of the year. The most notable have been:-
(i) The introduction of H2S MK.II into Nos. 44, 207 and 619 Squadrons.
(ii) The introduction of H2S MK.III into No.54 Base.
(iii) The introduction of an H2S categorisation scheme at Coningsby in order to ascertain the most efficient blind marker crews.
(iv) Experiments at Coningsby to determine the efficiency of H2S MK.III and the production of specially selected MK.III equipment to give far more efficient blind marking than before.
(v) Incorporation of the 184 indicator in H2S MK.III, which has enabled a blind bombing technique of releasing direct on the response to the developed to a high standard of proficiency. [sic]
(vi) The introduction of H2S photography both on MK.II and MK.III squadrons from which it has been possible to ascertain the positions of release of mines and T.I’s and also give us considerable H2S cover of the Continent.
(vii) The introduction of the R.F. Unit 27 for use with the Gee receiver.
(viii) Consequent upon the invasion of Europe, the introduction of Continental Gee chains which give more accurate coverage over Western Germany.
(ix) The introduction of Loran, which has resulted in long distance fixing, and a consequent improvement in D.R. navigation.
(x) The appointment of Station Radar Navigation Officers who are responsible for the application of, and training in, Radar Navigational aids throughout the Group.
Most notable of the above activities were the experiments at Coningsby, which have resulted in a considerable decrease in blind marking errors, and have produced equipment which has given far better responses on the H2S MK.III P.P.I. than ever before. Coupled with this is the introduction of Loran into the whole of the aircraft in No.5 Group, which has further raised the standard of navigation, and resulted in fixes being obtained over various areas of enemy territory with considerable success and without enemy interference of any kind. This was an ambitious scheme as it involved the fitting of all aircraft and the training of all navigators within a period of six to eight weeks, and great credit is due to the Radar sections and Loran Instructors for carrying it out without a hitch.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated in the forth coming year, not only by the introduction of new Radar
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
navigational aids, but by the raising of the standard of efficiency of the present equipment. Suggestions as to how this can be done will be welcome. Do not be afraid to let us have your ideas and opinions. No matter how trivial they may seem to you, they may have far reaching effects if applied throughout the whole Group. If you do this far better Radar navigation facilities may come into being, and possibly help to win the victory this year.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The majority of operators have made good use of this aid during the month and much information has been obtained on the operational value of the chain.
A summary of results obtained on the three long range operations is as follows:-
[Underlined] MUNICH [/underlined] Rate 4 signals, particularly the Master signal, were weaker than usual with considerable splitting, thus decreasing the value of the S.S. Chain as a whole on this particular sortie. Rate 5 signals were much stronger than previously reported, perhaps due to the southerly route taken. Investigations have been made into the possible causes of the difficulties experienced and have rather indicated that weather conditions were the primary cause of the Rate 4 signals’ weakness, as the worst meteorological conditions lay between the Rate 4 Master Station and the route taken. A plot of the first and last fixes taken on this operation indicates, however, that despite the difficulties outlined, Loran could have been used from 0400E on the outward route on 0700E on the return route. It is apparent from this plot that many operators did not make full use of this aid, and it can only be assumed that they did not persevere with the equipment to ensure fixing at frequent intervals.
The procedure of watching the signals and taking readings between splitting cannot be too highly stressed. A visit to the Radar Section at night now and again and watching the S.S. Loran Chain on the bench set will prove of great value if you wish to become really efficient on this excellent navigational aid.
[Underlined] GDYNIA & POLITZ [/underlined] Much to the surprise of the majority of Loran operators exceptional coverage was obtained on these attacks. Although the routes lay mainly outside the service area, signals were strong and fairly easily recognisable, and a considerable number of operators were able to obtain fixes from the Danish Coast to the target and return. Once again, however, the first and last fixes plotted indicate that operators are not persevering. It is appreciated that many little difficulties crop up in flight but when Loran is the only aid available there can be little excuse for not endeavouring to use it.
It should be possible to obtain a first and last fix plot which shows a concentration of fixes at the point of entry into the service area and another concentration at the target. Whether or not this can be achieved is entirely up to the skill and initiative of every individual operator.
The main snags encountered on operations this month were:-
(i) Incorrect alignment of dividers.
(ii) Dampness.
(iii) H2S interference.
(iv) Difficulties with the trailing aerial.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Divider trouble appears to be an inherent fault of this equipment and has occurred more frequently in the past few weeks due to dampness. Switching the set on and leaving it for a little while to dry out may cure the trouble due to dampness. If the set does not react, then it is up to the operator to carry out the correct alignment procedure. Screwdrivers are trickling through slowly, and when all operators are equipped failures due to divider trouble should be things of the past.
In addition to divider trouble, there are still some operators who report equipment unserviceable although on check nothing can be found wrong. In the majority of these cases the remedy is simple such as turning up the brilliance, switching on the master switch, or checking and replacing blown fuses – small points but essential ones, and if you know your Loran Aircraft Drill you should have little trouble from this source.
As regards snags (ii) to (iv) the Radar Sections are working out means of counteracting efficiently the snags which have cropped up from these sources, and we expect to hear of their solution any day. 55 Base are busy with a fixed aerial which has already been used on operations with success.
Further trials are to be carried out and if successful it is intended to adopt this aerial throughout Group.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee has again proved the most valuable navigation aid during the month, although from maximum fix plots it is evident that operators are still failing to obtain maximum coverage from the Continental chains.
With little or no jamming reported on the Continental chains there should be little difficulty in obtaining fixes to maximum range, and the spread between maximum fixes obtained by squadrons should be less than 1/2 a degree and not 3 degrees as is the case at the present time. The fact that all squadrons are also using Loran should not prevent operators from obtaining an occasional Gee fix as a check.
Due to circumstances beyond control, one of the Ruhr Gee Chain Stations has had to be moved away from the vicinity of the front line. This Stations [sic] has been re-sited and the Ruhr Chain has been renamed the Cologne Chain. Topographical Charts have been issued but once the front line is again stabilised it is anticipated the Ruhr Chain will once again come into being.
News has also been received of new lattice charts to a scale of one million. These charts covering the London-Berlin and London-Munich areas will give the lattice lines for the Continental Gee chains and they should be in general use by the end of January.
Navigators are reminded that the Eastern Chain is now phased for a point in the North Sea, and that inaccuracies occur in the chain South of a line Calais to Frankfurt. If you are flying below this line remember the fixes you obtain should be from either the Ruhr or Reims Chain and [underlined] not [/underlined] the Eastern Chain.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
H2S Mark II have been used on two occasions during the month, and operators, despite their various activities with Gee and Loran,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
managed to obtain good results on the equipment. This is evident from the excellent P.P.I. photographs which have been produced both of the targets and landmarks on track. It is, however, evident from H2S reports that many operators are still failing to use H2S (when they can) for a check on the target. Although you are bombing visually, there is no reason why you should not set up your H2S for blind bombing – the Air Bomber’s remark “Bombs gone” will serve as an admirable check on your estimation of the release point on H2S.
The highlight of this month’s activities with H2S Mark III has been the introduction of H2S Mark IIIE which gives much more clearly defined response and incorporates sector scan. So far blind bombing errors on this equipment have averaged .4 of a mile. In addition a new scanner has been manufactured which is practically perfect, and it is anticipated will give far better reception on the P.P.I. than before. Further tests are being carried out before any general statement as to its efficiency is made.
Intense interest has been shown in this Group’s challenge to 8 (P.F.F.) Group for an inter-Group Blind Bombing Competition which 8 (P.F.F.) Group have accepted.
The final details of the competition are almost complete and the contest will take place during January on the neutral Bombing Range. Good luck 54 Base and may the best side win.
H2S Photography has improved considerably during the month with both Mark II and Mark III squadrons producing excellent results. Revised H2S Photographic Instructions have been issued, and every operator should visit the Photographic Section and acquaint himself with the provisions laid down in these instructions.
Once again the reputation of the Group has been maintained on Gardening sorties. Both photographs and plots indicate that plantings have been in the correct furrows. These results indicate that despite restrictions, operators can still use H2S efficiently when required.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] air bombing
1944 has been a year of exceptional progress from the bombing aspect of the activities of the Group. The average crew error for December 1943 was 295 yards at 20,000 feet, and our present results have not been achieved without a sustained effort on the part of everybody concerned to reduce that figure to the present error of 171 yards at 20,000 feet.
Changes have taken place in equipment and methods of training during the past year, and all possible means of improving the bombing accuracy of the Group have been investigated and, where possible, put into operation. The more important changes were as follows:-
The introduction of a completely new method of Bombing Analysis and the provision of a tour-expired Air Bomber to conduct the analysis on each squadron.
The categorisation of all crews on their ability to bomb accurately.
The installation of the Mark XIVA Bombsight.
A drive on the crew aspect of bombing training and the installation of Automatic Observers and sensitive skid recorders in selected squadrons to determine the errors due to inaccurate flying.
Permission to build two new targets at Wainfleet was obtained, and clearance for local dropping of T.I’s was granted.
A quarterly inter-squadron bombing competition was started, the winning squadron to hold a splendid trophy presented by Lord Camrose.
Crews were instructed to bomb on briefed tracks to provide training in operational methods.
An extension of flashlight targets took place early in the year but other commitments have caused the reduction of flashlight facilities at the present time.
Improved methods of transmitting bombing results from ranges has provided means of early analysis and assessment.
The two most notable events were the introduction of the new form of bombing analysis and the system of categorisation of crews on their ability to bomb accurately. Bombing analysis provides a method of determining the source of errors and has produced an excellent standard of wind finding, and bombsight maintenance, but it will not provide the maximum benefit until every captain studies the analysis of the exercises completed by his crew, and ensures that everything possible is being done to eliminate errors.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The categorisation of crews, although based on practice bombing only, does give an indication of a crew’s ability on operations. When a crew obtains an A+ or A category it proves three things:-
(i) The Captain can make an accurate bombing run with no skidding turns or sudden changes in the flying attitude of the aircraft.
(ii) The Navigator can find a good wind.
(iii) The Air Bomber knows how to use his bombsight correctly and can guide the bombsight graticule [underlined] on [/underlined] to the target and not merely in the vicinity of the target.
It is reasonable to suppose that a bombing team displaying these qualities on a practice target can reproduce similar efficiency on a real precision target, but it would be unreasonable to suppose that a crew obtaining ‘C’ or ‘D’ category results during practice will obtain better results on a real target. Therefore it is essential that Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders make every effort to provide these low category crews with as many opportunities as possible to improve their position.
The weather experienced recently, plus unavoidable commitments has reduced the time available for training, but a study of the summary of practice bombing illustrates the disparity in the number of bombs dropped by various squadrons.
During the coming year it will be more necessary than ever to maintain steady progress in bombing accuracy, targets will grow smaller and more valuable to the enemy. It is certain that the Hun will make strenuous efforts to defend them; his defences can be outwitted, but it is all of no avail if the percentage of bombs required to demolish a target fails to hit that target. A continuance of progress already made, and a repetition of the excellent co-operation existing between our crews, armourers and bombsight maintenance staffs will make an early end to the War something more than wishful thinking.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
The lifting of black-out restrictions on certain areas is causing some confusion in the identification of bombing ranges at night, and it is only by good fortune that serious accidents have been avoided. Bombing Leaders must make sure that crews taking off on a night bombing detail are conversant with the lighting arrangements at the Practice target. The installation of illuminated signal arrows on all Bomber Command ranges should eliminate any doubts concerning identification, and it is expected that all crews know the provisions of 5 Group Air Staff Instruction BL.24.
Another point which is not receiving the necessary attention is the firing of smoke-puffs during a practice bombing exercise. At least one smoke-puff [underlined] must [/underlined] be fired during every exercise, and to enable the range staff to find an accurate wind the smoke-puff must be fired directly over the range signals area. Some smoke-puffs intended for Epperstone have been fired over Nottingham, and the Hill’s Mirror (Observation) is not sufficiently mobile to cope with these approximations.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” TROPHY. [/underlined]
The trophy, awarded to the squadron producing the best average crew error over a period of three months, is leaving Skellingthorpe
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER. [/underlined]
for Bardney. No.9 Squadron has achieved an outstanding result with an average crew error of 127 yards for 570 bombs, during the months of October, November and December. No.50 Squadron made a gallant attempt to retain the trophy for the third successive occasion, but their average crew error of 139 yards for 420 bombs during the same period only took them to second place.
No.9 Squadron’s success was made possible by the hard work and co-operation of all concerned with the bombing effort, and it will be necessary for other squadrons to obtain extraordinarily good results if the trophy is to change hands at the end of March.
Well done No.9 Squadron!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
56 Base (S/Ldr. Walmsley) is making efforts to find ways and means of obtaining a true wind for purposes of bombing analysis. The method now adopted seems promising and after an extended trial it might be worthy of adoption by all Bases. A smoke-puff is fired at the commencement of the exercise and the wind found is recorded at the range. At the end of the exercise, when times and headings are passed to the Range, the A.P.I. wind used for the exercise and the A.P.I. wind found from the positions recorded during the exercise are both transmitted to the Range. All three winds are then sent on the same signal as the bombing results e.g.
SP 300/40
API 290/39
MAPI 305/42
If a squadron carries out four exercises it can be seen that twelve winds are easily available for analysis purposes.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE BOMBING ERROR FOR 8 EXERCISES. [/underlined]
1st 97 80
2nd 463 87
3rd 9 89
4th 630 95
5th 50 97
6th 467 106
7th 207 107
8th 619 108
9th 49 116
The remaining squadrons did not complete sufficient exercises to submit an entry.
No.97 Squadron have headed the Group competition after being placed second last month. Their effort during this month was undoubtedly the best in the Group, both in numbers and quality, and the Squadron is to be congratulated on the results. The efficiency of a squadron is reflected in the condition of its various Sections, and the Bombing Section at 97 Squadron H.Q. is an example of what it should be.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DECEMBER’S OOUSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
44 F/O Daggett F/O Sharpe F/O Hindlay 55
50 F/O Lillies F/O Skinner Sgt Tye 71
189 F/O Herbert F/O Cottier F/O Skinner 43
207 F/O Cook F/S Boddy F/S D’Arcy 75
227 F/O Skipworth Sgt Steadman Sgt Ward 72
617 F/O Leavitt F/S Oldman F/O Withams 49
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O McKie 53
F/L Dobson F/O Johnstone P/O Knight 55
619 F/L Brown F/S Meakin F/O Thanes 68
5 LFS F/O Blair F/S Bethune F/S McShane 74
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisations by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
All A+ crews can be congratulated on the exceptional standard of accuracy and efficiency attained by the bombing teams. It is not just luck which produces results, methodical work and attention to detail is the basis of accurate bombing.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What are the safety heights for the release of a 4000 lb. bomb over land and water?
2. What suction recordings must be obtained to ensure full bombsight serviceability?
3. What prevents condensation on the lens of the collimator?
4. Is it possible to do a “lights” check with bomb doors closed?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
On the completion of the first full year of Base Organisation, progress can now be reviewed. For inclusion in this Summary such a review must necessarily be very brief, but it is the intention to produce one in detail under separate cover so that lessons learnt during the year can be made clear, and faults can be analysed and suggestions made for improvements.
53 and 54 Bases have completed a full year unhindered by unheavals [sic]. 51 Base after a long period of excellent work in the Group transferred their affection wholly to 7 Group on formation of the separate training group. 56 Base, which was the original 52 Base at Scampton had unfortunately to break down their organisation at Scampton and rebuild it on new ground at Syerston. This did not retard progress to a great extent, but the smooth running efficiency of the Base Organisation was some weeks getting into its stride again. 55 Base is our only Base which is formed on a war-time station, and has been functioning as such for the latter half of the year; the problems of the economical and efficient running of this type of Base vary from those which are housed on stations built to peace-time design.
The basic principle behind the original scheme of Base organisation is the economy in man power, material and equipment, and this economy has been implemented in the Bases in 5 Group since their formation.
Conservation of equipment is the key note of serviceability. The least line of resistance is to remove an unserviceable item of equipment from an aircraft and fit a new item from the main stores caring little of what happens to the unserviceable item removed, which is returned to the main stores for ultimate transfer to a Repairable Equipment Depot. There is no doubt that up to a point, serviceability can be maintained with this short-sighted outlook; but by this means much equipment is en route between stations and R.E.D’s and between R.E.D’s and repair contractors, and much more is heaped up outside these various places waiting repair. So there must come a day when many particular items are in very short supply. By taking full advantage of the Base organisation and the repair facilities of the Base Major Servicing Sub-sections, the unserviceable item removed can be repaired and kept in circuit. It can be used time and time again, maintained in a serviceable condition, and a good Base can pay a dividend rather than rely on a subsidy. Such conservation of equipment has been made possible by the formation of the Base specialist repair bays, i.e. hydraulics, pneumatics, tyres, brakes, sparking plugs, propellers, metal repairs, modifications, power plants, instrument and electrical sections.
Much thought has been given to the building and improvement of these specialist bays and, for instance, the spark plug cleaning is now in its correct perspective. Due to a large amount of pressure and powers of local purchase being brought to bear, ideal cleaning and test equipment is available in Bases in this Group, and Bases are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
capable of catering for cleaning and testing up to a thousand plugs a day. As Base organisation was a scheme devised subsequent to the building and planning of stations, no designed housing for the various sections was available; therefore improvisation of certain other rooms, buildings and sections has been necessary by local initiative. The equipment required for the repair and testing od the hundreds of components has not been available through Service sources, as the requirement at the time of Base sub-section organisation was not known to higher authority. Therefore local initiative was brought to bear again, and Base major servicing sections are now in possession of excellent test equipment which will cater for the efficient testing of the various services.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR. [/underlined]
There were numerous changes and developments in training throughout 1944 to meet operational requirements and to deal with new equipment, particularly Radar devices. As a background to all that was new there was a constant pressure on basic flying and operational procedure in an endeavour to improve standards and enable crews to raid successfully in more rigorous conditions.
On other pages of this Summary, developments in training are dealt with in detail. The main task has been to produce sufficient crews of a good standard to do the job, and at the same time to form new squadrons.
The year opened with the Training Units in the throes of conversion to Stirling aircraft and the L.F.S. in its infancy. This 2-type training on 4 engined aircraft created many problems which made the life of aircrew under training extremely strenuous. New, at the end of the year a change-over is again in progress, but squadrons fortunately have a surplus of crews to help them through the Winter months until “all through” Lancaster training is in full swing.
Among the many new features introduced into training, the Categorisation of aircrew members was perhaps the most interesting and represents an attempt to increase the individual efficiency by frequent detailed tests of his ability and analysis of his results. As an essential part of this policy, various instructors and Analysis Officers were appointed to squadrons and the value of their work was soon evident.
