2
25
59
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1411/26583/LHaddowEJ1623118v1.2.pdf
a133913f143d91583b7c3c80592bdf97
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Thomson, Thomas
T Thomson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-03
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Thomson, T
Description
An account of the resource
18 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant Thomas Thomson (1919 - 1991, 1366937 Royal Air Force) He flew operations as a wireless operator with 49 Squadron. It contains photographs, documents, a brief biography and a copy of E J Haddow's log book.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Suzanne Fletcher and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
E J Haddow’s navigator’s air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for E J Haddow covering the period from 28 November 1943 to 26 September 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF Wratting Common, RAF Waterbeach, RAF Witchford, RAF Talbenny. RAF Silverstone and RAF Dunkeswell. Aircraft flown in were Stirling, Lancaster, Wellington and Warwick. He flew a total of 28 operations with 115 squadron, 1 daylight and 27 night. Targets were Leipzig, Stuttgart, Le Mans, Frankfurt, Berlin, Nuremberg, Laon, Rouen, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Karlsruhe, Essen, Friedrichshafen, Cap Gris Nez, Courtrai, Duisburg, Dortmund, Trappes, Calais, Caen, Lisieux, Gelsenkirchen, Le Havre, Valenciennes, Mont Didier and Domleger. His pilot on operations was Warrant Officer Hemming.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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One photocopied booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LHaddowEJ1623118v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Mike French
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Devon
England--Northamptonshire
England--Suffolk
France--Domléger-Longvillers
France--Caen
France--Calais
France--Île-de-France
France--Laon
France--Le Havre
France--Le Mans
France--Lisieux
France--Montdidier (Hauts-de-France)
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Rouen
France--Valenciennes
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Friedrichshafen
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Wales--Pembrokeshire
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Cap Gris Nez
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-03-01
1944-03-02
1944-03-07
1944-03-08
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-03-22
1944-03-23
1944-03-24
1944-03-25
1944-03-30
1944-03-31
1944-04-11
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-04-22
1944-04-23
1944-04-24
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-04-28
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-04
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-18
1944-06-21
115 Squadron
1651 HCU
1678 HCU
17 OTU
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Dunkeswell
RAF Silverstone
RAF Talbenny
RAF Waterbeach
RAF Witchford
RAF Wratting Common
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1652/26481/SBriarsRA1299161v1.1.pdf
2a781daac7a5ee89fd2d6eb170264b96
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Casswell, Robert Ivan. Ralph Briars DFM
Description
An account of the resource
1 Item. Was an air gunner on John Sanders and Roy Machin's crew on 49 Squadron. Collection consists of a memoir.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-27
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Briars, R
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[picture]
REAR VIEW
Ralph Briars
[page break]
[photograph]
TO MARK AND AMANDA, IN THE FERVENT HOPE THAT THEY AND THEIRS NEVER BECOME INVOLVED IN WORLD UPHEAVALS SUCH AS HAPPENED BETWEEN 1939 AND 1945
DEDICATED FIRSTLY TO MY TRAVELLING COMPANIONS IN THOSE UNFRIENDLY SKIES, PARTICULARLY TO JOHN SANDERS WHO FLEW US THERE AND BACK, AND JAMES BARRON WHO GUIDED US. THE OTHERS AL AND ARTHUR, ROY AND TOMMY, ALL STRANGERS THROWN TOGETHER IN THE COMMON CAUSE.
SECONDLY TO BILL HUDSON WHO CAME WITH ME FROM GUNNERY SCHOOL TO FISKERTON, A WARMLY REMEMBER [sic] PERSON WHOSE FAVOURITE TIPPLE WAS GUINESS AND GIN-MIXED. SADLY HIS AIRCRAFT DID NOT RETURN FROM A RAID IN MARCH 1944, SHORTLY BEFORE WE WERE POSTED TO 617 SQUADRON.
[page break]
[underlined] FORE-WORD [/underlined]
TO EMPLOY A WELL WORN BUT NONE THE LESS ACCURATE CLICHÉ, LIFE IS FULL OF SURPRISES. THUS I PONDERD [sic] RUEFULLY, IN JANUARY 1944, ON FINDING MYSELF SITTING AT THE REAR OF A LANCASTER BOMBER EN ROUTE TO STETTING, WHICH IS THE WRONG SIDE OF DENMARK. NOT THAT I AM UNPATRIOTIC REALLY, BUT DURING THE TIME THAT HAD PASSED SINCE JOINING THR [sic] ROYAL AIR FORCE I DID THINK THAT SOMEONE OUGHT TO GET A MOVE ON AND WIN THE WAR BEFORE I BECAME INVOLVED.
THE R.A.F. INVITED ME TO JOIN IN 1941 ON THE ROSY PROSPECT THAT TRAINING AS A WIRELESS OPERATOR/AIR GUNNER – KNOWN IN THE TRADE AS A WOP/AG – WOULD FOLLOW INITIAL INSTRUCTION ON GETTING THE LEFT FOOT AND RIGHT ARM IN SYNCHRONISATION ON MOVING OFF. SO AWAY TO SAMPLE THE DELIGHTS OF THE BLACKPOOL LANDLADIES, BLESS-EM. SOME WERE LIKE MUVVERS, OTHERS LET YOU WASH IN THE YARD AND NO WARM SHAVING WATER. ONE LEARNED, USUALLY TOO LATE, NEVER TO EXPOUND THE VIRTUES OF THEIR COOKING – OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITY – FOR THE PERMANENT STAFF SOON HAD YOU OUT AND THEMSELVES IN, TO USE THE VERNACULAR, WITH THEIR FEET AND TRULY UNDER THE TABLE.
NOW I WOULD NOT SAY THE MORSE CODE IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO LEARN GIVEN MORE TIME MY INSTRUCTORS WERE PREPARED TO OFFER, AND AS THE WAR WAS NOT GOING ALL THAT WELL I HAD TO DEPART FROM THIS POSH PART OF LANCASHIRE. ALTHOUGH I WAS A BIT MIFFED AT THE TIME, THE DECISION WAS EVENTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, AS I WILL EXPAND LATER,..
SO THERE I WAS, WITH A FEW OTHER FAILURES, ON THE ISLE OF SHEPPEY, BEING INSTRUCTED ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT, PARACHUTE AND CABLES. BEAR WITH ME, IF YOU WILL, YOU’LL NOT BELIEVE THE REST. SOME BRIGHT SPARK IN THE MIN. OF DEFFENCE [sic] INVENTED A FORM OF DEFENCE AGAINST LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT CONSISTING OF A ROW OF TUBES SET VERTICALLY AND CONTAINING ROCKETS TO WHICH WERE ATTACHED. [sic]
[page break]
2
LONG LENGTHS OF STEEL CABLE, WITH INCREDIBLE ACCURACY YOU FIRED THESE OFF JUST AS AN AIRCRAFT – PREFERABLE [sic] BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE – WAS ABOUT TO CROSS THE LINE, WHERE-UPON UP THEY WENT TO AROUND 800 FEET, EJECTING A PARACHUTE FIXED TO THE CABLE WHICH THEN SLOWLY DROPPED TO THE GROUND. IF THEN YOUR TARGET WAS NOT ENTANGLED IN THE STEEL CURTAIN, OR A SECOND ONE CAME ALONG, YOU NEEDED AT LEAST 30 MINUTES TO REFILL THE SYSTEM, PRESUMABLY THIS VISIONARY TYPE OF DEFENCE AROSE DURING THE PROBLEMS OF SUPPLYING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AT THAT STAGE OF THE WAR, AND WAS USED TO DEFEND MERCHANT SHIPPING AS WELL AS AIR FIELDS.
ANYWAY, I WAS PACKED OFF TO SAVE THE R.A.F. BASE AT LINTON-ON-OUSE, NEAR YORK, AND IN THE PERIOD FROM CHRISTMAS 1941 TO AROUND FEBRUARY 1943 WE FIRED NOT ONE SHOT. NO DOUBT THE LUFTWAFFE HAD HEARD ABOUT IT ALL. DURING THIS EXCITING PERIOD I MADE REGULAR APPLICATIONS TO TRAIN AS AN AIR GUNNER, FOR NOT ONLY WAS THIS DEFENCE WORK FARCICAL – FOR EXAMPLE ONE COULD NOT OPERATE AFTER DARK AS THERE WAS NO REFERNCE [sic] TO JUDGE DISTANCE – OUT DEFENCE DUTIES WERE BEING SLOWLY TAKEN OVER BY THE NEWLY FORMED R.A.F. REGIMENT, WITH ALL THE ASSOCIATED ARMY STYLE TRAINING WHICH I COULD PLAINLY SEE WAS NOT GOING TO BE MY CUP OF TEA AT ALL.
EVENTUALLY I FOUND MYSELF IN ST. JOHNS WOOD, IN LONDON, ONCE AGAIN ON ASSESSMENTS AND INITIAL TRAINING LEADING TO A GUNNERY COURSE. THENCE TO BRIDLINGTON FOR THE REAL THING, WHERE AMONGST DIVERS ACTIVITIES WE SPENT HOURS IN A LOCAL GARAGE WHIRLING AROUND ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF GUN TURRETS MOUNTED UPON METAL FRAMES CONTAINING SMALL PETROL ENGINES WHICH SUPPLIED ELECTRIC AND HYDRAULIC POWER. NEARBY FLAMBOROUGH HEAD WAS USED FOR LIVE FIRING MUCH TO THE DISCOMFORT OF THR [sic] RESIDENT GULLS, FOR THE CONTINUAL USE OF OLD GUNS SEEMINGLY SO WIDENED THE BORE THAT TRACER BULLETS RARELY FOLLOWED EACH OTHER BUT WANDERED ABOUT LIKE GUNSHOT.
[page break]
3
THE NEXT STOP WAS DALCROSS, THE FLYING SCHOOL NEAR INVERNESS WHICH IS NOW THAT TOWN’S AIRPORT. WHERE WE SPENT SEVERAL WEEKS IN LOVELY WEATHER FLYING OVER THE MORAY FIRTH IN OLD DEFIANTS AND ANSONS FIRING AT TOWED TARGET DROGUES OR SEA MARKERS. MANY OF THE PILOTS WERE POLISH, TEMPORARILY WITHDRAWN FROM ACTIVE DUTY, AND THEY UNDERSTANDABLY WANTED TO RETURN TO BASHING THE HUN RATHER THAN FERRYING AROUND THREE TYRO GUNNERS AND THEIR INSTRUCTOR. ONE OCCURRENCE THAT WOULD INVITE A FLOW OF FURIOUS POLISH – THE PURPORT OF WHICH WAS CLEAR EVEN THOUGH THE LANGUAGE WAS NOT – WAS WHEN AFTER PAINFULLY CLIMING [sic] TO HEIGHT AND AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF THE TARGET TOWING AIRCRAFT THE FIRST GUNNER IN THE TURRET SHOT OFF THE DROGUE. AMONGST US GUNNERS THIS WAS SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF GREAT PROWESS, BUT THE RESULT WAS RATHER A LONG HOPEFULL [sic] WAIT FOR A NEW DROGUE TO BE STREAMED BY THE TOWING AIRCRAFT, OR, AS MORE OFTEN HAPPENED, A RETURN TO THE AIRFIELD. EACH GUNNER FIRED 200 ROUNDS. THE TIPS OF WHICH HAD BEEN DIPPED IN A STICKY SORT OF PRINTERS INK, RED PURPLE OR GREEN, SO THAT THE HITS COULD BE COUNTED. THE PROCEDURE WAS FOR US TO LAND FIRST AND AWAIT THE DROPPING OF THE DROGUE TARGET, WHICH WE HAD TO LUG INTO THE SCOOL [sic] FOR ASSESSMENT. OH! THE EXCITEMENT! HOW MANY WOULD YOU HAVE? HAD YOU, IN FACT ANY? 10 WAS EXCELLENT 15 INCREDIBLE, MORE OFTEN IT WAS SINGLE NUMBERS. AIR TO AIR FIRING WAS WILDLY WASTEFUL, NONE OF YOUR HEAT-SEEKING MISSILES THEN!
WE DID A LOT OF GUN TURRET TRAINING, AND COULD EVENTUALLY WRITE OUR NAMES BY MEANS OF A PENCIL WEDGED INSIDE THE GUN BARREL WHICH ENABLED ONE TO TRACE THE LETTERS ONTO A BOARD HELD IN FRONT OF THE TURRET. HOURS WERE SPENT INSIDE LARGE WHITE WASHED DOMES WHERE MOVING FILMS OF VARIOUS ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WERE PROJECTED, AND WITH A TORCH STRAPPED TO THE GUN BARREL ONE HAD TO SHOW CONVINCING ABILITY TO TRACK AND LEAD THE TARGET. ALERTNESS WAS EVERYTHING, FOR SOMETIMES A BRITISH AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SHOWN, AND IF NOT
[page break]
4
IDENTIFIED HEAVY SARCASM WOULD BE OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTOR, HAD NOT THE SERVICE ENOUGH TROUBLES ALREADY?
THE END OF THE COURSE CAME AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE UNFORTUNATE SOUL WE ALL PASSSED [sic]. THERE WE WERE AGAIN, BACK ON THE OLD L.M.S., TRAIN, DESTINED FOR VARIOUS COMMANDS AND GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. PASSING ALONG THE GRAND SCOTTISH SCENE THROUGH AVIEMORE, PERTH AND CARSTAIRS, AND THEN BY WAYS DEVIOUS I ENDED THE JOURNEY, WITH ONE ACQUAINTANCE FROM DALCROSS, AT 14 C.T.U. [sic] 9 (OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNIT) AT COTTESMORE IN WHAT AT THE TIME WAS THE PLEASANT COUNTY OF RUTLAND.
HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME WE MET OTHER FLYING TRADESMEN, PILOTS, NAVIGATORS, WIRELESS OPERATORS AND BOMB AIMERS. FIVE TO A CREW FOR THE TIME BEING, AS WE TRAINED ON WELLINGTON TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT. IN A SURPRISING BUT SOMEHOW VERY BRITISH WAY, A NOVEL WAY OF FORMING CREWS WAS ADOPTED.
NOT FOR US A LIST OF WHO WOULD FLY WITH WHOM, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, BUT INSTEAD A PERIOD – FROM LONG MEMORY AROUND TWO DAYS – IN WHICH WE MADE OUR OWN SELECTION. ANYONE NOT CREWED UP IN THE TIME ALLOTTED WAS MADE UP WITH OTHERS SIMILARLY PLACED. SO IT WAS DOWN TO THE (GEORGE) AT OAKHAM, AND BY THE TIME WE WERE CHUCKED OUT MOST CREWS WERE ARRANGED. HOW, YOU MIGHT SAY, DID ONE CAREFULLY SELECT SUITABLE SKILLED, ALERT, ETC. COMPATRIOTS WITH WHOM TO GO SWANNING AROUND GERMAN SKIES? DID ONE EARNESTLY ASK A PILOT HOW MANY HAD HE WRITTEN OFF ALREADY, OR SEEK A NAVIGATORS OPINION ON THE TRIANGLE OF VELOCITIES? YOU MUST BE JOKING! AFTER A FEW DRINKS WE WERE ALL EXCELLENT FELLOWS! THIS NAVIGATOR STEADIED HIMSELF ON ME AND SAID HE HAD A PILOT, WAS I FIXED UP? SEEMINGLY REASONABLY RESPECTABLE I WANT ALONG WITH HIM TO SEE THE PILOT, WHO HAD TWO WINGS UP SO WAS CLEARLY RELIABLE, AND HE TOOK ME ON, WE THEN ALL FOUND A WIRELESS MAN APPARENTLY KNEW ALL THE PUBS IN NOTTINGHAM, AND ON---
[page break]
5
ON THE WAY BACK ASSISTED THIS CANADIAN BOMB AIMER WHO WAS NOT SURE WHICH WAY EAST OR WEST, AND SO SANDERS SAINTS WERE FORMED.
TOGETHER WE TRAINED AS A TEAM UNTILL [sic] THE END OF SEPTEMBER, FLYING OUT OF SATELLITE AIR FIELDS AT MARKET HARBOROUGH AND HUSBANDS BOSWORTH, TOTALLING AROUND 80 HOURS FLYING TIME. INITIALY [sic] THE PILOT WAS MOST INVOLVED IN FAMILIARISING HIMSELF, UNDER INSTRUCTION, WITH THE LARGER AND HEAVIER AIRCRAFT. ONE HAS SOME FEELING FOR HIM IN THIS, FOR HIS SKILL AND PROGRESS WERE WITHIN SIGHT AND SOUND OF THE REST OF US PASSENGERS DURING SEVERAL HOURS TAKINF [sic] OFF AND LANDING, COLLOQUIALLY KNOWN AS CIRCUITS AND BUMPS. HOWEVER JOHN SANDERS WAS QUITE UP TO ALL THIS, AND BEFORE LONG WE ALL HAD TO JUSTIFY OUR TRAINING DURING CROSS-COUNTRY EXERCISES, PRACTICE BOMBING AND GUNNERY. IN THESE THE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR WERE OF COURSE CONTINUALLY EXTENDING THEIR EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE, AS WAS THE WIRELESS OPERATOR, TUCKED UP IN HIS LITTLE NICHE, AND HERE I WOULD INTERPOSE MY FEELINGS TOUCHED UPON EARLIER CONCERNING MY SUMMARY EXIT FROM THE WIRELESS SCHOOL.
THE VITAL WIRELESS OPERATOR, - RECEIVING INFORMATION ABOUT WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION CHANGES, ALTERATIONS TO BOMBING TECHNIQUES, CHECKING THE INTERCOM, TUNING IN TO ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND THEIR CONTROLLERS WAVELENGTHS SO THEY COULD BE JAMMED VIA A MICROPHONE IN AN ENGINE COMPARTMENT, TRACKING POSSIBLE NIGHT FIGHTERS ON A SMALL VDU, - SAW LITTLE OF ACTUAL WAR. SOME MAY THINK IMAGINATION WOULD HAVE WORKED OVERTIME WONDERING WHAT WAS HAPPENING OUTSIDE, LISTENING AND FEELING BUT NOT KNOWING. THE SIGHTS I SAW FROM MY VANTAGE POINT AT THR [sic] REAR WERE NOT ALWAYS ENTIRELY REASSURING, BUT THAT’S REALITY, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NOT KNOWING AT ALL, WAS PREFERABLE.
[page break]
6
SHORTLY BEFORE LEAVING COTTESMORE AT THE END OF OCTOBER 1943 TWO MORE CREW MEMBERS ARRIVED, THE ENGINEER AND THE MID-UPPER TURRET GUNNER. WHILST THE FORMER COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IN THE DUAL COCKPIT OF THE WELLINGTON, THE NEW GUNNER WAS LESS FORTUNATE AND SPENT A FEW DRAUGHTY COLD SPELLS IN THE FUSELARGE [sic]. ROY MACHIN WAS A LITTLE LESS THAN DELIGHTED WITH LIFE, BUT IT WAS NOT LONG BEFORE WE MOVED AND HE HAD HIS OWN NEST.
SO IT WAS OFF TO THE LAST STAGE OF TRAINING AT WINTHORPE, NEAR NEWARK. THIS PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT AT COTTESMORE, EXCEPT THAT THIS UNIT, 1661 CONVERSION UNIT, FAMILIARISED US WITH THE SAME TYPE OF AIRCRAFT USED IN OPERATIONS, THE HALIFAX AND THE LANCASTER. I BELIEVE OUR 5 GROUP WAS PHASING OUT THE HALIFAX AT THE TIME, ANDWE [sic] ONLY FLEW ABOUT FIVE HOURS IN THEM. FROM THE GUNNERS POINT OF VIEW THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES WAS THE BOULTON AND PAUL (BP) TURRET IN THE HALIFAX AND THAT MADE BY FRAZER-NASH IN THE LANCASTER. BOTH HAD FOUR GUNS FED BY AMMUNITION CONVEYED ON TRACKS FROM BINS NEAR THE CENTRE OF THE FUSELAGE TO AVOID UNWANTED WEIGHT AT THE REAR OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE BP TURRET WAS ELECTRICALLY OPERATED AND CONTROLLED BY A SINGLE JOYSTICK, WHEREAS THAT IN THE LANCASTER WAS HYDRAULICALLY DRIVEN WITH BICYCLE TYPE HANDLEBAR CONTROLS. I PREFERRED THE LATTER, PROBABLY DUE TO FAMILIARITY THOUGH BOTH HAD A SMOOTH AND PRECISE ACTION, EACH ‘303 BROWNING GUN FIRED ABOUT 1200 ROUNDS A MINUTE, AND WERE (HARMONISED) THAT IS FOCUSED FOR MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON TARGET AT 400 YARDS. HAVING SEEN THE DEVASTATING RESULT OF SIX GUNS ON AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT DURING OUR FIRST OPERATION TO STETTIN WE HAD MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THEM.
THE PROBLEM WITH NIGHT OPERATIONS WAS, SIMPLY, SEEING THE ATTACKER. THE REAR GUNNER SEARCHED BEHIND AND BELOW, THE OTHER GUNNER BEHIND AND ABOVE, BOTH CONSTANTLY SCANNING THE SIDE AREAS AS WELL. THE MAIN DANGER CAME FROM TWIN ENGIND [sic] ME110’S AND JUNKERS 88’S NEITHER OF WHICH WAS ------
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7
PARTICULARY [sic] FAST BUT EASILY SURPASS A LADEN LANCASTER’S CRUISING SPEED OF 170 M.P.H. FURTHERMORE, SOME FIGHTERS WERE FITTED WITH UPWARD FIRING 20 M.M. CANNON, AND WOULD CREEP ALONG BELOW BOMBERS WHICH TENDEDTO [sic] SILHOUETTE AGAINST THE LIGHTER UPPER SKY. THEY WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE, UNLESS THE GROUND WAS SNOW COVERED AND ALL WE COULD DO WAS TO CARRY OUT A BANKING SEARCH – THE PILOT DOING THE HARD WORK TILTING THE AIRCRAFT ENABLING THE AREA BELOW TO BE INSPECTED. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, DIFFICULT WITH A LOADED BOMBER, AND DOUBTLESS MANY GOOD CREWS WERE LOST DUE TO THE SHEER SLOG OF CONTINUAL SEARCHING AND A CONSEQUENT FALLING OFF OF EFFICIENT LOOKOUT.
THERE IS THOUGHT, HOWEVER THAT AS THE CANNON WERE, I BELIEVE, INCLINED AT 60 DEGREES ABOVE THE HORIZONTAL, IN ANY LIKELY FIRING ATTITUDE THE FIGHTER HAD TO BE BELOW, AND BEHIND, THUS WITHIN THE REAR GUNNERS FIELD OF SEARCH. PROVIDED NATURALLY IT WAS NOT TOO DARK TO SEE ANYTHING AT ALL!
MANY OF THE RADIAL ENGINED LANCASTER II WERE FITTED WITH AN EXTERNAL GUN POSITION OPERATED REMOTELY FROM WITHIN THE REAR FUSELARGE [sic], PROBABLY WITH A PERISCOPIC SIGHT VISIBILITY AT NIGHT WITH THE NAKED EYE IS OBVIOUSLY LIMITED AND MOST REAR TURRETS EVENTUALLY HAD THE PERSPEX PANEL FRONT OF THE GUNSIGHT REMOVED ENTIRELY. ANY FORM OR [sic] PERISCOPE WAS NO DOUBT FOUND TO HAVE SUCH A POOR FIELD OF VISION TO NOT JUSTIFY THE ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER AND THE WEIGHT PENALTY INSTALLATION.
I HAVE INTERJECTED ONE OR TWO MATTERS FOR THE RECORD, AS THIS FORWARD TO THE DIARY FINISHES WITH COMPLETION OF THE COURSE AT WINTHORPE AND OUR POSTING TO 49 SQUADRON AT FISKERTON, A FEW MILES EAST OF LINCOLN, IN DECEMBER 1943.
A WORD ABOUT THE DEPTH OF TRAINING THE R.A.F. GAVE US. DESPITE THE WAR LOSSES OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL – MANY AND MUCH OR [sic] WHICH CAME BY HAZARDOUS SEA PASSAGES – THERE WAS NEVER ANY FEELING OF HASTE IN INSTRUCTING TRAINEES SO THEY COULD BE PASSED ON QUICKLY TO OPERATIONAL DUTIES.
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8
THE INSTRUCTING AND TRAINING SOMETIMES WAS UNIMAGINATIVE AND REPETITIVE, BUT IN THE OUTCOME IT WAS OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH FOR ONE TO ACHIEVE SOME SKILLS AND QUICK REACTION TO EVENTS. THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE OF THE OTHER SERVICES, AND SOMETHING FOR WHICH ALL TRAINEES SHOULD BE THANKFULL [sic]. HOWEVER, IT IS AN INEVITABLE FACT THAT IN WARTIME THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF TRAINING IS SUBJECT IN MANY RESPECTS TO LUCK, OR FATE, OR WHAT YOU WILL. THAT IS, BEING IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME OR BEING IN THE WRONG PLACE AT ANY TIME.
CONSIDER AIR COLLISIONS, A MATTER MUCH DISCUSSED IN THESE ‘80’S OBVIOUSLY IT CAN NEVER NOW BE KNOWN WHAT PROPORTION OF WARTIME LOSSES WERE DUE TO THIS CAUSE, BUT VISULISE [sic] THE FACTS. IN 1944 UP TO 800 OR SO BOMBERS TAKING OFF IN THE DARKNESS FROM DOZENS OF AIRFIELDS IN THE MIDLANDS AND EASTERN ENGLAND, NAVIGATION LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED BEFORE CROSSING THE COAST, ALL CLIMBING TOWARDS THE FIRST TURNING POINT. AS TIME TO BE OVER THE TARGET IS STAGGERD [sic] THROUGHOUT THE FORCE OVER A PERIOD OF SAY 20 MINUTES, AND THE NAVIGATOR FINDS SOME TIME MUST BE LOST, (DOG-LEGGING) IS RESORTED TO. SIMPLY THIS MEANS THE AIRCRAFT DIVERGES FROM THE COURSE BEING FOLLOWED AND RETURNS WHEN SUFFICIENT TIME HAS BEEN DROPPED.
THE IMPLICATION OF DELIBERATELY TURNING ACROSS THE PATHS OF MANY UNSEEN OTHERS AND RETURNING A LITTLE LATER STILL CHILLS ME. WHILST STILL OVER THE NORTH SEA IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL TO SEE AN EXPLOSION IN THE SKY, FOLLOWED BY BURNING DEBRIS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PREVIOUS AIR TO AIR FIRING IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME A COLLISION HAD OCCURRED. SOMEWHAT WORSE WAS WHEN THE TARGET WAS REACHED AND GROUND MARKERS HAD NOT BEEN DROPPED, OR WERE IN THE WRONG POSITION OR HAD BURNT OUT, AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO CIRCLE WHILST AWAITING FRESH MARKERS. CLEARLY, NOT ALL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CIRCLING CONCENTRICALLY!
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THEN UPON RETURN TO ENGLAND THERE WOULD BE A CONVERGING OF THE THRONG, WHICH FOR VARIOUS REASONS WOULD BE FROM MANY DIRECTIONS. ONCE AGAIN WITHOUT NAVIGATION LIGHTS UNTILL CLOSE TO BASE (OR NOT AT ALL IF THE LUFTWAFFE WAS INFILTRATING THE STREAM HOPING TO FIND SOMEONE ASLEEP) WHERE WE CIRCLED HOPEFULLY WELL AWAY FROM ONE ANOTHER BEFORE BEING CALLED TO LAND. THIS WAS IRKSOME AT WOODHALL SPA BECAUSE BEING CLOSE TO CONINGSBY THE RING OF MARKER LIGHTS GUIDING AIRCRAFT AROUND EACH FIELD ACTUALLY INTERSECTED AND TO AVOID COLLISIONS AT THIS POINT WE ALL HAD TO FLY THE DOUBLE CIRCLE THUS CONSIDERABLY EXTENDING THE TIME TAKEN TO LAND. THIS PROCEDURE WAS OF COURSE PARTICULARLY TIRING TO THE PILOT WHO HAD BEEN AT THE CONTROLS CONTINUALLY FOR MANY HOURS.
THE POINT OF ALL THIS IS TO REITERATE THAT THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF TRAINING CANNOT NECESSARILY OVERCOME CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ODDS ARE ADVERSELY STACKED. THE MIRACLE IS THAT SO MANY SURVIVED THESE ODDS; THE SADNESS THAT SO MANY CAPABLE CREWS WERE LOST, OFTEN THROUGH CAUSES OTHER THAN ENEMY ACTION. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS IS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES CONCERNING A RAID ON A TARGET NEAR RHEIMS ON THE 31ST OF JULY.
AS TO THE DIARY, WELL, THIS WAS WRITTEN UP SHORTLY AFTER EACH TRIP, USUALLY IN BED FOLLOWING THE TRADITIONAL SUPPER OR BREAKFAST OF EGG AND BACON. I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION WHY I WROTE IT, IT’S JUST THE SORT OF THING I USED TO DO. THE DIARY WAS MISSING FOR YEARS, BUT I HAD A FEELING IT WOULD RE-APPEAR, AND WHEN IT DID I DECIDED TO PROPERLY LAY IT OUT BEFORE IT WENT AGAIN. DESPITE WINCING AT THE STYLE AND PROSE OF THOSE TIMES I FELT IT RIGHT TO REPRODUCE IT VERBATIN [sic], WARTS AND ALL.
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[underlined] 6 – 1 – 44 STETTIN [/underlined]
FELT MORE INTEREST THAN NERVOUSNESS ON THIS TRIP – QUEER,. NOT TOO COLD AT 22,000 FEET, TARGET WELL ALIGHT. ENGAGED 109 WHICH WAS FINALLY SEEN WITH BROWN SMOKE POURING HEAVILY FROM THE ENGINE, OUR DAMAGE WASA [sic] FEW BULLETS FROM M.U. THROUGH THE FUSELAGE AND ONE THROUGH THE TURRET, SHAKY DO! SIX HOURS BACK – TERRIBLE, SAW SUN RISE OVER THE SEA, TEA NEVER SO WELCOME. SHORT OF FUEL, S.O.S. PREPARED, READY TO DITCH, FINALLY MADE IT AND LANDED AT THE FIRST DROME, LUDFORD MAGNA. PRETTY TIRED, 9 HOURS 50 MINUTES IN THE AIR. DICKENDS [sic] OF A JOB TO KEEP AWAKE, LUCKILY BAGS OF CLOUD, NEVER DID LAND LOOK MORE WELCOME AS THE COAST OF LINCOLNSHIRE.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] 109 WAS A SINGLE ENGINE MESSERSCHMITT AIRCRAFT, NORMALLY A DAY FIGHTER, BUT OCCASIONALLY SEEN AT NIGHT. WHEN THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE WE HAD JUST ENTERED AN AREA ILLUMINATED BY FLARES DROPPED BY HIGH FLYING GERMAN AIRCRAFT; THE FIGHTER APPROACHED FROM NEARLY DEAD ASTERN, FIRING – BUT MISSING – ALL THE WAY IN. AS I STARTED FIRING I SAW TRACER PASSING OVERHEAD FROM ROY MACHIN IN THE – UPPER TURRET (M.U.) AND ALTHOUGH INTERUPTER [sic] GEAR SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED HIS FIRE FROM DAMAGING OUR AIRCRAFT IN THIS INSTANCE IT DID NOT, FORTUNATELY WITOUT [sic] DISASTROUS RESULTS.
[underlined] 14 – 1 – 44 BRUNSWICK [/underlined]
FAIRLY COLD, -32 CALL LIGHT REPEATEDLEY [sic] FLASHED FOR NO GOOD REASON, HAD TO SMASH BULB HAVING NO WISH TO ADVERTISE OUR POSITION. CLEAR MOST OF THE WAY, 7/10 OVER TARGET, FIRES WERE NOT SO GOOD AS BEFORE, SAW 110 BUT DID NOT ENGAGE, LITTLE FLAK, BAGS OF SEARCHLIGHTS, NO OTHER FIGHTERS SEEN. SCARECROW FLARES SEEN, TWO LOADS JETTISONED NEAR TEXEL,. ENGINEER SHORT OF OXYGEN, DROPPED MY KNIFE WITH LEAFLETS. BACK AT 10-30 BEST LANDING JACK MADE. EGG, SAUSAGE, AND BACON FOR SUPPER, LOVELY;
[underlined] NOTES NEXT PAGE [/underlined]
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] CALL LIGHT WAS A SIGNALLING LIGHT AT ALL CREW STATIONS FOR USE IN CASE OF FAILURE OF THE NORMAL INTERCOM, IN THE GUNNERS POSITION IT COULD BE SEEN FROM OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT. 110 WAS A TWIN ENGINE MESSERSCHMITT, MUCH USED AGAINST THE R.A.F. AT NIGHT. SCARECROW FLARES GAVE THE EFFECT OF AN AIRCRAFT EXPLODING PRESUMABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST MORALE. WHEN BOMBS HAD TO BE JETTISONED THE RESULTING LINE OF EXPLOSIONS GAVE AN INDICATION OF ROUTE TO ANY NIGHT FIGHTERS IN THE AREA. BETTER THE BOMBS WERE DROPPED (SAFE) BUT THIS WAS UNDESIRABLE OVER ENEMY OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY AS THEY COULD BE RECOVERD [sic] AND EXAMINED. FUSES WERE OFTEN RE-DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE, UNEXPLODED BOMBS BEING MADE SAFE BY THE ENEMY. TO BE HONEST, HOWEVER, IN AN EMERGENCY NECESSITATING JETTISONING A HEAVY LOAD IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE (SAFE) OR (LIVE) ASPECT WOULD OFTEN BE CONSIDERED! 7/10 INDICATED PROPORTION CLOUD/SKY.
[underlined] 20 – 1 – 44 BERLIN (MY BIRTHDAY) [/underlined]
NICE TRIP, FELT QUITE GOOD ALL WAY, EXCEPT USUAL SINKING FEELING OVER TARGET; THIS WAS WELL LIT UP, ANOTHER BROCKS BENEFIT, SCARECROWS AND ROCKETS ABOUT, FLAK NOT TROUBLESOME, NO FIGHTERS SEEN. DICKENS OF A JOB TO KEEP EYES OPEN LAST TWO OR THREE HOURS, EVEN STICKING HEAD INTO THE WIND DOESN’T HELP MUCH. MIKE WAS U/S FOR A PERIOD, HEARD SKIPPER SAY WAS I ASLEEP, CHEEK! FIRED TEST BURST OVER TARGET, GUNS O.K. WASN’T VERY COLD. CAME HOME A BIT QUICKER THAN USUAL, HOPE ALL TRIPS ARE AS PEACEFUL.
[underlined] Notes [/underlined] (MIKE) WAS MICROPHONE BUILT INTO OXYGEN MASK AND OFTEN FROZE DUE TO BREATH EXHALATION FREEZING. EVENTUALLY SMALL HEATERS WERE FITTED INTO THE MASK, AND THESE CURED THE PROBLEM.
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[underlined] 21 – 1 – 44 MAGDEBURG [/underlined]
HAD LITTLE TROUBLE OURSELVES, NO ENGAGEMENTS, A FEW FIGHTERS SEEN, BAGS OF FIGHTER FLARES AND SOME SCARECROWS. MIKE FROZE AS WE CAME ON TO THE TARGET, LUCKILY THERE WAS NO TROUBLE, IT BECAME U/S 1 HOUR FROM BASE. SPOOF ON BERLIN ABSOLUTELY USELESS, THERE BEING NO FLAK, FLARES OR ANYTHING, RAN INTO COASTAL FLAK ON RETURN, NO DAMAGE. TARGET WELL ALIGHT, LIKE STETTIN, 3/10 CLOUD. DON’T KNOW HOW I KEPT AWAKE AFTER LAST EFFORT, DARNED TIRED NOW.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (SPOOF) WAS A DIVERSIONARY RAID, OFTEN CARRIED OUT BY MOSQUITO AIRCRAFT TO SOW DOUBT INTO THE GERMAN DEFENCES AS TO THE REAL TARGET. LIKE MANY THINGS IN WARTIME, SOME WORKED, OTHERS DID NOT.
[underlined] 27 – 1 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]
VERY QUITE TRIP ON THE WHOLE, WARM TOO, TEMP. ABOUT – MINUS 20, DIFFICULT TO CLIMB – OVER TARGET AT .17,500 FEET. 10/10 CLOUD OVER CITY, NO FIGHTERS SEEN, THO’ OBVIOUSLY ACTIVE, QUITE A NUMBER OF FIGHTER FLARES, SAW ONE LANC. ONLY, NOT MUCH DOING OVER THE TARGET, QUEER. LONG ROUTE BACK, TERRIBLE BIND, ARRIVED AT ENGLISH COAST BANG-ON, DON’T KNOW HOW JOCK DOES IT. JACK WHEELED KITE IN, PERFECT LANDING NO TROUBLE WITH MIKE THESE DAYS.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (JOCK) WAS THE NAVIGATOR JAMES BARRON, A CHEERFUL, SCOT WHO GUIDED US THERE AND BACK WITH LITTLE FUSS BUT WITH MUCH EXPERTISE. LIKE MOST BRITISH AIRCRAFT OF THE TIME, THE LANCASTER NORMALLY LANDED ON TWO MAIN WHEELS AND THE TAIL WHEEL, (THREE POINT) LANDING. OCCASIONALLY THE PILOT WOULD TOUCH DOWN ON ONLY THE TWO MAIN WHEELS, HOLDING THE TAIL WHEEL OFF THE RUNWAY UNTILL SPEED REDUCED. THIS WAS MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE FOR THE REAR GUNNER.
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[underlined] 29 – 1 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]
THE BOYS WERE CERTAINLY WAITING FOR US TONIGHT, SAW COMBATS ALL THE WAY IN FROM THE COAST, BAGS OF FIGHTER FLARES, ROUTE LIKE PICCADILLY IN PEACE TIME. FIRED AT ORIGIN OF GREEN TRACER, SAW SOMETHING FALLING. TARGET HORRIBLY WELL LIT UP, HOW WE GET AWAY WITH IT BEATS ME, MARVELLOUS PRANG, FAR BETTER THAN PREVIOUS, SAW GLARE WHILE NEAR ROSTOCK ON THE WAY BACK. BAGS OF CLOUD MOST OF RETURN, - VERY USEFUL. CLOUD AT BASE DOWN TO 800 FEET, DON’T CARE FOR HEDGE HOPPING IN EARLY MORNING. VERY TIRED, BUT WE GO ON LEAVE TOMORROW!
[underlined] 15 – 2 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]
10/10 CLOUD OVER MOST OF GERMANY, LITTLE TROUBLE EXCEPT AT TARGET, - LOADS OF FIGHTER FLARES AND FAIR AMOUNT OF FLAK BELOW, NO FIGHTERS SEEN. GENERATOR WENT U/S AFTER TARGET, GYRO COMPAS [sic] U/S, HAD TO USE P4. JACK MANAGED WELL. 23,000 FEET ON THE WAY BACK, SUITS NOT VERY USEFUL OWING TO LOW VOLTAGE. R/T U/S AT BASE, HAD TO USE VERY’S TO COME IN. TARGET NOT MUCH TO LOOK AT GENERALLY
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] I DON’T REMEMBER HOW MANY GENERATORS THERE WERE, BUT CLEARLY MORE THAN ONE! THE P4 WAS A STANDBY MAGNETIC COMPASS, QUITE RELIABLE BUT NOT SO EASY FOR THE PILOT TO FOLLOW AS WAS THE GYRO COMPASS REPEATER. (SUITS) REFERS TO ELECTRICALLY WARMED SUITS WORN BY BOTH GUNNERS. THERE WAS NO HEATING IN THE FUSELAGE AFTER THE MAIN SPAR AT THE WIRELESS OPERATORS POSITION, -- AND NOT A LOT FORWARD EITHER. VERY’S ARE SIGNALLING PISTOLS, USED HERE TO SEEK LANDING PERMISSION BY FIRING APPROPRIATETCOLOUR [sic] TO RUNWAY CONTROLLER IN THE CARAVAN, WHO SIMILARLY RESPONDED.
I NOTE FROM MY LOG BOOK THAT DURING THESE FIRST SEVEN OPERATIONS 261 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST. TOWARDS THE END OF FEBRUARY THIS INFORMATION WAS OMITTED, PRESUMABLY FOR BEING TOO GLOOMY TO INCLUDE.
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[underlined] 19 – 2 – 44 LEIPZIG [/underlined]
ON THE WAY OUT COULD GET NO GUN DEPRESSION, AGREED TO GO ON, FLACK AND SEARCHLIGHTS OVER COAST, SAW A NUMBER OF COMBATS, AND AIR WAS FAIRLY LIVELY ALL THE WAY TO THE TARGET; ARRIVED EARLY AND HAD TO STOOGE AROUND UNTILL THE MARKERS WENT DOWN. NOT A LOT OF OPPOSITION OVER TARGET, WHICH BLAZED UP QUITE WELL. SOON AFTER LEAVING THE TARGET OXYGEN TUBE DISCONNECTED FROM MASK, AND HAD TO COME HOME SUCKING TUBE – NOT VERY COMFORTABLE CLOUD MOST OF THE TRIP, COLD TOO – MINUS 30.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] ONE OF THOSE TRIPS; DESPITE PRE-FLIGHT AIR TEST, FAULT OCCURRED IN TURRET HYDRAULICS THAT PREVENTED GUNS BEING DEPRESSED BELOW HORIZONTAL. FORTUNATELY WE WERE NOT ATTACKED, - AND 79 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST.
[underlined] 20 – 2 – 44 STUTTGART [/underlined]
COLD TRIP, ABOUT 20,000 FEET MOST OF THE WAY, WENT OVER READING, FELT QUITE HOMESICK. VERY QUIET TRIP, COUPLE OF FLAK BURSTS OVER FRENCH COAST SHOOK ME A BIT. MIKE FROZE UP SOME TIME BEFORE TARGET, GETTING A REGULAR HABIT. 5/10 OVER TARGET, SAW BITS OF GROUND, GOOD PRANG, NOT MUCH FLAK, FIGHTER FLARES DID NOT ARRIVE UNTIL ABOUT 15 MINUTES AFTER LEAVING. HAD TO LAND AT DUNHOLME OWING TO TAKE-OFF CRASH AT BASE. PRETTY TIRED, BED LOOKED GOOD TO ME
[underlined] 24 – 2 – 44 SCHWEINFURT [/underlined]
ARRIVED AT THE SOUTH COAST IN TIME TO GET MIXED UP IN HUN RAID; CONED BY OWN SEARCHLIGHTS, LUCKILY COLOURS OF THE DAY DOUSED THEM BUT IT WAS PRETTY WARM. OVER THE OTHER SIDE IT WAS VERY QUIET, DIDN’T SEE ONE FIGHTER FLARE OR COMBAT. GOOD VISION, NO CLOUD, BOMBS WELL CONCENTRATED ON TARGET, BAGS OF SMOKE -----
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--- AND FIRES AS WE LEFT, AIRCRAFT CLIMBED WELL 23,000 FEET WAY BACK; FOR ONCE MIKE DIDN’T FREEZE, BUT ICE FORMED ON MASK OVER FRANCE.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] COLOURS OF THE DAY WERE FIRED FROM A VERY PISTOL FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, RED/WHITE GREEN/RED ETC. COLOURS WERE CHANGED AT REGULAR INTERVALS, SOMETIMES EVERY 12 HOURS, LEST THE ENEMY USED THEM TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST OUR DEFENCES.
[underlined] 25 – 2 – 44 AUGSBURG [/underlined]
7 HOURS SLEEP, AND NO SQUARE MEAL BEFORE TAKE-OFF, BAD SHOW ARRIVED FRENCH COAST IN SOME LIGHT, PROMPTLY GOT SHOT-UP BY FIGHTER, FEW HITS ON PORT WING AND COCKPIT. LOTS OF ACTIVITY OVER FRANCE, SAW SEVERAL KITES GO DOWN. 30 MILES FROM TARGET LANCASTER BELOW SQUIRTED AT US, DAMAGED AIRCRAFT BEHIND DOOR SEVERELY, ON FIRE, ROY AND I PUT IT OUT, REAR TURRET U/S, NO OXYGEN, HAD TO GO FORWARD. BOMBS JETTISONED, STARBOARD ELEVATOR FABRIC STRIPPED, BALANCE TAB PRACTICALLY SHOT OFF, INTERCOM U/S, KITE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE, SKIPPER DID WIZARD JOB GETTING US HOME AND LANDING – SHAKY NIGHT.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (SQUIRTED) – FIRED AT US FROM REAR TURRET. U/S – UNSERVICEABLE. THE FOLLOWING WAS ADDED TO MY DIARY ENTRY, UPON SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION IT WAS FOUND THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN HIT BY CANNON SHELLS SO IT SEEMS WE WERE HIT BY STRAY SHELLS AT THE IDENTICAL MOMENT THE LANCASTER FIRED. ALTERNATIVELY THE LUFTWAFFE WAS USING A CAPTURED LANCASTER WITH CANNON IN THE TURRET. THE 5 GROUP INVESTIGATOR THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY. WONDER IF WE’LL EVER KNOW? I STILL HAVE NO DOUBT AS TO WHAT I SAW THAT NIGHT. THE LANCASTER BELOW US WAS QUITE VISIBLE AT INTERVALS WHEN WE PASSED OVER PARTLY SNOW COVERD [sic] LAND, I HAD NOTICED IT EACH TIME THE TURRET WAS ROTATED IN THAT DIRECTION, AND NO ONE WAS MORE SURPRISED THAN I WHEN THE STREAM OF TRACER CAME TOWARDS US – AND WE WERE ON FIRE. THE DIRECTION OF THE SUSTAINED DAMAGE AND THE EXPLOSIVE EVIDENCE SUGGEST
S THAT POSSIBLY -------
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------- AND AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE STRUCK BY CANNON SHELLS FROM A NIGHT FIGHTER BELOW AND TO THE OTHER SIDE. IT SOUNDS A BIT THIN, BUT THE CASE WILL HAVE TO REST.
PILOT JOHN SANDERS WAS AWARDED A IMEADIATE [sic] D.F.C. THE WIRELESS OPERATOR ARTHUR WARD AND THE TWO GUNNERS ROY MACHIN AND RALPH BRIARS WERE AWARDED IMEADIATE D.F.M.
[underlined] 10 – 3 – 44 OSSUN [/underlined]
FIRST TRIP IN BRIGHT MOONLIGHT, FELT VERY OBVIOUS IN THE SKY, VISION ABOUT 3 MILES. EXPECTED BAGS OF FIGHTERS, BUT NONE SEEN, DIDN’T GET IT; OVER FRANCE AT 15,000 FEET TEMPERATURE MINUS 14, LOVELY, TARGET AT 8,000 FEET. CLEAR OVER OSSUN, HAD TO IDENTIFY TARGET FOR A CHANGE, WERE STOOGING AROUND FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES BUT DIDN’T FEEL UNDULY WORRIED, - IT WAS TOO PEACEFUL. AL FINALLY SAW THE TARGET AND WE BOMBED, WE HAD D A’S SO DID NOT SEE RESULT, BUT SAW AND HEARD OTHER BOMBS GO OFF. SAW PYRENEES, LOKED [sic] GRAND BUT RATHER FORBIDDING. RATHER TIRED ON RETURN.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] AL WAS OUR CANADIAN BOMB-AIMER, D A’S WERE DELAYED ACTION BOMBS, JUST TO CONFUSE OUR FRENCH ALLIES, WHO NO DOUB-T [sic] HAQD TO DEFUSE THEM.
[underlined] 15 – 3 – 44 STUTTGART [/underlined]
BAGS OF OPPOSITION ON THE WAY IN, SAW SEVERAL COMBATS – AND SEVERAL GO DOWN, NOT SO GOOD, MAKES ONE WONDER WHO’S NEXT. FLAK HEAVY OVER TARGET, NO FIGHTER FLARES, SAW ONE COLLISION. BIT IF [sic] A MIX UP, PFF LATE, FEW T I’S UNTILL WE LEFT, APEARED [sic] TO BE QUITE A GOOD BLAZE ON TARGET LATER. VERY QUIET RETURN, SAW NOTHING; CLOUDS UP TO 20,000 FEET IN PLACES, CON TRAILS APPEARD [sic] NEAR FRENCH COAST, MOON BRIGHT, EXPECTED TROUBLE, NONE CAME.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] PFF WAS PATH FINDER FORCE WHO IDENTIFIED THE TARGET AND DROPPED TARGET IDENTIFIERS – COLOURED GROUND MARKERS WHICH THE MAIN FORCE FOLLOWING BEHIND SIGHTED UPON -----
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----- AND THESE WERE BACKED UP AS NECESSARY AS THR [sic] RAID PROGRESSED SO POOR OLD PFF HAD TO CIRCLE AROUND UNTIL EVERYONE HAD DONE THEIR BIT, NOT AN ENVIABLE JOB; CON. TRAILS THEN, AS NOW, OCCUR WHEN AIR CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT WATER VAPOUR IN EACH ENGINE’S EXHAUST BREEZES [sic] AND TRAILS ALONG WHITE PLUME, JUST RIGHT FOR A NIGHT FIGHTER TO FOLLOW. CHANGING HEIGHT DOWNWARDS WAS THE CURE AND THE PILOT PROMPTLY DID SO ON HEARING THE WAILS FROM THE GUNNERS.
[underlined] 30 – 3 – 44 NUREMBURG [/underlined]
VERY COLD TRIP, OPPOSITION HEAVY SOUTH OF RHUR, FULL MOON NO CLOUD TO KEEP FIGHTERS DOWN. USUAL TROUBLE, ROUTE TOO LONG, JERRY MARKING TRACK ON BOTH SIDES WITH COLOURED FLARES, 96 AIRCRAFT LOST A.M. WILL HAVE TO REVISE ROUTING METHODS. SAW AT LEAST A DOZEN KITES SHOT DOWN, BAD FOR MORALE IF NOTHING ELSE, SEVERAL ROCKETS OBSERVED. TARGET LOOKED POOR, THICK FLAK AT 17,000 TO 19,000 FEET. WAY BACK AGONY TO SIT TWO HOURS AND KEEP AWAKE. PERHAPS DAYLIGHTER WOULDN’T BE SUCH A STRAIN. TIRED AS HELL, BED;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE LOSSES ON THIS RAID WERE THE WORST SUSTAINED DURING ONE OPERATION. AIR CHIEF MARSHALL HARRIS LATER SAID THAT AGAINST AN EXPERIENCED, WILY ENEMY, WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH MOST OF OUR AIR WAR STRATAGEMS BY 1944, THINGS WERE INEVITABLE OCCASIONALLY DISASTROUS. SEEMINGLY THE LONG STRAIGHT ROUTE LEGS WERE, HOPEFULLY, A RUSE TO SUGGEST TO THE LUFTWAFFE THAT WE WERE GOING TO NUREMBURG, WHERE UPON THEY WOULD, BY EXPERIENCE, SUSPECT WE WOULD SUDDENLY DIVERT ELSEWHERE AND DISPOSE THEIR FORCES ACCORDINGLY, THIS TIME THEY WERE NOT DECEIVED. TRULY ONE CANNOT WIN’EM ALL, PARTICULARLY IN WARTIME. REFERENCE TO (DAYLIGHTS) REFERRED TO DAY OPERATIONS, OF WHICH AT THAT TIME, WE HAD NO EXPERIENCE. WHEN, LATER, WE FLEW MANY SUCH RAIDS, I ADDED A FOOTNOTE TO THIS DIARY ENTRY – AFTER 22 DAYLIGHT TRIPS I FOUND THIS TRUE – WELL, THERE’S NO ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES.
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FOLLOWING THR NUREMBURG TRIP WE WERE POSTED, QUITE SUDDENLY AND FOR WHATEVER REASON, TO 617 SQUADRON AT WOODHALL SPA, NORTH OF BOSTON LINCOLNSHIRE. THE MUCH PUBLICISED RAIDS ON THE GERMAN DAMS AT MOHNE, SORPE AND EDER WERE CARRIED OUT BY THIS SPECIALLY FORMED SQUADRON, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY, THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY RETAINED FOR SPECIALISED OPERATIONS. LEONARD CHESHIRE WAS THE WING COMMANDER WHEN WE ARRIVED AND HE WAS REPLACED BY WILLY TAIT IN JULY, I THINK BOTH WERE OF SIMILAR MOULD AND MUCH RESPECTED.
[underlined] 18 – 4 – 44 JUVISY RAILWAY YARDS – PARIS [/underlined]
DARK NIGHT, 10,000 FEET ALL THE WAY, TEMPERATURE MINUS 5,. DROPPED FLARES TO HELP MOSQUITOES IDENTIFY MARSHALLING YARD, THEN CIRCLED AND BOMBED THEIR MARKER, SAW ONE MOSQUITO CIRCLING AT 2-3000 FEET APPARENTLY UNCONCERNED AT WHAT LITTLE FLAK THERE WAS, IMAGINED BOMBS SHOOK IT RATHER. NO FIGHTERS, FLAK SHIP IN THE CHANNEL FIRED AT US, WISH WE HAD BEEN LOW ENOUGH TO DO THE SAME. CIRCLED BASE FOR 50-55 MINUTES BEFORE COMING IN, - SHADES OF FISKERTON.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] MOSQUITOES WERE TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT, LARGELY BUILT OF PLYWOOD AND GLUED TOGETHER. FAST AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN VARIOUS ROLES – NIGHT FIGHTERS, BOMBERS THAT COULD DROP 4000 POUNDS ON BERLIN, RECONNAISSANCE AND CLANDESTINE MISSIONS INCLUDING CONVEYING DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS IN THE (VERY COLD) BOMB BAY BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN. BOTH CHESHIRE AND TAIT USED THESE FOR TARGET MARKING, LATER CHANGING TO ANOTHER EXCELLENT DESIGN, THE ROLLS-ROYCE ENGINE MUSTANG FIGHTER. PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWED AN UNUSUALLY CONCENTRATED BOMBING PATTERN, AT THE TIME WE DID NOT FULLY APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RAIL DISRUPTION SIX WEEKS OR SO BEFORE THE JUNE INVASION OF FRANCE. REFERENCE TO FISKERTON IS DUE TO THE GOOD OLD HABIT OF BELIEVING THE LAST WAS BETTER THAN THE NEW; ------
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------ INITIALLY I THINK WE FELT PROCEDURE AT WOODHALL WAS NOT TO THE STANDARD OF FISKERTON, IN OTHER WORDS WE WERE KEPT WAITING FOR OUR SUPPER; THIS SOMETIMES WAS DUE TO HAVING TO FLY AROUND TWO OUTER MARKER CIRCLES OF LIGHTS WHEN NEARBY CONNINGSBY WAS ALSO RECEIVING AIRCRAFT, AS MENTIOND [sic] IN THE FORWARD. TO BE FAIR, THOSE IN THE CONTROL TOWER WERE NO DOUBT JUST AS ANXIOUS TO GET US DOWN QUICKLY AS WE WERE; ONE’S FIRST DUTY WAS TO THE KING, THE SECOND TO GRUMBLE ABOUT THE METHOD OF SO DOING ..
[underlined] 20 – 4 – 44 PARIS – LA CHAPPELLE [/underlined]
INTRUDERS OVER AS WE TOOK OFF, STARTS STRAIN AT ONCE, STILL THERE WAS NO APPARENT TROUBLE. QUIET ALL IN AND OUT, BOMBED AT 11,500 FEET, TARGET, BEING NEARER THE CENTRE OF THE CITY, HAD QUITE A BIT OF MEDIUM AND LIGHT FLAK. LONG STRINGS OF RED AND GREEN CAME ALL ROUND, BURSTING ABOUT 1000 FEET BELOW, WITH BRIGHT SPARKLING FLASHES – PRETTY; AL WELL AND TRULY HIT THE YARDS WITH OUR BOMBS, CARRIED 12 X 1000 LBS BOMBS, NICE LOAD. SAW MOSQUITO RUN INTO AREA – AND SHOOT HELL OUT OF THEM. TEMPERATURE MINUS 5.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (INTRUDERS) WERE NIGHT FIGHTERS PROWLING AROUND FOR SOMEONE LEAVING THEIR NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON TOO LONG AFTER TAKE-OFF MIND YOU, A TRICKY DECISION. LEAVE THEM ON FOR FRIENDS TO SEE – AND THE LUFTWAFFE, TURN THEM OFF AND RISK A COLLISION.
[underlined] 22 – 4 – 44 BRUNSWICK [/underlined]
LITTLE FIGHTER OPPOSITION IN OR OUT, CONDITIONS HAZY OVER TARGET ABOVE 18,000 FEET, SO WE DIVED THROUGH TO ABOUT 16,000 FEET TO BOMB, PFF A FEW MINUTES LATE SO IT WAS A NIGHT-MARE OF KITES COMING IN ALL DIRECTIONS. HEARD FLAK BURSTING FOR THE FIRST TIME, TARGET WAS WELL ON FIRE. LONG TRIP BACK, TO AVOID ANOTHER LANCASTER JACK DIVED SO SUDDENLY AND STEEPLY MY NEW THERMOS WAS BROKEN, MY KNEE BRUISED AND ALL THE AMMUNITION WAS THROWN OUT OF THE TANKS. -----
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----- INTRUDERS ALL THE WAY HOME, DARNED NUISANCE BUT WE HAD NO TROUBLE, TEMPERATURE MINUS 15 TO MINUS 20
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] AS MENTIONED IN THE FOREWARD, CIRCLING THE TARGET WHILST AWAITING MARKERS TO BE DROPPED BY THE PATHFINDERS WAS NOT THE MOST DESIRABLE OCCUPATION. LOOK AT THE MOANS AND GROANS, TOO, DON’T YOU KNOW THERE’S A WAR ON.
[underlined] 24 – 4 – 44 MILAN (ABORTED) [/underlined]
OUR FIRST BOOMERANG; (EARLY RETURN TO BASE) SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF AN OIL PIPE IN THE TURRET BURST AND IN A FEW MINUTES THERE WAS NO OIL IN THE SYSTEM, - MOST OF IT WAS ON ME. AFTER A BIT OF NATTERY WE DECIDED TO RETURN, REMEMBERING THE LEIPZIG TRIP, AND IN VIEW OF A LONG JOURNEY – MILAN. PITY, BUT IT WAS THE BEST THING, BESIDES, WE GO ON LEAVE TOMORROW.
[underlined] 6 – 6 – 44 2ND FRONT (D-DAY) [/underlined]
AFTER NEARLY SIX WEEKS OF VERY BORING TRAINING AND INACTION WE DID OUR STUFF – SLINGING OUT WINDOW TO SIMULATE A CONVOY AND TO CONFUSE POOR JERRY; BY THE LACK OF OPPOSITION DURING TROOP LANDINGS IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A USEFUL TRIP. TOOK TWO CREWS IN ONE KITE, ROY AND I TOOK TURNS AS FRONT GUNNER, QUITE A CHANGE. SAW SOME OF THE SHIPPING IN THE CHANNEL – GRAND SIGHT – ALSO THE LUFTWAFFE APPARENTLY ATTACKING A CONVOY, ONE SHIP CAUGHT FIRE AND BLEW UP. LOTS OF TUGS AND GLIDERS SEEN GOING OVER. QUIET TRIP.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (WINDOW) WAS METALLIC COATED STRIP DROPPED TO CONFUSE ENEMY RADAR. WE FLEW OVAL COURSES, EACH CIRCUIT BEING PROGRESSIVELY NEARER FRANCE. THE INTERVALS OF DROPPING THE FOIL MATCHED THE SPEED OF AN IMAGINARY CONVOY IN THE CHANNEL APPROACHING THE COAST MILES TO THE EAST OF THE ACTUAL LANDING AREA IN NORMANDY -------
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------ I AM NOT NOW SURE, BUT POSSIBLY ANOTHER SQUADRON WAS WITH US. TWO CREWS BECAUSE OF THE QUANTITY OF WINDOW TO BE DROPPED. AGAIN, MANY AIRCRAFT ORBITING UNSEEN TO EACH OTHER OVER A FOUR HOUR PERIOD IN QUITE A NARROW SPACE. I DOUBT THE BLOOMIN’ INFANTRY BELOW CONCIDERED [sic] THERE WAS A LACK OF OPPOSITION! WE CAN ONLY HOPE OUR EFFORTS SOMWHAT [sic] REDUCED THE PRESSURE.
[underlined] 8 – 6 – 44 SAUMER (FRANCE) [/underlined]
FLEW THROUGH CLOUD MOST OF THE WAY THERE AND BACK, WEATHER CLEAR OVER TARGET. USUAL SCHEME, H2S KITES DROPPED FLARES AND MOSQUITOES MARKED WITH RED SPOT FIRES. SQUADRON CARRIED 12,000 POUNDER BOMBS, - LOOK LIKE TORPEDOES – AND WE TOOK 1,000 POUNDERS TO ATTACK NEARBY BRIDGE, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE FAIRLY UNSUCESSFUL [sic]. BIG BOMBS MADE COLOSSAL FLASH AND WE SAW EARTH FLUNG TO HELL OF A HEIGHT, THIS WAS SUCESSFUL! FLAK FROM ONE GUN BURST AT OUR HEIGHT BUT ONLY IN ONE AREA, SO WE CIRCLED ROUND IT – NO FIGHTERS ARRIVED, - NO TROUBLE, DIVERTED TO METHERINGHAM AIRFIELD TO LAND BECAUSE OF LOW CLOUD.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] SAUMER WAS ON THE MAIN RAIL LINK TO NORTHERN FRANCE AND THE OPERATION WAS TO PREVENT PANZER DIVISIONS ARRIVING AT THE DEVELOPING BRIDGEHEAD AT NORMANDY. THERE ARE PICTURES SHOWING HOW COMPLETELY THE TUNNEL WAS BLOCKED. H2S WAS AN EARY [sic] FORM OF RADAR THAT GAVE THE NAVIGATOR A RATHER POOR PICTURE ON HIS VDU OF THE GROUND BELOW. RIVERS AND ESTUARIES SHOWED UP QUITE WELL, OTHER FEATURES WERE NOT EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE. THE EXTERNAL SCANNER WAS CONTAINED IN A PROMINENT HALF-EGG SHAPE HOUSING BELOW THE AIRCRAFT. THIS TRIP WAS THE FIRST TIME WE HAD COME ACROSS THE 12,000 LB. BOMB, CODE NAME (TALLBOY) AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY DROPPED MANY ON SPECIALIST TARGETS. THEIR TAIL FINS WERE OFFSET, AND WHEN DROPPED FROM NEARBY AIRCRAFT ONE COULD OBSERVE THEM STARTING TO SPIN AS THEY RAPIDLY FELL OUT OF SIGHT. MY LOG BOOK REVEALS THAT WITH CAPTAIN SANDERS I WENT TO METHERINGHAM BY ROAD TO FLY OUR LANCASTER BACK TO WOODHALL. AS FLIGHT ENGNEER [sic] (TEMPORARY UNPAID) I THINK I WAS PERMITTED TO RAISE THE UNDER-CARRIAGE (MY FINEST HOUR.)
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[underlined] 14 – 6 – 44 LE HAVRE [/underlined]
FIRST DAYLIGHT RAID – OVER THE TARGET ABOUT 10-30 P.M. FLEW IN FORMATION GOING, SOME SIGHT, WENT AS FRONT GUNNER AS WE STILL HAVE NO KITE OF OUR OWN. SECOND TO BOMB – WITH TALLBOY – TARGET QUIET UNTILL A FEW MINUTES BEFORE DROPPING THE BOMB, THEN THEY LET LOOSE BAGS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM FLAK, PREDICTED, TOO AS BOMB LEFT FLAK HIT STARBOARD INNER ENGINE AND TOP TURRET, GUNNER OK, ENGINE HAD TO BE FEATHERED. E BOAT PENS, 25 FEET THICK, WERE HIT, GOOD BOMBING. SAW PART OF SPITFIRE ESCORT, NO ENEMY FIGHTERS SEEN, INTERESTING TRIP.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE LANCASTER WE FLEW FROM FISKERTON WHEN POSTED TO 617 SQUADRON IN APRIL 1944 REMAINED A 49 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH WE USED IT ON SEVERAL OPERATIONS PENDING IT’S RETURN TO THAT SQUADRON. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ALLOCATED A 617 AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN REPAIRED AFTER A SPOT OF BOTHER LATE IN 1943. OMINOUSLY NUMBERED ME562, IT NEVERTHELESS SERVED US WELL OVER NINE MONTHS FOR NINETEEN OR SO OPERATIONS, SURVIVED THE WAR AND WAS SOLD OUT OF SERVICE IN JANUARY 1947. BY CONTRAST, OF THE TWELVE OTHER OPERATIONAL LANCASTERS WE HAD FLOWN IN – EITHER ON RAIDS OR PRACTICE BOMBING OR OTHER EXERCISES – ONLY TWO SURVIVED, ONE BEING THE FIRST WE HAD FLOWN IN ON A CROSS-COUNTRY EXERCISE ON ARRIVAL AT FISKERTON.
[underlined] 15 – 6 – 44 BOULOGNE [/underlined]
FOUND PORT OUTER ENGINE MOUNTING HAD ALSO BEEN HIT AFTER LAST NIGHT, SO IT HAD TO BE CHANGED, THIS MADE US FORTY MINUTES LATE TAKING OFF BUT WE GOT OVER THE TARGET SHORTLY BEFORE REST OF KITES LEFT, VISIBILITY WAS VERY BAD WITH LOW CLOUD AND WE WERE TOLD TO RETURN TO BASE. BOB KNIGHTS, BEING A KEEN TYPE AND IN VIEW OF THE WORK THE GROUND CREW HAD DONE DECIDED TO BOMB. BAGS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM FLAK, HOT FOR A FEW MINUTES, REAR TURRET AND OIL TANK HIT, NO ONE INJURED. TARGET LOOKED QUITE A MESS WHEN WE LEFT, SAW LITTLE FIGHTER COVER. TARGET HEIGHT 7,500 FEET. ------
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------ [underlined] NOTES [/underlined] HERE AGAIN, I FLEW WITH THE SAME PILOT AS THE DAY BEFORE. WHAT NOW PUZZLES ME IS WHY I FLEW FIVE SUCCESSIVE TRIPS WITH BOB KNIGHTS, AS FRONT GUNNER. WHAT WAS THE THEN P.O. SANDERS DOING ALL THIS TIME? I HAVE A FEELING HE WAS AWAY HAVING A BABY, FOR I HAVE A FAINT RECOLLECTION OF A CONSTANT AIR OF CRISIS CONCERNING THE EVENT. THERE WERE EVEN STRONG RUMOURS THAT A LANCASTER HAD BEEN BORROWED TO FURTHER THE ABOUT-TO-BE-FARTHER’S [sic] CAUSE.
[underlined] 19 – 6 – 44 WATTEN (PAS DE CALAIS) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 6 PM IN TRUE FIGHTER STYLE, ONE EACH SIDE OF THE RUNWAY, FLEW OVER IN FORMATION OF FIVE, WEATHER PERFECT. FIGHTER COVER OF SPITFIRES., MET US AT ORFORDNESS. TARGET 10-12 MILES INLAND, SAW RESULTS OF THE MARAUDERS WORK IN LOTS OF PLACES, A LITTLE FLAK OUTSIDE TARGET AREA DIDN’T TROUBLE US. CIRCLING FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES BEFORE WING COMMANDER GAVE THE OK TO BOMB, TARGET DIFFICULT IT WAS IN A CLEARING ON THE EDGE OF A WOOD. BOMBING FAIR, BOMBAIMER’S [sic] A BIT DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS, WATCHED THE REST OF THE AIRCRAFT COMING IN TO BOMB AND THEN CAME HOME. BELIEVE BANDITS TURNED UP AS MOSQUITOES LEFT – GOOD SHOW, FLEW AT 17,000 FEET.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE OPERATION WAS AGAINST FLYING BOMB SITES AS WERE MANY OTHERS THIS MONTH AND AGAIN IN JULY. (MARAUDERS) WERE TWIN ENGINE AMERICAN BOMBERS MUCH USED BY THE TACTICAL AIR FORCES.
[underlined] 4 – 7 – 44 ST-LEV-D’ – ESSERENT (PARIS) [/underlined]
FULL MOON – EXPECTED – AND HAD A RECEPTION AS AT NUREMBURG, SEARCHLIGHT BELT JUST INSIDE COAST ANNOYING BUT NO FLAK. COMBATS SEEN ALL THE WAY IN AND OUT, AT TARGET WE TURNED AND HAD THE MOON BEHIND, HARDLY HELPFUL; FIGHTERS CAME IN FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, NEVER SEEN SO MUCH TRACER, GOT VERY MAD AND SCARED; ------
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------ JU88 AT LAST CAME NEAR ENOUGH TO GIVE IT TWO LONG SQUIRTS OF GUN FIRE AND IT APPEARED TO GO INTO ONE BIG BALL OF FIRE, LOST SIGHT OF IT BUT SKIPPER RECKONS IT BROKE IN HALF AND HIT THE DECK. UNABLE TO BOMB BECAUSE MARKERS INDEFINITE, PITY. FIGHTERS FOLLOWED ALL THE WAY TO OUR COAST, COULDN’T HAVE ANY COFFEE TILL WE GOT TO READING.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] TARGET HERE WAS A V.1 STORAGE DEPOT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PARIS. V1’S WERE PILOTLESS FLYING BOMBS V2’S WERE THE LATER GUIDED ROCKETS. THE LAUNCH SITES OF BOTH WERE THE FOCUS OF MUCH BOMBING EFFORT, AND WERE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LOCATE.
[underlined] 17 – 7 – 44 WIZERNES (FRANCE) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 11 A.M FLEW IN LOOSE BUNCH TILL REACHING TARGET, CLOSED UP A LITTLE THERE. WEATHER GRAND, ABOUT 1/10 CLOUD COVER OVER FRANCE, TARGET VISABLE [sic]. TARGET AREA HEAVILY BOMBED. SPITFIRE ESCORT, SAW NO HUN FIGHTERS, NO FLAK AT ALL, GENERALLY ALL WAS REMARKABLY QUIET. BOMBING SEEMED GOOD – ALTOGETHER VERY NICE AND QUIET TRIP. HAD TWO EGGS FOR DINNER, WONDER WHAT THE CATCH IS.
[underlined] 25 – 7 – 44 WATTEN [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 07-00 FAIRLY CLEAR, COOL. SKY CLEARED NICELY OVER THE CHANNEL, TARGET EASILY SEEN. WATCHED KITES BEHIND AS WE RAN IN, SO INTERESTED THAT I FORGOT ABOUT DEFENCES, AND THEY LET GO SOME VERY ACCURATE FLAK JUST BEFORE BOMB WENT DOWN. DESPITE ALL THIS BOMBS WERE WELL DROPPED, GRAND SHOW ON BOMBAIMERS [sic] PART. WEAVED LIKE HELL FOR A FEW MINUTES TILL CLEAR OF AREA, NEVER FELT OR HEARD FLAK SO NEAR – SLUNG OUT SOME WINDOW MYSELF, STARBOARD TAILPLANE SLIGHTLY DAMAGED. SAW ONE KITE HIT IN ENGINE, SMOKE POURED OUT, ENGINE WAS FEATHERD [sic] AND THEY GOT BACK HOME.
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[underlined] 31 – 7 – 44 RILLY-LA-MONTAGE (NEAR RHEIMS) [/underlined]
WENT WITH ABOUT 200 MAIN FORCE KITES, - MADE A SIGHT WORTH SEEING. TARGET 120-150 MILES INLAND, JUST SOUTH OF RHEIMS, ANTICIPATED SOME JERRY ACTIVITY BUT NONE APART FROM HEAVY FLAK IN TARGET AREA. TARGET IN WOOD, DEPOT FOR FLYING BOMBS, RESULTS APPEARED GOOD, DIFFICULT TO ASSESS DUE TO SMOKE. JUST MANAGED TO WEAVE OUT OF THE WAY OF A STICK OF BOMBS FROM KITE ABOVE. BILL REID V.C. WAS HIT THE SAME WAY AND WAS LOST – SEE NOTES. WEATHER QUITE CLEAR. SPITFIRE ESCORT. ONE PIECE OF FLAK IN AIRCRAFT NOSE, AL (BOMB AIMER) DIDN’T KNOW TILL WE LANDED.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] BILL REID’S AIRCRAFT WAS TO ONE SIDE AND BELOW US AND WAS HIT BEHIND THE TOP TURRET BY A BOMB THAT DID NOT EXPLODE BUT SO DAMAGED THE FUSELAGE THAT IT MOMENTARILY SAGGED, THEN BROKE IN TWO AND SPUN AWAY. MIRACULOUSLY, BILL AND ONE OF HIS CREW SURVIVED. DURING THE LUNCH FOLLOWING THE SQUADRON MEMORIAL DEDICATION IN 1987, BILL TOLD US OF HIS FEELINGS AS HE FELL FROM THE STRICKEN LANCASTER, KNOWING HE HAD WON A FEW POUNDS GAMBLING, (THERE GOES THAT B----- REID) THEY WOULD BE SAYING (TAKING OUR MONEY WITH HIM) A LOVELY CHAP.
[underlined] 5 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 09-45, CLIMBED ON TRACK FOR A CHANGE. WEATHER PERFECT, COUNTRYSIDE LOOKED GRAND, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH WEST. SPITFIRE’S MET US OFF SIDMOUTH. TARGET U-BOAT PENS, DIDN’T FEEL SO HAPPY KNOWING BREST’S REPUTATION FOR FLAK, OVER 80 HEAVY GUNS TO BE SHARED AMONGST SIXTEEN KITES. AS WE RAN IN FLAK BANGED VERY CLOSE, BUT CLEARED FOR BOMBING RUN. GOOD RESULTS, FIVE PENS HIT, REST VERY CLOSE. SAW ONE PARACHUTE FROM KITE THAT WAS LOST, QUEER THING, IT APPEARED TO BE UNDER CONTROL BUT MADE NO EFFORT TO COME HOME. WE HAD FLAK THROUGH THE NOSE AND ONE ENGINE COVER.
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE AIRCRAFT LOST AT BREST WAS PROBABLY F/LT CHENEY’S, AND BRINCKHILL’S BOOK (THE DAM BUSTERS) HAS A VIVID DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENED TO IT AFTER RECEIVING DIRECT FLAK SHELLS. THE PILOT AND TWO OTHERS WERE PICKED UP BY A FRENCH FISHING BOAT AND LATER RETURNED TO THE SQUADRON, THE REST WERE NEVER FOUND.
[underlined] 6 – 8 – 44 LORIENT [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 18-00, WEATHER AND FLIGHT PLAN AS BEFORE, PROBABLY; SAW AN AIRFIELD BEING SHELLED NEAR TARGET. FLAK STARTED EARLY BUT AT 16,000 FEET WE SEEMED TO BE IN A FREE BELT, AS ABOVE AND BELOW IT WAS VERY THICK. BOMBING RUN GOOD, ALTOGETHER IT DIDN’T APPEAR TO BE SUCH A GOOD EFFORT AS YESTERDAYS, BUT DIFFICULT TO TELL REALLY. HEAVY FLAK FOR A FEW MINUTES OUT OF THE AREA, HIT IN TAILPLANE AND SPINNER, NO KITES LOST. HOPE THERE ARE NO MORE PENS TO HIT, JERRY GETS ANNOYED SOMEWHAT.
[underlined] 9 – 8 – 44 LA PALLICE [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 10-00, WEATHER GOOD. BEING A BIT LATE WE CUT ACROSS COUNTRY, PASSED QUITE CLOSE TO ALDERNEY AND GUERNSEY, EVENTUALLY CAUGHT UP WITH THE REST NEAR FRENCH COAST. WENT NEAR TO LORIENT AND FOLLOWED COAST TO THE TARGET. RAN IN FROM THE SEA, NO FLAK UNTILL BOMB WENT, RESULTS GOOD EXCEPT FOR ONE BOMB THAT WENT A LONG WAY WIDE AND HIT THE HARBOUR WORKS INSTEAD OF THE PENS. FLAK MODERATE, HIT ON ONE SPINNER. QUITEA [sic] LONG TRIP, SAW NO ENEMY FIGHTERS, ESCORT OF MUSTANGS AND SPITFIRES, MOST OF THEM MET US ON THE WAY BACK – HELPFUL; SKIPPER AND ROY’S THIRTIETH TRIP.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] ALTHOUGH AIRCREWS NORMALLY FLEW TOGETHER UNDER ONE PILOT, THERE WERE OCCASIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS WOULD JOIN OTHER CREWS, AS I DID FOR SEVERAL TRIPS WITH BOB KNIGHTS. THE REASONS WERE MANY, SICKNESS OF ONE MEMBER MIGHT RESULT IN A REPLACEMENT FROM ANOTHER CREW, OR THE VARIOUS TRADES MIGHT BE FARMED OUT TO OTHER CREWS NEEDING TEMPORARY STAFF. ------
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------- THUS DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF THE SAME CREW OFTEN HAD VARYING NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL SORTIES TO THEIR CREDIT, I SEEM TO REMEMBER THAT ON ARRIVING AT 49 SQUADRON OUR PILOT, JOHN SANDERS, FLEW HIS FIRST FLIGHT OVER GERMANY AS SECOND PILOT, SO HE WAS ONE UP ON THE REST OF US ALREADY; I SUPPOSE THE IDEA WAS TO SEE IF HE LIKED THE EXPERIENCE. . . . THE FIRST TOUR WAS THIRTY OPERATIONS, THE SECOND FIFTEEN.
[underlined] 11 – 8 – 44 LA PALLICE [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 11.30, LOAD 6 X 2.000 LD. [sic] ARMOUR PIERCING, DON’T KNOW WHAT USE THESE ARE AGAINST PENS, - OURS NOT TO REASON WHY. ROUTE AS YESTERDAY, AS WAS THE ESCORT. MUCH MORE FLAK ON RUN IN, SAW ONE KITE HIT AND CONTINUE ON THREE ENGINES, HEARD LOTS OF BURSTS, BOMBS WENT DOWN BANG ON TARGET, WE WERE HIT IN THE AIRCRAFT NOSE AND ONE ENGINE, NOTHING SERIOUS. LANDED AT GROVE, SHORT OF PETROL. HOPE THIS TARGET IS FINISHED, FLAK FAR TOO ACCURATE FOR COMFORT,
[underlined] 12 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 07-00 – 12 HOURS AFTER LANDING. WEATHER PRETTY FOUL, TRIED TO CLIMB THROUGH CLOUD, BECAME ICED UP, HAD TO REDUCE TO 11,000 FEET AND CLIMB OVER CHANNEL. ONLY EIGHT KITES ON THE RAID, EXPECTED TO BE SHOT TO HELL, BUT LUCKILY FLAK WAS LIGHTER AND LESS ACCURATE THAN BEFORE, - ONE FLAK SHIP IN THE HARBOUR. PENS APPEARED TO RECEIVE SEVERAL DIRECT HITS, SMOKE POURED FROM GAP IN THE ROOF, SMALL DENT IN SPINNER, NOT BAD TRIP, INTERCOM BETTER THAN YESTERDAY, SO CREW WAS MORE SOCIABLE; SAW NO ESCORT, EXCEPT USUAL MOSQUITO.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] IT SEEMS WE HAD MORE DENTED SPINNERS THAN ANYTHING ELSE, WHICH IS PROBABLY VERY FORTUNATE, CURIOUS REFERENCE TOA [sic] MOSQUITO AS ESCORT, WHEREAS I KNOW VERY WELL IT WAS THE MARKING AIRCRAFT. PERHAPS THE CRACKS WERE BEGINNING TO SHOW.
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[underlined] 13 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 08-30, WEATHER GOOD. TARGET FOR US WAS A SHIP IN THE HARBOUR THAT MIGHT BE USED AS A BLOCKSHIP, OTHERS BOMBED PENS, AND 9 SQUADRON SUPPORTING HAD ANOTHER VESSEL. FLAK; COR! IT WAS HOT, JUST LIKE FIRST TIME TO BREST HIT IN UNDERCARRIAGE AND HYDRAULICS, BEFORE OUR BOMB LOAD (12 X 1.000 POUNDERS) WENT DOWN, BAGS OF HOT OIL AND VAPOUR IN THE NOSE, PANIC FOR A FEW MINUTES; TOMMY’S HARNESS WAS HIT AND THERE WERE OTHER HOLES. SAW ONE KITE GO DOWN, STRAIGHT DOWN AND BURST ON THE SHORE, NASTY, ONE BURST OF FLAK WAS PINK, - GREMLINS GOT ME AT LAST; ALTOGETHER FAR TOO LIVELY FOR MY LIKING.
[underlined] 14 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 08-30, USUAL TIME, WEATHER GOOD. AFTER YESTERDAYS EFFORT FELT LOUSY ON THE WAY ANTICIPATING EVERY SORT OF TROUBLE, THE OLD TUMMY GETS A BIT SORE THINKING OF FLAK THESE DAY’S. TARGET – SHIP IN THE HARBOUR AGAIN, 9 SQUADRON SUPPORTING RAN INTO TARGET IN MORE N.W. DIRECTION – OVER – BAY HEIGHT 16,200 FEET, FLAK BOUNCED US ABOUT A BIT BUT IT WASN’T QUITE SO BAD. PIECES OF FLAK THROUGH JACK’S SCREEN, MID UPPER TURRET AND ONE ENGINE, NOTHING SERIOUS. SAW SEVEN STICKS OF BOMBS GO DOWN, EACH JUST MISSED THE SHIP, HOPE SOMEONE HIT IT OR BACK WE GO ANOTHER DAY. BOMB LOAD 6 X 2,000 POUNDERS, ARMOUR – PIERCING.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (STICKS) WERE THE ENTIRE BOMB LOAD DROPPED BY EACH AIRCRAFT. IT WAS INFURIATING TO WATCH THE FOUNTAINS OF SPRAY APPEAR AS EACH BOMB HIT THE WATER ON EITHER SIDE OF THE VESSEL. I WONDER IF IT EVER SANK, WE DIDN’T GO TO BREST AGAIN, THANK GOODNESS, (THE SHIP WAS THE GERMAN CRUISER GUEYDON) WE THEN WENT ON TO MORE INTERESTING THINGS. -----
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[underlined] 11 – 9 – 44 KAA FIORD NORWAY (VIA RUSSIA) [/underlined]
THE BIG ONE AGAINST THE GERMAN POCKET BATTLESHIP [underlined] TIRPITZ [/underlined], WHICH HAD SO FAR LED A CHARMED LIFE DESPITE A VARIETY OF ATTACKS BY EVERY – BODY EXCEPT THE ARMY, - AND SURVIVED THE LOT AS THE VESSEL WAS OUT OF RANGE FROM BRITAIN THE PLAN WAS TO FLY TO YAGODNIK, AN ISLAND AIRFIELD UPSTREAM FROM ARCHANGEL, REFUEL, CARRY OUT THE RAID, REFUEL AGAIN IN RUSSIA AND RETURN TO LINCOLNSHIRE. AS ADDITIONAL PETROL HAD TO BE CARRIED THE TOP TURRET WAS REMOVED, TOGETHER WITH MUCH OF THE AMMUNITION FOR THE REAR TURRET, SOME OF THE RADAR AND THE EXHAUST COWS [sic] FROM EACH ENGINE, - WHICH SEEMED RATHER EXTREME AND MAY HAVE BEEN DONE UNDER THE OLD DICTUM THAT EVERY LITTLE HELPS. A 250 GALLON FUEL WAS INSTALLED IN THE FUSELAGE, AND THE LENGTH OF THE TANK NECESSITATED THE DEPARTURE OF THE TOP TURRET. WE CARRIED TWELVE 450 POUND BOMBS – WHICH I HAVE A FEELING WERE A SORT OF SEA MINE – AND OTHERS HAD THE 12,000 POUND “TALLBOY”. THERE WERE TWENTY LANCASTERS FROM 617 AND EIGHTEEN FROM 9 SQUADRON. THE DIARY ENTRY:
TOOK OFF 19-00, HEADED FOR NORWAY AT 2,000 FEET, CLIMBED TO 6,000 FEET AT THE COAST TO CLEAR THE MOUNTAINS, BIT CLOUDY, SAW GLIMPSES OF THE PEAKS AT TIMES. SWEDEN WAS WELL LIGHTED, EVEN SAW NEON SIGNS OCCASIONALLY, SOME FLAK IN ONE AREA, ONE KITE DAMAGED. AS IT BECAME LIGHTER WE DROPPED TO AVOID CLOUD AT 500-1,000 FEET, CROSSED WHITE SEA VERY LOW, LOOKED SOMEWHAT INHOSPITABLE AND COLD. EVENTUALLY FOUND ARCHANGEL IN THE MOUTH OF THE RIVER, AND AFTER SOME SEARCHING CAME ACROSS THE AIRFIELD ON A [sic] ISLAND DOWN STREAM. LANDED ON GRASS WITH BOMBS ON BOARD. QUARTERS IN A OLD RIVER STEAMER, HAD TO CLEAN OUT, WASHING AND SANITARY CONDITIONS LOUSY. MEALS GOOD GENERALLY, PLENTY OF EGGS, BUTTER AND SUGAR. TEA WITHOUT MILK – IN GLASSES – SLIGHTLY SOUR BREAD AND SPAM WILL BE REMEMBERD [sic]; --------;
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----- SWAPPED CIGARETTES FOR CAP BADGES, COINS, PAPER MONEY AND BUTTONS. ENTERTAINED EVERY NIGHT WITH CONCERTS, FILMS AND DANCES. BAND COULD EVEN PLAY (LAMBETH WALK) SAND AND GRASS FIELD, WEATHER SLIGHTLY COLDER THAN AT HOME.
TOOK OFF 09-30 ON SEPTEMBER 15TH LOOSE GAGGLE, 1,000 FEET, ROUTE OVER FINLAND, SWEDEN AND NORWAY, A GOD-FORSAKEN COUNTRYSIDE OF HILLS, RIVERS, TIMBER AND MARSHES. WE LED J.W. FORCE AND CAME IN FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. TO THE MAIN FORCE. SAW SMOKE GENERATORS START UP A FEW MINUTES BEFORE BOMBING, NUISANCE. SAW J.W’S SWINGING DOWN ON PARACHUTES, WEIRD SIGHT, FLAK SCATTERD [sic] AND INACCURATE, SUPRISING [sic] AS WE BOMBED AT 11,000 FEET, NO FIGHTERS. ONE KITE ONLY DAMAGED.
TOOK OFF 19-15 ON THE 16TH TO RETURN HOME. WEATHER DULL, POOR VISIBILITY, 1,500 FEET OVER FINLAND, CLIMED [sic] TO 7,000 OVER SEA AND SWEDEN. DARK NIGHT, SAW SOME AIRFIELDS LIGHTED, OCCASIONAL LIGHT FLAK. BAD WEATHER JUST AFTER LEAVING SWEDEN, HAD TO DROP TO 4,000 FEET TO CLEAR CLOUD AND HEAVY RAIN, OFF TRACK, RAN OVER NORTH DENMARK, SEARCHLIGHTS EVADED BY USING CLOUD COVER, FLAK SHIPS A DARN NUISANCE OFF COAST. CARRIED THREE OF ROSS’S CREW BACK. BET THEY WERE COLD IN THE FUSEELARGE [sic]. GLAD TO SEE ENGLISH SEARCHLIGHTS AND AIRFIELDS AGAIN – AND REAL EGG, BACON AND CHIPS ON RETURN.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] RE READING THE DIARY REMINDS ME OF THE PROFICIENCY OF OUR NAVIGATOR, JAMES BARON, WHO SO SKILLFULLY [sic] GUIDED OUR WAY TO RUSSIA AND BACK, BASICALLY WITH ONLY HIS EXPERTISE, MAP, AND SIX PAIRS OF ANXIOUS EYES TO ASSIST. NO NAVIGATIONAL AIDS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, SEVERAL AIRCRAFT FORCE-LANDED IN THE AREA WHEN FUEL RAN OUT IN THEIR VAIN SERCH [sic] FOR THE LANDING FIELD; SO FAR AS I RECALL, NO ONE WAS LOST, THE RUSSIANS BROUGHT THEM ALONG IN VARIOUS ANCIENT LIGHT PLANES AT INTERVALS. THERE IS A PHOTO OF A DOWNED LANCASTER, IT’S 12,000 POUND TALLBOY BOMB HURLED FREE ON LANDING INPACT [sic] AND LAYING FORLORNLY IN THE MUD. A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE AIRCRAFT.
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THE CREWS INVOVLED [sic] WITH THESE CRASHED LANCASTERS CAME HOME IN OTHER AIRCRAFT AND THEIR AIRCRAFT LEFT IN RUSSIA.
THE RUSSIAN FILMS WERE TERRIBLE, LONG AFFAIRS OF CONTINUAL WAR SCENES, AND I SEEM TO RECALL THAT THE ROYAL NAVY CONTINGENT AT ARCHANGEL SENT SOME CARTOONS WHICH CHEERED US UP AND LEFT OUR HOSTS BAFFLED. LIVING AROUND THE AIRFIELD IN VARIOUS PRIMITIVE HUTS WERE SOME OF THE RUSSIAN STAFF, INCLUDING, NO DOUBT, THE LADIES WHO FELL ABOUT IN LAUGHTER WHEN ASKED FOR HOT WATER TO SHAVE WITH – SUCH WESTEN [sic] DECADENCE. THE MEN SPENT MUCH TIME PLAYING CARDS ON THE RIVER BANK. THEIR WIVES ONLY APPEARED WHEN CALLED TO HAVE LARGE TREE TRUNKS, THAT HAD FLOATED DOWN FROM THE URALS, HOISTED ON TO THEIR STURDY SHOULDERS BY THEIR CARING PARTNERS; IT WAS A PEACEFUL SCENE, ONLY DISTURBED BY THE SOUND OF CHOPPING AND SAWING WHILST THE INTERRUPTED CARD GAME CONTINUED. LENIN WOULD SURELY HAVE APPROVED. I JEST A LITTLE, WITHIN THE LIMITATION OF THE TIMES, THE RUSSIANS WE MET WERE GENERALLY KINDLY, GENEROUS HOSTS. THEY BEAT US HANDSOMELY AT FOOTBALL TOO.
THE WAIT FOR SUITABLE WEATHER ACCOUNTED MAINLY FOR THE FEW DAYS THAT PASSED BEFORE ATTACKING THE (TIRPITZ) AND THE TIME WAS PROBABLY USEFUL TO ENABLE SOME AIRCRAFT SERVICING TO BE DONE. I THINK OUR J.W. BOMBS WERE KNOWN FOR SOME REASON AS JOHNNY WALKERS, AND AS DESCRIBED, THEY FLOATED GENTLY DOWN ON PARACHUTES. IF THEY HIT SOMETHING SOLID THEY EXPLODED ON CONTACT, IF THEY FELL INTO THE WATER THEY WOULD SINK ARMED THEM SELVES AND RISE TO THE SURFACE HOPEFULLY DETONATING UNDER A SHIP IF NO TARGET WAS FOUND THEY WOULD SINK AGAIN AND MOVE 30 FEET AND REPEAT.
AT THE TIME OWING TO THE SMOKE SCREEN THE RAID WAS NOT THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN THAT SUCCESSFUL, BUT LATER IT WAS FOUND THAT TALLBOY NEAR MISSES HAD DAMAGED THE SHIP AND PREVENTED IT FROM RETURNING TO THE SEA.
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THE TAKE-OFF TO RETURN HOME TO ENGLAND WAS AN INTERESTING SIGHT FOR ONLOOKERS, AS REFUELLING HAD TO BE DONE WITH THE ONLY AVAILABLE LOWER OCTANE RATED PETROL SO THERE WAS SOME ENGINE COUGHING AND BANGING AS EACH LANCASTER SPED ALONG THE SO CALLED RUNWAY AND FINALLY STAGGERD [sic] INTO THE AIR.
[underlined] 23 – 9 – 44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]
NIGHT TRIP AGAIN – DARNED IF I LIKE ‘EM TARGET – AQUEDUCT CARRYING CANAL ACROSS A RIVER, LOAD TALLBOY. HAD FIRST SHAKING WHEN TWO KITES COLLIDED OFF THE COAST; THEN ANTI-RADAR LIGHTS WERE LEFT UNCOVEREDAND [sic] FLASHES ALL ROUND THE TRIP. QUEER THINGS, RED GREEN AND YELLOW FLARES, ENORMOUS FLAK BURSTS, KITES GOING DOWN WITHOUT COMBAT, - NO TRACER USED BY FIGHTERS, I GUESS. SPOT FIRE JUST UNDER CLOUD, HAD SEVERAL TRIES TO BOMB, BUT IT BECAME COVERED JUST BEFORE RELEASE SO WE BROUGHT THE BOMB BACK FELT VERY TIRED AND SHAKEN ON RETURN, CURSE THE DARKNESS.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] I DON’T REALY [sic] RECOLLECT BEING UNDULY DISTURBED ABOUT OPERATIONS, BUT IT SEEMS THERE IS JUST A HINT OF BOTHER WITH MY DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS. USUALLY UNSYMPATHETICALLY REFERRED TO AS THE TWITCH, IT WAS QUITE OFTEN EVIDENT IN THE DEMEANOUR OF THOSE IN THEIR THIRD OR FOURTH TOUR.
