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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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[Drawing]
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5 GROUP NEWS
No 30 JANUARY
[Boxed] NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATION TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41. [/boxed]
[Page Break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Boxed] In our last issue Air Marshal Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., bade farewell to the Group after two years of command. As many know, Air Marshal Cochrane left us to take up the appointment of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Transport Command. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
It is unfortunate that his successor, Air Vice Marshal Constantine, C.B.E., D.S.O., is unable to write a Foreword this month. At the time of going to press he is suffering from a bad bout of influenza, and we wish him a speedy recovery. Air Vice Marshal Constantine has come to us from Headquarters, Bomber Command, so we are by no means strangers. In welcoming his to the Group we assure him of our close co-operation and support for the future. [/boxed]
[Page break]
Famous Last Words
[Drawing] Navigator: “Pilot, you are below the safety height for this area”
Pilot: “To hell with that, I’m not going to fly in cloud” [Drawing]
These actually were the last words that this pilot ever spoke. Immediately afterwards, the aircraft struck a hillside, six of the crew being killed. The seventh member, although badly injured, survived to tell the tale. Here is his account.
“It was on the attack on Heilbronn on the night 4/5th December, 1944. The attack was successful and after bombing we set course for position ‘D’ descending in steps as briefed. Just South of Strasbourg the Navigator told the Captain that we were below safety height and the Captain replied that he wanted to get out of cloud. This was the last speech over the intercom., and I have no idea of the height of the aircraft. Immediately after this remark the aircraft hit a hillside. I was thrown out of my turret and landed under the mid-upper turret. I eventually regained consciousness, not knowing how long I had been there or where I was. After calling out the names of the other members of the crew for 15 minutes I decided to sit in the aircraft until daylight owing to inclement weather. Daylight arrived with a heavy fall of snow, but it did allow me to find my boot which I had lost, and with great difficulty, owing to my right arm and left hand being broken, put my boot on and jump out of the aircraft. The aircraft was broken in half, the break being behind the wings. The mid-upper gunner was dead in his turret and the others were 15 – 20 yards from the aircraft. After convincing myself that all were dead I set course SW by the aid of my compass.”
Here is a perfect example of the gross disobedience and stupidity of the Captain being responsible for the death of himself and five other members of the crew. It has happened hundreds of times before and will happen as many times in future, unless YOU guard against it.
The flight plan is issued for your safety. It is the best efforts of the planning staffs to safeguard you from your twon [sic] main hazards – the enemy and the weather.
KNOW. YOUR. FLIGHT. PLAN, AND. STICK. TO. IT.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] DORTMUND EMS CANAL – 1st JANUARY. [/underlined]
The stretch of canal at LADBERGEN, newly repaired, was once again attacked, this time in daylight. Force employed – 102 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two Mosquitos of No.54 Base were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I. cascading at 5,000 feet, burning for 12 minutes at H – 4. The leading Lancasters of No.54 Base were also to drop Red T.I. on the aiming point.
[Underlined] AIMING [/underlined] (a) Using the T.I’s as a guide to identification, crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Western branch of the canal. Care was to be exercised not to overshoot, as the Western branch was the primary objective.
(b) Normal gaggle formation was to be maintained until the Bomb Aimer could see the target. During the bombing run, aircraft on the flanks would automatically converge towards the centre. Immediately after bomb release, flank aircraft were to resume normal gaggle formation. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 14 x 1000lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear, with good visibility, and crews identified the target visually. Once again the bombing was very concentrated, but results could not be assessed on the spot, as a large proportion of delay-action bombs was used. Owing to the frequency with which this target has been attacked, and the vast number of bomb craters, it is impossible accurately to estimate the degree of concentration, but it is apparent that as good a concentration was achieved on this daylight attack as on any of the night attacks.
The Western arm of the canal was breached once more, over a considerable distance, and there is much flooding both to the East and West of the canal.
[Underlined] MITTELAND CANAL – 1/2nd JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
Aerial reconnaissance showed that the Germans were making frantic efforts to put this canal back into commission. When repairs were about complete, it was decided to make a further attack on the stretch of the canal at GRAVENHORST, to deny the enemy this important artery of communications. The attack was carried out at night. Force employed – 152 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target to be marked blind by Lancasters with T.I. Green. Flares to be dropped in target area, in the light of which the aiming point was to be marked by Mosquitos with Red T.I. Crews to aim centre bomb of stick at the M.P.I. of the Red T.I. or as directed by the Master Bomber. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear, with good visibility. The blind marking and illumination went according to plan, and a very good concentration of Red T.I. was dropped 150 yards from the aiming point. Once again a very large proportion of delay-action 1,000lb MC/G.P. bombs was used. The attack was an outstanding success, and a tremendous concentration was achieved on and around the aiming point. The canal and its embankments have almost been obliterated, in fact to such an extent that their course in places can hardly be distinguished. Many barges have been destroyed or left stranded. Both this canal and the stretch of the Dortmund Ems canal at LADBERGEN, attacked during the afternoon, are still 100% unserviceable four weeks after the attack.
[Underlined] ROYAN – 4/5th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
A surprise attack was made against the German garrison at Royan, on the French West coast at the mouth of the Gironde. The 5 Group raid was later followed by an attack by No.1 Group.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected, and the target was divided into seven sectors. One or two Squadrons were allotted to each sector. Bases were to spread their aircraft evenly over the allotted sectors and height bands. Bombing was to be carried out by means of a timed overshoot of the markers. Bombing heights 6,000 – 10,000 feet. Marking and illumination sequence as normal. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 500lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: no cloud, but some ground haze. After some preliminary delay and difficulty with the marking, the Mosquitos succeeded in dropping 2 Red T.I’s 100 yards 220 degrees, and a third Red T.I. 180 yards 190 degrees from the marking point. The main force was then called in to bomb with overshoots as planned, and a good sector attack developed, in spite of some aircraft having to make more than one bombing run.
It is not possible to distinguish on the P.R.U. cover, the 5 Group from the 1 Group attack which followed soon after, but damage is well spread throughout the town, and is severe.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] The planned T.O.T. was 10 minutes, but investigation reveals that about 80% of all aircraft bombed over a T.O.T. of 5 minutes. This caused a high concentration of aircraft and was chiefly due to the unforeseen and unavoidable hitch in the preliminary marking. The result was that many of the earlier aircraft had to go round again, and some were seen flying on reciprocal courses to the planned bombing headings. The consequent risk of collision may largely have accounted for our loss of six aircraft, as the defences were practically negligible.
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 5/6th JANUARY [/underlined]
Houffalize was an enemy strong point in the Ardennes salient. The aim of this attack was to destroy enemy troops, armour and supplies concentrated in and around the village. Force employed – 131 Lancasters.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Oboe Mosquitos of No.8 Group were to mark the target with Red T.I. These T.I’s were to be backed up by four Lancasters of No.54 Base dropping Green T.I’s. The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s. or failing this, at the M.P.I. of all the Green T.I’s. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500 lb MC/G.P. Crews were warned of the proximity of allied forces, and strict instructions were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless the T.I. Red and/or Green were positively identified.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 8/10ths thin cloud inlayers 4,000/10,000 feet, with good visibility. A good concentration of Red and Green T.I’s was put down on the target, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct as planned. The majority were able to do so, but some 30 aircraft were unable to obtain satisfactory bombing runs on account of the cloud conditions and quite rightly brought their bombs back. Reconnaissance, and later the capture of the village, proved that it was virtually destroyed.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Squadron Leader Stubbs.
Two attacks were made on Munich this night, the first one by 216 aircraft of No.5 Group, and the second by some 370 aircraft of Nos. 1, 6 and 8 Groups.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind markers were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point; these were to be followed by a small number of flares. The accuracy of the Greens was to be assessed by Mosquitos of No.54 Base. This assessment was then to be passed to the Master Bomber, who was to order the backers up to drop Red T.I. in relation to this assessment. The Master Bomber was then to select the most accurate markers, on which to issue his bombing orders. Blind marking with high bursting T.I’s was to be used as an emergency.
Main force crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the most accurate T.I. with delay as ordered. Bombing heights 17,250 – 20,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 4lb incendiary clusters.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: broken medium cloud in early stages of attack. Later clear, with moderate visibility. The Lancasters dropped several Red T.I’s accurately in the target area; Mosquitos then went in dropping Green T.I’s. The most accurate one, some 200 yards North of the marking point, was then backed up on the Master Bomber’s instructions, and the main force ordered to bomb the centre of the Green T.I’s with overshoot as ordered. Crew reports indicate a heavy and successful sector attack, but no photographic cover has yet been obtained to confirm this.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 13/14th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
This was No.5 Group’s second attack on this first priority oil target, and it was confidently expected that, given favourable conditions, amends would be made for the attack which went astray on December 21/22nd, 1944.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind marking, flare illumination and Mosquito visual marking in normal sequence. Skymarking was provided for, should cloud conditions preclude visual marking. A suitable marking point was selected, and crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers as directed by the Master Bomber, using a false wind vector to bring the bombs on to the aiming point. Bombing heights 15,500 feet to 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500lb G.P.
The Master Bomber was to transmit a false wind vector to the main force at H – 5. The vector was to be calculated on a forecast bombing wind, which would be either confirmed or corrected at H-15 on W/T from 5 Group Headquarters. A vector wind, to be set on the bombsight, was issued to crews before take-off. This was based on forecast winds, and was to be used if the vector bombing wind transmitted by the Master Bomber was not received.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: there was no cloud in the target area, but a smoke screen was in operation. In addition, the snow covered ground made visual identification of the marking point difficult. Proximity T.I. Green were dropped punctually near the target, and flares followed. Several Red T.I. were dropped wide by the Mosquitos, but subsequent ones were more accurate, one 50 yards and 155 degrees and a second 300 yards 290 degrees from the marking points (plotted from night photographs). The accurate markers were backed up, and the main force was ordered to bomb as planned.
Crews reported a good concentration, but an investigation of the winds used for bombing indicated that the attack once again miscarried. A serious mistake was made in the calculation of the false vector, and the wind thus used resulted in the displacement of the M.P.I. of the bombs some 1,000 yards S.E. of the aiming point. This is borne out by plots of strike photographs. The vector wind issued by the Master Bomber was transmitted several minutes late. A fair proportion of crew, those who bombed in the first waves, used the vector wind set on the bombsight before take-off. There is therefore a prospect that a proportion of the weight of the attack fell on the target, but while no P.R.U. cover has yet been obtained, there is sufficient evidence from night photographs and analysis of the winds used, to indicate that this attack may prove to be a disappointing failure.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Success against this type of target, now amongst the most heavily defended in Germany, depends to a large extent on initial surprise. The losses incurred on this attack were 2 Lancasters, or 0.9% of the total force, but this low loss rate cannot be expected to continue, if the target has to be revisited several times before success is achieved.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Stubbs
A force of 219 aircraft was despatched to attack the priority one synthetic oil plant at LEUNA, near Merseburg.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] It was anticipated that the target would be covered by a thin layer of cloud, and therefore, in addition to the normal illumination and blind marking procedure, arrangements were made for high-bursting Red T.I’s to be dropped blind over the selected marking point, during the T.O.T. If cloud conditions permitted, Mosquitos were to mark the marking point with T.I. Green. The Master Bomber was to instruct the main force at which markers they were to aim.
The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers selected by the Master Bomber, delaying release for 12 seconds, attacking on a common heading of 120°.
Bombing Heights 15,500 – 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4000lb H.C. + maximum 500lb MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at target: 10/10ths thin stratus at about 1,000 feet. Hazy; poor visibility. Blind markers and flares went down on time, and in the light of the latter the Mosquito markers were able to identify the target area through the thin cloud. The first Green T.I., assessed as 250 yards N.W. of the marking points (and plotted 300 yards 282°) was backed up, and the Master Bomber instructed the main force to aim at the resulting concentration, delaying release for 14 seconds.
Crew reports of the attack were enthusiastic. P.R.U. photographs so far obtained only cover the Northern portion of the plant, but they reveal that this section has been heavily hit, and almost all important installations damaged. On the date of photography (21.1.45) there were no signs of productive activity, and economic experts estimate
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
that production will be restricted to about 25% for one to two months.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] It must be borne in mind that this target was attacked later in the night by other Groups in the Command. They, however, encountered worse weather in the target area, and obtained no night photographs with ground detail.
[Underlined] BRUX – 16/17th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
The synthetic oil plant at BRUX was the third oil target to be attacked by the Group within a week. Force employed – 230 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked by blind markers with T.I. Green, followed by flare illumination. If cloud conditions permitted, a selected marking point was then to be marked visually by Mosquitos with Red T.I. The Master Bomber was then, if possible, to assess the markers, and instruct the main force at which group of T.I’s they should aim. T.I. Green bursting above the cloud, were to be dropped over the target as a last resort by the Blind Markers. The main force were to aim their bombs as ordered by the Master Bomber, on a heading of 118°, delaying release by 13 seconds. Bombing heights 14,000 – 16,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + maximum MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 10/10ths strato cu; tops 3,000 feet. Two Mosquito visual markers flew below cloud and were able to identify the oil plant; they dropped their Red T.I’s but these were almost invisible from above the cloud. The Master Bomber therefore decided on sky marking, and told the Flare Forces to retain their flares. A good concentration of green skymarkers was dropped, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct either the Red T.I’s if visible or the glow of fires.
No bombing results were seen, and no indication of the accuracy of the attack could be obtained from night photographs owing to cloud. Photographic cover since obtained is partly cloud obscured, but shows very heavy fresh damage, especially to the Power Station, Cooling Tower, organic sulphur remover plant and pump houses. It is also possible that the most important Winkler Generator (Priority I) has been considerably damaged.
Despite the difficult marking conditions the results of this attack may be considered highly satisfactory.
[Underlined] ATTACKS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] BERGEN – 12th JANUARY [/underlined]
Sixteen Lancasters from each of 617 and 9 Squadrons took off to attack the U-boat pens, a floating dock and shipping at Bergen.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Three aircraft of No.617 Squadron were each to select a ship (in known positions) with Tallboy fused .5 seconds. Three more No.617 Squadron aircraft were to attack a floating dock, in which was a submarine. The remaining 617 aircraft and all No.9 Squadron aircraft were to attack the pens with Tallboy fused 11 seconds delay. No.617 Squadron (using the S.A.B.S.) were to aim direct, and No.9 Squadron (using the Mark XIV) were to select a suitable aiming point off the target and calculate a false wind vector to shift the bombs onto the target. The Squadrons were to be escorted by Mustangs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear: good visibility.
[Underlined] No.617 Squadron. [/underlined] Two of the three aircraft detailed to
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
bomb shipping attacked. The aircraft detailed to attack the floating dock found it visible only from directly overhead; it could not be seen from sufficient distance away for a satisfactory bombing run to be made, so these aircraft also attacked shipping. Of the ten aircraft whose target was the Pens, only three attacked: four did not bomb because smoke from previous bombs obscured the target, the remainder experienced other troubles.
[Underlined] No.9 Squadron. [/underlined] Fourteen aircraft attacked the primary target. One aircraft was unable to identify the selected aiming point owing to smoke, and one aircraft is missing.
No.617 Squadron claim one ship sunk; three ships received near misses. A good concentration of Tallboys was put down on the Pens, and the attack is reported as the best yet made on them. Pens No.2 and 3 were both hit, and photos show two (possibly three) direct hits.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Several snags arose during this operation. No.617 Squadron, using the S.A.B.S. must be able to see the aiming point clearly. On this occasion, several aircraft could not bomb, in spite of making several orbits, as the target was obscured by smoke from earlier bombs. No.9 Squadron were more lucky, and their offset aiming point remained visible during nearly the whole of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] STANDARD OF NAVIGATION FOR JANUARY. [/underlined]
Navigation during January (when the majority of targets were long range) was the highest standard for any month. This shows that Navigation, which has stood still for so long, is now moving again, and in the right direction. This is good – let us keep it moving, and in the same direction.
An analysis has been made of the width and length of the Bomber stream during January. To deal first with track-keeping. The average width of the streams going to the target was 25 miles; on the return journey, it was 25 1/2 miles. (The former figure does not include supporters, who normally take a different route). The maximum permissible width of the stream is 10 miles, therefore we still have a long way to go. However, considering that the majority of operations were against long range targets and that on a number of occasions the true wind velocity differed vastly from that forecast, these results are satisfactory.
Now to deal with timing. The average length of the stream going to the target was 50 miles, permissible length being 36 miles. On the return journey it was 64 miles, permissible length being 37 miles. It will be noted that the standard of timing going to the target is very good, particularly considering the deep penetrations and the varying winds encountered. On the return journey, however, the standard of timing is NOT good. Crews are STILL racing back to liberated territory. It is easier to maintain accurate timing on the return journey because Navigators know the true wind velocities and can therefore make allowances. But in a number of instances they do not make the necessary allowance, and consequently concentration suffers. It is a well known fact that aircraft who lag behind the main stream are easy prey for enemy fighters, also those who stick their necks out ahead of the mainstream give the enemy that little bit of extra warning which is so vital to him. Captains and Navigators have been told this time and again, but a few tend to completely ignore all warnings.
In the last three years Navigation has progressed beyond expectation; immense strides have been made in windfinding, track keeping, the air plot, navigational aids and navigation technique. All these improvements should have resulted in perfect timing, but they haven’t – yet! Navigators, you must do everything in your power to remove this deficiency, because only when our timing is as good as all other items of Navigation can we say that we are doing a 100% job.
At this stage it is well to recall the aim we set ourselves 3 months ago. That is, a concentration of no greater dimensions than 50 miles X 20 miles. Well, we have almost achieved that. When we do in fact achieve it, then we shall set ourselves a new goal, until finally we reach perfection. DON’T say this cannot be done, we set ourselves what was thought to be an impossible goal in practice bombing wind finding – and we achieved it. On this same reasoning there is no reason why we should not obtain perfect track keeping and timing – but remember, this depends entirely on YOU.
Read this entire paragraph through again, then set yourselves a goal – and, finally make sure you achieve it.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Station and Squadron Navigation officers must ensure that all new crews are made aware of the great importance of accurate track keeping and timing. These officers must see that all new crews know the goal we have set ourselves and that they must help us to achieve it.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by Squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly, the same as last month. We are STILL not getting any nearer our goal of 3 m.p.h. This goal can and must be obtained if we are to play our full part in the bombing team. Let us then get on with the job and achieve our goal immediately.
[Table of Ranked Average Vector Error by Squadron]
It is good to see that No.56 Base have made a big improvement in their Vector Errors and are now in the top half of the list. No. 55 Base, with the exception of one Squadron, have slipped very badly, and are now in the bottom half of the table. This is not their usual place of residence; it is to be hoped that they do not intend staying there.