Crew members thus have the opportunity of finding out quickly where they are wrong, why they are wrong and what they can do to improve their efficiency. Squadron Commanders and Specialist Officers can also place their fingers quickly on the weak spots in crews.
The year also saw the introduction of No.5 Group Aircraft Drills, Check Lists in aircraft, and the addition of several new and important Air Staff Instructions; one of the latest and most important being “Precautions against Hazards in Conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”.
Other new features were the production of the new Lancaster Aircrew Quiz and the standard No.5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus which was produced to meet the particular requirements of four engined pilots. All these things provide sufficient material for crews to “find the answers” if they are in doubt and give instructors the facts necessary for the production of high standard crews.
Figures are not the final measure of effort, and “figure chasing” invariably defeats its purpose. They do, however, provide a basis for comparison and do indicate if an effort is being made. The final measure comes in the assessment of raid damage, the casualty lists and the squadron record of early returns and abortive sorties.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that parallel to the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
increase in sorties flown and bombs dropped, training hours and figures have also improved. The total of practice bombs dropped has increased and the error has gone down. Assessable fighter affiliation exercises have more than doubled themselves, and in particular, night affiliation grew from nothing to a satisfactory total of nearly 350 exercises in the first month of the Winter. Navigation errors came down. Link Trainer hours rose steadily and instrument flying standards improved – a little slowly perhaps but the ground was ploughed.
There must be no relaxation in training during 1945. It has no saturation point.
[Underlined] EVENTS DURING DECEMBER. [/underlined]
The exceptionally bad weather during December made regular training difficult, but despite this, Squadron Instructors completed 102 Category Checks, leaving 159 Category Checks to be done to give every pilot in the Group a Category. There are now 185 pilots in the Group holding Categories. Nos. 54 and 55 Bases are well behind the other Bases in their category tests. The following table shows the state of categorisation of pilots in the Group:-
[Underlined] CATEGORY OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categories by Base]
Total squadron training amounted to 2200 hours – a very big increase on the previous month owing to the weather. Of this total 1650 hours were by day and 550 by night. The average per squadron was 122 hours. Six squadrons were very low on the list – No.61 Squadron did 50 hours; 189 Squadron 58 hours; 227 Squadron 64 hours; 630 Squadron 65 hours; 44 Squadron 85 hours. It is hoped all these squadrons will double their efforts during January.
[Underlined] NO. 5 L.F.S. REPORT. [/underlined]
No. 5 L.F.S. produced 73 crews for squadrons at an average of 13 hours per crew. The Unit flew 1100 hours. Loran training was given during December, and bombing results showed improvement on November.
[Underlined] 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
The Flight was “grounded” by weather for 14 days, but they flew whenever squadrons asked for details. A total of 252 day details and 91 night details were flown. This included 97 da details and 41 night details for No.75 Base.
Total hours for the Flight were 323, and the average hours per aircraft on charge was 24. Pilots averaged 18 hours per month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
During the Winter of 1943 there was definite evidence that the standard of instrument flying was not sufficient to meet all the requirements of operational flying in conditions of adverse weather, and special attention was paid to this phase of flying throughout 1944. A summary of the action taken to improve instrument flying throughout the Group is tabulated below:-
(i) More flying on primary instruments, by the inclusion of specific exercises in the Heavy Conversion Units, and the inclusion of a test on this point in the Pilot’s Category Check.
(ii) A revival of the use of the “hood” to provide more genuine I.F. practice in the air in day light.
(iii) The issue of a standard 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus to meet the particular requirements of pilots of four engined aircraft (corkscrew on instruments, and flying on primary instruments only, etc.).
(iv) A modification to the Link Trainer to enable the Artificial Horizon and Directional Gyro to be “toppled” during an exercise.
(v) The introduction of a new type Artificial Horizon with a reduced turn error.
(vi) The acquisition of additional Link Trainers and Instructors towards the end of the year, which now gives each squadron one machine and one instructor.
The effort made is revealed by the fact the Squadron Link Trainer hours rose from 495 hours in December, 1943, to 1804 hours in December, 1944 – just short of a four-fold increase. The new squadrons and new Link Trainers now make more practice easier, and the acid test is the squadron average spread equally over all pilots and flight engineers on strength, and most of all, the quality of the instrument flying.
December was the best month to date and congratulations go to Nos. 49, 467 and 50 Squadrons for having reached the target for pilots on the Link Trainer. This was the third consecutive month in which No.49 Squadron has reached their target. No.44 Squadron went very close to the squadron target of 132 hours, but the bulk of the time was done by the flight engineers, the pilots being below the average with a total of 44 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES. [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Hours by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL – 1804 hrs.
ACTUAL AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 78.8 hrs.
REQUIRED AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 132 hrs.
+ SQUADRONS WHERE LINK TIMES ARE FAR TOO LOW.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] SWINGING ON TAKE-OFF. [/underlined]
There have been two swinging accidents on take off recently and on each occasion the Pilot flagrantly ignored the Lancaster Swinging Drill (No.5 Group Aircraft Drill No.5). Read the Drill through carefully again and make sure that both you and your Flight Engineer know it thoroughly.
[Underlined] FIDO LANDINGS. [/underlined]
The average hold-off tends to be too long and the landing too far up the runway. This is largely because Pilots, having an exaggerated idea of the bumpiness in the box, come in at too high an airspeed – 115 m.p.h. I.A.S. is quite sufficient. Check this tendency particularly when returning with full bomb load.
On the circuit “glare” makes it difficult to see other aircraft on the same level, or slightly above. Ensure a careful “circuit look-out” normally is maintained and that navigation, upper and lower identification lights are on.
Turn your cockpit lighting on full before entering the funnel. This will enable you to read your instruments in the glare on the approach.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined]
The following are the commonest causes of overshooting:-
(i) Airspeed too high on the approach into wind. It should be 120m.p.h. with a moderately laden aircraft on the initial approach, and [underlined] 105 – 110 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined] With an all up weight of 55,000 lbs to 58,000 lbs. it should be 120 m.p.h. on the initial approach and [underlined] 115 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined]
(ii) Too high over boundary. You should not be above 25 – 50 feet over the boundary by day or in the Green of the G.P.I. by night.
(iii) Throttles left open too long after the initial check thus prolonging the float.
[Underlined] LOSS OF CONTROL. [/underlined]
Straight and level instrument flying is fairly sound with the amount of practice that the average pilot has during training and operations, but instrument flying with Artificial Horizon or A.S.I. u/s, steep turns, combat manoeuvres, etc. are known to be weak through lack of practice. There is no reason why this weakness should exist as there are ample opportunities for instrument practice on N.F.T’s and training flights generally.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] CUMULO NIMBUS CLOUD. [/underlined]
Take special note of the new Air Staff Instruction Trg/6 – “Precautions against Hazards in conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”. This instruction contains three main points:-
(i) A Safety Area for climbing and descending.
(ii) A maximum height above which the aircraft is not to fly until it enters the Safety Area.
(iii) A minimum ”cross country” height above the cloud after climbing in the Safety Area.
Make sure you can see clear skies above by day or stars by night before climbing in the Safety Area. Do not fly in Cumulo Nimbus cloud. Turn round and fly clear.
[Drawing] Do [underlined] you [/underlined] always catch the “LATTICE LINE SPECIAL”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “P” – 106 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “Q” – 61 Squadron – ME.410
4/5.12.44 “M” – 189 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “V” – 630 Squadron -JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “B” – 57 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6/7.12.44 “L” – 97 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “F” – 463 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “A” – 619 Squadron – FW.190
4/5.12.44 “W” – 207 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “B” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” – 227 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “D” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” - 44 Squadron – ME.410
6/7.12.44 “O” – 619 Squadron – ME.110
6/7.12.44 “D” – 49 Squadron – FW.190
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
There was a marked increase in the number of combats this month, though the majority took place on the first two operations of of [sic] the month; the targets being Heilbronn and Giessen respectively. These two nights contributed 82 combats to the total of 101 for the whole of the month, and it will be noted that all the successes claimed were registered on these two nights.
Five enemy aircraft are claimed as Destroyed, two Probably Destroyed and eight Damaged. Five cases were noted of gunners firing on enemy aircraft attacking another Lancaster, and in one case the fighter was destroyed. In all the other cases the enemy aircraft broke off his attack. These gunners are to be congratulated on their vigilance and offensive spirit. See the fighter first and shoot first are the two best axioms for gunners; it has been proved that they pay.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
F/O MacIntosh – 207 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Van Beck – 619 Sqdn – Cat “B”
F/O Ray – 97 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Hansom – 83 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Burnham – 467 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Annandale – 50 Sqdn. – Cat. “B”
It is good to note that the standard of candidates selected
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
for C.G.S. courses has been such as to show a return of 9 Cat. “B”s out of the last 9 nominations. Keep this up Gunnery Leaders, and submit to your Base Gunnery Leader any gunner who possesses the necessary qualifications for C.G.S. Gunners who have been categorised as “A+” on Squadrons should be automatic selections as candidates for C.G.S.
[Underlined] REVIEW OF ADVANCEMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DURING 1944 [/underlined]
1944 marked the advent of new training equipment and new ideas on training, which have resulted in a marked improvement in training on Squadrons.
The most important items are as under:-
1. Standard Free Gunnery Trainer.
2. Flash Trainer.
3. Turret Manipulation Assessor.
4. Skeet Ranges.
5. Self-towed Drogue.
6. Categorisation of Air Gunners.
7. Gunnery Analysis Officers.
8. Infra-Rad Photography on Night Fighter Affiliation Exercises.
9. A.G.L.T.
Of the above items, Categorisation of Gunners has gone ahead in Conversion Units and on Squadrons and every Squadron gunner now has a category. 92 Group have now followed suit and are now categorising gunners on similar lines.
Gunnery Analysis Officers were instituted on the basis of one Officer per Squadron, whose duties are to supervise and co-ordinate all training, both practical and theoretical, on Squadrons. These duties include Skeet Range shooting and assessment of all cine gyro assessor films. Each Officer has attended the Skeet Range Shooting Course and an Aessment [sic] Course at 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) – 10 points.
Night Affiliation (without Camera) – 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Gyro and Camera) – 5 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera only) – 3 points.
Day Affiliation (without Camera) – 1 point.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Order of Merit by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES. [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR DECEMBER – 502 [/underlined]
Bad weather and operational commitments have brought the total of Fighter Affiliation details for the month down with a rush; this month’s total being less than half of the total for November. Even with this low total, it is very satisfactory to note that [underlined] Night Affiliation exercises totalled 111, [/underlined] eleven of which were with Infra Red film. It is to be hoped that squadrons will fit the camera to the maximum number of aircraft carrying out Night Affiliation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
This year 1944 has seen the introduction into the Group of many new items of equipment and stores; a review of the changes and the part taken by Armament personnel in producing the right answers, or getting the inevitable gremlins out of new equipment will not come amiss in this issue.
[Underlined] BOMBS. [/underlined]
This subject is overshadowed by Tallboy; the introduction of this large egg has been most successful but has entailed a lot of hard work and hard thinking for armament personnel. Other bombs which arrived are the American series A.N.-M.44, 58, 59, 64, 65 and 76.
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES. [/underlined]
The long awaited incendiary clusters have arrived in the form of Nos. 4, 14, 15 and A.N.M.17. So far these clusters have proved a mixed blessing, and have not yet replaced our old friend (or enemy) the S.B.C.
Handling clusters in the open resulted in many attempts to devise a satisfactory lay-out, but no really satisfactory method, providing adequate protection against weather and damage during handling, was evolved.
The A.O.C. came to the rescue with the Large Incendiary Store House Scheme. Successful trials have been carried out which indicate that this scheme will solve all our troubles, and damaged clusters will become a thing of the past, or a case of excessive handling.
[Underlined] BOMB GEAR. [/underlined]
The introduction of hydraulic winches has saved much sweat and many man-hours.
Modification No.74 has been incorporated to enable 18 bombs (20 when No.13 Station adaptors is available) to be dropped in one stick.
The Type N. Release slip arrived fortunately in small numbers, as snags were soon found to exist. No.53 Base have done a lot of work and finally produced a modification which it is expected will eliminate the danger of accidental release during bombing-up and de-bombing.
[Underlined] MARKER STORES. [/underlined]
Since No.5 Group has carried out its own target marking, many stores have been introduced, considerably complicating armament work in No.54 Base, and calling for local modifications to meet ever changing operational requirements.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUZES AND PISTOLS. [/underlined]
The introduction of new stores has brought with it a corresponding increase in the variety of Fuzes and Pistols. The quantity necessitated the approval of an additional storehouse.
[Underlined] BOMB HANDLING AND STORAGE. [/underlined]
Stacking trucks have made their appearance, and have proved useful tools. The cry is for more and we hope to see more during 1945.
Equipment for handling S.B.C’s including the heavy transporter (once again modified) is arriving, and all stations should be fully equipped early in 1945. Some of this equipment can be used in handling cluster projectiles and mines.
[Underlined] MINES. [/underlined]
The variety has increased and is still increasing, calling for carefully planned storage so that any type can be made available at very short notice.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined]
The F.N. 121 has arrived in small numbers. No.56 Base found some snags in the Servo Feed and initiated remedial action.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined]
Great strides were made at the beginning of the year in solving the gun freezing problem. Experiments were carried out with various types of anti-freeze oil, both for the turret hydraulic system and for the guns themselves. Gun ejection seals were introduced and extensive firing trials carried out on operations to ascertain whether, in fact, it was the accumulation of ice on the breech block which caused failures, or the freezing of static oil in the Palmer Firing Gear. Attempts were made to raise the internal temperature of the turret by the use of first, the Galley heater, which proved unsuccessful, and secondly, with ducted heating both to the rear and mid-upper turrets. This type of heating has proved more successful, and is being incorporated in production aircraft, many of which are already in service.
[Underlined] MODIFICATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. [/underlined]
Apart from those already mentioned, Armament personnel were responsible for many bright ideas, some of which are reported below.
A de-belting and cleaning machine for .303 ammunition was designed an manufactured by R.A.F. Station, Swinderby. It is understood that Bomber Command is interested in this machine which has been working satisfactorily for some months.
The enlarging of trigger guards to enable gunners to have easy access to the triggers when wearing thick gloves. Now a Bomber Command modification.
Modification to F.N. 120 turrets to enable gunners to wear the pilot type parachute submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, now as a Command Modification.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
Heating for the Palmer Firing Valve Box, submitted by East Kirkby and issued as a Command modification.
Re-positioning of the MK.IIC C.G.S. Junction Box to enable the ‘C’ type parachute to be used in F.N.121 turrets. Submitted by R.A.F. Station, Waddington, and issued as a Bomber Command modification.
Improvements of Bomber Command Mod. No.3 to increase the Gunner’s vision, submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, and at present being investigated by Bomber Command.
All electrical firing gear in turrets. This modification submitted by Metheringham was at first turned down due to the inability to obtain the necessary solenoids. M.A.P. have recently shown interest in this modification and have requested full particulars.
The re-positioning of F.N. 50 Solenoids and the shortening of the Bowden Cable. This modification was submitted by R.A.F. Station, Bardney, as a means of preventing the Bowden Firing Cable from catching on the armour plating and causing run-away guns. Although not accepted, an alternative modification was incorporated in production.
East Kirkby were responsible for a modification to the No.44 Bomb pistol which facilitates the fitting of safety wires. Now a Command modification.
R.A.F. Station, Bardney, were responsible for the design and manufacture of a triple adaptor to enable 3 X 500 lb. bombs to be carried on the four centre stations of the Lancaster bomb bay. This modification aroused great interest both at Headquarters, Bomber Command, and at the Air Ministry, but was eventually turned down as the Ministry of Aircraft Production had, at this time, a similar development under way to achieve the same purpose. This adaptor took the form of a quintuple carrier slung across the bomb bay. It is understood that progress with this development is satisfactory.
Due to the delay in the manufacture of the new Heavy S.B.C. Transporter a protective plate to prevent damage to 4 lb. incendiary bomb tails when carried in S.B.C’s was introduced by R.A.F. Station, East Kirkby, and has since been issued as a Bomber Command modification.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
To meet the increased number of bombing targets required for practice bombing, personnel at Wainfleet Range erected two additional targets at Ingoldmells and Wrangle, the former was initially used as a dive bombing target. The range personnel worked hard to keep this target in repair and put up a tough fight against the sea assisted by well aimed bombs.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
A year ago, the “5 Group Quick Landing Scheme” was introduced, following trials at Skellingthorpe. During the year developments in the scheme have speeded up the landing times. In September, 1943, the Group average was 3.67 minutes. On the introduction of the scheme this average fell to 2.66 minutes in January, 1944. Since May, 1944, when it fell to 1.99 minutes, the figure has remained below 2 minutes and in December, 1944, reached its lowest level, 1.61 minutes.
The main alteration to the original scheme took place at the end of September, on the introduction of the Command Standard Landing Procedure, when the Group scheme was amended to bring it into line with the Command Scheme by advancing the initial call-up point to the funnel, increasing the height at the initial call and renaming the calling positions.
Developments in airfield lighting have assisted in this reduction of landing times, mainly in conditions of poor visibility. Sodium lights in the funnel and on the flarepath have been of great value. Speedier clearance of the runway and perimeter track have been assisted by the introduction of directional arrows and illuminated dispersal numbers.
Tarmac and asphalt used in the surfacing of runways and perimeter tracks have improved serviceability, though considerable difficulties have arisen in the case of satellite airfields carrying two squadron traffic.
Radar developments during the year foreshadow and entire change in flying control methods, when much of the present use of lighting will be subordinated to control through Radar. The increased heavy traffic in all areas of Bomber Command makes such development vitally necessary.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
[Underlined] ANALYSIS DAY PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Day Photographic Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding “Target Conditions” “T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of events.
+ 617 and 627 Squadrons are omitted from the ladder in view of the relatively low number of attempts of each.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] THE PAST YEAR. [/underlined]
The drive to save lives of ditching bomber crews and crews forced to bale out or crash land was continued. It is hard to establish how many lives were lost due to ignorance of procedure, Safety Drills or equipment, but a review of successful incidents shows a trend towards better knowledge and understanding of the drills and a decline in the number of stupid mistakes.
The year saw the ‘K’ type personal dinghy come and go. It also saw the completion of successful trials in 5 Group of the prototype Back-type parachute, which it is hoped will soon be available to all heavy bomber crews. As an interim measure the Seat-type parachute was made compulsory for Pilots and Rear Gunners.
An ingenious “Warning horn” for emergency in the air was devised within the Group and tested successfully. It has been forwarded to Bomber Command for approval and general adoption. The horn gives audible warning to all crew members to bale out or prepare for ditching when the intercomm. has failed.
[Underlined] INTO THE SEA. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred in the Group during December – an aircraft (believed to be of 189 Squadron), returning to a diversion airfield after attacking Politz, came down in the sea about 5 miles N.W. of Banff. No signals were received from this aircraft, the incident being reported from land, and in spite of an extensive search no survivors were picked up though an aircraft wheel was seen.
[Underlined] CRASH STATIONS. [/underlined]
There have been several crashes recently in the vicinity of airfields during return from operations in bad weather. Captains of aircraft are reminded of the “Crash Landing Drill” (Appendix ‘C’ to Drill No.8 of 5 Group Aircraft Drills refers). This Drill says “The Pilot is to order ‘Crash Stations’ as soon as a crash is imminent or probable, i.e. landing in bad visibility or when the aircraft has suffered damage which is likely to make a normal landing difficult”.
[Underlined] PARACHUTES. [/underlined]
It has been noticed that a lot of pilots and rear gunners are still not using the Seat-type parachutes on all flights. This is now compulsory. See Air Staff Instruction Trg./7.
[Underlined] DRILLS. [/underlined]
A reminder that Saturday morning is still the Safety Drill morning. Get a practice done once a week and you won’t get your feet wet if you have to ditch. It’s cold in the North Sea these days.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
In reviewing flying accidents for the past 12 months, it is only fair to record what the Group has achieved in effecting a reduction in the actual rate of accidents during the period. This is best shown pictorally by means of the following graph:-
[Graph of Aircraft Damaged per 10,000 hours through 1944.]
The graph is self-evident and the consistent decrease in the rate throughout practically the whole year is something of which we can be proud. At the same time, without wishing to belittle the efforts of the those who have been responsible for achieving this reduction, we must not be misled by these figures into thinking that the accident rate is by any means satisfactory.
The hard fact still remains that in 12 months 360 aircraft were seriously damaged in flying accidents. Of these4 125 were totally destroyed including 60 cases in which one or more members of the crew received fatal injuries. In squadrons you can probably recall a fatal crash and perhaps a taxying collision and you may even have been involved in an accident yourself. We at Group as onlookers see most of the game; the accidents we can call to mind are not just isolated instances and it is for this reason that the above figures are quoted: to emphasise the serious consequences of accidents and to make quite clear that great effort is still required if we are to fulfil our aim of entirely eliminating unnecessary loss of lie and unnecessary damage to aircraft.
[Underlined] CAUSE AND PREVENTION. [/underlined]
If you have read past issues of ‘V’ Group News you will have seen repeated references to taxying accidents. It is not surprising therefore, that when examining all the avoidable accidents which have occurred during the year, we find that no less than 32% occurred whilst taxying. Barely is there the slightest excuse for this type of accident, particularly as Air Staff Instructions give adequate advice as to the means of safe taxying. Read Flying Control 24.
Overshoots and heavy landings together accounted for 22% of the avoidable accidents. These two causes have been linked together because
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the root cause of each often lies in the approach and a good approach is dependent to a very great extent upon speed. Remember that when landing heavily laden there is no need for an excessively high final approach speed: 115 m.p.h. but never faster.
The next most serious cause from the point of view of numbers was swinging during take off and landing, accounting for 16% of the total. Once again we repeat the warning to open throttles slowly, easily and smoothly, and do not open up to full throttle before travelling 500 yards down the runway irrespective of your load.
A reminder to Squadron Commanders. Do not forget Air Staff Instruction Ops.2/47. This will help materially in the general drive to keep accidents down to a minimum.
[Underlined] THE NEW YEAR. [/underlined]
Thank you for the results achieved in 1944. You have proved what can be done and it only remains for this success to be continued and bettered in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] USE OF EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
The Powers that Be are becoming very anxious about the large quantity of Service Equipment which is being mis-used. Instances quoted are Navigation Bags used for weekend holdalls, blankets as table coverings, etc. Equipment Officers can help the Station Commanders to stop this mis-use by pointing out any irregularities that come to their notice.
[Underlined] DISCREPANCIES IN BARRACK INVENTORIES. [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters, Bomber Command, letter BC/50816/E.1 dated 19th December, 1944. If the station has not already broken down the Barrack Inventory into site inventories, under A.M.O. A.559/43, this should be done at once.
[Underlined] IN RETROSPECT. [/underlined]
The Equipment Officers and their staffs very rarely see the result of their work. Nevertheless the work they have put in during the last year has certainly helped the Group’s achievements. Without their good work this Group would not have done as much as it has. The New Year motto for the Equipment Section is “We get ‘em, you smash ‘em – we getcha some more!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
During December, Bomber Command opened its own E.V.T. school at Bourne. The aim is to train instructors for E.V.T. work after the cessation of hostilities with Germany. Groups are being asked to supply 10 instructors for each course, so that it is essential that a steady influx of volunteers is forthcoming from stations. Lists are submitted from Stations monthly, and the last two or three returns have not brought in nearly enough names to ensure the success of the scheme. There should always be publicity on stations asking for volunteers, and the importance of the work must be impressed on suitable candidates. It is realised that some men are put off by the fact that conditions of service have not yet been published, and by the idea the E.V.T. work might postpone demobilisation. It is thought that conditions of service will not be unfavourable, and great emphasis must be laid on the fact that no one will be kept in the service after they are due to be demobilised. It is clear that to postpone demobilisation after a person’s group is named to leave the service would destroy the whole foundation on which the scheme has been built.
The end of December makes a logical break in the winter programme, when the work of the last three months can be reviewed. Many stations have produced fairly good results, no station has done all that can be done even under present conditions. Classes at Lincoln have been well attended, there have been successful classes on stations. Some very good work has been done with aircrew cadets and handicraft and music clubs have flourished. There are still many deficiencies however. There are some stations where no classes are organised for Matriculation. It cannot be that on a station of strength 1000, there are not six people who want to take this important examination. The only explanation is bad publicity and lack of drive on the part of the Education Officer. Some stations have, as yet, no facilities for woodwork, while suggestions for the formation of cookery classes and instruction in Home Nursing for W.A.A.F. have brought little result. In some cases there is an inclination to wait for this Headquarters to arrange lectures and not enough initiative of the part of stations to obtain good lecturers themselves.
To an outside observer, the difference in the standard of News Rooms is very surprising. It is realised that some stations have better facilities for display and more comfortable furniture than others, although this is not always the fault of circumstances, but rather a lack of interest and initiative. Sometimes this deficiency is not on the side of the Education Officer, but often that officer is to blame for not making the best of his opportunities. There should be a frequent alteration of display material, with news and topical articles up to date. There is not enough variety of topics and far too many maps reproducing the same localities. One large map of Europe and one of the Far East are sufficient for keeping the War Fronts up to date. The large number of airmen using the News Rooms is a proof that far more time and attentions should be given by the officers concerned in making the rooms really first class.