[underlined] 29 – 10 – 44 KEMS BARRAGE (ON THE RHINE) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 13-10 PLAN SEVEN KITES TO BOMB AT 7-6,000 FEET, SIX AT [underlined] 600 [/underlined] FEET, WE WERE ONE OF THE SIX, OF COURSE AFTER THE DRAW, MUSTANGS AS ESCORT AND ANTI-FLAK. WE BOMBED FIVE MINUTES AFTER HIGH FORCE, RAN IN TWO ABREAST DROPPING TALLBOY WITH DELAYED ACTION. NOT A LOT OF FLAK, BUT MACHINE GUNS VERY ACCURATE WHICH HIT TWO KITES AFTER BOMBING, THEY HIT THE DECK – HARD, SO ONLY FOUR OUT OF THE SIX MADE IT. MY PERSPEX WAS SHATTERED TWO SPLINTERS IN MY SHOULDER, (NOTHING MUCH) BLAZED AWAY AT FLAK POSTS, VERY HAPPY; AL’S BOMB ZIPPED OVER BARRAGE TOP, GATES FINALLY GAVE AWAY, GOOD JOB.
[page break]
33
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THIS WAS A PRE-EMPT EFFORT TO FORESTALL THE GERMANS FROM RELEASING THE PENT UP WATERS OF THE RHINE WHEN ALLIED GROUND FORCES WERE ABOUT TO CROSS. THE EFFECT OF A CONSIDERABLE HEAD OF WATER UPON TEMPORARY BRIDGES MAY BE IMAGINED. DURING A SWISS HOLIDAY IN THE MIDDLE 80’S WE TOOK A VERY FRAGILE BOAT TRIP TO A ROCKY ISLAND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RHINE FALLS AT SCHAFFHAUSES, WHERE THE VIBRATION GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED THE WEIGHT OF THE WATER FLOWING BY. THE TWO AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN PILOTED BY (S/L WYNESS AND F/O HOWARD) IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT WYNESS AND HIS CREW MANAGED TO GETOUT [sic] OF THEIR AIRCRAFT AND INTO THE DINGHY TO SAIL DOWN THE RHINE TO GAIN THE SANCTUARY OF THE SWISS BANK BUT WERE SHOT BY THE GERMANS. PILOT JOHN SANDERS WAS AWARDED BAR TO HIS D.F.C.
[underlined] 29 – 10 – 44 TIRPITZ – TROMSO [/underlined]
TOOK OFF FROM LOSSIE MOUTH AT 2 A.M. AND LANDED BACK AT 2-55P.M. – DID I FEEL DONE. CROSSED NORWEGIAN COAST AT DAWN AND FLEW NORTH OVER SWEDEN, LOOKED VERY BLEAK AND COLD HAD TO ORBIT AT RENDEZVOUS, BOTH SQUADRONS WENT ON TO THE TARGET, BECAME VERY HAZY EVEN AT 15,000 FEET WITH 7-6/10’S CLOUD BELOW, SHIP HARD TO FIND, AL FINALLY BOMBED ON FOURTH RUN. BAGS OF FLAK, BUT VERY INACCURATE, ONE KITE HIT BADLY, LANDED IN SWEDEN. TERRIBLE STOOGE HOME, SAW NO LAND FOR FOUR HOURS, - HAD 16 HOURS SLEEP AT LOSSIE.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE VESSEL WAS MOVED SOUTHWARDS TO TROMSO AFTER THE SEPTEMBER ATTACK, POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGED [sic] RECEIVED THIS PUT IT IN THE RANGE FROM LOSSIEMOUTH, AGAIN WITH LONG-RANGE FUEL TANKS. THE CLOUD PREVENTED ACCURATE BOMB-AIMING AND THE ‘TIRPITZ’ SURVIVED ONCE MORE, - BUT NEMESIS DREW NIGH; A SOME WHAT COMIC ASPECT OF THE LONG SEA CROSSING BACK WAS THE REASSURANCE GIVEN AT BRIEFING THAT ROYAL NAVY DESROYERS [sic] WOULD BE ON OUR RETURN ROUTE SHOULD ANY NEED TO PUT DOWN IN THE WATER ARISE. ------
[page break]
34
------ BY 1944 THE R.N. HAD QUITE PROPERLY DEVELOPED ITCHY GUN FINGERS WHERE AIRCRAFT WERE CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY IF THEY GAVE NO REGOGNITION [sic] SIGNALS. THUS WE WERE RATHER ALARMED TO FIND OURSELVES BEARING DOWN ON THIS MENACING LOOMING SHIP WITH AL IN THE NOSE FRANTICALLY DIGGING AROUND FOR THE COLOURS-OF-THE-DAY CARTRIDGES TO PUT IN HIS VERY PISTOL. I’M NOT SURE IF WE WERE ACTUALLY FIRED UPON, BUT CERTAINLY THE COLOURS WENT UP A TRIFLE LATE. ONE CAN IMAGINE THE IRATE OFFICER-OF-THE-WATCH DOWN THERE FUMING ‘THAT SHOWER’ UP THERE.
[underlined] NOVEMBER 1944 [/underlined]
MY LOG BOOK FOR THIS MONTH SHOWS ONLY A TRIP TO LOSSIEMOUTH FOR ANOTHER GO AT THE ‘TIRPITZ’, BUT THE WEATHER FORECAST WAS SUCH THAT WE RETURNED TO WOODHALL THE NEXT DAY.
MORE IMPORTANTLY, AN UN-DATED NOTE IS ADDED THAT MUST HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN JANUARY 1945:- “BROKE MY FINGER WHILST TRYING TO FIX AN ESCAPE HATCH DURING NIGHT PRACTICE BOMBING – CLOT!! WENT U/S UNTILL AFTER CHRISTMAS. ROY AND AL MEANWHILE FINISHED THEIR SECOND TOUR, DIDN’T SEE AL AGAIN. LUCKILY MANAGED TO GET BACK WITH SANDY AND REMAINDER OF THE CREW.
NIGHT BOMBING PRACTICE AT WAINFLEET WAS NOT A FAVOURITE PASTIME, SO I DOUBT ANYONE REGRETTED THE EARLY RETURN ARISING FROM MY MISHAP. I CHERISH THE MEMORY OF OUR CAPTAIN SPEEDILY CALLING FOR AN AMBULANCE TO MEET US ON LANDING, AND HIS INSISTENCE ON HALF CARRYING ME DOWN THE AIRCRAFT LADDER TO THE GROUND. BEING A VERY FORTUNATE CREW, THIS WAS ABOUT THE WORST THING THAT HAPPENED TO US IN ALL THE TIME WE FLEW TOGETHER ON OPERATIONS.
THUS I DID NOT JOIN THE FINAL ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ” ON 29TH OF NOVEMBER, WHEN THE VESSEL CAPSIZED FOLLOWING DIRECT HITS WITH TALLBOY 12,000 POUND BOMBS; INSTEAD ROY MACHIN HAD A VIEW OF THE AFFAIR FROM THE TAIL RATHER THAN HIS ACCUSTOMED POSITION IN THE TOP TURRET. ONE OF THE MINOR MYSTERIES IS WHY NO ENEMY FIGHTERS APPEARED DURING THE LAST TWO RAIDS, WHEN IN NORWAY.
[page break]
35
[underlined] 3 – 2 – 45 PORTESHAVEN (HOLLAND) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 14-00, TARGET MIDGET U-BOAT PENS. WEATHER CLEAR, HEIGHT 14,000 FEET. OVERCOAST [sic] SAW WALCHEREN ISLAND, NEARLY ALL FLOODED, TERRIBLE DEVASTATION. LONG RUN UP TO TARGET AND JUST BEFORE BOMB WENT FLAK WAS VERY ACCURATE THO’ NOT PARTICULARLY HEAVY. WE BOMBED SECOND AND I SAW THE REST OF THE EFFORT, WHICH EXCEPT FOR THREE WIDE THE REST WAS DEAD ON. P.R.L. COVER DETERMINED THAT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE HAD COLLAPSED. IT HAD FIFTEEN HOLES.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] P.R.L. WAS THE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE UNIT, OFTEN FLYING MOSQUITOES, SOMETIMES SPITFIRES, USUALLY ALONE – DODGY IN DAYLIGHT.
[underlined] 6 – 2 – 45 BIELEFELD VIADUCT (GERMANY) [/underlined]
ON THIS THE LONGEST TRIP INTO THE REICH, WE DEFINITELY EXPECTED BANDITS, SO GAGGLE WAS TIGHTENED AND ALTOGETHER WE HAD TEN SQUADRONS OF SPITFIRES AND MUSTANGS AS COVER, - VERY NICE FOR SEVENTEEN KITES; SOME HEAVY FLAK AT AACHEN AND COOLENZ, OTHERWISE NONE. 10/10 CLOUD COVER MOST OF THE ROUTE, SAW NO BOMBING. VERY SURPRISED AT NO LUFTWAFFE – AND RELIEVED. SKY WAS FULL OF OUR COVER, AND YANKS WERE VERY ACTIVE WITH HEAVY STUFF.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] BY 1944 THE AMERICAN AIRFORCE (U.S.A.A.F.) WERE WELL USED TO FORMATION FLYING NECESSITATED BY THEIR BOMBING TECHNIQUES, AND THE MUTUAL COVER AGAINST THE LUFTWAFFE. APART FROM INITIAL DISASTROUS DAYLIGHT SORTIES IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR, BOMBER COMMAND IN EUROPE LARGELY RESORTED TO NIGHT RAIDS UNTILL D-DAY IN 1944. THEN THE (GAGGLE) WAS THOUGHT UP AS A LOOSE FORMATION TO GIVE SOME PROTECTION AGAINST FIGHTERS WHILST STILL RETAINING EACH BOMB-AIMERS DESCRIPTION AS TO THE MOMENT OF RELEASE. HOWEVER, I FEEL THE WORTHY INTENTION WAS DIMINISHED BY THE RESULT IN THE AIR, AS AFTER YEARS OF INDIVIDUAL FLYING IN THE DARK THE DISCIPLINE-AND WILL-NEEDED TO KEEP IN CLOSE FORMATION WAS JUST NOT THERE AND WE TENDED TO JUST TRUNDLE ALONG FAIRLY NEAR TO ONE ANOTHER; ------
[page break]
36
------ AS IT HAPPENED IT DID NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE ON THE DAYLIGHT TRIPS I FLEW ON. THERE IS NOT MUCH DOUBT IN MY MIND, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTACK ON US BY THE LUFTWAFFE WOULD HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BEFORE OUR ESCORT COULD HAVE GOT AMONGST THEM. BOTH GERMANS AND AMERICANS FOUND THAT EFFECTIVE DEFENCE OF BOMBERS BY FIGHTERS IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AGAINST DETERMINED ATTACKS, SOME WILL ALWAYS SUCCEED.
[underlined] 6 – 2 – 45 IJMUIDEN (HOLLAND) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 06-00 UNDER DULL HIGH CLOUD THAT PERSISTED WAY TO THE TARGET, SAW BAGS OF LIBERATORS FORMING UP ON THE WAY OUT. SPITFIRE ESCORT MET US OFF THE COAST. BOMBING RUN SEEMED PLAIN STUPID; INSTEAD OF RUNNING IN FROM THE SEA WE CIRCLED IN LAND, NEAR AMSTERDAM, AND HAD A LONG RUN UP TO TARGET IN HEAVY FLAK AREA. JACK LED GAGGLE AND DID THEY PASTE US, FOR JUST OVER TWO MINUTES WERE CONTINUALLY PREDICTED, - NEVER FELT AND HEARD SO MUCH. U-BOAT PENS WERE HIT,
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] NOW WE ARE CRITICISING ROUTEING[sic] – EVERYONE IS AN EXPERT AFTER TWO TOURS, THIS WAS THE LAST OPERATIONAL TRIP FOR ME. DURING RAIDS INVOLVING MANY AIRCRAFT FLAK WAS GENERALLY INDISCRIMINATE, BUT WHEN ONLY TWENTY OR THIRTY WERE OVERHEAD IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE DEFENCES TO FOCUS ON ONE BY RADAR AND (PREDICT) ITS COURSE AND FIRE ACCORDINGLY. FLAK BATTERIES WERE OFTEN IN FOURS, AND OCCASIONALLY ONE COULD SEE SUCCESSIVE BURSTS FOLLOWING BEHIND, EVEN WHEN TURNING. I NOTICED THIS PARTICULARLY DURING THE OCTOBER (TIRPITZ) RAID AS WELL AS THIS ONE. NOT A LOT COULD USEFULLY BE DONE – EXCEPT HOPE – IF ON THE BOMB RUN; EVENTUALLY, OF COURSE, WE FLEW OUT OF RANGE, OR THEY SELECTED ANOTHER LUCKY LOT FOR ATTENTION.
[page break]
37
[underlined] POSTSCRIPT [/underlined]
TO FORESTALL ANY BRIGHT SPARK WHO MAY HAVE COUNTED ONLY FORTY OPERATIONS IN THE DIARY, THERE WERE FIVE OTHER TRIPS MENTIONED BUT NOT DESCRIBED AS EACH TIME THE TARGET WAS NOT BOMBED DUE, TO CLOUD AT THE CRUCIAL POINT, FOUR WERE ‘V’ BOMB SITES IN NORTHERN FRANCE, THE OTHER LA PALLICE AGAINST U-BOAT PENS TO MY SURPRISE, AND NO DOUBT PLEASURE, THESE WERE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL FOR TWO TOURS OF OPERATIONS, THAT IS FORTY FIVE TRIPS. THE ‘V’ WEAPONS WERE FIRSTLY SELF PROPELLED FLYING BOMBS DIRECTED AT LONDON, AND SECONDLY ROCKET PROPELLED MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM HOLLAND THAT FELL UPON THE CITY WITHOUT WARNING. FORTUNATELY THIS ALL STARTED AROUND THE SUMMER OF 1944, SO THE LAUNCH SITES WERE PROGRESSIVELY OVER RUN AS THE ALLIED LAND ARMIES MOVED EASTWARDS FROM NORMANDY LATER IN THE YEAR.
ONE MUST OBSERVE THAT AS A CREW WE WERE QUITE FORTUNATE, FOR I CANNOT RECALL ANYONE BEING HURT, NEITHER WERE THERE MANY DISAGREEMENTS. THE ONLY ONE OF THE LATTER THAT COMES TO MIND WAS AN ALTERCATION THAT AROSE WHILST WAITING AROUND OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT AS TO THE MERITS OF THE FLIGHT SANDWICHES ISSUED FROM THE OFFICERS PALACE AT THE PETWOOD HOTEL (OFFICERS MESS) COMPARED TO THOSE FROM THE SERGEANTS MESS; IMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS THIS COULD HAVE AFFECTED THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE WAR.
TO COMMENT ON LUCK, THERE IS A STORY OF THE BOMB-AIMER’S PARACHUTE HARNESS. WE WERE SETTLING DOWN AT DISPERSAL AWAITING TAXI CLEARANCE WHEN AN AGONISED CRY CAME FROM AL IN THE NOSE – I’VE FORGOT MY PARACHUTE HARNESS, JACK; MUCH HEAVY BREATHING FROM OUR ESTEEMED PILOT BRFORE [sic] HE GROUND OUT “YOU’D BETTER HURRY AND GET IT THEN” OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. WITH INTEREST I WATCHED AL LEAP OUT, GRAB ONE OF THE GROUND CREW’S BIKES AND VANISH IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LOCKER ROOM, HEAD DOWN, PEDALLING FURIOUSLY. ------
[page break]
38
------ MEANWHILE, IN THE COCKPIT THE CAPTAIN AND ENGINEER WERE DECIDING TO SWITCH OFF THE ENGINES AS THEY WOULD OVERHEAT QUITE QUICKLY WHILST IDLING DUE TO THE LACK OF AIR PASSING THROUGH THE RADIATORS FROM THE PROPELLERS. WHEN AL REAPPEARED FULLY KITTED AND BREATHLESS, THE ENGINES WERE RE-STARTED. ONE, HOWEVER, STUTTERD [sic] BANGED AND BELCHED BLUE SMOKE, RAN VERY ROUGHLY FOR A FEW SECONDS AND FINALLY STOPPED WITH A SHUDDER THAT SHOOK THE WHOLE AIRCRAFT. SO WE ALL CLAMBERED OUT AND JOINED THE GROUND CREW CLUSTED [sic] UNDER THE OFFENDING ENGINE, ONE STILL HOPEFULLY CLUTCHING A FIRE EXTINGUISHER, SOME STAGING WAS PUSHED INTO PLACE AND A FITTER REMOVED THE COWLING AND LOOKED INTO THE WORKS. “T’ARIN’T ARF A MESS” HE INFORMED THE THRONG, “RECKIN IT’S THE CYLINDER HEAD, THERE’S BITS AND PIECES EVERYWHERE”. THUS, IT SEEMS, OUR LUCK HELD AGAIN WHO KNOWS, BUT FOR THE DELAY, WHETHER THAT ENGINE MIGHT HAVE FAILED ON TAKR-OFF [sic], AND WE HAD A 12,000 LB BOMB ON ABOARD.
SO THERE IT IS. ON COMPLETION OF THE TOURS I WAS SOON POSTED AWAY TO BECOME THE SHIFT NCO I/C THE PARACHUTE STORE AT WOOLFOX LODGE, AND WHERE THAT WAS I NOW HAVE NO IDEA. HOWEVER, WHILST THERE I HAD MY LAST FLIGHT IN A LANCASTER ON THE 20TH OF JUNE 1945, STANDING BEHIND THE PILOT ON A SIGHT SEEING TRIP OVER GERMANY IN DAYLIGHT. NO FIGHTERS, NO FLAX [sic] JUST GHASTLY DEVASTATION IN THE RHUR DOWN AS FAR AS COLOGNE AND EASTWARDS TO DORTMUND. WHICH REMINDS THAT ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE IN THE STATION AREA OF DORTMUND, WHERE EVEN THE TAXIS ARE MERCEDES BENZ REFLECTING THE GENERAL WEALTH. BARMY, AIN’T IT.
IN DECEMBER 1945 I MANAGED TO GET ON AN AIRFIELD CONTROL COURSE AT WATCHFIELD, NEAR SHRIVENHAM. HERE WE OCCASIONALLY FLEW IN ANSON AIRCRAFT, THE SAME AS AT GUNNERY SCHOOL SEEMINGLY SO MANY YEARS AGO. NOTHING HAD CHANGED, THE UNDERCARRIAGE STILL HAD TO BE WOUND UP AND DOWN BY HAND. HAVING SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE COURSE IN THE NEW YEAR, I WAS POSTED TO WELFORD, NEAR NEWBURY.
[page break]
39
WE WERE MARRIED AT THIS TIME SO I WAS ABLE TO COMMUTE FOR A WHILE VIA THE LAMBOURN VALLY [sic] RAILWAY AND PUSHBIKE. THE JOB AT WELFORD WAS LARGELY IN THE RUNWAY CARAVAN WHERE ONE IMPORTANTLY FLASHED LIGHJTS [sic] AND FIRED FLARES WHILST HOPEFULLY CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE SHIFT ONE WAS ON RATIONS WERE SENT OUT TO BE COOKED ON AN OLD PRIMUS STOVE, AND WHEN THE WEATHER WAS KIND IT WAS ALL SORT OF IDYLLIC, MUNCHING ON A BACON SANDWICH WITH A POT OF STRONG TEA HANDY, OBSERVING THE WILD LIFE ALL AROUND BEFORE THE FIRST AIRCRAFT TO LAND OR TAKE OFF DISTURBED THEM. INEVITABLY THIS COULD NOT LAST, AS WELFORD WAS BEING LESS AND LESS USED, AND SO I WAS SENT AWAY AGAIN, FIRST TO DISHFORTH IN YORKSHIRE AND FINALLY TO TERN HILL IN SHROPSHIRE. HERE I RECALL ENDLESS HOURS IN THE CONTROL TOWER LOGGING TRAINING HARVARD AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. ONE HAD TO BE SURE THE NUMBERS THAT WENT OUT BALANCED THOSE THAT LANDED, OTHERWISE A GREAT FLAP AROSE, FOR WENLOCK EDGE AND THE WREKIN SEEMED TO ATTRACT THE UNWISE ATTENTION OF THE TYRO PILOTS.
EVENTUALLY THE R.A.F. AND I PARTED IN AUGUST 1946, WITH ME SENT TO OLYMPIA TO FIND A CIVVY SUIT. MY PARENTS HAD A FLAT AT POLPERRO AT THIS TIME, SO SYLVIA AND I WERE ABLE TO SOAK UP THE SUN IN THIS UNSPOILED VILLAGE BEFORE RETURNING TO NEWBURY AND WORK.
[underlined] WAS IT ALL WORTH IT; --- [/underlined] WELL, IT HAD TO BE, DIDN’T IT, AS I COME OUT UNSCATHED. AN ADVENTURE TO BE SURE, WITH GRAND AQUAINTANCES [sic] MET ON THE WAY. WITH OUR COMBINED GRATUITY WE BOUGHT SOME LAND ON WHICH OUR FIRST HOME WAS BUILT – BUT THAT’S ANOTHER STORY ----
RALPH BRIARS
BOURNMOUTH
1989
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Rear view - Ralph Briars memoir
Description
An account of the resource
Starts with tribute to crew and has colour photograph of a 617 Squadron Lancaster over Lincoln. Writes of his joining the RAF, selection as an air gunner and his basic training. Goes on with description of gunnery training, before going to OTU at RAF Cottesmore where he crewed (describes crew) up while training on Wellington. Carries on with description of heavy conversion unit flying Halifax and Lancaster. Provides description of turrets in both types. Provides a long description of a night sorties and discusses the level of training in the RAF for aircrew as well as problem of collisions. He is finally posted to become operational on 49 Squadron at RAF Fiskerton. He then provides a very detailed diary of the 14 operations he carried out on 49 Squadron followed by the 25 he carried out after the crew were posted to 617 Squadron. These sorties included the Saumur tunnel, V1 and V2 sites, the Tirpitz, Dortmund Ems canal and the Bielefeld viaduct. He concludes with some more anecdotes and his activities after he finished operational flying including getting married.
Creator
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R Briars
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1989
Format
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Thirty-nine page printed document
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Text. Diary
Photograph
Identifier
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SBriarsRA1299161v1
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--London
England--Yorkshire
Scotland--Inverness-shire
Scotland--Inverness
England--Rutland
England--Leicestershire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Nottingham
Poland
Poland--Szczecin
Germany
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Nuremberg
France
France--Paris
Italy
Italy--Milan
France--Normandy
France--Saumur
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Brest
France--Lorient
France--Creil
France--La Rochelle
Norway
Norway--Alta
Norway--Tromsø
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Netherlands
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Germany--Bielefeld
France--Tarbes
England--Hampshire
England--Bournemouth
France--Reims
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-01-06
1944-01-14
1944-01-20
1944-01-21
1944-01-27
1944-01-29
1944-02-15
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-10
1944-03-15
1944-03-30
1944-04-18
1944-04-20
1944-04-22
1944-04-24
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-19
1944-07-04
1944-07-17
1944-07-25
1944-07-31
1944-08-05
1944-08-06
1944-08-09
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-09-11
1944-09-23
1944-10-29
1945-02-03
1945-03-02
1945-02-06
1944-03-31
1944-06-16
1944-07-05
1944-04-19
1944-06-09
1944-06-05
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Christian
Steve Baldwin
1661 HCU
49 Squadron
617 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
control caravan
control tower
Cook’s tour
crewing up
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 2
Me 109
mid-air collision
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Dalcross
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Linton on Ouse
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodhall Spa
Scarecrow
searchlight
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
V-weapon
Wellington
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/20634/BCleggPVWilsonDv1.1.pdf
52fe453884f3b8aa4fb3ff000cb8677a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII. [/underlined] Page 1.
(A Veteran from 617 Squadron – David Wilson).
Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar – Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot, A.V. Roe & Co Ltd.
April 8th 1946 to August 23rd 1947 (killed in Tudor crash)
David James Baikie Wilson was born on January 16th 1917, in Highgate, London, to his Scottish mother and Norfolk-born father. His mother came from a tough sea-faring family called Baikie living in [inserted] Brisbane Street, [/inserted] Greenock, on the River Clyde, to the west of Glasgow. From her, David inherited a great resolution of character, and from his father he acquired a brilliant academic brain – a combination that does not often lead to its owner becoming a test-pilot.
David was the only child in the family, and his mother inserted the name of her Sea-Captain father, James Baikie, between “David” and “Wilson” to perpetuate the family name – as is the wont of many Scottish families.
David’s father and mother had moved down to North London prior to the birth, and remained in that area while he grew up. Attending the local Kingsbury County School, and later Berkbeck College in Fetter Lane, David soon proved himself extremely bright, academically, obtaining [inserted] School Certificate [/inserted] “Distinctions” in Pure Maths, General Physics and Chemistry and “Credits” in Advanced Maths, French, History and English. He left the College with Higher School Certificate in Pure and Applied Maths, Chemistry and Physics, and then went straight to London University, to try to gain a degree in some of these subjects. True to his academic form, he gained a B.Sc. (General) in Chemistry, Physics and Pure Maths in July 1937 and then studied Chemistry for a further two years, gaining a “First” in the “Special” B.Sc. category and [inserted] starting work at the British Oxygen Company in November 1938. [/inserted]
Combining a taste for something more exciting, with his studying, David was already very keen
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on aircraft and flying, and as the inevitable War loomed up he joined the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), and was called up for deferred service in January 1940, training at Hendon (his nearest RAF base) for six months until June that year. Then he was called up properly to attend initial RAF training and selection, and spent the next two months being drilled and graded – as David had hoped – for pilot training in the Commonwealth. September 1940 saw him arrive in Southern Rhodesia at No 25 Elementary Flying Training School at Salisbury, and his pilot training started on September 18th with his first flight there in a Tiger Moth flown by his instructor, Flt/Sgt Marsden.
[Underlined] Pilot Training in Rhodesia [/underlined]
Flying in the [inserted] dry, [/inserted] sunny climate of Southern Rhodesia, David was able to [inserted] thoroughly [/inserted] enjoy his airborne experiences, and progress rapidly with the training routine. He went solo after 18 hrs 25 mins dual flying – indicative not so much of his own ability but the steady and rigorously adhered to procedures followed at the EFTS there, to cut down the early accident rate. It was not a spectacular time in which to go solo – rather the opposite – but David learned slowly but surely, and once learned, he never forgot, becoming a very sure-handed pilot.
Training progressed rapidly – David making three or four flights a day at times, and a lot of attention was paid to aerobatics, spinning, forced landing practice, and even night flying on the Tiger Moth! Some instrument flying was also done on the Tiger, and – a curious exercise – “abandoning an aircraft in flight”. His qualifying Cross-Country on October 31st was from Salisbury to Gatooma and back, and then he was posted out the same day, categorised a “Average” as a pilot, and recommended for “twin-engined types” in furthur training. He had gained his “Wings” on the Tiger Moth.
After a weeks’ leave, David now attended the No 21 S.F.T.S. at [inserted] Kumalo, [/inserted] Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, to start training on Oxford aircraft. He had by now clocked up 65 hrs flying, 28 hrs 30 min of which
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was solo. His first flight in an Oxford was now made on November 11th 1940, with his [inserted] new [/inserted] instructor, Flying Officer Wood. David actually failed his first solo test on the Oxford, but managed all right on the second occasion, on November 14th, and from there on never looked back. As the training progressed, he passed a “Height-Test”, “Navigation”, “Navigator Test”, “Cross-Country”, “Low-flying”, “triangular cross-country on instruments”, “Formation”, “Progress”, and finally his passing-out test by the Chief Flying Instructor, Sqd. Ldr Hendrikz. With a total of 115 hrs now (55 hr 55 mins solo), David passed the first stage of the twin-engined Oxford Course on Dec 18th 1940, again classified as “Average” as a pilot.
The second stage started on December 30th now concentrating on tactical flying – making reconnaissance sorties, low-level bombing practice, and a lot of instrument and cross-country flying. There were night landings by floodlight, and many more low-level bombing runs at 1,000 ft, during which David’s mean bomb-dropping error crept down from 126 yds to 88 yds, and finally to 42 yds on average. Then they indulged in a bit of aerial gunnery from the Oxford, firing 90 rounds off from the Oxford’s single target gun. Near the end of the course, there were “ZZ” approaches, photography – “stereo pairs”, and “line-overlap”, and finally, formation flying. David passed out of No 21 S.F.T.S on February 12th 1941, with an “Average” grading again, having now flown 163 hrs 35 mins, of which 99 hrs 15 mins was solo. He was now posted to No 11 Operational Training Unit on Wellington bombers, at Bassingbourn, back in England.
[Underlined] Operations with 214 Squadron [/underlined]
At Bassingbourne [sic] David rapidly completed a further 75 hrs 40 mins flying on Wellington IO and IA aircraft, starting on May 21st 1941. He solo-ed on the Wellington after some 21 hrs 10 mins “dual” and “2nd pilot” flying, and then started to do a lot of night flying ranging from “circuits and bumps” to cross-country flying, mock bombing raids, air-to-air firing [inserted] and [/inserted] a North Sea Sweep. [Deleted] and [/deleted] Cross-country instrument flying was invariably from Bassingbourne [sic] to Wittering and Andover
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to Upper Heyford and return. At the end of all this, on June 26th 1941, David passed out of the O.T.U. and was posted to No 214 [inserted] (Federated Malay States) [/inserted] Squadron based at RAF Stradishall in Suffolk. This Squadron – as its name implies – was supported by the Malay Federation in WWII and several aircraft were paid for by funds raised in the States, including a Wellington II, W5442* coded BU-V, which David Wilson flew the first evening he arrived at the Squadron. After having an “Air Test” with one of the Flight Commanders, Sqd. Ldr. Field, in the morning of July 9th, David flew as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader that same evening on his first operation – carrying a 4,000 lb “dookie” to drop on Osnabruk.** The raid was carried out by a total of 57 Wellingtons from No 3 Group, and, as discovered after the War, not many bombs fell on the target area. Two Wellingtons were lost that night, but David returned safely.
Only five days later, David was off on his next operation – this time to Bremen, to drop three 500 lb bombs and clusters of incendiaries. After this, raids followed in quick succession every two or three nights; Cologne, Rotterdam, Mannheim, Hamburg, Hanover, Duisburg, Keil, etc. Each time David was flying as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader, or to a Sgt. Foxlee. On the night of July 25/26th, after raiding Hamburg with Sgt. Foxlee, they had to divert to Debden on the return, as their own base had poor weather and low visibility. The same thing happened on August 12th, on their return from Hanover, but this time David and Sqd. Ldr. Field diverted to Newmarket instead.
At this time, these attacks were mostly being directed at German ports, shipping and naval bases, or railway yards, but [inserted] their [/inserted] accuracy – or [inserted] the [/inserted] damage [inserted] caused [/inserted] - at this stage in the war, in hindsight, did not reach any great measure of success.
David recorded his longest operational flight so far on September 7th 1941, when he acted as Second pilot again for a Pilot Officer Barnard, and they bombed Berlin, taking 8 hrs 15 mins for the entire flight. Two sorties later – and on his own 6th operation – David was
* This Wellington was named “Sri Guroh” and had already completed some 25 successful raids before David flew it.
** See appendix 4 for details.
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the Captain of the aircraft for the first time, and this particular trip was a short one across the Channel to Le Havre. He flew a Wellington IC, N2850, but there was ten tenths cloud over the target, and they eventually dropped their bombs in the sea before returning to base
After this, David was the Captain on all his future operations, which included an attack on Hamburg on the night of September 29th carrying a 4,000 lb High Capacity blast bomb – and flying W5442, the old aircraft of the O.C. “B” flight, Sqd Ldr Field.
David was now allocated Wellington IC X9979 for his own crew to use, and this “Wimpy” stayed with him from October 2nd 1941 right up to the end of David’s tour of operations on January 31st 1942.
Many of his raids in October over the German sea ports were plagued by solid cloud cover, or bad weather, and they often bombed “blind” over the top of the targets. On November 7th David set out for Berlin again with six 500 lb bombs, but there was extremely bad cloud and icing over Germany, and Berlin, and so he unloaded his bombs over Osnabruck instead, on the return journey. This was one of Bomber Command’s biggest raids on Berlin to date, and there would be no more large raids on the capital until January 1943. The weather was equally bad over England on the return, and David [inserted] had to [/inserted] divert to another airfield.
Back [inserted] on [/inserted] September 1st, David and others in 214 Squadron began a series of low-level bombing practices, flying over their ranges at [inserted] Foxcote at [/inserted] 200 ft and dropping six bombs at a time. By December 9th they were dropping up to eight practice bombs a time, and on the 11th David, again flying at only 200 ft, dropped a massive 4,000 lb bomb from this low altitude! The end of the year 1941 arrived with David bombing Brest on December 23rd and 27th, trying to hit the Port area.
In January 1942, David was sent to Brest on four more occasions, having to divert to land at Harwell on one of these raids because of bad weather on the return. On January 21st he flew to Bremen to drop a 4,000 lb HC bomb, and then on the 28th came the final “Op” of the Tour – a raid on Münster. The cloud cover was again so bad that they returned home without dropping the bombload, and diverted to Waterbeach to land. David had safely completed his first Operational Tour, having flown
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289 hrs 50 mins in all with 214 Squadron, of which 199 hrs 35 mins were on actual operations. * He was now graded as “Above Average” as a pilot by 214’s C.O., Sqd. Ldr. Carr.
[Underlined] Becoming a Flying Instructor [/underlined]
For his traditional rest from operations, David was now posted to No1 Flying Instructors School at Church Lawford, near Rugby. He arrived there on February 24th 1942,[inserted] to start on the No22 War Course, and [/inserted] to be trained to teach others how to fly multi-engined aircraft. This course here lasted to April 21st, and during this time he was given intensive instruction on Oxford I’s and II’s, and (surprisingly enough) on some single-engined pre-war Avro Tutors!
David underwent day and night instruction, his mentor being a Flt. Lt. Mann, and sessions of any of the half dozen Avro Tutors were interspersed with the twin-engined flights on Oxford trainers. Between March 27th and April 2nd, he was sent down to Upavon to pass the 24th “Beam Approach” Course with flying honours (being graded “Above Average” again, and “Fit to Instruct”). This Course, in fact, was run as part of the Central Flying Scool [sic] of the RAF.
Then it was back to Church Lawford on the Oxford and Tutor, until he was finally passed out as a qualified instructor on April 20th 1942, rated as “Average” on both single and twin-engined aircraft.
[Inserted] David had been commissioned as a Pilot Officer out in Rhodesia, and on completion of this Course was made up to a Flying Officer, preparatory to commencing duties as an Instructor at RAF College Cranwell. [/inserted]
He arrived at Cranwell on May 1st [inserted] as a “B” Category Flying Instructor [/inserted] to start to instruct pupils at the College [inserted] Flying Training School [/inserted] how to fly the Oxford. Most of these were ordinary Leading Aircraftsmen (LAC’s) or Corporals, or Lieutenants (presumably the College Officer Cadets). By late June, a few Miles Master II single-engined trainers had been acquired, and David instructed on these as well. And at the
* See appendix 4 for details.
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end of July he was posted to No 7 Flying Instructors School at Upavon. This time to train others how to become “Instructors”!
David was becoming restless to be back on operations again, but had to put up with the daily round of flying Oxfords, Magisters and Masters again at Upavon, until the beginning of November 1942, when the CFI, Wing Cmdr GFR Donaldson, graded him out as “Above Average” again on David’s posting to 196 Squadron – a brand new night-bomber squadron formed on November 7th at Driffield in Yorkshire.
[Underlined] Second Tour, with 196 Squadron [/underlined]
David reported to 196 Squadron at Driffield on November 7th, and then was immediately sent off on a new Course called the “Captains of Aircraft” at Cranage [inserted] near Holmes Chapel [/inserted] in South Cheshire. It was the 12th intake at this Course, and David was lectured there on Navigation, and had to undertake six long cross-country exercises on Ansons, flown by a Course pilot, with David and two others on board having to act as Navigators in turn. The Course was an adjunct of the RAF’s Central Navigation School, and was intended to refine operational Captain’s navigating skills, for posting them to Coastal Command, or to Bomber stations where new 4-engined bombers with only one pilot were the norm.
While he was posted to Cheshire over the Christmas period of 1942/43 [inserted] Dec 21st to January 3rd [/inserted], David had some chance to attend some local functions and festivities, as he did not have time to return to his parents in Hendon. It was while the Station was giving a Dance for local people that David met a Cheshire girl called Elsie, who worked at a nearby I.C.I. Works connected with the Salt industry Elsie was a very personable girl, with a number of boyfriends, and David was a shy and quiet person, but the two became immediate friends, and kept up correspondence with each other when David re-joined 196 Squadron (now moved to Leconfield) after Christmas. One other course David had to attend for a few days, was at Westcott in Buckinghamshire, at No 1 Engine Control Demonstration Unit (E.C.D.U), to learn “Engine Handling”
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and “Petrol Consumption” there on the Wellington Mk III. (No flying was involved). Finally, on January 14th 1943, he took to the air at Leconfield on Wellington X HE179, to try some “circuits and bumps” on this new Mark of the bomber He then had a few “working-up” flights to get his [inserted] brand- [/inserted] new crew shaken down, trying out air-to-air firing with his gunners, and practice bombing using [inserted] new [/inserted] infra-red photography to record the results.
David’s first sortie with 196 Squadron [inserted] and the Squadron’s second operation [/inserted] was on the night of February 7th 1943, when he dropped seven 500 lb bombs on a new type of “area-bombing” raid on French ports with German U-Boat pens. This directive had been issued by the War Cabinet on January 14th, and because the new U-boat pens of solid concrete were too thick to penetrate, the towns themselves were obliterated instead (the French civilians had been warned to evacuate them).
Some 323 aircraft bombed Lorient that night, with the [inserted] new [/inserted] Pathfinders marking the target well. Seven aircraft were lost, two being Wellingtons. David’s crew obtained a good infra-red photograph of the bomb bursts.
It was back again to Lorient on February 13th, this time forming part of a raid of 466 aircraft in all, and dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs for the first time on a Bomber Command target. The French town of Lorient received more devastation, but the U-boat pens survived. Then it was Cologne on the 14th, and Emden on the 17th, but the latter raid was abandoned by David’s aircraft, due to heavy cloud cover. Just six Wellingtons had been sent to Emden that night to test the infra-red bomb sights, but only three found the target, and bombed it. David brought all his bomb load back.
Before February finished, David had been to Cologne again on the 26th (where two of his three 500 lb bombs “hung up” and he had to return to base with them) and St Nazaire on the 28th (again dropping a “mix” of 500 lb bombs and incendiaries).
In March David went to Hamburg, Essen (twice) Duisberg and Bochum, dropping a 4,000 lb “Cookie” on one of the Essen raids. This was the beginning of the “Battle of the Ruhr”, devised now by Bomber Command to paralyse German Industry. There was an increasing flow of new four-engined bombers to the Squadrons, and a build-up of the Pathfinder
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Force and their new marking techniques using Mosquitos guided by Oboe equipment, * and Lancasters etc, to continue illuminating the markers dropped by the “Mossies”. All this now led to ever more accurate raids on the German Ruhr industrial zone.
The first Essen raid, on March 5th, was well marked by the Pathfinder Force (PFF), and David’s Wellington was in the second of three waves over the target – the Krupps industrial complex. This night marked Bomber Command’s 100,000th sortie of the war, and it is likely that David’s 4,000 lb bomb was one of the many that helped destroy an area of the Krupps works that night. A week later he was over the same target again, with the more usual mixture of 500 lb bombs (many fuzed for a long delay action) and incendiaries. Even more of Krupps was reduced to rubble that night.
David normally flew with a crew of four in his aircraft, and his regular crew consisted of Pilot Officer Parkin, Sgt. Wakeley, Flt. Sgt, Allen and Sgt. Lund. Occasionally he would take another Sgt. Pilot on board to give him operational experience for the odd flight or two (before he went off to captain his own aircraft). His O.C. in “A” Flight was Sqd Ldr Ian R.C. Mack, and the 196 Squadron C.O. at this time was Wing Cmdr. A.E. Duguid.
David only had one “Op” in April, to Kiel on the 4th, but May was another intensive month, with successful visits to Dortmund, Duisburg, Bochum and Düsseldorf. Most of the aircraft sent on these raids were now four-engines types, and of 110 Wellingtons sent to Dortmund, six were lost. The equivalent numbers [inserted] of Wellingtons [/inserted] sent to the other three points were: Duisburg 112 (10); Bochum 104 (6); and Düsseldorf 142 (6). The last two raids did not have the desired effects as the Germans were now starting decoy markers and fires outside the cities, to lure the PFF and bombing aircraft away. But the Duisburg raid had been highly successful, the Port and August Thyssen steel factories being badly hit.
[Inserted] On May15th [inserted] 1943 [/inserted] the [deleted] Press [/deleted] [inserted] London Gazette [/inserted] released the news that David had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (D.F.C.), for (as the citation stated) “completing numerous [inserted] operational [/inserted] missions, flying on many occasions to targets such as Cologne, Berlin, Kiel and Hamburg, where the fiercest opposition is encountered.
“Since the beginning of his operational career, his single aim has been to press home his attacks as accurately and efficiently as possible, and in this he has had many successes. His courage, skill and determination against all hazards have been an inspiration to the Squadron”. [/inserted]
In June 1943, David flew sorties to Düsseldorf, Krefeld and Wuppertal, using his normal Wellington X HE901 on most flights (he
* “Oboe” was a system in which radio beams were sent out from English points, to cross over a specific target, and the RAF aircraft fitted with the receiving equipment could tell exactly when to drop their markers.
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had previously used HE170 and MS488 for long spells at a time, all with 196 Squadron’s code letters ZO-. Two of his crew had been commissioned by now – Wakeley and Allen had been made Pilot Officers. (David himself was now a Flight Lieutenant). The Düsseldorf raid was very successful, and that on Krefeld equally so, devastating the city centres. Just prior to the Krefeld raid on June 21st, some “Monica” sets had been fitted to some of 196 Squadron’s Wellingtons, HE901 being one of them. David and his crew had conducted air teats with the new equipment on June 16th and 17th, and aerial exercises with fighters, to try out the operational aspects. “Monica” was the code name given to equipment which, installed in RAF bombers, would give warning of the approach of German night-fighters from the rear. This radar equipment gave out its own transmissions however, and later in the war, when a German Ju88 night fighter landed by mistake at Woodbridge on July 15th 1944, it was discovered that its “Flensburg” radar transmission detector set could “home in” from 50 miles away onto an RAF aircraft using Monica. The increasing losses of Allied bombers was being blamed on Monica, [inserted] “H2S” radar, [/inserted] and “I.F.F.” (Identification Friend or Foe) signals emanating from their aircraft, and instructions were immediately given to remove all “Monica” sets, use “H2S” only sparingly, and switch off “IFF” altogether over German territory.
The raid on Wuppertal on June 24th 1943, in which David dropped an entire load of incendiaries, devastated the Elberfeld half of the town (the other half had already been hit). Some 94% of the town was destroyed that night. 630 aircraft having taken part, and 6 Wellingtons out of 101 being lost (together with 28 Lancasters, Halifaxes or Stirlings).
David now made the last operational sortie of his second Tour, to Cologne again on July 3rd 1943. He was flying Wellington X HE901 [deleted] again [/deleted], with a new member of crew, Flt. Lt. Reaks (who had replaced P/O Allen), and the PFF successfully marked the industrial area of the town, on the East bank of the Rhine. Again, David’s load consisted entirely of incendiaries, and they bombed the target accurately, but on returning to England after a flight lasting 5 hrs 5 mins, had to divert to Westcott, Bucks, because
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of ground fog and bad weather in the North. This raid was noted for something else – the beginning of mass night-time attacks by German night-fighters over the target area – something not met before by the RAF – where the Luftwaffe units attacked from above, using the mass of fires, target indicators (T.I.’s) and searchlights below as illumination for the bombers. On this raid 30 aircraft were lost out of 653 despatched – 12 being claimed by the Luftwaffe night fighters. In hindsight David was lucky to finish his second Tour at this point, as the RAF raids over Germany began to meet increasing fighter opposition, leading to many losses.
[Underlined] Lancaster Conversion Unit [/underlined]
Again classed as “Above Average” [inserted] in his recent capacity as “Master Bomber” of 196 Squadron [/inserted], David Wilson was now posted to a Lancaster Conversion Unit [inserted] No 1660 [/inserted] at RAF Swinderby, to convert to flying four-engined heavy bombers. The reason he had had a shorter Tour than usual at 196 Squadron was because the Squadron was moving [inserted] its [/inserted] base down South now, and re-equipping with Stirling bombers. David neither liked the Stirling, nor the future role of the Squadron, which was to be on glider-tug and troop dropping rôles, and so he had quickly opted to go for a Lancaster Squadron posting. [Inserted] He had in fact volunteered to join 617 Squadron (now known as the “Dambusters”), who were now looking for a few more seasoned and “Above Average” graded pilots to replace the eight lost on their famous raid of May 16th/17th. Only men of exceptional experience and calibre would be accepted, and all crews had to show a very high accuracy in their bombing experience. David’s name had gone forward for consideration by 617’s C.O., Wing Cmdr. Guy Penrose Gibson, V.C., DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar, who was still in charge but about to be posted onto a temporary staff duty as a rest (against his wishes!). Provided he converted to the Lancaster successfully, he would be accepted. [/inserted]
And so Flt. Lt. David Wilson started at Swinderby on July 23rd 1943, learning the tricks of flying the mighty Lancaster – an aircraft that would endear itself to him for life. The Course was not long, only five weeks, and finished on August 30th, when David had completed his multi-engine transition to the big Avro machine designed by Roy Chadwick. The Lancasters at the Unit were old Mk I’s from early production runs by A.V. Roe & Co Ltd at Manchester, or Metropolitan-Vickers at Trafford Park, and some had originally been laid down as Manchesters, and converted on the line.
David firstly had “circuits and landings” practice, then “stalling”, “three and two engine flying”, “fire action”, and “three-engine overshoots”. Then came cross-country exercises, “time and distance”
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runs (practicing dropping bombs after a measured run-in from a known geographical position) “corkscrewing” (to avoid fighters at night), and “fighter affiliation” (practice in being “attacked” by fighters). Finally David made some bombing runs, dropping four bombs on Wainfleet Sands, then eight (getting a mean error of only 71 yds from the target), and finally a round-the-UK cross-country flight at night, from Swinderby to Ely, Bicester, Sidmouth, St. Tudwells (where he dropped two bombs, and hit the target), Strangford [inserted] Lough [/inserted] in N. Ireland Dumfries in Scotland, Aberdeen and back home! A large part of the return trip was flown on three-engines, the whole flight taking 5 hrs 35 mins – just like a typical raid over Germany.
Wing Cmdr. Everitt, the CO. of 1660 Conversion Unit, passed David out [inserted] on August 30th [/inserted] as “Above Average” once again on the Lancaster this time, and David thus had his posting to 617 Squadron confirmed, and joined them the same day at Coningsby, Lincolnshire. [Deleted] – the already famous 617 Squadron, otherwise known now as the “Dambusters”. [/deleted]
[Underlined] Joining the “Dambusters” [/underlined]
David Wilson joined 617 Squadron on August 30th 1944, the date the Squadron moved its home from Scampton to Coningsby, in Lincolnshire. Since its famous [inserted] first [/inserted] raid on the German dams on the night of May 16th/17th 1944, [sic] the Squadron had [inserted] briefly [/inserted] returned to [deleted] a rest period, and started [/deleted] operations again on July 15, raiding power stations in Northern Italy and landing [inserted] at Blida [/inserted] in N. Africa afterwards. [Inserted] (Blida was a [inserted] captured [/inserted] Allied aerodrome a few miles south-west of Algiers, in French North Africa). The Squadron’s third raid had been on the Italian port of Leghorn on the way back from Blida. And its fourth was a mass leaflet raid on major Italian cities on July 29th 1943, after which the aircraft landed at Blida again. (This time they positioned back to England without raiding any target on the way). [/inserted] With its high level of training [deleted] and accuracy [/deleted] in bomb dropping especially [inserted] at low level [/inserted] the Squadron was now being used for attacks on major targets which required a great deal of accuracy in placing their weapons. These targets by definition, were also likely to be very heavily defended.
David was airborne on September 1st, the second day after he arrived at Coningsby, and was promptly sent off on a low-level cross country. (With the “Dambusters”, low level meant just that – at 200 to 330 ft altitude! [inserted] all the way [/inserted]). Wing Cmdr Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar had just relinquished command of the Squadron [inserted] on August 3rd) [/inserted] to [inserted] Acting [/inserted] Wing Cmdr George Holden, DSO, DFC [inserted] and Bar? [/inserted]
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and there were 10 [deleted] complete [/deleted] Lancaster [deleted] crews [/deleted] pilots left at that moment out of the original 21 that had been in the Squadron when the raid on the Dams was mounted. * Apart from David, the other new pilots [inserted] ① who had joined 617 since the Dams raid were F.O. W.H. Kellaway, DSO; at the end of June; P.O. B. [deleted] (“Bunny”) [/deleted] W. Clayton, DFC, CGM, early in July; [deleted] and [/deleted] Flt. Lt. R.A. Allsebrook, DSO, DFC, also early in July; [inserted] and Flt. Lt. E.E.G. [inserted] (“Ted”) [/inserted] Youseman, DFC, at the end of July. (Ted came from David Wilson’s old 214 Squadron). [/inserted]. All these pilots – like David – brought their old crews along with them as well, and so all eight men in each Lancaster found themselves suddenly flying with the famous “Dambusters”. One of these new arrivals had also crashed on August 5th on Ashley Walk Bombing Ranges, when it hit the slipstream of another Lancaster, but luckily the crew survived, but with the exception of one gunner did not fly with 617 again. [/inserted]
The [inserted] surviving [/inserted] Lancasters which had been used for the Dams raid were in the process of being returned to A.V. Roe & Co to have the special fittings removed and the enlarged (bulged) bomb doors put in their place. For the purpose of keeping the crews in training, however, other Lancasters had to be borrowed or drafted in, and the Lancaster which David flew on September 1st was one such – ED735 (KC-R) from 44 Squadron (where it had been called KM-K). This Lancaster had just [inserted] ② been fitted with new “deep-section bomb doors by Avros, to take the new 12,000 lb High Capacity Blast bombs, and was sent to the A&AEE at Boscombe Down this month, to measure the Position Errors. [/inserted]
The Dambusters had moved from a grass airfield at Scampton, to one with hard runways at Coningsby and were sharing the latter airfield now with other Lancaster Squadrons. [Deleted] No 619 [/deleted] (Another Lancaster Squadron that would henceforth [deleted] to [/deleted] work closely with 617 was No 619 [inserted] - based nearby at Woodhall Spa - [/inserted] ) David flew Lancaster EE144 (KC-S) on September 14th – this aircraft was normally used by Sqn Ldr. Holden.
David was [inserted] then [/inserted] engaged in intensive low-level cross-country flying for the first two weeks of September, working himself and his crew up to the required accuracy of bombing, air firing, and low-level navigating as befitted the high standards expected of the specialist squadron. Two of these flights were on aircraft that had originally been on the Dams raid – ED886 (AJ-O flown then by P.O. Bill Townsend) and ED921 (AJ-W of Flt. Lt. Les Munro). These had been altered back to carry normal bombs, and in common with 617’s other permanent Lancasters were now fitted with new radio altimeters which could be set to give the pilot warning of dropping below, say, 75 ft above the ground (where a “hiccuph” could mean flying into the deck”).
All this preparation was for 617’s next scheduled raid on one of the War’s earliest, and by now most heavily defended targets – the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It had been decided to try to breach this by moonlight, and at low level. The canal was of vital importance to the German War industry, as it joined the steel plants of the Ruhr
*(for Note see over →③
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[Underlined] footnote ③ FOOTNOTE [/underlined]
* The original [inserted] 21 [/inserted] pilots of 617 Squadron at the time of their first operation – the Dams raid – consisted of Wing Cmdr. Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Flt. Lt. J.V. Hopgood, DFC; Flt. Lt. H.B. Martin, DSO and Bar, DFC and two Bars, AFC; Sqd Ldr. H.M. Young, DFC; Flt. Lt. W. Astell, DFC; Flt. Lt. D.J.H. Maltby, DSO, DFC; Sqd. Ldr. Henry Maudslay, DFC; P.O. L.G. Knight, DSO; Flt.Lt. D.J. Shannon, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Sqd. Ldr. J.C. McCarthy, DSO, DFC; Sgt. [inserted] V.W. [/inserted] Byers; Flt Lt R.N.G. Barlow; P.O. Geoff Rice, DFC; Flt. Lt. J.L. Munro, DSO, DFC; F.O. W.C. Townsend, CGM, DFM; Flt Sgt. K.W. Brown, CGM; Flt. Sgt. Cyril [inserted] T [/inserted] Anderson; P.O. [inserted] Warner [/inserted] Ottley; P.O. [inserted] L.J. [/inserted] Burpee (all of whom had flown on the raid); and P.O. W. [inserted] G. [/inserted] Divall and Flt. Lt. Harold [inserted] S. [/inserted] Wilson (both of whom had not been included on the Dams raid).
The [inserted] eight [/inserted] killed on the raid were Hopgood, Young, Astell, Maudsley, Byers, Barlow, Ottley [inserted[ and [/inserted] Burpee; Guy Gibson, of course, had now been rested from “Ops”; Cyril Anderson had decided to return to his original Squadron, and Bill Townsend had been posted away to 1668 Conversion Unit. All this left just 10 of the original pilots.
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with the Baltic, enabling iron ore from Sweden to be barged to the steelworks, and finished parts (Eg of U-boats) to be sent North to the German ports.
It was lucky for David that he was still getting into training at that moment. On a cross-country on September 13th, he practiced low-level bombing from 300ft and 500 ft, and gained a mean error of 73 yds from the target centre; and on September 14th he dropped bombs on the ranges from 200, 300, [inserted] and [/inserted] 400 ft high, and got his average error down to 36 yds.
David was assigned to “B” Flight, under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.L. (“Les”) Munro (a survivor of the Dams raid who had been hit by flak en route to the Sorpe Dam and had had to turn back because the radio/intercom had been destroyed). But due to his “working-up” period, he was not selected for the raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal on September 14th/15th. This was meticulously planned – as usual – and eight of 617’s Lancasters would take part, dropping new 12,000 lb High Capacity thin-cased, bombs from low level (fuzed for an adequate delay). The crews selected were the new C.O., George Holden, Dave Maltby, Les Knight, Dave Shannon, Harold Wilson [inserted] (no relation to David) [/inserted], Athelsie Allsebrook, Geoff Rice and Bill Divall. All but Holden, and Allsebrook [deleted] and Divall [/deleted] were survivors of the original 617 Squadron, and they set off on the evening of the 14th, but en route to the target received news back from a “recce” Mosquito in front, that the weather was too bad over the target area for low-level bombing. Regretfully they turned for home, but as they did so at low level over the North Sea, Maltby’s Lancaster hit someone else’s slipstream, dipped a wing into the sea, cartwheeled – and that was that. Maltby and his crew all perished.
Back home at Coningsby, they re-planned the raid for the next evening, the 15th, and Mick [deleted] y [/deleted] Martin just back from leave, filled Maltby’s place. [Inserted] David Wilson flew two more cross-country flights on this day, using one of the original Dams raid Lancasters, ED886 (AJ-O) [deleted] glued back again [/deleted] They were his last practices, and he was not called up for the raid that night. [/inserted] As the [inserted] others [/inserted] flew low over darkened Holland, Holden, flying with [inserted] Guy Gibson’s old crew [/inserted] and leading the two flights, was hit by flak and he climbed to avoid a church steeple in a small town while the others behind swung low around the outside of the built-up area. Holden’s Lancaster, trailing flames, went down and his 12,000 lb bomb exploded with a blinding flash of light.
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[Insertion for previous page]
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It was his 30th birthday.
Over the target area, a ground mist obscured the markers they dropped, there was a lot of light flak about, and the escorting Mosquitos found it difficult to silence the flak, and the 617 pilots found it very difficult to see the canal. Allsebrook, who now acted as leader, dropped his bomb and helped to direct others onto the target, but then disappeared. He had been shot down leaving the area. Knight, flying low, hit some trees which damaged his two port engines, and asked Mick Martin’s permission to jettison the bomb. He tried desperately to get home, but after allowing his crew to bale out over Holland, was killed trying to crash land the Lancaster alone.
Rice tried in vain for an hour to find the target, was holed by flak, jettisoned his bomb and managed to return home to Coningsby. Harold Wilson was hit by flak too, and had to crash-land his Lancaster with the bomb on board. It went up soon after, killing all on board before they could escape. Divall was [inserted] also hit and crashed. [/inserted]
// Dave Shannon flew around for 70 minutes, before he managed to spot the Canal and drop his bomb. It hit the towpath and did not seem to breach the canal banks. And Mick Martin flew around for a long 90 minutes, repeatedly getting hit by flak, and finally dropping his bomb on his 13th run in. He was two hours overdue when he landed back at Coningsby, to find only Shannon and Rice there before him. There were just the three Lancasters back, out of the eight that had set off. And nothing to show for the losses.
Next day Mick Martin was made a Squadron Leader by the A.O.C. No 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshal the Honourable Ralph Cochrane, and temporarily given command of 617 Squadron. Martin immediately volunteered to go back to the Canal the next night, and said there were six of them left who could try it (Martin himself, Shannon, Rice, Les Munro, Joe McCarthy and Ken Brown). In addition to these Martin could now call on the newly posted Captains - David Wilson, Ted Youseman and Bunny Clayton.
Fortunately Sir Ralph insisted on the three latest survivors being rested for 617’s next raid, on the Antheor Viaduct near Cannes in the South of France, on September 16th. And because
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this operation followed on without a break, the three “new boys”, and [inserted] the three veterans, [/inserted] Munro, McCarthy and Brown [deleted] (all had taken part on the original Dams raid) [/deleted] were supported by six Lancasters from 619 Squadron as well, and all placed under 619’s C.O., Wing. Cmdr. Abercromby.
[Underlined] The Anthéor Viaduct [deleted] preparing for the Tirpitz [/deleted] [/underlined]
It was against this backdrop of tragedy that David Wilson now flew his first “Op” for 617 Squadron. The atmosphere couldn’t have been worse, but morale was still high. Other Squadrons were [inserted] now [/inserted] beginning to call 617 the “Suicide Squadron”, and there were [inserted] noticeably [/inserted] fewer requests from other pilots to transfer to it [deleted] now [/deleted]! However, the intensive training, and the work involved in the briefing to the raids, kept David’s mind off all that (and the fact that his namesake, Harold Wilson, had died the night before).
This was 617’s seventh operation (including the first abortive Dortmund-Ems sortie), and the target was difficult to find, not counting hard to bomb accurately when they reached it. The main railway link between Central and Southern France and Italy, ran along the coast from Fréjus/St. Raphael to Cannes, and a typical curving viaduct lifted it across a ravine at a point just east of Cap du Dramont, a few miles on the Cannes side of St. Raphael. This little place was called Anthéor, and was 617’s next headache.
David flew in [inserted] company with the other 617 veterans, [/inserted] his “B” Flight Commander, Flt. Lt. John Leslie Munro, DFC, [inserted] RNZAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth Charles McCarthy, DSO, DFC, [inserted] RCAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth William Brown, CGM, RCAF, and two other “new boys”, Flt. Lt. “Ted” Youseman DFC, and Pilot Officer “Bunny” Clayton, DFC, CGM. Although the target was on France’s South coast, they were expected to return to England on this raid – not land in N. Africa.
David took Lancaster JB 139 on this raid, (coded KC-X and recently transferred from 49 Squadron). His bomb load included one 4,000 lb “Blockbuster” and three 1,000 lb bombs, and his crew consisted of Flt Sgt Hurrel, F.O. Parkin, Flt. Sgt. Barrow, P.O. Allen, Sgt Lowe and Sgt Mortlock. When they found their target, they jockeyed for position down the
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ravine to the sea, and David [inserted] and the others [/inserted] released their bombs from 300 ft. [Inserted] The idea was to lob the bombs onto or between the arches of the bridge, but all seemed to go through the arches instead. [/inserted] The viaduct seem [sic] unscathed, however, - although it and the rail tracks were peppered with holes – and they flew back in the knowledge it would probably need further attempt.
After a flight of 10 hrs 20 mins, David Wilson put his Lanc down at Predannack in Cornwall, to refuel, before flying back to Coningsby later.
[Underlined] Preparing for another Dams raid [/underlined]
Mick Martin was firmly in charge of the Squadron now, interviewing new would-be 617 pilots, thinking about a method of them taking flares with them on future raids to mark the target and make it easier for all to bomb, and liaising with the A.O.C. 5 Group with regard to future targets for 617.
In fact Cochrane was scheming up another attack on a dam, this time the big installation at Modane in Northern Italy, which lay deep in the hills. But Cochrane duped even Mick Martin for a time – he pretended it was to be a raid on the German battleship Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord, and this required flying over the hills, down the steep slope, across a short stretch of water and then over the ship (in reality, the dam in Italy)!
So Martin went looking for a suitable site to practice on, and found a hillside near Bangor in N. Wales, near the coast, where he could get 617 to try flying down the face of the slope to level out over the sea. He experimented with putting down his landing flaps, to 40° or so, but found although the Lanc would sink down the hillside better, he had to exceed the max speed with flaps down by some 60 mph, and thus risk [inserted] their [/inserted] collapse – with undoubted fatal results to aircraft and crew.
David flew in [inserted] Mick Martin’s [/inserted] Lancaster (EE150 [inserted] coded KC-Z [/inserted]) to the scene on September 18, with Dave Shannon, (one of the three Flight Commanders, with Munro and McCarthy) in the cockpit beside him, and the two of them took it in turns to try flying up and over the hills that Mick Martin had found. Next day David was up in the Midlands [inserted] in the same aircraft [/inserted], this time with his
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own Flight Commander, Les Munro, the two of them doing practice runs across the Derwent reservoir at very low level, and then they tried the hill near Bangor again, Les trying it out and handing over to David. It was all intensely demanding work, and the adrenalin flowed very freely!
Between September 19th and 23rd, the “dams” type training intensified, David flying dummy attacks over Derwent reservoir in ED735 (KC-R) [inserted] on the 19th, [/inserted], then on September 20th he used Guy Gibson’s old aircraft ED932 (AJ-G) of Dams raid fame to take up one of the special “Upkeep” weapons that they still held in store and he dropped this on a dummy low-level attack in the Wash. (Guy Gibson’s old aircraft, unlike the majority that had survived the Dams raid, had [inserted] not yet [/inserted] been converted to have the bulged bomb-doors, and the old cylindrical “Upkeep” canister was used on the original Barnes Wallis-designed release mechanism). Then, in the next three days came low-level cross-country formation flying, dropping bombs on the Wainfleet ranges. David dropped the first lot (of four bombs), getting a mean error of 64 yds, and on the second occasion dropped eight bombs from 800 ft high. Then came a night time cross country at low level on astro fixes only, and finally a trip to Castle Kennedy, and Turnberry in Ayrshire, carrying 14 [inserted] staff [/inserted] passengers in connection with these trials.
However, the very next day, September 24th, came a complete change of policy, and training. The reason was the development of a new, more accurate bomb-sight, and its ability to deliver two large new weapons that Dr Barnes Wallis had been developing recently – the 12,000 lb streamlined “Tallboy” bomb, and its big brother, the 22,000 lb “Grand Slam”. The Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, had been agonising over the future rôle of 617 Squadron with Sir Ralph Cochrane, and had concluded that it should stay in the latter’s 5 Group, and now become a “Special Duties” Squadron. Cochrane, on his part, decided to press ahead with Wallis’ new weapons, and get 617 equipped as fast as possible with the new bob-sight, to start dropping these expensive weapons.
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[Underlined] The Stabilising Automatic Bomb-Sight. [/underlined]
This SABS sight had been developed at the RAE at Farnborough back in 1941 by a man called Richards, and used the gyro principle in its stabilising system. It had been held up in its development by the fact that although it was a great deal more accurate than its predecessors, it did require a very careful straight and level approach at high altitude, on the run in to the target. Consequently the likelihood of Bomber Command taking heavier casualties from flak and fighters because of this, had resulted in its being “shelved” for the time being. But now, the development of these special weapons merited another look at it. A certain Sqd. Ldr. Richardson was now despatched post haste from the RAE to 617 Squadron at Coningsby, to see the SABS fitted, and perfected, in their Lancasters.
From September 24th, therefore, everything changed in David’s training. No longer was it low-level dams-type exercises, but he flew in EE150 [inserted] (KC-Z) [/inserted] this day, with Joe McCarthy acting as Captain for some of the time, making [inserted] the first [/inserted] high level dummy runs with the new SABS fitted. The next day, David took Bunny Clayton up with him, and Sqd Ldr. Richardson (by now dubbed “Talking Bomb” by the Squadron, for his propensity to talk bomb-sights from the moment he woke, until the moment he went to sleep), to check out the SABS in EE150 again.
Sqd Ldr Richardson was busy fitting the new SABS into all the aircraft, and then checking the installation by flying with it. He also knew that it took two to be accurate – the pilot on the one hand (to fly at a given height, and airspeed, on the final run in), and the bomb aimer on the other (who had to feed the correct data into the sight, and advise the pilot when he strayed off the necessary heading/approach speed). With the Squadron C.O. (Mick Martin), Richardson then evolved a system of each pilot being checked out, by someone senior, and each bomb-aimer being paired with different pilots – cross-checking the results against each other.
Thus David [sic] third flight (on September 26th) was with Mick Martin (now elevated to Sqd. Ldr. status),
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and they did high level bombing (HLB) from 6,000 ft gaining an average bombing error of 60 yds (this altitude was not “high” in the view of most other squadrons – but where 617 was normally flying below tree-tops and between haystacks, 6,000 ft really was “high” to them!
Next day (the 27th) David had two training sorties – one taking up Ken Brown to show him the ropes, dropping bombs at Wainfleet from 10,000 ft this time, and recording a mean error of 61 yds; the next sortie being with Bunny Clayton and flying at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft, recording an error of 50 yds. (It was getting better!)
Next day David took Geoff Rice up, and also made a sortie by himself. On the latter he dropped three bombs from 10,000 ft, but an error in the altimeter setting led to a mean drop error of 143 yds this time. All this showed how essential it was to get all the readings correct, and here they ran into the problem of calculating the exact [inserted] ground level [/inserted] barometric pressure reading over the target so as to be able to correct the altimeters to give their exact height. Another problem was to obtain absolutely accurate outside air temperatures, and the exact speed of the Lancaster (determined by a combination of airflow and Static Pressure vents in the instrumentation, and known errors (Position Errors) in the Static Pressure System (caused by the location of the vents in the fuselage airflow). All this was essential but complicated and the RAE and A&AEE had to make tests on the Lancasters to give 617 the most effective results, and to increase the accuracy of information fed into the SABS.
For a few days the weather held up training, but it resumed in October with a vengeance. David was flying different Lancasters on each sortie, a new [inserted] Mark III [/inserted] DV246 (KC-U) that had just been delivered, ED932 (Gibson’s old aircraft now recoded AJ-V) [inserted] for low-level sorties [/inserted], JB139 (KC-X), ED915 (AJ-Q), or EE146 (KC-K). He [inserted] sometimes [/inserted] went up three times a day, usually it was twice each day, and his bombing errors read consecutively: 74 yds from 10,000 ft, 182 yds (10,000 ft) then only 21 yds from a 200 ft high low-level sortie, 26 yds (200 ft), 96 yds (10,000 ft), 88 yds (10,000 ft), 101 yds [deleted] (10,000 ft) [/deleted], 86 yds [deleted] 10,000 ft) [/deleted], 57 yds (all at 10,000ft)
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60 yds (from 12,000 ft), 47 yds (1,000 ft), and so on. They had great difficulty getting the accuracy to any greater limits – which really was going to be essential if Barnes Wallis’ big, expensive bombs were to be dropped (These had streamlined aerodynamic fins, and would spin at an increased speed as they dropped, giving different trajectories to the normal, unstreamlined weapons).
Slowly the results of the RAE and A&AEE testing were incorporated on the Lancasters, and Sqd Ldr Richardson’s observations, and things at last began to come together.
Mick Martin went up with David and acted as the bomb-aimer himself on October 16th, flying in ED932 on a low-level sortie. He managed a mean error of 105 yds from 250 ft altitude – not very good! (He obviously then appreciated the level of accuracy David’s normal bomb-aimer could achieve – of 21 to 26 yds!)
David tried a run at 15,000 ft on October 17th – getting an error of 70 yds. But next day doing exactly the same, he only registered a mean error of 128 yds. (On both occasions he was flying ED932, now fitted up with the SABS system).
In the meantime, Mick Martin had been told by Cochrane to get the Squadron up to strength again in pilots and crews, and a good deal of interviewing had been carried out. Martin knew now that an extremely high degree of training and ultimate accuracy in dropping the new bombs was going to be needed, but the crews were going to have to be well blooded already with records to show that they could unflinchingly carry out day after day, the steady, straight run in to the target, whatever flak or defending fighter status. He sought only the very best and bravest of men, therefore, and rejected many applications on instinct. By the first week or so in October, however, he had selected a few more, including Pilot Officer F.E. Willsher – a young fair-haired boy of 19, only a year out of the school classroom; Flt. Lt Thomas Vincent O’Shaughnessy; Flying Officer Gordon Herbert Weeden; [deleted] and [/deleted] Warrant Officer “Chuffy” Bull; Flying Officer
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Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, [inserted] Flt Lt. R.S.D. Kearns, DFC, DFM; [/inserted] Pilot Officer Nicholas R Ross; [inserted] Sqd. Ldr William [inserted] R [/inserted] Suggett (to take over “A” Flight) [/inserted]; and Flying Officer J. (“Paddy”) Gingles. They all soon settled into the training routine, although both Ross and Bull hit trees on low-flying exercises, narrowly avoiding disaster each time.
David Wilson took up young Willsher on October 9th, to show him how the SABS worked on a 10,000 ft high-level bombing run, and in the afternoon of the same day, he flew ED932 at low level all through the Lake District and the Scottish Glens, taking 5 hrs 30 mins for the cross country. On the 11th he tried the SABS at 12 000 ft and got his error down to 60 yds, and then over the next few days he used it at 1,000 ft (Error=47 yds), 250 ft (with Mick Martin acting as bomb aimer again (Error=105 yds), then at 15,000 ft (Error=70 yds, with Sqd Ldr Richardson on board), then 15,000 ft again (128 yds). And so it went on with David flying his new Lancaster DV 246 [inserted]KC-U) [/inserted], or the two originals from the Dams raid, ED932 (AJ-V), or ED 924 [inserted] (AJ-Y) [/inserted], which had been flown by Cyril Anderson.
David took “Talking Bomb” down to the RAE at Farnborough on October 18th to have some modifications made to the SABS, then he flew the Sqd. Ldr. (who had been a Great War pilot in the RFC) up to the bombing range at West Freugh (near Stranraer) where they checked the bombsight out again at 14,000 ft and 8,000 ft.
As October drew to a close, the bugs seemed to be getting ironed out of the SABS system, as the various modifications were made to it, and after the sight went U/S two days running on practice bombing on 22nd and 23rd, at long last, on the afternoon of the 23rd, David flew over West Freugh again at 14,000 ft and dropped one 4,000 lb “Cookie” this time. It hit the 3-storey target building [inserted] at Braid Fell [/inserted] fair and square in the middle, demolishing it! (Average error = Zero!). On his next run, on the 25th, he dropped six 1,000 lb bombs from 14,000 ft, hit the target with one, gained a very near miss with a second, and put the other four close by ([inserted] Mean [/inserted] Error = 79 yds). Things were getting better!
[Underlined] Restarting Operations [/underlined]
November started off the same way – with more
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high and low level exercises. David had been allocated Guy Gibson’s old aircraft (ED932, AJ-V) on a permanent basis now, and he flew it on most of the practices. He did a run at 12,000 ft and dropped four [inserted] bombs (with [/inserted] an average error of 146 yds), then three bombs from 2,000 ft (53 yds), and then switched to one of Mick Martin’s latest ideas – bombing a PFF red Target Indicator from 15,000 ft. He scored a “bullseye” on it on November 5th (appropriately for Guy Fawkes night!), and with things now obviously getting to the stage where 617 Squadron was ready for operations with the SABS, David showed a VIP around his aircraft on November 6th (believed to be Roy Chadwick, Avro’s Chief Designer) and flew him back to Ringway in the afternoon.
Cochrane at Group had meanwhile decided it was time to test the SABS in action, and so Mick Martin was informed [inserted] that [/inserted] they were to raid the Anthéor Viaduct in Southern France again on November 11th – this time from 8,000 ft to avoid the flak from recently installed German defences.
On the morning of November 11th, David made one more practice flight in ED932, dropping 6 bombs from 15,000 ft and getting his mean error down to 89 yds. It was the best they could do, and he [inserted] then [/inserted] prepared for the evening’s operation. The Squadron despatched 11 aircraft, starting at 18.15, with Ted Youseman first off, and each being bombed-up with one 12,000 [inserted] lb [/inserted] H.C. Blast bomb. Mick Martin himself was leading the raid, and Dave Shannon and Les Munro were also flying, but Shannon had engine failure on take-off and had to abort. The others all got off safely – O’Shaughnessy, Rice, Bull, Clayton, Brown, Kearns, and David Wilson – and set course for Anthéor (David had two new members of his → [inserted] crew on this “op” – Flying officer Chandler and Warrant officer Holland, who were to stay with him ‘for some time (“Chan” Chandler had already survived 8 days in a dinghy in the N-Sea, after ditching in a 49 Sqd Hampden, returning from Düsseldorf in the early hours of July 1st, 1941). [/inserted]
They found the viaduct in half moonlight this time, but there were guns and searchlights to avoid, and there was another similar viaduct just to the West, in the bay by Agay, and this confused some crews sufficiently enough to aim at that. There were no direct hits, but Mick Martin’s bomb hit the railway line to one side of the viaduct, and several more got near misses, David’s bomb [inserted] being 30 yds out. [/inserted] But the viaduct survived, and the 10 Lancasters flew on to Blida again,
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in Algeria. There had been some ships just off the shore at Anthéor which had opened fire on some of the Lancasters, but none had been hit, and they all landed safely in N. Africa. They had a four day break there (taking full advantage of it as they had done before, to sample the local wines and unrationed food and fruit. [sic] They left on November 15th for Rabat in Morocco, and on the 17th flew home from Morocco to Coningsby, via the Bay of Biscay, loaded with Forces Christmas mail for home and fruit and wine. But one Lancaster never made it back – Ted Youseman and his crew were probably picked off by a German fighter, and were believed to have ditched in the sea south-west of Brest, perishing in the process.
{Underlined] New C.O.; new ideas. [/underlined]
While they had been away in N. Africa, a new C.O. had arrived to take command from Mick Martin (who had only been in charge on a temporary basis). His name – Wing Commander Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, DSO and Bar, DFC – and he had dropped a rank from Group Captain, in order to take over 617. Mick Martin had some burning ideas now about marking targets first with flares, so the rest could bomb with the SABS system, and so did Cheshire too. He was to change 617’s role quite dramatically with his ideas – how dramatically, and how successfully none of them would have guessed in their wildest dreams!
After they were once more back at Coningsby, David tried out his SABS from 18,000 ft now, gaining an error of 137 yds for [inserted] dropping [/inserted] six bombs, and made a few routine air tests of his Lancaster (ED932) early in December. Cheshire also loaned out from 617 crews with McCarthy Clayton, Bull and Weeden, for a few days to the Special Duties Squadrons at Tempsford. They were needed to make pinpoint drops of guns and ammunition to the French Resistance [inserted] near Doullens (on the River Outhie in Northern France) [/inserted] on December 10th. The raid went badly, flak bringing down both Bull and Weeden’s aircraft with two of Bull’s crew, and all in Weeden’s being killed. McCarthy couldn’t find the target, and so he and Clayton went back on December 11th, and were successful this time. Cheshire and 617
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had lost two more valuable crews.
Almost immediately after this, 617 was detailed to bomb a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais, and Group decided to try out the SABS again at night, but this time, working on Martin and Cheshire’s ideas, arranged for the P.F.F to mark the wood concerned with incendiaries. [Inserted] → Mick Martin [inserted] – as Cheshire’s Deputy - [/inserted] had now taken over as O.C. “B” flight from Les Munro, and David Wilson was now flying as Mick’s right hand man. [/inserted] Nine Lancasters were [inserted] therefore [/inserted] sent off from 617 Squadron on December 16th, [inserted] led by Cheshire with Martin as his Deputy [/inserted] to bomb the “Ski-site” ** at Flixecourt on the Somme between Abbeville and Amiens. A single PFF Mosquito used the “Oboe” beam system of marking the target [inserted] with incendiaries [/inserted], and all nine 617 Lancasters dropped their single 12,000 ln H.C. Blast bombs as close to the burning wood as possible. David dropped his, and his bomb-aimer took a photograph of the aiming point to check on their return. [Inserted] His sortie lasted for 3 hrs 40 mins in all. [/inserted] Subsequent “recce” pictures showed the Squadron had collectively achieved a mean error of 94 yds – but the “Oboe” Mosquito had marked 350 yds from the target – and so all the bombs were wide! Cheshire was not amused.
David was up again on December 18th, doing a practice drop from 2,500 ft (Error-70 yds), and on the [inserted] morning of the [/inserted] 20th from 15,000 ft (Error=60 yds). This was a good, consistent result from differing altitudes and in different aircraft (ED932 and ME557). In fact ME557 [inserted] (KC-O) [/inserted] was a brand new Lanc, and David took a Ministry of Aircraft Production official up on the practice to check the [inserted] Napier [/inserted] compressors [inserted] supplying air to the SABS system [/inserted]. * It was also one of the first Lancasters fitted out to carry Barnes Wallis’ new 12,000 ln Tallboy streamlined bomb to be delivered to 617.
The next operation was on [inserted] the evening of [/inserted] December 20th to [inserted] the Cockerill steelworks [/inserted] [deleted] an armaments factory [/deleted] in a residential area of Liege, in Belgium. The bombing had to be accurate to avoid civilian casualties, so eight PFF Mosquitos preceded eight 617 Lancasters. The Mosquitos marked the target, but [deleted] as [/deleted] low cloud prevented the markers being seen, [inserted] Cheshire dived low to see for himself, and found the markers were well off the target. He therefore ordered [/inserted] the force [inserted] to [/inserted] return without bombing. David (and the [inserted] others [/inserted]) brought their 12,000 lb H.C. bombs back, and Geoff Rice was shot down by a night fighter, miraculously surviving alone out of his crew, to be taken prisoner. One more of the original 617 founders had gone.
* Recoded later as KC-S, this was the aircraft in which Flt. Lt. “Bill” Reid, VC, was shot down on July 31st 1944 (he survived).
** So-called because of the shape of the curved ramp V1 launch site.
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Two days later, on December 22nd, David was off again [inserted] (in AJ-V) [/inserted] to attack a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site near Bellencombre, south-east of Dieppe, this time taking Flying Officer Len Sumpter, DFC, DFM as his [inserted] bomb-aimer [/inserted] [deleted] crew [/deleted] instead of F.O. Parkin. Sumpter had flown on the original Dams raid, been rested, and had just come back for a second tour with 617, [inserted] normally flying with Dave Shannon [/inserted]. But the PFF Mosquitos failed again, and David brought all 11 x 1,000 lb bombs back. There were no casualties, fortunately, but Cheshire was not impressed by these PFF failures
David had a few days leave, and resumed flying on the 31st, after Christmas. He missed the new attempt by 617 on December 30th to bomb Flixecourt again, with 10 Lancasters helped by six PFF Mosquitos. Once more the markers were 200 yds off target, 617 accurately straddled them, but because [inserted] of their accuracy [/inserted] missed the main target.
[Underlined] Sorting out the marking problem; a new base [/underlined]
At the beginning of January 1944, David was up on bombing practices again – high level from 15,000 ft (with an average error of 127 yds – and one bomb that toppled); then another of the same height with a better error (98 yds). That was on the morning of the 4th, and in the evening David was one of 11 Lancasters put up for attacking another Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais area [inserted] – this time at Fréval. [/inserted] With the others, he bombed a PFF Target Indicator that they had dropped at very low level this time – but the T.I. was four miles from the target, however, and David brought a photo back to prove it. He blamed the PFF once more! This was obviously not good enough, and whereas 617 Squadron was now trained up to be the RAF’s most accurate bombing squadron, it was the Pathfinders who were now plainly not up to scratch! It was no good having accurate bombing on inaccurate target markers, and so Cheshire, Martin and Bob Hay (Flt. Lt. Robert Claude Hay, DFC and Bar, RAAF – 617’s bombing leader, and Mick Martin’s own bomb-aimer from the first raid on the Dams) put their heads together to work out their own in-house method of marking a target, and then bombing it with the rest of the Squadron. But they first had to prove that the System worked, and to do this they needed Cochrane’s
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permission from Group to discontinue using PFF assistance Cheshire, with his innocently youthful and matter-of-fact ways, soon got this.
Meanwhile, determined to get everyone’s accuracy up even further, David and the rest of 617 went on practicing, day after day, over the next 17 days of January. They made high-level bombing runs, low-level cross country flights, and usually pin-pointed targets all the way round in woodland areas – just like the V1 Flying Bomb sites. David flew these separate and original 617 Lancasters during this period – ED915, ED924 and his own ED932
On January 9th, after a practice over the Wainfleet Sands at low level, he and the others landed at Woodhall Spa – to be their new base from now onwards. Cochrane had decided that 617, with its special techniques, top priority targets – and more importantly, the forthcoming new Tallboy and 10-ton Grand Slam bombs they were to use – deserved a special one-squadron base secluded away from other camps. Woodhall Spa was a one-squadron aerodrome, and so 619 Squadron there moved to Coningsby (which could hold several squadrons), and 617 transferred in the reverse direction on January 9th 1944. → [Inserted] A few more pilots joined 617 at this time, including Lt. Nick Knilans, DSO, DFC (USAF), Flying Officer Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, and Flying Officer J.L. Cooper. [/inserted]
Over the next few days, operations now from Woodhall Spa and billeted in the delightful Petwood House Hotel (which served as the Officer’s Mess) David flew on low-level cross country sorties, but this time in formation. He flew his (and Guy Gibson’s old aircraft) ED932 for the last time on January 18th [inserted] across to Coningsby, [/inserted] and this veteran Lancaster was left there to be used by 61 Squadron in future (it survived the war intact, only to be eventually scrapped). On the 20th, David started some new tactics that Cheshire was devising – low flying over the Wash at only 60 ft high, and then flying across, and down, the aerodrome’s flarepath at 60 ft, practicing the tactics of dropping more Target Indicators onto a cluster dropped already by the leader (using the runway lights as imaginary markers). It was during this practicing on → [inserted] the 20th that O’Shaughnessy misjudged his height and hit a sea wall at Snettisham, crashing on the beach. He and one of his crew were killed, but the rest (one badly injured) survived to fight again. The Squadron had lost another [inserted] good [/inserted] pilot. [/inserted]
Next day, January 21st, Cheshire announced he had got permission to strike at a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site again – but this time without using the PFF at all. That evening, they set out with even greater excitement than usual, for they knew they had to get a good result
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this time, to substantiate all their training.
David took another of his old mounts, JB139 [inserted] (KC-X) [/inserted], on this raid, and 617 put up 12 aircraft in all. The target was at Hallencourt, a few miles South of Abbeville, and Cheshire and Martin carried out their own new “Pathfinder” technique. First of all the leading pair dropped [inserted] Red Spot [/inserted] flares from 7,000 ft, then dived down [inserted] to about 400 ft, [/inserted] using their illumination of the target area to drop long-burning Target Indicators right on top of the Ski-site.* The rest of 617 then flew over, dropping their bombs on the T.I’s. David, in fact, carried 2 x 1,000 lb, 13 x 500 lb bombs and 6 flares in his Lancaster, and, in common with others, would have used the flares if necessary to help Cheshire and Martin to go on marking the target if their first T.I’s had gone out. But David didn’t need to use the flares on this occasion, nor did he drop all his bombs – only 7 x 500 lb and 1 x 1,000 were let go, and he brought the rest back. He got a good photograph of the aiming point [inserted] from his bombing level of 13,000ft, [/inserted] and when the crews got back to Woodhall Spa, they were jubilant. It had worked, and later “recce” pictures confirmed they had blasted the main target area – for a change!
Once again, in the next few days, David was hard at Cheshire’s new tactics again, doing low-level [inserted] (60 ft high) [/inserted] runs over Uppingham Reservoir, and practicing aiming at the flarepath at their base – or carrying out “Tomato” exercises (as they now referred to them). Then on January 25th came their second “Op” using their own marking [inserted] techniques [/inserted] on a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site. Now it was Fréval [inserted] again [/inserted], and David was one of 12 617 Lancasters to head for the target, flying a Mk I (DV385, KC-A). [deleted] from 50 Squadron for a few days [/deleted] He carried 13 x 500 lb and 2 x 1,000 lb bombs and Cheshire and Martin dived in low again aided by a green Target Indicator dropped [inserted] in the general target area by the PFF, [/inserted] marked the target [inserted] with Red Spot flares [/inserted] in very gusty wind conditions, and David and the rest dropped their bombs exactly on target. It was a case of two out of two “bullseyes” for 617, and there were no losses from either raid.
[Underlined] Picking off the targets [/underlined]
Cochrane now realised that Cheshire and 617
* Cochrane had insisted that the marking had to be done from above 2,500 ft, but Cheshire and Martin had worked out the dive-bombing technique down to 400 ft!
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were now thoroughly capable of using their low-marking techniques on any number of specialised targets – and Cheshire had eventually told him of their habit of dive-bombing their Lancasters right down to 400 ft over the target. So Cochrane now picked a beauty for them – the new engine works at Limoges, in mid-western France. This was to be on February 8th, and so in the days leading up to this, David found himself practicing once again, this time dropping bombs on the ranges from 1,500 ft, 2,000 ft, then at 8,000 ft, 10,000 ft and finally 14,500 ft (at West Freugh). At low-level his mean error was 222 yds, but at 10,000 ft he got it down to 39 yds, and at West Freugh to 65 yds.
Finally, the 8th dawned, and in the evening 12 Lancasters took off for the Gnome et Rhône aero engine works at Limoges. Cheshire and Martin left 15 minutes before the rest – led by Dave Shannon and consisting of David, Ken Brown, Bob Knights (a new pilot), Knilans, Ross, Kearns, Willsher Clayton and Suggitt.
Para // Cheshire had worked out a special technique for this raid , as most of the workers were French, and the factory was close to a built-up area where many of them lived. There was cloud right along their route, but it broke just before they reached Limoges, on the River Vienne. Cheshire then flew over the factory roof three times, down to about 100 ft to warn all the night shift workers to leave, and take shelter. His aircraft, DV380 (Coded KC-N) had had some modifications to accommodate an RAF Film Unit crew, led by Sqd Ldr. Pat Moyna. Half its fuselage door was cut away to instal [sic] two 35mm movie cameras, and two large mirrors were fitted underneath to reflect as much light as possible (had Roy Chadwick, the Lancaster’s designer known, he would doubtless have considered it as sacrilege)!
After Cheshire’s third run, his crew could see the French workers streaming out of the factory, to their air raid shelters, and after waiting a few minutes, Cheshire went in to drop his cascading incendiary markers and Red Spot fires directly on top of the centre of the factory roofs. The Film crew had a beanfeast, obtaining some of the most remarkable shots of the War, as the cascades of light lit up the factory, river and railway yards nearby.
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Mick Martin then followed Cheshire in, flying his Lancaster DV402 (coded KC-P), and dropped his markers on top of Cheshires – After that Cheshire told the main force overhead to bomb, and he cruised around the area at 5,000 ft, to let the film crew record the event. They had a grandstand view, as the other 10 Lancasters (David was flying ME559, KC-Q) unloaded their weapons on the factory. Five of them carried 12,000 lb H.C. Blast bombs, the other seven – like David – [inserted] each [/inserted] dropped 12 x 1,000 lb bombs, and most of them were within the factory perimeter. David reckoned his stick fell slightly off target, and straddled the railway lines away from the factory.
Cheshire then ordered all crews home, but he flew around the burning, smoking factory in the moonlight at 100ft (or less) for half an hour, letting the Film crew complete a unique task. Even Cheshire’s crew got fidgety, trying to egg him on gently to start for home. As Moyna said afterwards: “Cheshire seemed as unconcerned as an assistant arranging a group photograph in a studio”! Finally, they turned out to the Bay of Biscay, and flew back over the sea. They all arrived back safely – Cheshire about an hour behind the rest. And the main achievement (for Cheshire) was a perfect record on film to show the AOC and all the others at Bomber Command HQ, illustrating how effective low-level marking could be.
[Underlined] Third attempt at Anthéor. [/underlined]
After the attack on Limoges, David’s next flight with 617 was another operation on February 12th – back to the Anthéor viaduct again. The Squadron had already attacked it twice, and the USAF once, but it was still intact and carrying almost 100,000 tons of German supplies down to the Italian Front each week. All these attacks had, however, served only to get the Germans to defend it more heavily each time, and the defences were formidable this time.
Once again 617 fielded 10 Lancasters for the “Op”. but Cheshire was concerned about the range at their disposal, for Cochrane refused permission for them to carry on to Sardinia this time, saying he needed 617 back in the UK after the raid. In order to squeeze every gallon of petrol into their tanks, they flew
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their Lancasters down to Ford aerodrome, between Bognor Regis and Littlehampton on the South Coast, using it as an advance base to refuel. Then Cheshire and Martin took off ahead of the others, climbing through bad icing conditions, and arrived some five minutes ahead of the main force.
It was a pitch black night and the narrow valley was full of all types of ack ack guns, which opened up in an absolute hail of flak. Cheshire tried three times to dive down the valet over the viaduct, and drop his load of markers and flares, but each time he was blinded by the flak and forced off course and out to sea. Martin then had a go, and Cheshire tried to get back inland to draw off the fire as he ran in, but was out of position as Mick slid down the dark ravine. As Mick levelled out over the viaduct, a 20mm cannon shell exploded through the bomb-aimers’s cupola, and Bob Hay was killed instantly, and the Flight Engineer, Ivan Whittaker injured in his legs.
Cheshire ordered Martin to fly on to Sardinia, and land there (where he had wanted the entire Squadron to go), and then he went in again himself, this time at 5,000 ft, above the ravine and out of range of the cannon fire. There was still a mass of heavy flak bursts, and David [inserted] in Lancaster ED763 (KC-D), [/inserted] and the others flying overhead thought it looked impossible for anyone to survive in that holocaust. Cheshire managed to drop some of his Red Spot markers, but they drifted to the beach side of the viaduct. With time over the target limited by having to return to the UK, Shannon up above now commenced the high-level bombing, and David and the others followed. David dropped his single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb [inserted] from 9,500 ft [/inserted] and turned for home. Only one of these weapons dropped close to the viaduct, the rest falling closer to the beach, and once again the bridge remained intact! Finally, after a flight lasting seven hours exactly *, David touched down at Ford again, to refuel and rest, before flying back to Woodhall Spa that morning. [Deleted] The Lancaster he had used this time was ED763 (KC-D). [/deleted]
But fate had not finished with the Squadron yet, for next morning, as the 617 crews left Ford to fly up to Woodhall Spa, Sqd. Ldr. Bill
* David’s previous sortie to Limoges lasted 7 hrs 25 mins altogether but this was from Woodhall Spa. It took about an hour each way from there down to Ford.
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Suggitt climbed out to the West, and turned to starboard in DV382 (KC-J) to set course to the North-east. He had to climb up through the clouds shrouding [inserted] the [/inserted] South Downs, and just after 08.30 a tractor driver at Duncton Hill Farm saw the Lancaster impact on Littleton Down, above him. Wreckage spread everywhere, and all Suggitt’s crew died instantaneously, although Suggitt himself died two days later, still in a coma. Flight Sgt. John Pulford, DFM, the last but one survivor of Guy Gibson’s original raid crew, died in the crash. (The last survivor, Flt. Lt. Richard Trevor-Roper DFC, DFM, was killed on a 97 Squadron operation just 20 days later).
[Underlined] Improving the techniques. [/underlined]
After Mick Martin returned from Sardinia later, his Lancaster temporarily patched up, Cochrane sent him off for a rest period – much against his will. But Cochrane preferred living Flight Commanders to dead ones, and he had few survivors left now, of the original 617 founding pilots.
Then came some top-level Group and Command meetings – at one of which Cheshire appeared on the one hand, proposing greater use of his and Martin’s low-level marking techniques (preferably using Mosquitos in future), and on the other hand Air Vice Marshal Don Bennett [inserted] of 8 Group [/inserted] was strongly defending his PFF high-level marking (and being generally dismissive of 617 Squadron’s techniques).
Cochrane, however, gave Cheshire some leeway in his 5 Group, and set a string of targets now for 617 to attack where Cheshire could devise the necessary low-level marking himself. With Martin gone now, Cheshire took Les Munro as his Deputy, and Les became “B” Flight Commander, with David Wilson as his right hand man. Cheshire did not yet put in a bid for two Mosquitos (but he was busy making the necessary high-level contact in the RAF in order to obtain them quickly and painlessly when he needed them). He knew that the light, fast and manoeuvrable Mosquito would help to make diving onto the target so much easier, and also assist in avoiding the defensive flak.
The last half of February 1944 passed for David with no more than four training flights or air tests
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being flown, due to bad weather. The last of these, on February 29th, was a bomb-dropping exercise from 15,000 ft, where David’s crew scored a 100 yd average error. Then came another practice from 10,000 ft on the morning of March 2nd, followed by 617’s next operation the same evening – this time to the aero-engine works at Albert in the Pas de Calais, between Amiens and Bapaume. Because this was believed to be heavily defended (repairing as it did, vital BMW engines for Focke Wulf FW 190 fighters) Cochrane ordered Cheshire not to mark below 5,000 ft this time. This was Leonard Cheshire’s 75th operation, and David Wilson’s 67th, yet 617’s three Flight Commanders – Dave Shannon, Joe McCarthy and Les Munro were some way behind these totals themselves. Both McCarthy and Munro were now promoted to Squadron Leaders.
David’s aircraft, DV246 (KC-U) was loaded up completely this time with [inserted] 248 x 30 lb [/inserted] incendiaries, and Cheshire and Munro (as deputy) went ahead to position themselves down to 5,000 ft so as to identify the target when the flares were dropped by the leading 617 Lancasters [inserted] of the 13 flying [/inserted] overhead. Cheshire went in under the flares to drop his markers, but his aircraft’s SABS bombsight went U/S on the approach, and while he stood off [inserted] for his bomb-aimer [/inserted] to try to get it working, he called in Munro to drop markers [inserted] just [/inserted] as the flares burnt out. Munro’s markers were spot on, and 617 bombed the factory from higher up, practically all their bombs and certainly David’s load of incendiaries [/inserted] (dropped from 9,200 ft) [/inserted] hitting the factory dead-centre. It was a text book operation, and Cheshire’s diary entry was almost right when he wrote: “This factory will produce no more engines for the Hun!”
Two nights later, on March 4th, 617’s target was the small, but important [inserted] La Ricamerie [/inserted] needle-bearing factory at St. Etienne (to the South-west of Lyon). It was a very small target, in a narrow valley with 4,000 ft hills on either flank, and once again in a built-up area, meaning it had to be picked out surgically, without harming the French citizens if possible.
Again, 15 Lancasters were put up that night, Cheshire and Munro leading (the latter on three engines, as one had packed up after take off). But there was ten-tenths cloud over the target, as David Wilson recorded. He was carrying a Sqd Ldr. Doubleday that night in his usual mount, JB139 (KC-X), and 1,000 lb
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bombs. But Cheshire couldn’t mark the target because of the bad weather, and so they all brought their bombs back that night. David’s flight there and back lasted exactly four hours.
Six days later, with better weather forecast, 617 tried to hit St. Etienne again. This time 16 Lancasters set off for La Ricamerie factory – on the same night that 5 Group bombed the Michelin works at Clermont-Ferrand. This time Cheshire made six attempts to mark at very low level in the blackness, dropping them accurately on the last run, but they bounced beyond the factory. Munro followed, and dropped short, Shannon tried and his markers bounced beyond, and finally Arthur Kell (a new Australian pilot) made a low-level dive and planted incendiaries in the factory. The rest of 617 then bombed the incendiaries (to Cheshire’s commands), and David unleashed his 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] from X “X-Ray” on the second run in [/inserted] in two sticks, [inserted] dropping them from 8000 ft. [/inserted] When they returned safely, David’s bob-aimer believed they had missed the target, but when “Recce” photographs were obtained, 617 was delighted to see the target had been completely destroyed, and there was no damage to the built-up area outside!
There was no more training at the moment, and the next “Op” was on March 15th, to an aero-engine works at Woippy, on the Northern outskirts of Metz (on the R. Moselle, East of Paris). It was freezing cold weather and 617 and 619 Squadrons sent a combined 22 Lancasters up this night, but the target was hidden by cloud [deleted] again [/deleted]. David was carrying a single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb in his [inserted] JB139 [/inserted] X “X-Ray” again, but there was no hope of bombing, and so they all brought their bombs back. This was a longer sortie – 5 hrs 30 mins – and one [inserted] 617 [/inserted] crew, flying with Flying Officer Duffy, were attacked by three night fighters on their return leg, and claimed all three shot down!
Next day, March 16th, 617 was off again, this time to bomb the Michelin tyre factory at Cataroux, Clermont-Ferrand. The 15 Lancasters they put up were joined by six from 106 Squadron that were fitted with [inserted] the [/inserted] new [inserted] H2S [/inserted] radar bombing equipment. These latter aircraft dropped the flares this time, and Cheshire
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Made his usual low-level dives over the Cataroux Michelin factory to warn the [inserted] French [/inserted] workers to take cover, dropping his markers on the third run – but a little short. He was being extremely careful once more, because the factory had these major sheds in its complex, but a fourth large building – the French workers canteen – had “on no account to be damaged, if possible”, (Group’s instructions). Cheshire then called in his three Flight Commanders, Munro, Shannon and McCarthy, and they all managed to drop their markers directly on the factory sheds. To do this, they had to have a constant rain of flares to illuminate the target, and David Wilson in JB139 released his six, to help their aim. Then Cheshire called up the others to bomb the newly laid markers and David released his [inserted] single [/inserted] 12,000 Blast bomb *, right on target, and turned for home. This trip lasted 6 hrs 40 mins in all, with the separate run-ins to drop flares, and then the weapon, and with poor weather conditions back at Woodhall Spa, David landed at Coningsby on the return, positioning back to base [inserted] later [/inserted] in the morning.
The “recce” pictures next morning showed the works entirely in flames – and yet the canteen was intact! In fact Cheshire had once again carried Sqd Ldr Pat Moyna and his Film Unit in his Lancaster, and filmed the progress of the bombing from low-level.
Off again on March 18th, David was one of 13 Lancasters this time from 617 Squadron, to bomb the French [inserted] “Poudrerie Nationale” [/inserted] explosives factory at Bergerac, on the R. Dordogne east of Bordeaux. Cochrane had meanwhile told Cheshire that he would try to obtain two Mosquitos, to carry on the low-level marking in greater safety, and therefore until they came, Cheshire must not do any more low-level marking below 5,000 ft. On this raid therefore, six other 5 Group Lancasters, using H2S, joined 617 Squadron, and Cheshire marked from 5,000 ft – spot on – followed by an equally accurate Munro. Shannon and McCarthy both marked an ammunition dump close by. Then the others started to bomb, and before David [inserted] (in JB139 again) [/inserted] dropped his 12,000 lb weapon on the factory [inserted] from 10,000 ft [/inserted], Bunny Clayton dropped his on the nearby
* Six crews carried this weapon on the raid (those with the most accurate bombing averages). This weapon was now referred to as “The Factory Buster”.
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ammunition dump, which exploded in a 15-second long, gigantic flash that blinded everybody. Cheshire, down below, looked up and saw the rest of 617’s Lancasters silhouetted above him against the sky. Then David’s bomb slammed into the powder works, and it disappeared in turn beneath a series of vast explosions. “The powder works”, Cheshire noted, “would appear to have outlived their usefulness!”
This route also took 6 hrs 40 mins from take-off to touch-down, and two days later (as usual now) on [inserted] March [/inserted] 20th, David was off again [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] to another explosives works – this one at Angoulême, [inserted] North-east of Bordeaux [/inserted]. The pattern was repeated, six 5 Group Lancasters using H2S to drop flares, Cheshire leading 617’s total force of 14 Lancasters and marking from 5,000 ft again. This explosives factory, on a bend on the R. Charente there, performed in the same manner as the one at Bergerac. David dropped 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb from 8,300 ft on top of this works, and the factory was completely – and spectacularly – destroyed. Some 6 hrs 5 mins later, David was safely back at Woodhall Spa, as were all 617 crews, and the Film Unit in Cheshire’s aircraft again.
[Underlined] Lyon – third time lucky [/underlined]
The fact that 617 would never leave a “demolition job” half-finished was becoming equally well known to Germans and British alike. The Germans were, in fact, beginning to draft in more defences to the vital plants in France that were supplying their War Effort. But nowhere was this reputation more tested than with their attack on the SIGMA aero-engine works near Lyon on the night of March 23rd 1944. Again six Lancasters of 106 Squadron were to act as the Flare droppers, and 617 put up 14 aircraft.
Cheshire told the 106 crews when to drop their flares, but the first lot were too far North, the second try fell short to the South, and final corrections failed to illuminate the actual target. Cheshire now had to send in his own 617 flare droppers, at altitude, and he just managed one dive over the target at 5,000 ft before they went out. He was not sure his markers had hit, but ordered the rest of 617 to bomb them. David was carrying 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this time, all fitted with long delay fuses (for the safety of the French
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civilians), so Cheshire had to fly around on his own afterwards to assess the results. They exploded eventually, and certainly something had been hit fair and square.
On the return, all but one 617 aircraft diverted to Tangmere – a fighter station near Chichester – only Nick Ross getting back to Woodhall Spa [inserted] (David’s sortie had lasted 6 hrs 45 mins by this time). [/inserted] There was very limited accommodation, and Cheshire and his Flight Commanders slept with some of the 617 crews in their billets, and on the floor – being last in that morning! When they returned to Woodhall Spa after resting, it was to discover that their target was untouched – they had bombed the wrong factory!
So, next day, March 25th, they went back again to finish the job. This time there were 22 Lancasters in all, including the half dozen from 106 Squadron, but Cheshire had re-organized the Flare-dropping force this time, putting 617’s Kearns in charge of all such flare usage – be it by 106 or 617 Squadron. Cochrane had allowed Cheshire to mark at low-level this time, if required, and as the flares went down Cheshire once again realised they were off target. Eventually he and Kearns got them back on the right target, and Cheshire and McCarthy simultaneously marked underneath. Cheshire then realised they had dropped their spot markers on the wrong buildings, and went in again, his second lot of red spot incendiaries again overshooting. Finally he called in McCarthy again, who hit the target with his last markers, and Cheshire ordered these to be bombed by the rest. Due to problems of communication, however, all the 617 crews orbiting overhead then bombed the early markers – missing the target once again! David’s load this time consisted entirely of 500 lb incendiary clusters and they obtained a good aiming point photograph – proving once back home again 7 hrs 20 mins later, that they had missed the right aero engine works for the second time!
Once more, therefore, 617 set out again on March 29th to try and complete the demolition job. This time 106 and 617 put up 19 Lancasters, and Cheshire was ordered to mark from 5,000 ft again. The flares
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dropped by 106 this time failed to ignite, and Kearns therefore ordered 617 crews to drop their flares. These were accurate, and Cheshire then marked carefully, getting his spot fires just a few yards out of the target centre. When David and the rest above bombed these, their average error put their bombs within the target area this time. David was carrying 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this occasion, [deleted] flying his usual X “X-ray” [/deleted], and his crew knew immediately that they had at last scored a “bulls-eye”. It took just 7 hrs this time, before they were back at base, third time lucky!
[Underlined] Mosquito marking; and marshalling yards. [/underlined]
Two days before this operation – the last that Cheshire flew and marked in a Lancaster – Cochrane said he had obtained the use of two Mosquitos for marking in future. Cheshire went to see them at Coleby Grange on the 27th, and then later on the day he returned from Lyon (the 30th) he had an hour’s dual instruction on it before flying it to Woodhall Spa. He decided that [inserted] McCarthy [/inserted], Shannon, Kearns and Fawke should join him on the Mosquitos as pilots, and they did some rapid dual instruction and test flights. And within two weeks Cochrane had given them two more Mosquitos.
David Wilson was on a few days leave at the beginning of April, and missed the next operation to the aircraft repair plant at Toulouse-Blagnac aerodrome on April 5th. This was the first time Cheshire used his Mosquito to do the target marking, and this time he was marking not just for 617 Squadron – in the lead – but for the whole of 5 Group which joined in the raid for the first full scale rest of operations to come. In addition to Cheshire’s Mosquito, 617 Squadron fielded 17 Lancasters, and 5 Group put up another 127 altogether. Cheshire found the target clear of cloud, and dived three times, dropping his markers right on target, despite considerable flak of all types. But the Mosquito was fast and agile, and the flak was inaccurate because of this. Munro and McCarthy had marked with Lancasters, and then 617 and other 5 Group Lancasters unloaded their bomb
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loads on the aircraft factory, and on other nearby targets too. All were destroyed, but Cheshire had to leave the scene early, as he was not sure of the range of the Mosquito at low altitude, without extra wing tanks.
When David returned from leave, he was immediately scheduled on the next raid on April 10th, this time to the Luftwaffe’s Signals Equipment Depôt at St. Cyr, by Versailles. He was given the new Lancaster, LM485 (KC-N), which Les Munro had flown in the Toulouse raid on the 5th, and bombed-up with 1 x 8,000 lb and 6 x 500 lb bombs. This raid was just carried out by 617, using Cheshire’s Mosquito and 17 Lancasters, and Cheshire eventually dive-bombed the target [inserted] down to 700 ft [/inserted] with his markers, after having trouble finding it in the dark. But he was spot on again, and David and the rest bombed the target [inserted] from 13,600 ft, [/inserted] destroying most of it.
Discussions at Bomber Command HQ now led to the C-in-C, Harris, agreeing now to let Cochrane have his own Pathfinder Force, within 5 Group, built around the special marking techniques developed by 617 Squadron. Thus Cochrane now received back two Lancaster Squadrons – 83 and 97 – which had originally been seconded to 8 PFF Group, and one Mosquito Squadron – 627 – [inserted] also [/inserted] from 8 Group, (much against the wishes of their A.O.C., Don Bennett).
The object now was to use the Mosquito squadron, and 617’s Mosquitos, for marking large targets, have the Lancasters of 83 and 97 Squadrons dropping the flares and acting as back-ups, and use 617 as the lead bombing squadron, and the others to bomb from a higher level. The next target was just such a place – the marshalling yards at Juvisy, 10 miles South of Paris.
David, meanwhile, had been back over the ranges again with 617, honing their skills all the time. He had “Talking Bomb” up with him on one high level from 15,000 ft, did some low-level flying, and then, on April 18th, was off to Juvisy with 201 other Lancasters in the Group, plus 617’s four Mosquitos [inserted] flown by Cheshire, Fawke, Shannon and Kearns.) [/inserted] Flying LM 485 [inserted] (KC-N) [/inserted] again, David was designated (as was the whole of 617 Sqd) to mark the target for the [inserted] Group’s Lancasters. [/inserted], and carried 6 x Red Spots,
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[inserted] 6 x 1,000 lb, and [/inserted] 4 x 500 lb bombs. The railway yards were on the West bank of the R. Seine, just on the south-east corner of Orly aerodrome, and [deleted] they covered such a large aera that the raid was split into two waves – one to attack the Southern half, the next (one hour later) to attack the Northern section. [/deleted] Cheshire found the Southern aiming point under flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadrons above (although he had suffered a compass [inserted] failure [/inserted] in the Mosquito). He marked the yards successfully, and was backed up by the other [deleted] of the [/deleted] 617 Mosquitos, and David and the 617 Lancasters then unloaded their markers and bombs from 6,500ft fairly accurately on the target, [deleted] David and his 617 colleagues being the most [/deleted] with the rest of 5 Group – being trained in area (rather than spot) bombing – then carpeting the whole area. [Deleted] soon marked for the second wave, in Northern half of the yards, and again the results were accurate. [/deleted] The combined 5 Group method was becoming one of Bomber Command’s [inserted] most [/inserted] successful weapons!
On [inserted] the morning [/inserted] April 20th, David made his highest practice bombing run yet on Wainfleet Ranges – from 20,000 ft this time. He did not know it, but Cochrane was anticipating the arrival shortly of Barnes Wallis’ new Tallboy Bomb, and the higher it would be accurately dropped, the deeper it would penetrate in the ground before exploding, and creating an “earthquake” effect – bringing any building crashing (even if made of solid concrete).
The same evening (April 20th) David took part in another massed 5 Group attack – this time on the marshalling yards on the North side of Paris, at Porte de la Chapelle, just up the line from the Gare du Nord. He was flying LM485 (KC-N) this evening, and because these yards were very close to the residential tenement blocks surrounding them, extreme care was needed in dropping both markers and bombs. This raid was also even bigger than the one in Juvisy, because 5 Group also borrowed the services of some 8 Group PFF Mosquitos to drop markers by their Oboe equipment (using converging radio beams from UK stations), before 617’s Mosquitos, and Lancasters [inserted] of [/inserted] all three 5 Group marking Squadrons (617, 83 and 97) did their marker and bomb dropping, and then the 5 Group’s Lancasters bombed the target. There was a total of
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247 Lancasters, and 22 Mosquitos in all involved this night, and the raid was split into two waves, each about an hour apart, which attacked the Southern and Northern halves of the yards separately.
The Oboe markers were a little late over the target and there were inevitably some communication problems with all the aerial units involved, and Cheshire trying to control the different facets of the operation. But these were overcome, and another accurate blitzing of the target was achieved. David dropped [inserted] 6 x Red Spots, 6 x 1,000 lb and 4 x 500 lb [/inserted] bombs this time [inserted] from 6500 ft [/inserted], and achieved a direct hit on the aiming point. His sortie lasted 4 hrs 10 mins this time, and once again, all 617 aircraft – Mosquitos and Lancasters, returned safely, although 6 Lancasters from the other squadrons were lost. On the subject of Squadron losses, 617 itself was now very much below the average of most squadrons in this respect, helped no doubt by its training, and the fact that it had concentrated recently on French targets, rather than those in the most heavily defended parts of Germany. There were other reasons too – such as Cheshire’s acquaintance with an RAF officer who was [inserted] the [/inserted] Senior Controller of Beachy Head radar station, near Eastbourne. This had some new American equipment that gave long range cover for Fighter Command deep into France and the Low Countries, and the officer suggested that it could be used at night to warn 617’s Lancasters if they were being stalked by German nightfighters. Cheshire then had 617’s Lancasters fitted with special crystal pick-ups and the latest VHF sets (all with Cochrane’s approval) and from there on, they had valuable radar protection on their missions into the Continent.
[Underlined] Tallboys, and “Taxable”. [/underlined]
The next operation Cochrane planned for 617 was an attack on a German railway centre, and the first he chose was Braunschweig (Brunswick), to the east of Hannover, on the evening of April 22nd. This was historically important, as it was the first time that 617 and 5 Group employed their low-level marking activities over German soil. David, however, missed this operation, and the next ones on Munich [inserted] on April 24th [/inserted] (marshalling yards again) and the German
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tank and troop park at Mailly-le-Camp (May 3rd) – because he was busily engaged in working [inserted] up [/inserted] himself and a few [inserted] other [/inserted] specially selected 617 crews on the Barnes Wallis Tallboy bomb technique. For the most accurate bombing crews on the squadron had been selected to drop these new 12,000 lb weapons (and later, the 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs too).
It is worth recording, however, that the Braunschweig raid saw 238 Lancasters and 17 Mosquitos of 5 Group, and 10 Lancasters of 1 Group take part, The result was not good, chiefly because there was low cloud and although 617 marked the yards successfully (in the light of flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadron Lancasters above), other H2S aimed markers were inadvertently dropped farther South, and much of the main force bombed these. One Lancaster of 5 Group had left its radio transmitter on, and it jammed every direction Cheshire tried to give to the other crews. Four Lancasters were lost, but none from 617.
The Munich raid, on April 24, was by contrast an immense tactical success. A mixed force of 260 aircraft once more struck the railway yards there (as well as spreading out over other areas of the town) after Cheshire and 617 Mosquitos had marked the target, [inserted] and Cheshire flew around at low level through a considerable curtain of flak and searchlights. Diversionary raids were flown to Karlsrühr (by the main force), and on Milan (a spoof “Window” dropping exercise by six 617 crews), and the only casualty 617 suffered this time was Flt. Lt. J.L. Cooper (a recent joiner from 106 Squadron). His Lancaster was shot down en route to Munich as Aichstetten, just North-east of Lake Constance, and although his bomb-aimer was killed, the rest of the crew survived to be taken prisoner. [Inserted] Eight other Lancasters of 5 Group were also lost this night. [/inserted] They were lucky to be in Bavaria – for there was now a large price on the heads of 617 crews caught in France!
[Inserted] After this raid on Munich, Cochrane ordered 617 crews to have a weeks complete leave, and most used the rest to good effect. But one or two stayed behind, David Wilson being one.
One factor worth noting about this raid was that Cheshire could not obtain extra fuel tanks for 617’s four Mosquitos. They had to fly these to Manston, refuel on the runway and take off without warming up the engines, to be sure of getting to Munich. None of them believed they could get back to Manston, and yet all just made it – despite a German night fighter in the circuit when they landed! [/inserted]
The Mailly raid upset 617’s and 5 Groups recent success patterns with a vengeance – but it was [inserted] just [/inserted] one of these things (C’est la Guerre”). Mailly was a large French military training area South of Chalons-sur-
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Marne (itself just a few miles [inserted] South-east [/inserted] of Rhiems). Here, it was known the Germans had a Panzer division and their equipment in transit.
Cheshire and 617’s other three Mosquito pilots, Shannon, Fawke and Kearns, were ordered to mark at Mailly, but 617’s Lancasters were not detailed for this raid – which was just as well. Cheshire marked the target perfectly, and ordered the 5 Group Controller to order the first wave of Lancasters to bomb. But things started to go wrong then, as the [inserted] latter’s [/inserted] radio was subsequently found to be seriously off frequency, and his VHF set was being drowned by an American Forces broadcast. After some delay they started to bomb, but because the second wave was held back, Shannon and Kearns had to remark the target in the face of considerable flak. The second wave also bombed accurately, but in the delays caused by the lack of communication, and while Cheshire had to get the Deputy Controller to take over, German night fighters began to arrive in large numbers, and harried the Lancasters all the way back to Northern France. All the 617 crews returned safely, but 42 Lancasters were lost out of the 340 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitos sent on the raid by 5, 1 and 8(PFF) Groups. (This was an 11.6% loss rate – some three times the normal)!
David missed Braunschweig and Munich, because on April 22nd (the day after his return from La Chappelle) he took his old JB139 (originally KC-X, but now changed to KC-V) down to Boscombe Down to carry out trials with Barnes Wallis’ 12,000 ln Tallboy bomb. Sqd Ldr Richardson (“Talking Bomb”) was also there and over the next four days, David took him up several times daily, making high-level trials dropping prototype Tallboys from 18,000 ft each time. On the 26th he returned to Woodhall Spa, carrying seven of the scientists concerned with these tests. He had to break off the special Tallboy dropping exercises in May, however, as all 617’s crews were now engaged on one of their most boring exercises – yet [deleted] as [/deleted] it turned out, it was to be perhaps their most successful and decisive of all – Operation “Taxable”.
The [deleted word] squadron was being trained up to conduct a major “spoof” exercise on the day before D-Day.
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This would entail [inserted] two waves, each of 8 [/inserted] [deleted] 16 [/deleted] Lancasters, flying on instruments in short overlapping circuits, and dropping “Window” to try to indicate to the German shore defences that an invasion fleet was heading their way. (And of course it would be in a very different direction to that taken by the real fleet). The whole operation, once started, would have to be kept up [deleted] continuously [/deleted] for some four hours or more. [Deleted] to seem on the German radar as if a vast number of ships was slowly advancing in their direction. [/deleted] The continuous orbiting by the Lancasters had to be at low level [inserted] 3,000 ft [/inserted], start at a pre-arranged time near Dover, and advance gradually over a group of 18 surface vessels flying barrage balloons, as the vessels sailed beneath them towards the coast below Calais. Bundles of “Window” would have [inserted] to be dropped out every 12 seconds during the four hours. [/inserted]
The month of May, 1944 was probably the most boring in the Squadron’s history, as they practised, day after day, and usually for an hour or so at a time, the intricate navigational exercises that would enable them to fly these continuous orbits. David flew a total of 26hrs 20 mins altogether on these exercises, between May 6th and June 4th, in his Lancaster I, LM485 (KC-N). As the continuous orbiting was going to be a taxing operation, each Lancaster would have to have two crews on board, one relieving the other at the halfway point. David had as his relief pilot a Pilot Officer Sanders and his crew, and after May 13th they always flew together.
On May 18th, David tested out a new “automatic pilot” (or “George”) that Avro’s had fitted to his aircraft, to alleviate the strain of the exercise. These were fitted to all the other Lancasters. At the end of May the Squadron flew up to Yorkshire to practice over the North Sea, and dovetail the second wave of 8 Lancasters into the tricky take-over from the first wave – to keep dropping the “Window” without any gaps (lest the German radar show some strange interruptions in the “fleet’s” progress).
Finally, all was ready on the night of June 5th, and the first wave of 617’s Lancasters set off at about 23.00, the first wave finishing their intricate movements halfway across the Channel
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between Dover and the Pas de Calais coast at around 02.30, and being relieved by the second wave, who finished at around 05.00, after daybreak and by which time they were in sight of the French coast. Another Squadron, No 218, used six Stirling bombers fitted with G-H blind bombing radar units, working in the same fashion but a little more to the East of 617.
In the event, as David noted in his log book, the exercise was “believed very successful”. His total sortie lasted for 4 hrs 40 mins, and the entire Squadron was heartily glad when it was over!
[Underlined] Effect of the Tallboy raids [/underlined]
Two days later, 617 Squadron was back on its normal type of bombing operations again, but this time the raid was laid on suddenly, at short notice, to try to prevent a German Panzer Division reaching the D-Day bridgehead. They were moving up from Bordeaux, and Cochrane ordered 617 to take the newly arrived Tallboy bombs, and try to block a rail tunnel on their route. This was at Saumur, on the R. Loire West of Tours, on the South side of the river just before the railway crossed the Loire on a long, low bridge.
The Squadron was hurriedly bombed up with the 12,000 lb streamlined Tallboy, which had a casing of hardened chrome molybdenum steel and a filling of some 5,000 lbs of Torpex D1 explosive. It was some 21 feet long, and 3ft 2 ins in diameter, with four aerodynamically shaped fins, offset slightly to the airflow in order to spin the bomb as it dropped.
David flew his usual Lancaster (KC-N), which accommodated the Tallboy in its bombay, and had the latest deep-section bomb-doors which closed around the bomb and were also flush with the fuselage – except at the rear end, where they left a [inserted] small semi-circular [/inserted] gap around the bombs tail-fin. The rest of 617’s earlier Lancasters [inserted] in the “DV” or “JB” serial range [/inserted] had been similarly modified, or exchanged for newer aircraft with “ME” or “LM” serials. David’s crew – which had changed slightly over the last few months with postings, etc – consisted of → [inserted] Flying Officer G.A. Phillips (Flight Engineer), F/O J.K. Stott (Navigator), F/O D.W. Finlay (Bomb Aimer/Front Gunner) Warrant Officer H.G. Allen (Radio Operator), Flt. Sgt. H.D. Vaughan (Mid-upper gunner), and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler (Rear-gunner), [/inserted] [deleted] F.O. [inserted] D.W. [/inserted] Finlay, W.O. [inserted] H.G. [/inserted] Allen, Flt Sgt. [inserted] H.D. [/inserted] Vaughan, and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler, [/deleted] and everyone was looking forward to seeing what these new “Earthquake” bombs could accomplish.
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Cheshire marked the target in his Mosquito, as usual, dropping his markers by the light of the flares from four Lancasters of 83 Squadron above, and placing his Red Spots by the tunnel mouth at the Southern end. He was followed in by his other two Mosquitos (Shannon had had to return home with engine trouble, soon after take-off), and then he called up the 25 Lancasters of 617 that were circling above (this raid was a “maximum strength” affair)!
David’s bomb-aimer released their Tallboy at the → [inserted] end of his seventh run-in over the tunnel. On all the earlier 6 runs his bomb-aimer was unable to see the markers clearly at the tunnel’s South end. He waited for the North end to be marked – the secondary aiming point – and then bombed on the seventh run-in. His Tallboy fell away at the [/inserted] end of a careful, steady run-in, and – like the others – they were disappointed to see only a small red splash [inserted] of light [/inserted] below, as it buried itself deep in the ground – not the blinding, white flash that their 12,000 lb Blast bombs always made, lighting up the countryside. Because of this the 617 crews were a little doubtful whether the tunnel, or railway cutting had been hit properly, until “Recce” pictures [inserted] arrived] [/inserted] next day. These were remarkable. David had written in his log: “Operations – Railway Tunnel at Saumur. 12,000 lb Special. Poor shot, but tunnel badly damaged” [inserted] and his sortie had lasted exactly 6 hrs 20 mins [/inserted]. Which crater applied to which 617 crew was impossible to verify, but the aerial reconnaissance pictures showed all the huge round craters clustered around the Southern end to the tunnel. Two Tallboys had hit the railway lines fairly and squarely in the middle, on the tunnel approach (wrecking an overhead road bridge too), three had landed on the top edges of the cutting by the tunnel mouth, cascading earth onto the lines, but one (and to this day, nobody knows who dropped this) hit the hill above the tunnel some 50 [deleted] hundred [/deleted] yards from the tunnel mouth, and did just what Barnes Wallis had predicted – [deleted] buried itself in [/deleted] penetrated the ground right down by the tunnel roof, and blew an enormous crater in the hillside, exposing the tracks at the bottom and dumping thousands of tons of rubble on them. The 617 crews were greatly heartened by the result, and there had been no casualties.
The next Tallboy raid was on June 14th, and this time Cochrane had sought Barnes Wallis’ advice about using the weapon on German E-boat pens at coastal ports like Le Havre. These torpedo boats were proving a pest at night amongst the convoys of ships off the Normandy beach-head, and so the idea [inserted] was both [/inserted] of dropping the Tallboys to create “tidal waves” to swamp the E-boats
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in harbour.
The raid was Bomber Command’s first daylight raid since June 1943, and was to be a big one on the Port area of Le Havre. Two waves of Lancasters, from 1 and 3 Groups, were to attack in the evening, and at dusk (it was almost Midsummer’s day), but 617 were to go in first with Cheshire and two other marker Mosquitos, followed by 22 Lancasters each carrying the Tallboy bombs.
The 617 aircraft took off, with a fighter escort of Spitfires accompanying them, as it was still broad daylight over the target area. There was heavy flak over Le Havre, but Cheshire [deleted] Shannon and Fawke [/deleted] dived his Mosquitos right down into the thick of it, getting down to 7,000ft over the Pens, and dropped his Red Spot markers by the E-boar quayside Shannon, Fawke and the leading Lancasters who were watching, marvelled at the way Cheshire flew through a dense curtain of all types of A.A. fire, and survived.
Cheshire then told his other Mosquito pilots not to bother marking (as the first Spots he had laid were very visible), and told 617 to start to bomb on these. David’s Flight Commander, Les Munro, then led the Lancasters in at around 17,700 ft (several had already been hit in the engines and wings by flak, and turned back), and David and his crew [inserted] in LM 485 [/inserted] recorded a “Direct-Hit” with their Tallboy on the E-boat [deleted] Pens and [/deleted] wharves. All the 15 Tallboys dropped by 617 hit the target area (one went right through the roof of a large concrete E-Boat Pen), and the E-boats were literally blasted out of the water onto dry land, or blown apart. The post-raid photos showed 617 had wreaked immense damage in the Port area, and the subsequent two waves of 199 Lancasters in all, blitzed the rest of Le Havre, rendering the German Naval presence completely ineffective after that. Again, 617 had no losses.
With this success behind them, Cochrane sent them up again next day (June 15th 1944) to do the same at Boulogne. For these Tallboy operations, David always had a seven-man crew (rather than the old six-man complement), and he had now added a Sgt. King to his regulars. Still using [inserted] LM485 [/inserted] (KC-N), David was up with 21 other 617 Lancasters that evening. There was thick cloud over
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Boulogne this time, and Cheshire (his Mosquito heavily patched up from its ordeal by flak the previous day) dived down below the cloud to drop his markers from around 6,000 ft, once more in a hail of anti-aircraft gunfire. Although his Mosquito was hit several times he survived again, and his markers hit the E-Boat Pen area. He ordered the 617 Lancasters in, but as it was now dark and the cloud had thickened up at 13,000 ft, 10 of the crews could not see Cheshire’s markers below the overcast, and regretfully turned for home taking their precious Tallboys back (they had strict instructions never to waste them!). The remaining 12, however, (mostly more experienced, and leading crews) dived below the clouds, enduring the same barrage of flak that Cheshire had, and lined up over the Pens to drop their bombs. David was one of these, following Les Munro in, and himself followed by McCarthy, Kearns, Clayton, Howard, Poove, Knights, Stout, Hamilton and two others. Most of their aircraft were hit by flak, but David dropped his Tallboy from 8,000 ft, and recorded “Believed Good Shot”. His aircraft was hit by flak, and holed as well.
All the 617 crews got back to base (David was only airborne for 2 hrs 35 mins altogether – against 3 hrs 40 mins for the previous Le Havre raid), but several crew members of other aircraft were injured. Following 617 in to attack had been 133 other Lancasters and 130 Halifaxes, aided by 11 Mosquitos of 8 (PFF) Group, and these had bombed the rest of Boulogne. Only one Halifax [inserted] had been lost [/inserted], out of all the aircraft taking part, and in the two raids taken together, 617 had been largely responsible for the wrecking of some 133 German boats (mostly E-boats).
[Underlined] V2 sites. [/underlined]
The moment they had returned from the Boulogne raid, there was a lot of patching up of the aircraft to do. David’s KC-N was too badly holed to be quickly back in service, and so he was allocated another – DV 380, Wing. Cmdr. Cheshire’s original Lancaster (KC-N), but now re-coded KC-X.
The very morning they had returned from Boulogne, Cochrane had alerted Cheshire to get ready for a
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very important operation that evening (the 16th). Cheshire had only just got to bed but was told to get up again and attend an intelligence briefing right away. The V1 Flying Bombs had started dropping on London, and Intelligence sources had warned the War Cabinet of the imminent firing of two other secret weapons at London – the V2 rockets, and in the V3’s case, huge shells fired through incredibly long [inserted] “Super” [/inserted] gun barrels being built across the Channel in France (a forerunner of the Iraqi “Super”-guns of 1991). The concrete blockhouses hiding these weapons had to be attacked with Tallboys immediately, as the War Cabinet thought on the one hand they might have to order the evacuation of London, and on the other – if aimed at Portsmouth and Southampton, etc, they might interfere [inserted] with [/inserted] the invasion of France, and put it in jeopardy.
The result of all this was that [inserted] David and the other [/inserted] [deleted] the [/deleted] Squadron crews were aroused, and after briefing, stood by all day at their aircraft dispersals, waiting for the signal that the cloud cover over the target had cleared. The Lancasters were bombed-up, but then had to be unloaded, one by one on a rota, to avoid straining their undercarriages. Food was brought out to dispersals, but late in the evening the raid was cancelled – the cloud was still unbroken over the target. Not long after, they were stood-to again, and then stood-down, and so it went on over three days!. Eventually the crews were living in a detached state of limbo, with too little sleep and their metabolic clocks thoroughly upset.
Finally, on June 19th, the cloud cleared and they were off at last. The first target for 617 was a large concrete structure to the [inserted] West of [/inserted] Watten (North-west of St. Omer), on the edge of the Forêt d’Eperlecques. [Inserted] This was one of two large “Bunker” sites for launching V2’s, consisting of huge [inserted] semi- [/inserted] underground concrete bunkers, with large armoured doors. Both these sites were constructed to initially fire the vertical-standing V2 rockets at London, but they were intended later to launch V2’s with nuclear or chemical war-heads, directly as the USA. [/inserted] David took off from Woodhall Spa [inserted] in DV380 (KC-X) [/inserted], with 18 other Lancasters, and Cheshire and Shannon in their Mosquitos. As it was a daylight raid, they were escorted again by Spitfires, and Cheshire went down to 8,000ft over Calais, to find the target beyond the town. He was engaged by a terrific flak barrage, so dived flat out down to 2,000 ft, and released smoke markers (for daylight use) on the target.
* The remains of this structure, called “Blockhaus”, are kept today as a tourist museum.
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Having come through the barrage miraculously unscathed, Cheshire’s markers then failed to ignite, so Shannon then went in through a haze that was developing as the day wore on. He dropped the last of the smoke markers, and as Cheshire believed they were close enough to the blockhouse, ordered 617 to bomb it. David dropped his [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] like the others, from 18,000 ft, but it “hung-up” momentarily, and recorded a near-miss on his aiming point – the smoke indicators. The rest dropped their weapons close to or on top of the markers, but when the raid was over and “Recce” pictures obtained, it was established that the markers had been some 70 yds wide of the target. Some Tallboys had dropped far enough away from the markers to fall beside (and one on top of) the concrete structure, and this proved sufficient to encourage the Germans not to use the site afterwards. * For some reason (perhaps connected with the repeated bombing-up and down over the three day wait) several Tallboys besides those on David’s Lancaster also “hung-up” – including those of Knilans, Ross and Howard (two of these were “freed”, but one had to be brought back).
Next day, the 20th, the second of these large “Bunker” sites, at Wizernes (just to the South-West of St. Omer) was given to 617, and this time 17 Lancasters set off, with Cheshire and two more Mosquitos in the lead David was still flying DV380, but he had only flown as far as Orfordness, near Woodbridge when Cheshire, in front of them, received information the cloud cover was too thick over the target, and recalled the Squadron (complete with Tallboys).
Two days later, they tried again, and reached the target area this time, but there was ten-tenths cloud over the area, and once more they brought [deleted] back [/deleted] the Tallboys back. Not to be outdone, 617 made a third attempt [inserted] the morning of [/inserted] June 24th, and this time the clouds had cleared. [Inserted] Again they had a fighter escort, [/inserted] and two Mosquitos led 16 Lancasters to the quarry in the North-facing hill near Wizernes station and Cheshire dived in to mark. His markers hung up, however, and he called Fawke in behind him. The flak was intense, and Fawke’s Mosquito and several 617 Lancasters above were hit, but David dropped his Tallboy from 17,400ft, recording a “Good Shot”. On the run in, John Edwards’ Lancaster DV413 (KC-G) was hit, and went
* After Allied troops had captured this site in Autumn 1944 → Barnes Wallis persuaded Bomber Command to let several Lancasters drop the new 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs on this structure in mid November, to test their destructive force. [/inserted]
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down out of control, [inserted] some crew baling out on the way. [/inserted] The Lancaster exploded as it levelled out, [inserted] its pilot fighting [/inserted] desperately to effect a crash-landing, [deleted] in a field [/deleted], and the rest of the crew were trapped [deleted] out [/deleted] amongst the debris, or flung out onto the field where it pancaked. Only the Navigator, Wireless Operator and Bomb-aimer survived, to become POWs. The rest of the Squadron returned safely, albeit many of the aircraft had flak damage.
As David’s aircraft was also damaged, he promptly air-tested his old aircraft, LN485 (now itself repaired), the same afternoon (June 24th), and next day he was off [inserted] in it [/inserted] with 617 to attack a huge underground storage area for V1 Flying Bombs – at Siracourt, just South of the main road from St. Pol-sur-Ternoise to Hesdin (and East of Le Touquet). The Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, 2 Mosquitos – and a North American Mustang fighter flown by Cheshire.
Para // There was quite a story behind the acquisition of the Mustang, but suffice to say that the Station Commander at Woodhall Spa, together with Cheshire’s friendship with the American Air Force Generals Spaatz and Doolittle, resulted in their sending a Mustang over [inserted] on the morning of the 25th [/inserted] for Cheshire to try out. The 617 ground crews had to work hard to modify the under wing bomb attachments, to fit the necessary smoke markers and the Squadron navigator had to plot Cheshire’s courses for him, and help him jot down the information on his knee pad – for the Mustang was a single-seater. Cheshire had never flown one before, nor a single-engined aircraft for some time, and by the time it had been prepared he was adamant that he would use it on that evening’s raid. He also knew that he had no time to do “circuits and bumps” in it, to get to know its landing techniques – his first take-off would have to be on the operation, and his landing back would have to be in the dark!
As the Mustang was a fast aircraft, David and the other 16 Lancasters and two Mosquitos took off ahead of Cheshire, and by the time they arrived at Siracourt, their C.O. was there, diving in to mark the concrete roof of the underground site with smoke indicators, and followed in by Shannon and Fawke. Then the 617 “gaggle” was called in to drop their Tallboys on the smoke, and David recorded a “Direct Hit” [inserted] from 18,800ft [/inserted], together with some of the others, while other Tallboys fell close by. Someone’s bomb pierced the
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16 ft thick concrete roof of the structure, [inserted] resulting in a spectacular collapse of the walls and ceiling, and others undermined the sides. [/inserted]
Three hours and five minutes after take-off, David was back on the ground at his base, and all had returned safely, including Cheshire in the Mustang.
There were still more sites to attack, but bad weather and thick clouds prevented 617 Squadron from further attacks for some days. [Deleted] In the days [/deleted] During this period, David only managed to get in one practice “Formation flight” and an “Air Test” (involving air-to-sea firing practice). Several times they stood by from dawn [inserted] onwards [/inserted], but raids were cancelled by the late afternoon. The urgency was in everyone’s minds, as the V1’s were now landing in London and the South-East in increasing numbers.
Finally the weather cleared again for the morning of July 4th, and they were briefed to attack a new V1 launch site located in underground caves in the limestone hill overlooking the River Oise, at St. Leu-d’Esserent, a little village North-west of Chantilly. These caves had been used before the war by French mushroom-farmers, but were now reinforced with concrete to store the V1’s, and their launching rails. [Deleted] and the gigantic barrels of the V3 guns [/deleted]
David’s Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, Cheshire in the Mustang, and his back-up in a single Mosquito for this daylight raid. Fawke in the Mosquito went ahead to get weather information, and then Cheshire arrived, dived very low over the caves and dropped his smoke markers accurately on top. Les Munro led in the Lancasters above, through fairly heavy, [deleted] and [/deleted] accurate, flak which caught several aircraft, but the Tallboys started to rain down on the site. One hit the main building, others dropped in the cave mouths and around the entrances to the site, all destroying a great deal of machinery. Many Germans [deleted] workers [/deleted] were trapped underground and some were entombed forever. David [inserted] flying in LM484 again, [/inserted] described his Tallboy hit [inserted] from 18,700ft [/inserted] as a “Fair Shot”, obtaining a good photograph of this exploding near the cave mouth. Once the limestone dust and debris had started to hide the target, some Lancasters had difficulty finding the aiming point, one was hit in all four engines and had to jettison the [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] over the Channel on the run home [inserted] and [/inserted] one had its bombsight go u/s. Thus only 11 out of the 17 dropped Tallboys on the target,
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but the results were once again spectacular – although in many of these Tallboy raids, these were only seen at first hand after the Allies had captured the area, later in 1944.
All 617 crews returned safely [inserted] David’s own sortie lasting 4hrs 05 mins this time [/inserted], although some had been injured by shrapnel from Flakbursts. [Deleted] but [/deleted] Bomber Command sent in another force of [inserted] 5 Group [/inserted] Lancasters later that same evening – totalling some 231, with 15 Mosquitos for marking. German night-fighters were very active, and shot down 13 of the Lancasters around the target area – a high price to pay.
[Underlined] Last “Op” with 617 – V3 Site. [/underlined]
Two days later, [inserted] on July 6th 1944 [/inserted], David took off on his last operation with 617 Squadron, this time another daylight raid on a V3 site at Mimoyecques, where several “super-guns” were being set up. Cheshire flew his Mustang again, with a Mosquito to back him up, and the usual “gaggle” of 17 617 Lancasters followed higher up (usually around the 18,00 ft level). The “gaggle” was so named by Cheshire, but referred to the pattern 617 was now adopting in its bombing formations – normally four parallel rows of Lancasters (four or five to a row), each of the leaders flying at carefully planned 200 ft or 300 ft vertical separation from each other, and behind each of them, every subsequent Lancaster flying [inserted] in turn [/inserted] at 400 ft lower than the one in front. Thus the “gaggle” had the best chance of avoiding each others bombs in the run-up to the targets, and had a better sighting of the target as it began to become obscured from the markers and first hits. Generally speaking, if the Lancasters adhered closely to this box formation (which was not always possible), the last aircraft’s Tallboys should have released before the first started to explode (they were frequently given delayed-action fuzes).
The V3 site at Mimoyecques was in the chalk hills behind Calais, and Cheshire once again went in very low and dropped his markers on top of the tunnels. The rest then dropped their Tallboys, and David’s went down on target [inserted] from 19,000 ft [/inserted], but the burst wasn’t seen by his crew. Then he flew LM 485 (KC-N) back to
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Woodhall Spa, joining the others who all arrived safely. “Recce” photos later showed the V3 site to have been hit and straddled by the Tallboys and completely wrecked, once more entombing some Germans.
[Inserted] Sub heading [underlined] Leaving 617 Squadron [/underlined] [/inserted]
After landing from this short flight (David had been airborne only 2 hrs 45 mins on this last occasion), [deleted] their C.O. [/deleted] Cheshire was summoned to Cochrane’s Group HQ. Cochrane looked at Cheshire, and said quietly to him: “I’ve been looking at the records, and see you’ve sone 100 trips now. That’s enough, it’s time you had a rest!” And he told Cheshire it was no use arguing! He also added that his three Flight Commanders, [inserted] Dave [/inserted] Shannon, [inserted] Joe [/inserted] McCarthy and [inserted] Les [/inserted] Munro had to come off as well, with David Wilson too. Mimoyecques had been David’s own 90th Operation [/deleted] as well [/deleted], and although the Flight Commanders had done fewer trips, they had [inserted] all [/inserted] been flying on “Ops” continuously for some two years.
So David was rested simultaneously with his CO and Flight Commanders. He had joined 617 in time for its seventh operation (and its first visit to the Anthéor viaduct) on September 16th 1943, and had been with the Squadron for over two months before Cheshire had arrived to take over from [inserted] Mick Martin [/inserted] the temporary C.O. When he joined there had been 10 of the original Dams raid pilots still flying in 617, but when he left, the last three – the Flight Commanders – left with him. It was the end of an era in 617, and David was very proud to have fought and lived alongside those famous names. As for himself, he has never really had the recognition that he deserved for his part in the 40 Operations mounted by 617 between September 16th 1943 and July 6th 1944, but this is no doubt because he was an inherently shy man – though a very tough one in his quiet [inserted] Scottish [/inserted] way.
With all of them being suddenly rested from 617, the 5 Group A.O.C. began to confer some long deserved awards on them. Cheshire had been given a second Bar to his DSO on April 18th 1944 (while with 617) and now, two months after leaving, he was awarded the Victoria Cross, for four years of continuous bravery (unique because it was not for one specific act of gallantry). Shannon was awarded a Bar to his DSO, and Munro was awarded a DSO (McCarthy had just been awarded a Bar [inserted] to his DFC. [/inserted] David was justly awarded a Bar to his DFC (gazetted on June 29th
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1944. This was [inserted] then [/inserted] followed up on November 26th 1944 by his second decoration with 617 – a DSO. (The delay in the award of the DSO was probably occasioned by the departure of Wing Cmdr Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, VC, DSO and two Bars, DFC, M.I.D., and the arrival and settling-in of his successor at 617, Wing Cmdr J.B. (“Willie”) Tait, DSO and Bar, DFC, MID).
The citation for David Wilson’s Bar to his DFC read: “Since the award of his first DFC in May 943, this officer has completed a third tour of operational duty, during which his experience, determination and devotion to duty have been displayed in the course of many sorties As a captain of aircraft, he can always be relied upon to complete his tasks in the face of the heaviest enemy opposition. He has a long and distinguished record of operational flying.”
And when the DSO was gazetted on November 26th this citation said: “This officer has taken part in numerous missions over enemy territory, including attacks on Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne and Mannheim. He is now in his 3rd Tour, and has completed many sorties demanding a high standard of skill and accuracy. He has proved himself to be an ideal leader and his example has been most inspiring.”
“. [sic]
It is interesting to look back on David’s three tours of operations to see the difference in training required by any pilot flying with 617, and the other squadrons. In his time with 214 Squadron (his first tour) David flew a total of 289 hrs 50 mins, of which 199 hrs 35 mins was on operations, and just 90 hrs 15 mins doing Squadron training and exercises, etc. In this case the training hours amounted to 31% of the total. With 196 Squadron, training hours (34hr 35mins out of a total of 135 hrs 40 mins) amounted to 25%. But in 617 Squadron, David’s training accounted for 239 hrs 45 mins out of 420 hrs 55 mins – or a massive 57% of his total time! For each operational hour flown, he had flown over an hour’s worth of practice – nearly all bomb-aiming. This just illustrates the degree to which Guy Gibson (who started it), followed by Mick Martin and Geoffrey Cheshire, had insisted on the very highest level of low and high-level bombing accuracy.
At the end of his third tour, David had flown 90 missions, lasting for a total of 481 hrs 50 mins, and trained for a further 364 hrs 35 mins in these squadrons.
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[Inserted] As for David’s Lancaster [deleted] that [/deleted] [inserted] in which [/inserted] he finished his days [deleted] in [/deleted] at 617 (LM485, KC-N), this aircraft survived a further V1 site attacks, two attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway (as KC-U), and further raids on Norway, etc, [deleted] in 1945, [/deleted] surviving the War to be scrapped in October, 1945. His other favourite, JB139 (KC-X, and later -V) was shot down over Brest on August 5th 1944, piloted by Don Cheney, R.C.A.F., who survived, with three of his crew (four were killed). The remains of the Lancaster can still be seen in the shallow water of St. Anne-la-Palud Bay, nearby. [/inserted]
[Underlined] Marriage, No5 L.F.S, and the E.T.P.S. [/underlined]
Now that David had obtained a welcome break from operations, he and Elsie were married on July 22nd 1944, and he snatched a quick two weeks leave before finally saying goodbye to 617 Squadron [inserted] at a mammoth farewell party [/inserted] on August 7th, and reporting to his new posting, No5 Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston, Notts, the next day.
David was now made [inserted] up to [/inserted] a Squadron Leader, and [deleted] at first [/deleted] put in charge of “B” Flight at 5 LFS. He was later [deleted] at Syerston until March 13th 1945, becoming [/deleted] appointed the Chief Flying Instructor of the whole School on October 4th, and remained its CFI until he ended his posting there on March 13th 1945. During this time he put many other budding Lancaster pilots through their paces on the School’s well worn (and operationally expired) Lancasters. They were mostly Flying Officers, but there were a few Warrant Officers, Pilot Officers and Flight Lieutenants, and the odd Squadron Leader converting onto the four-engined bombers.
David put all his pupils through the full training steps, which included “stalling practice”, “steep turns”, “three and two engine flying”, “three engine overshoots and landings”, apart from routine circuits and bumps, and night flying.
On several occasions he managed a trip in a Lancaster, or the unit’s Oxford “hack”, to visit 617 at Woodhall Spa, usually taking Sqd Ldr. Poore over as well (both of them had served with the Dambusters). And a number of the Lancasters David taught on at the LFS had once flown in 617 Squadron.
In March 1945, having come to the end of his
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Posting to the LFS, David applied to go on one of the Engine Test Pilot’s Courses at Boscombe Down. He was accepted on the No 3 Course there, and started the Course on March 15th 1945.
This was the third and last of the early Courses to be held at Boscombe Down, due mainly to the construction of hard runways on the aerodrome, leading to a veritable log-jam of aircraft taking off or landing on the restricted grass areas.
David’s Course lasted until October 2nd that year – a period of 6 1/2 months – and David was one of 31 test-pilots to complete it successfully. Amongst other subsequently famous names on the course with him were [inserted] Lt. [/inserted] Peter Twiss RN (to become Chief Test-Pilot for Fairey Aviation), [inserted] Sqd. Ldr. [/inserted] Charles McClure, who then took over from “Roly” Falk as Wing Cmdr. And Chief Test-Pilot at the R.A.E. at Farnborough, Flt. Lt. J.O. Lancaster who went to Boulton Paul, Saunders Roe, and finally Armstrong Whitworth; Ron Clear, from Airspeeds; and Lt. Cmdr. J.B.V. Burgerhorst, who went to Fokkers.
Five of the 31 on the Course were to lose their lives testing aircraft (the corresponding losses on the 1st Course were 5 out of 13, [deleted] and [/deleted] on the 2nd 7 out of 28, and the 4th, 7 out of 33). This eventual “loss” rate from the early courses was on average almost 23% , illustrating the high price paid in the lives of exceptionally brave and talented young men, by the advancement of Britain’s and other countries’, aviation industries.
As described in the chapters in these Volumes about Jimmy Owell, Ricky Esler and Jimmy Nelson, etc, the ETPS Course proceeded for David along the normal lines. The previous Commandant, Gp. Capt. J.F. McKenna [inserted] AFC [/inserted], had just been killed in a Mustang at the beginning of David’s Course, and his place was taken by Gp Capt. H.J. Wilson, AFC, who had been a senior test-pilot at the RAE. The Assistant Commandant was Wing Cmdr H.P. “Sandy” Powell, AFC, who also acted as the Chief Test-flying Instructor.
David flew the [inserted] range of [/inserted] ETPS aircraft, which at that time included an Oxford, Harvards, Lancaster
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Swordfish, Mosquitos, Tempest [inserted] I and II and V, [/inserted] Spitfire IX and XXI Boston, [deleted] Sptifire IX [/deleted], [inserted] and the [/inserted] Meteor I. The last machine was the first jet aircraft that David had flown, but it provided no undue problems for him.
By the beginning of October, David had passed the difficult classroom studies, and the flying examinations, with ease, and after qualification, he accepted a post as test-pilot in “B” Squadron ( [deleted] the [/deleted] multi-engine aircraft) at the A & AEE at Boscombe Down, to last until his demob on March 15th 1946.
At the A & AEE, he started flying there on January 10th 1946, and undertook some firing trials on a new Avro Lincoln, flew a Lancaster to measure “speed/power curves”, practiced bombing runs in a Mosquito VI, and carried out other tests on a Halifax III, Dakota, Warwick, etc. Then his Service career was over, and David was demobbed.
[Underlined] A Career at A.V. Roe & Co. [/underlined]
With his brilliant academic qualifications, his war-time record, and qualifications now as a test-pilot, David Wilson [inserted] now [/inserted] had a great deal to offer the world. He was immediately offered a job at RAF Cranwell, and in fact the College was very keen to employ him, but David had written to Sir Roy Dobson, Managing Director now of A.V. Roe & Co. Ltd. at Manchester, to seek a post there – not necessarily in the Flight Test Dept., but perhaps connected with the Design side.
Sir Roy offered David the post of “Manager – Aerodynamic Development and Testing”, and David promptly accepted, starting work at Woodford [inserted] on April 8th 1946 [/inserted] at a salary of £800 per annum, with the promise of an early rise to £900 p.a. He was now 29 years of age, and had a total of 1807 flying hours to his credit.
David’s new job was immediately very tied up with examination of the Tudor airliner designs – both the Mark I and Mark II that were on order for BOAC and BSAA. A considerable amount of aero-dynamic research was going on into the problems affecting these designs, and several establishments
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Apart form Avro’s were engaged in a dramatic race to find the answers. The description of these problems can be found in the stories of Bill Thorn and Jimmy Orrell in these Volumes, but suffice to say that David and his Dept. were soon very busy liaising with Roy Chadwick, [deleted] the [/deleted] Avro’s Chief Designer (and from February 1947, their Technical Director), and the Test-pilots at Woodford to try to overcome the Tudor’s bad stalling characteristics, and excessive drag problems.
Once settled in at Woodford, David decided he had better keep his hand in at flying, and so [inserted] he had a medical on January 1st 1947, and [/inserted] took out a Civilian Flying Licence (No 24644) on March 26th 1947, not valid for flying Public Transport aircraft, but enough to cover him for test-flying at Woodford.
[Inserted] It was also early in 1947 before David and his wife were called to Buckingham Palace to receive the DSO he had won in 617 Squadron – so great had been the queue of people at the end of the War. As he was now a civilian, David had to receive the decoration in civilian clothes. [/inserted]
David was by now living at 3, Leith Rd, Sale, Cheshire, some miles from Woodford and closer to the Southern side of Manchester, and he and his wife Elsie now had a baby daughter, Carol. He was very satisfied with his work at Woodford, and he was starting to fly as Second pilot to Ken Cook and others, and rapidly getting the taste of flying back again. → [Inserted] For instance he went up with Ken on November 25th 1946 [inserted] and Reg Knight on November 27th [/inserted] in the Anson C.Mk XIX Series 2 VL 310, to conduct “Trailing Static Tests”[inserted] “Asymmetric and P.E.” tests. On December 1st he was flying with Reg Knight in Tudor I G-AGPF, doing tests at 25,000’. [/inserted] On December 30th and 31st he was up again with Ken in the Anson XII NL172 doing “Trimmer Setting” tests with the C of G fully forward and full aft, and “Single-engine” tests loaded up to 10,000 lbs weight.
In January 1947, David was flying with Ken again, doing “Trim” tests and “Loop swinging” on York MW322, checking “Stalling speeds” [inserted] and “P.E’s” [/inserted] on Avro XIX G-AGNI, and conducting “Pressurization and Heating” trials on the Tudor I G-AGRJ. And in May 1947 he was flying with Reg Knight in the Tudor I G-AGRI, Anson VM172 and Tudor IV G-AHNI, carrying out “stalls”, “stabilities”, “levels” and other aero-dynamic tests. [/inserted] And it was because of his flying ability, coupled with his interest in sampling the stalling characteristics of the new Tudor II, and observing the reaction of the [inserted] newly-shaped [/inserted] wool-tufted wing fillets fitted to it that he flew as Second-pilot with Bill Thorn on [inserted] that fateful [/inserted] August 23rd 1947. He was not originally → [inserted] scheduled to be the No 2 pilot on this flight as Bill had intended to take Reg Knight up with him. But Reg (see the next Chapter) had to go down to see his mother at Nuneaton, at very short notice, due to a dispute she was having over a new house. And Fate thus decreed that David would take his place. [/inserted]
So Bill Thorn and David Wilson taxied out in G-AGSU that sunny Saturday morning at a little after 10.50 (GMT), carrying Roy Chadwick (Avro’s Technical Director) and Stuart Davies (now the Chief Designer), with their Flight Engineer Eddie Talbot, and radio operator J. Webster. And soon after lift off on the main runway, Bill Thorn got into difficulties with Britain’s largest passenger aircraft (at that time), because of the aileron circuits being mistakenly reversed during work in the factory. The Tudor tilted right over onto
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[Insertions to previous page]
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Its starboard wing, the tip touched the ground and the Tudor II sideslipped slowly into a field, crumpling the wing, sliding along the stubble on its belly, and then decelerating into a group of oak trees surrounding a deep pond. The trees broke up the fuselage and wings, and the long nose of the Tudor fractured, and dropped the cockpit end into the pond, drowning the two pilots. But for the presence of water, they would undoubtedly have survived.
Thus, David’s career with Avro’s came to a sudden halt, along with the great Chief Test-pilot sitting beside him, and the man in the back who had designed all these magnificent machines, - and the Lancaster bomber in which David had spent so much of an eventful wartime career, and survived because of its strength and performance. Certainly, if he had to die, he could not have died in the company of any greater men than these.
Roy Dobson, who should have been on the test flight himself, but had skipped it because he was called to his office for an urgent ‘phone call, tried to cope with the tragedy that afternoon from his office at Woodford. The relatives of the other occupants, dead or injured, were contacted by various means, but David’s wife Elsie was mistakenly overlooked for a time. With a young daughter to bring up, and a home to try to keep together, things looked bleak. But when Sir Roy realised how difficult things were, he went out of his way to do all he could for Elsie. He had Avro’s arrange to pay off the mortgage, [inserted] and [/inserted] and give her a monthly sum for quite some time. He sent presents for Carol from time to time, and used to bring them back for the little girl from his overseas trips.
Sir Roy was greatly affected by the accident, and genuinely grief-stricken over the deaths of his life-long friend and colleague, Roy Chadwick, and Bill Thorn and David Wilson. He advised Elsie Wilson to brief a good solicitor and sue A.V. Roe & Coe for damages, so that she could be awarded compensation, and although Elsie found this difficult, and at times could hardly understand what was going on, eventually she was awarded damages and these were held by the Court in 2 1/2 % War Loan on trust for her daughter, with the income being paid regularly.
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In fact David’s daughter Carol was eventually offered a Dr. Barnes Wallis Scholarship, had her mother wanted to accept this (out of the two per year that the great aircraft and bombs designer had set up out of his own money). This could have entitled Carol to attend Christ’s Hospital (Girls School,) in Hertfordshire, but Elsie declined, in order to keep the family close together.
David was buried in Woodford Church, near Roy Chadwick and Bill Thorn, and where Sir Roy and Lady Dobson now also lie. The funeral was a very grand affair, attended by hundreds of colleagues of the crew from all walks of life, the Ministries, RAF and 617 Squadron, and other Aviation companies. Afterwards, Sir Roy said of David:
“He was a brilliant young man, and a technician of extraordinary aptitude and ability, who would soon have made his mark on the company. His loss is going to be most severely felt”.
And it was, no less than by his daughter Carol, who to this day remains devoted to the war hero father she scarcely remembers, and her mother Elsie, who has remarried, but still lives in Cheshire not many miles from Woodford, and under the flight path to Ringway Airport.
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P1
[Underlined] Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC & Bar [/underlined]
[Underlined] List of Operations (3 Tours) [/underlined]
[Underlined] With No 214 Sqd: [inserted] (Wellington IC). [/inserted] Target Bomb load make-up Total Bombs dropped [/underlined]
1941 July 9* Osnabrück. 1 x 4000 4,000
July 14* Bremen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries. 1,500 +
July 17* Cologne 1 x 4000 4,000
July 20* Rotterdam 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, + Incendiaries 2,500 +
July 23* Mannheim 1 x 4000 4,000
July 25* Hamburg ? ?
Aug 12* Hanover ? ?
Aug 16* Duisburg ? ?
Aug 19* Kiel 6 x 500 3,000
Aug 22* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 27* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 31* Cologne 1 x 1000, 5 x 500 3,500
Sep 2* Frankfurt 1 x 4000. (Retd, engine trouble) –
Sep 7* Berlin ? ?
Sep 8* Kassel ? ?
Sep 11 Le Havre ? ?
Sep 15 Brest 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Sep 17 Karlsruhe 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500 3,000
Sep 29 Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HCMI 4,000
Oct 3 Antwerp 1 x 1,000, 6 x 500, 1 x 250 4,250
Oct 10 Cologne 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 12 Bremen ? ?
Oct 13 Dusseldorf 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 21 Bremen 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500 3,500
Oct 23 Kiel 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, 1 x 250 2,750
Oct 31 Bremen Bad Wx, retd with bombs. –
Nov 7 Berlin 6 x 500 (Bad Wx, Osnabruck bombed) 3,000
Nov 9 Hamburg 6 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Dec 23 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Dec 27 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
1942 Jan 2 Brest ? ?
Jan 8 Brest ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
Jan 11 Brest 6 x 500, 3,000
Jan 21 Bremen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Jan 26 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Jan 28 Munster ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
[Underlined] TOTAL = 36 MISSIONS Total hours with Squadron = 289:50 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 199:35 [/underlined]
* Flying as Second-pilot on these raids (Rest as Captain).
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P2
[Underlined] With No 196 Squadron. (Wellington X) [/underlined]
1943 Feb 7 Lorient 7 x 500 3,500
Feb 13 Lorient 3 x 500, 6 Containers 1,500 +
Feb 14 Cologne 3 x 500 6 Containers
Feb 17 x Emden ? Bad Wx. Bombs returned. –
Feb 26 Cologne 3 x 500, +Incendiaries (2 x 500 bombs hung up, returned) 500 +
Feb 28 St. Nazaire 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 3 Hamburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 5 Essen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Mar 12 Essen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 26 Duisburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 29 Bochum 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Apr 4 Kiel 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 4 Dortmund 2 x 500, 6 x SBC 1,000 +
May 12 Duisburg 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 13 Bochum 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 25 Düsseldorf 2 x 500, 7 x SBC 1,000 +
June 11 Düsseldorf ? ?
Jun 21 Krefeld ? ?
Jun 24 Wuppertal (Elberfeld) Incendiaries only. ?
Jul 3 Cologne Incendiaries only ?
[Underlined] Total = 20 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 135:40 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 101:05 [/underlined]
[Underlined] With 617 Squadron. (Lancaster I and III) [/underlined]
1943 Sep 16 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 4,000, 3 x 1,000 7,000
Nov 11 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 12,000, HC 12,000
Dec 16 Flixecourt xx 1 x 12,000 HC 12,000
Dec 20 Liege 1 x 12,000 HC Bomb returned, raid abortive (due PFF) –
Dec 22 Abbeville-Amiens. xx 11 x 1,000. Bombs brought back (due PFF failure) –
1944 Jan 4 Pas de Calais (Flying Bomb Site) ? Bombs dropped 4 miles from target due PFF error ?
Jan 21 Hallencourt. xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500, 6 Flares. Only 1 x 1,000 and 7 x 500 dropped 4,500
Jan 25 Fréval (Pas de Calais) xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500 8,500
Feb 8 Limoges 12 x 1,000 12,000
Feb 12 Antheor Viaduct 1 x 12,000 12,000
x Daylight raid.
xx Flying bomb site. (V1 weapon).
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P3
[Underlined] With 617 Sqd cont’d [/underlined]
1944 March 2 Albert All Incendiaries ?
March 4 St. Etienne. ? Bad Wx. Returned –
March 10 St. Etienne 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 15 Woippy (near Metz). 1 x 12,000. Bad Wx. Returned. –
March 16. Clermont Ferrand 1 x 12,000, 6 Flares 12,000
March 18 Bergerac 1 x 12,000 12,000
March 20 Angouleme 1 x 8,000, 1 x 1,000 9,000
March 23 Lyons 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 25 Lyons ? x 500, Incendiaries ?
March 29 Lyons 1 x 8,000. 1 x 1,000 9,000
Apr 10 St. Cyr. 1 x 8,000, 6 x 500 11,000
Apr 18 Juvisy 4 x 1,000, 4 x Red Spots 4,000
Apr 20 La Chapelle 12 x 1,000 12,000
Jun 5 D-Day decoy mission
Jun 8 Saumur Tunnel 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 14 Le Havre Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 15 Boulogne Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 19 Watten xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 20 Wizernes xx – Tallboy Raid recalled over Channel –
Jun 22 Wizernes xx Tallboy Bad Wx. Bomb brought back. –
Jun 24 Wizernes xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 25 Siracourt xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 4 St. Leu d’Esserent. Xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 6 Mimoyecques xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
[Underlined] Total – 34 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 420:55 [/underlined]
[Underlined Total hours on “Ops” = 181:10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total (3 tours) = 90 Operational Flights. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours with Squadrons = 846:25 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours on Operations = 481:50 [/underlined]
Dublin Core
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Title
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A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII
Description
An account of the resource
Biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar (1917 - 1947). He flew operations as a pilot with 214, 196 and 617 Squadrons before becoming Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot at A V Roe & Co Ltd. He was killed 23 August 1947 in the Avro Tudor crash.
Creator
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Peter V Clegg
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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handwritten sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Personal research
Identifier
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BCleggPVWilsonDv1
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1945
1946
1947-08-23
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
Conforms To
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Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Liège
England--Cheshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Suffolk
France--Albert
France--Angoulême
France--Bergerac
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Creil
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Lorient
France--Lyon
France--Mimoyecques
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Étienne (Loire)
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Siracourt
France--Watten
France--Woippy
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Osnabrück
France--Watten
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
11 OTU
1660 HCU
1668 HCU
196 Squadron
214 Squadron
5 Group
617 Squadron
8 Group
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Boston
C-47
Chadwick, Roy (1893-1947)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
final resting place
Flying Training School
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
grief
H2S
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lincoln
Meteor
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
Pathfinders
pilot
promotion
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Church Lawford
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranage
RAF Cranwell
RAF Driffield
RAF Leconfield
RAF Stradishall
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Upavon
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Spitfire
Stirling
Tallboy
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1271/17886/LBrittRG1739520v1.2.pdf
b99268ee5803cc0846735451cd928fa9
Dublin Core
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Title
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Britt, Ron
Ronald Gleeson Britt
R G Britt
Description
An account of the resource
Five items. The collection concerns Ronald Britt (b.1923, 1939520 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and photographs. He was an air gunner who flew 30 operations with 103 squadron and Binbrook Special Duties flight.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Stuart Pearce, Debbie Pearce, nee Britt, and Gail Elizabeth Britt. It was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-05-21
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Britt, RG
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Title
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Ronald G Britt’s navigator’s air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for Ronald G Britt, covering the period from 1 October 1943 to 26 May 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Stormy Down, RAF Wymeswold, RAF Lindholme, RAF Hemswell, RAF Elsham Wolds, RAF Binbrook and RAF Greenock. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Halifax, Lancaster and Sunderland. He flew a total of 30 operations with 103 squadron and 103 special duties flight, 22 Night and 8 daylight operations. Targets were Aachen, Calais, Wimereux, Crisbecq, Vire, Flers, Gelsenkirchen, Le Havre, Sterkrade, Aulnoye, Beaupre, Domleger, Oisemont, Revigny, Fontenay, Douai, Orleans, Dijon, Rieme, Russelsheim, Gdynia, Chapelle Notre Dame, Stettin, Agenville, Eindhoven, Frankfurt, Kattegat and Leeuwarden. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Colvin, Pilot Officer Green and Group Captain Shean.
Creator
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Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
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One booklet
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
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LBrittRG1739520v1
Coverage
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Civilian
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Belgium--Flanders
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Yorkshire
France--Beaupréau
France--Calais
France--Dijon
France--Douai
France--Flers-de-l'Orne
France--Jura
France--Le Havre
France--Manche
France--Nord (Department)
France--Oisemont (Canton)
France--Orléans
France--Reims
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Somme
France--Vire (Calvados)
France--Wimereux
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Poland--Gdynia
Scotland--Greenock
Wales--Bridgend
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
France
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Domléger-Longvillers
France--Fontenay
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-06
1944-07
1944-08
1944-01-28
1944-01-30
1944-05-24
1944-05-28
1944-06-02
1944-06-03
1944-06-04
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-09
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-06-18
1944-06-27
1944-06-29
1944-06-30
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-08
1944-07-09
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-17
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-23
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-11
1944-08-19
1944-08-20
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-28
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-03
1944-09-05
1944-09-10
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-09-17
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
103 Squadron
1656 HCU
28 OTU
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Binbrook
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF Greenock
RAF Hemswell
RAF Lindholme
RAF Stormy Down
RAF Wymeswold
Sunderland
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
Dublin Core
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Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Copies sent to:
Stns. 9
S Th 10
B 6.
[Indecipherable] 2
Base 1
[Stamp] Base Copy.
V GROUP NEWS V
JUNE * 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 23
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
June has proved to be a month of record achievements. For the first time in its history the Group despatched 3,000 sorties of which a very high percentage were successful. Much of this success is due to the flare and marking teams who are now getting into their stride, and there has been a similar improvement in bombing. For the first time the average crew bombing error from 20,000 feet for the whole Group is below 200 yards. If the reduction of 50 yards which was achieved during June can be repeated during July, the number of bombs falling on the average target will be increased by something in the order of 50. This can be seen by looking at any P.R.U. photograph and counting the number of craters which are shown in open fields on either side of the target.
I therefore ask all crews to continue with their efforts to reduce bombing errors in the knowledge that by doing so they will add to the striking power of the Group to an extent which could be achieved by no other means. The new orders for maintenance which have recently been issued should help the Instrument Section, upon whom so much depends, to improve the serviceability of the sight, and eliminate minor inaccuracies.
On two occasions during the month the Group came up against the main strength of the German Night Fighter Defences, and on both occasions suffered serious losses; although over the whole month the missing rate was below the average for previous months. Nevertheless these instances show the vital importance of gunnery and the need for improving results by every means in our power.
There is ample evidence that the combined power of the rear and mid-upper turrets will bring down enemy fighters if the aim is correct. As an example, there is the case of “M” of 207 Squadron whose crew on the night of June 9/8th destroyed two JU. 88 and one ME.110. Although results such as this will always remain exceptional, it should be possible to improve the accuracy of aim over the present general standard. Fighters are now available in 1690 Flight for affiliation exercises and every chance must be taken whenever the weather is suitable especially at night. The bombing team has shown how greatly it can improve its results by methodical training and analysis and I now look to the gunnery team to do likewise. I will do everything in my power to provide them with means and facilities for training, but much is a matter for each gunner. Night vision, methodical search, aircraft recognition, turret manipulation, clearing stoppages, can only be improved by hard individual work.
The effort which the Group has put in during the month had been made possible by the high standards of serviceability which have been achieved, and I congratulate all ranks who have helped to get aircraft and equipment into the air. The Armament sections have loaded a record tonnage of bombs while all other sections on each station have contributed their full share to the success achieved.
Finally, I congratulate No. 51 Base on completing more than 8,000 hours of training and passing out a record number of crews. In particular I would mention No. 5 L.F.S. who completed a month’s flying with no avoidable flying accidents.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] BASE GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
June has seen the establishment of a S/Ldr Air Gunner at each Base, and a list of the officers concerned is appended at the foot of this paragraph. Whilst these officers will be concerned with all Gunnery matters, their main functions is to improve the standard of training throughout the Group, as it has long been realised that with long periods of operations the Squadron Gunnery Leaders are fully occupied and can find little time for all the other aspects of Gunnery. The Base Gunnery Leaders will, therefore, be able to devote their time to improve training facilities and equipment, and to ensure that the equipment is available in sufficient quantity to ensure the maximum benefit being obtained from it. They will also be able to supervise the preparation of Gunners for Gunnery Leader, A.G.I. and Specialist Sighting Courses, to enable the candidates to have the best possible chance of passing these courses, thus avoiding wastage of valuable vacancies. The appointment of these Officers to S/Ldr posts offers more advancement for Gunnery Leaders, and is an indication that the importance of air gunnery is receiving recognition. We wish the officers concerned good luck in their new appointments, and hope that very shortly dividends will be paid by this new establishment.
51 BASE – S/LDR HIPKIN
52 BASE – F/LT McCURDY
53 BASE – F/LT BEALE
54 BASE F/LT HOWARD
55 BASE – F/LT BREAKEY
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
An error appeared in the Movement’s column for May, regarding 467 and 44 Squadrons, and is corrected below.
F/Lt Clarke ex 1660 Con. Unit to 44 Sqdn.
F/Lt Cleary ex 27 O.T.U. to 467 Sqdn.
Other movements are:-
S/Ldr Undery ex 1690 B.D.T.F. to H.Q. No. 5 Group.
F/Lt Cass, ex L.F.S. to 630 Sqdn.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
Considerable time is wasted in returning incorrect combat reports to Squadrons, through claims being made which do not conform to the standards laid down by Bomber Command, as issued to all Units. The Gunnery Leaders must ensure that information entered is correct in every detail and that all claims are submitted under one of the headings, i.e. “Destroyed”, “Probably Destroyed” or “Damaged”. Numerous incidents occur when information regarding Tail Warning Devices is incomplete, and it is emphasised that this is most important and must be included in combat reports. Combat reports could be forwarded to Headquarters 5 Group more quickly than at present; the standard pro-forma is now in general use and should help in the preparation of reports. Units should check that only this amended pro-forma is used for this purpose.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn. A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. ME. 410 (c)
630 “Y” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
44 “O” 9/10.6.44. ME. 109 (c)
97 “D” 9/10.6.44. DO. 217 (c)
50 “U” 15/16.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “F 21/22.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88
97 “Q” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “B” 24/25.6.44. ME 109
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
106 “G” 6/7.6.44. ME. 110 (c)
467 “X” 21/22.6.44. T/E.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
207 “J” 1.6.44. T/E (c)
57 “P” 1.6.44. JU. 88
50 “D” 6.6.44. ME. 410
9 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “V” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
97 “Q” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
106 “F” 14/15.6.44. FW. 190 (c)
207 “D” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A new type of two-piece flying suit is on trial in 53 Base, and the results will, in due course, be made available.
Replies have been received from all Units in the use of the Pilot type parachute for rear gunners and recommendations forwarded to H.Q. Bomber Command. With slight modification to the turret, this idea seems feasible, but may call for a revision in the type of clothing to be worn.
Ampro projectors are appearing in operational units for assessing Cine Gyro films. The establishment is one per station.
Units are again reminded that filters suitable for the Shadowgraph and 16 m.m. projector for use in night vision training are available. When requesting an issue of these filters from H.Q. 5 Group, units are to confirm that they have a [underlined] fully [/underlined] blacked out room for night vision training.
CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING
Instructions have now been issued to all Stations to construct a sandbag traphouse for clay pigeon shooting, and full details given for the layout of the range. Severn P.F.O’s are attending the Instructor’s Course on the 7th July, and the remainder on the 23rd July; these instructors will pass on to Unit Gunnery Leaders instructions for these practices, to ensure that at least two officers are available for conducting the exercises. Gunnery Leaders should press for the construction of the traphouses and ensure that all equipment is overhauled and ready for use.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JUNE.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
Fighter Affiliation Grand Total = 1493
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] ATTACKS ON LIMOGES MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined]
1,424 bombs were dropped. Of this total 844 craters have been counted on the P.R.U. photographs. We can therefore only consider 59% of the total number of bombs dropped.
The M.P.I. of all craters was established and a circle of radius 150 yards was drawn. Inside this circle the number of craters that could be counted totalled 152 and the remaining 692 craters were counted outside the circle. Therefore the Pilot and Air Bomber’s error for 692 bombs was greater than 150 yds.
With our 152 bombs inside the 150 yards circle we achieved 10 hits per acre and if we assume that of the bombs not counted, we obtained the same percentage inside 150 yards our hits per acre would increase to 17.
There were 211 bombs between the 150 yards and 250 yards circles. The maximum errors permissible for these bombs to get them into the 150 yards circle are:-
125 yards – average line error
160 yards – average range error
We all agree that these limits are reasonable and that crews should not have errors in excess.
Now, if the bombs had been contained in the limits of 125 yards line and 160 yds. range, our resultant average radial error about the M.P.I. would be 175 yards. This would mean that instead of sending the 96 aircraft to Limoges that we had to, we need only have sent 59 aircraft to achieve the same number of hits. We would then have had 37 aircraft free to attack the factory at ??? There were, of course, 330 bombs seen outside the 250 yards circle and great effort must be made to eliminate the errors that were responsible.
The Moral! – You must practice, practice and practice until you are a certain “A” category crew.
!!! [Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined] !!!
A+ Crews – 60 yards or less
A Crews – 100 yards or less
B Crews – 100 yds. to 150 yds.
C Crews – 150 yds. to 200 yds.
D Crews – Over 200 yards.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE: [/underlined] Plotted 1597 bombs aimed by 309 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE: [/underlined] Plotted 1510 bombs aimed by 319 aircraft.
[Underlined] WAINFLEET: [/underlined] Plotted 2056 bombs aimed by 440 aircraft.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of High Level Bombing Training Statistics by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR JUNE
In the April “News” it was threatened that owing to the improvement in Crew Errors, it may be necessary to lower the qualifying figure for the inclusion of errors in this column. June has produced the largest number of below 100 yards errors yet, and in consequence only those crews who have obtained crew errors of 80 yards or less, converted to 20,000 ft. can receive publicity.
Squadron or Con. Unit. Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
9 F/O Blackham F/O Elphick F/O Wenger 72 yards
44 F/L White Sgt Jenkins F/S Jones 66 yards
P/O Baxter W/O Young W/O Rutherford 50 yards
P/O Stewart Sgt Stubbs Sgt Wright 65 yards
49 P/O Appleyard F/S Jameson F/S Blumfield 78 yards
P/O Arnold F/O Dewar W/O Fleming 72 yards
57 F/S Clark Sgt Johnson Sgt Lugg 65 yards
83 P/O Meggeson W/O Franklin F/O Wicker 65 yards
F/O Kelly F/O Irwin Sgt Burleigh 58 & 64 yards
97 F/L Van Raalte F/O Arnold F/S Williams 52, 69 & 78 yards
S/L Ingham F/O Perkins F/L Chatten 69 yards
467 P/O Waugh F/S Southgate F/O Semple 67 yards
F/L Brine F/S Luton F/S Sutton 80 yards
617 P/O Duffy F/O Woods F/O Bell 42 yards
F/O Knights P/O Bell F/O Rhude 48 yards
P/O Jingles F/S Hazell F/O Beal 63 yards
619 P/O Johnson Sgt Vaughton F/S Tranter 79 yards
F/L Howes F/O Baker F/L Harrison 74 yards
1654 C.U. F/S Beharrie Sgt Dean Sgt Brownhall 74 yards
F/S McKechnie F/S Wallace Sgt Little 53 yards
1660 C.U. P/O Dyer F/S Howard F/S Lemaire 74 yards
F/S Millar F/O Banks W/O Wilday 70 yards
1661 C.U. F/O Franks F/O Orry Sgt Roe 78 yards
F/O Furber Sgt Le Marquand F/O Hassel 78 yards
5 L.F.S. S/L Smith Sgt Wallis Sgt Page 49 yards
F/O Edwards F/S Wallace F/O Nunn 54 yards
Congratulations to F/L Van Raalte and crew, 97 Squadron for the outstanding 3 exercises!!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 Squadron (F/Lt Hearn, D.F.C) [/underlined] report that to try and reduce bombing errors to a minimum a system of practice bomb plotting on small perspex covered boards is being inaugurated. The errors will be plotted on this board and the reason explained verbally to the Air Bomber, Captain and Navigator. In case of suspected instrument error the Bombing Section will examine the results plotted with the Instrument Section.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron (F/L Keats) [/underlined] report that a modification to permit the emergency jettisoning of smaller H.E. bombs only when a mixed load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried has been suggested by an Air Bomber and submitted for approval. An isolation switch would be incorporated in the circuit between the Connell Pre-Selector and No. 13 Station. This switch would be permanently wired down except when the special load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried, in which case it would be left up for take-off and put down by the crew when a height of 4,000 feet is reached. In the event of engine failure at take-off, the pilot could jettison the smaller H.E. bombs safe with the jettison toggle instead of the normal jettisoning of containers by Type H Jettison.
[Underlined] 52 Base [/underlined] report that [underlined] 12 [/underlined] aircraft took off between [underlined] 08.30 hours and 09.30 hours [/underlined] on 4th July to carry out High Level Practice Bombing. Early morning details can be sure of the best bombing weather!!
[Underlined] 106 Squadron (F/L Morgan) [/underlined] report the following outstanding exercise:-
Pilot:- F/O Meredith
Air Bomber:- F/O Mitchell.
As the port outer engine had to be feathered before completion of the cross country, bombing was carried out on only three engines. As Gee was thus u/s and as petrol was running short, no wind was found, but the wind velocity found on the last leg of the cross country was used for bombing. This wind velocity was found at 18,000 feet, whereas the bombing was carried out at 14,000 feet owing to having only three engines. Thus a fairly large vector error of 214 yards (Converted to 20,000 feet) resulted, but the bomb aimer’s error was only 16 yards at 14,000 feet, which is an error of 19 yards when converted to 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
Bombing Leaders in 54 Base are:-
83 Squadron – F/L Bedell
97 Squadron – F/L Rogers, D.F.C.
627 Squadron – F/L Mitchell
[Underlined] F/L Harris, D.F.C. [/underlined] has arrived from H.Q. 6 Group to take over Bombing Leader duties at No. 5 L.F.S. Syerston.
[Underlined] F/L Honnibal [/underlined] (ex 92 Group) has succeeded F/L Keats as Bombing Leader to 57 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/L Keats [/underlined] (57 Squadron) has moved to H Q 92 Group.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Clegg (44 Squadron), F/S. Booth (619 Squadron) and F/O Linnett (207 Squadron) obtained “B” Categories on No. 84 Course and F/O Nugent (61 Squadron) obtained “B” Category on No. 85 Course.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
The month of June was notorious for bad weather, numerous operations and stand-by’s. Hence the competition entries were fewer in number than of late. It has been decided to include the Conversion Units in the Competition under the same rules as for the Squadrons. It is realised, however, that they have an advantage over Squadrons in so far as they have considerably more qualifying entries from which to make selection. However it is hoped that squadrons will make determined efforts to beat the Conversion Units in July. Out [sic] congratulations are extended to 51 Base for their high standard, and their commanding positions in this, their first entry!!
PILOT AND AIR BOMBER’S ERROR AT 20,000 FEET
1st 1654 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd 619 Squadron – 62 yards
3rd 1660 C.U. – 68 yards
4th 1661 C.U. – 69 yards
5th 44 Squadron – 70 yards
6th 467 Squadron – 78 yards
7th 5 L.F.S. – 83 yards
8th 49 Squadron – 85 yards
9th 83 Squadron – 90 yards
10th 9 Squadron – 92 yards
11th (630 Squadron- 96 yards
(106 Squadron 96 yards
13th 463 Squadron- 107 yards
14th 97 Squadron – 109 yards
15th 207 Squadron – 116 yards
16th 57 Squadron – 124 yards
Non-qualifying Squadrons:-
17th 50 Squadron (6 exercises)- 106 yards
18th 61 Squadron (3 exercises)- 91 yards
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C. – 52 Base – 76 yards
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
G/Capt Johnson, D.F.C., A.F.C. – 88 yards
(R.A.F. Station, Syerston)
[Underlined] ? ? AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ ? ? [/underlined]
1. What can cause an apparent Vector error in practice bombing?
2. List the possible causes of Large Random Errors.
3. What errors in practice bombing will be caused by low suction?
4. If you set the wrong T. V. what kind of error will you get?
[Underlined] MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT – DO’S AND DON’T’S [/underlined]
DO:- (i) set Bomb T.V. (the TV’s of all bombs likely to be dropped should be recorded on the levelling card on the top right-hand corner of the computor).
(ii) Set Target height against Q.F.E. ([underlined] SEA LEVEL PRESSURE [/underlined]).
(iii) Set [underlined] INDICATED [/underlined] Wind Speed because Bombsight Computor works on Indicated Air Speed and indicated height (indicated wind can be found from true wind by SUBTRACTING 1.5% per 1000 ft of height).
(iv) Synchronise bombsight compass with Pilot’s D.R. repeater (by pressing in and turning the synchronising knob on the side of the Computor box.)
(v) Check that sufficient suction is reaching the bombsight gyros.
(vi) Remember to turn on air supply to the bombsight by means of the Bombsight Cock.
(vii) Be sure that the Pilot puts main control cock of “George” to OUT when Bombsight is to be used, or no compressed air will be available.
(viii) Keep the bombsight clean and check all the loads are correctly attached.
(ix) Liaise with the Instrument Section who maintenance [sic] your bombsight.
DON’T (i) Use the Emergency Computor until you have checked the bombsight and tried to correct the fault.
(ii)Touch the reflector glass of the Sighting Head when the gyro is running (the gyro is always running when the engines are running).
(iii) Forget to adjust the levelling scales for the all-up weight. (The Flight Engineer will know the A.U.W.).
(iv) Put any pressure on the reflector glass – even the edge of a map may lead to the toppling of the gyro when the engines are running.
(v) Let anything, not even your oxygen mask, press on the Sighting Head. (The upper part is supported on anti-vibration mountings which prevent the bearings of the gyro being damaged – the least pressure can make the alignment inaccurate).
(vi) Stow parachute, window, etc. near any of the leads to the Computor Box or Sighting Head.
(vii) Forget to liaise with the bombsight maintenance staff.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS (Continued from back page) [/underlined]
were daylight attacks) with varying degrees of success. Notable among these attacks were the operations in daylight against WATTEN and SIRACOURT on the 19th and 25th respectively. In both cases direct hits are claimed on the launching ramps involving damage which, it is hoped, will put them out of -commission at least temporarily.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
No long range sorties have been carried out during the month; in fact almost all the targets have been in Gee range. No Navigational difficulties therefore have been experienced. Broadcast winds have not been attempted during the month because of shallow penetration.
One major navigational “boob” was, however made during the month by a Navigator of No. 106 Squadron. The aircraft was detailed to attack a Ruhr target, and reached the enemy coast on track and on time. The Navigator then gave the next course to the pilot who in error steered 100° different from that given him. The Navigator was at fault in not checking the course with the pilot. The aircraft continued on the wrong course for six minutes until a Gee fix was obtained. The sortie was eventually abandoned because of the time element. This is another example of what can happen if you do not carry out the correct drills. Immediately the pilot says “on course” make it your first duty to check the true course steered.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
During the month an analysis of errors which may arise in windfinding has produced the following probable error:-
Probable Error
(i) Inability to read A.P.I. to nearest half minute of Lat. and Long. 1 mile
(ii) Inability to plot a position in Lat. and Long. accurately (e.g. Air Position and Gee fix) 1/2 mile (at least)
(iii) Inherent error in H2S fixes of at least half a mile. 1/2 mile
(iv) Inability to plot an H2S fix to within 1/2 mile because of mile scale limitations on chart 1/2 mile
(v) Probable error in synchronising of D.R. compass repeaters when airborne. 1 mile
(vi) Error in Compass swing of at least 1°. 1 mile
(vii) Probable error in measuring off length of wind vector, because of mile scale limitations, on chart. 1/2 mile
[Underlined] Total [/underlined] 5
Therefore if a wind was found over a period of 15 minutes it would be possible to obtain an error of 20 m.p.h!! Fortunately, of course, some of the errors will cancel out, but even then there will always be a residue which, multiplied by four, may still give a large error.
It will be noticed that careless errors in taking of Gee and H2S fixes, reading off A.P.I. co-ordinates, incorrect plotting etc. have not been mentioned.
The problem now is, how can we eliminate the above errors. Action has already been taken to eliminate points (iv) and (vii). Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are urged to discuss the above list with all Navigators on the Squadron, and submit any suggestions to Group Headquarters immediately.
Don’t be afraid to give us all your suggestions. Remember, the more accurate w/v’s we obtain, the more accurate the bombing, concentration and timing.
Referring back to careless errors, by far the largest of these are plotting and computing errors. A list of exercises to improve plotting and computation was forwarded to each S.N.O. some weeks ago. It is the responsibility of each S.N.O. to see that these exercises are completed at regular intervals. Short computation tests, lasting 15 – 20 minutes should be completed every morning if this is possible. There is always a spare half hour between assembly at the flights and commencing N.F.T’s. The plotting tests should be carried out at least once every fortnight, particular stress being laid on wind finding. Make it a point always that the tests are analysed immediately after completion, and the results made known as soon as possible.
Many Squadrons have adopted the above procedure, and are being well repaid. There are still one or two Squadron Navigation Officers, however, who say they are too busy to do such things. Don’t let this be your excuse – try it conscientiously and well for the next fortnight, and note the improvement in the work of your Navigator.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
All Navigators will now be conversant with the resetting modification fitted during the past months. It is hoped that maximum use is being made of this device, which should considerably simplify resetting.
Yet another modification to simplify resetting has been suggested by the Navigation Staff at Syerston. It is the fitting of a “winder handle” to the resetting knob. Only one handle need be used when resetting and, much more important, the time taken to reset will be reduced by at least 2/3rds. The above modification has been submitted to Bomber Command for approval, and as soon as this is obtained, all aircraft will be modified.
Several Squadrons have been persevering with the graphical resetting procedure, but this has not proved very successful. When the modification suggested by Syerston has been fitted to all aircraft, all objections against resetting regularly will have been overcome, and it will be possible to adopt the standard procedure of resetting the A.P.I. regularly.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
During the summer months it is hoped we may further the Navigation technique to such an extent that Navigation will be considerably simplified during the winter period. We must aim for simplification and standardisation in use of A.P.I., H2S and log and chart keeping. This will be of considerable benefit to the Conversion Units. At the present time a Navigator is taught one method at the Conversion Unit and another on the Squadron – consequently he is proficient at neither. Ideas are being collected from Squadrons and it is hoped to present to Squadrons and Conversion Units the ideal Navigation technique. Let us have your suggestions.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The results of the drive on practice bombing and wind finding have, on the whole, been satisfactory – but in certain cases they have been disappointing. The Conversion Unit Navigators have surpassed many operational Navigators. A vector error of less than 5 m.p.h. should be your aim.
Improvements have been made during the last 7 or 8 weeks, and the average vector error produced this month is 7 3/4 m.p.h. – a commendable effort on the whole but there is still room for improvement.
It was stated in last month’s News that a monthly Bombing Wind Finding Competition would be held. It was the intention to publish the best eight vector errors for the month, but so far there have been 14 instances where NIL vector error was obtained and a further 14 instances of vector errors of 2 m.p.h. and below! It has therefore been decided to issue the AVERAGE vector error obtained by each Squadron and Conversion Unit for the month. The order is as follows:-
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron]
[Underlined] Average Error: [/underlined] Squadrons – 7 m.p.h.
Con. Units – 8 m.p.h.
It will be noted that only one Squadron has achieved the ideal, i.e. a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Day, D.F.C. Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to Ops.II H.Q. 5 Group.
S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C. S.N.O. Dunholme to Base Nav. Officer, Scampton.
F/Lt. Bray, D.F.C. 207 Sqdn. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, D.F.M. 44 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Craven 50 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. R. Adams, D.F.C. 630 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Lascelles, D.F.C. 1654 C.U. Navigation Leader to be Squadron Nav. Officer No. 50 Squadron.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] A RECORD MONTH [/underlined]
The month of June produced two new records when a total of 3000 sorties was flown, resulting in 11,708 tons of bombs dropped on enemy territory, an increase of 3,000 tons over our previous record in May. All armament personnel can be justifiably proud of their contribution, particularly as this phenomenal tonnage represents only a fraction of the tonnage actually handled during the month.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL BOMBING GEAR [/underlined]
One drop of water in the wrong place may result in several thousands of pounds of high explosive failing to reach the target – a startling yet true statement. Bad weather has necessitated leaving aircraft bombed up for several consecutive days, and as no aircraft can be guaranteed waterproof, it is quite possible that some of our recent “summer weather” has seeped into the bombing circuit.
All Armament Officers are reminded if the correct procedure to be carried out when aircraft are left bombed up after the cancellation of operations, and a quick reference to Air Staff Instructions would not be amiss at this stage. Are your electrical circuits tested each day, and do you always remove pyrotechnics from the aircraft immediately after the cancellation? Check up on these and all other relevant points, and ensure that the [underlined] full [/underlined] load reaches its destination, and not just a small fraction of it.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN [/underlined]
The Bomber Command Armament Bulletin for June has now arrived and contains some very interesting and useful information, particularly the suggestions made for improving the condition of bomb dumps in general. Page 9 of the Bulletin refers to the difficulties encountered in the storage of cluster projectiles and introduces a new type of tracking which is intended form a temporary hard standing in bomb dumps which have no suitable storage space for this particular weapon. Supplies of this Summerville tracking have already arrived at some stations in the Group and although it is, as yet, too early to express an opinion as to the efficiency of this equipment, it is considered that it will prove to be a very great asset.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Types and Squadron]
A= MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
[Underlined] GUN FREEZING [/underlined]
Although the immediate danger of gun failures due to freezing has now passed, the problem of preventing such failures is still being very carefully investigated, and to assist in this investigation samples of hydraulic fluids have been taken from gun turret systems of operational aircraft for analysis by the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
A [indecipherable] of water in suspension in hydraulic fluid is sufficient to cause the oil to freeze at a considerably higher temperature, and consequently the importance of ensuring that oil containers used to fill gun turret systems are free from water, cannot be too strongly stressed. Results of this analysis will be forwarded to all Bases and Stations when received. We hope that they will be negative.
[Underlined] AMMUNITION [/underlined]
The repeated changing of ammunition from night to daylight sequence results in all ammunition bolts being handled several times a week. If ammunition is transported in suitable containers and handled carefully when being loaded into the aircraft, no misalignment should occur.
The necessity for ensuring that only correctly aligned ammunition is loaded into gun turrets should be brought to the attention of all armourers and air gunners.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The emphasis during the past month has been on wind finding for practice bombing, and we are pleased to say that Navigators on the Training Base have risen to the occasion and produced excellent results. The most notable performances have come from Winthorpe, where seven Navigators obtained a Nil vector error. This drive on wind finding has created a desire to find equally correct winds during Navigational exercises. The result has been a big improvement in track keeping and timing.
From time to time improvements on the A.P.I. are suggested. The latest suggestion comes from F/O Richardson of No.5 L.F.S., who has suggested a modification to facilitate re-setting. This modification, if adopted, will reduce the time taken to reset the A.P.I. by at least 2/3rds. Good work Syerston!
H2S training is getting into its stride at Wigsley, and 1/3rd of each course is now being trained. Only one trainer is available at Wigsley at the moment, but as soon as the second trainer arrives it is the intention to train 50% of all crews. Winthorpe and Swinderby Conversion Units are already training half their inputs. Pupils are receiving approximately 14 hours air training, and at least 20 hours ground training. When more aircraft are available it will be the policy to train more crews rather than increase the number of flying hours per pupil.
Bullseye exercises have been seriously interrupted by bad weather, but 10 and 12 Groups have co-operated to the maximum extent on every possible occasion, and several good exercises have been completed.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “OVER KEENNESS” [/underlined]
A Navigator on a cross country flight who was endeavouring to work the Swinderby system of obtaining six minute fixes and winds, experienced Gee failure. He immediately instructed his W/Operator to obtain a M/F fix every six minutes. The W/Op. found the ether rather congested, so he attempted priority fixes – much to the concern of the M/F Section, R.O.C, 5 Group and No. 51 Base!
Public Relations
Public Relations work during June has been rather confused owing to the altered nature of the Command’s operations, and the uncertainty of many circumstances. Only a few reports were issued to the press at any length by the Air Ministry News Service.
Three war correspondents have flown in Group aircraft on operations: Mr. Ronald Walker, of the “News Chronicle” who went over Caen with S/Ldr. Fairburn of 57 Squadron on June 12/13; Mr. R.J. Kiek, of the Netherlands Press Agency, who flew over a French target with his countryman, F/O Overgaadu of No. 207 Squadron, on June 16/17; and Mr. Kent Stephenson, B.B.C. War Reporter, who unfortunately failed to return with W/Cdr. Crocker of No. 49 Squadron on June 21/22.
(Continued in Column 2)
(Continued from Column 3)
Three parties came to our stations: June 1st, Dunholme, Mrs. Billingham (Reuters), Miss Tredgold (South African Argus) and Mr. Fletcher (Sport and General Press Agency Photographer) for the visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: June 17th, Waddington, Mr. W. Farmer, of the “Melbourne Herald”; and June 22nd, Waddington, Mr. Wilkins and Miss Elizabeth Riddell (journalists) and Mr. J. Warburton (Sport and General photographer), for the visit of the Duke of Gloucester.
A party of employees of the Firma Chrome Plating Co., of Sheffield, visited the Sheffield Squadron (No.49) on June 3rd.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
June was quite a fair month from the aircraft signals point of view, but improvement can and must be made. It is hoped every endeavour will be made by Signals Leaders to raise the standard of Aircrew Signals operating to a high state of efficiency.
Have all Signals Leaders read and digested 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13, and acquainted all their operators with its contents?
This instruction lays down the requirements for W/T Control Operators. Endeavour should be made to bring every Operator up to the standard required. Two Squadrons have already carried out air tests with quite satisfactory results. One important point – once an operator reaches the standard required, he must, by constant practice maintain that standard, and to ensure that he does, he may be required to do an air test with Group at any time, without previous warning.
[Underlined] DAILY INSPECTIONS. [/underlined]
Signals Leaders, do you ever take a quick run out to your aircraft and check over the “Daily” done by your W/Ops?
An aircraft of this Group took off on Ops one night, was only airborne a short time when the intercom. failed. Cause – faulty 2v 20 Acc! The W/Op did not carry out the correct drill for the use of emergency intercom. as laid down in 5 Group Aircraft Drill No.11, Appendix “A”. Result – one early return and one load of bombs the Hun did not receive. Was this the only dud 2v 20 Acc. airborne that night? Or was he the unfortunate W/Op. who, through his lack of knowledge or carelessness in carrying out his emergency drill, was found out? We wonder!! It would be worthwhile checking up on these accs. in the aircraft. Yes, there was a lot of truth in the film “BOOMERANG” !
The new Wireless Operators (Air) log has now gone to the printing press and should be available for issue very soon. We hope to see some very neat and fully detailed logs returned, just to show your appreciation.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
This month’s Good Show comes from 57 Squadron, by an operator who showed coolness and initiative in fixing up his broken dinghy aerial (fixed) and operating his dinghy radio, thus enabling the rescue aircraft to “home” on his signal.
The aerial mast was broken while erecting, and the operator fixed his aerial lead into the aerial part while other members of the crew took turns at holding the aerial aloft, by the insulated part which separates the aerial from mast.
This is an excellent example of cool and intelligent thinking under very difficult circumstances.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The co-operation of W/Op. and Gunner reporting on unserviceability of Early Warning Devices is improving, but there are still the few cases of discrepancy appearing in these E.W.D. reports and Combat reports. Just a little more drive in this direction will eradicate this, so Signals Leaders and Radar Interrogators, do your stuff.
Manipulation failures are still occurring, mostly due to lack of experience, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. Efforts are being made for every Squadron to have one Early Warning Device Instructor, and quite a few Squadrons have them already. Signals Leaders, get your W/Ops over to them for that little extra instruction which means all the difference between failure and serviceability of your E.W.D. and sends your Squadron percentage of serviceability soaring.
The cards, depicting combats on Monica, sent from this Group to Headquarters Bomber Command, are now in the process of being reproduced and will soon be available for issue to Squadrons and Conversion Units.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The alteration to the time of the Group W/T exercise has met with universal approval from all Squadrons, and there has been some good operating. The reallocation of Squadrons to Sections 1 and 2 should also help to make the exercise more interesting by eliminating the possibility of any two transmitters “blotting out” each other due to their close proximity.
[Underlined] VALETE ET SALVETE [/underlined]
Our heartiest congratulations to W/Cdr. Skinner on his promotion and his appointment as Officer Commanding No. 14 Radio School. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
Our congratulations also go to S/Ldr. Andrews on his appointment as Signals Leader, 92 Group.
Five Group are poorer by two very popular officers.
44 Squadron will welcome F/O Hughes (a former 44 Sqdn. W/Op) as Signals Leader.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failures percentage against total operational sorties has shown a great decrease during the month. There were 27 failures reported out of 3,000 sorties – the percentage being 0.9, the lowest figure for many months. The maintenance personnel are to be commended for repeating last month’s record of zero maintenance failures. Out of this enormous number of sorties, only two aircraft returned early as a result of signals defects. The number of component failures (equipment) was 14. Surprisingly enough, not one condenser or resistor defect was reported; R. 1155 output valves again proved troublesome.
[Underlined] V.H.F. FITTING [/underlined]
At the time of going to press, 200 aircraft are fitted with V.H.F. equipment. The speed of fitting has placed us well ahead of schedule. Units are reporting that they are receiving a considerable number of crystals which on test have been found inactive. R.A.E., Farnborough, have evolved a modification (R.T.I.M. No.629) employing a choke unit type 45, which, in A. D. G. B. aircraft has proved quite successful. When the choke units become available, units will be notified.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
There are two main reasons why the total number of Mandrel fitted aircraft in this Group has fallen. They are (a) supplies of Col.9 not forthcoming, and (b) large scale V.H.F. fitting drive, which has absorbed all available Signals manpower in the squadrons. It is emphasised, however, that squadrons must ensure that all their complete Mandrels are fitted as soon as possible. The Countermeasure Party is still available at Group Headquarters in readiness to offer assistance.
[Underlined] CARPET II [/underlined]
Contrary to many beliefs, Carpet II is in no way connected with Persian Markets. It is, however, a new radio countermeasure device fitted to the Illuminating Force aircraft of this Group. It is quite popular with the C.S.O!
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Base Signals and Radar Officers attended a conference at Group Headquarters on 16th June, to discuss the Bomber Command proposed establishment of Radar personnel. After considerable discussion and divergence of opinion the proposals were accepted. Some alterations were suggested in connection with accommodation and holdings of spare equipment, and these were forwarded to Bomber Command. It is understood that the proposals are now being considered by the Establishment Branch at Bomber Command.
[Underlined] BOOZER [/underlined]
Sufficient Boozer equipment became available during the month to enable fitting to proceed in our two Boozer squadrons. As this equipment is in very short supply, every effort must be made to make immediate use of all that is available. Test equipment is at the moment, difficult to obtain, but a proposed re-distribution of the total Command holdings should ease this situation.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
It has become increasingly obvious from scrutiny of combat reports that Tail Warning Devices are not being watched continuously by the Wireless Operator. Originally it had been hoped that with training and experience a W/Op would be able to carry out his W/T work whilst, at the same time keeping one eye on the Tail Warning Device, but this has been found to be very difficult. The possibility of repositioning the Tail Warning Indicator so that two of the crew can watch it, has been thoroughly investigated, and found impracticable. Experiments have been made to ascertain the possibility of using a second indicator. This repeater indicator is located adjacent to the Gee indicator. An indicator standard for both Monica IIIA and V, has been designed and tested by the Group Trouble Shooting Party. It has proved quite satisfactory and Bomber Command have been asked to arrange for its early introduction. The design of a simple Fishpond repeater indicator proved too great a problem, and it is now expected that a second standard Fishpond indicator will be the only answer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee was once again the leader in serviceability, showing a new high percentage of 97.77 out of 2,639 sorties. This was obtained in spite of the decrease in new equipment available, and a consequent reduction in the spare sets which squadrons were able to hold.
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 1249 sorties was completed by aircraft equipped with H 2 S Mark II, and of these 103 experienced difficulty; the remaining 91.76% were serviceable throughout the sorties. The fitting of this equipment to 619 Squadron has not yet been completed, but it is proceeding as fast as circumstances will allow. The movement of the Bomber Command Fitting Party to Dunholme will ease considerably the strain of fitting now being carried out by squadron personnel. The supply of fitted aircraft is keeping pace with the number of trained crews.
Mark III H 2 S has shown a decided improvement and the 76 sorties completed resulted in a serviceability of 92.11%. Supply of this equipment is still very grim, but does show signs of improving.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
As is to be expected, this equipment followed in step with H2 S, 92.72% of the 1236 sorties being free of difficulty. Training has shown very decided improvement and the operational reports indicate that W/Ops. are having increased success with this equipment.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA remained at almost the same level as May. 830 sorties were completed, and there were 39 difficulties reported. The remaining 95.31% gave completely satisfactory results. Monica V came closer than ever to overtaking its predecessor with a percentage serviceability of 93.91. The more prevalent causes of unserviceability have been almost eliminated, and the lesser difficulties will no doubt diminish as further experience is gained by Radar personnel. The supply position of both types of Monica becomes increasingly difficult, so squadrons must do their utmost to conserve their existing equipment, and to keep all sets serviceable. The delivery of a Monica Trainer to the Aircrew School at Scampton should help squadrons considerably in their training programme.
The serviceability figures for the month are very gratifying. They indicate a decided increase in the standard of training and workmanship of Radar personnel. In these days of intensive operations, it requires hard work to keep all our equipment serviceable, but the bombing results are more than worth the effort. With the introduction of the proposed establishment, and an adequate number of Radar vans, we should be able to meet the rain and altitude trials of winter on better than equal terms.
[Underlined] TELEPHONE EXCHANGES [/underlined]
Last month’s issue of the News contained a cartoon for which we, in Signals, accept no responsibility. We are delighted, however, to be given the opportunity to refute the allegation of inefficiency which was inferred by publishing the following bouquet.
Skellingthorpe has produced some surprising figures showing the number of calls handled by the Admin PBK during a 24-hour non-operational period. A total of 3,725 calls was handled during this period, and of these 3,143 were extensions – to – extension calls. The Station Commander comments – “My opinion of our operators, always high, has gone up still further”, and – “at Skellingthorpe we have an exchange staff second to none”. We hope that this latter remark will be accepted as a challenge by other exchanges within the Group.
[Underlined] TELEPRINTER TRAFFIC [/underlined]
In April of this year, this Headquarters Signals Office was handling about 9,000 teleprinter messages per week. A drive was then inaugurated to divert traffic to less congested channels, such as D.R.L.S., and our weekly total fell in five weeks by 4,000 messages!
Now that “D” Day has passed, however, the total is commencing to rise. This must be checked, since as the Western Front develops, our commitments increase – It’s often quicker by postagram – at any rate for Admin messages.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] LANCASTER SPARES [/underlined]
This month sees a changeover in our method of demanding spares for Lancasters. Instead of demanding straight on to the M.P.O. demands are now placed on No.207 M.U. who are in a position to supply.
Equipment Officers will help No. 207 M.U. provisioning to a great extent by keeping a close watch upon demands for Lancaster spares, and ensuring that demands are going to No.207 M.U. and not to the M.F.O.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS [/underlined]
A point to watch is the serviceability of mechanical sweepers. If these machines go u/s it means that runways cannot be kept clear of flints and stones, which means a rise in consumption of tyres. The aircraft tyre situation is still acute, and every care must be taken to get the maximum amount of life out of every tyre.
Equipment officers should therefore look into the holdings of spares for mechanical sweepers, and in conjunction with the M.T. Officers provision wisely on those parts which have a habit of going u/s. This will keep the sweepers serviceable and the consumption of tyres down.
[Underlined] WINTER CLOTHING [/underlined]
Now the English summer is upon us it would be wise to overhaul items of winter clothing such as overcoats, waterproof overalls, leather jerkins etc., and get them into good trim for the forthcoming winter.
It would be better to do it now instead of waiting for the winter when these items will be in great demand.
[Underlined] BLANKETS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred where it has been found that Stations have been holding blankets far in excess of their entitlement as laid down in A.M.O. A. 700/43. A quick check of stocks may mean the release of many blankets with a subsequent saving of man-hours at the factory which manufactures them.
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT (Continued from column 2) [/underlined]
[Underlined] OXYGEN TRANSPORT CYLINDERS [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters Bomber Command letter BC/S.21459/E.6, dated 30th June, 1944.
The scale of issue of these items is 32 per squadron. Equipment Officers should make every effort to reduce any surplus holdings and return these cylinders to the M.U.
GARDENING
5 Group’s gardening this month amounted to two small but useful operations by No.44 Squadron against two of the Biscay U-Boat lairs, on the nights of 6/7th and 8/9th. Planting was done in H 2 S from high altitude and some excellent P. P. I. photographs were obtained. A total of 30 vegetables was planted.
Although the record breaking figures of April and May were not reached, the Command planted the considerable total of 1772 vegetables, in some 20 gardens. Over 1,000 were directed against the U-Boats – off their bases and in their approach routes to the Western end of the English Channel. This, combined with vigorous and successful action by air and surface striking forces has brought almost to nothing the threat to our Invasion supply lines, in spite of the massing of the U-Boats to the West of the Channel in the first few days. Nearly 600 vegetables were laid in the Channel itself, to impede enemy surface craft – principally E-Boats – in their anti-invasion operations. (Here, we gratefully admit, we were helped more than a little by the wholesale slaughter of these vermin in their harbours by the bombers). Certain North Sea gardens received some 150 vegetables, and Mosquitos of 8 Group planted a small number in the Kettegat.
During the three months preceding “D” Day well over 7,000 vegetables were planted by the Command, 5 Group being responsible for 908. These figures show that in actual quantity we distributed about one eighth of the Command total. What they do not show is that nearly all our operations were special ones, involving either exceptionally long distances (DANZIG); exceptional accuracy from very low level (KONIGSBURG CANAL); exceptional weight of attack in one night (KEIL BAY) or gardening in daylight (KATTEGAT). We do little routine gardening, and so do not get regular practice, but our recent successes show the value of keeping up to date in slack periods.
Results are beginning to come through, but details of casualties still refer to at latest three months ago; in fact, in the latest list we discover that 5 Group sank a U-Boat in April [underlined] 1943! [/underlined] Fortunately some reports get through more quickly than that, and news of the tremendous indirect effects of the pre-invasion gardening is plentiful. We hear of the route from TRELLEBORG to KIEL (150 miles) being marked with a [underlined] WRECK [/underlined] buoy every 1 – 2 miles; of Swedes and Finns laying up their ships rather than risk out mines, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare states that the mining of the Kiel Canal, backed up by the mining which preceded and followed it in the Baltic and North Sea approaches to the Canal, caused an [underlined] IRRECOVERABLE [/underlined] loss of 3 million tons of overall imports/exports to the German War Machine.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
June brought a record number of operational sorties and, at the same time, an increase in the known number of incidents involving Safety Drills.
A squadron aircraft disappeared over the Irish Sea on a navigational exercise with the loss of the entire crew. Four crews had occasion to use the Parachute Drill, two were successful; in the third, four members who baled out were lost in the sea; in the fourth the rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute, and a gallant attempt by the Air Bomber to share his own parachute was un successful.
[Underlined] 9/10th June. [/underlined] S/44 Squadron returning from operations, got out of control in bad weather. Its position was uncertain, and the captain ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Four members had jumped when the pilot regained control. They fell into the Thames Estuary and were drowned. The aircraft landed at base. None of those lost attached their K-type dinghies before jumping. [Underlined] MORAL [/underlined] – If in doubt about your position always take your dinghy with you.
[Underlined] 21/22nd June. [/underlined] Z/44 Squadron was hit in the starboard elevator from extreme range by a night fighter over enemy territory. The aircraft dived sharply with the elevators jammed, and when over the vertical the pilot considered he had no hope of recovery and ordered the crew to abandon. The Air Bomber was jammed against the rear of his compartment. The Rear Gunner was caught in his turret and trapped by piles of ammunition on his lap, caused by a runaway servo feed. Four members baled out and their parachutes were seen to open. The captain eventually regained control and flew the aircraft back to base, navigated by the Air Bomber.
S/630 Squadron was badly shot up by a fighter. Wings and fuselage were riddled, and the rear turret so badly damaged it was a wonder the gunner escaped injury. The rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute.
With the assistance of two crew members, the pilot flew the aircraft back to this country where, due to damage, he found he could not turn and so was forced to bale out his crew.
At the risk of grave personal injury, the Air Bomber allowed the Rear Gunner to attach his parachute clips to the “K” Dinghy ”D” rings of his (the Air Bomber’s) harness, and the two went out together. Unfortunately, his “D” rings tore through the webbing when the parachute opened and the Gunner was lost.
[Underlined] SUCCESSFUL DITCHING [/underlined]
A/57 Squadron on the same night was returning across the North Sea at 7000 feet when all engines failed, apparently through shortage of fuel. The Captain immediately warned his crew, and ordered the Wireless Operator to transmit S.O.S. The Wireless Operator switched I.F.F. to “Distress” and transmitted “S.O.S.” and the aircraft callsign about ten times before being ordered to his ditching station.
The aircraft ditched ten minutes later. The pilot made use of his landing light which helped him to judge his height, but having no power the aircraft struck the water very severely breaking off the tail. The Captain’s harness had not been tightened sufficiently and he was flung upwards, making a large hole in the perspex and cutting his face deeply. The pilot left the aircraft by means of this self-made hole. The Flight Engineer was also flung upwards and cut his nose on the fuselage roof. The gunners were flung over the flapjack but were uninjured, falling on top of the Air Bomber who was also unhurt, and the Navigator cut the back of his head.
Exit was made from the aircraft “except-
(continued on page10, col.3)
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Place Dinghy Drill Parachute Drill [/underlined]
1 52 Base 52 Base
2 53 Base 55 Base
3 55 Base 53 Base
[Table of Drill Results by Squadron]
No crews in No. 54 Base were tested during the month.
[Underlined] Points arising from Safety Drill Tests. [/underlined]
(a) A number of crews have not thoroughly read “5 Group Aircraft Drills”.
(b) Insufficient use of made of the intercom in practicing “Safety Drills” – the more use that is made of the intercom the more informed and less worried the crew will be.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined]
The monthly summary of Ditchings in Home Waters for May, 1944, shows that 508 airmen were concerned, of whom 242 (47.2%) were saved – a marked percentage increase in lives saved.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
An aircraft of No. 207 Squadron, flown by F/O Smart, collided over the target with another Lancaster which broke cloud above on the port quarter. In spite of the fact that the entire port fin and rudder were torn away and the port tail plane, elevator and aileron badly damaged, F/O Smart completed the bombing run and showing great skill, flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
By his prompt action, F/O Sanders of No. 463 Squadron averted what could have been a serious accident. He was taking off with full bomb load when the starboard tyre burst at a speed of approximately 90 m.p.h. Displaying great skill, he controlled the swing and made a successful take off, and after completing the sortie landed his aircraft in such a way that only minor damage was sustained.
P/O. Meggeson of No. 83 Squadron showed a fine example of airmanship. The port inner of his aircraft caught fire. Though he was unable to operate the fire extinguisher or feather the propeller, by maintaining a very low airspeed, he succeeded in controlling the fire and few his aircraft back to base, where he made a successful landing.
As a result of combat with an enemy fighter, and aircraft of No. 61 Squadron, piloted by P/O Passant, was severely damaged. The starboard fin and rudder were shot away, the fuselage and starboard main plane badly damaged, and the starboard tyre burst. P/O Passant displayed great skill and determination in flying the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
Whilst making a night approach in 7 miles visibility, and aircraft struck a tree 1000 yards from the end of the runway. When the aircraft eventually landed the Pilot stated he had had a successful trip but that the aircraft felt very heavy to handle. This was not surprising as he was still carrying full bomb load when he landed.
Whilst flying at 8000 feet, all four engines of a Stirling cut. The aircraft lost height to 600 feet before the engines were re-started. The First Engineer was changing tanks when the engines cut. They started again when the Second Engineer turned the petrol on!
In broad daylight, after a clear straight run of 200 yards, a pilot taxied his aircraft into an M.T. vehicle standing on the perimeter track.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties carried out totalled exactly 3,000; this constitutes an excellent effort when it is considered that this number of sorties affected serviceability very little and a much larger number could have been laid on had the weather permitted and circumstances required them.
A large number of acceptance checks had to be carried out during the month and some excellent work was carried out by the Group Servicing Section, and the very fine spirit which exists within the Group was made evident by bases which had few acceptance checks to carry out volunteering to accept aircraft for check from other bases. This greatly decreased the period which would normally have elapsed to bring this large number of Lancasters to operational standard.
1.003% of aircraft which either failed to take off or returned early were due to technical faults for which the Engineering Branch is responsible. This 1.003% includes defects beyond our immediate control and remedial modification action is being taken in respect of many of the defects. It is good to know that not one of these aircraft failed due to a maintenance defect, and squadrons are to be congratulated on this aspect. The following squadrons had no early returns or cancellations due to Engineering defects during June, and are awarded a “big hand”:-
44, 83, 97, 467 and 619 Squadrons.
Failures are still occurring of the now famous oil pipe from relief valve to dual drive, and it is hoped that all promises made during June will reach fruition during July.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The effort which is put in by maintenance personnel to maintain this high standard of aircraft serviceability has been increased on many stations to maintain a similar high standard of serviceability of ground equipment. It is pleasing to see the drive which is progressing to maintain these essential aids to serviceability. When a “set-up” looks efficient, it invariably is efficient. Nothing looks so inefficient as a dirty hangar with trestles, wheels, cowlings and any odd items lying around the floor in pools of oil, whilst engine platforms are oil saturated and the equipment generally filthy. This state of affairs does not exist at any station in this Group, but there is considerable room for improvement on certain stations. Once a high standard of efficiency has been achieved it can easily be maintained, but don’t sit back and maintain your present standard unless it is highly efficient.
Many grand jobs have been carried out during June to keep the serviceability high and it is very difficult to pick out any single base in this News.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
During the past month a drive was made to improve the maintenance of the Mark XIV Bombsight. Results have shown a marked improvement, but we will not be satisfied until every sight in the Group can be guaranteed accurate. Much more care must be taken in the levelling and lining up, as it is in these operations that most of the errors occur. The Mark XIV Bombsight is one of those instruments which requires plenty of liaison between Electrical officers and the Air Bombers’ Union, and it has been noted that this is now very effective.
Electrical sections deserve a pat on the back for the very intensive efforts they have put in during the latter half of the month. The list of modifications does not get any shorter, yet initial checks are still being completed in 24 hours.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Stirlings and Lancasters]
Flight Engineers
[Underlined] ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUTANTS [/underlined]
Many more administrative adjutants to the Chief Technical Officer are required; these adjutants will be volunteers from tour expired commissioned Flight Engineers. They will be responsible to the C.T.O. for the efficient administration of the Servicing Wing, and for the discipline and welfare of all the technical personnel on its strength.
Apart from this new post for Flight Engineers, there are also vacancies for administrative duties in the M.T. Section on Base Stations, and the duties will generally be the same as Adjutant to the C.T.O.
It will be seen that these posts have created quite a new avenue for Flight Engineers, but every facility will be given them to improve their engineering knowledge while undertaking administrative duties as their primary roles.
Flight Engineer Leaders must bring those vacancies to the notice of the commissioned Flight Engineers who are about to finish their tour of operations.
[Underlined] NON-COMMISSIONED FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
A course of instruction for newly screened N. C. O. ‘s commenced at St. Athan on 7th June 1944. The object of this course is to train screened Flight Engineers to take up their new duties as Instructors in Heavy Conversion Units and Lancaster Finishing Schools.
Revision and technical subjects are included in the syllabus, but the course is designed mainly to teach the technique of lecturing.
As this course is most important to new instructors, it is hoped that all Flight Engineers will be enthusiastic, for much will depend on their results if the standard of lecturing is to improve in our Conversion Units and Schools.
TRAINING
Despite the bad weather towards the end of the month, 51 Base flew a total of over 8,000 hours and produced 130 crews for Squadrons.
Twice during the month, 1654 Conversion Unit, taking a leaf from the book of 1661 for May, laid on “operational” take offs for aircraft on night exercises. They got 17 and 22 off on these occasions in almost as many minutes.
Re-organisation of the Heavy Conversion Units commenced in the last week of the month to ensure that training of crews under the summer output can be increased to the highest level. Under this new system intakes of 11 every six days will go into the Heavy Conversion Units and the Group target figure for the month is 160 crews.
Each Conversion Unit now consists of 3 large flights, each of which is sub-divided into two. The Stirling Academy has also been split up into three parts, each one becoming the nucleus of a small flight at each Conversion Unit.
The Base had a very much better month from the accident point of view, and tyre bursts are now the only chronic complaint left. Undercarriage pylon failures have been reduced and coring has slipped rapidly out of the Base vocabulary.
New appointments within Base include Wing Commander Derbyshire, D.F.C., as Chief Instructor, 1660 Conversion Unit, and Wing Commander Kingsford Smith as Chief Instructor 1654 Conversion Unit.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 9) [/underlined]
ionally quickly” and all the crew members were in the dinghy almost before they knew it. The kite container was lost in transit, but all other equipment was transferred to the dinghy – a parachute found its way in, but was afterwards lost in the excitement of getting clear of the aircraft which was keeling over and threatening to come down on top of the dinghy.
This crew merely got their feet wet in boarding the dinghy but later got the seats of their pants wet because of a small hole in the dinghy which was subsequently plugged.
The pilot was weak from loss of blood, and shock, so the Air Bomber took charge and bullied the rest of the crew into activity. They say this did the world of good. The aircraft floated for about 10 minutes.
The dinghy mast was broken when being stepped, but the Wireless Operator managed to connect the aerial to the dinghy radio and almost continuous transmissions were made with other crew members holding the mast erect. Some hours later they were spotted by 91 Group Wellingtons which brought in an A.S.R. Hudson. A Lindholme dinghy was dropped, but failed to inflate though the crew managed to collect three of the ration containers. About 14 1/2 hours later a Naval Launch picked up the crew and took them into Yarmouth.
This crew had done a practice dinghy drill on the day before the incident, and attribute much of the success of this ditching to that fact.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ENEMY AGENTS – CARELESS TALKERS
On the 30th January, 1942, there was published a document of some importance – to wit A.M.C.O. A.9 of that year.
It was important because it cleared the air of a good deal of confusion on the subject of security, and it achieved this by defining the functions of Security Organisation – thereby defining what is meant by the term ‘Security’ – and it laid down the organisation by which these functions were to be performed.
Security was by no means a new subject. Prior to the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, a vast number of thoughts on the subject had already made themselves felt, chiefly in the form of posters. They bore a slogan – “CARELESS TALK COSTS LIVES” – they sought to impress the truth of this slogan by representing pictorially such distressing events as ships being blown up, aircraft being shot down, and so on, all, by implication, the result of the wrong word being spoken at the wrong time in the wrong place. These were reinforced, in lighter vein, by coloured drawings, more or less amusing, of Hitler listening beneath a table at which, presumably, two people were discussing the future plans of the Allies; of Hitler repeated ad infinitum in the pattern of the wall paper; of Hitler looking out of the frames of otherwise harmless pictures: all of them indicative of the ubiquity of Hitler, and of the truth of that apalling [sic] statement “Walls have ears”.
And since the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, these pictorial exhortations to verbal discretion have been emphasised to us, in the R.A.F., by a quantity of printed matter in the form of lectures, bulletins, reports, instructions which, if expressed in terms of tonnage of paper they consumed, or if placed end to end, or on top of each other in one column, would, one feels sure, provide much indigestible food for thought in the shape of one of those totals which impress more by number of their digits than by any meaning they are able to convey to the ordinary mind. Add to this the number of words which must have been spoken in lectures on this subject since the 30th January, 1942, the countless man-hours devoted to the study and promulgation of this gospel of silence, and our total will become more astronomical and, therefore, more meaningless than ever.
Staggering as this total would be, however, it would never reach the dimensions of those our enemies could provide in the same field of endeavour, for the very good reason that they had been at it long before we commenced piling ours up. Japan, for instance, had been preaching the gospel of silence to her people for something like twenty years before Pearl Harbour. She taught it not only to her soldiers, sailors and airmen, but to the man in the factory, the woman in her home, the pedestrian on the street; with the result, as the writings of any of the foreign newspaper correspondents, some of whom had been in the country for years, will tell you, it was next to impossible to find out anything worth knowing about the country’s strength, or her intentions.
And what of Germany? Those Germans who were not born silent, or had not achieved silence by the time Hitler took them over, had silence so thoroughly thrust upon them that they really came to understand how and to know that even the walls of their own homes could grow ears. They were left in no doubt whatever upon the value of silence when it came to discussing either the affairs of the Party or of the Fatherland.
All of which surely points to the conclusion that silence in war-time, or, in other words, Security of Information, must be a matter of very great importance. Of course it is. You know that already. The meanest intelligence, you will point out, can grasp quite easily the simple truth that, if you prevent the enemy from knowing what you are up to, you place him at a serious disadvantage; you render him, so to speak, both deaf and blind, and, therefore, easier to deal with. Any fool knows that.
They [sic] why do people talk? Why do they write home letters full of chatty information about their stations? Why does one feel so certain that, were it possible to tap, at once all the telephone lines in the vicinity of our stations all over the country, one would become possessed of a mass of service information about all sorts of things and people – whither, why and when such a squadron is moving, who have finished their tours, where people are posted to, who didn’t come back last night, who the new C.O. is, and where he comes from, what the weather is like, what are the chances of a scrub tonight, how the R.A.F. is fed, clothed, housed, organised – and so on and so on? Not to be too depressing about it, let it be stated at once that one would probably, even certainly, gain much less information than would have been the case say two years ago; but who would like to bet that there still wouldn’t be plenty to be picked up?
So, why, after all the effort that has been made, all the money that has been spent, the paper that has been used, the words that have been spoken, should this be so? Now here, it is suggested, lies the root of the matter, and if this root can be dug up and examined, the apparently indestructible weed of Service Gossip, a weed which, while harmless, perhaps, nine times out of ten, can, on that tenth time, produce enough poison to be fatal to precious lives and expensive material, can be understood, and to understand any problem is the first step towards solving it.
Let us examine it then. People talk because that is the easiest and most natural way for them to express their thoughts. They talk their thoughts, they think about their daily lives; therefore, they talk about their daily lives. Now apply that formula to the R.A.F. and what do you find? You discover a service filled, for the most part, with very young people, a number of them still in their formative years. They talk their thoughts, they think their lives, their lives are, at the moment, the R.A.F; therefore they talk about the R.A.F. To go on from here; they are young people who have been brought up in countries in which free speech, outside the debateable limits of the law of scandal, is as instinctive as breathing. They have never had occasion to practice this habit of silence - a most difficult habit to acquire – and finally, they serve in a force which has been publicised, photographed and if one may use such a word, glamourised, more than any other organisation ever has before. Flying, as the R.A.F. flies, is a continual source of wonder to the lay mind. This business of lifting tons of explosive material off the earth at one spot, transporting it at phenomenal heights to another spot hundreds of miles away, and there dropping it in spite of such discouragements as flak, fighters, the weather, and so on, is something of a miracle to the civilian, and, naturally enough, he wants to know about it. The youngsters of the R.A.F. are, of course, the horse’s mouth, which is given every encouragement to open itself, and to remain open. And when a W.A.A.F. goes home on leave Mother wants to know what it’s all like – the food, the quarters, the station, what they do there and that gives her mother something to talk about to somebody who will pass it on to somebody else who will…..why go on?
It is, you see, a personal problem. There is no mass-produced solution to it. It is every man and woman for himself, and only he and she can deal with it. How? Well, try this recipe. Try writing home letters in which you never even refer to the Station upon which you work, beyond, of course, the address in the top left hand corner. Apply the same rule when you leave your Station, even when you meet another R.A.F. type. Regard every telephone you use as a menace because it is you who are using it, and finally, when you have finished your work for the day, don’t make conversation out of it in the mess or the canteen. Try these four riles as an act of self-discipline, and never relax, and you will solve all your problem and, what is far more important, you will solve one of the great problems which confront your country. Difficult? Yes, very. Impossible? No. It has been done. There is a station which once had the privilege of guarding part of a great and important secret. It wrote its letters by the thousand, it went to the nearest town, it went on leave. But never a word got out. No less than 12,500 letters from that Station were opened over a period of three weeks, and only two minor indiscretions were discovered in them, both after the great event. If you were a stranger, you couldn’t get very far on that station without being questioned; every rumour heard on or off it was faithfully reported – just in case. The result is history, not only because the event referred to was one of the best kept secrets and, therefore, one of the most successful undertakings of the war, but because it provided proof that, with the problem fully explained to them, the A.C.2. and A.C.W.2. can keep a secret, can keep their mouths shut and their pens discreet, and can do so as a matter of conscience, and as an act of self discipline.
Now if only the civilian could be persuaded not to make the R.A.F. talk……
(Continued from Col. 3 page 12)
(c) I.A.S. within 2 m.p.h. and height within 50 feet.
It’s practice which, makes perfect.
Gunnery is the order of the day for you and your crew again. Keep a banking search going. See that your guns and gunners are in first class condition. Check up on your corkscrew and patter.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
June was not a cricketers’ month; the weather was “flaming [sic] but not in the sense of the old adage. Fielders and batsmen alike quailed before wind and rain. As a cricketers’ month it was grand for Rugger. In spite of the weather, however, several stations got in a full programme.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] – This station managed to complete the amazing total of 25 games. In addition, W.A.A.F. personnel played four games. Any challengers for an inter-station W.A.A.F. game? The Aircrew School represented the Station in five of the games, and themselves played 10 inter-course matches.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] – had five station matches, one of which, with Woodhall, was abandoned after Fiskerton had knocked up 87 for 8. Their other games were as follows:-
V Dunholme at Dunholme – Fiskerton 72 for 7 Dunholme 68 all out
V Fiskerton Village at the Camp – Fiskerton 108 for 6 Village 29 all out
V Bardney at Fiskerton – Fiskerton 62 all out Bardney 22 all out
V Scampton at Scampton – Scampton 120 for 9 Fiskerton 71 all out
In addition to this successful record several inter-section games were played.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] managed five station games, and are now getting into their stride under the captaincy of F/Lt Wardle.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] had three wins, one draw, and one loss from five games. They beat 5 Group H.Q., Welton Home Guard and Scampton, drew away with 5 Group H.Q. and suffered their only defeat at home with Fiskerton. An inter-section knock out is in full swing, with 12 teams competing.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] had an unlucky month, with four postponed matches out of the six arranged. Against Coningsby, Metheringham scored 37 for 1 (Coningsby 179 for 7) before rain stopped play. The only completed game was with R.C.A.F. Digby, who hit 60 for 6 against Metheringham 56 all out.
Inter-section games produced some close results, viz:
Flying Control 55 for 7 V R.A.F.Regt. 50 all out
“B” Flight 60 all out V “A” Flight 36 all out
Servicing Wing Fitters 60 all out V Servicing Wing Riggers 65 all out
“B” Flight 43 for 5 V “A” Flight 39 for 9
In the Base Commander’s Trophy, 106 Sqdn dismissed 617 for 70 runs, but they could not bat and the game was abandoned.
[Underlined] 5 Group H.Q. [/underlined] played five games, four of them being away, since the 5 Group pitch has not yet “settled down”. They produced the following results:
V Dunholme, at Morton. 5 Group 148 for 8 Dunholme 89 for 8 (Draw)
V Dunholme at Dunholme. Dunholme 129 for 6 5 Group 64 all out (Lost)
V Swinderby at Swinderby. Swinderby 88 for 7 5 Group 83 all out (Lost)
V 93 M.U. at Collingham M.U. 77 all out 5 Group 84 for 6 (Won)
V Newark Town at Newark Newark 77 for 8 5 Group 72 for 5 (Lost)
There were two intersection games, in one of which the “Hall” beat the rest by 136 for 8 against 99 for 8.
[Underlined] GROUP CRICKET COMPETITION [/underlined]
Woodhall beat Coningsby in the final of “A” Section, so now Syerston (winners of “B” Section) meet Woodhall in the deciding game for the Trophy. The game will probably be decided on Saturday or Sunday (July 15th or 16th) at Woodhall Spa. Woodhall have taken over the town’s local ground, and with the addition of a score board and sight screens now have one of the finest grounds in the Group. The game will be one of the features of Woodhall’s “Wings for Victory” Week, and given good weather will be a highly successful event between two of the strongest Group teams. It is hoped that the A.O.C. will be able to present the handsome silver bowl to the winning side.
[Underlined] ATHLETIC MEETINGS [/underlined]
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] ran a highly successful Athletic Meeting on Saturday, 3rd June, when favourable weather for once coincided with a stand-down. Fourteen events were contested on an inter-section basis, the trophy being a shield presented by Corporal Ward, Instrument Section. The final placings of the teams were as follows:-
Winners: Navigators – 137 points
Second Pilots – 93 points
Third W/Ops. – 83 points
Fourth Rear Gnrs. – 82 points
Fifth Air Bombers – 78 points
Sixth Engineers – 63 points
Seventh M.U.Gunners – 43 points
Mrs. McKechnie presented the shield to F/Sgt. Croft, who assisted the Navigators by winning the 440, 880 and mile. Another outstanding performance was by F/O Gantschi (Air Bomber) who won the 100, 200, 220 and Long Jump.
[Underlined] 54 BASE INTER-SQUADRON SPORTS MEETING [/underlined] was on Saturday 17th June. 83 Squadron won the Base Commander’s Trophy, scoring 35 points, but 106 Squadron, with 33 points and 617 with 32 points, were good losers. 106 Squadron, feeling fit, provided winners for the 440, 880, mile, 3 miles and Long Jump. F/Sgt. Croft again had a field day, winning the 440, mile, 3 miles, and running second in the 880 yards. There was a big crowd at the games, and enthusiasm ran high. Lord Brownlow, Lord Lieutenant of the County, presented the prizes.
[Underlined] 93 M.U. SPORTS [/underlined] 93 M.U., whose work is so completely bound up with 5 Group, ran a highly successful Field Day on June 24th. Besides the usual athletic events, side shows, boxing and dancing made up an excellent programme. They plan another Gala Day, in aid of the P.O.W. Fund on August Bank Holiday Monday, and any personnel who can reach Swinderby will be sure of an enjoyable day.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Get down to crew Gunnery problems in July. Check your knowledge of the corkscrew, polish up your patter and do all the fighter affiliation you can.
Careful trimming of your aircraft ensures accurate flying. The correct sequence of action is:-
Fly the aircraft straight and level, trim the elevators, trim all load off the rudder and finally trim out any aileron load.
2.5° of skid at 10,000 ft. means an error of 250 yards on the ground. This common bombing error is often unconsciously caused by pilots sitting tense and rigid on the bombing run. Ensure the aircraft is properly trimmed and the [underlined] relax [/underlined] and fly the aircraft naturally and carefully.
If you find it difficult to read the instruments when coned by searchlights, get your navigator to call the airspeed. Make it a standing arrangement with him.
Here are the common faults in night circuits, don’t allow these errors to “creep” in.
(i) Edging in towards the flare path on the down wind leg.
(ii) Not allowing for drift on approach.
(iii) Failing to close the throttles when touching down.
(iv) Going too far across wind before the final turn in.
Should you have to land without flaps, remember to lengthen your downwind leg as the approach will be flatter and therefore longer. Start the final turn in earlier since the turn without flap will be wider, and approach at 125 m.p.h. Touch down as soon as possible and expect a longer landing run, and be prepared to use brake progressively.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Are you brake conscious? Brake efficiency falls off with rise in temperature of – brake shoes and drums. Avoid continual use of brakes, control direction by engine and release brakes as soon as possible to allow heat to go into the air and not up into the tyres. Never apply full brake at once. This induces tyre creep.
If you have to land in a very strong, gusty wind, use only 40° of flap and aim to do a wheel landing. Make a normal approach and when the wheels touch, ease the stick [underlined] slightly [/underlined] forward and keep it steady till the tail sinks on to the ground.
A word on Met; remember that forecast height of cloud base id always height above sea level. Bear this in mind if you are forced to break cloud at a diversion aerodrome, and allow for height of ground.
Have you and your crew an “A” category for bombing? You can have if you accept nothing less than these limitations;
(a) Course within 1° (b) Bank within 2°
(Continued on page 11 Col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
The award of the Silver Model Lancaster to the Unit having the best accident rate for the six months ended June goes to No. 106 Squadron. This squadron had one accident for a total of 6,848 flying hours. Nos. 49 and 57 Squadrons also had one avoidable accident, for a total of 6,743 and 6,294 hours respectively. These squadrons are to be congratulated on a splendid achievement, It’s up to the other Squadrons to dethrone the champions during the next three months. GO TO IT!!
Altogether there was a decided improvement in the number of avoidable accidents during June.
36 aircraft were damaged in the Group by causes other than enemy action. This is a reduction of 15 compared with May, and the improvement is also reflected in the avoidable accident total which stands at 16 for June as opposed to 20 in May.
Of the aircraft damaged, 12 were CAT A, 5 CAT AC, 5 CAT B, and 14 CAT E.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS – 51 BASE RECORD [/underlined]
51 Base are to be congratulated for the lowest number of avoidable accidents for a long time; 4 aircraft were damaged under this category. The squadron total of 12 for the month was an increase of 2 over May’s total. Details are as follows:-
Squadron – Ground collisions (taxying) 3; overshoots landing 2; undershooting 1; Swings landing 1; Flying into high ground 1; Collision in air 1; errors of judgement 3; TOTAL 12.
51 Base – Swings taking off 1; Swings landing 2; Taxying 1; TOTAL 4
[Underlined] ACCIDENT CAUSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Taxying. [/underlined] 3 of the 4 taxying accidents in the Group follow the usual pattern. One struck a trestle outside dispersal at night, and no taxying light was being used. Another hit an M/T van left unattended just off the perimeter track, while a third (a Stirling) broke its tail wheel when it ran off the perimeter track. The 4th taxying accident was caused by a Flight Engineer starting up the engines of a Lancaster without permission. Brake pressure was low and the aircraft moved forward and struck another parked alongside.
[Underlined] Swings [/underlined] Three of these occurred on landing. One was a Mosquito in which the pilot, flying a Mosquito for the first time, was not quick enough in correcting. The other two landing swings were by pupil pilots on Stirlings, and were due to inexperience more than anything else. They both knew the correct drill, however, but were slow to react. The swing on take off occurred in a Stirling, when a pupil pilot opened the throttles too quickly and failed to control the violent starboard swing which followed. The undercarriage collapsed.
[Underlined] Other Accidents. [/underlined] A Lancaster returning in poor weather descended through cloud and hit a hill 500 feet above sea level. This accident has not yet been fully investigated, but preliminary evidence indicates that the pilot lost height contrary to orders at briefing.
Another Lancaster on return from Ops. in good weather hit a tree 1000 yards from the runway on his approach. The wing tip was torn off but the pilot went round again and made a good landing on his second attempt. In this instance the bombs were still on board unknown to the pilot. His Air Bomber had told him that all bombs had gone. Air Bombers please note!!
Two Lancasters overshot on landing at strange airfields on return from operations. The bomb load exploded after one of them crashed.
A formation flying collision resulted in the destruction of two aircraft this month. Number 3 of a “Vic” formation knocked the tail off the Leader.
The two remaining avoidable accidents cocurred [sic] on operational flights. One pilot lost control in cloud on return and ordered his crew to bale out. Four of them left before control was regained. They had not been told to take their ‘K’ type dinghy packs with them and landed in the sea. The aircraft made a safe landing at base.
A Mid-Upper Gunner firing at searchlights on the ground damaged the port fin of his aircraft with a burst. The solenoid had jumped from its bracket. The gunner was at fault.
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Most operations were within normal Gee range and no exceptional results have been recorded. There has, however, been a substantial decrease in jamming which may be due to the increase in the number of frequencies now in use.
Non-H 2 S squadrons are now equipped with the new R.F. Unit 27 and have had several chances of using it during the month. As yet there has been no opportunity to test its efficiency at long range, but reports indicate the signal strength to be good with little or no interference. It is hoped that the supply position in regard to these new units will improve shortly and H 2 S Squadrons can then be equipped.
Several changes in Gee transmissions have taken place recently, and it would be advisable for all navigators and wireless operators to check upon these and make sure they are using the right frequencies and aerial loading stud at the right time.
One word regarding Gee homing. It is apparent from recent operations that navigators are not checking up with Gee on the position of the markers. There is little excuse for this, as most operations at the present time are within normal Gee range and subject to little or no interference. Navigators would be well advised to check up on their homing procedure now – because sooner or later the time will come when owing to weather conditions bombs may have to be released on Gee.
With regard to Gee training, a modification is being issued shortly which will enable navigators to carry out dry swims and Gee homing procedure with the trainer. The first will be issued to Scampton Aircrew School and should prove an interesting and invaluable “toy”.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The targets this month have been rather disappointing for the H 2 S operator, and H 2 S has been little used. Whilst Gee may seem much simpler to use it is essential for all operators to use H 2 S as much as possible on these short range operations to augment training. We may switch to the longer range targets with little or no notice, and if operators have been relying to a very great extent on Gee, some difficulty with H 2 S may be experienced.
Just a word to Captains; your navigator depends to a very great extent upon the bomb aimer and his efficient manipulation of the equipment. If you are keeping him in the nose the whole of the time on these short operations he is getting little or no H 2 S training. A.S.I. BL/17 dated 26th April, 1944, details the duties of Air Bombers in H 2 S aircraft and however short the operation, Captains must see that this instruction is complied with.
One word with regard to H 2 S training on operational squadrons. With the present commitments there is very little opportunity for air training, but this does not prevent operators from obtaining as much ground training as possible. Ground trainers are available at all Units and they are yours to use at will. Squadron Navigation Officers and H 2 S Instructors should ensure that all operators get at
(Continued in Col. 2)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Continued from col.3) [/underlined]
least 30 minutes practice every day and should make periodic tests to see that operators are remaining efficient.
H 2 S operators will be interested to hear that 54 Base have been carrying out some experiments in the assessment of a Paramatta attack, and conclusions reached show that assessments can be made to within approximately 1/2 mile of the correct position. If this assessing can be carried out on operations it may prevent many attacks from developing around T.I’s a considerable distance from the aiming point. Preliminary trials are now being attempted with regard to Wanganui attacks and it is hoped that something useful may be produced for next winter’s operations.
Training at Conversion Units is progressing satisfactorily and Wigsley is now producing H 2 S trained crews.
There are still a few people in the Group who are sceptical about the amount of H 2 S. training carried out at No. 51 Base and in fairness to the effort being made by the Conversion Units, it would be advisable to outline the training being carried out by them.
Up to June 1st this year, 111 H 2 S trained crews have been produced by the Conversion Units, of which only 6 were sent to non-H 2 S squadrons (of these crews, 3 were Flight Commanders and 3 Australians).
With the increase in the number of H 2 S squadrons it became increasingly apparent that more crews would have to be trained by the Conversion Units and instructions were issued to that effect.
Despite the fact that [underlined] extra time or aircraft [/underlined] are allowed for this training, the Conversion Units are now taking 50% of the
(Continued on page 14 col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.A. DOREHILL, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O McKENZIE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.H. BOTHA D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O R.E. WALKER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O T.T. SMART D.F.C.
F/O W. McINTOSH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.S. STOUT D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H. STEERE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/L R.F. DAVIES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ G.H. PROBERT D.F.C.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L L.C.A. HADLAND D.F.C.
F/O W.W.W. TURNBULL D.F.C.
A/F/L E.M. ARMSTRON D.F.C.
F/O M.J. MAY D.F.C.
F/O F.B. HALL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.W. GREENWOOD D.F.M.
SGT J. WATERHOUSE D.F.M.
P/O A.E. GILES D.F.C.
P/O B.G.L. ROGERS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O W.A. GALL D.F.C.
F/O J.A. PRIOR D.F.C.
P/O W.F. POSSEE D.F.C.
P/O F.G. HAYLER D.F.C.
F/SGT J. LEVER D.F.M.
F/SGT W.I. WILKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT J.C. DICKINSON D.F.M.
SGT D.E. LAYSHON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.H. McFERRAN D.F.M.
F/SGT F. LOMAX D.F.M.
F/SGT J. RYAN D.F.M.
SGT J.H. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT LOMAS D.F.M.
F/O D.H. PEARCE D.F.C.
F/O McMASTER D.F.C.
P/O J.D. DUNCAN D.F.C.
P/O S.W.A. HURRELL D.F.C.
P/O H. BLOW D.F.C.
F/SGT H.F. SMITH D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT L.J. HUMMELL D.F.M.
SGT F. GARRETT D.F.M.
P/O F.B. SOAPER D.F.M.
F/SGT K.R. BLUNDELL D.F.M.
SGT R.H. BATEMAN D.F.M.
A/F/L R. McCURDY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O T.W. BLACK D.F.C.
F/SGT E. BARTON D.F.M.
F/SGT P.A. DEACON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.C. WRIGHT D.F.M.
F/SGT E.D. PRATT D.F.M.
P/O A.C. BAKER D.F.C.
F/O R.H. MAURY D.F.C.
F/O A. RIMMER D.F.C.
SGT D. CHARLES D.F.M.
F/SGT A.J. GURR D.F.M.
F/SGT W.H. BARKER D.F.M.
SGT WILLETT D.F.M.
SGT R.H. TURRELL D.F.M.
P/O J.A.W. McCALLUM D.F.C.
SGT H.G. CAPPS D.F.M.
F/SGT H.S. TILLER D.F.M.
SGT J.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
F/SGT F.H. BARNES D.F.M.
SGT E. HEDLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT M.M. SCOTT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.H. PRYOR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O J.V. REDDISH D.F.C.
F/SGT S.E. STEVENSON D.F.M.
P/O C.R. ROANTREE D.F.C.
F/SGT D. ANDREW D.F.M.
P/O BLACKHAM D.F.C.
F/SGT M.R. PRICE D.F.M.
F/SGT V.F. PITCHER D.F.M.
P/O D. JONES D.F.C.
F/O W.J.V. HAMILTON D.F.C.
F/SGT J.J. PAGE D.F.M.
P/O G.M.E. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT J.A. KIRWAN D.F.M.
W/CDR A.A. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.J. LUNDY D.F.C.
P/O L. DURHAM D.F.C.
F/O M.J. BEETHAM D.F.C.
P/O P.E. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.R. MOSSOP D.F.C.
F/O K.W. ODGERS D.F.C.
F/O P.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
F/O A.H. BIGNELL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.C.A. RODGERS D.F.M.
F/SGT N. HORSLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT A.D.F. SPRUCE D.F.M.
F/O L. HORNER D.F.C.
F/O H.S. SHORTT D.F.C.
F/O R.G.G. PAGETT D.F.C.
F/SGT D.E. WESTERMAN D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. COLLINGWOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT C. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT R. STANWIX D.F.M.
F/SGT A.L. BARTLETT D.F.M.
F/O A.S. KEITH D.F.C.
P/O A. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O J.A. WILDING D.F.C.
SGT W.M. RUNDLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. REID D.F.C.
SGT J.C. EVANS D.F.M.
P/O E.A. DOWLAND D.F.C.
P/O C.J.M. MARTIN D.F.C.
SGT T. DAVIES D.F.M.
F/O J. SIMMS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. COLLINS D.F.C.
(Continued on page 15, Column 1)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Contd. From page 13 Col.2) [/underlined]
crews passing through and giving them full H 2 S ground training with 10 – 15 hours air training. This output will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all H 2 S squadrons. These crews should reach the squadrons by the middle of August.
In the meantime H 2 S squadrons will have to put up with a quota of non H 2 S crews and continue to train them.
To further ease the training commitments of both the Conversion Units and squadrons, it is hoped that H2S training will be introduced into the Scampton Aircrew School by the middle of August. This training will consist of approximately 5 hours lectures with further time in manipulation of the H 2 S synthetic trainer. It is to be appreciated that this training will have to be in addition to the present essential navigational training carried out at the School, and navigators and air bombers must be prepared to undertake some of it in their spare time.
PHOTOGRAPHY
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL £15,498 13 9
LINK TRAINER
The number of hours link practice carried out by pilots during the month shows an increase over last month’s total. There is, however, still room for improvement in the standard of instrument flying. This can only be achieved by close co-operation between Link Instructors and Pilots.
The new Link Syllabus was distributed to Stations in the middle of the month and should now be in use at all Units. It is again emphasised that this Syllabus is progressive and if full value is to be obtained from it, Pilots and Flight Engineers must ensure that they complete all exercises, and keep an accurate record of the exercises carried out.
[Table of Link Trainer by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
(CONTINUED)
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
SGT J.T.WATTS D.F.M.
SGT F.A. SIMMONDS D.F.M.
F/O G.S. JOHNSON D.F.C.
SGT F. ROBERTS D.F.M.
F/O R. DAVIS D.F.C.
F/SGT R.W. CLEARY D.F.M.
F/O K.D. SMITH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O E.A. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
P/O J.E.R. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
SGT L.G. BOLTON D.F.M.
F/SGT C. BALDWIN D.F.M.
P/O E.H. WALKER D.F.C.
F/SGT L.W. CROMARTY D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. BUNYAN D.F.M.
P/O W.C. MacDONALD D.F.C.
F/O N.F. TURNER D.F.C.
P/O D.E. TREVETHICK D.F.C.
P/O G.A. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT. W.A. LEE D.F.M.
P/O J. BARR D.F.C.
P/O C.A. HAIGH D.F.C.
F/SGT LYNCH D.F.M.
F/O S.J. BEARD, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT C.P. STEEDSMAN D.F.M.
SGT G.M. WARD D.F.M.
SGT McQUILLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT C. WILCE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.C. BELL D.F.C.
F/O A.F. POORE D.F.C.
F/O G.E.D. TOOGOOD D.F.C.
P/O A.E. BRISTOW D.F.C.
F/SGT J. GRAVES D.F.M.
F/O R.J. ELSEY D.F.C.
F/O R.A. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT V. LYNCH D.F.M.
P/O P.J. RICHARDS D.F.C.
F/O W.R. LEE D.F.C.
F/O J.H.S. LEE D.F.C.
SGT T.C. WALLER D.F.M.
F/SGT G.R. CARLILE D.F.M.
F/O F.M. MIFFLIN D.F.C.
F/SGT A.D.J. GROOMBRIDGE D.F.M.
F/O C.J. DUNN D.F.C.
P/O R.A. HINCKLEY D.F.C.
F/O D.L. CRAMP D.F.C.
F/O D.V. GIBBS D.F.C.
F/L C.J. GINDER D.F.C.
F/SGT D. PINCKARD D.F.M.
F/SGT F. MYCOE D.F.M.
F/LT W.A. WILLIAMSON D.F.C.
F/SGT F.L. HIGGINS D.F.M.
F/O D.A. PAGLIERO D.F.C.
F/O R.L. WAKE, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT R. APPLEYARD D.F.M.
SGT V.H. BLACKWELL D.F.M.
P/O J. O’LEARY D.F.C.
F/O A.V. WITHERS D.F.C.
F/O R.P. RAMSAY D.F.C.
F/SGT S.J. HALVORSEN D.F.M.
SGT J.G. LANCASTER D.F.M.
F/SGT E. CLODE D.F.M.
SGT R.F. LAWRENSON D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.G. MYERSCOUGH D.F.M.
SGT D. FRISKEY D.F.M.
F/SGT E.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
P/O C.W. BARNETT D.F.C.
SGT W.G. LAMONT D.F.M.
F/SGT J. SKELTON D.F.M.
P/O R.G. CAMPBELL D.F.C.
P/O D.R. DEARMAN D.F.C.
P/O K.L. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/SGT E.H. BUNN D.F.M.
SGT D.C. MARK D.F.M.
SGT F.H. HAZEL D.F.M.
SGT F.C. DOWLING D.F.M.
SGT R.M. GALLOWAY D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
F/LT H.L. McCARTHY D.F.C.
F/O D.S.P. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O C.T. HARPER D.F.C.
F/O A. HOLLINGS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. CURTIS D.F.C.
F/O E.R. FREEMAN D.F.C.
F/O A.E. VOWELS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BROOKER D.F.C.
P/O H.R. MAHON D.F.C.
F/O F.B.M. WILSON D.F.C.
F/O J.E.R. REES D.F.C.
F/SGT J.B. CHILDS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.F.S. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O F. MORRIS D.F.C.
P/O A.R.T. BOYS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. GOLDSTRAW, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O H.C. CHANDLER D.F.C.
F/O D.T. CONWAY D.F.C.
F/O J.A. COLPUS D.F.C.
P/O M.F. SMITH D.F.C.
P/O N.D. MARSHALL D.F.C.
F/O F.J. NUGENT D.F.C.
F/O H.S.L. CROUCH D.F.C.
F/O G.G. ABBOTT D.F.C.
P/O A.A. TAYLOR D.F.C.
P/O A.P. SPERLING D.F.C.
F/SGT G. NOBLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O P.N. BUTTLE D.F.C.
P/O P.E. PIGEON D.F.C.
P/O H.A. WEEKS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. CLAY D.F.C.
F/O E. WILLSHER D.F.C.
W/O J. DACEY D.F.C.
F/O J.S. WATSON D.F.C.
F/SGT McCLELLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT L. EATON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.J. HENDERSON D.F.M.
F/SGT APPLEBY D.F.M.
F/SGT W. HOWARTH D.F.M.
F/O R. ADAMS D.F.M.
F/O A. HILL D.F.C.
F/LT WILSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.G. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.L. VICKERSTAFFE D.F.C.
F/O W.E.D. BELL D.F.C.
P/O G.G. TAYLOR D.F.C.
F/SGT J.A. FEATHERSTONE D.F.M.
F/O N.B. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O B.T.J. HUCKS D.F.C.
W/O C.G. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT M.H.G. KING D.F.M.
P/O J.P. HIND D.F.C.
P/O J.I. JOHNSON D.F.C.
P/O E.K. ALLEY D.F.C.
P/O R.T. BOULTBEE D.F.C.
F/O P.H. TAYLOR D.F.C.
W/O R.A. WESTAD D.F.C.
F/O T. WILKIE D.F.C.
F/O JOHNSON-BIGGS D.F.C.
F/LT R. AYTOUN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT J.H. BRYANT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.C. BLOIS D.F.C.
P/O T. SMART D.F.C.
W/O L.H. TODD D.F.C.
P/O R.T. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O G.W. BRAKE D.F.C.
W/O D. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/O A.J. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/O K.R. AMES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O F.R.G.A. HIGGINS D.F.C.
W/O H. GLASBY D.F.C.
F/SGT T.H. SAVAGE D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
All stations are to be congratulated on the excellent landing times produced this month, in which the average for the Group is below the 2 minutes per aircraft mark. In particular, Waddington recorded consistently good times for each operation. One [sic] the night of the 24/25th June this Station landed 32 AIRCRAFT IN 31 MINUTES, the average being less than 1 minute per aircraft. This is a record for the Group, and probably for the Command.
One word of warning, however; recently aircraft from another Group were diverted and on arrival at the diversion airfield proceeded to use their own Group landing scheme, with which the diversion control staff were not familiar. It is sufficient to say that confusion followed, with extreme danger to the aircraft and crews concerned. A.S.I. FC/11 contains the standard diversionary control procedure and must be adhered to.
[Underlined] STONES, CONCRETE AND METAL [/underlined]
Every stone, every sharp edge of concrete, every spent cartridge or piece of metal, constitutes a menace to tyres.
During the last 3 month there has been a very high average of tyres changed on accounts of cuts – (25 per station per month). Recently, endeavours have been made on stations to overcome this menace, but the intensified clean-up of perimeters, runways and dispersals must be maintained.
FLYING CONTROL must ensure that not the smallest break in the perimeter track or runway is overlooked, that grading does level up with the perimeter track and runways, and that any looseness in the surface of the French drains is attended to at once. Station Admin and Clerks of Works must help to the utmost.
GROUND CREWS must assist by seeing that their dispersals are thoroughly clean, and AIRCREWS watch carefully that cartridges cease to be a menace to tyres.
TRANSPORT – keep the sweepers fully serviced and see that nothing is loose on vehicles employed on the airfield.
ARMAMENT, too, can assist by ensuring that the access roads to the bomb dump are clear of stones and that wooden chocks from bomb trolleys are recovered before aircraft move. A 4” x 3” block with nails in it is not healthy treatment for a tyre!
ONLY BY FULL CO-OPERATION CAN THE ULTIMATE AIM BE ACHIEVED-AN AIRFIELD 100% SERVICEABLE.
JUNE LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
At dawn on the 6th of this month, the first Allied troops landed on the Normandy coast. A contribution towards the success of this amphibious operation was no doubt made in the effective silencing of most of the shore batteries. During the last month and again on three nights prior to D – Day this was one of the Group’s tasks. The heavy railway gun battery at WIMERAUX was attacked on the 2/3rd and although the interpretation report embraces previous attacks, there is no doubt that severe damage was inflicted; a large number of new craters being seen around the target. Both the western turntables have received direct hits.
The coastal defence batteries at MAISY (4/5th), ST PIERRE DU MONT (5/6 th) and LA PERNELLE (5/6th) next received our attention. Little could be gleaned from photographic cover as to the precise damage to the targets, but their apparent failure to contest our landing bears testimony to the success of the raids.
Another pre-invasion target was the Radar Jamming Station at FERME D’URVILLE. This target was attacked on 3/4th and, to quote A.I.C.U. “The station is completely useless”.
Our beachhead having been secured, our bombing role turned to close support of the land forces. The 21st Panzer Division was moving into CAEN to threaten the British Beaches. Two road bridges in this town were accordingly scheduled for attack on the 6/7th; both bridges were hit, and the road approaches heavily cratered, presenting an embarrassing obstacle to the Hun. On the same night an attack was directed against the ARGENTAN Railway centre. This raid also was calculated to hamper the arrival of reinforcements, which object was achieved by the severing of almost all the tracks and the destruction of many essential buildings.
During the day of the 7th, elements of the 17th Panzer Division were concentration [sic] in the FORET DE CERISY, a number of ammunition dumps, fuelling points and tank harbours having been located in this area. This was our assignment for the night 7/8th, and although results were not spectacular, many bombs fell on the aiming point.
The battle of communications continued on 8/9th against targets south of the battle area, when the marshalling yard at RENNES and rail junction at PONTAUBAULT were attacked. Severe damage was sustained at the former target while at the latter, the tracks were cut at several points.
One of the outstanding operations of the month was against the SAUMUR tunnel on the 8/9th. Already the railway junction had been attacked on 1/2nd with excellent effect, but the later attack on the tunnel left no doubt that the line would be denied the enemy for some time to come. A direct hit on the roof of the tunnel at its southern entrance has probably caused a major collapse while the tracks and embankments are severely damaged.
Our attack on the railway junction at ETAMPES on 9/10th was rendered extremely difficult owing largely to adverse weather, although hits were scored on the electrified railway north east of the junction.
The possibility of the enemy using the PARIS/ORLEANS route to effect troop movements led to a request for the destruction of the marshalling yard at ORLEANS on 10/11th. The mission was successfully undertaken, all through lines being severed and further damage sustained to rolling stock railway depots etc.
The attack on POITERS on 12/13th in which very severe damage was inflicted on the railway facilities was designed to delay the 2nd S.S. Division, believed to be moving up from South France.
On the same night support was given to our troops advancing East and West of CAEN, by the further bombing of the town’s road bridges.
The Lehr Panzer Division is reported to have visited AUNAY SUR ODON on the same night as aircraft from this Group, namely, 14/15th. AUNAY is completely obliterated – speculation is rife as to the fate of the Panzers.
Photos taken the day following the attack on the LIMOGES marshalling yard (23/24th) indicate that fires were still burning in the area, and that all tracks in the sorting sidings have been blocked.
AT VITRY LE FRANCOIS on 27/28th damage was almost entirely confined to the west end of the marshalling yard where all the tracks have been cut. Other damage throughout the yard is apparent.
For 48 hours the spotlight of war turned from the battlefield to the sea, to the harbours of LE HAVRE and BOULOGNE where a powerful force of small craft had been assembled by the enemy with a view to menacing our supply lanes. It is now reported that as a direct result of the two raids on 14/15th and 15/16th no fewer than 80 vessels have been sunk or seriously damaged. Damage to port installations is also severe.
Oil targets have been attacked sporadically since the war began, but in the knowledge that the enemy is suffering from fuel shortage we returned on three occasions to attack his resources.
At CHATELLERAULT on 15/16th a fuel dump was raided, considerable damage resulting to storage units.
The attacks on WESSELING and SCHOLVEN Synthetic Oil Plants on 21/22nd were not, however, satisfactory and, influenced by bad weather conditions, were off the mark.
During the month two gardening operations were undertaken, on 6/7th and 8/9th.
In the concluding phases of June our attention was diverted from Normandy to the rather more immediate problem of combating the flying bombs which had commenced to operate over this country on 12/13th. On the whole, weather was exceedingly unco-operative, but, despite this, 10 missions were launched (three of which,
(Continued on page 4 Col. 2)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Operations with Sorties, Accidents and Stars Awards, by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, June 1944
5 Group News, June 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 23, June 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about gunnery, air bombing, navigation, armament, navigation training, public relations, signals, gardening, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, and shows not so good, engineering, training, flight engineers, enemy agents - careless talkers, signals, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, radar / nav, honours & awards, photography, aircrew volunteers, war savings, link trainer, flying control, operations, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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18 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-27
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--La Pernelle
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Paris
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Saumur
France--Vitry-le-François
Germany--Wesseling
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
5 Group
617 Squadron
627 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bomb dump
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
rivalry
service vehicle
tactical support for Normandy troops
tractor
training
wireless operator
-
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16772/PCheshireGL18050006.2.jpg
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
A mosaic of three target photographs of attack on Le Havre. Shows sea and cluster of bombs in the centre of left photograph and port area in the centre and right photograph. Caption '723, KLS, 14/6/44, 8", 1`9500, U. U625' Taken by Lancaster U of 625 squadron. Attack marked by Leonard Cheshire. On the reverse 51:56, photo 53'. Additional information about this item was kindly provided by the donor.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Three b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCheshireGL18050005, PCheshireGL18050006
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of Le Havre (1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
625 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16771/PCheshireGL18050003.2.jpg
d439b9633984ab6b37cf31e84daff658
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16771/PCheshireGL18050004.2.jpg
8e7ebccb33f36c6d54abdb33f3691f9e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing land top left with bomb explosions on left edge just above centre. Caption '731, KLS, 14.6.44, 8", 19500, U, U625, Attack on Le Havre taken by Lancaster U of 625 squadron. Attack marked by Leonard Cheshire. On the reverse '51:55'. Additional infomation on this item was kindly provided by the donor.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCheshireGL18050003, PCheshireGL18050004
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of Le Havre (1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
625 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16769/PCheshireGL18050001.2.jpg
b525ddee2be4bc214bc90593faefc28c
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16769/PCheshireGL18050002.2.jpg
2d76f271f6f9f5f65dae4c7c3f89211c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Reconnaissance photograph showing a damaged port area with a basin orientated left right with a pier in the centre. Caption 'Le Havre K2491(IMMED)'. On the reverse 'Date 11.7.44, Unit WS, Neg No. G103, 51:53'. Dock area has been heavily bombed, with numerous bomb craters and damaged buildings. Breakwater to bottom right has been damaged and breached midway along, with basin to its left partially drained. At least five boats or lighters can be seen beached or partially submerged in this basin. At the far end of the central pier, the Le Havre E- Boat pens form a rectangular concrete structure into the basin below. Above the pier, in the second basin up, a submerged structure lies at an angle to the surrounding docks. This has a jetty leading to it and a small vessel alongside. Three larger vessels are in the upper dock off this basin. The channel at the top of the photograph is the Canal De Tancarville. Three lighters or other small vessels are alongside the dock towards the right. A plume of smoke is rising from the dockside to the top left.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07-11
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCheshireGL18050001, PCheshireGL18050002
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Geolocated
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07-11
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of Le Havre (1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Stuart Cummins
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
reconnaissance photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16558/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020034.2.jpg
208da780a206121d85a884f5939d5d3c
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16558/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020035.2.jpg
a2234334faa5a4dfd4ab8be0375529dc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing land at the top and sea at the bottom with town and harbour centre. There are two bomb explosions visible left centre and a bright spot below them to the right.. Caption '6 90, KLS, 14/6/44, 8" 20000, H, H625'. On the reverse 'Shows bomb flash on 617 Sqdn target, 51:83/17'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020034, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020035
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16557/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020032.1.jpg
88507ee511eb4a7bfd1a2bbd96401694
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16557/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020033.1.jpg
c63f4510c5602950aed0a5342bdccdc0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph blurred with built up area on left. Caption '137, WS 14/15.6.44, NT 8, 16700, 108 degree, 2234, Le Havre RD, Z, 1 x 14000, 15 secs, F/O Ross, Z, 617', On the reverse '500 yards 190 degrees'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020032, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020033
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16555/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020030.1.jpg
f7bb86a5470d389666d600a79335241f
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16555/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020031.1.jpg
08ed4c09fd3a7739c4fe8d420291a7ea
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing bright spots bottom left and just right of centre. Caption '141, WS 14/15.6.44, NT 8", Le Havre RD, V, 1 x 14000, F/O Cheney, V, 617'. On the reverse '51:93/15'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020030, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020031
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16554/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020028.1.jpg
e224f82b0fb5b0274938c7fdb4556b92
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16554/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020029.1.jpg
d792908f5c161a760dee34adbfc0fc58
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing two bright spots on left side. Caption '148, ,W.S. 14/15.6.44, NT 8", Le Havre RD, V, 1 x 14000, F/O Cheney, V, 617'. On the reverse '51/93/14'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020028, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020029
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16553/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020026.1.jpg
26c9a3e0d9b917bac85e3f67f9237d37
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16553/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020027.1.jpg
056be507ad6489c8f8f0874600900b4e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing bright spots bottom left and bottom centre. Caption '172, W.s. 14/15.6.44, NT 8", Le Havre, T, 1 x 14000, F/O Willsher, T, 617'. On the reverse '51:93/13'
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020026, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020027
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16551/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020024.1.jpg
bec83984786df445bf304a8915dfa06a
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16551/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020025.1.jpg
1c6e95b136b5d7a108a2e9e12e2964fc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing coastline on the left. Caption '138, W.S 14/15.6.44, Le Havre RD, S, 1 x 14000, F/Lt Reid, S, 617'. On the reverse '53:93/12 Photo 159'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020024, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020025
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16549/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020022.1.jpg
1d916e15cccce45f8472e1ee77038d52
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16549/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020023.1.jpg
ee10403d16722e6fe34710bc3463c713
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing built up area on the left and harbour area on the right. Bright spot centre one third way up. Caption '130, WS 14/15.6.44, NT 82, Le Havre RD, K1, 1 x 14000, F/L Wilson N, 617'. On the reverse 53:93/11'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020022, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020023
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16548/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020020.2.jpg
0de3ee91dadb0eb4a60f95c217403702
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16548/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020021.2.jpg
56d625ce8d4c0f82c86d43848d80983a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing harbour area on the left with bright spots top left quadrant and just below centre left. Caption '146, WS 14/15.6.44, NT8", Le Havre RD, J, 1 x 14000, P/O Gingles, L, 617'. On the reverse 53:93/10'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020020, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020021
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16547/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020018.1.jpg
68e4f9e362d35d9a3ff8618905550b77
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16547/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020019.1.jpg
818fe9df6fc6c9de9c604314e547b477
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing harbour area on the left with bright spots top left quadrant and centre left. Caption '128, WS 14/15.6.44, NT 82, Le Havre RD, F, 1 x 14000, F/O Stanford, F, 617'. On the reverse '51:93/9'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020018, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020019
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16545/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020016.2.jpg
05741a85384d842f783459ade63bf6e4
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16545/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020017.2.jpg
14aa30754ea1c64913be8ff16586be3b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing harbour area on the left side with two bright marks centre and bottom left. Caption '126, WS 14/15.6.44, NT 8, Le Havre RD, F, 1 x 14000, F/O Stanford, F, 617'. On the reverse '1700, from Pens'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020016, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020017
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16544/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020014.1.jpg
01110a7b4cc360831405635603c7e1c1
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16544/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020015.1.jpg
33ba049f623bbd8774d1af6d861bd274
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre harbour
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing coastline runs from left to right with harbour behind breakwaters in the centre. On the reverse '162, cam 1, neg 19, daylight/night attack on harbour Le Havre, date 14.6.44, squadron 463, 617, pilot F/O Schultz, a/c Lancaster, height 16000' 19, 51:93/7'
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020014, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020015
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
463 Squadron
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16542/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020012.2.jpg
a2a1d2425df52c4aa395ef62a6aa9ed1
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16542/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020013.2.jpg
5fc0bfa6a28d4284939e888a56317e75
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Le Havre Harbour
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing sea to the left and a point of land left centre with harbour to the right. There are a large number of bomb explosions in the harbour area top right. On the reverse 'Ops 162, cam 1, neg 9, daylight/night attack of Harbour - Le Havre, date 14/15.6.44, squadron 463, 617, pilot F/O Schultz, a/c Lancaster, time 2243-2250, height 16000, 51:93/6'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020012, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020013
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
463 Squadron
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16541/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020011.1.jpg
4d98aab52a6a1f10847a58ec41d0024d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] EXTRACT FROM BOMBER COMMAND SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.
LE HAVRE E-BOAT PENS – EFFECT OF 12,000 LB BOMBS. [/underlined]
During the attack, two or possibly three direct hits were scored, which in fact penetrated the roof and from examination of the general pattern obtained, it is evident that near misses were also achieved.
As a result of the attack, some 20,000 tons of the roof gave way some days later and crashed into the pens beneath. This would be in accordance with expectation, the process by which the destruction was caused being in all probability as follows.
The two direct hits which went deep amongst the foundations of the pens would, as designed, have secured the effect of blasting away the soil under the foundations of the immensely thick concrete dividing walls upon which the roofs of the pens rest. The shock wave and subsoil removal effect of the other bombs which fell nearby in the water would tend to undermine the whole building, and this coupled with the damage done by the direct hits would be likely to, as in fact it did, cause the collapse of the roof which was holed and cracked by the direct hits and left largely unsupported by the damage underneath the foundations.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Extract from bomber command summary of operations, Le Havre E-boat pens - effect of 12,000 lb bombs
Description
An account of the resource
Mentions two or three direct hits which penetrated the roof as well as some near misses. Describes damage to roof and foundations and subsequent collapse of the roof.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020011
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One-page typewritten document
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Laura Morgan
617 Squadron
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16530/MCheshireGL72021-181210-020010.2.jpg
2503795cede92833321058230c57eeae
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] INTERPRETATION REPORT. [/underlined]
[underlined] LE HAVRE. [/underlined]
[underlined] PROVISIONAL STATEMENT OF DAMAGE. [/underlined]
The E-Boat pens in the Bassin de Maree appear, from the marks on the roofs to have received several direct hits, but definite damage to the structure is confined to the north-west corner where a hit has penetrated the roof, destroying about 25 feet of the edge of the north wall and displacing the whole corner. On the eastern half of the building there is what appears to be a very shallow crater. Whitening in several places may indicate other hits, three of the five gun positions on the roof appear to be empty, while a fourth has been completely destroyed.
Many small craft and barges are very heavily damaged and the large floating dock near the E-boat pens is now half submerged. In the part still visible there are several points of damage.
Several jetties have been severely damaged and warehouses and dockside installations have suffered heavily, particularly around the Bassin de l’Eure and the Bassin Bellot, north of the pens. There are many craters seen on the quaysides. Fires are still burning among the warehouses.
Damages outside the dock area is limited to a few items, industrial, business and residential, in the area close by the docks.
[page break]
[underlined] EXTRACT FROM BOMBER COMMAND SUMARY OF OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[underlined] LE HAVRE E-BOAT PENS – EFFECT OF 12,000 lb BOMBS. [/underlined]
During the attack, two or possibly three direct hits were scored, which in fact penetrated the roof and from an examination of the general pattern obtained, it is evident that near misses were also achieved.
As a result of the attack, some 20,000 tons of the roof gave way some days later and crashed into the pens beneath. This would be in accordance with expectation, the process by which the destruction was caused being in all probability as follow.
The two direct hits which went deep amongst the foundations of the pens would, as designed, have secured the effect of blasting away the soil under the foundations of the immensely thick concrete dividing walls upon which the roofs of the pens rest. The shock wave and subsoil removal effect of the other bombs which fell nearby in the water would tend to undermine the whole building, and this coupled with the damage done by the direct hits would be likely to, as in fact it did, cause the collapse of the roof which was holed and cracked by the direct hits and left largely unsupported by the damage underneath the foundations.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interpretation Report, Le Havre, provisional statement of damage
Description
An account of the resource
Describes damage to E-boat pens mentioning some direct hits and definite damage to north-west corner. Mentions other hits and heavy damage to small craft, a floating dock, jetties and basins. Limited damage outside dock area.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020010
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
David Bloomfield
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One-page typewritten document
617 Squadron
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] E-BOATS AND E-BOAT SHELTERS, LE HAVRE. [/underlined]
[underlined] NARRATIVE. [/underlined]
This attack against Le Havre was ordered so as to assist the Navy in their fight with enemy E-Boats operating against our Invasion Forces in the English Channel.
It was known that the E-Boat Pens were of such strength that they would be proof against direct hits with the new type of 12,000lb. bomb. It was decided, therefore, to drop these 12,000lb. bombs at the entrance to the Pens, and by this means, create such a wave and underwater disturbance that the E) Boats would be smashed to pieces against their own shelters. The E-Boats moored alongside the Quai Jeanne Couvert were also to be attacked by dropping bombs in the water alongside the Quay. The attack was planned to take place at dusk and 617 Squadron was to attack just ahead of other aircraft from the Command which had been detailed to bomb the Harbour Installations.
The Force Leader, W/Cdr. Cheshire, put down four red spot fires to act as a guide to the approaching bombers. These markers were assessed by S/Ldr. Shannon as approximately 1000 yards from both the Aiming Points. In spite of a smoke screen the bombing was very accurate. A good concentration fell around the Pens and there were at least three direct hits on the Pens themselves. Four to six bombs were seen to burst alongside the Quai Jeanne Couvert but towards the end of the attack the smoke from the bombing and from the screen obscured any further observation of results except a very large explosion which occurred at 2235/6 hours.
Throughout the attack flak was intense and very accurate. The aircraft piloted by F/Lt. Clayton, Lt. Knilans, and F/O. Stanford were all hit but were able to return to Base without further mishap. Sgt. Crosby, Mid Upper Gunner in Lt. Knilans’ crew, was slightly injured.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
E-boats and E-boat shelters, Le Havre, narrative
Description
An account of the resource
Account of operation against sheltered E-boats in Le Havre harbour. Tasks to assist Navy in their fight against E-boats who were operating against allied invasion forces. States pens would be invulnerable even to 12,000 lb bombs therefore, bombs would be dropped at entrances, Goes on with account of marking and bombing. Mentions heavy anti-aircrat fire and that three aircraft were hit, with one slight casualty, but all returned safely to base.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020009
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
David Bloomfield
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One-page typewritten document
617 Squadron
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target indicator
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] DATE: [/underlined] 14/15th JUNE, 1944.
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] SUBMARINE PENS, LE HAVRE.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR: [/underlined] 2235 HOURS.
[underlined] CREWS: [/underlined]
[underlined] LEADER & MARKER NO. 1: [/underlined] W/Cdr. Cheshire
[underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined] Mos. ‘N’
Navigator: F/O Kelly
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 4 Red Spot Fires
[underlined] MARKER No. 2: [/underlined] S/Ldr. Shannon [underlined] A/C Letter:[/underlined] Mos. ‘G’
Navigator: F/O Sumpter
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 4 Red Spot Fires
[underlined] MARKER No. 3: [/underlined] F/L Fawke [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined] Mos. ‘L’
Navigator: F/O Bennett
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 4 Red Spot Fires
[underlined] DEPUTY LEADER: [/underlined] S/Ldr. Munro [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined] ‘W’
F/Engineer: F/S Appleby
Navigator: F/L Rumbles
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/O Pigeon
A/G M.U.: P/O Howarth
Air Bomber: F/L Astbury
A/G Rear: F/O Weeks
Front Gunner: S/L Walker
[underlined:] CAPTAIN [/underlined] S/Ldr. McCarthy [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined] ‘Q’
F/Engineer: F/O Radcliffe
Navigator: F/O MacLean
W/Operator: W/O Eaton
A/G M.U.: W/O Batson
Air Bomber: F/O Daniel
A/G Rear: F/L Rodger
Front Gunner: F/L Curtis
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS: [/underlined]
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Wilson [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Cherrington
Navigator: F/O Stott
W/Opertor: F/O Allen
A/G M.U.: F/S Vaughan
Air Bomber: F/O Finlay
A/G Rear: F/L Chandler
Front Gunner: Sgt. King
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Poore [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: F/S Johnson
Navigator: F/O Roberts
W/Operator: F/S Thompson
A/G M.U.: F/S Tookey
Air Bomber: F/O Elsey
A/G Rear: Sgt. Fowle
Front Gunner: F/S Castleman
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Fearn [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: P/O Davies
Navigator: F/S Johnson
W/Operator: F/S Baker
A/G M.U.: F/S Wilson-Williams
Air Bomber: F/O Chadwick
A/G Rear: W/O Kemp
Front Gunner: Sgt. Ronald
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Clayton [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: F/O Hill
Navigator: F/O Buttle
W/Operator: F/O Chalmers
A/G M.U.: F/S Sharp
Air Bomber: F/O Watson
A/G Rear: F/S Hume
Front Gunner: F/O Ward P/O Carey
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS: [/underlined]
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Williams [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Soilleux
Navigator: F/O Talbot
W/Operator: F/S Potter
A/G M.U.: F/S Blagdon
Air Bomber: F/O Walker
A/G Rear: Sgt. McKellar
Front Gunner: Sgt. Craig
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Edward [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: F/O King
Navigator: F/O Pritchard
W/Operator: F/S Hobbs
A/G M.U.: P/O Johnston
Air Bomber: F/S Brook
A/G Rear: F/S Isherwood
Front Gunner: Sgt. Henderson
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Kearns [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: P/O hewnderson
Navigator: F/O Barclay
W/Operator: P/O Ellwood
A/G M.U.: W/O Bickley
Air Bomber: W/O Bennett
A/G Rear: F/O Petch
Front Gunner: F/L Tate
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Reid [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: F/S Stewart
Navigator: F/O Peltier
W/Operator: F/O Luker
A/G M.U.: F/S Holt
Air Bomber: P/O Rolton
A/G Rear: W/O Hutton
Front Gunner: F/S McNally
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS: [/underlined]
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/L Howard [underlined] A/C letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Hawkins
Navigator: F/O Hawkins
W/Operator: F/S Lucan
A/G M.U.: W/O Woods
Air Bomber: F/S Hartley
A/G Rear: F/F Clarke
Front Gunner: P/O Heggie
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] L ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] Lt. Knilans [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: F/O Ryall
Navigator: P/O Geller
W/ Operator: F/O Knell
A/G M.U.: Sgt. Crosby
Air Bomber: F/O Rogers
A/G Rear: P/O Learmouth
Front Gunner: P/O Castagnola
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Ross [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: F/O Girling
Navigator: F/O Davies
W/Operator: F/S Hickson
A/G M.U.: F/O Platt
Air Bomber: W/O McClellan
A/G Rear: F/O Tuxford
Front Gunner: F/O Atkinson
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Knights [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: P/O Twells
Navigator: F/O Rhude
W/Operator: F/O Hosie
A/G M.U.: F/S Pengelly
Air Bomber: P/O Bell
A/G Rear: F/S Derham
Front Gunner: Sgt. Briars
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS: [/underlined]
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Duffy [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Benting
Navigator: F/O Bell
W/Operator: F/O Pearce
A/G M.U.: W/O Porter
Air Bomber: F/O Woods
A/G Rear: P/O Evans
Front Gunner: W/O Allen
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Hamilton [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Rooke
Navigator: P/O Jackson
W/Operator: Sgt. Thompson
A/G M.U.: Sgt. Dadge
Air Bomber: F/O Duck
A/G Rear: F/S Hamilton
Front Gunner: F/S McLean
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Kell [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: P/O Clarke
Navigator: F/O Hager
W/Operator: F/O Evans
A/G M.U.: P/O Snell
Air Bomber: F/O Morieson
A/G Rear: F/S Price
Front Gunner: Sgt. Thomas
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Stanford [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Judson
Navigator: P/O Butler
W/Operator: W/O Jordon
A/G M.U.: F/S Griffiths
Air Bomber: W/O Clarke
A/G Rear: P/O Jewell
Front Gunner: W/Cdr. Weir S. Evans
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS: [/underlined]
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Stout [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: P/O Gurney
Navigator: F/O Ingleby
W/Operator: F/S Nuttall
A/G M.U.: P/O C-Underwood
Air Bomber: F/O Rupert
A/G Rear: W/O Smith
Front Gunner: F/S Hunnisette
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Willsher [underlined] A/C letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Hurdiss
Navigator: F/O Playford
W/Operator: P/O Bell
A/G M.U.: F/S Salter
Air Bomber: P/O Everett
A/G Rear: F/O Witherick
Front Gunner: Sgt. Matthews
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] F/O Cheney [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Rosher
Navigator: P/O Welch
W/Operator: F/S Pool
A/G M.U.: F/S McRostie
Air Bomber: F/S Curtis
A/G Rear: F/S Wait
Front Gunner: F/S McKie
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
[underlined] CAPTAIN: [/underlined] P/O Gingles [underlined] A/C Letter: [/underlined]
F/Engineer: Sgt. Gallagher
Navigator: F/O Beale
W/operator: W/O Riley
A/G M.U.: F/L Scott-Kiddie
Air Bomber: F/S Hazell
A/G Rear: F/O Hall
Front Gunner: W/O McLennan F/S Mason
[underlined] Bomb Load: [/underlined] 1 ‘Tallboy’
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Crew list for operation against submarine pens in Le Havre
Description
An account of the resource
Specifies date - 14/15 June 1944, target and zero hour 2235 hours. Lists crews with Wing Commander Cheshire leading along with two other markers flying Mosquito and 22 crews flying Lancaster all armed with one Tallboy bomb.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-14
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Six page typewritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020003, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020004, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020005, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020006, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020007, MCheshireGL72021-181210-020008
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
David Bloomfield
617 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] POSTAGRAM [/underlined]
R.A.F. Form 1924
Originator’s Reference Number:- SY.574
Date:- 20th June, 1944.
To: Base Commander, Coningsby, Station Commander Woodhall, O.C. No. 617 Squadron
From: H.Q. No. 5 Group
Herewith copy of H.Q.B.C’S A.313 dated 18th June, 1944 from A.O.C. in C. HQ. Bomber Command.
[underlined] TOP SECRET. [/underlined]
Following for crews not for publication or to be repeated outside crew circle of addresses.
Begins:-
The attacks on Le Havre and Boulogne succeeded in virtually destroying the entire German Naval Forces in these harbours. Nearly one hundred Naval and Naval Auxiliary Craft were sunk or damaged. The proportion [inserted] sunk [/inserted] at least sixty being remarkably high. For security reasons not too much was made of this greatest of Air-Sea victories but crews can be satisfied that their efforts have altered the entire aspect of the Naval war in the Channel.
NOT TO BE QUOTED.
ENDS.
Originator’s Signature [initials indecipherable] Beale S/O
Time of Origin 201100B
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Postgram from 5 Group Headquarters to Officer Commanding 617 Squadron
Description
An account of the resource
Message is a copy of Headquarters Bomber Command signal congratulating crews that their attacks on Le Havre and Boulogne succeeded in virtually destroying German naval assets in those harbours.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
5 Group
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-20
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Correspondence
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-020002
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Le Havre submarine pens (14/15 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
David Bloomfield
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One-page typewritten document
5 Group
617 Squadron
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
RAF Woodhall Spa