An excellent example of consistently accurate windfinding was given by F/O Chorney, Navigator, No.9 Squadron. He recently arrived on the Squadron from Conversion Unit and completed, with his crew, three high level bombing exercises in the first few days on the Squadron. The Vector Errors, converted to 20,000 feet were as follows:-
First Exercise – 14 yards or 2/3 m.p.h.
Second Exercise – 16 yards or 4/5 m.p.h.
Third Exercise – 6 yards or 3/10 m.p.h.
This is really first class windfinding, and it enabled the Bomb Aimer to obtain some perfect bombing results. No. 9 Squadron are always leading the Group in bombing vector errors. What about some other Squadron making a really determined effort to oust them from their position of honour?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight Navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and E.T.A. checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
1. W/O Murray – No.50 Squadron
2. F/O Harris – No.463 Squadron
3. F/O Pilkington – No.227 Squadron
4. F/O Hassall – No. 49 Squadron
5. F/L Williamson – No.619 Squadron
6. F/S Baker – No.630 Squadron
7. F/L Hatch – No. 97 Squadron
8. F/L Westphal – No. 83 Squadron
[Underlined] MET. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
It has been the practice in this Group for nearly 3 years to get the Station Met. Officer on each Station to give a brief review of the Met. situation to Navigators every morning. Everyone has agreed that this has been most useful to Navigators, particularly the wind distribution information. Two Squadrons in the Group have improved on this system, and it is now the responsibility of each Navigator in turn to obtain from the Met. Officer the “story” for the night, and then give the information, more fully, to the Navigators. This system has a double benefit. It necessitates each individual Navigator taking a keen interest in Met., thereby considerably improving his knowledge; also it provides Navigators with valuable practice in lecturing, practice which almost everyone needs. In each Squadron the Navigation Officer is present, and he is the judge on the effectiveness of the lecture and the ability of the lecturer.
This new system has provoked great competition throughout the two Squadrons and its adoption by other Squadrons is strongly recommended. All Navigation Officers are urged to give this system a trial.
All Navigators are provided with a Form 2330 before take-off, and are asked to make observations of the weather and fill in the back of the form. This is a big task for anyone because it necessitates spending a considerable amount of time away from Navigation – time which can be ill afforded. However, it is vital that the Met. Staff obtain an accurate picture of the weather encountered on route and at the target. If they do not receive this information, then it is obvious that their future forecasting will suffer.
Here is a difficult problem which has to be solved. No. 55 Base appear to have the answer. Each Navigator is given a specific
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
area in which to make accurate observations of the weather and it is necessary for him to give information only for this area. Consequently each Navigator need only concentrate on this item for a few moments of the operation, and naturally he is therefore more determined to do that amount of work thoroughly. The result is that Navigators need only spend two minutes at the most observing the weather, while on the other hand the Met. Officer is assured much valuable and accurate information. The Met. Officers of No.55 Base are very pleased with the reports they have received under this new scheme; they consider they are more complete and accurate than those received under the old scheme.
All Bases are urged to give this method a trial.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the third and final Self Analysis Chart for you to complete. If you missed the first two for any reason look them up immediately and answer those questions too.
(i) Do you know how Gee coding is indicated on the main time base and how to apply the corrections?
(ii) On entering the aircraft do you always note the ‘A’ error of the D.R. compass?
(iii) Do you check through your Navigation Order Book regularly to ensure that you are conversant with all orders?
(iv) Do you know how to adjust the presets on the Loran receiver, and do you know what faults are attributable to wrongly adjusted presets.
(v) Do you always remember to switch on your ‘Z’ equipment before take off?
(vi) Do you always carry out your preflight test in accordance with Appendix ‘B’ of Aircraft Drill No.9.
(vii) Do you know the three standard methods for windfinding and issue of bombing winds, which were issued recently?
(viii) Do you always remember to alter your V.S.C. when you pass the central position of two isogonals; and do you check regularly that the variation has been set in the right direction? (Don’t laugh at the second half of this question, to date some 20 instances have occurred of Navigators straying badly from concentration, and one actually returning early, as a result of setting the variation the wrong way).
(ix) Do you always make sure that you fully understand the procedure for bombing windfinding and issue of bombing winds, for each operation? (This question is most important, lack of knowledge of the procedure by a large number of crews on a recent operation, had a disastrous effect on the bombing accuracy).
If you have answered all the questions truthfully you will now be able to categorise yourself. The system of marking is in the November Summary.
Did you make note of all the points on which you lost marks, and did you rectify those mistakes immediately?
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Question (v) of last month’s Summary was incorrectly worded, it should read as follows:- “Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation from which you are allowed to relax the Group timing. Do you know why you are allowed to relax Group timing from this position and why this position was chosen”.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION ORDER BOOKS. [/underlined]
All navigation order books have been standardised during the month, and by the time this Summary reaches Squadrons all new order books should be completed.
This is the first time we have had standardisation in order books. Now that we have brought them up to date we must keep them so. Squadron Navigation Officers must see that all documents marked for inclusion in the Order Book are inserted immediately.
You will find a great deal of valuable information in this book. The rigid adherence to all these orders is a necessity and is vital to the safety of the aircraft. Don’t rush through the enclosures, read them carefully and make a note of all items of major importance. Let you [sic] motto be to “read, mark, learn and digest”.
Make a habit of going through the order book once a week, thus keeping yourself up to date.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Beattie, D.F.C. Nav. Leader No.5 L.F.S. posted to Transport Command.
F/Lt. Bowes, D.F.C. No.5 L.F.S. to be Nav. Leader.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
In view of the nature of the targets attacked by this Group during the month, and to prevent early warning of the approach of a bomber stream, H2S Mark II was not used on any of the bombing operations.
It has also been necessary to cut down the use of H2S Mark III to the absolute minimum that will allow accurate approach and target marking.
Many operators have expressed strong opinions regarding these restrictions, and the view is held that H2S is redundant, or that the efficiency of crews is decreasing. Don’t be misled by these opinions but judge by results. One can bring up many arguments for and against the current policy, but few set operators will fail to agree that the whole success of many of Five Group’s attacks has been solely sue to the element of surprise. Radar silence has helped considerably to bring this about. Another factor partly due to Radar silence has been the very low loss rate suffered by the Group.
[Underlined] H2S Mark II [/underlined]
A number of Gardening operations have been carried out by Squadrons equipped with H2S Mark II during the month, and the standard attained by the crews indicated that individual operators are still maintaining their efficiency on the set, despite the difficulties in obtaining sufficient training.
P.P.I. photographs indicate that good approaches have been made and excellent lays obtained. In this connection Station Radar Navigation Officers are to be congratulated on the conscientious manner in which they are plotting the photographs of the release points. All the plots are checked at this Headquarters, and so far, only one has been found to be incorrect.
H2S mining is, and will continue, to play a great part in the strangling of the enemy’s shipping lanes and to ensure that not one single mine is laid outside these channels it is intended to develop mining teams in each of the five Squadrons of No.55 Base in the very near future. Crews will, therefore, be tested on their ability with H2S on arrival on these Squadrons, and the best will be selected to receive highly concentrated training in all aspects of mining with H2S.
These teams will be given the best possible equipment available to the main force, and every effort will be made to keep it in a high state of serviceability.
Preceeding [sic] crews have set a high standard in H2S mining in the Group, but it is hoped with the development of these mining teams an even higher standard will be reached. It is therefore up to each and everyone concerned wo make this scheme a practical success.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H 2 S Mark III [/underlined]
Despite the restrictions on the use of H2S Mark III which have been necessary, and the low serviceability, there has been some excellent blind marking during the month. The majority of the targets were small, but fortunately gave compact responses useful for blind bombing. One target in particular – BRUX - was a completely new H2S target for No.54 Base, with little or no landmarks in the vicinity to check. This in no way deterred the marker and flare force, and they were able to find and mark it with their usual precision.
The new Mark IIIE equipment has been tried successfully on operations during the month. The mark, which gives a far better definition than previous marks, and has the added advantage of sector scan, is expected to be used increasingly during the next few months, and we are confidently expecting even more accurate target marking with it in the near future.
[Underlined] H2S Photography [/underlined]
A new Air Staff Instruction relating to H2S photography has been issued recently, and all set operators should be now aware of its contents. If you are not, ask your Station Radar/Nav. for a copy and study it carefully.
It can hardly be said that the P.P.I. photographs taken during the month were of a high standard, and it is evident that set operators are not carrying out the correct photographic procedure. It is appreciated that the Bantam Camera is only makeshift equipment until the Automatic Camera arrives, but excellent results have been obtained by those operators sufficiently keen to find out where they released their T.I’s, flares, bombs or mines. P.P.I. photographs are the only means of ascertaining where the attack developed if 10/10 cloud prevailed and therefore they are as much an operational photograph as the ordinary F24 bomb release photograph. Unfortunately many crews fail to realise this, and the photographs now being received look as if they have just been taken haphazardly in the target area.
One photograph taken anywhere in the target area is insufficient for plotting purposes, and operators must see that they carry out the provisions of A.S.I. Nav.17 to the letter – i.e. one photograph on the run-up 10-15 miles away from the target, and another within 30 seconds of the T.I., flare, bomb or mine release. Unless you take these two photographs and they are plottable, the whole film will be classed as a MANIPULATION failure and questions will be asked.
The majority of P.P.I. photographic failures during the month have been due to:-
(i) Insufficient gain.
(ii) Insufficient exposure.
(iii) Failure to wind the film over (two exposures on one negative).
(iv) Failure to set shutter.
(v) Too large 10 mile zero.
In taking P.P.I. photographs remember maximum contrast is necessary so that towns may be distinguished among the ground returns, and the illumination must be sufficient to register on the film. A complete revolution of the scan must also be given for the exposure as the afterglow is too faint to produce an image, and the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
photograph is formed gradually as the scan revolves.
H2S Training
To enable crews to obtain more training in the use of H2S Mark II it has been decided to allow the equipment to be used on the return route from all operations from a position of longitude determined by this Headquarters. Station Radar/Navigation Officers are to ensure that every advantage is taken of this facility.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The Continental Gee Chains continued to give good service during January, with the majority of operators obtaining coverage on both chains to 1000E.
There were, nevertheless, many conflicting reports on jamming experienced on these chains, but many navigators expressed the opinion that the enemy was transmitting a complete set of locked spurious pulses. To ascertain if this was so it has been decided that on the Squadrons holding H2S cameras one navigator is to take photographs of the Gee tube on future operations. R.A.F. Station, Fulbeck, have carried out ground tests to decide the best exposure, and it has been found that with the green filter removed, gain normal and brilliance high, 1/25 second is sufficient. Until this evidence is forthcoming no move can be made to counteract the menace.
There is one point, however, that navigators should remember. By reference to your D.R. position, you have a sound idea of the lattice values to give a fix, and is these values are set up on the Gee Indicator there should be no difficulty in defeating locked spurious pulses jamming.
With the successful elimination of the salient in the West the “C” slave of the Cologne Chain has been returned to its original position, and the Ruhr Chain is once again transmitting. Cologne Chain Fixing Charts are therefore being withdrawn, and the Ruhr Chain Charts re-issued. In addition the maintenance periods have been re-adjusted, and the Ruhr and Rheims Chain now give 24 hours service.
The Northern Chain was again used most successfully and gave excellent coverage to 1300E, but unfortunately there is evidence of errors in the fixes given by this Chain. The Radar Navigational Aids Control were approached with information on the approximate inaccuracies and their conclusions indicate that the errors experienced are more likely to be due to natural causes than in the Transmitting Stations.
For instance at 5600N 0600E an error of ± .02 in reading on the North Eastern Chains gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 6 nautical miles. The same reading tolerance on the Northern Chain in the same area gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 17 nautical miles.
It might be argued on mathematical grounds that such errors should be evenly distributed about the true track, but the evidence of test flights etc., seems to indicate that under any given conditions most navigators will have a definite bias on one side or the other, and that this bias is influenced far more by local conditions than by the individual.
On this case the average error of all fixes was approximately 126°/10 nautical miles and it would appear the local conditions influencing the bias were:-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
(i) Weak “A” pulse on the Northern Chain and navigators would thus set a low reading when lining up the leading edges of the pulses. The amount of this error depends on the difference in amplitude of the signals.
(ii) A wind change to Westerly giving a starboard drift.
In view of the above it is therefore considered unlikely that errors exist in the Northern Chain.
Navigators may do well to ponder over the above facts, which indicate the necessity for reading off co-ordinates accurately to ensure that no discrepancies arise when changing over from one Gee chain to another.
Work is still progressing on the damaged Eastern Chain Tower, and corrections to be made to the B, C and D readings on this chain will continue to be issued when the route taken by aircraft is in an area where considerable fixing errors are likely to be encountered.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran has proved by far the most useful Radar navigational aid during the month, excellent coverage having been obtained on all operations.
It is gratifying to note that since the introduction of this aid, increasing use if being made of the navigational facilities it affords, and navigators are quite confident as to its accuracy. With more and more reliance being placed on Loran it is anticipated that in future routeing will be more carefully considered so as to simplify fixing and if possible to run along lattice lines.
It is noted from operational reports that it is not always possible to check Loran fixes against Gee or H2S. Should any Navigation Analysis Officer note any discrepancies in Loran fixes which it is thought may be due to errors in ground stations, information will be welcome at this Headquarters. It may be possible to correct the ground stations for such an error, provided information is forthcoming.
The following are comments on the major operations carried out during the month:-
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good and maximum coverage obtained was approximately from 03.00E to the target. It is however, noted that operators are still not making maximum use of the equipment as the spread between first fixes is in the region of 8 degrees. This may be due to some navigators placing more reliance on Gee fixes. It is emphasised that operators must use Loran to its maximum coverage, particularly as training flights are not possible over this country, and Gee must only be used as a check. Sky waves can be tricky, and the more experience one has in fixing with them, the simpler the identification becomes. Jamming in this area was practically negligible and splitting of signals did not present any serious difficulties to the operators. The only jamming reported appeared to be due to static or W/T transmissions and only resulted in an increase of grass or waving of the traces.
[Underlined] PILITZ – 13/14th January, 1945. [/underlined]
The Rate 5 signal strength again restricted coverage on
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
this operation, although most operators managed to obtain fixes outside the theoretical limits of the S.S. Chain. A plot of first fixes on this operation is much more concentrated than before. This indicates that where Gee coverage is likely to be erratic, operators are resorting to Loran and trying to obtain full use of the facilities it affords. Rate 5 signals presented difficulties throughout the route due to fluctuations in strength, but spitting and jamming was practically non-existent. Routeing along R4 lattice lines where possible in this area would no doubt be helpful.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th January, 1945, and
BRUX 16/17th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good, and coverage was obtained to the target. Once again navigators expressed their preference for Gee, the first fixes plotted in the majority of cases being at the limits of Gee coverage. Set operators can do a lot to remove this prejudice by obtaining accurate Loran position lines and urging the navigator to use them in preference to Gee. It is appreciated that Gee position lines are obtained simultaneously and are simpler to plot, but with the increased attention the enemy is paying to the Continental Gee Chains, more interest shown in Loran may result in dividends.
Intermittent splitting was reported by the majority of crews, but in no way did this interfere with the fixing. A number of operators reported jamming at approximately 10E. This appeared to consist of spurious pulses or sine waves, but did not last long enough to cause any serious difficulties.
The policy adopted by this Group of instructing Loran operators to correct dividers in the air is having excellent results, and practically 75% of all alignment troubles are being cleared up during flight. Much of the success of this is due to the Loran Instructors and Radar Officers on the Squadrons and it is hoped that before long operators will be 100% efficient. To assist in this a simple fault finding table is being issued to all operators shortly.
All Loran operators will be interested to hear that steps are being taken to extend S.S. Loran coverage North for 250 miles. This will considerably simplify training over this country, and will mean that S.S. Loran can be used on night operations from Bases. It will only then be necessary to use Gee for homing and other duties requiring accurate and easy fixing.
The [sic] provide this S.S. coverage one of the Homing Chain stations has had to be closed down, and position lines only can now be obtained from this chain.
The question of serviceability checks on Loran has been discussed recently, and it has been decided that the navigator shall carry out the pre-flight tests. This in no way relieves the Air Bomber of his responsibilities in regard to Loran, and a good Air Bomber will always be present when the navigator carries out the tests. Squadron Loran Instructors must therefore ensure that both navigators and Ait Bombers are capable of carrying out the pre-flight tests.
Tests have been carried out with a fixed aerial and loading unit on the last five operations. These tests have proved quite successful and the signal strength has been equally as good as with a trailing aerial. Air Ministry have been approached for permission to manufacture the Loading Units and it is anticipated the whole of the Group will be equipped shortly. The provision of such a fixed aerial will considerably simplify the use of Loran and enable operators to fix
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
in the target area.
One further word in regard to Loran Training – Air Bombers, in view of the fact that they are the set operators, must be given equal if not more instruction than the navigators, and the Squadron Navigation and Bombing Leaders must co-operate fully in this connection.
[Underlined] Loran in Mosquitos [/underlined]
Better results are now being obtained by the Mosquito navigators. Difficulties due to an inefficient aerial system have been overcome, and Loran has been used successfully for tracking into the target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
The main interest this month from the tactical point of view was the attack on Bergen by Nos.9 and 617 Squadrons, when several aircraft were intercepted by enemy fighters when withdrawing from the target area. An escort of Mustangs accompanied the force, but was unable to come to their assistance; this was due mainly to the aircraft being dispersed over a considerable area after orbitting [sic] the target. The enemy fighters, however, did not have everything their own way. One Lancaster was attacked continuously for 16 minutes by no less than five fighters, but got away with only moderate damage, while another survived three attacks without sustaining any damage whatsoever. All crews would do well to note the points brought out by this attack.
(i) A fighter escort cannot protect stragglers or widely dispersed aircraft.
(ii) A resolute crew, well trained in gunnery and combat manoeuvres, can give a very good account of itself, even when singled out for concerted attack.
(iii) The corkscrew is a very effective combat manoeuvre in daylight as well as night.
The golden rule, however, is still DO NOT STRAGGLE. Combat manoeuvres are unnecessary and dangerous if aircraft are in gaggle.
Our night tactics of evasion and rapid loss of height from the target are still keeping our losses to fighters very low, but the last attack on Karlsruhe showed once again that if the fighters do contact the bomber stream either en route or over the target they are just as deadly as ever. Crews should, if possible, increase their vigilance near the target as the enemy, particularly since the successful jamming of his A.I. by Window and other means, is making every effort at target interception, where a concentration of aircraft is assured.
A small number of combats is still being reported with jet-propelled aircraft. Reports generally are inconclusive, but although it seems unlikely that the enemy is using jet-propelled fighters at night in any numbers, it is possible that some form of rocket or liquid jet projectile is being used. Crews should pay close attention to such phenomena and report in particular if a suspected jet fighter makes any attempt to follow the aircraft, or carry out a definite attack.
[Underlined] WISHFUL THINKING [/underlined]
A captain of aircraft was heard to remark that he had heard upward firing cannon in German night fighters were no longer being used as they interfered with the master unit for the compass. He has since been reported missing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The past month has not provided many opportunities for crews to display their bombing skill either on the Ranges or on Germany, but it is hoped that the slack periods have been used to full advantage and that new and inexperienced crews now have a full understanding of what is expected of them in the target area.
There are still too many examples of bomb loads being scattered over considerable distances from the target for no apparent reason, and the manipulation failures that still happen from time to time are difficult to understand in view of the fact that the Air Bomber has plenty of time to check and double check every switch on his panel on the way to the target. Be prepared for any swift change in the tactics to be employed over the target, and if the change involves any alterations to bombsight settings, make sure that they are done accurately.
The importance of accurate “flying for bombing” has often been stressed, and if any doubts still exist among Pilots the following example should help to dispel them.
F/O McDonnell and crew, No.9 Squadron, have completed three bombing exercises since their arrival from No.5 L.F.S. and obtained the following results:-
[Table of Errors on Exercises]
Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.
These results show a fine understanding between the members of the bombing team, F/O McDonnell (P), F/O Fricker (A/B), and F/O Chorney (Nav.) which is all the more remarkable as F/O Fricker did not join the crew until the end of L.F.S. training. The errors speak for themselves and require no comment, but the fact that F/O McDonnell was a Staff Pilot at a Bombing and Gunnery School before coming to No.5 Group should provide food for thought.
Good results, operational or training, are obtainable only if every member of the bombing team realises the importance of his own contribution to the combined effort, and it is the Captain’s duty to ensure that his crew make every effort to obtain results similar to those mentioned above.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
F/O Jones has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.44 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Lowry, now tour-expired.
F/Lt. Foulkes has moved to No.617 Squadron and F/Lt. Arkieson has taken over the Bombing Leader’s duties at No.630 Squadron.
F/Lt. Wake, ex No.106 Squadron and No.1660 H.C.U. has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.61 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Nugent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
No.9 Squadron, Bardney, have carried their Bombing Analysis a step further than the majority of Squadrons in the Group, and there is no doubt that their methods are producing results.
Each crew has its own file which contains all the practice bombing results, including the Forms 3073 and signals giving the quadrant readings. In addition, a sheet of tracing paper with the graticule cross in the centre, is kept in the file and all bombs dropped by the crew are re-aligned on a common heading and transferred to the tracing paper. Therefore, when a crew has completed five exercises, there are approximately 30 bombs shown on their sheet and as they are all re-aligned on to a common heading it is easy to detect any tendency of the Air Bomber to sight slightly off the target.
These sheets do indicate that some Air Bombers consistently sight to one side of the target and steps can then be taken to eradicate this tendency.
Bombs dropped with a proven instrument error are marked in a different colour and can then be ignored when assessing the Air Bomber’s accuracy of sighting.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The following results have been received, all from No.56 Base.
S/Ldr. Walmsley, DFC – 119 yards
120 yards
150 yards (A.S.I. error)
F/Lt. Lewis (189 Sqdn.) – 123 yards
F/Lt. Gibson, DFC (49 Sqdn.) – 125 yards
No.56 Base would welcome a little competition from Bombing Leaders in other Bases.
[Underlined] BIG CHIEF COMETITION. [/underlined]
W/Cdr. Milward (No.619 Sqdn.) 61 yards.
An excellent exercise, which has seldom been beaten by any entrant in this competition.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. Which is the sighting angle flexible drive, the top or the bottom one?
2. In what respects does the normal 30 lb. I.B. differ from that used in the ‘J’ type cluster?
3. How is the heating device in No.13 bomb station controlled?
4. What are the Air Bomber’s duties in an aircraft joining the circuit after an operational flight?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BEST EXERCISES. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR CREW ERROR
9 F/O McDonnell F/O Fricker F/O Chorney 75, 63, 34
44 F/O Coventry F/S Gibson Sgt Ayre 39
57 F/O Pauline Sgt Cartwright Sgt Hole 47
61 F/O Cain F/S Lewis F/O Williams 75
F/O Crocombe F/S Devine F/O Reeves 78
227 F/O Osborne F/S Rochman F/S Kydd 74
617 F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O Mackie 72
F/L Lancey F/S Perry W/O Robin 80
619 F/O De Marco F/S Johnston F/S Sharman 65
F/O Davis F/S Page F/S Cook 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Squadron Bombing Competition Results]
No.83 Squadron head the January competition with a clear lead over the remainder of the Squadrons, six of whom failed to qualify.
No.61 Squadron have shown a great improvement over last month, when they failed to qualify. It would not be unexpected if they finish at the head of the table next month.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF CREWS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
For the month of January No.55 Base were credited with 52 ‘C’ categories, the correct number was 23.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice by Squadron]
No.627 Squadron:- 134 bombs with an average error of 77 yards, and 70 T.I’s with an average error of 139 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
The W/T control of operations during January maintained the high standard which is now characteristic of our W/T Controllers’ Operators. A pleasing feature of this operating is the accuracy of tuning and timing now being obtained by all Link aircraft. These are very important points, and this accuracy is now even more important than ever, as the time of opening W/T watch has been curtailed, thus allowing a much shorter time for the Main Force aircraft to be properly tuned to the Link aircraft. This should present no great problem to Wireless Operators, but it will require constant practice and training to maintain the standard now expected.
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During January, 48 Wireless Operators (Air) took part in the W/T Controllers’ Test, as laid down in 5G. S.S.I. No.13, and out of this number 32 passed as fit for control duties. The percentage of failures (33 1/3) is a measure of the severity of the test. The failures can be classified under two headings, viz. inaccuracy in tuning, and incorrect procedure. The first of these faults can be eliminated by practice tuning in the Squadron W/T Training Room, and the second by more thorough scrutiny of Air Staff Instructions, Part VI, Sigs/1, Page 7, para.10. Signals Leaders please note!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
Categorisation of all Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is being carried out enthusiastically by all Squadrons. The results at the end of January are as follows:-
[Table of Wireless Operator (Air) Categorisations by Squadron]
To ensure that this categorisation is being carried out in accordance with the instructions laid down in 5 Group letter 5G/S.14466/Sigs. dated
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
5th December, 1944, the Group Signals Leader, when visiting Squadrons, will check some of the Wireless Operators as to their eligibility for their category.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during January was, like the curate’s egg, good and bad in parts. The frequency (5220 kc/s) is not very suitable, being rather overcrowded, and efforts are being made to obtain another one for this exercise. The geographical position of some squadron installations, in relation to this Headquarters, makes reception of each other’s signals very difficult, but this is, perhaps, within limits, quite useful in training operators to work under difficult conditions. After each exercise a signal is now being despatched to each Base and Squadron concerned, giving a summary of the exercise.
[Underlined] APOLOGY. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary, in our appreciation of the work done by Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units in producing the type of Wireless Operator we require, we inadvertently left out the (O) A.F.U’s and 5 L.F.S. As continuity is essential throughout all training, the work done by these units is obviously on a par with the others. We regret this omission and assure these units that their work is just as much appreciated.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The signals failures percentage, against the 1,572 sorties flown during January, was 3.684. This shows an increase of 0.501 against the figure for December. Approximately 75% of the defects are attributed to faulty equipment and are, presumably, unavoidable. There was one servicing failure and one due to manipulation. Despite this increase in failures, not one sortie was cancelled as the result of a signals defect. There were three early returns, all of which were caused by faulty equipment. One revelation worthy of note is that there was only one T.R.1196 failure throughout the month – never has T.R.1196 serviceability been so high.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
The V.H.F. R/T serviceability shows a decrease against the figures for December. Of the 33 T.R.5043 defects, eight were due to broken whip aerials. Six of these aerials had been repositioned in accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10 (R.T.I.M. No.833), but owing to our inability to obtain the correct rubber grummets and paxolin plates, unsatisfactory substitutes had to be used. A very careful watch must be kept on existing non-standard V.H.F. aerial fittings. Meanwhile, further efforts are being made to obtain the correct items.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AMALGAMATION. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of attention was focussed this month on the problem of amalgamation of the Communications and Radar Maintenance Branches. Following a conference with No.56 Base representatives, a visit was paid to Linton-on-Ouse in No.6 Group, where a scheme is working with great success, and much useful information was gained. With this as a basis, an experiment was commenced in No.56 Base, from which some measure of success is expected.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EMPLOYMENT OF WIRELESS OPERATORS
(W.A.A.F.) IN RADAR. [/underlined]
Following up a suggestion by Mr. Wardley-Smith, of T.R.E., a scheme was put into effect in No.49 Squadron, Fulbeck, whereby ten Wireless Operators (W.A.A.F.) were attached to A.G.L.T. Daily Servicing Parties, and the R. & I. Section, No.49 Squadron, were warned that after one month’s training, six Radar Mechanics would be withdrawn from the squadron. A T.R.E. P.D.S. member has been attached to Fulbeck to observe the experiment, which is progressing favourably.
In view of the increasing employment of Wireless Operators in Radar duties, a series of courses was commenced at Bardney for their benefit. The duration of the course is a fortnight, and will cover Radar principles, Loran and Gee. Relevant films will be shown and practical work given. Although no startling results are expected, it is hoped to stimulate interest, and provide for any further knowledge.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
A most welcome chapter in the Loran story occurred last month, when Air Ministry decontrolled the supply of the equipment. This permitted immediate action to renew the rapidly dwindling stocks of spares and to silence the cynics who were saying that no sooner is an installation proved than the equipment goes off the market.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
As a result of the shortage of Radar personnel, the decision was made last October to curtail the fitting of H.2S. in No.53 Base, and concentrate personnel thrown up, into No.54 Base, with the object of obtaining the best from the H.2.S. available. Since that date, efforts have been made to legalise the position of these Radar mechanics. On January 19th official approval was given with the birth of the No.5 Group Special Radar Development Party, vacancies for which were given up by No.53 Base. Much good work has been done already by the party in their unofficial capacity, and continued and increasing success will be expected in the future, now that it is legalised.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gardening
The Group Gardeners operated on two nights this month, visiting the Eastern Gardens, and planted the small but effective total of 143 vegetables.
Bad weather limited the Command output to 668 vegetables, which is well below the present monthly lift, and clearly demonstrated the importance of taking every available opportunity to plant in good weather, so that the enemy’s minesweeping force may be employed to its maximum capacity and never allowed to relax for one moment.
[Underlined] COMMAND SUMMARY OF VEGETABLES PLANTED. [/underlined]
No. 1 Group – 235
No. 5 Group – 143
No. 4 Group – 137
No. 6 Group – 119
No. 3 Group – 34
[Underlined] GREAT STRENGTH RETURNS THE PENNY. [/underlined]
After months of hard work, and heavy Gardening operations, combined with the menacing effects of our Group’s bombing visits to the Oslo Fjord areas, interesting news is now coming to hand of some of the disturbing results achieved.
The main trooping ports in Oslo Fjord were closed on various occasions and the enemy has had to bring less suitable ports into use, and employ extra shipping in the effort to carry out his programme of transporting troops from Norway to Denmark. The Harbour Master of this district has been working overtime to compete with his difficulties in keeping an ‘Open Port’, and has bitterly complained that 12 mines exploded without warning between the 8th and 25th October, 1944.
A new transport the “DARES”, estimated at 7,000 tons, has joined the Oslo – Aarhus run, but she is reported to have returned to Aarhus on 2nd January with damage to her engines caused by mine. The “DONAU”, 9035 tons, also employed on this run, was sunk by sabotage in Oslo Fjord on 16th January, and the 6,360 tons “ULANGA” was last reported in floating dock as a result of bomb damage received during the bombing attack on shipping on New Year’s Eve.
Two more large transports, the “WINRICH VON KNIPRODE” (10,123 tons) and the “MAR DEL PLATA” (7,340 tons) have also been damaged by collision and marine risk, and so the enemy’s valuable fleet of twelve large transports has, for the time being, been reduced to seven.
The attack with bombs on 28/29th December also reduced the available shipping by sinking the “NORDVARD”, when 70 Germans were lost, damaging the “ANGAMOS”, an ex-Danish fruitship, and breaking the back of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
an oil lighter, the “SAONE”, now reported aground off the port of HORTEN. Three more ships were also sunk off MOSS.
THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED:-
“ROALNDSECK”, 1,845 tons, was damaged by an explosion on 17th January, after loading horses and material for Oslo; her cargo was unloaded subsequently and she was expected to dock for repairs.
The German vessel “GOTENHAFEN” was damaged by a mine prior to 27th November, 1944, and returned to Hamburg to discharge.
A minesweeper was sunk by a magnetic mine near Arundal, Norway, on 3rd January, 1945.
A German Auxiliary, believed minelayer, was mined and sunk 4 miles North of Rosnaes Light, at the Northern entrance to the Great Belt, on 5th January, 1945.
The Danish “FREDERICKSHAVN” 1,480 tons, damaged by a mine off Halls on 19th November, 1945.
The Norwegian S.S. “KONG TRYGVE”, 1,141 tons, mined at Moen and towed to Copenhagen.
The German “MARTHA HALM”, 984 tons, mined near Aarhus (probably November, 1944).
Norwegian “MARVEL”, 1,566 tons, slightly damaged by a mine off Kullen on 17th October, 1944.
“DORIANA” Danish Schooner, mined and sunk in Femersund late November, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] TRAINING ACTIVITIES DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
It was a month of snow, hail, fog and ice, but despite this the amount of training by Squadrons showed an increase on the December figures.
Squadrons did 3245 hours training – 2868 hours by day and 377 hours by night – giving an average od 180 hours per Squadron compared with 122 hours in December.
Some of the Squadrons occupying the lowest place in the training lists in December improved their position very much – in particular No.44 Squadron which recorded a total above the Squadron average.
The lowest Lancaster Squadrons were No.227 Squadron (99 hours), No.9 Squadron (124 hours), No.189 Squadron (140 hours) and No.57 Squadron (141 hours). Thus for the second consecutive month Nos. 227 and 189 Squadrons were behind in their training. No.9 Squadron is also showing low figures and for the last two months has done scarcely any air gunnery training. Fighter affiliation can always be included on bombing exercises.
No.627 Mosquito Squadron is lowest of all with 56 hours, but when its aircraft situation improves the training hours are expected to jump.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
There are now 273 pilots in the Group holding categories, leaving 142 yet to be categorised. The remaining pilots on Group strength are those not liable for categorisation because they have done more than 20 sorties in the main force and over 30 in No.54 Base Squadrons.
During the month 171 categories were given to pilots on New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks. No.54 Base showed good progress and are making up leeway rapidly now the Base has facilities for categorisation. This Base has also introduced Categorisation into No.627 Mosquito Squadron. The following table shows the state of Categorisation in the Group:-
[Underlined] RECORD OF CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisation by Base]
Total Categorised in January = [underlined] 171 [/underlined]
Total Categorised in Group = [underlined] 273 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The “percentage categorised” is based on recorded pilot strength on 31st January. This includes pilots not liable for categorisation.
[Underlined] ERRATA: [/underlined] Apologies to No.55 Base for an error which incorrectly put the Base “well behind in categorisation” in last month’s summary.
[Underlined] NO.5 L. F. S. REPORT [/underlined]
No.5 L.F.S. produced 49 crews for Squadrons at an average of 15 hours per crew, and its aircraft flew 840 hours. The crew total was the lowest in the Unit’s history because of the weather, and accommodation at Syerston is now at its maximum.
There are still approximately 160 crews to be trained by the L.F.S. before it disappears, and its last days are going to be strenuous. It is estimated by 1st April, 1945, the Staff will be able to say “D.C.O.” and pack their bags.
[Underlined] NO. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined]
There were 13 days during the month unfit for fighter affiliation – about the same as December – but fighter affiliation results were mush better. The Flight did 398 details, of which 332 were by day and 66 by night. The night details included 21 for No.75 Base.
The total hours for the Flight were 354 and the average hours per aircraft was 25. Pilots averaged 24 hours for the month.
The fine affiliation record which has been established by No.1690 B.D.T. Flight is still being marred by accidents. There were three again last month in the Flight, two the month before, and three the month before that.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
There was a further improvement in Link times. The average Squadron time has gone up from 78 hours in December to 101 hours in January but Nos. 9, 463, 97 and 617 Squadrons are still lagging behind.
[Table of Link Times by Base and Unit]
GRAND TOTAL (Including 5 LFS and 1690) = 2173:
ACTUAL AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 101 hours. REQUIRED AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 132 hours.
+ Marks the Squadrons where times are TOO LOW.
˨ 1690 B.D.T.F. and No.5 L.F.S. excluded from Base average.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “GEORGE” MARK VIII [/underlined]
The Auto Pilot Mark VIII is the latest and best type of “George”. One of our S.D. Squadrons has used it for 90% of all its operational flying time in recent months. Points to note:-
(i) Trim your aircraft BEFORE putting “George” in.
(ii) If “George flies one wing low, trim out with rudder bias.
(iii) Keep the trim indicator on the air pressure gauge central by adjusting the elevator trim.
(iv) When reporting unserviceability, give full information including behaviour of aircraft, air pressure and outside air temperature. Whenever possible take the mechanic up on an air test.
(v) Exercise “George” at every opportunity. The more it is used the better it is.
(vi) Read Pilots Noted General A.P.2095, Part IIIG – Auto Pilot, Mark VIII.
[Underlined] FIRST AID [/underlined]
Investigations into emergency landings at Woodbridge show that first aid in the air can do a lot to help the recovery of injured aircrew. Remember:-
(i) Keep the patient comfortable, warm and on oxygen.
(ii) Always use the First Aid dressing. Know when and how to apply a tourniquet.
(iii) One Ampoule of morphia is sufficient for a person in pain.
(iv) Do not remove flying clothing unless it is absolutely necessary to allow the wound to be dressed. Flying clothing provides warmth and a certain amount of splinting.
(v) The M.O. has a lot of useful tips. Talk to him.
FLY YOUR CORKSCREW – DON’T SKID ALL OVER THE SKY!
UP PORT
[Drawings]
IS LIKE THIS – [underlined] NOT [/underlined] LIKE THIS!
N.C.M.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
The first month of the year produced a “score” of 28 aircraft damaged in the Group. 11 were totally destroyed, 1 was Cat. ‘B’, 8 were Cat. ‘AC’ and 7 were Cat. ‘A’. Of the total, 14 were the result of technical failures, collisions on operations, or high winds, while one was unavoidably damaged when it hit birds in flight. 5 accidents are still “obscure”, leaving 8 accidents classed as definitely avoidable.
This shows a welcome drop in the “avoidable” rate, and even allowing for some of the “obscure” accidents eventually being classified accurately, the total is still well below the previous monthly average. This is a big step in the right direction at the beginning of the year. Here are the details:-
[Underlined] Squadrons. [/underlined]
[List of Avoidable Accident Type Numbers]
[Underlined] TAXYING ETC. [/underlined]
These accidents maintain their notorious position. Never a month but brings its depressing tale of careless taxying and M.T. collisions, and although, as a rule, severe damage is not sustained, these incidents are never excusable. Log Books are endorsed in “red” for careless taxying every month, and we can only repeat once again that it is folly and gross disobedience of orders to taxy at night without searching thoroughly ahead with taxying light or Aldis lamp.
[Underlined] HIGH GROUND ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
A Lancaster proceeded on a short navigation cross country recently. The pilot was briefed to set course over base at 4,000 feet. The aircraft left a base in this Group to fly due West for some 60 miles and back again. It must have been apparent to the pilot and navigator that the safety height near the end of the outward leg was much higher than at base, yet this crew descended through cloud and hit a hill in level flight, with all the engines under power. The hill was some 1,700 feet high. There were no survivors.
In spite of all that has been done to stamp out this “suicidal” descent through cloud, these incidents still occur, and by no means as seldom as is generally realised. All pilots and navigators take heed.
Another accident this month points almost the same moral. The results of the investigation are not yet forward, but it would appear that a Lancaster returning from an operation flew low in bad visibility, and hit a wireless mast. The pilot may have simply been trying to break cloud without checking his safety height, or he may have misread his altimeter, but in any case there is every indication that this was another completely avoidable fatal accident. Although the truth will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
never be completely known, the circumstances of this crash provide a warning to all. [Underlined] Do not [/underlined] come down to low heights in bad visibility to see the ground. Height spells safety every time, and good instrument flying clinches it.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below shows the avoidable accident position this month. This is, as usual, subject to revision when all accidents have been thoroughly investigated.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
Enemy fighter activity was comparatively slight during the month of January, 1945, and a total of only 38 combats took place over this period. Of these, 3 enemy aircraft are claimed destroyed, one of these being reported as a jet aircraft, and 5 are claimed as damaged.
Of the 38 combats, 9 were reported following the daylight operation on Bergen when Lancasters of Nos.617 and 9 Squadrons were repeatedly attacked by F.W.190’s. Crews from these Squadrons claimed 4 F.W.190’s damaged, and these have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. During these encounters the Hun made full use of the sun, and it is wondered how many Gunners went prepared, armed with spectacles, anti-glare. Each gunner is entitled to draw one pair of these spectacles on his clothing card, and it is hoped that Squadron Gunnery Leaders will check that Gunners are fully equipped.
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
14/15.1.45 “W” 189 Sqdn – ME.109
14/15.1.45 “M” 467 Sqdn – 1 Jet aircraft.
16/17.1.45 “D” 630 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
12.1.45 “U” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “W” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “S” 9 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “J” 9 Sqdn - FW.190
13/14.1.45 “M” 61 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) 10 points.
Night Affiliation (Without Camera) 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera and Gyro) 5 points
Day Affiliation (Camera only) 3 points
Day Affiliation (Without Camera) 1 point.
[Table of Air Training Scores Ranked by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
No.467 Squadron are to be congratulated on going to the top of the ladder, and also for completing 32 Night Affiliation exercises. Certain squadrons are still making scant use of their Gyro Assemblies, and it is hoped that next month’s returns will show an improvement in this respect.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] Total number of Affiliation exercises for January = 878 [/underlined]
In spite of 14 days of inclement weather which prohibited all flying, the total of Affiliation exercises shows a very creditable increase on the December total. Night Affiliation exercises are increasing steadily, and Infra-Red films are being taken more frequently. Self-towed drogue exercises have been completed by certain Squadrons, and it is hoped that next month Squadrons will use every endeavour to get the maximum number of crews carrying out this exercise. This is the one exercise where the gunner has the opportunity of firing his guns at a target whilst carrying out combat manoeuvres.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STOREHOUSES. [/underlined]
Covered storage for cluster projectiles containing 4 lb incendiary bombs has now been provided at all stations and the layouts should be in full working order.
Present stocks of clusters are low, but stations must be prepared to receive larger quantities which will test the efficiency of the organisation and layout of these stores. Full information is contained in the following letters and signal:-
5G/402/17/Org. dated 3.11.44.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 3.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 21.1.45.
Signal R.911 dated 27.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 4. 2.45.
Particular attention is drawn to the need for careful handling of uncased cluster projectiles in order to avoid damage to either the cluster tail or the tails of the 4 lb. bombs.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS. [/underlined]
We are well aware that preparing six copies of a defect report in accordance with A.P. 2608A and B.C.A.S.I’s causes a certain amount of inconvenience but unless these reports are submitted on every occasion, complete information on any one subject is not available. Instances have occurred where the ingenuity of Armament personnel has produced excellent modifications, but when forwarded to higher authority the reason for the modification is not understood because no defect reports have been rendered. Although “pen pushing” is not popular amongst Armament Technical personnel, it is, as you will see, necessary.
[Underlined] S.B.C’s. [/underlined]
Our old friend the S.B.C. is still called upon to perform its duty in delivering showers of 4 lb incendiary bombs upon our enemies. If reliable functioning of this equipment is to be ensured, the various tests and inspections laid down must be carried out conscientiously, more particularly so if S.B.C’s have not been used recently.
[Underlined] MAN-POWER. [/underlined]
The foregoing remarks will undoubtedly raise the question of lack of man-power. This deficiency is well known and aircrew cadets have been posted to units to assist armament personnel. These cadets are strong, healthy and intelligent and after elementary training, if armament personnel issue clear and concise instructions, they are quite capable of dealing with many of the jobs requiring unskilled and semi-skilled labour, thus relieving trained armament personnel to perform the more intricate technical duties.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
During the recent heavy snowstorms and frost, the fall on occasions reached five inches. Snow plans have been revised and were put into operation early, with a consequent higher degree of serviceability. Methods employed varied considerably because of local conditions and the amount of manpower available. The three methods generally used were “sand and salt”, ploughing and rolling. Sand and salt proved excellent under conditions of small falls, rolling where the fall was medium but a heavy fall required ploughing. Salting brought with it difficulties of drainage clearance and ordinary mechanical brushing was not always equal to the task. Similarly, the “Snowgo” was not of great assistance in conditions where the fall of snow was fine and a strong wind prevailed, but was of use following ploughing.
Except in the morning following the heaviest fall, stations maintained a high degree of serviceability. All stations were able to keep their runways serviceable and in only a few cases was there not a subsidiary runway available by the afternoon following overnight fall. In one or two cases lighting difficulties followed on the thaw, but were tackled promptly and except in one case were remedied at an early stage. The position was complicated by the high wind causing damage to outer circuit and funnel lighting.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
The P.W.D. has developed a new form of lighting, evolved from the F.I.D.O. installation. The apparatus is portable and is intended to assist aircraft in lining-up on the approach under conditions of poor visibility. Petrol from a 40-gallon drum is pumped manually through a 50-yards feed pipe into a pre-heater at the end of a 20-feet burner line which is pegged into the ground. The intense flame far exceeds the sodium burners in brilliancy and penetration. Following successful trials by 2nd T.A.F., various lay-outs are being tested at Balderton. When the most successful form has been found, a demonstration will be arranged.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] DITCHINGS. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred this month and another possible one was reported at the same time and in the same area. An aircraft, believed of 617 Squadron was seen to ditch on the 12th approximately 15 miles off the Norwegian coast. The ditching was seen by a number of crews and was well covered by prompt sighting reports. A Warwick standing by for just such an eventuality was quickly in position, and in making a dummy run saw the crew on the wing of the aircraft with no dinghy visible. As the airborne lifeboat was dropped, the aircraft sank. One man was seen to board the lifeboat and all but two of the others were seen to be making their way towards it. A Lindholme dinghy was then dropped to the two stationary members after which the Warwick, owing to the presence of enemy fighters had to withdraw.
In a position just North of the above ditching, an aircraft which was seen to be on fire over the target was believed to have ditched. A further lifeboat was dropped in darkness over the believed position.
In spite of intensive searches for these lifeboats and survivors from other incidents, nothing was found and it is believed that the survivors were found and picked up by the enemy.
[Underlined] HEAD INJURIES. [/underlined]
A medical report from the Emergency Landing Runways states:- “The majority of eye and face injuries are caused by perspex fragments, the eyes and upper head being involved more than the head below the eyes”. Most injuries have been caused by enemy action and the carrying of goggles (to be used whenever possible) by all crew members cannot be too strongly emphasised.
[Underlined] FIRST AID. [/underlined]
The above report also states “First Aid has, on the whole improved, but is still not up to the standard of the Americans. It was felt that poor First Aid was chiefly due to night condition, but that this is not the case has been proved by recent R.A.F. daylight raids. There is still the occasional casualty who has bled to death from a limb arterial wound and which could have been prevented by a properly placed tourniquet”.
Aircrew Safety Officers should institute a drive to improve the standard of First Aid.
[Underlined] THREE GOLDEN RULES. [/underlined]
When in doubt of your ability to:-
(i) Reach an airfield – initiate Emergency and Distress messages.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
(ii) Fly the aircraft – order your crew to “Put on parachutes”.
(iii) Land safely – order your crew to “Crash Landing Stations”.
A little time spent in studying for your own safety will afford you more time to study for your enjoyment.
[Underlined] THE DIVIDENDS. [/underlined]
Air Ministry report that 2161 aircrew (923 R.A.F. and 1238 Americans) were rescued in Home Waters during 1944 making a total, since the War began, of 5,467.
During last December 41 aircrew were rescued – this represents 19.3% of the aircrew involved in known ditchings.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
January produced only 1572 sorties; weather conditions were the retarding factor. The peack [sic] serviceability reached during January was 95.8% of Lancasters on charge: the balance of unserviceable aircraft was made up of aircraft undergoing Major Inspection and aircraft undergoing modification for special commitments. It was singularly fortunate that during this bad weather spell quite a number of aircraft became due, or almost due, for Major Inspection.
[Underlined] ENGINE FAILURES [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLAME TRAPS. [/underlined]
Much progress has been made with the methods of cleaning flame traps, and it is hoped that now local instructions have been given to C.T.O’s to remove flame traps at 150 or 225 hours according to the time available, and also to change the flame traps at any time they are suspected of being choked, that another source of engine failure has been eliminated. Under a scheme evolved by Messrs. Rolls Royce, these flame traps can be cleaned quite successfully in under half an hour. 53 Base are experimenting with their own washing bath and if successful this scheme will be introduced into each Base Major Servicing Section to cater for flame traps throughout the Base.
[Underlined] COOLING DUCTS. [/underlined]
Unfortunately, much unserviceability is being caused by the failure of the one-piece cooling duct and many hours are consumed in changing them after few flying hours. Command are controlling the supply of replacements but the situation is becoming serious owing to the extremely short life of this type of duct.
[Underlined] FAILURE OF NO.2 FUEL TANK. [/underlined]
The work entailed in changing No.2 tank is fully realised. The frequency with which these tanks spring a leak does not decrease, and many high speed tank changes have taken place to get the aircraft off on Ops to time. Although Mod.1179 was introduced with a view to reducing the number of No.2 tank failures, insufficient of these modified tanks have been received in the Service to make themselves felt.; as a result of enquiries, it seems pretty certain that many modified tanks are now coming through. No instance is known of a tank failing subsequent to the incorporation of Mod.1179.
[Underlined] CONTROL OF M.T. [/underlined]
In view of A.M.O. A.30/45, the complete responsibility of the maintenance organisation of Mechanical Transport now rests with the Engineer Branch. Due to a number of reasons which are well known to many, immediate improvements cannot be expected, nor will the position be eased without hard work and perfect co-operation. The broad policy has already been defined by Bomber Command Engineer Staff, and early in February it is anticipated that this Group will be in a position to request the attendance of the Command Engineer Officer to discuss the proposals for placing the M.T. maintenance on a sound footing. Man power is the obvious problem, and even with an increase in maintenance establishment the actual bodies will not be available for some time, if at all.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
This control of transport maintenance is an added responsibility to the already hard pressed C.T.O., but it was the natural course of events that this transfer of responsibility should take place as the first major consideration of the C.T.O. is the serviceability of aircraft, and with an inefficient mechanical transport section, the serviceability suffers considerably. C.T.O’s, in their own interests, must endeavour to give as much thought as possible to this transport problem without detracting from their personal interest in the operational efficiency of the aircraft.
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUEL GAUGES [/underlined]
A demonstration to prove the accuracy of petrol gauges was laid on at Coningsby on the 25th January, but unfortunately the weather intervened and it was agreed that it would be unsafe to carry out these trials; it was most disappointing as it was hoped that the accuracy or otherwise of these gauges would be proved once and for all. The demonstration will be laid on again at some future date, but in the meantime Flight Engineers can do much to help to prove the statement that these petrol gauges are sufficiently accurate to be relied upon. In the new Flight Engineer’s log (B.C. Form 10) on page 3 under the heading “Flowmeter Reading” four columns will be found; all Flight Engineers, in future, must record in these columns petrol gauge readings throughout the trip, paying particular attention to the reading just before landing and then checking the reading again when the aircraft is parked in dispersal. Care must be taken to read the gauge in the tail down position for this check. With the information gained from Flight Engineer’s Logs, and the results of the demonstration, it will be decided if gauge reading should replace dips to ascertain the fuel remaining in an aircraft after a trip.
[Underlined] PETROL CONSUMPTION. [/underlined]
Petrol consumption throughout the Group has shown a marked improvement over the past twelve months, but occasions still arise in squadrons where two or three aircraft use 210 gallons per hour when all other aircraft use an average of 180 gallons per hour. The Flight Engineer Leader must investigate these cases thoroughly. Points to note are air speeds, revs and boost used and A.S.I. in climb and descent. He must check the last six trips of these aircraft; if he finds high consumption in all cases he must report it to the C.T.O. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that it is the pilot and flight engineer to blame, he must report this to the Commanding Officer of the squadron who will undoubtedly see that the erring pilot and flight engineer receive instructions on engine handling.
[Underlined] FRESH RECRUITS. [/underlined]
When a new Flight Engineer reports to a squadron be must be thoroughly examined by the Flight Engineer Leader to ascertain if he is quite capable of carrying out his duties. Questions should be selected from the 5 Group Lancaster Quiz. If it is found that he is weak in any subject, instruction must be given him without delay. If convenient, the Flight Engineer Leader or his deputy should fly with him on his first N.F.T. or cross-country, to check him on aircraft drills and the way in which he handles throttles, rev levers and his fuel tank manipulation in the air. Any faults must be remedied before he becomes operational.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 L.F.S. Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
During the month of January, 54.6% of the night attempts produced successful ground detail photographs, a good figure for this time of the year, and an increase of 8% upon the previous month.
Examination of the table shown on the following page will reveal an improvement in the failures recorded, 5.62% as compared with December, 1944, 9.2% and November, 1944, 12.4%. It should, however, be clearly remembered that discarding the “bomb-door operation” of the F.24 camera is probably one of the causes for this reduction.
The descriptive list still contains many failures which should never occur, and it is hoped that the efforts of all concerned will result in a steady monthly decrease of all technical failures.
Photographers are again reminded that inability to trace the real cause generally results in a failure being classed as “obscure – photographic”. Therefore every effort must be made to root out the causes and to effect cures for future operations.
Now that all units except Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons are using 100% composite film, it will demand all the skill of the photographers and full supervision of the N.C.O’s to ensure that the attention to detail in making up the composite films, and their final processing is carried out in accordance with B.C. Composite Film Instructions. There is no room for slap dash work when working with colour film. Extreme care in making up the film, correct preparation of solutions, and exact time and temperature during processing are essential. Photographers are reminded that this branch of R.A.F. Photography was introduced by photographers of this Group, and the standards set must be maintained by all Bases.
H. 2. S. photography and the equipment, is not yet receiving the attention that is necessary. This branch of photography is as important as the normal F.24 photography, and Senior N.C.O’s are to see to it that all their staff are skilled in producing the best results in the shortest possible time. The local manufacture of perspex trays and fixed vertical enlargers should do much to solve dark-room problems.
It is not enough to produce good photographs, unless they are available for the Air Staff in the shortest possible time, and in this respect the S.I.O’s and Photographic N.C.O’s should remember that A.C.I.U. waits for all films to arrive before commencing their analysis. This is being delayed unnecessarily because some films are not reaching this Headquarters until five and six days after the raid, and in some cases failure films are as much as 14 days overdue. All films, whether ground detail, target conditions, or technical failures, must reach this Headquarters within the time limits prescribed in B.C.Ph.I’s.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS – NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Results Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding those due to Target Conditions –“T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of attempts.
NOTE + (Armt. I = Armt. [underlined] Technical [/underlined] Failures.
(Armt.II = No flash illumination – presumed flash failures.
Owing to the limited number of Day operational sorties during the month of January, 1945, a ladder will not be compiled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
Supplement No.36866 to London Gazette dated 29th December, 1944.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following promotion in, and appointments to, the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire:-
To be Additional Knight Commander of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Air Vice Marshal The Honourable Ralph Alexander Cochrane, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Officer of the Military Division of the Military Division [sic] of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Wing Commander Walter Edward Dunn (35210), Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Members of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Acting Squadron Leader Edwin Maurice Undery (79198) R.A.F.V.R.
Acting Flight Lieutenant Henry Rutter Locke (101687) R.A.F.V.R.
The KING has been graciously please to approve the award of the British Empire Medal (Military Division) to the undermentioned:-
560272 Flight Sergeant Frank Haines, Royal Air Force.
The following IMMEDIATE award were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
W/C J. WOODROFFE, DFC & BAR DSO
W/C M.A. SMITH DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O I.H. BYERS DFC
F/SGT G.F. CARTWRIGHT DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/C J.A. INGHAM, DFC, AFC DSO
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O S.V. GEORGE DFC
SGT W.T. STOKES DFM
F/L W.M. KYNOCH DFC
SGT D.J. ALLEN CGM
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT R.H. PAYNE DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS [/underlined]
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.F. LEWIS DFC
F/O R.G.W. GROSS DFC
F/O B. GRIFFITHS DFC
P/O E.C. REDFERN DFC
P/O G.F. MAULE DFC
P/O W.J. SHEPPARD DFC
F/O J.D. MELROSE DFC
P/O B. TAYLOR DFC
P/O W.R. HORNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J.A. PETERSON DFC
F/O C.H. SHEPHERD DFC
F/O J.W. MOORE DFC
W/O C.B. WATTS DFC
F/O A.R. DEARDEN, DFM DFC
F/SGT R.D. KERR DFM
SGT S.G.D.L. MAJOR DFM
F/O S.A. MORRIS DFC
P/O A.M. HOLMES DFC
SGT A.L. CUNNINGHAM DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT F.A. WELLS DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.E.W. WYNARD, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O P.M. ABBOTT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H.G. McLEOD DFC
F/L H.W.T. ENOCH DFC
F/O E.R. OLIVER DFC
F/O E.H.E. HEARN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O A. GEORGE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O C. SHILLAW DFC
P/O C.V. ALLEN DFC
F/O E. GLOVER DFC
F/O N.J. MacDONALD DFC
F/O J.S. BEARD DFC
F/O M.T. CLARKE DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.J. LING DFC
F/O S. PARKER DFC
F/O H.L. INNISS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. BOOKER DFC
P/O C. SUMMERSCALES DFC
W/O M.F. INGMIRE DFC
F/L W.E. SIDDLE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L A.C. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.J. WOOLNOUGH DFC
P/O W. HARVEY DFC
W/O G.O. EDMUNDS DFC
F/L W.G. COOPER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.B. CANEVER DFC
P/O A. McCRACKEN DFC
F/SGT R. SMITH DFM
F/L C.C. SHERRING DFC
F/O H.W. HAGGERSTON DFC
F/L W.G. ROGERS DFC
F/O W.E. CLAYFIELD DFC
W/O G.A. CARVELL DFC
F/L W.M. REID, DFC BAR TO DFC
S/L W.G. WISHART, DFC & BAR DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O E.W. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.K. BRADY DFC
F/O J.A. GIDDENS DFC
F/O F. PARKER DFC
P/O N.A. FERGUSON DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. HATTAM DFC
F/O B.K. PURDY DFC
F/L G. GARDEN DFC
F/L A.R.H. MORRIS DFC
F/O G.M. DENHOLM DFC
F/O K. SCHULTZ, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.W. BOARD DFC
F/L D.J. JOHNSTONE DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O N.J. ERB DFC
F/O A.W. ALLISON DFC
SGT J. PALIN DFM
P/O V.A. BAGGOTT DFC
F/L D.F. McLAUGHLAN DFC
P/O S.J. HAYTON DFC
P/O H.R. PURSER DFC
P/O L.W. WEAVER DFC
P/O C. DEAN DFC
P/O B.F. KENT DFC
F/O S.A. SEMPLE DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.H. CHENEY DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.G. STEVENS DFC
P/O A.B. NEILSON DFC
P/O J.R. HILL DFC
P/O K.H. YOUDALE DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT W.W.M. DEBOOS, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L J.B. MITCHELL DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.R. KERR DFC
P/O W.K. GOODHEW DFC
F/O H. LONG DFC
P/O D.R. MALLISON DFC
P/O M.A. SWAIN DFC
P/O R.P. MITCHELL DFC
F/O R.L. McCANN DFC
F/SGT E.J. BROWNE DFM
W/C BLOME-JONES DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Results Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COLD WEATHER. [/underlined]
The whole country has recently had one of the coldest spells in human memory; in fact in Lincolnshire we thought it much colder. At any rate Equipment Officers managed to keep their stations fairly warm. In view of the strictness of the regulations on rationing of coal and coke they are to be congratulated.
Equipment Officers should look to their fuel stocks; there may be another cold spell.
[Underlined] THEFT. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers should check every now and again the registered mail book. A case has come to light where an N.C.O. Equipment Assistant made it his job to collect the registered mail and also by some means managed to get the blue I.V’s given to him. Thus by destroying certain of the blues he was able to get away with quite a number of watches.
So carry out surprise checks on the registered mail.
[Underlined] CONFERENCE. [/underlined]
The Group Equipment Officers’ Conference was held this month at Bomber Command. Many points of interest were discussed and the minutes which have been received at this Headquarters will be passed to Base Equipment Officers in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] A LETTER FROM “A DEAD CITY”
We publish below a letter written from Brunswick to a German Soldier on 17th November, 1944. The names and address shown are entirely fictitious, but the letter itself is authentic.
Beckenwerker Strasse 157
Braunschweig
Nov 17
My Dear Karl,
I would have replied to your last letter earlier but in consequence of the great raid on Braunschweig we were without light or water for a long time and we are still without gas. Braunschweig was completely reduced to dust and ashes by a heavy night raid on the 15th. October. We were very lucky – the Forchaus is still standing quite undamaged. The Kraft Durch Freude Hall and factory bay and a hostel were destroyed. It is said that Braunschweig is the most severely damaged town, apart from Darmstadt. Gauleiter Lauterbacher called Braunschweig “the dead city”. Its innumerable citizens were charred or burned in their cellars, there are even yet any number of missing. The numbers of dead runs to about a thousand. All the same the victims are few when considering the destruction. We are at present completely cut off from the world; as our station is destroyed, as well as the signal box and the installations, no trains are arriving here.
We are weary of the war and hope it will end soon. God keep you.
Emma.
Reference is made to the attack by aircraft of this Group on the night of 14/15th October, 1944, which was dealt with in detail and photographs published in the November issue of the NEWS.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR JANUARY, 1945 - £8,711 13. 6d.
A – Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL. [/underlined]
No. 53 Base … 28
No. 54 Base … 28
No. 55 Base … 24
No. 56 Base … 20
No. 75 Base (“For Attention Base Intelligence Officer”) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command … 6
Headquarters, Bombe Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickens, O.R.S., H.Q. B.C. … 1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q., P.F.F., Wyton … 1
P.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (vis H.Q. B.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2 …2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. … 1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr. Nairn M.A.P., Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank, S.W. 1
A/Cdr. H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.), King Charles Street, Whitehall … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey. … 1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C.-in-C., Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C. 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Commodore H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., Headquarters, No.54 Base 1
S/Ldr. D.A. Green, D.S.O., D.F.C., Bomber Command Tactical School, Finningley … 1
Headquarters, No.92 Group … 6
Headquarters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 25, 54, 91, Groups 1
Headquarters, No.29 Group … 12
Nos. 11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No. 16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No. 93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College, Beach Hotel, Weston-Super-Mare 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No.25 Group, School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
92 Group Navigation & Signals Instructors’ School, Little Horwood, Nr. Bletchley, Bucks … 1
Aircrew School, Balderton … 2
Bomber Command Instructors’ School, Finningley … 2
[Underlined] INTERNAL. [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. …1
OPS. 1 … 1
S.MET.O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS. RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE … 1
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Stamp]
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bdy.
2 Minuted.
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V Group News, January 1945
5 Group News, January 1945
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 30, January 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on famous last words, operations, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, signals, gardening, training, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, gunnery, armament, flying control, aircrew safety, engineering, photography, decorations, war effort, equipment, a letter from a dead city, war savings,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1945-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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59 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Germany--Braunschweig
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
France--Royan
Belgium--Houffalize
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Leuna
Czech Republic--Most
Norway--Bergen
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1945-01
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS V
[Picture]
[Page Break]
[Underlined] BASE INTELLIGENCE [/underlined] [Indecipherable]
[Drawing]
[Stamp] [Underlined] Copies to Stns [/underlined]
Base.
[Circled] [Indecipherable [/circled]
FIVE
GROUP
NEWS
JULY
No. 36
1945
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A.O.C.
At mid-night yesterday, Mr. Attlee, our Prime Minister, our Prime Minister, announced the final cessation of the War with Japan. This is great news. At last the world is at peace. To-day, August 15th, is VJ-Day and there can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that we are all greatly relieved that the end of hostilities has at last come. Nevertheless, for some, and particularly those who had volunteered to go to the Far East, there must be a certain sense of disappointment and, no doubt, many will feel annoyed that they personally have not been able to have a crack at the Japs.
The future of 5 Group is now very much in the air and I am unable to give you the answer to the many queries you may have at the moment. I doubt if many heavy bomber Squadrons will be required as part of the occupation forces in Japan, although it is more than possible that one or two of the Squadrons will proceed somewhere out to the East in the near future. It is unlikely that the Government and the Air Ministry will be able to review the many difficult problems and agree on new policy for some days, and, until definite orders are received, all Squadrons should continue their normal training and their normal routine of work.
More than any other Group, 5 Group has had a particularly difficult time since VE-Day. The Squadrons have undergone many changes; some Squadrons have been disbanded; others moved to new Stations; there has been a vast change round of personnel to ensure that only those fit and eligible for the Far East were left in those Units proceeding overseas. Many others have left the Service but, in spite of all this change, I have noticed that many long and arduous hours of training have been put in by Squadron and Station personnel to prepare themselves for what was to have been a very hard role in the Pacific. In addition to this training, I decided to carry out a series of inspections of all Stations. I have now completed six out of the ten and have been very impressed with the high standard of smartness and efficiency which have been attained at those Stations which I have inspected. I realise that many man hours of hard work have been put in by all ranks, both in the training and preparation of Squadrons for war against Japan and also to attain such a high standard of cleanliness at Stations.
Much of the material and information contained in this “5 Group News” is now out of date, but I have, nevertheless, decided to issue it in spite of the fact that all hostilities have now ceased. I thank all ranks for their hard work and fine spirit of co-operation during these last few months, and I know full well that, if 5 Group had managed to reach the Pacific before the end of hostilities, the various Units that have been preparing themselves for War, would have put up a very fine show.
MORTON HALL,
[Underlined] 15th August, 1945. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
The weather, particularly at the beginning of the month, did not prove very helpful in enabling the Group to put in as many flying hours as was hoped for. The G.T.I’s Flying Training Chart shows little or no increase in night flying training from the period 6th – 11th July to the period 23rd – 29th July, while the day flying line shows a steady rise with very few breaks throughout the month.
During their visits to Stations and Squadrons throughout the Group, the G.T.I. and his training Specialist Officers have noticed a lethargic attitude in some Squadrons to Tiger training. Such phrases as “We’ve got plenty of time to go yet”, “The War will be finished before we get there”, and “Do you think we’ll go?” have been heard time and time again. It should have become apparent by now that there is only a limited time available for training and that every opportunity should be made to seize every spare hour for ground training and every period of fine weather for air training. Certain Squadrons have already found out that there is even less time than they thought left for training on this side of the world.
As for the phrase “The War will be finished before we get there” – unless crews finish their training thoroughly they won’t get there at all, and it is to be borne in mind that there are still immense areas of land and sea yet to be regained. As is well known, the Jap is a fanatical fighter and does not give up until he is dead. There are millions of Japs who have yet to be made to give up in Burma, Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra, Thailand and French Indo-China, to say nothing of Japan, China and Manchuria, where the Japs are most firmly rooted. As regards to the question “Do you think we’ll go?” – the answer is “Yes”.
The G.T.I. and the Training Specialists welcome 460 and 75 Squadrons into the Group. When the G.T.I. first visited these Squadrons and explained the number of hours flying and number of hours ground lectures required from them, one of the first remarks was “What – only 22 1/2 hours training per crew per month: that is 675 hours per Squadron … We shall get over 1,000 hours in next month”.
Whilst figures of flying times are not a perfect indication of training done, they provide a fairly sound means of assessing the training efforts of individual Squadrons. Therefore to enable Squadron Commanders to appreciate the position of their Squadron in relation to the rest of the Group, the flying times for June and July are given below:-
[Table of Flying Times by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] OTHER SPECIAL UNITS [/underlined]
[Table of Flying Times by Unit]
No. 467 Squadron is congratulated on its training effort, particularly since it has been at R.A.F. Metheringham, where it has done over 1,000 hours during July.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER [/underlined]
Tiger Squadrons in Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and R.A.F. Stations Syerston are progressing satisfactorily with Link Training in B.A.B.S. and Radio Range. No.54 Base Squadrons, however, are a long way behind and there is room for great improvement.
Nos.44 and 619 Squadrons put in a total of 90 hours before they left the Group in the middle of the month.
[Table of Aircrew Hours by Base and Squadron]
Total hours by Group – 1,285
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
Total Categorised in Group = 270
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
Group Captain Vickers, D.S.O., Chief Signals Officer, Tiger Force, who has just returned from a tour of the American Theatre of Operations, visited this Headquarters on Saturday, 4th August, and gave us a very interesting and descriptive lecture on the Signals facilities in use there. As the Tiger Force will be operating in conjunction with the American Air Forces, the existing facilities are practically those which Tiger Force will be required to adopt. A brief outline of these facilities is given below.
[Underlined] AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS [/underlined]
Group or Wing (American equivalent to our Group) have W/T control channels in the 3 mc, 6 mc and 8 mc bands, keyed simultaneously throughout the 24 hours, thus affording the air operator three channels of reception, dependent upon the time of day or night the aircraft is airborne. Broadcasts are made at half-hourly intervals and control, in general, is similar to that of our G.C.F. Weather information is broadcast on these channels every hour in the U.C.O. P.A.C. (the weather code used in that theatre).
H.F./D.F. facilities are available, but our Wireless Operators must train themselves to request QUJ instead of QDM as used in this country. H.F./D.F. fixing facilities are available in an emergency. MF/DF facilities are not available, but other aids, such as M/F Beacons, Radio Ranges and V.H.F. Homing facilities are numerous. I.F.F. is also carried and can be used for fixing purposes in an emergency. R/T communication is by V.H.F. and each Group or Wing has V.H.F./D.F. facilities for homing when within 100 miles from Base. Weather information is also broadcast by R/T at four minute intervals once aircraft are within 100 miles from Base.
[Underlined] CODES AND PUBLICATIONS [/underlined]
As all ground W/T Stations already hold C.S.P.1270 (the American Aircraft Code) the problem of supply is greatly reduced if Tiger Force adopt the same code. Wireless Operators will find this code similar to our own C.D.0250 except that it is a four letter code instead of two as in C.D.0250. The lay-out is similar and spare groups are allotted for any specific requirement. In each of these codes, which change about every four days, is an authenticator table which is used extensively. The method of authentication, while not quite similar to that in C.C.B.P.127, is on the same lines, and Wireless Operators should have no difficulty in learning the procedure. Weather information is obtained, normally by the Group or Wing W/T broadcasts, in code, using the U.C.O. P.A.C. – a code similar to our own U.C.O. Request. If a more detailed weather report is required, it can be requested, and this information is supplied in another weather code – W.A.F.3. In any message where the need for speed outweighs the need for security, Q Code or plain language can be used.
[Underlined] AIR/SEA RESCUE [/underlined]
As most operations involve long hours of flying over water, the facilities for Air/Sea Rescue are well organised. Practically every island in Allied hands has an Air/Sea Rescue Unit located on it. In addition to these units, which maintain a continuous W/T watch on two
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
exclusive distress frequencies, there is an elaborate organisation of Naval aircraft (Dumbos) at rendezvous points along the track. B.29 aircraft (Super Dumbos) are also circling rendezvous points on track, and submarines and destroyers are at pre-arranged stations on the route. Aircraft, surface vessels and submarines all maintain a continuous listening watch on the above two distress frequencies, and in addition on the international distress frequency (500 k/cs). A V.H.F. watch is also maintained so that aircraft in distress have no less than four channels of communication with rescue craft.
[Underlined] CLIMACTIC CONDITIONS AFFECTING RADIO RECEPTION [/underlined]
The climactic conditions in the theatre where Tiger Force aircraft will be located, will at times adversely affect radio reception, and Wireless Operators must be trained to overcome “atmospherics”. Morse reception through interference must be regularly practiced to enable Wireless Operators to overcome the conditions which prevail.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
W/T and R/T silence are normally maintained throughout an operation, unless otherwise ordered, or when aircraft are in an emergency or distress.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
As everyone must know by this time, the latest Bullseye exercise carried out by this Group was practically ruined by another case of inadvertent radiation of intercomm. on V.H.F. The details have been fully covered in this Headquarters letter 5G/S.14500/9/Sigs., dated 3rd August. At the risk, however, of being accused of emphasising the obvious, the main points to be noted are repeated below:-
(a) If satisfactory V.H.F. reception is not obtained by H – 10, the whole set is to be switched off. Instructions can still be obtained by W/T.
(b) All crews of Marker Force, Flare Force and Master Bomber aircraft are to be reminded of the need to watch the neon “V.H.F. R/T on transmit” indicator lamp from H – 30 until the end of the attack.
(c) Captains of Nos. 9 and 617 Squadron aircraft which require V.H.F. for landing, are to ensure that the V.H.F. H/T switch is not put in the “On” position until the aircraft are within 50 miles of Base on return.
(d) All crews must receive constant instruction on the contents of 5 Group A.S.I. Part VI, Sigs/1.
(e) The transmissions made by the Master Bomber, his deputy and the Link aircraft during the period H – 16 to H – 10 serve as the V.H.F. R/T reception test for all other aircraft. These transmissions must therefore be made in a precise, deliberate manner. All volume controls should be set at maximum volume during this period.
[Underlined] WIRLESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Tiger Training [/underlined] Throughout July the training of Wireless Operators (Air) for Tiger Force continued satisfactorily and results so far obtained are gratifying. Many Squadrons have almost finished the Ground Training Syllabus and revision will ensure that all Wireless Operators are 100% trained. The results of loop and Radio Range training have been very good – Wireless Operators obtaining good loop bearings and Pilots carrying out successful Beam flying. Perfect-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ion in this type of homing to an airfield is absolutely essential in the new theatre and only constant practice at every available opportunity will ensure this. It Is hoped to have all aircraft fitted with American type Radio Range Receiver for use by Pilots only, thus the Wireless Operator will have his Marconi equipment free to use for any other purpose. The training on “Consol” beacons has been held up due to lack of information regarding the beacons in use and for charts to cover them. It is hoped, however, to have all the information of these beacons which are in operation in the European Theatre very soon, so that air training can be carried out, but as there are not yet “Consol” facilities in the new theatre this training should come at the bottom of your priority training list.
[Underlined] Squadron Signals Training Trophy [/underlined] The result of the Squadron Signals Training Trophy competition was announced during July. The winner was No.44 Squadron, whose training room was an outstanding example of what can be done to make these rooms places where Wireless Operators can really find inspiration and interest in every phase of their work. Second and third places in the competition were won by 57 and 83 Squadrons respectively. The standard of all Signals training rooms was very high throughout, and showed that Signals Leaders and Wireless Operators really had taken a keen interest in their layout and cleanliness – Good work chaps – keep it up, and remember when you may be in a tent in some far land, that these too can be kept clean, tidy and made places of interest. The same spirit which prevailed in your training rooms here can be maintained despite all they may say about fungus, mosquitoes, sunshine and rain – not to mention some yellow rats which will soon be dealt with.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise [/underlined] This exercise has been re-arranged, thus enabling the two new Squadrons to No.5 Group to take part. The work carried out during July has been up to standard, though there are still a few cases of incorrect tuning which must be eliminated. Nos.75 and 460 Squadrons will find this exercise their introduction to 5 Group W/T Control, and practice will soon make them quite familiar with the procedure.
[Underlined] W/T Controllers’ Test [/underlined] Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their splendid efforts to get all their Wireless Operators qualified as W/T Controllers. At the end of July only four Operators of 97 Squadron and 7 of 83 Squadron had still to pass the tests laid down in 5 G. S.S.I. No.13. We should like to see a percentage of all Wireless Operators in each Squadron passing out as W/T controllers, as there is always the possibility that they may be called upon to carry out these duties.
[Underlined] Signals Leaders [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to the two new Signals Leaders to the Group, namely F/Lt Baxter, Signals Leader, No.75 (N.Z.) Squadron and F/O Moir, Signals Leader, No.460 Squadron. We hope that they are now settled down in their new quarters and will soon be familiar with 5 Group Signals technique.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
[Underlined] Gee [/underlined] The news came as a bombshell late last month, that as a result of consultations in the Theatre, and the need to conserve shipping space, Gee was not to be used by the Tiger Force. Training in this equipment for both aircrew and maintenance personnel was to cease immediately. Although the consternation of the navigators was great, the maintenance side was no less concerned, because in three years of operational development Gee became a sound and reliable equipment, easy to maintain and relatively fault free. However, the Loran and Rebecca combination will do the work of Gee from the operational point of view. We have had experience of Loran, and if our efforts to obtain Modification IV are successful, with the divider troubles elimin-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ated, we can hope for high serviceability. Few of us have had experience with Rebecca, but the equipment was developed by other Commands and with constant practice there should be little difficulty in maintenance.
[Underlined] Workshop Convoys [/underlined] At a rather sultry conference at Coningsby the final form of the workshop convoys was decided. Bomber Command rules that the 3 H.P. Motors were not to be removed from the R.V. 421B, although provision could be made to allow this to be done in the Theatre. The only major modification what was approved by Bomber Command was the installation of a scanner on the roof of the R.V.420B, this work to be carried out by Coningsby.
The task of the preparation of these vehicles for operational use fell on the No.381 M.U. detachment at Coningsby. The work included the installation of bench sets, the scanner modifications, minor re-arrangement of shelving and other work. Five convoys had to be completed in ten days, and the fact that the work is well up to schedule reflects great credit on F/O Milsom in charge of the job, and the remainder of the personnel concerned.
[Underlined] ADMONITORY SONNET [/underlined]
O, ye who venture forth in War’s array
To fight vile Nippon’s hordes, the yellow foe,
From some Pacific islet far away,
Know ye that there ye’ll find no G.P.O.?
All those of ye with gadget minds take heed,
The surplus fittings of the German war
Will vanish quite. Austere will be, indeed,
Your future days compared with those of yore.
Reproach us not in future when you find
That telephones are quantitively few,
And qualitively very far behind
The standards which in England you once knew.
One cheerful note! Be very sure we’ll fix
That telephones supplied aren’t candlesticks!
(Anon. (Circa 1945))
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION TRAINING [/underlined]
The training programme is proceeding satisfactorily. Navigators and Set Operators are making ample use of the aids available with the exception of loop and radio range bearings. These seem to be avoided like a plague, or, if they are not entirely neglected, the Navigators [underlined] do not use them. [/underlined]
They lack faith in them. Why? Providing the loop is swung satisfactorily and the Wireless Operator takes great care in obtaining his readings, the resulting bearings should be very accurate. “Alright”, you may say, “but the bearings we get are hopeless, never nearer than 10 miles to the actual position.” Well, you have the solution in your own hands – either the loops are not correctly swung or the Wireless Operator is not doing his job properly. We repeat, the solution is in your own hands.
Apart from these two aids, however, the impressive array of navigational aids are being used to full advantage. In fact, too much so in the case of Gee. A few navigators have taken a commonsense attitude towards “Gee” and so not use it unless it is required in an emergency. They navigate with the assistance of the other and more difficult-to-manipulate aids. This is sound common sense and can result in one thing only – a very high standard of efficiency. But what of those people who do not adopt this rightful attitude, who continually obtain Gee fixes even though they have serviceable H2S, Loran and loop? By pursuing this policy they will never attain a high degree of manipulation skill, nor will they gain real confidence in other aids. Therefore, leave Gee alone. Discard it altogether. Use it only in an emergency – then you will quickly gain efficiency – and confidence – in all your other “boxes of tricks”.
The Drift Sights and G.P.I’s are not yet available in sufficient quantities to allow fitting to aircraft, and it may not be possible for crews to obtain flying practice with these instruments until Squadrons receive their new aircraft, which is leaving it very late. To compensate for this crews must get the maximum ground practice. It is not quite the same thing, but nearly so. Both these instruments are easy to manipulate and it requires but a little time and effort to become proficient in their use. Therefore, get as much practice as you can, reduce the drills to habit and then you can perform the actions automatically. (A tip here- always try to reduce your work to a series of habits, it then becomes much simpler to perform. If you have to think about a thing before you can do it, you use up energy – a lot of energy. If you can do it habitually then very little energy is required. There is no need to wear yourself out navigating for a few hours – so, make a habit of each and every drill. On every occasion you obtain a fix, go through the complete cycle of obtaining a wind, G/S and E.T.A. check and altering course if necessary. Do this a few times and you have reduced the whole thing to a habit – a very good habit too, because as a result you will be a very reliable and efficient Navigator).
To sum up, Navigation training is proceeding satisfactorily, but a little more attention is required in the direction of Loop bearings, Drift Sights and G.P.I’s. Polish off these three and we may
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
consider the training situation very satisfactory.
[Underlined] FAR EASTERN NAVIGATION FLASHES [/underlined]
(a) Serviceability of Radar aids ‘out there’ is approximately 92%.
(b) Loran ranges fluctuate violently, maximum 1500 nautical miles, minimum 700 nautical miles.
(c) Wireless reception satisfactory, no undue interference from any source. Bearings and emergency fixes therefore easily obtainable and reliable.
(d) Maps and Charts for the Far East are now ready. Two copies of each sheet are being forwarded to Squadrons for perusal.
[Underlined] ASTRO COMPASS [/underlined]
Agreement has at last been reached on the position to be occupied by the Astro Compass in Lancaster aircraft. This is on the starboard side of the coaming which is just forward of the Navigator’s table. A trial installation was held at an 8 Group Station recently and this position seemed very satisfactory. It is easy to get at, very easy to manipulate and is also easily stowed.
Owing to great pressure of work it may be impossible for the Astro Compass to be mounted in this position in the existing aircraft, but some compensation will be found in the fact that the new aircraft which we shall shortly receive will have the Astro Compass correctly positioned. Crews will, therefore, not have much opportunity of practice in using this instrument in the correct position, but continue to obtain the maximum possible practice whilst it is situated in the present position, so that when you do get the new aircraft you will require only familiarisation.,
[Underlined] DRIFT SIGHT [/underlined]
A final position for the fitting of the U.S. Navy Mark VI Drift Sight into Lancaster aircraft has not yet been decided. The present approved position is aft of the flare chute; it is considered to be far from ideal. We in this Group are therefore experimenting by fitting the sight in different positions in the nose of the aircraft. The most obvious and easily accessible position has been vetoed by the larger escape hatch about to be incorporated in the production line aircraft. A second position just aft of the bomb sight is now being perfected and it is earnestly hoped that it will be satisfactory for everyone. A decision on this matter will be reached before the end of August.
Once again, however, no matter what the approved position, it will be impossible to have the sights installed in the existing aircraft, so crews must obtain the maximum practice, ground practice in this instance, on the instructional “mock up”. It is not very difficult to manipulate this new drift sight and fifteen minutes practice should be sufficient to make everyone at least partly proficient. Much experience can be gained of course, either during the short time between the arrival of the new aircraft and the “fly out”, or whilst on the “fly out”.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
(a) [Underlined] Station Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE – Waddington – S/Ldr Evans, D.F.C.
Bardney – S/Ldr Rumbles, D.F.C.
Skellingthorpe – S/Ldr Bray, D.F.C.
551 Wing - F/Lt Johnson.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
54 BASE – Coningsby – S/Ldr Baxter, D.S.O., D.F.C.
Woodhall – S/Ldr Bennett, D.F.M.
Metheringham – S/Ldr Martin, D.F.C.
552 Wing – S/Ldr Hatch, D.F.C.
553 Wing – S/Ldr Ayles, D.F.C., D.F.M.
55 BASE East Kirkby – S/Ldr St.Clair Miller, D.F.C.
Spilsby – F/Lt McKinnon, D.F.C.
SYERSTON – S/Ldr De Friend, D.F.M.
(b) [Underlined] Squadron Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE 9 Squadron – F/Lt Peasfield
189 Squadron – F/Lt Booth
463 Squadron – F/Lt Markham
617 Squadron – F/Lt Martin
54 BASE 83 Squadron – F/Lt Bowes
97 Squadron – F/Lt Woolcott
106 Squadron – F/Lt Curry
467 Squadron – F/Lt Pickard
627 Squadron – F/Lt Tyce
55 BASE 57 Squadron – F/Lt Bradley
75 Squadron – F/O Parsons
207 Squadron – F/Lt Gully
460 Squadron – F/Lt Young
SYERSTON 49 Squadron – F/O Prentice
This month we have said goodbye to two stalwarts of the “Union”, namely S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C, and S/Ldr Crowe, D.F.C. Both of them have been with us for a very considerable period and have done outstanding work. They have been responsible in no small part for the progress of Navigation in this Group during the last two years. We are very sorry to see them go, because they will be sorely missed, but we wish them every success and the very best of luck in “civvy street”.
[Underlined] BOUQUETS [/underlined]
After omitting the “bouquets” for two months, it has been decided to re-introduce them. Below is a list of the two best training efforts from each Base during the month of July. The navigators have been chosen for their consistently accurate work, rigid adherence to system, constant checking of winds, ground speeds and E.T.A’s, and log and chart work, particularly chart work, of a very high order.
53 BASE 1. F/O Burke 463 Squadron
2. F/O MacIntyre 453 Squadron
54 BASE 3. F/Lt Stevens 106 Squadron
4. F/S Barker 97 Squadron
55 BASE 5. F/S Mancer 57 Squadron
6. F/O Huggins 57 Squadron
SYERSTON 7. F/O Prentice 49 Squadron
No one is barred from this competition. We do not ask for ultra neatness; the qualifications are as stated in the introductory paragraph. All of you can produce exemplary work if you try. You have the knowledge, you have the necessary Navigational aids available, and all that is required is hard work and common sense on your part. You will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
see that it is possible for anyone to qualify as one of the seven best Navigators in the Group. You have been given knowledge, now apply it, and produce some really first-class work. We do not like to see the same name appearing each month and are always anxious to replace the “old timers” with a newcomer. Let us therefore see a new list of names next month, and YOU make sure your name is on the list.
[Underlined] ALLOCATION OF DUTIES IN THE NAVIGATION SECTION [/underlined]
Checks carried out in all Navigation Sections throughout last month have shown that a number of Navigation Officers are loath to appoint the more senior Navigators to assist them in their multifarious tasks. It is the view of a few of them that as they are responsible for the entire section they should do all the work; but this is an unwise policy. It is impossible for a Squadron Navigation Officer to carry out all the necessary work himself. Consequently it is necessary to delegate authority to the senior Navigators in the Section. In nine out of every ten cases it will be found that these people are only too willing to assist the Navigation Officer in any way. Therefore, Squadron Navigation Officers, do not take upon yourselves entirely the burden of the Navigation Section – share this responsibility with your experienced Navigators and make your task, and in fact your life, much easier to bear.
A word to you Senior Navigators – do your bit for the “Union” and give your Navigation Officer all the assistance you possibly can. Take over one or two of his minor duties, such as looking after Order Books, supervising stores etc., By such action you will help not only the Squadron Navigation Officer, but you will also improve the efficiency of your Section.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS [/underlined]
The average error for the month was 2.7 knots, an improvement of .3 knots on the last two month’s figures.
Once again we are treading the path of progress! By the combined and determined efforts pf every Navigation team the bombing vector error is being systematically reduced to what may well be considered a negligible error.
Don’t forget that we set ourselves the task of reducing this error to 2.5 knots. It can be done as five Squadrons have shown this month; press on therefore, and let us obtain our objective immediately.
[Table of Vector Errors Ranked by Squadron]
No.189 Squadron have dropped with a very big bang from 3rd place last month to bottom of the ladder this month. This month’s vector error is the highest ever obtained by No.189 Squadron since their formation. We hope they will never again obtain such a distinction. Come on now 189 Squadron, make a really determined effort this month and let us see you at the top of the ladder next month!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVOGRAPHS [/underlined]
Did you decipher the word picture couplets included in last month’s News? If you didn’t here they are:-
[Underlined] Couplet No.1 [/underlined] “Destination Tokyo – a very long hop,
Maintain track or you’ll get the chop.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.2 [/underlined] “Loran, H2S. Rebecca and Gee,
Keep your future trouble free.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.3 [/underlined] “Accurate winds so timing sound,
Target pranged, then homeward bound.”
Now, although these word pictures may have provided a very welcome diversion when reading through the News, it was our intention that they should bring home to you, with great force, the morals enclosed therein. Did they have this effect on you, and did you apply the morals immediately?
Those of you who did not decipher them and did not, therefore, get the gist of the thing, now have the answers given to you – now it is up to you to apply them immediately [underlined] and always. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place amongst the Gee transmitting stations during the past month – changes intended to standardize [sic] the system in Europe for peace time Air Force flying, for certain operations taking place in the Italian zone, and to bring all frequencies on the same RF Unit.
As the majority of these changes have taken place with little or no warning, there may still be doubt amongst some Navigators as to the correct frequencies to use for the now standardized [sic] chains. To counteract this confusion, details of the new frequencies are outlined below.
[Table of Gee Chain Frequencies and Ident Blinks]
+ New chains – not yet working.
Information relating to Gee in the Far Eastern Theatre is going to cause considerable heartburning amongst Navigators and Pilots alike, as it is now definitely known that no Gee Chain is to be provided there. To ensure that crews reach a high standard of efficiency in navigating without this aid, it is expected that instructions will shortly be issued for Gee to be taken out of all aircraft. It must, however, be emphasised that Gee is not the be all and end all of navigation and has never superceded [sic] the basic principles of navigation. Therefore, however great the loss of this aid may seem at first, air navigation will not become impossible. Other aids are available, equally as accurate, and crews must develop them to a high standard.
When this instruction is issued, Pilots, Navigators and Set Operators must therefore concentrate on Loran, to ensure a higher standard of fixing accuracy, and on Rebecca and Radio Range for more accurate homing. Only by determination and continued training can crews overcome the disadvantages which will necessarily result from the taking out of Gee.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
The training of crews in H2S Navigation and Blind Bombing is progressing satisfactorily throughout the Group despite the shortages of equipment and the lower serviceability rate.
With the expected loss of Gee, H2S is quickly becoming the most accurate method of overland navigation, and much greater importance must be paid to its homing facilities in view of the nature of the Pacific Bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
An accuracy in fixing, equal to that of Gee, is not expected but one of less than 1 1/2 miles (this is about the present error) is demanded and can be obtained, providing set operators are made aware of their responsibilities, particularly when using H2S fixes for windfinding. The less accurate a crew is in H2S fixing, the lower will be their standard in blind bombing.
No relaxation in H2S training can therefore be allowed, in fact greater effort is essential and instructors and crews alike must take every opportunity of furthering their ability in the use of H2S, both for navigational and blind bombing purposes.
On the last Bullseye, instructions were issued for all crews to blind bomb on Bristol and take a P.P.I. photograph within 30 seconds of release. The results obtained were far from gratifying, and it was noted that many operators had forgotten the most elementary principles of blind bombing and P.P.I. photography.
It is hard to realise that some crews even attempted bombing on the 30 mile scan, others had too large 10 mile zeros, and many did not make any serious attempt at obtaining a decent photograph.
Great emphasis is being placed upon Blind Bombing and P.P.I. photography in the Far East, and results such as these reflect seriously upon the upon the attitude which is being adopted in the training for the Pacific. No.5 Group has been, and is, a precision bombing Group on visual targets, it must retain that distinction in Blind Bombing. Let the results obtained on the next Bullseye prove this beyond doubt. It is up to every crew to see that it turns in the best effort possible, and Instructors must watch their briefing if this is to be achieved.
No.97 Squadron have challenged the remainder of the squadrons in 5 Group to a blind bombing competition. This competition to take place as soon as sufficient crews are blind bombing trained and the Plotting Unit at Ipswich is operating. By the use of IPSWICH and the plotting unit all crews will have the same advantages and each aircraft will be plotted within the same degree of accuracy. Conditions of the competition are to be agreed shortly and forwarded to all Units. The results should prove interesting in view of the various types of equipment which will have to be used.
[Underlined] REBECCA [/underlined]
More Rebecca equipment is becoming available daily, and many crews will soon have the opportunity of testing this aid for themselves.
With the likelihood of Gee being taken out of aircraft, Rebecca will be the main Radar homing aid, and if used correctly is far more accurate than Gee.
Training is comparatively simple and quick, but requires constant practice. Don’t let the equipment lie forgotten once you’ve learnt how to use it. Make it your job to home on Rebecca to your Base after every flight – you may have need of it someday.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran is coming into it’s [sic] own. Gee is out in the Pacific Theatre.
This is a plain statement of fact, not to be passed over lightly. Loran facilities in the Far East are not all they ought to be but providing an operator has the basic principles at his finger-tips, can take a fix accurately and can correct simple faults, navigation in the Far East should be just as simple as in Europe.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
It is known that the United States Army Air Forces are obtaining Loran with a reasonable degree of accuracy to the coast of Japan. A further Master Station and Slave are being provided to give position lines running N.E. to S.W. and coupled with the present facilities, reasonable coverage should result.
It has been evident from reports received after Cross-countries and other flying exercises that insufficient care is being taken in fixing. Complaints have been made that Loran is inaccurate over this country, fixes being in error etc. Investigations often prove that the wrong skywave has been used, or that the count has been made incorrectly. Watch these points carefully, particularly identification of skywaves, as this will be extremely important in the areas in which you may be operating in the Pacific Theatre.
[Underlined] RADAR ALTIMETER SCR718C [/underlined]
Supplies of this equipment are extremely short, and up to the present time little use has been made of the aid.
There is one little point to stress however. This altimeter can be used to show when an aircraft is over sea or over land. Over sea the reflected pulse is very steady – over land the pulse moves about most irregularly. Watch this point when you have a chance and see if you can detect your change from sea to land.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
During the month S/Ldr S.J. Abbott relinquished the post of Group Bombing Leader to go back to “Civvy Street” and his old job in the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police Force.
Never the spectacular type, as probably became his Police Force training, S/Ldr Abbott’s quiet efficiency was a contributory factor in the Group’s present high standard of bombing accuracy. Much was achieved during his 10 months spell of duty, and, in saying farewell, all of us wish him every success in his new post.
His is one job where the bowler hat will be useful anyway!!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
Far too many crews saw the end of July without achieving a bombing category. It is realised that most crews were starting July from scratch, owing to re-shuffling, but every effort must be made to categorise all crews as soon as possible.
[Underlined] AN OUTSTANDING RESULT [/underlined]
No.97 Squadron (F/Lt Coates) report a magnificent effort on the part of F/Lt Wilkinson and crew. The error achieved was a CREW error of 23 yards converted to 20,000 feet. This is really excellent, particularly so as their Air Bomber is actually a Squadron trained PILOT/FLIGHT ENGINEER; what makes the feat even more remarkable is that it was the first exercise completed by this crew.
This is an all time record for No.5 Group, and can’t possibly fall far short of the “best ever” for Mark XIV bombing.
Congratulations to:-
F/Lt Wilkinson (P) F/Sgt Salter (P/FE) F/O Collins (Nav)
not forgetting the Rear Gunner for keeping his turret still!!
[Underlined] REMOTE CONTROL INDICATORS [/underlined]
No.207 Squadron have been carrying out trials with a Remote Control attachment to the Mark XIV Sighting Head. This attachment is operated by the Navigator who feeds Sighting Angle and Drift to the Sighting Head. The object of the attachment is to cope with winds above those for which the Mark XIV is built (i.e. over 66 knots Indicated) and it is worked in conjunction with the Emergency Computor [sic] You will be hearing more of this later.
[Underlined] THE M.P.I. TRAINER [/underlined]
The purpose of this trainer is to give Air Bombers practice in judging the Mean Point of Impact of various Target Indicator Patterns. S/Ldr Graham Rogers (No.54 Base Bombing Leader) reports that the Trainer is proving extremely popular and Air Bombers are not finding it easy to judge the centre of a group both quickly and accurately. The trainer works on a similar principle to the A.M.B.T. and is about the size of a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
pin-table (hence its popularity!) Twenty slides are provided, each having a pattern of six Green T.I’s. No.1 slide being a compact group, the groups becoming more scattered as the slide number increases until finally, No.20 requires considerable thought. Errors can be measured both for Line and Range from the scales provided. It is hoped that all Air Bombers will see that they derive maximum benefit from the trainer when it is allocated to their Squadron.
[Underlined] NEW INCENDIARY BOMBS [/underlined]
Models of new incendiary bombs, which we shall use “out there” will be coming along to all Squadrons. Study these and get all the gen you can on them from your Armament Officer.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The N.C.O. i/c Wainfleet Bombing Range reports that 2,286 bombs and 667 T.I’s were plotted during the month. This number could be stepped up considerably if only Squadrons would spread their bombing times more evenly throughout the day. Early morning and evening details are the answer.
[Underlined] BEST CREW ERRORS FOR JULY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error
9 F/O Bloodworth F/S Turner F/S Walker 64 – 75
F/O Plowman F/O Frazer F/S Esterman 48 – 57
F/O Myatt F/S Cubitt F/S Smith 62
S/L Blair F/O Skinner F/O Herks 58
57 F/L Nichols F/S Knight F/S Sheldon 72
S/L King F/O Crate F/O Thom 67
F/L Karop F/S Drackett F/S Fishman 76
F/O Wood F/S Crowther F/S Streathfield 72
F/L Appleton F/S Stevens W/O Cobb 68
97 F/L Wilkinson F/S Salter (P/F.E.) F/O Collins 23
463 F/O Houngan F/S Niblock P/O Pepper 58
F/O Ferris F/S Cliff F/O Richardson 74
467 F/L Morris F/S Gillespie F/S Silver 51
617 F/O Taylor F/S Shires F/S Bache 54
F/O Young F/S Hill F/S Howell 53
F/L Martin F/S Tedder P/O Barlow 65
S/L Ward F/L Sumpter F/O Christian 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Competition Results]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Base and Squadron [/underlined]
[Underlined] No.627 Squadron [/underlined] 668 T.I’s – Average error 118 yards.
176 Practice Bombs – Average Error 81 yards.
F/O George’s average error was 54 yards for 5 exercises – good show!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] gunnery
Since our last issue, Squadrons preparing for service with the Tiger Force have completed 75-80% of the Training Syllabus. This is a remarkably good effort, and Gunnery sections concerned are to be congratulated on the fine showing and the results obtained.
During the next few weeks it is hoped that aircraft recognition will be given as much priority as possible, in order that there will be no doubt in the mind of any gunner when called upon to identify aircraft. Most gunners by now have an excellent working knowledge of the .5 and a little study in one’s spare time should be sufficient to keep in touch with this gun.
It is refreshing to note that gunners have taken an active interest in subjects dealing with the “other fellow’s jobs” and Base Gunnery Leaders report that of the many gunners questioned, quite 75% have exhibited a marked degree of “gen”.
The new type of flying suit has been tested recently and most gunners have commented with enthusiasm on this equipment. The diligence displayed during the test of this clothing has given satisfaction, and we look forward to a general issue of the new suits as and when such issue becomes possible.
Owing to the fact that all Squadrons within the Group are conforming to the Tiger Training Syllabus, the “Order of Merit” for Fighter Affiliation Exercises is now cancelled.
Trials have been carried out in the FN.82 – reports of which have been submitted to Bomber Command. In the meantime, gunners are advised to rehearse speedy exit from the FN.82 – one or two helpful points being:-
(i) Avoiding the V.O.M. adjacent to the right leg.
(ii) Ensuring the freedom of the right foot before falling out.
(iii) Familiarising oneself with the Hand Rotation Lever (This is difficult to operate in its present position and will call for practice in manipulation).
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
Total Day Affiliation = 333: Total Night Affiliation = 142.
Total Number of Affiliation Exercises for July = 475.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] tactics
Recent reports from 21st Bomber Command, U.S.A.A.F., have shown that Japanese night ground defences are rapidly assuming the proportions, if not the accuracy, of the Germans’. Superforts operating at night have reported accurate coning by radar controlled searchlights, with intense concentrations of heavy and light flak in the cones. The Japs’ task is, of course, made easier by the low altitude at which the Superforts operate at night, and also by the very low concentration rate over the target, allowing a large proportion of the attacking aircraft to be engaged individually.
Japanese night fighters have still apparently got a lot to learn, and are learning the hard way by attacking with navigation and cockpit lights burning. They have, however, had some success when attacking aircraft illuminated by searchlights, the old German “Wilde Sau” technique, and have on occasion pressed their attacks to very close range. We can expect an increase in this form of attack, as it has the advantages of not needing efficient A.I. and also, day fighters can be used.
The latest phenomenon over Japan at night is the “Ball of Fire”. Variously described as a “flaming onion” or “Fiery rocket”, it has all the hallmarks of the rocket projectile used by the Germans in the closing weeks of the war. In fact, one Superfort crew has reported “a small winged projectile with flames emitting from it”. Unless it is a great improvement on the German model it is likely to be merely an interesting addition to the other fireworks commonly seen over a target at night.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION ON THE BULLSEYE [/underlined]
The one Bullseye flown this month, on the night off the 23rd, showed once again the overwhelming advantage possessed by night-fighters in moonlight conditions. We had 154 Lancasters airborne and the fighters claimed 161 successful combats, a total amassed by only 24 Mosquitos! The fighter pilots reported that our Gunners were keeping a very poor look-out over the Channel, but improved over the land. One Mosquito carried out 12 unseen attacks, although burning navigation lights! The loss of mid-upper gunners has, of course, made the carrying out of a thorough search more difficult, but the figures show that a great many crews either have incompetent gunners or else are not taking sufficient interest in a training exercise designed to increase their chances of survival once they start operating over Japan. It cannot be overemphasised that a Group Bullseye is the best experience a crew can get without risking being shot down, and as such it should be treated as a real operation from take-off to landing. The pilot who thinks that a Bullseye is just another training bind is heading right for a posthumous Pacific Star.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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Jap Fighter Control
As yet there is no comparison between Allied and Japanese fighter control, for though the enemy early warning system is considered adequate for giving general warning of the approach of large Allied air formations to Japan, Japanese fighter control is in an undeveloped state. The limited scope of Japanese fighter operations control is demonstrated by the type of fighter reaction experienced on Allied bomber missions over Japanese-held territories and by the poor performance characteristics, for purposes of fighter control, of radar and communications equipment known to be in operational use in the Japanese Air Force. The Japanese have under development a number of special devices for use in ground and air-controlled interception and they have been conducting research and experiments in fighter control organisation and procedure. Eventually, these activities may be expected to result in fighter control operations of wider scope.
The present Japanese early warning and fighter control system for air defence, however, is in a state of development roughly comparable to German development in the period from 1939 to 1941. The Germans also used picket boats to supplement the early warning radar and their first night interception system depended on illumination of raiders by searchlights. The Japanese early warning system appears to be adequate for the purpose of giving general warning of the approach of Allied aircraft to Japan. In view of the inferior performance of the radars, however, and of the apparent lack of a well organised filtering system, it is doubtful if accurate and prompt information on pin points, courses, speeds, heights, identifications and strengths is being supplied to Japanese Air Force Control Centres.
Without such information, the operations of these Control Centres must be quite restricted, and it is not likely that they are in a position to make material changes in the disposition of fighter squadrons to meet the special tactical requirements of individual raids. As a corollary, it may be stated that Allied diversionary raids staged in connection with bomber attacks against primary targets in Japan probably have little effect on lessening the number of fighters available for attack against the main force.
Operations at Japanese Fighter Control Centres appear to consist of scrambling fighters, broadcasting warning to airborne aircraft of the presence of enemy aircraft, and ordering fighters to proceed to designated general areas in the vicinity, most often a target area, for “attack” , or in other cases to take appropriate action for evasion.
Night interceptions are accomplished by co-ordination of night fighters with searchlights and in other cases by night fighters free-lancing in the target area, often with no detection aid of any kind.
It is possible that in the immediate future the Japanese will perfect a system of air control interception based on homing fighters on to a shadowing aircraft by means of airborne detection finders. This system might be fairly effective for day operations, when spotting and closing can be done visually, but does not seem to be suited for night operations.
It is unlikely that the Japanese Air Force will be able
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] JAP FIGHTER CONTROL [/underlined]
to organise an effective system for ground control interception or fighter control, especially for night operations until such time as they have in operation ground and airborne radar more suitable for the purpose than any now in operation. It is possible, however, that the Japanese are developing specially designed fighter control radar, perhaps an adaptation of the Giant Wurzburg, and also A.I. equipment possibly adapted from Allied airborne 10-centimetre equipment.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia. W.I.S.86. [/underlined]
Further light on this subject is now cast by the capture of a document on Luzon which gives a description of Japanese fighter direction methods, as they existed in April, 1944. It is reprinted from A.T.I.S. Translations, No.156. Particularly interesting is the dependence of the Japanese on reconnaissance aircraft – which should make good targets – and on a constant speed and course of the attacking aircraft.
The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects. Various radars report to a control station which we should call a filter centre. At this location pilots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a common reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of “grid” system). The Japanese have an organisation designated an “intelligence squad” which would compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicated that D/F equipment is used in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.
Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearings and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on incoming raids.
To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar, scouting aircraft are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow and report position, type, strength, altitude etc., as an aid to directing the intercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which will act as shadows and not as attacking units. The reconnaissance aircraft represent an important cog in the intercept system.
Due to the time element required in the filter centre, the method of radio relay, and the fact that mechanical methods are utilised for computation of vectors, much time is wasted; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation is on the premise that the “enemy raids” will remain on almost constant course and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked changes in course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.
After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial “vector” and “range” on the “point of encounter” (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method; e.g. “03.10” equals “right front ten kilometres”.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia, W.I.S.87. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was no operational activity during the month. Four aircraft of No.54 Base “stood by” for a search on the 24th but were not required. This followed a report by a No.463 Squadron aircraft of what appeared to be a dinghy in the sea off the East Coast, and A.S.R. Warwicks carried out a search although there were no aircraft missing at the time.
Casual sightings are going to be just as important in the new theatre as they were over here, maybe more so, and all that is required to ensure a happy ending to someone’s troubles is:-
(a) A careful description of what is seen.
(b) The most accurate fix possible.
(c) The time of the sighting and good signals procedure.
Accurate information will assist both those below and those above – if passed quickly.
Training on all Squadrons has made good progress during the month. The Mark II Airborne Lifeboat commenced a Group tour, and a mobile parachute instruction unit is also going ahead.
Yet a third circus is lining up to spread knowledge on Air Sea Rescue and land and sea survival in all theatres.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “CAN YOU SWIM?” [/underlined]
(If you can’t you are missing a lot of fun and – by the way – if you ditch you may not reach the dinghy!! [/boxed]
As was stated in last month’s News, S/Ldr Becker left this Group to take up a Safety and Rescue appointment with Transport Command. B.B. was one of the earliest members of the team, then led by W/Cdr Dabbs, by whose efforts such vast improvements were made in Air Sea Rescue throughout Bomber Command, and to whom a lot of chaps indirectly owe their present existence.
During his long stay with No.5 Group, S/Ldr Becker played a big part in improving both training and equipment, and we wish him the best of luck in his new appointment and also when he returns to his tobacco manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
During July flying accidents in the Group rendered one aircraft Cat. B., one Cat. A., and completely destroyed four others. Three Formal Investigations were convened to inquire into the more serious ones and two of them are still incomplete. Evidence so far places three of the six accidents in the avoidable category, viz:-
Swing on take off – 1; Overshoot on landing – 1;
Crashed on overshoot on one engine (Mosquito) – 1.
In addition one aircraft burst a tyre and crashed on landing; another had an engine failure on take off and crashed with fatal results. The remaining accident in unclassified as results of the investigation are not yet to hand: the aircraft belly landed after engine failure on a three engined practice overshoot.
One accident is singled out for special mention this month as the errors made by the pilot provide lessons for all Mosquito pilots in the Group. A Mosquito with the port engine feathered returned to Base and was given permission to land (in daylight) on the 2,000 yards runway. The pilot made a [underlined] right hand [/underlined] circuit and turned in for his approach rather low. He came in too fast and purposely delayed his selection of wheels down. The aircraft levelled off 300 yards along the runway and floated for some 600 yards. At this stage the pilot [underlined] decided to go round again [/underlined] as the wheels had not locked down. Full flap had been applied. The aircraft climbed to approximately 40 feet, at which height the left wing dropped and the aircraft stalled. The pilot was killed and the Navigator seriously injured.
The greatest mistake this pilot made was to try to take a Mosquito, with one engine feathered and wheels and flaps down, round again from ground level. Pilots Notes state that going round again in only possible in these circumstances if the decision is made at an early stage in the approach when it is clear that the undercarriage and flaps can be raised and speed increased by diving in the height available. Contributory factors to this crash were the [underlined] right [/underlined] hand circuit and the low, excessively fast approach. Final approach speed should be 122 knots and circuits should be made left handed irrespective of which engine has failed.
[Underlined] CASUALTY SIGNALS AND FORMS (765C) [/underlined]
Of recent weeks some slackness in the compilation of casualty signals has been evident. Once again Units are reminded that [underlined] every type [/underlined] of damage to an aircraft, including straightforward engine failure, requires notification by signal. Under para. “G” should be stated “765(C) yes” or “765(C) no”. A.M.O. A.1348/43 gives detailed instructions on the compilation of casualty signals. This A.M.O. must be obeyed to the letter. Those Officers who are concerned in any way with signals for aircraft damage must have this A.M.O. by them at all times.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS [/underlined]
All Units have Gold Stars this month with the exception of Nos.627 Squadron (Blue) and 97 Squadron (Red). The position of No.106 Squadron is still undecided.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
The following are the main observations made during the Group Engineering Staff Inspection of Stations, prior to the A.O.C’s inspection:-
(i) On the whole the Base Servicing Sections and Servicing Wings are organised on sound and efficient lines.
(ii) The inevitable chopping and changing between Units of both aircraft and personnel is causing some dislocation in Servicing Wings.
(iii) A considerable amount of surplus equipment exists in most Servicing Wings.
(iv) M.T. Servicing leaves much to be desired on some Stations.
With regard to (ii). It is a well known fact that the standard of servicing in one Unit is not acceptable to another. The spirit behind this is natural and it cannot be expected that anyone will accept full responsibility for the serviceability of a strange part worn aircraft without a very careful and critical inspection. This applies particularly to engine, airframe, instrument and electrical trades, whose responsibility covers almost entirely the safety of the aircraft and a single point overlooked is liable to have most serious consequences for both the aircraft and crew and tradesmen concerned.
Although it is appreciated that the swopping od old aircraft is bad business, it is inevitable at this stage and in dealing with this problem the following points should be noted:-
(i) In view of possible changes it is now more important than ever that all defects are recorded on F.700.
(ii) The servicing of such aircraft on receipt should as far as possible be carried out by experienced tradesmen.
(iii) Cases of indifferent servicing by the previous holding Unit should be reported officially, the reports being confined to statement of facts.
The surplus equipment referred to in para.1 (iii) should be returned to the Equipment Section on paper and stored under arrangements made by the C.T.O. and equipment Officers pending final disposal.
The present shortage of personnel and equipment is undoubtedly reflected in the comparatively low standard of M.T. servicing. This standard has recently improved but there is still room for improvement with the existing resources. It was apparent during the inspection that some C.T.O’s were not keeping up to date with the progress of unserviceable vehicles and where this was the case, the number of unserviceable vehicles was comparatively high.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY AND FLYING HOURS [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Hours Flown by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
Further information has now been received from Headquarters Tiger Force regarding the requirements and commitments of Photography. The growing importance of careful preparation is further emphasised, and the points enumerated below will prove to be of paramount importance to all concerned.
[Underlined] F.60 CAMERAS [/underlined]
It can now be stated that the F.60 (35 mm) fully automatic camera with scanner contact, and fitted with visor mounting, will be issued on 100% basis to all aircraft proceeding with Tiger Force. This camera will supercede [sic] the Bantam and Kodak 35 mm now in use, and will entirely eliminate manipulation failures. The camera is on a fixed mounting and is operated by the Bomb Firing Key. This feature will be greatly appreciated by the Set Operator, as he will have no knobs and triggers to bother about, and we are certain that operational photography will be thereby improved.
[Underlined] F.67 CAMERAS [/underlined]
In addition to the F.60 cameras, each Squadron will be equipped with two F.67 (16 mm) cameras. This camera is similar in operation to the F.60, being fully automatic and operated by the scanner contact making one exposure per second and like the F.60 it is operated by the bomb firing key.
[Underlined] TYPE 35 CONTROL DIAL [/underlined]
The existing Bromide Paper Control Dial is considered unsuitable for use in all conditions of high humidity. Arrangements have therefore been made for the production of dials manufactured from some suitable plastic material which would stand up to the wear and tear of exacting tropical conditions. The lay-out of the dial has been arranged to suit bombs having a terminal velocity above 1200 feet per second. In order to ensure accuracy, the R.A.E., Farnborough, are checking the dials against a stop watch, and will amend the calibrations as necessary. It is anticipated that 400 of these new dials will be ready for issue at an early date.
[Underlined] TYPE 20A, 35 CONTROL [/underlined]
In future the No.20 Controls will be fitted with contact springs and will be known as type 20A. These controls will be made a general issue to Units from 1st September, when they will be coming off production at 50 per week.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC TENT – TRIALS [/underlined]
Good progress has been made by Nos. 54 and 55 Bases in the use of the photographic tent, and from the reports so far received, the tents appear very satisfactory. The chief difficulty with the equipment appears to be the limited size of the film drying drum and the fact that it has to be revolved by hand while the film is drying. For this reason the standard portable type 14B/528 complete with motor and belt is being issued instead. It is also hoped to include 3 or more table fans to ensure a speedier method of drying.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH SPEED DAY FILM [/underlined]
The poor keeping qualities of High Speed Night Film has rendered it unsuitable for use in the East, and High Speed Day Film is to be issued instead. It will be necessary in the initial stages however, to cut the present 125 exposure lengths into 14 exposure lengths until such times as the manufacturers supply the film in the requisite size.
[Underlined] CAMERA – F.24 – TRANSPORTATION [/underlined]
It can now be confirmed that cameras will be housed in their storage cases with ancillary equipment and flown out direct to the Theatre of operations. Units have been instructed to demand storage cases for the purposes from the appropriate M.U.
[Underlined] INITIAL EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As preparation against any unforeseen emergency, or the delay of equipment arriving by sea, quantities of photographic materials are to be conveyed by other methods ready for immediate use if necessary. Early in the campaign R.A.F. photographers may have to use the American type Photographic Tents pending the arrival of the standard R.A.F. equipment. Some considerable time may elapse before pre-fabricated buildings are erected, and in consequence use will have to be made of these tents until more permanent buildings are available.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL [/underlined]
Some anxiety has been experienced regarding the ever increasing problem of staff who are eligible for overseas service. The matter has been taken up with Records, and it is thought that we shall soon have a much clearer idea of the personnel required. The confirmed establishment of photographic personnel for two Squadrons proceeding with “Tiger” Force is as follows:-
1 F/Sgt. 1 Sgt. 2 Cpls. 13 A.C’s.
[Underlined] WATER SUPPLY [/underlined]
It is of interest to note that the estimated consumption of water by the Tiger Force for photographic purposes alone will be approximately 8,000 gallons per day! In order to secure this supply special well boring equipment is being taken to the area.
[Underlined] H2S PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
Results now being received show a marked improvement in H2S photographs, but it is felt that there is still room for more care and attention in the developing and printing of the films. Special attention is necessary to ensure that each film has the “Start Frame” recorded, and also that cameras are in correct focus. On the last Bullseye training exercise carried out on the night of 23/24th July, several H2S films received at this Headquarters indicate that no attempt had been made to record the “Start Frame”. As pointed out in last month’s News, frank criticism is very necessary, and W/O’s i/c Bases and N.C.O’s i/c Sections should pay particular attention to this, and thereby ensure that such “snags” are brought to light. Bullseye exercises provide excellent training of personnel and it is important that this training is used as fully as possible.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
Photography is a recognised indispensable factor in war;
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
the article of military intelligence in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica [sic], written by a great military authority, mentions photography as a main source of obtaining information form the enemy. We must always keep this in mind and realise that only by the continuous vigilance of all photographic personnel, and their extreme care and attention to detail, can this be achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] 2,000LB. MARK II WINCHES [/underlined]
In our last issue we referred to the trials being carried out with the modified Mark II, 2,000lb Bomb Winches. We are pleased to say that these trials have been successful and the modified winches can be positioned on all bomb stations in the Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] RETURNS – GENERAL [/underlined]
Again!! We request Armament Officers to ensure that [underlined] ALL [/underlined] returns to this Headquarters are made on the appropriate days and [underlined] NOT [/underlined] three or four days later. Also, please ensure that the information is accurate. The importance of accuracy cannot be over-emphasised, because all information submitted to this Headquarters is consolidated and passed on to Higher Authority. Finally, to eliminate unnecessary telephone calls to Stations, please submit “NIL” returns where applicable.
And, while we are on the subject of telephone calls, may we draw your attention to the paragraph headed “Co-operation” in Issue No.28 of this News. We repeat that we are always prepared to help the Armament Staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but please first try to settle your problems at Station and Base level. If you cannot obtain satisfaction there, then telephone us by all means. A day in this office would convince you that it was never more aptly named than by the word “Madhouse” which appears on one of our telephones.
[Underlined] DEMANDS [/underlined]
A tip! when a demand has been submitted, do not just sit back and wait. Periodically “chase” those concerned. With the end of the war in Europe, the pressure of work at Maintenance Units and Equipment Sections has, if anything, increased, but we are certain that an occasional reminder, stating fairly the reasons for your inquiry, will be received in the spirit in which it is given.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS [/underlined]
Here we would like to draw your attention to the Editorial of the August issue of the Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, in which reference is made to Forms 1022 and 1023. Especially do we concur with the last paragraph, having noticed the fall-off in the number of 1023’s received. Please note that we require a “Nil” return, but it is very unlikely that such a return will be necessary.
Having relieved ourselves of these moans and as we are talking about the BOMBER COMMAND ARMAMENT BULLETIN – you will by now have received your copy of this month’s bumper issue. It is full of most interesting information.
As this Group us carrying out an extensive training programme, we feel sure that the Booklet on the Handling etc., of Practice Bombs, mentioned in the Bulletin, will be most useful in reducing the number of accidents, and look forward to receiving our copies.
Another matter likely to be of interest to Armament
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT [/underlined]
Officers in the near future, is the article on Tropical Storage of Explosives. We recommend you study this thoroughly.
We are now beginning to receive reports on the effectiveness of our bombing of Germany. A very interesting article on this subject appears on Page 37 of the Bulletin. It is gratifying, to say the least, to know that the work of the Armament Sections throughout the War has yielded such worth while results.
To close this month’s News, we should like to wish those Armament Officers who will be leaving us for warmer climes, the best of luck in their new assignments, and hope that their job will not be a long one.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
medical
In the forthcoming operations overseas, the following information may prove of value to all personnel concerned.
[Underlined] D.D.T. [/underlined]
The above initials represent a white, crystalline powder with the full chemical name of dichloro-diphenyl-trichlorethane. It is a comparative newcomer to the field of preventative medicine, but promises to be of the greatest value in the prevention of insect-borne diseases. Supplies of D.D.T. are now adequate for its full use on operational areas overseas.
In tropical and sub-tropical areas, many diseases are conveyed by insects which fly or crawl and which transmit the diseases by biting or being crushed into skin abrasions during scratching, and so convey to man the disease which the insect carries. Any substance which will kill insects in an efficient manner will thus help to reduce the incidence of disease. To date D.D.T. is the most effective substance to be discovered.
In brief, D.D.T. exercises its lethal effect by producing paralysis of the insect followed by death. The precise way in which D.D.T. reaches the body of the insect is uncertain, but absorption through its feet is believed to be the principal route. Swallowing, during feeding, of D.D.T. is also important. The absorption of D.D.T. is hastened by incorporating it into a liquid such as Kerosene or a water emulsion. The precise way in which D.D.T. is used will vary according to the insect. Thus, it may be dissolved in Kerosene, or in a water emulsion, and used as a spray, or incorporated in a dust with talc, flour or road-dust, and dusted onto the surface requiring such treatment.
In the prevention of malaria, the anopheline mosquito which carries the parasite of malaria, is attacked in all its stages.
The young mosquito, or larva, may be killed by covering the surface of the water in which the larva breeds with a dust containing D.D.T. Large areas of water may be dusted by aircraft. The adult mosquito is more effectively killed by spraying with a solution containing D.D.T. in Kerosene.
Typhus Fever, which is conveyed to man by the body louse, can be most effectively prevented by dusting the skin of people exposed to the disease with a dust of talc and D.D.T. The louse is killed before it can bite. Underclothing, such as shirts, can be impregnated with D.D.T. and is still lethal after a number of washings. The method of dusting was used in Naples in 1943, during an outbreak of typhus, with outstanding success. The whole civil population was dusted, and for the first time in history a typhus outbreak was halted.
The above information is only of the briefest, and should not be regarded as in any way exhaustive.
[Underlined] SCHISTOSOMA JAPONICUM [/underlined]
This disease is likely to be met with in the operational
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] MEDICAL [/underlined]
area overseas.
The schistosome is a small worm, 1 to 2 1/2 cms in length and is capable of living within the body of a man for long periods. It can cause serious disease unless treated adequately.
The young worm leaves the body of man as an egg. This egg will only hatch out in [underlined] fresh [/underlined] water, and the young worm so liberated enters, and lives for a period, in the body of a small water snail. Subsequently, it leaves the snail, and in swimming about, it will readily attach itself to and enter the human skin. Thenceforth it grows to maturity in the body of man, sets up disease, and produces eggs which are voided in the urine or faeces.
With the above in mind, it is easy to see how streams, rivers and water holes can easily become infected with the young worm in an area where the native population exercises no sanitary control.
To avoid infection one should never bathe in rivers or streams which are likely to be infected. Also, water for drinking or washing should come from an approved source – that is, water which has been filtered and chlorinated.
Sea-bathing is quite safe if well away from the mouths of rivers.
[Underlined] MALARIA PREVENTION BY SUPPRESSIVE MEPACRINE [/underlined]
In view of the lessening of the incidence of malaria in the operational area, it will not be necessary for personnel travelling by sea to take suppressive meparine. Parties travelling by air, however, will still take meparine from the date of their departure from the United Kingdom, as they will be living in malarious zones en route. The improvement has been effected by American anti-malarial unites and by R.A.F. anti-malarial workers already in the theatre.
Other anti-malarial precautions, already mentioned in previous articles in this section, will continue to be necessary.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.W. BAIRD DFM
P/O A.J. WILLIAMS DFC
F/O J.A. PETERSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O A.E. BOON DFC
F/SGT F. WHITFIELD DFC
F/SGT F. STEBBINGS DFM
F/SGT H.R. LYNHAM DFM
F/SGT P.R. ASLIN DFM
P/O J.C.B. GRAN DFC
P/O J.W. SINGER DFC
F/SGT P.F. JACKSON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR R.A. NEWMARCH DSO
F/L L.W. HAYLER DFC
F/O R.T.F. COVENTRY DFC
[Underline] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. NOWRIE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.W. FIRMIN DFC
F/O W.J.K. ENDEAN DFC
F/O A.H. NISBETT DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR E.G. WARD DFC
P/O K.G.W. MANTOCK DFC
P/O A.G. WEAVER DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR I.G. FADDEN DFC
F/L P.M.P. CRAMPTON, DFM DFC
F/O J.W. ATKINSON DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR H.L. CREETH DFC
F/O J.W. HUDSON DFC
F/L A.H. GIBSON DFC
F/O G.E. GAMBLE DFC
F/O R.B. PHILLIPS DFC
F/L J.E. DUNCAN DFC
F/L J.E. CARTWRIGHT DFC
P/O L. GRIMSHAW DFC
W/O L.R. GOULBURN DFC
F/O J.F. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/L E.F. ROBERTS DFC
P/O J. RAYNER DFC
F/L F.W.A. HENDRY DFC
F/L J. MOLLISON DFC
F/SGT J.R. WHITEHEAD DFM
F/SGT J. SPRIGGS DFM
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. DANIEL DFC
CAPT. A.E. HOWES DFC
F/L G.H. EAKINS DFC
CAPT. P.C. PECHEY DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.E.W. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L M.R. CROCKER DFC
F/L F.E. WILSON DFC
P/O J.H. PECK DFC
P/O H.R. SEARLE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W. SINCLAIR DFC
S/LDR H.W. RADFORD, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.B. EASTON DFC
F/O R.C. FAULKES DFC
F/SGT H.C. ADAMS DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.G. FARTHING DFC
P/O J.E. RONALD DFC
F/O E.L. McKAY DFC
F/SGT G.R. BRADBURY DFM
W/O D. HAMILTON DFC
F/SGT S.J. HENDERSON DFM
F/SGT J.A. DADGE DFM
F/O E.G. STROM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.M. PROCTOR DFC
P/O W.L. REEVES DFC
F/O K.L. KELLY DFC
F/O K.R. HICKMOTT DFC
F/O R. DICKINSON DFC
F/SGT T.T. TURNBULL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.G. BOYDEN, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR J.E. GRINDON DSO
F/L H.B. ARCHER DFC
F/O F.E.H. MILLAR DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL [/underlined]
NO. 53 BASE … 26
NO. 54 BASE … 27
NO. 55 BASE … 23
R.A.F. Station, SYERSTON … 10
No. 75 Base (For attention Base Intelligence Officer) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command. … 6
Headquarters, Bomber Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickins, O.R.S., Headquarters, Bomber Command …1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q. P.F.F. Wyton … 1
R.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (via H.Q.D.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2. .. 2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. …1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr Nairn, Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank … 1
A/Cdr H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.) … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey …1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C. in C. , Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C., 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Vice Marshal H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middlesex … 1
W/Cdr G.W. Gilpin, D.F.C., R.A.F. Staff College, HAIFA … 1
Headquarters, No.25 Group … 8
Headquarters, Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 54, 91 Groups … 1
Headquarters No.29 Group … 9
Nos.11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No.16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby …1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No.93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College … 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No. 25 Group School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
R.A.E., Farnborough … 1
Headquarters, Tiger Force, R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middx. 1
[Underlined] INTERNAL [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. … 1
OPS. 1. … 1
S. MET. O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS.RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE …1
NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATIONS TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
Recognition Test
Here are the 17 aircraft hidden in last month’s puzzle – did you find and name them correctly?
[Drawing]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, July 1945
5 Group News, July 1945
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 36, July 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on training, signals, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, gunnery, tactics, Japanese fighter control, air crew safety, accidents, engineering, photography, armament, medical and decorations.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-07
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
41 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Japan
Pacific Ocean
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-07
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
Tiger force
training
wireless operator
-
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608e3ad160ed5d6554f9a12078f8eb21
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Culkin, Jean. Album
Description
An account of the resource
64 items. An album containing photographs and newspaper cuttings from her husband John George Mackel Culkin's service as ground crew in North Africa and Italy, and Hong Kong post war.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
John George Mackel Culkin
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Culkin, J
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Brindisi
Drop tank boat race
Description
An account of the resource
Page captioned 'Brindisi Italy 1944 'Drop Tank' boat race, Jimmy Green and I win!!'. Six photographs, first drop tank race competitors gather on the water, reverse captioned '16/7/44 Darling xx, Just a little chatter before the race Love Jack'.
Second three boats in foreground, headland with spectators in background, reverse captioned '6/8/44 Darling, Another one of the finish of the race, that's us in front. Love Jack'.
Third is of lots of servicemen and their boats, reverse captioned '9/7/44 Brindisi Italy, Darling, after the race! Our boat is [three words unreadable]. Love Jack'.
Fourth is Jack and Jimmy afloat, headland in background.
Fifth is of boat with headland with many spectators in background, reverse captioned '16/8/44 Brindisi Italy, winning the home made canoe race, Darling, yes it's one of those [unreadable word] Love Jack'.
Sixth is of a group of servicemen with water and a headland in the back ground, reverse captioned '6/8/44 Brindisi Italy, Darling ,Any one you know on here? Love him? As he loves you a real lot. That's him in the trilby hat! Love Jack'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07-09
1944-07-16
1944-08-06
1944-08-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Six b/w photographs on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCulkinJ17010046, PCulkinJ17010047, PCulkinJ17010048, PCulkinJ17010049, PCulkinJ17010050, PCulkinJ17010051, PCulkinJ17010052, PCulkinJ17010053, PCulkinJ17010054, PCulkinJ17010055, PCulkinJ17010056, PCulkinJ17010057, PCulkinJ17010058
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Italy
Italy--Brindisi
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07-09
1944-07-16
1944-08-06
1944-08-16
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
entertainment
ground crew
ground personnel
rivalry
sport
-
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19a1d189de10fa583d95409311a00f47
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Banks, Peter. Album two
Description
An account of the resource
The album contains a varied collection of photographs taken whilst based at RAF Feltwell from 1937 onwards. There are aerial views of Windsor and Buckingham Palace, Harrow aircraft, plus social and service events. Post-war he was transferred to Singapore via India and Burma. The album reflects his social life with occasional photograph of his service activities at RAF Seletar. His return to UK via Bombay at the time of Indian independence is recorded, followed by scenic shots round Wick in Scotland. Finally there are some photographs of Angkor Thom in Cambodia. It also contains pages from newspapers dated 18 and 19 June 1940. <br /><br />Return to the <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/140">main collection</a>.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One photograph album
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBanksP1501
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Unite RAF and army
Description
An account of the resource
Main article - editorial expounding air and land integrated operations with reference to Spanish civil war and Germans in Poland. Suggests that British forces adopt the same approach and that there should be no lack of cohesion or rivalry between the RAF and army. Second article - editorial call to battlements - report on Churchill's comments on situation to house of parliament.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1940-06-19
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One newspaper page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBanksP15020026
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
British Army
Civilian
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Daily Sketch
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
rivalry
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2251/40595/PBirdJH18010014.1.jpg
25f2edf018ef61c5a3af392fd2fe3dd8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bird, JH. Photo Album
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Bird, JH
Description
An account of the resource
The album contains images taken during his service in Italy and includes target photographs and descriptions of bombing operations.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Award for the Best Night Photographs Month of June
Description
An account of the resource
A certificate awarding Sergeant Bird and crew the best night photographs for June. The artwork comprises a large bomb with the citation written in it, and the outline of a Wellington, stars, searchlights and a port. On the opposite page is a handwritten title about the Prahova Oil Refinery.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Romania
Romania--Ploiești
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Artwork
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One printed sheet on an album page
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBirdJH18010014
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
104 Squadron
arts and crafts
bombing
rivalry
searchlight
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2251/40599/PBirdJH18010020.2.jpg
4077acd3aceb3b969adfd1466fc3c702
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bird, JH. Photo Album
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Bird, JH
Description
An account of the resource
The album contains images taken during his service in Italy and includes target photographs and descriptions of bombing operations.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Award for the Best Night Photographs July 44
Description
An account of the resource
A certificate awarding Sergeant Bird and crew the best night photographs for July 1944. The artwork comprises the outline of a Wellington, Flak bursts, searchlights and bomb explosions. It is signed by a Squadron Leader.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Artwork
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One printed sheet on an album page
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBirdJH18010020
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
104 Squadron
arts and crafts
bombing
rivalry
searchlight
Wellington