The service as a whole has shown a greater realisation of the importance of education in the last six months. It is up to Education Officers to take advantage of this increased interest and to make their work attractive and appealing to the personnel of their station.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. BLUNSDON DFC
P/O A.F. JONES DFC
F/O R.C. LAKE DFC
F/L E.F.A. JONES DFC
S/L A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/SGT A.H. HORRY DFM
P/O J.E. STOWELL DFC
P/O E. SHIELDS DFC
P/O D. MacINTOSH DFC
P/O W.D. TWEDDLE DFC
F/O R.C. HARVEY DFC
F/O F. SOWERBY DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J.H.C. BRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. WALKER DFC
F/O T.H.J. PLAYFORD DFC
W/O L.J. HAZELL DFC
P/O N. EVANS DFC
A/F/L R.E. KNIGHTS, DFC DSO
F/O A.E. KELL, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/C J.B. TAIT, DSO & 2 BARS, DFC & BAR 3RD BAR TO DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S.J. BRISTOW
F/O N. STOCKWELL DFC
SGT H. McKNOX DFM
F/SGT A.J. FROST DFM
F/SGT E.R. BOLAND DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O H.F. ARNOLD DFC
F/O L.M. PEDERSON DFC
P/O J.C. FLEMING DFC
P/O J.A. CASTLES DFC
F/SGT E.R.G. HAINES DFM
F/SGT J. CHRISTIAN DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
SGT J. SKIDMORE DFM
SGT J.A. RICHARDS DFM
W/O L.W.J. THOMAS DFM
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.N. QUINN, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O F.N. DAVIS DFC
F/O W.J. DAVIS DFC
A/F/O N. BALLANCE DFC
F/SGT F.A. KIRBY DFM
F/SGT E.T. MANNING DFM
F/SGT H. LEWIS DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.C. THOMAS DFC
F/O W.F. MARTIN DFC
F/SGT M.J. THORNE DFM
F/O K.E. BLY DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.W. SIMMONS DFC
W/O V.G. BURGESS DFC
F/SGT J.H. KEENAN DFM
W/O A.F.C. HARROW DFC
SGT J.A. LYON DFM
P/O E.J.H. ROBERTS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.W. ALLWOOD DFC
A/F/O P.C. CORNISH DFC
F/O T.P. JUPP, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT I.O. HARRIS DFM
F/O L. HATCHER, AFM DFC
F/SGT G.S. HAZELTINE DFM
F/O R. HOBBS DFC
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/W/O W.G. TROTTER DFC
F/SGT M. BRENNAN DFM
W/O J.E. HUDSON DFC
P/O V.J. ROBLEY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. PEARCE DFC
A/W/O G.D. MOIR DFC
A/F/L N.N. PARKER DFC
A/F/L G.H. LAING, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/SGT G. BROWN DFM
W/O A.J. CROLL, DFM DFC
W/O F.H. GREEN DFC
A/F/L G.H.R. POLSON, DFC, DFM BAR TO DFC
F/O P.J. HUMPHREYS DFC
F/SGT D.S. NICHOLLS DFM
F/SGT J.D. McINGLIS DFM
A/S/L T.H. MAKEPEACE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT W. MANDERSON DFM
F/SGT R. MOORE DFM
P/O A.A. AVELINE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J. NETHERWOOD DFC
F/O L. COEN DFC
A/S/L J.W. ALLINSON
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W. McINTOSH, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O E. OAKES DFC
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O G.D. CHESWORTH DFC
P/O J.S. COOK DFC
W/O G.W.J. AINSWORTH DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.G. EVANS DFC
W/O T.J. McLEAN, DFM DFC
A/F/O J. GINGLES, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L R.L. BARTLEY, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.E. MILLICHAP DFC
F/L J.W. MARTIN DFC
F/O J.W. LENNON DFC
F/O M.A.J. BEAUDOIN DFC
A/F/L D.E. HAWKER DFC
F/O G.J. BATE DFC
F/O L.A.V. WOOD DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR DECEMBER, 1944 - £6,476. 7. 11d.
A- Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
It Happens Every Day!!
When A.C.W. Mary Jones arrived at Station Z,
She saw the Station Signals Off., and unto him she said,
“I’ve nine days leave to come, good sir, and it would be a boon
“If I could have it right away. My boy friend’s sailing soon”.
Without delay the woeful Waaf was whisked upon her way,
And when her time was up she sent a message reading “Pray
“Extend my leave a further week; the ship is still in port”.
The Signals Off. agreed to this – he was a decent sort.
But when the girl requested yet a further forty-eight,
He quite forgot his decency and telegraphed, irate,
“Return at once to unit”, but the errant maiden tarried,
And wired “I want another fortnight more, for I am getting married,
“The church is fixed; the guests are warned. This afternoon at two
“By special licence we’ll be wed. Our hours of bliss are few
“So please agree”. Defeated he confirmed this new request,
And fourteen days ensued of peace, with no word from the pest.
On day fifteen a gentle knock upon his office door
Announced that Mary Smith (nee Jones), was back in camp once more,
And wished to have an interview, which he with some elation
Agreed to give, because he wished a fuller explanation.
The genial soul was quite prepared to overlook the past;
A little talk was his intent, and so he gently gassed,
And maundered on, and moralised for quite a lengthy spell.
‘Mongst other things – “My dear”, he said, “I’m pleased to see you well;
“And now that you are back you’ll do your very best I know.
“The section’s very under-staffed. We need you ever so!”.
He stopped at last. The girl then spoke. (You’ll guess her purpose maybe).
“Oh sir” I’d like my ticket please” I’m going to have a baby!”
ANON. (Circa 1945.).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft and Sorties Carried out by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, December 1944
5 Group News, December 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 29, December 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on tactics, operations, gardening, signals, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, air bombing, engineering, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, armament, flying control, photography, aircrew safety, accidents, equipment, education, decorations, war savings, it happens every day, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-12
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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68 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-18
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Belgium--Houffalize
Belgium--Saint-Vith
Denmark--Kalundborg
Denmark--Langeland
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Netherlands--Ijmuiden
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Norway--Oslo
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Urft Dam
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-12
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
demobilisation
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator