2
25
75
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2573/44630/BUreILUreILv1.2.pdf
33ef94d4b6b42cee0b9e403dc49f120a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ure, Ivan Lochlyn
I L Ure
Description
An account of the resource
27 items. The collection concerns Ivan Lochlyn Ure (b. 1922, 1323004 Royal Air Force) and contains his memoirs, prisoner of war log, correspondence, documents, and photographs. He flew operations as an air gunner with 10 Squadron before he became a prisoner of war.
The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Tim and Heather Wright and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-08-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ure, IL
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
... just ... Chapters in a Life .. and some History
Description
An account of the resource
A detailed autobiography by Ivan Ure.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ivan Ure
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1997
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Isle of Wight
Norway
Scotland--Argyllshire
England--Yorkshire
England--Sussex
England--Westbourne (West Sussex)
England--London
England--Hayling Island
England--Evenley
England--Somerset
England--Blackpool
Germany
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Nuremberg
France
France--Abbeville
France--Paris
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Poland
Poland--Gdańsk
Lithuania
Lithuania--Šilutė
Lithuania--Klaipėda
Poland--Szczecin
Poland--Białogard
Poland--Pyrzyce (Powiat)
Germany--Lauenburg
Germany--Lüneburg
Germany--Rheine
England--London
Germany--Dresden
Ireland
Ireland--Dublin
Ireland--Cork
Austria
Austria--Vienna
Libya
Libya--Tripoli
Libya--Banghāzī
Egypt
Egypt--Cairo
Egypt--Jīzah
Egypt--Port Said
Kuwait
Bahrain
Iran
Iran--Tehran
Scotland--Oban
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Polskie Siły Powietrzne
Royal Navy
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Royal Australian Air Force
Royal Canadian Air Force
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
140 printed sheets
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BUreILUreILv1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
10 Squadron
4 Group
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
bale out
Blenheim
bomb aimer
Botha
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Churchill, Winston (1874-1965)
crewing up
Defiant
ditching
Dominie
Dulag Luft
entertainment
flight engineer
Goldfish Club
ground personnel
Halifax
Hampden
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
Hurricane
Ju 88
Lancaster
Lysander
Me 109
Me 110
Morse-keyed wireless telegraphy
navigator
Operational Training Unit
perception of bombing war
physical training
pilot
prisoner of war
Proctor
radar
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Brize Norton
RAF Cosford
RAF Hendon
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Madley
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Melbourne
RAF Padgate
RAF Sywell
RAF Uxbridge
RAF Yatesbury
Red Cross
Spitfire
sport
Stalag Luft 1
Stalag Luft 4
Stalag Luft 6
Stirling
the long march
training
Typhoon
Wellington
wireless operator / air gunner
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2573/44638/BUreILUreILv2.2.pdf
a87581cb66c4d8dae556d3359dde9c1b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ure, Ivan Lochlyn
I L Ure
Description
An account of the resource
27 items. The collection concerns Ivan Lochlyn Ure (b. 1922, 1323004 Royal Air Force) and contains his memoirs, prisoner of war log, correspondence, documents, and photographs. He flew operations as an air gunner with 10 Squadron before he became a prisoner of war.
The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Tim and Heather Wright and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-08-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ure, IL
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Years up to the Outbreak of the Second World War and How it Affected Me
Description
An account of the resource
A part autobiography of Ivan's pre-war life.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ivan Ure
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Wales--Colwyn Bay
England--London
England--Lancing
England--Blackpool
Scotland--Edzell
Scotland--Arbroath
England--Whitley Bay
Germany
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Nuremberg
France
France--Le Tréport
France--Abbeville
France--Paris
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Lithuania--Klaipėda
Poland--Świnoujście
Poland--Białogard
Europe--Elbe River
Germany--Lüneburg
Germany--Rheine
Germany--Dresden
Lithuania--Klaipėda
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Royal Air Force
Polskie Siły Powietrzne
United States Army Air Force
Royal Australian Air Force
Royal Canadian Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Format
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23 printed sheets
Identifier
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BUreILUreILv2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
10 Squadron
4 Group
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
B-24
Blenheim
bomb aimer
bombing
Botha
Chamberlain, Neville (1869-1940)
Churchill, Winston (1874-1965)
crewing up
ditching
Dominie
Dulag Luft
flight engineer
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895-1952)
Halifax
Halifax Mk 1
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
Ju 88
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
Lysander
Me 109
Me 110
Morse-keyed wireless telegraphy
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
prisoner of war
Proctor
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Hendon
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Madley
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Melbourne
RAF Padgate
RAF Wittering
RAF Yatesbury
Red Cross
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882-1945)
Spitfire
Stalag Luft 1
Stalag Luft 4
Stalag Luft 6
Stalin, Joseph (1878-1953)
Stirling
the long march
training
Typhoon
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
Wellington
Whitley
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1825/33682/SBrennanJ1210913v20003-0008.2.pdf
d393dbc2346c41618193151356e54e03
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Brennan, Jack
John Brennan
J Brennan
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Brennan, J
Description
An account of the resource
Twenty-four items.
The collection concerns Sergeant John Brennan DFM (1210913 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book as well as documents including a Goldfish Club certificate, notes from station and squadron operational record book with details of activities and operations, memoirs, newspaper cuttings and correspondence. In addition, contains operation order and other details for 617 Squadron's attack of German dams on 16/17 May 1943.
He flew operations as a wireless operator with 102 and 35 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by T Noble and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
ONE
RAF Lecture - "PRESS ON"
Joined the Royal Air Force in June 1941 as an Air Observer under training and saw service in London, Torquay, Eastbourne, Blackpool, South Africa, Honeyburne, and Long Marston.
So far, I had flown in Oxfords, Ansons, and Whitleys (known as a flying coffin). It was now March 1943 and I was in a crew totalling five and had now completed Operational Training.
The training was marvellous, we were happy, and all lived the life of Riley.
Events took a much more serious note in a posting to RAF Station Rufforth to convert to Halifax bombers. At Rufforth the crew was increased to 7 by the addition of a mid-upper gunner and a flight engineer. Conversion took just one month. Because of the rather absent minded behaviour of the Flight Engineer the Captain asked me to take over the job of pilot's mate in addition to navigation & bombing duties.
The crew now consisted of 4 Englishmen, 1 Scot, and 2 Canadians. We were all about 21 except Jock who was 38 and needed reading glasses. We all got on splendidly.
In May 1943 we were posted to 102 Squadron at Pocklington and here we very quickly learned that losses were currently extremely high and concequently [sic] morale at that time was low
What could you do to help survival ???
Keep on track corkscrew always near, or over, enemy territory, watch for fighters always, arrive on target at correct time – object is to saturate the defences
BEFORE THE OPERATION
At 10.00 notice on blackboard says "PARTY". About 16.00 briefing --- target, route, enemy defences along route-weather forcaste [sic], wind strengths & directions-role on target-work out courses-egg, bacon, beans - collect coffee, sandwiches, orange juice, chewing gum, parachute, sextant, escape & survival packs, caffiene pills, assemble crew -
Squadron Commander chalks AGLA on our pocket flap-aircrew bus to dispersal-Warm up aircraft engines, test magnetoes, taxi round perimeter track to runway-await green light and take off.
The aircraft & crew is now on their own and will remain so until touchdown.
OPERATIONS
23-5-43 Dortmund-5 hours 30 mins-happy valley
Beautiful colours. One failed to return
25-5-43 Dusseldorf-5 hours 20 mins-happy valley.
27-5-43 Essen-5 hours happy valley-Krupps works-Flak was so intense you
[page break]
TWO
could walk on it – explain about 2 sky markers
One failed to return
12-6-43 Bochum-5 hours-happy valley.
One failed to return.
19-6-43 Le Creusot-7 hours 5 minutes-Armaments works
21-6-43 Krefeld-shot down over Dutch coast-ditched 11 miles out, time 1.55 on 22-6-43.
4 aircraft failed to return (including us)
Ditching very successful, aircraft floated for over half an hour. Sitting in a pool of water in the dinghy very unpleasant & the dinghy had a leak.
MID MORNING.
Circled by Focke Wulf 190 who presumably obtained a fix on us.
Observed Flying Fortress being shot down by Me 109 (Met the crew later at Felixstowe Hopital [sic])
THE RESCUE
2 Typhoons of 198 Squadron airborne Martlesham Heath 15.15 to find and obtain a fix on our dinghy; this was achieved.
2 Waruses [sic] airborne Martlesham Heath 18.37 on 22-6-43, one Walrus picked up 4 of our crew, and the other the remaining 3. Both Walruses had difficulty in taking of [sic] due to the rough sea & heavy load, but one achieved this after 20 mins and several bounces. The pilot of the heavier aircraft decided tht [sic] it was too dangerous to attempt a take off and started taxing [sic] to the English coast.
2 Typhoons airborne Martlesham Heath 19.04 on 22-6-43
4 Spitfires airborne Martlesham Heath 19.32 on 22-6-43
2 Typhoons airborne Martlesham Heath 19.72 [sic] on 22-6-43
2 Folke Wulfe 190 attacked at 20.55 on 22-6-43, one of which was shot down by a Spitfire.
A Walrus and 2 Spitfires airborne Martlesham Heath 21.20 on 22-6-43. The sea was too rough for the Walrus to land, but it stayed in the vicinity and was ultimately able to direct MTB D16 (RN) to the taxiing Walrus.
2 Spitfires airborne Martlesham Heath 22.19 on 22-6-43.
Our Walrus taxied from 19.50 on 22-6-43 until 02.00 on 23-6-43 until prtrol [sic] was exhausted. At this time waves were 10 to 15 high when the RN took 20 mins to attach a tow rope to our Walrus.
The RN towed us for 1 hour but we were taking such a battering that it was
[page break]
THREE
requested that the Walrus be abandoned and the crews be transferred to the MTB which was achieved with difficulty.
We arrived at Felixstowe at 6.30 on 23-6-43.
It was later learned that the Walrus drifted onto a sandbank and was later towed to Harwich by HMS Mackay (destroyer).
De-briefed by AVM Gus Walker who commented on the loss of 4 "T" Halifaxes on 4 successive operations; he wondered about sabotage.
We were given 14 days leave and were requested to consider volunteering for Pathfinders.
We were informed, following a meeting years after the war between the Pathfinder Association and the Luftwaffe Association, that we had been shot down by W/O Vinkler in a ME 110. Regretfully Vinkler died in combat 24 hours later.
Posted to 35 Squadron-PFF
29-7-43 Hamburg-5 hours 55 mins-Supporter
2 aircraft failed to return
2-8-43 Hamburg-5 hours 15 mins - Iced up in Cumulo Nimbus - Very heavy predicted flak-Supporter. One aircraft failed to return.
4-8-43 MANY BOUNCE LANDING & 3 ENGINE TAKE OFF-relationship between Captain and pilots mate.
CRASH WITH 2 LORRIES ON PERIMETER TRACK
10-8-43 Nurnburg-7 hours-Supporter
2 aircraft failed to return
12-8-43 Turin-8 hours 30 mins-Supporter
Our route icluded [sic] Base-Reading-Selsey Bill-On arrival near Portsmouth we saw intense A/c A/c through which we had to fly. The question is - Were we flying through a German raid?, or were the RN exhibiting their well known dislike of aircraft over their ships?.
16-8-43 Turin-3 hours 40 mins-turned back-engine failure-landed at Ford-Supporter. One aircraft failed to return.
23-8-43 Berlin-7 hours 25 mins-Supporter
4 aaicraft [sic] failed to return.
27-8-43 Nurnburg-7 hours 20 mins-Supporter
Coned by several searchlights with potential attack by fighter.
[page break]
[inserted] 4 [/inserted]
Dived steeply and managed to evade. H2S went U/S at this point and because of our excessive speed and frequent changes of course we were uncertain of our precise position. As a result we flew over Mannheim and received the undivided attention of their intensive predicted heavy Ac/Ac
Approaching Beachy Head we observed searchlights instructing us to turn to port which we did and then to land at Ford. On landing we were asked the reason for our arrival at a fighter base. It turned out to be an interservice exercise
Believe that this was the time that the Wop/ag discovered the "bomb" inside the fuselage.
30-8-43 Munchen Gladbach - 4 hours 10 mins-supporter-attacked by fighter but evaded.
31-8-43 Berlin-7 hours 40 mins-Supporter
One aircraft failed to return.
5-9-43 Mannheim-2 hours 25 mins-turned back-engine failure-Supporter
22-9-43 Hannover-5 hours 55 mins-Supporter
23-9-43 Mannheim-6 hours 5 mins-Backer up
27-9-43 Hannover-5 hours 10 mins-Backer up
One aircraft failed to return
29-9-43 Bochum-4 hours 40 mins-Backer up
3-10-43 Kassel-6 hours 20 mins-Backer up-made dummy run!
4-10-43 Frankfurt-3 hours 15 mins -turned back-engine failure-Backer up
One aircraft coned for 5 miutes [sic] and severely shot up by flak. Crashed in flames at Biggin Hill-4 crew in hospital
8-10-43 Bremen-4 hours 50 mins-Blind Marker
One aircraft badly shot up-Crashed at Coltishall. Minor injuries only
11-11-43 Cannes-8 hours 40 mins-Blind Illuminator
2 aircraft failed to return. (Petrie-Andrews ditched off Sardinia & escaped to North Africa.)
22-11-43 Berlin-3 hours 15 mins-turned back-engine failure-Backer up
23-11-43 Berlin-6 hours 20 mins-Blind Marker
20-12-43 Frankfurt-5 hours 15 mins-Blind Marker
One aircraft failed to return, & one caught fire while landing.
"While circling the airfield prior to landing a Halifax captained by S/ldr J. Sale caught fire when a target indicator exploded. S/Ldr Sale climbed to 2000 ft, baled out 5 members of his crew, the mid upper gunner being unable to do so as his parachute was destroyed by the ensuing fire. S/Ld Sale calmly landed the burning aircraft, taxied off the runway. The aircraft exploded when he & the gunner were some 200 yards away."
[page break]
[inserted] 5 [/inserted]
23-12-43 Berlin-7 hours-Blind Marker
5-1-44 Stettin-9 hours-Blind Backer up
Routed over Denmark and Southern Sweden Flak from the latter intensive, but not at our height
2 aircraft failed to return.
21-1-44 Magdeburg-6 hours 40 mins-Blind Backer up
"Suddenly the rear gunner saw an ME210 astern level at 150 yards. He told his Captain to corkscrew starboar [sic] and caused the other aircraft to pass to port quarter up. As the bomber rolled at bottom of corkscrew and commenced it's climbing turn to port the fighter attacked from deep port quarter. Rear gunner opened fire at 100 yards with 250 rounds each and saw tracer enter the underside of the ME 210 causing it to break off starboard beam below. ME210 fired a short burst without tracer before breaking off. No damage to Halifax but ME210 claimed as damaged."
3 aircraft failed to return.
15-2-44 Berlin-7 hours 5 mins-Blind backer up
Numerous fighter flares above clouds. It was like day.
One aircraft failed to return.
19-2-44 Leipzig-2 hopurs [sic] 40 mins-Blind backer up
4 aircraft failed to return.
20-2-44 Stuttgart-6 hours 5 mins-Blind backer up
One aircraft failed to return.
24-2-44 Schweinfurt-6 hours 50 mins-Blind backer up
25-2-44 Augsburg-6 hours 30 mins-Blind backer up
1-3-44 Stuttgart-6 hours 40 mins-Blind backer up
8-3-44 CONVERTED TO LANCASTERS
18-3-44 Frankfurt-5 hours-Blind backer up.
24-3-44 Berlin-6 hours 50 mins-Blind marker
THE NIGHT OF THE JET STREAMS - Zephyring-Winds of 135 knots
"Why aren't we going through the flak like every one else??"
One aircraft failed to return.
18-4-44 Rouen-3 hours 40 mins Blind marker/Illuminator
20-4-44 Cologne-3 hours 50 mins Blind backer up
23-4-44 Laon-3 hours 40 mins-Blind Illuminator
Had to make 3 runs over target becaause [sic] bomb doors would not open.
24-4-44 Karlsruhe-5 hours 40 mins-Blind marker/Illuminator
26-4-44 Villeneuve-St George-4 hours-Blind Illuminator
27-4-44 Friedrichshafen-6 hours 30 mins-Blind re-centerer [sic]
[page break]
[inserted] 6 [/inserted]
Flew over Switzerland on the commencement of bombing run!!
One aircraft failed to return.
3-5-44 Montdidier-3 hours 40 mins-Blind Illuminator
8-5-44 Haine St Pierre- 2 hours 45 mins-Blind Illuminator
One aircraft failed to return.
10-5-44 Lens- 2 hours 55 mins-Blind Illuminator
11-5-44 Hasselt-2 hours 55 mins- Illuminator at request of Master Bomber
28-5-44 Mardick-1 hours 55 mins-bombed using "G"
31-5-44 Trappes-4 hours 20 mins-Blind Illuminator
2-6-44 Trappes-3 hours 25 mins-Blind Illuminator
29-6-44 Crew, minus our pilot, asked to do another tour with Wing Commander P.H. Cribb, but on a majority vote,, this was declined. Cribb became CO of 582 Squadron, but did not survive for long.
Posted to Air Ministry London as a staff officer, including 3 months in Cairo at HQ Middle East
Note--On the 51 operations in which we participated 37 aircraft were lost, 21 aircraft is full squadron strength.
Acknowledge the considerable assistance given by Seema in the preparation of her file of our exploits.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lecture - "PRESS ON"
Description
An account of the resource
Text for a lecture. Joined RAF as air observer in June 1941. List initial training postings, conversion to Halifax, crewing up and posting to 102 Squadron at RAF Pocklington in May 1943. Describes preparation for operations and lists 6 operations with some details including having to ditch in North Sea on return from the sixth. Goes on to describe rescue in detail. Then posted to 35 Squadron Pathfinders and lists 32 further operations. Converted to Lancaster and lists a further 15 operations. Some operation listed have some descriptions of events that occurred during the attacks, role, the numbers of aircraft that failed to return and duration. Crew (minus pilot) was asked to another tour but declined on vote. Then posted to air ministry as staff officer.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
J Brennan
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941-06
1943-05-23
1943-05-25
1943-05-27
1943-06-12
1943-06-19
1943-06-21
1943-07-29
1943-08-02
1943-08-04
1943-08-10
1943-08-12
1943-08-16
1943-08-23
1943-08-27
1943-08-30
1943-08-31
1943-09-05
1943-09-22
1943-09-23
1943-09-27
1943-09-29
1943-10-03
1943-10-04
1943-10-08
1943-11-11
1943-10-22
1943-10-23
1943-12-20
1943-12-23
1944-01-05
1944-01-21
1944-02-15
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-01
1944-03-08
1944-03-18
1944-03-24
1944-04-18
1944-04-20
1944-04-23
1944-04-24
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-05-03
1944-05-08
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-28
1944-05-31
1944-06-02
1944-06-29
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force. Coastal Command
Royal Navy
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Six page printed document
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SBrennanJ1210913v20003-0008
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
South Africa
Germany
Great Britain
France
Italy
Poland
Belgium
England--Devon
England--Sussex
England--London
England--Lancashire
England--Worcestershire
England--Warwickshire
England--Yorkshire
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Bochum
France--Le Creusot
Germany--Krefeld
England--Suffolk
England--Felixstowe
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Nuremberg
Italy--Turin
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Bremen
France--Cannes
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Augsburg
France--Rouen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Friedrichshafen
France--Montdidier (Hauts-de-France)
Belgium--Hasselt
France--Lens
France--Dunkerque
France--Paris
Belgium--La Louvière
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Sue Smith
102 Squadron
35 Squadron
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
B-17
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
ditching
Fw 190
Halifax
Lancaster
Me 109
Me 110
Oxford
Pathfinders
RAF Honeybourne
RAF Martlesham Heath
RAF Pocklington
RAF Rufforth
shot down
Spitfire
Typhoon
Walrus
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2200/40073/EDarbyCAHWellandJ440614.1.pdf
1006f6da20c6fc117bd379b1489388d7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Darby. Charles Arthur Hill
Darby, CAH
Jack Darby
Johnny Darby
Description
An account of the resource
203 items. The collection concerns Charles Arthur Hill Darby (1915 - 1996, 154676 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, photographs, documents and correspondence. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 186 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Richard John Darby and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
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2018-02-02
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Darby, CAH
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Letter from Jack Darby to Jean
Description
An account of the resource
He has been doing dinghy drill at the Baths in Oxford. Then they went shopping, failed to get a beer because the pubs were sold out and went to see a film.
Creator
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Jack Darby
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Oxfordshire
England--Oxford
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
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Format
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Three double sided handwritten sheets and envelope
Conforms To
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Pending text-based transcription
Identifier
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EDarbyCAHWellandJ440614
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
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1944-06
aircrew
ditching
entertainment
RAF Barford St John
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2119/35620/ACurtisL90XXXX.2.mp3
b4ecb6812ebc08febef7b390f7c7545d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Curtis, L
Leslie Curtis
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Leslie Curtis who describes ditching his Wellington into the Mediterranean in 1941.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by Matt Phillips and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2022-01-11
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is property of the Matt Phillips who has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Identifier
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Curtis, L
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
LC: Start about July 1941, at a place called Harwell, and Harwell was the airfield at which I had completed my training as a pilot, on Wellingtons, and at a time when we had just been crewed up. Now, by crewing up I mean that you had been given a navigator, and a second pilot, and a wireless operator/air gunner and two other gunners, which means a crew of six in all. And having got that crew and having practiced together, we were then posted to a place in the Middle East, which we weren’t to know until we got there, because we were due to go there in stages. And the first stage of that trip was from Harwell to Gibraltar. Now, there were a flight of eight Wellingtons in the crew, in the flight I mean, and the job really, was for the crews to fly out their brand new aircraft, by stages, first of all to Gibraltar, and then on to Malta and then from Malta on to the Middle East. Well eventually we took off and all went well, and although there was a flight of eight aircraft, we were to make our way individually to Gibraltar and of course at that time you couldn’t fly across France and across Spain to get to Gibraltar because these were countries that were unsafe to fly over, and therefore you had to go on the sea route, which meant you had to fly out to the south west of England, and then right across the Bay of Biscay, right down the coast of Portugal or some fifty, sixty miles off the coast of Portugal, fly right round to the south of Gibraltar and you had to come into Gibraltar on a pre-determined route. You had to come into Gibraltar at a height of two thousand feet and not two thousand and fifty feet, or nineteen hundred and fifty feet, but exactly two thousand feet and on a bearing of exactly due north, coming up to the Rock of Gibraltar. Because as you approached the Rock, you had all the defending guns of the Rock trained on you and if you didn’t come in at the right height and on the right course it was assumed that you were an enemy aircraft and therefore you were liable to get shot down! You see. So you were very careful on how you approached Gibraltar. Which we did, and obviously we didn’t get shot down and eventually we were able to turn in to our landing run to come in and land on Gibraltar airfield. Now, at that time, and this is an important fact in the story, Gibraltar did not have any runways, which it does now of course. The Gibraltar airfield was virtually just an area of sand between the Mediterranean on one side, on the east side, and Algeciras Bay on the other side, and if you landed too short you knocked your wheels off on the kind of wall, that separated the airfield from the beach, and if you came in too high you were liable to run out of landing room and roll down the beach on the other side and finish up in Algeciras Bay. And I mention that point because that is crucial to the story as you will hear later on. Anyway, we got there all right, we landed, and one by one all the other aircraft landed and we taxied in and that was that. And then we had to stay at Gibraltar until we had clearance to take off and fly on to Malta, and there was several days before we were able do that, because there was a lot of naval activity going on around Malta, as you probably know from your history, and therefore we couldn’t take off until all was quiet down there. Eventually we got the okay to take off, and one by one the aircraft taxied out to take off, having refuelled and that sort of thing. [Cough] Unfortunately because, as I mentioned to you, this airfield was just sand, as we were taxying out we hit a rough bit of sand which made the tail of the aircraft bump up and down over the ruts in the sand, and as the tail of the aircraft came down, in one of these ruts, the tail wheel had twisted round sideways and the weight of the aircraft taxying forward broke the tail wheel, and consequently the tail of the aircraft went down into the sand and we were stuck; we couldn’t take off. So whilst all the other aircraft got off safely, we were left stuck behind, on the airfield, with a busted tail wheel. Now, because this was [cough] 1941, there were not much in the way of maintenance or repair facilities at Gibraltar and consequently we were going to be stuck there until either a replacement tailwheel was flown out from England, or alternatively the fitters on the spot could make any repairs or any other arrangements. And what, finally, they managed to do, because there was no sign of anything coming out from England was to wade out into Algeciras Bay, where a Wellington had overshot and finished up in the sea some months before and had been there ever since! And they waded out to this aircraft, and they managed to detach the whole tailwheel assembly from this sunken aircraft out in the sea, haul it back to the land, take off my busted tailwheel and fit this recovered tailwheel on in its place. Alright, so we were okay to take off again. But the only trouble was that by this time, some more naval action had come about out of Malta and it was not safe for us to take off and arrive at Malta during this period. And this naval activity and everything else that went on, bombing and what not, out of Malta, went on for some time, for several weeks in fact, three or four weeks. During which time we were stuck in Gibraltar, and of course as a crew fine, it was a holiday for us, we used to wander off into Gibraltar town, and have tea and coffee and pastries up in the cafes and a few drinks and that sort of thing and buy cheap cigarettes, which you could do then of course, very cheap, and you know, come back to the airfield now and again to see if there was any news, and if there wasn’t, well. Anyway, we had a holiday for about three or four weeks, that was fine. But eventually we got the okay to take off. Now, the next important point to mention is, that all the time that we were stuck there on the airfield waiting permission to take off, the weather was very hot, and it was very windy, and the aircraft was parked on a sandy [emphasis] airfield, right. Now because of these circumstances, what I think [emphasis] happened was that during all this time, that sand got blown into the engines you see, and although from time to time when we went back to the airfield to see if there was any news, we used to start up the engines and run them, it was not possible to be certain that the engines were perfectly all right. So when we finally got the okay to take off, we had to assume that they were all right and so off we went and we didn’t take off until quite late at night. It was going to be a night flight to Malta which was going to be a bit dodgy anyway, because bear in mind we were very young trainee crews, you know, this was the, almost the first time we’d flown any distance from home, we were all very green and the idea of finding Malta, which is only quite a small island as you know, some I suppose, I don’t know, eight or nine hundred miles away perhaps, from Gibraltar. Well this would have been a fairly formidable proposition, even in broad daylight, but you can imagine, in these circumstances, after dark and with only an inexperienced navigator to rely on, it was going to be a fairly dodgy experience anyway, and although the navigator, assuming that it was a clear night, would be able to take star sights through the astrodome and get an approximate fix, as his position was known, that would have been some help, I think we would have been trusting to a fair slice of luck to be reasonably certain of arriving at Malta, because by that time, with any luck, it might have been daylight. I forget exactly what time we took off, we were certainly doing most of the trip, or reckoning on doing most of the trip, in the dark, but it should have been dawn by the time we got to Malta so at least we should have been able to see the island. However, as luck happened, we never did see the island because we never got there! And why we never got there was due to a very unfortunate set of circumstances. One of which was due, in my opinion, certainly with the benefit of hindsight, was due to this business of sand in the engines, because we had only been airborne and on our way for about three hours, two and a half to three hours, when the engines started playing up. Now how you can tell that the engine is playing up are one of a number of reasons. First of all obviously if an engine is in very bad shape it’s going to vibrate very badly so that you can feel that there is something wrong with the engine, but in this case, the first sign of trouble was by what was known as the oil pressure gauges. And of course, being a twin engined aircraft, the Wellington has two oil pressure gauges, and there is a range of temperature on those gauges within which it is safe for that engine to operate, but if the temperature on those engines starts going off the clock as we say, if it’s getting too hot then you’ve got problems. And this is precisely what happened, and it happened first of all with the starboard engine, that’s the engine on the right hand side, as I’m sure you know, and the temperature started going up to a very, very dangerous level, right. So the first thing to do was to try and close down that engine a little, to try and stop this overheating, but when we closed down the engine that side, a little, it obviously needed more revolutions on the port engine to keep the aircraft up, and when we increased revolutions on the port engine, the temperature on that [emphasis] gauge started mounting up and up and tending to go off the clock. So now we were in the awful position that we could not maintain enough revolutions on both engines to keep us flying level. So we didn’t know quite what we were going to do. But then the decision was taken out of our hands in effect, because what happened was that the starboard engine had overheated so much that it caught fire. And when it caught fire, of course we had a real problem because what happened then, was that although you have a fire extinguisher button in the cockpit, which you can press to activate a fire extinguisher in the engine, once you’ve done that of course, you’ve killed the engine. You can’t restart the engine so if you press that button you’ve killed that engine. But in fact, that again was somewhat academic because the fire which had come back from the engine housing, had in fact set alight to the wing surface, and the wing surfaces of a Wellington are covered with fabric, as you perhaps know, they’re not metal wings like on modern aircraft, they are fabric covered and only the control surfaces were covered with metal. And this fire spread to the fabric of the aircraft, not seriously, but, well I suppose any fire in any part of an aircraft is serious. Anyway, the upshot of the matter was that it had now become impossible to maintain height on the power that we’d got on the left hand engine and if we had put the left hand engine up to full power then that might have caught fire as well and that would have been curtains. Because as long as you’ve got some engine power you’ve got some control over the aircraft. When you’ve got no engine power at all you’ve got no control over the aircraft at all and it’s liable to drop out of the sky, isn’t it. So, we reckoned that by our navigation that at this time we were probably only about fifty or sixty miles off the North African coast and if you look at the map and you draw a line from Gibraltar to Malta you will see that at some point you are not very far north of the North African coast. So I decided, and being the skipper of the aircraft you know it’s entirely up to me what decision we make about this situation, I decided that no [emphasis] way were we going to be able to turn round and fly for two and a half hours or more back to Gibraltar, which was nearer than trying to go on to Malta, okay. So in view of the fact that we could neither hope to get back to Gibraltar, certainly not go on to Malta, my thought was, well all we can do is, we’re probably going to have to put this aircraft down in the sea, the best thing I can do is to turn south and get the blessed aircraft as near to dry land, whatever that land happens to be, that I possibly can. So I turned the aircraft south, told my wireless operator to send out a mayday signal, if you don’t know what a mayday signal is, it’s the internationally recognised signal for SOS, for assistance, sent out a mayday signal, we don’t know actually whether that mayday signal ever reached anybody, but we sent it out anyway and I told the crew to prepare for ditching. Now that means they have to leave their normal seats, go back into the body of the aircraft, into the fuselage, and brace themselves as best they can with their backs to the front of the aircraft and to brace themselves as best they can for what is going to be a bumpy landing. You know, whether you land on the sea, or whether you land in the dark on open country it’s going to be a bumpy landing, or a dodgy one at the best of times. So that’s what we did, we headed south, losing height all the time, because by the time we decided that these engines weren’t going to produce any more power, we were probably down to about two thousand feet and we weren’t going to stay airborne a lot longer, so we just kept on going down, and down, and down. And eventually there was just [emphasis] about enough light, starlight or moonlight, I can’t remember which, to see the waves, and so far as I was concerned, flying the aircraft, I was in the rather tricky position because although when you are flying an aircraft you are supposed to have your seatbelt on, in fact, it was hot and uncomfortable to wear a seatbelt, you know, down in the Mediterranean, and I hadn’t put my seatbelt on, in fact I was sitting on it! And because it was so difficult to control the aircraft and try and keep it flying at all, I couldn’t leave my seat or even get out of my seat in order for my second pilot to get my seat belt out from underneath me in order to wrap it round me and belt me in, you see. So I thought well, can’t be helped, I’ve just got to do the best I can. [Cough] So when it became apparent that we were getting near the sea and we were going to have to ditch it, all I could do, in fact, was to put my feet up onto the dashboard and brace it against the dashboard as best I could, and had the wheel, you know, in my hand, the steering column, and as we approached the sea, just to haul back on the, on the stick to try and get the tail to hit first and we just ‘bump’ into the sea with an almighty kersplosh, you see. And because the, as I mentioned to you, the bulk of the Wellington aircraft is covered in fabric, much of the fabric must have been torn away on impact so the sea immediately rushed in everywhere, you see, and I was pretty well knocked out because having had the control column in front of me, as we hit the sea, so it whipped back and forth and the centre part of the control column hit me right on the top of head, above the temple and virtually knocked me out, I didn’t know what the devil was happening, but I became aware of the fact that there was water gushing in everywhere. One thing I forgot to tell you was that, as we were on the last stages before the landing, I’d asked the second pilot to open the roof of the cockpit, because on the Wellington you had, kind of glass doors, which you could open up, for an emergency, and he’d opened up these doors and the water just washed me out of the roof, you see. And I came to in the sea, was sploshing around the thing and that I suppose brought me round to some extent, and I was aware of our dinghy floating in the sea about, I don’t know, I suppose ten or fifteen yards away and the only other thing I could see, and I remember seeing clearly, was the big tail of the aircraft, the fin and the rudder of the aircraft sticking up out of the water over there on my right. Anyway, I floundered and splashed my way across. I’d got my, I’d got my Mae West on, you know, the flotation jacket that you wore anyway, I’d got that on, I didn’t even think of flotating it, you know, at the time, you know, because I was so confused and half unconscious anyway, but I do remember floundering over in the direction of this dinghy which was tossing up and down on the waves and eventually I got there and grabbed the sort of rope going all the way round it, grabbed the rope and hung on to it for dear life, literally, and called out at the top of my voice to the others to tell them, you know, where I was and where the dinghy was, except that I didn’t get any answering shouts, or calls, which I thought was a bit strange, I remember. I thought well the next thing to do, I’d better get into the dinghy and I had the dickens of a job getting into the dinghy because, never having had any proper dinghy drill, I had completely forgotten that there was a little kind of rope ladder which hung down below the dinghy which was supposed to help you climb in, and I’d forgotten all about that, and it cost me nearly all my strength and energy to flounder over the side of the dinghy, eventually, and flop into the bottom of the dinghy where I promptly passed out, and that was all I remember of that stage of it. Well then eventually I came round, I don’t know how long it must have been, I think it must have been just about getting light, so it was probably about, I don’t know, four, five o’clock in the morning, something like that, and there I was in the dinghy which was half full of water, and a horrible sort of yellowy green water and I wondered why it was yellowy green and I wondered if I’d been sick, and if I’d been sick was it that kind of colour? I eventually realised that that was because a thing called a marker, which the dinghy carried, which was a kind of, a kind of chemical, a kind of phosphorescent chemical in a bag, which if you were in a dinghy you were supposed to trail this overboard and it would leave a fluorescent trail in the sea which was visible from a searching aircraft at some altitude you see. Anyway, I’d forgotten all about that as well. Well I came round in the dinghy and there I was all by myself. There was not another soul in sight. There were no signs of anybody floating or swimming round in the sea. Of course no more signs of the aircraft. The Wellington aircraft, incidentally, we were told, that if it was landed well, on a smooth sea, with luck it would float for seventy two seconds, which is not a lot of time, to evacuate an aircraft, and ours, you know, certainly didn’t float that long. However, there I was in my dinghy and to cut a long story short, I stayed in my dinghy, being sick from time to time, and being tossed around in the dinghy from time to time and trying to keep going on some inedible chocolate because there were some what were known as emergency rations attached to the dinghy, and the emergency rations consisted of a tin, rather like a sardine tin, of unsweetened chocolate, which was horrible, and almost impossible to eat, you know, when you’ve got a dry mouth, something horrible, but there were some, some tablets there, I can’t even remember, oh, malted milk tablets I think they were, and there was some chewing gum, and there was also our water ration. And the water ration, and bear in mind the rations were intended for a crew of six, the water ration consisted of an ordinary hot water bottle full of water. I suppose about two pints of water. How long that was supposed to last a crew of six I don’t quite know, but anyway I sipped that from time to time and I sat there in the dinghy and from time to time it got rough and other times it calmed down a bit and I looked round the sky and I never saw any other aircraft or anything like that for about two days. On the third day I thought I spotted an aircraft a way up, very high in the distance, but it wasn’t coming my way anyway, so nothing further happened and I just decided to float around until something turned up. So I floated around and floated around and after the third night, I think it was, three days, no the fourth night I think it was, I was fast asleep in my dinghy and the sea was calm and smooth, it was dark and I was fast asleep, and suddenly the dinghy nearly turned upside down. A great wave woke me up in a start and I clutched the dinghy to stop myself falling out and looked up to see a great big dark shape going past in the night, very close to me. And I thought it’s a ship, it’s a ship, and it nearly ran me down! And I yelled and the ship ploughed on, so I yelled a bit more, I said ‘hey, come back!’ you see. It disappeared into the night and I thought, oh my goodness, perhaps it was a dream, perhaps I’m dreaming this, perhaps it was a mirage, I never saw it at all, perhaps there wasn’t a ship, and then much to my huge relief, I saw the ship coming back and it came alongside me, and I couldn’t tell in the dark exactly what sort of ship it was, but a voice called out, ‘who are you?’ [Laugh] You see. I said ‘I’m the pilot from Wellington Z8773, you’re a pretty sight, can I come on board?’ And they threw a scrambling net, as it’s called, over the side of this ship. A couple of sailors scrambled down this, this net ladder thing and they said ‘are you able to climb out of there on this?’ And I said ‘I’ll get there if it’s the last thing I do!’ Anyway it was clear I was clearly wasn’t able to climb it up, I was obviously very weak by this time so a couple of darned great sailors came down this ladder and they got hold of me and they sort of hauled me on board and happily they also hauled the dinghy on board and then the ship got underway and I went down to the sick bay and they looked after me down there. Oh, and the story could go on and on for a long time but that was really, about the end of the active part of it, I can just wind up by saying that I finished up in hospital in Gibraltar, which was where the destroyer - I’d better tell you a little bit about that. The destroyer was one called HMS Avon Vale and it was one of the civil destroyers which were screening what was known as H Force. And H Force was part of the Mediterranean Fleet, which consisted of I think it was the battleships Rodney and Renown, and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, and a couple of cruisers and about eight destroyers, which were known as H Force, which were all on their way back to Gibraltar from all this naval action which had been going on around Malta and Italy which had prevented us from going from Malta earlier than we did. Do you remember? I mentioned that earlier. Anyway, they treated me very well on the ship and they dumped me at Gibraltar and I was taken up to the KG5 military hospital, as it was called, in Gibraltar and I was there for, almost, in the main hospital, for about a week, not much longer, because I wasn’t really very seriously injured and then after that I was sent down to a sort of convalescent place, again still on the Rock of Gibraltar, until there was room on an aircraft to fly me back home. Which eventually there was. There was room on a Catalina, a flying boat, which was leaving for Milford Haven in South Wales. I got on board that, we took off and flew back, landed at Milford Haven in Wales and I got a travel warrant to go back up to London, where I met my wife, somewhat to her relief, and all was well. Except that a crew of six and a brand new aircraft went out and all that came back was a busted up pilot. End of story.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Leslie Curtis
Description
An account of the resource
Leslie Curtis describes how, when flying from Gibraltar to Malta, his Wellington (Z8773) experienced engine failure and he was forced to ditch in the Mediterranean Sea. The sole survivor, Leslie was picked up after four days by the destroyer, HMS Avon Vale, upon which his cousin was a crew member.
This recording was made around 1990, as Leslie recounts the story to his grandson, Matt Phillips.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Matt Philips
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1990
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941-07
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Gibraltar
Great Britain
Malta
Mediterranean Sea
Middle East
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
England--Berkshire
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Sound
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
00:28:43 audio recording
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Matt Phillips who has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
ACurtisL90XXXX
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Carolyn Emery
aircrew
ditching
pilot
RAF Harwell
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/482/8365/PBryanWA1501.2.jpg
59162f541a4af207c564fe798763c837
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/482/8365/ABryanWA151028.2.mp3
fa10d5d05b642bb735e489ecc37ecb1a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bryan, William A
William Bryan
W A Bryan
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Bryan, WA
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Sergeant William Bryan.
He was a flight engineer with 102 Squadron.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by William Bryan and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
WB: My name is William Bryan, I was a flying engineer on (unclear) onwards during the war, on a hundred and two squadron, at Pocklington, and we had one or two rather dodgy moments. Um, the first one when we were flying to Kiel Bay, to lay mines in Kiel Bay, which was quite a fair distance. Er, everything went fine, you have to cross Denmark, and everything went fine. You come down to four hundred feet to drop your mines accurately, and then you have to climb back up to eight, ten, twelve thousand feet. So coming over Denmark we were flying in a rather dark, very dark night, and er, suddenly our rear radar Monica started to tick. You usually get this ticking when an enemy aircraft passes by fast, you'd get one tick, but this particular time the ticks started coming faster and faster and faster, and I could hear our gunners saying, 'can you see this fighter, can you see him, can you see him?' And I thought, 'well, if they can't see him, we've had it'. And so I got down as low as I could behind my, my control panel, and er, because I thought there was no point in me getting injured if I need to do something for the aircraft. So, I thought (coughs), 'well, I've got about three seconds to live here', because they hadn't seen this fighter, and it's coming in on us, and the next minute, our pilot, he flipped the plane over, into a dive, just flipped over, and down it went. And the German fighter pilot, he'd apparently turned up the wick too much on his engine, to catch us, and when we got to the bottom of this dive my pilot called out, 'come and have a look at this', so I went to the front, and the German was on fire, his engine was on fire, and he was going like a bat out of hell back to his base. Er, I've told my family (laughs) that our gunners shot it down. They might have done, but I don't think they did. I think he had an engine fire, and I did er, I looked up the history of these fighters, and the Germans had used ersatz material for their gaskets, and the gaskets used to blow on quite a number of them. The RAF used to get fires now and again, but no, not in the same way as the Germans got them. So we got away with that, and came home and reported it, but the thing that worried me at the time was our Monica rear radar is supposed to pick out only the enemy, and we feel, at least, I feel, that they've got our secret, they picked up our secret and used it to find us, which I think they did. Anyway, some months later Air Marshall Harris ordered all the Monica radar to be taken out, because they were death traps, the Germans knew where we were all the time. So, so that's that one trip. Another trip which was similar mining trip (coughs) in Kiel Bay. We got off course, somehow, and we were flying over Sweden, and the bomb aimer called up um, 'Ted, Ted', the navigator, 'we're flying over Sweden!'. Ted said, 'no we're not.' 'Yes,' he said, 'they're firing at us'. So Ted, Ted was then convinced (chuckles), so we got out of there fairly quickly. We laid our mines and came back over Denmark. But we'd been warned on briefing that the Germans had two flagships on the coast, right on the coast, we should be aware. And strangely enough, not for his fault, the navigator took us right across these flagships. We got badly shot up. Er, I asked the pilot after (unclear), I asked him how did he manage to evade the gunfire, and he said, 'well, it's predicted fire the Germans use, and you fly into the last shell burst', he said, 'and that confuses them. So if you fly into the last shell burst, they don't know where you're going to be next.' Eventually they stopped firing because we were too far away, and we went into a dive to get away from it, and landed safely. But not without some damage, we had a, a hole in the windscreen, with the air coming in through, and in the morning after breakfast I went up to the hanger to see this aircraft, and they told me that it was a right off, it was too badly damaged to repair. So that was the sum title of the, er, my dodgey times flying, although, there are times when you're pretty scared that there'd be fighters around at night with searchlights playing around, and you certainly wonder whether you would get back alright. (Pause) So for the rest of my tour it was a reasonably quiet time. It consisted mainly of the preparations for the invasion. And we were (unclear) of a lot of bombing in France, erm, marshalling yards, places like that, to disrupt all the trains so the Germans couldn't use it. Now this is approximately three weeks before D-Day. (Pause) So, we actually finished our tour about a week before D-Day, and I must admit, I was glad to see the end of it, of, of flying, and as for going back for a second lot, well, I always think that some of the crews had an exceptionally quiet first tour, went back, and got killed the next lot, on the next one. So, that's my story.
(Woman's voice): Carry on.
WB: Well, I don't think, at least I'm not sure whether our pilot reported at de-briefing, that the engine fire was caused by his gunners. He might have done, he might not. But I don't think the gunners would take credit for it, anyway. Er, and, by and large, I think there's a, it was pretty well a good job done that night. We did our job, and we got back alright. (Pause and noises off). When I finished flying I was posted to an operational training unit, where I became a member of the airmanship staff who were supposed to teach these crews coming on, airmanship, and how to handle things in the plane, which included parachute jumping, although we never went up to do that, um, dinghy drill. Now, with dinghy drill, we would take a crew, or sometimes two crews, in a Bedford truck to Cowley baths, in Oxford, and, I would tell them what was going to happen, 'you're going to do dinghy drill, you're going to have to jump into the pond, er into the pool, and you're going to have to turn this dinghy upside down, as you would in a heavy sea, so I'll blow the dinghy up', which I did, and turned it over and tossed it into the pool, and then they took their turns at jumping in, and turning the big dinghy, it was quiet a big dinghy, dinghy over. Er, I did some time at that. And then some years later, er I was posted to an RAF station in, up North, and er, unfortunately, after one leave, I missed some train, and I arrived at Peterborough, where they said there would be no train until the morning, but, they said, we have a post office van who has to go at four 'o' clock, he may give you a lift. So I asked this chap if he would give me a lift. 'Yes sir, jump in'. He took me up towards our camp, a long miles away, and he dropped me, this is dead, middle of the night, and he said, 'if you take that road, it'll lead you down to that camp'. And, where was I? I just managed to find my way round and I very happily took the right forks and the right bends in the right places, and eventually I came along a road, and I looked at the side off the road, there were some sheds (unclear) with lights on. And I thought, 'well, why do farm buildings have lights on at night?' And I suddenly realised it was the RAF camp I was looking for, so I walked in, up to the guard room, and booked in.
Woman's voice: And you got there in time?
WB: So all RAF places. The memory's gone. I can't remember.
MJ: That doesn't matter.
WB: Well, I can't remember. I should. It was North Luffenham, which is Rutland, and right by Rutland Water, you know? So as I'm finding my way I could hear the water, so I knew I couldn't be too (interrupted).
Woman's voice: So tell the story about when you were invited to this do, and this do, (WB talking across) yes, tell them
WB: Oh that one. I was invited. ER (pause). Yes ok. While I was at -
MJ: Is this right?
WB: Is it on?
MJ: Mm!
Woman's voice: It is on, Bill, it is on. Leave it alone.
WB: While I was at (pause) (unclear) Training Unit I met some of our H Squadron gunners, and we went out for a drink. And, one of them, one of them was a chap named Kelly, and he, he told us a story about, he was playing cricket at camp, and the CO was watching. And the CO came up and spoke to him, and said, 'where did you learn to bat like that?' And he said, 'at Sherbourne College'. 'Oh, really? So, why aren't you commissioned?', (chuckles) 'I never applied, sir'. He said, 'you apply for a commission right away'. (unclear) (woman's laughter in background) and that was that story.
Woman's voice: (laughter) Is that the one where someone came down all dressed up?
WB: No, no, yeah, there's more. And these, this Kelly and his rear gunner friend, the gunner was a rough lad from Birmingham, he said, 'Kelly's invited me to his home, for dinner'. He says, 'I'm going to go'. And he told me after, he said,' I dressed in my best blue, and I arrived at a stately home (chuckles), and I was ushered in by a butler. And I was offered a drink, and after a short while was asked to come and sit down for dinner. So I went and sat down, waiting for my friend to come down, and I turned, he was coming down the stairs in full gentleman's gear. The, the evening dress, the whole lot'. And he said, ' I was most impressed, but it made me feel rather inferior.' And that's the story.
Woman's voice: Carry on then. You don't have to do anything.
MJ: It's alright, it's on.
Woman's voice: Just say.
WB: Pilot Officer Bill Wood was the pilot of our group, and (coughs) I didn't know about his history, or how much flying he'd done before, but some months after we'd finished flying I met a chap who'd been an air gunner on Bill Wood's machines, er, a man from Whitworth Whitley, which was on Coastal Command down in Cornwall, and it was supposed to be flying out to attack submarines on the surface. Over the Bay of Biscay one day they found a U-Boat on the surface, and went in to attack. However, the U-Boat captain decided he would stand and fight, so their gunners got up on the their deck and started firing at the Whitley until they knocked an engine out and it caught on fire, So, our pilot, who was in actual fact at the controls although he was the second pilot, he decided they'd have to ditch. So they ditched down in the Bay of Biscay, and after about twenty four hours they were picked up by a Spanish trawler, who took them to Gibraltar. The strange thing about that is that I lived with our pilot for many, many months, and he never whispered a thing about this. I thought that was amazing. (Tape machine noises) Standard Rank.
MJ: Yes.
WB: And they brought in Standard Rank because they wanted to, all the temporary ranks, they wanted to cut those out, and so my substantive rank was sergeant, so everyone was knocked down one pip, at that time, to a substantive rank, which is what they would have been if they'd carried on and signed on in the Air Force. So, meant you had your own room, or shared with two of you. And the other guy, another Flight Engineer, he got promoted, he got commissioned, and he said, 'I'm going, can I leave this for you'. I said, 'yes, sure', so I put it in the bottom the the kitbag and forgot about it.
MJ: That's how you got your Halifax?
Woman's voice: Oh, that's how you got it?
WB: Put it in the bag and forgot about it. Well he meant, he said, ' I won't need this any more, going to leave it with you'. You know.
MJ: And that's how you got it.
WB: And anyway, it was a Lancaster station, North Luffenham, was a Lancaster station, not Halifax, so it wouldn't have been any good to them. Unless a Halifax had landed.
Woman's voice: And Halifax didn't land there?
WB: No, not usually, not usually.
MJ: Well, thank you for that, I'll tell-
WB: If they'd landed and got damaged, they'd have probably sent a crew from its home station to, ground crew from its home station. Sent a (unclear) and everything to see what's wrong with it, see if they could do something with it. But the main gear for lifting it up, trolleys and that to cart it around, that would have been supplied by the home station.
MJ: Well alright. On behalf of the International Bomber Command, I'd like to thank Bill Bryan on the twenty eighth of October two thousand and fifteen for his recording at his home in Southampton. Once again, we thank you with great thanks.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with William Bryan
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mick Jeffery
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-28
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ABryanWA151028, PBryanWA1501
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Description
An account of the resource
William Bryan reminisces being hit by a German fighter and anti-aircraft fire while mine laying the Kiel Bay. The rest of the tour was a reasonably quiet time, consisting mainly of operations in the run-up of the Normandy campaign. Describes bombing in France on marshalling yards, trains and other targets. William's tour ended a week before D-Day. He then was posted to an operational training unit at RAF North Luffenham, where her taught airmanship, parachute jumping and dinghy drill. Reminisces a meeting with meeting Pilot Officer Bill Wood being shot down in the Bay of Biscay while attacking a U-boat. He was then picked up by a Spanish trawler and dropped off in Gibraltar. William discusses ‘standard rank’ adjustments when some were promoted and obtained commissions, while others ended up with a lower rank.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Rutland
England--Yorkshire
Atlantic Ocean
France
Gibraltar
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Germany
Atlantic Ocean--Kiel Bay
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
Conforms To
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Format
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00:23:52 audio recording
102 Squadron
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
ditching
flight engineer
ground crew
ground personnel
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
pilot
promotion
radar
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Pocklington
Resistance
shot down
submarine
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1313/19048/PStachiewiczM17010029.2.jpg
9b4b01251c9f2028819c079237ab9eb6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stachiewicz, Mieczysław. Album
Description
An account of the resource
58 items. An album of photographs, newspaper clippings and papers relating to Mieczysław Stachiewicz's escape from Poland through Romania, Greece, and France to Great Britain, and his tour of operations as a pilot with 301 Squadron from RAF Hemswell. The album also contains photographs of his friends and family.
These items were digitised by a third-party using technical specifications and operational protocols that may differ from those used by the IBCC Digital Archive.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-01-19
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stachiewicz, M
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Chart of Central England
Description
An account of the resource
A chart of central England used for navigation. It is annotated with navigational fixes. The position of a dinghy is marked with the date 23/6/42.
In the top corner is a photograph of an airman in the cockpit of his aircraft.
There is a yellow post it with 'Nad celem' [Over the target].
Format
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One printed map and one b/w photograph
Language
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eng
pol
Type
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Map
Photograph
Identifier
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PStachiewiczM17010029
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Polskie Siły Powietrzne
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942-06-23
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mieczysław Stachiewicz
aircrew
ditching
navigator
pilot
RAF Hemswell
RAF Wyton
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1406/36507/ECusseOARosserLV411002-0002.2.jpg
a1536d0deebca8bc4c4d7a2784c01fef
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1406/36507/ECusseOARosserLV411002-0003.2.jpg
f91c0dccfb4fb97b1267c646498bdbd7
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1406/36507/ECusseOARosserLV411002-0001.2.jpg
ca95b9f7fdcd3d92e1d22c6c33b03b7c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Rosser, Lewis Victor
L V Rosser
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-05-17
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Rosser, LV
Description
An account of the resource
154 items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant Lewis Victor Rosser (b. 1919, 745193 Royal Air Force) and contains his log books, a diary of his operations, notebooks, documents, correspondence and an album. He flew operations as a pilot with 35, 58, 51 and 115 Squadrons. <br /><br />The collection includes a <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2133">Photograph album</a> with photographs of people and aircraft, artwork cards, newspaper cuttings and documents. <br /><br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ann Godard and Joy Shirley and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
923357 Sgt/Pilot Cusse O.A.
Dishforth
2.10.41.
Dear Vic,
Enclosed are the ends & odds left in my care. 1 Letter & 1 Bank Book.
Today your shoes or rather boots went into the menders with a pair of my own & the two tickets are in my wallet should anything happen.
We lost “J” last “op” & also “A”. F/O Barsby took my kite & Dickinson said he would give my [sic] a rest. The crew were Barsby, [underlined] Sature, [\underlined] Warburton, Knight, Steel.
In “A” Charles (pranger) [indecipherable] on a
[Page break]
nursery went in the drink 20 miles off Flamboro [sic] but we have not found them yet.
Alf Hughes had one engine go having Cocker in the tail but made a super landing at Driffield.
It was scrubbed tonight so am getting to bed early.
All the best
Olaf.
P.S. We have only 2 kites O.K. now in “A” Flight
[Page break]
Mr. Victor Lewis Rosser,
139. Marlborough Road,
Oxford.
[\Inserted] Olaf Cusse [\inserted]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Letter to Victor Rosser from Olaf Cusse
Description
An account of the resource
Writes that he was enclosing odds and ends left in his care. Mentions losing colleagues on operations and other operational matters including a ditching with missing crew.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
O A Cusse
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1941-01-02
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941-01-02
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Yorkshire
England--Oxfordshire
England--Oxford
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
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Text
Text. Correspondence
Format
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Two page handwritten letter with envelope
Identifier
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ECusseOARosserLV411002
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
aircrew
bombing
ditching
missing in action
pilot
RAF Dishforth
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/855/EStubbsRAWoolgarLA420216-0001.2.jpg
669d550551a6b063c9fb49a1466d5198
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/855/EStubbsRAWoolgarLA420216-0002.2.jpg
a8f6cbfb429c89bebbdffb2dfc505a60
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Woolgar, Reg
Reg Woolgar
R L A Woolgar
Jimmy Woolgar
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Bombing, Aerial
Description
An account of the resource
<a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/browse?collection=87">17 items</a>. The collection consists of an oral history <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2148">interview</a> with air gunner Reginald Woolgar DFC (139398 Royal Air Force), correspondence to his father about him being missing in action and subsequently rescued from the sea, his <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2205">log book</a>, <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/854">service and release book</a> and nine photographs.<br /><br /> He flew operations as an air gunner with 49 and 192 Squadrons.<br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Reg Woolgar and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning John William Wilkinson. Additional information on John William Wilkinson is available via the <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/125319/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Woolgar, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-04
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Requires
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Please scroll down to see all X items in this collection.
Reg ‘Jimmy’ Woolgar was born and schooled in Hove. He began working life as a valuations assistant and was training to be a surveyor, which was interrupted when, in December 1939, he joined the RAF. Although he had aspirations to become a pilot, he trained as a wireless operator/air gunner instead. His wireless operator training was carried out at the wireless training school, RAF Yatesbury. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/849/PWoolgarRLA1609.2.jpg His air gunnery training on Fairy Battle aircraft was conducted at RAF West Freugh. On 15 November 1940 he was promoted to sergeant and posted to No 10 OTU at RAF Upper Heyford. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/845/PWoolgarRLA1601.2.jpg Initially flying Anson aircraft and then Hampdens with C Flight, he had his first ‘Lucky Jim’ moment, on 6 February 1941, when his Hampden aircraft was forced to crash land in a field near Cottesmore, in Lincolnshire. The aircraft was written off, but he and the pilot survived with minor injuries. At the end of operational training, instead of going directly onto operasations, he spent the next 5 months as a screen operator instructor. Eventually, on 1 September 1941, he was posted to 49 Squadron, Hampdens, at RAF Scampton https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/852 where his very first operational trip (described as a baptism of fire) was to Berlin. With headwinds going out and coming back, and nil visibility, it was likely the crew would have to bail out. Fortunately, the skipper found a break in the clouds and the aircraft landed wheels down in a field near Louth. The aircraft had to be recovered back to base, transported by road, on a low loader. On another occasion, on a mine laying operation to Oslo Fjord, his aircraft was peppered with anti-aircraft fire, it returned to base with 36 bullet holes in the fuselage and mainplane. A bullet had also passed through the upright of his gun sight while he was looking through it, whilst another tore through his flying suit. The nickname ‘Lucky Jim’ was beginning to stick.
In February 1942, on an operation to Manheim, the port engine, hit by flak, cut dead. Despite jettisoning all superfluous weight, which unfortunately included all the navigation equipment, the aircraft rapidly lost height, and the pilot ditched the aircraft in the English Channel. Whilst the crew had struggled to keep the aircraft airborne, (on a single engine), it had steered on a massive curve and unbeknown to them was headed down the English Channel, before it ditched. The crew scrambled out onto the wing and managed to inflate the dingy, then had to cut the cord attaching the dingy to the aircraft using a pair of nail scissors, moments before it sunk. In the water for hours, the crew thought they were drifting near the Yorkshire coast, but were rescued by a motor anti-submarine boat, much to their surprise, near the Isle of Wight.
Operational flying was intense, Reg would feel wound up before take-off and there was much apprehension on the way out to the target. Often, they flew through intense flak that was sometimes so close they could smell it. There was always a sense of sense of relief once they came away from the target. In between operations, each day was treated as it came along with many off-duty hours spent socialising in the local hostelries https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/853
After his first operational tour (he completed two) he was commissioned and became gunnery leader with 192 Squadron in 100 Group.
After the war ended, he signed on for an extra two years and was posted to Palestine as an air movements staff officer. Luck was again on his side when, one day, he was on his way to an Air Priorities Board Meeting at the King David Hotel when the hotel was bombed, resulting in many army and civilian casualties.
After a short tour in Kenya, as Senior Movements Staff Officer, he returned to Palestine flying with 38 Squadron until August 1947. In his flying career he amassed over 1000 flying hours. For services to his country Reg was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/858
He was released from the RAF in September 1947. Initially employed as an assistant valuations officer, he studied to become a Chartered Surveyor and secured a job as a senior valuer with the City of London. He later became the planning valuer of the city. After 14 years he was made a partner at the firm St Quintin Son and Stanley. Reg retired in 1971.
08 December 1939: Joined RAF as a wireless operator/air gunner
28 August 1940: 145, 3 Wing, RAF Yatesbury - Wireless Operator training
29 October 1940 - 15 November 1940: RAF West Freugh, No 4 Bombing and Gunnery School, flying Battle aircraft
November 1940: Promoted to Sergeant
15 November 1940 - 20 August 1941: RAF Upper Heyford, No 10 Operational Training Unit flying Anson and Hampden aircraft
02 September 1941 - 24 March 1942: RAF Scampton, 49 Squadron, flying Hampden aircraft
28 April 1942 - 24 June 1942: 1485 Target Towing and Gunnery Flight flying Whitley and Wellington aircraft
02 July 1942 – 3 July 1942: RAF Manby, Air Gunnery Instructor Course
4 July – 10 July 1942: RAF Scampton, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Manchester and Oxford aircraft
25 July 1942 – 10 August 1942: RAF Wigsley, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Lancaster aircraft
3 October – 27 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington and Hampden aircraft
28 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge, Gunnery Leader Course
End of 1942: Awarded RAF Commission
09 Nov 1942 – 18 March 1943: RAF Fulbeck flying Manchester aircraft
14 May 1943 – 11 June 1944: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington aircraft
20 June 1944 – 27 July 1945 RAF Foulsham, 192 Squadron flying Halifax and Wellington aircraft
29 April 1946 – 30 August 1946: Palestine, Air Movements Staff Officer
01 September 1946 – 21 January 1947: Kenya, Senior Movements Staff Officer
30 January1947 – 10 June 1947: Ein Shemer, Palestine, 38 Squadron flying Lancaster aircraft
13 July 1947 139398 Flt Lt RLA Woolgar released from Service.
Transcribed document
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Royal Air Force
Scampton
[underlined] Lincoln [/underlined]
[underlined] 16.2.42 [/underlined]
Dear Mr Woolgar,
I hope you received my second telegram informing you of your son’s rescue yesterday afternoon. he is now at the Royal Naval Hospital Haslar Portsmouth and will be returning to the squadron within a day or two. I intend to grant him leave when he returns but it is necessary for him to return here first in order to comply with certain formalities.
I must apologise for giving you
[page break]
a serious shock but I am sure you will appreciate that [deleted] will [/deleted] we always try to notify next of kin as soon as possible when our crews are reported as missing – that is to say when we have confirmed that they have not landed anywhere in this country.
Yours sincerely
R Stubbs
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Letter to Mr Woolgar
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An account of the resource
R Stubbs writes from RAF Scampton to Mr Woolgar informing him that his son has been rescued and is at the Royal Naval Hospital in Portsmouth. He advises that he will be granted leave after he has returned to the squadron.
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R Stubbs
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1942-02-16
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Cathie Hewitt
Steve Baldwin
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Two page handwritten letter
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eng
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Text. Correspondence
Text
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EStubbsRAWoolgarLA420216
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Navy
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Great Britain
England--Portsmouth
England--Lincolnshire
England--Hampshire
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1942-02-16
1942-02-15
1942-02-14
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air sea rescue
crash
ditching
missing in action
RAF Scampton
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/561/8829/PStonemanWJ1605.1.jpg
889a4d1d0af552221054f861e73b2214
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/561/8829/AStonemanWJ161114.2.mp3
2dfa9efaf8411e162dbfb9dd0d0d01ba
Dublin Core
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Title
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Stoneman, William James
W J Stoneman
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stoneman, WJ
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Squadron Leader William James Stoneman (1923 - 2017, 186627 Royal Air Force). He flew operations as a rear gunner with 138 Squadron.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Date
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2016-11-14
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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This interview is being conducted on behalf of the International Bomber Command Centre. The interviewer is Rod Pickles, the interviewee is Bill Stoneman. The interview is taking place at Bill’s home in Newquay, Cornwall on the 14 November 2016. Also present is Pam Roberts who is Bill’s carer. Well good morning, Bill, and thank you for inviting me in, it’s lovely to be here with you.
RP: Pleasure.
RP: The story we want to hear is yours and the voice we want to hear is yours, so I’ve just asked the initial questions and let you carry on.
AS: Yes.
RP: So, can we sort of go back to the time, you’re approaching leaving school and thinking about what to do with your life and what prompted you to join the RAF?
AS: Yes. It was when the war started, 1939, I was 16 years of age so it was like all the other boys, wanting to join the service at the time but being under age, I couldn’t so I had to wait until I was 18. Ah, when I was 18, I went to, I had a girlfriend in St Leonards, I lived in the Cley area at St Leonards. My hobby was music, I played in quite a famous silver band, St Leonard’s Silver Band, and won trophies, very well known throughout the band world. I also played in dance bands. The girl I was in love with, a girl called Barbara Hale, her father owned a restaurant, believe it or not, in a small village in St Leonards. There was a restaurant with one big room on the first floor, which was used for weddings and things by the local people, and I was engaged by him for a very small amount of money, but when he wanted a band to play at the weddings, I would get five or six musicians and provide the music and, of course, to be near this girlfriend Barbara who, of course we were married in 1947. I then left St Leonards to go to Bristol, because they moved to Bristol. He was given a job, he was asked to take over, he had a catering background, my wife’s father, and he was asked to take over, umm the catering at a large place in Bristol, which was used for trainees in the engineering and electrical engineering world. They always had a big restaurant there he took on the job, and I went with the family and lived with them. I then went to the local government training school to become an instrument repairer or instrument maker. Whilst I was there, I saw chaps in uniform, especially round the Bicester area and there was a lot of flying going on, especially with Bristol Aircraft who made the Beaufighter and the Beaufort and that. So, I went along to the recruiting centre and joined the RAF with the idea of being an instrument maker. However, ahh there was a hold up on training, I was posted to Elsham Wolds, which was in Lincolnshire near Barnaby/Scunthorpe, that area, with a very famous squadron, No. 103 Squadron and I was just a gofer, just helping out at the armaments section waiting to come, which I thought I’d become an instrument repairer. However, then I started flying with them because they wanted air testing, to do with, they were testing the aircraft for its airworthiness and I was pinching every few minutes I could to be in the air, and I said to my Warrant Officer, I remember the chap very, very, very well, always with a bicycle this man, pair of bicycle clips cycling round the field after his men, I said ‘how do I become aircrew?’ ‘Well,’ he said ‘that’s simple, you know, go along to the station headquarters, fill in a form’, which I did and oh, it was days, they were obviously short of aircrew at the time and I ended up at the Aircrew Reception Centre at Cardington in Bedfordshire. Had interviews, medicals and so forth and um arithmetic test, English test, that sort of thing, general knowledge and when I came out the chap, there was an old, he must have been about 50/60 years of age which was very old to me at that time in, he’d obviously been in the First World War because he had First World War medals on his chest, and he said ‘you’ve passed as a PNB’. I had no idea what he was talking about so I said, ‘but I don’t understand’, so he said ‘pilot, navigator or bomb aimer’. That’s what PNB — so I said ‘grand, lovely job, when can I go?’ He said ‘oh it’s a few months, could be five or six months’ and I said ‘I want to go now’. He said ‘the only way to go now is to become a rear gunner or a gunner’. I said ‘that’s for me’, and believe it or not ahh Rod, that was the best choice I think I ever made in my life because how, the courage of pilots, navigators, wireless operators, engineers ahh, who couldn’t do anything about an attack, to sit there in an aircraft relying on a chap with four Brownings in the back and a chap in mid upper with four Brownings, I just don’t think I’d have had the nerve to do it. After, so I was sent for air gunnery training, which was at Bishopscourt, Northern Ireland. I can’t tell you, I can’t remember the number of the course, but very early on in the course, they were short of motor transport there, I don’t think we had a dentist very early on. It was building up, yes that sort of thing. There were a few, some WRAF were posted in, they were WAAF at the time, W - double A - F, and there was no transport to get them so we walked, we marched four miles from there to the nearest railway station to carry the WAAFs’ kit bags to their quarters that had been built for them. Of course, we all were tickled pink, young men of 18/19 years of age, we all made dates on the way of course, this was fun. The aircraft they had there were Ansons, so you climbed onto an Anson with a pilot there who’d probably done a tour of operation, I don’t know, I didn’t know too much about the RAF at that time, but the undercarriage had to be wound up by hand, it was not automatic. I think it was five revolutions to an inch or something like that. I know, but he would get you doing this so you sat there winding and towards the end, he would say ‘oh for goodness sake, give it here’, knowing damn well you were on the last four revolutions you see. And that was the undercart up and we flew over the Irish Sea and we met a Manchester aircraft. Manchesters came from the Isle of Man, I’ve forgotten the name of the airfield now, it was on the Isle of Man, it will come to me in a moment, probably after you’ve gone [laughter] but the Manchester would come out towing a drogue, which is a bit of rope with this long bit of ahh, drogue on the back which we were to fire at. I never shot down an aircraft as far as I know, but we were out one day and there was a Manchester in the water with a drogue and we stood by, it was quite thrilling actually to fly around, and they launched an air sea rescue launch from RAF Jurby, or wherever they were stationed in the Isle of Man and picked the crew up, which was, it was quite an exciting thing to see actually. Anyway, finished the course at Northern Ireland at Ardglass and I was posted to Turweston.
RP: Oh yes.
AS: Which was an operational training unit which came under the Silverstone, which is now a famous race track. It was a satellite of Silverstone. I must tell you while I was on the air gunnery training, I met a chap and we were crewed together as air gunners, a chap called Bob Wilmot, and he was from Hinckley in Leicestershire and he had been in the Air Force quite a time so he had switched from ground crew, I can’t remember what trade he was, but he was, he came from Iceland, from Reykjavik where he was stationed to er, for training. So Bob and I paired off and we went through air gunnery training together, when we got to Turweston, we were collared a billet and we were going to a hangar where we were going to be crewed up. This is where we meet the pilot which we, we were all green, we hadn’t a clue what was going on, but as we wandered towards the hangar, the hangar doors were open and two Canadian officers ran out, a pilot and a navigator, that was Sid Godfrey, pilot and the navigator was called Don Lenny, a Flying Officer, both Canadians, and grabbed us, ‘fly with us’. It appears, we didn’t realise that British air gunners were rather prized, I probably shouldn’t say this but we were. It seems that the name had got around that if you could get yourself a British tail gunner, you had a good chance of surviving [laughter], which was nice to hear.
RP: Nice to hear yes.
AS: Nice to hear. However, from there we went to the um operational training unit, flying on Wellingtons.
RP: So, this is still part of your gunnery training?
AS: Still part of the gunnery training, all part of the, except you’d fly as far as Belfast and pretend that Belfast was the target, you know, and err other places, training all the time of course. It was good training for the pilot and the navigator and everybody in the crew. Ah, so that was that bit of training, I’m trying to think —
RP: So where, from the operational training unit did you have any further training?
AS: Yeah, then we went to the conversion unit, ah which was up in Yorkshire.
RP: They sent you to a few places then?
AS: Dishforth.
RP: Dishforth yes,
AS: Dishforth, No 1664 Conversion Unit.
RP: So, what were you converting to there then?
AS: That was from Wellingtons on to Halifaxes.
RP: So, you were nearly at the end of your training?
AS: That’s right, yes, towards the end of the training then. From Wellingtons on to Halifaxes at Dishforth and er, which was a satellite of Topcliffe, and err that was very interesting because that was going from Wellingtons, which was a Frazer Nash Turret, rear turret where like you fired your guns, it was like handlebars. Frazer Nash was like driving a motorbike but the Boulton Paul was a single thumb on the —
RP: On the button.
AS: On the button, you know the turret moved with the control column, you know left, right, up, you know down.
RP: Which did you prefer?
AS: Hmm?
RP: Which did you prefer, the Boulton Paul or the Frazer?
AS: Well listen, I think, I felt very happy with the Frazer Nash because I’d got so used to it, but once I’d got used to the Boulton Paul I was, you know. I had a feeling that the Boulton Paul turret was slightly smaller and seemed to be more cramped than the Frazer Nash though someone might correct me. Uhm, so that was at Dishforth and I must tell you a story. We were coming back and the pilot who I trained with, ah, I’ll get to the story later but I never flew with him on operations because on his first flight, all pilots when they were posted to an operational station which was 138 Squadron at Tempsford in Bedfordshire, had to do a second dicky flight, because we weren’t dropping bombs, we were dropping agents and supplies and it was a tricky old business, because he had to drop on three torches and so he had, it was low level flying, coming in at low level and dropping the supplies at about 800ft, and I think if it was a live body to be an agent, it was dropped from 1000ft. But that was what he went on, and he went on the very first flight and they got shot down by a, we found out later it was a Night Fighter that got him. He was the second dicky, he wasn’t flying the aircraft he was there for an experience flight. So him, I understand, I may be wrong but it was only him and the mid upper gunner survived that crash so he was a lucky man. But we didn’t so we were a headless crew, we were. A navigator, a bomb aimer, a wireless operator, gunners with no pilot, so I was asked by the Station Commander would I like to go back on to training again and be re-crewed and would I stay at Tempsford as a spare gunner, that’s a ‘spag’ SPAG ([laughter] because, in case another gunner got toothache or was wounded err, which was fair. So I stayed on the squadron and did 32 operations, I’ve got the logbook to show you Rod, which includes Germany, France, Belgium and um Holland, Norway.
RP: These are all special ops?
AS: They’re all special ops, dropping to the agents much needed supplies, ammunitions, cameras, food, explosives, whatever they need to carry out their dangerous work.
RP: So, so what was, Norway, ah —
AS: Norway you see was an occupied country and was very, that was dangerous flying because as you know, it is a very mountainous country and to drop supplies, you can’t drop from 20,000ft, I mean you have to go down lower to drop them and you dropped on torches, torchlight or, even bonfires if it was safe, if they were far enough away and they knew the Germans weren’t near, they would light bonfires to guide us in.
RP: So every operation you were on you were more or less liaising with a resistance group in that country.
AS: Always a resistance group yes, and all been organised previously by the British Broadcasting Company, you know with clandestine —
RP: Cryptic messages.
AS: Cryptic messages, music, different tunes being played ah, quite fascinating really. We’d, in fact I was ignorant of a lot of things that were so clever, the British at this, subterfuge, of making sure that the people on the ground got the required stuff to do their damage.
RP: Were you ever attacked on any of these missions?
AS: No, very, very lucky. Saw aircraft looking for us but because we flew so low, I’d see JU88 which was famous fighter, twin engined German fighter, going the other way, searching for us. They obviously had us on radar or something but missing us. That was quite frightening [laughter], you sat there with bated breath for 30 hours because you’d seen one and you’d think are they coming back? But we obviously, we were very, very, very lucky people.
RP: So on a normal trip, say to France it’s, you don’t always fly on through, you sometimes, you return to Tempsford but obviously you had one incident where flew on to North Africa.
AS: Yes, that was it.
RP: Was that a deliberate fly through there?
AS: If it was a long flight, for instance in the South of France, it was for conservation of fuel and so forth, it was better and safer to fly on to North Africa to a place called Blida, RAF Blida and stay the night, refuel the aircraft and then also add ahh, pre-arranged for guns replace, canisters replace for us to do a drop on the way back. It was very, very well thought out, and also we had pigeons, that seems funny—
RP: I’ve heard about those.
AS: Yes. And when I’ve taught, I’ve taken Pam to the schools, I’ve given talks in schools and the children are always interested when I talk about the pigeons.
RP: Yes, a lot of people don’t believe it but I know about them yeah.
AS: Yes, pigeons were in a little cardboard, pressed cardboard container with a parachute, that’s a miniature parachute and in the container would be a bottle of water and a packet of seed and also a pencil, a special pencil and paper with a questionnaire which was all events of war, and the commanding officer’s name, all sorts of things, motor transport nearby, airfields, what sort of airfields, you know and these pigeons they had to fill in this bit of paper, the children all burst mad on what we’d found in occupied country, put the paper back in the pigeon’s canister on his leg and release it and back it would fly to Tempsford with some very, very interesting information, you know ahh. I don’t know if it’s true but I understand that the first information that Rommel was dead came back by pigeon. That was the rumour going around at the time.
RP: Yes, sometimes they carried them on aircraft to release if you did ditch, didn’t they?
AS: Oh yes, we had that as well yes. A cage inside the aircraft in case of a ditching. I think we were the only aircraft that did have pigeons on board for that. Yeah.
RP: Because if you had time to put your reference you could be rescued.
AS: That’s right, the navigator would put yeah — Now apart from the wireless operator giving away the position of the crash, they’d also have the pigeons with the, as you say, with the reference of the area where the aircraft was going to go down.
RP: So, tell us about this incident when you did go down, it must have been —
AS: Let’s see, we went to ah North Africa with the idea, we did a successful drop on the way out and stayed the night at North Africa, RAF Blida, with the idea of going back, I can’t remember the target area but we were going back to the South of France near there and drop our supplies and agent, no agent, just supplies this time. However, when we took off, it was getting dark, very nearly dark and all we know was a bang. We were flying along, I didn’t see it but later on I was told like, l can tell you the full story that a JU88 had been seen in the area and they flew, they had a gun which could fire upwards through the top Jaegermeister or something it was called.
RP: It come underneath you.
AS: Schräge yeah. And this is obviously what happened because we were flying along at dusk and then there was a bang so that was all, and nearby lucky for us there was a hospital ship, an Italian hospital ship with an Italian crew, I understand the Italian Captain called Principessa Giovanni and this, having wounded on board there was a British sergeant medical sergeant. There was no smoking on board and he was, I understand, he was, the story came out he was behind the lifeboat on the deck having a crafty fag [laughter] and he actually saw the incident.
RP: Oh right.
AS: So —
RP: He knew there’s been a crash.
AS: He saw, he saw us go down. He saw the flame, and he saw flames and it was still light enough to see what happened, and he had the courage to go to a senior officer ‘an aircraft had just been shot down’ he said because he’d seen the incident.
RP: So, they knew you’d crashed, but obviously, when you were ditching you weren’t aware you’d been spotted, so what was it like when you hit the sea?
AS: That’s right, so we hit the water not knowing that anyone — that, that’s it. The navigator was in the aircraft with us and we were, you sit at crash position, the pilot said you know ‘get in ditching positions’. There was a main spar runs through the aircraft which with the wings, strengthen the wings and you brace yourself against that. The pilot stays at the control and the flight, and the flight engineer assisting him the rest, cos he’s watching the engines and everything like that in case he requires help. The pilot was a chap called Highwalker, Flight Lieutenant Canadian, already had a Distinguished Flying Cross and he got the Distinguished Service Order for this err, probably got the result for his flying before and this crash because how he controlled that—
RP: Once you put it down and not break up.
AS: Fantastic, it was like a sycamore leaf, it was completely out of control it had been hit, you know, badly damaged.
RP: But normally you would expect it to break up.
AS: At the very last moment it flew, super [unclear] but you’re given, they say you’re given extra strength at certain times.
RP: Yes.
AS: Anyway, he landed but obviously he’d couldn’t land gently, it smashed the front of the aircraft in and water rushed, the salt, the sea came straight away, and the navigator was obviously washed towards my rear turret where I’d climbed out of, and was back in the same position. But it was all, a huge inrush of water. And so I got out, I was lucky, I got out, there was no dinghy, it should come out by an immersion switch but it didn’t, you know the water should get it out, but it didn’t come out. But the bomb aimer, a Canadian Officer, held my, I still had my parachute harness on, and held me. I went back towards the aircraft, I could see the D, it’s illuminated, it’s got a handle just a normal handle to, and a D on it. I could see it so I reached it and I turned it and it was so still by that time, luckily the Mediterranean was not rough at that moment. I could hear the hiss for while I was carrying it over the aircraft, I got a hiss of a dinghy being inflated automatically, and it came out, I had got a frangible chord which holds it and you can cut it when you get in. Unfortunately, in the crash, the frangible chord must have broken, must have snapped because the dinghy was on its way. [laughter]. Luckily being ahh, a Cornish boy and always in the sea swimming, I was a strong swimmer, though fully dressed with flying boots it was quite easy for me to swim and get the dinghy and get it back to the aircraft. Loaded people on it, the pilot had hurt his hands and so forth, you know. We all got on it quite safely, all but the navigator. If I remember correctly, the engineer damaged his hands as well but er, and then we looked towards the aircraft, we were then I suppose say 40 feet away about that from the aircraft I think the dinghy drifted away. All that was left was two fin and rudders from the Halifax together with water and my turret, and two shouts of ‘help’ came but there was nothing we could do then and then he gurgled under the water with the navigator in the turret.
RP: So he must have been knocked unconscious and just come round.
AS: Yes I think he’d just come round because he did shout ‘help’. And his son has been here to see us, he’s been here to see me and um, I’ll tell you the story about it. Anyway, that was the crash, ah, fortunately the ship, the Principessa, the hospital ship, the sergeant had witnessed this, British sergeant
RP: So they were already on their way to you.
AS: Otherwise we’d never have, I don’t think, ‘cos the wireless operator whether his message was received we will never know, no. I never saw the Court of Enquiry or formal investigation into the crash, uh but there must have been one of course. However, we were picked up by this ship, given a slug of whisky and looked after and err, the engineer hadn’t come round, he was still, not unconscious, but he’d been very, he’d been knocked about and when he came to, on the ship there were black troops on board, they’d been fighting, I can’t remember the name of them now, it’s amazing, like our Ghurkhas anyway, they were fighting for the Americans and the French. They were French troops anyway and when he came to there were these men dressed in white swats with black faces standing around the engineer and he thought he’d died and gone to hell [laughter]. He did, he told us afterwards. That’s it then.
RP: Someone came in to reassure him then?
AS: Yeah, well we all came in yeah.
RP: So where did the ship dock, where did they take you?
AS: They took us to err, out to Oran and at Oran there’s the American hospital Number 6 General, it was called Number 6 the American General Hospital and they um, we was in sodden clothes, my uniform was green, I suppose some dye had come out of the aircraft somewhere from some stuff we were carrying. However, they gave us a dressing, pair of pyjamas, pair of slippers and a nice velvet dressing gown which we wore all the time we were there and err, that’s where we did our recovery and on the bottom of my bed, I felt OK, but the doctor wrote ’shock and exhaustion’ so I must have been you know worse than I thought I was.
RP: So how did they get you back to the UK then?
AS: Well that was it so there we were in the hospital in Oran and they err, we would be trying to get back again and a Liberator, an RAF Liberator was up in North Africa, must be at Blida or somewhere, came to Oran and picked us up and took us back to the UK and we landed um, in Kent. I’m trying to think of the airfield.
RP: Manston?
AS: Hmm?
RP: Manston?
AS: Yeah, that’s it yeah. And err, there, we made our way back you know, we were given warrants we went back to the station as though you know, that was it.
RP: It was back to work, no leave.
AS: I’d been given a spot of leave and that’s it. ‘Well done mate’, shook your hand — [laughter]
RP: And you were back flying then were you?
AS: That’s is yeah. That was my thirteenth operation.
RP: So you still had another?
AS: I did another —
RP: Nineteen.
AS: I completed thirty-two
RP: So you still had another, almost the same to go.
AS: Exactly, yeah, yeah.
RP: No more incidents after that? I mean that’s enough for anybody.
AS: Not of that nature no, no, nothing like that.
RP: That is enough for anybody though really.
AS: Oh yeah. No, I had a very trouble-free tour, very lucky I had a very trouble-free tour really.
RP: So where was your last op then? The last op you did, can you remember the last one?
AS: I’ve got the log but I can’t remember where it would be, it might have, I’ve got it in my log with me to show you.
RP: OK Bill, you were going to tell us about, you went back to base after the crash and you were straight back to flying, but it’s a different aircraft though, isn’t it?
AS: Yeah, they changed the aircraft to the Stirling. Now the Stirling had a, was not really suitable to Bomber Command’s high altitude flying, but the ones we had had been reconditioned and we went over to Northern Ireland to pick them up. As crews we all flew over there, went with the crew and flew them back from Belfast to the UK to Tempsford. I found the Stirling an excellent aircraft as a rear gunner, brilliant rear turret Frazer Nash rear turret, four Bristol engines which gave you great confidence. You could see flames, you sat in the rear turret you saw a little bit of flames, but two engines each side. But for, I had great confidence in the Stirling. I thought they were very well suited to the work that Tempsford did, dropping agents’ supplies. Plenty of room in them, ah they had a nickname in the Air Force, called the Flying Solenoid for some reason, had a lot of electrics in them.
RP: Oh right.
AS: That’s why but ah, I thought completely reliable and it’s amazing, in all the time I flew, a lot, never had an engine failure with them. What you’d normally get, come back with a wing and a prayer as they say.
RP: [unclear]
AS: No, no a very solidly built —
RP: So when you’re dropping supplies, are you dropping them out of the bomb bay?
AS: Yeah, no, the —
RP: Or are they going out of the door?
AS: They cut a hole in the floor of the aircraft, we called it a Joe Hole because the agents we dropped off were nicknamed Joes.
RP: They went through the same hole?
AS: The same hole. It was quite a big hole, two flaps, the mid upper gunner had been to Ringway and done a course and become an expert dispatcher going into … to dress people in harnesses for their, with their Mae West and their parachutes, and the mid upper gunner became a dispatcher and he would open up the Joe Hole, throw back the two things, the lights of course would give, the pilot would show where the agents would drop over the dropping zone and err, they would sit on the edge of the Joe Hole and as the, the tap on the shoulder and so they would jump. And as a rear gunner, you would sit in the back and the slipstream takes the body, the jumper and he seems to level out and if it was you Rod, jumping I’d recognise you for a split second with a terrified look on your face [laughter], you know what I mean, and he’d lay on his back it seemed to be, for a split second, I’d know the person who had jumped from the rear turret , yeah. And you’d see the bag, you know because you were—
RP: Did you circle round?
AS: We’d be circling round, you’d see them going in.
RP: But you’ve obviously done the important thing of dropping them in occupied territory. Was there ever a follow up, did you find out what happened to any of them?
AS: No. I wish we could have done because it is so, it had been ages as well. They were brought out to the aircraft at the very last moment ahh, they had a farm on the um, it was called Gibraltar Farm, it’s still there at Tempsford, I’ve taken Pam to it, you can go and visit it. There’s photographs there, there’s names, there’s a plaque about the work.
RP: So there’s a Veterans’ Association for Tempsford isn’t there?
AS: That’s right, yeah and err, it’s quite an interesting place to go to. And they’d be dressed at Gibraltar Farm and then they’d be put into a closed vehicle so the crew wouldn’t see them till the very last moment your doors would open of course, they would climb in, sit down. Not a nice comfy chair for them, just a canvas seat.
RP: I’m assuming the crew were briefed at the last moment as to their target then?
AS: Oh yeah, we knew the target, we did the target in the afternoon.
RP: Oh right.
AS: We knew exactly where they were going. We knew um —
RP: By that time of course you were restricted to base I assume.
AS: Exactly, we couldn’t go out, no phone calls off the base or anything, restricted. You had your, you’d go and have your bacon and egg you know, your meal sort of thing, draw your rations and err, yeah. Get a flask of coffee.
RP: Yes. So, Stirlings up until the war ended you were on the Stirling, until your last op?
AS: Yeah.
RP: So the war ends —
AS: It’s funny because people didn’t associate Stirlings with —
RP: I must admit I thought it was Halifaxes and Lancasters.
AS: Yeah, no and then the Stirling was, that was —
RP: But when you’d done your last op, can you remember the day the war ended, where you were? Were you at Tempsford?
AS: Yeah, I, no I was on a codes and cipher course when the war, we’d all been, when you’d done a tour you retreaded, you know they’d give you a job. I was given admin and accounts I was trained, I was given, but that codes and cipher is included so I was sent to Yatesbury
RP: Oh yes.
AS: For the codes and cipher course. That was eight weeks, eleven weeks though I remember.
RP: And of course, very modestly, haven’t told us that during this time you were now a commissioned officer.
AS: Right.
RP: So what rank were you when the war ended?
AS: Ahh, a Flight Lieutenant. Yes
RP: So you were a Flight Lieutenant at the end of the war.
AS: Yes, I was a Flight Lieutenant um, training as a gunnery leader at that time, you know. At Turweston I was a Flight Lieutenant. I was a senior air gunner on the station training chaps which was err —
RP: So if the war ends, are you given the option to leave or stay?
AS: Yes I stayed on, you know. I’m glad I did because I love the service and I ended up with the rank of Squadron Leader, should have gone higher but [laughter].
RP: They didn’t recognise brilliance when they saw it though, that’s what it was. So, so obviously the war ended and you’re staying in an admin job now then?
AS: That’s right, admin and accounts, yeah.
RP: Yeah ok.
AS: And I was, err, where was my first posting, I’ve forgotten? Anyway, I went to Cyprus, Singapore, Germany. Oh, my first trip was immediately after the war in Germany, Belgium first on this Missing Research and Enquiry Unit. Number twenty — This is where we’re looking for crashed aircraft and bodies, because parents still believed that their boy was walking round lost somewhere.
RP: Yes.
AS: The finale was, you know they formed this Missing Research and Enquiry Unit. I was at the one in Belgium and we cleared up Belgium and Holland. That was going around to the cemeteries and making and, not exhuming graves but making sure that people were in there and we found lots of crashed aircraft, in fact what we would do, we would go to a, there were twenty-three, I think there were twenty-three chaps in Belgium, Holland and Germany. I had a Land Rover, no I didn’t I had a Jeep.
RP: Slight difference I know [laughter]
AS: I had a Jeep and err, a pipe to keep my nose warm [laughter] and that was, and err a Wing Commander, commanding officer, Canadian who been an evader himself and err, we just went to a Town Hall, put a notice up, we had an interpreter given to us by the way
RP: Yes.
AS: And the idea was, that we were coming to that town, could anyone come forward with any news of any crashed aircraft or aircrew? It was amazing the people you found.
RP: You’d get a good response from them.
AS: Yeah. It was amazing.
RP: And this was to verify, so you could then verify to the parents that you’d located their son.
AS: That’s right. One of my friends err, we were together, we were working together, and he had a pastor came, he put his notice up and a pastor said ‘A nun, a nun [unclear], a nun came he said. Behind the nunnery there’s an RAF chap because he was shot and put into the ground so they followed that. She, they took my friend by the Austin to the spot, he got some grave diggers, they exhumed the body, it was just under the ground and it was a Flight Lieutenant and he had a hole in the middle of his forehead.
RP: They’d just shot him, out of hand.
AS: And I didn’t understand, I wasn’t privy to all the facts but the British Army took that case over and they got the killer.
RP: Oh good.
AS: They, through finding out through, in the pubs and that, who the people who were stationed, Germans in that area, at that time and they got the culprit, so I understand.
RP: That must have been a very err, sort of depressing job,
AS: Oh yeah.
RP: But you must have felt satisfied at the end.
AS: Exactly, oh yeah.
RP: The satisfaction of actually finding people.
AS: Pam loves this story. This Wing Commander aha, a Canadian had a —
RP: Please tell us.
AS: Churchill accent. You know a Canadian and a Churchill [unclear].
RP: Slight lisp, yeah.
AS: I took the me I think. We were stationed at a place called Schloss Schonberg and this castle we were stationed in had lovely steps, and we were billeted there, a whole gang of us. And I’d been out for a whole week living off a, being in cemeteries, finding bodies, listing work, at night you might get a room you know, tucked away in a hotel, pub general pub somewhere. So I came back, obviously, a bit smelly and there they were, my friends having a drink at the bar, lovely little bar we had and the steps going up. So I was taking the mickey out of the commanding officer, I said ‘I think it’s disgusting, young officers drinking at this time of the day’ and they were going like this [laughter]. Too late, I was going up the stairs and the Wing Commander, there he was, he wasn’t a Jack McLean, he got off his chair put his newspaper down so I went to, I had to go to his bedroom. Still as that, he sat on his bed and gave me the biggest bollocking I’ve ever had. Lovely, he could really give one, he ended up as a Minister in the Government.
RP: He didn’t see the funny side of it.
AS: No, no but he but, but it’s funny, when he left the err, when he left Germany to go back to Canada, as his tour expired, the Adjutant a Welsh feller came to me ‘the CO wants to see you’. I said ‘Christ I’ve done nothing wrong, I’ve been good as gold’. And he, charming, went in, he said ‘Bill cheerio, why don’t you come to Canada, you’re just the sort of chap we could do with‘. So all of that was forgotten, it was all about play you know it was—
RP: So having done that, at what point did they decide to the wind the operation up, about finding crashed aircraft, how long did they–
AS: Probably when they found, when they must have found them all I suppose
RP: And so you came back—
AS: As near as dammit. Couldn’t do any more, the graves were all, I can’t remember the timing.
RP: But you came back, you came back to the UK then?
AS: That’s right, yeah.
RP: Where were you then? What did you do then?
AS: I’m trying to think. No — That’s when I was in codes and cipher I think, yeah.
RP: So—
AS: I came back, I was sent to Compton Bassett.
RP: Ahh, Compton Bassett.
AS: Yeah, Compton Bassett. On a code and cipher course, and err, which you’re mad after six years so I did nine so — [laughter] But funnily enough I quite enjoyed it you know, it was an interesting job. So I did codes and ciphers in Singapore and Gibraltar and it was quite interesting, you get to meet, you throw stones at the CO’s window at 3 o’clock in the morning, always gives you a glass of whisky [laughter].
RP: So how long were you in the RAF then, how long did you stay?
As: Thirty-seven years.
RP: So that’s a long time.
AS: That’s a long time yeah.
RP: You stayed on,
AS: I stayed on, yeah, yeah.
RP: And that was sort of on the admin branch.
AS: Yes, I think I finished at St Mawgan as OC Station Services, you know works and bricks working with DoE sort of thing.
RP: Yeah, but err, out of those thirty-seven, I’m guessing the first three or four were the most interesting.
AS: Yeah, right.
RP: That’s that. You were going to err -
AS: I was going to tell you the story about York
RP: About York. Tell us the story about York Minster then, coming back in the snow.
AS: Oh yeah, yes.
RP: You were going to tell us the story.
AS: Yeah, that’s all, and this pilot he came back, he came back to see me in Cornwall which I was quite thrilled, when you think that err, what he’d been through as a prisoner of war and err, we were walking out in the sunshine at the time, reminiscing and he remembered his old Cornish air gunner. I said he was a Freemason and talking all over Canada, he said I told the story, your ears should have been burning you know.
RP: Tell us the story about the church, the York Minster.
AS: Ah yes.
RP: You were coming back from a training flight I think was it, coming back from a training flight to York Minster when he was telling you about going to church?
AS: That’s the one.
RP: That’s the one, yes.
AS: Just flying in the area of, and we were coming back from the North Sea, and err, very low unfortunately because it started to snow, just climbing over the, coming over York and that, and the wireless operator could actually see people in the cinema queue but as we went over York Minster, which we didn’t realise we were so low, I said ‘guys’ I said, ‘I haven’t been to church in bloody years’, but we could see err yeah.
RP: Well I think that that, the thing about your crews at Tempsford, I think there was obviously great camaraderie with all the various people there.
AS: Pam likes me to tell the story when, because when you’re in the rear turret you can, in a Frazer Nash, you’d like a motorbike, when the Boulton Paul I’d put a flask of tea, I took a flask with me and it would just fit, there’s a little ledge on the right hand side of the Boulton Paul turret which just takes a flask just nicely so it won’t roll, but unfortunately, we err, I’ve forgotten which country we were over, I think Belgium, I saw a Night Fighter so I threw my guns to the left and I saw him disappear. I went to try to find out where he was, I had my turret and guns going everywhere, I didn’t hear any fire but all of a sudden, I had the most red hot feeling in my stomach. It took me ages to have the courage, I thought, well they tell me you don’t feel when you’ve been hit, it’s just, just get a wound and you know that was it. Hot. So I put my hand and what had happened, my gun, the solenoid underneath the gun had picked the flask up, pierced it and it dropped in my lap.
RP: So it was actually hot tea.
AS: Hot coffee.
RP: Oh hot coffee.
AS: Yeah.
RP: Oh dear, so that was a relief in one way then. That was definitely a relief.
RP: What you haven’t told us but you’ve been very modest about your medals. What medals have you got then, what were you awarded after the Halifax?
AS: Ah, I’ve got the Distinguished Flying Medal which was awarded in um err, July 1944 which was the result of the ditching in the —
RP: That’s a lovely medal, isn’t it?
AS: Yes it is, which I’m very, very proud of.
RP: Quite right and I think we needed to mention that, but I think the hot coffee story is a good point to bring our interview to an end I think. Thank you for telling us all those lovely stories.
AS: Ah well.
RP: It’s been a privilege and pleasure. Thank you very much, thank you.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with William James Stoneman
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Rod Pickles
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-11-14
Type
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Sound
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
AStonemanWJ161114
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Format
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00:48:17 audio recording
Description
An account of the resource
William James Stoneman was posted to RAF Elsham Wolds before Aircrew Reception Centre at RAF Cardington. He chose to become a rear gunner as he did not have to wait. Air gunnery training followed at RAF Bishopscourt in Northern Ireland on Ansons and Magister aircraft. He was posted to RAF Weston and the Operational Training Unit (OTU). Bill describes crewing up and flying Wellingtons at the OTU. He then went to the Conversion Unit at RAF Dishforth and flew Halifaxes. Bob compares the Frazer Nash turret with the Boulton Paul rear gun turrets.
Bill joined 138 Squadron at RAF Tempsford. He carried out 32 operations in Belgium, France, Germany, Holland and Norway. Flying low, they dropped agents and supplies. He describes the clandestine liaison with resistance groups. On long flights to southern France, they would refuel at RAF Blida in North Africa. He also discusses carrying pigeons for intelligence gathering. Bill recounts how their aircraft was shot down on one occasion, returning from RAF Blida. On his return, Bill changed to Stirling aircraft which he very much liked. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Medal in July 1944.
Finishing the Second World War as a flight lieutenant, he was sent to RAF Yatesbury working on codes and ciphers. He went to Belgium, Cyprus, Germany and Singapore. He worked at the Missing Research and Enquiry Unit in Belgium and finished at RAF St Mawgan having been served for 37 years.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Bedfordshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Cornwall (County)
England--Lincolnshire
England--Wiltshire
England--Yorkshire
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Belgium
Cyprus
France
Germany
Netherlands
North Africa
Norway
Singapore
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sally Coulter
Vivienne Tincombe
138 Squadron
1664 HCU
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
air sea rescue
aircrew
animal
Anson
crewing up
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
final resting place
Heavy Conversion Unit
Ju 88
Magister
memorial
military service conditions
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Cardington
RAF Dishforth
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF St Mawgan
RAF Tempsford
RAF Turweston
RAF Yatesbury
Resistance
Special Operations Executive
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1357/22526/ACoxOV200131.1.mp3
c718a8bae9d15f63bb0f7d5b1f9da95d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cox, Owen
Owen Valentine Cox
O V Cox
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Owen Cox, who served in Italy and ditched near Sicily.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2020-01-31
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cox, OV
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
RP: This interview is being conducted on behalf of the International Bomber Command Centre in Lincoln. The interviewer is Rod Pickles. The interviewee is Owen Cox. Also present is the niece of Owen Cox, Mrs Wendy Wood. The interview is taking place on the 31st of January 2020 at Mr Cox’s home in Honiton, Devon. Good afternoon, Ian.
OC: Hello.
RP: Ian? Owen.
OC: It’s nice to meet you.
RP: Thank you for inviting me in, in to your home. If you could start.
OC: Yeah.
RP: Perhaps you could tell us where you were born, and when you were born and your early life and how you came, what prompted you to join the RAF. But —
OC: I wanted to join the RAF when I was at school.
RP: And where were you at school?
OC: I was in the Kings School at Ottery St Mary. The Grammar School. And my parents wouldn’t let me join the RAF, and by various means I passed them all. I was only seventeen when war broke out and I joined the LDD. It’s even worse than Dad’s Army. And when I was eighteen I joined the Home Guard. The only difference was I had a different arm band. And when I was eighteen I went in the Recruiting Office in Exeter on my way to, during my lunch hours and the first thing that happened was the flight sergeant came along. He said, ‘Hello sonny, what do you want?’ That rather put me off. Eighteen, you know. A teenager being called Sonny. And so I said, ‘I want to join the RAF.’ ‘Oh yes? What would you like to be?’ So I said, ‘Aircrew.’ So he said, ‘Oh,’ he said, ‘Well, you nip home and get your birth certificate.’ So I said, ‘Well, I’m eighteen.’ He said, ‘You’ve still got to get your birth certificate.’ Then I was in trouble. Trying to get a birth certificate. How could I do it without my parents knowing why? So I’d just been on the Devon County staff for just over six months and I was put on the permanent staff after six months probationary period. So I went home and I said, ‘Mum, I want my birth certificate. I’ve been put on the permanent staff and they want my birth certificate.’ ‘Oh yes,’ you know, with a joys, got a job in those days because were hard to come by. And so I got this birth certificate and went in. Then I was offered, he said, ‘What do you want to be?’ The same flight sergeant. So I said, ‘Well, the same as last time. Aircrew.’ So he said, ‘There aren’t any vacancies.’ He said, ‘You can be a clerk g.d. or a driver.’ So I said, ‘Well, I’m a clerk already just up the road. I don’t like the sound of g.d,’ which is general duties I found out afterwards, ‘And I don’t want to be driving all over the country. So if you give me back my birth certificate I’ll nip somewhere where they will accept it.’ And then he came back and in the end he agreed that I could join the RAF. And so I went home that night and I said to my mother [pause] if I wanted to say anything controversial I used to wait until she was busy, you know, getting father’s meal or in the evening. And when she was in middle of that I said, ‘I’ve joined the RAF today, mum.’ She said, ‘Oh yes,’ and went on busy, you know. And that went on and it wasn’t until, oh when we first of all the Devon County Council if you more or less volunteered you had to get committee approval so that the job was vacant when you came back. It was a very good job that I did because I was a wreck when I came home. But if you were a conscientious objector you got the sack. Yes. It was like that. And eventually in November I got a letter. When I came home mother said, ‘There’s a letter from the RAF for you.’ So I said, ‘Oh, I expect that’s my calling up papers.’ ‘What do you mean calling up papers?’ I said, ‘Well, don’t you remember, you know.’ ‘No,’ she said, ‘Well, you’re always saying stupid things,’ you know, ‘And if you say anything like that we don’t take any notice of it, you know.’ So I said ‘Well,’ I said, ‘I was quite honest. I told you what it was.’ I told a lie about my birth certificate but that was all [laughs] And when father came home she said, mother, ‘What do you think he’s done?’ Father was rather exasperated, ‘Whatever has he done now?’ You know. She said, ‘He’s joined the RAF.’ My father said, ‘He can’t. He’s not old enough.’ So I said, ‘Yes, I volunteered, father.’ ‘Oh.’ He said ‘That’s it, and you can’t say anything about it,’ I said, ‘In the First World War you volunteered when you were seventeen.’ He said, ‘But I didn’t go.’ I said, ‘No. The only difference between you and me, I passed my medical and you didn’t.’ So, I won the argument, didn’t I? And in the January —
RP: What year is this then? The January of — ?
OC: The war broke out in ‘39.
RP: Yeah.
OC: ’40.
RP: January ’40. Oh right.
OC: January ’40, I got my calling up papers to go up to Blackpool and there were two Devon County Council members on the station with me. They were a lot older than me and they were called up, you know. And so we travelled up there and that was, that was quite an experience. It’s all in my book you know.
RP: So, was that just to, just to get you the uniform and everything? And then you got on to training from there, did you?
OC: Yeah. There we had to do square bashing first. And then six months afterwards I went to Yatesbury near Calne, near Swindon. And we had to get wireless up to eighteen words a minute, and I could. I took to Morse and I could do twenty quite easily. Send and receive. And I was posted to Plymouth.
RP: Right.
OC: And I was down there fourteen months and —
RP: Doing what? What were you doing there?
OC: Oh. Ground wireless operator waiting to go on the gunnery course.
RP: Oh right.
OC: They said, it’s very funny really, you know they said there weren’t any vacancies at the Gunnery Schools. That was, I thought to myself, my God what have I done now? You see, it wasn’t, they couldn’t keep up with gunners that had been wiped out, you know.
RP: Right.
OC: Not being very helpful.
RP: So where were you based in Plymouth for this then?
OC: Mount Wise.
RP: Mount Wise.
OC: Mount Wise.
RP: So the telecommunications side.
OC: In the end, after being put on a charge for being one day late from leave I went out into billets at Crownhill.
RP: Oh yeah. Yeah.
OC: And we were underground at Eggbuckland underground station. And, while I was undressing that’s how I got my name Inky. When I was on this charge I was wild. To think it’s my own fault, you know. I’d got the last day’s leave was this day and instead of that it was the day before.
RP: Oh right.
OC: So I was a day late and oh, I was in quite a bit of trouble there. I thought arrive at a station and before you say hello you’re in trouble. And out there I was very very good [ unclear] and oh when I was on, doing the, emptying my kit bag in this great block all to myself. A room all to myself in a block that was empty I emptied my kit bag out and there was a bottle of marking ink that burst all over my —
RP: Oh dear.
OC: Left shoulder. But when we went to the wireless cabin one of the WAAFs there, one of the wireless operator WAAFs was getting tea for the underground and everybody had taken their coats off, you see. So I took off my coat. Got this, the only clean shirt I had.
RP: Oh right.
OC: So she said, ‘You’re the new boy aren’t you?’ So I said, ‘Yes.’ She said, ‘My name’s Griffiths. Always known as Griff. What are you called?’ She said, ‘It doesn’t matter. We’ll call you Inky.’ That’s how I got that name.
RP: And that’s, that’s what you became.
OC: Yeah.
RP: So were you in Plymouth during the blitz then?
OC: No. Just after.
RP: Just after. Right.
OC: Yeah. I [pause] about, oh three weeks, a month after.
RP: Oh right.
OC: Yeah.
RP: So from Plymouth then when did you finally get to your gunnery course then?
OC: Fourteen months later.
RP: Gosh.
OC: I was down there, oh the other thing was that if you were a good wireless operator they tried to hang on to you.
RP: Of course. Yeah.
OC: And that’s why I was there fourteen months.
RP: You knew your Morse too well obviously.
OC: I loved Morse.
RP: So where did you go for the gunnery course then?
OC: First of all we went to air training for wireless sending and that was at Madley. We weren’t there very long. A horrible place. Then we went to Castle Kennedy near Stranraer.
RP: Oh my goodness.
OC: That was —
RP: Way up north.
OC: Yes. That would be December. December ’40. ’41.
RP: Yes.
OC: Or ’42. I can’t remember which and it would be in the book, but the accommodation there was rather luxurious. We used to have a Nissen hut that was, held about twelve people. Twelve or fourteen, I forget which. And it had one bulb one end and one bulb the other. Forty watt.
RP: Gosh.
OC: We’d got a tortoise stove in the middle and the supply of coal was half a sack a week. And if you didn’t pick it up pretty quickly somebody else did so you had none.
RP: Oh right.
OC: And we used to get wood. We were in the middle of a wood and we used to get any dead wood we can, and if it wasn’t desperate you used to get, break down something and get it.
RP: Yeah.
OC: And the railway went just by. We used to go out there and wave to the engine driver and the stoker of the train used to throw out huge lumps of steam coal.
RP: Oh right.
OC: And they used to do that. And when we were flying around we —
RP: So what were you training on? What aircraft were you on?
OC: The first time I was, was ever airborne was a De Havilland Dominie which is a De Havilland Rapide.
RP: Oh yes, I know.
OC: Civilian aircraft. Lovely aircraft. Twin.
RP: Twin wings. Yeah.
OC: Yeah. And then I was on Magisters for [pause] or in Magisters for the air training, and then we went up to Castle Kennedy and we were on Beauforts which was deadly and [pause] Now, now I’ve stopped.
RP: No. Don’t worry. We can, we can pause it there. Don’t worry.
[recording paused]
OC: I was posted to 13 OTU. As I walked in through the door, I’d been there two days and a fella from Honiton was walking out and we met. And the people that I was with said, ‘Oh, do you know him, Inky?’ So Derek said, ‘Who’s Inky?’ I said, ‘I’m Inky.’ And after the war we were at the Golf Club and everything, he always called me Inky. Never went back.
RP: Right.
OC: He died a few years ago.
RP: Yeah.
OC: A couple of years ago.
RP: Ok. So, anyway, you get to Bicester. You’re at the OTU. What aircraft are you now using there then?
OC: I was in Blenheims. And —
RP: What was a Blenheim like as an aircraft then?
OC: Horrible.
RP: Was it?
OC: Well, not horrible but it’s very difficult to explain really. For a wireless operator it was very difficult. You had like motorbike handles.
RP: Oh right.
OC: When you pressed them down like that your seat went down, your guns went up.
RP: Oh, I see.
OC: Then you could use your set.
RP: Got you. Oh, so the guns moved out the way so you can —
OC: Yeah.
RP: Got you. Got you. Yeah.
OC: Yeah. There’s a post comes down. There’s two cannisters of ammunition. One for each gun. And in behind there’s two little cases of coils. One was used for trailing aerial and one was to use for ordinary sending station, you know. If you used a trailing aerial that was for getting bearings. But you had to change. These were in two little boxes. They had wing nuts and you had to undo the wing nuts. Luckily they were attached.
RP: Yeah.
OC: To the case. Take out the coil, take out the one that you were using. Hold it in your lap, put the one that you picked out and put up. That one you put back in the bottom in case it —
RP: And all the time the aircraft’s —
OC: Oh, it was going. Then you, if anything happened well you had to drop the lot and curl up under. So while I was there I went under friendly fire the first time. We were just finishing our being crewed up. I was with a fella from Trinidad and one from Liverpool. They were both officers, pilot officers, and in the Blenheims there was only three in the crew and we were going out over the, before you left OTU they used to send you out over the coast after a big bomber raid in to see if there was any of any of our airmen had come down in the sea, you know. In the North Sea. We used to do a square search and come back. And we were just crossing the, I’d got permission to cross the coast and I thought well let’s get some exercise in with sending, you know back to base.
RP: Yeah.
OC: I did this, and all of a sudden the aircraft was being thrown all over. So I said, ‘Dave, what the devil are you doing? I’m trying to send Morse.’ He said, ‘If you looked out — ’ And there were puffs of bomb curling around the [pause] So I said, ‘Oh God.’ He said, ‘Did you get permission?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ So we belted out to the North Sea as fast as we could, did our section and coming back and I fired the letter of the day. It was yellow. I always remember [laughs] And peace reigned once again. So we went out and I said to Dave on that, ‘You’re coming in the same place as where we went out. They fired at us on the way out. What do you think they’re going to do when we come back?’ I said, ‘I’ve loaded the pistol again.’ And, but we came back alright. We reported it. I don’t know what happened to the ground crew but —
RP: You’d think they’d recognise a Blenheim.
OC: Yeah. Oh, we were supposed to be something like a JU88 I think it was.
RP: Ok.
OC: But they had swastikas all over them. We had roundels all over us. Top and bottom. You know.
RP: You wonder.
OC: You wonder. And well I wouldn’t be here if they’d had the things that they fired at you.
RP: If you’d been hit. Yes.
OC: Yeah.
RP: So at the Gunnery School. How long were you at the Gunnery School then on the Blenheims?
OC: Oh, the Gunnery School. I was only there about six weeks. Two months. Something like that.
RP: Then you were posted to a squadron?
OC: Then I was posted to OTU.
RP: Oh right.
OC: And I was there, oh and then we changed over to Bostons. That was a lovely aircraft. The De Havilland. Not the De Havilland. The Boston.
RP: Douglas.
OC: Douglas. That’s right. Douglas 3A. And we got a fourth member of the crew who was an under gunner who fired through the floor. That’s important because a bit later on and [pause] he used to lift up the flap on the door and he was attached by his monkey, what we called the monkey strap which was fixed to the aircraft and then he used to clip it on to his parachute harness and so he, if he got a bit excited he didn’t fall out, you know. I could never see why it happened because I mean it wasn’t that big. I suppose the length of that.
RP: Oh right.
OC: Not quite as long as that and they used to go back, clipped back and used to fire a Vickers gas operated gun through the floor but I mean by the time the enemy did that thing he was gone up past you so you wouldn’t have had time to switch it. I never saw that. I never saw him shoot his gun. And —
RP: So, you’re on, you’re on the Douglas. So how long were you at the OTU then?
OC: About four months.
RP: Oh. And that’s familiarisation is it?
OC: That’s moving from Blenheims on to Bostons. And then we went to Finmere, kitted up for overseas and we went down to Portreath in Cornwall.
RP: Oh yes.
OC: We had extra fuel tanks on them. On the aircraft. The guns were stowed, and all our kit was on the flap. So Jack, our gunner, under gunner was sitting on all our kit. And down in the, he saw nothing. I was up the top. And when you were in the Boston it’s a, it was a lovely aircraft. When you were firing your guns your feet were going that way, your guns were there. You had a swivel seat. You could swivel round and there was your wireless set.
RP: Oh right.
OC: And the Morse key, everything. And we went to Finmere. We were there about a fortnight getting used to this aircraft and one day they said to me, because of the new wireless set, ‘We’ll show you how it works.’ I said, ‘Oh yes,’ because we were to do our last what we called cross country and we went right down to Cornwall. Get permission to cross the coast up to the Irish Sea. Get permission to get back in to England and then back to base. And when I got down to Cornwall I couldn’t find the Morse key. Going this way and the Morse sets were here, and TR9 and I said, ‘I can’t find the Morse key. It was here this morning.’ Say it like everybody else you know. Couldn’t find it. I said, ‘Jack, come up and have a look. So he came. So, Dave the pilot said, ‘Well?’ I said, ‘I can’t. We can’t cross the coast,’ I said, ‘I can’t find my Morse key.’ So [laughs] Then he said, ‘Right. Abort.’ And we went back to base. Coming in I swung round all my wireless stuff was up there like everybody else, and I was just looking around and the aircraft came down like this, and in this came in [pause] six inches I suppose, nine inches and underneath this was a little square box with a button about the size of my thumb and I thought I’d never seen that before. I wonder what that is. Pressed the button. That was my Morse key. So I thought however could you send Morse on a button which was only coming up about this, above base. You had to go like this and every time of course the aircraft went down your hand went down with it, so you didn’t do it —
RP: Yes. You’re mixing it up, aren’t you?
OC: You couldn’t, you couldn’t send Morse on it. And so I said, ‘I found my Morse key.’ And when we they got back they laughed. And we used to have a board in the mess that said, “The sign of the irremovable finger,” which is Chad looking over the wall. Do you know it?
RP: Oh yeah. I know what you mean.
OC: And his hand was like this. And at the end this finger stuck up with [unclear] “Awarded this week to Sergeant Cox who couldn’t find his Morse key.”
RP: Oh dear, embarrassment.
OC: Yes. They used to say, ‘Have you got your Morse key this morning?’ Every time we went up near there. Yes. And also the Boston, the pilot, the w/op a.g. had a set of controls at the back. He had rudders but they were right up you know, you were up like this.
RP: Oh right.
OC: You couldn’t, couldn’t use it. Dave said, ‘Don’t bother about them. Just fly using everything else you’ve got there.’ I had a speedo and what height you were. Well, we were tipping, the trouble was you see oh that was done so that the pilot, if you were in trouble the wireless operator took the joystick as they called them from the side, jammed it in and you fly the aircraft. And very often Dave said, ‘Have some driving practice.’ You know. So, ‘Alright.’ Used to quite enjoy that. But of course the same thing, I was like this this and of course when you go like this this one goes that way doesn’t it? So you’re flying like this along. We were going down through the Bay of Biscay and went to, to give me some practice at that. So he said, ‘And we want to fly straight and level. We don’t want to be at an angle.’ I said, ‘Alright.’ Gradually of course I turned over and if I went that way it was even worse because it was just, it was harder to look out that window. And then we had a loop aerial that used to tune in to any station. You could get bearings on it and you knew what stations you were tuned in, you know. Music stations and all that. So I did that. Gave it to the observer. My readings. He said, ‘That’s an interesting, Owen.’ he said. Oh, they always called me Owen except the pilot who called me Cockles. And, and so I said, ‘Everything all right?’ He said, ‘Yes. We’re either in Germany or the middle of the Irish Sea which do you want?’ The [unclear] was on the Irish Sea.
RP: Oh, I see. Right.
OC: So I said, well I couldn’t be like that. Just couldn’t. And when we landed at Gib. Gibraltar. They found out that the loop, the loop aerial up there was turned. It was giving a, of course whatever instead of being nought there it would be, nought would be over here.
RP: Oh yes. Not aligned properly.
OC: Yeah. Not aligned. And I was angry at this.
RP: Because that puts all the readings out.
OC: Yeah. Oh, and another thing you have to do when you’re coming in to land you’ve got to have the aldis lamp, and send the letter of the day. Well, if you’re going this way, and you’re right or left handed whatever light you see you’re like this and then you stand up and see Europa Point, which is this point and if, if you’re not aligned on it all they see is a white light. So I undid my monkey strap, and was right outside almost, and I nearly fell out.
RP: Oh gosh.
OC: Yeah. And I just kept firing, pointed after that and when we got down —
RP: Hoped for the best.
OC: Jack said to me, ‘What do you think the ground crew are laughing at?’ I said, ‘Well, Jack we’re in shorts.’ Lillywhites you know, and, ‘Look at your knees and look at theirs.’ I said, ‘They’re just Lillywhites.’ But I was wrong. The runway at Gibraltar goes about six hundred yards out into the sea.
RP: I’ve seen it. Yeah.
OC: Yeah. And Dave brought it in as low as he could and as slow as he could to make sure because we were heavily loaded with all our stuff and everything and when the crew came up, as I jumped out they said, ‘Do you think you’ve lost anything?’ And my trailing aerial. I’d come in without winding it in.
RP: Oh dear.
OC: It had wrapped itself around a Naval boat that was passing, or anchored I don’t know which. Brought down that aerial, snapped off mine, and then I was so angry thinking that you know a trained man had done that. If I’d done it at OTU.
RP: Yeah.
OC: Yes. That would have been alright. I was still learning. But to be trained and that was went down wrong. I grabbed my parachute, pulled it out, but I caught hold of the rip cord. That one opened. So —
RP: Not a good trip.
OC: No. No, I didn’t enjoy that.
RP: So, from, from where had you gone from the OTU then, where were you now?
OC: From OTU we went to, we went to Portree.
RP: Portree. Then from Portree.
OC: Portree to Gibraltar.
RP: Oh right. And you were stationed in Gibraltar then?
OC: No. No.
RP: Just staging through.
OC: Yes. On our way to Sicily.
RP: Oh right. Right.
OC: And then we went down to Spanish Morocco. A place called Fez. And we stayed there. How the fellows lived there I don’t know. Sandstorms. And food used to go green from morning to night.
RP: Gosh.
OC: You know. And then we went across North Africa and landed at Tunis and that was an American station. And they’d rigged up hot showers. I mean not cold showers. Hot showers or cold. Whichever you liked.
RP: Gosh.
OC: And oh, they had and I always remember they said, ‘What would you like for a sweet?’ They’d given us some, I’ve forgotten what we had from the menu but I always remember peaches and cream.
RP: Gosh.
OC: I mean we couldn’t get —
RP: That’s a luxury.
OC: We couldn’t get that in England so that was fine.
RP: So was this leading up to the invasion of Sicily then?
OC: No.
RP: Not really taking part.
OC: They’d taken. That had finished.
RP: Oh right.
OC: That had finished about two or three weeks. We landed. And we slept under trees, on the ground. And then we went up to Gerbini Three which is on the Catania Plain and from there we started ops. And there was a, it was at the beach head at Salerno was it?
RP: Yeah. Salerno. Yeah.
OC: Salerno. And the Germans were coming down, bringing down Panzer divisions. And we were after three bridges the night we went out. Oh. Now, in our hut, you know, hut [laughs] tent there was Jack and myself, a gunner and a wireless operator, and in, and the same with another crew. And our pilot and observers were together in another crew.
RP: Oh right.
OC: Funnily enough. And Jack, our, both our gunners, the under gunners were called Jack and he was in hospital with dysentery so our Jack and myself used to take it in turns to fly with the other crew.
RP: Oh, I see.
OC: And I was flying as an under-gunner, not a wireless operator and we went on this raid and we hadn’t got, we were told it was going to be probably running mist or a bit of rain but it was the worst static storm I’ve ever seen even on trying to fly through it and we [sound of knocking] I don’t think it’s us. I think its next door. And they [pause] where was I?
RP: So you were on the raid in the static storm.
OC: Oh yes, and we climbed over it. Of course Jack and I were, well we all were cold, and we were frozen in the back.
RP: Yeah.
OC: Open top and bottom. And we came down the other side and we had three bridges. A road, rail and river and we went for the river bridge, and we got, as far as we could see two direct hits on it. First aircraft out. 5.15 we’d left. And so we thought there was another seventeen aircraft. They should be able to put paid to the other two. And coming back Mac said, he’s the pilot, he said, ‘We shall have to, if we run into that storm again we shall have to fly through it because,’ he said, ‘There’s no way have we got enough fuel to climb up above it and get back to base.’ And we started to fly through it and we got struck by lightning. All the intercom went out. Everything. The wireless went. Everything you’d think. Jack and I were alright at the back because we could talk to each other but the important people were of course the observer and the pilot. The observer was right in the front. Steel plating. Then the pilot’s got all his controls, steel plating behind him. Then you come to the bomb bay and the wireless equipment. Then you come to us. And we lost our way. And the pilot said, ‘Well,’ he said, ‘We’ve got a choice. We either bale out or ditch.’ So I was, seeing as it wasn’t my crew I was what you would normally call spare, and I said, ‘Well, there’s four of us in this aircraft, and if you get two or more you don’t know what to do. So —’ I said, ‘I vote —' Vote. ‘But I’ll agree to anything that you say.’ Well, they all three voted to ditch. I said, ‘Fine.’ So I closed the door and stowed my gun and I thought to myself [pause] as I picked up all the verey cartridges, stuffed them inside my [unclear] and then, and the verey pistol, so I thought a few pyrotechnics. If they don’t get too wet somebody might see us. Well, we came down, and of course ditching is rather dangerous at the best of times but when you’ve got fifteen foot square high waves going along you don’t know whether you’re at fifteen feet or —
RP: And this was at night time.
OC: Yes.
RP: Yeah.
OC: Yes. It would be after 9 o’clock at night and I don’t know anything else. I can remember having a clout on the head, but I don’t remember anything else until I was in the sea. And I suddenly became conscious again and I heard voices. I tried to blow my whistle but I couldn’t. I didn’t have any breath. And I tried to shout. That wasn’t very loud. But suddenly I had hands grip me, and I thought I was being, coming in the dinghy and I thought, cor this is hard. I never realised the dinghy was as hard as this. Well, I had twenty one ribs broken or fractured, three fractures of the spine, severe compressed fracture of the spine, severe concussion and I lost my little finger. And as I went in I lost consciousness and I don’t know anything more until I came to in the hospital.
RP: And that was in Sicily? The hospital.
OC: In Sicily. In, yes Sicily, at Patti.
RP: Yeah.
OC: And these, these brothers that I got in they’d, it was a fishing boat not the dinghy that they pulled me up. The observer was right in the front. Well, he would have been smashed to pieces. And of course no one ever said anything but he was buried. His body was washed ashore ten days later. So I was told after this. And he was buried in Catania War Cemetery. And they never found Jock or Mac. The pilot or the w/op a.g. because they’d been strapped in and the aircraft was broken all in pieces and they would have been strapped.
RP: They’d gone down with the aircraft.
OC: They’d gone down with the aircraft. It was only because I didn’t strap myself in on the end of the monkey chain. I’d undone that. I said that’s, no, I don’t want to be dangling on the end of a piece of a cord.
RP: So this was off the west coast of Sicily then. Yeah?
OC: Yes.
RP: So, looking back then do you think the better option would have been to bale out?
OC: No.
RP: No.
OC: No.
RP: You don’t think so.
OC: Well, it might have been.
RP: Because of the rough sea.
OC: Rough sea. Yeah.
RP: Yeah.
OC: I mean my pilot that night, Mac had been right through the Battle of Britain. He was on Hurricanes in the Battle of Britain. When that was over he was given the choice of night fighters or medium bombers. He said, ‘I’m not stooging around at night looking for nothing. Then turn on the light and —’ He said, ‘No.’ He said, ‘I’ll go on bombing.’ He did.
RP: Was that your first sortie out of Sicily then?
OC: Pardon?
RP: Was that your first sortie?
OC: No.
RP: No. You’d done —
OC: I think it was my sixth.
RP: Oh right.
OC: Before this, before this raid we were thinking of doing a daylight raid. Well, no way could you do a daylight raid going out one at a time. You’d just be picked off like flies, you know. And so we went out in a box of six. And we were never flown in formation except from Comiso up to Gerbini Three. That’s the only formation flying. So they said, ‘Well, we’d better get some practice in.’ So we did. The pilot, the first there, we were in number two, three, four, five, six, and the first time we went off our nose wheel burst and the pilot upended the undercarriage and slewed into another aircraft.
RP: Oh dear.
OC: And so they said, ‘You hadn’t better fly tomorrow. We’ll have a rest.’ So we went out the day after that and then [pause] so we went up again. As we, we got back to base the leading aircraft slewed down, came up, hit our wing and about two feet of wing just crumpled down. Their wing fell off and they crashed and they all got killed. And that was the aircraft that we took out to Sicily. A brand new aircraft, you know. Didn’t —
RP: Oh dear. So you’ve been recovered. You’re in hospital. How long were you in hospital for?
OC: I was in hospital. This all happened within six days. I had three accidents on landing err take-off, a mid-air, and the ditching.
RP: All come in threes.
OC: Yes.
RP: Oh dear. That was bad luck wasn’t it?
OC: Yeah.
RP: Gosh.
OC: And, oh what was the question you asked me?
RP: How long were you in hospital for?
OC: That must be the 1st of October 1943. I got back —
RP: That was the ditching, yeah?
OC: That’s, yes, well, I was in hospital that night but I was unconscious.
RP: Yeah.
OC: And I went in. Then they transferred me from that hospital to number 1 Advanced Field Dressing Army Hospital and I was still unconscious. And about ten days after that I began to get conscious. Then I was, when I began to come to a bit, I couldn’t see. I was blind. So I said, ‘Shall I ever see again?’ I thought, oh crumbs, you know. Get over something and you’ve got something else. They said, ‘Oh, yes. We’ll do that. Don’t worry. He says, ‘It’s only a matter of days now that you’re conscious that it’ll come back.’ I didn’t know how it was going to happen but it did and then I realised I was paralysed from the waist down.
RP: Oh dear.
OC: And so I said, ‘Shall I ever walk again?’ They said, ‘Yes. Yes. We’ll get you alright.’ So then my sight came back so I thought well theyll get me walking again, you know. I had complete faith and they were wonderful. Wonderful staff. And one day the medical officer was coming around to do the, the chief medical officer of the hospital going around and he said, ‘If we can keep this fellow alive until midnight we should be able to pull him through. We’ve got every chance of pulling him through.’ So I thought, oh bad luck fella because the next place to me there’s a fella with his, this absolutely just two little slits for his eyes.
RP: Oh right.
OC: And one for his mouth. A primus stove had blown up in his face.
RP: Gosh.
OC: And I thought crumbs, you know. I felt sorry for him. Then the next thing I heard was, ‘Oh, and this afternoon we shall be removing the bandages from this fellows head.’ So they’d been talking about me and they said they should be able to keep me alive.
RP: Right.
OC: Pull me through.
RP: So when did you come back? When did you return to England then after that?
OC: A week before December.
RP: So you got, got back for Christmas.
OC: Before Christmas. Right.
RP: Yeah.
OC: I went on the, from landed at Portreath. I went to Plymouth Royal Hospital. I got up to Wrougton Hospital near Swindon and they said they were going to amputate my little finger but my own doctor saw that, did it. And in Tunis was one of the places I landed. I was there for over a month. I’ve never been treated so badly in all my life. And I didn’t have any clothes. I came back to England in a pair of gym shoes. I, when we went to Wroughton they didn’t have a pair of size eight shoes there so I came back to Honiton in a pair of gym shoes and then I put my own shoes on.
RP: So did you arrive back in Honiton for Christmas?
OC: Yes.
RP: Oh, ok.
OC: Yeah.
RP: And what did you parents have to say?
OC: I shocked them. And when the lads, I used to go to church every Sunday with the organist, and his young brother used to answer. Well, I used to go up every Sunday. Walk up to the house, it was a big white house up here behind the park and just tap on the door and walk in. I thought, well they don’t know that I’m coming so I’ll wait outside and tap. Young Edward opened the door, looked at me, slammed the door and went in. So I didn’t know what to do. The next thing I knew all the family came out to the back door. They said, ‘Edward said he thought he’d seen a ghost,’ and [pause] because I was just a bag of bones, you know.
RP: So did you stay in the RAF or were you discharged?
OC: Discharged. I, oh, so then I went from Wroughton. I wasn’t there that long. I was in a convalescent home in Loughborough for four and a half months and then I went to the Central Medical Board in London, and I went through five doctors there. And they told me to report to wing commander so and so at lunchtime, after lunch. So I said, ‘Alright.’ So I went down and we had a little chat and he said, ‘What were you doing before you came in the Services?’ I said. ‘Oh, I was a clerk with the Devon County Council.’ So he looked up. He said, ‘Well,’ he said, ‘I think you’d better go back to the Devon County Council. Be a clerk again back at the Devon County Council. You’re no further use to the RAF.’
RP: Oh dear.
OC: That’s how it ended [unclear]
RP: So how long was it before you got back to your normal good health as it were after all that?
OC: Years.
RP: It must have been a while.
OC: Yeah. I was sitting with my back to the wall and a bag of nerves now. Yeah.
RP: So did, did you get your job back with Devon County Council?
OC: Oh yes. Yes.
RP: Yeah.
OC: That was terrible. I couldn’t last a day. I used to go down on the fire watchers bed down in one of the committee rooms and lay on my back and very often I used to fall asleep. They used to come down and wake me up to go back to work again, you know.
RP: And yet for all that —
OC: Pardon?
RP: And yet for all that your ninety eighth birthday is coming up.
OC: Yes.
RP: It’s amazing and I mean that’s it’s an amazing story. I’m really, I’m privileged to hear you talk and I think that’s probably a good point to end on but I have to say thank you very much. It’s been amazing.
OC: My pleasure.
RP: Absolutely amazing. Thank you.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Interview with Owen Cox
Creator
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Rod Pickles
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2020-01-31
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ACoxOV200131
PCoxOV2003
Conforms To
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Pending review
Format
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00:54:08 audio recording
Description
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Owen Cox went to a grammar school in York and joined the Home Guard when the war started. At 18 he joined the Royal Air Force, although his parents were not keen. His initial trade was ground wireless operator (Morse), waiting to attend a gunnery school. He describes service life at RAF Castle Kennedy, living in a Nissen hut. Owen flew in Manchesters, Blenheims, and Bostons. He was then posted to Gibraltar, Sicily, then Morocco, and eventually Tunis, at a USAAF airfield. He recollects operations to the Salerno beach heads. In October 1943 his aircraft was struck by lightning: following electrical issues, they ditched at night-time. Badly injured, he was rescued by a fishing boat, then taken to hospital in Sicily. He had serious health consequences, including deteriorated eyesight. Owen was eventually repatriated and then discharged on medical grounds.
Contributor
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Graham Emmet
Julie Williams
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Scotland--Dumfries and Galloway
Gibraltar
Morocco
Tunisia
Tunisia--Tunis
Italy
Italy--Sicily
Italy--Salerno
North Africa
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-09
1943-10-01
Language
A language of the resource
eng
13 OTU
air gunner
aircrew
Blenheim
bombing
Boston
civil defence
crash
ditching
ground personnel
Home Guard
Manchester
military living conditions
Morse-keyed wireless telegraphy
Nissen hut
Operational Training Unit
RAF Bicester
RAF Castle Kennedy
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1560/35630/BMillingtonRWestonFv1.2.pdf
8f0a70969cd59c55fef62f5a0d5a383d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Weston, Fred
F Weston
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-11-13
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Weston, F
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. The collection concerns Fred Weston DFC (1916 - 2012, 126909 Royal Air Force) and contains documents and photographs. He flew operations as an air gunner with 101 and 620 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Catherine Millington and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Air Gunner
Based around the WWII service of Fred Weston DFC RAFVR
Description
An account of the resource
A biography of Fred. In addition it includes histories of aircraft and squadrons he served in, Details are included of airfields he served at. Additionally there are biographies of various servicemen associated with Fred's squadrons and service.
At the end there is a biography of the officer in charge of Arnhem, Lt-Gen Sir Frederick Browning and his wife Daphne du Maurier.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Roger Millington
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2005-01
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Cambridge
England--Letchworth
Wales--Bridgend
Wales--Penrhos
Egypt--Heliopolis (Extinct city)
Singapore
France--Cherbourg
Netherlands--Eindhoven
France--Brest
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Dunkerque
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
France--Brest
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Berlin
Italy--Turin
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Quiberon
France--Boulogne-Billancourt
Germany--Essen
France--Le Creusot
Germany--Leverkusen
France--Caen
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Belgium--Brussels
England--Rochester (Kent)
Northern Ireland--Belfast
England--Longbridge
France--Arras
England--Darlington
Italy--Genoa
England--Longbridge
Yemen (Republic)--Aden
Europe--Frisian Islands
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Nuremberg
Italy--Sicily
France--Normandy
Netherlands--Arnhem
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Nijmegen
Wales--Pwllheli
England--Yorkshire
England--Leicester
England--Sunderland (Tyne and Wear)
Scotland--Edinburgh
England--Rochford
England--London
England--Cornwall (County)
Scotland--Ayr
England--Friston (East Sussex)
England--Gravesend (Kent)
England--West Malling
England--Hailsham
England--Yelverton (Devon)
England--Bentwaters NATO Air Base
England--Great Dunmow
England--Heacham
England--Weybridge
Wales--Hawarden
England--Blackpool
England--Old Sarum (Extinct city)
England--Kent
England--Folkestone
England--Hambleton (North Yorkshire)
England--York
Scotland--Scottish Borders
England--Cambridge
England--Thurleigh
England--Darlington
England--Hitchin
England--Lancashire
Italy
France
Egypt
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Great Britain
Yemen (Republic)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Bedfordshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Devon
England--Durham (County)
England--Sussex
England--Essex
England--Herefordshire
England--Norfolk
England--Suffolk
England--Surrey
England--Wiltshire
England--Worcestershire
England--Leicestershire
England--Swindon (Wiltshire)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force. Coastal Command
Royal Air Force. Fighter Command
British Army
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Royal Canadian Air Force
Royal New Zealand Air Force
Free French Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
85 sheets
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BMillingtonRWestonFv1
1 Group
100 Group
101 Squadron
103 Squadron
105 Squadron
114 Squadron
139 Squadron
141 Squadron
148 Squadron
149 Squadron
162 Squadron
1657 HCU
1665 HCU
18 Squadron
180 Squadron
2 Group
208 Squadron
214 Squadron
239 Squadron
3 Group
301 Squadron
304 Squadron
342 Squadron
6 Group
6 Squadron
620 Squadron
7 Squadron
75 Squadron
8 Group
9 Squadron
90 Squadron
97 Squadron
99 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
air gunner
aircrew
B-17
B-24
B-25
bale out
Beaufighter
Blenheim
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
Boston
Caterpillar Club
Churchill, Winston (1874-1965)
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
evading
final resting place
Gee
Gneisenau
H2S
Halifax
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
Horsa
Hurricane
Ju 87
killed in action
Lancaster
Lysander
Manchester
Me 109
Meteor
mid-air collision
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
P-51
Pathfinders
prisoner of war
propaganda
radar
RAF Bicester
RAF Biggin Hill
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Bottesford
RAF Bourn
RAF Bradwell Bay
RAF Bramcote
RAF Chedburgh
RAF Chipping Warden
RAF Coltishall
RAF Drem
RAF Driffield
RAF Duxford
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF Evanton
RAF Fairford
RAF Finningley
RAF Great Massingham
RAF Halfpenny Green
RAF Harwell
RAF Hendon
RAF Holme-on-Spalding Moor
RAF Honington
RAF Hornchurch
RAF Horsham St Faith
RAF Kenley
RAF Lakenheath
RAF Leconfield
RAF Leuchars
RAF Linton on Ouse
RAF Little Snoring
RAF Ludford Magna
RAF Manston
RAF Marham
RAF Martlesham Heath
RAF Mildenhall
RAF Newmarket
RAF Newton
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Oakington
RAF Penrhos
RAF Pershore
RAF Ridgewell
RAF Shepherds Grove
RAF Sleap
RAF Stradishall
RAF Tangmere
RAF Tempsford
RAF Tilstock
RAF Tuddenham
RAF Waterbeach
RAF West Raynham
RAF Woodbridge
RAF Wratting Common
RAF Wyton
Resistance
Scharnhorst
Special Operations Executive
Spitfire
Stirling
target indicator
Tiger force
training
Typhoon
V-1
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2428/47025/EStevensMTempestRE440513.2.jpg
aeffaa0999b5b83cdf08468778637ba7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robinson, George
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. The collection concerns AC1 George Robinson (1623526 Royal Air Force) and contains correspondence and photographs. He served as ground personnel with 514 Squadron and was killed 1 May 1944 when the aircraft he was in crashed in the Channel while <span>on an air experience flight.</span><br /><br />The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Geraldine Wells and catalogued by Andy Fitter. <br /><br />Additional information on George Robinson is available <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/224054/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-04
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Robinson, G-2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Letter from 514 Squadron RAF to Mrs RE Tempest
Description
An account of the resource
Letter confirming that her son, George Robinson, is missing, presumed dead and describing the circumstances surrounding his loss. It is dated 13 May 1944 and carries the reference: "514/C.2051/10/P.1." Most of the text is typed but a handwritten expression of sympathy is included. It is signed by the squadron adjutant.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-05-13
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-04-30
1944-05-01
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Great Britain
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Correspondence
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One page letter
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
EStevensMTempestRE440513
514 Squadron
crash
ditching
killed in action
RAF Waterbeach
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/501/22535/MCurnockRM1815605-171114-010.2.pdf
ceca0a67127007a05d837a67b8652f2f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Curnock, Richard
Richard Murdock Curnock
R M Curnock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Curnock, RM
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-18
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
92 items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Richard Curnock (1924, 1915605 Royal Air Force), his log book, letters, photographs and prisoner of war magazines. He flew operations with 425 Squadron before being shot down and becoming a prisoner of war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by Richard Curnock and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Kriegie March 2007
Description
An account of the resource
The news-sheet of the RAF ex-POW Association. This edition covers the award of an OBE to the Association's President, the Prisoners of War memorial at Hendon, Trooping the Colour, the annual parade of the Air Cadets, a visit to RAF Cranwell, Lunches, the Long March Re-enacted, the retirement of Robbie Stewart, an obituary for Frank Harper, requests for lost friends, Book reviews, and Recco report on ex-POWs
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
The RAF ex-POW Association
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2007-03
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
16 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCurnockRM1815605-171114-010
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
United States Army Air Force
Royal Canadian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--London
England--Hampshire
England--High Wycombe
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Mannheim
Malta
Germany--Duisburg
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Brussels
Germany--Luckenwalde
Poland--Żagań
North Africa
Libya--Banghāzī
Poland
Libya
Germany
Belgium
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Buckinghamshire
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
102 Squadron
103 Squadron
138 Squadron
139 Squadron
150 Squadron
18 Squadron
207 Squadron
32 Squadron
50 Squadron
625 Squadron
7 Squadron
77 Squadron
78 Squadron
83 Squadron
9 Squadron
97 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
Anson
Blenheim
bomb aimer
ditching
Dulag Luft
flight engineer
Halifax
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Hurricane
Ju 88
Lancaster
Me 109
memorial
mine laying
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
prisoner of war
RAF Cosford
RAF Cranwell
RAF Halton
RAF Marham
RAF Northolt
RAF St Eval
RAF Wittering
Red Cross
Special Operations Executive
Stalag Luft 3
Stalag Luft 4
Stalag Luft 7
Stirling
the long march
Typhoon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/857/OWoolgarRLA908870-160614-020001.1.jpg
210ef309ec5667ddc687258388c3466e
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/857/OWoolgarRLA908870-160614-020002.1.jpg
2d161e4278e8f248698676af56b14413
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Woolgar, Reg
Reg Woolgar
R L A Woolgar
Jimmy Woolgar
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Bombing, Aerial
Description
An account of the resource
<a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/browse?collection=87">17 items</a>. The collection consists of an oral history <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2148">interview</a> with air gunner Reginald Woolgar DFC (139398 Royal Air Force), correspondence to his father about him being missing in action and subsequently rescued from the sea, his <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2205">log book</a>, <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/854">service and release book</a> and nine photographs.<br /><br /> He flew operations as an air gunner with 49 and 192 Squadrons.<br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Reg Woolgar and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning John William Wilkinson. Additional information on John William Wilkinson is available via the <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/125319/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Woolgar, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-04
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Please scroll down to see all X items in this collection.
Reg ‘Jimmy’ Woolgar was born and schooled in Hove. He began working life as a valuations assistant and was training to be a surveyor, which was interrupted when, in December 1939, he joined the RAF. Although he had aspirations to become a pilot, he trained as a wireless operator/air gunner instead. His wireless operator training was carried out at the wireless training school, RAF Yatesbury. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/849/PWoolgarRLA1609.2.jpg His air gunnery training on Fairy Battle aircraft was conducted at RAF West Freugh. On 15 November 1940 he was promoted to sergeant and posted to No 10 OTU at RAF Upper Heyford. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/845/PWoolgarRLA1601.2.jpg Initially flying Anson aircraft and then Hampdens with C Flight, he had his first ‘Lucky Jim’ moment, on 6 February 1941, when his Hampden aircraft was forced to crash land in a field near Cottesmore, in Lincolnshire. The aircraft was written off, but he and the pilot survived with minor injuries. At the end of operational training, instead of going directly onto operasations, he spent the next 5 months as a screen operator instructor. Eventually, on 1 September 1941, he was posted to 49 Squadron, Hampdens, at RAF Scampton https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/852 where his very first operational trip (described as a baptism of fire) was to Berlin. With headwinds going out and coming back, and nil visibility, it was likely the crew would have to bail out. Fortunately, the skipper found a break in the clouds and the aircraft landed wheels down in a field near Louth. The aircraft had to be recovered back to base, transported by road, on a low loader. On another occasion, on a mine laying operation to Oslo Fjord, his aircraft was peppered with anti-aircraft fire, it returned to base with 36 bullet holes in the fuselage and mainplane. A bullet had also passed through the upright of his gun sight while he was looking through it, whilst another tore through his flying suit. The nickname ‘Lucky Jim’ was beginning to stick.
In February 1942, on an operation to Manheim, the port engine, hit by flak, cut dead. Despite jettisoning all superfluous weight, which unfortunately included all the navigation equipment, the aircraft rapidly lost height, and the pilot ditched the aircraft in the English Channel. Whilst the crew had struggled to keep the aircraft airborne, (on a single engine), it had steered on a massive curve and unbeknown to them was headed down the English Channel, before it ditched. The crew scrambled out onto the wing and managed to inflate the dingy, then had to cut the cord attaching the dingy to the aircraft using a pair of nail scissors, moments before it sunk. In the water for hours, the crew thought they were drifting near the Yorkshire coast, but were rescued by a motor anti-submarine boat, much to their surprise, near the Isle of Wight.
Operational flying was intense, Reg would feel wound up before take-off and there was much apprehension on the way out to the target. Often, they flew through intense flak that was sometimes so close they could smell it. There was always a sense of sense of relief once they came away from the target. In between operations, each day was treated as it came along with many off-duty hours spent socialising in the local hostelries https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/853
After his first operational tour (he completed two) he was commissioned and became gunnery leader with 192 Squadron in 100 Group.
After the war ended, he signed on for an extra two years and was posted to Palestine as an air movements staff officer. Luck was again on his side when, one day, he was on his way to an Air Priorities Board Meeting at the King David Hotel when the hotel was bombed, resulting in many army and civilian casualties.
After a short tour in Kenya, as Senior Movements Staff Officer, he returned to Palestine flying with 38 Squadron until August 1947. In his flying career he amassed over 1000 flying hours. For services to his country Reg was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/858
He was released from the RAF in September 1947. Initially employed as an assistant valuations officer, he studied to become a Chartered Surveyor and secured a job as a senior valuer with the City of London. He later became the planning valuer of the city. After 14 years he was made a partner at the firm St Quintin Son and Stanley. Reg retired in 1971.
08 December 1939: Joined RAF as a wireless operator/air gunner
28 August 1940: 145, 3 Wing, RAF Yatesbury - Wireless Operator training
29 October 1940 - 15 November 1940: RAF West Freugh, No 4 Bombing and Gunnery School, flying Battle aircraft
November 1940: Promoted to Sergeant
15 November 1940 - 20 August 1941: RAF Upper Heyford, No 10 Operational Training Unit flying Anson and Hampden aircraft
02 September 1941 - 24 March 1942: RAF Scampton, 49 Squadron, flying Hampden aircraft
28 April 1942 - 24 June 1942: 1485 Target Towing and Gunnery Flight flying Whitley and Wellington aircraft
02 July 1942 – 3 July 1942: RAF Manby, Air Gunnery Instructor Course
4 July – 10 July 1942: RAF Scampton, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Manchester and Oxford aircraft
25 July 1942 – 10 August 1942: RAF Wigsley, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Lancaster aircraft
3 October – 27 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington and Hampden aircraft
28 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge, Gunnery Leader Course
End of 1942: Awarded RAF Commission
09 Nov 1942 – 18 March 1943: RAF Fulbeck flying Manchester aircraft
14 May 1943 – 11 June 1944: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington aircraft
20 June 1944 – 27 July 1945 RAF Foulsham, 192 Squadron flying Halifax and Wellington aircraft
29 April 1946 – 30 August 1946: Palestine, Air Movements Staff Officer
01 September 1946 – 21 January 1947: Kenya, Senior Movements Staff Officer
30 January1947 – 10 June 1947: Ein Shemer, Palestine, 38 Squadron flying Lancaster aircraft
13 July 1947 139398 Flt Lt RLA Woolgar released from Service.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
From: - R.A.F. Station, Gosport, Hants.
To: - Whom it may concern.
Date: - 17th February, 1942.
Ref: - GOS/
[underlined]908870 Sgt. Woolgar R.L.A.[/underlined]
The above named N.C.O. has been rescued from the sea, and is not in possession of a complete suit of uniform or respirator, and is hereby authorised to proceed to his Parent Unit for completion of kitting etc.
[signature]
Station Adjutant
for Group Captain,
Commanding,
[underlined]R.A.F. STATION, GOSPORT[/underlined]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Correspondence
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
OWoolgarRLA908870-160614-02
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Title
A name given to the resource
Request to kit out Sergeant Reg Woolgar
Description
An account of the resource
Letter from RAF Gosport regarding Sergeant Reg Woolgar being rescued from the sea and requiring new kit. On reverse, address of an office in London.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1942-02-17
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page typewritten letter
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942-02-14
1942-02-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Hampshire
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Bloomfield
air sea rescue
crash
ditching
RAF Gosport
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/187/2467/SMarshallS1594781v10031.1.jpg
127f75d875563164a3ceb15110f8de91
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Marshall, Syd. Album
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Marshall, S
Description
An account of the resource
77 items. The album contains wartime and post-war photographs, newspaper cuttings, and memorabilia assembled by Warrant Officer Sidney Charles Marshall (1924 - 2017, 1594781 Royal Air Force). Syd Marshall was a flight engineer with 103 Squadron and flew operations from RAF Elsham Wolds.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Marshall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-05-08
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
ELSHAM WOLDS’ GREAT PART IN BOMBING CAMPAIGN
Four Years of Magnificent Effort
ELSHAM Wolds began to operate with R.A.F. Bomber Command in July, 1941. The airfield was not quite completed when No. 103 Squadron arrived from Newton on July 11, but the Squadron soon settled in and has remained there ever since.
In nearly four years Elsham has built up a high reputation in the Royal Air Force. There was little delay before the airfield was placed on an operational basis and the Wellingtons were out on July 24, from 11 a.m. to 6.45 pm., attacking the battle cruiser “Gneisenau” at Brest.
Before long the Germans knew of the new bomber station, and in August, 1941, enemy aircraft attacked it. They did no serious damage. They tried again several times in later years, though never in strength.
The “Wimpeys” held the fort while the factories got busy with the production of the new four-engined bombers.
On September 10, 1941, Wellingtons flew to Turin for the loss of only one aircraft. By the end of December, Elsham was able to record as many as 17 Wellingtons airborne on a single night.
On one occasion two sergeants brought back their aircraft after four of the crew had baled out; a flare had caught alight in the rear fuselage.
AMONG THE 1,000
After taking part in the May and June 1,000 bomber raids in 1942, there was a lull.
Halifaxes began to arrive and in August made their first sorties from the station, against Dusseldorf. Hardly had the engineering staff accustomed themselves to these aircraft when there was another change, this time to Lancasters. By November 21 the Lancasters had replaced the Halifaxes and were doing excellently.
On the night of May 23-24, 1943, No. 103 Squadron put up 27 Lancasters, which at that time was a Command record.
The Commander-in-Chief, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, G.C.B., O.B.E., A.F.C., visited the station in September and addressed the crews.
One of the flights of No. 103 Squadron was transferred to No. 576 Squadron, which was being formed at Elsham. This left 103 a two-flight squadron. The two squadrons were together in close association and friendly rivalry until October, 1944.
OVER BERLIN
No. 103 Squadron had 30 aircraft over Berlin on the night of November 26-27. Elsham became a base station from December 1 and controlled the airfields at Kirmington and North Killingholme.
The wild weather of January, 1944, made life at Elsham what the R.A.F. call “pretty raw,” but the ground staff worked wonders in clearing blocked roads, and runways.
During the spring the Base Commander, Air Commodore Ivelaw Chapman, O.B.E., D.F.C., A.F.C., was shot down over France and taken prisoner. He has recently returned to this country. Air Commodore F.R.D. Swain, O.B.E., A.F.C., who broke the altitude record some years ago, took over from Air Commodore Chapman.
In June both squadrons at Elsham dropped a thousand tons in a month for the first time, and kept this up for some time. In the summer people in the neighbourhood were able to realise the full power of Bomber Command. Daylight operations against V sites, railway centres, and in close support of the Army enabled them to see the sky full of four-engined aircraft day after day.
In October, No. 103 Squadron dropped 1,277 tons, and 86 aircraft of both squadrons operated against Duisburg within 24 hours. On October 31, No. 576 Squadron left Elsham for Fiskerton. With 103 Squadron they had dropped 5,748 tons in the previous five months.
BOMBER COMMAND’S PRIDE
Elsham was the home of Lancaster “M.2,” the pride of Bomber Command. Its long life showed what a high standard of maintenance had been kept up. “M.2.” first flew on operations on May 4, 1943, to Dortmund, with 103 Squadron. It was later transferred to 576 Squadron, and had been on 103 operations by the beginning of 1944. It was retired with 144 trips to its credit, 97 of them to Germany and 15 to Berlin.
During the last winter everyone at Elsham was working at full stretch, and the Lancasters were fully employed on targets like the Ruhr, Ludwigshafen, Nuremburg, Munich, Chemnitz, and Dresden. Many mines were laid in enemy waters.
For the last month of operations No. 103 Squadron was joined by No. 100 Squadron from Waltham (Grimsby), and both were in the attack on Berchtesgaden on April 25.
When there was no more bombing to be done, large convoys of Army vehicles began to drive up to the station. They carried food for the Lancasters to take to Holland. Another task was to bring back hundreds of freed prisoners of war from the Continent.
Many Elsham names will go down in history for acts of heroism. On May 4, 1944, an aircraft of No. 576 Squadron, captained by Pilot-Officer Reed, of Wellingborough, Northants, landed with the flight engineer helping Reed to hold the control column and the air bomber clinging to the rudder pedals. The Lancaster looked a total wreck. It had been shot up by a fighter over Mailly-le-Camp; it had caught fire, a large hole was knocked in the floor, electrical and navigational instruments were smashed, the rudders and elevators were damaged, and the rear-turret was hanging by a threat.
Two Lancaster from 103 Squadron were each attacked by two fighters on July 29, 1944, when bombing Stuttgart. All four of the enemy were destroyed in a couple of minutes.
Another 103 crew shot down a Ju. 88 over Karlsruhe on April 25, 1944, but sustained serious damage. The pilot had to ditch, and the crew were on the Goodwin Sands for seven hours before being picked up.
Just before the end of the war one of Elsham’s aircraft came back with a 250lb. bomb embedded in a wing. The pilot told the crew to bale out, and the baled out himself near base.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Elsham Wolds' Great Part in Bombing Campaign
Four years of Magnificent Effort
Description
An account of the resource
A history of 103 Squadron's operations at RAF Elsham Wolds.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One newspaper cutting on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
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SMarshallS1594781v10031
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France--Brest
Italy--Turin
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Dresden
Netherlands
France--Mailly-le-Camp
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Karlsruhe
France
Italy
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Govert J. van Lienden
100 Squadron
103 Squadron
576 Squadron
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
ditching
Gneisenau
Halifax
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Ju 88
Lancaster
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operation Manna (29 Apr – 8 May 1945)
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Kirmington
RAF North Killingholme
rivalry
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/17014/PCheshireGL1819.1.jpg
63d2ea6d01657082b47e2c7f55b500b9
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/17014/PCheshireGL1820.1.jpg
6ed893dd17cd93ddec61fcdc5ede023b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dinghy drill
Description
An account of the resource
A group of aircrew wearing tunic and side or peaked caps standing looking into a swimming pool where a rubber dingy is floating. Reported to be possibly 102 Squadron. On the reverse 13.08.40 No. 4. Additional information about this item was kindly provided by the donor.
Date
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1940-08-13
Identifier
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PCheshireGL1819, PCheshireGL1820
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
License
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Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
102 Squadron
aircrew
ditching
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/875/17101/SHollisAN124522v10013.1.jpg
73d33016e8199d94f4ff3d9bef2a400f
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/875/17101/SHollisAN124522v10014.1.jpg
19587483842792adfcad9b3a6467727e
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Hollis, Arthur
Arthur Norman Hollis
A N Hollis
Description
An account of the resource
56 items. The collection concerns Arthur Hollis (b. 1922) who joined the RAF in 1940 and after training completed a tour on 50 Squadron before becoming an instructor. At the end of the war he was deployed as part of Tiger Force. Collection contains a biography and memoir, his logbook, correspondence, training records, photographs of people, aircraft and places, his medals and flying jacket. It includes an oral history interview with his son, Richard Hollis.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Richard Hollis and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-11-07
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Hollis, AN
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] Subsequent Fate of Lancaster. [/underlined]
[symbol} R. ED 483 Lost Kassel 22/23 Oct 43. 456 hrs.
(1)
F. R 5687 Lost Hamburg 27/28 Jul 43 515 hrs.
N. ED 423 Lost Berlin 1/2 Mar [underlined] 44 [/underlined]?
G. ED 478 Lost jettisoning bombs off Skegness 10/11 Apr 43. 143 hrs.
I. ED 429 Missing Bochum 3th June 43.
[symbol] K. ED 691 Missing 17th April 43 98 hrs.
(1)
P. ED 472 Missing (Bochum?) 12/13 June 43 151 hrs.
(Tunn?)
[symbol] D ED 475 Ditched off Hastings 19/10 Jul 43
(18)
N. W 4932 Crashed 16th April 43
Z ED 810 Lost Oberhausen 14th/15 April 43. 145 hrs
[symbol] A ED 468 Burned out after ops 30th July 43
(1) [deleted] 1 [/deleted]
Q ED 755 Lost Berlin 3/4 Sept. 43. 366 hrs.
B. EE 124 Lost 24th June 44.
[symbol] G. ED 588 Lost 29/30 Aug 44 1052 hrs
(1) 116 ops
[page break]
DU 156 Lost Turin 12/13 July 43.
J. W 4161 Became 4451 M after 75 ops - 587 hrs.
[symbol] K ED383 Crashed Lakenheath 26 Feb 44. 628 hrs.
(1) probably mistake in number. should be 3 [underlined] 9 [/underlined 3?
[symbol] D JA 899 Damaged 3 times Lost Prouille 22 Jun 44
(2)
[symbol] K ED 393 Crashed on houses at Hayton 26/27 Nov 43.
(2) prob.
[symbol] F DV227 Lost St Leu d'Esserant 7/8 July 44
(1)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Subsequent fate of Lancasters
Description
An account of the resource
List of aircraft with aircraft letter, what happened to the aircraft, and some with hours or number of operations..
Format
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Two page handwritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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SHollisAN124522v10013, SHollisAN124522v10014
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Berlin
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Skegness
Germany--Bochum
England--Sussex
England--Hastings
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Italy
Italy--Turin
England--Suffolk
France
France--Creil
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
crash
ditching
Lancaster
missing in action
RAF Lakenheath
shot down
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Underlined] 53 Base Commander [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
JANUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] [indecipherable] * NUMBER 18
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The final battle of Germany has now been joined. The enemy has been forced to concentrate two-thirds of his whole fighter strength for the protection of his citied, thus providing a classis example of the way in which air superiority, contrary to popular opinion, is won as much by the bomber as by the fighter. Crews should know that the superiority which the Russian Air Force enjoys on the Eastern Front, with all that this means to Russian military operations, is largely their doing; and the same is true of the Italian theatre.
This massing of the German fighter strength in an attempt to stop our attacks and those of the U.S.S.A.F.E. calls for serious thought on our part. In the long run the effect of the combined R.A.F. and American attacks will reduce the German fighter production so that they will be unable to support their present first line units, and the force will slowly diminish, but this is not a result which can be expected immediately, and much hard fighting lays ahead.
Bomber attacks are planned to reach the target having encountered as little opposition as possible. This is achieved by taking advantage of weather which will keep fighters on the ground, or involve them in great hazards if they take off; by careful routeing; by feint attacks; and by the full use of the radio offensive which prevents orders reaching the German pilots. In spite of this planning, scheming and foxing, a proportion of fighters are bound to get into the bomber stream. It is then that the tactics of the individual crews win or lose the battle.
There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand it may be considered that the sole duty of a crew is to reach the target and bomb it. Therefore, it is said it is imprudent to become involved in any fighting, and a crew should do its best to avoid combat and only open fire if directly attacked, and then only after failing to shake off the fighter by manoeuvre. On the other hand, while accepting that it is the object of the bomber to reach the target, refusal to engage in combat, while possibly safeguarding the individual, may by no means be the best for the force as a whole.
The German night fighter pilot must pray fervently that crews will adopt the first policy, for then he can cruise in the bomber stream unconcerned, except to find and stalk an unsuspecting prey. He will not be shot at by a bomber, which he has failed to see below him or to one side, and he can devote his whole attention to manoeuvring for the final shot. In other words he has a job almost free from the hazards of war, and as a result he will grow fat, and gain in skill and experience, and, therefore, in his ability to do us harm.
Now consider the other policy – to shoot at every German aircraft within range. About that policy I will say this. Firstly, that it is in general the duty of every combatant officer and man of any of His Majesty’s Forces to attempt by every means in their power, to destroy such of the King’s enemies as come within range. Secondly, that execution of this duty will aid the security of the bomber force as a whole, and, therefore, of the individual crew.
The matter is not, however, entirely straightforward, and there are two situations which have to be considered. Firstly, one in which a crew sees an enemy fighter not in a position to attack them but attacking, or about to attack, another bomber. They should be prepared to go in and shoot it down. At the foot of this foreword will be found some selected combats in which crews have acted in this way. They acted rightly, and deserve the congratulations of all in the Group, for they saved the lives of other crews, and rid us of pests who, if not destroyed, will quickly become adept at the art of killing at night.
The second situation is more complicated. A crew know, from their early warning device, that a fighter is nosing after them, and will soon be in a position to attack. Should they continue on their course until it is within range, and then attempt to shoot it down? Emphatically no – because the fighter in these circumstances has certain advantages which will give him temporarily the upper hand. The crew should carry out the standard corkscrew, remembering that this is designed to give the Gunners a standard deflection shot, known to them but not to the fighter pilot. Hence the importance of keeping to the exact standard speeds, rates of turn, loss and gain in height etc., set out in 5 Group Tactical Notes. Any other manoeuvre executed in the heat of action will provide the Gunners with deflection shots which, with present equipment, they have no means of calculating, but which the fighter pilot will find no more, and probably less, difficult to assess than the corkscrew.
Thus, while the standard corkscrew can be used as a manoeuvre for disengaging from enemy fighters, it is also a manoeuvre – and in fact the only manoeuvre – which we can employ and at the same time shoot accurately. Different speeds or rates of turn, or any skid or slip, may cause the Gunner to miss by 40 feet or more. In particular, too high a speed on the downward legs will lessen the rate of turn and, therefore, provide an easier shot for the fighter.
The policy outlined above was first set out in June, 1943. Over the following four months the Group shot down 58 fighters, but recently the numbers have been less, because I believe some crews are in doubt as to the correct action to take.
There is one final point; there must be no firing at an aircraft unless it is identified beyond any reasonable doubt. There have been instances in the past of Lancasters firing on other Lancasters, and there can be no justification for this.
To sum up, every crew in the Group should know that weather – routes – spoof targets and all other devices at the disposal of Bomber Command – are used to out-manoeuvre the German Fighter Force. It can only be out-fought if every crew in the Group is ready to “FORCE HIS WAY IN AND FIGHT HIS WAY OUT”. By that means we shall reduce the power of the German fighter to do us harm, to our own lasting advantage.
Need I add that the Air Gunners are playing a more and more vital part in the success of the bomber offensive. It is their quickness of eye and hand which determines success or disaster – but they are gravely handicapped if the pilot does not keep to the standard corkscrew, and may be caught unawares if the Wireless Operator relaxes his watch on his Monica or Fishpond tube. Such, then, is the team on which we rely to defeat the enemy fighters.
[Underlined] 23/24th August, 1943. J/207. [/underlined] Twin-engined enemy aircraft attacking another aircraft at 800 yards range. Rear gunner opened fore at 700 yards. Enemy aircraft broke in two and hit the ground in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 22/23rd November, 1943. P/619. [/underlined] Rear gunner saw ME109 attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster “P” turned starboard and Rear Gunner opened fire at 200 yards range and scored hits. ME.109 reversed and dived violently to port, emitting flames. Enemy aircraft disappeared in the cloud, after which an explosion was seen. ME.109 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 26/27th November, 1943. Z/44. [/underlined] Rear gunner sighted ME.210 flying to attack another Lancaster ahead. Lancaster Z corkscrewed and both gunners opened fire at 800 y ards [sic] range. Enemy aircraft followed the corkscrew and fired a burst which went well above [sic] Both gunners kept firing short burst, registering hits. Enemy aircraft seen to disintegrate by another crew, and ME.210 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 16/17th December, 1943. A/44. [/underlined] ME.109 sighted 600 yards range parallel, following another Lancaster. ME.109 opened fire on another Lancaster who did not return fire. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits. ME.109 burst into flames and disintegrated. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 30/31st January,1944.U/44. [/underlined] Over target area Rear Gunner sights ME.210 800 yards down attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster U was corkscrewing on a Monica IIIA indication. Rear Gunner opened fire and strikes were observed. Enemy aircraft dived away with port engine on fire. Last seen entering cloud in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographs with plottable ground detail obtained during January, was 73; these were almost entirely due to the conditions prevailing during the Stettin raid. For the remaining raids, the presence of heavy cloud caused the majority of technical successful exposures to be placed into the Target Conditions category.
Failures for the month were 58, which represents 5.4%. These failures can be reduced considerably if the personnel concerned will make the necessary effort, and it is suggested that still more co-operation is needed between the Bombing Leaders, Electrical, Armament and Photographic personnel in tracing the causes and ensuring that failures are not repeated. The first step in film fault analysis is to decide the ‘bombing frame’; failure to do this correctly will normally cause the investigation to be abortive and a complete waste of time.
There is reason to think that insufficient care is being exercised when setting the fusing time on the Type 35 Control. It is of the utmost importance that the fuse setting and the Type 35 Control are identical. Squadron photographers must realise that the setting is extremely critical, and even a small misadjustment of the Control Setting Knob will normally be sufficient to cause the flash illumination to be misplaced, and may therefore be considered a ‘pick-up’, resulting in a theoretical failure.
A new method of Night Photography is being tried out by Nos. 44 and 49 Squadrons. This is the use of Kodacolour film on frames Nos. 3 and 4 and H.S. night film on the remaining frames. The object of this composite Colour and Black and White is to photograph any T.I’s and Sky Markers in colour and at the same time to procure ground detail on Frame 5 by the illumination provided by the photo flash if conditions permit. The Photographic Section, R.A.F., Scampton, have undertaken to make up and process the films, and with full co-operation of the Station Workshops, have produced some very fine work.
It is too early to forecast whether this new method will generally be adopted. Much depends on the value of interpretation, supply of Kodacolour and technical equipment, but so far results are very promising.
[Table of Photographic analysis results by Squadron]
[Table of Photographic failure analysis results by Squadron]
A.S.R. (CONTINUED)
(Continued from back page Col. 1)
follows :-
(i) 256 aircrew lost their lives when other members of their crews were saved, which gives a strong indication of incorrect dinghy drill being carried out.
(ii) 23 lost their lives after having been sighted in dinghies – weather and lack of knowledge of searching procedure were the main causes for this.
(iii) 663 are known to have come down in the sea but no S.O.S. signal was transmitted making search almost impossible.
(iv) 280 disappeared over the sea without word or trace.
The above figures show that aircrews generally have a very sad lack of knowledge of what to do in the event of an emergency over the sea, both as regards W/T procedure and dinghy drills. A tremendous amount of money has been spent building up the Air Sea Rescue Service, and in providing safety equipment for aircrews, all of which can work satisfactorily with the full co-operation of the aircrews for whose benefit they have been designed.
When you bale out over enemy territory, your future welfare depends on your own initiative [underlined] after [/underlined] you have come to earth, but the reverse holds good in baling out over the sea or ditching. Emergency incidents over the sea depend for their success on full crew co-operation and knowledge of W/T procedure and dinghy drills – all of which must be gained [underlined] before [/underlined] the incident occurs.
One hour a week spent on the study of search procedure, emergency and S.O.S. W/T procedure, and dinghy drills, is sufficient to ensure that you will never be caught unprepared in case of emergency over the sea.
[Underlined] HELP A.S.R. TO HELP YOU [/underlined]
OPERATIONS
It would perhaps not be inopportune in the first month of the New Year, to reflect on one of the most valuable technical inovations introduced this time last year, and which is to-day largely instrumental in waging the Battle of Berlin with unabated vigour. It was just a year ago that blind bombing was first on trial and an analysis of its success or otherwise was anxiously awaited. This month, with the aid of this technique, we were enabled to conduct seven raids on Berlin, and one each on Brunswick and Magdeburg. Stettin alone, to its everlasting regret, was cloud free. 1341 sorties were flown, of which 89% were successful in attacking the primary. Increased fighter activity and the long range at which targets were attacked perhaps accounted for the rather higher loss rate of 4.6%.
At the beginning of this month, Hitler declared “The Winter may be difficult. Its blows, however, cannot hit us harder than last year”. The month was not out before this illusion was shattered by a sustained series of attacks on the Nazi capital, bringing the tonnage dropped since the beginning of the Battle of Berlin, to over 24,500 tons. One is perhaps best able to appreciate the magnitude of this figure when it is borne in mind that 50,000 tons would “Hamburgise” Berlin. The latest reconnaissance to secure photographic evidence of the raids up to and including 2/3rd January, was made on 4th January, but only poor quality photographs of parts of the city (excluding in particular the centre) were obtained. These however revealed important industrial damage in the Johannisthal district to the South East, with severe damage to several less important business and residential areas. It is interesting to note that in a statement issued by Transocean on 7th January, it was estimated that the damage sustained up to that date would take some 7 1/2 years to rebuild.
Little is yet known of the remaining 4 major attacks of the month against the Reich capital on 20/21st, 27/28th, 28/29th and 30/31st, except that reports suggest they were concentrated. Ground information points to the significant fact that with the possible exception of the North Eastern outer suburbs of the city, not a district in the capital has escaped. Impressive as this picture is , it really affords no index to the scale of administrative dislocation which must be a most acute problem for the Nazis; added to which the paralysis of the focus of German was industry and transport, together with the ever increasing influence of the raids on that intangible factor, morale, would also appear to promote a depressing effect on the Hun’s capacity to wage war.
The attack on Stettin on 5/6th January, provided adequate material for our reports. The blanket of cloud, which for some time past has shrouded the continent, was absent at the target, enabling the snow outlined town to be clearly identified. The resultant attack was well concentrated, and P.R.U. cover indicates severe damage in the Southern half of the town centre, extending into the West and East basins of the dock area. Ten buildings of the large military barracks to the South of the town have been gutted, and fairly heavy damage was sustained by business and residential property. The same night a
(Continued on page 4, col. 1)
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT RATE INCREASES
Halfway through January, it was apparent that the excellent accident figure for December was not to be repeated, and the number of avoidable accidents, of all kinds, by the end of the month was nearly doubled – 18 against 10.
This month’s total is made up as follows: Ground collisions – 9; Overshoots on landing – 3; Heavy landings – 1; Swings on take-off – 1; Other errors of judgement – 3.
In spite of all that has been done and written about “ground collisions” there has been no decrease whatsoever in these avoidable accidents. This month there were again 9, and they follow much the same patter as those of December, with this difference:-
Two aircraft were damaged in dispersal while being run up by ground crew, through chocks slipping on greasy surfaces. In both instances the aircraft swung round and collided with obstacles.
It has been a long time since an accident of this type occurred in the Group. The remedy is obvious. Ground crews must examine all chocks for serviceability, keep dispersals well sanded, and, above all, never start to run up engines until the dispersal is clear of obstructions. It is the old, old story of a little foresight paying a big dividend.
During this month a taxying incident occurred in which a major contributory factor was the failure of a captain of aircraft and of ground crew to notify Flying Control quickly that a Lancaster was obstructing the perimeter track. The aircraft had become bogged in soft ground just off the track at night, and was struck by another Lancaster taxying, without an aldis lamp, and at excessive speed.
Flying Control, had they known, could have taken immediate steps to have the aircraft marked as an obstruction, and could have warned other captains of its position.
This accident adds emphasis to the warning in last Month’s News that ground crew should make every effort to let pilots know of obstructions. The captain of this particular Lancaster showed bad captaincy in not notifying Flying Control, and also in leaving his aircraft in charge of ground crew when he knew it was in a dangerous position.
Needless to say, the pilot of the moving aircraft had his log book endorsed in “RED”.
The 3 “overshoots on landing” this month bring out the usual pilot error – too fast an approach in bad visibility and failure to go round again. If the various factors of height, speed, cockpit drill etc., are not correct, it is no use “hoping you’ll stop in time”. It might be all right nine times out of ten, but the tenth means another Lancaster in a heap at the end of the runway.
One crash occurred again this month on a 3-engined overshoot. The pilot was an experienced captain with many Lancaster hours to his credit, yet he [underlined] failed to keep in trim for 3 engined flying [/underlined] on his approach. When the engines were opened up to full power, the inevitable swing caught him unawares. Result was a bad crash with fatal consequences.
Drills and instructions are not issued by this Headquarters just to be read and forgotten, so if there are any you are not sure about, now is the time to brush up your knowledge. [Underlined] You [/underlined] will reap the benefit.
Conversion Units had a bad time this month. The total of nine “avoidables” exceeds the total of all the Squadrons put together. Winthorpe had four. 1660, 1654 and 5 L.F.S. had one each. 1485 Flight had two taxying accidents.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
FRESHMEN
1. Remember the lowest fuel consumption is not obtained when you are flying at the lowest possible speed. With the increased angle of attack of the wings at a low speed, you get increased drag and consequently require a greater power output. Neither maximum endurance nor maximum range will be obtained by flying as slowly as you can, so don’t “waffle” around the sky hanging on to your props. If you are getting short of petrol and have got a long way to go, try 2000 revs + 3 boost. That will give you a healthy airspeed, economical petrol consumption and excellent range.
2. You know why you can expect climbing difficulties on warm nights? The air is thinner at a given aeronoid height and so increases the true air speed at which the aircraft must be flown and the power required to fly it. The thinner air also reduces the charge drawn in to the engine and so reduces the power available.
3. Don’t sheer off track because you see pinpoints of flak dead ahead. It may be anything up to 100 miles away and as you get closer you will find that your route will probably bypass the flak area. Flak which explodes with a large orange coloured flash is within 15 mls and is quite harmless. It is only when you can hear or feel it that it is within 250 feet and getting dangerous. If you SMELL it, well get cracking.
[Cartoon]
4. Always take a note at Briefing of the times of the other waves in the attack in case you strike trouble on the way and cannot make good your T.O.T. Aim to make good the T.O.T. of another wave. It is safer to be bombing with bags of company.
5. Give your Navigator as good a platform for his Astro shots as you give your Air Bomber for his bombing run. Hand over to “George” if your instrument flying is not 100% and let the Navigator know the moment you consider the aircraft is as stable as it is likely to be.
6. If you use Caffein tablets it is a good plan to take one as you leave the English Coast outward bound. That will see you to the target. Take another when you are clear of the defences to see you home. Never take any just before take-off. Once upon a time there was a mid-upper gunner who took four tablets 10 minutes before take-off. The “Op” was scrubbed. The gunner wasn’t seen for 24 hours after he eventually went to sleep about noon the next day. Then he was posted !
VETERANS
1. Don’t get out of touch with existing orders. You have read them once, but only by constantly referring to the Flight Order books can you be sure that you have got them buttoned up. Just one example – never take off rudder bias on the approach for a 3-engined landing. You can easily control any tendency to swing after landing, but if you have to overshoot on 3 engines, the bias is the only thing that will enable you to control the immediate swing towards the dead engine at full power. If the swing is not controlled the result is fatal.
2. Another word on overshoots. You can still overshoot even though you are in the green of the G.P.I. and the airspeed is O.K. This circumstance may arise if your initial approach has been too low and you have used the extra engine to get back into the Green. Don’t forget once you have made good the undershoot throttle back again and get your angle of descent right.
3. Don’t attempt to raise flaps after landing when you have “pulled the bottle”, because there is a danger of bursting the header tank. If in an emergency you have to raise flaps in the air after pulling the bottle, do so slowly and in stages.
4. If you have to jettison fuel, close the valve while there is still 75 to 100 gallons in each tank. It is a precaution against fire, because the last 30 gallons of jettisonable fuel runs out slowly and splashes over the airframe. Never jettison if you are going to do a wheels up landing when there is any likelihood of fire.
5. Never take off flap during an approach if you suddenly decide you don’t want flap in a very high wind. The lowering of the flap increases the lift coefficient of a wing and any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the stalling speed being increased above the approach speed.
6. Get together regularly with the other members of your crew behind a hangar or in the crew room and exchange ideas on your recent trips. There’s bound to be a few points in crew routine that need patching up. Don’t wait until there is a party in the Sergeants’ Mess before you find out that the crew have a thing or two on their minds.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
WIND MESSAGES
Bomber Command Signals Staff Instructions commence with an “Order of the Day” by the C.-in-C. which says that :- “The tradition of the Signals Service is that the safety of aircraft overrides every other consideration and every other interest…The Signals Service aspires never to lose an aircraft”.
Since this message was originated, many and varied aids have been introduced falling within the purview of the Signals Service which attain towards the achievement of this objective.
It is generally agreed that losses in the main bomber force may be considerably reduced if a high degree of concentration of aircraft during the route to and from the target, and at the target itself, can be effected.
Radar/Navigation aids fitted to many aircraft now make it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy, the velocity and direction of winds at the height and in the area of the main force. The means of communicating this to the Meteorological staffs on the ground, and of passing to every aircraft on the force the assessment of accurate winds on their route, is the responsibility of the Signals Service.
This method has been in use since towards the end of the Old Year, and, from the signals aspect, has been successful. The method used has been for wind-finding aircraft to transmit their winds to the Base D/F Station, and the ground staff to transmit the wind assessment to the main force on Group operational frequency.
The transmissions by Wind Finders to Bases gives an increase on the number of channels, with a better spread over of the volume of traffic at any one time. To ensure that every message which can possibly be received, is received, an additional watch is maintained at each Base on a normal receiver, and a watch, on each frequency in use, at Group Headquarters. The watch at Group Headquarters serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables received winds to be in the Meteorological Officers’ hands in the minimum time, and secondly, provides an additional check on the Base D/F frequencies. Any Wind Finding aircraft unable to establish satisfactory communication on its Base frequency, reverts to the Group operational frequency, and by these means we have been successful in receiving almost 100% of wind finding messages transmitted. There have been two occasions when conditions on the 3 to 4 m/c band made communication rather difficult, and in order to provide an additional channel should this re-occur, an allotment of a frequency in the 7 m/c band has been obtained. The results of this frequency on similar occasions, should they arise, are awaited with interest.
The reception of the wind assessments by the main force has been good, but could be improved. Generally, the number of messages missed has been in the region of 2.5% of the total which should have been received.
The loop aerial has proved a reliable selectivity device, and it should always be tried when other efforts to get rid of jamming fail.
GEE
The introduction of new equipment leaves Radar Sections less time for standard Gee maintenance. It is gratifying to note that, in spite of this, the serviceability remains high. There are however, numerous unnecessary faults, which render the equipment difficult to use, or completely unserviceable. Great care should be taken to prevent slipshod D.I’s, and faults such as leads off etc. Many Squadrons are still reporting divider trouble, indicating that the necessary modification has not been completed. If this is due to a shortage of equipment, ask the Equipment Officer to expedite.
AURAL MONICA
Aural Monica is slowly disappearing. Many crews would, however, like to keep Monica, even though they now have Fishpond. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the Radar Sections to maintain both installations in all aircraft.
VISUAL MONICA
This installation remains a most effective and valuable Radar aid. Serviceability is high in comparison with other equipment, but to be a first class warning device, 100 per cent serviceability is required. Switch motors have caused nearly one third of Visual Monica failures, but it is hoped that this trouble will soon be cleared, since the correct type of grease has now been found. Next month should show a large increase in serviceability. Unfortunately, there is no more equipment available, so squadrons must ensure that no sets remain unserviceable, or are destroyed, through careless maintenance. Many crews already owe much to Visual Monica. Don’t let the lack of serviceability spoil a first class device.
H 2 S
The fitting of H 2 S is greatly retarded by the shortage of scanners. It is impossible to fit all H 2 S aircraft in the existing squadrons, and so there is little likliehood [sic] of fitting new H 2 S squadrons for some time. Last month’s problem, freezing scanners, appears to have been corrected by use of anti-freeze oil and repositioning of the scanner heater. A new snag is now appearing in the slowing down of the repeater motors. Radar Sections should contact Instrument people for information regarding the correct type of oil to use on the motor bearings. A new pulse transformer has been designed and trials are being conducted. It is hoped that a large percentage of the very numerous H 2 S failures will now be prevented.
FISHPOND
Fishpond fitting still continues slowly, hampered by the connector shortage. Trained crews are getting very good results, but it is necessary to emphasise that Wireless Operators should spend considerable time on the Fishpond trainer. A few extra minutes learning to use the set correctly may well save many an unpleasant trip.
MONICA AND FISHPOND TRAINING
Now that all available sets have been fitted, a drive has started to eliminate preventable failures. Aircraft are being deprived of the protection of a tail warning device during entire sorties, simply because one plug is loose, or a fuse blown. We must make full use of every available set and to do this, Operators must be given a greater insight into the workings thereof. Fault finding tables – with sketches of what the CRT shows for various faults – are being prepared.
Various synthetic training schemes have been evolved, including a series of cards showing typical “blip” pictures with the appropriate patter printed underneath. A similar set of cards without the patter is used to test the Operator’s reactions.
An epidiascope is being used by one Squadron, and lifelike “blips” are introduced up and down the time base, and shown on the screen for brief intervals.
Which squadron will produce the best synthetic training device?
Signals and Radar officers – are you getting that occasional flight? (See A.M.O. A.1323/43). You should all have flown with Monica or Fishpond by now. Don’t forget to enter your trips in the old log book.
WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR)
[Underlined] (CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO LOOK) [/underlined]
The article on wind finding from the signals aspect, which heads this Section of the News, should be read and digested by all Wireless Operators.
The Group W/T Exercise has improved this month, but Section I are definitely superior to Section II, and should any Operators of Section II doubt the truth of this statement they may like to do a little eavesdropping. After all, the ether is free.
This month’s three star effort for air operating was the performance by Wireless Operator Sgt. Barnes Moss of No.61 Squadron (formerly of 1661 Con. Unit and 16 O.T.U.), on the night of 5/6th January. The aircraft “J”Jig was severely damaged over the target, the port outer engine being rendered unserviceable, resulting in a loss of the Gee facilities. Sgt. Barnes Moss rose to the occasion and managed 12 fixes, 1 bearing and 1 message, keeping a good log, and also receiving the odd Group broadcast at the same time. It would appear that this Wireless Operator set about his job with calm determination, and was partly responsible for the safe return of his aircraft to this country, and in doing so proved a credit to his Squadron, captain and crew.
(continued on Page 12, Col.1)
(Continued from Page 2, Col.3)
small force of our aircraft successfully laid mines.
Although for the moment we are without precise information as to the result of the raids on Brunswick on 14/15th, and against Magdeburg and Berlin on 21/22nd, preliminary reports show promise of impressive returns. These attacks will contribute to the nomadic population of the Reich, and provide a tinge of irony to the announcement in a Frankfurt paper that “Evacuees are not gypsies but Germans”.
Thus ends the first month of our “decisive year, boasting a new record tonnage dropped on Germany itself – a portent of the scale of future operations.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
It was at the beginning of May, 1943, that the initial drive on greater accuracy in practice bombing was commenced throughout the Group. Very good co-operation by the Squadrons within the Group led to most intensified training, so much so that in the months of May, June, July and August a grand total of 23,310 bombs were dropped. This total almost equalled the number of bombs that were dropped in the preceding [underlined] 4 years. [/underlined] However, one fact emerged, namely the average error was remaining at approximately the same figure, and that this figure, 220 yards, was still much too high.
September heralded the introduction of bombing analysis. F/Lt. Cooper, an expert analyst was attached to us from No. 25 Group and travelled from Squadron to Squadron to implement the Group’s very scanty knowledge of assessment of bombing. Thus, slowly we learned the way bombing errors are split into certain definite categories. The first major item which was tackled was the bombsight maintenance, which had contributed no small portion of bombing errors; and by the end of November, errors directly attributable to bombsight defects were almost eliminated.
We next learned that the main error, called Crew Error, had two components. The error caused by the failings of Pilot and Air Bomber, and the Vector Error, that is the error due to the use of faulty wind velocities.
The Pilot and Air Bomber’s error was tackled with considerable vigour until, by the end of December we were really getting down to very small proportions. 106 Squadron for instance, dropped 182 bombs from High Level during December for an average Pilot/Air Bomber error of 78 yards, an astonishingly good achievement. 619 Squadron with 101 yards, 467 with 115 yards and 50 and 463 Squadrons with 116 and 117 yards respectively were close behind.
However, and now we come to the major bombing problem, our Crew Errors were still too large because our average Vector Errors were much too high.
November/December and January has shown the gradual appreciation of this Vector Error problem, and in the Squadrons where bombing is accepted as the be-all and end-all of 5 Group (and their number is ever-increasing) the problem is a matter of real concern. The Group’s average Vector Error for November was 169 yards at 10,000 feet, in in December 162 yards, and these figures convert to roughly 13 m.p.h. A good Vector Error is considered to be 5 m.p.h. (that is 60 yards at 10,000 feet) and it is to this figure Crews must make their way.
When this is achieved, and it will come only with the greatest flying care by the pilots and the most accurate plotting, timing and computing by the Navigators, then a crew will be able to take up 6 bombs, drop them in a close group of less than 50 yards radius with the Mean Point of Impact less than 70 yards from the target. Then, and not until then, can we call ourselves BOMBER CREWS.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt.Walmsley) submits the following “Stop Press” news on the Vector Error problem.
(continued in next column)
“ F/O. Ingleby, a Navigator of 619 Squadron has spent a great deal of time on trying to find out why such large Vector Errors occur. He back-plotted a navigator’s bombing wind, [underlined] to a much larger scale, [/underlined] and discovered that a 15 seconds error in timing over 6-7 minutes gave a Vector Error of 10 m.p.h., that is 130 yards at 10,000 feet. “
The wind found, in the words of the Navigator, brought us from Nottingham to Base on E.T.A. “
Agreed that such a wind would, because an error up to 300-400 yards in track and 1/2 to 1 second in time is almost unnoticeable, but it is such small and apparently insignificant Navigation Errors that cause displacement of bombs from the target to distances up to 200 to 250 yards away.
COMPETITION BOMBING
A much better show was put up by the Squadrons this month in the Competition, the results of which are as follows:-
Pilot & Air Bombers Navigators
1st 106 Sqdn – 58 yds 1st 630 Sqdn – 87 yds
2nd 619 Sqdn – 82 yds 2nd 106 Sqdn - 124 yds
3rd 630 Sqdn – 92 yds 3rd 619 Sqdn – 183 yds
4th 57 Sqdn – 118 yds 4th 57 Sqdn – 264 yds
Further entries with less than [underlined] 8 [/underlined] qualifying exercises.
5th 50 Sqdn – 74 yds 5th 467 Sqdn -110 yds
6th 463 Sqdn -129 yds 6th 50 Sqdn – 119 yds
7th 61 Sqdn -145 yds 7th 61 Sqdn -163 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -158 yds 8th 463 Sqdn -165 yds
9th 207 Sqdn -165 yds 9th 44 Sqdn -176 yds
10th 44 Sqdn -221 yds 10th 207 Sqdn -220 yds
No entries were submitted by 9 & 49 Sqdns. Next month we want a TOTAL all-out effort!
[Table of High Level Bombing Training by Squadron showing Error Rates]
[Underlined] OUTSTANDING BOMBING DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 10,000 ft.
[Underlined] 9 W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined] F/O. Prior P/O. Gall 66 yds
[Underlined] 50 F/O. Robinson [/underlined] F/O. Lavery Sgt. Sanderson 84 yds
[Underlined] P/O. Dobbyn [/underlined] Sgt. Jackson F/O. Horner 66 yds
61 P/O. Wallis Sgt. Pardoe F/Sgt. Tozer 67 yds
F/O. Fitch F/O. Lyons. F/O. Jennings 86 yds
106 F/O. Latham F/O. Martins F/L. Williamson 89 yds
P/O. Lee F/Sgt. Hoyland F/Sgt. McKie 81 yds
P/O. Gibbs F/O. Cramp F/Sgt. Appleyard 75 yds
F/Sgt. Rosser Sgt. Goss F/Sgt. White 61 yds
F/O. Lee F/O Beven F/O. Langrish 95 & 72 yds
P/O. Pezaro Sgt. Greenwood Sgt. Wade 63 yds
[Underlined] 463 P/O. Saunders [/underlined] Sgt. Govett Sgt. Falconer 84 yds
[Underlined] F/Sgt. James [/underlined] F/Sgt. Bowes F/O. Pettitt 92 yds
630 W/Cdr. Rollinson F/Sgt. Rosser F/L. Ehrman 88 yds
1654 C.U. F/Sgt. Page F/O. Braithwaite F/Sgt. Fair 99 yds
F/Sgt. Perry Sgt. Duncombe Sgt. Hather 84 yds
Sgt. Paterson Sgt. Hall Sgt. Rice 90 yds
1661 C.U. F/Sgt. Falsted F/Sgt. Hancock Sgt. O’Connor 95 yds
617 Squadron obtained 11 exercises with less than 100 yards average error, and the following :
S/Ldr. Suggitt F/O. Davidson W/O. Gordon 30 yds
[Table of Additional Bombing Training by Squadron, including bombs dropped, error, A.M.B.T. hours, infra-red exercises, traces and T. & D. runs & indirect attacks]
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CON)
“GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS
[Underlined] 61 Squadron’s [/UNDERLINED] (F/Lt. McDonald) bombing figures for December failed to include the month’s best week of bombing because the return affecting that week was mislaid. 15 exercises were carried out, 77 bombs being dropped for an average Crew Error at 10,000 feet, of 177 yards. Vector Error averaged 126 yards and Pilot’s and Air Bomber’s error was 129 yards.
Congratulations to the Bombing Staff off [underlined] No. 5 LANCASTER FINISHING SCHOOL, R. A. F. [/underlined] Syerston, who, under the guidance of W/O. Linnett, constructed an excellent small instructional display of ‘Paramatta’ and ‘Wanganui’ attacks showing the danger of incendiaries “creep-back”.
Group Captain Evans-Evans, R.A.F. Coningsby, has pointed out that [underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Walmsley) in the first two weeks of January AIMED 36 day and 54 night Practice Bombs and not one of these 90 bombs were “aimed” below 8,000 feet.
To quote the Station Commander – “a real effort on all crews’ part to bomb as near operational height as possible.”
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S., R.A.F. Syerston [/underlined] (F/Lt.Wonham.) reports the most creditable attainment of 12,300 feet average height for all practice bombing during January. This is what we want !!!
[Underlined] 467 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. McCarthy) reports yet a further “Mod” to the Bomb Aimer’s compartment.
To quote :-
“The stationary lights do not supply illumination to points where they are needed, i.e. the lamp on the bombing instrument panel does not afford enough light to read the pre-selector box and no light is in position to check camera leads. A “wander” light has been installed above the selector box and will supply any part of the nose for any job including map reading”.
5 Group will seek permission to make this modification general as soon as possible.
Thank you, 467 !!!
It is pointed out that [underlined] 49 Squadron [/underlined] are doing a considerable amount of bombing training which does not appear in the normal returns.
This training is in the form of blind bombing using H2S, which is achieving considerable success.
[Underlined] 617 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Hay) reports that average bombing error for December was 90 yards – on one [underlined] operation [/underlined] during January the Squadron’s average error was 94 yards from 12,000 feet. Enough said !!!
In column 2 will be found an article by F/Lt. Hay on the “617” bombing team, as promised in the December issue.
“GEN” FROM WAINFLEET
Despite 8 days and 15 nights unfit for bombing training, Wainfleet plotted [underlined] 2398 [/underlined] bombs dropped by 363 aircraft during the month. All Squadrons used the range for night training, special mention being made of 617, 106, 207 and 619 Squadrons who aimed 155, 60, 51 and 50 bombs respectively.
[Boxed] LATE ENTRY FROM 49 SQUADRON FOR COMPETITION
Bombing Error – 156 yards
Navigator’s Error – 124 yards [/boxed]
THE SECRET OF 617 SQUADRON’S HIGH STANDARD OF PRACTICE BOMBING.
The S.A.B.S. – Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber Team.
The excellent results gained by crews of 617 Squadron using the SABS have only been achieved by the fullest, most practical use of the “Bombing team”. Before any bombs are dropped some four hours training on the specially adapted A.M.B.T. are carried out by the Pilot and Air Bomber to give manipulation practice to the latter, and to familiarise the pilot with the B.D.I. (Bombing Direction Indicator). The Navigator is trained to carry out compution of true height and airspeed, and settings for a given course of attack with the instruments and computers at his disposal. Some 2 - 4 hours are then spent in the air doing “dummy runs”, firstly on objects “on track”, and then choosing targets and “turning on”, and finally on to targets and setting up sight in accordance with settings computed from known navigational data. The sight is only accurate when correct height above target is set. Thus the pilot must fly at the indicated height he states he will be at, the Navigator must correctly compute this to the true height above target, and the Air Bomber set this accurately.
True height is dependent upon :-
(i) [Underlined] Sea Level Pressure at Target. [/underlined] This is gained by setting aerodrome height for practice bombing or, operationally, from Form 2330. It is the Q.F.F. which is set.
(ii) [Underlined] Indicated Height above Sea Level. [/underlined] All 617 Squadron altimeters have been accurately calibrated for every 1000’ for 140 and 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. and from the appropriate card the Navigator allows for this error, which may be up to 300’
(iii) [Underlined] Temperature. [/underlined] “Thermometer, Air, Direct Reading, Mk.I”, now fitted, does not give an accurate reading for temperature of the outside air, as (a) the stem is heated by cabin temperature, and (b) the outside air bearing against the bulb is under pressure varying with airspeed. Both factors tend to give a “warmer” reading than true. Again the Navigator computes from a special computer to get an accurate air temperature.
With these factors and the use of an ICAN computer, true height (c) can be computed. True height above target will need a deduction of target height above sea level, and there will be a further allowance (addition) to be made where stick bombing is being used.
When the pilot advises IAS with aircraft trimmed and bomb doors open, the Navigator computes a T.A.S. which is used against a Trail scale for the appropriate bomb number. Errors of + or – 5 m.p.h. make negligible ground errors. Most errors in range can be traced to (1) flying at other than the indicated height stated by the pilot, (2) incorrect compution of height and/or T.A.S., by the navigator, or (3) by incorrect settings or bad manipulation, by the Air Bomber.
The sight will automatically correct for Drift and Ground Speed if switched on with the target in the graticule, and held there by proper manipulation of the sight by the Air Bomber, and by the pilot following the direction of his B D. I., until such time as the point of release is attained. Those who remember the A.B.S., and who used it to its utmost efficiency, realise that the length of run could be considerably decreased if settings were applied before the run. As the heading of attack is generally known, the navigator just prior to the run, can pass a drift and G/S setting to the Air Bomber. So, after practice, the Air Bomber need only wind his sighting head back for a 25 second run, whereas 40 -50 seconds may be required without these settings.
Let us listen to a typical 617 Squadron bombing run :-
Pilot. “Turning on to a heading of 250°”
Nav. “250° - drift 4° port, G/Setting 17”
A/B acknowledges, directs pilot on and calls “Run stated”, at the appropriate moment. After 30 seconds of concentration, but silence, by Pilot and Air Bomber, we hear :-
A/B. “ Bombs gone, good run here, drift 3° port, G/S 16.5 “, and after time of fall “ Bomb plotted, 10 yards overshoot “.
Pilot. “Sorry, my fault, I was 120 ft. high!!
When results are received from the Range, the team assembles about the plotting table to further sort out factors causing any errors.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
A hearty welcome to F/Lt. Lowry ex 3 Group who has arrived in this Group to become Bombing Leader to 44 Squadron, R.A.F., Dunholme Lodge.
F/O. Jacombs (463 Squadron) was 1st and F/O. Abbot (106 Squadron) was 3rd, both with “A” Categories on No. 74 Bombing Leaders’ Course. This is a particularly good show on the part of these two Officers. F/O. Jones (49 Squadron) obtained a “B” category on the same Course, being 15th.
[Cartoon of two WAAFs] Dot and Dark – the immaculate W.A.A.F’s – “… and don’t you suggest he made the first Begin Approach…”]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Concentration, track keeping, and Navigation generally improved during the month. This was largely due to the efficiency of the selected wind finders and to the working of the Wind Finding Scheme as a whole. The selected wind finders’ results have been carefully analysed and it is now possible for the Met. Section at Group Headquarters to place certain degrees of reliability on the information which is passed back from individual crews. Special mention is made here of F/Lt. Townsend – Pilot, and F/O. Haxby, Navigator, of No.57 Squadron who have proved to be most reliable as wind finders; they have consistently sent back accurate wind information which was used as a basis for future winds transmitted to all 5 Group aircraft. It is hoped that all crews selected for this special duty will reach a 100% reliability standard, and send back wind information which will not only be of great value to non-wind finding crews in the Group but to many other crews in the Command.
It has been suggested in some quarters that transmitting winds from aircraft over enemy territory renders the aircraft more susceptible to Freya and Wurtzburg plotting, and therefore to greater danger from vectored fighters, flak and searchlights. As far as the losses in this Group show, there is absolutely no foundation in fact for this belief, so that crews need have no qualms about using the W/T transmitter. They should regard their transmissions as a valuable means of helping all the other aircraft to keep to the planned route.
It was particularly emphasised in the December Monthly News that all Navigators must continue to find winds whenever possible and to check accuracy of their wind finding with broadcast winds. Many crews are not doing this, but are content to use all broadcast winds without checking their accuracy. This practice is a dangerous one, and can easily lead a crew into trouble. Assume that the Navigator has rechecked his calculations and is satisfied that the course and airspeeds flown are those for which he is calculating. The winds found by this Navigator are the only ones on which a revised wind could be based should the aircraft get into difficulties as a result of using the broadcast wind. It is imperative, therefore that all Navigators check, and re-check, the wind velocity whenever a good air position and fix are obtained simultaneously. Your ability to find accurate wind velocities may mean that you will be selected as a Group wind finder, and that in consequence, the main force concentration and track keeping will be directly affected by your efficiency.
5 GROUP SPOOF ATTACK 21/22ND JANUARY
Reference must be made here to the Spoof Attack carried out by 22 aircraft of this Group on BERLIN. Theirs was not considered a desirable mission, and the success of the attack makes the job they did all the more noteworthy. It seems that this small attack drew off the enemy fighters from the stream of the main force aircraft which attacked Brunswick at the same time, and the combats recorded on the two routes bear this out.
The return from this raid was flown over 10/10ths cloud almost the whole way. Route Markers were dropped by our own aircraft along this route and winds were broadcast by 57 “C” for the assistance of the rest of the force. Only one aircraft failed to return from this attack, which emphasises the general quality of the Navigation and the careful pre-flight planning employed.
A.P.I.
Supplies of A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have now been received in the Group and they will be sufficient to equip all H 2 S aircraft. Any surplus A. P. I’s will be distributed to the non-H 2 S Squadrons. This method of distribution was decided on so that the maximum assistance in windfinding would be available in certain Squadrons. Their help will be to the benefit of all non-H 2 S squadrons.
Fitting is going on as rapidly as possible in all squadrons.
M/F FIXES
In the past many Navigators have considered that to request a fix from the W/Op means an admission of defeat in their job as a Navigator. If the security of the aircraft is in danger and the Navigator is temporarily uncertain of his position when returning from operations, then he should not hesitate to obtain a fix.
This of course must only be resorted to in emergency, otherwise aircraft which urgently require W/T assistance are unable to receive from the M/F Station until it has dealt with the first aircraft. Recently a fix was requested from Heston, (Section D) by an aircraft returning from the South from operations. This was not obtained, although a position line was given instead. (The significance of this was not appreciated by the Navigator). If a line bearing is received in reply to a request for a fix, it normally means that the aircraft is in transit with the base line of the M/F Stations. This Navigator should have requested another fix about 15 minutes later from the same M/F Station, or better still should have asked the W/Op to change over to Section N.
STRAIGHT FROM THE O R S’s MOUTH
A system of Raid Assessment has now been in operation in 5 Group since May, 1943. The system has progressed, and ways and means to improve it are considered daily. The objects of the system are (i) to try to discover [underlined] quickly [/underlined] what went right or what went wrong with each attack, and (ii) to consider over a period what lessons can be learnt. In this way, it is hoped, future attacks may be conducted with greater precision and reduced casualties.
Each Station has a copy of the teleprinted O.R.S. (R) form – the information on this form, the additional data on raid reports and the details of combats, will enable Stations to draw their own conclusions. Finally, the Group Raid Assessment Report, the statistical Chart and track keeping diagram, furnish as complete a picture of each attack as is possible at the moment.
The consideration of the salient features of each assessment means that the plans for each subsequent attack can be more carefully prepared. Aerial warfare has now become a highly scientific affair, and as with all scientific ventures, rapid future progress depends on intelligent deductions from a fund of accurate and ‘up to date’ facts.
Aircrew will, therefore, realise that the navigational and other ‘gen’ which is collected from them at interrogation is not just another ‘bind’. This ‘gen’ is of the greatest importance, and must be given with the utmost accuracy which the conditions under which it is obtained permit.
GEE
Range on Gee increased on the raids towards the end of the month, particularly on the Berlin operation of January 30/31st when fixes were obtained of XF frequencies up to 8 E, with position lines still further. If this excellent reception continues, there should be a marked improvement in concentration and timing. With regard to position lines, these may be the means of keeping within the 10 mile band of concentration, particularly if the track runs parallel to the Gee lines, and Navigators should endeavour to make the utmost use of Position Lines wherever possible.
From reports sent in after each operation it appears that some navigators are relying solely upon the XF frequencies on the RF unit 25 and not attempting to use the RF unit 24. When reception fades on the unit 25 navigators should insert the Unit 24, and at least endeavour to find out whether reception is better on this or not.
Whilst the usual technical failures still occur due to deterioration of components, serviceability on the whole has been good, but unfortunately the odd manipulation fault crops up now and again, and every effort must be made by navigators, (particularly those on H2S Squadrons) to remain proficient in the operation of the set, and in the correction of simple faults. (See the Navigation Quiz).
With the introduction of miniature lattice charts, errors in the plotting and transferring of fixed should be reduced to the minimum. However, these charts do not cover certain areas and navigators must carry the large charts for those areas until miniatures are published.
It is hoped that a North Eastern chain will be available within a month, to cover the present blank areas of the Western North Sea.
[Boxed] [Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. J.H. Evans, D.F.C. – H.Q. No.5 Group to 49 Sqdn. as Flt. Commander.
S/Ldr. J. Vivian, D.S.O., D.F.C. – No. 57 Sqdn. to H.Q. No. 5 Group as Group Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. R.H. Schofield, (H2S Instructor) – H.Q. No. 5 Group to Fiskerton. (Stn.Navigation Officer)
F/O. W.T. Haxby, D.F.C. – 57 Sqdn.to H.Q. 5 Group (Radar Nav.)
F/Lt. P.F. Bailey. – 1661 C.U. to 619 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. P.M. Materkeyn – 93 Group to 44 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. B. Asson, D.F.C. – 44 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to 10 O.T.U.
F/Lt. M.J. Baud. – 207 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to SPILSBY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/Lt. W.M. Burnside, DFC. – No 5 LFS. (Sqdn Navigation Offr.) to BARDNEY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/O. Parker. 44 Sqdn. to 207 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/O. R.O. Beattie. 207 Sqdn. to 5 L.F.S. SYERSTON [/boxed]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
Navigation (Cont.)
H 2 S
Training on H 2 S has progressed satisfactorily during the month, but once again bad weather and cloud have prevented much blind bombing, and until this training is given, crews cannot be considered fully trained.
Serviceability during this month has been quite up to standard considering the difficulties of replacement and our main worry at the present time is failure due to bad manipulation. Failures such as these can only be overcome by constant practice both in the air and on the ground. Ground training is essential, and with Ground trainers now installed at 1660 and 1661 Con. Units, and 49 57 and 630 Squadrons, there should be less reason for manipulation failures in the future.
Intelligent use was made of the H 2 S in operations this month, and many operators are finding it a great help in avoiding defended areas. Navigational fixes are being obtained up to 40 and 50 miles by some operators, but still 17% of the fixes are wrongly taken or plotted. With the advent of broadcast W/Vs there is even greater need for accuracy in D.R. and the navigator must work in close co-operation with the Air Bomber if they wish to make the most of H 2 S.
A few simple rules such as the following should result in greater accuracy in navigation with H 2 S :-
(i) Pre-flight planning must be looked upon by the Navigator and Air Bomber as an essential part of the operation, and they must work in close conjunction with each other. The Navigator should point out to the Air Bomber all features from which fixes are likely to be required, and their Flight Plan E.T.A’s. The Air Bomber must draw in the tracks on a Mercator Plotting Chart, clearly ring all recommended H 2 S landmarks and mark in their Flight Plan E.T.A’s.
(ii) This close co-operation must be maintained in flight, and the Navigator must inform the Air Bomber from time to time of the aircraft’s D.R. position and alterations in E.T.A’s, which he must mark on his chart. The Air Bomber must be allowed time to take a fix and the Navigator must cross check all fixes used. To save time and unnecessary chatter over the inter-com. the Air Bomber could be taking fixes and entering them on a log form giving time, place, bearing and distance, or, the Bomb Aimer can make a track crawl on a chart of his own, so that the Navigator will be able to choose any suitable fix at any time.
Remember, it is the reliability of fixes that matters, not the quantity.
The reliability of H 2 S is dependent upon the accuracy of the D.R. Navigation, and conversely without frequent reliable fixes the D.R. becomes increasingly inaccurate. The H 2 S must, therefore, be used to increase the accuracy of the D.R. navigation.
GARDENING
On 5/6th January, 49 Squadron provided 6 aircraft fitted with special equipment, to plant vegetables in the approaches of SWINEMUNDE. This force was detached from the main stream (bound for STETTIN) close to the gardens, and re-joined shortly after planting. This operation was the first of its kind to be carried out entirely with special equipment, and one of the first from high altitude (12,000 feet). Five out of six aircraft planted successfully on a timed run from the pinpoint. The sixth was unable to pinpoint due to failure of special equipment and descended to the lowest permissible height as briefed; being still unable to pinpoint visually, due to cloud, the vegetables were correctly jettisoned in a previously ordered position. The importance of the sea routes here is their use for supplying the Russian front – and by the look of things on the Leningrad front – for repatriation purposes. There is every indication that the vegetables went into the right “hole”, but definite information on the results is hard to come by from such distant places.
The raising of the maximum height for dropping mines to 15,000 ft., has made gardening possible, with reasonable safety, in many areas hitherto immune, and where the presence of mines will present an even worse problem to the enemy than hitherto.
The Bombing Development Unit has carried out trials which prove conclusively that, contrary to expectation, the mine has an extremely consistent flight, and figures for drift due to wind have also been found.
Allowances for Forward Travel and drift due to wind can, therefore, easily be made.
The Command planted 1100 vegetables during the month – 3 Group were responsible for 833. Gardens visited were many and varied, the most densely sown being those off the ELBE, WESER, and EMS; KIEL BAY; the FRANCH COAST U-BOAT BASES.
-“Where angels fear to tread”
In seemly and imposing state, th’elect of God conferred,
The operations staff did hang upon their spoken word.
Save which, the room all silent was, and deathly as the tomb,
(Though sound of trotting horsed permeated through the room)
Tranquility [sic]was shattered as a vulgar voice did rant
“Connect me please with Swinderby, for Swinderby I pant”
The Lords of all creation ceased. A frozen silence fell;
The D.S.O. was seized, and cast into a dungeon cell.
And there without a trial doth the poor wretch meditate,
The sins of other people, for whose crimes he’ll meet his fate.
Let those who keep the watches now resolve they never will
Repeat th’offence, the cure for which is published in the drill.
ANON. CIRCA. 1944.
LINK TRAINER
[Table showing Link Trainer use by Squadron]
ASTRO COMPASS
The astro compass is a precision instrument for checking courses against any heavenly body. In this Command, however, it is rarely used, and even then only for sights on the Pole star.
The Astro compass in its present form is a precision and somewhat complicated instrument, and it is suggested that a much simpler instrument should serve the purpose equally well. This Headquarters is experimenting with a very simplified Astro Compass, and as soon as it is ready for trials, Squadrons will be informed and asked to give their criticisms.
The DR and P4 Compasses should be checked approximately every 15 minutes, and also after every major alteration of course. If these two compasses agree within 2 degrees, then it is not considered essential to check them by use of the Astro Compass. If however, they do not agree within these limits an immediate check should be made of the D.R. Repeaters and the Master Unit. If the compasses still disagree, then a check should be made to ascertain which is correct.
NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ
1. What is the safety height over :-
(a) North Yorkshire.
(b) S.W. England.
(c) Lincolnshire.
(d) West Scotland.
2. What M/F Sections would you use if you were approaching Cornwall (a) from the Wexford region, (b) from the Cherbourg region?
3. Which is the shortest distance from Berlin – Lincoln or Leningrad?
4. Assume your aircraft is engaged on a dinghy search. The W/Op receives an S.O.S. on 500 K/Cs. What immediate action should be taken by the Navigator.
5. If none of the 6 pin sockets on the V C P give a proper picture on the screen, two separate actions can be taken by the navigator. What are they? (N.B. The V.C.P. light is on all the time.)
6. What is the recommended method of search to be used when engaged on dinghy search?
Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
TRAINING ON SQUADRONS
Checks carried out recently reveal that the standard of knowledge on tactics and the corkscrew among Air Gunners is well below the high standard required. It would appear that insufficient time is being allocated to “vetting” air gunners on arrival, and ensuring that their knowledge is retained by constant practice and instruction. It is a simple matter to get the gunners together and hold a quiz on these subjects; naturally some will be on leave, others flying or sick, but if this is carried out regularly all the gunners will receive checks.
This check can be carried out whenever gunners have a few minutes to spare and requires no equipment. All that is required is to ensure that every gunner on every Squadron knows automatically the sequence of the corkscrew manoeuvre, the correct deflection and how to give a clear picture to the remainder of the crew of what is going on during an attack. Squadron Gunnery Leaders recently attended a two day course at R.A.E. Farnborough. This was primarily concerned with the function of ice in oxygen equipment, and should have been passed on to the gunners. It included quite a few valuable tips on the care of this equipment and how to keep it working in severe icing conditions.
FIGHTING CONTROL EXERCISE
An excellent scheme for carrying out the Fighting Control exercise at night on the ground is contained in the February issue of “TEE EMM”. It will be found on page 274; it requires little equipment and can be carried out on the aerodrome, and also gives good practice in night vision training.
10 DAY SIGHTING COURSE AT NO.1 A.A.S. MANBY
This course has recently been started with the object of providing expert sighting instructions, with particular emphasis on the assessment of Gyro films.
During the first few courses it was found that adjustments to the syllabus had to be made, and now the course has settled down to what might be termed an advanced sighting course; the subject is covered more thoroughly even than the C.G.S. course, and any prospective candidate should ensure that he has a thorough knowledge of the G2 notes, as a lack of preliminary knowledge has caused the downfall of several air gunners who have attended the course.
The vacancies on this course are very few, and only gunners who are keen on sighting and have already proved their worth as instructors, should be submitted.
FLYING CLOTHING FOR AIR GUNNERS
During the two-day course which the Gunnery Leaders attended at Farnborough, a discussion was held with the officers responsible for the design and production of clothing and oxygen equipment, and most interesting “gen” was obtained. Here are a few of the new items to be produced :-
New type Oxygen Mask (H) which is much smaller, lighter in weight, causes less obstruction to downward vision and houses a much smaller microphone.
(Continued in column 3)
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBATS – 155
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 K 2/3.1.44. ME.110
61 J 2/3.1.44. ME.210
207 D 5/6.1.44. JU. 88
49 U 5/6.1.44. ME.109
49 K 14/15.1.44. TE/EA
[Underlined] 463 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 W 21/22.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 T 28/29.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 467 T 30/31.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
44 U 30/31.1.44. ME.210
[Underlined] 50 X 30/31.1.44. TE/EA [/underlined]
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 O 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 L 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 V 1/2.1.44. JU. 88
44 A 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 R 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 M 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 G 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 K 2/3.1.44. Unidentified
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
49 H 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 P 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 467 C 5/6.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
106 V 5/6.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 R 5/6.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 J 14/15.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 F 14/15.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
49 M 14/15/.1.44. JU. 88
630 Z 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
44 L 14/15.1.44. ME.110
207 M 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
207 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190
49 H 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 9 T 21/22.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 G 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 J 21/22.1.44. ME.109
207 K 21/22.1.44. ME.210
207 K 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 K 21/22.1.44. ME.109
57 O 27/28.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 M 27/28.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
49 J 28/29.1.44. TE/EA
106 G 28/29.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 B 28/29.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
49 J 30/31.1.44. ME.110
DAMAGED (Continued)
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 L 30/31.1.44.JU.88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 D 30/31.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 P 30/31.1.44. ME.109
630 P 30/31.1.44. T/E
57 G 30/31.1.44. DO.217
All except G/106 28/29th and G/57 30/31st have been confirmed by Command.
OMITTED FROM LAST MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
44 Z 16/17.12.43. T/E E/A
(confirmed by Command)
The type “E” heated lining is to have more heating elements in the knees and seat, heated gloves are to have extra heating elements, and the high wattage socks to have the heating slightly reduced.
A new glove with all the heating elements in the back to give better grip and a more positive control over the equipment when handled with the gloves on, is on the way.
A silk glove, which has had the finger tips dipped in Latex to give a coating of rubber and enable even small articles to be picked up with ease, has been experimented with.
A flap has been attached to the neck of the flying helmet in order to exclude draught; this flap is made to go inside the flying suit and form a seal around the neck, which keeps the draught out and the heat in.
With the introduction of the new oxygen mask and microphone, the inter-com lead is taken round the back of the helmet, this making for more freedom of movement.
Production on the Taylor Suit has ceased but as there is still a large number in service, the new suit will not be seen for some time.
STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER
The first of these trainers to appear in the Group is being erected at Fiskerton and by the time this “News” reaches the Squadrons, it should be in working order. The trainer provides for deflection practice and range estimation, aircraft recognition, zone sightings and also produces tracer simulation. The trainer will shortly be adapted to take the Mark II Gyro Sight as 49 Squadron have been fortunate enough to be selected for the installation of this sight. The sight is similar to the one now in use as an assessor in the Group, but has a range component which enables the range to be fed into the sight by means of foot pedals operated by the gunner. It is a reflector sight with much improved dimming controls on the graticules; in short, all the gunner has to do is to make settings on the sight for height and airspeed, place the moving graticule on the target, estimate the range, and he cannot miss.
Considerable practice is required in the manipulation of this sight, and the free gunnery trainer has been installed for that purpose.
(Continued on page 13, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.18. JANUARY, 1944. PAGE 9.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
GUNS AND TURRETS
Guns freezing, combined with sluggish turrets, due to the extreme cold conditions experienced on operational sorties, sets a problem which is, at present, being tackled in several ways.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined] The exclusion of moisture from the moving portions will, it is considered, be ensured by the fitting of gun ejection slot seals which have been issued to all units in the Group.
There is little point in fitting ejection seals if guns are being tested or cocked after being fully loaded for operations, as the ejection seal will be broken. After the seal is broken, moist air entering the ejection slot is sure to freeze under certain conditions, and a cure for this cannot be found by the application of Anti-Freeze oils.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined] From reports received, turrets appear to give various troubles, when subjected to extreme cold. Various hydraulic media are being tried to overcome these troubles, but it is the Air Gunner who can tell the Armament Staff what actually happened.
First hand information from Air Gunners to their Gunnery Leaders or Armament Officers is of vital assistance in the investigation of all suspected freezing troubles. The Air Gunner is the man who experiences the trouble, and he is the only one who can give the required information on the actual failure and the conditions prevailing at the time. A remark made, and later entered on a combat report such as “Guns would not fire during combat”, does not help in any way.
An Armament representative is always present at Interrogation, and any information passed to him there and then will greatly assist the investigation to be carried out at once. This information will surely help to diagnose the cause of the trouble.
See to it, gunners, that you give full details of all troubles experienced with either guns or turrets, to your Gunnery Leader or Armament Officer. They cannot get a story from anyone but you. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU TELL THE ARMAMENT OFFICER. He cannot reproduce what you experienced under the same conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHIC FAILURE
A small percentage of photographic failures have, on investigation, been attributed to Armament causes. It was hoped that with the introduction of the Mk.111 fuse those failures, however small in number, would disappear. A very careful analysis of the film gives indication that a certain discrepancy exists between the timing of the camera control and the E.111 Fuse. The importance of setting this clockwork fuse correctly cannot be too strongly emphasised, and all Armament Officers can help stamp out this type of failure if they ensure that all fuses M.111 are set correctly.
NEAR ENOUGH IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH
Liaison between Armament and Photographic Sections is essential. Try it and see – who knows, it might reduce the number of failures all round, and so produce vitally important plottable pictures of the target area.
SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS
The preparation of the ever-faithful S.B C. has been, and still is, the immediate concern of all Armament Sections. To prepare the bomb load and bomb up aircraft for an operation is, with the S.B.C’s now available, a matter for organisation. Difficulty can, however, be experienced on the second day when these S.B.C’s have to be filled in the limited time available.
The introduction of Conveyor Rollers has undoubtedly relieved this arduous task, but there is still room for improvement. These rollers can be put to untold uses, and with this in mind, numerous schemes are at present undergoing trials, which will, if applied in the correct manner, enable bomb loads to be prepared for the second sortie in quick time.
Full details of these schemes will be distributed to all Units in the near future. When the new equipment is received it should be subjected to a fair trial according to storage conditions available.
BOMBING RANGES
The lighting of Targets at Wainfleet Bombing Range is causing grave concern, owing to the ingress of salt water into the electric light fittings. Every effort is being made to keep the targets serviceable for night use, but after high tides, faults appear which may, therefore, make it necessary on occasions to declare certain targets unserviceable.
Representatives have been made to obtain an improved type of electric light fitting. In the event of it becoming necessary, improvised lighting has been arranged at EPPERSTONE Range.
FENTON BOMBING RANGE
A further Bombing Range, to be known as Fenton, has been allotted to the Group, making five ranges in all. Work has already commenced on this range, and when complete it is to be administered by R.A.F. Station, WIGSLEY.
FLYING CONTROL
In the table below will be seen two average landing times. The first is calculated by dividing the total period occupied by landing, from first to last aircraft, by the number of aircraft landed. This does not take into account any allowance for the time when the circuit was empty. The adjusted time shows the nett period, that is with allowances made for spasmodic return of aircraft, and the final average is the average time per aircraft based on this adjusted time.
From these two averages can be seen that whereas most Stations have got accustomed to the circuit drill of the landing scheme, there is still scope for improvement in the arrival of aircraft at the airfield.
However, the averages of 3.49 and 2.66 indicate that all Stations have really got down to the problem of landing aircraft quickly, and from reports to hand, it is encouraging to note that the scheme has met with the full approval of the aircrew. Some Stations who, at present, house only one Squadron, are not giving the results they might; this would seem to be an indication that on account of the limited number of
(continued on page 12, Col. 3)
JANUARY LANDING TIMES
[Table showing the Number of aircraft, Time, Average, Adjusted Time and Average by Station]
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Gun Turret Failures and Bombing Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
SPORTS
[Cartoons]
FOOTBALL – THE MATZ CUP
The first round of this annual knock-out is now complete, except for one match, Strubby v Scampton. In the Preliminary Round, Waddington held Scampton to “2 all”, but lost the replay. Without being too partisan, may we wish good luck to the Strubby “giant killers”.
PRELIMINARY ROUND
WADDINGTON 2 SCAMPTON 2
WADDINGTON 0 SCAMPTON 2
(re-play)
ROUND ONE
WINTHORPE 1 SYERSTON 0
WIGSLEY 0 SWINDERBY 11
BARDNEY 0 METHERINGHAM 10
DUNHOLME 2 FISKERTON 0
WOODHALL SPA 1 CONINGSBY 3
SPILSBY 2 EAST KIRKBY 3
SKELLINGTHORPE 3 H.Q. 5 GROUP 1
Scampton are again holding second place in the Lincoln League, Division 1, having won 7 out of 9 games. They were runners up in the League last year, and winners of the Matz Trophy – a fine record.
Dunholme had a busy soccer month, winning four out of five games, in addition to their Matz Cup game with Fiskerton.
Syerston, like Scampton, are all out for the Newark and District League championship. They have, to date, won six out of seven games. Intersection competition produced 12 matches during the month.
Skellingthorpe and Bardney have been busy with both inter-section games and weekly Station matches.
Metheringham lost only one out of four station games, and in inter-section matches, Squadron Armoury won all their games decisively.
Coningsby soccer has been notable for a duel between 619 and 61 Squadrons. Each Squadron has won one game each and the decider should be a real blood match.
Swinderby Station team won four out of five games, losing to O.C.T.U. Newark. Judging from their Matz Cup score, they have some big guns in the forward line.
Winthorpe had four Station games, and were unlucky to win only one, but although losing 5 – 2 to Syerston, they pulled off the Matz Cup game. There was much inter-section activity.
Wigsley were unlucky to have two Station games cancelled. Of the remaining two, they won one and lost one. The R.A.F. Regiment had several games in the inter-section matches.
RUGGER
LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE COMPETITION
It has unfortunately proved impossible to complete the squadrons knock-out phase of this competition by January 31st. To date, only 9 Squadron have completed their finals, F/Lt. Hadland’s crew beating P/O. Glover’s crew in the final by 11 – 3. Nineteen teams took part in the competition. Within 53 Base alone, 61 matches have been played and the competition has become increasingly popular as it has progressed. All squadrons are urged to play off their matches as early as possible, so that the date for the Inter-Unit competition can be re-arranged. There will be some magnificent rugger in the final games, so get cracking squadrons, so we can arrange the big play off.
Syerston Rugger side is now considerably stronger than its early season form, and won three out of four games during the month.
Metheringham played two games, beating Bardney, and losing to 7 K.O.S.B.
Coningsby beat the 9th Field Regt. R.E.D., and the S. Staffs. Regiment in no uncertain manner.
Swinderby suffered their second defeat of the season against R.C.A.F. Digby, losing 6 – 0. Several Canadian Football mannerisms crept into the game, such as the referee putting the ball into the scrum, players “blocking” their opponents, and an occasional forward throw. All of which served to fox the Swinderby team.
Winthorpe lost to Syerston, but beat both 93 M. U. and Newark R. F. C. The Winthorpe pitch has, unfortunately, been “put to the plough”, necessitating all away matches.
HOCKEY
Swinderby can put out a very strong team, and only failed to win one game, which they drew with O.C.T.U. Newark, 4 – 4.
Syerston played 7 games in all, including two mixed and two all W.A.A.F. games, winning six of them.
Coningsby played four Station games, of which they won one.
Scampton, Metheringham, Winthorpe and Wigsley, all had Station matches. Metheringham hope to have their new hockey pitch ready in a few days.
H.Q.5 Group played its first match (mixed) against Syerston on February 6th, losing 2 – 1 a very promising start for a team that has only a half-sized pitch to practice on, until permission is obtained to fell a few trees.
It is hoped to promote a Group mixed Hockey knock-out in the very near future.
CROSS-COUNTRY
Wigsley, Skellingthorpe, Dunholme Lodge and Coningsby have all had successful runs during the month. 619 Squadron took over a hundred bodies about four miles from the camp by coach and released them. S/Ldr. Churcher was first man home. Feeling fit and frisky after their first gamble, 619 now challenge all cross country teams to battle.
SWIMMING
The stations around Lincoln make good use of the baths, and it should be possible to promote an interesting gala.
FISHING
Syerston has a thriving Anglers’ Club with facilities in the River Trent and in the lake at Flintham Hall. The club boasts over 40 “line shooters”. Other Stations please note. (What about a Strubby Wild Fowlers’ Society?)
MINOR GAMES
A most popular game at Bardney is Skittle Ball, played daily inside or outside the Maintenance Hangar at Tea Van time. A P. T. I. arrives with the van, and the fun begins. 20 – 40 men take part, and it is a most enjoyable and stimulating way of spending break.
It is regretted that some Station Sports summaries are not to hand for inclusion in the News, and it is requested that all Stations will despatch their summaries to reach H.Q. within two days of the end of the month.
TRAINING
STIRLING TRAINED CREWS GOING TO SQUADRONS
The first of the Stirling trained Conversion Unit crews went to Squadrons by way of 5 L. F. S. during the month, and the new training policy is now in full swing. A total of 35 crews were posted to Squadrons from 51 Base in January. 45 crews went from Conversion Units to No.5 L.F.S.
The weather was fairly good, and had no great adverse effect on flying, but many unfamiliar technical snags with the Stirling had to be overcome. Serviceability was affected by the carrying out of Acceptance Checks, but these have now been nearly completed, and improved serviceability is expected during the coming month.
Three fatal accidents, involving Stirling aircraft at night, are at present under investigation. Two occurred during Bullseye Exercises, and one during local night flying.
The standard of crews coming from O.T.U’s was maintained. High Level bombing training was very much improved throughout 51 Base, and heights up to 20,000 feet were recorded on night details. H 2 S training suffered owing to an initial shortage of instructors. The aircraft position earlier in the month was also acute, and H 2 S aircraft were being employed on normal training commitments.
The majority of the Squadron crews attached to No. 5 L.F.S. for a short refresher course during the month, completed the syllabus despite some restrictions by weather, and much valuable information was obtained from this mid-tour check.
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD)
There are, however, a few entries on the other side of this month’s balance sheet, such as the two Wireless Operators who, on the night 27/28th January, when briefed to use M/F D/F Section “N” on return from operations, obtained LINE BEARINGS from Hull and Heston. The question arises, what were the Captains and Navigators doing to allow the Wireless Operators to be so dim? Then there is the Wireless Operator who, when sending an early return message, spelt the word STARBD in Bomber Code, when there exists a code group for the word. When questioned, he admitted that he “was in a bit of a spin”. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened to any of these Wireless Operators AND THEIR CREWS (Captains please note), had they been in the position in which Sgt. Barnes Moss found himself, and confronted with a big job to do. Consider then, and note well, ye who do wear the badge of Sparks, that when trouble cometh, it doth not come after friendlie warning, but is swift and sudden, and never forget – it might be YOU.
Now let us consider the question of the Wireless Operator being in the astrodome over the target area. It is difficult to see any advantage that captains gain by having him there. In fact, if they take care to study a few facts, they will see that placing the Wireless Operator in the astrodome only gives a false sense of security and endangers [underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined]
Firstly, the Wireless Operator has very little night vision, having been employed during the three hours previous in gazing at a cathode ray tube or magic eye. Just ask yourselves how you feel when emerging from a cinema into the night –“Hell, I can’t see a thing”. Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that if your Wireless Operator is off Tinsel, one of your own aircraft may be shot down by an enemy night fighter free to operate because you have cleared the obstacle out of his path. Thirdly, the majority, but not all, of the Wireless Operators in astrodome incidents, come from squadrons fitted with Monica III, where the operator would see a fighter so much plainer on the CRT than in the flesh, in spite of all the blips made by friendly aircraft. Captains who make a habit of doing this are invited to reconsider their views in the light of the above remarks.
MOVEMENTS FOR JANUARY
F/Lt. Andrews, No.467 Squadron, has completed No.4 Signals Leaders Course, and is to be congratulated on being the first Signals Leader in this Group to obtain an “A” categorisation.
F/O. Rademeyer has taken the post of Signals Leader with No. 44 Squadron, F/Lt. Barrett having completed his operational tour.
P/O’s. Worthington, Thomas and Freeman should now be installed, and working to full pressure as Fishpond Instructors at East Kirkby, Fiskerton and Metheringham respectively, and Squadrons are invited to make full use of their services.
The visits to O.T.U. by Signals Leaders are in full swing, and squadrons should benefit from the move at a later date.
Now, here is an open invitation for any Signals Leader, Deputy Signals Leader or Wireless Operator (Air) to visit the W/T cabin at this Headquarters on an operational night. The only thing you need to do to take advantage of this offer, is to give a few hours notice on the telephone (extension 54).
TACTICS
EFFECT OF WINDOW AND COUNTERMEASURES
The enemy G. C. I. system continues to be subdued by Window. To retain maximum effect, however, there must be no slacking off in the rates of dropping. The times and rates of dropping laid down for each operation must be rigidly adhered to, and Window dropping must never be regarded as just another ‘bind’. These rates have been carefully calculated, and the individual who is “too lazy” or “forgets” is jeopardising not only his own safety, but that of the whole force. The Window dropper’s slogan must be “Not too much, not too little…..”
It is interesting to study the development of the enemy’s reaction to Window, and the results of our countermeasures over the past few months. That the highly mobile fighter force controlled by HF and V.H.F./RT, organised after the initial success of Window, could be a serious menace, was soon appreciated by the planning staff, who set to work to devise new tactics. As this fighter force was being directed to target areas being attacked, the first essential was to delude the enemy as to the areas to be attacked. Spoof attacks by Mosquitoes and small forces of “heavies” were attempted, and the main force was routed to within 20-30 miles of defended areas before turning to attack another target. These spoof attacks and feints have undoubtedly drawn a number of fighters away from the main targets. A more recent attempt at delusion was to move the whole force by ordering all aircraft to alter course simultaneously at a predetermined time, so as to displace the main stream suddenly. The unprecedented manoeuvre undoubtedly upset the enemy controllers’ calculations.
Not the least important of our countermeasures are the radio jamming devices. These are many and varied, and have produced very marked results. Special Tinsel is rated highly amongst the successful jamming devices, thus Wireless Operators must comply with Tinselling instructions on all occasions. Information on the work of the Radio Countermeasures Group must obviously be guarded, but a report on the results achieved by Ground Cigar, Ground Grocer, Corona and other H.F. and VHF. countermeasure schemes, is set out in a paper BC/S.31009/Sigs., dated 3rd February, 1944, “Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command”. Aircrew should read this report, which is available in all Intelligence libraries. The extract quoted below is typical of the confusion that arises, and shows the measure of success achieved. In fact, jamming has been so complete as to force the enemy to use his National Broadcast wavelengths to get orders through to his fighters. This new step should present no difficulty to our Countermeasure Experts, who are continually a step ahead of the enemy in radio jamming.
[Underlined] “Corona (HF) [/underlined]
This countermeasure continues to annoy the enemy Controllers and harass their pilots, and on occasion has been known to lead to unprintable ruderies being addressed to the efficient young W.A.A.F. officer who frequently plays the controller’s part for us. However, one of the methods of judging the success of Corona is by noting the enemy controller’s reaction to it over the air, and it is considered an unsuccessful night if we do not succeed in drawing at least one crack which is worth recording in the line book.”
TAIL WARMING DEVICES
With the advent of Monica IIIA and Fishpond, the duties of Wireless Operator have been still further extended. It is unfortunate that the sole attention of a crew member cannot be diverted to these devices, but for the moment the Wireless Operator has under his control something which, when properly used, can have immeasurable success against enemy fighters. A high degree of training in the manipulation of the set and interpretation of the P.P.I. and cathode tubes, is called for, and a drive must be made for the Wireless Operators to have as much air practice as possible with the sets.
MONICA IIIA
Several squadrons have now had experience with Monica IIIA, and have proved that for the set to be of any value at all, certain factors are essential. A detailed knowledge by the Wireless Operator of the suppression and gain settings to give well defined blips which can be followed in to a minimum of 250 yards range, a standard reporting patter by the Wireless Operator, and a knowledge of the interpretation of blips by pilots and gunners so that there is perfect crew co-operation whenever an enemy blip is sighted. The exact procedure for using Monica IIIA is set out in an instruction which is available in all Signals Leaders’ Offices. Gunners, pilots and Wireless Operators should be given an opportunity of reading this instruction.
FISHPOND
57 Squadron, from an investigation into Fishpond results, estimate that out of 80 Fishpond sorties, 9 combats have been avoided by utilising the early warning given by Fishpond. Their knowledge and experience will shortly be made available to other Fishpond Squadrons in the form of a tactics instruction. To get a good P.P.I. picture, liaison between Wireless Operator and H 2 S operator is essential, as is also a knowledge by the Wireless Operator of H 2 S manipulation and P.P.I. settings. Captains must remember that Fishpond does not record fighters attacking from above, and should therefore see that their gunners never relax the normal crew search procedure.
[Underlined] Continued from page 10, col.1) [/underlined]
aircraft no great need for quick landing is felt. Those Stations should remember that a second Squadron is always liable to be posted in at very short notice when, under these conditions, the average landing time of two minutes per aircraft, for between 30 and 40 aircraft, would be a godsend.
The Landing Board, originally designed by R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, has been improved on by many Stations in the Group. It is gratifying to note that new suggestions and modifications are continually being submitted. They are a big help, let’s have more of them.
No. 5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 12.
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
[Drawing]
HEADQUARTERS NO. 5 GROUP
A/Cdre. H.V. SATTERLY, D.F.C. C.B.E.
HEADQUARTERS NO. 53 BASE
A/Cdre. A. HESKETH, O.B.E., D.F.C. C.B.E.
R.A.F. STATION, SCAMPTON
F/O. C.F. GIBSON. M.B.E.
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. GLOVER. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. A. LYNCH, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. K.L. HOWARD. D.F.M.
F/O. E. MERCER. D.F.C.
P/O. A. WRIGHT. D.F.C.
P/O. V.D. PURVIS. D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. J.G.DAY. D.S.O.
Sgt. A.E. KEELING. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
A/F/Lt. G.H. LAING. D.F.C.
F/O. W.T. HAXBY. D.F.C.
61 SQUADRON
F/O. J.W. EINARSON, D.F.M. D.F.C.
W/Cdr. R.M. STIDOLPH. D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
P/O. D.C. HARVEY. D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
F/O. N.E. WESTERGAARD. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.E. BROOKES. D.F.M.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/Lt. C.J. BRAIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
9 SQUADRON (Contd.)
P/O. R.W. CORKHILL. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
P/O. R.L. ASH. D.F.C.
F/O. C.R. SAVAGE. D.F.C.
F/Lt. B. ASSON. D.F.C.
Sgt. L. UNWIN. D.F.M.
F/Lt. D.A. BARRETT. D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
A/S/L/ W.F. PARKS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
Sgt. J.E. HEATH D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.W. THOMPSON. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.R. POLLOCK. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. JOSLING. D.F.C.
P/O. S.G. TOWNSEND. D.F.C.
P/O. A.R. KNOWLES. D.F.C.
F/O. R. McROBBIE. D.F.C.
P/O. R.J. GOOCH. D.F.C.
P/O. J.A. KIMBER. D.F.C.
P/O. E.J. HOWES. D.F.C.
P/O. F. NORTHCLIFFE. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.B. HUGHES. D.F.M.
P/O. W.H. SIDDONS. D.F.C.
Sgt. D.J. GRIFFITH. D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
A/S/L. E.A. BENJAMIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.F. EMERSON. D.F.M.
106 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. R.E. BAXTER. D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
Sgt. T. GEDLING. D.F.M.
F/O. J.E.F. MITCHELL. D.F.C.
P/O. J. KIRKWOOD. D.F.C.
W/O. H.F. CONELLY. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.C. METCALFE. D.F.M.
619 SQUADRON
P/O. T.A. PEATFIELD. D.F.C.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J. SIMKIN. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.T. PAGE. D.F.M.
[Page break]
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
[Tables of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Total] 25 18 5 26
WAR SAVINGS
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved. £. s. d.
H.Q. (UNIT) 5 GROUP 51.4 10.0 95. 7. 6.
£2935.2.0.
[Page break]
GUNNERY (CONTD)
(Continued from page 9, col.3)
Now 49 Air Gunners, this is the biggest thing that has hit gunnery in 25 years, and it is up to you to take every opportunity of make for 100% proficiency in the use of this new equipment. Great things will be expected from you, losses should go down and E/A destroyed go up; so go to it, and make the life of the Hun fighter short and sweet!
CENTRAL GUNNERY SCHOOL RESULTS
No. 72 COURSE
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit. Category. Exam. Results. [/underlined]
P/O. Gross “B” 90.4%
Results of No. 73 Course not yet to hand.
SQUADRON AND FLIGHT GUNNERY LEADERS
Below is a list of Squadron and Flight Gunnery Leaders at present in Squadrons and Conversion Units.
44 Squadron F/Lt. McCurdy
F/O. Neison
49 Squadron F/Lt. Cork
F/O. Hamilton
463 Squadron F/Lt. Moorhead
F/O. Kirkpatrick
467 Squadron F/Lt. Nordon-Hare
9 Squadron F/Lt. Armstrong
50 Squadron F/Lt. Gray
P/O. Beale
619 Squadron F/Lt. Howard
P/O. Hammond
61 Squadron F/Lt. Breakey
617 Squadron F/Lt. Rodger
F/O. Buckley
F/O. Chandler
106 Squadron F/Lt. Sullivan
630 Squadron F/Lt. Stead
57 Squadron F/Lt. Taylor
F/O. Ward
207 Squadron F/O. Moore
F/O. Harper
1485 Gunnery Flight S/Ldr. Undery
F/Lt. Leonard
F/O. Mills
1660 Con.Unit F/Lt. Clark
P/O. Gross
1661 Con.Unit F/Lt. Gray
1654 Con.Unit F/Lt. Hoad
F/O. Simister
No. 5 L.F.S. F/Lt. Cass
P/O. Black
Aircrew School SCAMPTON F/Lt. Patten
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
On taking an analysis of a large number of flight engineers logs a considerable discrepancy has been noticed between the fuel consumption of different aircraft. This discrepancy is not due to the varying consumptions inherent in the engines of any particular aircraft. In most cases where an aircraft has had a high fuel consumption on a specific operation, the subsequent operation with a different crew proves that this aircraft has a low consumption. This all points to manipulation.
There are many cases where far too high revs are used at too low a boost and it is apparent that many flight engineers are not paying sufficient attention to the boost and revs required for the most economical conditions.
It is not economical above full throttle height and boost below E.C.B. to reduce I.A.S. by throttle manipulation. I.A.S. should be controlled on propellor speed only, and if you are at an altitude where the ‘S’ blower is in operation, by controlling I.A.S. on the throttles you are merely strangling your engine. To quote one instance, an extract from one flight engineer’s log shows that 2850 r.p.m. was used at + 2 lbs boost at 15,000 feet in ‘S’ gear. This is an obvious case of engine strangling, and had the throttles been open to + 4 boost E.C.B. to take full advantage of the engine power available at that altitude, then the r.p.m. could have been cut down to maintain the required I.A.S. with the resultant decrease in fuel consumption. The consumption in the particular case quoted averaged 66 gallons per hour per engine which speaks for itself. Flight Engineer Leaders must bring home by means of lectures to their flight engineers instances such as this. Such manipulation may cost you an aircraft and maybe the crew, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the fuel consumption of a Lancaster is in the hands of the flight engineer, and where the flight engineer knows that incorrect revs and boost are being used for any specific condition, then he should advise the pilot accordingly; if this advice is ignored, the cause of the high fuel consumption should be reported on return. Many more instances such as that quoted have been found, and space does not allow to quote them all. Efforts are being made at this Headquarters to find other reasons for high consumption in each case, but so far high consumptions have been caused solely by incorrect engine manipulation.
EARLY RETURNS
In The case of an oil pressure gauge failure which causes quite a few early returns, this can be diagnosed quite easily. If the oil pressure drops off suddenly, and coolant and oil temperatures remain normal, the oil temperature should be watched closely, and if this remains normal, together with the coolant temperature the gauge is definitely suspect. Flight engineers should watch this sort of thing and advise the pilot accordingly.
Many early returns are caused by so called generator failure, and the following notes will be of interest to all flight engineers, and should go a long way to preventing unnecessary early returns due to this fault. These notes will be circulated separately to flight engineers.
1. [Underlined] The Voltmeter [/underlined] is the most important of the three instruments on the main control panel. In flight it normally indicates between 27 – 29 volts.
2. The Ammeters merely indicate how the generators are sharing the load, and as long as they both give a positive reading, even though unbalanced, the circuit is O.K. (i.e. +55 and +5). If the degree of unbalance is above 15 amps this matter must be reported to the Electrical Officer.
3. If one of the ammeters shows a negative reading, i.e. a discharge”, then before switching off one of the generators, reference must be made to the voltmeter. If the voltmeter reads 29 volts or under, switch off the generator giving the negative reading. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts, switch off the generator giving the positive reading.
4. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts the accumulators are being overcharged. In this case switch off the generator showing the higher current. If the voltmeter still indicates over 29 volts switch off the other generator and all non-essential loads to conserve the accumulators. The pressure head heater [underlined] must [/underlined] remain ‘ON’. After a short time, say 5 minutes, [underlined] one [/underlined] generator, preferably the one giving the lower reading, may be switched ‘ON’ again, but a careful check must be kept on the voltmeter. Both generators must [underlined] not [/underlined] be switched ‘ON’ again after they have been switched ‘OFF’.
5. [Underlined] Never [/underlined] disconnect the cables from the accumulator in flight, otherwise it may cause an explosion. If the accumulators become overheated and are gassing excessively, turn the “Ground-Flight” switch to “Ground”.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, col.3) [/underlined]
from service sources does not appear to fulfil our requirements. Coningsby has produced a most useful piece of apparatus, and details of it will be circulated to other Bases and Stations. It will be to the advantage of Electrical Officers of other Units if they pay a personal visit to Coningsby to see this test rig for themselves. Further, it is suggested that visits to other Stations will enable the best ideas to be incorporated in all instrument and electrical sections. So far as is known, the many excellent schemes which have been produced by local initiative have not been patented.
In the last month the incidence of oxygen failure has increased, but in many cases no technical fault has been found. This indicates that more “gen” in the use of oxygen must be passed on by Electrical Officers to members of aircrew. The introduction of the microphone heater and the Mk.I jet has produced very favourable results, and steps have been taken to obtain further supplies of heaters for the use of all gunners.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table showing the serviceability of aircraft by Conversion Unit and Lancaster aircraft]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
Look after your ‘K’ type dinghies, you may find them very useful one day – F/Sgt. Groves of 50 Squadron did, on the night 29/30th December. The aircraft of which he was rear gunner had been damaged on operations. The pilot could not close the bomb doors, and due to lack of petrol the captain of the aircraft, while still over the sea, was forced to decide whether to ditch the aircraft or to bale out his crew. The captain eventually had to give the order to bale out using ‘K’ dinghies, having first sent out an S.O.S. and received fixes.
F/Sgt. Grove was the first out of the aircraft and the only one saved. The indications are that at least one other member of the crew was prepared to abandon the aircraft but no more was seen or heard of the crew or the aircraft after F/Sgt. Groves had left. F/Sgt. Groves suffered considerably from exposure while in his ‘K’ dinghy, but has since recovered.
It is possible to ditch an aircraft with open bomb doors, and it has been successfully accomplished on more than one occasion. In any case the doors are liable to collapse on impact with the water, and where this has happened, crews have managed to clear the aircraft without too much trouble. While no blame is attached to the pilot of this particular aircraft, this fact should be borne in mind, and pilots should resort to the ‘K’ type dinghy only as a last resort – e.g. should the aircraft be on fire, or in danger of breaking up in the air.
Successful ditchings, in seemingly impossible sea and weather conditions have shown that, provided you have practiced your emergency procedure and dinghy drills you should have no worry in making the decision to ditch. The days are over when a successful ditching was something to be marvelled at. To-day they are a common occurrence, and experience has shown that ignorance and stupidity are to blame in almost every case of failure.
A summary of Air Sea Rescue incidents for the six month ending 31st December, 1943, show that of a total of 3271 aircrew involved, 1,078 were rescued and brought back to England; most of the remainder fared as
(continued on page 2, col 2)
ENGINEERING
The operational effort for January was very high considering the bad weather periods which were encountered during the month. The squadrons were all down in aircraft strength, but in spite of this a high total was achieved; this, of course, was only possible by many squadrons operating 100% each night. With the man power shortage it requires very hard work and long hours to maintain this effort, and now that squadrons are almost up to full strength on the new establishment, the load will be even heavier. Due, however, to the efforts of the ground crews, February should see the biggest effort ever put out from this Group.
No.54 Base, Coningsby, which formed on 1st January, 1944, is already making itself felt as a formidable and efficient formation. There is still much to do to bring the various sections up to the peak of perfection, but as these were started on sound lines, there is no doubt of their ultimate efficiency.
All operational bases and R. & I. sections have been kept extremely busy on acceptance checks recently, and as a result certain other work has had to be left. This is only a passing phase, and it is hoped that once the squadrons are up to full strength, the task will be easier by dealing with the normal replacements. The many high speed enemy action repairs which have been carried out in time to get aircraft ready for ops on the second night, including many power plant changes, which are carried out immediately the aircraft lands during the night, are so numerous that it is difficult to single out individuals for praise; it all points to the splendid morale and staying powers of the ground crews.
There are many early returns and cancellations which could be avoided and Engineer Officers must keep on with the drive to eliminate these entirely, as far as is humanly possible; they are responsible for the non-delivery of a very large tonnage of bombs when calculated over a month.
The number of failures of exhaust studs has been considerably reduced where 3.5% Nickel steel studs have been fitted, and results so far are very pleasing. When further experience has been gained it is hoped to go over to this kind of stud completely.
The introduction of the 30 lbs pressure type relief valve on the header tank in place of the thermostatic valve is gradually taking place throughout the Group, and a marked improvement is noticed by the smaller number of failures due to engines being “cooked”.
WEIGHT SHEET SUMMARIES
A new weight sheet summary as applicable to 5 Group has been issued to all Bases. Stations and Squadrons, and the use of this with the bomb load chart which accompanied it should dispel any further doubts as to what can and what cannot be carried at an all-up weight of 65,000 lbs.
CONVERSION UNITS AND NO.5 L.F.S.
The Conversion Units commenced a Stirling programme early in the month, and although the results of the first month’s work were good and called for a colossal amount of work, it is anticipated that with certain improvements, the February figures will be much higher. Great credit is due to the C.T.O’s and men under them, who have tackled this task and overcome their setbacks in an admirable manner. The programme which has been set for No. 5 L. F. S. calls for good organisation and planning on the technical side, and so far the job has been done well.
FLIGHT ENGINEER LEADER
A very necessary addition to the Group Headquarters staff is the establishment of a Flight Engineer Leader. This post has been filled by F/Lt. Gottwaltz, and Base Engineers and C. T. O.’s are requested to afford him every facility to assist in attempting to solve the carrying fuel consumption problem. A column elsewhere in this News has been allocated to Flight Engineers.
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS
It is most important the Command Modification No. 57 is completed on all aircraft fitted with A.P.I. and A.M.U. at the earliest opportunity, to eliminate errors due to inefficient cooling.
The test rig for the instruments issued
(continued on page 13, col.3 )
WAR EFFORT
[Table containing details by Squadron of averages and numbers of sorties, tonnage dropped, operational hours and losses as well as ratings]
ORDER OF MERIT IN THE FOREGOING TABLE IS BASED ON THE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED PER AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON CHARGE
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944.
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V Group News, January 1944
5 Group News, January 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 18, January 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, tactics, sports and operations.
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1944-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-22 jan 44
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
Germany
England--Lincolnshire
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1944-01
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
ground personnel
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
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Base Commander.
Base Int: [Stamp]
MARCH * 1944* CONFIDENTIAL * NO * 20
V GROUP NEWS V
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
March proved a record month for 5 Group, with a total of 1720 aircraft despatched, and a bomb load of 7200 tons. The month also showed a lower figure for early returns at 4.01%, and a missing rate well below the average for the past six months.
Outstanding during the month were the series of attacks on small targets, by individual Bases. These were well undertaken and caused much damage to the French aircraft industry, which is engaged on sub-contracting and repair work for the G.A.F. – work which is of increasing importance as the major factories in Germany are obliterated by the U.S. .A.F.
These attacks call for exact marking, accurate bombing and good signals communications. Much training is still necessary before every operation runs smoothly and can be undertaken with equal success on dark nights, by the aid of flares instead of the moon. That such attacks are possible is shown by the success achieved by No. 617 Squadron, who in this respect are acting as pioneers and gaining invaluable experience of a type of attack which is of growing importance.
The success which this Squadron has achieved was rewarded by a special visit from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the United States Strategic Air Forces, and General Doolittle, Commanding the 8th Bomber Force, who came to see for themselves the methods which are employed.
Further evidence of the wide interest which is being taken in these attacks can be found in the Air Intelligence Summary of the United States Strategic Forces in Europe, for the week ending April 2nd.
An article headed “R.A.F. Precision Attacks by Night”, after describing the results of many of the recent attacks, including those undertaken by all squadrons in this Group, continues as follows:-
“Relatively small formations of Lancasters, manned by experienced and carefully trained crews, are responsible for the success of these missions, an outstanding feature of which has been the economy of force used to produce the desired result. Expert navigation followed by pin point marking of the target by a single aircraft at low level, has permitted visual bombing with a precision comparable to the best results obtained in daylight.”
This praise, coming from the United States Air Force, is indeed welcome, for we recognise the magnificent results which they are achieving by day. If we think that precision bombing by night is not only possible, but in some respects easier than precision bombing by day, as well as being more economical, it is up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that our conviction is right by the only valid method – that of results. I hope that during April we shall have an opportunity of gaining further experience and providing further proof of what can be done.
With so much activity in front of the Group a heavier load than ever will be placed on the Training Base. It is going to be hard work for everyone, but it is only through their efforts that we have been able to carry out these damaging attacks. I congratulate all ranks in the Base on having achieved the full planned output of crews throughout the winter months, in spite of great difficulties of weather and an unexpected change in the type of aircraft used for conversion training. The requirements from now on are for the maximum number of crews who can be trained with the available resources.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION
For the first two years of the war, the policy of operational navigation was controlled by individual Station and Squadron Commanders. Routeing, timing, heights to fly and recommendations of the best Navigational aids then available were decided locally.
As the Command effort increased, and the enemy night defences grew stronger, it became necessary to route aircraft in concentration; thus, routeing was taken over by Bomber Command. The concentration achieved was still poor, however. There were several contributory factors:-
(i) Lack of Navigational aids which would enable all aircraft to establish their positions when over enemy territory.
(ii) Inaccurate flying of courses by Pilots due to weaving, evasive action, etc.
(iii) Inaccuracies in calculations and computations by navigators.
(iv) Due to the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, the inability of the Navigator to determine the correct wind velocities.
A concentrated drive was then made to remove these shortcomings. Gee, and later H.2.S. was introduced to enable Navigators to determine their position over enemy territory. The introduction of the A.P.I. which maintains an accurate air plot, gave the Navigator a method of recording inaccuracies of the aircraft and of the pilot which would normally pass unnoticed. Weaving was forbidden. More attention during the Navigator’s training, was given to computations and the elimination of careless mathematical errors.
H 2 S and the A.P.I., however, were not available to the entire force, and the average Navigator was still unable to determine correct wind velocities. An analysis of many raids proved that a certain number of experienced Navigators, with the required aids, could find accurate winds, and it was decided to let the whole force benefit by the experience and capabilities of these crews. The scheme was pioneered by this Group on several occasions, and the results were very successful. It was then adopted by Bomber Command for general use. The procedure is as follows
15/25 crews from each Group flying in aircraft equipped with H 2 S and A.P.I. are detailed as “wind finders”. The Navigators of these aircraft obtain wind velocity checks as often as possible, and transmit to Base all wind velocities found.
Before the operation, the Senior Met. Officer at Group prepares a chart illustrating the route, the meridian code and the estimated position of aircraft at broadcast times. Attached to this chart is a list of the wind finding aircraft. As each wind is received, it is entered in the column allotted to the particular aircraft.
The wind signals from aircraft are intercepted at Group Headquarters by the Signals Section, who keep a monitoring watch on all Base frequencies. From the time of breaking enemy R.D.F. cover, signals runners are constantly employed delivering wind messages to the Met. Office.
There is a hook up between all Group Met. Sections within the Command, and winds received from the entire force are collated. The Met. Officer sits with one eye on his chart and one eye on the clock, and five minutes before the next broadcast is due, a forecast wind is issued, and, if necessary, a corrected past wind.
As the raid progresses, and the chart fills up, so the look of satisfaction grows on the Senior Met. Officer’s face. Sometimes there are blanks when aircraft cannot obtain a wind velocity check, due to u/s equipment, or because aircraft have returned early. At other times a wind velocity obtained is not transmitted by the aircraft until long after it has left the area to which the wind velocity applies. In both instances, this gives the Met. Staff so much less information on which to base their corrections and forecasts. There have been instances when they have had no more than two or three wind velocities over a detailed area, and even then there have been large discrepancies. A good example is the Berlin raid of 24/25 March, 1944, when only 9 wind velocities were received, homeward bound, from the target to the enemy coast – 2 1/4 hours flying! In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult to give you accurate forecast winds. Crews now realise how important it is to obtain as many wind velocity checks as possible, and pass them to Base immediately. Even if the wind velocity obtained differs considerably from the forecast on the Form 2330, then providing you are confident of the fix used, send back the w/v you have found. If you have “boobed”, then the Met. Staff can, and will, see this, and no harm will be done. There will be no “strips” for the crew concerned. If, however, you obtain a w/v and [underlined] DO NOT [/underlined] send it back, then you are withholding vital information which may affect the safety of the whole Bomber Force, including your own.
The Group Met. Staff have had considerable experience of this scheme, and they are getting to know the various windfinders. One often hears a remark in the Met. Office “Old Snooks is flying in “F”57 tonight, we shall get some reliable winds from him” – and they do!! They know that each wind “Old Snooks” sends back will be reliable, and his messages are greatly treasured.
A Navigator is employed in the Met. Office whose duty it was in the past, to present to the Air Staff the effect of the corrected w/v’s on track and time keeping, and whether aircraft would arrive at the target early or late. All went well until the attack on Leipzig on the night of 19/20th February, when it was obvious from application of the broadcast winds that aircraft would arrive at the target 10 – 15 minutes early. We all know the result – 79 aircraft lost.
The obvious way to tackle this problem was to adjust the zero hour, and since we were obtaining from aircraft reliable information of true winds over enemy territory, a scheme was devised whereby the zero hour could be amended if necessary. The Duty Navigator in the Command Met. Office ascertains from application of the corrected w/v’s, whether the aircraft will arrive at the target early on time, or late, and consequently whether the zero hour needs amending. All H 2 S wind finders in this Group transmit the times at which they pass two datum points on the route. It is obvious, however, that both calculations will be valueless unless all aircraft [underlined] do [/underlined] leave the concentration point [underlined] exactly [/underlined] on time, and fly at the speeds laid down at the Flight Planning Conference. It must also be obvious to the reader, that unless wind information and times at the datum points are sent back by aircraft immediately, then there will be neither sufficient information on which to base an amendment to the zero hour, nor time in which to take necessary action.
Accurate time keeping, good concentration and correct timing of the attack, in short the success of the operation, depend on every wind finder knowing and doing his job. It’s up to you.
WHERE TO LOOK
A.O.C’s Foreword. Page 1
Aircrew Volunteers. 6
Air Bombing. 7
Air Sea Rescue. 8
Absence. 11
Accidents. 14
Armament. 15
Bombing, Air. 7
Decorations. 6
Engineering. 14
Equipment. 11
Flying Control. 5
Flight Engineers. 6
Gardening. 4
Gee. 5
Gunnery. 9
H 2 S. Page 5
Link Trainer Times. 10
Navigation, Progress of. 2
Navigation. 13
Organisation. 14
Operations. 16
Progress of Navigation. 2
Photography. 4
Public Relations. 10
Signals/Radar. 3
Second Thoughts for Pilots 10
Sports. 12
Tactics. 6
Training. 11
War Effort. 16
War Savings. 6
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
March was not the best of months from the Aircrew Signals point of view, and it is to be hoped that Signals Leaders will make every endeavour to effect an improvement in the coming month.
You may not have any connection with the following examples but is that because you know all the answers, or is it that you have not been caught out.
There was once a Wireless Operator (Air) who after 14 operational sorties, used the spelling table of CD0250 for the following – REQUEST Q.F.E. – a total of 5 Groups where 1 Group would have covered the situation. Five minutes instruction per day would prevent any unnecessary waste of ether time.
Once upon a time (in March) a Wireless Operator (Air) gave out the wrong Bomber Code, which all the simpletons in his section accepted without a murmur. It is said at this Headquarters that all the murmuring came from the Duty Signals Officer – I wouldn’t know. In days gone by (March again), a Wireless Operator (Air) did not know where to find the fuse of his Visual Monica equipment, and the aircraft had no Early Warning Device – a congratulatory message from the Luftwaffe is expected any day. Talking of Early Warning Devices, the writer knows of two Operators (no names, no Grade 1) who did not know how to cope with simple fault finding.
Now we can do better than this, and it is suggested that every Signals Leader has a daily session with all the Wireless Operators, just ten minutes every morning will pay handsome dividends.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The new system of reporting the performance of Early Warning Devices by pro-forma is working very well, thanks to the co-operation of all concerned. This is going to save a lot of time and unnecessary telephone calls, which ultimately will help the war effort. Since the last News, a new instruction on the use of I.F.F. when circling dinghies or crashed aircraft, has been brought into force, 5G/S.4403/50/Sigs, of 23rd March, refers.
On Flight Planning for Thursday, 30th March, the Air Officer Commanding outlined the danger to the Bomber Force caused by selfish captains trying to but [sic] a little extra security for themselves at the expense of their fellow captains, when they order their Wireless Operators into the Astro-dome. It is hoped that this point has now gone right home, and that there will be nor further occurrence of this practice.
Just one more item that requires the attention of all Airborne Signals types. The constant back tuning that goes on during every operation, and the passing back of wind messages during the normal transmission times. When you read the first part of these notes again, as it is hoped you will, add a reminder about back tuning and listening out, to your daily session.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
Two good points stand out for the month; they are both from No.57 Squadron.
P/O. Bracker, on the night of 24/25th did some quick thinking to get his R1155 working and receive the broadcasts.
On the same night, Sgt. Robinson saw on his Fishpond screen, two aircraft close together. He reported this, and gunners reports a combat taking place. The aircraft joined in the fight, drew the enemy aircraft’s fire and eventually shot it down.
This is an excellent example of the intelligent use of Fishpond – a good show by the W/Op and his crew.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt. Stevens, Signals Leader of No.57 Squadron, on obtaining an “A” category on No.5 Signals Leader’s Course.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures for March is considerably lower than for February, being less than 50% of the February figures. No Signals failure was responsible for a cancelled sortie, but out of the total of 24 failures reported, four were the reason for, or a contributory cause of, early returns.
The very small percentage contribution to early returns for March 0.235% against 1.30% for February is a welcome indication of a general drive to eliminate the possibility of Signals contribution in any way to a cancelled or abandoned sortie.
This does not mean that failure reports generally show a decrease. On the contrary, the conscientious reporting of any type of failure whatsoever, irrespective of whether it affects the success of the sortie or not, or even appears on the raid report, is essential.
A perusal of the details of failures for March, shows that one Squadron reported ten failures, none of which caused an early return; but they do provide the information required to enable action to be taken to institute modifications which will, in time, make failures almost impossible. The more attention which is paid to reporting failures the sooner will the improvements be incorporated.
We do not wish to take part in any competition between Groups for the lowest number of reported failures, but we must show the lowest percentage contributing to cancellations and early returns.
[Underlined] COUNTERMEASURE MANDREL [/underlined]
The fitting of Mandrel is proceeding satisfactorily. The great hold-up has been due to so many new aircraft arriving with the downward vision blister, thus denying us our original aerial position. However, Bomber Command have now authorised the removal of these blisters and, as a result, the aerial returns to its original position.
We still manage to fly a high proportion of the Command Mandrel effort.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
During the month there occurred an outstanding example of loss of security on an operation through injudicious use of R/T. Take-off was 18.13, the route was northerly, and W/T silence was not to be broken until approximately 20.45. At 19.09 an early return called up his station, stating that his instruments were u/s, and requesting permission to land after jettisoning petrol. On being told to stand by, the E.R. stated that although he was aware that boomerang procedure was to jettison the cookie, he didn’t want to fly around much longer, and suggested jettisoning the petrol and landing with cookie. The ground station then requested details as to what was wrong with the aircraft instruments. After replying, the aircraft requested instructions again, and was told to jettison incendiaries safe, and pancake. This instruction was repeated, the aircraft carried out the instructions and returned, making a final reference to his cookie as a warning to ground crews. The entire conversation lasted 23 minutes, by which time any doubts the enemy might have had of the hostile intentions of the force plotted by his long range Radar must have been completely dispersed. “It is to be assumed” say Bomber Command, “that every time a word is spoken, it is heard by the enemy”. So, on this particular night, we gave him one hour’s prior notice of the attack and that is a luxury we can’t afford.
After many representations, the British Joint Communications Board have now conceded that for INTER RAF WORKING ONLY, J – Johnny may be used in lieu of J-Jig. For combined and joint working, J-Jig must still be used. This latter point is important. The probability of joint and combined working is imminent, and strict observance of the alphabet and standard procedure will play an important part in ensuring the smooth working of our forces.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee remains high, and shows a slight improvement over February. A total of 1201 Gee sorties were flown during the month, and in 96.7% of them the equipment was completely serviceable. It is hoped that a further increase can be shown next month.
Three new Radar Workshops have been completed during the month. All squadrons now possess their own building, which should help considerably to increase serviceability.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
H 2 S serviceability improved slightly during last month, but it is still far from satisfactory; the percentage serviceable to the target and back was 76%.
The new Filament Transformers, which have now flown up to 50 sorties, give every indication of being the solution to the main causes of unserviceability; unfortunately, production difficulties will cause considerable delay in a changeover programme. The arrival of a drier season should prevent a further source of unserviceability that has been caused by dampness. It is felt that a considerable percentage on non-reproduceable faults were due to such dampness.
Manipulation failures due to lack of experience with the equipment, still assume too high a percentage, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. A new switch procedure has been drawn up and put into force which, if strictly adhered to, should result in greater serviceability.
The repositioning of the Scanner Heater
(Continued on page 4, col.3)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Failures from all causes totalled 109, equalling 6.9%; this represents a decrease of 1.4% on the month of February. These technical failures remain persistently at 6-7% and there is no doubt that many of them can be avoided with more careful inspection and maintenance.
Instructions have been issued by Eng/Elect Branch to modify all Lancaster aircraft camera circuits; this is a return to bomb door operation of the camera. Briefly this circuit is wired through the Mk. XIV bombsight panel, and incorporates a relay which safeguards the camera from premature operation through deliberate or accidental movement of the pilot’s bomb door selector arm, provided that the bombsight graticule is not switched on. Once the bombsight graticule has been switched on, the circuit from the selector arm is “live”. Therefore, when the bomb doors are selected open, the camera winds over one frame; when the Air Bomber releases the bombs, the normal camera cycle commences. During the period that the Type 35 Control motor is running, the pilot’s selector arm circuit to the camera is “dead”, and should the doors be closed before the camera cycle is completed, the frame sequence remains uninterrupted.
An effort has been made to produce an ideal circuit, and the modification now being introduced is as near to the ideal as possible; for instance, switching on the graticule late i.e. after the bomb doors have been opened, would result in the loss of the first frame, and would bring the bombing frame into position at No.6 instead of No.7. This will be bad enough with ordinary H.S. night film, but with composite colour in use, the probable loss of ground detail on the bombing frame would be serious.
The introduction of this circuit does not mean that technical failures in Type 35 Controls and camera gear boxes are overcome. Careful inspection, testing and thorough maintenance, are the only cures. It is evident from failure reports that insufficient care is being taken to ensure that camera equipment issued from the Equipment Section is entirely satisfactory before installing it into operational aircraft.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadrons]
GARDENING
The Command planted 1,472 vegetables this month, 76% being distributed off the East Frisians, in Keil Bay and the Fehmarn Belt and off the French U-boat bases; the remainder in the Channel, off Holland and on the Spanish Iron Ore Routes. 3 Group planted over half the total 6 Group nearly 400 and 4 Group nearly 300.
This is the third month of intensive high altitude gardening and reports of results now coming in are proof of its success. So far this year the casualty rate due to Bomber Command’s mining is 5 ships sunk or damaged per week, but latest reports show that this has now increased to a rate of [underlined] 1.4 ships per day. [/underlined]
The most encouraging report has come to hand from a source now in this country, who, up until recently, has been obliged to sail the German North Sea Convoy Routes, and who had to “swim for it” at least once. “Minephobia” is so acute that whenever minelaying is even suspected, all traffic is stopped for 24 hrs. The crews of mine sweepers after a six months “tour”, now get three months leave, most of which is spent in hospitals specialising in the cure of neurosis.
Now that the various methods of high altitude mining have had fair operational trial, it is possible to lay down standard rules, and various orders lately issued will be consolidated. A point which stands out from the last three months work, is that the success of high altitude mining outside Gee range has been dependent on H 2 S aircraft being available either to mark for those not so fitted, or, in restricted gardens, to do the laying.
Undoubtedly the ideal method is a D.R. run from a visual pinpoint using the Mark XIV bombsight and aided by H 2 S, but weather conditions which will permit visual pinpointing unaided by markers are the exception rather than the rule.
Commander R. A. McDonald, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Vernon, explained to aircrews of 49, 57, 630, 207, and 106 Squadrons some of the pleasant little surprises that our mines spring on the enemy’s shipping and mine sweepers (and the devices which prevent them from being sprung on our own Armament staffs). He was unfortunately prevented from visiting other Squadrons, by operations.
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from page 3, col. 3)
has been practically completed, and during the last month no scanners have frozen where this modification has been incorporated. Bomber Command is also issuing a modification covering heating of Scanner Motors, and repositioning of the Scanner Heater Switch.
[Boxed] FISHPOND [/boxed]
This device also showed an improvement during the month, but here too a great deal of work remains to be done. The serviceability percentage for March was 78%.
W/Ops and Navigators still lack the training and co-ordination required to derive the full benefit from this Warning Device. It is to their own advantage to become fully proficient in its operation. A shortened maximum range has been experimented with, and those Operators who have used it express complete satisfaction. Bomber Command have been requested to approve this modification for general installation.
[Boxed] VISUAL MONICA [/boxed]
Serviceability continues to improve, and last month reached 89.5%. It is felt, however, that this figure may still be improved.
The amount of work spent on the Switch Motors has paid great dividends, and the old theory that the Motor was to blame has been refuted. In this connection, the changeover plugs for the aerial leads have proved very valuable on the few occasions when Switch Motors have stopped.
The introduction of Mark IV A.I. as a Tail Warning Device has made available from 54 Base further supplies of Visual Monica, with which it has been possible to almost completely equip the Group with Visual Tail Warning Devices, and thus eliminate Aural Monica.
[Boxed] A.I. [/boxed]
The new addition to Bomber aircraft has now seen considerable operational work, and shows the qualities of a fine Tail Warning Device. Serviceability was 78% for the two weeks it has been in operation. This will, without doubt, be raised week by week as personnel become fully conversant with the equipment.
Operators find the equipment easy to use, due to previous experience in Visual Monica, and are very enthusiastic. The elevation part has worked very satisfactorily in No. 617 Squadron, and a general installation programme is now in hand for the other A.I. squadrons.
[Underlined] SPORTS (Contd. From page 12, col. 3) [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUTURE EVENTS [/underlined]
RUGBY – No. 1 Air Landing Brigade is of the opinion that its Brigade Rugger side can put paid to a 5 Group representative team. The challenge is being joyfully taken up; the result should be a first class game.
CRICKET – It has, unfortunately, been impossible to obtain transport for a ‘straight’ Group Cricket League. The next best thing, a Group Cricket Knock-out, is being run. Full details will be forwarded to all stations. It [sic] the meantime, stations are advised to look up friendlies as usual.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
GEE
Ranges obtained on Gee this month were average on all major operations. Many Navigators however, obtained quite remarkable fixes on special operations, and in a number of cases over the targets. Single position lines from strong signals were intelligently used, and in a few cases Gee was used by Navigators as a means of homing to the special targets.
The mere fact that signals begin to fade into the jamming appears to act as a deterrent to many navigators who forget that jamming can occur in certain local areas on the continent. Once through a local jamming area fixes may again be obtained and under no circumstances should a Navigator neglect to check the Gee Indicator to see if this is so. If a local jamming area is encountered report it at interrogation for the benefit of others.
“Coding” does not appear to have caused any serious trouble and is reported to be phased and timed accurately. However, now that further instructions have been issued, navigators and wireless operators are warned to take greater care in reading the indicator to prevent serious mistakes being made. If you are uncertain of the present day instructions check up at your section now.
Don’t forget that the Southern and South-Eastern Chains are now on a new frequency. This recent changeover should solve the problem of break through pulses which have been reported recently.
The new North Eastern Chain is now operating daily for test purposes and reports on transmissions are requested. Navigators and Wireless Operators, this chain has been provided for your benefit, let us have these reports; in doing so you are helping the technicians to provide a better facility for yourselves. It is hoped that charts to cover this chain will be issued this month.
One word about descent through cloud and the correct homing procedure to Base. Air Staff Instructions lay down the procedure to be adopted for descent through cloud and homing to Base on Gee and these instructions must be followed. Navigators should ensure that the captain follows the correct procedure. Descent through cloud must be made between the correct lattice lines and along the correct homing lattice line applicable to base. Remember – individual lattice lines have been chosen for each airfield to prevent the risk of collision, and these are to be used like railway tracks. Follow the Green Indicator to safety.
H 2 S
H 2 S training on Squadrons this month was confined mainly to the Bombing Competition, and although a considerable number of aircraft were detailed, few obtained photographs owing to unsatisfactory target conditions. Of the results received to date, the majority are within one mile of the aiming point, reflecting great credit on the crews taking part. It is hoped to publish a summary of results in the next issue of the “News”.
Training at Conversion Units is improving and many crews are now completing 10 – 15 hours air training, which should prove of considerable benefit to the squadrons.
Full use is being made of the ground trainers both as navigational and bombing aids. Emphasis must be placed on the use of H 2 S as a navigational aid, particularly in the early stages of training, and trainer cross countries should be carried out with this point in mind. Navigators and Air Bombers must aim at a high standard of efficiency in both the taking and plotting of fixes, particularly as the whole of the Bomber Force depends on this aid for accurate broadcast winds.
An investigation has been carried out this month into all manipulation failures since the beginning of the year, and it is noted that they occur during the first 20 hours of air training and are mainly due to incorrect tuning. To overcome this, Aircraft Drill No.14 was issued setting out the correct H 2 S switching, tuning and re-tuning sequences and operators are to follow this procedure at all times. It is of no practical use to switch the set on, tune and leave it whilst Gee is in range, then commence trying to identify responses when out of Gee coverage, without re-tuning. Tuning varies with the height and time the set is on, so recheck frequently.
Bomber Command intend issuing in the near future a list of faults which can be remedied in the air. However, it is pointed out at this stage, operators are still failing to check fuses when the equipment goes unserviceable. This fault is the easiest which can be remedied in the air and failure to do this is inexcusable.
As always, practice makes perfect, and to overcome manipulation failures, operators should endeavour to spend considerable time tuning and re-tuning the bench set, following the procedure laid down in the drill. This applies to trained and untrained crews alike.
H 2 S and Fishpond are inter-dependent; consequently a manipulation failure on H 2 S leaves a crew without an essential warning device. This point alone easily outweighs all other arguments which may be brought up regarding manipulation failures. H 2 S operators and Wireless Operators must therefore realise that by spending a little time in training to keep efficient on both H 2 S and Fishpond, they are contributing to the safety of their aircraft and crew.
FLYING CONTROL
33 AIRCRAFT LANDED IN 45 MINS:
March has seen a further improvement in landing times, the average for the Group for the month being 2.13 minutes per aircraft. There is still, however, room for improvement in Single-squadron Stations, and Skellingthorpe has shown that the Landing Scheme can produce a high landing rate with small numbers of aircraft; on the night 18/19th March they landed fifteen aircraft in 25 minutes; the fact that a station only has one squadron to land is no excuse for poor landing times. If all single squadron stations follow Skellingthorpe’s example, then we can look forward to an overall Group average of well below the two minute mark.
Some excellent performances have been put up by Stations in this Group during the past month. Below are some figures which are the result of good flying discipline and good airmanship. They are not “peak period” figures, but are taken over the total period.
[Table of selected Aircraft recovery times by Station]
A conference was held at this Headquarters early in the month to review the landing scheme, and improve where necessary. One point raised was the difficulty in persuading pilots to adhere to the airspeeds laid down for return from the last concentration point. If you are one of the unfortunate ones, and are allotted one of the lower airspeeds, make up your mind to stick to it, for it does eliminate that tedious and highly dangerous orbiting of the airfield on return. There are many aircraft using a small piece of sky, and although we are not often troubled with intruders yet, one Hun fighter operating around 5 Group could do a deal of damage. If you rush back, you will certainly have to waste time before landing, so why not waste it peacefully over the sea, rather than be told to go for a short cross country in a congested area.
On reviewing diversions over the past six month it is obvious that standard R/T and control drills are lacking. As the result of a conference held at Headquarters Bomber Command, a standard method of control and R/T procedure has been agreed and will be issued shortly. It is to be used when aircraft are diverted away from Base and the 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme consequently not in operation. It is important that pilots have this procedure at their fingertips. Diversions are never a pleasant end to an operational sortie, but if you can get down at your diversion airfield with the minimum trouble, it makes the task an easier one for all concerned.
FOG DISPERSAL
The fog dispersal apparatus at Fiskerton was responsible for the landing of 14 aircraft during the month. The total number of aircraft landed to date, using this installation is 48. On the 17th March, when five aircraft landed, visibility before lighting up was only 200 yards, with fog estimated to be 800 feet thick. In sixteen minutes visibility on the runway had improved from 15 – 2,000 yards. Again on the 24th, 5 Group aircraft were able to use Fiskerton, and visibility was increased from 100 yards to 1500 yards in 12 minutes. Fog Dispersal is there for your use and your safety. Landing Notes have been issued to all Units and pilots must ensure that they are fully conversant with the use of the Fog Dispersal Installation. We will shortly have another installation serviceable at Metheringham, and perhaps the day
(Continued on page 8, col. 3)
MARCH LANDING TIMES
[Table of March Landing Times by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
DECORATIONS
The following immediate awards were approved during the month.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ W.D. ERVINE D.F.C.
A/W/Cdr E.L. PORTER, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt F.H. PHILLIPS. D.F.C.
P/O H.N. DAVIES D.F.C.
A/F/L I. RADEMEYER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.B. HEALEY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L/ L.A.J. McLEOD D.F.C.
R/O T.H. BLACKHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT J. BRADFORD D.F.M.
F/SGT D. LIGHTFOOT D.F.M.
A/F/L C.J. SPRIGGS D.F.C.
A/F/L W.M. WALTON D.F.C.
P/O S.F. ATCHESON D.F.C.
A/S/L M.I. BOYLE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L E.H. MOSS D.F.C.
F/Lt B.C. FITCH D.F.C.
F/O T.D. HALLIWELL D.F.C.
SGT A.E. HARRIS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O V.H. TRIMBLEE D.F.C.
SGT G.R. PRICE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ I. WHITTAKER, DFC. Bar to D.F.C.
A/S/L H.B. MARTIN, DSO, DFC & Bar. Bar to D.S.O.
F/O L.W. CURTISS, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
F/O T.D. SIMPSON D.F.C.
F/O B.T. FOXLEE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O K. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT G.C. KING D.F.M.
F/SGT D. SCHOFIELD D.F.M.
F/SGT G.E. HEXTER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L J.C.W. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT R. PARLE D.F.M.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £7299.2.0.
TACTICS
The ill effects of weaving in the bomber stream have been recorded by an experienced Flak Liaison Officer, and his opinions are set out in 5G/1/41/Air, sent to Stations on the 27th March, 1944. All crews should read this letter.
Since the introduction of early warning devices, more attention than ever must be paid to flying straight and level unless attacked. In this connection there is a point about weaving which is perhaps not fully appreciated. A weaving aircraft is continually closing range on other aircraft in the stream and is likely to confuse Monica and Fishpond operators, who may interpret the resultant blip as an enemy fighter closing in to attack. The consequencies [sic] may then be serious, particularly on a dark night, when gunners have been known to mistake four engines for two. In these days when all crews are conscious of some collision risk, the sighting of an aircraft crossing their line of flight is, to say the least, upsetting, and in any event, is unfair to gunners who can ill afford to waste time in identifying friendly bombers which behave in a suspicious manner.
Further, the straight and level policy is enforced to enable crews more easily to keep to the track laid down. The dangers of straying from track and the concentration are known to all. All the old hands at the game have realised that weaving is out of date and leads to trouble, and are now following the straight and narrow. Why not you?
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Two points of interest have been sorted out from an investigation into combats for March. They are:-
(i) Enemy fighters rarely fire more than one burst during each attack.
(ii) Period between opening fire and breaking away is a matter of seconds.
It is clear that many enemy fighters are opening fire at about the same time as they are identified by gunners or before a defensive manoeuvre is started. Night fighters as a rule depend on surprise and accuracy of their first burst, and if this fails, there is no doubt that the advantage passes to the gunners. The main problems are therefore:-
(i) To see the fighter and recognise it before it opens fire, and
(ii) to convey the information to the pilot immediately.
Problem (i) can only be met by energetic use of early warning devices, constant recognition practice and efficient night vision by gunners.
Problem (ii) can be solved if gunners report sightings immediately to the pilot, using the standard reporting code. A second’s delay in identifying the attacker before reporting it may mean the difference between eventually shooting it down, or your sustaining damage before you have that opportunity. Remember that a defensive manoeuvre, although designed to give gunners a known deflection, is also intended to evade the fighter’s fire; therefore, in view of the apparent short duration of combats, if an aircraft is flying suspiciously, gunners should not wait to identify it before ordering a corkscrew, particularly if the suspected aircraft is within firing range.
Flight Engineers
The most important job of the Flight Engineer is to help in getting his aircraft to the target and back, in the most efficient manner possible. But there us another side of his job that must not be forgotten; it is of the greatest importance. He must assist in keeping his machine up to the best standard of serviceability.
He can only do this id he is a keen, conscientious worker. He must pay every attention to the smallest detail in his aircraft, both when he is flying and on the ground; he should be with the ground crew whenever he can while they carry out their daily inspection.
He is the “Flying Spanner”, but firstly he should be the engineer on the ground, and know that the aircraft is tuned up to the last ounce. How can he know this if he only visits his dispersal about one hour before he goes on “Ops”?
Delay has occurred many times in the rectification of defects through an aircraft landing away from the parent station; this must be altered. It must be impressed upon Flight Engineers that it is their responsibility to report to the C.T.O. of that Station any defects or trouble which have developed during flight, and which may prevent them returning to their Base at the earliest moment. It is no good to be interrogated, have a meal and go to bed forgetting to report to the C.T.O. until the next day. The report must be given in person to the Engineering Officer on duty that night; he should also be told if petrol and oil is required, and the approximate time the aircraft will take off.
In the past, aircraft have been delayed through wrong information being passed on, and so it is essential that the Flight Engineer reports all known defects to the C.T.O. Confusion and incorrect information is caused by too many inexperienced people handling the message.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BOMBING [/underlined]
March was a varied month for the Bomb Aimers in the Group, the highlight from the bombing point of view being the precision attacks by Bases on special targets deep into France.
On the whole bombing was accurate, severe damage being done by Nos. 52, 53 and 54 Bases. It is apparent therefore, that our continuous practice has not been wasted. However, no one who studies the stick craters on the P.R.U. photographs can possibly feel complacent. Many crews missed!!!
The question immediately raised by these misses is whether or not the bombsight was serviceable. It is an intricate bombsight, but anyone who doubts its capabilities should study the long list of bombing errors less than 150 yards at 20,000 feet, given on this page. It must be serviceable, though, and it can only be proven serviceable though use. Therefore you must, at every opportunity, carry out practice bombing with your sight. Whenever you fly, carry out the established N.F.T. checks – report any failings you discover in the bombsight to the Instrument Section, and when you get crew errors of 100 yds or less, thank the instrument section who have helped to make it possible.
Finally, treat all practice bombing as precision bombing – the Air Bombers in 106 Squadron have reason to be proud. In teamwork with their pilots, they won the Squadron Bombing Competition against all-comers in the Group for 3 successive months, and were runners up in March. There is a great gap between the top and bottom errors in the Competition – there should not be! It should be a neck-and-neck struggle with only a few yards separating the Squadrons in the Group.
Are [underlined] YOU [/underlined] bombing your best for your Squadron?
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Bell, D.F.C.) reports the construction and issue to all Air Bombers of a hook as per diagram.
[Diagram]
This device is used for manual release of any H.E. hang-ups, and is of a length that ensures the linkage can be raised. Further, it can be used on No. 13 Station to make certain the “Cookie” has actually left the aircraft, a visual check from the nose being impeded by the incendiary containers.
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) has had the illumination bulbs in the Mark XIV Bombsight Computor [sic] painted red to counteract the glare. This ensures minimum effect on Night Vision.
[Underlined] 1654 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Morgan) has completed the installation of the complete Mark XIV Bombsight in the A.M.B.T.
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.) have nearly completed installation of A.M.B.T. Mk. XIV, several clever modifications being introduced. Excellent co-operation has been provided by the Armament and Electrical Officer and their staffs.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS IN YARDS, CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training and Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units, with averages]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES DURING MARCH
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
44 P/O Levy Sgt Peck F/O Fox 82 & 130 yds
P/O Hobbs F/S Scott F/S Fenwick 144 yds
F/L Dorehill F/S Deacon F/S Wright 116 yds
W/O Barton F/S Barnes F/O Sparrow 125 yds
F/L Wiggin F/O Marshall F/O Maury 112 yds
50 P/O Lundy F/O Bignell F/S Jordan 125 & 145 yds
Sgt MacFarlin Sgt Ball Sgt Elliott 108 yds
57 F/L Munday F/O Evans P/O West 120 yds
106 P/O Rossel Sgt Goss F/S White 140 yds
F/O Clement F/O Gautschi F/O Wilkinson 82 & 120 yds
463 F/S Page F/O Braithwaite W/O Fair 84 yds
619 W/Cdr Jeudwine Sgt Booth Sgt Gosling 79 yds
S/L Whamond F/O Kennedy F/O Marshall 135 yds
F/L McGilvray F/O Baker F/O Drake 140 yds
F/L Moore F/O Butler F/O Wood 123 yds
F/S Schofield F/S Hexter F/S Withinshaw 147 yds
630 F/L Roberts Sgt Davies Sgt Jeffreys 140 yds
W/Cdr Deas F/O Barker Sgt Wright 120 (twice) and 143 yds
S/L Calvert F/S Hogg F/S Beaudoin 148 yds
P/O Hill Sgt Allen F/S Stancer 120 yds
1654 S/L Bloom-Jones F/O Foulkes F/L Martin 148 yds
F/O Murray F/O Towers F/S Keeble 144 yds
F/S Ayres Sgt Charteris Sgt Airey 114 yds
P/O Spencer Sgt. Gordge Agt Hugh-Games 122 yds
1661 S/L Jones F/O Seibal F/O West 140 yds
5 LFS F/S Horne Sgt Johnson F/S Shipley 88 yds
Sgt Patterson Sgt Hall Sgt Rice 121 yds
Special mention is made of W/Cdr Deas and crew, 630 Squadron, who achieved Crew Errors less than 150 yards on [underlined] three [/underlined] exercises this month.
617 Squadron obtained a total of 26 exercises in the “Less than 150 yards” category the best three being:-
[Underlined] PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR [/underlined]
F/O Kell F/O Morieson 47 yards
F/L Cooper F/O Harden 68 yards
F/O Willsher F/S Everitt 75 yards
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION
In a month where 9 Squadrons qualified in the Competition it fell to 44 Squadron to wrest the leadership from 106 Squadron who headed the table for the three months December, January and February. 44 Squadron have set a very high standard and are to be congratulated on rising from the 6th position to the top of the table.
57 Squadron have shown notable improvement in rising to 5th place, which they share with 207 Squadron.
It is expected that April will bring maximum qualification by all Squadrons in the Group and a really close struggle for the top position.
[Underlined] PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS [/underlined]
[Underlined] ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET [/underlined]
1st 44 Squadron – 85 yards 1st 630 Squadron – 120 yards
2nd 106 Squadron – 98 yards 57 Squadron – 120 yards
3rd 619 Squadron – 108 yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 134 yards
4th 630 Squadron – 119 yards 4th 44 Squadron – 138 yards
5th 207 Squadron – 141 yards 5th 207 Squadron – 154 yards
57 Squadron - 141 yards 6th 467 Squadron – 181 yards
7th 463 Squadron – 169 yards 7th 463 Squadron – 197 yards
9 Squadron – 169 yards 8th 9 Squadron – 223 yards
9th 467 Squadron – 196 yards 9th 106 Squadron – 253 yards
The following Squadrons failed to enter the necessary 8 qualifying exercises:-
10th 61 Squadron – 132 yards (5 exercises) 10th 61 Squadron – 143 yards
11th 50 Squadron – 90 yards (4 exercises) 11th 50 Squadron – 123 yards
12th 49 Squadron – 89 yards (1 exercise) 12th 49 Squadron – 92 yards
ADDITION BOMBING TRAINER
[Table of Trainer Activity by Squadron]
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
Two entries were received this month:
W/Cdr Porter 112 yards (Errors include bombsight error)
G/Cpt Pleasance 289 yards (Error of 98 yards)
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley – 122 yards
How about some competition, Bombing Leaders?
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What is the theory of Wanganui technique and what are the correct bombsight settings?
2. If the Bomb Doors were open, but the Bomb Release Test could not be extracted from the positive Fusing Device, what check would you make before manually releasing?
3. Where is the type “H” Jettison Button and when do you need to use it?
4. Why do you set [underlined] indicated [/underlined] Wind Speed on the Mk. XIV Computor. [sic]
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
F/Lt Allan has left Scampton and is passing through the Conversion Units in order to return to operations for his 2nd tour. Good Luck!
F/Lt Gibson has become tour-expired and moved to Scampton to superintend the Bombing Section of the Aircrew School.
F/O Abbott has moved from 106 Squadron to 49 Squadron. We now expect to see [underlined] 49 [/underlined] Squadron top of the Bombing Competition!!
F/O Toogood (106 Squadron), tour-expired has moved to 92 Group for Bombing Leader’s duties.
P/O Duck who obtained 14th position with “B” pass on 77 Bombing Leaders’ Course has moved from 619 to 617 Squadron.
F/O Falgate (463 Squadron) and P/O Hulland D.F.M., (1654 Con. Unit) were 8th and 12th respectively on No.78 Bombing Leaders’ Course, with “B” passes.
AIR SEA RESCUE
For two months now there has been no ditching in this Group, which shows a deal of consideration for the Air Sea Rescue Officers in the Group, but at the same time it is wondered whether crews generally have increased their knowledge to an equivalent extent – have you got all your A.S.R. gen and equipment buttoned up?
In addition to giving swimming instruction P.F.O’s are now lending a hand with dinghy instruction in the South Park Girls’ School Swimming Baths. Now that summer is almost here, this should be a real attraction, and every effort must be made for regular attendance. As a further attraction some stations have periods during the early evening so that, with the co-operation of the M.T. Sections, an evening out in Lincoln should be enjoyed by all – after the instruction is over.
[Cartoon] EMP.
It is hoped that “Q” type dinghies (which will replace the “J” type fairly soon) will shortly be available on the scale of one per Squadron for instructional purposes. This dinghy is quite a complicated bit of work, and crews should take every opportunity of getting in sailing practice on local stretches of water (remembering that the depth of water must be at least 4 feet, owing to the depth of keel). Some good fun should be had these long summer evenings – when you can afford time off from obliterating the Hun.
[Underlined] HINT TO USERS [/underlined]
The floating torch has a nasty habit of lighting at awkward moments – why not pad the torch pocket in Mae Wests and Buoyancy suits with some light-damping material, so that the light will not shine through? Whatever happens, don’t go flying over the sea without your floating torch.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL (Contd. From page 5, col. 3) [/underlined]
is not far off when an operation will be planned and will depend solely on Fog Dispersal Installations for landing of aircraft.
There will be, therefore, three Fog Dispersal airfields situated in a comparatively small area, LUDFORD MAGNA in 1 Group, FISKERTON and METHERINGHAM. The identification of these airfields as night presents a problem, for you if you mistake another airfield for your own and are listening on your local airfield frequency, there is no means of contacting you by R/T. It is essential therefore, that darky frequency is used for all R/T control at Fog Dispersal airfields.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER [/underlined]
The trainer at Fiskerton is now equipped for training with the Mark IIC Gyro Gunsight, and training of the squadron gunners is going ahead under the supervision of F/O Johnson-Biggs, ex 619 Squadron, P/O Collingwood, ex 50 Squadron, and Sgt Kennedy of 49 Squadron. The trainer is housed in a spacious blister type building equipped with a large screen on which the target aircraft is projected, together with the fixed and moving graticules which are a feature of the new sight. An F.N. 16 turret is used for manipulation, and this is fitted with all the controls of the gunsight. Very realistic conditions can be reproduced, although until a trainer is produced which will introduce conditions like the Link Trainer with its “Bumps” attachment, the gunner is still operating from a rock steady platform which does not give a true indication of his ability to hold a target in the sight. A demonstration stand is housed in the same building which has a complete Gyro Gunsight with all controls and fittings. This is used for introducing gunners to the sight during initial instruction, and enables one gunner to operate the sight on the stand whilst another gunner is operating the turret on the trainer. A new type of film is available for use with the trainer; this gives a light coloured aircraft on the screen with a dark background, differing from the film in general use for aircraft recognition training on the Jurby trainer, which project a dark aircraft on a light background.
[Underlined] FUTURE INSTALLATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Swinderby [/underlined] is the next station to have the trainer installed. This will be housed in the standard spotlight trainer building, which at present is being modified by removing the steelwork situated on the front of the screen. All the equipment is available and installation should commence within the next two weeks.
[Underlined] Winthorpe [/underlined] have received part of the equipment and the construction of the building has been commenced.
[Underlined] G.2. GUNNERY NOTES [/underlined]
On the 6th January, 1944, a letter (BC/S.24636/Trg.) was issued from H.Q.B.C. stating that the G.2 Notes were available in large quantities, and intimating that they could be demanded on the following scale.
[Underlined] Instructors’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per instructor or Gunnery Leader not already holding one.
[Underlined] Students’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per Air Gunner not already holding one. This would appear to be a straightforward matter, but certain Units within the Group are still without these very important notes for a variety of reasons; units who demanded the notes as instructed received their demands promptly, but any unit who has not received these notes may obtain single copies by contacting the G.G.O. As these notes form the basis for all instructions on sighting in the Command, it is of paramount importance that all Gunnery Leaders instructors and gunners be familiar with their contents. It has been discovered that gunners attending the Specialist Sighting Course and Air Gunner Instructors’ Course at Manby have been handicapped by a lack of preliminary knowledge of sighting due to the failure of Units to obtain the notes when the instruction was first issued.
(Continued on page 10, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
THIS MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
49 Sqdn “D” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
619 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “L” 18/19 March, 1944. ME109 c
61 Sqdn “K” 22/23 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “R” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109
106 Sqdn “N” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109
PROBABLY DESTROYED
619 Sqdn “T” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “S” 24/25/ March, 1944. ME109 c
463 Sqdn “Q” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88 c
DAMAGED
207 Sqdn “G” 1/2 March, 1944. T/E c
467 Sqdn “F” 1/2 March, 1944. FW190 c
61 Sqdn “W” 15/16 March, 1944. FW190 c
619 Sqdn “P” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
207 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. ME109 c
50 Sqdn “M” 18/19 March. 1944. ME109 c
467 Sqdn “J” 18/19 March, 1944. ME110 c
207 Sqdn “O” 18/19 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “D” 22/23 March, 1944. JU88 c
467 Sqdn “Q” 22/23 March, 1944. ME109
50 Sqdn “U” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
49 Sqdn “K” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
44 Sqdn “J” 24/25 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “H” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109 c
57 Sqdn “M” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
463 Sqdn “G” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
44 Sqdn “U” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
57 Sqdn “B” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
50 Sqdn “Z” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109 c
Claims annotated “c” have been confirmed by Command. Other claims have not been confirmed owing to late rendition of combat reports.
It is intended to publish in the “News” a table showing the amount of air training carried out by Units each month. This will chiefly consist of Fighter Affiliation exercises and air firing, and provision is made for tabulating the Fighter Affiliation under three headings, i.e. “Camera & Gyro”, “Camera only” and “Without Camera”. This table is standard throughout the Command.
To ensure that a standard method is used throughout, a fighter combat exercise is to be considered as a “Combat” between a fighter and one air gunner in a bomber aircraft. Thus, if both Mid-Upper and Tail turrets are in use two exercises would be carried out. In future monthly training returns are to state the number of exercises as defined above. It is hoped that future tables published will include attacks by fighters on “Bullseye” exercises.
[Underlined] C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Course No. 75 [/underlined]
F/O Spilsbury – 5 LFS – 82% - Cat. “A”
Sgt Boardman – 49 Sqdn – 77.2% - Cat. “C”
Gunnery Leaders are reminded that they are invited to attend the Assessment Committee held at the conclusion of each course, and Gunnery Leaders who have gunners taking the course should make an effort to attend this board and obtain first hand information of their pupil’s efforts.
Gunnery Leaders desirous of visiting the C.G.S. for this purpose are to contact the G.G.O. who will make the necessary arrangements.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING – MARCH [/underlined]
[Table of Gunnery Exercises by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHT FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Stick rigidly to your lattice lines when homing to your airfield. There was a regrettable accident during the month when a pilot in the Group arrived at the airfield on the wrong side of the circuit and crashed when he was forced to dive to avoid an aircraft on the circuit. The lattice lines are your “right of way“ in the sky.
Don’t get careless about your flaps, and remember the Lancaster flaps provide maximum lift from 25° to the fully up position. From the 25° stage to the fully down position, lift is decreasing and drag is increasing. So, remember, take your flap off in two stages and exercise great care in taking off the last 25°. Trim as you do it.
If you make a “sighting” and you are orbiting a ditched aircraft or a dinghy, switch your I.F.F. on to “distress”. Do not change height while orbiting otherwise your plot will fade and you may give the impression that you have ditched. This new Signals Instruction is to enable R.D.F. to plot you, and thus double check your position, and the position of the sighting.
Don’t get off hand about reporting defects after flight. Record any defect on Form 700. Let the ground crew or Flight Commander and the N.C.O. know. Keep them all in the picture, the Security Officer won’t jump on you for that.
By the way, when did you and your crew last go through the bombing up procedure with the Armament types? There might be a day when you have to do your own bombing up.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
If you are unlucky and get fire in the air, do not dive your aircraft in the hope of putting the flames out. It will make them spread more, making it difficult to abandon aircraft, and will produce structural strain, causing a more rapid break up as the fire develops. The “gen” for fire in the air is in the 5 Group Aircraft Drills.
You can now land from West to East as well as from East to West at Woodbridge. The landing is from East to West at all times except when you see smoke generators burning at each end of the main runway. So watch for the smoke, and then land towards the sea.
Inspect S.D. 158 periodically. It is a secret document, and therefore you won’t find it lying around the Flight office; Ops/Flying Control will oblige. Note the instruction to burn resin lights above 8,000 feet at night.
Pay the closest attention to the latest “gen” about the moveable T.O.T. and remember the importance of sticking to the air speed laid down. 5 m.p.h. either side of the specified air speed it not good enough.
Have you dropped any practice bombs yet? It is the duty of every pilot to try his hand at bombing. Team up with another pilot in your flight, and see who gets the best result.
Public Relations
[Underlined] SIX STATIONS ON THE AIR [/underlined]
No.5 Group entered the radio world in earnest during March, no fewer than six stations being visited by B.B.C. recording units.
Though the resulting broadcasts did not hit the high lights in home programmes, they were given many times, and in many languages, all over the world. They reminded our overseas troops that the R.A.F. is still doing big business!!
First, a five day visit was paid to Skellingthorpe by F/Lt W Caverhill, of the broadcasting branch at Air Ministry, accompanied by B.B.C. engineers. They prepared scripts and made records of 18 R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel, who gave short talks to be included in the B.B.C’s overseas programme “Radio News Reel”.
Bardney was visited on the night of March 18/19th by a B.B.C. recording unit, and more than a doz en [sic] records were made of the station’s contribution towards the night’s attack on Frankfurt. This picture of R.A.F. life was broadcast in both short and long versions on the General Forces programme, as well as overseas.
The success of the Bardney broadcasts prompted the B.B.C. to make a return visit to record the operation against Berlin, on the night of March 24/25th. This time, the famous commentators, Mr. Robert Dunnett and Mr. Stewart MacPherson, brought a recording unit to Coningsby. On the way, the unit stopped at Metheringham as the aircraft were taking off and filled one disc with an interesting description of the scene.
At Coningsby a number of members of ground crews and station personnel came to the microphone and described their work. Further recordings were made in the Operations Room.
Owing to weather changes, the party beat a hasty retreat from Coningsby and went to
(Continued on page 11col.1)
Negotium Perambulans In Tenebris
The Meteorological Gremlin has spectacles and grey hair,
And his mysterious lair
Is very jealously guarded;
And must be regarded
With suitable awe, by all except
The few adept.
It is chiefly a nocturnal beast, and is often found
Prowling and prowling
(Like a host of Midian)
Searching for a datum or perhaps a meridian.
In this it is frequently assisted by a tiny female mammal whose chemical formula is PA2AOC,
Whose small scurrying figure you will often see
Bearing winds to the Gremlin. It is easy to please
With an airy zephyr, or a balmy breeze
Which it consumes with avidity, and that is why
It is able to prophesy!!
ANON (Circa, 1944)
Link Trainer
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
[Underlined] GUNNERY (Continued from page 9 col 1) [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY [/underlined]
The object of this course, which lasts for 10 days, is the training of sighting instructors and instructors capable of assessing cine gyro films. Originally only Conversion Unit or Gunnery Flight personnel could attend but this restriction has recently been removed, and all Units may now nominate gunners for this course; they must show an aptitude for sighting and must have passed well in this subject on a Gunnery Leaders’ Course or Air Gunner Instructors’ course. One vacancy only is allotted to the Group per month.
[Underlined] THOSE SQUADRON GYROS [/underlined]
The Gyro Assessors held by squadrons have in some instances been leading a very quiet life tucked away nicely in the Armoury or on a shelf in a cupboard. Numerous reasons are put forward for not using the Gyro during Fighter Affiliation exercises; for instance, aircraft not modified, not enough notice given to Gunnery sections, Photo. Section unable to process film, etc., etc. None of these reasons is really serious , and all can be easily overcome by a little more co-operation from the sections concerned. Modification on the aircraft is simple, consisting of enlarging the port inner gun port in the rear turret, and can be done in half-an-hour. It is not, repeat not, necessary to blank off the servo motor, and the gyro assembly can be installed in half an hour at the most. All the electrical gear is mounted on the gyro rig and after the rig has been fitted to the gun cradle only three things remain to be done:-
(i) Connect electrical cable to supply in turret.
(ii) Connect rear sear release pipe to gyro rig.
(iii) Harmonize gun sight to camera.
All Photo. Sections CAN process the film, and there is no shortage of magazines in the Group. At 51 Base, a Corporal Armourer is available to give assistance on gyro assessors. This N.C.O. has constructed all the Gyro Assessors in use in the Group, and the present compact and efficient rig is his product. Units requiring his services should contact 51 Base Armament Officer. The Gyro Assessors are not to be left in aircraft which are engaged on night flying as two assessors have already been lost through aircraft with gyros fitted, crashing on night flying.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] M.T. SPARES [/underlined]
Concern Is being caused by the unserviceability of M.T. vehicles in general, and every effort should be made by Equipment Officers to review establishments and ensure that demands are raised regularly to keep stocks of the generally used items up to maximum. It is impracticable and uneconomical to hold stocks of the many parts which not only vary with the make of vehicles but also with the diverse models of each make of vehicle, which again vary according to the year of manufacture. Therefore all M.T. Officers must anticipate requirements for inspection overhauls and other contingencies where certain parts are known to be badly worn and will need replacement in the near future. [Underlined] At least two weeks’ [/underlined] notice of these requirements should be given to the Equipment Officer, and Forms 674 should not only state for what purpose the spares are required, but the approximate date the replacement is required; the chassis and engine number of the vehicle MUST in all cases be quoted. Demands will then be raised in accordance with A.M.O. A.481/43.
[Underlined] A.E.C. TANKER FUEL HOSES [/underlined] (Stores Ref 4K/2009) have for some considerable time been in very short supply, and the chief cause for this is the difficulty in the manufacture of sufficient protective coverings. Bomber Command have now agreed to accept these hoses without this covering and as a result it is anticipated that the supply position will improve considerably within the next two months. In the meantime, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for the repair of these hoses by the manufacturer, under Station local purchase powers.
It is understood that Messrs. Zwicky of Slough (telephone: Slough 23776) are prepared to sell these hoses to the Service, but stations are only to resort to local purchase in extreme cases, where operational efficiency is directly affected and supplies cannot be obtained through Service channels.
A meeting of Base and Station Equipment Officers was held at this Headquarters during the month, when points of mutual interest were discussed, with a view to giving even better service than in the past, to all and sundry.
Before closing the meeting, the A.O.C. spoke highly of the service given by the Equipment Branch. This, naturally, was most gratifying, for sometimes we feel that quite a lot of people look upon us as mere “dogsbodies”, and give no thought to the time, patience and methods (sometimes very unorthodox) adopted in an endeavour to produce the goods.
(Continued from page10, col. 2)
Fiskerton, where the return of aircraft was described, and aircrew were interviewed.
Dunholme received a short visit of the Hon. Herman Hodge, of the Colonial Office, and a B.B.C. recording unit, on 21st March.
Press visitors during the month included representatives of “The Star”, Sheffield, to the Sheffield Squadron at Fiskkerton, on March 15th, and Mrs K. Wilson of the “Sydney Morning Herald”, to Waddington on 31st March.
TRAINING
The Stirling is becoming slowly but surely a nicely house-trained creature. It can be taken out for long or short trips with few difficulties that delay training and rend the tempers of Lancaster loving instructors. The lurid language of February, which produced a glow like unto many batteries of sodiums, is scarcely remembered. Perhaps ‘tis Spring and everything is set for an ideal world.
The L.F.S. at Syerston achieved great success with 93 crews passed out to Squadrons and the H.C.U’s were in no way overshadowed, for they passed on 98 crews for Lancaster training. The outlook for April is therefore fairly good, and squadrons may look forward with confidence to a reasonably early increase in crews, weather permitting.
It is a matter of real regret that accidents have marred an otherwise good month, and may have dragged 5 Group to the bottom of the ladder. A promise has however, been extracted from all and sundry, that 5 Group shall move to the top in April and there will be no avoidable accidents in 51 Base. The heavy snow fall, and the resultant snow banks were chiefly responsible- or perhaps it was the determination to get on with flying and crew output, despite the snow banks.
The April programme is optimistic indeed. There is a measure of quiet confidence about, and if results come up to expectation a new high standard will have been set for Conversion Bases. The results will be seen in better trained and more experienced crews, and we hope the squadrons will not be reluctant to pay the Units a visit and express their appreciation.
Fighter Affiliation Training is now being carried out in Units with detachments of 1690 Flight (1485 regenerated) and an improvement in Gunnery standards is expected.
Synthetic Fishpond training has been introduced, and is likely to be adopted generally.
Recent changes include Group Captain Vintras to command Wigsley; Wing Commander Baxter (106) to Chief Instructor, Swinderby; Wing Commander Jennings (207) to Wing Commander Training, 51 Base; Wing Commander MacFarlane (51 Base) to Chief Instructor Wigsley, and Wing Commander Hallows (5 Group) to Chief Instructor, Winthorpe.
Squadron Leader Osborne (1660) is training Lancaster instructors at Syerston, and also Wing Commanders “Ops” from operational Bases. Squadron Leader Shields and Flight Lieutenant Wyness (1654) are training Stirling instructors at Swinderby. Both “Academies [sic] are doing well.
ABSENCE
ENEMY AGENTS – ABSENTEES
During the coming months, the Allied Forces are likely to be called upon for a maximum effort on land, sea and air, to defeat the enemy.
No. 5 Group will certainly be expected to take its full part in this effort, and there can be no doubt that at heart every man and woman serving in the Group would agree that he or she was going to do it. In spite of all these good intentions there are still far too many absentees, aircrew and ground staff alike. Not long absences, just a few hours or a few days, but absences just the same, at a time when the manpower position simply cannot afford absentees. There isn’t a Tom there now to do Dick’s work while he slips off to see the Dog-races, and there isn’t a Joan there to drive that van while Mary goes off to her sister’s wedding.
[Cartoon] WFW
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE
Of course those two extra days at home in the garden with the wife were well worth two days pay, and even a bit of C.C. as well, and that special party was well worth a day’s pay and a rep., but that isn’t the point. It’s to have days at home in the garden and special parties that we are fighting this war. There might very well not be a garden or wife at all if the Germans laid down the orders for us, and we should certainly not be the ones to enjoy any parties that were arranged.
There is this special point for aircrews to remember too. You work together as a team and your captain has to have complete confidence in each one of his crew or he cannot give his best to his job. If you have let him down by going absent once or twice during training is he going to have that confidence and is he going to feel quite certain that you’re not absent(minded) in that rear turret? It might make all the difference!
If you’re absent on the ground, you’re quite likely to be absent in the air; it’s all a matter of self-discipline, and that’s the same in each case.
In this war, no-one in the services can be a neutral; if you don’t do a day’s work for the Allies, you are doing a day’s work for the Axis, and at the end of the war your Form 121 will show just how many days you put in fighting [underlined] for [/underlined] Hitler. If you put it that way, that day’s absence doesn’t look so good, so cut it out and [underlined] don’t be an enemy agent. [/underlined]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The semi final between Coningsby and Scampton was a tremendous affair. From the kick off, Scampton’s attack went all out, and Coningsby’s defence is to be congratulated on the way they held them. Coningsby’s attack improved, and the game swung from goal to goal. Ten minutes before half time, Coningsby centre headed a goal from a corner kick. After the break, Scampton forced the pace and equalised after ten minutes with a shot that gave the Coningsby goalie no chance. Both sides were all out in an endeavour to snatch the lead. Coningsby left wing repeatedly broke away and centred, but nobody could connect. By three quarters time both teams were slackening as a result of the terrific pace; both defences, and especially the goalies, were coping brilliantly. A draw seemed inevitable. Then came the turning point; Coningsby attacked, their left half was well up the field, and instead of the usual pass to the wing he made ground, then shot hard and true for the top corner. The last 15 minutes of the game saw repeated Coningsby attacks, and five minutes from time they got a third goal. It was a magnificent game, and Coningsby are to be congratulated on entering the final via such a tremendous obstacle in the powerful Scampton team.
Round two produced a hard fought duel between Winthorpe and Metheringham. Two draws were played, 1-1 and 3-3 after extra time in each game. In the third game Winthorpe won 4 – 1, and are now due to play Skellingthorpe at Swinderby in the semi final.
[Underlined] THE LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE RUGGER COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has been a failure as a Group competition, but has been an immense success in 53 Base where 86 teams in all have taken part. Very few casualties have resulted in the large number of games played, the most serious being a broken collar bone, which is undoubtedly more than could be claimed for a Soccer competition boasting a equivalent number of entrants. The event must now be considered a 53 Base monopoly, since in spite of many appeals from this Headquarters, no other squadrons have got cracking. The inter unit play off will be at Waddington within the next few days (to be signalled to all stations) and it is hoped that Stations will provide transport for as many of their aircrew personnel as possible to witness the play off.
[Underlined] THE WINES RUGGER TROPHY [/underlined]
Round two of the competition saw Winthorpe beat Scampton 14 – 11 in a hard fought game. Dunholme beat Swinderby 8 – 0, so these two teams pass to the semi final. Round two games still undecided are – Waddington v Metheringham/Woodhall and East Kirkby v Fiskerton. It is hoped those Stations will complete the events within the next few days.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
Swinderby are now in the semi final, and the outstanding matches are – Waddington v Metheringham. Syerston v Scampton and East Kirkby v 5 Group. These three games should be decided within the next week.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played six station matches with the very fine result of 4 wins. Their only loss was with Coningsby in the Matz semi-final. They beat A.V. Roe 5 – 4 in the 3rd round of the Lincoln Amateur Cup, and drew 0 - 0 with R.A.F. Wickenby in the semi-final of the Amateur Cup.
DUNHOLME had a busy but rather unsuccessful month. They lost their 3rd round Matz Cup game 2 – 3 to Coningsby, and their 3rd round in the Amateur Cup by the same score to R.A.F. Wickenby.
CONINGSBY – The highlight of the Coningsby month, indeed to quote 54 Base excellent “GEN” – of the season, was their MATZ Cup victory over Scampton. Intersection league games were fewer than usual owing to the bad weather. 619 v 617 and 106 v 61 are also games due this month in the Base Commander’s “All Sports” Trophy.
METHERINGHAM – The duel with Winthorpe in the 2nd round of the Matz Cup was most notable. Weather caused cancellations of no fewer than 10 games, but five inter-section games were completed.
BARDNEY played 4 station matches, playing the 1st Border Regt. twice (1 win 3 – 2, 1 draw 1 – 1), beating Metheringham 3 – 2 and losing to Coningsby by the same margin. 5 inter-section games were completed.
EAST KIRKBY Station XI played 4 games, and won all four, beating Kirkby and Spilsby R.A.F.R. teams and two Field-Craft Airborne Units. In the seven inter-section events, 630 – B Flight were most successful.
SPILSBY had seven games during the month. Their R.A.F.R. Squadron beat East Kirkby R.A.F.R. Squadron 7 – 2, and the local Suffolks 9 – 3, losing 4 – 2 to Kirkby and 3 – 2 to R.A.F. Skegness.
H.Q. 5 GROUP – The Group side are still only able to play away fixtures. In March they had three games, losing to a Scampton team 2 – 3, to Skellingthorpe 0 – 4, and holding their old opponents 93 M.U. to a 2 – 2 draw.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON had only the two games completed due to cancellations by opponents. They lost to Hemswell 0 – 3 and to Winthorpe 11 – 14 in round two of the Wines Cup.
DUNHOLME have a really strong side led by F/L Waterhouse. They overwhelmed Bardney 33 – 0 in round 1 of the Wines Cup, and have since beaten Swinderby 8 – 0 in round two.
METHERINGHAM list 0 – 27 to Waddington, and were unlucky to have six games postponed, their opponents including Digby, Bardney and Coningsby.
BARDNEY had only one station game, in which they were unlucky to meet Dunholme on top of their form in the Wines Cup, and suffer a 33 – 0 defeat.
EAST KIRKBY had three games, a 630 Squadron A and B practice game, and a 57 Squadron A and B practice, followed by a station A and B trial. In spite of this preparation they were unlucky enough to forego their Wines Cup round one as Wigsley could not raise a side. They are now waiting to play Fiskerton in the second round.
HOCKEY
SCAMPTON had four games of mixed hockey, beating Spilsby 6 – 1 in round one of the Group competition, and Foldingsworth 5 – 0. They lost 2 – 3 to 368 Searchlight Battery and 1 – 5 to Rose Bros. In the second round of the cup they have now to play Syerston.
DUNHOLME had only one mixed hockey game, v Scampton in the Group competition, which they lost 1 – 4.
METHERINGHAM played a 2 – 2 draw with Waddington on their new aerodrome pitch. They are now due to play Waddington again in the Group contest.
BARDNEY neat Dunholme 4 – 1 in the Group contest, and later registered a 4 – 1 win against Waddington. They were finally knocked out of the trophy by Swinderby (5 – 1).
EADT KIRKBY had four games, three inter-station and one (a 1- 1 draw) with Spilsby G.S. They are now waiting to meet 5 Group at home in the contest.
SPILSBY played Scampton in the Group trophy, but were defeated 6 – 1.
[Underlined] ICE HOCKEY [/underlined]
54 Base boast a Canadian Cougars’ team that is certainly 100% full blooded, judging from the “GEN” account of their 5 – 4 victory over Digby Dynamites.
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
F/Lt. Rodgers (Gunnery Leader 617) now has a Woodhall Soft Ball team that challenges all comers. Roll up, roll up, and have your money ready!!
(Continued on page 4, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
Dot and Dash, the immaculate WAAFs.
“…OPERATIONS? I’VE ‘AD ‘EM!”
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Navigation generally has been of a high order this month. There is still room for considerable improvement however. A good many of the Navigators’ Charts still look very bare. Although all aircraft are equipped with Air Position Indicators, a few Navigators still do not “keep an air plot”, in that they do not plot their Air Position regularly and obtain a D.R. position. This is most important and must be done. A standard Navigational procedure to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s, has been laid down (see Air Staff Instruction Nav/14). We are constantly striving for concentration, and for obvious reasons the concentration should be on the planned track, it is therefore imperative that you constantly obtain your D.R. position by intelligent use of the broadcast w/v’s. If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, then alter course immediately and regain track.
The A.P.I. has been modified, and the error in this instrument is now very small. If the windfinders obtain accurate fixes on their H 2 S, the resultant w/v should be almost perfect. Navigators should, therefore, have every confidence in the broadcast w/v’s and make the fullest possible use of them.
Whilst track keeping is very important, it must be remembered that timing is equally important. This does not seem to be fully appreciated, and a few Navigators still persist om leaving the concentration point with “a few minutes in hand”. Other aircraft inadvertently leave the concentration point a few minutes late (possibly due to late take-off, etc.) with the result that the stream of aircraft is very much longer than it should be, and the chance of success by the German night fighter is increased. If it is calculated that the aircraft will arrive at the concentration point early, then dog-legs [underlined] must [/underlined] be carried out before reaching this position. All Navigation Officers are to check the time at the concentration point of each aircraft, and they must insist that no aircraft leaves this position with any time in hand.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
All aircraft of the Group are now equipped with the A.P.I. fully modified. Several tests have been carried out to ascertain the accuracy of this instrument now it has been modified, and the results have shown that the error is now very small, and of the order of 3 or 4 m.p.h. We must, therefore, make every use of this valuable instrument. It is considered by a few Navigators that errors arise when resetting the A.P.I. Mechanically this is not so, and any errors are due to incorrect setting by the Navigator. If the A.P.I. is reset every 30 minutes, as it should be, then the amount to be subtracted or added to the counters should not be great, and would not generally be more that 30-35 minutes of latitude or longitude. For ease and simplicity, the A.P.I. should not be reset until the latitude or longitude counters are showing an even number of minutes, e.g. 10, 20, 30, etc. It should then be a simple matter to add or subtract say 25 minutes of latitude or longitude.
It is advocated by a small section of the “Union” that the A.P.I. should be reset as little as possible, e.g. at the last Gee fix, the target, and first Gee fix, etc., but this method has several disadvantages. It will become cumbersome after a long period of D.R. e.g. the Berlin raid 24/25 March, 1944, when the wind vector from target to Enemy Coast was approx. 230 miles long. There is as great a risk of error in plotting this vector as in resetting the A.P.I. Another disadvantage is that the Air Position may run off the chart in use. This would necessitate carrying several charts.
The Air Position Indicator is a valuable instrument if correctly used. Navigators are urged to experiment with the A.P.I. in the various methods of use, and discuss with their Station Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
March was a mixed month for broadcast w/v’s. The wind finding and resultant track keeping was good, with the exception of Berlin and Nuremburg. The last two mentioned raids have been investigated, and the results are worthy of special comment.
[Underlined] Berlin. [/underlined] Average forecast w/v from Base to Target at 20,000 feet was 350/60. Average w/v transmitted was 350/90. Average true w/v was approximately 350/105. It will be noted that the winds transmitted by Aircraft were, on average, 15 m.p.h. under strength. A large percentage of windfinders obtained the accurate w/v, but only a few transmitted it. The remainder either did not send it, or, not believing there could be such a large error in the forecast w/v’s, “watered it down” and sent that. This procedure is very dangerous. Navigators must send back all w/v’s they obtain, providing they are confident the fixes used are accurate.
Another feature of the Berlin raid was the delay in aircraft sending back w/v’s. All the difficulties experienced by aircrew are fully appreciated, but every effort must be made to get the w/v’s back to Base as soon as possible.
[Underlined] Nuremburg. [/underlined] The investigation into this raid has not yet been completed, but the one outstanding feature is that the wind direction at and above 20,000 feet backed by 15° - 20° and this was a contributory factor to the Northerly trend on the return journey.
[Underlined] LIAISON VISITS [/underlined
Only a few liaison visits have been completed during the month. It is very difficult for operational Station and Squadron Navigational Officers to visit the Con. Units or Scampton Aircrew School, but every effort should be made. Make a note of all the deficiencies of Navigators, your suggestions, criticisms etc., then go and discuss them with the Con. Unit or Scampton. More good can be done by paying one liaison visit than by writing a hundred letters. Con. Unit, L.F.S. and Scampton Instructors must also pay regular visits to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
During the month, one Navigator from each Squadron was detailed to experiment with Log and Chart work. Each was asked to work almost entirely on the Chart, making only a very few log entries. This method has proved very popular. Full reports are not yet to hand, but an analysis of all reports will be sent to Stations and Squadrons in due course.
1. If the D.R. Compass topples, and the repeater rotates, what action would you take to maintain the line of flight marker on the H 2 S correctly orientated?
2. What action would you take to tune in the ground returns and set up the height marker on the H 2 S equipment if the trace on the height tube were missing?
3. You are using broadcast wind velocities, and the Bomb Aimer gives you a pinpoint which is “off track”. What two actions would you take?
4. You have received an amendment to the zero hour, but, having applied the correction, observe that you still have several minutes in hand. How and where would you lose this time?
5. In which countries are the following towns: Strasbourg, Aix-le Chappelle, Flensburg, Ghent, Pilsen, Charlattenburg?
6. Which is the shorter distance – Stuttgart to ROME or Stuttgart to LONDON?
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. (a) Passes to W/Optr. On paper (1) Course, (2) Height, (3) I.A.S., (4) present position, (5) estimated time of ditching, (6) reason for ditching. ( )
(b) Obtain a Gee fix and pass to W/Op., on paper, the Gee co-ordinates and time of fix.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Few crews carry out correct procedure, which is – the emergency procedure when ditching is considered unavoidable, S.O.S. procedure when ditching is imminent within 15 minutes.
2. 30°
3. If B strobe is missing. Line up signals in usual manner, and take “C” reading. Then reverse signals so that B signal is on the C trace, strobe the signal and take the reading remembering to subtract 30. If “C” strobe is missing, reverse above procedure and add 30 to the “C” pulse reading.
4. (a) It means that you are heading for high ground.
(b) Turn on reciprocal course and obtain a check on your position. If no reliable aids are available in the aircraft, the Navigator should request W/Op. to obtain an M/F D/F fix.
Lines to those who went on leave on April 4th.
For you the birds tra-la do sing!
For me the heavens do glower and rain!
For you buds burst like anything!
My buds ‘gainst blight do strive in vain!
The reason’s simple why I grieve,’
And why my downtrod soul doth pine;
For you continue with your leave,
But I’ve just heard that I’ve had mine!!
ANON (Circa 1944)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ANOTHER BAD MONTH [/underlined]
The [underlined] Avoidable [/underlined] Accident Summary for March again makes bad reading – Squadrons had 9 and Training Base had 33. These figures speak for themselves, and they use pretty strong language. As a result of these accidents, 4 aircraft were CAT “E”, 6 were CAT “B”, 20 were CAT AC” and 12 were CAT “A”. Bear in mind these were only avoidable accidents. Technical failures are not included in this list. Details are as follows:-
Ground collisions (including taxying) – 15; overshoot landing – 3; crashes on 3-engined overshoots – 3; swings on take off – 5; swings landing – 4; errors of judgement landing – 5; heavy landings – 3; maintenance – 2; taking off – 1; other errors of judgement – 1: Total [underlined] 42 [/underlined].
The snow period at the beginning of the month was directly responsible for 14 of these accidents, all within 51 Base. Had there been no hard snow banks, no damage would have been done to these aircraft. The hazard had to be accepted, and no action was on these “snow” accidents. Under this heading there were 5 taxying, 7 swinging and 2 landing. This however, still leaves 19 avoidable accidents in 51 Base, in the usual categories, and 9 in squadrons – total 28, as under:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined] – Ground collisions – 3; overshoot landing – 2; maintenance errors – 2; other errors of judgement – 2.
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined] Ground collisions – 7; swings – 2; overshoot landing 1; heavy landings – 2; other landing errors – 4; crashes on 3 engined overshoots – 3.
Collisions on the ground (10) still account for more damaged aircraft than any other category. There were two more M.T. collisions this month, both due to careless driving by ground personnel, in spite of the recent drive to eliminate these costly entirely inexcusable accidents. One aircraft was damaged during compass swinging at a squadron, and two more were damaged on dispersal. In the others, only a very slight degree of carelessness was shown by aircrew. They were more unfortunate than anything else. Apart from the M.T. collisions, there has not been an instance this month of down right careless taxying, which is a step in the right direction.
The swings were by inexperienced pilots, both of whom took the correct action after the swing developed. This action avoided serious damage. One of the heavy landings was made in difficult wind conditions, the other only accentuated damage which had been started as a result of previous heavy landings; both pilots were under training.
Three aircraft crashed on 3 engined overshoots – two Stirlings and one Lancaster. It is hoped that the revised technique of dealing with three engined landings at Conversion Units will minimise these three engined accidents. The overshoot landing at Training Base was also made on three engines. The pilot hesitated between landing and going round again, decided on one, then changed his mind; he finished up in the overshoot area. Overshoots on the squadrons were made under extremely difficult circumstances. One was made on two engines, and in the other, visibility was practically nil.
(Continued on page 15, col. 3)
ORGANISATION
[Underlined] (MAY BE READ BY AIRCREW TYPES) [/underlined]
When the so-called “brained types” of the Royal Air Force are binding round the fireplace in the mess, they sometimes utter the most amazing theories on how the war can be won on a date earlier than that already forecast by Lindoe. But no one tries to make a note of what is said by these Fuehrers, except, maybe, to insert a few rude remarks in the local “Line Book”.
When, however, an observation is made that is clever and helpful, quotations are extracted and issued to the world at large. Such an extract is made in Section 1 of A.P.837 – “Principles of Administration”.
An extract from the Manual says “A good organisation requires competent management to produce satisfactory results”. In the Royal Air Force, this management of the [underlined] ORGANISATION [/underlined] is called Administration; it is the system whereby, in principle and in executive detail, the Service carries out its function ….TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY….!!!... and to work efficiently, co-operation is essential. (Co-operation, by the way, is something to which every member of a Service contributes).
Another famous quotation by Socrates, was to the effect that “A disorderly mob is no more an army than a “pranged” aircraft a fighting machine”. The bits and pieces must be [underlined] organised. [/underlined]
So, therefore, let’s have a look at organisation in action-theory is not sufficient, it must be applied.
With apologies to Tee Emm. here are a few “Do’s and Don’t s”.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] see that Orders issued are brief, complete and unambiguous. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] lay yourself open to being misunderstood. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that in your planning, you must always ask yourself who has to be consulted before you reach a decision, and who has to be informed of your decision.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] grasp the scope of the task, and foresee what it demands, with thoroughness and imagination. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] see with what other tasks run by other Sections, you must interlock. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] co-ordinate with your equals and underlings. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] plan until you are absolutely clear what is to be done. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] jump at the first solution. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] consider all the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] go off at half-cock.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] remember that in war, speed is nearly everything.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that ceaseless driving force and ceaseless supervision are essential.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] check and check again.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget, whatever your job, your ability to organise is every bit as important to the Service as a whole, whether you are throwing an aircraft about the sky, or writing Railway Warrants.
ENGINEERING
Early returns for the month of March were about average, and cancellations were much reduced. Cancellations for March were 0.98%, a considerable improvement on the 3.47% recorded for February. Early Returns for March were 4.01% for all causes, again, an improvement on February’s figures which were 6.5%.
Serviceability was generally good, the main causes of unserviceability being:-
1. Aircraft on acceptance checks.
2. Aircraft on minor inspection.
3. Aircraft landing away from base due to diversion.
The number of sorties flown by this Group is again a record, but still greater numbers will be expected during the coming months.
The maintenance statistics staff are still at Waddington and very soon experiments will proceed with a 75 hour maintenance cycle, using the revised maintenance schedule.
Much unnecessary engine running is taking place on the ground, and the method of some of the running is harsh and detrimental to the engine. C.T.O’s must ensure that all N.C.O’s and men who “run up” engines are qualified to do so, and that they have passed the necessary test.
Many cases have been noticed where on a ground run a mag drop has been experienced, and the fitter at the controls has run the engine up three or four times “hoping! It may clear. This is a waste of time, imposes heavy loads on the engine, and proves the man in the cockpit does not know his job.
Another point about ground running is that much damage is done on a ground test by inspection panels and turret covers not being secure, and being damaged by the slipstream. C.T.O’s must have a drive on this, and when they see it happening, check the man at the controls and the N.C.O. i/c aircraft.
[Underlined] RENDITION OF FORMS 765C [/underlined]
The remarks on Form 765C by the specialist officers are in many cases too brief and are of no assistance to this Headquarters in attempting to establish a cause, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the trouble which led to the forced landing or failure. This is liable to indicate, in the case of engine trouble, that the cause is not investigated thoroughly at the Station. As it is known that the cause is always investigated it is small trouble to insert more details in the paragraph provided in the 765C for Specialist’s remarks, and it will save a large amount of correspondence and telephone calls between Group and Stations. If a full technical report is to follow after rendition of the 765C then of course this should be stated in the appropriate paragraph.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Serviceability of Stirling and Lancaster aircraft by Unit]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 14.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
This has been a month of records, and on one occasion a period of sweat, toil, and almost tears.
To create a record with the existing power available, whether it be sprinting, car racing or bombing up, it is necessary to exclude wasted energy. As man power cannot be increased and new armament records must be realised, it is essential that this strive for maximum efficiency be closely investigated.
Wasted energy in the bombing up phase of operations is too often attributed to shortage of equipment, bomb trollies, small bomb containers, Whitlocks, Hampden twins, liners; even spanners. It is admitted that there is a shortage of some of these items; all the more reason why the few available should be kept serviceable; further, if failures and faults occur, an expedient system of repair must be instituted. A flat tyre on a bomb trolley, a few popped rivets on a small bomb container, small faults, easily remedied, but if allowed to accumulate they may easily cause a bottleneck in the repair section and eventually a complete breakdown.
A large percentage of the necessary repairs are caused by mishandling. Bombing up parties must not be allowed to model on the popular conception of a dockyard stevedore.
A release slip that fails is a bomb returned, and a stupendous effort is wasted, especially as it is necessary to cart the weapon back to the bomb dump. Do not therefore allow speed to interfere with the quality of workmanship.
Short cuts and new devices of local manufacture, such as tools and loading platforms save time, and time saved is man hours of effort that can be directed to raising the standard of workmanship, and thus increasing the tonnage dropped on the enemy.
New records will be set, so prepare now for every eventuality.
Load the [underlined] GOODS [/underlined] so that our colleagues the aircrew may deliver them.
[Underlined] WARNING TO WANTONS [/underlined]
A rumour is rife that by trial, a certain Group discovered that if the centre station release mechanism is plugged to the rear turret electric heating system, and the gunner turns on his heated clothing, the following incidents occur:-
(a) A large bomb goes through the bomb doors.
(b) The rear gunner is practically electrocuted.
(c) Pandemonium reigns in the aircraft.
(The Group and Unit concerned prefer to remain anonymous.)
[Underlined] FIREWORKS [/underlined]
To alleviate the somewhat chaotic state brought about by the increase in the use of target markers and indicators, and the need for an improved system of supply, it has been decided to form a pyrotechnical park at Woodhall. It is intended that this park should hold a quantity sufficient to supply any Station at short notice, and that any technical information regarding these new and unheralded devices will be available from that source.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
A word of appreciation is directed to the transport sections, who undertook many nocturnal journeys to ensure prompt deliveries of bombs in readiness for operations.
[Underlined] FAILURES [/underlined]
This month a total of 2 cancellations and 7 Early Returns were attributed to Armament. Although this represents a decided improvement on last month’s figures, it is still too high. The total of 9 abortive sorties were due to:-
(i) 3 Gunners’ “boobs”.
(ii) 1 aircraft returned early as a result of a sticky Palmer Firing Valve, the result of a tight gland nut on the valve spindle.
(iii) 1 aircraft was not bombed up in time for take-off and consequently cancelled.
(iv) 4 aircraft returned with unserviceable tail turrets due to defects in technical equipment, i.e.
(a) A broken ball bearing resulted in a seized vane oil motor.
(b) Spline shaft of the E.D.P. sheared.
(c) Pressure pipe union at the Engine Driven Pump fractured during flight – exit the last old type flex pipe in the Group.
(d) Collapsed gun ram washer.
From this analysis it can be seen that at least 5 out of 9 abortive sorties could, and should, have been avoided. After deducting the three gunners’ “boobs” and 4 failures due to defective equipment, Armament can say with satisfaction, that they were responsible for only two abortive sorties out of a total of 1720 sorties flown. (.116%) – Good show!! A record number of sorties flown, a record tonnage dropped on the Hun and an all-time low of abortive sorties.
There is, however, grave cause for alarm regarding small bomb container compartment hang-ups. Although a greater tonnage than ever before was dropped, so also was a greater tonnage returned to the bomb store, and unfortunately over 50% of the failures were caused by carelessness. Of 102 S.B.C. hang-ups there were 60 maintenance failures directly attributed to severed and trapped leads.
These maintenance failures cannot be accepted, and it is obvious that the present system of supervision during bombing up needs overhaul.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE + = H 2 S Squadron
ACCIDENTS
(Continued from page 14, col.1)
The other landing accidents occurred in 51 Base. They consisted of collapsing of Stirling under-carriages after touch-down. These have not yet been fully investigated.
The remaining “error of judgement” occurred in a squadron. The aircraft crashed in the circuit at dusk. The reason for this crash is still obscure, and has only been included because investigation at this stage does not suggest technical failure of any kind.
A fatal accident took place this month in the Waddington circuit. A Lancaster collided in mid-air with a 1 Group aircraft on its way home to base. Responsibility for the accident has not yet been allocated, but it brings home once again the necessity for keeping a thorough look-out at all times. The pilot of an aircraft is naturally preoccupied in the circuit with his cockpit drill etc., and it is up to the crew, especially the gunners to keep up a search all round. The natural tendency to look inside the circuit at the flarepath must be resisted.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 15.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The opening months of the year have each [missing word] noteworthy contributions to the Bomber Offensive, and this month has proved no exception. Not only have we established a new sortie peak of 1720, but our achievements also include the distinction of being the first Group in the field to drop over 1000 tons in one night on a single target. The high percentage of successes (89.7%) was maintained despite the set-back of two abortive operations, and losses remained a constant 3.37%.
The principal role of the Group, outside the main force “blitz” targets, has been the continuation of the offensive, commenced last month, against Germany’s aircraft production – an essential prelude to the establishment of a Second Front. This offensive has been rewarded by no mean success.
The attack on 2/3rd March against ALBERT resulted in the total destruction of the aero-engine factory of Cle Mecanique d’Albert, with the aircraft factory of S.N.C.A. du Nord more than half destroyed – an impressive result.
MARIGNANE, singled out for attack on the 9/10th, also sustained extremely severe damage, particularly to the assembly shop, heat treatment shop, offices, flight hangar, components’ store, garages, workshops and other buildings in the factory area.
The following night (namely the 10/11th), an ambitious programme was conducted against aircraft factories at CHATEAUROUX, CLERMOND FERRAND and OSSUN, and the Needle Bearing Factory at LA RICAMARIE. Interpretation of P.R.U. photographs provides evidence of the high measure of success which attended these missions. Thirteen buildings comprising the larger part of the workshops of S.N.C.A. du Sud-Ouest Chateauroux, have been destroyed or severely damaged, including the main assembly store, transformer house and other key buildings. The aircraft repair factory at CLERMOND FERRAND has received major damage throughout, including two large multi-bay buildings, compounding plant and power station – the latter now being observed to be inactive – OSSUN Factory airfield bears its scars in the form of severe damage to the two larger factory buildings and other ancillary buildings. The devastation at LA RICAMARIE is particularly acute. The eastern two thirds of the plant has suffered heavily, and every building, with one exception, has been either damaged or destroyed.
Three persistent attacks against the Sigma Aero Engine Works, LYONS, on 23/24th, 25/26th and again on 29/30th, terminated in sixteen out of the 22 buildings comprising the Factory receiving varying degrees of damage, in addition to which a neighbouring hutted encampment has been virtually destroyed.
A further two nights out of the month were devoted with great profit to the firing of Hun powder magazines. The results were impressive indeed, and upheld the high hopes of the crews. BERGERAC on 18/19th took the count in the first round. The east end of the plant is almost completely demolished, while the nitration houses and acid recovery plant are severely damaged, with evidence of severe blast throughout the Factory. ANGOULEME, attacked on 20/21st, was still burning the day following the raid, and severe damage throughout the target area, particularly to the nitro-cellulose plant, can be seen.
We, as a Group, also played a small, but nevertheless noteworthy part in the attack against the enemy’s communications supplying his Channel Ports. AULNOYE was selected as our target, and the ensuing attack on 25/26th resulted in the central portion of one of the carriage and wagon repair shop being damaged. Rather more than twenty direct hits have been secured on the tracks – and the locomotive shed to the south is half destroyed.
An outstandingly successful attack was made on 16/17th against the CLERMOND FERRAND MICHELIN PLANT – not a building of which escaped. Severe damage is displayed throughout the entire area.
Seven major attacks were undertaken during the month. STUTTGART was our first objective on 1/2nd and again on 15/16th. The heaviest concentration of damage from these attacks is seen to the North West and North East of the town centre, where many factories of high priority are situated. Throughout the town, scattered incidents to business and residential property are apparent.
FRANKFURT on 18/19th and 22/23rd, was spectacular, not only by reason of the success of the attack, but because the Group seized the unique opportunity of unloading bombs exceeding 1000 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the target. Some 12 hours after the second attack, columns of smoke were rising to 15,000 feet, and drifting southwards for at least 200 miles – a grave spectacle for dwellers in the South of the Reich. The principal damage is concentrated in the city centre, stretching a scarred arm northwards between the railway station and east harbour.
No month would be complete without an attack on the “Big City”. Limited cover only was available the day following the raid on 24/25th, but from the provisional report (which omits reference to the centre and the east), the potential results can be contemplated with some optimism. At the time of photography, fires were still burning.
For some months, rebuilding in ESSEN has been stealthily proceeding, and the night of 26/27th was selected as a favourable opportunity to disrupt this activity. PR.U. photographs are of poor quality, but fresh damage can be identified in many parts of the town, and in the workshops of Krupps. A full report is awaited.
The final bout of the month witnessed a bitter struggle with the enemy’s fighter defences throughout the deep penetration to NURNBERG on 30/31st, involving our heaviest loss so far recorded. Our aircraft, however, put up a spirited defence, shooting down a number of the enemy. The losses were not a small price to pay, even for a successful attack on this extremely important war production centre, but the casualties can perhaps be placed in their proper perspective, and to some extent minimised, when viewing the Battle of Germany as a whole. It is difficult to place any assessment on the raid owing to cloud conditions, and P.R.U. cover has not yet been obtained.
To speculate on the value of our contribution towards the opening of the Second Front is obviously vain, but there can be no doubt that the month’s activity has left its mark clearly impressed on the Reich.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of statistics on aircraft, sorties, bombing and training by Squadron]
ORDER OF MERIT in this table is now based on the number of SUCCESSFUL sorties completed, per average aircraft on charge, i.e. Total number of sorties minus Early Returns and Missing, divided by Average A/C on charge. No 617 Squadron, in view of their special task, are shown separately.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944.
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V Group News, March 1944
5 Group News, March 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 20, March 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about processes of navigation, signals/radar, photography, gardening, Gee, flying control, H2S, decorations, tactics, flight engineers, war savings, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, air sea rescue, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, public relations, link trainer, equipment, training absence, sports, navigation, accidents, organisation, engineering, armament, accidents, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-03
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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17 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-24
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France--Albert
France--Bergerac
France--Châteauroux
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--La Ricamarie
France--Lyon
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
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1944-03
5 Group
Absent Without Leave
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
FIDO
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Scampton
RAF Waddington
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Base [underlined] Int [/underlined]
Wadd 9
Skell 10
[Indecipherable]
Base 1
minuted
V GROUP NEWS V
APRIL 1944 [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 21
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Last month I said that it was up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that we were right in our view that night bombing could be made more accurate than day bombing. During April we have gone a long way towards furnishing the proof. The concentration of bombs which was achieved during some of the attacks, notably those on the marshalling yards at La Chappelle and Juvisy, and against some of the small aircraft factories, was outstanding, and probably represents the greatest weight of bombs in a small areas which has yet been achieved in this war.
By previous standards, therefore, our results have been excellent. But there is still much more to be done before we can afford to be satisfied. We can, however, say that the system of marking, which was pioneered by W/Cdr Cheshire and 617 Squadron, has been applied with success to larger operations, including the highly successful attack on Munich. Nevertheless, in all our attacks during April we inflicted less damage than could have been caused by the weight of bombs carried, and I want crews to think carefully over the reasons which I outline below and to take note of the remedies which are being applied.
[Underlined] Communications [/underlined]
On nearly all targets a proportion of the effort was misplaced due to a failure in communications. It is recognised that the T.R. 1196 operates on an unsuitable frequency and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the wireless link which, on occasions, has proved highly satisfactory, is not well suited to the transmission of anything except short instructions in a pre-arranged code. The solution to these communication problems is the introduction of V.H.F. throughout the Group and this policy has now been approved by the Air Ministry although some little time must elapse before all squadrons are fitted. In the meantime, Wireless Operators must ensure a very high degree of efficiency in handling communications.
[Underlined] Smoke [/underlined]
The smoke given off by the bombs has, on many occasions, obscured, or partially obscured, the markers and has made bomb aiming exceedingly difficult during later stages of an attack. Delay action fuses will soon be available once more and their use on certain types of target will ensure that the aiming point is clearly visible throughout the whole run up. An additional method of avoiding the smoke nuisance by aiming off, is described below.
[Underlined] Bombing Errors [/underlined]
There is no doubt that crew bombing errors are still too large and that the pattern of bombs plotted around these precision targets bears a remarkably close relationship to the pattern of bombs plotted around the practice targets at Wainfleet. A proportion of crews obtain good results up to the performance of the sight, which is well under 100 yards. Other crews seem content with results between 200 and 300 yards and a small proportion manage to drop bombs at even greater distances from heights of 10,000 feet or below. There are many causes for these errors but all can be remedied if crews determine that every load of bombs carried out of this country shall fall fair and square on the aiming point.
In the past, the majority of errors in practice bombing have been due to wrong winds, but this source of error should be virtually eliminated by the introduction of the A.P.I. wind finding method. This method will also be used by selected crews on operations so that the bombing winds transmitted to the main force should be more accurate than in the past.
A further source of bombing error has been unserviceable instruments and many Air Bombers are still failing to take the close personal interest in their bombsight which is essential if they are to obtain good results. Although the Instrument Repairer forms the fourth member of the bombing team, it is the Air Bomber who uses the instrument and who must ensure that any difficulties, however trivial, are immediately reported so that they can be put right.
A third main source of error arises out of the manner in which the Pilot flies the aircraft. I find that a number of pilots are still attempting to turn the aircraft flat when making their final corrections during the run up and I can only say to them that such action may easily throw the bombs off by 100 or 200 yards, and that every turn, however small, must be made with the appropriate angle of bank. Far better not to turn at all at the last moment rather than risk a sked. Even a skid of 2° or 3°.
Finally there are errors due to the Air Bomber. Errors which can only be avoided by constant practice in directing the pilot over objects on the ground on every flight; by learning how to adjust in plenty of time for a drift greater or less than that set on the sight. This will become of increasing importance with the introduction of the technique described below.
The accumulative effect of all these errors results in the employment of too many aircraft on each attack, or, put another way, we knock out too few targets each night with the force available. There are many targets which could be destroyed with the effort of a single squadron if the bombing errors could be reduced to 100 yards. These are targets which, at present, have to be attacked by a Base.
I have referred above to the new technique which is being introduced for attacks against small targets on which it is essential that the whole weight of bombs should fall. In the past we have endeavoured to put a marker on the aiming point and, if there were two or more aiming points to put down two or more markers. Examples are some of the railway marshalling yards, or the dispersed hangars making up the aircraft factories at Toulouse. There are several disadvantages in this method of marking. First, the markers often fall through the roofs of buildings and are consequently difficult to see. Secondly, they may be blown out by the concentrated bombing which follows or, if not blown out, obscured by smoke.
It is now proposed that the markers shall be laid by Mosquitos on the upwind edge of the target and that the bombs shall be displaced by the simple expedient of setting a false wind vector on the sight. Recent trials at Wainfleet have shown that a displacement of 300 yards does not unduly complicate the Air Bomber’s run up. If, therefore, the target is 1000 yards long or consists of scattered buildings, one aiming point will be put down and portions of the force will be given different wind settings which will offset their bombs accurately on to the various parts of the target which it is desired to erase. By this means, the target can be scientifically covered and improved results obtained from fewer aircraft.
Success depends, however, on accurate bombing and I would again ask all crews to tackle this problem and to determine that, during May, they will not be satisfied with a bombing error, whether on the practice ranges or against small precision targets, of more than 100 yards from the aiming point or the M.P.I. if a false wind has been applied.
Nothing can more quickly bring this war to a close than the regular achievement of bombing errors of this order.
The arrival in 5 Group of Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons on attachment from P.F.F. provides the Group with the means of marking targets with great accuracy and I consequently look forward to a steady reduction throughout May in the number of aircraft which have to be detailed for the destruction of these small targets, and by this means to a steady increase in the effective aid which this Group can give in the great offensive which lies ahead.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF SERVICING
One of the major problems of the Engineering Branch is to maintain large numbers of aircraft which are of very complex design, with a limited number of tradesmen and with the use of the minimum quantity of test equipment. At the same time, the serviceability state must be high; therefore the time taken over periodical maintenance must be short and the work efficiently carried out.
Early in the war the number of really experienced tradesmen was comparatively few. All the men were exceptionally keen, and to make full use of experienced tradesmen on jobs requiring the greatest amount of skill, a reorganisation of the system of aircraft maintenance was effected.
Originally the squadrons on a station worked as independent units, each squadron being divided into two or three flights according to the number of aircraft held. Each of these flights had its own separate maintenance “set up”, with all equipment required for minor and major inspections. Each of these flights also kept its own supply of spares and tools, and minor and major inspections on aircraft were carried out by the ground crew who remained with the aircraft for all purposes including daily servicing.
This was so obviously uneconomical, not only in equipment, spares and tools, but also in the employment of skilled men and expenditure of man hours, that the new scheme was brought into force very soon after the commencement of hostilities.
The maintenance layout then consisted of the Flying Flights and a Maintenance Flight. Squadrons were still maintained as separate units, but the detailed maintenance was carried out in “M” (Maintenance Flight), i.e. minor and major inspections, acceptance checks and engine or power plant changes, whilst in the Flying Flights, daily inspections, refuelling and rectification of petty unserviceability only was necessary. The man power was of course split up accordingly, the more skilled and experienced men forming the maintenance gangs, whilst the men with less experience were employed in the flying flights.
The economy was marked and as can be visualised, only one squadron store, one pool of ground equipment for aircraft inspections and one set of test equipment for the various ancilliary trades were necessary. The economy however which made itself felt as much as anything was the saving of man-hours caused by the use of highly skilled men on detailed maintenance in the Maintenance Flight, with the result that a generally higher serviceability state was achieved.
There was a certain amount of opposition to this scheme by those who though that flights would lose their identity and spirit. This did not happen.
At a later date a further change in maintenance organisation took place. This was the formation of Station Maintenance. The resources of all squadrons on a station were pooled, and a Station Major Servicing Section was formed, catering for all major servicing work for all squadrons on the station.
These two improvements were merely forerunners of the present Base Maintenance Organisation and the advantages from the aircraft maintenance point of view are manifold.
With this scheme, squadrons do not carry out any of the detailed maintenance, this being left to the Base Major Servicing or Repair and Inspection Squadron. All tradesmen with the exception of the daily servicing squadron are controlled entirely by the Chief Technical Officer, so that by far the greatest amount of maintenance work which goes to keep the squadron at a high serviceability figure is carried out by tradesmen who, whilst working for the squadrons may not be known by members of the squadron.
It would appear therefore that those who said that we would lose the Squadron spirit etc., stood a good chance of being correct. These fears were proved groundless; the spirit has grown to embrace something which was very rare in the early days of the war. Not only have we squadron spirit which has never been as strong as it is now, but we also have pride in the station and Base achievements, and progress of the Group has naturally followed.
An extract from a letter written by a Flight Commander to the Base Maintenance Staff at his Base is typical of the spirit which exists at present. The letter refers to certain aircraft which had been modified, and brought up to operational standard in time for a specific operation, and continues:-
“It is known that in order to have these aircraft ready for operational requirements it was necessary for the staff to sacrifice much of their leisure time and to work long hours without relief.
“Occasions such as this bring forcibly to notice the excellent work being performed daily by the ground staff, and show how necessary it is for us to have their co-operation.
“We member [sic] of aircrew know that we can rely on the ground staff to help in every way possible, and we hope that we can show our appreciation by carrying out the duties in our particular sphere with the same thoroughness, perseverance, and resourcefulness which we have learned to expect from the members of ground staff.”
GARDENING
Interrogation, Easter Monday:-
“That wasn’t a U-boast, it was me – low!”.
Thus, when 5 Group staged a large scale comeback to gardening, out of six aircraft specially detailed to mine a stretch of water in the Eastern Gardens about the width of a runway, 4 (3 of 106 and 1 of 49 Squadrons) were successful despite heavy opposition, and the remaining 2 (49 Squadron) after valiant attempts, during which good use was made of firing the front guns, correctly planted in another furrow. The remaining 50 gardeners put down 244 vegetables off ports in the Gulf of Danzig. Two were missing and one returned early after jettisoning safe in the North Sea. This operation took place almost exactly on the fourth anniversary of the opening by 5 Group of Bomber Command’s mining offensive. During the four years over 30,000 vegetables have been planted, and over 1,000,000 tons of enemy shipping accounted for.
On 18/19th April, and again on 23/24th April, the approaches to Swinemunde received a total of 125 vegetables.
These attacks in the Baltic fill what was a serious gap in the mining campaign in these waters. This year intensive minelaying has been carried out by the Command to the West of Pomeranian Bay with highly successful results. One effect of this, however, was to intensify the use of mine-free waters further east as:-
(i) Training areas for all types of Warships especially U-boats.
(ii) Supply routes for vital imports and military exports to Scandinavia.
(iii) Supply routes to the North Russian front.
Press reports describe very great congestion throughout the Baltic due to closing of ports and channels; P.R.U. cover of the Western Baltic shows some of this, but was unfortunately not obtained of the 5 Group Gardens. Ground reports of sinkings are hard to come by, and take time to reach us, so for the moment we must wait for the news – which will surely come providing our mines were well and truly laid in the swept channels.
The summary of the month’s work is as follows:-
Sorties 80
Successful 77
%age successful 96.25
Mileage flown 126,880
Total vegetables planted 388
The Squadrons responsible were:- 44, 49, 57, 630, 207 and 106.
The Command effort for this month resulted in the successful planting of 2,643 vegetables in some 40 gardens ranging from South West France to the Gulf of Danzig. About half this total was planted in the Baltic, a quarter in the North Sea and the remainder in the Bay of Biscay and Channel. This is easily a record – the previous highest total for one month being 1,869, in April, 1943. A German Naval Correspondent of Transocean, states that in the Channel alone it has been necessary to treble the mine sweeping effort, but discreetly does not mention the Baltic. The problem that faces the German mine sweeping effort is to cope with a great increase in mining spread over some 2000 miles of shipping lanes. The same correspondent complains that we sometimes use 12 different types of mines necessitating the use of numbers of ships fitted with different types of sweeps to clear the same patch, [sic] of water. In fact, the number of different
(Continued in previous column)
types of mine now in use is about four times that number.
A special word of praise is due to the Armament Staffs for their complete success in the unfamiliar work of preparing and loading the vegetables. In particular, East Kirkby’s effort on the 9th April, in sending off 108 in good order, was outstanding. In some cases the weekly stock return continues to be rendered incorrectly, chiefly due to confusion about the different types sterilisers for the new and old marks of mines. The correct use of these sterilisers will literally be a matter of life and death to any of our forces who may operate in areas where we use them, and now is the time therefore, to clear up any doubts as to exactly what types are held.
Station Tracings have proved something of a stumbling block, as have some of the details required in Raid Reports. Both are designed to answer the question – “where do those mines actually fall”, using all the available evidence. Naturally the planning and success of future operations, especially the “triphibious” variety, depend to a large extent on the accuracy of this information.
5 Group News. No. 21. April, 1944. Page 2.
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NAVIGATION
There has been a marked improvement in the navigation this month. Navigators are now realising how important it is to obtain constant checks on their position by intelligent use of either H2S or application of the broadcast w/v’s.
H2S navigators and bomb aimers are checking and cross checking all fixes they receive. If the navigator obtains constant D.R. positions along track, say every 15 minutes, and corrects these positions as ground speed checks are obtained, then it is impossible to obtain wrong fixes on the H 2 S. All Navigators should ensure that bomb aimers cross check every fix obtained, no matter how confident they may be. Also remember that a track made good, w/v and G/S check can be obtained from an unknown response. Very few operators make use of this.
The majority of navigators now use the broadcast w/v’s in an intelligent manner. There are a few, however, who [underlined] do not. ALL NAVIGATORS [/underlined] are to make a regular practice of obtaining a D.R. position by use of broadcast winds every 30 minutes – and do not forget to use the “Past” w/v!! If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, alter course immediately and regain track. Now that 5 Group operate alone, concentration is even more important. Station Navigation Officers must have a concentrated drive in this direction, and ensure that all H 2 S navigators are making the fullest possible use of their equipment, and also that the remainder are making full use of broadcast w/v’s, by obtaining constant D.R. positions checks on ground speed etc.
The importance of timing was discussed in last month’s “News”. We would do well however, to reconsider this subject seriously. Accurate timekeeping is more important now than ever before. The largest discrepancies in timing occur on the return journey. This is due partly to the fact that aircraft do not all bomb at the same time and therefore do not leave the target at the same time. To overcome this it may be necessary to establish a concentration point on the return journey, situated close to the target. It is obvious, however, that many navigators make no effort to achieve good timing; they merely carry on and get there “sometime or other”. There are a few pilots who consistently fly at greater speeds than those laid down, and consequently on the return journey are some 10 or 15 minutes ahead of the main force, By so doing they give the Hun a few extra minutes warning of the route home, apart from exposing themselves to individual interception. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must watch for and stem any tendency for bad time-keeping. Sufficient navigational aids are now available to ensure that you are on track and on time. Now it is up to [underlined] YOU [/underlined].
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
April has been a very good month for broadcast w/v’s, particularly since the Group began operating alone. Windfinders have been doing an excellent job. On two occasions this month more than 300 w/v’s were received from aircraft – an excellent effort. Windfinders are transmitting all the winds they obtain. If you note a sudden change in the wind direction or speed, then provided you are satisfied with the fixes used, send back [missing word] w/v immediately.
There are one or two cases, however of navigators chosen as windfinders not realising their responsibility. One navigator for instance, stated that he just couldn’t be bothered to send back w/v’s!! Another said that sufficient w/v’s were being sent back by other aircraft, so he didn’t bother either. Those few navigators who are chosen as windfinders must realise that the whole Group is navigating on the w/v’s they transmit to Base. We cannot afford to have anyone “not bothering”. So buck up chaps, the vast majority of you are doing an excellent job, but those few, who just “don’t bother” – well -- !!
Many experiments have been carried out on French targets to ascertain the most accurate and practical method of obtaining a bombing W/V, which must of course, be a w/v prevailing in the target area. The experiments have proved that the most accurate method is to use a datum point in conjunction with the A.P.I. It is hoped therefore that this method will be adopted on all future operations where practical. Any suggestions or criticisms on this subject will be welcomed.
[Underlined] ASTRO NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
It has been decided that Astro can no longer be considered as an essential aid to navigation. Much time has been devoted to teaching this subject to Navigators, but the results obtained do not justify this training. Therefore this training time is to be devoted to improving the general standard of navigation. More time is to be devoted to plotting and computing two of the weakest links in navigation at the moment.
This decision for not mean that Astro is now “dead” and can be forgotten by all., It is still a standby aid, and all navigators should keep themselves in practice. There have been isolated incidents where a Polaris shot or an Astro fix have been the means of saving an aircraft. You may find yourselves in such a predicament one night – so be ready.
All Astrographs and sextants are to be withdrawn from aircraft, but those navigators who are considered by the Station Navigation Officer as competent Astro Navigators may draw the equipment from the station stores.
[Underlined] SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS [/underlined]
(i) Many station and squadron navigation officers find it impossible to spend as much time as they would like in supervising the work of a new navigator, and teaching him all the things he should know. To overcome this [underlined] East Kirkby [/underlined] put each navigator under the care of a very experienced navigator whose responsibility it is to supervise the other at briefing, to check his log and chart the next day, and to pass on to him all useful information and “tips”. In short the senior navigator acts as a “father” to the “sprog”.
This scheme is working extremely well, and should be adopted by all squadrons.
(ii) Many navigators cannot remember to check compasses regularly. [Underlined] Dunholme [/underlined] have overcome this by marking red or green dots on the face of the Astro watch. This serves as a constant reminder to the navigator. It is recommended that compasses be checked every 20 minutes, and therefore the dots on the face of the Astro watch should be spaced accordingly.
(iii) [Underlined] Metheringham [/underlined] suggest that since Astro will no longer be used to any great extent that astrograph films should be treated and used instead of Gee charts. The procedure would be to mark on the film the lattice lines in the same way as on the Gee Charts. The film or films applicable for each night’s operation would be placed in the aircraft before take-off.
There are two great advantages:-
(a) Fixes would be plotted directly on the plotting chart, thus saving time and reducing the risk of errors.
(b) It would not be necessary to carry a large supply of Gee Charts as at present.
[Underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined]
We welcome the arrival of the 3 P.F.F. squadrons to this Group. There is no doubt that we shall be able to pick up from them many useful ideas and suggestions. These will be passed on to Squadrons as soon as possible.
It is hoped that all station navigation Officers will make a determined effort to visit these 3 squadrons whilst they are attached to the Group.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s Summary that one A.P.I. was being modified by having a “miles flown counter” fitted. This has been done & has been tested by No.617 Squadron on three 6-hour cross countries, undertaken at operational height.
The results are as follows:-
Miles flown registered on counter = 2927
Miles flown calculated by navigator = 2892
Percentage error = 1.2
These tests have proved conclusively that the over reading error in the A.P.I. is negligible.
Permission is now being obtained from Bomber Command for the fitting of the “air miles flown” counter to all A.P.I’s. The manufacturers state however, that the modification may not be retrospective.
There is still considerable difference of opinion as to the best method of using the A.P.I. One third of the Group prefer to reset, the remainder prefer the “graphical” resetting method. It is not necessary to lay down any one method of use but Station Nav Officers must ensure that all Navigators use one of the above two methods.
Station navigations officers are to discuss the use of the A.P.I. with all navigators. Any suggestions on improvements or methods of resetting etc. should be tried out immediately and if successful passed to Group Headquarters.
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Put the switch on the heading Control unit to “Manual” and by means of the setting knob adjust the line of flight marker until it corresponds to the true course as indicated by the P.4 compass. Maintain the switch on “manual” until the D.R. compass is functioning correctly, when you should switch to “Auto”.
(Continued on page 4, Column1.)
GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
(Continued from page 3 column 3)
2. To obtain ground returns, tune in brightest responses on the P.P.I. by means of brightness, contrast, gain and tuning controls. To obtain correct height set range drum at zero and adjust the range marker ring by means of the height control until it is on the first ground returns.
3. (i) Check the pinpoint yourself, visually and by the aid of D.R.
(ii) If pinpoint correct, alter course immediately to regain track by 30° if more than 10 miles off track, by 15° if less than 10 miles off track.
4. You would lose the time in hand by flying small dog legs, preferably either side of track, and of a maximum duration of 2 minutes. Dog legs to be completed before reaching a position 50 miles from the target. Navigator must use his own discretion as to the most suitable area in which to lose time.
5. (i) France (ii) Germany (French name for AACHEN) (iii) Germany (iv) Belgium (v) Czecho-Slovakia (vi) Germany (Part of Berlin).
6. Stuttgart to London.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Quinn, DFC. Sqdn Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn to Stn Nav. Officer, Skellingthorpe.
F/Lt Cunningham 50 Sqdn promoted to Sqdn Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Waterkeyn Sqdn Nav. Officer 44 Sqdn to P.F.F.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, DFM. H2S Instructor, Metheringham to Sqdn. Nav. Officer, 44 Squadron.
P/O Blackham 49 Squadron to H2S Instructor, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Bone, DFC. H2S Instructor Swinderby to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Murphy Sqdn. Nav. Officer No. 467 Sqdn. to No. 61 Squadron (with W/Cdr Doubleday)
F/O Abbott 467 Squadron promoted to Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Bonefield Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No. 9 Squadron – Missing.
F/Lt. Jones Nav. Officer, 1660 Con. Unit to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 9 Squadron.
S/Ldr. Georgeson, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer No.83. Squadron.
S/Ldr Stevens, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No.97 Squadron.
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.R. HEAD D.S.O.
[/Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. CHATTERTON D.F.C.
P/O R.T. MANNING D.F.C.
P/O J. BRADBURN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. A. WARD D.F.M.
SGT. R. MACHIN D.F.M.
SGT. R.A. FRIARS D.F.M.
P/O SANDERS D.F.C.
SGT. R.H. HUDSON D.F.M.
P/O A.W. SHINN D.F.C.
F/L. D. MILLER, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O J.E.W. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. LLOYD D.F.C.
W/CDR. A.W. HEWARD D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.S. LUDFORD D.F.C.
F/O F.A. THOMAS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. FARMILOE D.S.O.
F/O S. HALLIWELL, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O D. PAULL D.F.C.
SGT. P. MCGABNEY D.F.M.
P/O D.C. FREEMAN D.F.C.
SGT. L. CHAPMAN C.G.M.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F. GRIFFITHS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT T.W.J. HALL D.F.M.
F/O R.F. ANDERSON D.F.C.
P/O G.S. MILNE D.F.C.
F/O J.B. LATHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR. J.R. BALMER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR G.L. CHESHIRE, D.S.O. & BAR 2nd Bar to D.S.O.
S/LDR J.L. MUNRO, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/L C.K. ASTBURY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
S/LDR J.C. MCCARTHY, D.S.O. D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O W.G. BICKLEY C.G.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W. KELLAWAY, D.S.O. Bar to D.S.O.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR A.S. JOHNSON D.S.O.
The following non-immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.J. KNELL D.F.C.
F/O R.H. SMITH D.F.C.
F/L J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C.
F/O J.N.G. WYATT D.F.C.
F/SGT. K.J. DAGNALL D.F.M.
F/SGT R.N. BROWN D.F.M.
SGT. E. SULLIVAN D.F.M.
SGT. E.R. BAKER D.F.M.
F/SGT. E.G.B. COLE D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.F. PARSONS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J. MURPHY D.F.M.
F/O D.C. ARMSTRONG D.F.C.
F/SGT. A. HOLDEN D.F.M.
W/O G.A. WILKIE D.F.C.
P/O G.G. WHITEHEAD D.F.C.
F/SGT J.R. OSWICK D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. J. CHALONER D.F.M.
SGT. (NOW P/O [sic] A.E. BOASE D.F.M.
P/O H.C. DARNTON D.F.C.
P/O G. SERGEEV D.F.C.
SGT. R. JEFCOCK D.F.M.
F/SGT (NOW P/O) W.A. MOORE D.F.M.
F/L D.J. BACON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.C.B. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O E.C. WEATHERSTONE D.F.C.
P/O A. BEALE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W. FEARN D.F.C.
F/L R.V. MUNDY D.F.C.
F/L R.K. EGGINS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.H. PULLMAN D.F.C.
[/Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J. SEARS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O R.E. KNIGHTS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.C. GREENHALGH D.F.C.
S/LDR A.R. DUNN D.F.C.
F/SGT. M.D.J. PARKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT. L. BENDING D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.J. FLOWER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.O.P. BEATTY D.F.C.
P/O D.E. FREEMAN D.F.C.
P/O H. THOMAS D.F.C.
P/O L.W. MITCHELL D.F.C.
P/O C.M. LAWES D.F.C.
F/SGT. P. PULLAR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. ROBERTSON D.F.C.
P/O W.T. LOFTUS D.F.C.
P/O W. BOOTH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. R.W. JAGGS D.F.M.
F/O H. McDONALD D.F.C.
F/O C.H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O N.H. KOBELKE D.F.C.
W/O H. McCABE D.F.C.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
April has provided another milestone on our road to the fullest use being made of radiations and echoes helping to get more bombs on the target. V.H.F. R/T has been fitted to two more squadrons – W/T has provided almost 100% communication between Controllers and Main Forces – the serviceability of all Radar devices has improved.
We are grateful to all those outside the Group who have helped us so readily – particularly 92 Group and the Signals Schools with their special drive to train Wireless Operators to read morse through severe interference and to tune their W/T sets with one eye on a C.R.T.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
A hearty welcome to all those faces, both old and new, that have appeared within the Group since our last edition.
April 1944 will long be remembered in the history of 5 Group as a month of hard work, which was crowned with the success it so richly deserved. Wireless Operators (Air) played their part with the energy and determination that is always to be found when there is an extra job to be done, and a large slice of the credit for our recent achievements is due to them.
As usual, the “Back Room Boys” at stations and in our own W/T cabin at Headquarters gladly threw their weight into the fray, and we are indebted to them. Their keenness has always been an inspiration.
Several points have been brought out this month, first and foremost being the quality of morse emanating from the Controllers’ aircraft. There has been a noticeable difference between operators, which, if all past suggestions re training had been acted upon, should never re-occur.
It has been stressed time and again that ANY ONE Wireless Operator (Air) may be called upon to transmit control signals and the only way to ensure perfection is by constant practice.
In this connection, it is pointed out that the Group exercise is an ideal medium for improvement of morse (although not even a whisper of control code must be allowed to pass through the other), and during the coming month the exercise frequency will be closely watched.
Signals Leaders, get this fact thoroughly instilled into your flock – “The ultimate success or failure of future operations may depend on the ability of a Wireless Operator to send or receive signals”. Display it in your training room, convert it into morse symbols, give morse tests regularly each week for we have reached a stage in the conflict where every minute spent in training counts one hundred fold in the air.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following is a combat report from 619 Squadron for the night of 22/23 April:-
“The first indication was a contact by W/Op. on Visual Monica Mark V at 1,800 yards… E/A dropped back out of gunner’s sight and W/Op reported it 800 yards astern down… E/A broke away to starboard and disappeared from gunner’s sight, W/Op again reported E/A 1100 yards, closing slowly…E/A disappeared and was reported once again by the W/Op.”
The outcome of this combat was one JU. 88 probably destroyed. Sgt. Brady, Wireless Operator (Air) deserves the highest praise for his reporting.
You see, it can be done, and when handled in the proper manner not only SAVES YOUR AIRCRAFT but probably destroys a Hun, which reduces the total that can be put in the air against you on the following operation.
Once again, there is only one path to take to success, and that path is labelled TRAINING. Constant practice with your Early Warning devices will pay handsome dividends.
Points for Signals Leaders to include in their “daily ration” to the Section:-
(i) Spare Groups No.12 and 15 in CD.0250.
(ii) X114 and X623 are still being used by some careless operators.
(iii) Log keeping could improve (we have seen some good logs this month).
(iv) More practice – or has that been mentioned somewhere before?
F/O Cook, D.F.M., has gone to No.9 Sqdn., as Signals Leader.
F/Lts Gronow and Chambers, D.F.C. are the Signals Leaders of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons respectively, who are to be congratulated in accepting such a sudden change of procedure and dovetailing into the 5 Group system with the minimum of trouble.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
Facts and Figures about Failures
Out of a total of 2034 operational sorties during the month, 34 Signals failures were reported. Although these represent an increase over last month’s figure, this can be attributed almost entirely to the rise in Category 4 failures (miscellaneous). It is again stressed that Category 4 failures are most unsatisfactory. Most of the failures in this Category are of the type “Equipment reported u/s. O.K. on ground test. No fault found.” Every effort must be made to pin down any reported failure to some definite cause.
An investigation into failures in this Group over the past year reveals some interesting results. Apart from an unfortunate month in February, the percentage of failures shows a slight decrease over the year. This unfortunate February figure coincides with a large percentage of miscellaneous failures as well as a large percentage of T.1154/R.1155 failures. Category I (Equipment) failures show a general tendency to rise during the year. The other categories (2 and 3) have a see saw effect and no general conclusion can be made.
Intercom. failures over the year show a pronounced tendency to decrease, while T.1154/R.1155 failures show a corresponding pronounced increase. The reason for the former can be put down to the energetic drive which Signals Officers have kept up in their Squadron Maintenance Sections against this type of fault. The reason for the latter is not hard to find. During the past year the W/T installation has come into its own again and is an essential piece of equipment for the success of current operations. Whereas in the past unserviceability of the of the main W/T installation may have gone by unnoticed, now it cannot escape report.
[Underlined] THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH…. [/underlined]
Authority has finally been given for the removal of S.D.A. equipment from all Lancaster aircraft in 5 Group. This event has fortunately coincided with the partial introduction of V.H.F. (T.R.1143) installation. Command have agreed in principle that the fitting of V.H.F. is a necessity for the success of the type of operation now being undertaken by 5 Group, and every endeavour is being made to find sufficient equipment to fit all 5 Group squadrons. Careful thought has been given to the possibility of utilising the S.B.A. connectors as a small contribution to ease the very tight V.H.F. equipment production. The only small saving envisioned is the main receiver aerial and lead in; the length of the aerial will, of course, have to be shortened.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Last month saw a great improvement in the serviceability of all Radar equipment. However, before anyone relaxes and sticks his chest out, it should be remembered that the advent of warm, dry weather was a contributory cause. In addition, many sorties have been at lower altitudes than usual, which would eliminate many of those non-reproduceable faults.
(Continued on page 6, col.1)
Then and Now – and how!!
[Underlined] Then [/underlined] In Ancient times, the D.S.O.
Performed his duties staid and slow.
He did his routine work by day,
And dozed his duty nights away,
Untroubled save for threats of violence
‘Gainst those who busted wireless silence!
[Underlined] Now [/underlined] The aethor’s full of legal dope
Which we receive, (at least we hope!).
It’s also full of surplus dits
Transmitted by the brainier twits;
While brighter souls – misguided clots –
Originate redundant dots!
Amendments to a basic plan
Are never ending, and unman
The D.S.O. who, frantic, chases
Vital gen in awkward places;
And rubs – with bitter rueful tear –
His Port, or Telephonic, Ear!
Poor chap, how like a sponge his brain,
Which, like a sponge, he’ll learn to squeeze;
And fill it daily once again
With brand new gen – with practiced ease!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. APRIL, 1944. NO.21 PAGE 5.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from Page 8, col.3)
Having however, realised the existence of those contributory causes, it is possible to say that a considerable increase in serviceability was due to more efficient maintenance and manipulation. It is sincerely hoped that this improvement will continue.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 767 sorties was flown with H.2.S, with 99 defects for a serviceability rate if 87.87. This is an increase of 10% over March. With an extra effort, and the weather on our side it could be made over 90% in May.
There has been a noticeable drop in filament transformer failures, largely due to the weather and height conditions. It is not expected that we will see the end of filament transformer breakdowns until the new type is introduced. The same is true for the 2000v condensers.
The expansion of H 2 S training in Conversion Units should go a long way towards eliminating the alarming number of manipulation failures. Manipulation and maintenance failures can be eliminated by constant training.
The arrival of 83 and 97 Squadrons has given us a taste of equipment to come. These Squadrons have a few Mark III sets and every one is very pleased with their performance. To date, the serviceability of the equipment is 92.8% which is very satisfactory for a new set. In this connection a debt is owed to 8 Group for having pioneered so well and eliminated most of the teething troubles. We can now look forward to a general changeover to Mark III with confidence in our ability to maintain and use it.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond was 86% serviceable, an increase of 8% over March. This increase is of little value of W/Ops are not fully trained in the use of this equipment. The necessity for the Navigator – W/Op co-ordination cannot be overemphasised. Efforts have been made to reduce the minimum range below its present 600 – 800 yards. These have been unsuccessful, but it is believed the “back room boys” are now on the right track, so an answer should be forthcoming soon.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
As usual, Gee is top man when it comes to serviceability. In 96.5% of sorties, Gee was 100& serviceable. This reflects credit on both maintenance personnel and navigators, as it is an increase of 1.2% over last month. Gee could be made almost 100% serviceable; those last few percent are hard to get, but keep trying. The next few months of dry weather should give ample opportunity to break all records.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK IIIA [/underlined]
The expression “Ever Upwards” could be fittingly applied to Mark IIIA serviceability. This Group has watched Monica grow from an idea to a headache when the word “Switchmotor” nearly drove a Radar mechanic mad, and now to a reliable and efficient tail warning device. April serviceability was 91.6% out of 534 sorties, an increase of 1.3% on March.
An examination of combat reports provides innumerable examples of Monica’s capabilities in the hands of a trained operator. The fitting of 10 aircraft at 5 L.F.S. should relieve squadrons of a great deal of preliminary training.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK V [/underlined]
Another 5 Group “baby” (Lulu to some) is growing up, after a rather shaky beginning. Out of 299 sorties flown, 259 were trouble free for a serviceability rate of 86.7% - an increase of 5%. Now that the initial teething snags are over, it should be possible to make Mark V follow the footsteps of IIIA and push serviceability to 90%.
TACTICS
[Underlined] PRECISION ATTACKS [/underlined]
The big step made this month towards perfection of target marking, with its detailed methods of target illumination, initial marking, assessing, backing up, and controlling the force, although introducing many new ideas and problems, has brought little change in basic tactics. Indeed more attention than ever must be directed to tactics, particularly to precise orders and instructions given out for each operation. Special attention must be paid to timing and track keeping, adherence to allocated heights, compliance with instructions from the Controller and an exact knowledge of the marking method. These are dealt with separately.
[Underlined] TIMING AND TRACK KEEPING [/underlined]
The force employed on each target is now normally very much smaller than that in the past. This means that greater accuracy is needed in timing and keeping on track. It also means that if you stray a few miles off track with force of 150 aircraft or less, you are more likely to be singled out by G.C.I. than if you stray the same distance with a force of 800aircraft. Timing is vital. Only a limited number of target markers are dropped, and unless all aircraft are ready to bomb on time, these may be obscured by smoke or blown out by the bombs that drop before yours, and in any case may be difficult to locate.
[Underlined] HEIGHT BAND [/underlined]
The allocation of height bands to Bases, which means that each crew must fly at a given height, has been introduced for several reasons and entirely for your own protection. Firstly, it is intended to protect the force against a collision risk, mainly in the target area, where it may be necessary to do dog legs. Secondly, as a countermeasure against barrage flak. The Hun must now put up the same number of rounds into a very much larger area than before, thus decreasing the chance of individual aircraft being hit. Thirdly, combined with extremely accurate timing, the length of the stream can be very much shorter, and therefore less liable to interception by radio controlled fighters. To achieve the full advantage of this scheme, it must be accompanied by a drive by each Captain to make sure that Window is always thrown out correctly, particularly OVER THE TARGET AREA. If this is done, then there is no reason why crews at the lower heights need have any concern. It is, however, their duty to tighten up the normal crew search procedure and to be aware of fighters which may attack from above.
[Underlined] CONTROLLER’S INSTRUCTIONS [/underlined]
It is essential to comply strictly with the Controller’s instructions throughout the attack, and his decisions should never be questioned in the air. A wrongly timed load of incendiaries dropped whilst the Mosquitos are examining the roof tops to assess the marking, may upset the whole routine and possibly divert the main weight of the attack.
[Underlined] TARGET MARKING METHODS [/underlined]
All crews must be quite clear before leaving the briefing room of the colour of the spot-fires to be used, and the details of the controlling code. It doesn’t pay to be doubtful after you have taken off. You must be ready to carry out orders given over the target without hesitation.
(Continued in col.2)
TACTICS (Continued from Col.3)
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The fruits of good training in tail warning devices are borne out by the following Combat Report. Each month there are many similar instances of fighters which have been beaten off because the correct drill has been carried out. Each month there are also instances of fighter damage sustained, and the fighter that did it is not picked up until after the attack. It pays to practice the reporting code at least once a day!
“First indication was contact by W/Optr. on Visual Monica Mk.V, 1,800 yards, Port Quarter down. Pilot altered course and E/A followed and closed in to 800 yards. W/Optr. ordered corkscrew to Port, and at the same time E/A opened fire and scored hits on tail unit on Lancaster “G”. R/G sighted E/A at 500 yards, Port beam down 30° and opened fire. E/A fired again and missed Lancaster. W/Optr. reported E/A closing in slowly and R/G sighted it at 500 yards astern level. R/G opened fire and E/A broke away to Starboard Quarter up. Hits claimed on E/A which disappeared from Gunner’s sight. W/Optr. again reported E/A on starboard quarter up at 1,100 yards and closing slowly. Rear and Mid-Upper Gunners sighted E/A simultaneously at 500 yards, Starboard Quarter level. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits on E/A which broke away at 300 yards, diving to Port Quarter down with smoke pouring from both engines.”
The Station Commander’s comments are self-explanatory: “I consider that Mark V Monica saved this crew. The Wireless Operator’s commentary was excellent, and the crew co-operation of a very high standard.”
FLYING CONTROL (Continued from page 15)
play a part in the final choice. From the condition of the airfield right down to such small items as the cleanliness of the flare path party room will be reviewed, so if you want to top the bill S.F.C.O’s, start cracking the whip NOW.
[Underlined] BLIND LANDING EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
It has been decided by this Group to remove all S.B.A. equipment from operational aircraft and it is hoped that in the not too distant future other and better means will be introduced. The first piece of equipment which we hope to get is a P.P.I. which will be installed in the watch tower and on which will be indicated the positions of all aircraft in the circuit.
Other equipment such as Radar Landing Beam, coupled with a Radar G.P.I. Radar Homing Beacons will all follow in due course. These will naturally give Flying Control Officers more work and more responsibilities but with the increased safety of aircraft this work and the short training required will be well repaid.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
April has been a most satisfying month for the bombing crews of 5 Group. Numerous precision attacks have been carried out with a great measure of success. The front pages of the Daily Press made public the achievements of 5 Group when they printed the after-bombing photographs of the marshalling yards at JUVISY, South of Paris. Equal success rewarded the attacks at TOURS and LA CHAPPELLE. The raid on MUNICH was successful, and a fair measure of success resulted from the attacks on BRUNSWICK and SCHWEINFURT. Finally, further small factories near OSLO, BORDEAUX and CLERMONT FERRAND are now devastated.
[Underlined] HOW HAS ALL THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? [/underlined]
Firstly, of course, most credit is due to the marking success of 54 Base. The next main contribution to the Group’s success has been the intense practice bombing carried out by the squadrons for the last year.
Owing to the very limited time available for bombing training at Conversion Units the final co-ordination of the bombing team has to be carried out on the squadrons. Much credit is due to the Conversion Units for their efforts, and particular praise is due to the Lancaster Finishing School who have elevated the importance of crew practice bombing to the extent of averaging between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in all bombing exercises over the last three months!!!
However, the crews are inexperienced with both aircraft and bombsight on arrival in the squadrons and intensive training is essential to bring them into line with the precision our operations require.
[Underlined] THE MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT [/underlined]
This bombsight has proved its worth. Although it is by no means a perfect sight, it is true that provided it is expertly maintained by the Instrument Sections and carefully handled by the Air Bombers, it can put bomb loads on to a target.
Air Bombers should make sure that their bombsights [underlined] are [/underlined] serviceable. It is the most important individual item of equipment that your aircraft carried, and as such should be the most carefully maintained. Its best test is on the practice bombing range – 6 bombs aimed accurately on different headings should produce a CLOSE GROUP. If not, then SOMETHING is wrong – report it to the instrument section – help them to find out what is wrong and then test it again. It may not always be possible to get this test exercise in the air – if not you must do the next best – carry out the exhaustive N.F.T. check.
In every P.R.U. picture there are sticks off the main concentration – it is almost certain that these sticks are wide because they were aimed with an unserviceable bombsight – are they yours? Were you absolutely certain that on Juvisy, La Chappelle, Tours, Brunswick, Munich or Schweinfurt, your bombsight was functioning correctly – when did you last do practice bombing with it – did you give is a thorough check during your N.F.T. or Ground Check? Did you??
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined]
O.R.S. at Bomber Command have conducted a painstaking analysis of 5 Group’s practice and operational bombing. They report that
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING [/underlined]
(ERRORS IN YARDS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training achievements by Squadron and Conversion Units]
[Underlined] THE BEST RESULTS FOR APRIL. [/underlined]
In previous months all crew errors at 20,000 ft. of less than 150 yards were listed in this column However, in April [underlined] 103 [/underlined] such results were obtained and it is therefore impossible to record them all. The crew errors of less than 100 yards are shown this month but it is confidently expected that in future space will only permit inclusion of results of less than 75 yards. It is possible – the list below proves it – therefore it must be done!!!
Squadron or Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 ft
9 S/Ldr. Keir F/Sgt. Coates P/O. Lewis 54 yards
44 F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 99 yards
49 F/Lt. Adams F/Sgt. Underwood S/Ldr. Evans 84 yards
F/O. Edwards F/O W. Smith F/Sgt. Cavanagh 83 yards
50 P/O. Lundy F/O. Bignall F/Sgt. Jordan 90 yards
P/O. McFarlin Sgt. Ball Sgt. Elliott 75 yards
F/O. Botha Sgt. Thompson F/O. Bishton 95 yards
S/Ldr. McLeod Sgt. Price F/Lt. Cunningham 80 yards
61 P/O. Ascott F/Sgt. May F/O. Ward 98 yards
F/O. Jeavons Sgt. Graham F/Sgt. Dow 93 yards
F/O. Paul P/O. Cook P/O. Griffin 40 yards
W/Cdr. Stidolph F/O. Aley F/O. Dyer 71 yards
F/Sgt. Woolnough F/O. Ravenscroft F/O. Haggerstone 71 yards
467 F/Lt. Marshall F/Sgt. Borman F/O. Easton 96 yards
619 P/O. Roberts F/Sgt. DeViell F/Sgt. Lott 43 yards
P/O. Saunders F/O. Rosenfield F/Sgt. Greacen 84 yards
630 F/Lt. Roberts F/Sgt. Jeffery F/Sgt. Davies 75 yards
S/Ldr. Calvert F/Sgt. Hogg F/O. Beaudoin 95 yards
Sgt. Mallinson Sgt. Pomeroy Sgt. Nassau 73 yards
F/O. Joblin F/O. Beeson F/O. Lambton 80 yards
1654 F/O. McLaughlan Sgt. Leeson F/O. Phillips 90 yards
F/Sgt. Pethick Sgt. Wallace F/O. Baldwin 82 yards
P/O. Richards Sgt. Buckby Sgt. Fazackerley 93 yards
F/O. Long F/O. De Sautels Sgt. Thomas 88 yards
1661 Sgt. Marsh Sgt. Carr ? ? 98 yards
5 LFS F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 98 yards
617 F/O. Knights F/Sgt. Bell ) The best two 49 yards
S/Ldr. Munro F/Lt. Astbury ) exercises 53 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
APRIL has produced the first maximum entry for the Competition since its inception in June, 1943. Some excellent results have been submitted and hearty congratulations are due to 61 Squadron for their outstanding exercises. The results are as follows:-
PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS
1st 61 Squadron – 55 Yards 1st 50 Squadron – 59 Yards.
2nd 619 Squadron – 63 Yards 2nd 61 Squadron – 84 Yards.
3rd 49 Squadron – 71 Yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 96 Yards.
4th 50 Squadron – 80 Yards 4th 630 Squadron – 98 Yards
5th 44 Squadron – 81 Yards 5th 463 Squadron – 111 Yards.
6th (630 Squadron – 90 Yards 6th 44 Squadron – 125 Yards.
(106 Squadron – 90 Yards 7th 57 Squadron – 136 Yards.
8th 207 Squadron - 101 Yards 8th 467 Squadron – 141 Yards.
9th 9 Squadron – 112 Yards 9th 49 Squadron – 152 Yards.
10th 463 Squadron – 116 Yards 10th 106 Squadron – 163 Yards.
11th 467 Squadron – 125 Yards 11th 9 Squadron – 167 Yards.
12th 57 Squadron – 135 Yards 12th 207 Squadron – 188 Yards.
Group Captain Butler (R.A.F. Dunholme Lodge) produced a token cup to celebrate 44 Squadron’s victory in March. It is hoped that 44 will pass on the token to 61 Squadron.
It is noteworthy that the three Squadrons of 52 Base are all in the first five.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Only two entries were received this month:-
1st F/Lt. FARARA (630 Sqdn) – 85 yds.
2nd F/Lt. McDONALD (61 Sqdn) – 160 yds.
Congratulations F/Lt. Farara!!
(Continued from Page [sic]
our errors on both are similar – that means that 5 Group Bombing Teams achieve substantially the same results on German targets that they obtain at Wainfleet, Epperstone, Owthorpe and Bassingham Ranges, therefore, it merely remains to improve our results on the “home” ranges in order to obtain more hits on the “away” targets.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 106 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Wake DFC) reports that their descent from top position in the Bombing Competition is only temporary and is due to their best crews finishing about the same time. Other Squadrons are warned that 106 intend to be back at the top by the end of May.
[Underlined] 44 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Lowry) have constructed an effective Mk.XIV mock-up as follows:-
1. No suction used – Gyros are counter-balanced in Sighting Head and Computor.
2. All electric motor is used to obtain pressure.
3 Airspeed and Height operation is obtained by connecting two external sylphan tubes to the static and pitot heads of Computor Unit. Attached to sylphan tubes are adjustable thumb screws to enable airspeed and height indicators to be carried throughout their range.
This go ahead Bombing Section have also introduced the use of Navigator’s Log Books (an idea borrowed from 5 L.F.S Syerston) in which are posted all permanent information such as Bomb T.V’s Conversion of True to Indicated Wind speed tables, etc. and is also used to carry target maps and operational bomb load instructions.
[Underlined] 1661 Con. Unit. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Brewer, DFC.) have completed the installation of Mk. XIV bombsight complete, in the A.M.B.T. A really first-class job by all concerned!!!
[Underlined] 61 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. MacDonald) Competition winners for April, report that W/Cdr. STIDOLPH and crew set the pace with a Crew Error of 71 yds. This aroused competitive spirit to a marked degree in the Squadron. The following result was obtained:-
Crew Error ar 20,000 ft. – 40 yards
Navigator’s Error – 25 yards
Pilot & Air Bomber’s Error – 37 yards
The crew were:- Pilot – F/O PAUL
Air Bomber – P/O COOK
Navigator – P/O GRIFFIN
[Underlined] 9 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DFC.) reports the following excellent method of plotting crater positions from night photographs.
Plot the centre of the photograph on tracing paper pinned on to the target illustration. Mark the heading accurately from the compass rose on the tracing. Calculate distance between centre of the bombing photograph and centre of bomb craters commencing with position of bomb and flash release. The distance from this position to the centre of the photograph is the ground speed of the aircraft in feet per second multiplied by the flash setting; a deduction being allowed for the 5° aft tilt of the camera.
Forward travel of the bombs can be noted in A.P.1730A.Vol.1. to which must be added or subtracted the distance due to the wind component.
Plot this distance forward along track on the tracing paper and the approximate position of the centre of the stick is recorded. The stick length is known and should be drawn to scale. This method if accurate provided that:-
(i) the aircraft maintains heading and attitude from bomb release to explosion of flash (this can be checked by study of pre-bombing frames on the film)
(ii) There is only a small error due to cross trail - allowance can be made for this if necessary.
9 Squadron have found that their plots using this method are accurate to within 100 yards by subsequent comparisons with P.R.U. photographs.
[Underlined] 617 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/L Astbury, D.F.C) reports the following outstanding exercise:-
F/L Clayton, Pilot, F/O Watson, Air Bomber, carried out an application exercise from 20,000 ft. And averaged 73 yards. Two of the six bombs were DIRECT HITS!!
[Underlined] “G”N” [sic] FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
(I) [Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] – plotted 5,492 bombs aimed by 1,044 aircraft during April. Thus in one month 28 tons of practice bombs have been dropped at this range.
(ii) [Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] – plotted 990 bombs aimed by 200 aircraft.
(iii) [Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] – plotted 916 bombs aimed by 147 aircraft.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. What would happen to the Mk. XIV Bombsight if the Port Inner engine had to be feathered?
2. How would you use the Quadrant Plate and Pointer at 13,000 feet?
3. How could you jettison a load of incendiaries “SAFE” with reasonable certainty?
4. If the Pilot operated the Jettison toggle what would happen to your Jettison bars and what extra action is necessary to put them back to “SAFE”?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Abbott [/underlined] is now Bombing Leader at 49 Squadron. It is noted that 49 moved from hitherto unplaced position in the Competition up to [underlined] 3rd [/underlined] in April.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Stoney, DFC. [/underlined] (1660 Con.Unit) has moved to 97 Squadron for his 2nd tour of operations. Good Luck!
[Underlined] F/O Lowans, DFM. [/underlined] has moved from 49 Squadron to 54 Base where he is attached for Bombing Leader duties.
[Underlined] F/O Tibbs (207 Squadron) [/underlined] obtained “B” category on No. 79 Bombing Leaders Course.
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (619 Squadron) [/underlined] and F/O Martins (106 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on No. 80 Course.
[Underlined] P/O Ball, DFM. (1660 Con. Unit) [/underlined] has been attached to Headquarters, Bomber Command for Bombing Analysis duties.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place in H2S training during the month, the most notable being:-
(i) H2S training has been expanded at the Conversion Units to cover 12 crews per course, to meet increased demands of the squadrons.
(ii) To standardise training throughout the Group, a Ground Training Syllabus has been issued outlining the minimum amount of ground training to be carried out by H2S crews, whether trained on squadrons or Conversion Units.
(iii) Greater emphasis is being placed on the Navigational aspect of H2S to increase further the reliability of fixes and winds obtained.
A concentrated drive is being made by all Instructors to improve D.R. navigation by H2S, to ensure that failures due to lack of confidence and inability to interpret the P.P.I. are things of the past. The tendency to slur over H2S navigation must be overcome as a successful H2S bombing run is largely dependent on a correct navigational approach to the target. This does not mean however that blind bombing is to be relegated to a mere fraction of the training time; on the contrary a large part of training can be devoted to blind bombing technique when crews are able to navigate accurately by H2S and ensure that the target is reached at the correct time.
Manipulation failures still continue to be reported and every effort must be made by operators to prevent such failures being attributed to their neglect. Now that the Air Bomber is required to sit in the navigator’s compartment and manipulate the H2S equipment, manipulation failures should be on the downward path. Two heads are usually better than one and with the list of H2S faults and remedies, one of them should at least have some knowledge of the symptoms and their correction. The impression conveyed is that many of these manipulation failures are due to lack of understanding of the equipment. The Technical Radar Officer is always willing to part with “gen” providing questions are asked. Don’t be afraid to worry these officers because in the long run by asking questions about your equipment you are probably saving their time and yours.
Leica cameras are now being used to photograph the P.P.I. on training flights and several remarkable prints have been obtained. particularly [sic] on Edinburgh and London. Two squadrons are now equipped and it is eventually hoped to obtain further cameras for the remainder. With the advent of P.P.I. photography blind bombing can be carried out irrespective of cloud cover and accurate results obtained. Much information can also be obtained on the definition of built up areas and it is hoped eventually to relate individual bright responses with definite structures in these built up areas. It is therefore essential that the camera operator fills in the photographic interrogation report in a concise and accurate manner, enabling much valuable information to be obtained for use of H2S crews on future operations.
The results of the blind bombing competition have now been received and are published below. All crews who participated are to be congratulated on the excellent results obtained.
[Underlined] Final Order Captain Squadron Av. Error. in miles. [/underlined]
1 P/O Rogers 630 .33
2 F/S Canever 57 .38
3 P/O Manning 44 .42
4 F/L Smith 57 .46
5 P/O Ross 57 .46
6 P/O Higgs 44 .48
7 F/O Bayley 57 .49
8 F/L Healy, DFC. 49 .60
9 F/O Penman 106 .64
10 P/O Shinn 49 .65
11 P/O Jones, J. 49 .66
12 F/O Thomas 57 .87
13 F/L Kellaway, DSO. 630 1.12
14 F/L Roberts, DFC. 630 1.15
One point arising out of blind bombing on H2S which has been noticeable on operations during the last month is that many H2S operators who claim to mark blind are unduly influenced by the markers showing a lack of faith in the instrument. Complete confidence can only be built up by sufficient training in which advantageous use should be made of the synthetic trainer.
Talking about synthetic trainers, East Kirkby have introduced a modification to the trainer which gives correct crystal current movement and a tuning position, thus enabling operators to practice manipulation on the trainer. It is hoped to introduce this modification to other trainers in the Group as soon as the technical details are settled.
This month we welcome 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons into the Group. They have brought with them new equipment and methods and it is felt that as pioneers in H2S much can be learnt from them. It is hoped that all H2S Instructors will take the opportunity of visiting these squadrons and utilising the information gained to the benefit of their respective units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee range has improved considerably during the month and many navigators obtained fixes over targets attacked. However, there is still a tendency to neglect Gee when jamming appears.
Some navigators had opportunities of using the new North Eastern chain this month with gratifying results, many fixes being obtained further than 8° East, and off chart coverage. Providing navigators continue to give reports on the reception they receive outside the limits of the present lattice charts, something can be done to produce additional charts.
Coding has not caused any confusion, and the blinking of the “A” pulse appears to have been a success. There is one point, however, which must be borne in mind by all navigators and wireless operators regarding the use of coding in distress signals. All fixes passed for transmission during distress procedure must give the true lattice line values and therefore the coding figures must be deducted by the navigator from the indicator readings prior to passing the fix to the Wireless Operator. Watch this or you will be plotted miles away from your true position.
Manipulation failures are still too high and these can be overcome only by constant practice in setting up and correction of faults. Many navigators to whom manipulations faults have been attributed are still changing over alternator plugs with the set switched on resulting in fuses being blown. When changing the R. F. Units or alternator plugs, Gee must be switched OFF.
The following is an extract from a report on Gee which should be of interest to all navigators:-
“There seems to be a popular idea with navigators that XF’s necessarily give extra range. This is based on the fact that when they were first introduced, they gave extra ranges before the enemy had time to organise counter measures. The main advantage of XF’s is not to give extra range but to make the enemy spread his jamming over more than one frequency, tending to make it less intense on any one frequency”
Another point is that many navigators are using stud settings and RF Units which have not been detailed for the operation in question. There is even a case this month of a navigator using a chain which was not detailed, and he claimed far greater range though admitted the fixes were unpotable.
(Continued on page 14, col.2)
Link Trainer
The nil returns for 630, 617 and 627, and the very low return for 57 Squadron were due to the absence of Link Trainers at East Kirkby and Woodhall. Machines were, however, installed at these Stations at the end of the month and it is hoped these Squadrons will make up the deficiency by an increased effort next month. A revised Link Trainer Syllabus is being drafted and should be available to Units by the middle of the coming month. The amount of Link done on the squadrons still warrants improvement and it is hoped that the new Syllabus will assist in this.
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron and Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoons]
April, and the first few days of May, saw the last of the two Group Competitions – the Lancaster Seven-a-Side Rugger Trophy, and the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] The Lancaster Seven-a-Side Competition [/underlined] has had a very mixed reception. Although designed on a Group inter-squadron basis, to include every crew in each Squadron, and having a system of points that favoured squadrons fielding the greatest number of teams, no squadron outside 53 Base even began the competition. But within 53 Base it was an amazing success. 86 teams took part, and the resulting increase in fitness, and the keenness that developed, fully repaid the efforts of A/Cdre. Hesketh who originated the competition. Next season this is going to be one of the Rugger high-lights, with a smashing Boxing Day final meeting of all the squadron finalists, followed by “noggins for all” round “Ye Olde Yule Logge”.
[Underlined] The Matz Soccer Cup. [/underlined] Coningsby crowned a successful soccer season by beating Winthorpe 2 – 0 in the Matz final on the Lincoln City ground on 6th May. In their semi-final game, Coningsby met the Group “giants” – Scampton – at Waddington, and emerged successfully after a terrific duel. Winthorpe had to play three games with Metheringham before they got to the semi-final stage. Then they defeated Skellingthorpe 3 – 2, after being 2 goals down with only twenty minutes to go. The final was worthy of the competition, and produced a clean, hard fought duel, perfectly even in the first half, but with the Coningsby forwards more dangerous than their opposites in the second. Winthorpe goalie and backs are to be congratulated on their fight, they certainly kept the flag flying. Coningsby’s first goal came from a penalty, their second from a beautifully placed header into the corner of the net in classic “corner kick” style. Coningsby were minus their professional left winger, Colinridge, but his successor ably filled the bill, and the forwards were presented with many openings by a clever half back division. After the game, Mrs. Cochrane presented the cup in the stand, and the A.O.C., who had been a delighted spectator, congratulated the teams in the dressing rooms on their splendid show. Later the teams had tea together in Lincoln, and later again the Cup was christened with the traditional quart of “old and mild”, we hope.
[Underlined] The Wines Rugger Trophy. [/underlined] Dunholme are hot on the scent of this “pot”, and it will take a good side to stop them. Winthorpe are in the remaining semi-final with Waddington. It is proposed to polish off the semi-final and the final before the 14th, leaving King Willow in peaceful possession.
[Underlined] 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. [/underlined] East Kirkby reached the final by beating the redoubtable Swinderby on their own ground. It now remains for Metheringham to play Waddington and the winner to meet Scampton, to provide the other finalist. This competition must be polished off quickly, before hardening grounds make the ball a little too lively for all but the steel shinned types. This new competition has proved very successful and should provide a most interesting final.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played eight Station matches, during the month, of which they lost only one, 2 – 1 to R.A.F. Ingham. In the semi-final replay of the Lincoln and District Amateur Cup they defeated R.A.F. Wickenby 3 – 0. In the final with Lincoln Rovers on City ground they played magnificently for a 5 – 4 victory, finishing the game with only nine men. Now they are all out for the Lincoln and District League Championship. They have had a most brilliant season.
DUNHOLME had six games, of which they won four. Their two losses were to Scampton – 1 – 5, and to Headquarters 5 Group 3 – 4. Eight inter-section games were played off.
FISKERTON laid out two soccer pitches during the month and gained a considerable impetus in ensuing activity. The station team won its last three Lincoln League games. A combined league and knock-out competition is running with eleven teams competing. 49 Squadron has three teams entered. Two games per day is common; B.A.T. Flight v Echelon have already fought three pointless duels, playing extra time in the last two games. Which shows what a new pitch can do.
BARDNEY have a very strong team, and won six out of their seven April games, including Coningsby and Skellingthorpe, Matz winners and semi-finalists, among their victims. They challenge all comers to do battle! and they are keen, they even cycled to a match – and won!!
METHERINGHAM were unlucky in having three station games cancelled. They played three losing to Digby and 373 Battery, Woodhall, but beating Woodhall Spa 5 – 2. Inter-section fixtures (league and knock-out) produced 14 games, Squadron Armoury, the League champs, being knocked out by R.A.F. Regiment.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is building up steadily, the laying out of a pitch having provided a much needed stimulus. After winning the opening game against Wigsley, 3 – 1, on the new pitch, the Group lost to Skellingthorpe away. Six games yielded four wins, a draw with 93 M.U. the old rivals, and one defeat. In early May, there was much creaking of joints when an officer’s team emerged minus winter woollies and held the Group side to a mere 3 – 1 triumph.
RUGBY
DUNHOLME, finalists in the Wines Trophy, have a powerful side. They defeated Swinderby 8 – 0 in the Wines’ second round, defeated 2 A.A. Command School both away and at home, and Scampton 7 – 6 on the latter’s ground. They are all out for the Wines Trophy and beat Fiskerton 27 – 0 in the semi-final.
METHERINGHAM with a greatly improved side held Waddington to a 9 – 0 victory, and win one and lost one with R.A.F. Digby.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON certainly got in plenty of practice, with eight April games. They won five, knocking Syerston out of the Group Trophy, their victories also included Ingham, Faldingworth and 5 Group. They are in a strong position for the Trophy competition.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is most active. Through the generosity of Swinderby they hold “home” games there pending completion of their Morton Hall pitch. During April they played six games winning two, with one draw. East Kirkby proved their downfall in the Group Trophy. A friendly three game duel with Swinderby has produced one win each and one draw. It is hoped to continue hockey, even if only in inter-section “sixes” throughout the summer.
[Underlined] GENERAL JOTTINGS. [/underlined]
SOFT-BALL 0 Fiskerton have a team in the Lincoln area league. Metheringham are also running a team, playing in a Digby League. 5 Group H.Q. have a willing, if unskilled, nucleus who like to “play ball”. There should be some scope for friendly games within the Group.
TENNIS and BOWLING – Bardney and Metheringham are lucky in having village facilities available, and the games are in full swing.
CYCLING is popular in Bardney. The tough kind with a “cow’s horn” handlebar and a “tail up” racing crouch. Any ex “roadmen” are welcomed to compete in a friendly “25”. A perimeter track is the proposed venue.
CRICKET – The great concern of every captain’s heart is the pitch. The sacred sward where worms and birds both “fear to tread” is THE FOCUS OF ALL CRICKETERS THOUGHTS. May we remind stations that it will be appreciated if they will keep to the date schedule of the Group competition, and not insist on a too Velvet like patch before playing their first round.
WAR SAVINGS
FISKERTON are to be congratulated on another fine effort in National Savings this month. Last month’s increase of 143% to £884 has again been increased by 34% to £1185.
FISKERTON will doubtless be only too pleased to pass on details of their fruitful methods to other Stations – if only to get a bit of competition!!
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) Percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTALS 6309.13.4.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RECORD [/underlined]
The month of April showed a welcome drop in the number of accidents in the Group compared with March, but though there was a large increase in total flying hours, this accident rate did not improve in the same ratio, and is still well below the Group’s best standards.
In all 40 aircraft were damaged during the month, 19 of which were classed as “avoidables”. The remainder were classed as technical failures or obscure. The total of “avoidables” may be subject to alteration as one or two accidents occurring at the end of the month have not been fully investigated and are not included. At the moment they appear to be technical failures or entirely obscure.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE [/underlined]
The details of the avoidable accidents are as follows:-
Ground collision (including taxying) – 6
Swings … 2
Heavy landings …2
Low flying … 2
Overshoots landing … 2
Mid air collisions … 2
Errors of judgement landing … 1
Other errors of judgement … 2
TOTAL … 19
51 Base accounted for 11 and Squadrons 8.
[Underlined] M.T. COLLISIONS & TAXYING [/underlined]
There were again two M.T. accidents this month. In spite of strenuous efforts to stamp out this type of accident it still recurs. Next month [underlined] MUST [/underlined] be “M.T. Accident Free”.
Of the taxying accidents two occurred at night and two during the day. One of the “night” accidents was caused primarily by the pilot neglecting to use an Aldis lamp or taxying light. He struck an obstruction just off the dispersal lead in. In this instance his Flight Engineer was aware of the obstruction but did not warn his captain. Both log books were endorsed in RED.
A Lancaster pilot had just landed landed [sic] and was proceeding round the perimeter, when he told his Engineer to cut the outer engines. The Flight Engineer did so, but opened the starboard outer throttle fully before the propeller stopped turning. The engine roared into life and swung the aircraft off the perimeter. Again, the log books of both pilot and F/E were endorsed in RED.
[Underlined] SWINGS AND HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
Both Swings this month were on take off – one Stirling and one Lancaster.
In the Stirling the pupil pilot swung off the runway, throttled back completely as per drill, but did not stop before his aircraft struck another in dispersal.
The Lancaster pilot ignored all he had ever been told about take-off procedure, handed over his throttles too soon to the Flight Engineer, swung to port at “full power”, over-corrected and broke his undercarriage on a final swing to starboard. His bomb load exploded. Luckily the crew got clear before this happened.
This pilot made another mistake in running up to +4 lbs, 2650 revs. against the brakes.
Heavy landings were of the usual pattern. One occurred at Conversion Unit in unfavourable weather conditions. The other was the result of a Lancaster pilot levelling off too high and not using the engine to correct.
[Underlined] MID-AIR COLLISIONS [/underlined]
There have been four mid-air collisions in the Group in recent months – two in April. There are so many aircraft over this country both by day and night that crews must keep absolutely on their toes at all times. We hear reports of “narrow squeaks” almost every
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash, the immaculate W.A.A.F’s … “and I’d have been all right if that Stirling hadn’t backed into me”
day. The answer, of course, is to maintain a thorough look-out.
Don’t ignore the new “look-out” drill which was sent out this month. There should be no tendency to relax when an aircraft comes back into the circuit after an Op. or any other flight. The danger of collision is always present, and as the pilot is necessarily busy with his cockpit drills, it is up to the rest of the crew, especially gunners, to ensure the safety of the aircraft by keeping up a search and warning the captain of other aircraft.
[Underlined] OTHER INCIDENTS [/underlined]
A pupil pilot in a Stirling was out of line with the runway at 500’ on a good clear night. He landed anyway, off the runway, and knocked over the wind sock.
An Instructor in a Lancaster in showery weather, also found himself out of line with the runway. Instead of going round again he landed off the runway. His speed was excessive and he overshot. A deliberate ground loop placed the aircraft – CAT AC.
A Conversion Unit Mid-Upper Gunner was unloading his guns after a flight. One went off and fired a round into the “fin”. The fin had to be replaced. Gunners! make sure your guns are on “Safe” – all of them.
One Lancaster crashed this month in obscure circumstances. The aircraft was seen coming out of cloud in a high power dive. The tail fell off and then the aircraft broke up. The suggestion at the moment is that the pilot lost control in daylight in cumulo-nimbus cloud. The Accidents Investigation Branch may produce further evidence.
Further proof of the merits of the Lancaster came out this month. An aircraft returned on two engines after being badly shot up. On making an approach at a strange airfield, the pilot could not get his wheels down and went round again from a low height. Unfortunately on his second attempt the pilot overshot on a short flarepath and crashed.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Milne of 50 Squadron displayed exceptional airmanship, and also proved that the Lancaster can be flown on two engines even with a load. He lost both starboard engines while outward bound on ops., at 3,000 feet. Forced to return to Base, he jettisoned the fuel from the inboard tanks and effected a perfect approach and landing still carrying full bomb load.
F/Sgt Young, a pupil at 5 L.F.S., put up a good show which also reflects credit on his Instructor. Shortly after take-off on his first solo in a Lancaster, the starboard tyre burst. F/S. Young was diverted to Woodbridge where he made a successful landing without causing any further damage to the aircraft.
F/Sgt. White and F/Sgt Millikan, the Navigator and Air Bomber of a crew under training at Conversion Unit, set an example which would have done credit to an experienced crew. While on a high level cross country flight, their pilot passed out through lack of oxygen and lost control of the aircraft. F/Sgt Millikan regained control of the Stirling and under the direction of F/Sgt White who assumed the responsibility of captain, they flew the aircraft for 1 1/2 hours back to Base when the pilot had recovered sufficiently to land the aircraft.
The “Plumbers Union” have also distinguished themselves. F/Sgt Gledhill, a Staff Engineer of 1660 Conversion Unit, was a member of a crew of a Stirling. While the aircraft was taxying to dispersal, the port inner caught fire. The Graviner had no effect, and F/Sgt Gledhill promptly removed the engine cowling and extinguished the fire with a hand extinguisher, saving the aircraft from much more serious damage.
(Continued on page 12, col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING [/underlined]
F/Lt. Lucas of Flying Training Command visited the Group during April to advise on the subject of Clay Pigeon Shooting, this Officer is stationed at 54 Group Headquarters, and is responsible for Clay Pigeon Shooting in the I.T.W’s. It was obvious that we are getting little if any training value out of clay pigeon shooting at present, due to the lack of proper ranges and the fact that very few Gunnery Leaders have ever had instruction in the art.
A trap house was constructed at Waddington from sandbags, and seven firing points laid out; this work was done in two days. The lay-out in use at I.T.W’s has two trap houses, but this was not considered necessary for our purpose. A request has been made for an officer from Flying Training Command to be attached to the Group to give advice and instruction to all stations, and the possibility of constructing a sandbag trap house on each station is under consideration. A demonstration of the lay-out at Waddington, makes it obvious that clay pigeon shooting must be done on a properly constructed range under the supervision of an instructor; under these conditions it is an excellent quickening exercise and when gunners are proficient in hitting clays, they have confidence in themselves.
[Underlined] .5 UNDER DEFENCE GUN. [/underlined]
Six squadrons have aircraft fitted with this gun and squadrons have been asked for opinions on the value of the gun on operations, and if H 2 S is preferred to the gun, as the aircraft can obviously only have one or the other. Opinions given to date are not very favourable as several snags have been encountered during the trials carried out so far. With the gunner strapped in his seat it is difficult to follow the gun round on the beam; it is difficult for the gunner to get his head down behind the sight as it tends to push the oxygen mask upwards on the gunners face; and also considerable vibration is experienced on the sight when the gun is fired.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Combats for April numbered 81, resulting in 5 enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed, 1 as probably destroyed and 7 damaged. The maximum number for any one operation was 24 and this was on the 22/23rd April on Brunswick five claims being made on that night; 1 destroyed, 1 probable and 2 damaged. Combats on French targets were few, but these sorites are not to be treated lightly by air gunners and the most vigilant search is to be maintained at all times. Squadrons must include instruction on search during night vision training. Search from the rear turret is difficult as it entails the rear gunner standing or crouching in a most uncomfortable position for short periods to enable him to see below and astern; this must be carried out as the view below is very poor when the gunner is in the seat.
[Underlined] SELF TOWED DROGUES [/underlined]
This practice has not been carried out on the scale it was hoped for, due to a variety of reasons, the main one being the shortage of brackets for attachment to the aircraft. Some Stations have had difficulty in obtaining the material for the manufacture of these items and snags have been met in obtaining the quick release unit. Gunnery Leaders should press for this equipment to enable a consensus of opinion to be obtained on the value of the exercise. Self tow at night with the drogue illuminated is the best step and should present no difficulties when Squadrons are satisfied that the existing equipment is satisfactory.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO. 77 COURSE. [/underlined]
F/O Wyand – 9 Sqdn. – 83.8% - Cat. “B”.
F/O Fisher – 1660 C.U. – 77.8% - Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 14. [/underlined]
F/O Gross – 1660 C.U. – Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 17. [/underlined]
P/O Hammond – 619 Sqdn. – Cat. “A”.
Congratulations to P/O Hammond on obtaining first place on the course.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
49 Sqdn. “M” 20/21st April,1944 FW.190 C.
106 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 ME.109 C.
467 Sqdn. “N” 26th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “B” 29/30th April,1944 FW.190 C.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
619 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 JU. 88 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
44 Sqdn. “Z” 9/10th April,1944 ME.110 C.
207 Sqdn. “A” 22/23rd April, 1944 ME.210 C.
467 Sqdn. “W” 22nd April,1944 ME.109 C.
630 Sqdn. “J” 24th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “T” 24th April,1944 ME.109 C.
97 Sqdn. “Q” 24th April,1944 JU.88 C.
[Table of Air Training for April showing Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS (Contd. From page 11, col.3) [/underlined]
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
A Stirling made a crash landing last month and the only man injured was the rear gunner. He was also unique in that he was the only man not in his crash position.
A Squadron aircraft crashed in poor visibility. There were several diversion airfields available and the pilot was told to stand by and orbit Base. But he thought he’d come down to have a look!! He and two occupants were killed as a result.
Two aircrew baled out over the Wash. They did not take their ‘K’ type dinghy, and so threw away their last chance.
An experienced captain was recently forced to make an early return. His Flight Commander removed his pitot head cover for him when he landed.
Another “gen man” thought it unnecessary to await the ground crew’s signal to leave dispersal. He taxied into the tail of an aircraft in front of him. Both aircraft are CAT A/C!!
A very much sadder and wiser crew landed badly shot up recently. They explained they had lost the Concentration. The pilot had put red on black on one course. Yes it can still happen!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of April was 1635, of these 952 produced plottable ground detail, this increase being due to better conditions and the type of attack. It will be seen from the analysis that the percentage of failures is still excessive with a considerable increase in failures attributed to “no flash” illumination”. [sic]
There can be no doubt that, in the past, many flash failures were passing through as “flash muffled by cloud”, since it is impossible to assess bombing frames exposed by the light from fires on the ground when cloud conditions are 10/10ths. This is no attempt to draw attention to the high percentage of Armament failures; failures, whatever the cause, result in the loss of very valuable information and represent a loss in efficiency.
Photographic and Armament personnel must co-operate with each other to establish the [underlined] real cause [/underlined] of these failures; Type 35 camera controls and photo flash fuse settings must be identical with each other. It is not enough to set the control pointer to the required setting. Make sure that the timing of the control agrees with that indicated upon the setting dial before it is fitted to the aircraft; adjustments can be made to the pointer where necessary.
It is again necessary to stress that once the aircraft have returned from the attack, the production of the photographic results in the minimum period of time is essential to the Air Staff. The majority of the section personnel are aware of this fact, but improvement can be made by better organisation and attention to the following:-
(i) Ensure that everything is ready to commence processing as soon as the first magazines arrive (at one section seven minutes were lost between the time of the first magazine going into the darkroom and the lights being switched off).
(ii) The photographer detailed to receive the film magazine from the aircrew must obtain essential information and pass the first four or six magazines to the processing section in the quickest possible manner. (One section wasted valu-
{Continued on Page 14 Column 3)
[Table of Photographic Analysis Results by Squadron]
TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD MONTH FOR TRAINING BASE [/underlined]
During April, 51 Base flew more hours and passed out more crews than ever before in its existence. The Stirling Conversion Units produced a grand total of 5500 flying hours, and the Lancaster Finishing School a total of almost 1900 hours. The Lancaster Finishing School posted 109 crews to squadrons and 95 crews were posted into the Lancaster Finishing School for Lancaster training.
These results were achieved as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of maintenance personnel and instructional staffs throughout the Base, despite the fact that the first ten days of the month produced little flying owing to bad weather. The operational stations in the Group assisted by providing their airfields for circuits and landings when training base airfields were overcrowded.
With excellent co-operation between this Group and 10 and 12 Fighter Groups, Training Base flew Bullseyes on 18 nights. Crews also took part in Command Bullseyes, including three spoofs over the North Sea which, in addition to providing good D.R. practice for the Navigators, helped divert the enemy’s fighter strength from the operations against enemy centres in France.
The main concern during the month has been burst tyres on Lancasters and Stirlings, and every precaution is being taken to reduce these to a minimum, because it is fully appreciated that the minor mishap caused by a burst tyre can well lead to a serious accident. The overall total of accidents for the Base is still too high, and the staff is pressing forward strongly with an “accident reduction” drive.
The forthcoming expansion in Training Base by which 132 crews are to be produced each month, has led to a revision of the Ground Syllabus and the Flying Syllabus. The revised Flying Syllabus is not yet effective, but will come into operation during May. There has been an expansion of H 2 S training in the two Units at present equipped for this training, and when 1654 Conversion Unit at Wigsley becomes productive, the periodical shortage of H 2 S crews should cease.
AIR SEA RESCUE
It is a very easy thing, when ordered to practice Parachute or Dinghy Drills to go out to an aircraft sit around smoking for half an hour and then report back to the Flight Office “D.C.O.” These drills are the “Safety Drills” and the instinct of self preservation alone should make crews practice them until “Practice makes Perfect”.
Generally speaking parachute drills are carried out more conscientiously than Dinghy Drills, but in recent incidents in this Group it appears that even this drill is not receiving the attention it should. Note the findings of the investigating officer after a recent fatal accident. “It seems doubtful whether the crew had done the amount of parachute drill accredited to them in the “Flight Records”. In other words completed records may save you a lot of bother, but unless the records are true they are valueless and wasteful.
Let us face facts. Even [underlined] you [/underlined] may be shot down and bale-out or ditch some time or other. If you have just a rough working knowledge of the drills, some of the crew will probably save their lives, but, equally probably, some will lose their lives. If you and your crew are word and action perfect in the drill, you will live to fight again, and get a good spell of “Survivors’ leave” into the bargain. Most probably!
Saturday morning had now been set aside as the time when every available crew is to spend at least an hour on these Safety Drills. It should also be regarded as a suitable time to acquaint aircrews with the latest safety equipment and modifications. This period, however, should not be regarded as an excuse for not doing drills at other times. There’ll be the odd occasion when you are elsewhere on a Saturday morning.
One Base has issued instructions that crews are to be ordered at Briefing, from time to time, that they are to do these drills after landing from Operations – when tired and in darkness, when their physical condition is similar to that when facing a real “Bods out” or ditching, or baling our [sic] conditions. This is a very good way of doing things – you get the maximum benefit, as you are already in full flying kit, with the minimum of effort.
In March 36.9% of aircrews in all Groups who ditched in “Home Waters” were saved, while 397 lost their lives. The fact that 73 lives were lost in crews where other members were saved stresses the importance of drills. The Americans are still making better use of your Air Sea Rescue Service than you are.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT (Continued from Page 15 Col.2) [/underlined]
stations in the near future to service the F.N.64 turrets prior to their being returned to Maintenance Units – a step in the right direction at last. All Armament Officers can assist in speeding up this servicing process by ensuring that a hydraulic turret test rig and a complete set of tools are available for the party when they arrive. Don’t leave it until the day the party is expected, and so waste a day collecting the equipment from various dispersed points around the station. Do it now and ensure that the floor space at present cluttered up by these turrets is made available for more important equipment.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
A record number of sorties has been carried out during April and it was pleasing to note that note that the cancellations due to technical defects were: Early Returns .73% - Cancellations .69% - both being very definite improvements.
The number of engine failures which occur and necessitate change of an engine before the completion of its life are not decreasing at the rate we should expect now that a more reliable engine forms the bulk of our holdings. The Merlin 24 from which we expected such high performance is doing its best to produce this performance. It is however handicapped by the fact that paddle-blade propellers and AY/118 constant speed units have invariably been fitted to this type of engine, the results being that instances are occurring of over speeding and the odd case of engine disintegration. Action is in hand to fit modified C.S.U’s and this must go ahead with all possible speed.
The Merlin 28 and 38 still suffer from loss of coolant occasionally, and we still get failures due to fracture of the oil pipe to the dual drive, mainly due to the slow rate at which the modified oil pipe is being supplied.
It is pleasing to see the local improvements which are being carried out by C.T.O’s the improvement of technical sites on the “self help” scheme and the general clean-up and overhaul of equipment.
Although the introduction of a technical adjutant was mainly to allow the C.T.O. to be out amongst the aircraft more, there may be a tendency for the C.T.O’s to leave too much to the technical adjutant. This is a point which must be watched and although it is not the intention to pin the C.T.O. to his office, he must keep a tight control on correspondence, returns and technical reports and keep “au fait” with all leaflets and technical letters issued.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
It is gratifying to note that the maintenance of the Mk.XIV Bombsight improves month by month, as is evidenced by recent photographs of targets after a visit by 5 Group. Ground crews in general share in these achievements, but the instrument repairer deserves a special pat on the back for the hours well spent in tuning and levelling the Bombsights to produce these results.
The same degree of accuracy is unfortunately not apparent in the A.P.I./A.M.U. Cases are still being reported of “racing” of the A.M.I. despite the fitting of Command Modification No. 57. This “racing” can be attributed in most cases to incorrect tension of the relay spring and as no test equipment is yet available the fault cannot be laid at the door of bad maintenance. Efforts are being made to obtain the necessary tension gauges so that this fault can be cured. In the meantime units must make every effort to complete the manufacture of the Coningsby A.P.I./A.M.U. test bench, details of which were forwarded several weeks ago.
April witnessed the introduction of new equipment the responsibility of which rests on the instrument repairer. The most important is the nitrogen installation. It is not necessary to demand the ground charging equipment, but units must advise their Equipment Officer when an aircraft with nitrogen is received so that the necessary steps can be taken to obtain the charging equipment. At the same time the Group electrical officer must also be informed.
The other item of new equipment arriving in aircraft is the Mk.VIII Automatic Control, the introduction of which should ease maintenance problems. The Group servicing van has been round all operational stations to give preliminary instructions on the maintenance of this instrument and courses of three weeks’ duration will shortly become available to those personnel who have already attended the Mk.IV Control course. The question of the inferior luminous markings of the Mk.IA repeater has been brought to the notice of Headquarters Bomber Command, and it is hoped that an improvement will be made shortly.
The Electrical Sections – particularly those in Base major servicing units – continue to do a good job of work, despite the increasing number of modifications in which the Electrician is involved. Further modifications of an operational necessity are on the way, so electrical officers must give all future suggested modifications very serious consideration before submitting them to higher authority, if the electrical sections are not to be overburdened.
A word about Bumph. There appears to be a rooted objection among electrical officers to put pen, pencil or typewriter – if you can get one – to paper. Base and Station electrical officers must realise that it is impossible to get on without a certain minimum of paper work and promptness in replies is essential. If you are asked to reply to a question by a certain date make sure that your reply is one time.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability for Stirling and Lancaster]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV. (Contd. From Page 9 Column 3) [/underlined]
This dangerous habit must cease. Some navigators seem to use R.F. Units and Stud Settings as toys to be changed and switched about to see what fixes they can obtain; the result is incorrect fixes, and chaos. These navigators are playing right into the enemy’s hands, particularly if they obtain signals which do not emanate from our Gee Stations!”
All Navigators must realise the importance of the above points as it is possible that in future several operations per night may be planned with an XF possibility for each operation. If navigators persist in using XF’s which are not assigned to them and phased for their route, there will be multitudes of incorrect fixes, and possibly casualties as a result of careless navigation.
Flight Engineers
In the past the Flight Engineers have been selected from Group I or II tradesmen; having been in the R.A.F. for long periods they gained quite considerable experience of many types of aircraft and engines, and therefore the changeover to their new duties was easy.
To-day we are faced with the problem of having to train pupils who perhaps a few weeks ago, had never seen inside an aircraft. During their training in the early stages, many subjects are taught which would appear to have no bearing on their job as Flight Engineers; this must be done however, so that later in the course, when boost control, hydraulics and pneumatics are explained, the pupil will have the basic knowledge to understand them. This takes time, and as we must produce more and more Flight Engineers, time cannot be spared to train them as Fitters. They are trained as Flight Engineers but perhaps a few corners remain that can be “polished off” by the Flight Engineer Leader.
The Flight Engineer Leader in a Squadron is responsible for training new members until he is satisfied that after a personal check, they can carry out the duties as laid down in A.M.O. A.538/43. He must make them continue their practical training, and whenever possible let them be with the ground crews on Daily Inspections, or any other work on their aircraft. Only in this way will good aircraft familiarisation be gained.
The training to be carried out in Squadrons must consist of Daily and Between Flight Inspections, instructions on the electrical panel, log keeping and engine limitations. The last subject is most important; only last month an early return which could have been avoided was made by a crew in this Group. On this occasion the oil pressure dropped to 50 lbs. per square inch at 20,000 feet, but the temperature remained at 80°C. Engine limitations laid down in A.P. 2062C (Pilot’s Notes) are:-
Oil Pressure minimum 45 lbs. per sq. in.
Oil temp. maximum 90°C.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY (Continued from Page 13 Col.1) [/underlined]
able time in processing a batch of films which had not been exposed, for the simple reason that the bombs had been brought back. This was negligence on the part of the airman who took over the magazines from the aircrew.
The photographic N.C.O. is responsible for the first film analysis and must decide whether it is a success or failure. Despite repeated instructions, many instances still occur where films are sent to this Headquarters as successes when in fact they are failures, and failures which should be classified as successes. This wastes the time spent on correspondence and telephone calls. One N.C.O. stated that it was because everything was required in a rush; this is true. THE AIR STAFF MUST HAVE PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS as soon as they can be produced and in ensuring this there must be no reduction of effort. Once the prints have been despatched, all films should be carefully re-examined, to ensure that no mistakes have been made.
Now that Headquarters, Bomber Command have reduced the amount of photographic printing, an improvement in the printing quality is expected. Faint ground details which could be plotted is often lost through poor processing and printing.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
The expression “unable owing to pressure of work” has become the password for excusing a dirty and untidy bomb dump. A slovenly bomb dump is too often the hall mark of poor workmanship and the effect is cumulative until unstacked empty cases, broken trollies and transporters disposed at random are taken for granted.
It takes little longer during a fusing operation to stock the tail boxes when removing the tails, rather than strew them indiscriminately over a large area; the effort is not great but the resultant tidiness is surprising.
A scene reminiscent of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow can be avoided if only a few men are employed on cleaning up after a fusing detail. If the broken transporters, trollies and liners are not repairable, write them off for scrap metal – the country needs it.
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH [/underlined]
Nearly 7% of the total number of photoflashes carried in April have been classed as flash failure. The classification flash failure is given when:-
(i) There is no indication of illumination on frames 6, 7 and 8 (or 4, 5 and 6 in the old sequence) of the film.
(ii) The fusing wire from the fuse is brought back.
(iii) There is no indication of violent evasive action on any of the bombing frames.
(iv) The camera control is checked and found correct.
(v) The electrical circuit and release slip are found serviceable.
This figure of 7% is excessive and so much higher than any previous month that it must be assumed, as in many cases the same lot numbers were used over two consecutive months, that some of this 7% was, in fact, incorrect fuse setting and bad maintenance. Co-operation with the photographic section can solve this problem.
[Underlined] “J” CLUSTERS [/underlined]
Loading ramps and rollers for 500 lb “J” clusters should be spring cleaned so that the clusters which are now arriving in quantity may be loaded directly on the rollers, thus saving double humping.
[Underlined] SUPPLY [/underlined]
Owing to the present precarious supply position of certain weapons the C.O. and personnel of No.93 M.U. have been called upon to produce stores at a moment’s notice from nowhere. To the credit of 93 M.U. these stores always turn up, but it is realised how much extra work is entailed in meeting a rush demand.
The staff of 93 M.U. are extremely well informed regarding the requirements and difficulties of operational armament, but it is doubted if Armament Officers realise the difficulties of the M.U. who handled nearly 30,000 tons of bombs last month.
It is suggested that Armament Officers could spend a profitable day by accompanying an Austin to the M.U. and see for themselves how large scale humping is organised.
[Underlined] MANIPULATION FAILURES. [/underlined]
A marked increase in manipulation failures has been apparent this month resulting in a large number of bombs and pyrotechnics being returned to base. The more outstanding “boobs” are set out below:-
1. 2 S.B.C’s complete with contents returned to Base – distributor arm fouled by the quadrant peg card. No jettison action carried out.
2. The following stores were returned to Base due to non-[underlined] selection [/underlined]:-
2 x 4.5” photoflashes
2 x 250 lb Target Indicators
2 x 7” Hooded Flare Clusters
1 x 1000 lb M.C.
NO FURTHER COMMENT IS NECESSARY.
[Underlined] FN.64 TURRETS [/underlined]
The turret servicing party is visiting all
(Continued on Page 4 Column 2) [sic]
[Table of Failures by Squadron]
FLYING CONTROL
The high standard of landing achieved last month has been maintained during April. It is significant to note that SKELLINGTHORPE who pioneered this scheme when it was first introduced and in fact, carried out all the trials, have risen to the top of the ladder with an excellent average of 1.85 minutes.
The most outstanding figure for the month, however, is 30 aircraft landed in 36 minutes at Waddington. This is, in fact, the finest performance which has ever been put up within the Group and possibly within the Command. The following are some examples of really first-class performances for the month:-
[Table of Selected Flying Control Sessions by Stations]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
It is hoped to introduce shortly a competition embracing all Flying Control aspects. This will be judged on a quarterly basis and the condition and efficiency of every part of the Station Flying Control organisation will
(Continued on Page 6 Column 2)
[Table of April Landing Times by Station]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
Our brief this month was abundantly clear. With the Allied air offensive continuing almost uninterruptedly on a rising scale against communications targets and airfields, it appeared certain that our own role would be integrated in the common plan to wear down the Western Wall. To this end we have seen during the course of the month a revolution in our bombing technique confirming the undoubted accuracy of low level precision attacks.
The importance of hammering railway targets as a means of reducing the enemy’s capacity to meet a threat from the West was fully recognised. On 10/11th TOURS was effectively attacked, followed by JUVISY and LA CHAPELLE on 18/19th and 21/22nd respectively. The results in each case were impressive. At Tours an exceptional concentration with over 100 hits fell on the track disrupting all communications. A particularly high precedent was established at Juvisy. Here we achieved one of the greatest concentrations of craters yet obtained on a target of this type – the attack almost completely devastating the marshalling yards.
The attack on La Chappelle was no less successful. Damage is severe at the southern end of the Marshalling Yard which sustained the main weight of the attack. Large fires were still burning in the area the day following the raid, and it could be seen that tracks had been severed at several important junctions. The importance which the enemy attaches to keeping his railroads open, and the difficulties which he is experiencing in handling even high priority traffic is perhaps reflected in the fact that some 50000 Germans have now been transported into France to relieve the situation and, furthermore, German branch lines have been torn up to provide new tracks.
This wearing down process is also being applied with particular attention to the Luftwaffe itself, its sources of supply being very seriously threatened by repeated attacks on aircraft factories. On 5/6th, 605 tons of bombs were dropped on four plants at TOULOUSE. The S.N.C.A.S.E. Aircraft Assembly Plant has sustained serious damage to its three main buildings – the assembly plant, component store, and testing shop. At the A.I.A. Works, every building is more or less severely damaged, while the Aircraft Factory buildings are all damaged – amongst those completely destroyed being the components manufactory shop, components store, drawing offices, heat treatment and plate shop. The Montaudran Airfield is now without its three principal hangars, and has suffered damage to other unidentified buildings.
Coupled with the first attack on St. Medard-on-Jalles (reported later) was a raid on the KIELLER Airframe Factory near OSLO – PRU cover is not complete, but the photographs available indicate that damage is considerable in the North Eastern part of the target area, including heavy destruction in the Bayerische Motorenwerke.
It is perhaps interesting to note that following the attack on CLERMONT FERRAND Aulnat Aircraft Factory, the sick bay is almost the only building undamaged. It is open to some doubt as to whether this fact can be accepted as a tribute to our precision bombing, but whatever the position may be in this respect, it is manifest that this Repair Factory will not be available to the enemy for a long time to come.
The attack on the ST CYR Signals Equipment Depot on 10/11th was highly successful – resulting in the destruction of several of the principal buildings in the Depot.
Although the focus of attention was directed on rail centres and other special targets in the occupied zone, this concentration in policy did not imply that other forms of attack would be discontinued; still less that they were conceived independently of the supreme invasion task. In fact four “blitz” attacks were staged during the course of the month. AACHEN was singled out for attack on 11/12th. Throughout the city – particularly to the South and South West, industrial and residential damage has been fairly severe, while the Main Station and sidings, large Passenger Station, Locomotive Sheds, and Goods Depot Shed have suffered heavily. Reconnaissance following our attack on BRUNSWICK on 22/23rd is not complete, but from the photographs obtained, it can be seen that damage is considerable in the business/residential area South of the City Centre, with many hits in the South Eastern marshalling yards. A high measure of success also attended the attack on MUNICH on 24/25th.
[Underlined] RIDER [/underlined]
Until that date this Nazi birthplace had escaped serious damage, but it is now known that the town has suffered its first heavy battering. No interpretation of the reconnaissance photographs is yet available but even to the unpractised eye it is obvious that the target is severely hit. Widespread areas of devastation are apparent in the old city (which is 30 - 40% gutted) continuing in a wide sear from East to West up to and including the Main Railway Station. The Nazi Party meeting place Kreig Ministerium and Prinz Leopold Platz, to mention but a few of the important Municipal Buildings are either destroyed or severely damaged.
Fierce fighter activity was encountered in defence of SCHWEINFURT on 26/27th. Despite this violent reaction, however, the attack was pressed home, resulting in severe damage to all five ball-bearing plants, in particular to the Deutsche Star Kugalhalter where two thirds of the machine shops have been demolished. The adjoining marshalling yards have also sustained damage, and there are many incidents throughout the town.
No less important were our minelaying trips on 9/10th, 18/19th and again on 23/24th. These sorties probably lack the spectacle of a bombing attack, but their sinister loads will doubtless reap a very real contribution in the war harvest.
The culminating stage of the month was in the final raid on 29/30th against the Explosives Works at ST. MEDARD-on-JALLES. A pass had already been made at this same target the previous night, but had been frustrated by unfortunate weather conditions. So with redoubled vigour another attack was launched. On this occasion the weather chose to be our ally, and the opportunity afforded was seized to produce one of the most impressive pyrotechnic displays. For more than half an hour the target was in the throes of a succession of violent explosions. The greatest concentration of the attack fell to the North East of the works area extending across the centre of the works to the western border. A most heartening result and an inspiring conclusion to the month’s work.
The above achievements were contributed by 1950 Lancs and 84 Mosquitos – 88.6% of which were successful in attacking the primary, with 2.5% casualties.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Statistics by Squadron showing Availability, Sorties, Results and Points]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944
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V Group News, April 1944
5 Group Newsletter April 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 21, April 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about process of servicing, gardening, navigation, honours and awards, signals / radar, tactics, air bombing, radar / navigation, link trainer, sports, war savings, accidents, gunnery, training, air sea rescue, engineering, armament, flying control, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-04
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Anne-Marie Watson
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-25
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Tours
France--Toulouse
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
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1944-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Metheringham
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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V GROUP NEWS V MAY * 1944 * SECRET * NO * 22
[Stamp]
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The results achieved by the Group during May far exceed those of any previous month. They represent a full contribution to the great effort put in by the whole of Bomber Command which, it can now be seen, was a big factor in the safe arrival on French soil of the “Armies of Liberation”.
Not only did the Group carry out more attacks, but each attack was more effective than in the past. Throughout the month, the centre of the pattern of bombs averaged only 100 yards from the aiming point. A great improvement on previous results. This improvement has been brought about mainly by the steady development of the system of marking, and I wish to pay tribute to those pilots of No.627 Squadron who have gone in low to mark the target and who have not allowed their aim to the spoilt by the light flak defences. Their accuracy has been consistently of a very high order, far exceeding tat of any other system of marking so far tried.
The Group also owes a great deal to the Master Bombers who remain throughout the attack directing the marking and assessing the bombing. With better communications, their task will become easier, and I hope that, before long, all aircraft in the Group will be fitted with V.H.F. Crews will then be able to hear the orders which are given to the Flare and Marking Forces and will know what is happening, and the reason for any hold up. Without this means of communication, it is impossible to keep crews informed when things go wrong, with the result that they have often had to delay their bombing without knowing the reason.
In spite of these great improvements, half the bombs dropped against these small precision targets fell [underlined] more than 250 yards [/underlined] from the aiming point, where they were wasted. This percentage of bombs wide of the aiming point coincides almost exactly with the percentage which fell at similar distances on the practice ranges during May. These errors are too great for, not only is the bombsight capable of achieving errors of less than 100 yards from 10,000 feet, but errors below this figure are consistently achieved by a number of crews in the Group, not only on the ranges but also on operations.
If the bombing error of all crews can be reduced to the level of the best 25%, it will be equivalent to doubling the effective striking power of the Group.
I, therefore, make a special appeal to the bombing team for practice and yet more practice; in accurate flying; in executing the small alterations of course during the bombing run, and in the quick test of the sight to ensure that it is producing the correct sighting angle and is properly aligned. These may seem small matters, but it is on details such as these, that our efficiency as a Bomber Group depends.
I want every crew to realise that each stick of bombs which can be dropped even a few yards nearer the marker, will directly affect the duration of the war. At present, more than at any other time during this war, it is the effort and accuracy of each individual crew which can expedite or delay victory. If each crew can place their centre bomb within 100 yards of the marker, the result will be overwhelming. Individual effort for greater accuracy by each crew is the keynote now. This improvement will first appear in a marked reduction in crew errors on the practice ranges.
Let each crew check their own bombing error at the end of this month and see what progress they have made towards achieving this result.
Copies Sent: Wadd. 9
Skell. 10.
Bard. 6
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has recently been fully occupied with the introduction of target markers and the more general use of high explosive bombs within the Group. This has had a detrimental effect on the investigation of gun and turret failures and it would be folly to assume that the present decrease in gunnery failures is other than a temporary relief brought about by the milder weather conditions prevalent at this time of the year.
The gun ‘Bogey’ must be beaten before next winter, and with this end in view all new evidence must be examined and forwarded to those most qualified to analyse and correct the many small faults combining to cause major unserviceability. An appeal is therefore made to all Armament Officers, Gunnery Leaders and, above all, to the gunners themselves to report all faults, however petty they may seem.
A recurring fault is often accepted as a matter of course and not reported to a higher authority, as it is assumed that “everyone knows about it”. Unfortunately, those scions of industry responsible for corrective action are often office bound due to causes beyond their control, and a serious fault is only recognised by a number of units reporting the same defect.
The failure to report defects is attributed to the feeling of competition when comparisons are printed, and as a result false records are being received. These records are, in fact, printed to avail armament specialists of figures and facts normally reserved for higher formations, so they too may have data for research and modification. It is not intended that these tables should indicate the relative efficiency of units.
[Underlined] All defect reports are gratefully received. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GUN TURRETS [/underlined]
Yet another new turret failure has recently appeared, which requires the urgent attention of all Armament Officers.
Hydraulic pipe lines located in the leading edge of the Lancaster aircraft are being fractured, and preliminary investigation has shown that there are several factors contributing to this failure:-
(i) Pressure and return pipes are positioned too close together and, in some instances, the unions are actually touching.
(ii) Pipe positioning cleats are of inferior design and are not standing up to the job. This is aggravated by the fact that there are insufficient cleats, and those that are provided are badly positioned.
(iii) The packing between the cleat and the pipe line vibrates out of position, leaving the pipe to chafe against the cleat, resulting in a fractured pipe.
At present only three small inspection panels are located between the two power plants and it is impossible to inspect the full 13 feet of pipe lines through these small panels.
Recommendations have been made to Command for:-
(a) Additional cleats.
(b) Re-positioning of existing cleats.
(c) Re-design of pipe layout.
(d) More effective packing between pipe and cleat.
An early answer is expected.
In the interim, Armament Officers should make an immediate check of all turret hydraulic pipe lines, and so ensure that the possibility of a fracture is kept to an absolute minimum.
[Underlined] HYDRAULIC MEDIA [/underlined]
Trials have been carried out this month with a mixture of 70% DTD.585 and 30% DTD.472B and although these trials were only of a short duration, the unanimous opinion appears to be that this mixture seems to be the “best yet”. A definite decrease in leaks has been apparent turret functioning has been normal, and several squadrons are of the opinion that turret speeds have, if anything, slightly improved.
Requests have been made to higher authority for permission to fill all hydraulic systems with this new mixture as soon as possible.
(Continued on Page 17, col.3)
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) Percentage of personnel saving
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Unit]
TOTAL AMOUNT SAVED £7828.0.4.
An increase of £1,518.7s.0d. over April figures.
FLYING CONTROL
Once more the average landing times for the Group have been reduced and our target of two minutes per aircraft is drawing nearer. There are still the same one or two Stations, however, who seem unable to reduce their landing figures. Circuit drill is easy and causes no difficulty whatsoever to crews. The main fault lies in a straggling return and Stations must stress continually the need for discipline in maintaining the airspeeds on which crews are briefed. It is noticed from other Groups’ figures that they are not very far behind, and since we regard ourselves as the pioneers of quick landing, then we must hold our lead.
Below are the three best performances for the moth, but at the time of going to press, these figures have all been beaten and the new record will be published in next month’s News.
[Table of Best Landing Tines by Station]
(Continued on page 3, col.2)
MAY LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties undertaken by the Group achieved still another record, some 2254 sorties being carried out during the month.
The serviceability figure still remains high, although the number of engine changes which are carried out before the engine has completed its life is still far too high. This is due to defects which have been occurring now for a long period, the main being:-
1. Failure of oil pipe between the relief valve and the dual drive.
2. Flame trap failures due to blow-back.
3. Leaking cylinder blocks due to cracks on Merlin 22’s and 24’s.
The percentage of early returns due to defects in equipment controlled by Engineer and Eng. Elect. Was 0.8% and the aircraft failing to get off provided a further 0.5%
Now that a test crew is attached to each Base Major Servicing Section, full advantage should be taken of this crew for testing aircraft with any unusual flying characteristics which are reported from time to time by squadrons. Any adjustments found necessary should be carried out by experts in the Base Major Servicing Section and not by any gang who happens to be available.
No. 55 Base has now formed and all stations in 5 Group are under Base Organisation. 55 Base is not yet functioning as such in every respect, but everything is working in the right direction and it is anticipated that the results will be good.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNITS [/underlined]
Again a record number of flying hours has been produced by the Conversion Units, and No. 5 L.F.S., and the number of hours required to produce the crews necessary has not been exceeded. Major Inspections are progressing satisfactorily, and the organisation is such that the maintenance can keep pace with the amount of flying produced. The major troubles experienced with the Stirling during the month have been coring subsequent to going over to summer grade oil, and undercarriage pylon failures which occur usually when the undercarriage is being lowered prior to landing. It is hoped that the coring troubles will be cured by returning to the use of winter grade oil, together with the fitment of the approved blank.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
Within the next few days a start will be made to modify the bomb aimer’s panels of Lancaster aircraft, details of which have been issued to all Bases. A modification gang will be formed at Scampton to undertake the alteration to all Bomb Aimers’ panels in the Group aircraft. Panels will be issued in batches of 20 at a time, so that there will be no delay in the change-over. It should be the aim of Electrical Officers to remove the old panel and fit the new in all aircraft of a squadron within 24 hours. By good co-operation it will be possible to complete all aircraft in the Group within three to four weeks.
Recent precision targets demand that the accuracy of the Mark XIV Bombsights must be given absolute priority. We must aim at errors of not more than 50 yards at 10,000 feet in the immediate future. To achieve this, greater care must be taken in the tuning, levelling and lining up of the sights, and discussions with Bomb Aimers on the analysis of practice bombing results will also help. Base Bombing Leaders have realised the necessity for this co-operation, and Electrical Officers must do all in their power to reciprocate.
Trials have recently been carried out in all squadrons with a synchroniser for the two inboard engines. This permits synchronisation within 1 r.p.m. and flight engineers state that the device is very satisfactory, particularly from the point of view of crew comfort, since the severe periodic vibration which occurs when the engines are de-synchronised is entirely eliminated, and fatigue on long flights is reduced. There has also been a marked decrease in the incidence of instrument failure, noticeably engine speed indicators. Up to the present a single lamp has been used which merely indicated de-synchronisation and a method of trial and error is necessary to obtain synchronisation. A new indicator consisting of three lamps is being tested at East Kirkby which will give an indication of which engine is running fast. This indicator will be submitted to Bomber Command after further trials have been completed.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Stirling and Lancaster Training Aircraft Serviceability by Unit]
FLYING CONTROL (Cont. from page 2)
[Underlined] WOODBRIDGE [/underlined]
Crews are now aware of the facilities available at the emergency landing field at Woodbridge. The staff at Woodbridge are only too glad to see operational crews on ‘non-emergency’ visits. Although landing instructions have been circulated and (we hope) read by all aircrew, a visit to Woodbridge or even a run down there during N.F.T. to look at the lay-out from the air will provide a more permanent image of the landing drill required. One point which is to be particularly stressed is that crews must not attempt to turn off midway along the runway at night time. They must continue right along to the end of the runway where marshalling crews are ready to direct them to dispersal.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
All Stations are now reported to be getting down seriously to improving their airfields and Watch Offices for the competition which closes on the 31st July. S.F.C.O’s must remember, however, that although 31st July is the official date for closing, inspections by the G.F.C.O. can be expected any day.
Flight Engineers
When checking logs it is found that some Flight Engineers are filling in the details on the top of their logs before they examine the aircraft. Such things as “Hatched checked and found secure”, “Auto Controls out”, “Air Intakes cold” and many other vital checks are being taken for granted. This log is for the benefit of all the crew and the safety of the aircraft; therefore these checks must be carried out on dispersal just prior to start up, and only then recorded on the log.
The Flight Engineer Leader on each Squadron must check all logs returned, and bring to the notice of all pilots and flight engineers any bad engine handling; if no notice is taken, and such combinations of revs and boost as 2700 revs + 3 lbs boost or 2850 revs + 2 lbs boost etc., continue to be used, then the Flight Engineer Leader must take these culprits to task.
5 Group has laid down a drill for climbs and engine conditions to be used on operations; therefore until any amendments to this order are published, no alterations should be made unless in case of an emergency. The above drill is being taught by No.5 L.F.S. and must be stressed from time to time by squadrons; they should bear in mind that engineers who come on to operations now have spent most of their initial training on Stirlings; the engine handling differs greatly between the two types of aircraft.
The Flight Engineer Leader must have closer liaison with his C.T.O. and report to him any little snags that crop up from time to time, instead of what happens at present – Flight Engineers talking it over between themselves. Improvements can only be brought about by reporting any defects or peculiarities to the right person.
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash the immaculate W.A.A.F’s. …”if this is your idea of a domestic night, may I never marry!”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
GARDENING
On the 21/22nd of the month more vegetables were planted by any one Group than ever before. 5 Group were the authors of this horticultural masterpiece, in planting 382 out of 418 vegetables lifted. 298 of these were Mark VI’s – in which hitherto undreamed of depths of frightfulness have been reached, and some varieties of which were used for the first time this night. 4 and 6 Groups also took part in the operation, bringing the Command total for the night up to 501. Three 5 Group aircraft were missing.
The Armament staffs at the Stations concerned did a great job of work – not made any easier by having also to prepare bomb loads – and East Kirkby performed the unprecedented feat of loading 154 Mark VI vegetables.
The operation was carried out entirely on H2S. Only three failures of sets occurred.
Results? – So far the immediate effect of this attack has been fully up to expectations, namely complete paralysis of all sea-borne traffic in areas vital to the movement of both warships and supplies. Sinkings can be expected as soon as the enemy releases the shipping held up, which he is bound to do soon despite his known inability to sweep his channels clear. The link between this operation and the coming invasion is obvious and the final effects can only be seen in the light of future events.
Other Gardening by 5 Group during the month were as follows:-
48 plantings off the FRISIANS
30 plantings in the HELIGOLAND BIGHT
36 plantings at the Southern end of the KATTEGAT.
24 plantings at the Northern end of the KATTEGAT.
The last two of these are worthy of note, first for the excellent P.P.I. photographs obtained by three aircraft of 44 Squadron, which proved conclusively that their mines were right in the channel; and secondly the success of the long low level flight in daylight conditions by four aircraft of 57 Sqdn.
Facts and figures for the month are:-
Sorties 93
Successful 87
%age successful 93.5
Aircraft missing 3
Mileage flown 91,120
Total successful plantings 520
The total has only once been exceeded by the Group, in April, 1943, when the total was 543. A fine job of work, contributed to by the six H 2 S Squadrons.
Gardening by Command again broke all records, resulting in the planting of 2,749 vegetables plus a small but highly effective effort by Mosquitos of 8 Group. Bomber Command’s war against communications has, in fact, reached a new degree of intensity on land and at sea.
[Cartoon]
“THE VOICE THAT BREATHED O’ER WAINFLEET”
5 GROUP P.O.W. FUND
By now, everyone is probably aware of the formation, on a full Group basis, of the 5 Group Prisoners of War Fund.
The Fund has been formed with the object of obtaining monies for sending monthly parcels of cigarettes and tobacco to each 5 Group Prisoner of War and, where possible, regular consignments of musical instruments, gramophone records, sports equipment, books, etc.
Sending foodstuffs and comforts, such as jerseys, stockings, scarves, etc., is subject to restrictions and is only handled by the B.R.C.S. and the next-of-kin. However, it is not possible for the Red Cross to send foodstuff parcels to any specific person; they are, in fact, sent in bulk to each Camp and distributed evenly amongst all the prisoners. The Fund will, therefore, make contributions to the B.R.C.S. who are requesting the Captain of each Camp containing 5 Group Prisoners of War to put up a notice in the Camp to the effect that the parcels for 5 Group prisoners are being provided by the Fund. It will be appreciated by all that the calls upon the B.R.C.S. at the present time are enormous, and any help we can give by taking over the responsibility for providing the monies for these parcels will be greatly appreciated, and will release money for the other many calls on the Society. Similar contributions will be made to the Canadian, Australian and South African Red Cross Societies and the New Zealand Patriotic Fund.
The next-of-kin are being requested to inform this Headquarters of the type of gift they wish the fund to send and, if possible, their requirements will be met. The next-of-kin are also allowed to send four special parcels per year, and those parcels may contain quite a number of articles. Should the next-of-kin find difficulty in obtaining these articles, they may inform this Headquarters, who will lend assistance in obtaining them.
All parcels, such as cigarettes and those referred to above, originating from this Headquarters, will be marked that they are being sent by the Fund.
Each Base has taken on the responsibility of providing a certain sum of money each month. The organisation and running of the Fund is being undertaken by the Group Headquarters, in addition to their committed financial contribution. The amount of voluntary work entailed to make this scheme a success is large, and is being met mainly by parties of volunteers from all Sections of Group Headquarters.
It is hoped that every member of 5 Group will endeavour to assist the Fund by means of financial contribution. The amount of money required to ensure its success is considerable; any monies left in the Fund at the close of hostilities will be dealt with at the discretion of the Executive Committee, either to help prisoners after their return, or to send to the R.A.F. Benevolent Fund.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
The most disturbing feature of the month’s bombing is the continued high Crew errors in the summary of practice bombing. We have, over the last three months, made intensive efforts to improve our standard of bombing and the steady decrease in our bombing errors, both operational and practice, is reflected in the practice bombing figures and the P.R.U. pictures of shattered enemy targets.
However, we are not bombing as well as we MUST in order to ensure that the minimum number of bombs and aircraft are used to destroy the numerous targets awaiting our attention.
Now in what ways can we ensure that, instead of making a monthly decrease in our Crew errors of from 10 to 30 yards, we crack them down in one month by 100 yards and achieve the immediate goal of 150 yards at 20,000 feet.
The following points are designed to make practicable this target for the month:-
1. The last two weeks have seen the introduction of the A.P.I. and Datum point method of finding the bombing wind velocity. A marked decrease in Vector errors has resulted. This method of wind finding, detailed in 5 Group Aircraft Drills, will produce vector errors of less than 60 yards.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The Navigator’s Union must therefore concentrate on the perfection of this technique, and one of the main sources of bombing errors will be finally eliminated.
2. Bombsight Serviceability:- Large errors are still directly attributable to technical faults in the Mark XIV. 5 Group Aircraft Drills detail the pre-bombing checks that must be carried out by Air Bombers. Further it is important that the suction that goes into the bombsight is at least 4 1/2“. To ensure this, the reading on the ground of the gauge on the pilot’s panel, with the changeover cock at the Emergency or No.2 position, must be 5 1/2” or more when the inboard engine feeding the sight is run up to at least 1800 revs.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] It is essential that the Air Bomber teams up with the instrument man responsible for the serviceability of his bombsight. Discuss your bombing results with him, tell him whether your errors are in line, range or are random and go through the causes of particular types of error with him. Reference to paragraph 63, Chapter 9, of the Mark XIV Bombsight booklet held by your Bombing Leader will make you an authority on sources of error.
3. Flying for Bombing:- Much has been said about this most important subject. There is no other type of flying which calls for precision measured in yards, and therefore it is not something that comes automatically, but only with hard training.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Pilots must study both the services required by the bombsight and the limitations from which it suffers in its quest for the correct bombing angle.
4. Bomb Aiming:- Unless the drift is absolutely accurate and the pilot’s flying perfect, the target will not drift down the graticule length to the intersection. Therefore it will be seldom that you will have an
(Continued on page 6, Column 1)
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
(Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.)
The results of bombing for the period 28th to 31st May (inclusive) will appear next month.
[Table of Bombing Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR MAY
25 Results with Crew Errors below 100 yards at 20,000 feet.
Next month should see a record number!
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 feet.
9 W/Cdr Porter F/O Pearson F/O Logan 63 yards
P/O Campbell F/O Tyne F/O Bennett 72 yards
P/O Bunnagar F/O Isfan Sgt Henderson 93 yards
49 P/O Graves-Hook F/O Sinden F/O Johnson 92 yards
F/L Matheson F/O Matthews Sgt Launder 77 yards
F/O Hill Sgt Bell F/O Jones 78 yards
P/O Sullings F/S Haines Sgt. Christian 83 yards
P/O Green F/S Hinch F/S Neal 89 yards
50 P/O Oliver Sgt Leonard Sgt Morris 63 yards
61 P/O Street F/S Brown Sgt Waghorn 90 yards
P/O North F/S Jarvis F/S Crawley 96 yards
P/O Dear Sgt. Wray Sgt Reeve 65 yards
106 P/O Durrant F/S Buchanan Sgt Pittaway 87 yards
617 Lt. Knilans F/O Rogers ? ? 98 yards
619 P/O Aitken P/O Whiteley Sgt. Levy 85 yards
F/S Donnelly F/O Grant F/S Johnson 98 yards
F/S Bennett F/S Griffiths Sgt Lyford 53 yards
P/O McCurdy W/O Stern P/O Hawkes 23 yards
F/L Roberts F/S Deviell F/S Lott 29 yards
F/S Morcom Sgt Lebatt Sgt Whitehurst 91 yards
630 P/O Lindsay Sgt Cummings F/S Rayner 91 yards
1654 F/O Rabone F/o Bjarnason F/O Dilworth 86 & 96 yards
Sgt. King Sgt Harder Sgt Stevenson 78 yards
F/S Jeffery F/S Downie F/S Benson 90 yards
5 LFS F/S Rose Sgt Chatteris F/S Richards 38 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
(Continued from page 5, Column 1)
ideal run up to the release point. It is best to realise this and thus avoid these panicky last moment corrections which will upset the aircraft’s attitude at the vital moment of release. It is far better to accept a small error in line and note on your Form 3073 the amount the graticule was left or right of the target, using the known size of the target to estimate your error. Allowances can then be made in the analysis.
Further, Air Bombers must realise that it is quite impossible for a pilot to stop a 4-engined aircraft dead when making a turn in response to your corrections “LEFT, LEFT” or “RIGHT”. In any case it would be detrimental to the bombsight’s calculations.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Air Bombers must, by close co-ordination with their Pilots, develop a smooth unhurried technique on the run-up and correct inter-com patter will aid good team work.
5. [Underlined] TO AIR BOMBERS:- [/underlined] You are the men who actually fire the bomb release switch, and therefore the greatest responsibility is yours. Remember, however, that you are part of a large team, and when you reach the stage of scoring direct hits every time, remember the credit is due to
The Pilot
Navigator
Fitters and Riggers
Bombsight Maintenance Men
Armourers
And
YOU
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
Base Bombing Leaders have been appointed as follows:-
51 Base – F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.
52 Base – F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C.
53 Base – F/Lt Murtough, D.F.C.
54 Base – F/Lt Stoney, D.F.C.
55 Base – F/Lt Wonham, D.F.M.
Squadron changes are as follows:-
9 Sqdn. – F/Lt Quilter from 92 Group.
50 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Hearn, D.F.C.
106 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Morgan from 1654 Conversion Unit.
463 Sqdn. – F/O Kennedy from 467 Squadron
619 Sqdn. – F/Lt Ruddock from 6 Group.
Conversion Unit changes are:-
1654 Con. Unit – F/O McRobbie, D.F.C.
1660 Con. Unit – F/Lt Wake, D.F.C. from 106 Squadron.
1661 Con. Unit – F/O Price, D.F.C.
No. 5 L.F.S. – F/O Mercy.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Honig (57 Sqdn) and P/O Pinches (630 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on Nos.81 & 82 Courses.
Congratulations to P/O Page (1661 C.U.) on obtaining an excellent “A” category on No. 83 Course!
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
“Records are made to be broken” !! – an old saying, but very true this month. Firstly all qualifying Squadrons obtained errors below 100 yards, and secondly 619 Squadron, the stalwarts of the competition, are back at the top with a record low error.
[Underlined] PILOT AND AIR BOMBERS’ ERROR [/underlined]
1st 619 Squadron 42 yards
2nd 61 Squadron 53 yards
3rd 49 Squadron 59 yards
4th 50 Squadron 72 yards
5th 57 Squadron 80 yards
6th 207 Squadron 81 yards
7th 44 Squadron 83 yards
8th 9 Squadron 85 yards
9th 106 Squadron 86 yards
10th (630 Squadron 98 yards
(467 Squadron 98 yards
463 Squadron failed to qualify this month owing to lack of Avro Adaptors necessary to carry out 6-bomb exercises. The Squadron state, however, that they will not only qualify in June, but will win the competition.
Last month’s competition news stated that as 52 Base Squadrons obtained places in the first five. 54 Base have rightly pointed out that the 1st and 2nd places were held by Squadrons who had only just left that Base. It is interesting to note that the same two Squadrons are still on top, but have exchanged position.
Navigator’s Error has been left out this month. The Group Navigation Officer intends to run a wind-finding competition commencing in June.
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron (F/Lt Lowry) [/underlined] have now constructed a first-class bombing panel mock-up in the Bombing Office. It is of inestimable value in checking Air Bombers on panel drill and general manipulation. It is understood that great credit for both this installation and the Mark XIV mock-up referred to in last month’s News is due to F/Lt. Hodgson, Eng. Elect. R.A.F. Station Dunholme, and his instrument men.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt Walmsley) [/underlined] makes the following report on the Squadron’s bombing accuracy (see competition results).
(i) Every aircraft on the Squadron carried out at least one High Level exercise during the month.
(ii) Every morning and afternoon the N.C.O. i/c Bombsight maintenance visits the Bombing Office to report on investigations into previous bombsight failures and to interrogate Air Bombers on current ‘snags’.
(iii) As soon as possible after each operation Air Bombers assemble for their own private raid assessment. Useful suggestions that result are passed on to the appropriate authorities by the Bombing Leader.
Finally a word of thanks is due to Pilots and Navigators of the Squadron for greatly improved flying and wind finding, for bombing.
Publicity has already been given to the outstanding bombing results obtained by two 619 Squadron crews captained by F/Lt Roberts and F/O McCurdy, who obtained errors of 29 and 23 yds. respectively, converted to 20,000 feet. Special mention however, is merited by the exercise carried out at [underlined] Syerston [/underlined] by a crew doing only its first bombing detail in a Lancaster.
PILOT – F/SGT ROSE
AIR BOMBER – SGT CHATTERIS
NAVIGATOR – F/S RICHARDS
The average error for 4 bombs aimed from 12,000 feet was 29 yards – a most creditable performance!!!
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Billington) [/underlined] have introduced the following excellent scheme:-
From several 1;500,000 maps, a number of cuttings were taken of prominent and likely landfalls on the enemy held coastline. These cuttings measure approximately 5” x 5” and so cover quite an appreciable area of coastline. The landfalls shown were then painted black, with the exception of the towns and rivers or estuaries which are printed in red and blue respectively.
Each cutting was then orientated in a different direction and pasted on a large notice board. The various orientations made identification more difficult and provided useful practice in landfall recognition.
Each pinpoint was then clearly numbered and a corresponding number was attached to a 1;1,000,000 “area of operations” map in the vicinity of the pinpoint in question. At briefing, the route to the target was outlined with a suitable length of cord, and the bomb-aimers could see if the route passed over or near any of the pinpoints! The ‘numbers’ of such landfalls could then be referred to the notice board (as above). By virtue of the blacked out land masses, an impression of the landfall as it would appear either visually or on the H2S – P.P.I. tube, could easily and accurately be obtained.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
619 Squadron report that F/Lt. Buttar, a pilot, carried out an exercise as Bomb Aimer and obtained average error of 18 yards from 12,000 feet!!!!
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Where and how would you read the suction for the Mark XIV Bombsight?
2. What is the minimum suction on the ground for the Mark XIV and what minimum reading on the suction gauge is required to ensure the necessary suction for the bombsight?
3. What is the correct vectored wind velocity for the Mark XIV Bombsight for True Wind of 090°/30 m.p.h. bearing and distance of marker from Aiming Point 045°/200 yards at a height of 8,000 feet?
4. What are the T.V’s of 4 lb incendiary, 4000 lb H.C., 500 lb G.P. and 1000 lb H.C. bombs?
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
All operations this month, with the exception of two, have been of short range. Navigation has therefore been very much easier. Broadcast w/v’s have been used on only two occasions. The results were not very satisfactory in either case. On the Brunswick operation (23/24 May, 1944) nearly half of the windfinders detailed did not transmit a single W/V! Navigators in H2S aircraft must realise they are fortunate in being able to check constantly their aircraft’s position. Non-H2S Navigators are not so fortunate, and they [underlined] do need [/underlined] assistance from you luckier fellows. Bear this point well in mind, windfinders, and the next time we use broadcast winds, let us have 100% co-operation!
With the approach of summer and the consequent drop in “darkness hours available” night sorties will decrease in range. Navigation will therefore become much easier. We must [underlined] NOT [/underlined] however “slacken off” our efforts. Concentration, track and time keeping are still essential to the success of any operation. Station Navigation Officers must carefully check the work of each Navigator and curtail immediately any attempt to “slacken off”. We may be called upon to carry out long range operations at any time, therefore constant practice in the use of Broadcast Wind Velocities, obtaining D.R. positions, etc., is essential, particularly for those new crews who will be arriving at Squadrons during this coming period. To maintain and improve the present standard of navigation, it is suggested that short plotting and computation exercises (similar to those already forwarded to squadrons) should be completed two or three times every week. If they are run in a competitive spirit, they will cease to be a “bind”, and much valuable experience will be gained. Here again particular attention should be paid to the less experienced Navigator.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING [/underlined]
There has been a gradual improvement during the last few months in the accuracy of winds found on operations. The “spread” now experienced in approximately half that of 4 or 5 months ago. An analysis is being made of winds found by the wind finding aircraft on the night 24/25th April, target – MUNICH. The analysis is not yet complete, but a rough indication shows that the probable error in wind finding is now down from 17 to 9 m.p.h. A big improvement, but no one can say there wasn’t room for one! The “spread” on this raid was 60° and 30 m.p.h. 75% of the winds being within 20° and 10 m.p.h. – here again a slight improvement.
It will be seen from the foregoing figures that errors are still far too high. The main causes of such errors are as follows:-
(i) Inaccuracies in taking and plotting of Gee and H2S fixes.
(ii) Inaccuracies in reading and plotting of A.P.I. positions.
(iii) Inaccuracies in measuring the w/v.
These are elementary points and should have been mastered long ago. Nevertheless, they [underlined] do [/underlined] exist and [underlined] must [/underlined] be eliminated. This can only be done if navigators make a regular practice of checking and re-checking all their plotting. It is far better to obtain two Gee fixes and plot them correctly than to obtain four and plot them all incorrectly. There is absolutely no reason why three of four navigators flying in aircraft at the same height, place and time should find w/v’s differing by 40° and 10 – 15 m.p.h. – but this does happen – even when in Gee range. Stations and Squadrons Navigation Officers must check the winds found by all navigators on each operation, and find out what large discrepancies do occur.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
It is now a known fact that the most accurate method of finding a W/V is by the A.P.I. and datum point method. Instructions have therefore been issued that this method is to be used on all practice bombing exercises. The “vector error” in practice bombing has decreased considerably since this method was introduced. We still have a long way to go however. Not until the “vector error” is 50 yards or below can we claim to be doing our bit. This, therefore, must be our aim. It is not by any means impossible to achieve, providing we carry out the drill correctly and do not make stupid mistakes. Do not for example try and find a w/v over a period of less than ten minutes – it can’t be done!! Always see that you pass over the “datum point” on the [underlined] same [/underlined heading as the first time. This is very important, otherwise large errors creep in.
We now have available a method of checking the w/v’s found by navigators. Downham Market (near Skegness) obtain accurate w/v checks every 6 hours. They are accurate to within 5° and 2 m.p.h. These winds are forwarded to Base and Station Navigation Officers daily. It is hoped that full use is being made of this valuable means of checking navigators work. Navigators should also check with their Squadron or Station Navigation Officers the post-Met. Wind applicable for their exercise.
To foster the competitive spirit, the best 8 wind finders for each month will appear in the Monthly News, commencing next month.
Any criticisms or suggestions for the improvement of the present wind finding procedure will be welcomed. So, go to it, and let us have your opinions – now!!!
[Underlined] TRAINING BASE SUMMARY [/underlined]
During May 229 details were flown on Command and Local Bullseyes, and excellent co-operation has been forthcoming from Nos.12 (F) and 10 (F) Groups. These exercises enable navigators to practice Gee and H2S fixing and learn the troubles associated with defensive manoeuvres. Many special radar routes have been laid on especially across the coasts of Wales, N.W. England and Northern Ireland, and on several occasions squadron aircraft have come in on these exercises (one C.U. pupil on one such flight took no less than 146 H2S fixes – and plotted them!)
H2S training is being extended in the Base and Wigsley will be staring early in June. Preparations have gone on steadily all through May. A trainer, radar mechanics and a training staff are standing by waiting for the next course. At Swinderby and Winthorpe nearly half of each course is now being radar trained and it is hoped that squadrons will appreciate the trouble which has been encountered with aircraft serviceability and stress of other training. Like Gee in the early days, H2S has been thrust upon C.U’s with very little extra staff and inadequate equipment to cope with demands. The second Radar buildings will very soon be ready, and extra bench sets available, so the Group can confidently look forward to a greater number of H2S crews coming through during the summer.
Priority is being put on wind finding by A.P.I. on all exercises – particularly during bombing practices. Trouble is being experienced in fitting the complete modification to the new Stirlings, but this work is being pressed on with as fast as possible. There are now approximately 70 aircraft in the Base fitted with the A.P.I. so that most navigators will receive air practice during their course. Ground Demonstration sets are also being made for all units so that pupils may see the A.P.I’s working on the ground. They will also receive resetting practice. Coupled with A.P.I. instruction, a long D.R. plot using broadcast w/v’s is incorporated in C.U. training. Therefore navigators should be arriving on squadrons fully trained, and well “genned up”. If they are not, then let us hear about it!
The training staffs at H.C.U’s have changed considerably during the last three months. Predominance is now on youth – navigators fresh from Squadrons, and there is only a small percentage of instructors who have been off operations longer than six months. Several Instructors have lately gone to Mosquito squadrons while others have returned to operations in 5 Group and P.F.F.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Operational results on H 2S have been quite good this month, and its potentialities in gardening have at long last been recognised. In this connection, various methods of gardening with H2S have been used effectively.
Dunholme had the first opportunity of using Leica cameras for photographing the P.P.I. at the gardening areas, and proved without doubt that the vegetables were planted in the correct furrows. Unfortunately the shortage of cameras still prevents us using them on operations to any great extent. Training is also restricted to one Base.
This month we welcome 619 Squadron into our select band. It is hoped that they will prove as capable in the use of this new aid as they have in the past with Gee. The responsibilities of training are considerable, and crews in 619 Squadron will have considerable extra flying training to carry out to master H2S. It must be remembered that H2S is primarily a navigational aid, and this must be borne in mind during training; complete mastery of H2S as a navigational aid means better track keeping, better winds, and above all better bombing. By bombing I mean that crews using H2S will ensure arriving at the correct target on time.
Training at Conversions Units is improving considerably, and increasing numbers of crews are being turned out practically fully trained. Wigsley is now ready to commence training and have been fortunate in securing a synthetic trainer. This increase in H2S training reflects great credit upon all the sections concerned, and considerable benefit should be derived by the operational squadrons.
Bomber Command have recently issued a sum-
(Continued on page 8, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 7
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NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
mary on H2S navigation, proving that the most effective method of track keeping is by frequent fixing. Frequent fixing ensures a higher reliability of fixes, and in addition it has been found normal navigation is not neglected. This indicates that successful H2S navigation requires frequent checks on position (at least one fix every ten minutes) combined with the normal navigational procedure. It is realised that most H2S operators in this Group are taught to take H2S fixes every six minutes; however, this point is mentioned in order to prevent the failure of navigation by H2S due to infrequent fixing, which has occurred on several operations in the past.
Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are concentrating on blind bombing trials with H2S Mark III and he 184 Indicator, and it is eventually hoped to come to some conclusion regarding the errors of respective methods of blind bombing.
Whilst it is realised visual bombing is the most effective when targets are small and can be identified, H2S Squadrons must by no means relax in their blind bombing training.
In this direction, operators should practice bombing runs on suitable targets whenever airborne. Then the set operator can so tune his set that only the town, the course marker the range marker and the very faintest of ground returns can be seen, he can consider himself approaching proficiency. With this is mind, 55 Base have designed an extremely efficient poster of H2S Track and Ground Speed Bombing, and a copy of this is reproduced in this issue. It is hoped that Command will eventually issue this as an official poster for use on the Navigation Section of all H2S Units.
H2S photography has been rather disappointing this month. Instructions detailing the steps to be taken when photographing the P.P.I. are available on the Squadrons carrying out this training and they must be followed to obtain good quality photographs. Remember poor photographs reflect upon your set manipulation, and individual assessments of your operation of the equipment can be made from the photographs you obtain.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Operations this month produced no exceptional ranges on Gee, partly due to the fact that most targets were within normal range.
Certain discrepancies were noticed in the North Eastern Chain by navigators in this Group, and steps have been taken to ascertain the error to correct the phasing. Until such time as this is done, the error, although opinions differ as to its limits, will have to be accepted.
Instances have also occurred recently where lattice charts have been found to be inaccurate due to the colour plates slipping during printing. Whilst all Lattice Charts are hand checked, inaccurate charts have on occasions reached navigators, who have been at a loss to explain the difficulties experienced with the Gee chain.
Care is being taken to see that faulty charts are not set [sic] out to units, but in the meantime, every navigator should check his charts to see if the coloured registration crosses (either green, red, or purple) found at each corner of the printed map surface are superimposed one above the other. If one of these crosses is displaced, then the particular coloured lattice lines have been inaccurately positioned and the chart must be exchanged for a correct one.
Good D.R. navigation enabled both the above inaccuracies to be found out and one navigator actually assessed the error which he applied to all his fixes.
Against this we have the navigator who puts the whole of his navigation on to the box and this month a little story with a moral is printed. Acknowledgement for this is due to F/O Craven of 1660 Conversion Unit.
COX AND THE BOX
COX AND THE BOX
You’ve heard of Salome and Lulu,
They’re as well known as Nerve and Knox,
But listen to me while I tell you
The tale of young Cox and the Box.
For 12 months he’d listened to lectures
(Such a bind, and so orthodox),
But just at the end of his training,
An Instructor said “Now meet the Box”.
At the end of a few simple lectures,
He mused on his way to the Blocks;
“Damn the D.R. and the Astro –
Why work when you’ve got the old Box?”
Navigation henceforth seemed so easy,
Bang on! – Back to Base from Clyde Docks.
On return they repeated the warning;
“Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
On the Squadron, his first trip was simple,
From the time he heard “Out with the chocks”,
To the time that Control replied “Pancake”,
He chewed – and got round on the Box.
The next was to Essen – they bombed and came out,
But were coned, and took several hard knocks;
The kite had been hit, but what shook him most
Was to find he’d no joy on the Box.
The petrol was low, they couldn’t find Base,
But by now accustomed to shocks.
No D.R. – no air plot – he vainly looked up,
But still found no joy on the Box.
The sequel is morbid, and sad to relate,
It’s all filed away under “Cox”,
Read on if you will, and you’ll see what we say,
Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
“You had a son, in the Air Force,
In Aircrew I think, Mrs. Cox?
Well, he’s been pretty rapid and finished his trips.
And they’re sending him home – in a Box”.
EQUIPMENT
The present grave shortage of manpower is causing increasing difficulties to Maintenance Units and Station Equipment Officers should therefore ascertain by personal investigation whether all their demands are being correctly prepared. If all stations regularly raised their demands in the official manner, there would be considerable economy in manpower and time spent in satisfying demands at M.U’s. and numerous queries would be obviated. For easy reference, some of the salient points are set out as follows:-
[Underlined] Forms 600 Demands. [/underlined]
(i) Insufficient address. Units should always state full postal address, and it is important that the accounting serial number is clearly endorsed as part of the address.
(ii) Nearest railway Station muse [sic] be quoted directly beneath the address.
[Underlined] Urgent Demands (A.M.O. A.481/43) [/underlined]
(i) These demands must be placed together in a separate envelope, stamped in RED, “PRIORITY 1 C”.
(ii) Date for delivery must be quoted in all cases, and an interval of at least ten days should be given.
(iii) The endorsement must be initialled by the demanding officer.
(iv) Aircraft or engine type and serial number, or the purpose for which other items are required, must be quoted. In the case of M.T. the chassis number must invariably be given.
(v) Immediate despatch of all Urgent Demands to Equipment Parks by their transport or D.R.L.S.
[Underlined] A.O.C. or I.O.R. Signal Demands. [/underlined]
It is important that this type of demand be raised strictly in accordance with A.M.O. A.1312/42, as amended by A.M.O. A. 326/44. These demands are of the very highest priority and therefore it is essential that the method of raising the signal is uniform in every detail at all Units. Signals must be made out very clearly, and only one section may be demanded on one signal, and not more than 8 items of one particular section – and each of these items must be given a separate line (see A.M.O. A.604/40).
If all concerned comply strictly with the letter of the law in this respect, there is every reason to hope that the goods will be received with the minimum of delay with consequent reflection of increased serviceability and efficiency.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 10 Col.1)
New crews are now getting a thorough introduction to the Lancaster Dinghy and Parachute Drills at the L.F.S. and the dummy fuselage is paying high dividends. The record time for a dummy ditching at Syerston is 10 seconds. It was encouraging to hear a gunner remark as the crew stood on the starboard mainplane with their drill completed in 16 1/2 seconds – “That’s not good enough, Skipper, let’s have another go.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 8
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H.2.S TRACK & GROUND SPEED BOMBING
IDEAL BOMB
Set on Dalton Computer W/V and True Air Speed. From the measured track compute the course to make good this track. Make any alterations as necessary. Set Range Drum to 10 miles in order to know when to switch to 10/10 scale. [Diagram] No. 1
When on 10/10 scale make final corrections of heading to ensure correct tracking. Range marker is set to correct radius on range drum ground speed settings. [Diagram] No. 2
No. 3 [Diagram] Height pulse must be set against first ground return before ground speed is set on the Range Drum.
No. 4 [Diagram] Ground speed is found to be 200 m.p.h. Rotate range drum until 200 ground speed line is against range pointer. This pre-sets range marker ring to a set radius on 10/10 scale.
Note the time that range marker ring cuts response. 30 seconds plus time delay for real bombs from this time the aircraft has travelled to bomb release point. At this point bombs away. [Diagram] No. 5
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The 30 second delay release lines on the H2S range drum is calibrated for the ideal bomb. To ensure that real bombs strike the target, a time delay has to be added to 30 seconds. This time delay differs for different categories of bombs and will be given at briefing by the Bombing Leaders.
No. 6 [Diagram]
Point where range marker ring cuts response on 10/10 scale.
Distance denoting timed run of 30 plus seconds to release point.
Release Point. Bombs Away.
Forward trail of bomb carries it to objective from release point.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 9
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AIR SEA RESCUE
There was one known ditching in the Group during May. On the night 27/28th May, a Mosquito of 627 Squadron was heard to transmit “Engine on fire – ditching”. The aircraft was flying at low height over the sea after attacking the target, and later was sighted burning on the surface. Search on the following morning revealed aircraft wreckage off the enemy coast. Unfortunately no one was rescued.
This one incident does not mean that 5 Group crews are “Ditching free” or are unlikely to have to ditch in future. The most recent monthly analysis shows that 189 lives were saved from aircraft in all Commands which ditched in home waters. A total of 467 lives were lost, however, in ditchings – a high proportion of 71%. A majority of these losses occurred in ditchings when no W/T messages were received. This proves that sea crossings, even on short range targets, are still a hazard for aircraft which may have been damaged by enemy defences.
Regular practice of dinghy and parachute drills must continue. Saturday morning is the time for such practice. Several squadrons have got down to this very quickly, but others are not carrying out the instructions from this Headquarters in either the spirit or the letter.
Ten crews were tested during the month in the Safety Drill Competition. Generally crews has a good idea of what was required, but the majority revealed lack of practice. One Flight Commander provided a refreshing example. His crew drills were perfect. A Flight Commander is a busy man, and yet he and his crew made the time to set an example and give themselves a wide safety margin if ever they have to ditch.
(Continued on page 8, Column 3)
Results of the Safety Drill Competition for May are as follows:-
Place Dinghy Drills Parachute Drills
1 52 Base 55 Base
2 53 Base 54 Base
3 54 Base 52 Base
5 55 Base 53 Base
The best and worst crews were in 55 Base, and one crew with just over 50% of marks placed the Base last in order of merit. Details of Squadrons tested and marks gained are as follows:-
[Table of Safety Competition Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The Training Base Record for a Dinghy Drill is 10 seconds. The best Squadron time was [underlined] 18 seconds [/underlined], the worst [underlined] 43 seconds. [/underlined]
ENEMY AGENTS CARELESS WALKERS
With the lighter evenings and finer weather there is a great deal to be said for a country walk over the fields after working in an office all day.
You may not be interested in birds nests or flowers but even in flat country like Lincolnshire there is some amazingly pretty scenery if you will only walk to see it. If you are lucky, you may be able to take a pretty picture of scenery with you, which will make all the difference.
Do remember though, that when walking in the fields, you are really trespassing and owe a debt of gratitude to the owner or tenant of the land for letting you enjoy yourselves. Hardly any farmers will raise any objection wherever you walk, if you for your part will take just a little trouble to avoid two things,
(i) trampling on growing crops
(ii) leaving gates open.
The farmer is putting a great deal of very hard work into his land nowadays and suffering just as badly from the manpower problem as we are in the Service, perhaps even worse. You will see Mrs. Farmer nowadays doing much heavier work in the fields than many of us would care to tackle, and for very long hours too.
If you walk along the hedgerows or fence sides you will do no harm to crops; its [sic] the best place to walk too if you are interested in nature, but most important of all DO SHUT EVERY GATE you go through, even if its [sic] open when you get there. It was probably left open by someone careless ahead.
Gates left to swing in a wind soon break and farmers can’t get new ones nowadays. Cattle get through from the roadside or neighbouring fields; a flock of sheep in the wrong field can easily cause a loss of a hundred pounds or more to a farmer. He won’t want you in his fields at that price, and it’s no good blaming the sheep. The farmer’s doing a vital job of work in this war to provide our food, so help him as much as you can when you enjoy his fields and [underlined] PLEASE SHUT THAT GATE [/underlined] and don’t be a CARELESS WALKER.
ACCIDENTS
During May [underlined] over 50 [/underlined] aircraft were damaged in accidents within the Group – the majority seriously. At least 14 were written off completely, and 8 were [underlined] Cat. B [/underlined] The Cat. AC total will probably be 16, which leaves only about 12 aircraft which sustained minor damage. These are depressing figures, and are all the more regrettable because at least 20 of these accidents were “avoidable”.
Squadrons damaged 21 aircraft including six Mosquitos, and 51 Base damaged 29. One Spitfire of 1690 B.D.T.F. was also damaged.
Details of avoidable accidents during the month are as follows:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined]
Taxying…3
Swings…2
Overshoots on Landing…1
Mid-Air collision…1
Others…3
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined]
Taxying (M/T)…1
Overshoots on Landing…3
Swings…2
3 engined overshoot crashes…1
Maintenance errors…1
Others…2
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] TROPHY FOR ACCIDENT FREE SQUADRON [/underlined]
A Silver model of a Lancaster has been presented to the Group by Messrs. A.V. Roe. The Air Officer Commanding has decided to award this model Quarterly as a trophy to the Squadron or Training Unit with the least number of avoidable accidents. The first award will be made at the end of June for the period January to June and thereafter every three months. The Squadrons in the lead at the end of May are 49, 57 and 106 Squadrons.
[Underlined] TAXYING [/underlined]
Taxying accidents were fewer this month. It is notable that Training Base had only [underlined] one [/underlined] and this an M/T collision, which did minor damage, A most peculiar accident, which is classed as “Taxying” for want of a better category, occurred on a Squadron recently. A Lancaster pilot turned off the runway and stopped all his engines because of low brake pressure. He re-started his inners with the idea of proceeding to a position more favourable for towing and had just started moving when a ground crew N.C.O., entered the cockpit, grasped the throttles and commenced manipulating them. The Lancaster gathered speed, left the perimeter and finished up with a broken undercarriage when it hit an obstruction. As ground personnel are strictly forbidden to taxy aircraft this episode needs no further comment.
[Underlined] SWINGS [/underlined]
Mosquitos provided the two serious swinging accidents in Squadrons this month – one landing and one taking off. Both occurred in a cross wind.
One Stirling swung on take-off and sustained only minor damage when the tailplane struck some bushes. The pilot did the right thing after the swing started. A Stirling
(Continued on page 16, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1844. PAGE 10
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SIGNALS
[Underlined] INT QEF? [/underlined]
The R.1082/T.1083 W/T G.P. installation departed from Bomber aircraft about three years ago; with it went the crystal monitor, and we were all very pleased! Since then the Marconi G.P. installation has performed excellent service, and with operators who are kept in practice, has tuned to within a kilocycle of the required frequency.
When an aircraft is acting as W/T control for a large force, it is imperative that the W/T equipment is accurately tuned, otherwise the vital control messages are lost in the welter of interference which hems in all frequencies those nights.
On two occasions this month the control aircraft has been off frequency. This has necessitated the re-introduction of the crystal monitor as an essential item in aircraft carrying out the duties of Controller, Deputy Controller and W/T link, and good results are now once again being obtained. The crystal monitor is, however, a rather clumsy device and requires some skill. Thanks to the ingenuity of Ludford Magna we are trying out a crystal controlled T.1154, which eliminates – almost entirely – the human element. Ludford Magna id obtaining excellent operational results, which we intend to emulate. Thank you 1 Group.
[Underlined] WE HEARD [/underlined]
During the month we have obtained several excellent recordings of the intercom. and R/T in control aircraft during controlled attacks. These recordings, in addition to providing accurate minute by minute pictures of the course of attacks, have brought to light several technical difficulties and enabled them to be overcome. One, in particular, was the loud high pitched whine which had been accepted by crews as an unfortunate regular feature of V.H.F. R/T over the Continent. Thanks to the recordings this whine has been identified and almost completely eliminated. Arrangements are in hand to make permanent recordings for issue to Squadrons and training units. Main Force crews will then fully realise the many problems with which the Controller has to contend.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
As far as Aircrew Signals is concerned, the month resembled the old adage – “Came in like a lion, went out like a lamb”. And what a lion?
Nevertheless, we have derived much profit from our mistakes, and have emerged the purer for our trials, although it is to be regretted that our major “boob” occurred when our comrades from No.1 Group were helping us. We hope that on the next occasion we can prove to them that all is now well with our Operators. All Wireless Operators (Air) are fully aware by now of what is expected of a Controller’s Operator, and without any excuse for the repetition we would say [underlined] Practice makes for Perfection. [/underlined]
To improve the standard of speech throughout the Group, not only on V.H.F. but on R/T generally [underlined] and [/underlined] intercomm., it is hoped to install a Speech Training Section in our Conversion Units and at the Aircrew School at Scampton. Instructors have had a special short course a A.D.G.B. Headquarters where all Sector Controllers are taught the art of making themselves clearly understood without the need for repetition. The idea is not to produce an Oxford accent, but rather to give all crews the perfect “Mikeside Manner”, and if we can achieve this end, we shall be a step nearer to perfection.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS [/underlined]
All Signals Leaders by now will have had a copy of the schedule of equipment laid down for Signals Training Rooms. This is just one more step in the right direction, and it is hoped that all concerned have taken advantage and put in all the necessary demands.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
A few Squadrons did not produce their past form this month. Little points like not using the correct aircraft letters allocated to the Squadron, starting the exercise late, giving one message and then asking permission to close down. Now all Signals Leaders will agree that the Group exercise is an invaluable method for keeping operators on top line, and more attention must be paid to it in future.
[Underlined] RECALL SIGNALS [/underlined]
Why is it that Wireless Operators (Air) take so long to answer a recall signal? The need arose during this month to recall the few aircraft that had taken off for an operation, and considerable time elapsed before all aircraft had acknowledged the message. This state of affairs hardly ties up with Instructions in force about maintaining a continuous listening watch on Base. The Group Signals Leader would like to see an improvement, please.
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING REPORTS [/underlined]
There is another corner of the Signals Leaders’ domain that could stand a clean up with the help of our sister section, the Gunners (Bless ‘em). There is still a good deal of duff gen reaching this Headquarters on the Form “Z”. The Operator states that there were no sightings of enemy aircraft not picked up by the E.W.D; the Gunners sign that statement, but someone tells the Intelligence Officer a different story. You can help the war effort by vetting the Intelligence reports and preventing this duff gen from leaving your Station. It would save the writer’s telephone extension from overwork too.
Apart from these few moans, the general standard of Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is high. They are doing an excellent job, and playing a worthy part in the present battles. Make sure that we can continue this be profiting [sic] from our mistakes in the past, and training at every available moment.
[Underlined] POINTS TO NOTE [/underlined]
1. Has the new Bomber Command General Instruction governing attacks at night by aircraft in home and enemy waters been seen and read by all Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group?
2. M/F D/F Sections now send out an interval signal, if not already on the air. Are you au fait? Note – no DIT DITS in acknowledgement, by order.
3. Have you all met Monica’s baby brother Walter – by Pickup out of Her?
[Underlined STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt Cawdron, D.F.M., No.630 Squadron, who topped No.7 Signals Leaders’ Course.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failure percentage for the month of May has, regrettably, shown an increase over the previous month. Congratulations are however, extended to Signals Officers and their Maintenance staffs for having no maintenance failures in Sqdns throughout the month. It is interesting to see how the maintenance failure percentage has slowly decreased to zero, and it is hoped that during the forthcoming months this can be maintained. During May there were no cases of aircraft failing to take off on operational missions as the result of Signals defects. It is also gratifying to learn that there were only five “early returns” due to signals failures out of 2,254 operational sorties flown. Of the remaining 42 failures, approximately 90% of them are attributed to equipment defects. A good show, chaps – keep it up.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T FITTING [/underlined]
All stations have received during the month, a policy letter on the projected programme of V.H.F. fitting for the remainder of 5 Group Squadrons. The supply of all items of equipment, apart from connector sets, has been kept up to schedule. The first consignment of connectors is due, while the 26 Group Fitting Party should be with us any day. Fitting of 44 Squadron should therefore commence without much delay. All indications are that the flow of connector sets will be steady from then onwards.
[Underlined] RADAR CONFERENCE [/underlined]
The Radar Conference held during the month was attended by all Base Signals Officers and Radar Officers in the Group, as well as representatives of Bomber Command. The agenda
(Continued on page 12, Column 1)
ELEMENTARY MY DEAR WATSON
Flight Lieu-ten-ant Jo-seph Soap
Re-port-ed every wire-less slip
In the de-cent pi-ous hope
That R.A.E. might take a tip,
And fab-ric-ate su-per-ior mods
For fit-ing by main-ten-ance nods.
He viewd with sca-thing scorn-ful jeers
And wide su-per-ior smiles,
Dis-com-fit-ure of dull con-freres
Whose in-eff-ect-ual wiles,
And urg-ent eff-orts ne’er re-lax
To co-ver up their sec-tions’ blacks.
E-vas-ive ac-tion reaps re-ward
By kee-ping fail-ures down.
On hon-est men a-buse is poured;
Con-tume-ly is their crown.
A pa-ra-dox you must ad-mit.
The mo-ral’s there, dis-cov-er it!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
was long, and a great divergence of opinion was shown on many items. All agreed, however, that the conference had cleared up numerous points, and such conferences should be held more often.
The introduction of Base Servicing was the main item on the agenda. This subject was discussed in detail, and it was agreed that Base Servicing would be introduced when appropriate accommodation and test equipment became available. Some Bases have, at present, a system of Base servicing, and are of the opinion that it produces a great saving in time. The systems now in use, however, are not all-inclusive and to make them so, many changes will be necessary. Bomber Command is at present working out the final details of a complete Base Servicing system. It is probable that they will send representatives to each Base to study the accommodation position.
Another complicated issue was the standardisation of Daily Inspections. There has long been a requirement for some D.I. card, similar to the Form 700, to standardise Daily Inspections, and to ensure that nothing is forgotten. This was not thought necessary by many Radar Officers. However, some days ago, a check was made on man-hours spent in the daily inspection on various equipments, and it was found that Bases often differed by 100 per cent. This confirms our opinion that there is a lack of standardisation which may be responsible for some of our failures. Trials are now being carried out by all Groups on D.I. cards forwarded to Command by this Headquarters. Any suggested alterations will be made to Bomber Command, and a final card is to be printed and issued. It will then be up to the Squadron Radar Officers to ensure that these cards are correctly used. H.Q.B.C. is also preparing a Form 22E for major and minor inspections of Radar equipment. This form will be similar to the present Signals Form 22, and will cover inspections of Col.7 and Col.9 equipment.
[Underlined] H 2 S FITTING [/underlined]
The fitting of H2S in the Stirlings of out Heavy Conversion Units has now been completed. This provides 41 aircraft for training in H2S and Fishpond, with the resultant increase in the number of trained H2S crews arriving at Squadron. Metheringham and Wigsley received their synthetic trainers during the month, and there is a good chance of all H2S Squadrons being so equipped by the end of June.
The introduction of H2S to 619 Squadron is now under way, and it is expected that this squadron will be completely equipped by the end of June.
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
Last month’s forecast of an increase in serviceability was no doubt greeted with laughter. However, fine weather, short range targets and greater attention to detail have brought their reward with an increase in the serviceability of all equipments except H2S Mark III.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The short range targets attacked during May provided ample opportunity for Gee to regain much of its old glory.
Serviceability was the highest yet – 96.9% an increase of 0.4% over April. The other types of Radar equipment are, however, catching up rapidly, and it appears that there is a possibility of Gee losing its leadership in the coming month.
[Underlined] MONICA IIIA [/underlined]
This equipment came the nearest to overtaking Gee, with a serviceability of 93.5% out of 745 sorties. This is very commendable indeed, and it is hoped that squadrons can maintain this high figure when the weather and target ranges are not so favourable. Congratulations to 467 Squadron, who have completed their last 134 sorties without a single Monica defect. This is a record well worth beating.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II [/underlined]
May brought us to the end of the second round in our battle for increased H 2 S. Mark II serviceability. For the first time the Group serviceability for a whole month was 90.0%. This is good. Let us now try, during the third round, to bring it up to 100%. There still remains, however, a serious number of cases of switching off and flashing on the screen, which seems to indicate that the old sources of trouble still predominate, viz., filament transformers, and H.T. condensers. H.Q.B.C. are making every effort to divert the new type filament transformers from the production lines for retrospective fitting. They have been informed however, that it will be a few weeks yet before this can be done. Crystals and cases of no signals are also assuming a large proportion of the failures, and to combat this, improved versions of valves are being tested.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK III [/underlined]
Unfortunately a setback in serviceability of H2S Mark III was experienced during May. Out of a total of 75 sorties, there were 14 difficulties reported, giving a serviceability of 81.2%. Among these failures there do not appear to be any outstanding breakdowns, but considerable work remains to the done in clearing up the various minor snags which only become evident after considerable operational experience.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond has made a favourable advance in serviceability, with an increase of almost 3% over April. A total of 937 sorties was flown of which 89.1% were serviceable. As Fishpond serviceability largely depends on H2S, an increase in H2S serviceability will cause a corresponding increase in Fishpond. In last month’s V Group News, reference was made to trials to reduce Fishpond minimum range. The filter unit which was produced has proved unsatisfactory, and at present there are no signs of this problem being solved.
TACTICS
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following extracts from combat reports show again what Monica and Fishpond can do is properly used:-
(i) “The only indication of E/A’s presence was on Visual Monica which first indicated at 2,000 yards. The W/Op. gave running commentary until E/A closed to 800 yards – fighter not identified visually by either gunners. W/Op. instructed “corkscrew to port”, tracer from fighter then seen to pass on the starboard beam – gunners still unable to make visual contact.” (467 Squadron).
(ii) “After breaking away from first contact (this was indicated by Monica) E/A continued to shadow our aircraft until time of this attack, during the period between attacks the W/Op. reported contacts on Visual Monica but no visual was obtained owing to bad visibility.” (50 Squadron)
(iii) “Contact by Fishpond at 2 1/2 miles dead astern, and the bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards, visual by both gunners at 500 yards. Both gunners opened fire at 500 yards and strikes were seen on the fuselage, followed by a bright white flash. E/A did not return fire and broke away on the starboard quarter down.” (50 Squadron)
(iv) Contact on Fishpond at 2 miles port quarter. Bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards. Visual by gunners at 400 yards; both fired short bursts before E/A disappeared from view. No return fire.” (44 Squadron)
It appears from other combat reports that some crews are getting contacts quite early (up to 2000 yards), but do not corkscrew until the fighter is at a range of 600 yards, or until the gunners obtain a visual. The outcome in several encounters of this nature has been for a gunner to order “corkscrew” and the fighter to open fire at the same moment, often causing damage to the aircraft before the manoeuvre has begun. The moral is quite obvious. If you have adequate warning of an E/A go into a corkscrew at 750 yards. This technique has put fighters off time and again.
[Underlined] WINDOW [/underlined]
Frequent reminders have been seen in these pages in recent issues emphasising the necessity for dropping Window at the correct rate. If some people have taken note of these reminders, there are still others who have yet to realise the importance of launching Window correctly. A long and interesting paper has been produced by the Window experts and will be forwarded to units in a day or so. All crews must take the opportunity of finding out all about Window from this informative paper.
[Underlined] RECORDINGS OF CREW PROCEDURES [/underlined]
An excellent portable wire recording and reproducing unit, lent to us from the USAAF has supplied us with some interesting recordings of crew intercommunication and V.H.F. R/T procedure in Controllers’ aircraft during recent attacks. Experiments are being carried out to convert these recordings into permanent records for use in squadrons and training units. One point which stands out clearly is the reluctance of the bombing force
(Continued at foot of Column 2)
[Underlined] TACTICS (Cont. from Col.3)
to comply quickly with the Controller’s orders. After he orders bombing to cease there should be no delay in withholding your bombing run. Even a Mosquito which probably has to fly low and re-mark or back up, cannot cope with a shower of bombs falling on top of it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] TRAINING WITH CINE GYRO ASSESSORS [/underlined]
This training showed a very welcome increase during May, particularly in the 51 Base units, who have now got the scheme working smoothly, but could produce even better results is [sic] more gyro assessors were available. 20 more assessors have been asked for, and it is intended to distribute them within 51 Base to reduce the amount of fitting and removal in aircraft. This, at present, is considerable, and rapid changes have to be made each time an aircraft detailed for gyro work becomes unserviceable. With the increased allotment of assessors, more aircraft will be fitted, and less wear and tear imposed on the assessors.
Squadron training with gyro assessors has also improved, but there still remain several squadrons who are lagging behind. These Units should make an effort to exercise more crews during June, and aim at giving each gunner at least one exercise during each month. 97 and 83 Squadrons have now been equipped with assessors and will commence training early in June. Squadron Gunnery Leaders have been instructed in assessing the films, and all processing can be carried out on the spot. Instances have occurred when processed films have remained in the Photos. Section 24 hours after processing; this shows a lack of co-operation between Photos. and Gunnery; it is essential that films be shown as soon as possible after landing, while details of the exercise are still fresh in the gunners’ minds. All operational units are being equipped with an “Ampro” projector, for projecting cine gyro films, and all existing silent projectors will be replaced by the “Ampro”, which is particularly suitable for film assessing. Details of the issue and exchange are contained in Bomber Command letter BC/S.23964/E.4. dated 25th March, 1944.
[Underlined] SIGHTING CHECKS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
During May, personnel from 1690 B.D.T. Flight carried out a series of sighting checks on Squadron gunners; the results are given below:-
[Table of Gunners’ Test Results by Squadron]
Squadron Average 64.64
Gunnery Conferences were also held at each Base, and all Gunnery matters, particularly training were discussed; minutes of these Conferences have been circulated to all units. The suggestions put forward at these conferences are under consideration, and decisions will be communicated to Units shortly. The suggestions that each squadron should have a training aircraft was of particular interest to Gunnery Leaders, as it will ease the problem of gyro fitting and harmonising considerably.
[Underlined] FROSTBITE [/underlined]
After a period of warm weather, and medium height attacks, the return to high level attacks on Duisburg and Brunswick produced several instances of frostbite amongst gunners. Precaution against frostbite must be observed at all times. A recent examination of gunners’ helmets in one unit revealed that quite a number had not the metal parts of the harness covered with tape, thus increasing the risk of frostbite to the face. Both the use of Lanolin and the abovementioned precaution are vital if frostbite is to be avoided.
The use of Balaclava helmets has proved successful, and a request has been made to establish this a as a stores item; this will eliminate the necessity for relying on the local knitting circle and the Comforts fund as a source of supply. While we are very grateful for the efforts of those concerned, some units had difficulty in obtaining enough to equip all gunners.
[Underlined] CLEANLINESS OF PERSPEX [/underlined]
Units are reminded that “SINEC” cleaning outfits, stores reference 336/767, are available on a scale of one per aircraft, for cleaning perspex, and gunners should avail themselves of this equipment for cleaning turret cupolas. The outfit consists of three bottles of cleaning and polishing preparations together with cleaning rags. One squadron has twenty of these outfits held in the Gunnery Section, which are issued on signature to Gunners each morning when gunners are allotted aircraft for daily inspection.
[Underlined] MARK IIIN REFLECTOR SIGHT {Stores Ref. 83/2465 [/underlined]
The above item has been introduced in sufficient quantities to equip all rear turrets in operational aircraft, letter dated 21st May, reference 5G/618/2/Armt. gives full particulars of this issue. The sight embodies a new type dimming control and has no metal hood, which improves the search position. No sunscreen is fitted to the Mark IIIN sight, but special sights are available fitted with a sunscreen. Reports from gunners who have used the sight on operations are all in favour, and Gunnery Leaders should press for the fitting of this item.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Experiments are being made to ascertain the possibilities of using a pilot type parachute in the rear turret.
Fiskerton have received the first F.N.121 rear turret on a demonstration stand. This turret includes Mark 2C Gyro Gunsight, electric motor for servo feed, and improved valve-box.
Supply of microphone heaters is held up for three months, but an allotment of 100 has been received; these will be distributed early in June.
Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Swinderby is completed.
Squadrons are now being equipped with electric gun heaters in rear turrets.
1690 B.D.T.F. personnel at Swinderby are producing a synthetic trainer for teaching the corkscrew.
Tests with infra-red cameras in rear turrets against Hurricane aircraft at night, will be made during June.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
Congratulations to S/Ldr. Patten on appointment to the C.G.I. post at Aircrew School, Scampton.
F/Lt Hamilton will fill Gunnery Leader vacancy at Aircrew School.
(Continued on page 14, Column 2)
This month’s bag:
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Squadron. A/C letter Date Type of E/A
44 Y 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
207 X 3/4.5.44. ME.110 (c)
106 Q 9/10.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
61 P 11/12.5.44.. JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
630 Z 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
57 C 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
57 T 1/2.5.44. ME.210
97 N 3/4.5.44. ME.210 or 410
57 A 7/8.5.44. ME.410 (c)
97 E 7/8.5.44. ME.109
57 L 7/8.5.44. JU. 88
57 L 7/8.5.44. T/E u/i
619 A 7/8.5.44. DO.217 (c)
630 E 12.5.44. ME.110 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
619 G 21/22.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 Q 21/22.5.44. T/E u/I (c)
207 F 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 V 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 R 27/28.5.44. ME.110
The claims marked (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Cartoon]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Read paragraphs 1 to 3 for Freshmen. The same applies to you. The 90° test for the Mark XIV Bombsight is as new to you as to the freshmen, so get it buttoned up. It has been proved that experienced pilots who can fly accurately in normal flight, and keep the top needle of the turn and bank indicator central, develop a consistent creep as soon as they commence the bombing run. Are you one of the offenders?
Take an interest in the analysis of your practice bombing results. Take an interest in the technical staff who maintain your bombsight. Talk things over with your Air Bomber. You’ve probably some these things before, and you must concentrate on them even more from now on.
Don’t expect your navigator to get accurate pinpoints on H2S unless you are assisting him by flying straight and level. If you fly unsteadily, the images he gets will be blurred and indistinct.
There’s a landing ground at Fristen near Eastbourne which you may see homeward bound sometime. This is not an airfield with facilities comparable to Woodbridge and is now unsuitable for night landings. The airfield surface is grass and the longest run, 1650 yards, has a sheer drop into the sea. Don’t use this landing ground except as a last resort in a grave “emergency”.
If your hydraulics are unserviceable and you are attempting a belly landing or a ditching, don’t use the air bottle to lower some flap otherwise the wheels will come down as well!
If you have to land using Fido, turn on your internal cockpit lights. This will help to counteract dazzle from the glare of the burners.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Flying for bombing must be your main preoccupation from now on. You are attacking small targets and are putting night precision bombing on the map. First of all learn the limitations of the Mark XIV Bombsight, and the flying errors that can creep in.
Study the 90° method of testing the Mark XIV Bombsight in flight. Don’t leave this to your Air Bomber. You play a very large part in making this test productive.
Do correctly banked turns for correction on your bombing run. Keep the top needle of the turn and bank central. Don’t slip or skid. Practice correction with your Air Bomber, and when you get the “Steady” from him, come out of your turn in the normal way. Don’t hurry the recovery from the turn.
Several pilots got into difficulties last month through flying in or near cumulo-nimbus cloud. This type of cloud is dangerous for all aircraft, and the moral is – avoid it!! Get a copy of A.P. 1980 – “How to Avoid Flying Accidents due to Weather” – it’s well worth reading.
If you experience juddering after take off it is probably due to the wheels spinning as the undercarriage retracts. Apply a touch of brake to stop the wheels. Check your cowlings in case the juddering is due to other causes.
This is old “gen” but it is still ignored. Don’t rush your throttles open on take-off, just because you are on a short runway with a full load. Your airscrews will only be slipping, and you won’t get the thrust equivalent of the power used. Open up easily and gradually. You’ll “unstick” just as soon and you won’t swing.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.B.S.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS (Cont. from page 13 Col. 3)
F/Lt. Wynyard, ex 57 Squadron, will take over Gunnery Leader’s post at 49 Squadron.
F/Lt. Harper, ex 207 Squadron will fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 1660 Con. Unit) [sic]
F/Lt. Clarke, ex 1660 Con. Unit to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 467 Squadron.
F/Lt. Cleary, ex 27 O.T.U., Lichfield, to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 44 Squadron.
F/Lt. Gross appointed Gunnery Leader at 9 Squadron.
F/O Wyand posted from 9 Squadron to 619 Squadron.
F/Lt. Howard posted to Coningsby for special duties.
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of May was 1515, of which 1045 produced plottable ground detail; it will again be noted from the analysis that the percentage of failures remains high. Many of these failures should not have occurred.
Small stocks of Kodacolour films do not permit its extensive use, but a proportion of aircraft in all squadrons except No. 54 Base, have been detailed to carry composite film. It is still necessary to centralise processing at Scampton to economise in the use of special chemicals. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases have now undertaken the assembly of their own composite film, and it is interesting to note that no major difficulties have been experienced. It is, however, obvious that all photographers do not yet realise the extreme care that is necessary when dealing with composite film assembly. Senior N.C.O’s are directly responsible for studying the preliminary instructions issued from this Headquarters, and ensuring that he whole of their staff are trained and practiced; this is particularly important in respect of processing, and when sufficient chemicals and film are available, each Base Photographic Section will commence its own processing. No deviation from these instructions will be permitted.
[Underlined] H 2 S Photography, [/underlined] the small supply of miniature cameras has retarded progress, but an improvement is expected during this month. Results have been obtained with the few cameras at our disposal, but some of them were out of focus. This is thought to be due to the focussing device. Examine this item of equipment, and ensure that the matt surface, of the glass is [underlined] towards the camera lens and the packing piece between the glass surface and the screw locking ring. [/underlined]
It is necessary to draw attention to the curious fact that there are still some photographic personnel that imagine that their only duty is F.24 night photography, and that when new methods and equipment are introduced they should be attended by increases of staff. That this attitude should be obvious id an indication of poor control on the part of certain N.C.O’s; it is, therefore, necessary to correct this idea immediately. It does not matter what photography is undertaken, the photographic section on the Station and Squadron will treat each branch with speed and efficiency. There are no trade union hours in the R.A.F. and Senior N.C.O’s are reminded that the question of priority of work, should it arise, will be given by the Senior Intelligence Officer.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
The month is remarkable for the scarcity of station reports. The change-over from winter to summer games may have some bearing on this, but reports are essential if this column is to mirror the Group activities, so next month, chaps, please let us have it by the 2nd, missing nothing from the activities of the local trout-ticklers to the best figures of the station Henry Cotton.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON’s [/underlined] final game in the Lincoln League was with Avro. They lost 5- 3 to their “case hardened” rivals, but have put up the following significant record:-
Played. 52
Won. 38
Lost. 10
Drawn. 4
Goals for 193
Goals against 113
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] completed their season with two games, losing 1 – 3 to Waddington and beating Scothern 2 – 0 at home.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] football has seen a memorable rivalry in the knock-out competition, between “B” Flight and S.H.Q. These two teams have now played four games with extra time in the last two, and still no result. The winners of this Homeric duel meet B.A.T. Flight to battle for the cup.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] wound up their season with a 4 – 2 win over the 1st Border Regiment, leaving them with the following satisfactory season result:-
Played. 18
Won. 12
Lost. 3
Drawn. 3
Goals for 65
Goals against 42
RUGGER
[Underlined] WINES RUGGER CUP [/underlined] – The Wines trophy was finally won by Winthorpe in a hard tussle with Dunholme. The result was 11 – 8 for Winthorpe after a keen game with both sides going all out. In the second half some pretty passing was produced, and it was certainly anyone’s game until the final stages when Winthorpe got on top although their right three-quarter had left the field. Air Commodore Hesketh presented the trophy to the winning team. Winthorpe are to be congratulated on reaching the final of both the Wines Cup and the Matz Soccer Trophy – well done Winthorpe.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] would [sic] up their season with three games, all of which they won. A Men’s team beat Ingham 4 – 0 at Scampton. Their next two matches were the semi-final and final of the Group Mixed Hockey Competition. In the semi-final they beat Waddington 4 – 3 in a hard fought game, and defeated East Kirkby 5 – 3 at Swinderby in the final.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
The latter stages of this Competition were rather long drawn out, and East Kirkby stood patiently by, waiting for the other finalist to be decided. Scampton and Waddington met in the semi-final, Scampton winning 4 – 3 by a last minute goal. The final was played off at Swinderby. Scampton had a very forceful forward line and led 5 – 1 until Kirkby staged a rally and added two quick goals, leaving the final score 5 – 3 for Scampton. So Scampton became the first holders of the 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. This latest addition to the Group Cups has been purchased by the officers of 5 Group Headquarters, and presented for annual competition amongst the Group Stations.
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE GROUP COMPETITION [/underlined] is going well. Sections A and B have already produced finalists. In Section B two powerful teams are to meet in the final – Swinderby and Syerston. In Round 1, Swinderby beat Dunholme by 5 wickets; in Round 2 they beat Waddington without losing any wickets. Syerston scored 115 – 0 against Skellingthorpe’s 26 all out in Round 1. In Round 2 they beat Headquarters 5 Group side, scoring 70 – 10 against Group’s 52 – 9. This last game was quite a thriller. Group batted first on a well soaked wicket, and scratched together 52. The formidable Syerston opening pair (MacKenzie (Hants) and Warburton (Lancs)) soon rattled up 30, and looked set for the night. Then inspiration came to the Group’s change bowler. MacKenzie and Warburton fell in successive overs and Todd went on to return an average of 7 for 8. Group passes out of the competition, but got a tremendous moral fillip at having “shaken ‘em”. Even the fielders, floundering (and sitting), in knee high grass, felt the flush of near-triumph. Wigsley, in Round 1, were unlucky to lose to Group. The Headquarters side were all out for 102 and Wigsley made 94 for 5, not realising until too late in the game that the 15 overs were nearly spent.
In Section A, Metheringham beat Spilsby (62 – 8; 58 – 10), and Woodhall (33 – 4) beat Bardney (32-10). East Kirkby had a bye to the second round and Coningsby beat Fiskerton to become the other semi-finalist. Metheringham (95 – 8) beat Kirkby (79 – 10) in Round 2, the other finalist not yet being decided. It should be possible to play off the Section finals and the Group final before this month end, leaving the warmer (we hope) weather for more leisurely friendly games.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] played five Station matches during May, and in addition had several inter-section matches and W.A.A.F. games.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] managed three games, losing to Swinderby in the Group Cup, beating Scampton and playing a draw with De Ashton Schools. In addition five section games were played.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] were very industrious and laid two practice wickets and two pitches in a field adjacent to the camp, and practice wickets at Watch Tower, A and B dispersal, and B.A.T. Flight Hangar. There is no better way of ensuring a full and profitable season than this adequate provision of pitches – well done Fiskerton.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined played Border Regiment, losing 43 – 62; their second games was with Woodhall in the Group Cup. Woodhall, who field a powerful side, defeated them33 – 4 against 32 – 10.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] boast a cricket pitch with fielders’ amenities, in the form of trees within whose shade the more cunning deep slips lurk. The wicket is not so kind, and emphatically earns its title “sporty”, in true village tradition. The Group side beat Wigsley in Round 1 of the Cup, but lost to Syerston. An evening game v 93 M.U. at Collingham was marred by Home Guard charging about the field in their Salute the Soldier manoeuvres. A R.A.F. – W.A.A.F. game Is planned, the only limits imposed on the R.A.F. being that they bat left-handed, bowl underhand, and take catches one handed!
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
Fiskerton beat Skellingthorpe 25 – 2 in the first match in the South Lincoln Zone Competition. The game is arousing considerable interest among non-Canadian personnel. Any station that would like to field a team is invited to contact Fiskerton or Bardney.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Tennis, Squash, Swimming, Cycling, Golf, Badminton – every game has its enthusiasts throughout the Group. Sport is doubly important just now – it’s a duty to be “fit to fight”.
ECONOMY AND SALVAGE
DUNHOLME LODGE received a “special mention” for Economy and Salvage in the Bomber Command Bulletin No. 35 for May, 1944.
Most people in this country, and probably in many other countries as well, are keyed up for the biggest military operation in history, which is scheduled to begin on “D” Day.
There is no doubt that when the plunge is made, very great demands will be made on transport for some time, and the supply of materials will be a matter of first-rate importance.
“Ah, yes”, you say, “but the plans are already made, and sufficient materials will be available and provision made for their transport when the day arrives. Anyway, what’s that got to do with my job?”.
Just this. Each of us has the opportunity day in and day out, of effecting some economy, either by means of using less of certain things than we have become accustomed to, or by ensuring that minor repairs to equipment are carried out promptly, and so preventing major repairs or renewals.
Our first aim should, therefore, be to take care of materials and equipment so that their repair or replacement is reduced to a minimum, and, secondly, when things cannot be used any longer, they are disposed of as salvage.
The most important items are Paper and Cardboard, Heavy Ferrous Metal, Drums of all types, and used Oils.
The Scots have a saying – “Every mickle makes a muckle” which, being interpreted, means “A stitch in time saves nine”!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS (CONTD:)
also on landing, and damaged another aircraft in dispersal. This accident has not yet been fully investigated.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTS [/underlined]
A Squadron pilot made a wheel landing on a long runway in a Lancaster, and did not take into account his all up weight of 55,000 lbs. He was late in applying brake, and overshot. The undercarriage broke in a ditch. There was no wind at the time. Remember the slower rate of deceleration with a heavily laden aircraft!
Two of the Stirlings which overshot were on three engines. One pupil Pilot landed on a short runway in a light wind. He should have asked Flying Control to let him use the long runway, as three-engined landings on less than 2000 yards runways are forbidden in 51 Base. Details of the other three engined overshoot are not yet available, but it follows the usual pattern – an error of judgement by and inexperienced pilot who approached too fast.
[Underlined] OTHERS [/underlined]
One pupil in a Stirling crashed while attempting to go round again from a low height, with one propeller feathered. This accident is still under investigation.
A Lancaster pilot returned from an operation this month and forgot to lower his undercarriage before landing. Such accidents are fortunately few and far between on Lancasters. Sufficient to say that the log books of both Pilot and Flight Engineer have been endorsed in RED. This aircraft had a noisy TR1196, which probably accounted for the F/Engineer not hearing the order “Wheels Down”, but….
A Lancaster was taking off when the leading edge of the port wing came loose and folded back. With great difficulty the pilot got the aircraft in the air. He made a fast approach out of necessity but the resultant heavy landing wrecked the aircraft. The primary cause of this accident was faulty maintenance, but it must be remembered that when examining leading edges for security before starting up, pilots and Flight Engineers must get [underlined] under [/underlined] the wing and see that the panel is flush with the mainplane. It is no good just looking at the screws from the front.
Included in the other accidents (not classed as avoidable) are 7 caused by tyre bursts, 3 undercarriage pylon failures in Stirlings, and 4 obscure crashes. One Lancaster landed on top of another which was about to take off, and caused fatal injuries. This accident is under investigation.
[Underlined] HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
The ‘score’ of heavy landings this month is [underlined] nil. [/underlined] – first month for a long time. This is just as it should be. Keep it up!
GIVE ALL YOU CAN TO THE 5 GROUP PRISONERS OF WAR FUND.
(SEE PAGE 4 FOR DETAILS)
TRAINING
There was a record number of crews produced by 51 Base during the month. A total of 131 crews were posted to No. 5 L.F.S. and 136 passed out from 5L.F.S. to squadrons. The Base, therefore, produced eleven crews in excess of the commitment for the month. To achieve this, the Heavy Conversion Units flew 5,650 hours and the L.F.S. the exceptionally fine figure of 2,240 hours. The weather was exceptional throughout the month, and hard work by maintenance personnel provided all units with the aircraft necessary to meet commitments.
A high light during the month was provided by 1661 Conversion Unit which put up 21 Stirlings on the night of 24/25th May, on night cross countries, Bullseye and bombing exercises. There were 21 aircraft detailed, no cancellations, no early returns and no accidents. The take off was on Operational lines and the aircraft took off at about a minute and a half intervals.
Accidents, unfortunately, marred the picture. The problem of tyre creep and busts is still a major one. Undercarriage defects have involved extensive co-operation with the manufacturers. It is hoped that “coring”, which has been a chronic complaint, will be cured as a result of the month’s investigations. Experiments are being made with tractors to tow aircraft instead of taxying, to see whether braking during taxying is the prime factor contributing to tyre defects.
H 2 S training is expanding in quantity and quality with each week. The difficulty of keeping the necessary serviceability balance between H 2 S and non-H 2 S aircraft is a serious headache for engineers. The new radar buildings will enable extra bench sets to be installed and more ground training completed.
A new syllabus for ground training has been introduced to provide instruction on better crew co-operation lines. Lecture room accommodation is inevitably an associated problem. The Instructor check staff now fly more frequently with crews under training, and some improvement in al specialist sections is apparent.
[Underlined] COMMITMENTS FOR JUNE [/underlined]
The month of June will see the summer training programme in full swing. The commitment will be 132 crews per month from the 3 Heavy Conversion Units, and 128 from No.5 LFS. From 15th June, LFS. are scheduled to produce 132 crews per month. This should be regarded as the minimum, and all Units should endeavour to exceed their commitment without loss of quality.
To ensure that the demands of No.5 L.F.S. are not excessive, and that crews will get a maximum amount of supervised training a revised Lancaster training syllabus has been produced. This will give crews at L.F.S. a total of 11 hours Lancaster flying, of which 6 hours will be dual. The instruction is confined basically to conversion to type and all cross country and affiliation exercises will be done on the squadrons. Instructors have been detached from 51 Base to supervise squadron training which will amount to 11 hrs 10 minutes, not including an experience sortie. Careful organisation by Operational bases is essential to ensure the smooth running of the supervised training in squadrons.
(Continued from previous column)
H 2 S commitments are increasing steadily, and with the fitting of H2S in 619 Squadron, approximately 50% of crews under training will now be required for H2S Squadrons. This means that 15 crews going into our Heavy Conversion Units from now on should be ear-marked for H2S training.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING DRIVE [/underlined]
A drive on bombing, and the need for the most intensive application to bombing training is paramount. The night precision bombing which this Group is carrying out will receive its foundation of consistent accuracy in 51 Base. Crews at the Aircrew School must receive a thorough grounding in the checking of the Mark XIV Bombsight and its use on operations. On all flying exercises when practice bombs are carried, the correct bombing procedure and the elimination of error is to be regarded as the main object of the flight. The bombing exercises are to be thoroughly analysed after every flight, and the Base Bombing Leader must check the progress of the bombing drive in the Base. The motto is- Think bombing, talk bombing, practice bombing, analyse bombing and BOMB ACCURATELY.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Secker and Sgt Gillespie of 619 Sqdn. set a fine example of airmanship on a recent sortie. During take-off P/O Secker found the A.S.I. was unserviceable. He continued the take-off, however, and in spite of the unserviceable instrument, set a course for the target. Sgt Gillespie, the Flight Engineer, traced the fault to a stripped nut in a pipeline. He repaired the pipeline with adhesive tape, and the crew completed a successful sortie.
P/O Dunne, pupil pilot of 1661 Conversion Unit, was taking off in a Stirling when at about 50 feet the port inner engine caught fire. He feathered the propeller and made a safe three-engined landing. This was a good show which reflects credit on his instructor.
Quick thinking and decisive action on the part of Sgt. Spears, a pupil Flight Engineer of 1654 Conversion Unit, saved a Stirling last month. Due to faulty manipulation by the 1st Engineer, all four engines cut through lack of fuel. Sgt Spears, however, tackled this failure and managed to restart the engines when the aircraft had reached 600 feet.
P/O Monaghan of 106 Squadron, showed excellent captaincy and skilled flying under very difficult conditions. He was shot up over the target, and on his return to this country could only get one leg of his undercarriage down. He made a superb landing on the one main whell [sic] in 500 yards visibility at Carnaby emergency airfield, without causing injury to the crew.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 16
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. K.L. SUMNER D.F.M.
P/O W.A. STRATIS D.F.C.
S/L S.L. COCKBAIN D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
P/O G.E. BALL D.F.C.
A/S/L J.H. EVANS, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
P/O A.G. EDGAR D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
SGT. R.D. CHANDLER D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
P/O R.J. AUCKLAND D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
83 SQUADRON
W/O K.A. LANE D.F.C.
F/L N.A. MACKIE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
97 SQUADRON
A/F/L G.S. CHATTEN D.S.O.
106 SQUADRON
S/L E. SPRAWSON D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
W/C J.F. GREY D.F.C.
463 SQUADRON
A/S/L W.L. BRILL, DFC D.S.O.
F/O D.F. WARD D.F.C.
W/C KINGSFORD-SMITH D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
F/O J.A.C. KENNEDY D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
F/O P. KELLY, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/O L.J. SUMPTER, DFM D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
SGT. H.G. BRADY D.F.M.
P/O D.A. WADSWORTH D.F.C.
SGT F.H. JOY D.F.M.
SGT. J.H. MALTBY D.F.M.
W/C J.R. JEUDWINE, OBE D.F.C.
A/S/L W.N. WHAMOND, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/L J.A. HOWARD, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT L.J. BIRCH D.F.M.
627 SQUADRON
F/L D.W. PECK, DFC D.S.O.
630 SQUADRON
P/O R.C. HOOPER D.S.O.
A/F/L T. NEILSON D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/SGT N.D. OWEN D.F.M.
F/SGT J.L. ELLIORR D.F.M.
SGT. A. FIELDING D.F.M.
SGT A.G. DENYER D.F.M.
SGT. K. PACK D.F.M.
F/O C.P. NEWTON D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
F/SGT B.H. WHITE D.F.M.
SGT. H.R. PITCHER D.F.M.
F/SGT C.W. DIMBLEBY D.F.M.
P/O R.A. McKITRICK D.F.C.
F/O J. GOURLAY D.F.C.
SGT. V.F.G. LAKER D.F.M.
P/O Q. SNOW D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
F/L R.N. GIBSON D.F.C.
P/O L.F. TAYLOR D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
P/O J.M. LAING D.F.C.
F/O W.R. FRANCIS D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
F/O G.K. KING D.F.C.
SGT. H. JOHNSON D.F.M.
[Page break]
57 SQUADRON cont.
F/O H.H. CHADWICK D.F.C.
P/O J. SHERRIFF D.F.C.
P/O W.A. WEST D.F.C.
F/SGT W. DAVIS D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
F/L A. SANDISON D.F.C.
F/O C.E. LANCE D.F.C.
106 SQUADRON
F/O H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
F/SGT W.P. AHIG D.F.M.
F/SGT J. BOADEN D.F.M.
A/S/L A.H. CROWE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
SGT L.J.B. BLOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT A.G. MEARNS D.F.M.
207 SQUADRON
P/O C.M. LAWS D.F.C.
SGT H.C. DEVENISH D.F.M.
SGT G.H. CASTELL D.F.M.
A/F/L H.J. PRYOR D.F.C.
P/O S.V. SAFELLE D.F.C.
F/SGT A. BRUCE D.F.M.
SGT. A. BARKER D.F.M.
467 SQUADRON
P/O B.R. JONES D.F.C.
P/O R.M. STANFORD D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
W/O W.J. BENNETT D.F.C.
P/O W.G. RADCLIFFE D.F.C.
F/SGT R. BATSON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.G. DOWMAN D.F.M.
463 SQUADRON
F/O A.E. KELL D.F.C.
630 SQUADRON
SGT D.J. TAYLOR D.F.M.
F/O J.H. PRATT D.F.C.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONT.)
damage, although on a rather less severe scale can be seen at the Power Station to the N.E. The attack by a small force on Annecy on 9/10 was outstandingly successful. Apart from one small building in the S.E. corner of the factory, the whole target has been almost completely destroyed. On the 24/25th the raid on Eindhoven was abandoned owing to 10/10ths cloud, but this disappointment was to some extent compensated by a successful attack on the General Motors Assembly Plant on the same night. The main building group is about 75% demolished, while damage can be identified to dockside buildings and servicing tracks.
Sea mining was undertaken on five nights during the month.
A note of extreme optimism perculated into the month’s operations by the introduction of four coastal defence battery targets. The first to be attacked was Marselines and St. Valery-en-Caux, both on 27/28. The former battery received many near misses within 50 yards, but it is difficult to speculate on the resultant damage to the primary weapons. Some damage to personnel accommodation is, however, apparent.
St. Valery was more successful 208 craters can be seen in the target area, resulting in four of the emplacements receiving direct hits, with very near misses to the remaining two positions. The following night, 28/29, the battery at St. Martin de Varreville was attacked. An extremely heavy concentration of craters throughout the battery area was achieved, with obliteration of all but one of the emplacements. The coastal defence battery at Maisy, singled out for attack on the night of 31st, had 10/10ths stratus to thank for a quiet night.
Although the true Allied design is cloaked, and little can be gained from the study of the month’s air tactics, it can at least be tendered that our offensive is producing results which are measurable and progressive.
AIR TRAINING
There was a satisfactory improvement in the number of fighter affiliation details flown by aircraft of 1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month, Squadrons and Training Units trebled the number of Gyro Assessor exercises compared with the April figure.
The fighters carried out 440 hours day affiliation (over 1700 exercises) and 251 hours other flying, which included standing patrols for “snap” interceptions of Stirlings in 51 Base, night training, air tests and drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. The posting of five Hurricane pilots in a week towards the end of the month seriously handicapped Squadron affiliation and replacements are urgently required.
Hurricane pilots of the detached elements of the Flight in the Operational Bases who were out of touch with night flying, were given a short refresher at R.A.F. Station, Cranwell. No. 52 Base showed initiative and enthusiasm by completing their night Hurricane training during the month and doing some searchlight co-operation by arrangement with 50 A.A. Brigade (5 A.A. Group). They were all set to start night affiliation with their own bombers when two of their three pilots were posted. The other Bases have yet to complete night training. This must be done in the early part of June. The absence of flame shields and V.H.F. is no restriction; neither is essential.
The following table shows the details of air training in the Group, and the flying times of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING MAY
[Table of 1690 B.D.T. Flight Flying Times by Base]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
There is a slight increase from last month in the total number of hours Link practice carried out during the month. This was, however, due entirely to an increased effort by Flight Engineers, pilot times being slightly less than the previous month. This decrease was due mainly to operational commitments, but there is still room for improvement in Link Hours. Don’t neglect your Link practice, accurate instrument flying is essential for accurate bombing.
LINK TRAINER FLYING TIMES
[Table of Link Trainer hours carried out by Squadron]
ARMAMENT (Continued from page 2 Col. 2)
[Underlined] VISIT TO STEEL FOUNDRY [/underlined]
The Armament Brach at this Headquarters was fortunate enough to pay a very interesting visit to a Steel Foundry which is casting out 1000 lb M.C. bombs for us. It is understood that this particular firm were the pioneers of the new method of casting steel bomb bodies and consequently a very comprehensive story of the evolution of the 1000 lb cast steel MC bomb was obtained from the people who really know.
The visit was of about four hours duration and all stages of the process were witnessed under the watchful eye of a very competent guide. The visit was not without its comic side; the Group Armament Officer at one time was seen diving into a heap of wet sand as a very large crucible of hot molten steel swept smartly past his ear. Incidentally the crane carrying the steel was in the very skilful hands of a member of the fair sex, which may account for the C.A.O. not seeing the crucible a little earlier.
Efforts are being made to obtain permission for all Armament Officers to have the opportunity of visiting a similar foundry.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
There is at last news of the 30 cwt van for Armament Officers, and as it is now on the establishment, a daily visit to the transport section might prevent a mis-allocation.
The Army have provided 24 lorries and 50 men to assist in handling explosives – a duty new to them, which they are performing with great zeal.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The high light of the month’s offensive was the dropping of more than 37,000 tons of bombs by Bomber Command – the greatest weight of bombs ever dropped in a single month. Our contribution to the blue print pattern of the Second Front has been a rather varied one, including attacks on railway centres, ammunition dumps, military depots, aircraft factories and explosives factories. 2254 sorties were flown, with 3.2% casualties.
The campaign against the enemy’s aircraft production, commenced in April last, was continued with unabated vigour, culminating in five successful missions. The attack against the Usine Liotard Aircraft Repair Works on 1/2 set a particularly high standard for the month. Of the three main buildings comprising the works, two were completely destroyed and the third severely damaged. On the same night an attack was launched against the same S.N.C.A.S.E. aircraft assembly plant at Toulouse. The whole factory sustained severe damage, including in particular, the destruction of the three main buildings, the assembly plant, the testing shop and the components store.
The main weight of the attack on TOURS airfield on 7/8th was distributed among the administrative buildings and the N., S., and W. hangar areas. In the former, seventeen buildings have been more than 50% destroyed – only eight out of the 41 buildings in the area remain undamaged. Damage is also severe in each of the hangar areas.
Both the Airfield and Seaplane Base at Brest/Lanveoc-Poulmic were attacked on 8/9. All five hangars at the airfield were hit, causing serious damage. Other incidents can also be identified. The principal damage at the Seaplane Base is to the main hangar and officers’ quarters, which have sustained several direct hits.
Mobility, and the resultant power of rapid concentration, which the Hun no doubt hoped would assist in countering the invasion threat, has made transportation the objective of much of May’s 37,000 tons. This Group was detailed to attack the railway yard and workshops at Lille on 10/11. Photographs taken after the attack indicate that two locomotive sheds and a car repair storage shed have been destroyed – the transhipment sheds and other buildings being severely damaged. There are also numerous hits on the tracks. Cover of Tours following our attack on the marshalling yard on 19/20, shows particularly severe damage to railway facilities and the passenger station. The goods depot is more that [sic] 50% destroyed, while the locomotive workshops and depot are severely affected. All tracks are interrupted. Weather affected our effort on the Amiens marshalling yard on 19/20, although some aircraft bombed. P.R.U. cover is awaited. In the raid on Nantes on 27/28, only half the effort could be brought to bear owing to smoke obscuring visibility. Despite this, a total of at least eighty hits were secured on the railway tracks, causing considerable dislocation. The railway junction at Saumur was attached [sic] with some effect on the night of the 31st. On this occasion also, smoke tended to obscure the target, but not before rather more than half of the attacking force had bombed, securing hits on the tracks, railway station and sheds and causing damage to the road bridge.
Two main targets were selected during the month – Duisburg on the 21/22, followed immediately by Brunswick on 22/23. At Duisburg further damage has been caused to business and residential property, especially in the town centre, and also to important industrial targets, chiefly in areas south of the docks. Brunswick, unfortunately, continued its charmed life, and apart from a few incidents near the eastern marshalling yards came through its ordeal unscathed.
It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that already the German repair system is overtaxed to such a degree that no attempt has been made to repair much of the damage to his communications.
If evidence is required of the rapid approach of invasion hour, this can surely be found in the recent shifting od the main weight of attack to the methodical disorganisation of the Western Wall itself. Not only have coastal defence batteries commanded our attention, but also ammunition dumps, military camps and powder works. The attack on the Pouderie Nationale Explosives Works at Toulouse was outstandingly successful. Extensive damage has been caused, which has virtually written off the plant. Sable-sur-Sarthe on 6/7th was equally effective. Photos taken the day following the raid show smoke emitting from the remains of the ammunition dump. All the principal buildings in the ammunition filling installation have been destroyed or damaged – the site of the storage units in the central sector of the dump being marked by large craters. The Salbris Explosives Works and Depot attacked on 7/8th sustained severe damage. Of the larger of the two factory units not one building has escaped. Despite the dispersal if the storage depot, which consist [sic] of ten separate areas, five have been damaged, three particularly severely.
The tank training centre at Mailly le Camp received our attention on the 3/4. Some 5000 troops and between 50 – 60 Tiger tanks were believed to have been housed here. The results achieved by the attack were impressive. Not one building in the group of M/T and barrack buildings has escaped damage, 34 out of a total of 47 buildings being totally destroyed. In the remaining group of 114 barrack buildings, 47 were destroyed and many of the remainder damaged. Bourg-Leopold (11/12) the largest enemy barracks in France was a most attractive target, but again the weather was fickle, with the result that the mission was abortive. It is interesting to note that Command has since attacked this target, producing very heavy damage throughout the entire barracks area. Our agenda for the month included four more pre-invasion targets of a rather miscellaneous variety – namely the Gnome and Phone Foundry at Gennevilliers, the Ball-Bearing Factory at Annecy the Phillips Works at Eindhoven and the Ford and General Motor Works at Antwerp. Very severe damage can be seen throughout the Foundry and Stamping Plant at Gennevilliers following the attack on 9/10. The adjoining Electrical Engineering Works and Tyre and Rubber Works have also suffered. In addition
(Continued on Page 17, Column 1)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties carried out during June including awards by Squadron]
ERRATUM: In the above table 463 Sqdn should occupy fifth place, with all subsequent squadrons amended accordingly.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944.
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V Group News, May 1944
5 Group News, May 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 22, May 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about armament, war savings, flying control, engineering, flight engineers, gardening, prisoner of war fund, air bombing, navigation, equipment, H2S track and ground speed bombing, air sea rescue, enemy agents and careless walkers, accidents, signals, tactics, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, photography, sports, economy and salvage, training, recent good shows, honours and awards, air training, link trainer, operations and war effort.
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1944-05
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Anne-Marie Watson
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-26%20may%2044
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Royal Air Force
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Belgium
France
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Amiens
France--Brest
France--Gennevilliers
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France--Nantes
France--Sablé-sur-Sarthe
France--Saumur
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Duisburg
Germany
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1944-05
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
ditching
flight engineer
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
RAF Winthorpe
rivalry
sport
Stirling
training
wireless operator
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
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Copies sent to:
Stns. 9
S Th 10
B 6.
[Indecipherable] 2
Base 1
[Stamp] Base Copy.
V GROUP NEWS V
JUNE * 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 23
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
June has proved to be a month of record achievements. For the first time in its history the Group despatched 3,000 sorties of which a very high percentage were successful. Much of this success is due to the flare and marking teams who are now getting into their stride, and there has been a similar improvement in bombing. For the first time the average crew bombing error from 20,000 feet for the whole Group is below 200 yards. If the reduction of 50 yards which was achieved during June can be repeated during July, the number of bombs falling on the average target will be increased by something in the order of 50. This can be seen by looking at any P.R.U. photograph and counting the number of craters which are shown in open fields on either side of the target.
I therefore ask all crews to continue with their efforts to reduce bombing errors in the knowledge that by doing so they will add to the striking power of the Group to an extent which could be achieved by no other means. The new orders for maintenance which have recently been issued should help the Instrument Section, upon whom so much depends, to improve the serviceability of the sight, and eliminate minor inaccuracies.
On two occasions during the month the Group came up against the main strength of the German Night Fighter Defences, and on both occasions suffered serious losses; although over the whole month the missing rate was below the average for previous months. Nevertheless these instances show the vital importance of gunnery and the need for improving results by every means in our power.
There is ample evidence that the combined power of the rear and mid-upper turrets will bring down enemy fighters if the aim is correct. As an example, there is the case of “M” of 207 Squadron whose crew on the night of June 9/8th destroyed two JU. 88 and one ME.110. Although results such as this will always remain exceptional, it should be possible to improve the accuracy of aim over the present general standard. Fighters are now available in 1690 Flight for affiliation exercises and every chance must be taken whenever the weather is suitable especially at night. The bombing team has shown how greatly it can improve its results by methodical training and analysis and I now look to the gunnery team to do likewise. I will do everything in my power to provide them with means and facilities for training, but much is a matter for each gunner. Night vision, methodical search, aircraft recognition, turret manipulation, clearing stoppages, can only be improved by hard individual work.
The effort which the Group has put in during the month had been made possible by the high standards of serviceability which have been achieved, and I congratulate all ranks who have helped to get aircraft and equipment into the air. The Armament sections have loaded a record tonnage of bombs while all other sections on each station have contributed their full share to the success achieved.
Finally, I congratulate No. 51 Base on completing more than 8,000 hours of training and passing out a record number of crews. In particular I would mention No. 5 L.F.S. who completed a month’s flying with no avoidable flying accidents.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] BASE GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
June has seen the establishment of a S/Ldr Air Gunner at each Base, and a list of the officers concerned is appended at the foot of this paragraph. Whilst these officers will be concerned with all Gunnery matters, their main functions is to improve the standard of training throughout the Group, as it has long been realised that with long periods of operations the Squadron Gunnery Leaders are fully occupied and can find little time for all the other aspects of Gunnery. The Base Gunnery Leaders will, therefore, be able to devote their time to improve training facilities and equipment, and to ensure that the equipment is available in sufficient quantity to ensure the maximum benefit being obtained from it. They will also be able to supervise the preparation of Gunners for Gunnery Leader, A.G.I. and Specialist Sighting Courses, to enable the candidates to have the best possible chance of passing these courses, thus avoiding wastage of valuable vacancies. The appointment of these Officers to S/Ldr posts offers more advancement for Gunnery Leaders, and is an indication that the importance of air gunnery is receiving recognition. We wish the officers concerned good luck in their new appointments, and hope that very shortly dividends will be paid by this new establishment.
51 BASE – S/LDR HIPKIN
52 BASE – F/LT McCURDY
53 BASE – F/LT BEALE
54 BASE F/LT HOWARD
55 BASE – F/LT BREAKEY
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
An error appeared in the Movement’s column for May, regarding 467 and 44 Squadrons, and is corrected below.
F/Lt Clarke ex 1660 Con. Unit to 44 Sqdn.
F/Lt Cleary ex 27 O.T.U. to 467 Sqdn.
Other movements are:-
S/Ldr Undery ex 1690 B.D.T.F. to H.Q. No. 5 Group.
F/Lt Cass, ex L.F.S. to 630 Sqdn.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
Considerable time is wasted in returning incorrect combat reports to Squadrons, through claims being made which do not conform to the standards laid down by Bomber Command, as issued to all Units. The Gunnery Leaders must ensure that information entered is correct in every detail and that all claims are submitted under one of the headings, i.e. “Destroyed”, “Probably Destroyed” or “Damaged”. Numerous incidents occur when information regarding Tail Warning Devices is incomplete, and it is emphasised that this is most important and must be included in combat reports. Combat reports could be forwarded to Headquarters 5 Group more quickly than at present; the standard pro-forma is now in general use and should help in the preparation of reports. Units should check that only this amended pro-forma is used for this purpose.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn. A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. ME. 410 (c)
630 “Y” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
44 “O” 9/10.6.44. ME. 109 (c)
97 “D” 9/10.6.44. DO. 217 (c)
50 “U” 15/16.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “F 21/22.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88
97 “Q” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “B” 24/25.6.44. ME 109
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
106 “G” 6/7.6.44. ME. 110 (c)
467 “X” 21/22.6.44. T/E.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
207 “J” 1.6.44. T/E (c)
57 “P” 1.6.44. JU. 88
50 “D” 6.6.44. ME. 410
9 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “V” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
97 “Q” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
106 “F” 14/15.6.44. FW. 190 (c)
207 “D” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A new type of two-piece flying suit is on trial in 53 Base, and the results will, in due course, be made available.
Replies have been received from all Units in the use of the Pilot type parachute for rear gunners and recommendations forwarded to H.Q. Bomber Command. With slight modification to the turret, this idea seems feasible, but may call for a revision in the type of clothing to be worn.
Ampro projectors are appearing in operational units for assessing Cine Gyro films. The establishment is one per station.
Units are again reminded that filters suitable for the Shadowgraph and 16 m.m. projector for use in night vision training are available. When requesting an issue of these filters from H.Q. 5 Group, units are to confirm that they have a [underlined] fully [/underlined] blacked out room for night vision training.
CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING
Instructions have now been issued to all Stations to construct a sandbag traphouse for clay pigeon shooting, and full details given for the layout of the range. Severn P.F.O’s are attending the Instructor’s Course on the 7th July, and the remainder on the 23rd July; these instructors will pass on to Unit Gunnery Leaders instructions for these practices, to ensure that at least two officers are available for conducting the exercises. Gunnery Leaders should press for the construction of the traphouses and ensure that all equipment is overhauled and ready for use.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JUNE.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
Fighter Affiliation Grand Total = 1493
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] ATTACKS ON LIMOGES MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined]
1,424 bombs were dropped. Of this total 844 craters have been counted on the P.R.U. photographs. We can therefore only consider 59% of the total number of bombs dropped.
The M.P.I. of all craters was established and a circle of radius 150 yards was drawn. Inside this circle the number of craters that could be counted totalled 152 and the remaining 692 craters were counted outside the circle. Therefore the Pilot and Air Bomber’s error for 692 bombs was greater than 150 yds.
With our 152 bombs inside the 150 yards circle we achieved 10 hits per acre and if we assume that of the bombs not counted, we obtained the same percentage inside 150 yards our hits per acre would increase to 17.
There were 211 bombs between the 150 yards and 250 yards circles. The maximum errors permissible for these bombs to get them into the 150 yards circle are:-
125 yards – average line error
160 yards – average range error
We all agree that these limits are reasonable and that crews should not have errors in excess.
Now, if the bombs had been contained in the limits of 125 yards line and 160 yds. range, our resultant average radial error about the M.P.I. would be 175 yards. This would mean that instead of sending the 96 aircraft to Limoges that we had to, we need only have sent 59 aircraft to achieve the same number of hits. We would then have had 37 aircraft free to attack the factory at ??? There were, of course, 330 bombs seen outside the 250 yards circle and great effort must be made to eliminate the errors that were responsible.
The Moral! – You must practice, practice and practice until you are a certain “A” category crew.
!!! [Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined] !!!
A+ Crews – 60 yards or less
A Crews – 100 yards or less
B Crews – 100 yds. to 150 yds.
C Crews – 150 yds. to 200 yds.
D Crews – Over 200 yards.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE: [/underlined] Plotted 1597 bombs aimed by 309 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE: [/underlined] Plotted 1510 bombs aimed by 319 aircraft.
[Underlined] WAINFLEET: [/underlined] Plotted 2056 bombs aimed by 440 aircraft.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of High Level Bombing Training Statistics by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR JUNE
In the April “News” it was threatened that owing to the improvement in Crew Errors, it may be necessary to lower the qualifying figure for the inclusion of errors in this column. June has produced the largest number of below 100 yards errors yet, and in consequence only those crews who have obtained crew errors of 80 yards or less, converted to 20,000 ft. can receive publicity.
Squadron or Con. Unit. Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
9 F/O Blackham F/O Elphick F/O Wenger 72 yards
44 F/L White Sgt Jenkins F/S Jones 66 yards
P/O Baxter W/O Young W/O Rutherford 50 yards
P/O Stewart Sgt Stubbs Sgt Wright 65 yards
49 P/O Appleyard F/S Jameson F/S Blumfield 78 yards
P/O Arnold F/O Dewar W/O Fleming 72 yards
57 F/S Clark Sgt Johnson Sgt Lugg 65 yards
83 P/O Meggeson W/O Franklin F/O Wicker 65 yards
F/O Kelly F/O Irwin Sgt Burleigh 58 & 64 yards
97 F/L Van Raalte F/O Arnold F/S Williams 52, 69 & 78 yards
S/L Ingham F/O Perkins F/L Chatten 69 yards
467 P/O Waugh F/S Southgate F/O Semple 67 yards
F/L Brine F/S Luton F/S Sutton 80 yards
617 P/O Duffy F/O Woods F/O Bell 42 yards
F/O Knights P/O Bell F/O Rhude 48 yards
P/O Jingles F/S Hazell F/O Beal 63 yards
619 P/O Johnson Sgt Vaughton F/S Tranter 79 yards
F/L Howes F/O Baker F/L Harrison 74 yards
1654 C.U. F/S Beharrie Sgt Dean Sgt Brownhall 74 yards
F/S McKechnie F/S Wallace Sgt Little 53 yards
1660 C.U. P/O Dyer F/S Howard F/S Lemaire 74 yards
F/S Millar F/O Banks W/O Wilday 70 yards
1661 C.U. F/O Franks F/O Orry Sgt Roe 78 yards
F/O Furber Sgt Le Marquand F/O Hassel 78 yards
5 L.F.S. S/L Smith Sgt Wallis Sgt Page 49 yards
F/O Edwards F/S Wallace F/O Nunn 54 yards
Congratulations to F/L Van Raalte and crew, 97 Squadron for the outstanding 3 exercises!!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 Squadron (F/Lt Hearn, D.F.C) [/underlined] report that to try and reduce bombing errors to a minimum a system of practice bomb plotting on small perspex covered boards is being inaugurated. The errors will be plotted on this board and the reason explained verbally to the Air Bomber, Captain and Navigator. In case of suspected instrument error the Bombing Section will examine the results plotted with the Instrument Section.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron (F/L Keats) [/underlined] report that a modification to permit the emergency jettisoning of smaller H.E. bombs only when a mixed load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried has been suggested by an Air Bomber and submitted for approval. An isolation switch would be incorporated in the circuit between the Connell Pre-Selector and No. 13 Station. This switch would be permanently wired down except when the special load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried, in which case it would be left up for take-off and put down by the crew when a height of 4,000 feet is reached. In the event of engine failure at take-off, the pilot could jettison the smaller H.E. bombs safe with the jettison toggle instead of the normal jettisoning of containers by Type H Jettison.
[Underlined] 52 Base [/underlined] report that [underlined] 12 [/underlined] aircraft took off between [underlined] 08.30 hours and 09.30 hours [/underlined] on 4th July to carry out High Level Practice Bombing. Early morning details can be sure of the best bombing weather!!
[Underlined] 106 Squadron (F/L Morgan) [/underlined] report the following outstanding exercise:-
Pilot:- F/O Meredith
Air Bomber:- F/O Mitchell.
As the port outer engine had to be feathered before completion of the cross country, bombing was carried out on only three engines. As Gee was thus u/s and as petrol was running short, no wind was found, but the wind velocity found on the last leg of the cross country was used for bombing. This wind velocity was found at 18,000 feet, whereas the bombing was carried out at 14,000 feet owing to having only three engines. Thus a fairly large vector error of 214 yards (Converted to 20,000 feet) resulted, but the bomb aimer’s error was only 16 yards at 14,000 feet, which is an error of 19 yards when converted to 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
Bombing Leaders in 54 Base are:-
83 Squadron – F/L Bedell
97 Squadron – F/L Rogers, D.F.C.
627 Squadron – F/L Mitchell
[Underlined] F/L Harris, D.F.C. [/underlined] has arrived from H.Q. 6 Group to take over Bombing Leader duties at No. 5 L.F.S. Syerston.
[Underlined] F/L Honnibal [/underlined] (ex 92 Group) has succeeded F/L Keats as Bombing Leader to 57 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/L Keats [/underlined] (57 Squadron) has moved to H Q 92 Group.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Clegg (44 Squadron), F/S. Booth (619 Squadron) and F/O Linnett (207 Squadron) obtained “B” Categories on No. 84 Course and F/O Nugent (61 Squadron) obtained “B” Category on No. 85 Course.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
The month of June was notorious for bad weather, numerous operations and stand-by’s. Hence the competition entries were fewer in number than of late. It has been decided to include the Conversion Units in the Competition under the same rules as for the Squadrons. It is realised, however, that they have an advantage over Squadrons in so far as they have considerably more qualifying entries from which to make selection. However it is hoped that squadrons will make determined efforts to beat the Conversion Units in July. Out [sic] congratulations are extended to 51 Base for their high standard, and their commanding positions in this, their first entry!!
PILOT AND AIR BOMBER’S ERROR AT 20,000 FEET
1st 1654 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd 619 Squadron – 62 yards
3rd 1660 C.U. – 68 yards
4th 1661 C.U. – 69 yards
5th 44 Squadron – 70 yards
6th 467 Squadron – 78 yards
7th 5 L.F.S. – 83 yards
8th 49 Squadron – 85 yards
9th 83 Squadron – 90 yards
10th 9 Squadron – 92 yards
11th (630 Squadron- 96 yards
(106 Squadron 96 yards
13th 463 Squadron- 107 yards
14th 97 Squadron – 109 yards
15th 207 Squadron – 116 yards
16th 57 Squadron – 124 yards
Non-qualifying Squadrons:-
17th 50 Squadron (6 exercises)- 106 yards
18th 61 Squadron (3 exercises)- 91 yards
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C. – 52 Base – 76 yards
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
G/Capt Johnson, D.F.C., A.F.C. – 88 yards
(R.A.F. Station, Syerston)
[Underlined] ? ? AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ ? ? [/underlined]
1. What can cause an apparent Vector error in practice bombing?
2. List the possible causes of Large Random Errors.
3. What errors in practice bombing will be caused by low suction?
4. If you set the wrong T. V. what kind of error will you get?
[Underlined] MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT – DO’S AND DON’T’S [/underlined]
DO:- (i) set Bomb T.V. (the TV’s of all bombs likely to be dropped should be recorded on the levelling card on the top right-hand corner of the computor).
(ii) Set Target height against Q.F.E. ([underlined] SEA LEVEL PRESSURE [/underlined]).
(iii) Set [underlined] INDICATED [/underlined] Wind Speed because Bombsight Computor works on Indicated Air Speed and indicated height (indicated wind can be found from true wind by SUBTRACTING 1.5% per 1000 ft of height).
(iv) Synchronise bombsight compass with Pilot’s D.R. repeater (by pressing in and turning the synchronising knob on the side of the Computor box.)
(v) Check that sufficient suction is reaching the bombsight gyros.
(vi) Remember to turn on air supply to the bombsight by means of the Bombsight Cock.
(vii) Be sure that the Pilot puts main control cock of “George” to OUT when Bombsight is to be used, or no compressed air will be available.
(viii) Keep the bombsight clean and check all the loads are correctly attached.
(ix) Liaise with the Instrument Section who maintenance [sic] your bombsight.
DON’T (i) Use the Emergency Computor until you have checked the bombsight and tried to correct the fault.
(ii)Touch the reflector glass of the Sighting Head when the gyro is running (the gyro is always running when the engines are running).
(iii) Forget to adjust the levelling scales for the all-up weight. (The Flight Engineer will know the A.U.W.).
(iv) Put any pressure on the reflector glass – even the edge of a map may lead to the toppling of the gyro when the engines are running.
(v) Let anything, not even your oxygen mask, press on the Sighting Head. (The upper part is supported on anti-vibration mountings which prevent the bearings of the gyro being damaged – the least pressure can make the alignment inaccurate).
(vi) Stow parachute, window, etc. near any of the leads to the Computor Box or Sighting Head.
(vii) Forget to liaise with the bombsight maintenance staff.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS (Continued from back page) [/underlined]
were daylight attacks) with varying degrees of success. Notable among these attacks were the operations in daylight against WATTEN and SIRACOURT on the 19th and 25th respectively. In both cases direct hits are claimed on the launching ramps involving damage which, it is hoped, will put them out of -commission at least temporarily.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
No long range sorties have been carried out during the month; in fact almost all the targets have been in Gee range. No Navigational difficulties therefore have been experienced. Broadcast winds have not been attempted during the month because of shallow penetration.
One major navigational “boob” was, however made during the month by a Navigator of No. 106 Squadron. The aircraft was detailed to attack a Ruhr target, and reached the enemy coast on track and on time. The Navigator then gave the next course to the pilot who in error steered 100° different from that given him. The Navigator was at fault in not checking the course with the pilot. The aircraft continued on the wrong course for six minutes until a Gee fix was obtained. The sortie was eventually abandoned because of the time element. This is another example of what can happen if you do not carry out the correct drills. Immediately the pilot says “on course” make it your first duty to check the true course steered.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
During the month an analysis of errors which may arise in windfinding has produced the following probable error:-
Probable Error
(i) Inability to read A.P.I. to nearest half minute of Lat. and Long. 1 mile
(ii) Inability to plot a position in Lat. and Long. accurately (e.g. Air Position and Gee fix) 1/2 mile (at least)
(iii) Inherent error in H2S fixes of at least half a mile. 1/2 mile
(iv) Inability to plot an H2S fix to within 1/2 mile because of mile scale limitations on chart 1/2 mile
(v) Probable error in synchronising of D.R. compass repeaters when airborne. 1 mile
(vi) Error in Compass swing of at least 1°. 1 mile
(vii) Probable error in measuring off length of wind vector, because of mile scale limitations, on chart. 1/2 mile
[Underlined] Total [/underlined] 5
Therefore if a wind was found over a period of 15 minutes it would be possible to obtain an error of 20 m.p.h!! Fortunately, of course, some of the errors will cancel out, but even then there will always be a residue which, multiplied by four, may still give a large error.
It will be noticed that careless errors in taking of Gee and H2S fixes, reading off A.P.I. co-ordinates, incorrect plotting etc. have not been mentioned.
The problem now is, how can we eliminate the above errors. Action has already been taken to eliminate points (iv) and (vii). Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are urged to discuss the above list with all Navigators on the Squadron, and submit any suggestions to Group Headquarters immediately.
Don’t be afraid to give us all your suggestions. Remember, the more accurate w/v’s we obtain, the more accurate the bombing, concentration and timing.
Referring back to careless errors, by far the largest of these are plotting and computing errors. A list of exercises to improve plotting and computation was forwarded to each S.N.O. some weeks ago. It is the responsibility of each S.N.O. to see that these exercises are completed at regular intervals. Short computation tests, lasting 15 – 20 minutes should be completed every morning if this is possible. There is always a spare half hour between assembly at the flights and commencing N.F.T’s. The plotting tests should be carried out at least once every fortnight, particular stress being laid on wind finding. Make it a point always that the tests are analysed immediately after completion, and the results made known as soon as possible.
Many Squadrons have adopted the above procedure, and are being well repaid. There are still one or two Squadron Navigation Officers, however, who say they are too busy to do such things. Don’t let this be your excuse – try it conscientiously and well for the next fortnight, and note the improvement in the work of your Navigator.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
All Navigators will now be conversant with the resetting modification fitted during the past months. It is hoped that maximum use is being made of this device, which should considerably simplify resetting.
Yet another modification to simplify resetting has been suggested by the Navigation Staff at Syerston. It is the fitting of a “winder handle” to the resetting knob. Only one handle need be used when resetting and, much more important, the time taken to reset will be reduced by at least 2/3rds. The above modification has been submitted to Bomber Command for approval, and as soon as this is obtained, all aircraft will be modified.
Several Squadrons have been persevering with the graphical resetting procedure, but this has not proved very successful. When the modification suggested by Syerston has been fitted to all aircraft, all objections against resetting regularly will have been overcome, and it will be possible to adopt the standard procedure of resetting the A.P.I. regularly.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
During the summer months it is hoped we may further the Navigation technique to such an extent that Navigation will be considerably simplified during the winter period. We must aim for simplification and standardisation in use of A.P.I., H2S and log and chart keeping. This will be of considerable benefit to the Conversion Units. At the present time a Navigator is taught one method at the Conversion Unit and another on the Squadron – consequently he is proficient at neither. Ideas are being collected from Squadrons and it is hoped to present to Squadrons and Conversion Units the ideal Navigation technique. Let us have your suggestions.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The results of the drive on practice bombing and wind finding have, on the whole, been satisfactory – but in certain cases they have been disappointing. The Conversion Unit Navigators have surpassed many operational Navigators. A vector error of less than 5 m.p.h. should be your aim.
Improvements have been made during the last 7 or 8 weeks, and the average vector error produced this month is 7 3/4 m.p.h. – a commendable effort on the whole but there is still room for improvement.
It was stated in last month’s News that a monthly Bombing Wind Finding Competition would be held. It was the intention to publish the best eight vector errors for the month, but so far there have been 14 instances where NIL vector error was obtained and a further 14 instances of vector errors of 2 m.p.h. and below! It has therefore been decided to issue the AVERAGE vector error obtained by each Squadron and Conversion Unit for the month. The order is as follows:-
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron]
[Underlined] Average Error: [/underlined] Squadrons – 7 m.p.h.
Con. Units – 8 m.p.h.
It will be noted that only one Squadron has achieved the ideal, i.e. a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Day, D.F.C. Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to Ops.II H.Q. 5 Group.
S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C. S.N.O. Dunholme to Base Nav. Officer, Scampton.
F/Lt. Bray, D.F.C. 207 Sqdn. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, D.F.M. 44 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Craven 50 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. R. Adams, D.F.C. 630 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Lascelles, D.F.C. 1654 C.U. Navigation Leader to be Squadron Nav. Officer No. 50 Squadron.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] A RECORD MONTH [/underlined]
The month of June produced two new records when a total of 3000 sorties was flown, resulting in 11,708 tons of bombs dropped on enemy territory, an increase of 3,000 tons over our previous record in May. All armament personnel can be justifiably proud of their contribution, particularly as this phenomenal tonnage represents only a fraction of the tonnage actually handled during the month.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL BOMBING GEAR [/underlined]
One drop of water in the wrong place may result in several thousands of pounds of high explosive failing to reach the target – a startling yet true statement. Bad weather has necessitated leaving aircraft bombed up for several consecutive days, and as no aircraft can be guaranteed waterproof, it is quite possible that some of our recent “summer weather” has seeped into the bombing circuit.
All Armament Officers are reminded if the correct procedure to be carried out when aircraft are left bombed up after the cancellation of operations, and a quick reference to Air Staff Instructions would not be amiss at this stage. Are your electrical circuits tested each day, and do you always remove pyrotechnics from the aircraft immediately after the cancellation? Check up on these and all other relevant points, and ensure that the [underlined] full [/underlined] load reaches its destination, and not just a small fraction of it.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN [/underlined]
The Bomber Command Armament Bulletin for June has now arrived and contains some very interesting and useful information, particularly the suggestions made for improving the condition of bomb dumps in general. Page 9 of the Bulletin refers to the difficulties encountered in the storage of cluster projectiles and introduces a new type of tracking which is intended form a temporary hard standing in bomb dumps which have no suitable storage space for this particular weapon. Supplies of this Summerville tracking have already arrived at some stations in the Group and although it is, as yet, too early to express an opinion as to the efficiency of this equipment, it is considered that it will prove to be a very great asset.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Types and Squadron]
A= MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
[Underlined] GUN FREEZING [/underlined]
Although the immediate danger of gun failures due to freezing has now passed, the problem of preventing such failures is still being very carefully investigated, and to assist in this investigation samples of hydraulic fluids have been taken from gun turret systems of operational aircraft for analysis by the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
A [indecipherable] of water in suspension in hydraulic fluid is sufficient to cause the oil to freeze at a considerably higher temperature, and consequently the importance of ensuring that oil containers used to fill gun turret systems are free from water, cannot be too strongly stressed. Results of this analysis will be forwarded to all Bases and Stations when received. We hope that they will be negative.
[Underlined] AMMUNITION [/underlined]
The repeated changing of ammunition from night to daylight sequence results in all ammunition bolts being handled several times a week. If ammunition is transported in suitable containers and handled carefully when being loaded into the aircraft, no misalignment should occur.
The necessity for ensuring that only correctly aligned ammunition is loaded into gun turrets should be brought to the attention of all armourers and air gunners.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The emphasis during the past month has been on wind finding for practice bombing, and we are pleased to say that Navigators on the Training Base have risen to the occasion and produced excellent results. The most notable performances have come from Winthorpe, where seven Navigators obtained a Nil vector error. This drive on wind finding has created a desire to find equally correct winds during Navigational exercises. The result has been a big improvement in track keeping and timing.
From time to time improvements on the A.P.I. are suggested. The latest suggestion comes from F/O Richardson of No.5 L.F.S., who has suggested a modification to facilitate re-setting. This modification, if adopted, will reduce the time taken to reset the A.P.I. by at least 2/3rds. Good work Syerston!
H2S training is getting into its stride at Wigsley, and 1/3rd of each course is now being trained. Only one trainer is available at Wigsley at the moment, but as soon as the second trainer arrives it is the intention to train 50% of all crews. Winthorpe and Swinderby Conversion Units are already training half their inputs. Pupils are receiving approximately 14 hours air training, and at least 20 hours ground training. When more aircraft are available it will be the policy to train more crews rather than increase the number of flying hours per pupil.
Bullseye exercises have been seriously interrupted by bad weather, but 10 and 12 Groups have co-operated to the maximum extent on every possible occasion, and several good exercises have been completed.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “OVER KEENNESS” [/underlined]
A Navigator on a cross country flight who was endeavouring to work the Swinderby system of obtaining six minute fixes and winds, experienced Gee failure. He immediately instructed his W/Operator to obtain a M/F fix every six minutes. The W/Op. found the ether rather congested, so he attempted priority fixes – much to the concern of the M/F Section, R.O.C, 5 Group and No. 51 Base!
Public Relations
Public Relations work during June has been rather confused owing to the altered nature of the Command’s operations, and the uncertainty of many circumstances. Only a few reports were issued to the press at any length by the Air Ministry News Service.
Three war correspondents have flown in Group aircraft on operations: Mr. Ronald Walker, of the “News Chronicle” who went over Caen with S/Ldr. Fairburn of 57 Squadron on June 12/13; Mr. R.J. Kiek, of the Netherlands Press Agency, who flew over a French target with his countryman, F/O Overgaadu of No. 207 Squadron, on June 16/17; and Mr. Kent Stephenson, B.B.C. War Reporter, who unfortunately failed to return with W/Cdr. Crocker of No. 49 Squadron on June 21/22.
(Continued in Column 2)
(Continued from Column 3)
Three parties came to our stations: June 1st, Dunholme, Mrs. Billingham (Reuters), Miss Tredgold (South African Argus) and Mr. Fletcher (Sport and General Press Agency Photographer) for the visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: June 17th, Waddington, Mr. W. Farmer, of the “Melbourne Herald”; and June 22nd, Waddington, Mr. Wilkins and Miss Elizabeth Riddell (journalists) and Mr. J. Warburton (Sport and General photographer), for the visit of the Duke of Gloucester.
A party of employees of the Firma Chrome Plating Co., of Sheffield, visited the Sheffield Squadron (No.49) on June 3rd.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
June was quite a fair month from the aircraft signals point of view, but improvement can and must be made. It is hoped every endeavour will be made by Signals Leaders to raise the standard of Aircrew Signals operating to a high state of efficiency.
Have all Signals Leaders read and digested 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13, and acquainted all their operators with its contents?
This instruction lays down the requirements for W/T Control Operators. Endeavour should be made to bring every Operator up to the standard required. Two Squadrons have already carried out air tests with quite satisfactory results. One important point – once an operator reaches the standard required, he must, by constant practice maintain that standard, and to ensure that he does, he may be required to do an air test with Group at any time, without previous warning.
[Underlined] DAILY INSPECTIONS. [/underlined]
Signals Leaders, do you ever take a quick run out to your aircraft and check over the “Daily” done by your W/Ops?
An aircraft of this Group took off on Ops one night, was only airborne a short time when the intercom. failed. Cause – faulty 2v 20 Acc! The W/Op did not carry out the correct drill for the use of emergency intercom. as laid down in 5 Group Aircraft Drill No.11, Appendix “A”. Result – one early return and one load of bombs the Hun did not receive. Was this the only dud 2v 20 Acc. airborne that night? Or was he the unfortunate W/Op. who, through his lack of knowledge or carelessness in carrying out his emergency drill, was found out? We wonder!! It would be worthwhile checking up on these accs. in the aircraft. Yes, there was a lot of truth in the film “BOOMERANG” !
The new Wireless Operators (Air) log has now gone to the printing press and should be available for issue very soon. We hope to see some very neat and fully detailed logs returned, just to show your appreciation.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
This month’s Good Show comes from 57 Squadron, by an operator who showed coolness and initiative in fixing up his broken dinghy aerial (fixed) and operating his dinghy radio, thus enabling the rescue aircraft to “home” on his signal.
The aerial mast was broken while erecting, and the operator fixed his aerial lead into the aerial part while other members of the crew took turns at holding the aerial aloft, by the insulated part which separates the aerial from mast.
This is an excellent example of cool and intelligent thinking under very difficult circumstances.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The co-operation of W/Op. and Gunner reporting on unserviceability of Early Warning Devices is improving, but there are still the few cases of discrepancy appearing in these E.W.D. reports and Combat reports. Just a little more drive in this direction will eradicate this, so Signals Leaders and Radar Interrogators, do your stuff.
Manipulation failures are still occurring, mostly due to lack of experience, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. Efforts are being made for every Squadron to have one Early Warning Device Instructor, and quite a few Squadrons have them already. Signals Leaders, get your W/Ops over to them for that little extra instruction which means all the difference between failure and serviceability of your E.W.D. and sends your Squadron percentage of serviceability soaring.
The cards, depicting combats on Monica, sent from this Group to Headquarters Bomber Command, are now in the process of being reproduced and will soon be available for issue to Squadrons and Conversion Units.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The alteration to the time of the Group W/T exercise has met with universal approval from all Squadrons, and there has been some good operating. The reallocation of Squadrons to Sections 1 and 2 should also help to make the exercise more interesting by eliminating the possibility of any two transmitters “blotting out” each other due to their close proximity.
[Underlined] VALETE ET SALVETE [/underlined]
Our heartiest congratulations to W/Cdr. Skinner on his promotion and his appointment as Officer Commanding No. 14 Radio School. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
Our congratulations also go to S/Ldr. Andrews on his appointment as Signals Leader, 92 Group.
Five Group are poorer by two very popular officers.
44 Squadron will welcome F/O Hughes (a former 44 Sqdn. W/Op) as Signals Leader.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failures percentage against total operational sorties has shown a great decrease during the month. There were 27 failures reported out of 3,000 sorties – the percentage being 0.9, the lowest figure for many months. The maintenance personnel are to be commended for repeating last month’s record of zero maintenance failures. Out of this enormous number of sorties, only two aircraft returned early as a result of signals defects. The number of component failures (equipment) was 14. Surprisingly enough, not one condenser or resistor defect was reported; R. 1155 output valves again proved troublesome.
[Underlined] V.H.F. FITTING [/underlined]
At the time of going to press, 200 aircraft are fitted with V.H.F. equipment. The speed of fitting has placed us well ahead of schedule. Units are reporting that they are receiving a considerable number of crystals which on test have been found inactive. R.A.E., Farnborough, have evolved a modification (R.T.I.M. No.629) employing a choke unit type 45, which, in A. D. G. B. aircraft has proved quite successful. When the choke units become available, units will be notified.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
There are two main reasons why the total number of Mandrel fitted aircraft in this Group has fallen. They are (a) supplies of Col.9 not forthcoming, and (b) large scale V.H.F. fitting drive, which has absorbed all available Signals manpower in the squadrons. It is emphasised, however, that squadrons must ensure that all their complete Mandrels are fitted as soon as possible. The Countermeasure Party is still available at Group Headquarters in readiness to offer assistance.
[Underlined] CARPET II [/underlined]
Contrary to many beliefs, Carpet II is in no way connected with Persian Markets. It is, however, a new radio countermeasure device fitted to the Illuminating Force aircraft of this Group. It is quite popular with the C.S.O!
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Base Signals and Radar Officers attended a conference at Group Headquarters on 16th June, to discuss the Bomber Command proposed establishment of Radar personnel. After considerable discussion and divergence of opinion the proposals were accepted. Some alterations were suggested in connection with accommodation and holdings of spare equipment, and these were forwarded to Bomber Command. It is understood that the proposals are now being considered by the Establishment Branch at Bomber Command.
[Underlined] BOOZER [/underlined]
Sufficient Boozer equipment became available during the month to enable fitting to proceed in our two Boozer squadrons. As this equipment is in very short supply, every effort must be made to make immediate use of all that is available. Test equipment is at the moment, difficult to obtain, but a proposed re-distribution of the total Command holdings should ease this situation.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
It has become increasingly obvious from scrutiny of combat reports that Tail Warning Devices are not being watched continuously by the Wireless Operator. Originally it had been hoped that with training and experience a W/Op would be able to carry out his W/T work whilst, at the same time keeping one eye on the Tail Warning Device, but this has been found to be very difficult. The possibility of repositioning the Tail Warning Indicator so that two of the crew can watch it, has been thoroughly investigated, and found impracticable. Experiments have been made to ascertain the possibility of using a second indicator. This repeater indicator is located adjacent to the Gee indicator. An indicator standard for both Monica IIIA and V, has been designed and tested by the Group Trouble Shooting Party. It has proved quite satisfactory and Bomber Command have been asked to arrange for its early introduction. The design of a simple Fishpond repeater indicator proved too great a problem, and it is now expected that a second standard Fishpond indicator will be the only answer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee was once again the leader in serviceability, showing a new high percentage of 97.77 out of 2,639 sorties. This was obtained in spite of the decrease in new equipment available, and a consequent reduction in the spare sets which squadrons were able to hold.
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 7
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SIGNALS (CONT.)
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 1249 sorties was completed by aircraft equipped with H 2 S Mark II, and of these 103 experienced difficulty; the remaining 91.76% were serviceable throughout the sorties. The fitting of this equipment to 619 Squadron has not yet been completed, but it is proceeding as fast as circumstances will allow. The movement of the Bomber Command Fitting Party to Dunholme will ease considerably the strain of fitting now being carried out by squadron personnel. The supply of fitted aircraft is keeping pace with the number of trained crews.
Mark III H 2 S has shown a decided improvement and the 76 sorties completed resulted in a serviceability of 92.11%. Supply of this equipment is still very grim, but does show signs of improving.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
As is to be expected, this equipment followed in step with H2 S, 92.72% of the 1236 sorties being free of difficulty. Training has shown very decided improvement and the operational reports indicate that W/Ops. are having increased success with this equipment.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA remained at almost the same level as May. 830 sorties were completed, and there were 39 difficulties reported. The remaining 95.31% gave completely satisfactory results. Monica V came closer than ever to overtaking its predecessor with a percentage serviceability of 93.91. The more prevalent causes of unserviceability have been almost eliminated, and the lesser difficulties will no doubt diminish as further experience is gained by Radar personnel. The supply position of both types of Monica becomes increasingly difficult, so squadrons must do their utmost to conserve their existing equipment, and to keep all sets serviceable. The delivery of a Monica Trainer to the Aircrew School at Scampton should help squadrons considerably in their training programme.
The serviceability figures for the month are very gratifying. They indicate a decided increase in the standard of training and workmanship of Radar personnel. In these days of intensive operations, it requires hard work to keep all our equipment serviceable, but the bombing results are more than worth the effort. With the introduction of the proposed establishment, and an adequate number of Radar vans, we should be able to meet the rain and altitude trials of winter on better than equal terms.
[Underlined] TELEPHONE EXCHANGES [/underlined]
Last month’s issue of the News contained a cartoon for which we, in Signals, accept no responsibility. We are delighted, however, to be given the opportunity to refute the allegation of inefficiency which was inferred by publishing the following bouquet.
Skellingthorpe has produced some surprising figures showing the number of calls handled by the Admin PBK during a 24-hour non-operational period. A total of 3,725 calls was handled during this period, and of these 3,143 were extensions – to – extension calls. The Station Commander comments – “My opinion of our operators, always high, has gone up still further”, and – “at Skellingthorpe we have an exchange staff second to none”. We hope that this latter remark will be accepted as a challenge by other exchanges within the Group.
[Underlined] TELEPRINTER TRAFFIC [/underlined]
In April of this year, this Headquarters Signals Office was handling about 9,000 teleprinter messages per week. A drive was then inaugurated to divert traffic to less congested channels, such as D.R.L.S., and our weekly total fell in five weeks by 4,000 messages!
Now that “D” Day has passed, however, the total is commencing to rise. This must be checked, since as the Western Front develops, our commitments increase – It’s often quicker by postagram – at any rate for Admin messages.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] LANCASTER SPARES [/underlined]
This month sees a changeover in our method of demanding spares for Lancasters. Instead of demanding straight on to the M.P.O. demands are now placed on No.207 M.U. who are in a position to supply.
Equipment Officers will help No. 207 M.U. provisioning to a great extent by keeping a close watch upon demands for Lancaster spares, and ensuring that demands are going to No.207 M.U. and not to the M.F.O.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS [/underlined]
A point to watch is the serviceability of mechanical sweepers. If these machines go u/s it means that runways cannot be kept clear of flints and stones, which means a rise in consumption of tyres. The aircraft tyre situation is still acute, and every care must be taken to get the maximum amount of life out of every tyre.
Equipment officers should therefore look into the holdings of spares for mechanical sweepers, and in conjunction with the M.T. Officers provision wisely on those parts which have a habit of going u/s. This will keep the sweepers serviceable and the consumption of tyres down.
[Underlined] WINTER CLOTHING [/underlined]
Now the English summer is upon us it would be wise to overhaul items of winter clothing such as overcoats, waterproof overalls, leather jerkins etc., and get them into good trim for the forthcoming winter.
It would be better to do it now instead of waiting for the winter when these items will be in great demand.
[Underlined] BLANKETS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred where it has been found that Stations have been holding blankets far in excess of their entitlement as laid down in A.M.O. A. 700/43. A quick check of stocks may mean the release of many blankets with a subsequent saving of man-hours at the factory which manufactures them.
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT (Continued from column 2) [/underlined]
[Underlined] OXYGEN TRANSPORT CYLINDERS [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters Bomber Command letter BC/S.21459/E.6, dated 30th June, 1944.
The scale of issue of these items is 32 per squadron. Equipment Officers should make every effort to reduce any surplus holdings and return these cylinders to the M.U.
GARDENING
5 Group’s gardening this month amounted to two small but useful operations by No.44 Squadron against two of the Biscay U-Boat lairs, on the nights of 6/7th and 8/9th. Planting was done in H 2 S from high altitude and some excellent P. P. I. photographs were obtained. A total of 30 vegetables was planted.
Although the record breaking figures of April and May were not reached, the Command planted the considerable total of 1772 vegetables, in some 20 gardens. Over 1,000 were directed against the U-Boats – off their bases and in their approach routes to the Western end of the English Channel. This, combined with vigorous and successful action by air and surface striking forces has brought almost to nothing the threat to our Invasion supply lines, in spite of the massing of the U-Boats to the West of the Channel in the first few days. Nearly 600 vegetables were laid in the Channel itself, to impede enemy surface craft – principally E-Boats – in their anti-invasion operations. (Here, we gratefully admit, we were helped more than a little by the wholesale slaughter of these vermin in their harbours by the bombers). Certain North Sea gardens received some 150 vegetables, and Mosquitos of 8 Group planted a small number in the Kettegat.
During the three months preceding “D” Day well over 7,000 vegetables were planted by the Command, 5 Group being responsible for 908. These figures show that in actual quantity we distributed about one eighth of the Command total. What they do not show is that nearly all our operations were special ones, involving either exceptionally long distances (DANZIG); exceptional accuracy from very low level (KONIGSBURG CANAL); exceptional weight of attack in one night (KEIL BAY) or gardening in daylight (KATTEGAT). We do little routine gardening, and so do not get regular practice, but our recent successes show the value of keeping up to date in slack periods.
Results are beginning to come through, but details of casualties still refer to at latest three months ago; in fact, in the latest list we discover that 5 Group sank a U-Boat in April [underlined] 1943! [/underlined] Fortunately some reports get through more quickly than that, and news of the tremendous indirect effects of the pre-invasion gardening is plentiful. We hear of the route from TRELLEBORG to KIEL (150 miles) being marked with a [underlined] WRECK [/underlined] buoy every 1 – 2 miles; of Swedes and Finns laying up their ships rather than risk out mines, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare states that the mining of the Kiel Canal, backed up by the mining which preceded and followed it in the Baltic and North Sea approaches to the Canal, caused an [underlined] IRRECOVERABLE [/underlined] loss of 3 million tons of overall imports/exports to the German War Machine.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
June brought a record number of operational sorties and, at the same time, an increase in the known number of incidents involving Safety Drills.
A squadron aircraft disappeared over the Irish Sea on a navigational exercise with the loss of the entire crew. Four crews had occasion to use the Parachute Drill, two were successful; in the third, four members who baled out were lost in the sea; in the fourth the rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute, and a gallant attempt by the Air Bomber to share his own parachute was un successful.
[Underlined] 9/10th June. [/underlined] S/44 Squadron returning from operations, got out of control in bad weather. Its position was uncertain, and the captain ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Four members had jumped when the pilot regained control. They fell into the Thames Estuary and were drowned. The aircraft landed at base. None of those lost attached their K-type dinghies before jumping. [Underlined] MORAL [/underlined] – If in doubt about your position always take your dinghy with you.
[Underlined] 21/22nd June. [/underlined] Z/44 Squadron was hit in the starboard elevator from extreme range by a night fighter over enemy territory. The aircraft dived sharply with the elevators jammed, and when over the vertical the pilot considered he had no hope of recovery and ordered the crew to abandon. The Air Bomber was jammed against the rear of his compartment. The Rear Gunner was caught in his turret and trapped by piles of ammunition on his lap, caused by a runaway servo feed. Four members baled out and their parachutes were seen to open. The captain eventually regained control and flew the aircraft back to base, navigated by the Air Bomber.
S/630 Squadron was badly shot up by a fighter. Wings and fuselage were riddled, and the rear turret so badly damaged it was a wonder the gunner escaped injury. The rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute.
With the assistance of two crew members, the pilot flew the aircraft back to this country where, due to damage, he found he could not turn and so was forced to bale out his crew.
At the risk of grave personal injury, the Air Bomber allowed the Rear Gunner to attach his parachute clips to the “K” Dinghy ”D” rings of his (the Air Bomber’s) harness, and the two went out together. Unfortunately, his “D” rings tore through the webbing when the parachute opened and the Gunner was lost.
[Underlined] SUCCESSFUL DITCHING [/underlined]
A/57 Squadron on the same night was returning across the North Sea at 7000 feet when all engines failed, apparently through shortage of fuel. The Captain immediately warned his crew, and ordered the Wireless Operator to transmit S.O.S. The Wireless Operator switched I.F.F. to “Distress” and transmitted “S.O.S.” and the aircraft callsign about ten times before being ordered to his ditching station.
The aircraft ditched ten minutes later. The pilot made use of his landing light which helped him to judge his height, but having no power the aircraft struck the water very severely breaking off the tail. The Captain’s harness had not been tightened sufficiently and he was flung upwards, making a large hole in the perspex and cutting his face deeply. The pilot left the aircraft by means of this self-made hole. The Flight Engineer was also flung upwards and cut his nose on the fuselage roof. The gunners were flung over the flapjack but were uninjured, falling on top of the Air Bomber who was also unhurt, and the Navigator cut the back of his head.
Exit was made from the aircraft “except-
(continued on page10, col.3)
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Place Dinghy Drill Parachute Drill [/underlined]
1 52 Base 52 Base
2 53 Base 55 Base
3 55 Base 53 Base
[Table of Drill Results by Squadron]
No crews in No. 54 Base were tested during the month.
[Underlined] Points arising from Safety Drill Tests. [/underlined]
(a) A number of crews have not thoroughly read “5 Group Aircraft Drills”.
(b) Insufficient use of made of the intercom in practicing “Safety Drills” – the more use that is made of the intercom the more informed and less worried the crew will be.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined]
The monthly summary of Ditchings in Home Waters for May, 1944, shows that 508 airmen were concerned, of whom 242 (47.2%) were saved – a marked percentage increase in lives saved.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
An aircraft of No. 207 Squadron, flown by F/O Smart, collided over the target with another Lancaster which broke cloud above on the port quarter. In spite of the fact that the entire port fin and rudder were torn away and the port tail plane, elevator and aileron badly damaged, F/O Smart completed the bombing run and showing great skill, flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
By his prompt action, F/O Sanders of No. 463 Squadron averted what could have been a serious accident. He was taking off with full bomb load when the starboard tyre burst at a speed of approximately 90 m.p.h. Displaying great skill, he controlled the swing and made a successful take off, and after completing the sortie landed his aircraft in such a way that only minor damage was sustained.
P/O. Meggeson of No. 83 Squadron showed a fine example of airmanship. The port inner of his aircraft caught fire. Though he was unable to operate the fire extinguisher or feather the propeller, by maintaining a very low airspeed, he succeeded in controlling the fire and few his aircraft back to base, where he made a successful landing.
As a result of combat with an enemy fighter, and aircraft of No. 61 Squadron, piloted by P/O Passant, was severely damaged. The starboard fin and rudder were shot away, the fuselage and starboard main plane badly damaged, and the starboard tyre burst. P/O Passant displayed great skill and determination in flying the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
Whilst making a night approach in 7 miles visibility, and aircraft struck a tree 1000 yards from the end of the runway. When the aircraft eventually landed the Pilot stated he had had a successful trip but that the aircraft felt very heavy to handle. This was not surprising as he was still carrying full bomb load when he landed.
Whilst flying at 8000 feet, all four engines of a Stirling cut. The aircraft lost height to 600 feet before the engines were re-started. The First Engineer was changing tanks when the engines cut. They started again when the Second Engineer turned the petrol on!
In broad daylight, after a clear straight run of 200 yards, a pilot taxied his aircraft into an M.T. vehicle standing on the perimeter track.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 9
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ENGINEERING
The number of sorties carried out totalled exactly 3,000; this constitutes an excellent effort when it is considered that this number of sorties affected serviceability very little and a much larger number could have been laid on had the weather permitted and circumstances required them.
A large number of acceptance checks had to be carried out during the month and some excellent work was carried out by the Group Servicing Section, and the very fine spirit which exists within the Group was made evident by bases which had few acceptance checks to carry out volunteering to accept aircraft for check from other bases. This greatly decreased the period which would normally have elapsed to bring this large number of Lancasters to operational standard.
1.003% of aircraft which either failed to take off or returned early were due to technical faults for which the Engineering Branch is responsible. This 1.003% includes defects beyond our immediate control and remedial modification action is being taken in respect of many of the defects. It is good to know that not one of these aircraft failed due to a maintenance defect, and squadrons are to be congratulated on this aspect. The following squadrons had no early returns or cancellations due to Engineering defects during June, and are awarded a “big hand”:-
44, 83, 97, 467 and 619 Squadrons.
Failures are still occurring of the now famous oil pipe from relief valve to dual drive, and it is hoped that all promises made during June will reach fruition during July.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The effort which is put in by maintenance personnel to maintain this high standard of aircraft serviceability has been increased on many stations to maintain a similar high standard of serviceability of ground equipment. It is pleasing to see the drive which is progressing to maintain these essential aids to serviceability. When a “set-up” looks efficient, it invariably is efficient. Nothing looks so inefficient as a dirty hangar with trestles, wheels, cowlings and any odd items lying around the floor in pools of oil, whilst engine platforms are oil saturated and the equipment generally filthy. This state of affairs does not exist at any station in this Group, but there is considerable room for improvement on certain stations. Once a high standard of efficiency has been achieved it can easily be maintained, but don’t sit back and maintain your present standard unless it is highly efficient.
Many grand jobs have been carried out during June to keep the serviceability high and it is very difficult to pick out any single base in this News.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
During the past month a drive was made to improve the maintenance of the Mark XIV Bombsight. Results have shown a marked improvement, but we will not be satisfied until every sight in the Group can be guaranteed accurate. Much more care must be taken in the levelling and lining up, as it is in these operations that most of the errors occur. The Mark XIV Bombsight is one of those instruments which requires plenty of liaison between Electrical officers and the Air Bombers’ Union, and it has been noted that this is now very effective.
Electrical sections deserve a pat on the back for the very intensive efforts they have put in during the latter half of the month. The list of modifications does not get any shorter, yet initial checks are still being completed in 24 hours.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Stirlings and Lancasters]
Flight Engineers
[Underlined] ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUTANTS [/underlined]
Many more administrative adjutants to the Chief Technical Officer are required; these adjutants will be volunteers from tour expired commissioned Flight Engineers. They will be responsible to the C.T.O. for the efficient administration of the Servicing Wing, and for the discipline and welfare of all the technical personnel on its strength.
Apart from this new post for Flight Engineers, there are also vacancies for administrative duties in the M.T. Section on Base Stations, and the duties will generally be the same as Adjutant to the C.T.O.
It will be seen that these posts have created quite a new avenue for Flight Engineers, but every facility will be given them to improve their engineering knowledge while undertaking administrative duties as their primary roles.
Flight Engineer Leaders must bring those vacancies to the notice of the commissioned Flight Engineers who are about to finish their tour of operations.
[Underlined] NON-COMMISSIONED FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
A course of instruction for newly screened N. C. O. ‘s commenced at St. Athan on 7th June 1944. The object of this course is to train screened Flight Engineers to take up their new duties as Instructors in Heavy Conversion Units and Lancaster Finishing Schools.
Revision and technical subjects are included in the syllabus, but the course is designed mainly to teach the technique of lecturing.
As this course is most important to new instructors, it is hoped that all Flight Engineers will be enthusiastic, for much will depend on their results if the standard of lecturing is to improve in our Conversion Units and Schools.
TRAINING
Despite the bad weather towards the end of the month, 51 Base flew a total of over 8,000 hours and produced 130 crews for Squadrons.
Twice during the month, 1654 Conversion Unit, taking a leaf from the book of 1661 for May, laid on “operational” take offs for aircraft on night exercises. They got 17 and 22 off on these occasions in almost as many minutes.
Re-organisation of the Heavy Conversion Units commenced in the last week of the month to ensure that training of crews under the summer output can be increased to the highest level. Under this new system intakes of 11 every six days will go into the Heavy Conversion Units and the Group target figure for the month is 160 crews.
Each Conversion Unit now consists of 3 large flights, each of which is sub-divided into two. The Stirling Academy has also been split up into three parts, each one becoming the nucleus of a small flight at each Conversion Unit.
The Base had a very much better month from the accident point of view, and tyre bursts are now the only chronic complaint left. Undercarriage pylon failures have been reduced and coring has slipped rapidly out of the Base vocabulary.
New appointments within Base include Wing Commander Derbyshire, D.F.C., as Chief Instructor, 1660 Conversion Unit, and Wing Commander Kingsford Smith as Chief Instructor 1654 Conversion Unit.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 9) [/underlined]
ionally quickly” and all the crew members were in the dinghy almost before they knew it. The kite container was lost in transit, but all other equipment was transferred to the dinghy – a parachute found its way in, but was afterwards lost in the excitement of getting clear of the aircraft which was keeling over and threatening to come down on top of the dinghy.
This crew merely got their feet wet in boarding the dinghy but later got the seats of their pants wet because of a small hole in the dinghy which was subsequently plugged.
The pilot was weak from loss of blood, and shock, so the Air Bomber took charge and bullied the rest of the crew into activity. They say this did the world of good. The aircraft floated for about 10 minutes.
The dinghy mast was broken when being stepped, but the Wireless Operator managed to connect the aerial to the dinghy radio and almost continuous transmissions were made with other crew members holding the mast erect. Some hours later they were spotted by 91 Group Wellingtons which brought in an A.S.R. Hudson. A Lindholme dinghy was dropped, but failed to inflate though the crew managed to collect three of the ration containers. About 14 1/2 hours later a Naval Launch picked up the crew and took them into Yarmouth.
This crew had done a practice dinghy drill on the day before the incident, and attribute much of the success of this ditching to that fact.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 10
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ENEMY AGENTS – CARELESS TALKERS
On the 30th January, 1942, there was published a document of some importance – to wit A.M.C.O. A.9 of that year.
It was important because it cleared the air of a good deal of confusion on the subject of security, and it achieved this by defining the functions of Security Organisation – thereby defining what is meant by the term ‘Security’ – and it laid down the organisation by which these functions were to be performed.
Security was by no means a new subject. Prior to the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, a vast number of thoughts on the subject had already made themselves felt, chiefly in the form of posters. They bore a slogan – “CARELESS TALK COSTS LIVES” – they sought to impress the truth of this slogan by representing pictorially such distressing events as ships being blown up, aircraft being shot down, and so on, all, by implication, the result of the wrong word being spoken at the wrong time in the wrong place. These were reinforced, in lighter vein, by coloured drawings, more or less amusing, of Hitler listening beneath a table at which, presumably, two people were discussing the future plans of the Allies; of Hitler repeated ad infinitum in the pattern of the wall paper; of Hitler looking out of the frames of otherwise harmless pictures: all of them indicative of the ubiquity of Hitler, and of the truth of that apalling [sic] statement “Walls have ears”.
And since the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, these pictorial exhortations to verbal discretion have been emphasised to us, in the R.A.F., by a quantity of printed matter in the form of lectures, bulletins, reports, instructions which, if expressed in terms of tonnage of paper they consumed, or if placed end to end, or on top of each other in one column, would, one feels sure, provide much indigestible food for thought in the shape of one of those totals which impress more by number of their digits than by any meaning they are able to convey to the ordinary mind. Add to this the number of words which must have been spoken in lectures on this subject since the 30th January, 1942, the countless man-hours devoted to the study and promulgation of this gospel of silence, and our total will become more astronomical and, therefore, more meaningless than ever.
Staggering as this total would be, however, it would never reach the dimensions of those our enemies could provide in the same field of endeavour, for the very good reason that they had been at it long before we commenced piling ours up. Japan, for instance, had been preaching the gospel of silence to her people for something like twenty years before Pearl Harbour. She taught it not only to her soldiers, sailors and airmen, but to the man in the factory, the woman in her home, the pedestrian on the street; with the result, as the writings of any of the foreign newspaper correspondents, some of whom had been in the country for years, will tell you, it was next to impossible to find out anything worth knowing about the country’s strength, or her intentions.
And what of Germany? Those Germans who were not born silent, or had not achieved silence by the time Hitler took them over, had silence so thoroughly thrust upon them that they really came to understand how and to know that even the walls of their own homes could grow ears. They were left in no doubt whatever upon the value of silence when it came to discussing either the affairs of the Party or of the Fatherland.
All of which surely points to the conclusion that silence in war-time, or, in other words, Security of Information, must be a matter of very great importance. Of course it is. You know that already. The meanest intelligence, you will point out, can grasp quite easily the simple truth that, if you prevent the enemy from knowing what you are up to, you place him at a serious disadvantage; you render him, so to speak, both deaf and blind, and, therefore, easier to deal with. Any fool knows that.
They [sic] why do people talk? Why do they write home letters full of chatty information about their stations? Why does one feel so certain that, were it possible to tap, at once all the telephone lines in the vicinity of our stations all over the country, one would become possessed of a mass of service information about all sorts of things and people – whither, why and when such a squadron is moving, who have finished their tours, where people are posted to, who didn’t come back last night, who the new C.O. is, and where he comes from, what the weather is like, what are the chances of a scrub tonight, how the R.A.F. is fed, clothed, housed, organised – and so on and so on? Not to be too depressing about it, let it be stated at once that one would probably, even certainly, gain much less information than would have been the case say two years ago; but who would like to bet that there still wouldn’t be plenty to be picked up?
So, why, after all the effort that has been made, all the money that has been spent, the paper that has been used, the words that have been spoken, should this be so? Now here, it is suggested, lies the root of the matter, and if this root can be dug up and examined, the apparently indestructible weed of Service Gossip, a weed which, while harmless, perhaps, nine times out of ten, can, on that tenth time, produce enough poison to be fatal to precious lives and expensive material, can be understood, and to understand any problem is the first step towards solving it.
Let us examine it then. People talk because that is the easiest and most natural way for them to express their thoughts. They talk their thoughts, they think about their daily lives; therefore, they talk about their daily lives. Now apply that formula to the R.A.F. and what do you find? You discover a service filled, for the most part, with very young people, a number of them still in their formative years. They talk their thoughts, they think their lives, their lives are, at the moment, the R.A.F; therefore they talk about the R.A.F. To go on from here; they are young people who have been brought up in countries in which free speech, outside the debateable limits of the law of scandal, is as instinctive as breathing. They have never had occasion to practice this habit of silence - a most difficult habit to acquire – and finally, they serve in a force which has been publicised, photographed and if one may use such a word, glamourised, more than any other organisation ever has before. Flying, as the R.A.F. flies, is a continual source of wonder to the lay mind. This business of lifting tons of explosive material off the earth at one spot, transporting it at phenomenal heights to another spot hundreds of miles away, and there dropping it in spite of such discouragements as flak, fighters, the weather, and so on, is something of a miracle to the civilian, and, naturally enough, he wants to know about it. The youngsters of the R.A.F. are, of course, the horse’s mouth, which is given every encouragement to open itself, and to remain open. And when a W.A.A.F. goes home on leave Mother wants to know what it’s all like – the food, the quarters, the station, what they do there and that gives her mother something to talk about to somebody who will pass it on to somebody else who will…..why go on?
It is, you see, a personal problem. There is no mass-produced solution to it. It is every man and woman for himself, and only he and she can deal with it. How? Well, try this recipe. Try writing home letters in which you never even refer to the Station upon which you work, beyond, of course, the address in the top left hand corner. Apply the same rule when you leave your Station, even when you meet another R.A.F. type. Regard every telephone you use as a menace because it is you who are using it, and finally, when you have finished your work for the day, don’t make conversation out of it in the mess or the canteen. Try these four riles as an act of self-discipline, and never relax, and you will solve all your problem and, what is far more important, you will solve one of the great problems which confront your country. Difficult? Yes, very. Impossible? No. It has been done. There is a station which once had the privilege of guarding part of a great and important secret. It wrote its letters by the thousand, it went to the nearest town, it went on leave. But never a word got out. No less than 12,500 letters from that Station were opened over a period of three weeks, and only two minor indiscretions were discovered in them, both after the great event. If you were a stranger, you couldn’t get very far on that station without being questioned; every rumour heard on or off it was faithfully reported – just in case. The result is history, not only because the event referred to was one of the best kept secrets and, therefore, one of the most successful undertakings of the war, but because it provided proof that, with the problem fully explained to them, the A.C.2. and A.C.W.2. can keep a secret, can keep their mouths shut and their pens discreet, and can do so as a matter of conscience, and as an act of self discipline.
Now if only the civilian could be persuaded not to make the R.A.F. talk……
(Continued from Col. 3 page 12)
(c) I.A.S. within 2 m.p.h. and height within 50 feet.
It’s practice which, makes perfect.
Gunnery is the order of the day for you and your crew again. Keep a banking search going. See that your guns and gunners are in first class condition. Check up on your corkscrew and patter.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
June was not a cricketers’ month; the weather was “flaming [sic] but not in the sense of the old adage. Fielders and batsmen alike quailed before wind and rain. As a cricketers’ month it was grand for Rugger. In spite of the weather, however, several stations got in a full programme.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] – This station managed to complete the amazing total of 25 games. In addition, W.A.A.F. personnel played four games. Any challengers for an inter-station W.A.A.F. game? The Aircrew School represented the Station in five of the games, and themselves played 10 inter-course matches.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] – had five station matches, one of which, with Woodhall, was abandoned after Fiskerton had knocked up 87 for 8. Their other games were as follows:-
V Dunholme at Dunholme – Fiskerton 72 for 7 Dunholme 68 all out
V Fiskerton Village at the Camp – Fiskerton 108 for 6 Village 29 all out
V Bardney at Fiskerton – Fiskerton 62 all out Bardney 22 all out
V Scampton at Scampton – Scampton 120 for 9 Fiskerton 71 all out
In addition to this successful record several inter-section games were played.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] managed five station games, and are now getting into their stride under the captaincy of F/Lt Wardle.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] had three wins, one draw, and one loss from five games. They beat 5 Group H.Q., Welton Home Guard and Scampton, drew away with 5 Group H.Q. and suffered their only defeat at home with Fiskerton. An inter-section knock out is in full swing, with 12 teams competing.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] had an unlucky month, with four postponed matches out of the six arranged. Against Coningsby, Metheringham scored 37 for 1 (Coningsby 179 for 7) before rain stopped play. The only completed game was with R.C.A.F. Digby, who hit 60 for 6 against Metheringham 56 all out.
Inter-section games produced some close results, viz:
Flying Control 55 for 7 V R.A.F.Regt. 50 all out
“B” Flight 60 all out V “A” Flight 36 all out
Servicing Wing Fitters 60 all out V Servicing Wing Riggers 65 all out
“B” Flight 43 for 5 V “A” Flight 39 for 9
In the Base Commander’s Trophy, 106 Sqdn dismissed 617 for 70 runs, but they could not bat and the game was abandoned.
[Underlined] 5 Group H.Q. [/underlined] played five games, four of them being away, since the 5 Group pitch has not yet “settled down”. They produced the following results:
V Dunholme, at Morton. 5 Group 148 for 8 Dunholme 89 for 8 (Draw)
V Dunholme at Dunholme. Dunholme 129 for 6 5 Group 64 all out (Lost)
V Swinderby at Swinderby. Swinderby 88 for 7 5 Group 83 all out (Lost)
V 93 M.U. at Collingham M.U. 77 all out 5 Group 84 for 6 (Won)
V Newark Town at Newark Newark 77 for 8 5 Group 72 for 5 (Lost)
There were two intersection games, in one of which the “Hall” beat the rest by 136 for 8 against 99 for 8.
[Underlined] GROUP CRICKET COMPETITION [/underlined]
Woodhall beat Coningsby in the final of “A” Section, so now Syerston (winners of “B” Section) meet Woodhall in the deciding game for the Trophy. The game will probably be decided on Saturday or Sunday (July 15th or 16th) at Woodhall Spa. Woodhall have taken over the town’s local ground, and with the addition of a score board and sight screens now have one of the finest grounds in the Group. The game will be one of the features of Woodhall’s “Wings for Victory” Week, and given good weather will be a highly successful event between two of the strongest Group teams. It is hoped that the A.O.C. will be able to present the handsome silver bowl to the winning side.
[Underlined] ATHLETIC MEETINGS [/underlined]
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] ran a highly successful Athletic Meeting on Saturday, 3rd June, when favourable weather for once coincided with a stand-down. Fourteen events were contested on an inter-section basis, the trophy being a shield presented by Corporal Ward, Instrument Section. The final placings of the teams were as follows:-
Winners: Navigators – 137 points
Second Pilots – 93 points
Third W/Ops. – 83 points
Fourth Rear Gnrs. – 82 points
Fifth Air Bombers – 78 points
Sixth Engineers – 63 points
Seventh M.U.Gunners – 43 points
Mrs. McKechnie presented the shield to F/Sgt. Croft, who assisted the Navigators by winning the 440, 880 and mile. Another outstanding performance was by F/O Gantschi (Air Bomber) who won the 100, 200, 220 and Long Jump.
[Underlined] 54 BASE INTER-SQUADRON SPORTS MEETING [/underlined] was on Saturday 17th June. 83 Squadron won the Base Commander’s Trophy, scoring 35 points, but 106 Squadron, with 33 points and 617 with 32 points, were good losers. 106 Squadron, feeling fit, provided winners for the 440, 880, mile, 3 miles and Long Jump. F/Sgt. Croft again had a field day, winning the 440, mile, 3 miles, and running second in the 880 yards. There was a big crowd at the games, and enthusiasm ran high. Lord Brownlow, Lord Lieutenant of the County, presented the prizes.
[Underlined] 93 M.U. SPORTS [/underlined] 93 M.U., whose work is so completely bound up with 5 Group, ran a highly successful Field Day on June 24th. Besides the usual athletic events, side shows, boxing and dancing made up an excellent programme. They plan another Gala Day, in aid of the P.O.W. Fund on August Bank Holiday Monday, and any personnel who can reach Swinderby will be sure of an enjoyable day.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Get down to crew Gunnery problems in July. Check your knowledge of the corkscrew, polish up your patter and do all the fighter affiliation you can.
Careful trimming of your aircraft ensures accurate flying. The correct sequence of action is:-
Fly the aircraft straight and level, trim the elevators, trim all load off the rudder and finally trim out any aileron load.
2.5° of skid at 10,000 ft. means an error of 250 yards on the ground. This common bombing error is often unconsciously caused by pilots sitting tense and rigid on the bombing run. Ensure the aircraft is properly trimmed and the [underlined] relax [/underlined] and fly the aircraft naturally and carefully.
If you find it difficult to read the instruments when coned by searchlights, get your navigator to call the airspeed. Make it a standing arrangement with him.
Here are the common faults in night circuits, don’t allow these errors to “creep” in.
(i) Edging in towards the flare path on the down wind leg.
(ii) Not allowing for drift on approach.
(iii) Failing to close the throttles when touching down.
(iv) Going too far across wind before the final turn in.
Should you have to land without flaps, remember to lengthen your downwind leg as the approach will be flatter and therefore longer. Start the final turn in earlier since the turn without flap will be wider, and approach at 125 m.p.h. Touch down as soon as possible and expect a longer landing run, and be prepared to use brake progressively.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Are you brake conscious? Brake efficiency falls off with rise in temperature of – brake shoes and drums. Avoid continual use of brakes, control direction by engine and release brakes as soon as possible to allow heat to go into the air and not up into the tyres. Never apply full brake at once. This induces tyre creep.
If you have to land in a very strong, gusty wind, use only 40° of flap and aim to do a wheel landing. Make a normal approach and when the wheels touch, ease the stick [underlined] slightly [/underlined] forward and keep it steady till the tail sinks on to the ground.
A word on Met; remember that forecast height of cloud base id always height above sea level. Bear this in mind if you are forced to break cloud at a diversion aerodrome, and allow for height of ground.
Have you and your crew an “A” category for bombing? You can have if you accept nothing less than these limitations;
(a) Course within 1° (b) Bank within 2°
(Continued on page 11 Col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
The award of the Silver Model Lancaster to the Unit having the best accident rate for the six months ended June goes to No. 106 Squadron. This squadron had one accident for a total of 6,848 flying hours. Nos. 49 and 57 Squadrons also had one avoidable accident, for a total of 6,743 and 6,294 hours respectively. These squadrons are to be congratulated on a splendid achievement, It’s up to the other Squadrons to dethrone the champions during the next three months. GO TO IT!!
Altogether there was a decided improvement in the number of avoidable accidents during June.
36 aircraft were damaged in the Group by causes other than enemy action. This is a reduction of 15 compared with May, and the improvement is also reflected in the avoidable accident total which stands at 16 for June as opposed to 20 in May.
Of the aircraft damaged, 12 were CAT A, 5 CAT AC, 5 CAT B, and 14 CAT E.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS – 51 BASE RECORD [/underlined]
51 Base are to be congratulated for the lowest number of avoidable accidents for a long time; 4 aircraft were damaged under this category. The squadron total of 12 for the month was an increase of 2 over May’s total. Details are as follows:-
Squadron – Ground collisions (taxying) 3; overshoots landing 2; undershooting 1; Swings landing 1; Flying into high ground 1; Collision in air 1; errors of judgement 3; TOTAL 12.
51 Base – Swings taking off 1; Swings landing 2; Taxying 1; TOTAL 4
[Underlined] ACCIDENT CAUSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Taxying. [/underlined] 3 of the 4 taxying accidents in the Group follow the usual pattern. One struck a trestle outside dispersal at night, and no taxying light was being used. Another hit an M/T van left unattended just off the perimeter track, while a third (a Stirling) broke its tail wheel when it ran off the perimeter track. The 4th taxying accident was caused by a Flight Engineer starting up the engines of a Lancaster without permission. Brake pressure was low and the aircraft moved forward and struck another parked alongside.
[Underlined] Swings [/underlined] Three of these occurred on landing. One was a Mosquito in which the pilot, flying a Mosquito for the first time, was not quick enough in correcting. The other two landing swings were by pupil pilots on Stirlings, and were due to inexperience more than anything else. They both knew the correct drill, however, but were slow to react. The swing on take off occurred in a Stirling, when a pupil pilot opened the throttles too quickly and failed to control the violent starboard swing which followed. The undercarriage collapsed.
[Underlined] Other Accidents. [/underlined] A Lancaster returning in poor weather descended through cloud and hit a hill 500 feet above sea level. This accident has not yet been fully investigated, but preliminary evidence indicates that the pilot lost height contrary to orders at briefing.
Another Lancaster on return from Ops. in good weather hit a tree 1000 yards from the runway on his approach. The wing tip was torn off but the pilot went round again and made a good landing on his second attempt. In this instance the bombs were still on board unknown to the pilot. His Air Bomber had told him that all bombs had gone. Air Bombers please note!!
Two Lancasters overshot on landing at strange airfields on return from operations. The bomb load exploded after one of them crashed.
A formation flying collision resulted in the destruction of two aircraft this month. Number 3 of a “Vic” formation knocked the tail off the Leader.
The two remaining avoidable accidents cocurred [sic] on operational flights. One pilot lost control in cloud on return and ordered his crew to bale out. Four of them left before control was regained. They had not been told to take their ‘K’ type dinghy packs with them and landed in the sea. The aircraft made a safe landing at base.
A Mid-Upper Gunner firing at searchlights on the ground damaged the port fin of his aircraft with a burst. The solenoid had jumped from its bracket. The gunner was at fault.
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Most operations were within normal Gee range and no exceptional results have been recorded. There has, however, been a substantial decrease in jamming which may be due to the increase in the number of frequencies now in use.
Non-H 2 S squadrons are now equipped with the new R.F. Unit 27 and have had several chances of using it during the month. As yet there has been no opportunity to test its efficiency at long range, but reports indicate the signal strength to be good with little or no interference. It is hoped that the supply position in regard to these new units will improve shortly and H 2 S Squadrons can then be equipped.
Several changes in Gee transmissions have taken place recently, and it would be advisable for all navigators and wireless operators to check upon these and make sure they are using the right frequencies and aerial loading stud at the right time.
One word regarding Gee homing. It is apparent from recent operations that navigators are not checking up with Gee on the position of the markers. There is little excuse for this, as most operations at the present time are within normal Gee range and subject to little or no interference. Navigators would be well advised to check up on their homing procedure now – because sooner or later the time will come when owing to weather conditions bombs may have to be released on Gee.
With regard to Gee training, a modification is being issued shortly which will enable navigators to carry out dry swims and Gee homing procedure with the trainer. The first will be issued to Scampton Aircrew School and should prove an interesting and invaluable “toy”.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The targets this month have been rather disappointing for the H 2 S operator, and H 2 S has been little used. Whilst Gee may seem much simpler to use it is essential for all operators to use H 2 S as much as possible on these short range operations to augment training. We may switch to the longer range targets with little or no notice, and if operators have been relying to a very great extent on Gee, some difficulty with H 2 S may be experienced.
Just a word to Captains; your navigator depends to a very great extent upon the bomb aimer and his efficient manipulation of the equipment. If you are keeping him in the nose the whole of the time on these short operations he is getting little or no H 2 S training. A.S.I. BL/17 dated 26th April, 1944, details the duties of Air Bombers in H 2 S aircraft and however short the operation, Captains must see that this instruction is complied with.
One word with regard to H 2 S training on operational squadrons. With the present commitments there is very little opportunity for air training, but this does not prevent operators from obtaining as much ground training as possible. Ground trainers are available at all Units and they are yours to use at will. Squadron Navigation Officers and H 2 S Instructors should ensure that all operators get at
(Continued in Col. 2)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Continued from col.3) [/underlined]
least 30 minutes practice every day and should make periodic tests to see that operators are remaining efficient.
H 2 S operators will be interested to hear that 54 Base have been carrying out some experiments in the assessment of a Paramatta attack, and conclusions reached show that assessments can be made to within approximately 1/2 mile of the correct position. If this assessing can be carried out on operations it may prevent many attacks from developing around T.I’s a considerable distance from the aiming point. Preliminary trials are now being attempted with regard to Wanganui attacks and it is hoped that something useful may be produced for next winter’s operations.
Training at Conversion Units is progressing satisfactorily and Wigsley is now producing H 2 S trained crews.
There are still a few people in the Group who are sceptical about the amount of H 2 S. training carried out at No. 51 Base and in fairness to the effort being made by the Conversion Units, it would be advisable to outline the training being carried out by them.
Up to June 1st this year, 111 H 2 S trained crews have been produced by the Conversion Units, of which only 6 were sent to non-H 2 S squadrons (of these crews, 3 were Flight Commanders and 3 Australians).
With the increase in the number of H 2 S squadrons it became increasingly apparent that more crews would have to be trained by the Conversion Units and instructions were issued to that effect.
Despite the fact that [underlined] extra time or aircraft [/underlined] are allowed for this training, the Conversion Units are now taking 50% of the
(Continued on page 14 col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.A. DOREHILL, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O McKENZIE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.H. BOTHA D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O R.E. WALKER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O T.T. SMART D.F.C.
F/O W. McINTOSH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.S. STOUT D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H. STEERE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/L R.F. DAVIES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ G.H. PROBERT D.F.C.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L L.C.A. HADLAND D.F.C.
F/O W.W.W. TURNBULL D.F.C.
A/F/L E.M. ARMSTRON D.F.C.
F/O M.J. MAY D.F.C.
F/O F.B. HALL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.W. GREENWOOD D.F.M.
SGT J. WATERHOUSE D.F.M.
P/O A.E. GILES D.F.C.
P/O B.G.L. ROGERS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O W.A. GALL D.F.C.
F/O J.A. PRIOR D.F.C.
P/O W.F. POSSEE D.F.C.
P/O F.G. HAYLER D.F.C.
F/SGT J. LEVER D.F.M.
F/SGT W.I. WILKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT J.C. DICKINSON D.F.M.
SGT D.E. LAYSHON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.H. McFERRAN D.F.M.
F/SGT F. LOMAX D.F.M.
F/SGT J. RYAN D.F.M.
SGT J.H. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT LOMAS D.F.M.
F/O D.H. PEARCE D.F.C.
F/O McMASTER D.F.C.
P/O J.D. DUNCAN D.F.C.
P/O S.W.A. HURRELL D.F.C.
P/O H. BLOW D.F.C.
F/SGT H.F. SMITH D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT L.J. HUMMELL D.F.M.
SGT F. GARRETT D.F.M.
P/O F.B. SOAPER D.F.M.
F/SGT K.R. BLUNDELL D.F.M.
SGT R.H. BATEMAN D.F.M.
A/F/L R. McCURDY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O T.W. BLACK D.F.C.
F/SGT E. BARTON D.F.M.
F/SGT P.A. DEACON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.C. WRIGHT D.F.M.
F/SGT E.D. PRATT D.F.M.
P/O A.C. BAKER D.F.C.
F/O R.H. MAURY D.F.C.
F/O A. RIMMER D.F.C.
SGT D. CHARLES D.F.M.
F/SGT A.J. GURR D.F.M.
F/SGT W.H. BARKER D.F.M.
SGT WILLETT D.F.M.
SGT R.H. TURRELL D.F.M.
P/O J.A.W. McCALLUM D.F.C.
SGT H.G. CAPPS D.F.M.
F/SGT H.S. TILLER D.F.M.
SGT J.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
F/SGT F.H. BARNES D.F.M.
SGT E. HEDLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT M.M. SCOTT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.H. PRYOR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O J.V. REDDISH D.F.C.
F/SGT S.E. STEVENSON D.F.M.
P/O C.R. ROANTREE D.F.C.
F/SGT D. ANDREW D.F.M.
P/O BLACKHAM D.F.C.
F/SGT M.R. PRICE D.F.M.
F/SGT V.F. PITCHER D.F.M.
P/O D. JONES D.F.C.
F/O W.J.V. HAMILTON D.F.C.
F/SGT J.J. PAGE D.F.M.
P/O G.M.E. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT J.A. KIRWAN D.F.M.
W/CDR A.A. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.J. LUNDY D.F.C.
P/O L. DURHAM D.F.C.
F/O M.J. BEETHAM D.F.C.
P/O P.E. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.R. MOSSOP D.F.C.
F/O K.W. ODGERS D.F.C.
F/O P.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
F/O A.H. BIGNELL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.C.A. RODGERS D.F.M.
F/SGT N. HORSLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT A.D.F. SPRUCE D.F.M.
F/O L. HORNER D.F.C.
F/O H.S. SHORTT D.F.C.
F/O R.G.G. PAGETT D.F.C.
F/SGT D.E. WESTERMAN D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. COLLINGWOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT C. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT R. STANWIX D.F.M.
F/SGT A.L. BARTLETT D.F.M.
F/O A.S. KEITH D.F.C.
P/O A. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O J.A. WILDING D.F.C.
SGT W.M. RUNDLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. REID D.F.C.
SGT J.C. EVANS D.F.M.
P/O E.A. DOWLAND D.F.C.
P/O C.J.M. MARTIN D.F.C.
SGT T. DAVIES D.F.M.
F/O J. SIMMS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. COLLINS D.F.C.
(Continued on page 15, Column 1)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Contd. From page 13 Col.2) [/underlined]
crews passing through and giving them full H 2 S ground training with 10 – 15 hours air training. This output will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all H 2 S squadrons. These crews should reach the squadrons by the middle of August.
In the meantime H 2 S squadrons will have to put up with a quota of non H 2 S crews and continue to train them.
To further ease the training commitments of both the Conversion Units and squadrons, it is hoped that H2S training will be introduced into the Scampton Aircrew School by the middle of August. This training will consist of approximately 5 hours lectures with further time in manipulation of the H 2 S synthetic trainer. It is to be appreciated that this training will have to be in addition to the present essential navigational training carried out at the School, and navigators and air bombers must be prepared to undertake some of it in their spare time.
PHOTOGRAPHY
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL £15,498 13 9
LINK TRAINER
The number of hours link practice carried out by pilots during the month shows an increase over last month’s total. There is, however, still room for improvement in the standard of instrument flying. This can only be achieved by close co-operation between Link Instructors and Pilots.
The new Link Syllabus was distributed to Stations in the middle of the month and should now be in use at all Units. It is again emphasised that this Syllabus is progressive and if full value is to be obtained from it, Pilots and Flight Engineers must ensure that they complete all exercises, and keep an accurate record of the exercises carried out.
[Table of Link Trainer by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
(CONTINUED)
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
SGT J.T.WATTS D.F.M.
SGT F.A. SIMMONDS D.F.M.
F/O G.S. JOHNSON D.F.C.
SGT F. ROBERTS D.F.M.
F/O R. DAVIS D.F.C.
F/SGT R.W. CLEARY D.F.M.
F/O K.D. SMITH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O E.A. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
P/O J.E.R. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
SGT L.G. BOLTON D.F.M.
F/SGT C. BALDWIN D.F.M.
P/O E.H. WALKER D.F.C.
F/SGT L.W. CROMARTY D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. BUNYAN D.F.M.
P/O W.C. MacDONALD D.F.C.
F/O N.F. TURNER D.F.C.
P/O D.E. TREVETHICK D.F.C.
P/O G.A. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT. W.A. LEE D.F.M.
P/O J. BARR D.F.C.
P/O C.A. HAIGH D.F.C.
F/SGT LYNCH D.F.M.
F/O S.J. BEARD, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT C.P. STEEDSMAN D.F.M.
SGT G.M. WARD D.F.M.
SGT McQUILLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT C. WILCE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.C. BELL D.F.C.
F/O A.F. POORE D.F.C.
F/O G.E.D. TOOGOOD D.F.C.
P/O A.E. BRISTOW D.F.C.
F/SGT J. GRAVES D.F.M.
F/O R.J. ELSEY D.F.C.
F/O R.A. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT V. LYNCH D.F.M.
P/O P.J. RICHARDS D.F.C.
F/O W.R. LEE D.F.C.
F/O J.H.S. LEE D.F.C.
SGT T.C. WALLER D.F.M.
F/SGT G.R. CARLILE D.F.M.
F/O F.M. MIFFLIN D.F.C.
F/SGT A.D.J. GROOMBRIDGE D.F.M.
F/O C.J. DUNN D.F.C.
P/O R.A. HINCKLEY D.F.C.
F/O D.L. CRAMP D.F.C.
F/O D.V. GIBBS D.F.C.
F/L C.J. GINDER D.F.C.
F/SGT D. PINCKARD D.F.M.
F/SGT F. MYCOE D.F.M.
F/LT W.A. WILLIAMSON D.F.C.
F/SGT F.L. HIGGINS D.F.M.
F/O D.A. PAGLIERO D.F.C.
F/O R.L. WAKE, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT R. APPLEYARD D.F.M.
SGT V.H. BLACKWELL D.F.M.
P/O J. O’LEARY D.F.C.
F/O A.V. WITHERS D.F.C.
F/O R.P. RAMSAY D.F.C.
F/SGT S.J. HALVORSEN D.F.M.
SGT J.G. LANCASTER D.F.M.
F/SGT E. CLODE D.F.M.
SGT R.F. LAWRENSON D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.G. MYERSCOUGH D.F.M.
SGT D. FRISKEY D.F.M.
F/SGT E.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
P/O C.W. BARNETT D.F.C.
SGT W.G. LAMONT D.F.M.
F/SGT J. SKELTON D.F.M.
P/O R.G. CAMPBELL D.F.C.
P/O D.R. DEARMAN D.F.C.
P/O K.L. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/SGT E.H. BUNN D.F.M.
SGT D.C. MARK D.F.M.
SGT F.H. HAZEL D.F.M.
SGT F.C. DOWLING D.F.M.
SGT R.M. GALLOWAY D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
F/LT H.L. McCARTHY D.F.C.
F/O D.S.P. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O C.T. HARPER D.F.C.
F/O A. HOLLINGS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. CURTIS D.F.C.
F/O E.R. FREEMAN D.F.C.
F/O A.E. VOWELS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BROOKER D.F.C.
P/O H.R. MAHON D.F.C.
F/O F.B.M. WILSON D.F.C.
F/O J.E.R. REES D.F.C.
F/SGT J.B. CHILDS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.F.S. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O F. MORRIS D.F.C.
P/O A.R.T. BOYS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. GOLDSTRAW, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O H.C. CHANDLER D.F.C.
F/O D.T. CONWAY D.F.C.
F/O J.A. COLPUS D.F.C.
P/O M.F. SMITH D.F.C.
P/O N.D. MARSHALL D.F.C.
F/O F.J. NUGENT D.F.C.
F/O H.S.L. CROUCH D.F.C.
F/O G.G. ABBOTT D.F.C.
P/O A.A. TAYLOR D.F.C.
P/O A.P. SPERLING D.F.C.
F/SGT G. NOBLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O P.N. BUTTLE D.F.C.
P/O P.E. PIGEON D.F.C.
P/O H.A. WEEKS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. CLAY D.F.C.
F/O E. WILLSHER D.F.C.
W/O J. DACEY D.F.C.
F/O J.S. WATSON D.F.C.
F/SGT McCLELLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT L. EATON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.J. HENDERSON D.F.M.
F/SGT APPLEBY D.F.M.
F/SGT W. HOWARTH D.F.M.
F/O R. ADAMS D.F.M.
F/O A. HILL D.F.C.
F/LT WILSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.G. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.L. VICKERSTAFFE D.F.C.
F/O W.E.D. BELL D.F.C.
P/O G.G. TAYLOR D.F.C.
F/SGT J.A. FEATHERSTONE D.F.M.
F/O N.B. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O B.T.J. HUCKS D.F.C.
W/O C.G. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT M.H.G. KING D.F.M.
P/O J.P. HIND D.F.C.
P/O J.I. JOHNSON D.F.C.
P/O E.K. ALLEY D.F.C.
P/O R.T. BOULTBEE D.F.C.
F/O P.H. TAYLOR D.F.C.
W/O R.A. WESTAD D.F.C.
F/O T. WILKIE D.F.C.
F/O JOHNSON-BIGGS D.F.C.
F/LT R. AYTOUN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT J.H. BRYANT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.C. BLOIS D.F.C.
P/O T. SMART D.F.C.
W/O L.H. TODD D.F.C.
P/O R.T. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O G.W. BRAKE D.F.C.
W/O D. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/O A.J. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/O K.R. AMES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O F.R.G.A. HIGGINS D.F.C.
W/O H. GLASBY D.F.C.
F/SGT T.H. SAVAGE D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
All stations are to be congratulated on the excellent landing times produced this month, in which the average for the Group is below the 2 minutes per aircraft mark. In particular, Waddington recorded consistently good times for each operation. One [sic] the night of the 24/25th June this Station landed 32 AIRCRAFT IN 31 MINUTES, the average being less than 1 minute per aircraft. This is a record for the Group, and probably for the Command.
One word of warning, however; recently aircraft from another Group were diverted and on arrival at the diversion airfield proceeded to use their own Group landing scheme, with which the diversion control staff were not familiar. It is sufficient to say that confusion followed, with extreme danger to the aircraft and crews concerned. A.S.I. FC/11 contains the standard diversionary control procedure and must be adhered to.
[Underlined] STONES, CONCRETE AND METAL [/underlined]
Every stone, every sharp edge of concrete, every spent cartridge or piece of metal, constitutes a menace to tyres.
During the last 3 month there has been a very high average of tyres changed on accounts of cuts – (25 per station per month). Recently, endeavours have been made on stations to overcome this menace, but the intensified clean-up of perimeters, runways and dispersals must be maintained.
FLYING CONTROL must ensure that not the smallest break in the perimeter track or runway is overlooked, that grading does level up with the perimeter track and runways, and that any looseness in the surface of the French drains is attended to at once. Station Admin and Clerks of Works must help to the utmost.
GROUND CREWS must assist by seeing that their dispersals are thoroughly clean, and AIRCREWS watch carefully that cartridges cease to be a menace to tyres.
TRANSPORT – keep the sweepers fully serviced and see that nothing is loose on vehicles employed on the airfield.
ARMAMENT, too, can assist by ensuring that the access roads to the bomb dump are clear of stones and that wooden chocks from bomb trolleys are recovered before aircraft move. A 4” x 3” block with nails in it is not healthy treatment for a tyre!
ONLY BY FULL CO-OPERATION CAN THE ULTIMATE AIM BE ACHIEVED-AN AIRFIELD 100% SERVICEABLE.
JUNE LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
At dawn on the 6th of this month, the first Allied troops landed on the Normandy coast. A contribution towards the success of this amphibious operation was no doubt made in the effective silencing of most of the shore batteries. During the last month and again on three nights prior to D – Day this was one of the Group’s tasks. The heavy railway gun battery at WIMERAUX was attacked on the 2/3rd and although the interpretation report embraces previous attacks, there is no doubt that severe damage was inflicted; a large number of new craters being seen around the target. Both the western turntables have received direct hits.
The coastal defence batteries at MAISY (4/5th), ST PIERRE DU MONT (5/6 th) and LA PERNELLE (5/6th) next received our attention. Little could be gleaned from photographic cover as to the precise damage to the targets, but their apparent failure to contest our landing bears testimony to the success of the raids.
Another pre-invasion target was the Radar Jamming Station at FERME D’URVILLE. This target was attacked on 3/4th and, to quote A.I.C.U. “The station is completely useless”.
Our beachhead having been secured, our bombing role turned to close support of the land forces. The 21st Panzer Division was moving into CAEN to threaten the British Beaches. Two road bridges in this town were accordingly scheduled for attack on the 6/7th; both bridges were hit, and the road approaches heavily cratered, presenting an embarrassing obstacle to the Hun. On the same night an attack was directed against the ARGENTAN Railway centre. This raid also was calculated to hamper the arrival of reinforcements, which object was achieved by the severing of almost all the tracks and the destruction of many essential buildings.
During the day of the 7th, elements of the 17th Panzer Division were concentration [sic] in the FORET DE CERISY, a number of ammunition dumps, fuelling points and tank harbours having been located in this area. This was our assignment for the night 7/8th, and although results were not spectacular, many bombs fell on the aiming point.
The battle of communications continued on 8/9th against targets south of the battle area, when the marshalling yard at RENNES and rail junction at PONTAUBAULT were attacked. Severe damage was sustained at the former target while at the latter, the tracks were cut at several points.
One of the outstanding operations of the month was against the SAUMUR tunnel on the 8/9th. Already the railway junction had been attacked on 1/2nd with excellent effect, but the later attack on the tunnel left no doubt that the line would be denied the enemy for some time to come. A direct hit on the roof of the tunnel at its southern entrance has probably caused a major collapse while the tracks and embankments are severely damaged.
Our attack on the railway junction at ETAMPES on 9/10th was rendered extremely difficult owing largely to adverse weather, although hits were scored on the electrified railway north east of the junction.
The possibility of the enemy using the PARIS/ORLEANS route to effect troop movements led to a request for the destruction of the marshalling yard at ORLEANS on 10/11th. The mission was successfully undertaken, all through lines being severed and further damage sustained to rolling stock railway depots etc.
The attack on POITERS on 12/13th in which very severe damage was inflicted on the railway facilities was designed to delay the 2nd S.S. Division, believed to be moving up from South France.
On the same night support was given to our troops advancing East and West of CAEN, by the further bombing of the town’s road bridges.
The Lehr Panzer Division is reported to have visited AUNAY SUR ODON on the same night as aircraft from this Group, namely, 14/15th. AUNAY is completely obliterated – speculation is rife as to the fate of the Panzers.
Photos taken the day following the attack on the LIMOGES marshalling yard (23/24th) indicate that fires were still burning in the area, and that all tracks in the sorting sidings have been blocked.
AT VITRY LE FRANCOIS on 27/28th damage was almost entirely confined to the west end of the marshalling yard where all the tracks have been cut. Other damage throughout the yard is apparent.
For 48 hours the spotlight of war turned from the battlefield to the sea, to the harbours of LE HAVRE and BOULOGNE where a powerful force of small craft had been assembled by the enemy with a view to menacing our supply lanes. It is now reported that as a direct result of the two raids on 14/15th and 15/16th no fewer than 80 vessels have been sunk or seriously damaged. Damage to port installations is also severe.
Oil targets have been attacked sporadically since the war began, but in the knowledge that the enemy is suffering from fuel shortage we returned on three occasions to attack his resources.
At CHATELLERAULT on 15/16th a fuel dump was raided, considerable damage resulting to storage units.
The attacks on WESSELING and SCHOLVEN Synthetic Oil Plants on 21/22nd were not, however, satisfactory and, influenced by bad weather conditions, were off the mark.
During the month two gardening operations were undertaken, on 6/7th and 8/9th.
In the concluding phases of June our attention was diverted from Normandy to the rather more immediate problem of combating the flying bombs which had commenced to operate over this country on 12/13th. On the whole, weather was exceedingly unco-operative, but, despite this, 10 missions were launched (three of which,
(Continued on page 4 Col. 2)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Operations with Sorties, Accidents and Stars Awards, by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, June 1944
5 Group News, June 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 23, June 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about gunnery, air bombing, navigation, armament, navigation training, public relations, signals, gardening, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, and shows not so good, engineering, training, flight engineers, enemy agents - careless talkers, signals, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, radar / nav, honours & awards, photography, aircrew volunteers, war savings, link trainer, flying control, operations, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-06
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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18 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-27
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
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1944-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--La Pernelle
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Paris
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Saumur
France--Vitry-le-François
Germany--Wesseling
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
5 Group
617 Squadron
627 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bomb dump
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
rivalry
service vehicle
tactical support for Normandy troops
tractor
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/891/17977/MHuntleyR1436327-171005-03.2.jpg
e3490dd06af6b73c758e3824b0f0dd1c
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Title
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Huntley, Ronald
R Huntley
Description
An account of the resource
Six items. An oral history interview with Ronald Huntley (b. 1922, 1436327 Royal Air Force), an account of the shooting down and rescue by one of the Liberator crew, and photographs of RAF high speed launches and personnel. After service as a flight mechanic on fighter aircraft, he applied to join the Air Sea Rescue service as a engine engineer on high speed launches. He was involved in the rescue of the crew of a United States Navy PB4Y-1 Liberator shot down in the Bay of Biscay in February 1944.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Ronald Huntley and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-10-05
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Huntley, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Ron Huntley and RAF High Speed Launch 2641
Description
An account of the resource
Top left a half length portrait of a man sitting in shirt sleeves. In the background other people. Captioned 'Ron Huntley'. Bottom right - air to sea view of a high speed launch on the right heading left towards a dinghy bottom left. Captioned 'This is the rescue on Feb 15th 1944 taken from Sunderland aircraft.
Date
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1944-02-15
Format
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Two b/w photographs
Type
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Photograph
Identifier
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MHuntleyR1436327-171005-03
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-02-15
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air sea rescue
ditching
Sunderland
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
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SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
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SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
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NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
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AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
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AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
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GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
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OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
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FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
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[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
[Page break]
TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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22 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
searchlight
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator