2
25
1367
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1615/24756/PCothliffKB15030121.1.jpg
265a761b6ff28348de2706c88c0c4a2b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cothliff, Ken 427 and 429 Squadrons
Description
An account of the resource
151 items. The collection contains photographs of personnel from 427 and 429 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ken Cothliff and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cothliff, K
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[a] POSN [b] RANK [c] NAME [d] NUMBER [e] HOME [f] AGE
[a] CAPT [b] W/O [c] Stevens R.M. [d] R107233
[a] NAV [b] F/S [c] Murray G.E. [d] R154962
[a] AB [b] Sgt. [c] Nunziato H. [d] R145900
[a] WOP [b] W/O [c] Steele W.B. [d] R135755
[a] FE [b] Sgt. [c] Brown F. [d] 1593749 [e] (Court Martialled
[a] MU/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Dennis A.J. [d] 1869622
[a] R/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Bogle F.V. [d] R192614
[photograph]
LMG. 120[inserted]A[/inserted] F/SGT. STEVENS. 427.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Warrant Officer RM Stevens and Crew
Description
An account of the resource
Seven airmen arranged in a row. Their names are listed in a caption above. On the image is annotated 'LMG. 120A. F/Sgt Stevens. 427'
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCothliffKB15030121
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
427 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
flight engineer
navigator
pilot
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1615/24618/PCothliffKB15030038.1.jpg
978f39b72fa846f706528415ca1ed7c9
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1615/24618/PCothliffKB15030039.2.jpg
6388701097401091bc6e071990ccea39
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cothliff, Ken 427 and 429 Squadrons
Description
An account of the resource
151 items. The collection contains photographs of personnel from 427 and 429 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ken Cothliff and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cothliff, K
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[photograph]
Tom Farr Bomb Aimer
Dave Foster Pilot
Ed Carter-Edwards Wireless Airgunner
Martin Donnan Rear Gunner
Mickey Ford Upper Gunner
Gord Waddell Navigator
George Philliskirk Flight Engineer
427 Squadron Halifax III ZL-K
[page break]
[a] POSN [b] RANK [c] NAME [d] NUMBER [e] HOME [f] AGE
[a] CAPT [b] W/O [c] Foster D.F. [d] R136520
[a] NAV [b] F/O [c] Waddell C.M. [d] J24620
[a] AB [b] F/O [c] Farr T.W. [d] J26297
[a] WOP [b] Sgt. [c] Carter-Edwards, E. [d] R186108 [e] P.O.W. 19.1.45
[a] FE [b] Sgt. [c] Philliskirk, G.W. [d] 1874051
[a] MU/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Ford C.W. [d] R223522 [e] P.O.W. 8.6.44
[a] R/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Donnan M. [d] R171503
[photograph]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Warrant Officer DF Foster and Crew
Description
An account of the resource
A copy of a photograph of seven airmen at the tail of their Halifax III, ZL-K. Each airmen and their role is identified on the caption.
A second image is a better quality photograph of the seven airmen in a row,
Two of the men have POW added to their caption.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCothliffKB15030038,
PCothliffKB15030039
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
427 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
flight engineer
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
navigator
pilot
prisoner of war
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1615/24578/PCothliffKB15030017.2.jpg
1f5b6e6680debbcb698fddf981acedb5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cothliff, Ken 427 and 429 Squadrons
Description
An account of the resource
151 items. The collection contains photographs of personnel from 427 and 429 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ken Cothliff and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cothliff, K
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[a] CAPT [b] W/O [c] Clibbery A.R. D.F.M. [d] R142144 [e] Posted To Topc[missing text]
[a] NAV [b] Flt/O [c] Morrison R.E. [d] R223131
[a] AB [b] F/S [c] Nash W.N. [d] R147019 [e] posted to RCAF O/[missing text]
[a] WOP [b] W/O [c] Jardine J.C. [d] R107499 [e] posted to Dalton 2[missing text]
[a] FE [b] Sgt. [c] Pratt L. [d] 1603507 [e] Posted to Dalton
[a] MU/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Qualle R.E. D.F.M. [d] R181818 [e] posted to Dalton
[a] R/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Martin B.L. [d] R176595 [e] Posted to 420 Sqd
[photograph]
LMG. 140. W/O CLIBBERY. 427.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Warrant Officer AT Clibbery and Crew
Description
An account of the resource
Seven airmen arranged in a row. Their names are listed in a caption above. On the image is annotated 'LMG. 140. W/O Clibbery. 427'
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCothliffKB15030017
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
427 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
navigator
pilot
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1615/24660/PCothliffKB15030060.1.jpg
5f98013e0dea55771478d268b90001c7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cothliff, Ken 427 and 429 Squadrons
Description
An account of the resource
151 items. The collection contains photographs of personnel from 427 and 429 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ken Cothliff and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cothliff, K
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[a] POSN [b] RANK [c] NAME [d] NUMBER [e] HOME [f] AGE
[a] CAPT [b] W/O [c] King A.J. [d] R144492
[a] NAV [b] F/O [c] Wilson W.A. [d] J22078
[a] AB [b] [deleted] F/S [/deleted][inserted] P/O [/inserted] [c] [deleted] Bailey N.W. [/deleted][inserted] Poohkay W.H. [/inserted] [d] [deleted] R156309 [/deleted]
[a] WOP [b] Sgt. [c] Mowbray R.A. [d] 1577274
[a] FE [b] Sgt. [c] Morgan H. [d] 1583634
[a] MU/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Vallieres, S.K. [d] R189708
[a] R/AG [b] Sgt. [c] Cotton D.N. [d] R196419 [e] Winnipeg [f] 22
[photograph]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Warrant Officer AJ King
Description
An account of the resource
Seven airmen arranged in a row. Their names are listed in a caption above.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PCothliffKB15030060
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Manitoba--Winnipeg
Manitoba
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
flight engineer
navigator
pilot
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/259/10587/PWhittleGG1606.2.jpg
99e3d695fdb20d99288171c39996ba5d
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/259/10587/MWhittleGG1397166-160822-03.2.jpg
351b9ddd23964a24184ed086cd9db52f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Whittle, Geoffrey
G G Whittle
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-26
2016-08-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Whittle, G
Description
An account of the resource
12 items. An oral history interview with Squadron Leader Geoffrey Gordon Whittle DFM (1923 – 2016, 1397166 Royal Air Force), as well as his log books, photographs and memoirs.
Geoffrey Whittle flew operations as a navigator with 101 Squadron from RAF Ludford Magna.
There is a sub-collection of 25 Air Charts, mostly of Great Britain.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Denise Field and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Warrant Officer ‘Bill’ Walker’s crew
No.101 Squadron, RAF Ludford Magna. October 1943
(from left)
Sgt Geoffrey Whittle, Navigator.
Sgt Reg Hebditch, W/Op
Sgt Bob Scott, Mid Upper Gunner
W.O. ‘Bill’ Walker, Pilot
Sgt. Stan Mayer, Flight Engineer
Sgt ‘Jock’ Robertson, Special Duties Operator (joined crew October 1943)
P.O. Bert Gadd, Bomb Aimer
Sgt Ken Hicklin, Rear Gunner
On 27th September 1943 for their 15th operation the crew was tasked to attack Hannover. On the approach to the target their aircraft was coned by searchlights and at the same time engaged by heavy flak and attacked by a night fighter.
The port inner engine caught fire and the fire started amidships. The pilot went in to a steep dive to port to avoid the fighter. The crew was ordered to stand by to bale out and the bomb load was jettisoned. Fortunately the engine fire was extinguished during the dive and was later restarted by the engineer. He went back to tackle the fire and despite being overcome by fumes managed to put the fire out. On recovery he returned to ensure that the fire was fully out. The rear gunner was overcome by fumes and the engineer assisted by the mid upper gunner got himself out of his turret and revived him despite not being on oxygen themselves.
The intercom had been knocked out, the DR compass was smashed and the trimming cables burnt through. The aircraft was still flyable and a course for Ledford was set. The flight back to Ludford was in thick cloud and on arrival the aircraft was diverted to Lindholm where they landed in appalling conditions. The crew all received immediate awards as a result of the incident.
Pilot & Flight Engineer. Conspicuous Gallantry Medal 20th October 1943
Navigator & W/OP Distinguished Flying Medal 22 October 1943
Bomb Aimer Distinguished Flying Cross 5th November 1943
Mid & rear Gunners Distinguished Flying Medal 5th November 1943
Regretfully the crew without the navigator (in hospital) were shot down on 26th November 1943 over Belgium and with the exception of the pilot and w/op (PsOW) were killed.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Warrant Officer 'Bill' Walker's crew
Description
An account of the resource
A photograph of the crew and an account of the night (27/28 September 1943) they were nearly shot down over Hanover. Crew names and positions are detailed as are the events of the night. One engine was on fire and this was extinguished by diving and restarted. The engineer put out a second fire and was overcome by fumes. The rear gunner was overcome by fumes but was removed to safety. Despite the damage to the aircraft it landed at RAF Lindholme in appalling conditions.
All the crew received their awards in October and November 1943. The photograph of the seven airmen is annotated with the signature of the airman and his award.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph, annotated
One typewritten sheet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PWhittleGG1606,
MWhittleGG1397166-160822-03
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Germany--Hannover
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-09-27
1943-10-20
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Claire Monk
101 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bomb aimer
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
navigator
pilot
RAF Lindholme
RAF Ludford Magna
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2047/33328/ABiltonGHA960623-0001.1.pdf
68edbe099b5e26f2922404b2fb056c11
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2047/33328/ABiltonGHA960623.1.mp3
3f3f5cac621761fcd3088cee74a5d0fd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bilton, George Henry Albert
G H A Bilton
Description
An account of the resource
Nineteen items. The collection concerns George Henry Albert Bilton (b. 1923, 175723 Royal Air Force) and contains an oral history interview, his log book, correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 428 and 434 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Anthony Bilton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-09-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Bilton, GHA
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Music]
I: Were you born in Hull?
GB: Well, outside of Hull at Anlaby.
I: Which year were you born?
GB: 1923. October.
I: And what did your father do for a living?
GB: He was a coach builder for, well it’s now British Railway but first of all Hull and Barnsley. Then it was taken over by the London Northeastern and he built the coaches and the waggons. He was with them all his life.
I: Did you go to school in Anlaby?
GB: Anlaby Church of England School. And then the last two years I was at Hessle School when they closed the Church of England one down. I left school 1938.
I: So you were fourteen.
GB: Fourteen. Yeah.
I: Did you get a job?
GB: Yes. I went and got a job as an apprentice furniture salesman.
I: In Hull.
GB: In Hull. At Harry Jacobs Furniture.
I: Were you doing that when war broke out?
GB: Oh, I was still with them when war broke out. I was with them until I went into the Forces in 1942.
I: What was your reaction when you heard Chamberlain make the declaration that we were at war with Germany?
GB: Well, I think it was a bit too young and didn’t know anything about it but I volunteered for an ARP messenger boy and I was accepted and that kept us busy on a night time. Even with practices.
I: Where did you volunteer for it?
GB: Anlaby House which became the Central Headquarters for the ARP in Haltemprice. It is now the headquarters of Beverley Borough Council. The same house.
I: What kind of work did you have to do as an ARP messenger boy?
GB: Well, if any of the telephone lines were broken in a raid we had to go out and take messages from one post to another.
I: By foot?
GB: No. On our bikes.
I: Did you have a uniform?
GB: No. Just a steel helmet and an extra special gas mask. That’s all.
I: What was extra special about it?
GB: Well, it was more like the Services one. Not like the ordinary civilian gas mask.
I: What was the difference between the two?
GB: Well, it was heavier and, well and you just, you didn’t have the mask at the face. You had a small canister at the side.
I: So you didn’t have the protuberance.
GB: No. That’s right.
I: Did you have an arm band to show who you were?
GB: Yes. ARP messenger, that was all and the steel helmet with M on.
I: What did M mean? For messenger.
GB: For messenger.
I: Did you get paid for it?
GB: No. It was all voluntary. No. Nothing at all. You, you, when the sirens went you reported to Anlaby House and you stayed there until the siren all clear and then you went back home.
I: Whereabouts did you do this work?
GB: In Anlaby. The farthest we ever had to bring a message was from Anlaby to Cottingham when the lines were down.
I: Did you enjoy doing it?
GB: Oh yes. I did.
I: Could you have thrown it up any time you liked?
GB: Any time you wanted you could decide to finish and that was it.
I: Was there competition to get these jobs?
GB: Well, there was about four of us and that’s all they needed. They all went in the Forces and of the four there was one killed.
I: How did that happen?
[pause]
GB: It was a lad called John Harding. He was killed in Italy about a month after the war. He went all through the desert, all through Italy and he was killed about a month after the war moving shells from the artillery.
I: Were there any incidents that happened to you after you had done the messenger work?
GB: Not really.
I: That you can recount.
GB: No, there was, it was very very quiet in the area of Haltemprice. All the damage that was done was done in Hull. I think we had what five bombs dropped in the village of Anlaby and they were unexploded.
I: Whereabouts did they drop?
GB: At the, two or three hundred yards from Anlaby House down Woodlands Drive in a snicket.
I: A snicket being a cut through.
GB: A cut through. Yes. They did no damage. The Army came, found them and exploded them.
I: Was anybody injured?
GB: No. There was no injuries whatsoever.
I: When did the bombs drop on Anlaby? Which year would that have been?
GB: That was in the big raid of 1940. May the 8th 1941.
I: ’41. Any others that you remember that dropped in Anlaby?
GB: None at all. There was only the five.
I: Did you ever see the damage in Hull?
GB: Yes. I used to work in Hull. The place where I was employed in Jameson Street was completely gutted during the 1941 raid.
I: What was the name again?
GB: Harry Jacobs Furniture, Jameson Street.
I: What else did you see of the damage in Hull?
GB: All of Jameson Street were moved. Our offices were down Osbourne Street and that was severely damaged. You could see all of Paragon Square which was Hammonds at the time was gutted. There was a terrific amount of damage done and especially in the Stoneferry District where the oil mills were and the flour mills around it.
I: Did people come out of Hull to Anlaby to get away from the bombing?
GB: Yes, they did. They built a camp down Lowfield Road in Anlaby for displaced personnel from the raids and there was one built on Priory Road just outside Cottingham which was taken up by people who had been bombed out. Those two camps after the war housed the young couples who got married and they had no housing. When I got married in ’51 I finished up in one of those converted accommodations for a year before I got a house.
I: What were they like?
GB: Alright.
I: Just describe them.
GB: Well, they were two little bedroom. You had a small bedroom, small living room and there was a small like kitchen for cooking and doing your washing. In Priory Road where the camp is we spent a year in there didn’t we before we came to Cottingham. There were no housing at all and they were in use for about ten years before they were finally closed down.
I: What was the standard of accommodation like?
GB: Poor. Single bricks. Very damp. Corrugated roof.
I: Wasn’t it later used to house Poles?
GB: That’s correct. Yes.
I: Now, can you tell me how you came to be in the Air Force?
GB: I volunteered for air crew in, when I was eighteen in what we called a Selection Board. And I was accepted as a wireless operator air gunner.
I: When you, which year would this have been?
GB: That was 1941. I was eighteen in October ‘41 and I volunteered then and went down for an interview at Padgate. I went through the examinations. Then my medical and then the Aircrew Selection Board and I was accepted for training as a w/op a g.
I: Why did you volunteer for it?
GB: I was, I should have made a very very poor sailor and my father always said, ‘Don’t go in the Army.’ He’d had enough.
I: So you wanted to exercise a choice before you were directed.
GB: Before I was directed.
I: But you were. Did you become a w/op air gunner?
GB: No. There was, they had a tremendous influx of people wanting to be w/op a g’s and I think I’d been waiting about four months to go in and they were short of flight engineers for training so they asked me if I would like to take a test board and become a flight engineer for training. And I accepted that instead of waiting. So I was called up in August ’42. Went to Blackpool. Did my initial training footslogging and I stayed in Blackpool then for about ten months doing a flight mechanic and a fitter’s course. Passed out AC1 flight mechanic and AC1 fitter and I went down to St Athans for six weeks to do the Halifax course and I waited then in August ’43 and I was posted from St Athans up to Number 6 Group, a Heavy Conversion Unit 1664 which was then at Croft and I crewed up with a Canadian and English mixed crew on August 1943.
I: In that training did you run into any problems?
GB: None at all. The only time I got jankers was for failing to carry a bayonet whilst on duty [laughs] and I got seven days CB for it and I swore never again to do any punishment.
I: What happened to you on the CB?
GB: CB? Well, you reported at 6 o’clock after you’d done all your schoolwork for three hours of square bashing. Fifty five minutes square bashing, five minutes off with full kit. Saturday you scrubbed the NAAFI out at Squire’s Gate and it was a huge one. Sunday you reported after Church Parade on the hour every hour until 10 o’clock at night. That was enough. No more. So I kept my shoes clean after that.
I: Did you resent the punishment?
GB: Not really. It taught you to behave yourself.
I: What did you think of the quality of training that you got?
GB: Very good. The instructors were very good. I had no complaints whatsoever against any of the instructors. They were always fair and they helped you whenever. All the way through the course.
I: Were you taught what you had to know or did they miss any?
GB: Well, I think the original entries for flight engineers were given far too much training on engines. You didn’t have to become a fitter to become a flight engineer as they found out later. They shortened the course to about a twelve week course where it took me nearly a year. You didn’t have to be a qualified flight fitter engine to become a flight engineer.
I: What did a flight engineer have to do in a bomber?
GB: Look after chiefly the control of the engines, the petrol consumption, know the hydraulic systems and all the emergencies. Assist in take-off and landing.
I: If the pilot had been hit would you have been able to pilot it?
GB: It would have been a struggle. As a Halifax flight engineer you didn’t have any pilot training. You were never on the controls whereas in a Lancaster you were. You acted as a second pilot for take-off and landing but on a Halifax bomber the bomb aimer assisted in take-off and landing.
I: Now, you said that you were posted to 6 Group. Can you tell me about what 6 Group was?
GB: 6 Group was the Halifax group financed by the Royal Canadian Government. They provided all the aircraft and the crews were mixed. I had three English and four Canadians in the crew. The pilot was, pilot, navigator and the two gunners Canadians. The wireless operator, the bomb aimer and myself were the English members of the crew.
I: How was the crew formed?
GB: Well, I met the crew. They’d done their Operational Training Unit course and they were posted up to Croft and ten crews and ten flight engineers were told, ‘Sort yourselves out.’ And they picked me and I accepted them and I went with them. You weren’t allocated. You weren’t told, ‘You fly with that man.’ Or, ‘You fly with them.’ You were left to individually sort yourself out which crew you wanted to go with. So if you met a sergeant in the mess, you know you knew him and you had a drink or two before you crewed up you went to him.
I: How did you like serving with Canadians?
GB: Oh, they were very good. Very friendly. They didn’t have the bull. The discipline wasn’t as severe on the Canadian group as it was on the English groups.
I: Can you give an example?
GB: Well, I mean you mixed freely with the, when I was an NCO you mixed freely with the two officers. The Canadian officers. No trouble at all calling you by your Christian names.
I: Now, what was your first operational squadron?
GB: My first operational squadron? Well. I lost my first pilot. We went to 427 squadron and Sergeant Dresser went on his second second dickie trip and never came back.
I: 427 was your first.
GB: First squadron at Leeming. So we were a crew without a captain.
I: When did you join that squadron do you think?
GB: We joined 427 Squadron 4th of September and we left on the 23rd of September. We were posted back to 1659 Conversion Unit Topcliffe where there was another pilot waiting for us.
I: So did you do any operations —
GB: None at all.
I: At that base?
GB: No. None whatsoever there. As I say the pilot never came back from his second, second dickie to Frankfurt.
I: So you were posted to a new squadron.
GB: No. A new Conversion Unit for a new pilot. A new pilot by the name of Watkins, a flying officer who had been instructing in Canada for nearly two years. He’d been, come over and we crewed up with him on the 24th of September with Flying Officer Watkins at 1659 Conversion Unit Topcliffe and we went through our month training with him again until the 7th of October ’43 where we were posted to 428 Squadron, Middleton St George.
I: And it was then you started operations.
GB: Operations. Yes. The first operation we did was the 3rd of November.
I: Can you describe what you remember of it?
GB: Very very little. It was Dusseldorf and everything seemed to be on top of you at the first you know. You didn’t take it all in. All I seem to remember is a little bit of flak and the flares going down for target indicators for bombing. Everything happened so fast on your first two or three trips that you hadn’t adjusted to operational flying. I learned more on my second op. We went to Ludwigshafen on the 18th of November.
I: What happened then?
GB: Well, first of all we got coned over the target. We got the master searchlight on us which was a bluey colour and he followed us and we got out of him after a lot of evasive action and as soon as we got out a fighter opened up on us and we got a good hiding. The rear gunner was severely wounded. The IFF that we had was damaged. Monica, which we had was damaged. All the trimming wires for elevator and rudders were cut. We had petrol tank wires cut from one, two and four tanks. All hydraulic pipes were cut. We couldn’t close the bomb doors. They were fully opened. We were in a mess and we got hit about twenty one thousand feet and by the time the pilot got control we were down to fifteen thousand. We had no navigational aids and the navigator brought us back by straight navigation of the Pole Star. We were off track coming back when we crossed over Ostend at fifteen thousand feet and they hit us with everything.
I: They what?
GB: Hit us with everything. They opened up with everything they had and we couldn’t take any evasive action. We just had to go through it.
I: This was the flak.
GB: Yeah. There was flaming onions coming up in between the tail plane and the main plane. It was rough. And then we crossed the coast and we still didn’t know exactly where we were so the skipper called up. The emergency call sign then was Darkie and Woodbridge accepted the call and we did a full emergency landing there.
I: What was the emergency landing like?
GB: It was very rough. We couldn’t get the undercarriage, it came down but I couldn’t lock it down. We tried everything. Put in to a shallow dive, pulling out to see if we could just pulling into a shallow dive, pulling out to see if we could just jerk it that two or three inches to make it lock and we couldn’t do that. We were all in the emergency positions coming in to land and just as they pulled up to do a belly landing it just threw it that little bit forward, the wheels, and they locked. So we were alright. We came out. The rear gunner we, we’d patched him up. We’d pumped morphine into him and he went to Norwich Hospital. We never saw him again. He was very badly wounded in the head. And we spent the night there and then an aircraft flew us back the next morning to our base at Middleton St George.
I: What was the date of that?
GB: 18th of November.
I: And which Halifax was it? What was it called?
GB: NA O-Oboe. We were just off on a night operation at 16.45 on a trip which lasted seven hours and five minutes.
I: Did that put you off wanting to go on operations after that experience?
GB: Not really. We were in operations again on the 26th of November. We took two spare gunners and we went to Stuttgart and we had a reasonable trip. We had no fighter trouble but when we went to a diversionary raid being done on Frankfurt and the Germans had laid what they called you know the fighter flares, the path the Mosquitoes were taking oh and it looked rough. We bypassed it and Stuttgart was quite you know quite a normal trip. A bit of flak. No fighters. But I think that got the confidence of the crew back.
I: When you went on these trips to Stuttgart and Ludwigshafen could you see other planes being hit?
GB: Not on those two. No. I never saw anything anyone shot down over Ludwigshafen, Stuttgart or the first trip Dusseldorf.
I: How did your next operations go?
GB: Well, the next operation was January the 20th 1944, Berlin and that was a rough one.
I: Can you describe it?
GB: Well, at one part the Germans had laid a flare path for fighter flares and they were among the bomber stream and we were going down. You could see the fire from the German aircraft and a small amount coming from our aircraft. The Allied aircraft and then you’d just see a ball of fire and it would hold steady for a minute or two then it would just go in to a dive. That was quite an experience to see it. When we got to Berlin we were in the first wave and the target indicators were a few seconds late and we got caught in predictive flak because we were the first wave. We had no cover from the metal strips. The tin foil that we threw out. It didn’t affect, it didn’t help you it helped the people behind you and we were a little bit off. [pause]
I: Which was the worse? This Berlin one or the Ludwigshafen?
GB: Ludwigshaven. Ludwigshaven was the worst. I mean we got a lot of shell, a lot of holes, a lot of damage. This Berlin it was just that you were in the predicted flak. We didn’t get hit. We didn’t have any fighter trouble. Berlin, Ludwigshafen I’ll never forget it. Never.
I: Was Berlin a particularly dreaded place to go to?
GB: It was, yes. It was such a long, it was such a long stooge. It took us eight hours fifteen minutes. It was very tiring and it was overpowering on the target area because it was so heavily defended. There were so many searchlights. I think on the first one we lost about forty odd aircraft that night.
I: You said which particular Halifax you had. Did you always have the same one?
GB: No. That was Halifax NA U-Uncle on that Berlin trip.
I: Was there any competition to get the best aircraft?
GB: No. It was just what you were allocated. Our pilot later became a flight commander and he took any aircraft. I mean I think we were nearly always in a B flight when we flew aircraft.
I: What does that mean?
GB: Well, you had A flights and B flights.
I: As part of the squadron. To make up the squadron.
GB: The mark up the squadron. Yes. And the A flights were the first half of the alphabet and so the second B was the second half. We were either V-Victor, Q-Queenie, or O-Oboe later on that we flew in.
I: But was there any, ever any feeling that the more senior people were getting the best aircraft?
GB: No. No.
I: Or the best ground crews?
GB: No. The best ground crews were on operational squadrons. I thought so anyhow.
I: But was there any difference between the different ground crews that you had in your squadron?
GB: No. They were all first class. They all did a first-class job. The aircraft were always in good condition. We never turned back from thirty four trips from any trouble whatsoever.
I: What was the next operations that you had to do?
GB: Well, the next two I did were two mine laying stooges. One was to Kiel which was a quiet trip and the other one was down to la Rochelle which was a very long stooge. Eight hours ten minutes. That was the fourth of February ’44. Then we went to Berlin again on the 15th of February.
I: Was mine laying usually a quiet job?
GB: Yes. Well, it was a very hard job because you were by yourself. There would probably be about twenty aircraft you know to lay mines and you were on your own. You had no cover whatsoever. I mean the tin foil that you threw out didn’t help you. It more or less showed the Germans where you were because you were always ahead of the tin foil you were throwing out. There would be about twenty. Probably twenty two twenty three aircraft would go down to La Rochelle and lay two mines a piece. In between the island of la Rochelle and the mainland.
I: Did you ever call those gardening operations?
GB: They are gardening operations. I did the La Rochelle. I did two La Rochelles in February. One on the 4th and one on the 21st and then on the 25th I did a mine laying stooge to Copenhagen Sound.
I: Well, what was your next Berlin operation like? Was it any different from the first?
GB: It was the same as the first. A lot of flak. A lot of fighter activity but we never had an attack. That day, night we were diverted to Shipdham which was an American base and we were there for three days for bad weather. Our base was closed down and we stayed with the Americans. Had their hospitality.
I: What was the date of your second Berlin raid?
GB: 15th of February. We took off in NA Q-Queenie. We took off at 17.20. We were airborne for six hours fifty minutes.
I: What did you fear most over Berlin? Was it the night fighters or the flak?
GB: The night fighters. The flak no. It was the fighters. We were always looking out for fighters. You didn’t want, you didn’t want to battle with them you wanted to get out of their way because the armaments that we had was four 303s were just like peashooters to their cannons if you could see them and get out of their way. That was the main thing.
I: And then after Berlin? That second Berlin operation.
GB: After Berlin we did as I say two mine laying stooges to la Rochelle and Copenhagen Sound in February. Then March we started with another gardening operation mine laying to the mouth of the Gironde River which was seven hours fifty minutes. Then we started the pre-D-Day marshalling yards in the March of ’44 and it was the marshalling yard at Trappes. Now that one we had an absolute full bomb load, I’ll never forget it of eleven thousand five hundred pounders. We had eleven thousand five hundred and fourteen hundred gallons of petrol and it was made up of seven five hundred pounders and six one thousand pounders. That was the heaviest bomb load we’d ever taken and after the operation the marshalling yard at Trappes was never used again. It was, it was quite an easy trip. There was very very little flak. It was very light. No fighter trouble. We came, we did five hours forty minutes and there was bad weather at the aerodrome and we were diverted to Harwell. And we spent the night at Harwell and we left the next day back to base.
I: Now here you’ve given me a sheet headed “Target Token” relating to this Trappes raid on the 6th of March 1944. Can you tell me what this sheet signifies?
GB: Well, that is the marshalling yards there. Those are early flares, the photograph flares that we dropped to illuminate the target so we could take the photograph. Well, from that they could photograph from the headings that we were on. They could tell you exactly where those bombs straddled the target and the whole load went right across the marshalling yards.
I: So you’ve got the copy of the photograph.
GB: Of the photograph. Every crew member was presented with a copy of the photograph.
I: As a means of congratulating.
GB: Congratulating. More or less that you’d got the whole fifteen bombs right across the marshalling yard.
I: Any other marshalling yard operations that you did?
GB: Well, I know the next one we went to was, the next operation I did was another gardening trip to Kiel. We did the mining to the entrance to Kiel harbour. The next one was on the 25th of March. We went to Aulnoye. That was quite an easy trip. A marshalling yard. No trouble. Then on April our skipper had been promoted to squadron leader and we were posted 434 Squadron where he became B Flight commander.
I: Where was 434 Squadron?
GB: At Croft. It was a satellite aerodrome of Middleton St George. It was one that was built during the wartime use whereas Middleton St George was a peacetime aerodrome. The next marshalling yard we went to was Lisle. That was a quiet trip. That was on the 9th of April. We went on the 26th of April to Villeneuve St Georges. A French target. On the 29th we had a short gardening trip to the Frisian Islands. The mines we were laying were supposed to be for a convoy that was coming through. We laid the mines and the convoy was coming through. There was quite a bit of flak from the flak ships. That was then —
I: Were you hit?
GB: No. It was, we had no trouble. We seemed to be lucky again. There was a lot of flak from the flak ships but we had nothing. No holes whatsoever. Come to May, the 1st of May we went St Ghislian. And then on the 27th we went to Le Crepiet. They were quiet trips. Five hours and four and a half hours we did. On June the 15th we flew in J-Jig on a daylight to Boulogne and you could see the flak there. When we were going in there was one aircraft coming out with the whole of his starboard wing in flames. We never knew what happened to him.
I: Was that the first daylight raid?
GB: That was the first daylight I’d done. Yes.
I: How did you feel about that compared with the night raids?
GB: Well, you’re more confident because you could see what was happening and you knew you had fighter cover. It was just the flak but then flak you got used to. It never really bothered people unless you got hit with it badly.
I: What was the date of that bombing operation?
GB: 15th of June.
I: So this was after D-Day.
GB: After D-Day. I was on leave on D-Day. We were. And the next operation was to Disemont on the 21st of June.
I: What was the target in the Boulogne raid?
GB: On the Boulogne raid we were dropping bombs that exploded as soon as it hit the water to cause waves to go into the fence to destroy their MTB boats and that.
I: Do you think it worked?
GB: By all accounts yes. The reports we received afterwards it had been a successful raid and the docks got a good pasting as well. In July, we started off the 1st of July we went to a place called [Benayes or Beugnies] and when we got there there were no PFF markings so we bombed on Gee. There was quite a bit of flak and we lost all hydraulics and had to, we had to land using emergency undercarriage but I could never close the bomb doors. They were open all the way back and all the way for landing. And we had to use full emergency for getting the undercarriage down and the use of the flaps.
I: When was that?
GB: That was the 1st of June. We went in Q-Queenie that night.
I: 1st of July.
GB: 1st of July, sorry. They sent us back to the same target on the 6th of July. To [Benayes or Beugnies]. We went on G-George that time and it was a quiet trip.
I: Where is [Benayes or Beugnies]?
GB: It’s in France. All I can —
[recording paused]
GB: And after that I went to Caen on a daylight and on a night operation on the 18th of the 7th took off at 3.30 in the morning. That was when they started the big push and their breakthrough at Caen.
I: Was that a particularly big raid? A mass raid.
GB: Yes, it was a mass raid. They practically destroyed Caen that night and the Army moved forwards and they never stopped moving after that.
I: Do you have any memories of that raid?
GB: Yes, all I can remember was it was a dead easy raid. Flak not bothered. No fighters. No nothing. Just like a cross country.
I: Were you aware of all the other planes?
GB: Yes. They were all, they were all so close together. All bombing on one area. You could see them even though it was that time. Just two hours. It would be about 5.30. just dusk coming on.
I: So you didn’t have any opposition.
GB: Nothing at all. Nothing whatsoever. It was just like flying from here to Jersey on your holidays. No opposition whatsoever.
I: Do you think you hit your target?
GB: Well, we must have done because the Army never stopped moving. They took Caen. The next job after that it was a rough one. It was Hamburg. That was the 28th.
I: What happened then?
GB: Well, we were in the second wave and we were a bit late and we were at the scheduled height of bombing at seventeen thousand feet. There was somebody else above us and they dropped their bombs and we had, on our bombing run we just had to dive starboard to get out of the way of his bombs or we should have got the lot because they always had separate heights for bombing and we were late. Two minutes late. We were at seventeen and the next wave was at seventeen five. That was it. There was quite a bit of flak at Hamburg. That was the most terrifying thing. A full bomb load up there. And the skipper just dived starboard and we were on the bombing run. Where our bombs went we don’t know.
I: Was it common for planes to be hit by bombers above them?
GB: I don’t think so. I think it occasionally happened but this was too close.
I: What about collisions between bombers?
GB: I never saw any. Never saw any at all. I think they did happen but they were very few and far between.
I: And then —
GB: And then after that August was a very busy month. Our skipper had been promoted because our original wing commander, Wing Commander Bartlett had been lost. He’d been shot down and killed in action and our skipper was promoted and became wing commander of 434 Squadron. On the 1st of August we took J-Jig to Acquet in France. There was no PFF markings so the full bomb load was brought back. We brought the whole load back. On the 3rd of —
I: How dangerous was it to bring bombs back?
GB: Well, they weren’t fused. I mean they weren’t fused until you were bombing. Didn’t press the selector switches so they would be alright. It was just that we would have a heavy load for landing. After that on the 3rd we took J-Jig again to le Foret de Nieppe which was for fuel dumps. On the 4th of August again in J-Jig again we went to caves that were just outside Paris where the V-2 rockets were assembled and that was heavily defended with a daylight op and we were hit by flak. We got a few holes. We were caught in predictive flak. We were diverted on the 4th to Dalton.
I: Was this a V-2 place or a V-1 place?
GB: No. A V-2 place where they were assembling the, where they assembled where they assembled the rockets.
I: And where was it?
GB: Just outside Paris. Some from what we could understand from the briefing they were more or less mushroom caves and that. And then on the 5th we went to St Leu d’Esserent. On the 8th we went to a fuel dump just outside at Foret de Chantilly and that was hit and there was black smoke when we left up to fifteen thousand feet.
I: What do you think you hit there at Chantilly?
GB: It was a fuel dump. And on the 9th we went to Le Breteque. On the 12th of August we went to Brunswick. To Germany. On that raid according to recent record was a complete failure as everyone bombed on H2S as there were no markers went down so we bombed individually and there was no concentration.
I: Did you feel at the time that it was a failure?
GB: Well, it seemed to be a failure because there was no concentration of fires or anything. Then on the 14th we did the Army coop where the German divisions were trapped at Falaise. Now that was a very easy trip. There was no opposition whatsoever. The only thing wrong was that the Canadian group bombed their own troops. The Canadian Army had advanced past the markers and of course there was a few killed.
I: Was yours one of the bombers that dropped on the Canadians do you think?
GB: Hmmn.
I: Right.
GB: It wasn’t the Air Forces fault. It was the Army had advanced past the markers. And the last trip I did—
I: And that was what? That was the 14th was it?
GB: That was the 14th of August. We took off at 12.40. It was a five hour ten minute job. And the last trip I did was the 25th of August. We went to Brest to soften it up so the Yanks could take it. And that was quite easy. There was no trouble at all. I think they were more or less giving in. And that was on the 25th of August. There was bad weather back at base and we got diverted to Thorney Island. We spent the night at Thorney Island and then came back the next day and we were told that was it. We had finished our tour.
I: Had you done thirty?
GB: We’d done thirty four and one sea sweep. The skipper, the navigator and the bomb aimer were each awarded a DFC and myself, the wireless operator Jackie Bennett from Newcastle and Jimmy Silverman the rear gunner were granted a commission. That was our reward.
I: What happened to you then?
GB: Well, after that I was posted down to Bruntingthorpe which was 29 OTU and I was instructing on engine handling. I did very little flying. And a week at Blackpool on an Air Sea Rescue course which I thoroughly enjoyed. I only flew twice in the six months I was at OTU. I was never keen on Wellingtons.
I: Why not?
GB: Well, the Wellingtons were clapped out [laughs]
[pause]
GB: Then I went, I volunteered to go back on a second tour and I went in April ’45 with a Flight Lieutenant Kennedy. He made a crew up from 29 OTU and we went to 1651 Conversion Unit at Woolfox Lodge.
I: Why did you volunteer for a second tour?
GB: I didn’t like 29 OTU and I didn’t like what bit of flying I did do.
I: Why didn’t you like that OTU?
GB: Well, there was a little bit of too much bull. The group captain in charge was an ex-Cranwell boy and I think he thought it was still 1938 and not 1944.
I: So you preferred to risk your life.
GB: Yes.
I: Than have the bull?
GB: Have the bull. Yes.
I: Did you go back on ops in the end?
GB: Well, we did our conversion unit on to Lancasters and we were picked out unfortunately to go to Warboys for PFF training so by the time we’d finished the PFF training the war had finished. They had special training at Warboys and then we had to go through another course of automatic gun laying turret which was new to the gunners. By the time we’d finished those courses the war had finished. We finished up at 156 Squadron at Upwood and that was quite enjoyable because we did [pause] took ground crew on what was called a Cook’s Tour. We used to fly them over Germany up the Ruhr and show them all the damage that they’d helped to do in maintaining the aircraft. I did two of those Cook’s Tours in in June and we did a little bit of flying. I did an air test for the Royal Aeronautical Establishment. Another Cook’s Tour. We did a postmortem to Denmark where they did an actual like on operation to Denmark to see how the German radar system worked and that was on the 29th of June ’45. That was a five and a half hour.
I: Testing the radar defences.
GB: Yes. Of the, that the Germans had. Then we just did local flying and then for three days we were dumping. The 21st, the 24th and the 27th of July was dumping incendiaries in to the North Sea that were no good. And in the August of ’44 we, the 1st of August we did a passenger trip to Frankfurt and Nuremberg taking crew, ground crew in and bringing ground crew out. And we had a trip which made me want to go back to Italy when I got married but on the 15th of August ’45 we went to Bari in Italy and we had three days. Well, we crammed twenty of the 8th Army boys into a Lancaster fuselage, gave the a sick bag and put their kit in the bomb bays and flew them home. That was thoroughly enjoyable to see Italy.
I: Can I ask you about the difference between Lancasters and the Halifaxes. What did you feel about flying in the two?
GB: Well, on a Lancaster the flight engineer did the work of a second pilot. He did the throttles, looked after the undercarriage controls, flaps and everything. But as regards flying I still like the Halifax. Especially the Halifax Mark 3 with the Hercules Centaurus engines. It was a marvellous aircraft. There was more room in it. It could carry a bombload of twelve thousand pounds but it couldn’t carry the big bombs because they hadn’t the depth of the bomb bays. But I still liked the Halifax. I think it was because I did all my operations in them and I got through a tour with them.
I: Did the Halifax have any disadvantages?
GB: I don’t think so. Not the later ones. The one of the first lots, the first ones had a tendency to stall but they altered that by doing, altering the rudder system.
I: What did you learn in the Pathfinder course?
GB: I took a bomb aimer’s course and learned how to drop bombs [laughs] That’s the only difference.
I: How did you do that?
GB: Well, they give you a concentrated course on dropping practice bombs and that was the only difference.
I: Now, can I ask you some general questions about operations in the war. what was morale like amongst the bomber crews as far as you personally experienced it?
GB: Very good. Very high indeed. I only ever knew one person who went LMF and he was a member of our crew but everyone else that I knew enjoyed the life. It was a good life. I mean admittedly it was very very dangerous but it was a clean life. You came back to a clean bed and you came back to good food and you were treated well. You were given leave every six weeks. You were. You had extra rations when you came home. It was a dangerous job but they looked after you and discipline wasn’t severe on bomber squadrons. That was on the Canadian group anyhow. But aircrew was quite relaxed.
I: Could you see signs of LMF in this chap?
GB: No. No, we couldn’t. It was only the second trip after we got a good hiding and he never said anything on the night when we did the emergency landing at Woodbridge. When we came back the next day I met him in the Sergeant’s Mess in the afternoon and he said what had happened and I never saw him again. He was off the squadron as quick as that.
I: So you couldn’t think of any reason why he should have gone LMF.
GB: No. None at all. He was the mid-upper gunner and that was just it. He just threw the sponge in.
I: What did the rest of the crew think about him going LMF? Did you have sympathy or did you look down on him?
GB: I don’t think they looked down on him. They were just pleased that he’d gone so quick and nobody could dwell on the subject. And when we got two new gunners and as I say we were away within seven days of that operation on Stuttgart 18th to the 26th and we got two spare gunners. And after that we got two permanent gunners.
I: Were the aircrew superstitious? Did they have any lucky charms or anything like that?
GB: Yes, I’ve still got my little St Christopher cross and three us was always emptied our bladder on the starboard wheel before we took off. Myself, the rear gunner and the wireless operator.
I: This was a superstition was it?
GB: Always did it. Always, whether it was a daylight or a night op. Whether the groupie was there or anybody it was always emptied against the starboard wheel.
I: And did other crews do that?
GB: I think other crews always went in in certain order. Pilot first and like that.
I: What were the briefings like? Can you describe the scene when you got the briefings?
GB: Well, when it was the Berlin and you looked up and everyone said, ‘Berlin,’ everyone, ‘Oh.’ That was it. Then you just stepped back in silence and let them all give you the information. The German targets when you saw them when you saw the red lines leading you knew you were in for a warm night. The French targets everyone [clap] was happy.
I: They clapped.
GB: Well, there was that and a cheer when they said Caen or St Leu d’Esserent like that. I mean compared to the German targets they were easy. The only targets that we didn’t really like, the whole crew, was the mine laying duty because they, the majority of them were so long and there were so few of you you felt so exposed. I mean the Germans would probably leave you alone but then the next time they’d probably lose four five aircraft out of twenty odd. They would really come down on you like a tonne of bricks than leave you alone. When they hit you they hit you.
I: What do you feel about the criticism that has been lodged against Bomber Command since the war?
GB: I think its people who have got no idea about a war. They have no idea what the targets were like. Bombing had to be done. It was the only way of offensive against the Germans and I don’t think they take in to fact the amount of damage that we did do. The amount of people that were tied down. There was over a million people tied down in German defence. There was thirty thousand anti-aircraft guns and over, nearly ten thousand of those were eighty eight millimetre. Now if those eighty eight ten thousand millimetres had been used on the beaches of Normandy the Channel would have been blood red. They had, the German defences had all the ammunition they wanted up to within six weeks of the war. They were never short. They rationed the Army but they never rationed the local defence. And after all we did reduce production and if you reduced production by twelve and a half percent of the Tiger tanks it’s a heck of a lot because there was nothing could touch a Tiger. So I think the criticism has been very unfair because the boys went through hell.
I: When you were at these stations how and where did you spend your spare time?
GB: Well, at Middleton St George and Croft we used to go into Darlington and we all had one particular pub. The Fleece. And that’s where we spent our time. At the Fleece. But I was up there about eight or nine years ago and it’s been knocked down. The Old Fleece pub.
I: Did you put any kind of trophies or anything like that up in the bar?
GB: No. No, we just went there to drink and sing and other things.
I: Were there any breaches of security with people telling girlfriends about —
GB: Not to my knowledge.
I: Ops.
GB: No. No. If you were going up there for a night out you didn’t know anything because the station would be closed if there was a full ops on. There would only be probably only a few ground crew but the aircrew wouldn’t go, be allowed out. So most of the telephone lines were shut down. Were closed. You couldn’t make outside calls if there was ops on.
I: Did the German Air Force ever attack these airfields.
GB: No. Not to my knowledge. Not whilst ours.
Now, I think after the war had ended you went out to Burma.
Burma, yes. On 267 Squadron at Mingaladon. The squadron was keeping the airways open taking mail and passengers flying from Mingaladon in Burma up to Dum Dum at Calcutta. And then from, back again and then from Mingaladon to Bangkok. Bangkok, Saigon. Saigon to Kai Tak which is the aerodrome for Hong Kong on the mainland of Kowloon and they used to fly down to Singapore.
I: This is Dakotas.
GB: On Dakotas. Yes. And the flight engineers were all remustered as air quarter masters on those trips looking after the baggage and the passengers and I had about fifteen of the lads under me. We used to take them out on these trips which they thoroughly enjoyed going up to Calcutta. Spending a day in Calcutta and then coming back going down to Hong Kong. We had a thoroughly enjoyable time.
I: What kind of passengers were you moving?
GB: Well, RAF and Burmese and if you were coming from India you used to bring down the Indians who were coming down on business trips or anything like that. Used to bring our own people down to [unclear] and look after the stores. Generally taking mail across to Bangkok, Saigon.
I: So you were a bit like an airline.
GB: A bit like an airline. Yes. A bit rough and ready. I did one or two. I went to Saigon and worked with Saigon. Wanted to look around during the night time but we were informed that all personnel were on curfew and had to be in by 9 o’clock. And the biggest shock I ever had was walking into the hotel where we were billeted to be given a salute by a Jap prisoner of war with a rifle and fixed bayonets.
I: When was this that you were in Saigon?
GB: 12th of February ’46. Then from Saigon we’d go to Kai Tak which was the aerodrome for Hong Kong on the mainland and the people of the mainland which was a British colony I’ve never known people so friendly to see us. We were taken into cafes and restaurants and you could have everything you wanted.
I: In Hong Kong.
GB: In Hong Kong. But what I was surprised about Hong Kong is that they had everything on show and sale and the war had only been over for five months. You could go in and buy a Rolex Oyster watch. You couldn’t see them in Europe but they found them. They could. You could buy anything you wanted.
I: Were these Chinese who were —
GB: Yes. The —
I: You in Hong Kong.
GB: In Hong Kong where they were first class.
I: Coming back to Saigon did the Japanese soldiers do their job well?
GB: Yes, as far as I know they had no complaints. They guarded us well. But the trouble was just beginning to start then. There was just a bit of discontent amongst the Saigon people I think. It was just beginning to start with the Viet Cong. Just beginning to get unruly.
I: What did you see of disorder there?
GB: Nothing at the night time. That’s when it happened. During the day everything was normal. It was on a night time when they used to come and try and interfere on the aerodrome but we were in the town itself so we saw nothing.
I: So they were trying to attack the aerodrome.
GB: Trying to you know disrupt it more or less.
I: Did you see any French military presence there?
GB: Well, last I was there the only French presence was two Corvettes in the harbour. There was no French troops whatsoever. If the French had spent a little more time in French Indo China as it was then instead of parading around Europe they might have been in a bit better position out there.
I: Did you feel in much danger in Saigon?
GB: No. Not really. I wasn’t there long enough and the short time where the trouble was we were in the hotel out of the way.
I: You were telling me about 29 OTU at Bruntingthorpe was it called?
GB: Bruntingthorpe.
I: Where is that?
GB: Just outside Leicester.
I: And you were telling me about the excessive bull there that drove you to apply for a second tour. Can you give any examples of not —
GB: Well —
I: Without mentioning the group captain’s name any examples of the kind of bull that went on there?
GB: Well, we had once a month we had an officer’s dining in night where all the tables were put in the shape of a horseshoe with the group captain in the centre and then going left to right from squadron leader. From wing commander, squadron leader, flight lieutenant, flying officer down to pilot officer which was pre-war bull. Not wartime discipline. And then he would hold a full parade of the whole OTU and every officer and every airman would parade on the main runway and would march past the rostrum as though they were the guards which again goes back to pre-war. It should never have been done in wartime RAF. But the Australians didn’t like it because we had a lot of Australians go through there and they objected strongly. And in the Officer’s Mess we had a very big organ by a very well known organist. The organ, keyboard and the sound box system was flooded with beer. The Mess notice board all the Mess board notices were burned down by the Australians. The group captain had his own hook for his hat and coat with a bolt right through the wall. The peg was pulled out. Also, part of the wall [laughs] In fact they did so much damage the group captain closed the Officer’s Mess bar for a week. All because of bull.
I: Did you approve?
GB: No.
I: Of what the Aussies did?
GB: Yes. I did. But no one was allowed in the Officer’s Mess after 5.30 unless they were in full dress. No battle dress. I came back and I’ll tell you the exact day. We’d, I’d been out a cross country to check the pilot for engine handling on the 19th of February ‘45 and we took off at 12 o’clock and we’d been diverted to Husband Bosworth. And by the time we got back it was 16.35. I was pulled up for entering the Mess in battle dress and not allowed to have a meal, my evening meal until I had changed. And the evening meal finished at 19.00 hours which is 7 o’clock and I didn’t get in as I say until 16 —
I: Twenty five you said.
GB: That’s how bad, that’s how bad the bull was.
I: You also were telling me about another job you had I think in ’46 of having to deal with airmen’s possessions who had been killed.
GB: Yes.
I: In accidents.
GB: That was the, I did that at 29 OTU. The last job I had was on for in the July 1946 was Dakota KN585 was hit by lightning and crashed in to the Irrawaddy Delta at Bassein. The death roll was twenty two. By the time we got the bodies they were four days old and I had to [pause] another flight lieutenant and the local police identified the bodies and arranged burial which was a very distressing thing to do especially as five days later I was on my home.
I: How were the possessions dealt with?
GB: Well, most of the possessions that they had I had to burn because they’d been on the bodies and they had been five days in the swamp and they smelled terribly and there was very very little went home. And of the twenty two they had no identification. They were all just interred with no headstone. No one knew who they were. They were interred at the European Cemetery at that time in Bassein. They would later be moved to the War Graves.
I: But you were telling me about your special problem you had with the possessions of Australians.
GB: When I was at 29 OTU. Yes. With the letters I mean the Aussie boys would have two or three girlfriends and the trouble was sorting out the letters to make sure that the right ones went home and the other ones were destroyed. Of the, we had two crews killed whilst I was there. Eleven men died.
I: Would any of them leave wills?
GB: No. There was no wills. I never found a will in the, any of the airmen who I buried. I went through their personal effects.
[Music]
Dublin Core
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Title
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War Memoir - George Bilton
Description
An account of the resource
Talks of early life at school and work in Hull. Volunteered as ARP messenger and described duties and air raid damage in Hull. Volunteered as aircrew and initially selected for wireless operator/air gunner but later asked to change to air engineer. Trained in Blackpool and RAF St Athan. Crewed up with mixed Canadian British crew on Halifax HCU before being posted to 6 Group 427 Squadron. His pilot did not return from a second dickie orientation sorties so crew went back to conversion unit to crew up and train with new pilot. Then posted to 428 Squadron. Subsequently transferred to 434 Squadron when pilot promoted. Completed tout of 34 operations on Halifax. Gives detailed description of individual operations, experiences and activities. Describes flying in Halifax and discusses moral, discipline issues, operating with Canadians and other general comments. Did instructional tour after completing operational tour, offered commission, did not enjoy it and volunteered for second tour but curtailed by end of war. Comments on tours after war including one in Burma including dealing with casualties in from a Dakota crash in Egypt.
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G H A Bilton
Format
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Oral history
Language
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eng
Type
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Sound
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ABiltonGHA960623
Coverage
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Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Yorkshire
England--Hull
England--Lancashire
England--Blackpool
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
England--Durham (County)
England--Leicestershire
Burma
Germany
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Stuttgart
England--Berkshire
France
France--La Rochelle
France--Lille
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
Germany--Hamburg
France--Paris
France--Creil
France--Falaise
Germany--Braunschweig
France--Brest
England--Sussex
England--Huntingdonshire
Italy
Italy--Bari
Denmark
Denmark--Copenhagen
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Chantilly Forest
Temporal Coverage
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1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Julie Williams
427 Squadron
428 Squadron
434 Squadron
6 Group
aerial photograph
Air Raid Precautions
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bomb aimer
bombing
C-47
civil defence
Cook’s tour
crewing up
flight engineer
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
military discipline
military ethos
military living conditions
military service conditions
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Bruntingthorpe
RAF Croft
RAF Harwell
RAF Middleton St George
RAF St Athan
RAF Thorney Island
RAF Topcliffe
RAF Warboys
RAF Woodbridge
target indicator
target photograph
training
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
Window
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1912/35970/MHayhurstJM2073102-170725-11.2.pdf
1c6506547020969c83d9a7232acfd4bb
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Title
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Hayhurst, Jose Margaret
J M Hayhurst
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-07-25
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Hayhurst, JM
Description
An account of the resource
108 items. The collection concerns Sergeant Jose Margaret Hayhurst (2073102 Royal Air Force) and contains decorations, uniform, documents and photographs. She served as a radar operator in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Andrew Whitehouse and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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WAR
[underlined] Frankfurt Revisited [/underlined]
ISSUED FORTNIGHTLY BY THE
ARMY BUREAU OF CURRENT AFFAIRS
ABCA
[boxed] RESTRICTED
The information given in this publication is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person not authorised to receive it. [/boxed]
No. 62 January 22nd, 1944
[page break]
Lines of Thought
1. The ideal way to cover the subject of bombing is to invite a member of a bomber crew to talk about his job, and use this pamphlet to provide the questions to keep him talking. But failing this, the first half of the story is best reported on, and the second part which deals with the actual flight is best read aloud. Assume that everyone would like to have been on a bombing raid. Here is the detailed story of someone who had the good fortune to do so.
Remember that in spite of all that has been written about Bomber Command, the details of its day to day work are still extremely vague in most people's minds. The result of your talk should be twofold: firstly to give a matter-of-fact account of life in an air crew; secondly to provide a starting point for a discussion on the value of our bombing effort.
2. Perhaps the outstanding military moral is the complete unity of the bomber crew. This unity grows from their technical interdependence and from the nature of their work. A similar spirit is natural to the tank crew, the parachute stick, the mortar team, or in any situation where everyone feels that everyone else knows his job. There could be an interesting and useful discussion on the teamwork situation in your own group. It may not be easy to start because it depends on personal relationships about which people are reluctant to talk. But such a talk, arising in this apparently irrelevant way, can be exceedingly helpful. A useful point on which to launch this discussion is your own experiences of co-operation in previous military or civilian life.
3. During 1943 R.A.F. Bomber Command dropped 136,000 tons of bombs on Germany. Or more than twice the 65,000 tons dropped on this country since the war began. Another 15,000 tons fell on occupied territories and 6,000 tons on Italy; making a total average of 430 tons of bombs on the enemy every night of 1943.
The answering German total was under 7 tons a night, or 2,500 for the year.
By the end of 1943, 20 of Germany's 50 most important cities had been so devasted that they were more of a liability than an asset to the German war machine. Many others, including Berlin, had been severely damaged in varying degree.
ii
[page break]
[symbol][underlined] Frankfurt Revisited [/underlined]
Did I ever tell you about my operation?
By Major ANTHONY COTTERELL,
WAR Staff Writer
THE fact that there is going to be an operation is generally known to the crews about 10 a.m. of the morning of the operation. They don't know where it will be until the briefing later in the day. In the case of the R.A.F. Bomber Station visited, transport left the officers’ mess, a requisitioned hotel, two miles from the aerodrome, at 9 a.m.
The pilots report to their Squadron Leader in his office. Three mornings a week there is P.T. for aircrews at 9.30 a.m. to 9.45 a.m. But the general impression is of them waiting around for the decision which is the focal point of their day.
The point is that though they may not have operated for more than a week, they never know each morning whether or not they will be doing so. Of course, extreme weather conditions are a pretty good guide when they get up in the morning. But the weather overhead may have no particular bearing on the weather over Germany that night.
About 10 o'clock the telephone rings to say whether or not there will be operations.
What is the General Time-table for the Air Crews?
Every morning, whether or not they are operating, each aircraft must be tested. If there is no operation they probably make a practice flight. They may do some practice bombing with small practice bombs. If, on the other hand, they are going to be operating that night they will probably do their night flying test – N.F.T.s as the morning tests are called – on the ground. This takes up most of the morning.
In the afternoon there are probably lectures. There is a school for each operational job in the air crew. For instance, the navigators have lectures, inquests and discussions of their own. So do the wireless
1
[page break]
operators and the gunners, and the bomb aimers. They finish about tea-time, and the rest of the day is their own.
On this particular day the crews had been flying in the morning, and, at the point when I was introduced, the members of the particular crew to which I had been allotted were on their way to spend Sunday afternoon cleaning their Lancaster, T for Tommy.
There were seven in the crew: pilot, flight engineer, navigator, air bomber (or bomb-aimer), wireless operator, mid-upper gunner and rear-gunner. The Lancaster didn't look sensationally large despite its sensationally large bomb load. The pilot, Knights, showed me round it and indicated where I would stand for the operation, while the rest of the crew cleaned it. Apparently a pilot had to pay a half-crown fine if the Squadron Leader found any uncleaned portion of the aircraft.
Are Any Inquests Held?
We weren't there for long, as we had to be back at 4 p.m. for a post-mortem discussions on the last Berlin raid, which had taken place a few days before. It was held in the briefing room, which was about the size of a small church hall, with a table and forms for each crew.
The Group Captain conducted the meeting. Apparently it was the first of the kind held on this station. He explained that after each operation the report and photographs brought back by each crew were individually considered. He hoped that if the post-mortems were held in the presence of all concerned very useful lessons might be learned. It might help to counteract the tendency to think you knew a thing when you weren't really sure.
But criticism was to be constructive, not destructive. "When I ask why were you 20 miles off track, I don't mean why the hell were you 20 miles off track, I just mean why were you 20 miles off track?"
The various specialist officers, Intelligence, Radio, Ordnance, etc., and the two Squadron Leaders and the Wing Commander sat on each side of him. The Group Captain sat alone at a small table raised on a shallow platform. He had a pile of dossiers before him, one relating to each crew. He took these in turn.
Now, Was Priority Really Necessary?
"Tomlin came back with two engines U/S. and a third likely to go. Very good performance. Now, the point is this – he asked for radio priority, and he couldn’t get it because another aircraft already had priority. Now, was it really necessary for the other aircraft to have priority, and why was it necessary?"
The navigator of the crew concerned stood up and said that they had become uncertain of their whereabouts because he, the navigator, had been attending to another member of the crew who was unconscious through oxygen failure. The Group Captain went into the question of why there had been an oxygen failure. He prescribed a revised and
2
[page break]
tightened up arrangement for inspecting each man's oxygen mask before taking off.
One crew had complained that the door of the aircraft had blown open. The room became divided into two schools. Those who maintained the official view that it was mechanically impossible for the door to blow open. And those with experience of doors inclined to blow open.
T for Tommy was the last aircraft to be considered. There was laughter in the post-mortem when the Group Captain read out that Knights had bombed on the reciprocal. That is to say, he had been unsatisfied with his first bombing run and hadn't dropped his bombs, but had turned and made another run. To do this had to fly in the opposite direction to the general traffic path for aircraft over Berlin. It was considered very funny. "I don't know what to say to you," said the Group Captain. "Don't know quite what to say."
"It would have taken too long to circle the town and come in again in the ordinary way, sir," said Knights.
"Yes, couldn't do that over Berlin. Quite hopeless. Yes, I think you were justified. After all, you achieved your primary object. Dropped the bombs on the target. Yes, I think you were justified. Very creditable."
The rest of the day was our own.
Is There Much Excitement Beforehand?
Next morning the pilots were hanging round the Squadron Leader's office in the same way as yesterday.
Nothing definite had come in by 10 o'clock when we went out to the aircraft, though the weather was considered ominously suitable. Accumulators were being changed out in the aircraft, the radio was being tested. A girl's voice said, "I hear you strong and clear. I hear you strong and clear."
Discipline was informal but definite. Or rather, there didn't have to be any. The sense of interdependence between various members of the crew was complete. They all looked to the pilot for guidance. Each one was conscious of his own vital part in the crew. Apart from the pilot, the outstanding character was the tail-gunner who was referred to as "the old man" or "Dad" because of his pessimistic and hypochondriac tendencies. Apparently Dad was inclined to be an alarmist, to see fighters in a clear sky. But this increased the general confidence in him as a tail-gunner. They were convinced that no fighter could possibly catch Dad napping.
"Look at this, that's ominous," said Knights. A 4,000lb bomb was being towed up to the aircraft on a ground level buggy. The engines were given a ground run. There was a sense of pleasurable excitement as they started up one by one. The compartment warmed up very quickly. A new zest was detectable as it became evident that there was going to be an operation tonight. The sense of adventure is infectious. You feel that you are taking life by the throat and shaking it.
3
[page break]
After a cup of tea at the Y.M.C.A. mobile van we drove back to the mess for lunch at noon. My room-mate was changing. He put a small German dictionary in his pocket. "Come in handy in the Stalag," he said.
There was an atmosphere of quietly mounting excitement at lunch. People's minds were obviously slightly ahead of the current meal. Certainly mine was.
Is Briefing Just Like in "Target for Tonight"?
Pilots were to be briefed at 1 p.m. We sat around on wicker chairs and forms in a small room just off the main briefing room. The windows looked out over the airfield, but the aircraft were too dispersed to be visible. This room was the Intelligence Library. It was covered with training pamphlets, intelligence reports, not to mention the ABCA pamphlets. We were still waiting at 1.35 p.m. The pilots were discussing possible destinations.
Eventually the target map was brought in and unveiled. Coloured cords and pins marked the route to and from the target. It was Frankfurt, in South-west Germany. "I hate that name," said Knights. "Biggest concentration of searchlights you ever saw."
Roll call was then taken. The Group Captain came in and sat up on a table.
"Met., will you give your story?" said the Wing Commander. The Meteorological Officer started his technical monologue, illustrated by a large and complicated cloud diagram. "No fronts definitely affecting your route . . . bases should be O.K. to land all night . . ." and so on.
The Intelligence Officer described Frankfurt. Population about 570 thousand, a very important town; a commercial and financial centre; with very vital railway ramifications, also of considerable importance as an industrial centre. The docks had been badly damaged in October of this year.
Are Tactical Details Discussed?
The pilots had each been issued with a map of the target area set in a map-case, on the back of which there was a space marked off under various headings for them to make notes. The Wing Commander said that there would be several hundred aircraft on the raid (he gave the exact figure). The attack would be in waves. He read out which aircraft would be in the various waves.
He went on to give particulars of the petrol load, the bomb load, and the overall or all-up weight of the aircraft. One of these aircraft weighs as much as a small convoy of motor lorries.
"You'll set course over base at 17.50 hours. Must be comfortable at your height – 20,000 feet – shortly before crossing the enemy coast. Remain at maximum height all the way to the target. You can climb up afterwards but not above 23,000, as the wind increases at that point."
There was to be a spoof attack on Mannheim, to divert the enemy
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defences; this would go in earlier. There would be coffee and sandwiches in the crew-room at 3 p.m., transport at 3.35 p.m. We were to be at the aircraft by 4 p.m. First take-off at 5 p.m. Zero hour would be 7.35 p.m. Zero hour for the last wave would be between 14 and 17 minutes later.
We moved into the neighbouring room for the main briefing. Here the crews were sitting, each of them on their separate tables. Ours was in the middle of the room. Knights started telling them what had gone on in the pilots' briefing. When all the pilots had finished telling their crews the Group Captain stood up on the platform at the end of the room and read out one of the Prime Minister's messages of congratulation to Sir Arthur Harris. The Group Captain said he was sure they would all be glad to hear that Sir Arthur had sent a message expressing their appreciation of the Prime Minister's thoughtfulness. "And I'm sure you will join me in congratulating our late Wing Commander – Wing Commander Abercrombie – on his very well deserved bar to the D.F.C. I wired him congratulations from us all."
He went on to say that Frankfurt had often been scheduled as a target, but bad weather had often interfered. Tonight was perfect. "The Met. merchant won't dare to show his face if anything goes wrong.
"Now let's have 14 first-class aiming-point photographs for the Wing Commander's first trip. Have a good trip – 14 aiming-points, remember, and 14 back."
What is it Like, Waiting to Go?
We went to dress ourselves. I put on the whole rigmarole; flying suit, fleece-lined boots, sweater, parachute harness, and Mae West.
We were driven out to the aircraft and stood around warming ourselves at the ground crew's fire which was burning outside their little shack. It was pretty cold. Things were very quiet. No sensation of being surrounded by an air armada waiting to take off. Just a small party in a corner of a big, windy field. It was about twenty to five when Knights said: "Well, better be getting in." The engines were started at 4.50 p.m. The pilot and the engineer started going through their checking and testing rigmarole. I stood just behind them in the gangway which leads past the pilot's chair from the nose where the bomb aimer was reclining to the navigator's position just behind me.
The navigator was a rubicund country boy. He sat at a table which grew out from the wall of the aircraft and worked at his maps. [symbol] I had a very good view out of the right-hand side of the aircraft which consisted mostly of glass. I could see out of the left-hand side, but only a limited range of vision owing to the high back of the pilot's seat and the blackout curtain which partitioned off the navigator's
[symbol] Navigators have a separate and elaborate briefing: "The major responsibility for arriving at the right place at the right time rests with the navigator of each aircraft. He maps out the route, and then, using the wind directions and speeds obtained from 'met,' plots the times over the turning-points en route. In flight as often as possible he checks his course by obtaining a 'fix'; then calculates any change there has been in wind speed and direction and revises his flight plan.”
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[diagram]
Diagram shows a German newspaper impression of an R.A.F. raid on Berlin, reproduced by courtesy of the News Chronicle.
compartment. Outside the ground crew were shivering with their hands in their pockets.
Do You Climb Up Quickly or Gradually?
"Is the door shut, Bill?" asked the pilot over the inter-com. On hearing that it was he began to start the engines, one by one, from right to left, until the four of them were roaring. Almost immediately the cabin began to get noticeably warmer. The aircraft edged out on to the taxi track. Other aircraft were lumbering in the same direction. Presently we wheeled into the runway past the little group of blue figures standing to watch the take-off and wave good-bye.
The sense of adventure was further enhanced by the gathering darkness into which the aircraft ahead was just disappearing, followed at about 30-second intervals by our own. The pilot and the engineer were meanwhile carrying on their technical dialogue. "Under-carriage," said the pilot.
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"Undercarriage up," said the engineer.[symbol]
We flew over a river. "Let me know when I'm right over the drome," said the pilot.
"O.K.," said the navigator. "O.K., that'll do."
"O.K., Navigator."
There was a band of olive green, orange and scarlet across the general greyness of the sky: it was like marzipan. Turning round I could look down the length of the aircraft; it looked much bigger in the air than on the ground. There was a slightly sinister red glow from each of the four engines.
The navigator asked the pilot to give him the air speed and height. "170; 11,200," intoned Knights. We started passing large formations of aircraft flying in the opposite direction and distinguishable by their navigation lights. Sometimes they flashed past, seeming to be
[symbol] Every 20 minutes the engineer logs the engine temperatures and oil temperatures. He watches the boost and R.P.M. to prevent using fuel unnecessarily. The more fuel they land with the better everyone is pleased. If, say, an engine catches fire, he must feather it, turn off the petrol, try to extinguish the fire; and, if possible, get the engines going again. If the aircraft has to be ditched he is responsible for launching the dinghy.
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dangerously near. All this time we were climbing. At ten to six I noted that the stars were looking down.
"O.K. Turn right now," said the navigator, and we started wheeling round.
What Does the Pilot Watch For?
I noticed that Knights always looked behind before turning. In the Squadron Leader's office there was a list of instructions for pilots headed "Experientia Docet," in which one of the rules was "Always look behind before taking off. Also before doing a turn in the air. The machine you are flying isn't the only one in existence. Neither are you the only fool. Make a habit of this, but not the habit that makes you screw your head round without seeing anything."
There were other rules. "A good pilot when travelling by train or car should subconsciously be seeing the passing country in the light of a forced landing ground." "Always regard the other man as a fool. Then if he turns out to be one, you won't be surprised." "Do everything in the air smoothly – one might almost say with rhythm. Treat the machine as you would a lady." The one which I hoped Pilot Officer Knights had taken most to heart was: "A steady, consistent pilot is of far more use than a brilliant, erratic one."
"Is that the coast?" the rear-gunner's voice suddenly asked, over the inter-com. I looked down and just made out the division between land and water.
"Yep, Norfolk," said Knights.
"There's a convoy off Great Yarmouth," announced the navigator.
At 6.25 someone asked if we could have the heat lowered. I couldn't identify the inter-com. voice, but he said he was getting fairly sweating. The rear-gunner excitedly announced the approach of an aircraft and then said, "O.K., Lancaster."
"Keep a good look round, Dad," said the pilot.
What Does Europe Look Like?
Distant flashes and searchlight cones began to be visible. The aircraft broke into an odd swaying motion. As we drew nearer Europe the whole horizon was punctuated by signs of strife. These activities were forbiddingly widespread.
"Coast coming up," said Knights presently.
"You're heading straight for flak," said the bomb aimer.
"That's right, run right into it," said the engineer sarcastically.
Knights was suddenly concerned that his windscreen was icing up. The engineer bent up forward and rubbed the rag round it.
"Two searchlights on the starboard bow," said the tail-gunner.
"O.K.," said Knights.
The aircraft started weaving slightly. The two searchlights were creeping with sinister purposefulness around the sky; every now and then executing a dart as if to demonstrate their reserves of mobility. They seemed to stroke the sky all round us, playing cat and mouse. It seemed unlastably [?] good luck, that they didn't find us. There would
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be no trouble about the morale of searchlight detachments if the men could be taken for a ride in a bomber and experience the attention and respect induced by the weapons they wield.
I looked at my watch, which I could read quite plainly in the reflected light of the searchlights. It was 6.45 p.m. We seemed to be passing through a belt of searchlights, which in the way of searchlights switched on and off without much apparent logic. There seemed to be no telling where they would spring up next, and this was horrifying.
There seemed to be a lot of gunfire, but nothing came near us. Our relative position to most of the clusters of searchlights took a long time to change, which meant, I suppose, that they were much farther away than I imagined. Quite suddenly, after flying in this atmosphere of action and enemy protest for some time, we were in the clear again. We were in fact clear of the coast, or in the fighters' parlour, according to how you felt. Incidentally, there isn't much you can feel.
Do the Crew Talk Much?
"I think everybody's early, Bob. There's no searchlights at the back now," said the tail-gunner after a little while. The tail-gunner seemed to be easily the best-informed commentator on the social scene. He seemed to know the most and talked the most. [symbol] Perhaps his isolation stimulated his appetite for sociability. Presently he said, "There's one going down in flames. Right behind us."
I looked back and couldn't see anything until the engineer pointed it out. I could distinguish a faint shapeless glow of flames.
It served to emphasis that admission to these quarters was not free. The gate was shut behind. The house was haunted. Europe was all around us and we were all alone. Looking down on the ground you could see odd, inexplicable, unaggressive looking lights from time to time. They had no apparent significance, and may even have been blackout infringements of the grosser kind. But they served to emphasise our sense of being cut off. I need hardly say, because it has been said so often already, that this gives one a tremendous sense of comradeship with the other members of the crew. Your companionship with each other knows no inhibitions of temperament or prejudice. Friendship is perfect and complete. The idea of carrying an irritation or a resentment against one of them into the air seems quite out of the question.
"Fighter flares in front," said Knights. "Keep a good look out, Dad."
I began keeping a good look out immediately. I saw a row of orange flares hanging pendant in the sky. They seemed to be quite a distance away, but I distrusted them none the less for that. Having already underestimated the distance of some searchlights, there seems no reason why I shouldn't be overestimating the distance of these flares.
Back in the rear-turret, Dad seemed to be having a whale of a time. He kept asking Knights to switch the aircraft in different directions
[symbol] He said his main job was keeping warm and seeing the fighter first. Fighters usually approach from astern and below, unless they get an aircraft silhoutted against a cloud, when they approach from above.
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so that he could get a better view of points where he thought he saw a fighter. (Incidentally, though he had nearly finished his operational tour and been on many of the severest recent raids, he had never yet been opened fire on by a fighter.)
The Ruhr ("Happy Valley") was now pointed out to me. I looked and saw nothing but distant cones of searchlights. "I think that's Cologne," said the engineer, pointing at nothing in particular. It wasn't really a very satisfactory view of the Ruhr. But I felt glad to have seen it. It felt very grand to be able to look out of the window and say to oneself: "Oh, yes, of course, the Ruhr.”
Are There Many Collisions?
"That's Mannheim. Looks as if they're going in early," said Knights.
You could see it quite plainly ahead of us to the right, though it must have been about a hundred miles away. You could see the clusters of searchlights, the flares, the fires and the flashes. Mannheim is about fifty miles from Frankfurt, and it was about this time that we began to come in sight of our target. There were the same flashes and searchlights, but much more clearly defined. It was quite unlike what I expected. Everything was so neatly beautiful.
"Hello, Bob. Junkers 88 coming up, starboard," said Dad in a sudden urgent voice. Knights threw the aircraft over to allow the gunners to get a better view.
"No, O.K., sorry it's a Lanc.," said Dad. I looked up and saw that it was indeed a Lanc. Coming towards us in what seemed like a sideways motion. One second a vague shape, it alarmingly materialised and defined its outline. There just seemed no possibility of avoiding collision. It was all over in a second, but it seemed quite a time. It passed just to the rear and slightly high. I looked up and saw its underbelly skim over us. "Jesus, did you see that," said Knights.
"I thought we'd had it that time," said the engineer. The aircraft was still rocking from the impact with the other aircraft's slipstream.
What Does the Target Look Like?
We were now coming up to Frankfurt proper. You could see what looked like hundreds of thousands of electric light bulbs carpeting the ground. It took me some little time to realise that these were incendiaries. They looked so regular and artificial, so naively pretty, that you couldn't associate them with any work of destruction. There was a large, long area of them shaped like the lobes of a gigantic liver.
The sky was suddenly filled with the regular grey puffs of a flak barrage. These barrages seemed to me extraordinarily consistent in their strength. They don't just throw up a few hundred rounds and stop. They continue with what seems like unlimited regularity.
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With the flares dropped by the pathfinders, the flares dropped by the enemy fighters, the waving searchlights, the bead-like pattern of incendiary fires on the ground, and the flashes of gunfire, there is a sense of supreme experience and excitement.
Knights was working to keep us out of the clutches of some peculiarly inquisitive searchlights, and away to the right another aircraft had failed to keep out of the way. You could see it wriggling in the cone of searchlights doing their best to hold it there while the guns concentrated on this one aircraft.
The cruel thing is that one's only sensation is one of relief that the searchlights are temporarily diverted elsewhere. You feel no urge to go to the assistance of the unfortunate aircraft that is cornered. Of course, obviously it would be senseless to do so, but it seems extraordinary that one doesn't feel any urge to do so. I noticed the same indifference to the troubles of others when flying with the Americans. There is complete unity within the individual aircraft, but for some reason that seems to be the limit of one's horizon. Nor is it simply the expression of my own individual idiosyncrasy. It was obviously a general state of mind.
Is There a Strict Time-table?
All this time the pilot and the navigator were keeping up a running dialogue on how the time was going for the approach to the target. Apparently we were a minute or two early, so we had to lose that amount of time. It was pretty impressive, if the word isn't too banal, to hear the young men talking about losing a minute or two while passing through this firework display. I hadn't much idea of what was going on. I didn't know whether we were running up to the target or still cruising round, and I didn't want to disturb the crew in any way. It hardly seemed in my best interest to do so. I was anxious that they should give of their best, and concentrate closely on the work in hand, i.e., my safe return to England. But presently I realised that we were running up.
"Get weaving, Skipper, the night's too long," said someone.
"I can't see that river," said Knights.
"Bomb-doors open," said whoever's business it was to open them.
"How're we doing?" said someone.
"Fine," said someone else.
Do They Just Drop Them Anywhere?
The first time over the target, conditions weren't apparently satisfactory. They couldn't see the pathfinding flares which they were supposed to bomb, so we flew across the town, then circled round and
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approached the target area from almost the diametrically opposite direction to the main stream of bombers. Coming back on to the target, it was like bright daylight.[symbol]
[diagram]
It is very difficult to describe. Nothing that I have ever read on the subject of bombing gave me anything like the impression which I actually had on the spot. I expected something of the atmosphere of a fire-blitz on the ground. I hadn't allowed for the sense of detachment produced by being 20,000 feet high. You knew that down there was a town of half a million people. By staring round the engineer's shoulder I could see the bomb aimer preparing to press the button which would release another 4,000 lbs. on to the town. But it seemed quite unreal.
Can You See the Fires?
The incendiaries were dropped first and then the 4,000 lb. cookie. Just beforehand there was an appreciable tenseness of the crew. The pilot, of course, had to keep the aircraft flying as level as possible for the bombing run. He turned and half rose from his seat as if he was willing the aircraft to a supreme effort. I tried to write down the dialogue between pilot and bomb aimer, but it was too fast for my hobbling shorthand. I wrote it down, but now I can't transcribe it.
I did not feel any appreciable lightness of the aircraft when "bombs away" was announced. All I knew was that the dialogue of "Steady," "Hold her steady," "O.K., Bob," "O.K., Bomb-aimer," and the sing-song intonation of members just before the dropping, subsided.
Knights asked the bomb aimer if he thought they had obtained a satisfactory picture; the bomb aimer thought he had. They were all professionally satisfied with the delivery of the bomb. There was a sense of achievement. The engineer pointed out the burning streets of Frankfurt. I could just make them out from an orange streak in the carpet of fairy-like lights produced by the incendiaries. I tried to think of the spectacle in terms of what was going on twenty thousand feet below, but it was just impossible to worry about. Mostly, I
[symbol] Approaching the target the bomb-aimer report every indication of position to the navigator. "When the navigator judges the aircraft to be over the target area the bomb-aimer guides the aircraft through the flak until he sees his target in the bomb-sight and releases his bombs." He tries to drop the cookie in the middle of the incendiaries. When the bombs drop the navigator logs the time, heading of the aircraft, speed and height. These particulars enable Intelligence to plot where the bomb has fallen. The diagram on this page is reproduced from a rough sketch made by the navigator.
N. & P. T51–1087
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suppose, because we had plenty to worry about twenty thousand feet above.
The amount of fun and fury and fighter flares are extraordinary. The sky was simply full of trouble. Yet, oddly enough, it was difficult to think of us in this particular aircraft as actively threatened by sudden death. I don't mean that, speaking for myself. I wasn't afraid. Certainly I was in a state of great alarm. But I didn't really expect that we in this aircraft would buy it.
Were Many Shot Down?
There seemed to be plenty to buy. The tail-gunner reported that he counted 49 fighter flares. Just afterwards he reported a fight going on behind us to starboard. I looked back and saw the flares and stabs of flame. This and the one we saw just after crossing the coast were the only two aircraft we saw going down, though we later learned that 42 aircraft had been lost that night.
"Is there a small defended area on the starboard?" Knights asked the navigator. Two or three of the crew got into an argument as to whether it was Aachen or Brussels. "That's Antwerp a bit further up," said one of them. It was ridiculous to hear the young men talk of the cities of Western Europe in terms of where they were last Friday, no, I'm a liar, that was Tuesday; or knowing their way so matter of factly round the Continent in these bizarre circumstances. They knew them not by their cultural monuments, their political significance or their hotels, but simply by their flak and searchlight barrages. They all looked alike to me, but I was told that after only two or three trips you remember the way awfully well.
There was quite a lot of flak going up over Brussels. We crossed the coast in the neighbourhood of Rotterdam. And just before doing so were nearly caught by searchlights. "Hello, they're having a go," said Knights, as the light seemed to lift the fuselage. The aircraft started weaving as, amid the incongruously factious encouragement of the crew, Knights went about the routine of evasion.
When you consider how large the coast of Europe is it seems extraordinary how difficult it is to cross it without coming up against resistance of one kind or another. "Keep a good luck out, Dad. See we're not being followed," said Knights. "O.K." said Dad.
Do You Get Anything to Eat?
It seemed a long way back over the North Sea. I was getting very tired of standing. The engineer let me sit on his seat for a spell, but then he had to have it back to go on with his business.
Coffee was now served from Thermos flasks. I opened the paper bag of rations with which we had been issued. There was an orange,
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a packet of chocolate, some boiled sweets, and two packets of chewing gum. I ate the chocolate, but with difficulty, as it was frozen hard. I then ate the orange, which was also frozen. In fact, the emotional experience of eating that orange was quite lost. It was painfully cold in the mouth.
We were now down to 10,000 or 11,000 feet and had taken off our oxygen masks. It wasn't long, but it seemed long, before we were skirting the English coast. There were searchlights here, too, but what a difference in their attitude. These were kindly lights pointing the way to security, not fingers of fate contriving your doom.
It was now something past 10 p.m., and we were due to land at 11 p.m. That last hour seemed interminable. I found it odd that I hadn't any particular sense of achievement, such as I had anticipated. All I felt was awfully tired.
The landing grounds were illuminated by circles of tiny light. And over each aerodrome there was a guiding cone of searchlights. The odd think was at this height they seemed so very close together. It was as if all the landing grounds were in adjoining fields, instead of being many miles apart. I got to the point where I didn't think we were ever going to land, but eventually we did.
We were driven back to be interrogated, and then home to the mess for bacon and egg.
I got to bed some time after 2 a.m.
This crew had been on operations for some time, and expected to finish their term in a month or so. The operations weren't at all monotonous, said Knights, but they were all of a kind. After the first few trips you learned your way round. Some crews regarded the business as getting progressively easier with each raid, but this crew made a point of regarding each raid as the first. They thought that was the surest way of getting through.
Two Footnotes
1. An R.A.F. officer with whom this pamphlet was discussed, said:-
"It may be a good thing to stress the immense amount of scientific knowledge that crews must have, despite the blasé way in which they refer to 'luck' and one trip being very much like another. It is only their intensive training before ever they reach an operational squadron, the continuation of training and practice when they do get to an operational station, the mastery of their aircraft and weapons, and their experience over enemy territory, that can make them appear to be so blasé."
2. An American Fortress crew with which I flew on daylight operations said that they would be scared stiff to fly at night in the R.A.F. fashion. While the R.A.F. crew said that they would be scared stiff to fly by day. There seems to be a moral lurking somewhere here.
iv
Dublin Core
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WAR - Frankfurt Revisited
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A booklet with information about the progress of the war. This edition covers RAF Bomber Command activities.
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Army Bureau of Current Affairs
Date
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1944-01-22
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Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Mannheim
Germany
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
British Army
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eng
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16 printed pages
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MHayhurstJM2073102-170725-11
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-01-22
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Sue Smith
aerial photograph
air gunner
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
B-17
bomb aimer
bombing
briefing
Distinguished Flying Cross
flight engineer
ground personnel
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Ju 88
Lancaster
meteorological officer
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
prisoner of war
propaganda
searchlight
target indicator
target photograph
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/612/32129/BMorrisWMorrisWv1.1.pdf
9f201c25d99b744766e20e799676569a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
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Morris, Walter
W Morris
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Morris, W
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. An oral history interview with Walter Morris (b. 1923, 1623898 Royal Air Force). and his memoir. He flew operations with 630 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Walter Morris and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
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217-02-18
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[typewritten]
[centred] Walter Morris – 1939/45 War Record. [/centred]
My story begins in 1923 when I was born in Kettering the elder son of Charles & Ethel Morris. My father served in the Army during the 1914/18 war, although he rarely talked about it, so I do not know any details of her service, except that he had a very hard time serving in the trenches, in terrible conditions. When he returned to Kettering he worked in a Boot & Shoe factory where I believe he met my mother Ethel May Smith who also worked there, & they married in 1922mat[sic] Carey Baptist Chapel. I was born in 1923 & my brother Peter followed two years later. I attended Park Road Infants school. When the family moved to the other end of Kettering Peter & I went to Hawthorn Road Junior School. In 1935 I moved on to the Central School (& Peter followed 2 years later). It was here that I first met Pauline in 1938. For a while we walked out together, & although we drifted apart, we were both in the same circle of friends, & I was still greatly attracted to her.
After 4 years I left School & obtained employment as a junior Clerk at Stewarts & Lloyds, Corby. I started to work there on the 26th August 1939, just 7 days before the war began. I don’t think that many people at the time thought of war starting, & it was quite a shock on the 1st September when without notice a black out was imposed. All street lighting in the Country was switched off, householders were ordered to black out their windows etc, no lights should be visible. These orders were put in place because of the probability of German aircraft making bombing raids over Britain. At 11 am on 3rd September the Prime Minister (Neville Chamberlain) broadcast to the nation to advise that Germany had ignored our ultimatum regarding their plans to invade Poland, & consequently a state of war existed with Germany. That day I recall my father, brother & I spent the afternoon digging a large hole in the garden so that an air raid shelter could be erected, & where we could go if Kettering was ever bombed. In fact we never did get an ARP shelter, & in Kettering only one or two bombs were dropped.
Conscription to the forces was quickly introduced, & men between the ages of 18 & 40 had to register, & were soon allocated to serve in either the army, navy or air force. The only exceptions, other than ill health or disability were men employed in essential work. Later women were also required to enlist, to join one ATS (army_ WAAF (air force) or WRNS (navy). Being just 16 this did not concern me at the time – many people said that the war would be over by Christmas, there was little enemy activity around this country in 1939, & life for me life went on as normal. How wrong we were – there were some food shortages, but rationing was still some time ahead. It was soon to alter, in the Spring of 1940, Hitler’s armies swept through Europe culminating with British troops being evacuated from Dunkirk. In preparation to invade Britain Germany launched ceaseless bombing raids on airfields etc in England in an effort to decimate the RAF fighter strength. However the Spitfires & Hurricanes of the RAF defeated the German bombers & in September 1940, Germany cancelled the plans to invade & instead turned their attention towards Russia, although their Air force commenced bombing raids on many cities & towns in this Country. Earlier Chamberlain resigned as Prime Minister, & was succeeded by Winston Churchill, many believe that he was the man who won the war for our country.
For me 1941 was rather decisive. At the beginning of the year the Government announced the formation of the Air Training Corps, which would train lads between the ages of 16 to 18, for enlistment in to the RAF. The response was overwhelming towns & cities all over the country formed squadrons. Volunteer instructors were enrolled from local people including School teachers, who would train the lads in basic requirements when the cadets reached the RAF. By this time I was 17 years of age – I knew that as the war dragged on, I would have to enlist & I desperately wanted to join the Air Force, so I was one of the first to enlist for the Kettering Squadron. In all over 200 boys enrolled at Kettering initially, & I was fortunate to be appointed to be a sergeant. It was a great adventure. We paraded at Stamford Road School two nights a week, & went through our routines & lessons, everything from drill, marching, to Aircraft recognition learning morse code, & much more &
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which was to hold me in good stead when I eventually joined the RAF. We also played at sports, including having a football team in the local youth league. A big thrill that year was a week end camp at RAF Wittering which included a flight in Dragon Rapide an old bi-plane, which at the time was a great thrill. At the end of the year having reached 18 years I volunteered for the RAF & was accepted for aircrew training – at that time I wanted to be a pilot. On February 12th 1942 I received my “Calling up” papers, & told to report to the Aircrew Receiving Centre at Lords Cricket Ground London on the 23rd. I was in fact the first cadet from the Kettering ATC to be called up. At the time I was still working at Stewarts & Lloyds in the Traffic Department, & was give immediate permission to leave, with an assurance that I could return after the war ended.
So for me, AC2 Morris W. 1623898, my war service started when I left Kettering for London on a cold February morning. I duly reported & registered at Lords Cricket Ground. There were many new arrivals & after signing in we were marched to billets about a quarter of a mile away. The billets were one time luxury flats which overlooked London Zoo. About 20 of us were allocated to each flat, which was to be our billet for the next 2 to 3 weeks. We were issued with mattresses & blankets, & had to make our beds up on the floor. For our meals we were assembled & marched to the Zoo Restaurant for our meals. During the next days we were issued with Air Force uniforms & clothing, & each given a Medical & received inoculations etc. Also we had lectures about life in the RAF, & what was expected of us as Airmen. We also took tests to ascertain our education etc. It was all very exciting. In mid-March I along with 40 or so others were posted & sent to the Grand Hotel, Scarborough Yorkshire which was an Initial Training Unit (for Aircrew training). At this time I & all the other new recruits held the rank of AC2 (the lowest of the low) & we were all at that time being accepted as trainee pilots. The course was hard, discipline was strict, we marched, & subjected to a great deal of physical exercise, as well as attending lectures daily in our quests to finally become fliers. Most of us cadets on the course were about the same age, 18 & 19 year olds, & it was really a great adventure. Graduating in June, we were then posted to a civilian air field, at Brough near to Hull, where we were given some instructions how to fly Tiger Moth aircraft, delightful old bi-planes. My instructor was a first world war pilot, & although he never allowed me to fly solo in a plane, did recommend that I should receive pilot training. So after 6 weeks at Brough, those of us who were selected to continue in our quest to be pilots, were sent to Heaton Park, Manchester to await our next step. Most of the aircrew training was overseas, either in the USA, Canada, South Africa or Rhodesia, & in late September 1942, I with several hundred others, received inoculations, further medicals, & sent to Glasgow to be shipped to Canada. What a thrill as the train pulled up on the dock, where the SS Queen Mary was waiting to embark us, a pre-war luxury liner it was a beautiful vessel, weighing in at over 70000 tons. The vessel had retained much of it’s pre-war glory, & after the austerity of war time Britain, it was like living in a wonderland. There were only a few hundred airmen on board, cabins had extra bunks built in, but it was never crowded. The catering arrangements were excellent, & the food was great, no worries about rationing, as the vessel was stocked up by the USA, who had joined with Britain to fight Germany & Japan in December 1941 after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. Ships to & from the war zones at this time sailed in convoy, protected by the Royal Navy, but the Queen Mary was too fast for convoys, & indeed could outrun & out manoeuvre German U-boats, as it zig-zagged it’s was across the Atlantic. So she slipped out of port quietly on her own. For 5 days we airmen lived in this seemingly unreal world, bags of lovely food, cinema shows, lounging on the decks as the ship took a southerly & warm weather course. All too soon we arrived in Boston USA, to a great welcome by the locals who treated us as heroes. But we had a shock as we marched by the front of the ship when we saw a massive great gash of some 12 feet in the bow just at the waterline. On enquiry we were told that in fact the Queen Mary had sliced a British Destroyer in two, on a previous journey back to Britain, being unable to cancel the pre-set zig-zag course in time, such was the force of the great ship. However, we were told that the hole had been filled with concrete to enable her to get to the States for repair. From Boston we went by train through the New England states to Canada, & it was one of the most unforgettable journeys of my life before or after. In beautiful warm autumnal weather the magnificence of the
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scenery was unbelievable, the trees with their red & brown leaves on the tree lined the route, small lakes with blue waters, neat & well manicured houses. Even for a nineteen year old it was a truly memorable experience. After a 15 hour journey we arrived in the Canadian state of New Brunswick shortly after reached RCAF Moncton – this was a “Holding” station, where groups of cadets were selected for various courses, being run in Canada & USA. I cannot recall how many training Centres there were in the USA Canada, they were situated mainly to the west of the Continent, & guessing I would think about ten in Canada & the USA for pilot training, whilst in Eastern Canada navigators & Air Bombers were trained. I spent some three weeks here waiting for a posting, with little to do, except walk to nearby Moncton or go to the camp cinema, write home etc. I was anxious to get on with my training. By the end of October, I with 40 or so other cadets received our posting to RCAF Bowden, in Alberta. After kitting up with winter clothing, we left Moncton early one morning, on our way to the other side of Canada, a journey which would take 5 days. We stopped for a few hours in Montreal, to change trains before proceeding on to Alberta a journey that took us alongside Lake Superior, & on to Winnipeg, where we [were] given a lovely welcome by a Ladies organisation, who supplied refreshments, magazines etc – you would think that we had just won the war, not raw recruits. Eventually we arrived at Calgary, on a sunny but cool November day, & already the first of the winter snow had arrived. A further 100 miles of train travel followed, as we made our way north to Bowden, which is near to Innisfail, midway between Calgary & Edmonton, & some miles to the west the mountain ranges of the Rockies could be seen stretching into the sky. Bowden was a small airfield with one runway. The billets were very good & well heated, but we did make the mistake of opening some of the windows because it was so stuffy, & did we regret it in the morning when we were nearly frozen. I recall that the days generally in Alberta were sunny but there was a dryness, which somehow made the below freezing temperatures bearable. Snow already covered the countryside when I arrived at Bowden, & more snow followed, to give a deep frozen surface, which lasted throughout the winter. To cope with the conditions, some of the aircraft were fitted with skis. It was not long before flying lessons started, but I was soon to be disappointed, as both I & my instructor, soon realised that I was pretty useless handling an aeroplane, & not surprisingly I was taken off the course. Whilst I loved flying in the old Tiger Moths, I just could not handle the controls, or land the aircraft without a lot of bouncing & bumping about, on reflection it was the right decision, although I was very upset at the time. I had been at Bowden for about 6 weeks, & loved it out there. This all happened about Christmas 1942, & two weeks later I & another 4 or 5 “failures” were posted to RCAF Trenton, Ontario, for Aircrew re-selection. The journey back east lasted some 3 or 4 days, as we travelled via Lake Superior & Toronto to our destination. Trenton was a huge station, seemingly full of Aircrew cadets, many like me for re-selection or waiting to be trained as navigators, wireless operators or Air Bombers. It was so different from Bowden, even the weather. The cold was more penetrating, as the wind picked up moisture off the nearby Lake Ontario & it was most unpleasant. It was a waiting game at Trenton, I was interviewed & decided to re-muster for training as an Air Bomber, & (I think) about a month later was seconded on to a Bombing & Gunnery course, at RCAF Picton, a small aerodrome nearly 100 miles further east. Arriving there I saw that Picton was an island in Lake Ontario joined to the mainland by a causeway, & the aerodrome was built on the top of a hill. It was a nice friendly station, & my course members were a good bunch of lads, mainly about my age. The course was a Bombing & Gunnery course, which commenced in March 1943. We were taught the theory of bombing, & of air gunnery, the composition & fusing of bombs etc. & later I flew some 50 hours in Ansons & Bolingbroke aircraft dropping countless 4lb practice bombs & firing guns. It was I[sic] most enjoyable, for a 19 year old. As Spring arrived the weather changed, everywhere was white when I arrived & it seemed that overnight during April the weather became sunny & warm for the rest of my stay. I was to be with many of my course mates until I got back to England 6 months later, & I made a number of good friends. We had some delightful evenings out, in the small town of Picton, or swimming in the lake. The population were very friendly & hospitable, & we were well looked after. The course lasted until early June, & looking at my log book see that I passed both the bombing & gunnery elements each
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with a 73% grading. I had passed this part of my conversion to an Air Bombers role & then I with rest of the course members moved on to an Air Navigation Course at RCAF Mount Hope. This station was to the west, near to Hamilton Ontario, & nearly halfway between Toronto & Niagra Falls (which luckily I was able to visit, together with a trip into USA.) During my six week course I learnt a little about navigation & air photography, both in the lecture rooms & by flying, some 45 hours all told, the flying was quite excellent as flights were of about 3 hours duration flying the length & breadth of Ontario. There followed a final examination, which I passed, classed as an Air Bomber & promoted to the rank of Sergeant. How proud I was as I sewed the stripes on to my tunic. What a celebration we all had that night in Hamilton, a city I enjoyed greatly.. But time was not on our side, & all too soon we were on our way back to Moncton, to be sent home to complete our training & to fight our war. How different to 10 months earlier, then an untrained airman, & on my return a fully fledged Sergeant. By this time America was sending thousands of servicemen to Britain, so space on the troop ships was full & consequently we had to wait a month before we could be accommodated. Eventually, at the end of September 1943 I & several hundred newly trained aircrew personnel were sent to Halifax, Nova Scotia, to embark once again on the “Queen Mary” en-route for England. Unlike my trip out it was very crowded with some 19000 troops (mainly Americans) aboard. This meant that we had a bed bunk for 24 hours & then 24 hours we had to sleep on the deck floor. Luckily the journey lasted only 6 days, before the vessel docked at Birkenhead. I was given two weeks home leave, to be re-united with family & friends. It was during this time, that I met up again with Pauline, & our romance commenced.
After my two weeks leave I reported to Harrogate before being posted to Whitley Bay, near to Newcastle, for a (Commando type) fitness course, before being sent to Scotland for further flying training, & on completion was sent to Silverstone, here in Northamptonshire, at the end of 1943, an Operational Training Unit where Pilots, Navigators, Air Bombers, Wireless Operators, & Air gunners were present. Here we had to form crews, who would later go on to the Squadrons. It was all rather haphazard, as some 200 of us wandered round a large hangar, trying to form crews. I didn’t know anyone else, other than Air Bombers, but eventually found a Pilot, a Navigator, a Wireless Operator, & two Air Gunners, (we would get a Flight Engineer at a later stage). Actually as a crew, we quickly became firm friends, & apart from one of the gunners dropping out, we completed our tour of operations together, with enormous respect for each other, & really we became as close as family. At Silverstone we trained in two engine Wellingtons as well as attending loads of lectures as we trained for the fight ahead. From Silverstone we were posted to RAF station Swinderby near Lincoln, for our first taste of flying in four engined aircraft. It was here that we met our Flight Engineer. The aircraft were Stirlings, big & ungainly machines, which proved to be a failure operationally – they could not fly any higher than 12-14000 feet, & easy prey for the enemy, but they were ideal for training purposes. Our next step was to convert to Lancasters at another station RAF Syerston, some 30 miles away. Our first experience of flying in a Lancaster was hardly encouraging, for as we took off with an instructor in charge, a tyre punctured & the aircraft swerved off the runway with one wing tip embedded in the grass. We made a very quick escape from the wrecked plane. But that apart, we soon appreciated the Lancaster bomber. 15 hours flying followed, & we were adjudged to be ready to go to a Squadron. On 5th June 1944, we were posted to East Kirkby, 10 miles north of Boston to join 630 Squadron. My first memory of East Kirkby, was the next morning, which was D.Day, 6th June 1944 when Britain & America & their Allies invaded France. The aircrews who had flown to support the ground troops were so excited by the scale of the invasion forces, the number of ships involved – it all seemed so impressive. The station was built only a year or two earlier, & was quite primitive, spread over a large area, our billets were nissen huts nearly a mile away from the airfield, the Sergeants & Officers’ Messes half a mile away, but strangely we soon loved the place. For the next few days as we settled in, we were introduced to the Squadron C.O. Wing Commander Bill Deas, a South African & a great character – sadly he & his crew were killed on a raid a few weeks later. At this time we met our replacement Rear gunner, Flying Officer Geoff Bate who still had half a dozen missions to complete his second tour of operations, we were well pleased. Our
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first mission was a night raid to Normandy, & was supposed to be in support of the Ground forces in the invasion area near to Caen. However on arrival over the target, we were ordered not to drop our bombs, as the ground armies had made a quick advance, & the target was now in their hands. So all the aircraft had to turn about & go back to base. When we did arrive over East Kirkby, we were then sent off over the North Sea, where I had to drop our bombs because it would be unsafe to try to land the aircraft because the overall weight was over the permitted limit. So out we flew to the dropping zone, & naively I dropped the lot, some 12000 lbs of high explosives, & back we went to base, where we were debriefed, given breakfast, which included a fried egg & bacon (a real treat, eggs were very scarce in war time Britain, but aircrews were always given one after an op.) But that was not quite the end of my mission – the next morning I was called to the Bombing Leaders Office, & given a telling off for dropping all the bomb load when I or the Flight Engineer should have calculated what weight of bombs to drop, to get the aircraft down to the safe landing weight, but on one had ever told me that. However I never heard any more about my “faux pas”. After our first mission others followed in quick succession & by the end of June we had notched up 4 more raids, including a rather hair raising trip to Germany, where some 37 Lancasters were shot down out of a total of 133 sent out, but luckily we were. Geoff, our Rear gunner had by the end of June completed his second tour, we valued his experience in those first few trips & were so pleased when we heard later that he had been rewarded with a DFC. During July we flew 10 further missions, including our first daylight raid – but only three over Germany. With the Allies invading Europe in June the role of Bomber Command changed, & support of the Armies was the first priority, by bombing Railways, Marshalling yards, Oil depots, to hamper the Germans. Also with the threat of Flying bomb attacks on England, a number of raids were against the launching sites, hence missions against German targets were reduced. July 18th was to prove the most horrendous trip we were to face, when we were hit by a German night fighter on our way home. Fortunately we escaped into cloud. & the attack was discontinued. However with the help of the Flight Engineer, Alec & Doug managed to pull the aircraft out of the dive, to regain control. A relieved crew were on their way home, thankful of the skill & calmness of our skipper, Alec Swain. When we saw the damage sustained by our Lancaster, with part of the wing missing & a hole just behind the Wireless Operators position, we wondered how we had survived. It said something for the skill of our pilot, & for the mighty Lancaster. But we had little time to feel sorry for ourselves, 12 hours later we were off on mission no 10 – our first day operation, thankfully a quiet trip. At the end of July we were allocated our own Lancaster, NN702J(Jig), in which we would end our tour. Nine more missions followed during August, three of them by daylight – it was much the same pattern as we supported the land armies, or raided Flying Bomb sites, attacked U-boat installations on the coast, & bombing an enemy fighter based aerodrome, to put it out of action, prior to a bombing raid t[to] be made that same night. Sad part of this daylight raid, when I witnessed a Lancaster bomber being hit by bombs dropped from another Lancaster flying above – particularly gruesome when we learned later that the doomed pilot, was a Dutchman, on the last mission of his tour, & the aerodrome under attack was in Holland. Sadly I saw no parachutes from the stricken plane. We were given two weeks leave on the 18th August with 26 trips completed. Returning to base, we still had 9 missions to fly to complete our tour of operations, & during the rest of September we completed a further 8 mainly against German industry, & one of those found me over Germany on my 21st birthday, thankfully it was an incident free journey. It was a bit of a change on raid number 33, when with 6 other Lancasters we dropped mines in the German sea-lanes outside of Heligoland, I recall it was quite boring flying for 4 hours over the North Sea. We flew our last mission on the 5th October a daylight raid to Wilhemshaven, although at the time we did not know we had reached the end, & until the next day when we were air testing an aircraft, & Alec, our pilot, told us that Bomber Command had reduced the number of operations from 35 to 34 with immediate effect, so our battle was over. I remember that when he told us there was a great rush about the aircraft, as we all donned parachutes – we were not taking any unnecessary risks.
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That night our crew, & the ground staff who looked after the plane, & were wonderful caring guys, all made our way to a pub in nearby Boston, where we had a whale of a party I’m afraid I do not remember too much about it, but that was excusable. A day or two later our crew left East Kirkby for good, & sent on leave, the seven of us boarded a train from Boston to Peterborough, & it all seemed so casual, we exchanged addresses, promised to keep in touch, but in an instant we went our separate ways. For nearly a year we had been together, living & flying & truthfully had become closed than family, as we supported each other during that period, & in a few seconds on the railway station it all ended & we all went our separate ways. Over the years Alec, Donovan, Dough & I met up a few times but some of the crew I would never see again. Now in 2010 as far as I know just Doug & I survive, although neither he nor I have any knowledge of what happened to Smithy our navigator or our first rear gunner, Geoff. Alec, Donovan & Jock (mid-upper gunner) have all died, but we remember them with great affection, & wonder about the others.
To sum up my tour I flew 34 missions from 12th June to the 5th October 1942 – 26 night & 8 daylight missions, flying 200 hundred hours. During that time we attacked industrial sites in Germany, Submarine depots, Oil terminals, Marshalling Yards & Railway Junctions, flying bomb sites & supported the Army by attacking enemy lines. On two missions we were instructed not to bomb on arrival in the target area. I do not have a complete record of bombing loads carried but estimate that in all we dropped over 150 tons – the average bomb carried was between 9000 & 12500 lbs (depending on the distance flown to the target) & the range of bombs dropped were 4lb incendiaries, 500lb, 1000lb, 2000lb & 4000lb. I would describe y tour as fairly quiet, twice the aircraft came under fire by night fighters, (the most serious I have detailed), & we did sustain slight flak damage. I have been asked whether or not I was scared, I don’t think I was, apprehensive – yes, but there was little time to think about those things, there was so much to do all the time. I was thrilled some weeks later when I heard that our skipper, Alec had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross – so well deserved.
After completing a first tour Aircrew were expected to have a 6 month break from operations before being recalled for a second tour & so three weeks after leaving East Kirkby, I was posted to RAF Westcott, near to Aylesbury, to await training as an Air Bomber instructor, but there was little to do as there were a number of men in the same category as me, & there was little to do. Whilst at Westcott, I received the most harrowing news, going home on a day off, my father handed me a telegram which had arrived earlier in the day, advising the death of my brother Peter. Returning from a raid on Dusseldorf, his aircraft was coming into land when it crashed just short of the runway, & tragically all the crew were killed. Peter had joined the RAF just a few months earlier; he had been selected for training as a Flight Engineer, & after qualifying was posted to 166 Squadron at Kirmington, Lincolnshire near to Grimsby. He was killed on 4th December 1944, & was just 19 years of age. We were all devastated, particularly my Mother & Father, who had no idea that he had started his operational tour – he had told me that he had, but being only a few weeks after the end of my tour, didn’t want our parents to know to cause them any concern or worry, - instead it was a more profound shock to them when it happened. I do know why the aircraft crashed, had it been attacked to cause damage or loss of fuel I don’t know, the Squadron records the crash with the remarks “cause unknown”. He was a cheerful lad, good sense of humour, & liked the girls. Unlike me he was mechanically minded, & a[sic] after leaving school, was training to be an Engineer. I often wonder if he wanted to follow me into the Air Force, because I think the job he was doing might have exempted him from joining up. We shall never know. He was buried in Kettering Cemetery, with the local Air Training Corps (of which he had been a member) in attendance. Peter’s crew were all Canadians & are buried near to RAF Kirmington. So very very sad. My parents were devastated, & it was something my father particularly never recovered from. To try to give them some comfort, I was able to get a compassionate posting to RAF Desborough, like Westcott an Operational Training Unit, & served there for about 6 months, although I was sent to a Air Bombers’ instruction Course at RAF Manby in Lincolnshire for three weeks early in 1945, & graduated from their[sic] as a fully fledged
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instructor. I stayed at Desborough for a few weeks, not much to do, but it was nice living with my parents, & biking or going by bus, to the base. In May the war against Germany had been won, & there were great celebrations, & we wondered what would happen next. I was soon to find out, aircrew were supposed to fly two tours of duty, the second after a 6 month rest period, so I was not surprised when I was included in a crew made up of instructors who like me were eligible to fly operationally. I do not remember much about my fellow crew members the pilot was from Edinburgh – a Flight Lieutenant Christie DFC, & that’s about all. We were posted to RAF Luffenham, near Stamford, arriving there in mid-June. The war in Europe was finished, but Japan was still fighting, so I & countless other aircrew were being retrained & refreshed for service in the Far East. The course lasted a month & after just 36 hours flying training we were judged to have passed, & then sent home on leave to await a posting to the Pacific war zone. Again fate was to take a hand, when early in August, the Americans unleashed two atom bombs on cities in Japan, catastrophic damage they to[sic] surrendered. My second tour would not happen, & my “career” in aircrew was over. Two days later I was sent to a unit near to Gainsborough, for re-mustering to a ground trade, for the rest of time. I was not alone many more ex-aircrew where[sic] there, but no one I knew. During my week there I was interviewed & given lists of various Ground staff vacancies, nothing really interested me, but having to make a decision, I opted for a RAF postal course, preferably near to home. I was given 7 days leave, after which I was posted to an Aircrew Holding Unit, near to Elgin, in Scotland, this was in fact a RAF Coastal Command Station, & no one knew why I, a Bomber Command person was there, & after 2 weeks doing nothing, I was sent to Haverfordwest in, over 400 miles from Elgin, in the South west of Wales. The date was 22nd September 1945, & by then Pauline & I had set the date of our wedding for October 6th, so after just a week in Wales, I was on my way back home for the big day. Despite the war, with food rationing etc we had a lovely wedding, the service was at Fuller Baptist Church, followed by a reception at a Traders Union hall in Club Street. I think there were about 60 people there. Pauline’s father had plenty of contacts, & despite all the shortages & rationing managed to provide lots of food & refreshment. Pauline had resigned as a nurse at Kettering General Hospital, when her mother was seriously ill 2 months previously. We left the reception in the early evening, spent the first night in London, & on to Bournemouth for a week, & we recall how unseasonably warm & sunny that second week was, we had a lovely time. Alas by the 18th I was on my travels again, this time to RAF Kirkham, Preston for my course to convert to a Postal Officer. It was a short & intensive course & I qualified early in November. During my service to date I had acquired the rank of Warrant Officer & although now a postal Officer I still retained that rate of pay. Like most wartime servicemen, with the war over I was thinking only of demobilisation – the Government had worked out a scheme for the constructive release of personnel & I learned that I would have to serve for nearly another year. When I agreed to train as a Postal Officer, I was asked where I would prefer to serve, & I specified either RAF Desborough or RAF Luffenham, & wasn’t too pleased at Kirkham when I was informed that I was to be posted to India!!!. Accordingly I was given embarkation leave, & at the end of November sent to Blackpool, to await shipment. After 12 days I was one of a train load of airmen, many just raw recruits, who were despatched to Plymouth, where we embarked on to HMS Devonshire, a destroyer, converted to troop carrier – we were on our way to the Far East. On the 15th we set sail. It was quite pleasant, the ship was manned by the Royal Navy, there was a Warrant Officer’s mess for the RAF, & we had little to do on the 15 days journey. In the traditional Navy way, a daily rum ration was served to us, although this stopped in a few days when it was discovered that some of the younger RAF personnel, were selling their ration to the Sailors. I was very seasick as the ship ploughed through the Bay of Biscay, & as I laid on my bunk felt even worse, when the radio announced that the Sunday service was being broadcast from Fuller Baptist Church Kettering, where 2 months earlier Pauline & I were [inserted] married [/inserted]. Since 1939 all servicemen going to the Far East were transported round South Africa, but the Devonshire was sent through the Suez Canal, & what a thrill that was, as we stood on the deck to see he[sic] ship negotiate a water way that appeared to be only just wide enough. By this time the weather had become warm, & did not really change for my time in India. We arrived in Bombay on New Year’s Eve & all of the airmen were transported by road to a Reception Camp a few miles away, called BRD Worli. A few days later, I was
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posted the Base Post Office in Bombay, where for 3 months, I was in charge of sorting incoming mail for RAF personnel stationed in India. ^ then arranging despatch of post bags to the various destinations. It was not a very demanding duty, & I recall sitting around in the rest room, drinking countless cups of tea, or minerals, to quench my thirst in the hot & sticky conditions in the [missing word?] to await the sea, & well looked after the Indian staff. May/June I was transferred to the Base Post Office at Calcutta, where I was still overseeing the redirection of mail etc. The Office was a large detached house, on the outskirts of the city, & in which the twenty of us lived with our own mess. The food was supplied by the nearby American garrison, & was very good. To get to the canteen we often hired rickshaws, rather than walk a mile or so, & it was good fun chasing along the roads, urging our drivers to race each other. I also had to escort lorries to carry mail to or from the Calcutta Airport, I recall being issued with a revolver for this duty, but cannot remember being given any ammunition!!!! In June I received notice of my demobilisation & was sent back to RAF Worli to await shipment back home. It was not a long wait, & I was soon on my way to Bombay, where I boarded a troop carrier, the SS Georgic a pre-1939 vessel but it was a pleasant 14 days voyage, as we returned via Suez (which we navigated at night with the ship’s spot lights trained on the sides of the xcaal [canal] – quite a thrill) to Liverpool. I didn’t really want to go to India, but having spent a few months there, I am pleased I had that experience – there is a certain fascination with the country, which as a young man I enjoyed. From Liverpool we were sent to RAF Kirkham, near Preston for demobilisation. I suppose it was quite clinical when the following day an endless file of separating airmen a[sic] made their way into an old hangar, where we were given choice of civilian clothing, ration books, six weeks pay, & a travel warrant, & out we come – I don’t recall anyone in authority thanking us or wishing us well, we just went in one door as airmen & out the other side into vehicles to take us to the local Railway station. But it was all forgotten a few hours later, I caught a train to Northampton, & hitch hiked to Kettering – my war service was over.
Pauline’s parents had provided rooms for us in their house in Charles Street, & for the next few weeks, it was a period of adjustment, gone was the routine of the RAF, after nearly 5 years, it was a new experience for me, but together Pauline & I got used to it. I had received 6 weeks termination pay from the RAF, so took advantage of that before returning to my former employment at Stewarts & Lloyds on the 26th August 1946, just 3 weeks before my 23rd birthday. After serving in some 40 different locations in the RAF it took a long time to settle in to work, not helped when received my first pay advice from S. & L. which equated at the princely sum of three pounds seventeen shillings (£3.75) per week – my Air Force pay was equivalent to approximately £11 per week plus my food. I was shocked & on querying this, I was told that under the rules of the Company, until I reached my 25th birthday, I was on the “junior scale”, but as my birthday was in September I would get a birthday rise. I did get an increase of just six shillings & three pence a week.
December 2010.
[centred] 8 [/centred]
[page break]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Walter Morris - 1939/45 War Record
Description
An account of the resource
A memoir covering Walter Morris’ early life before moving into his service in the Air Training Corps from 1941 and his entry into the Royal Air Force in February 1942 (as the first Air Training Corps Cadet from Kettering to be called up). The account continues through his service in the Royal Air Force, which started with his cohort being sent to RCAF Bowden in Alberta, Canada (via RCAF Moncton) aboard the “SS Queen Mary” for training. Following the completion of his training, the account continues with an overview of his service in the Royal Air Force in which he was a Flight Engineer on 34 combat operations, after which Walter transferred to an instructor’s position (which he retained rather than return to combat following the death of his brother in an aircraft crash). Following the end of the war he got married in October before being posted to Bombay and later Calcutta as a member of the Royal Air Force’s post office. He was demobilised in June 1946 and returned to England where he returned to his pre-war position at Stewarts and Lloyds.)
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
W Morris
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2010-12
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Eight page printed document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BMorrisWMorrisWv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Northamptonshire
England--Kettering
England--Cambridgeshire
England--London
England--Manchester
England--Yorkshire
England--Scarborough
United States
Massachusetts--Boston
Canada
New Brunswick--Moncton
Alberta--Innisfail
Ontario--Trenton
Ontario--Picton
Ontario--Hamilton
Germany
Germany--Helgoland
France
France--Normandy
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Massachusetts
Ontario
New Brunswick
Alberta
England--Lancashire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1942-02-12
1943-03
1943-09
1944-06-05
1944-10-05
1944-08-18
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
166 Squadron
630 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bomb struck
crash
crewing up
demobilisation
Distinguished Flying Cross
final resting place
flight engineer
killed in action
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
love and romance
military ethos
military living conditions
mine laying
Nissen hut
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Kirkham
RAF Kirmington
RAF Manby
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Silverstone
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Wittering
RCAF Bowden
Stirling
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2519/43774/LBraithwaiteW1293577v1.2.pdf
c570dde17e831e54b65a69c848a0f1db
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Braithwaite, Walter
W Braithwaite
Description
An account of the resource
21 items. The collection concerns Walter Braithwaite (1293577 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, note book and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 77 and 171 Squadrons. <br /><br />There is also a photograph <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2562">album</a> with 49 items. <br /><br />The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M Braithwaite and catalogued by Benjamin Turner.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-10-22
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Braithwaite, W
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Walter Braithwaite’s Observer’s and Air Gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Walter Braithwaite’s Observer’s and Air Gunner’s flying log book which includes a majority of his training, both stationed in Britain and Canada. Flights are recorded from the 2nd July 1942 to 13th July 1945. Walter began operations on 17th September 1943 after training. Braithwaite flew mainly as an air bomber. Braithwaite had numerous postings during training, but operationally, he served at RAF Elvington and RAF Full Sutton with 77 Squadron and at RAF North Creake with 171 Squadron. Aircraft included the Anson, Bolingbroke, Battle and Halifax. Braithwaite was involved in 43 operations (35 at night and 8 in the day). Operations took place over northern France, Normandy, Caen, Palaiseau, Saint-Lô ,Somme, Montreuil, Le Mans ,Amiens, Lille, Laon, Nieppe Forest. In Germany: Cologne, Essen, Bochum, Duisburg, Düren, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt am Main, Hannover, Jülich, Kassel,Krefeld, Neuruppin, Oberhausen,Ruhr, Schleswig-Holstein, Stuttgart, Wanne-Eickel. In Belgium: Brussels and Ottignies. His pilots on operations were Squadron Leader Procter, Flying Officer Hunter and Sergeant Mills. Furthermore, Walter Braithwaite did a number of ‘Gardening’ operations and later in 1945 took part in Special Duties and was “shot up by an intruder.” Braithwaite baled out and landed at USAAF Knettishall.
The last pages of the logbook contain four b/w photographs of Walter Braithwaite, airmen standing in front of an aircraft and a man playing basketball.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943-09-17
1943-09-18
1943-09-21
1943-10-02
1943-10-03
1943-10-04
1943-10-08
1943-10-09
1943-10-18
1943-10-22
1943-11-26
1943-12-20
1944-01-21
1944-01-27
1944-02-08
1944-02-11
1944-02-15
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-22
1944-02-24
1944-02-28
1944-03-01
1944-03-02
1944-03-06
1944-03-07
1944-03-08
1944-03-15
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-03-23
1944-03-29
1944-03-30
1944-03-31
1944-04-09
1944-04-10
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-05-12
1944-05-13
1944-05-24
1944-05-25
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-11
1944-06-12
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-06-18
1944-06-19
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-07-01
1944-07-11
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-17
1944-07-19
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-28
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-09-09
1944-09-12
1944-09-20
1944-09-21
1945-02-27
1945-02-28
1945-03-03
1945-04-08
1945-04-14
1945-04-15
1945-04-19
1945-04-20
1945-04-23
1945-04-24
1945-05-16
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Norfolk
England--Yorkshire
France
France--Normandy
France--Somme
France--Amiens
France--Caen
France--Palaiseau
France--Saint-Lô
France--Montreuil
France--Le Mans
France--Lille
France--Laon
France--Nieppe Forest
Belgium
Belgium--Brussels
Belgium--Ottignies
Germany
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Schleswig-Holstein
Germany--Neuruppin
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Jülich
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wanne-Eickel
Canada
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Benjamin Turner
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LBraithwaiteW1293577v1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
10 OTU
1652 HCU
171 Squadron
21 OTU
24 OTU
77 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bale out
Battle
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Cook’s tour
Halifax
Halifax Mk 2
Halifax Mk 3
Halifax Mk 5
Heavy Conversion Unit
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Elvington
RAF Full Sutton
RAF Honeybourne
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Moreton in the Marsh
RAF North Creake
RAF St Eval
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1765/30829/MLayneWH963102-170607-01.2.pdf
fc47960ac41bc841a85fddc0d83ccd19
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Layne, Wally
Walter Henry Layne
W H Layne
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-06-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Layne, WH
Description
An account of the resource
100 items. The collection concerns Walter 'Wally' Layne (b. 1916, 963012, 40348 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, prisoner of war diary, personal and official correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 97 Squadron and became a prisoner of war after being shot down.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by D Layne and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
A WARTIME LOG
[page break]
P.409001/5.
AIR MINISTRY [deleted] November [/deleted], [inserted] December [/inserted] 1943
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that 963102 W/O. W.H. Layne, R.A.F. born on 5th December, 1916 at present a prisoner of war in Dulag Luft and whose prisoner of war number is [deleted] unknown [/deleted] [inserted] 605 [/inserted] has been granted a commission in the rank of Pilot Officer with effect from 13th September, 1943 His official number is now 158255
This requisite notification has been published. [signature] Group Captain for Director of Personal Services [deleted] Asst. Secretary [/deleted]
AIR MINISTRY 11 MAY 1944 194
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that 158255 P/O. W.H. Layne (D.F.C.) R.A.F. born on 5th December, 1916 at present a prisoner of war in StalgLuft 6 and whose prisoner of war number is 605 has been promoted to Flying Officer with effect from 13th March, 1944. and the requisite notification has been published. [deleted] P.158255/43. [/deleted] [inserted] P.409001/43 [/inserted] [signature] Group Captain for Director of Personal services.
[page break]
[blank page]
[page break]
[blank page]
[page break]
[boxed] A WARTIME LOG FOR BRiTISH PRISONERS Gift from THE WAR PRISONERS’ AID OF THE Y.M.C.A. 37, Quai Wilson GENEVA - SWITZERLAND [/boxed]
[page break]
[greek text] R. Utteridge 4.10.44
[page break]
[boxed] THIS BOOK BELONGS TO P/O. W. H. Layne. D.F.C. Royal Air Force. Stalag Luft III, Germany. [Y.M.C.A. logo] [/boxed]
[page break]
[sketch map showing Stalag Luft locations]
[page break]
[underlined] 1 [/underlined]
[pilot wings drawing] F/Lt. Fletcher D.F.C. D.F.M. [observers brevet drawing] S/Ldr. Foster D.F.C. [bomb aimers brevet drawing] F/Sgt. Beasley. [wireless operators badge drawing] [air gunners brevet drawing] P/O. Layne D.F.C. [air gunners brevet drawing] S/Ldr. McKinna. D.F.C. [engineers brevet drawing] F/Sgt. Nelson [air gunners brevet drawing] F/Sgt. Page.
[page break]
3
The Spirit of Britain
We shall go on to the end - we shall fight in France. We shall fight on the seas and in the oceans - we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air - we shall defend our island whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches and on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and streets, and in the hills. We shall never surrender, and if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island, or even a part of it, is subjugated and starving, then our Empire accross [sic] the seas, armed and guarded by the British fleet, will carry on the struggle, until in Gods good time, the new world, in all its strength and might, sets forth to the rescue and liberation of the old. Britain will fight the menace of tyranny for years, and, if necessary, alone. Winston Churchill 1940
[page break]
5
A man who grumbles, because he doesn’t catch something every day, is a fool not an angler.
Gordon R. W. Albright
“Wiltshire House”
Hungerford
Berkshire
[page break]
[cartoon sketch of collapsing prisoners bunkbed] Good luck. Wally. [underlined] J. Beasley SEP 44 [/underlined]
[page break]
9
Jim. D. Skinner
10 Earl St.
New Brumby
Scunthorpe
Lincs.
[underlined] 26.8.44 [/underlined]
[page break]
12
Starkle starkle little twink
Who the hell you are think
I’m not under the alcofluence of inkohol
Though some think peep I am
I fool so fealish
I don’t know who is me
That the drunker I sit here
The longer I get.
[page break]
13
[cartoon sketch of prisoner life] “Do you think they’ll think we’ve changed?” Lots of Luck Wally -
Johnny Howes.
Peacehaven
- Sussex -
[page break]
14
[underlined] CONTENTS OF RED CROSS PARCELS [/underlined]
[list] [underlined] AMERICAN [/underlined]
8ozs COCOA OR 2 ‘D’ BARS 6 JAM 1oz SALT & PEPPER 12 BISCUITS ‘K2’ 1LB PRUNES 12ozs BULLY BEEF 12ozs MEAT & VEG OR SPAM 6ozs MEAT PÂTE 8ozs CHEESE 1LB POWDERED MILK 8ozs SUGAR 1LB OLEO MARGERINE 4ozs SOLUBLE COFFEE 2 SOAP 80 CIGARETTES 7 VIT C TABLETS
[underlined] CANADIAN [/underlined] 5ozs CHOCOLATE 1lb JAM 1oz SALT & PEPPER 12 BUSCUITS 6 ozs PRUNES 12ozs BULLY BEEF 10ozs KAM 7ozs RAISINS 4ozs CHEESE 1lb POWDERED MILK 8ozs SUGAR 1lb BUTTER 6ozs COFFEE OR 4ozs TEA 8ozs SALMON 1 SARDINE 1 SOAP
[page break]
15
[list] [underlined] ENGLISH [/underlined]
4ozs CHOCOLATE 8ozs JAM 1 TIN EGG POWDER (2ozs APPROX) 8ozs PRUNES OR APRICOTS 12ozs MEAT ROLL 16ozs MEAT & VEG 4ozs OAT MEAL 1 SOAP 3ozs CHEESE 1 TIN CONDENSED MILK 4ozs SUGAR 8ozs MARGERINE 4ozs COCOA 2ozs TEA 8ozs SALMON OR 8ozs BACON 1 PANCAKE POWDER OR 1 CREAMED RICE OR 1 APPLE PUDDING
[underlined] ARGENTINE BULK [/underlined]
3ozs BULLY BEEF 5ozs MEAT & VEG 3ozs RAGOUT 2ozs CORNED MUTTON 4ozs PORK & BEANS 5ozs BUTTER 2ozs LARD 2ozs HONEY 5ozs JAM 2ozs MILK JAM 4ozs CONDENSED MILK 8ozs SUGAR 7ozs CHEESE 8ozs BISCUITS 1oz PEA & LENTIL FLOUR 3ozs CHOCOLATE 2ozs COCOA 1oz TEA 1 SOAP 3ozs DRIED FRUIT
[page break]
17
[sketch of lincolnshire regiment cap badge] Best Wishes Wally
George. W. Hand,
Morcott,
Nr Uppingham
[underlined] Rutland [/underlined]
[page break]
19
[cartoon sketch of prison life] They also serve, who only stand and wait! John Milton
[signature]
CANTERBURY,
KENT.
[page break]
23
Sincerely Yours -
Laurie. W. Collins,
“Sackville House”,
4 Littlefield Lane,
Grimsby,
[underlined] Lincolnshire. [/underlined]
7-8-44
[page break]
24 BLOCK 22 ROOM 3 STALAG-LUFT 3 TARMSDEDT
[prisoner names and addresses]
[page break]
COMBINE 25
[food parcel contents drawings] [prisoner names and addresses]
[page break]
27
R. Coulbeck,
97 Ravendale Street,
Scunthorpe,
[underlined] Lincs. [/underlined]
P. [indecipherable name].
Sturton
Brigg.
[underlined] Lincs [/underlined]
[page break]
28
E hoa ka whawhai tonu ahau ki a koe ake! ake! [Maori for “friend, I shall fight against you, for ever! for ever!”]
[page break]
5/ Sept 44 [underlined] [signature] [/underlined] [various baseball cartoon caricatures] “PUT THE LITTLE APPLE DOWN HERE KID” 2 AND 1
[page break]
31
IF
IF YOU CAN SAVE YOUR BREW WHEN ALL AROUND YOU HAVE FINISHED THEIRS AND BORROWED MORE FROM YOU IF YOU CAN RUN A RACKET WHEN THEY DOUBT YOU BUT MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR THEIR RACKETS TOO IF YOU CAN WAIT AND NOT GET TIRED OF WAITING WHEN SOMEONE MAKES A BOOB WHILE ON PARADE OR STAND OUT IN THE COLD IN YOUR PYJAMAS WHILE HAUPTMANN MÜLLERS WEEKLY SEARCH IS MADE IF YOU CAN HIDE WHEN DUTY STOOGE IS ON YOU IF YOU CAN WASH YOUR SHIRT SAY TWICE A YEAR IF YOU CAN KEEP YOUR MIND ON HARMLESS PASTIMES AND NOT DANCING, WOMEN, WINE AND BEER IF YOU CAN LISTEN TO ANOTHER AIRMAN TELLING YOU HIS CROW IS ON THE WAY AND NEVER BREATHE A WORD WHILE HE IS MOANING WHILE YOU HAVE GOT AT LEAST THREE YEARS BACK PAY IF YOU CAN SAY “WIE GEHTS” OR ELSE “KARTOFFEL” OR ASK A GERMAN IF HE HAS A LIGHT YOURS IS THE CAMP AND ALL THATS IN IT HERE’S TO YOUR HAPPY FUTURE CLEAR AND BRIGHT
With apologies to Kipling Fallingbostel. Oct 11/44
[page break]
33
E. J. Hillman (Hilly.)
20, East Court Ave.
Earley.
[underlined] Reading. [/underlined]
J. Kenny
27, Featherstall Rd. N.,
Oldham
[underlined] Lancashire. [/underlined]
[page break]
35
And not by eastern windows only, When daylight comes, comes in the light; In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly! But westward, look, the land is bright.
Arthur Hugh Clough. [underlined] Rog. [/underlined]
[page break]
[facial caricature}
[page break]
39
[sketch of a Hampden bombing] Best wishes Wally, J. A. McDonald, 24 Brooklands Rise, London N.W.11. 26/9/44
[page break]
43
[cartoon caricature] MEDITATION [underlined] WAD [/underlined]
[page break]
46
THE PRISONERS LAMENT
BLOODY TIMES IS BLOODY HARD BLOODY WIRE AND BLOODY GUARD BLOODY DOGS IN BLOODY YARD BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
BLOODY TEA IS BLOODY VILE BLOODY COFFEE MAKES YOU SMILE BLOODY COCOA MADE IN STYLE BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
BLOODY ICE-RINKS BLOODY MUD BLOODY SKATES NO BLOODY GOOD SAT WHERE ONCE I BLOODY STOOD BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
BLOODY SALMONS BLOODY QUEER LOOKS AT YOU WITH BLOODY LEER IS IT GOOD? NO BLOODY FEAR BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
BLOODY BRIDGE ALL BLOODY DAY LEARNING HOW TO BLOODY PLAY BLOODY BLACKWELL’S BLOODY WAY BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
[page break]
47
NOW AND THEN THO’ BLOODY STALE CENSOR HANDS OUT BLOODY MAIL BETTER DRAW THE BLOODY VEIL BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY GIRLFRIEND DROPS ME FLAT LIKE A DOG ON BLOODY MAT GETS A YANK LIKE BLOODY THAT BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
BLOODY SAWDUST IN THE BREAD MUST HAVE COME FROM BLOODY BED BETTER ALL BE BLOODY DEAD BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
DON’T IT GET YOUR BLOODY GOAT WAS IT SHAW WHO BLOODY WROTE WHRE THE HELL’S THAT BLOODY BOAT BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY NOW I’VE REACHED THE BLOODY END NEARLY AROUND THE BLOODY BEND THATS THE GENERAL BLOODY TREND BLOODY BLOODY BLOODY
[page break]
49
[sketch of cottage style pub]
[underlined] THORN CAMP 357 JULY 27/44 [/underlined]
[page break]
51
[cartoon sketch of prisoners reading news bulletin] IT SAYS “THE ONLY RESULT OF THE ALLIED ADVANCE IN THE WEST IS TO MOVE THE FRONT FURTHER EAST.”[underlined] Beasley 44 [/underlined]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[photograph of family]
[page break]
[3 x photographs of family]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family and friends]
[page break]
[photograph of family]
[page break]
[photograph of family]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of family]
[page break]
[drawing of lancaster bomber] [underlined] All the Best Mick [/underlined]
[page break]
[2 x photographs of prisoners]
[page break]
FOLLINGS BOSTAL, [sic] GERMANY. 29/8/44 55
[sketch] O GOD OUR HELP IN AGES PAST, [sketch] OUR HOPES FOR YEARS TO COME, [sketch] THE SHELTER FROM THE STORMY BLAST, [sketch] AND OUR ETERNAL HOME.
REMEMBER ME!! [sketch]
Mr. GEORGE F. CALVERT,
11, MALLET CRESCENT,
BOLTON,
[underlined] LANCS. [/underlined]
[underlined] Drop around any time Wally. [/underlined]
[page break]
56
[sketch of prison guard tower]
Postern box S E [indecipherable word] Heydekrug [underlined] Stalag Luft 6 [/underlined] Oct 11/44
[page break]
58 Best Wishes to my friend THE MAIL HOG from H Ringham.
[3 x comical cartoon sketches depicting mail delivery]
[page break]
59
[underlined] TO: A THREE-TOUR MAN. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1ST. TOUR [/underlined] [coloured sketch of hampden bomber]
[underlined] 2ND. TOUR [/underlined] [coloured sketch of lancaster bomber]
[underlined] 3RD. TOUR [/underlined] [coloured sketch of cattle truck train]
[underlined] Best wishes Wally from Les Calvert. Jan 45 FALLINGBOSTEL [/underlined]
[page break]
62
[2 x german money vouchers]
[page break]
63
[german money certificate]
Prisoner of war camp money VOUCHER FOR 1 REICHMARK
This chit is valid for a means of currency for P.O.W.s and must be used by them for exchange only within the camp or on a working party in the expressly authorised canteens.
This exchange of this chit for actual currency can only take place by the express permission of the accounts officer.
Contravention, forging or any falsification will be punished
The Chief of the Supreme command of the defence forces
[page break]
[cartoon sketch] [underlined] W. PETCH [/underlined] 23, HAMILTON RD, SCUNTHORPE
[page break]
69
[6 x comical cartoon angling sketches] [underlined] WHL [/underlined]
[page break]
71
[sketch of circled red cross] EACH LIFE HAS IT’S CROSSES AND AN AIRMAN GETS HIS SHARE FROM A TRIP ACROSS THE OCEAN TO THE ENVIED “CROIX DE GUERRE
THERE ARE CROSSES BY THE CENSOR FAR TO MANY SO IT SEEMS THERE ARE CROSSES IN HIS LETTERS FROM THE GIRL FRIEND OF HIS DREAMS
THERE’S A CROSS THATS WORN BY HEROES WHO HAVE FACED A HAIL OF LEAD THERE’S A CROSS WHEN HE IS WOUNDED AND ONE WHEN HE IS DEAD
BUT THERE’S A LITTLE CROSS OF MERCY THAT QUITE A FEW MAY OWN TO A PRISONER IT IS SECOND TO THAT OF GOD’S ALONE
IT’S A CROSS THATS WORN BY WOMEN WHEN WE SEE IT WE BELIEVE WE RECOGNISE AN ANGEL BY THE RED CROSS ON HER SLEEVE
[page break]
72 [sketch of a country house]
[page break]
75
[sketch of a spitfire] J M Lockyer 1945
[page break]
76
1939 [raf crest] 194
BOMBER COMMAND
All the Best Bob Beaston 12-10-44
[page break]
78
S. S. KRIEGIE
SHE’S TREMENDOUS, SHE’S GIGANTIC, LOOKING TRIM IN EVERY LINE SHE’S MAGNIFICENT, COLOSSAL, SHE’S YOURS YET ALSO MINE. SHE’S GLORIOUSLY MAJESTIC, MOST REFRESHING TO THE EYE SHE’S EXCITING IN HER NEARNESS, FOR WE KNOW SHE’S STANDING BY. THERE’LL BE SEVERAL RED CROSS NURSES LINING UP BESIDE THE QUAY WITH A CHOICE OF DRINKS TO CHOOSE FROM, NAAFI BEER OR NAAFI TEA ITS GOODBYE TO RED CROSS PARCELS, NO MORE VITAMINISED JAM NO MORE BULLY BEEF OR SALMON, NO MORE APPETISING SPAM NO MORE PERSONALS FOR LISTING CIGARETTES OR CENSORED MAIL WHEN THE SHIP CALLED S.S. KRIEGIE SPEEDS ALONG THE HOMEWARD TRAIL NO MORE ROLL CALLS, NO MORE POSTERNS SEEKING BREW NO MORE BLOWERS OUTSIDE BILLETS, NO MORE AIR RAIDS ALL DAY THROUGH NO MORE BELT UPS NO MORE ARBEIT WHEN YOUR STOMACHS NOT SO GOOD NO MORE CONTINENTAL SAUERKRAUT. NO MORE SCROUNGING BITS OF WOOD NO MORE VISITS DOWN TO SICK BAY. NO MORE RACKETS NO MORE STEW NO MORE READING PROPAGANDA LIKE THE “GERMAN POINT OF VIEW” NO MORE BED BOARDS NO MORE COMBINES NO MORE OVERCROWDED SPACE NO MORE CATTLE TRUCKS TO GREET US AS WE MOVE FROM PLACE TO PLACE NO MORE BARBED WIRE NO MORE SEARCH LIGHTS NO MORE PINE TREES ALL AROUND NO MORE COMPOUNDS, NO MORE CIRCUITS, WHEN AT LAST WE’RE [underlined] HOMEWARD BOUND [/underlined]
[page break]
79
THERE IS PLENTY OF GOOD IN THE WORST OF US, AND PLENTY OF BAD IN THE BEST OF US, SO IT DOES NOT BEHOVE ANY OF US TO TALK ABOUT THE REST OF US.
William A. Roe, STALAG LUFT III, APRIL, 1945.
[page break]
80
[sketches] [underlined] DIE STEM [/underlined]
UIT DIE BLOU VAN ONSE HEMEL UIT DIE DIEPTE VAN ONS SEE, OOR ONS EWIGE GEBERGTES WAAR DIE KRANSE ANTWOORD ONS, DEUR ONS VER VERLATE VLAKTES MET DIE KREIN VAN OSSEWA RUIS DIE STEM VAN ONS GEUEFDES VAN ONS LAND SUID AFRIKA [Afrikaans for: From the blue of our sky, from the depth of our sea, over eternal mountains where the wreaths answer us, through our desolate plains with the cry of Ossewa Ruis the voice of our friends of our country South Africa]
[underlined] BEST WISHES, WALLY. GORDON. B. JACK TARMSTEDT, 1945.
[page break]
[indecipherable word] R2864 81
H Ringham,
133 Barden Rd,
Tonbridge,
Kent.
Essen 17.7.42. Halifax
J. R. Holsbourn,
Santiago
Chile.
South America.
Donald Walker
106 Sunderland Street
Tickhill
Doncaster
[page break]
[underlined] THE SAGA OF THE OLDEST KRIEGIE [/underlined]
OH WERE YOU OUT IN THE GRIM NORTH EAST WAY UP ON THE BALTIC SHORE WHERE THE WINTER NIGHTS ARE SIX MONTHS LONG AND THE DAYS ARE EVEN MORE. WHERE THE BITTER BLAST, A SNOW TOOTHED FIEND HOWLS DOWN FROM THE RUSSIAN STEPPES WHERE SOX GET FROZEN TO THE FEET AND THE HANDS ARE COVERED IN CHAPPES WHERE THE GREAT WHITE SILENCE COVERS ALL AND THE ONLY SOUND THEY SAY IS THE SONG OF THE DROSKI SINGING HIS LOVE IN THE MOUNTAINS FAR AWAY
THATS WERE THE OLDEST KRIEGIE LIVES A MAN BOTH SEEN AND HOARY LIVING ON NUTTY AND POLAR BEAR SOUP THE HERO OF THIS STORY
TWAS MANY MANY YEARS AGO WAY BACK IN 1940 THAT THE OLDEST KRIEGIE IN HIS PLANE EMBARKED UPON A SORTIE
TWAS THE SORTA A SORTIE A BRAVE MAN SHUNS AND THE COWARD RUNS AWAY FROM THE KIND OUR HERO HOPED TO CHRIST HE’D LIVE TO DRAW HIS PAY FROM
IN THE BRIGHT MOONLIGHT OF A SUMMER NIGHT OUR HERO CROSSED THE SEA HE BOMBED THE TARGET AND TURNED FOR HOME BUT WAS JUMPED BY A LOAN M.E.
[page break]
AND THEN THERE CAME A WEARY TIME A TIME MOST WONDOROUS [sic] [deleted] frying [/deleted] TIRING THEY TOOK HIM TO A KRIEGIE CAMP ALL RINGED ABOUT WITH WIRING THEY COUNTED OH THEY COUNTED HIM BY DAY AS WELL AS NIGHT SIDEWAYS DIAGONALLY BACKWARDS BUT THEY COULDN’T GET IT RIGHT AT LAST THEY HIT UPON A WHEEZE THAT SEEMED BOTH CUTE AND NEAT THEY FELL THE KRIEGIES IN AGAIN AND COUNTED ALL THEIR FEET AND WHEN THE FEET WERE COUNTED THEY DIVIDED THEM BY TWO BUT STILL THE ANSWER WASN’T RIGHT SO THEY THOUGHT OF SOMETHING NEW
THEY WENT AND GOT EXCITED AND SHOUTED WITH MUCH ZEST BUT IT DIDN’T DO THEM ANY GOOD FOR THE KRIEGIES WEREN’T IMPRESSED
THEN THEY LINED UP ALL THE KRIEGIES AT A TIME WHEN MOST FOLKS SLEEP AND MADE THEM FILE BETWEEN TWO POSTS SO THE KRIEGIES BAAED LIKE SHEEP AND WHEN THE COUNT WAS FINISHED AND THEY ADDED UP THE SCORE THEY FOUND THEY’D FAR MORE KRIEGIES THAN THEY’D EVER HAD BEFORE
FOR IN A WELL RUN KRIEGIE CAMP YOU MAY GET LOTS OF FUN BUT NO FUN QUITE AS POPULAR AS MUCKING UP THE HUN
[page break]
[sketch] E.A.L. SHORE MAR. 1945.
[page break]
86 SUSPENSE.
The prison camp so grim and bare within the hated wire In barracks prisoners drawn and grey Crouch huddled round the fire. What will the German verdict be? What will their minds conspire?
Outside the rain in torrents fall Heavens ripped open wide Hell! The suspense is terrible If only one could hide. At last, long blasts, the silence breaks. Thank God! Roll Calls inside.
J. E. Nelson,
15 Parkfield Road,
Bolton,
[underlined] Lancs [/underlined]
C. Hanrahan
5 Norbreck Close
Cinder Hill
Notts
[page break]
87
J. Beesley
76 Woodland Road
Handsworth
[underlined] Birmingham 21 [/underlined]
[underlined] A G Benson [/underlined]
“O.K”
Goondiwindi
Queensland.
J K Denton
4 The Terrace
Chyandour
Penzance
Cwll
Chas Allen (Tim)
70 Warren Rd
Washwood Heath
Birmingham
J. Seedhouse
C/O Morton
Skillington
Nr Grantham
R J Jackson
20 Maytree Crescent
Watford
Herts
(Odhams Press watford)
[page break]
89
O QUID SOLUTIS EST, BEATIUS CURIS, CUM MENS ONUS REPONIT ET PEREGRINO LABORE FESSI VENIMUS LAREM AD NOSTRUM DESIDERATOQUE ACQUIESCIMUS LECTO Louis B. Gunter. [underlined] Easter 1945. [/underlined]
[page break]
90
[circled red cross] From every prisoner’s lonely soul Thanksgiving does ascend; No matter what religious goal His ego may pretend; For this alone relieves the pall And helps monotony rend; The constant aid, the hope, & all Which you unfailing send. [/circled red cross] [underlined] Compost by F. Webster Written by J. Pryd [/underlined]
IT
IS A MELANCHOLY STATE
You are in the power of the enemy You owe your life to his humanity Your daily bread to his compassion You must obey his orders Await his pleasures Possess your soul in his patience The days are very long The hours crawl like paralized [sic] centipedes
Moreover, the whole atmosphere of prisons even the most easy and best regulated prison is odious. Companions quarrel over trifles and get the least possible pleasure from each others society. You feel a constant humiliation in being fenced in by railings and barbed wire, watched by armed men and webbed about By a triangle of regulations & restrictions. [underlined] Winston Churchill 1899. [/underlined]
[page break]
PRISONER OF WAR
IS A MELANCHOLY STATE. YOU ARE IN THE POWER OF THE ENEMY. YOU OWE YOUR LIFE TO HIS HUMANITY, YOUR DAILY BREAD TO HIS COMPASSION.
YOU MUST [deleted] AW [/deleted] OBEY HIS ORDERS, AWAIT HIS PLEASURE; POSSESS YOUR SOUL IN HIS PATIENCE.
THE DAYS ARE LONG, THE HOURS CRAWL LIKE PARALYZED [CENTIPEDES, MOREOVER THE WHOLE ATMOSPHERE OF PRISONS IS ODIOUS.
COMPANIONS QUARREL OVER TRIFLES AND GET THE BEST POSSIBLE PLEASURE OUT OF EACH OTHERS COMPANY. YOU FEEL A CONSTANT HUMILIATION IN BEING FENCED IN BY RAILINGS AND WIRE, WATCHED BY ARMED MEN AND WEBBED IN BY A TRIANGLE OF REGULATIONS & RESTRICTIONS. AND SO BE IT WINSTON CHURCHILL P.O.W. BRITISH EAST AFRICA NOVEMBER 1899.
[page break]
94 [underlined] Food for Thought [/underlined]
Twice I found this little book on my desk in Stalag 357 and I have come to the probably erroneous conclusion that you wish me to ‘do’ something in it, Wally. I hope one day to meet you again but, in case I don’t - do you remember -
[list] “ A journey from Heydekrug to Sagan? “ A pitoploly argument when we came back? “ hiding the “brew” from the Abwehr? “ my practice on the guitar? “ the day after the tunnel was discovered? “ the night of the Theatre Fire? “ the Abwehr steam-roller? “ the runaway coach in a German station? “ the second team’s centre-half? “ the pumps and spud peeling at Heydekrug? “ the evacuation of Heydekrug?
We could have gone on for hours, but the above will be enough - All the best - Wal
from R C Hancock
Woodhouse Farm
Leconfield E. Yorks.
[page break]
96 97
[Europe sketch map showing camp locations]
[page break]
98
[underlined] O FEELTHY FLY. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1 [/underlined] The fly flew in to the grocery store, He flew right in - by the front door, he fluttered round the bacon, and he fluttered round the ham, and finally lit on the strawberry jam.
[underlined] Ref. [/underlined] Oh, feelthy fly, Oh, feelthy fly, Oh, filthy fly, Repulsive parasite.
[underlined] 2 [/underlined] the fly looked here, the fly looked there, under the table & under the chairs, and into the office which was nearly dark, and there he spied the lady clerk - Oh feelthy [missing word]
[underlined] 3 [/underlined] That fly lit on the lady’s shoe, Then up her stockings both brand new. And when it reached above her knee, He sat down to see what he could see. Oh [missing word]
[underlined] 4 [/underlined] That lady clerk when she felt that fly, Settled upon her starboard thigh, She closed her knees & held her breath, And squashed that feelthy fly to death - Oh feelthy [missing word]
To be sung in slow, solemn time, with full Bar room accompaniment. All the best of luck Wally [underlined] Phillip Hyden [/underlined]
[page break]
99
[sketch of silhouetted female] [underlined] JACK SMITH [/underlined] 11-9-44.
[page break]
100 DIE MORDBRENNER VON WALLENDORF
[sketch of US soldier firing village] For no apparent reason U.S.A. troops burned down the village of Wallendorf before the eyes of the inhabitants. [underlined] Das Licht der Demokratic leuchtet VOLKISHER BEOBACHTER [/underlined] 17 OCTOBER 1944
102
AS A RESULT OF REPEATED APPLICATIONS FROM BRITISH SUBJECTS FROM ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD WISHING TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMON STRUGGLE AGAINST BOLSHEVISM, AUTHORISATION HAS RECENTLY BEEN GIVEN FOR THE CREATION OF A BRITISH VOLUNTEER UNIT. THE BRITISH FREE CORPS PUBLISHES HEREWITH THE FOLLOWING SHORT STATEMENT OF THE AIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNIT.
[underlined] I. [/underlined] THE BRITISH FREE CORPS IS A THOROUGHLY BRITISH VOLUNTEER UNIT [indecipherable word] AND CREATED BY BRITISH SUBJECTS FROM ALL PARTS OF THE EMPIRE, WHO HAVE TAKEN UP [missing word] AND PLEDGED THEIR LIVES IN THE COMMON EUROPEAN STRUGGLE AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA.
[underlined] II. [/underlined] THE BRITISH FREE CORPS CONDEMNS THE WAR WITH GERMANY AND THE SACRIFICE OF BRITISH BLOOD IN THE INTEREST OF JEWRY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND REGARDS THIS CONFLICT AS A FUNDAMENTAL BETRAYAL OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND BRITISH IMPERIAL INTERESTS.
[underlined] III. [underlined] THE BRITISH FREE CORP DESIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND GERMANY AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIC PEOPLES.
[underlined] IV. [/underlined] THE BRITISH FREE CORP WILL NEITHER MAKE WAR AGAINST BRITAIN OR THE BRITISH CROWN, NOR SUPPORT ANY ACTION OR POLICY DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE. PUBLISHED BY THE BRITISH FREE CORP.
[underlined] IN AN ENDEAVOR [SIC] TO FORM A BRITISH UNIT TO FIGHT AGAINST THE RUSSIANS, THE GERMANS CAUSED A PAMPHLET TO BE CIRCULATED IN CERTAIN PRISON CAMPS, A COPY OF THIS IS GIVEN ABOVE. [/underlined]
104 GEGEN ENGELAND
HEUTE WOLLEN WIR EIN LIEDLEIN SINGEN, TRINKEN SOLEN WIR DEN KÜHLEN WEIN, UND DIE GLÄSEN SOLLEN DAZU KLINGEN, DENN ES MUSS ES MUSS GESCHIEDENSEIN
REFRAIN
GIB MIR DIENE HAND DEINE WEISSE HAND, LEB WOHL MEIN SCHATZ, MEIN SCHATZ LEB WOHL, LEB WOHL DENN WIR FAHREN, DEN WIR FAHREN DENN WIR FAHREN GEGEN ENGELAND
UNSER FLAGGE UND DIE WEHT VOM MASTE SIE VERKUNDET UNSERES REICHES MACHT DENN WIR WOLLEN ES NICHT LANGER LEIDEN DASS DER ENGELANDER DARAÜBER LACHT
REFRAIN
GIB MIR DEINE ……………..USW.
KOMMT DIE KUNDE DASS ICH BIN GEFALLEN DASS ICH SCHLAFE IN DER MEERES FLUT WEINE NICHT UM MICHT MEIN SCHATZ UND DENKE FÜR DAS VATERLAND DA FLOSS SEIN BLUT
REFRAIN
GIB MIR DEINE ……………..USW.
[page break]
[sketch of a country cottage] WHL
[page break]
107
[underlined] Mail Extracts [/underlined]
A P.O.W. wrote home to his mother saying “Please send me a pair of slippers, size 9”. Six months later he received a letter saying, “what colour would you like”
Letter from mother to son, “chocolate is now almost unobtainable so I am sending you a postal order so you can buy it in Germany
Letter from wife to husband (POW 3 years) I” have had a baby darling, but don’t worry the American officer is paying all the expenses and is going to send you some cigarettes”
“After you were reported missing I was ill for a long time and unable to leave my bed, but when the news that you were a POW arrived I jumped out and polished the floor and felt better at once.
A sister to her brother. “Can you buy beer or do you only get wine
[page break]
Father to son. “I am glad you were shot down before flying became dangerous.”
Fiancée to P.O.W. “I could not stand the disgrace of your being a prisoner of war, so I broke off our engagement.”
From lady who enclosed his name and address in hand knitted pullover and was sent a letter of thanks. “I was annoyed when I read where it had gone to, I meant it for someone on active service not a scrounging P.O.W.”
“The first batch of repatriated troops arrived yesterday, horribly mutilated. Hope to see you on the next.”
[page break]
PRINTED BY ATAR S.A., GENEVA 1944
[page break]
[german poster]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wally Layne's YMCA prisoner of war log book
Description
An account of the resource
Includes certificates as a prisoner at Dulag Luft and Stalag Luft 6, sketch map showing locations of prisoner of war camps, list of crew with brevets, Churchill's speech, cartoons of prisoner life, contents of Red Cross parcels, notes, signatures, names and addresses, poems and sayings, sketches of Hampden and caricature, photographs of family and friends, sketch of Lancaster and train box cars (third tour), German cash certificates and other writing and sketches.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
W H Layne
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-12
1944-05-11
1944-08-26
1944-08-07
1944-09-26
1944-07-27
1945-04
1944-10-17
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Seventy-seven page book
Language
A language of the resource
eng
deu
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MLayneWH963102-170607-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Poland
Poland--Żagań
Poland--Toruń
Lithuania
Lithuania--Šilutė
Germany
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Scunthorpe
England--Berkshire
England--Hungerford
England--Sussex
England--Peacehaven (East Sussex)
England--Rutland
England--Uppingham
England--Kent
England--Canterbury
England--Grimsby
England--Brigg
England--Lancashire
England--Oldham
England--London
Germany--Fallingbostel (Landkreis)
England--Yorkshire
England--Bolton (Greater Manchester)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-12
1944-05-11
1940
1944-08-26
1944-08-07
1944-09-26
1944-07-27
1945-04
1944-10-17
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Robin Christian
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
air gunner
aircrew
arts and crafts
bomb aimer
Dulag Luft
flight engineer
Hampden
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
prisoner of war
Red Cross
Spitfire
Stalag Luft 3
Stalag Luft 6
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1495/30511/PColsonWA1601.1.jpg
dddbd4fc509c68f50cef3fccab17bcba
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Colson, William Alfred
W A Colson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Colson, WA
Description
An account of the resource
5 items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant William Alfred Colson DFM (1915 - 1943, <span>141402 </span>Royal Air Force) and contains a biography and photographs. He flew as a bomb aimer on 9 and 97 Squadron and was killed when his Lancaster crashed on return to base from an operation to Berlin in December 1943. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Mr Harrison and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on William Alfred Colson is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/205562/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
W A Colson's headstone
Description
An account of the resource
Headstone for Flight lieutenant W A Colson DFM 17 December 1943. With trees in the background. Submitted with caption 'Modern colour photograph of CWGC headstone for WA Colson taken by W Harrison' Additional information bout this item was kindly provided by the donor.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One colour photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PColsonWA1601
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--London
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-12-17
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
aircrew
bomb aimer
final resting place
killed in action
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1214/11942/PAzzaroVE1732.1.jpg
16f7caefe017ec00196646d35490a27b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Azzaro, Victor Emmanuel
Azzaro, Vic
V E Azzaro
Description
An account of the resource
12 Items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant
Victor Azzaro MBE, DFC (1915 - 1997, 56448 Royal Air Force) and includes nine photographs, his decorations and a letter awarding him his pathfinder wings. He flew operations as an air gunner with 196, 15 and 7 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Julie Azzaro and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
2017-10-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Azzaro, VE
Dublin Core
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Victor Azzaro and crew on a Lancaster
Description
An account of the resource
Six airmen sitting on top of a Lancaster cockpit with the pilot seated inside. Victor Azzaro is third from the left. Six airmen are wearing peaked caps and one a side cap. The nose art indicates at least 65 operations were completed.
Format
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One b/w photograph
Type
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Photograph
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PAzzaroVE1732
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
flight engineer
Lancaster
navigator
nose art
pilot
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1661/26944/PJonesWC18020098.1.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1661/26944/PJonesWC18020099.1.jpg
2b4bce5621d1ac9ab38dcb3aad35f68e
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1661/26944/PJonesWC18020100.1.jpg
bceb9fae0217c3ada12598b8751c7d9e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Jones, William. Album
Description
An account of the resource
35 items. An album of photographs, cuttings and cartoons from William Jones's service.
Date
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2018-07-04
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Jones, WC
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Veterans. A Tribute to a Fighting Crew of Immortals
Description
An account of the resource
William Jones and his crew positioned on top of the starboard wing of their Lancaster.
Captioned 'Veterans. A Tribute to a Fighting Crew of Immortals'
Left to Right. Pilot. W/Op. Mid Upper. Engineer.Bomb Aimer Nav. Rear Gunner.
"Winky" The best skipper, a fine courageous man.
"Tex" Enough said.
"Slash" always ready for a laugh or anything else.
"Frank" Greatly to be admired for coolness in an emergency.
"Cole" Lady's man, but also a mighty nice fellow.
"Taff" Always on course, a comedian, fine navigator.
"Trace" Bulldog tenacity, a terrific gunner.'
On the reverse of the second photograph '6286'.
Format
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One b/w photograph on an album page
Language
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eng
Type
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Photograph
Identifier
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PJonesWC18020098, PJonesWC18020099, PJonesWC18020100
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
flight engineer
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Picture]
V
GROUP
NEWS
No 26 SEPTEMBER 1944
Copies sent to Stns.
[Stamp] Base Copy.
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[Blank Page]
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FOREWORD BY A.O.C.
September was a most successful month and a reward for the hard work which all ranks have put in throughout the Summer. The Group secured two prizes for which many have striven since the early days of the War, the Tirpitz and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The attack on the Tirpitz was splendidly undertaken by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons and appears to have been highly successful in spite of a most efficient smoke screen. The attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal has earned the following message from the Secretary of State for Air.
“The War Cabinet have instructed me to convey to you and to all concerned their congratulations on the outstanding success achieved in the recent attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Pressed home with great determination against strong opposition and in difficult weather it constituted yet another major blow against German War economy.”
These two attacks have once more shown the remarkable efficiency of the 12,000 lb. “Tallboy” bomb when it hits the target.
The Group has achieved an equally high measure of success in attacks against German cities. During September alone, an area of nearly 3,000 acres has been burnt out. Such results can only be achieved if the marking is accurately placed and if the incendiaries are spread evenly over the whole area to be burnt. With a small force of Group strength there are no loads to be spared and if incendiaries go wide or are over-concentrated on certain sectors, it must be at the expense of the total area destroyed. Examples are Stuttgart where too high a percentage of loads fell wide of their sectors and Kaiserslautern where crews allowed themselves to be deflected inwards by the fires raging in the central sector, thus allowing the equally important areas on either side to escape.
I want to impress on crews that area bombing calls for every bit as much accuracy as attacks on the smallest factory or railway targets. In attacks on these targets during the Summer crews achieved remarkably small errors, and similar accuracy is needed on these large targets if they are to be burnt out from end to end leaving no gaps calling for an uneconomical return visit. Each crew in fact is given a small area of his own to burn and if his load falls on his neighbour’s patch, his own area may well escape destruction, and this has happened on some of our recent attacks.
The problems of lining up the aircraft on the correct heading after allowing for drift and of carrying out the overshoot procedure, are not easy to solve but instructions have recently been issued which should help crews in this matter. If an even spread of incendiaries can be achieved we should be able, with our normal effort, to burn out nearly 1,000 acres on each attack. This will represent a tremendous achievement, and one which will bring nearer the end of the War.
No.51 Base has also put out a great effort in training 161 crews during the month. This has enabled all squadrons to be kept up to establishment and had provided a margin from which new squadrons are already starting to be formed. I congratulate all concerned.
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[Drawing] OPERATIONS
[Underlined] BREST – 2ND SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Humphreys.
Operations in September opened with an attack on the dry docks and shipping in Brest Harbour by 67 Lancasters of Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, in daylight on September 2nd. There was no marking for this attack, which was carried out visually and according to plan. Officers who have since visited Brest say that the concentration of bomb craters around the two docks in such that it is almost impossible to get across this area on foot. Both ships are shattered by many bombs.
[Underlined] DEELEN AIRFIELD – 3RD SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
103 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, plus No. 106 Squadron, took off to attack Deelen airfield in daylight. Two Mosquitoes from No.54 Base went ahead of the main force to mark the target with smoke. One Mosquito fitted with an A.P.I. was detailed to find a bombing wind and pass it to the Master Bomber Two smoke bombs were assessed as being on the aiming point but no trace of markers was seen on strike photographs. No. 106 Squadron bombs were fused T.D. 0.025 while both 52 and 55 Bases carried a load of 1,000 lb. and 500 ln bombs all fused half an hour delay, with the object of avoiding smoke and thereby allowing each crew to have a clear run up to the target. This was the first occasion on which we have used the half hour delay fuse against an airfield target. Unfortunately there was much cloud so that the experiment was not conclusive.
RESULTS Only partial cover was obtained, but concentrations of bombs were seen to have fallen on the S.W. and Eastern intersections of the runways, and at least 60 craters are seen in the partial cover of the runways.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Wing Commander Simpson.
The United Stated Forces investing Brest were meeting stiff opposition from the defences around Brest. These enemy batteries were the target for 60 aircraft of No. 53 Base in daylight on September 5th. There were four aiming points, A.B.C. and D, to be marked by 7 Mosquitoes of No.627 Squadron. Crews were to bomb visually.
RESULTS All aiming points were attacked, a fair concentration being achieved, with the exception of some loose bombing on A. and B., several bombs falling as much as 400 – 500 yards to the West. A full interpretation from photographic cover was unobtainable owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the Lancaster and previous attacks.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH – 9/10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
Nos. 52 and 55 Bases provided 113 Lancasters to attack this target on the Western fringe of the Ruhr; in conditions of cloudless weather and good visibility.
PLAN For this attack, as area of the town was selected and a suitable marking point chosen, upwind from it. The marking point was to be marked with T.I’s dropped by Mosquitoes in the light of flares, after which the
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main force, tracking over the T.I’s on pre-determined headings through a sector of 90° were to aim their bombs at the T.I., but delay release for a certain number of seconds. The aircraft were divided throughout the sector and each division given its own band. In this way the incendiary load would be spread evenly over the selected target area.
Should the 54 Base Mosquitoes find it impossible to locate their marking point then they were to back up yellow Oboe T.I’s dropped in the centre of the target area by P.F.F. Mosquitoes, and the main force were to bomb the yellow and red direct, without delaying release. The Oboe T.I’s were dropped on time, but visual marking was delayed owing to the first and second flare waves dropping their flares too far to the South and South East over open country. The Master Bomber, therefore, ordered the third flare wave to drop their flares on the Oboe T.I’s, and by their aid, Marker II was able to identify and mark the marking point. The main force were then called in to attack.
RESULTS Photographs show enormous volumes of smoke coming from a very large number of fires scattered throughout the centre of the built up area of the town. Large new areas of complete devastation, mostly by fires, are seen all around the main railway station. This was a successful attack, but the Mosquito markers would have been aided had a more conspicuous marker point been chosen.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
Defences at Le Havre which were holding up the besieging Allied Forces were attacked by 108 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases in cloudless weather in daylight on September 10th. Aiming points were marked by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and the attack went according to plan.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that all areas have been heavily cratered in a widespread fashion. It was noticeable that there were no craters North of the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 11TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
A force of 101 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, plus 106 Squadron, again attacked the defences at Le Havre in good weather in daylight on 11th September. Here again the marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and P.R.U. cover confirms the success of the attack, showing that all aiming points were well covered. Once again no bombs were seen outside the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 11/12TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
The weather in the target area was clear with some ground haze.
PLAN The “fanning out” method employed against Munchen Gladbach was again planned for this attack, each Base being allotted a separate sector. On this occasion, leading aircraft of the flare force assumed the additional role of blind markers and, in addition to illuminating the target for the Mosquitoes, were to drop T.I. green in the centre of the target area. Mosquitoes were then to mark the marking point with T.I. Red, and the main force in their allotted height bands were again to aim their bombs at the Red, delaying release. To ensure the distribution of the incendiary load over the whole of the required area the first wave was to delay 20 seconds, the second wave 10 seconds, and the third wave 8 seconds. As on a previous occasion the green T.I’s from the Lancaster markers were to be backed up by the Mosquitoes, if the latter were unable to locate their own marking point, and the centre of
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these two sets of T.I’s was to be bombed direct by the main force. Flares were dropped accurately and on time, and the markers successfully dropped their red T.I’s on the marking point. The attack then proceeded according to the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographs show the main area of the city to be completely gutted. On the whole a highly successful attack but something went wrong with the Northern edge which has escaped devastation. Investigation into the reason is not yet complete.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 12/13TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
The target was heavily attacked by a force of 195 Lancasters from all Bases, in good weather on 12/13th September.
PLAN The target had suffered severe and wide spread damage from previous R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. attacks, and so a plan of attack was required to cover the remaining comparatively undamaged areas.
A marking point was therefore chosen, and sectors allotted to each Base in which bombing headings were to be evenly distributed, in order to cover the whole of the undamaged area.
No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the big railway yards with T.I. Red and Red Spot fires, with the help of illumination from the flare force.
Appropriate delays were ordered, and blind markers were again dropped by 54 Base Lancasters as an initial guide to the Mosquitoes, and as an insurance if the latter failed to locate their marking point.
Flares were dropped accurately and punctually. Marking was completed successfully and the attack was carried out in accordance with the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows new areas of damage round the aiming point, in the Bad Constadt district, and at Fueurbach to the North of Stuttgart, in addition to several important industrial works.
Plots show that, although a fair concentration of incendiaries was obtained within the sectors planned, the main weight in the later part of the attack tended to spread to the East and North. The reasons for this are being investigated.
[Underlined] BOULOGNE – 17TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Provided by P.F.F.
The garrison at Boulogne was putting up a heavy resistance against the Canadians attacking the town and harbour, and two forces comprising 199 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the specific aiming points.
PLAN All aiming points were marked by full P.F.F. Oboe marking. The first two forces were timed to attack in two separate waves, the first at 0830 hours and the second at 0940 hours. In view of the proximity of our own troops, crews were carefully briefed to make their run up from a well defined pin-point on the coast and use was made of the Navigator’s Master Bomber switch.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows well bombing concentrated around the aiming points.
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[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN – 18/19TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
207 Lancasters from all Bases and 7 Mosquitoes took part in a heavy and devastating attack on the town and harbour installations at Bremerhaven, in cloudless weather conditions, with good visibility.
PLAN There were five aiming points, lying in a rough direction from N.N.W. to S.E.E. on the Eastern bank of the river. Marking procedure for this target was to be similar to that for the preceding targets, but its shape restricted the use of sectors and it was therefore planned that part of the force would attack on defined tracks over the Mosquitoes’ T.I’s, with the appropriate delay in the release of the bombs, whilst others would aim direct at these T.I’s with a false wind vector applied to the bombsight. Illumination and marking was carried out without any hitches, and the attack was completed according to plan.
RESULTS The two most closely built up areas North and South of the harbour entrances have been completely devastated. Most of the warehouses and dockside buildings have been gutted. This was a model for an incendiary attack.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH AND RHEYDT – 19/20TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Gibson.
A further heavy attack was carried out on this target by 227 aircraft from all Bases in the Group, the intention being to complete the destruction of this enemy industrial centre.
PLAN There were three forces – Red (53 Base plus 106 Squadron), Green (52 Base), and Yellow (55 Base), each force being allotted separate height bands and its own Marking Point, each of which was to be illuminated by flares and marked with Red, Green and Yellow T.I’s respectively. The aiming point of the Red force was the primary target and was to be fully controlled. If the green or yellow targets could not be successfully attacked aircraft were to be ordered to attack the red target.
There was a hitch with the marking for the Red Force. In the light of accurately placed flares, the Master Bomber went in to drop his T.I’s on the Red Marking Point, but his markers hung up. He then called the markers to come in. Number one marker had trouble with exhaust studs and Markers 2 and 3 could not identify. As no Red markers were down, the Master Bomber ordered the Red Force to bomb the green T.I’s which were dropped on time. Later, however, Marker number one identified and marked his target. The order to bomb the green T.I’s was cancelled and the force were then ordered to bomb the red T.I’s. The yellow marking point was punctually and accurately marked, and the Yellow force completed their attack as planned.
RESULTS Considerable additional damage over the whole N.W. perimeter of the town is revealed adding to the already severe and widespread damage. This almost completes the destruction of the town. There is little additional damage in Rheydt.
Plots of night photographs and the incendiary plot show that although the incendiary sticks dropped early in the attack fell near the aiming point, a spread rapidly developed both to the South and W.S.W. and at the end of the attack, an area from S.E. to West was covered. No markers were plotted in these areas. No explanation for this wide spread beyond and outside the planned sectors has yet been arrived at.
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[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, HANDORF AIRFIELD AND MUNSTER – 23/24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Red Target: Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Green Target: Squadron Leader Owen.
A large force comprising 254 aircraft from all Bases in the Group was detailed to attack these targets, the first two being the primaries and the last, Munster, an alternative, should the weather present difficulties for marking and attack. Unfortunately 10/10ths cloud was encountered in the target area with base 8,000 ft.
PLAN No.53 Base plus 106 Squadron and 617 Squadron were ordered to attack the red target (Dortmund-Ems Canal) and Nos. 52 and 55 Bases the green target (Handorf Airfield). If the red target were not marked, the red force, excluding the Tallboy aircraft, were to attack the green target, or if the green target was not marked, the yellow target. Similarly, the green force were to attack the yellow target as an alternative.
RESULTS [Underlined] Dortmund-Ems Canal [/underlined] – Although the portion of the canal marked and attacked was some 7 miles North of the planned aiming point, a very successful attack ensued, and both branches of the embanked portion of the canal were breached. A stretch of 18 miles of the canal is now dry, and over 100 barges are stranded. A splendid result. Of the red force, 82 Lancasters attacked the primary, and 12 the alternative.
[Underlined] Handorf Airfield [/underlined] – The marker force experienced difficulty in identifying the target area, and after an unsuccessful attempt, the main force was ordered to bomb the alternative. 20 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes claim to have attacked the primary, and 61 Lancasters attacked the alternative. There was no new damage to the alternative.
[Underlined] CALAIS – 24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
30 Lancasters of 53 Base were ordered to attack defence positions at Calais in daylight on 24th September. Marking was to be carried out throughout the attack by Oboe Mosquitoes of P.F.F.
RESULTS Weather conditions were unfavourable, there being 10/10ths cloud, base between 2/3,000 feet. In view of this the Master Bomber cancelled the attack. This order was not received by 8 aircraft of the force, who carried out the attack visually having identified their respective aiming points.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE – 26/27TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Force employed – 216 Lancasters, 11 Mosquitoes. Weather conditions experienced over the target were 8 – 10/10ths cloud 6 – 8,000 feet.
PLAN In order that the whole weight of the attack should fall on previously undamaged areas of the town, a marking point was selected, to be marked with red T.I’s and each Base was allotted a sector or track, radiating from the marking point. Main force crews were to aim their bombs at the red T.I’s and delay for the detailed number of seconds. The usual blind marking technique was ordered to ensure against the failure of the Mosquitoes to locate and mark the aiming point visually.
Cloud conditions and poor visibility prevented the visual markers from identifying the marking point and consequently the secondary plan was resorted to.
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RESULTS P.R.U. photographs reveal a large area of gutted buildings extending over many blocks. This devastation spreads on both sides of the main East to West road through the city around the closely built up area, for a distance of 1,500 yards by 500 yards to 1,000 yards. There are many scattered incidents of destruction beyond this central area, and a large number of commercial and administrative buildings have been destroyed. This is a great triumph for the blind markers.
[Underlined] KAISERLAUTERN – 27/28TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
207 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes from all Bases in the Group were to attack the industrial centre and railway workshops. The attack was carried out in weather conditions of 2 – 8/10ths thin stratus at 3,000 feet and 10/10ths cloud at 7,000 feet.
PLAN The railway workshops were to be attacked with ‘J’ bombs using a false wind vector on the bombsight, and the town by the normal method of overshooting.
RESULTS The illumination and marking on both areas were accurate and punctual.
The damage inflicted on the town, confined chiefly to a narrow belt across the centre of the area id disappointing in relation to the number of aircraft used. Investigation shows that over 70% of the aircraft bombed on headings within a small sector, and were not evenly spread over the whole sector as planned, thus little damage was sustained by the Northern and Southern outskirts. Greater attention should be paid at briefing to explaining the details of the plan of attack, and the importance of aircraft adhering to their briefed bombing headings must be strongly emphasised. The attack on the railway workshops achieved a greater measure of success.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACK BY NO. 617 AND NO. 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ – SEPTEMBER 15TH. [/underlined]
Previous attempts made by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and midget submarines to sink the Tirpitz had proved unsuccessful. It was considered that a force of Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs and other special bombs would have a good chance of inflicting severe damage to the battleship, if not sinking her, provided the element of surprise could be achieved, so that aircraft could carry out their bombing run before the smoke screen, which was known to be capable of covering the ship and fiord in which she lay within 10 minutes, could be brought into operation.
On September 11th, 38 Lancasters and 2 Liberators took off and with the exception of one aircraft of No. 9 Squadron, which had to return to base, all arrived at Archangel or in that area. Weather conditions were appalling, with rain and low cloud, and some crews were unable to locate the advanced base and had to land on other airfields and even in open country. But for a very high standard of airmanship many more aircraft might have been damaged or lost.
It was hoped that by approaching the target from the South, the necessary element of surprise would be achieved. Tallboy aircraft were to attack first, as it was essential that they should see and aim at the Tirpitz visually. The aircraft carrying the special bombs did not depend on visual sighting of the target. A separate plan and aiming data were provided for them. The plan consisted of the selection of two clearly identifiable landmarks close to the target, at which the bomb aimers could aim, using false settings on their bombsights. Two lakes, one on either side of the fiord were chosen for this purpose. Each aircraft was given a separate track, with the intention of covering an area of 750 yards X 750 yards with the target at its centre.
The flight plan proceeded as detailed until the approach to the target area, when the Tallboy force had to make a last minute alteration of course, as they were west of track.
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The leading Tallboy aircraft saw the Tirpitz clearly when 8 minutes flying time away from it, but by the time the first bombing run was made, the smoke screen was already in operation, and later aircraft found the target area completely obscured. Some aircraft were able to aim their bombs before the last traces of the Tirpitz disappeared under the smoke screen, but others had to aim at the gun flashes and light flak seen through the smoke screen. Others, unable to identify the target, took their bombs back to the advanced base.
The six aircraft carrying the special load aimed their bombs at the planned aiming points, but were unable to observe any results.
The majority of bombing frame photographs are unplottable due to smoke but the release point frames of thirteen of the Tallboy aircraft have been plotted, and the calculated strike position of the bombs indicate that at least one direct hit, and three near misses are probable. Neither the bombing nor release point frames of the aircraft carrying the special load are plottable, as they are obscured by smoke.
Subsequent P.R.U. photographs show a large rent in the starboard side of the ship forward, covering much of the forecastle. Apart from this hit the explosion of some 6,000 lbs of Torpex at a depth of 60 feet within a few yards of the ship’s side cannot fail to have given her a severe shaking, and at least one of the near misses was very close.
This was a highly successful operation carried through in spite of considerable difficulties.
[Page break]
[Drawing] GARDENING
The Group Gardening effort this month has been on a small scale, and has only called for two operations in which a total of 77 vegetables were successfully planted, although crews stood by for other operations which were cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions.
It is interesting to note that in our first operation this month, the Gardeners from 44 Squadron were co-ordinated into the main force attack on an important German Port, and planted visually by the light of the Flare Force, close to the docks in a channel 800 yards wide, from 12,000 feet.
The second operation, performed by 57 and 630 Squadrons, was a normal H 2 S high lay off the entrance to important German shipping channels where 53 selected vegetables were successfully planted. Unfortunately H/57 had trouble with H 2 S equipment after trying local repairs to within 20 minutes of the target, and then correctly returned with a complete load.
The Command effort totalled 748 vegetables, mostly planted in the Baltic and Kattegat area, with the object of continuing the present dislocation of enemy shipping routes, and preventing troop movements from Scandinavia to the mainlands of the European offensive.
It can be estimated that at present the figures for vegetables planted per ships sunk, stand at 47 to 1. This is an encouraging figure when taking into account the number of Gardening sortied made, and bearing in mind that this does not include the loss to war effort while sweeping measures are put in hand and completed in each area, or the number of ships that are severely damaged and can only be repaired under difficult conditions, or the all-important morale effect on those who “go down to the sea in ships”.
The following extract from the “News Digest” of 28th September reveals the present state of our enemy’s imagination:
“Norway – German fear of Paratroops. British bombers have recently flown over Oslofjord dropping mines.”
“…The Germans are nervous because they think that paratroops were dropped at the same time as the mines. After the first attack some weeks ago, Oslo harbour was closed to all traffic for two days. Since then many attacks have been made, and the harbour has been closed every time. Even the Bygde ferries have, at times, had to stop their traffic. Large-scale raids have been carried out in Cjelleras, and even as far away as Lillestrom there have been raids for paratroops”.
It is also reported that all ships entering narrow channels in the Kiel area have to place two strong cables round their bottoms, and so sail until they are out of the area. This is done in order to facilitate the salvaging of a ship by cranes or other salvage devices in case she is bombed or mined.
In other words, our enemy has developed the minephobic complaint to a very high degree, and with our present increase in stocks he will receive further innoculations [sic] as, and where, we may decide in the future.
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WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties, Tonnage and Hours by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
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[Drawing] TACTICS
The main tactical development of this month has been the withdrawal of early warning devices, i.e. MONICA and BOOZER, and the limitation in the use of H.2.S. It is now known that Hun night fighters can home upon these devices. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no alternative but to withdraw them. MONICA is in the process of modification and may be reissued eventually, but in its absence, crews must exert the utmost vigilance in their search.
It must be appreciated that, although German C.G.I. is getting very much shorter warning of an approaching raid, the number of targets to which a bomber force may be going is also decreasing, making the night fighter controller’s job easier. He also has his night fighter squadrons concentrated into a smaller area and their transfer from one area to another is consequently easier. Bearing these factors in mind, there can be no doubt that the German night fighter will constitute our main problem during the coming months. The following steps should be taken to ensure utmost efficiency in combatting the enemy’s defensive measures.
(i) [Underlined] Night Vision Training. [/underlined]
No opportunity should be lost of training crews in night vision. Night vision efficiency is something which can be improved with practice. Remember, with the withdrawal of the early warning devices, it is now your eyes and night vision versus the night vision aided by A.I. of the enemy night fighter. On the other hand, you have seven pairs of eyes where he has one. This advantage must be exploited to the utmost.
(ii) [Underlined] Increased Banking Search. [/underlined]
Surprise remains the night fighter’s most important weapon. The only effective counter to surprise from behind and below is a constant banking search, and captains must increase the frequency with which they carry out this banking search.
(iii) [Underlined] Corkscrew. [/underlined]
The 5 Group Corkscrew continues to be a very effective fighting manoeuvre. A scrutiny of recent combat reports, however, reveals that there is little doubt that the Hun night fighters now expect the corkscrew and anticipate it. Out of 94 combats reported the enemy fighter opened fire only 37 times, and in many cases was seen to make a feint attack, sufficient to persuade the Lancaster’s captain to corkscrew, and then to hold off and wait until the manoeuvre was completed. The existence of a combat report proves that the corkscrew was successful, but it is considered that where no combat report exists, i.e. where the bomber has been shot down, the fighter’s tactics have been successful. In other words, he waited until the corkscrew has been completed and the aircraft has resumed course, and has then closed in and opened fire.
You are no longer safe in assuming, therefore, that one cycle of a corkscrew will throw off the fighter. Should the gunners lose the fighter in a corkscrew, a banking search should be carried out as soon as course is resumed, to ensure that he is not directly under the
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aircraft.
A new German night fighter, the H.E.219, is now known to carry two fixed astral guns, oblique upwards firing. It is believed that these fire at an angle of 65° upwards and forwards and are fired by the pilot. This adds further weight to the necessity for constant banking search.
To summarise:-
1. Learn how to use your eyes at night!
2. Carry out the correct search to find the enemy.
3. When you have found him – don’t lose him!
[Cartoon]
THE MAN WHO EMNTIONED THE TARGET AT FLIGHT PLANNING!
[Underlined] WITH APOLOGIES TO H.M. BATEMAN [/underlined]
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[Drawing] SIGNALS
[Underlined] W/T DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
On the night 27/28th. September, 217 aircraft of this Group attacked Kaiserslautern. In accordance with recent practice, very strict W/T, R/T and Radar silence was ordered en route to and from the target. Wireless Operators should have been well aware of the vital need for strict W/T silence on this occasion, in view of the unusual measures taken. In spite of this, however, five Wireless Operators of this Group broke W/T silence during the period 0114 to 0325. Their transmissions took the form of such senseless remarks as “INT WOP – HOW ARE YOU – BANG ON – IMI – GOOD SHOW – INT CUP OF TEA.”
What satisfaction these inane natterbugs got out of their efforts it is hard to see. The enemy, deprived of his usual means of detecting the stream, might easily have obtained bearings on these continuous transmissions, with the result that five brainless Operators would have been the direct cause of the loss of several Group aircraft and many of their comrades.
Despite energetic enquiry and investigation, it has not been possible – so far – to track down the culprits; they are obviously not the type who would own up. If they are found, however, they may rest assured that never again will they have the opportunity to jeopardise their comrades. That such incidents must never occur again has been made perfectly plain.
The Wireless Operators of 5 Group have had the privilege, since the attack on the Dams, of a fair amount of interesting W/T operating. This makes it all the more incomprehensible, therefore, that a few of them should adopt this culpable form of keybashing. It is known, however, that the vast majority of Wireless Operators are responsible men, who feel just as strongly about this “black” as does the C.S.O. It is hard that their good name should have been sullied by the action of so few, and all must now combine to ensure that such flagrant breaches of W/T discipline never occur again.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS. [/underlined]
The hope expressed in last month’s summary that a healthy competition between Bases would develop, has now materialised. In fact, it is almost a full time job for one man at Group Headquarters to book and supervise these exercises. Signals Leader should note that many a good exercise is spoilt by failure of the Operators to pay attention to detail. Before an operator takes part in any of these exercises, he should know 5 G.S.I. No. 12 backwards. In this connection, the main points to watch are:-
(1) The number of times call signs should be sent.
(2) How often the text of a message should be repeated.
In next month’s issue, it is intended to publish a table showing the number of exercises completed by Bases.
[Underlined] REGRADING. [/underlined]
The Group Signals Leader examined a large number of wireless Operators during the month, and claimed he was more or less up to date on regrading before proceeding on leave. Perhaps it is not generally known that the main purpose of this leave was to see for the first time Gilmour Junior – of the ‘transmitter’ variety we believe. It is known, however, that during the past fortnight quite a formidable queue of W/Ops Grade II has been forming, and every endeavour will be made to deal with these as soon as possible.
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[Underlined] GROUP EXERCISES. [/underlined]
These have taken place regularly throughout the month, and the high standard of operating maintained. They still reveal, however, that morse practice and more morse practice is essential. It is hoped that the recent quiet spell has been taken advantage of in this connection.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Signals failure percentage continues to increase, the figure for September being 2.459. Over the past 3 months the percentage has risen steadily. On reading through the defects summary however, it can be seen that over 90% of the trouble is still attributable to component failures. The long spell of no maintenance faults has broken, one Squadron having no less than three such failures. There are still quite a number under the heading miscellaneous – the “remarks” column being “No fault found”. This type of alleged failure must stop. There were two manipulation failures which could easily have been avoided, in one case an incorrect VHF channel was selected, in the other, the type 51 Junction box switch was in the wrong position.
It is most gratifying to see that not one failure of VR.101, i.e. output valve V8, was reported throughout the month. It appears that the recent glut of V8 failures can be attributed either to faulty manufacture or wartime materials.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
There have been many essential changes in the V.H.F. policy during the past month, the reason being, an operation on HANDORF airfield, night 23/24th September, when very heavy FREYA interference was experienced on the TR.1143 equipment. This setback made it quite clear that the series noise limiting diode modification had to be carried out on all the new SCR.522 equipments prior to their debut into 5 Group Lancasters and Mosquitoes. The modification is quite simple, the only difficulty being the realigning of the four I.F. stages and all Squadrons not possessing a suitable 12 m/c oscillator. It was decided, therefore, that the Americans be asked to incorporate the modifications for us, and this they most willingly agreed to. The result is, at the time of going to press, only 35 of the 435 SCR.522’s held, now require to be modified.
For 100% suppression of all noise, it has also been found necessary to filter the 150 volt Dynamotor output with a 5 uf electrolytic 200 volts D.C.W. Capacitor. If this equipment is readily available through R.A.F. sources, in such a large quantity the modification will be carried out locally. Failing this the U.S. Air Force has again expressed willingness to assist.
[Underlined] NOISE SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION. SCR.522. [/underlined]
Briefly the Noise Limiting modification functions as follows:- A double diode is inserted in series with the output from the 2nd Detector, one section of the valve is biassed by a portion of the average D.C. voltage developed by this detector. When normal speech is being received, the bias is such as to allow the diode to conduct, i.e. the diode becomes a low impedance. When any pulse waveform is impressed on the incoming required signal the diode anode is biassed more negative and cuts off; hence it offers a high impedance to the interfering pulse. The other half of the valve holds the A.V.C. to zero until the average D.C. voltage developed by the A.V.C. diode exceeds the delay voltage. The A.V.C. voltage, after the modification, is derived from the primary of the last I.F. transformer. Changes are also made in the I.F. Grid circuits, to reduce cross modulation effects caused by the grid current as the result of high noise voltage pulses.
[Underlined] BLIND MARKING – CONINGSBY’S SPECIAL RADAR EFFORT. [/underlined]
The story may now be told of the work done at Coningsby to improve the performance of MK.III H2S. During the latter half of July, it was decided that efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of our offensive Radar devices. Hs” MK.III was selected for particular attention, the main requirement was for an accurate Blind Bombing Instrument, and immediate steps were taken to improve MK.III H2S to enable it to perform this function. T.R.E. aided us in every way possible, to enable this commitment to be undertaken without impairing operational serviceability.
The greatest difficulty which had to be overcome was the tendency of the presentation on the screen to disintegrate or disappear at the shorter ranges. It was felt by T.R.E. that this was due to the inefficiency of the scanners, and therefore, scanners received the first attention. Those which had previously
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given the best results were carefully selected, and thorough checks made against specifications, at the same time the best Units of the equipment were subjected to a detailed and exacting overhaul for power output, tuning, and accurate calibration of height and range markers. When one complete installation had been fully tested in this manner, it was placed in an aircraft, and one of the most experienced crews commenced bombing trials on Wainfleet, and on several inland towns. The results obtained on these trials are compared here with results which were obtained previous to these experiments. The average error obtained at Wainfleet for 5 bombs was 316 yards as compared to a previous error of 1,193 yards. A second crew dropped 6 bombs with an average error of 1.6 miles with the ordinary Mk. III H 2 S equipment, and on using the improved equipment reduced this error to 800 yards. On inland towns the bombing results were similar to those on Wainfleet, an average error of 700 and 500 yards being obtained with the special equipment, whilst errors of 1,600 and 2,000 yards were obtained with the standard equipment.
It was decided from these figures that the experiments and improvements were making more accurate bombing possible, and a further 6 aircraft were similarly equipped, and the best Operators assigned to these aircraft. Further training and trials were carried out, and the results gave additional proof that the experiments were on the right road. The final assurance that all this concentration on improvements and selection of all Units and Operators was improving the bombing was soon forthcoming. The operations were conducted against Konigsberg, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe were most successful, the average error of the proximity markers being 550 yards.
These results do not by any means mark the successful conclusion of the experiments, but rather indicate that we are just beginning, and the coming few months will see an ever increasing improvement in both equipment and crews.
It is desired at this point to express our appreciation for the assistance which has been rendered by T.R.E. and H.Q.B.C. and for the close co-operation by all concerned at Coningsby without whose help none of this work would have been possible.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee maintained its usual high standard of serviceability through September. Of the 2386 sorties reported for the month, 62 difficulties were experienced for a percentage serviceable of 97.4 as compared with 97.26 for August.
The supply of Gee remains a very critical problem, although the position has eased up slightly. The new aerial loading unit is apparently becoming available shortly, and a few have already been received in new aircraft. The supply of R.F. Units Type 27 has also improved and an effort is being made to fit all Squadrons completely in the near future.
A modification which enables the simultaneous presentation of signals and calibration pips on the screen has been submitted by 617 Squadron, and forwarded to Headquarters Bomber Command for approval.
[Underlined] H 2 S. [/underlined]
Although for obvious reasons the use of H 2 S Mark II was restricted this month, a total of 819 sorties was completed and out of these 90.7 per cent were free of technical difficulty. A switch unit which allows the equipment to be switched on and off at altitude has been developed by T.R.E. This should soon be in production.
H.2.S. Mark III is not so badly affected by this restriction, and during September, a total of 135 sorties was reported. Twelve difficulties were experienced, which brings serviceability back to 91.2 per cent, an increase of 2.3 above last month. The work which has been undertaken on the H.2.S. Mark III at Coningsby has served to familiarise the Radar Mechanics even more with the equipment, and the benefits thus derived should bring the serviceability to a much higher standard from day to day.
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[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
Unfortunately Monica has had to be removed from all aircraft, but it is hoped only temporarily, pending the introduction of a modification developed by 53 Base and T.R.E. This modification is being pursued at T.R.E. with the assistance of a Radar Officer from this Group.
Before it was restricted, Monica IIIA reached its highest serviceability. Of the 139 sorties completed, only one defect was experienced, giving a percentage serviceable of 99.3. This provides a record which will require a great deal of effort if it is to be bettered on the re-installation of the equipment.
Monica V was, however, not far behind, for out of 99 sorties only one difficulty occurred, giving a serviceability of 99 per cent – another record which we will endeavour to equal.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond, due to the restriction on H 2 S, was also used to a lesser extent during September. Despite this, it rendered a very satisfactory service for 722 sorties out of 796 reported, a percentage of 90.7. Training of operators has increased the usefulness of the equipment, and every effort should be made to aid those operators in quickly interpreting the picture on the screen.
[Underlined] A. G. L. (T) [/underlined]
During the second week of September, A.G.L. (T) became operational and up to the end of the month 70 sorties had been completed. Of these, 20 developed difficulty which gives a percentage serviceable of 71.5. Nine of these defects were due to components in the A.G.L. (T) installation itself, whilst H 2 S, Fishpond and the power supply were responsible for the remaining eleven.
Although this standard of serviceability leaves a great deal to be desired, October should bring about an encouraging improvement, in view of the experience which has now been gained by servicing personnel. It is very gratifying to note the enthusiasm with which this new device has been received, on the part of both the air and ground crews. As it becomes increasingly familiar and serviceability steadily climbs, this enthusiasm will grow and the full benefit will be derived from it.
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[Drawing] AIR BOMBING
The month of September has provided some excellent results from the attacks on German towns, and despite adverse weather conditions on one or two occasions the determination of crews provided better results than were, at first anticipated.
Incendiaries formed the greater part of the bomb loads, and the previous difficulties experienced in aiming the 4 lb I.B. have been largely overcome by the use of the new wind conversion factors for bombs of low T.V. However, it is still very necessary for Air Bombers to adhere strictly to the “delay release” times supplied at briefing, and Bombing Leaders must ensure that the importance of this is stressed.
Another point which cannot be stressed too often is the necessity for not dropping any bombs until either the Controller has given the order to bomb, or ‘H’ hour has arrived and no instructions have been received from the Controller. You will be briefed to adopt the latter alternative is it has been decided that there will be no orbiting in the target area. The reasons for these instructions should be apparent; the difficulties of the Mosquito markers are greatly increased if a few stray ‘cookies’ are dropping while they are searching for the marking point, and a load of 4 lb. I.B’s can be very dazzling to the low-flying markers.
The destruction of towns and cities behind the actual battle-front will have a direct effect upon the results of the hard battles which the ground forces will have to undertake soon. The enemy will be denied the use of his most essential means of transport, shelter for his reserves, and what remains of his armament production in the previously attacked areas. To achieve this, all Air Bomber must make sure that their bombs hit the areas they are intended for, and that means constant practice, a thorough knowledge of all equipment, and the ability to conform strictly to the plan of attack.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
Although the amount of practice bombing has increased considerably during the past six months, there is still a large number of details being cancelled because of snags which could have been avoided.
Now that the winter months are approaching, and opportunities for bombing will decrease, it is essential that the best advantage be taken of every chance to complete an exercise.
Quite a large number of faults which cause an abandonment of an exercise could have been prevented if the air bomber had thoroughly checked his equipment before take-off.
First of all make certain that the auto-selector box on the Light series carrier has been reset to No.1. The ground crew will usually attend to that, but there are occasions when it has been missed.
Examine the bombs and change any that have damaged tail fins. At the same time see that the safety pins have been withdrawn.
Test your bombsight on the ground and make sure that you have an emergency computor [sic]. In the event of a bombsight failure you can still derive some benefit from the exercise.
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
The provision of Bombing Analysis Officers on Squadrons and Conversion Units has proved of great value during the past few months, ensuring speedy
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assessment of exercises and the abolition of inevitable errors which occurred when Bombing Leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to this very important duty.
However, there are still one or two points not receiving the attention required:-
(i) Crews must be given a detailed analysis of their exercises. It is not always possible to have the Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber present during the actual analysis, but they should see the plot as soon as possible.
(ii) Form 3073 must be completed, and the details supplied must be accurate. It will then afford the Analysis Officer, and the Bombsight Maintenance Staff, the maximum amount of assistance. It should be possible for the Squadron Commander to pick up a Form 3073 relating to an analysed exercise and thereby obtain a complete account of the bombing and any relevant comments from the Bombing Leader.
(iii) Do not forget that new crews have had very little experience in bombing from a Lancaster, and an accurate analysis will be of the greatest assistance to them.
(iv) When a bombsight fault has been discovered, inform the Instrument Section [underlined] immediately, [/underlined] and give them all the information you can. If necessary, produce the bomb plot and explain the errors. The Bombsight maintenance staff will appreciate all the assistance you can give them.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What action would you take if you obtained maximum starboard drift on the sighting head with zero wind set on the computor [sic]?
2. What is the procedure on landing at a strange airfield with 500 lb bombs (37 pistol) still on the aircraft?
3. Why is it essential to conform to the briefed air speed when making a “Wanganui” attack?
4. How does the Flight Engineer check the suction and what readings would you require to ensure that the bombsight was serviceable?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Mansbridge [/underlined] has left Group Headquarters and is now on a Staff Officers’ Course.
[Underlined] F/Lt Abbott [/underlined] (49 Squadron) is carrying out Group Bombing Leader’s duties.
[Underlined] S/Ldr Murtough [/underlined] (53 Base) has gone to Manby to take charge of the Bombing Leaders’ Courses.
[Underlined] F/Lt McCarthy [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) has gone to 53 Base and has been replaced by [underlined] F/Lt Kennedy [/underlined] (463 Squadron)
[Underlined] F/O Grime [/underlined] is doing Bombing Leader’s duties at 463 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt Harris [/underlined] (5 L.F.S.) has met with an unfortunate accident, and [underlined] F/O Wilkie [/underlined] (1661 C.U.) has taken over the Bombing Section at Syerston.
[Underlined] COURSES [/underlined]
The Group had three Air Bombers on No.91 Bombing Leaders’ Course, F/O Moreton (106 Squadron) was 6th, P/O Muhl (207 Squadron) 8th, and F/O Pyle (1661 C.U.) 10th, all obtaining “B” categories.
The bombing analysis courses are proceeding satisfactorily, and our
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candidates have all received excellent assessments. If any Squadron or Conversion Unit has not appointed a Bombing Analysis Officer who has completed the course, please apply for an early vacancy.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 97 61 yards
2nd 630 64 yards
3rd 619 71 yards
4th 83 74 yards
5th 467 77 yards
6th 207 81 yards
7th 9 89 yards
8th 49 90 yards
9th 463 93 yards
10th 61 113 yards
11th 44 114 yards
12th 50 117 yards
13th 57 118 yards
14th 122 yards
September has produced a 100% entry in the Squadron Bombing Competition and 97 Squadron are at the top with an average error, for 8 exercises, of 61 yards.
This is an excellent result and 97 are to be congratulated, more especially as quite a lot of their bombing was carried out by Flight Engineers.
With the exception of 619 Squadron, 52 Base have slipped down the ladder, but assurances have been received from 44 and 49 Squadrons that this is only a temporary lapse, and every effort will be made to return to their former positions.
106 Squadron are handicapped by having many unexperienced crews on their strength and consequently are at the bottom of the list. However, the keenness which is apparent on the station is sure to produce better results.
Competition should be very keen during October; 97 Squadron will be ‘all out’ to keep on top, and it will need a very special effort from the “Main Force” to depose them. Given suitable weather, all records should be broken.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1654 56 yards
2nd 1660 65 yards
3rd 1661 72 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 85 yards
1661 Conversion Unit, after leading for two successive months, have gone down to third place, and 1654 Conversion Unit have taken over the top position with an average error of 56 yards.
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
The only entry this month comes from 51 Base:-
G/Capt Coats (Swinderby) – 103 yards
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has only produced one entrant also:-
F/Lt Foulkes (630 Squadron) – 158 yards
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[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Errors by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
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[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
Wainfleet plotted 4945 bombs and 111 T.I’s dropped from 921 aircraft.
It is obvious that the Range staff have had a busy time, and to ensure accurate plotting, crews must conform to range procedure.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Wonham [/underlined] (55 Base) extends a hearty welcome to 44 and 619 Squadrons. The rivalry between the Squadrons, on Practice Bombing matters, is very keen and errors have shown a steady decrease during the past few months.
[Underlined] F/Lt Foulkes [/underlined] (630 Squadron) has equipped an excellent Bombing Analysis room. Points concerning Bombing, which need stressing, are emphasised by humorous cartoons, and the room itself is kept very clean and tidy.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
* Excluding 617 and 627 Squadrons.
A+ 85 yards or less.
A 140 yards or less.
B 210 yards or less.
C 280 yards or less.
D Over 280 yards.
The number of “D” category crews has decreased from 41 in August, to 15 for this month. This is a considerable improvement, but it is not good enough – there should be no “D” crews on an Operational Squadron, and Bombing Leaders must give careful attention to these errors.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
9 F/O Marsh F/O Carr - 78
44 P/O Evans Sgt Harper F/S Hunter 73
49 F/O Furber F/S Gentleman F/O Hassell 75
50 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 79
97 F/O Woolnough W/O Shearwood F/O Haggerston 57
F/L Shorter F/S Betts P/O Aveline 57 – 79
467 F/O Jones F/S Burns F/S Michelmore 74
617 F/L Knights F/O Rogers F/O Playford 74
F/O Levy F/S Peck F/O Fox 78
F/O Stout F/O Rupert F/O Graham 59
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard F/S Fish 70
F/L Hamilton F/O Rogers P/O Jackson 72
F/O Leavitt Sgt Oldham F/O Withams 73
619 F/O Cottman F/S Coster F/S Murray 71
1654 F/O Gray F/O Aitken Sgt Adams 62
F/O Denton F/O Goebel Sgt Kneebone 77
F/O Brammer Sgt White W/O Davies 69
P/O Dockworth F/S Quealy F/S Kenward 43
F/O Langridge F/O Cavanagh F/S Diggins 65
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OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS (continued)
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
1660 P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowen Sgt Ransom 56
Sgt Sargent Sgt Walters F/S Symes 67
Sgt Keen Sgt Hurst Sgt Fidler 62
Lt Evenson Sgt BJorcy P/O Carling 61
P/O Penman F/S Dash P/O Pointon 78
F/S Cox F/S Smitherwaite Sgt Taylor 68
F/O Downing F/O Harrison P/O Semark 64
Lt Howes Sgt Johnston F/O Butterfield 78
1661 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 78
F/O James Sgt Longhurst P/O Jeffreys 70
F/O Gillegin Sgt Jenden Sgt Elliott 58
P/O Smith F/S Scott F/O Sweeney 77
F/O Caryer F/O Arnett P/O Grassie 71
5 L.F.S. P/O Aryton Sgt Herkes F/S Bardsley 65
P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowers Sgt Ransom 78
Owing to the large number of crew errors below 100 yards, it is only possible to publish those below 80 yards. Congratulations are due to F/L Shorter and crew (97 Squadron), F/S Wonders and crew (50 Squadron) and P/O Le Marquand and crew (now of 49 Squadron) for their consistently good bombing during the month.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” BOMBING TROPHY [/underlined]
The “Lord Camrose” trophy remains at Skellingthorpe for another three months.
50 Squadron’s average crew error for the months of July, August and September is 148 yards at 20,000 feet. Well done 50 Squadron!
463 Squadron are the runners up with an average error of 153 yards at 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The complete summary of practice bombing results for the month of September provides some very interesting facts and comparisons.
The number of bombs dropped is the best ever, and 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their magnificent effort in dropping 789. However, it will be noted that 61 Squadron dropped only 96 and assuming the Squadron strength to be 25 crews, that gives an average of 4 bombs per crew for one month. This compares unfavourably with the other Squadrons in the same Base, and it is essential that crews have the maximum amount of bombing training permitted by operational commitments and weather conditions.
Crew errors have declined slightly this month, the average being 9 yards less than that of August. This is a step in the right direction and it is hoped that there will be a steady reduction in errors until we can get our average error down to less than 150 yards. It can be done, 50 Squadron have proved it by obtaining an average crew error of 148 yards for the last three months.
The number of bombsight errors has increased from 42 in August to 90 in September, but the proportion of bombsight errors to exercises completed remains the same. Close co-operation between the Bombing Analysis Officer and the Instrument Section will help to bring bombsight serviceability up to a satisfactory level.
Our practice bombing has improved considerably during the past six months, from 275 to 183 yards at 20,000 feet and this improvement is apparent in the results of the attacks on German targets. However, it is possible to reach an even higher standard of accuracy but it means constant practice on the part of every member of the bombing team.
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[Drawing] NAVIGATION
Almost all attacks this month have been on German objectives and navigators have done a good job on these longer range targets. Radar restrictions have necessitated flying considerable distances outside Gee range, and with winter approaching we must be prepared to fly even greater distances on D.R. alone. To achieve the high standard of navigation necessary for correct timing at the target, your D.R. navigation must be as sound and as complete as possible.
Mathematical accuracy, constant checking of D.R. positions and constant w/v checks, are the keynote of efficient D.R. navigation. Unfortunately very few navigators comply with all these points, and cases still occur of navigators not obtaining one D.R. position between their last Gee fix and the target.
Timing has been stressed frequently but on the coming long range operations it will be of paramount importance. By comparing forecast winds with winds found it is nearly always possible after the first hour’s flying to tell whether the aircraft will arrive at the target on time or not. If no moveable zero hour is being employed, then the earlier you can adjust your air speed, the easier it will be for you to arrive at the target at your scheduled time. During the winter months of last year it was not unusual to experience a spread of 15 – 20 minutes in the time over the target or along the route. With the concentration of enemy defences YOU CANNOT afford to fly in a bomber stream some 60 miles in length.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity scheme has not been used this month. Crews detailed to find correct bombing winds have put in some very good work, however, particular mention being due to 49 Squadron on the night 26/27th (Karlsruhe).
[Underlined] EXAMPLE OF GOOD “PILOT” NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
On the night of 27/28th September, 1944 (Kaiserlauten) F/O Nunns, Pilot of 630 Squadron gave an excellent example of “Pilot” Navigation. His aircraft was hit by flak on the return journey when some 150 miles inside France. He ordered the crew to abandon aircraft and was about to bale out himself when he managed to regain control. He decided to bring the aircraft back to base himself. Levelling out the aircraft and putting in “George” he went back to the navigator’s compartment and studied the log and chart carefully. From the information on the chart he was able to ascertain the aircraft’s present approximate position, and from the flight plan the courses to steer to reach base and the times on each leg. He flew the courses stated for the requisite amount of time and (strangely enough!) reached the base area. He was able to identify the beacons en route from the navigator’s flimsy and was thus able to “map read” the last few miles to base by this method.
This was a great effort and praise is due to both the pilot and also to his navigator who must have kept a complete and tidy chart to enable F/O Nunns to reach base the way he did.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF NAVIGATORS. [/underlined]
During the month of August it was decided to categorise navigators. Navigation does not lend itself easily to categorisation, mainly because it is impossible to lay down a procedure which will cater for every eventuality. It therefore will depend upon common sense and judgement of navigation officers.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
It is essential that all navigator’s operational logs and charts are thoroughly analysed immediately after each raid, and the results of that analysis made known to the navigation team as soon as possible, so that mistakes made will not be repeated. The analysis of logs and charts has always been the responsibility of Station and Squadron Navigation Officers; the present frequency of operations makes this an impossible task. It has therefore been decided to appoint one Navigation Analysis Officer to each Squadron, whose whole time duty it will be to analyse very thoroughly each log and chart.
By these appointments it is hoped to bring to light the errors and omissions of each navigator within 24 hours of completing a sortie. The Station Navigation Officer will thus be able to point out to each Navigator the “error of his ways” immediately, and will thus ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
Navigation Officers have a very big job in front of them and much hard work will be required.
[Underlined] APPROACH OF WINTER – WHAT IT MEANS! [/underlined]
Apart from all the well-known discomforts, the approach of winter means that OLD MAN WIND – the Navigator’s greatest enemy – will start hitting out again in force and will do all he can to land you in mischief. Low pressure systems are more prevalent in winter time, and therefore stronger winds have to be combated. Longer range targets means passing over territory which cannot at the moment, be too well explored by the Met. man, therefore you may pass over a front with a consequent wind change or run into a low pressure system which has not been forecast by the Met. Section. All this means that every individual Navigator must have a very thorough understanding of wind system. He must be able to interpolate for wind changes and must anticipate any sudden change of wind velocity. In last month’s summary attention was drawn to the Berlin raid of last Winter. We do not want this to happen again.
Get to know the wind system; visit the Met. man regularly and discuss the subject with him. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers should arrange constant lectures on this subject for the benefit of their Navigators. Wind is your biggest enemy.
[Underlined] O.R.S. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
A word about the O.R.S. information which is taken from you at interrogation. Numerous instances are occurring of incorrect information being forwarded to Group Headquarters. For example, an aircraft’s position is given as 4720N when it should be 4920N. These inaccuracies are obvious but other smaller inaccuracies are not so obvious. The concentration diagrams prepared from this information do not present a true picture of the situation, also many statistics prepared by O.R.S. are equally inaccurate and are therefore of no value.
All this O.R.S. information is collected and collated for your benefit and ultimate safety so do make sure that you give the CORRECT information and SEE that the Interrogator logs it correctly.
[Underlined] ATTACK ON TIRPITZ. [/underlined]
Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons had an opportunity during the month of showing their skill as “real” Navigators. The occasion was the attack on Tirpitz in Northern Waters and the landing at advanced bases in Russia. This operation, undertaken under difficult weather conditions and in total darkness, called for a very high standard of Navigation. It was anticipated that Gee would be received as far as 63° or 64°N; this was in fact correct. The remaining 1,000 miles over enemy occupied territory and enemy waters had to be tackled without the aid of Radar fixing facilities. Map reading was of course the most accurate method of fixing available, but this was very difficult over mountainous country studded with lakes and rivers. Nevertheless Air Bombers did some excellent work. Good use was also made of drifts
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and astro shots. Unfortunately the low pressure system which could not be accurately positioned by Met., was encountered over the most difficult part of the route. This meant that winds became much stronger than forecast and also a considerable lowering of cloud base. Nevertheless, practically all the Navigators noted this sudden strengthening and varying of the wind velocity and were able to combat it successfully.
It was anticipated that a little trouble might be experienced with the P4 Compasses in these Northern latitudes. Every precaution was therefore taken before the aircraft left this country, compasses were swung and as much deviation was removed before take-off for this operation. It was gratifying to note, however, that not one single instance of compass failure or excessive deviation occurred.
The Air Bombers and Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons did an excellent job on this operation, under the most difficult conditions. They brought back with them much valuable information on the performance of compasses, Northern chain Gee range at varying heights etc. – information which will be of considerable importance in the planning of future operations.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING W/VS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is shown below.
Average Error of Squadrons – 4.7
Average Error of C. Units – 5.0
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1.8 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.6 m.p.h. This is excellent and the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h. has been reached. Let us now try and reduce this ideal over-all to 4 m.p.h.
[Table of Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the fourth month is succession. A very creditable performance. There still appears to be little improvement in the errors obtained by the three Squadrons from 54 Base. Come along now, let us see them at the top of the list next month.
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[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. Mould, DFC – Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to be Base Nav. Officer, Syerston.
S/Ldr. Bray, DFC – Station Nav. Officer, Dunholme to be Station Nav. Officer, Strubby.
S/Ldr. Warwick, DFC – Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby missing on operations.
[Cartoon] “HERE IS THE BOMBING WIND – AND THIS IS P/O VECTOR READING IT!”
N.M.
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[Drawing] RADAR NAV.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The most outstanding feature regarding 2 S this month has been the severe restrictions placed upon its use for operations.
It is realised that with these restrictions of H 2 S, navigation is bound to suffer slightly, particularly during the autumn months as no one can be too certain of the ranges on Gee. Operators must therefore make the best of the limited use of H 2 S on each operation. This Headquarters will welcome any ideas on how to obtain maximum efficiency from H 2 S during the limited periods it is available.
There are one or two points regarding the restrictions which must be stressed at the present time. Firstly, operators, if they are allowed to use H 2 S on any part of the flight, must make sure that it is switched on below 6,000 feet or else circuit breakdowns may occur. Secondly, close watch must be maintained on the scanner position when turned off, as wander is likely particularly during tactical manoeuvres.
It must be pointed out that despite restrictions on H 2 S on operations, no relaxation in training can be allowed and every effort must be made to see that operators remain proficient in its use. Experiments are being carried out to develop some kind of sector scan and if successful, operators may be able to make use of H 2 S throughout the whole flight. Sector scan requires a high standard of proficiency in H 2 S particularly in the interpretation of the P.P.I., and although training in sector can cannot be given at the moment, operators may do well to bear the problem in mind.
Experiments are also going ahead with the Mark II H 2 S scanner to try and improve the bombing picture on the P.P.I. This is being done by altering the pitch of the scanner to concentrate the beam and alter the polar diagram. If successful it may be possible to modify other Mark II equipment gradually. This will only be done if the range is not seriously restricted and its navigational use is not affected.
Blind bombing technique in the Group has developed further in the past few weeks and considerable success has been obtained by 83 and 97 Squadrons on the last few operations. To indicate the high standard which these two Squadrons have attained, a resume’ of their flare and blind marking errors on operations is given.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 26/27 AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
This was the first operation on which the specially selected H 2 S Mark III equipment was used and F/Lt. Baker, Blind Marker crew of 97 Squadron dropped his marker 400 yds. south of the Aiming Point. Had the whole attack been based on this marker it might have been slightly more successful.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 29/30th AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
An extremely successful operation with the centre of the blind illuminating flares being plotted extremely close to the centre of the town. The blind proximity marker released by a crew of 97 Squadron was reported 600 yds. south of the aiming point although no photograph was obtained.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. 11/12th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
An excellent operation with highly successful blind illumination
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provided by 83 and 97 Squadrons. The direct release method of marking and blind bombing was used and photographs gave the following results:-
F/O TAYLOR 97 SQUADRON AIMING POINT.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O EATON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/LT. BAKER 97 SQUADRON 1.75 n.m.
[Underlined] STUTTGART. 12/13th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Blind marking was carried out by the direct release method with a G.P.I. check from PFORZHEIM. The following successful results were obtained:-
F/LT. AMES 97 SQUADRON 600 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,000yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. SHORTER 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds From Town Centre.
F/O. SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. LAING 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18/19th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A most successful sortie. Of the Primary Blind Markers F/Lt. Kelly of 83 Squadron dropped his T.Is. 500 yds. from the Aiming Point whilst F/Lt. Laing and F/Lt. Lines of 97 Squadron both had errors of less than 1 nautical mile. The Flare Force too was remarkably accurate, illuminating the target area to such effect that the Mosquito aircraft had no difficulty in marking the Aiming Point. The Flare Force photographs showed that F/O Gamble, 83 Squadron, F/O Price, 83 Squadron and F/O Canever of 97 Squadron had Aiming Points, whilst S/Ldr. Hatcher had an error of 1,400 yds.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH 19/20th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Technical failures prevented the plotting of many flare force photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows considerable damage in the target area, proving that the flare force illumination was of its usual high order.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE. [/underlined]
Cloud prevented the plotting of photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows very extensive damage in the most closely built up area of the town. P.P.I. photographs indicate that the accuracy of the blind markers was to the order of 1,000 yds. and 400 yds. respectively.
[Underlined] KAIDERSLAUTERN. [/underlined]
Using the direct release method with a G.P.I. check on SAABRUCKEN, W/C. Ingham of 83 Squadron dropped his flares 1,500 yards, F/Lt. Edwards, 83 Squadron 1.3 miles and F/O Simpson 1.25 miles respectively from the flare aiming point. By this illumination, the low level Mosquitos were able to mark the target accurately.
Great credit is due to the two marking Squadrons for the success obtained on these operations. The majority of the results were obtained on the specially selected and tuned up sets thus proving that not only have crews to be selected, but also the equipment. In addition, the results have been obtained only through particularly extensive training, and the enthusiasm of the crews carrying it out.
If we are to maintain these excellent results, the two squadrons must be provided with crews of a suitable type; Crews selected are carrying on high tradition and are directly responsible for the success of all future operations.
[Underlined] P.P.I. PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
The standard of P.P.I. photography has been raised slightly during the month and several good photographs have been received at this Headquarters. F/Lt. Dobbie of 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph
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of KAISERLAUTERN when on the operation to KARLSRUHE. This was of considerable assistance to set operators in their identification of this target on a later raid.
Very little gardening has been carried out this month. But so far the results received are up to the usual 5 Group standard. A paper on the plotting od H 2 S mining photographs has been received and copies are being sent to the gardening squadrons for their attention. This report supplements the report S.121 on the plotting of “Y” photographs and is based on data from No. 4 and 6 Groups who have carried out the majority of H 2 S gardening sorties.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Increased importance has been placed on the use of Gee this month due to the restrictions placed on the use of H 2 S. Thus the necessity for that very last fix is again well to the forefront. Operators must make every effort to read through the jamming and make maximum use of position lines where fixes cannot be obtained.
On the majority of operations during the month a considerable increase in ranges have been noticed due to the swift advance of the allied armies, capturing large areas of country in which Gee jamming equipment was sited. This at once extended the ranges obtainable over France and Belgium to the limits of the territory held, but no marked improvement was shown further north where enemy interference in Holland and N. West Germany, though varying in intensity from day to day, was nearly always at maximum intensity when heavy bombers were operating.
On the Eastern Chain it has been noted that the enemy has transferred a considerable amount of his jamming to the 27 unit and that greater range is being obtained on the Unit 25. Weakness of pulses only restricts range on the Unit 25.
The average range on the North Eastern Chain has been stabilised at about 6°E with the limiting factor being the weakness of the “A” pulse.
The Southern Chain appears to be giving the best results now that German jamming has ceased with fixes as far as 7°E. These ranges may drop during the Autumn due to meteorological conditions. The limiting factor on this chain appears to be the weakness of the “C” pulse.
There have been few reports on the Channel chain, but it would appear that the limits of its coverage are between 5 and 6° with little jamming. The general complaint on the use of this chain are that the topographical lattice maps suppled are unsuited for heavy bomber navigation.
Two Squadrons had the opportunity of using the Northern Chain at its extreme limits this month. The flight was carried out at low level and signals were received as far as 64 °N, but the small cut of the lattice lines did not enable fixes to be plotted accurately at that range. These results were as much as expected, and confirm the reports of Costal [sic] Command who do the most flying in that area.
The low level at which we are now flying over France may restrict Gee range somewhat but it is thought that the short ranges obtained by navigators on the operation on KAISERLAUTERN was due to the poor propagation properties of the atmosphere. These properties are most noticeable during the months of October and November, and it may well be that our Gee range on the present chains may be restricted to 5°E throughout these months.
However, to counteract this we have news of further chains which are being provided on the Continent and as soon as information is received at this Headquarters it will be passed to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Tests are still being carried out by Bomber Command as to the suitability of the use of the Homing and S.S. Chains for Bomber Command Navigation.
Until the results of these tests are known no action is being taken regarding the training of navigators.
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[Drawing] ENGINEERING
Large number of movements have taken place or about to take place which are liable to upset calculations, but it is apparent that the operational effort has not suffered as a result. 52 Base is about to leave the Group complete with R.A.F. Stations, Scampton, Fiskerton and Dunholme. The good work which we associate with such stations will now be associate with other stations within the Group. 55 Base now comprises as many squadrons as 53 Base, i.e. five full squadrons each, and No. 5 L.F.S., Syerston, comes within a Base Organisation.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL DEFECTS. [/underlined]
The operational effort was not quite so high as the previous month, but the aircraft were available had the weather given us a fair chance. The percentage of operational failures due to Engineer faults was 0.94 which is an improvement on the previous months. Out of this total, 0.24% were abortive sorties and 0.7% were early returns. Special mention must be made to No. 54 Base as a whole and they are given the ‘Big Hand’ for producing the record of having no operational failures due to matters concerning the Engineers during September. 49 Squadron also are to be congratulated for similar reasons.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE – 5 GROUP SERVICING SECTION [/underlined]
Appreciation of the efforts of No. 5 Group Servicing Section is recorded and the good work which is carried out by them under very often difficult conditions. C.T.O’s should realise the personal problems and difficulties of these mobile parties which are moved about at a moment’s notice to wherever the ‘shoe pinches’ within the Group. The sum total of the work carried out by these few men during the last four months comprises eight Major Inspections, thirty initial checks and 120 rebuilt power plants. During September two gangs were in operation as Major Inspection gangs solely for the first time, and their activities within the Group are apparent. Apart from the above work, four base hydraulic bays have been completed, two during the last four months. The instrument personnel have built and installed 110 second pilot’s instrument panels in Stirling aircraft of Conversion Units during the last three months.
[Underlined] FORMS 765C. [/underlined]
The remarks by the Specialist Officer concerned at para. 11 of the 765C are still far too brief and in many cases incomplete, and invariably give no indication whether relevant modifications are embodied or not. It is pointed out once more that care and thought in rendering Forms 765C will prove of assistance in attempting to establish the cause of failures and recommending action for preventing recurrences of such failures.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
Bombsight maintenance continues at a high standard throughout the Group, and accuracy of a high order is being achieved, mainly due to the effective liaison existing between Electrical Officers and Bombing Leaders. Bombing Analysis courses are now open to Base Electrical Officers, and two have, up to the time of writing, completed the course. The course has proved very valuable in assisting Electrical Officers in diagnosing the causes of bombing errors, particularly instrument errors, and we can now look forward to an even higher standard of accuracy. As it will be a long time before all Electrical Officers will be able to attend the course Base Electrical Officers should instruct their junior officers in the art of analysing a bombing plot.
Mk.XIVA bombsights are now arriving in large numbers and the Group Instrument Servicing Van is having a busy time in instructing personnel in
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the differences between the XIV and the XIVA. The new computor [sic] is not all that could be desired, the great majority of them (about 95%) needing retuning or the replacing of defective parts, and are generally requiring about twice the number of man hours to rectify. The matter has been taken up with higher authority and it is hoped that results of our ‘moans’ will soon be evident. In the meantime a thorough check must be given to every computor [sic] and 1022 action taken in every case of faulty design, or workmanship.
A word or two regarding defect action would not come amiss. Far too many defective items of equipment are being returned to stores without 1022 or 1023 action being taken. It must be impressed again on all officers that it is only by taking the correct official procedure that rectification action can be taken. It is of no earthly use just to tell the Group Specialist Officer that such and such is giving trouble if there is no 1022 backing. The Group Specialist Officer of course wants to know what is giving trouble but any report that he may make will be shot down if it is not supported by a 1022. A case in point concerns the low insulation of gun heaters. Only two cases have been reported to Command out of the hundred or so which have occurred. So let us have some more 1022’s.
After putting in a considerable amount of work in their respective sections the Electrical and Instrument personnel of 52 Base have had to evacuate their quarters and move to Syerston and start again from scratch. No doubt their experience will serve them well in producing even better sections.
Command Modification No. 74 is now completed throughout the Group and a word of praise must be given to those men who formed the Group pool to produce the modified bomb aimer’s panels. They worked long hours and did an excellent job of work. All Bases were represented so they will each have a good man to start their own modification gang cracking.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Training Unit Serviceability]
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Many applications have been made in the past by Flight Engineers to change over to Transport Command; This Command is now prepared to accept Flight Engineers for flying duties provided they have completed two operational tours and one tour of instructional duties. Flight Engineers who are eligible should make application through the usual channels at their unit.
Log keeping has improved throughout this Group, but it is noticed that many engineers do not record atmospheric temperatures and airframe serial letter and numbers; this has been pointed out before. Flight Engineer Leaders must insist that this omission is remedied.
Defect reports still come through showing the cause as manipulation trouble on the part of the Flight Engineer, in many cases these result in a cancellation or early return. Points for the Flight Engineer Leader to instruct on are as follows:-
[Underlined] Starter Motor burnt out: [/underlined] if correct drill had been used this would have been avoided.
[Underlined] Overheating of Engines: [/underlined] early returns are made because of supposed overheating; on examination, these temperatures prove to be within the engine limitations.
[Underlined] Misbehaviour of Engines: [/underlined] black smoke from exhaust; on this trip other crews reported same conditions but attributed this to atmospheric conditions on flying through cloud. Had this Flight Engineer checked all his gauges he would have been able to inform his Captain that engines were quite normal and this early return would have been avoided.
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[Drawing] AIR SEA RESCUE
With the liberation of countries in Western Europe, the flow back to England of aircrew who have been shot down is increasing – not only in numbers, but in speed. It is strongly rumoured that one, who was shot down on the outward trip, managed, with the assistance of a jeep and a flip from Paris, to arrive back before the Main Force!
These evaders tell amazing stories – some are good and reveal level-headedness, fine crew discipline and a sound knowledge of Safety Drills. Others are the reverse, and the following extracts from reports by 5 Group aircrew tell their own story.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 6th June, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “We’ve been hit kids, get out”.
“My parachute was only fixed by the right buckle”.
“Informant had known for some time that the left clip was loose, but had neglected to have it repaired”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 24/25th July, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “Get to Hell out of this as quickly as possible”.
“The informant did not leave his turret (Mid-Upper) very speedily as he experienced some difficulty in locating the footbar”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 3/4th May, 1944. [/underlined]
“The W/Op noticed as he passed, that the Navigator’s altimeter was reading 1,000 feet. He therefore pulled his rip cord while still in the aircraft. He gathered the canopy in his arms and went out head first, receiving a kick on the behind from the pilot”.
[Cartoon] DO YOU KNOW YOUR DRILLS? – OR DO [underlined] YOU [/underlined] HAVE TO BE KICKED OUT?? N.M.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 7/8th August, 1944. [/underlined]
“The Mid Upper Gunner was moving so quickly that he overshot the exit and fell against the rear turret. He returned with some difficulty to the exit, which he opened. He then took his parachute from his stowage and fastened it on”.
“The pilot had to go back from his seat for his parachute which the Navigator had failed to give him”.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR ESCAPE HATCH! [/underlined]
There have been too many incidents where the front hatch has
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jammed or taken a long time to open. The Air Bomber’s pre-flight drill calls for a check on this hatch. A check does not mean that the Air Bomber looks to see that the hatch is there, but means that he is to check its ease of release and that it is correctly fastened afterwards.
The parachute drill (5 Group Aircraft Drills) states that the hatch is to be JETTISONED, not pulled up inside the aircraft where it is liable to obstruct the exit.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR PARACHUTE! [/UNDERLINED]
An unfortunate incident occurred during the month when a Hurricane Pilot, not wearing his own parachute, collided with a Martinet and was forced to abandon his aircraft.
The pilot did not get clear until he was at about 3,000 ft. and, although he pulled the rip cord immediately, he was killed on impact with the ground.
An examination of the parachute harness also showed that it was far too loose for the wearer.
Each member of air-crew flying fighters or bombers, must check his parachute for serviceability and fitting before every flight.
[Underlined] EVASION [/underlined]
No less than 25 aircrew of No. 50 Squadron, missing since the beginning of May, are reported to have evaded capture and returned safely to this country.
Successful evasion depends upon:
(i) Your will to evade.
(ii) Your physical fitness.
(iii) An up to date knowledge of the military situation.
(iv) the latest advice which your Intelligence Officer will give you.
Consider these things beforehand and avoid Dulag Luft.
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[Drawing] PHOTOGRAPHY
The total number of failures on Night Photography has decreased to 5.93%. Failures on Day Photography amount to 4.07%. The decrease over the previous month in respect of Night Photography has occurred chiefly on the Armament side. The prevailing target conditions, when smoke from incendiary loads obscured the target, has made it impossible in many cases to determine whether a flash has or has not exploded correctly. This is a recurrence of conditions which existed during last winter. Manipulation failures have shown an increase in the last two months, in 83 and 97 Squadrons. In the past this type of failure has been very low in this Group, and it is to be hoped that the steps now being taken by the Bombing Leaders will eliminate them in these two Squadrons.
The supply of High Speed Night Film has now materially increased and Squadrons are to use this film on all operations. In view of the fact that we are now entering a period of the year when light conditions will often be poor, the use of this film will help to ensure sufficient exposure. It will, of course, save a lot of magazine reloading.
The supply of H 2 S cameras has grown considerably during the past month and promises to continue doing so. These cameras are not constructed for service work or to be handled by service personnel; great care will therefore have to be exercised in the handling and operating of them. A number of H 2 S photographs received have been unsharp and sometimes of poor quality. This poor workmanship will have to be remedied and a special effort by Photographic N.C.O’s in this direction is required.
No. 5 Group Headquarters now hold a K.20 camera for use on hand held obliques. Any station requiring the use of this camera is to inform the Group Photographic Officer who will make arrangements for the camera to be forwarded. Two days’ notice will be required.
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[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
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[Drawing] ARMAMENT
[Underlined] WINTER [/underlined]
Once more the annual reminder which you are no doubt tired of hearing, but a warning which must be even more carefully heeded this year than ever before.
Listed below are a few points which will require your personal attention during the coming months if an increase in failures is to be avoided.
[Underlined] Gun Heaters. [/underlined] Are all your aircraft fitted with gun heaters? The Electrical Officers are giving this matter their personal attention and the fitting of heaters is going ahead. Take a personal interest in this matter yourself, see that the Electrical Branch are given every assistance.
[Underlined] Duct Heaters. [/underlined] New aircraft are now arriving with ducted heating to both rear and mid-upper turrets. Have you any of these aircraft? If so, go and have a look at one and get the “gen” on how it works.
[Underlined] Browning Guns. [/underlined] Has your gun maintenance been allowed to slip during the summer months? If so, now is the time to tighten up. All new guns must be very carefully checked; all grease must be removed, particularly from the breach block, firing pin and spring, etc. and guns must be lubricated in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Pt.2, Section 14, Leaflet No.6, Issue No. 1.
[Underlined] Gun Covers. [/underlined] Have you an adequate supply of gun and turret covers? All Units should now have manufactured the cover for the Direct Vision Aperture in the F.N. 120. This Headquarters’ letter 634/4/Armt. dated 12th May, 1944 refers.
[Underlined] Cluster Projectiles. [/underlined] Wet Cluster Projectiles may cause functioning failures due to ice accretion on the mechanism or from rust. See that full use is made of all available tarpaulins. Recommendations have been made to Headquarters, Bomber Command for an increase in establishment of Covers, Water proof, Large and Small.
[Underlined] Bomb Trollies. [/underlined] Are all your trollies fitted with mud guards to prevent S.B.C. release slips from becoming splashed with mud and water during transportation?
[Underlined] Welfare. [/underlined] During Winter months Armourers will be working long hours in bad weather conditions. See that they are properly equipped with warm clothing, gloves, oil skins, and gum boots etc. A warm and contented man will work better than one half frozen.
[Underlined] SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS. [/underlined]
The month of September saw the return, after a long absence, of the Small Bomb Container. With the introduction of the Cluster Projectile, relief was felt by all Armament Officers as it was thought we had seen the last of the “very difficult to handle” Small Bomb Container. Unfortunately the shortage of Cluster Projectiles has necessitated our return to this item of equipment, consequently a large number of headaches have resulted.
With the introduction of the new Twin Adaptors the Incendiary load has been considerable [sic] increased and it is now possible to carry 20 S.B.C’s on the Lancaster. This increase in bomb load means that far more work is entailed in the preparation of the required number of S.B.C’s for an
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operation and it has been found necessary to seek outside labour to assist in the filling. Unfortunately it is still necessary to fill the Mk. VA. S.B.C. by hand, but small numbers of 50 pack Incendiaries are now being received and it is hoped that in the near future the boxes of 30 x 4lb. Incendiaries will entirely disappear. This step will be welcomed by all.
[Cartoon] THIS – OR THIS?? N.M.
[Underlined]
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES – HANDLING. [/underlined]
The organisation for the handling of Cluster Projectiles still requires a lot of attention on some Stations. Quantities of Roller Conveyors are now held on all Stations and this equipment, suitably raised from the ground on tail unit boxes or cluster projectile cases, provides an excellent method for the handling and fusing of cluster projectiles.
This equipment, suitably laid out, can provide multi unloading, fusing and loading points, and can cut down the man handling required to the barest minimum, and the saving in time will be considerable.
[Underlined] SALVAGE. [/underlined]
The problem of returning salvage has now become a major one, and when one considers that approximately, 4,000 boxes of 4lb. Incendiaries are thrown up from one operation on a 2 Squadron Station, it is obvious that careful attention must be given to the organisation for the return of this salvage. All 2 Squadron Station have now been supplied with additional labour kindly loaned to us by the Army. This additional labour, if correctly employed, should prevent the accumulation of any large quantity of salvage. When lorries deliver explosives to you let your motto be “They shall not return empty.”
All smaller salvage, i.e. nose plugs, transit caps from tail pistols etc., should be placed in bins and not left lying around to form a permanent menace to bomb trolley tyres. Bins are easily obtainable and sufficient should be placed in the bomb store to enable an ample supply to be available at all fusing and handling points.
[Underlined] HEAVY TYPE TRANSPORTERS. [/underlined]
There is at present a deficiency of approximately 2,500 transporters in this Group, including those sent away under Bomber Command’s instructions, for modification. Bomber Command have promised that every effort is being made to expedite the manufacture of new type heavy transporters and early issues are expected. In the meantime, continual care must be exercised in the loading of cluster projectiles on to bomb trolleys to ensure that no tail units are damaged.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BOOBS – BOMBING LEADERS PLEASE NOTE. [/underlined]
Two boobs by Air Bombers this month were responsible for complete bomb loads being returned to Base.
1. Bomb Aimer failed to fully rotate the Distributor Drum Switch with the result that no contact was made – FULL
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BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
2. Bomb Aimer set drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo” – FULL BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
Eight other manipulation failures resulted in 8 photoflashes being returned due to the Isolation switch not being made.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
Is your A.P. 2264A fully amended? If so where would you find the information on the Bomb, Smoke, Aircraft, 100 lb. Mk.1?
[Drawing] WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
TOTAL: £5,722.14s. 3d.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – Manipulation. B – Maintenance. C – Icing. D. – Technical. E – Electrical. F. – Obscure.
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[Drawing] GUNNERY
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BAG [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“E” 630 11/12 Sept. T/E
“B” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“T” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“O” 83 23rd Sept. S/E
“R” 630 23rd Sept. T/E
“U” 207 26/27 Sept. ME410
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“H” 50 11/12 Sept. ME110
“D” 207 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“X” 467 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“J” 106 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“J” 61 11/12 Sept. ME.109
“Y” 9 26/27 Sept. ME.410
Confirmation of these claims, by Headquarters Bomber Command, is awaited.
There was a total of 119 combats during the month’s operations which shows a slight increase on last month’s figure. Of these 8 are claimed as destroyed 3 as probably destroyed and 4 as damaged. The largest number of combats occurred on the night 11/12th September, when Darmstadt was the target. Out of 39 combats the Group claimed 3 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 2 damaged – an excellent return. During the month, tracer was removed from the first 300 rounds, with a view to assisting the gunner in his sighting. Reports have since been submitted by Bases, and these are now under consideration. If the test has convinced gunners that accurate shooting can only be applied through the sight, it has certainly been worth while.
Early Warning Devices, with the exception of Fishpond, have been temporarily suspended, so once again the gunner has got to rely on his ability to see under night conditions and on his mental alertness. Even with the E.W.D. several instances occurred of enemy aircraft approaching and attacking unobserved, and without the E.W.D’s we must expect more instances of this. To arm ourselves against this, we must make use of every opportunity of training under night conditions, either at night with night affiliation, or simple exercises on the ground, or by day in the Night Vision rooms. Whilst on the subject of night vision, it is painful to have to record that two instances of Lancaster firing on Lancaster were reported during the month. In each instance the aggressor was identified as a Lancaster by the gunners. It was fortunate that no serious casualties resulted from these attacks, but it does stress the fact that more aircraft recognition under night conditions is called for.
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[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred of guns being fired in dispersals and seriously damaging other aircraft. Gunners must make certain that all guns are on “SAFE” before unloading or testing.
Instructions are to be issued shortly regarding the wearing of Pilot type parachutes by rear gunners. This will come into force when sufficient quantities of this type of parachute are available.
Fighter affiliation exercises with Gyro Camera have shown a big increase on last month’s figures, and Squadrons are to be congratulated. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future, to issue an extra Gyro Camera assembly to each Squadron.
[Underlined] SQUADRON GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
9 Squadron F/Lt Gabriel
50 Squadron F/Lt Mills
61 Squadron F/Lt Glover
463 Squadron F/Lt Winston
467 Squadron F/O Ellis
44 Squadron F/Lt Clarke
619 Squadron F/Lt Waterhouse
83 Squadron S/Ldr Poole
97 Squadron S/Ldr Sherring
106 Squadron F/Lt Sullivan
617 Squadron F/Lt Armstrong
57 Squadron F/Lt Taylor
630 Squadron F/Lt Cass
207 Squadron F/Lt Wardle
49 Squadron F/Lt Wynyard
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training by Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR SEPTEMBER:- [underlined] 2535 [/underlined]
* 49 Squadron employed on special training.
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[Drawing] TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD OUTPUT [/underlined]
This was the last month of the full Summer Training Programme, and the number of crews produced was the highest on record. A total of 162 pilots (161 full crews) was posted to Squadrons and provided ample surplus for the forthcoming expansion.
Weather was patchy towards the end of the month, but despite this and some difficulties with power plants and tyres, the Stirling Conversion Units flew an average of 2,000 hours each. No. 5 L.F.S. did a total of just over 2,000 hours. The accident rate improved for the third successive month.
No.1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit is getting into its stride and flew 700 hours. The first course is due to pass out early next month. No. 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit which also formed under the control of 5 Group, made rapid progress once the Staff had the airfield to themselves. The first course enters on 7th October.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION [/underlined]
Fighter Affiliation continued to increase and 1690 B.D.T. Flight gave day and night affiliation on over 1,000 details, exercising 2450 gunners compared with 2100 for August.
Night affiliation with Hurricanes is growing from infancy into a robust child. 1690 B.D.T. Flight affiliated with 60 Squadron crews at night, exercising 120 gunners, double the total last month. The Hurricanes averaged 41 hours per aircraft.
The monthly target for night affiliation from now on is 600 details. If 300 crews do two night details each, and 9 of the 12 Hurricanes average 3 details each on approximately 21 fit nights in a month, the results will be 600 details, 1200 gunners exercised, and a figure ten-fold greater than this month!
Incidentally, 1690 B.D.T. Flight packed its bags once again, and is now located at R.A.F. Station, Metheringham.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING [/underlined]
The provision of an instructor for each Squadron, instead of instructors allocated to Bases, will give Squadrons a greater opportunity of supervising closely all new crews, and picking up any deficiencies which arise because of the shortness of the course at the L.F.S.
It is essential that Squadron Training Pilots forward their reports on new crews through the usual channels to Base Headquarters so that the Base Air Staff Officer can submit to this Headquarters at the end of each month a summary of opinion on the standard of training and points requiring attention. 10 and 20 sortie checks are essential for all crews in Squadrons throughout the Group, and Squadron Training Pilots are to give them special attention.
No.106 Squadron now has a new function as the “Nursery” for the two P.F.F. Squadrons in 54 Base. Outstanding crews under training in 51 Base and L.F.S. are being selected for P.F.F. duties in 5 Group, and are posted to 106 Squadron for experience and training, after which they proceed to either 83 or 97 Squadron to provide the necessary experience and for supervising the new crews.
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[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base, Squadron and Conversion Unit]
GRAND TOTAL:- Pilots: 1463 hours
F/Engineers: 965 hours
There was again an increase in Link Trainer Times for the month by both Pilots and Flight Engineers. The Pilots went up by about 100 hours and the Flight Engineers by about 40 hours.
Every little helps, but 140 hours among 21 Units represents an average increase of about 7 hours per Unit.
It should be possible to increase this four-fold now that the more doubtful weather is approaching. Each Squadron in particular should get its Pilots’ Link times up to the 50/60 hour mark.
[Underlined] SPECIAL NOTE [/underlined]
Pilots and Link Trainer Instructors should take special note of the modification to topple the Artificial Horizon and spin the Directional Gyro, and make sure it is used on every exercise.
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[Drawing] ACCIDENTS
The 26 aircraft damaged during August gave us a rate of 7.3 per 10,000 flying hours, one of the best rates the Group has ever attained, and good enough to put us in second place in the Command Accident ladder.
September’s total is 23, made up as follows:- 6 Cat. AC; 5 Cat. B; 12 Cat. E. Quite a number of aircraft were damaged to a lesser extent and repaired more or less “on the spot”. They, happily, do not count against us, and the “rate” should be close to August’s good figures. Flying hours will decide.
11 of the month’s accidents were avoidable.
[Underlined] SQUADRONS: [/underlined] Overshoots landing – 2; Heavy Landings – 1; Miscellaneous – 2.
[Underlined] 51 BASE: [/underlined] Swings Landing – 2; overshoots landing – 2; Taxying – 1.
[Underlined] 1690 Flight: [/underlined] Miscellaneous – 1.
None of these accidents have any special features except perhaps the collision between a Hurricane engaged on affiliation with a Lancaster, and a Master of another Group. From details at present available the Hurricane pilot appears to have been “shooting away” the Master who was taking close an interest in the exercise. Both single aircraft engined aircraft crashed, but the Master pilot escaped by parachute. 1690 pilots take note. Extreme care is required when dealing with these other aircraft which very often have pupil pilots aboard, and do not always do what you would expect.
In addition to the accidents above, there have been 7 minor taxying accidents in the Group this month. In each instance the damage was soon repaired, but that is not the point. Each one was completely avoidable, and required a certain amount of valuable time and labour to put right. With the coming of the darker nights and poorer weather it is most important, yes, essential, that this tendency to careless taxying is stamped out. Last winter’s taxying story was a sorry tale. It must not be duplicated this year.
The period for the second award of the Silver Lancaster has just ended. As soon as all accident reports are forward the result will be published. It looks like another close race.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
The above table includes minor avoidable accidents which are not listed in the review above. The damage was Cat. A in each instance. 51 Base Units are not given STAR awards.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS for PILOTS
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take your place in the drive on instrument flying. Nights grow longer and you’ll be getting both dark take-offs and dark returns.
(ii) Give yourself 5 – 10 minutes on your primary instruments – Turn and Bank, A.S.I. and Altimeter – on every N.F.T. Cover up the artificial horizon and cage the gyro.
(iii) Practice the corkscrew on instruments. Its [sic] easy to “mock up” a hood for instrument flying in day-light. Fold a map, fit it on your helmet and draw goggles on to your forehead. The goggles and strap will hold the map in place. Don’t forget to have a member of the crew keeping a look out for other aircraft.
(iv) Get your quota of Link hours in. The new device to topple the artificial horizon and spin the gyro will put you on your mettle.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take things steadily on the ground. The autumn and winter in the past have always produced a sorry tale of bogged aircraft and taxying accidents.
(ii) Look up Air Staff Instruction F.C. 24 for the duties and responsibilities of all aircrew when taxying.
(iii) Use the landing light on the Lancaster and man the Aldis light. Modifications to the landing light are under consideration in an attempt to further increase its usefulness as an aid to taxying.
(iv) Remember you get the illusion at night that you are taxying slowly when you are in fact going fast. CO-OPERATION – CAUTION – CONTROL are the three principles to apply to taxying.
[Underlined] THE LAST 100 FEET. [/underlined]
(i) Wind velocity decreases proportionately from 1,500 feet to ground level because of the friction of the ground. This is most pronounced at night.
(ii) Its [sic] possible to have a wind of gale force at 1,500 feet and dead calm at ground level at night. Its [sic] also possible for the wind direction to be 50° different between 1,500 feet and the ground.
(iii) So watch your approaches. In a very strong wind, increase your air speed by 5/10 m.p.h. and check for drift. The last 100 feet can be difficult if you don’t appreciate the circumstances.
(iv) A word on landings. Your Check Landing Card is a valuable record for [underlined] YOU. [/underlined] Don’t wait until your crew complains your landings are not too good. Inspect your Check Landing Card once a fortnight and see that it is up to date.
[Page break]
[Drawing] FLYING CONTROL
This month has seen the introduction of a Bomber Command Standard Landing Procedure which aims to provide a simple and standard landing drill, and which will give reasonably good landing times. It is hoped that this procedure will be adopted by other Commands, and that it will eventually be used at every airfield in the British Isles. This Group, however, has been permitted to retain its two R/T channels of communication, and the landing procedure, previously employed by 5 Group, has been substantially modified to bring it in to line with the new Standard Procedure.
In the near future, it is hoped that a directif will be issued to all Flying Control Officers laying down a standard technique of handling aircraft. At present there are two schools of thought. One in which one officer in the Watch Office controls aircraft on both Studs ‘A’ and ‘B’. Secondly where one officer in the Watch office feeds aircraft into the circuit on Stud ‘A’ and a second officer controls aircraft on Stud ‘B’, and gives instructions where necessary should aircraft be too closely or too loosely spaced. Trials are at present being carried out on both these schemes and the details will be issued on which scheme proves itself to be the safest and most efficient.
One word here about flying discipline. At some stations in the Group, breaches of flying discipline in the circuit are reports to Squadron Commanders, who take immediate action with the aircrew concerned. No matter how good or how safe a landing procedure might be, if crews don’t play fair and obey instructions to the letter then one might just as well give up the idea of trying to speed up the rate of landing, and at the same time maintain an adequate safety margin. If every crew takes its turn, plays fair and used its common-sense it will be landed within the minimum time and with perfect safety.
[Underlined] Marking Circuit Points. [/underlined]
It is appreciated that in the past there has been some difficulty in determining when an aircraft exactly reaches the various points of call around the circuit. The problem of marking these points to suit all runways is not an easy one, and several experiments have been carried out as yet with little success. It is hoped, however, that the end is now in sight and that very soon “call-up” and “check” points for use with every runway will be marked around the circuit.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Page break]
[Drawing] EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] UNIT RETURNS. [/underlined]
Cases have occurred where serviceable equipment returned to the U.E.D. has arrived in an unserviceable state. In most cases the cause has been careless packing. Equipment Officers should realise that this almost amounts to sabotage as not only is time and labour wasted at the receiving end, but equipment, which has taken the manufacturers valuable man-hours to make, is useless to the service until more man-hours are spent in repair.
Therefore watch this and thus save labour.
[Underlined] Q. FORM. [/underlined]
The Q Form has been amended and the old “U” has been broken down into “U.1” (awaiting spares, work held up) and “U.2” (awaiting spares but work proceeding). Up to now this Group has had a good record, so Equipment Officers should continue to keep both “U.1” and “U.2” out of the Q Form.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS. [/underlined]
Instances are still occurring where Mechanical Sweepers are unserviceable for some considerable time owing to the delay in obtaining spares. Owing to the very acute rubber shortage it is essential that runways be swept regularly. All Bases should ensure that at least one set of brushes and other frequently required spares are held, and Equipment Officers should give the subject their personal attention.
[Underlined] SURPLUS FIRE CRASH TENDER. [/underlined]
Several Bases are holding one surplus Crash Tender for use within the Group in an emergency. When this is required it is frequently found that the vehicle is unserviceable and in consequence a Station is left with only one Crash Tender standing by, which is totally inadequate. It is essential that these vehicles are kept serviceable, and all demands for spares required to render vehicles serviceable are to be sent by I.O.R. signal and hastened where any undue delay occurs.
[Page break]
[Drawing] DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. R. HARTLEY CGM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.E.P. OXBORROW DFC
F/O. B.J. DOBSON DFC
F/O. J.E. WHITE DFC
F/O. W.C. FREESTONE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L. D.R. STUBBS DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. P. AINLEY DFC
P/O. A.C. MCKELLAR DFC
SGT. L.J. CHAMPION DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. M. MCNEILL DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
S/L. H.B. LOCKE, DFC DSO
S/L. S.M.P. PARKES DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. C.W. KIPFER DFC
F/O. H.E. SAYEAU DFC
F/O. W.N. REDMAN DFC
F/L. M.H. PARRY AFC DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. R.C. DAVIE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. P.N. HERBERT DFC
F/O. F.N. CHANDLER DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/S. C.H. STEWART DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C G.W. CURRY, DFC DSO
The following NON_IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. HANCOCK DFC
SGT. T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT. J.H. MCCREERY DFM
F/O. R.W. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. P.E. PLOWRIGHT DFC
W/O. R. LAWSON DFC
F/O. S.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/O. S.J. MANCEKIVELL, DFM DFC
F/O. J.S. MIDDLETON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. N.H. STEPHENSON DFC
P/O. E.P. BURDEN DFC
P/O. J. HALL DFC
P/O. J.S. DEAN DFC
P/O. W. FARADAY DFC
P/O. R.B. FARREN DFC
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
1st Lt. J.F. STEVENS DFC
F/O. A.V. PATCHETT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. E. BERRY
F/O. J.C.D. GUTHRIE DFC
F/S. L. HOWARTH DFM
F/O. D.T. WATKINS DFC
P/O. G. EARNSHAW DFC
P/O. J.L. BENDIX DFC
W/O. G.W. MORREY DFC
P/O. J.H. COLE DFC
F/S. R. VICKERSTAFFE DFM
F/S. N.F. BACON DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/Underlined]
P/O. A.E. NICKLIN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. ANDERSON, DFM DFC
F/L. J. BREAKLEY DFC
W/O. J.A. LEWIS DFC
W/O. T. DOWYER DFC
P/O. A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/S. E.A. DAVIDSON DFM
SGT. A. KANE DFM
[Page break]
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. J. HARRISON DFM
P/O. J.H. WILKINSON DFC
F/S. H.D.K. LEWIS DFM
P/O. J.W. SCOTT DFC
S/L. W.A.G. GALLIENNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L. C.A.S. DREW, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/S. B.A. MANNING DFM
F/S. F. COOPER DFM
S/L. J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
F/L. D.H. PIDDING, D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
W/O. C.A. RUSSELL DFC
F/L. R.W. WESTON DFC
F/S. N. MACHIN DFM
F/O. O. HALLIKAS DFC
F/O. A. DRINKALL DFC
F/L. J.N.C. WRIGHT, DRF. BAR TO DFC
P/O. G.K. CHAPMAN DFC
F/S. R.C.T. LODGE DFM
P/O. M. MACDONALD DFC
P/O. W WARBURTON DFC
F/O. G.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. W.M. REID DFC
F/S. R.C. WOOLLFORD DFM
F/S. D. BOLLAND DFM
F/S. H. TOWNSLEY DFM
P/O. G.D. HOOTON DFC
F/S. K.S. RANDLE DFM
P/O. C.W. LACY DFC
F/O. J.J. ROGERSON DFC
F/L. C.W. SHIRES DFC
W/O. J.T. STANTON, DFM DFC
F/O. R.L.C. LASHAM DFC
F/S. D.P. GANNINGS DFM
F/L. T.H. MACKEPEACE DFC
F/S. R.J. BOWEN DFM
F/O. B.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
W/O. E.K. PIERCY DFC
P/O. B.F. DURRANT DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.T.H. GIDDENS DFC
F/O. R.Y. KENYON DFC
F/S. D.A. DEAR DFM
F/S. W. CHARLESWORTH DFM
F/S. K.E. BOONE DFM
P/O. F.W. BLAKE DFC
P/O. C.A. SKINNER DFC
P/O. A.W. HALLAM DFC
P/O. S. JOHNSON DFC
F/O. R.K. ESSERY DFC
P/O. S.W. CARTER DFC
P/O. J.M. DENTON DFC
F/O. R.W. JEW
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined] (Contd.)
P/O. G.V. MALON DFC
P/O. D.G.J. GRIFFITHS DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.W. MUDDLE DFC
F/O. K. SCHULTZ DFC
F/O. E.T. PICKERD DFC
SGT. A.V. WING DFM
P/O. G.F. FLANAGAN DFC
F/O. J.D.H. BILLAM DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. H.C.J. BENTLEY DFC
F/O. B. HAWES DFC
F/O. A.T. YOUDAN DFC
P/O. J. WESLEY DFC
P/O. L.S. AINSWORTH DFC
F/O. D.L. HARRIS DFC
F/O. J.S.A. MARSHALL DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. D. RODGER DFC
W/O. A. RUSHTON DFC
W/O. R. SMITH DFC
W/O. J.W. HUTTON DFC
F/O. S.R. CLARKE DFC
F/S. W. HUME DFM
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. N.D. KENNEDY DFC
F/O. K.R. MAKIN DFC
F/L. S.E.J. JONES, DFM DFC
F/S. T. FLEETWOOD DFM
F/S. P.V.J. LOWEN DFM
P/O. J.G. NOBLE DFC
F/S. T. AITKEN DFM
F/O. R.W. WOOD DFC
SGT. H. WATERSON DFM
SGT. A. MCINULTY DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. L.C.E. De VIGNE DFC
F/O. A.E. RICHARDS DFC
S/L. R.F. ELLIOTT, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O. S.F. PARLATO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. R.O. CULVERT, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/L. E.R. BUTLER, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/O, A. KUZMA DFC
P/O. D.W. ALLEN DFC
P/O. A.J. PAYNE DFC
P/O. A.J. LUCAS DFC
[Page break]
A TRIP TO RUSSIA
On the 11th September, 1944, Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons together with two Liberators attached from Transport Command, took off for YAGODNIK, an airfield near Archangel. The Liberators re-fuelled at Lossiemouth before leaving, and the hospitality extended by this Station was very much appreciated by the ground staff who were passengers in these aircraft.
The weather at first was good, but when about 150 miles from Archangel considerable low cloud and rain were encountered. Aircraft flew just above tree tops over the most desolate country imaginable – lakes, forests and swamps. Map reading was impossible; weather conditions alone made this too difficult, and in addition it was found that maps of the area were inaccurate – many villages and even railway lines being omitted.
The Archangel area was reached after about 10 hours flying, and with endurance becoming low and with no radio aids available, it was necessary for aircraft to land quickly. Some were fortunate enough to locate airfields quickly, whilst others searched through cloud and heavy rain.
Several aircraft landed at a small airfield named KEG ISLAND. Some of the crews of these aircraft originally thought they had landed at YAGODNIK and were unable to find out the whereabouts of the other aircraft. For some time they thought they were the sole survivors of the force. Later, however, all aircraft were located, though in all six had crash landed. In spite of this nobody was hurt and in the weather conditions it must be considered miraculous that no lives were lost. It was a great tribute to the skill of the pilots and navigators that so many masterly landings were made.
The Russians had originally expected some 250 guests but last minute alterations had increased this to 325. In addition, the crews of the crashed aircraft had to be located and collected from outlying districts.
In the circumstances the Russians performed wonders in giving all available help. A major diversion in this country often causes somewhat of an upheaval, but the Russians placed transport aircraft at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and even dropped a parachutist to direct the crew of one aircraft which had crash landed in a morass. In this particular case the “blind led the blind” for a while as the guide lost his way!
Eventually all crews and serviceable aircraft collected at Yagodnik where accommodation and re-fuelling facilities existed. Yagodnik is an island and is in the middle of the river Dvina, about 20 miles from Archangel It can only be reached from that city by air or river. The accommodation consisted of a paddle steamer which was moored to the river bank, and several underground huts. These huts provide warmth in winter but the absence of any kind of ventilation and the fact that a large brick fireplace forms a major part of the accommodation leads to a degree of stuffiness difficult to bear, and appears to form a breeding ground for various forms of life. The first few nights produced a large number of bug eaten victims until a form of insert [sic] killer, generously given by some American friends in the this country, was used.
Entertainment was provided by the Russians in the form of cinema shows, dances, etc., and on one occasion a lecture on a Russian composer which started 55 minutes late, lasted for 75 minutes, and was a complete mystery from start to finish to the British members of the audience.
The mush publicised football match also took place and proved a huge success. A football match in Russia produces much ceremony including the exchange of bouquets by the opposing captains before the start of game, and a tune somewhat similar to “See the conquering hero comes” has to be played each time the home team scores a goal. Apparently it is also possible for
[Page break]
the weary player to be replaced by a reserve – or was it the fear of possible repercussions that caused two members to retire from the game and be replaced by the Commanding Officer and the local Station Commander? The latter was so fed with passes by his triumphant tam that a glancing blow off his knee which scored a goal must have caused him considerable relief as it enabled the game to be continued under normal conditions! In spite of all this our Allies showed that they thoroughly understood the game and were indeed very capable players.
The major job of servicing and re-fuelling the aircraft for the operation was tackled by the maintenance crews in a whole hearted manner – they worked for 48 hours almost without a break and their keeness and cheerfulness was what one would expect of such a grand team. It was refreshing to see all trades helping where help was most needed. The following instances will give some idea of what difficulties were overcome. With bowsers available it took exactly 18 hours to re-fuel the aircraft alone. A spare engine was carried in the Liberators and as no crane was available to remove this from the aircraft, a ramp of trees with blankets on top had to be built so that the engine could be slid down.
Meantime a Mosquito had arrived in Yagodnik for P.R.U. duties and after a favourable report from the pilot the operation took place on the 15th September.
Both take off and landing were in accordance with the usual 5 Group high traditions, 28 aircraft taking off in 23 minutes and 27 landing in 30 minutes – one aircraft having flown direct to U.K.
The details of the operation are given elsewhere. As aircraft became re-fuelled and serviceable they returned to the U.K., until finally the two Liberators remained and they were held up for about a week.
While waiting for their aircraft to be re-fuelled some of the crews went into Archangel by minesweeper and were entertained by the R.A.F. Mission there. This measure of hospitality extended to them can be gained by the fact that one member on his return decided to jump in the river fully clothed, in an endeavour to return to the city. The sobering influence of the Dvina soon dissuaded him.
The final return to the U.K. was made under variable but much better conditions than the outward journey.
Finally a few impressions of this Northern outpost of the U.S.S.R. as seen in a fleeting visit may be interesting. It is of course, quite impossible to form balanced judgements, or to provide a real comparison between social and economic conditions seen in Archangel and those to which we are accustomed in Great Britain. After all, Archangel is far to the North of the vast land mass which constitutes the U.S.S.R., and was for some period cut off from the rest of Russia by the Finnish-German advances. Bearing all this in mind, it can hardly be described as a health resort. There was not a great deal of food, the clothing of the civilians was poor, and the roads, houses, sanitation and drainage, the latter where they existed, were far below anything generally to be seen in this country. However, we found that the organisation to provide the essentials of war was good, and all the technical teams we encountered were capable and willing workers. The system of privilege is apparent; extra food and clothing are the reward of rank in the armed forces and of position in civil works. But even in the inferior living conditions at Archangel we found among the Russians an intense patriotism, and a belief in the future of Russia after the war. All Russians’ energies seem directed towards the future.
Our hosts, with the limited facilities at their disposal, did all they could for our comfort, and for this we were all very grateful.
[Page break]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP NEWS” [/underlined]
The cover of this month’s News was designed by S/Ldr. N Floyd Wilson of Headquarters No. 5 Group. Each month the cover will be changed, and all artists in the Group are invited to submit specimen designs. The best design will be selected each month and will be adopted for the cover of the current issue. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
Dublin Core
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V Group News, September 1944
5 Group News, September 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 26, September 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, war effort, tactics, signals, air bombing, navigation, radar navigation, engineering, air sea rescue, photography, armament, war savings, gunnery, training, accidents, second thoughts for pilots, flying control, equipment, decorations and a trip to Russia.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-09
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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56 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-17
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Le Havre
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway--Kåfjord (Troms fylke)
Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ
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1944-09
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
fuelling
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Pathfinders
petrol bowser
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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To be inserted in folder when returned by S/L Lynch. [Underlined] Intelligence [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
[Waddington Central Registry Stamp]
SEPTEMBER 1943. [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 14.
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
This Group now carries a weight of incendiaries which, if concentrated on any target, could not fail to burn it out. Unfortunately analysis of night photographs continues to reveal a spread of incendiaries which, if it continues, can only result in a needless prolongation of the War. It is common for incendiaries to cover an area measuring five to ten miles in length and this is true even on some of the most successful attacks. Large areas of Hamburg have been burnt out and I have no doubt that crews who took part in the main attacks are satisfied with what was achieved, yet it is unfortunately true that of the bombs which left this country only 30% fell in the built-up area of Hamburg, the remainder in open fields outside. That is equivalent to only one crew out of three achieving the object of bombing Hamburg. Luck, was, however, on our side and the city caught fire, but luck has not been on our side in many recent attacks, and results have been disappointing because the density of the incendiary attack has not been sufficient to start a conflagration.
I believe that one cause of this spread is that crews have difficulty in appreciating the area which is covered by incendiaries. Invariably they uber-estimate distances and report a concentrated attack when subsequent photographs show it to have been spread over seven or more miles of country. The belief that the attack is concentrated and, therefore, that it does not matter a great deal where the bombs fall provided they are within the area in which incendiaries and T.I’s are lying is at the root of much of the trouble. As a guide to distance the ordinary target indicator, by the time it hits the ground, covers an area of quarter of a mile, while a single incendiary load has a spread of about half a mile. From operational heights it is hard to appreciate these distances.
The solution to greater concentration lies in a determination by the bombing team, Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber and Instrument Repair Staff, that the bombs will fall on the precise spot aimed at. This calls for constant practice and training, and the full analysis of results obtained on the bombing ranges.
It is sometimes said that practice bombing bears little relation to the requirements of operations, but this is not so. Turn to the table showing bombing results achieved by Squadrons last month. You will see that one Squadron with 22 details had an average error of 475 yards. Another Squadron with 32 details an error of 152 yards. Which of these two Squadrons is likely to achieve the better results on operations? An error of 475 yards under practice conditions, can only be a result of failure to maintain the sights in proper condition, coupled with failure on the part of crews to give the necessary time, thought and energy to the problem of accurate bombing. The moment carelessness creeps in there is no limit to bombing errors. An error of 475 yards on the practice range may be ten times that amount on operations, whereas an error on the practice range of under 100 yards demonstrates
(Continued on Back Page Col. 3)
[Boxed] ROLLS ROYCE AND THE MERLIN [/boxed]
PART II.
[Rolls Royce Logo]
Some idea of the complexity of the modern aero engine can be obtained from the fact that in the Merlin engine there are approximately 11,000 separate pieces, and of these, 4,500 are different. As would be expected, owing to the fundamental necessity for keeping weight down to the minimum, the maximum possible use is made of light alloy metals, and of the total engine weight almost one half is aluminium. All the metals used have been especially produced for the particular purpose for which they are used, and give the maximum strength in combination with minimum weight. Some parts are called upon to operate under exceptional conditions of heat, other parts to rotate at enormous speeds continuously; the valves, for instance, must work at 850 degrees Centigrade, the temperature of the wire in an ordinary electric radiator, and the impellor in the supercharger must revolve over 30,000 times every minute.
The aero engine of today is a highly complex piece of mechanism which must be capable of functioning under widely different conditions of temperature, and it must not falter when the machine in which it is installed is climbed, dived, rolled or flown upside down. During fighting manoeuvres the pilot’s life depends upon the response of the engine to its controls, it must not fade or cut out when he changes direction or altitude suddenly to avoid enemy attack, it must be immediately responsive to his will when he himself is attacking. Apart from the fact that it must function equally satisfactorily in climates as far opposed as Russia and the Middle East, it is subject to very quick temperature changes every time it climbs to altitudes. On a summer day in England, the pilot can leave the ground in the sweltering 90’s and climb straight up to, say, 7 miles high, where the temperature will be down to 100 degrees of frost.
Apart from the quick temperature variation encountered when climbing to altitude, there is one other natural effect which is all important, and this is rarification of the atmosphere; the higher the distance from the earth the less dense the air becomes. Air, in combination with petrol in the correct proportion, is the main factor, which determines how much power the engine is capable of giving, the more air and petrol that can be consumed by the engine in a given time the greater is the power developed. The higher the machine flies, the more difficult it is for the engine to obtain sufficient air due, of course, to the rarified atmosphere. Arrangements have to be made therefore to compensate for this effect, and in order to do so a supercharger is employed. A supercharger is in effect a pump which supplies air to the engine under pressure; this device is usually associated in the minds of most people with racing cars on which it is used to force as much air as possible into the engine, and so obtain the maximum power from a small sized engine. On the aero engine, this is a secondary consideration, and its main object is to compensate automatically for the gradually decreasing air density as the aeroplane climbs to altitude. The power output of an engine without a supercharger rapidly decreases as it climbs and at a height of 4 miles the power is less than half of what it was on the ground. By using a suitable supercharger it is possible to maintain the ground level power up to 40,000 feet or more. This has to be done automatically so that the pilot does not have to worry about working any controls.
The aero engine must also be as small and compact as possible, so that it offers the minimum wind resistance when installed in the aircraft, it must also be as light as it is possible to make it – power also is of course all important.
The Merlin engine produces more power than a modern express train engine, yet its weight including the propeller is only 1/84th. of the locomotive. All this colossal energy is packed into a space no bigger than that occupied by a single bed.
At the outbreak of war the fighter aircraft of the R.A.F. were exclusively powered by Merlin engines, it was the only engine used in all the fighter machines which so successfully defended our country in the Battle of Britain. In Spitfires and Hurricanes it is still the mainstay of our fighter attack and defence. It is employed in Defiant and Beaufighter night fighters, and the Fleet Air Arm use it to good effect in the Fulmar. In bomber aircraft also the Merlin is extensively used; the Battle medium single engined bomber which gave such good service in France prior to Dunkirk is now relegated to training use; the twin engined Whitley bomber famous for leaflet and bomb raids far into enemy territory in the early days of the was still does yeoman service defending our Atlantic convoys. It is used in Wellington bombers, and was more recently chosen as the motive power for the four engined Halifax heavy bomber, and also for the Lancaster, acknowledged the most effective bomber in the World, and which made its glorious debut in the daring Augsberg raid by 97 and 44 Squadrons
(Continued on Back Page Column 2 )
[Page break]
[Boxed] SIGNALS [/boxed] EFFORTS FOR IMPROVED TR.1196 PERFORMANCE BEARING FRUIT.
Our efforts towards improved performance from the TR. 1196 have advanced during the month. RAE are trying out two mods., one on a Conversion Unit aircraft – aimed at permitting good intercom. undisturbed by “blot out” from neighbouring R/T. An extra R – RA switch is fitted for the convenience of the instructor. Initial reports from the staff auger well. At Waddington the ground TR. 1196 has been modified to give better modulation and also provision of a manual volume control for use by the R/T operator. Tests are in progress.
A thorough vetting of Local Flying Control TR. 1196 frequencies has just been completed at all airfields. The present practice of accepting a maximum R/T range of only a few miles has rather fogged the issue. Range tests are now being carried out and all pilots are thanked in advance for the co-operation we are sure they will give. Remember our aim is to help you safely down immediately you arrive in the circuit and the greater the R/T range the nearer we shall be to attaining our object.
[Boxed] SIGNALS FAILURES [/boxed]
Helmets icing up and oil on the slip rings of the mid-upper turret are adding their toll of failures. Here are a couple of tips to help overcome them:-
Fit the oxygen mask snugly to the face and blow hard at regular intervals both before and during flight. This action prevents the valve adhering to the composition holder and so moisture cannot collect in the mask and freeze at high altitudes.
W/OP. A.G’s always carry a piece of material (4x2 is good stuff if the Gunnery Leader isn’t looking!) to clean the oil from the top of the mid-upper turret slip ring cover.
[Boxed] FAILURE SUMMARY [/boxed]
The percentage of failures against sorties detailed for operations is as follows:-
49 SQDN NIL 106 SQDN. NIL. 207 SQDN NIL
467 SQDN NIL. 57 SQDN. NIL. 61 SQDN .95
50 SQDN 2.13 44 SQDN. 2.74 9 SQDN 2.99
619 SQDN 4.25 617 SQDN 4.54
It will be noted that the figures for 617 and 619 Squadron appear unduly high: in the case of 617 it will be appreciated that due to the comparatively small number of sortied, the multiplicity of equipment carried and the nature of their tasks, the percentage represents only a small number of failures. In the case of 619, it is felt that this is due to very consciencious [sic] reporting of component failures particularly. It will be realised that the reporting of failures involving the breakdown of an individual component which, whilst not affecting the operational success of a sortie, does provide details which help considerably towards preventing their recurrence.
[Boxed] FLIGHT PLANNING TELEPHONE NETWORK CONFERENCE FACILITY [/boxed]
The conference facility has proved a great boon for flight planning purposes since its inception. To improve its efficiency and smooth workability, steps are being taken to have Base and Station installations standardised as soon as possible. This will mean that at a Base where the flight planning equipment is in the Intelligence room, this equipment will be transferred to the Operations room. Stations and Satellites provide a slight headache in this respect, because they by no means conform to a standard layout themselves.
A second aspect of the conference facility is its use as an intruder warning channel, which is not working satisfactorily. Local re-arrangements have just been completed at Group and it is hoped that a really efficient scheme has been evolved. The Teller and the Controller are now able to sit side by side, in full view of the plotting table, and each with a separate flight planning telephone. Flying Control “hook-up” will be set up whenever weather conditions or intruder activity make it necessary. Both Teller and Controller can then speak to Stations, the one to pass the intruder activity the other to order any necessary diversions.
[Boxed] MONICA [/boxed]
Our girlfriend Monica is still giving us all grey hair. The experts have now been at work for several weeks and are finding the problem far more difficult than at first expected.
In spits [sic] of this the serviceability has increased, and the faults in the sets are being cleared, slowly but surely.
A method of accurately testing the sensitivity of the Rx has been found preventing a fighter from getting into range without warning.
Some sets may give a fighter warning, but not respond to test. Crews are inclined to think these sets serviceable, but they must remember that such sets are on the borderline, and may not warn in every case. It is this drifting of the Rx gain that we are trying so hard to correct.
The aerials are a further source of trouble, partly caused by personnel using them as step ladders. A bent aerial will often make the set unserviceable.
In spite of all these difficulties, Monica has proved its usefulness over and over again, as many satisfied customers will testify. It is the only warning system we have, it can be made to work, so all concerned must keep at it until the answer is found.
[Boxed] GEE [/boxed]
As usual the GEE ranges vary from sortie to sortie. The serviceability, however, is very good from a maintenance and component viewpoint. Manipulation failures are too frequent, and every opportunity should be made to prevent these RF unit and aerial lead manipulation failures.
W/Op. A.G’s are now applying their GEE knowledge and are getting fixed on the return journeys.
[Boxed] SIGNALS SECURITY
Not many of us liked the new phonetic alphabet and the changeover was allowed to be gradual. However the time has now arrived when our Berties and Freddies should be discarded for ever. Squadrons which persist in the use of the old alphabet are labelling themselves to the Hun. [/boxed]
[Boxed] TRAINING [/boxed] WEATHER RETARDS OUTPUT.
A NEW TRAINING VENTURE.
[Illustration] MY LANDING ARE WIZARD
FAMOUS LAST WORDS Due to bad weather and shortage of Lancaster aircraft, the high output of over 100 crews per month could not be maintained by Conversion Units, and the figure dropped to 82 crews trained during the month. To overcome the temporary shortage of aircraft, it was necessary for Squadrons to loan aircraft during the stand down period to the Conversion Units and it is hoped that, given good weather, next month the deficit in crews will be more than made up.
[Boxed] THE NEW TRAINING VENTURE [/boxed]
The Conversion Base started on a new venture with a short course for Flight Commanders. All the Officers attending benefited by the course, and it is thought that at least three of the instructional staff have learned a great deal as well. Courses will continue during the coming months with, it is hoped, beneficial results.
[Boxed] TOTAL FLYING HOURS FOR THE MONTH WERE – 5481 FOR TRAINING UNITS [/boxed]
[Boxed] CREW SAFETY [/boxed]
The number of ditchings by Lancasters continues to go up. Most crews pay sufficient attention to this vital crew drill to ensure that they can leave the aircraft safely. However, constant practice is necessary to keep yourself up to the mark. In one unfortunate ditching it is known that complete panic ensued and all the crew simply leapt out of the nearest escape hatch straight into the water with fatal results excepting one man.
[Table of Link Trainer times per squadron]
[Table of Squadron Flying Times – Day and Night]
SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 2.
[Page break]
[Boxed] GUNNERY. [/boxed] FEWER SORTIES – MORE COMBATS: THE VITAL NEED FOR PERFECT RECOGNITION.
Although the number of sorties during the month was considerably less than August, the number of combats for September was 133. 14 Enemy aircraft are claimed as destroyed and 27 damaged. Enemy aircraft marked “C” in “This Month’s Bag” are those confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command at the time of going to press.
Unfortunately instances are still occurring of Lancasters being engaged by other Lancasters and it would appear that sufficient care is not taken to identify the other aircraft before pressing the trigger. This problem of identifying aircraft is extremely difficult under certain conditions and this statement is supported by night fighter pilots with considerable experience, but the only solution is Aircraft Recognition of a 101 per cent quality and Squadron Gunnery Leaders should keep this problem in mind always and Air Gunners should be classified on their ability and a scheme instituted whereby the Gunners who are weak in this respect are given exercises daily until the required standard of 100% is reached.
Instances are still occurring of early return due to turret doors not locking, no excuse can be accepted for this, as turret doors should be checked on N.F.T. and again when the crew go out to the aircraft for take-off. It is again stressed that Gunners should check as far as possible guns and turrets immediately on arriving at the aircraft prior to take-off; this practice has frequently enabled the ground staff to put right minor troubles. Any Gunner who is not 100 per cent satisfied with the operation of his turret and guns is to request the Pilot to run the engine and a test then carried out on the turret which is suspect.
[Boxed] MODIFICATIONS AND NEW EQUIPMENT [/boxed]
Experiments with an F.N. 50 Turret are being carried out by 1660 C.U. in an attempt to improve the visibility, metal is being replaced by perspex in the Cupola and much of the metal in front of the Gunner is being removed. A new bulb for the reflector sight is also being tested by this unit. 50 Squadron are carrying out tests on a reflector sight with most of the material from the hood removed, this precludes the sight being used in bright sunlight, but it is hoped to produce an attachment to overcome this difficulty.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
NO. 64 COURSE
P/O HUGHES – 61 SQDN – 13TH, PLACE CAT “B”
NO. 65 COURSE
F/O ARMSTRONG – 9 SQDN – 10TH. PLACE CAT “B”
F/O BUCKLEY – 617 SQDN – 17TH. PLACE CAT. “A”
NO. 66 COURSE
P/O BLACK – 1661 C.U. – 2ND. PLACE CAT “B”
F/SGT. VAUGHAN – 49 SQDN – FAILED CAT “D”
[Boxed] WAR EFFORT [/boxed]
[Table of Group aircraft statistics by Squadron]
[Boxed] This Months Bag [/boxed]
[Cartoon]
DESTROYED
ENEMY A/C AIRCRAFT LETTER SQUADRON DATE
ME109 F “C” 207 3/.4.9.43.
S.E. B “C” 44 3/4.9.43.
S.E. Z “C” 9 5/6.9.43.
ME110 C “C” 106 3/4.9.43.
S.E. R “C” 9 5/6.9/43.
S.E. U 467 23/24.9.43.
ME109 V 467 23/24.9.43.
JU88 K 61 23/24.9.43.
ME109 Z 207 27/28.9.43.
ME109 T 57 27/28.9.43.
JU88 N 57 27/28.9.43.
JU88 P 50 27/28.9.43.
ME109 X 44 29/30.9.43.
FW190 P 207 29/30.9.43.
DAMAGED
ME210 A 207 31/1.9.43.
ME100 J 49 3/4.9.43.
JU88 O 207 3/4.9.43.
T.E. X 44 3/4.9.43.
T.E. K 44 3/4.9.43.
FW190 K 49 6/7.9.43.
JU88 A 50 5/6.9.43.
FW190 C 619 6/7.9.43.
JU88 H 57 22/23.9.43.
JU88 X 57 22/23.9.43.
ME210 P 50 22/23.9.43.
JU88 ED944 57 23/24.9.43.
ME109 Z 207 23/24.9.43.
ME109 J 207 23/24.9.43.
ME210 D 106 23/24.9.43.
JU88 H 44 27/28.9.43.
ME109 Q 61 22/23.9.43.
ME109 F 61 22/23.9.43.
JU88 A 61 22/23.9.43.
ME210 C 207 23/24.9.43.
JU88 J 207 27/28.9.43.
ME109 K 61 23/24.9.43.
ME109 A 61 27/28.9.43.
DO217 L 44 29/30.9.43
T.E. X 44 29/30.9.43.
FW190 J 61 29/30.9.43.
JU88 R 61 5/6.9.43.
[Boxed] The Gunnery Leaders’ Conference was held at Waddington on the 27th. September. The minutes of the Conference have been circulated together with information on several points raised at the Conference which have now been clarified. [/boxed]
[Boxed] ACCIDENTS. [/boxed] INCREASED FLYING HOURS BRINGS SLIGHT RISE IN ACCIDENT RATE.
There were 17 accidents listed as avoidable for September, an increase of three on last month’s total, for an increase of 378 flying hours.
Flying hours for September – 13,520
Flying hours for August – 13,142
The summary of avoidable accidents for September is as follows:-
TAXYING – 2: HEAVY LANDINGS – 5: SWINGS – 2 (One on landing the other on take-off): OVERSHOOTING – 2: ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT – 5. The errors of judgement consist of:-
1. The pilot started the three engined overshoot at 20 ft., but was caught out by the swing resulting from three engines being opened to full power. The aircraft swung completely round from 180° and came to rest in the River Trent, luckily without fatal results. As a contributory factor the Navigator was not calling Air Speeds on the approach. As a result of this accident the Captain’s log book was endorsed in red for not ensuring that his own and his crew drill was correct. MORAL – TAKE CARE OF YOUR CREW DRILL.
2. Another instance of carelessness occurred at the end of last month when an aircraft crashed through taking off with four engines switched to No. 2 tanks which were empty, and were known to be empty by the Captain and Flight Engineer. Luckily the crew were not fatally injured.
3. At 23,000 ft. the pilot passed out for lack of oxygen and it was later found that he had inadvertently nipped his oxygen tube in his harness, cutting off the supply. The aircraft went into a steep dive and was only pulled out by the Navigator and Flight Engineer in unison, after losing 15,000 feet. The terrific stresses set up rendered the aircraft Cat. AC. MORAL – TAKE CARE OF YOUR OXYGEN TUBE.
4. On return from a long sortie the crew of a Lancaster decided they had enough fuel left to reach Base, but on approaching to land three engines cut out for lack of petrol and the aircraft crashed. Attention of all aircrew especially Pilots and Flight Engineers, must be drawn to the fact that a rigorous check of fuel consumption must be kept with the untrustworthiness of fuel gauges always kept in mind. Fuel consumption calculators have been issued to all Units MORAL – KEEP YOUR FUEL CONSUMPTION CALCULATOR HANDY ON ALL FLIGHTS.
5. On return from operations a Lancaster hit the sea with the altimeter reading 160 feet. MORAL WHY COME SO LOW AS THIS?
6. On a low flying exercise a pilot took his hands off the controls to adjust his goggles, and the aircraft hit a tree. MORAL – IF LOW FLYING, DON’T LET YOUR ATTENTION WANDER.
All these accidents are entirely due to carelessness on the part of aircrew and the cost to the country is appalling. Remember, every Lancaster lostthrough [sic] your “clottishness” is one less Lancaster to drop bombs on the Hun.
[Boxed] NEARLY A GOOD RECORD [/boxed]
1660 Con. Unit’s excellent record was marred this month by a swing on Landing but there is a gratifying decrease in all Con. Units this month. In all training Units there were five avoidable accidents for a total of 5481 flying hours.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
[Boxed] AIR BOMBING. [V Group drawings] [/boxed]
[Boxed] PRACTICE BOMBING ON THE SQUADRONS [/BOXED]
[Boxed] [Table of Practice Bombing exercises carried out by each Squadron] [/boxed]
[Boxed] Weekly returns have not yet been received from 49 Squadron and 1654 Conversion Unit, consequently leaving the monthly table incomplete.
617’s results were obtained using the S.A.B.S. Mark IIA.
5258 Practice bombs were dropped (excluding 49 Squadron and 1654 Conversion Unit)
The high level bombing average on Squadrons (from date available) was 218 yards at 10,000 feet and 308 yards at 20,000 feet. In general, results were a slight improvement on August, but the Group error was adversely affected by the high average error of 44 Squadron.
Great credit id due to 1660 Conversion Unit who achieved a Mark XIV Grouping Error better than that of any Squadron. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE [/underlined]
During September, exactly 5,000 bombs were plotted at Wainfleet Sands, although all targets were unserviceable for part of the month.
GOOD BOMBING
The number of details with average error less than 100 yards was greatly increased
SQUADRON PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR
617 (Using SABS)
F/O. CLAYTON P/O. WATSON 43, 59, 71.
P/O. BROWN SGT. DANCIA 72, 86, 75 (Twice)
F/LT. WILSON SGT. BARROW 94, 70, 61, 78.
F/LT MUNRO F/SGT. CALY 88, 41, 60, 94, 87, 65.
S/LDR. MARTIN F/LT. HAY 51, 82, 71, 64, 82.
F/Lt. MCCARTHY F/O. DAVIDSON 80, 49, 76.
619
P/O. JOSS F/O. ANDERSON 91.
F/O. MORRISON SGT. ALLEY 85.
F/LT. SANDISON F/O. WILKIE 81.
F/LT. SANDISON F/LT. SALMSLEY 95.
F/LT. SANDISON W/CDR. ABERCROMBIE 64.
SGT. THOMAS SGT. FONTAINE 70.
F/O. O’SHAUGNESSY F/O. KENDRICK 26.
S/LDR. CHURCHER F/O. MACDONALD 84.
F/O. FOX F/O. BRAID 77.
106
P/O. CALLAN SGT. GOMERSALL. 94.
P/O. COOPER F/SGT. CHRISTMAS 88.
P/O. STORER SGT. HACKETT 97.
P/O. YACKMAN P/O. MOREY 94.
467
F/LT. FORBES P/O. GRIME 79.
P/O. RILEY SGT. VALASTIN 90.
57
SGT. YATES P/O. WANGLER (PILOT) 86.
50
SGT. DURHAM SGT. BROCK 76.
61
F/O. PITCH P/O. LYONS 92.
1654 C.U. SGT. HOMEWOOD SSGT. WALKER 93. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
F/O. Murtough and P/O. Wonham, both of 1661 Conversion Unit assume command of the Bombing Section of 44 Squadron and 1668 Conversion Unit respectively.
The following have passed the Bombing Leader’s Course :-
GRADE “A” F/O. HAZELL (44) F/O. STANISLAUS (9) F/SGT. RUMGAY (207)
P/O. PRICE (1654) P/O. WONHAM (1668)
GRADE “B” F/SGT. LOWANS (49) F/O. TOOGOOD (106) F/O. BOSWELL (619)
SGT. TELFORD (467) F/O. McROBBIE (57) F/O. HARDEN (1660)
F/O. ASTBURG (1661)
P/ . Wonham was 2nd. on No. 63 Course and F/Sgt. Rumgay 3rd. on No. 66 Course.
WELL DONE BOTH! [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Despite a record number of details only 3 Squadrons qualified for this competition.
619 Squadron are to be congratulated on winning the competition for the third successive month, and in so doing obtained by far the best average yet returned although the errors include vector error and are application errors.
[Table of Squadrons and bombing results]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
Only two entries were received, F/Lt. Walmsley improving on his winning score of the previous month.
LEADER PILOT HEIGHT ERROR
F/LT. WALMSLEY F/LT. SANDISON 10000FT 95 YDS
S/LDR. BEACH S/LDR. PARKES 10000FT 280 YDS [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Diagram]
From 20,000 feet the Mark XIV graticule covers a width of 540 yards and a length of 3,100 yards on the ground at the moment of release.
If the centre of your graticule is only two graticule lengths from the aiming point, you stand a grave chance of missing even quite a large city. Remember, one T.I. has a diameter of 300 yards ! [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] ‘BIGCHIEF’ COMPETITION [/underlined]
BIGCHIEF PILOT ERROR AT 10000 FT.
W/CDR. ABERCROMBIE S/LDR. SANDISON 64 YDS
G/CPT. CHRISTIE S/LDR PULLEN 94 YDS
W/CDR. PENMAN P/O. EAGER 123 YDS
G/CAPT. CHRISTIE S/LDR. PULLEN 142 YDS
W/CDR. BURNETT S/LDR. BUNKER 238 YDS
It will be noted that representatives of 619 Squadron won all three competitions. Is this the result of bombing analysis ?!
A hot pace has already been set for October, several details have already been carried out, among them two by the A.O.C. who achieved average errors of 42 yards and 48 yards respectively – the latter was actually at 18,000 feet. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
[Underlined] V GROUP NEWS NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943.
SUPPLEMENT.
AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The month of September was notable for a complete revision of bombing training policy.
In the days of the A.B.S. only application bombing was possible and analysis of results was haphazard and involved considerable guesswork. Now that we are rapidly becoming equipped with Mark XIV bombsights, it is possible to carry out a full analysis by means of bombing grouping which reveals clearly where bombing faults lie.
These faults may be classified in three categories (a) bombing errors due to bombsight inaccuracies or unserviceability (b) vector errors (c) errors of pure bombing attributed to the pilot/air bomber team and caused by inaccurate flying, faulty bombsight settings and bombsight levelling, imperfect co-operation on the bombing run and various other personal factors.
The errors under (a) can be discovered by careful analysis of grouping exercises and must be eliminated completely. Those under (b) are now the joint responsibility of pilot and navigator. Flying for windfinding must be completely accurate and every care is to be taken by navigators to ensure the calculated wind is as accurate as conditions permit. Analysis has proved that in almost every exercise faulty windfinding is largely responsible for the bombing errors obtained.
After (a) and (b) have been removed we come to the Grouping error (c) which can be steadily reduced by a thorough understanding of bombing problems and true co-operation on the bombing run between pilot and air-bomber.
With the present percentage of Mark XIV bombsights in Squadron aircraft, it should now be possible for all competition details to be carried out with that sight, and the results of all such details in October are to be submitted as Grouping errors, in either of the following categories:-
(i) CLOSE GROUP
(ii) As open group if bombsight error is directly attributable to mechanical fault in the Bomb Sight which could not be detected by the Bomb Aimer in his pre-bombing check.
N.B. Bombs forming an OPEN GROUP pattern around an M.P.I. where the error from M.P.I. to the inner radius of the open group is attributable to Bomb Aimer’s negligence in N.F.T. check.
e.g. Drift de-synchronisation
Wring T.V. setting
Incorrect Level Readings etc.
MUST be returned as CLOSE GROUP error being from M.P.I. to inner radius of CLOSE GROUP pattern.
Now that all Mark XIV exercises in which four or more bombs are dropped are to be carried out as Grouping exercises, the following points are to be borne in mind:-
(i) All crews must carry bombing pro formae for bombing details
(ii) The position where bombs fall is to be estimated by the air bomber and plotted in pencil on the plotting rose.
(iii) On landing, the bombing leader is to plot the position of the bombs from the quadrant readings, and transfer the plots
/to the plotting rose…
[Page break]
to the plotting rose of the bombing pro-forma in coloured pencil.
(iv) Pilot, Navigator, Air Bomber and Flight Engineer are to take the form and make an analysis of the exercise.
(v) This analysis is to be checked and amended as necessary by the Bombing Leader and Bombing Officer.
(vi) The captain of the crew is to keep all pro-formae used for future reference.
The results submitted in weekly returns are to be the Grouping errors (c) on all MKXIV exercises, but when a wind velocity is found by the Navigator his vector error is to be noted in a book and kept for future reference. Similarly, bombsight errors are to be noted and rectified where necessary by the instrument section.
The results given in the bombing training table are not a true representation of bombing in the past month, as grouping and application errors are inextricably intermingled and in many cases incorrectly compiled returns failed to differentiate between the bombsights used.
Next month’s ‘News’ should give a true picture of the training carried out. Already we are discovering where our bombing failures lie, and it is only by rigid adherence to the new system that we can hope for a tangible improvement in the operational success of our bombing sorties.
[Boxed] [Underlined] STOP PRESS GUNNERY. [/underlined]
All aircraft claimed by the Group for September have now been confirmed by Headquarters,Bomber Command. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Boxed] DECORATIONS. [/boxed]
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE AWARDS WERE APPROVED DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1943. [/underlined]
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. McGUBBIN. DFC
44 SQUADRON
F/O. A.E.H. PARSONS. DFC
F/O. G.G. PASCOE. DFC
F/O. L.W. PILGRIM. DFC
F/O. H.J. BARLEY. DFC
P/O. H. ROGERS. DFC
106 SQUADRON
SGT. N.L.E. GALE. DFM
SGT. A.J. SARGEANT. DFM
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWINF NON-IMMEDIATE AWARDS WERE APPROVED DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1943. [/underlined]
9 SQUADRON
W/CDR. P. BURNETT. DFC
F/LT. C.A. PATTERN, MBE. DFC
F/O. C.A. HALE. DFC
P/O. J. BOCZAR. DFC
P/O. J.P.H. CARRERE. DFC
SGT. R.V. PIPER. DFM
SGT. J.W. VINALL. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/LT. R.D. ROBINSON. DFC
F/O. A.A. ST.CLAIR-MILLER. DFC
F/O. D.F.H. WALKER. DFC
F/O. W.J. HILTON. DFC
P/O. H. DUTTON. DFC
P/O. J.O. PENNINGTON. DFC
P/O. HEWITT. DFC
SGT. D. MORRISON. DFM
SGT. L.B. HAYWARD. DFM
SGT. G. HOMEWOOD. DFM
49 SQUADRON
W/CDR. P.W. JOHNSON, AFC. DFC
F/O. S.H. MANSBRIDGE. DFC
F/O. R.C. MUNRO. DFC
F/O. T.D. TAYLOR. DFC
F/O. L.R. HASTINGS. DFC
F/O. L.H. TOLCHARD. DFC
P/O. J.T. TAYLOR. DFC
P/O. B.C. DREAVER. DFC
50 SQUADRON
F/O. G.B. MURTOUGH. DFC
F/O. R.M. METHIESON. DFC
F/O. C.F. BONEFIELD. DFC
F/O. T.E. TANDLE. DFC
P/O. J.O. CHRISTIE. DFC
P/O. H.C. BERNARD. DFC
F/SGT. A.C. PARSONS. DFM
F/SGT. A.J. CORK. DFM
SGT. A. BRANSON. DFM
SGT. G. CABLE. DFM
SGT. W. MOONEY. DFM
57 SQUADRON
F/LT. J.C. ANDERSON. DFC
F/O. F. CARTER, DFM. DFC
F/O. E.W. PATTERSON. DFC
F/O. E.W. ADAMS. DFC
F/O. C. SHAW. DFC
2ND. LT. J.E. RUSSELL (USAAF). DFC
2ND. LT. R. WRIGHT (USAAF). DFC
P/O. C.A. MACDONALD. DFC
W/O. J. TOUGH. DFC
W/O. E.T. ENGLISH. DFC
F/SGT. R.W. LORELL. DFM
F/SGT. A.B. WELFORD. DFM
F/SGT. R. ROBERTS, DFM. BAR
SGT. S.J. MONDEL. DFM
61 SQUADRON
W/CDR. W.M. PENMAN. DFC
S/LDR. S.A. BENJAMIN. DFC
F/O. R.H. WILLIAMS. DFC
F/O. J. CRAVEN DFC
[Missing] FROST. DFC
[Remainder of page corner missing]
61 SQUADRON (Continued)
SGT. C.D. TOWSE. DFM
SGT. A.C. MULLINS. DFM
106 SQUADRON
F/LT. R LODGE. DFC
F/LT. W.D. BROWNE. DFC
F/O. G.T. HARDEN. DFC
P/O. J.A.C. MUNRO. DFC
P/O. J.E. CAMPBELL. DFC
W/O. T.R. KWILL. DFC
F/SGT. G.N. FELTHAM. DFM
F/SGT. G.W. CHRISTIE. DFM
207 SQUADRON
F/O. K.H.F. LETFORD. DFC
F/O. K.T. KNIGHT. DFC
F/O. F.G. SPANNER. DFC
P/O. F.M.H. FISHER. DFC
P/O. C. SUTTOR. DFC
SGT. E.D. LUCAN. DFM
207 SQUADRON (Continued)
SGT. G.T.C. BASSFORD. DFM
SGT. R. NUTTON. DFM
467 SQUADRON
S/LDR. E.K. SINCLAIR. DFC
F/O. R. McCURDY. DFC
F/O. G.D. CURRIE. DFC
F/O. T.W. HOPPETT. DFC
F/SGT. W.H. WHITE. DFM
SGT. S.R. ANDERSON. DFM
617 SQUADRON
W/CDR. G.P. GIBSON, VC, DSO, DFC. LEGION OF MERIT. (DEGREE OF COMMANDER)
619 SQUADRON
F/SGT. W.L. VADER-DASSON. DFM
SGT. D.J. COOMBES. DFM
[Boxed] PHOTOGRAPHY [/boxed] TECHNICAL EXPERT
DECLARE WAR ON “SMOKE OBLITERATION.”
Successful ground photographs, which were of immediate operational value, total 204 this month. Whilst there is a slight reduction in the percentage of success it is still good when it is considered that the presence of cloud and smoke over targets provide conditions which are anything but conductive to good night photography.
It is ironical that the very subject which has done so much towards the improvement of bombing should now be the one which is suffering from its effects.
Obtaining good night pictures of ground detail over targets is now almost impossible when large numbers of incendiaries are used, but the camera remains the one and only proof of bombing concentration. Fire track pictures, coupled with a few ground detail photographs, provide a very true picture of a bombing attack and from these fire track pictures, those responsible for assessing operations are able to gain a very good idea as to the degree of success of a particular raid.
In the meantime research is being made to combat the factor of smoke obliteration. Every effort is being made to improve the technical equipment so that ground detail is recorded despite the adverse conditions over the targets. We have already done much in the past few months towards this aim. For instance, the introduction of the American clockwork fuse which has proved so accurate and has permitted the reduction of “open frame time” in the camera from a second to within the region of three seconds, has solved the problem of fire track obliteration
From the analysis of results this month it will be observed that there were comparatively few actual technical faults. Other than the small percentage of flash failures and camera maintenance faults, the chief cause of failures spears to be unsatisfactory bomb firing button. This button has now been modified, but it is still necessary for the Air Bomber to press the button as far as possible to ensure positive contact for camera operation.
Manipulation faults on the part of Aircrews have again decreased in number, but there are still far too many failures due to camera leads being out at the time of bombing. As mentioned in last months’ NEWS it would greatly assist if Air Bombers would check all Cameraleads [sic] and any which are out of sockets should be replaced and upon return from operations the fact should be reported. In this connection a modification is now being produced which will prevent camera leads from the control being removed accidentally.
[Table of Analysis of Results by Squadron]
[Boxed] [Cartoon] QUINTUS QUINCE THE V GROUP ACE SAYS:- “MY GUNNER IS A [underlined] HUMAN [/underlined] ‘MONICA’” [/boxed]
PAGE 5.
[Page break]
[Boxed] ENGINEERING. [/boxed] INSPECTION DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME BY HARD WORK.
All Squadrons being well below establishment in aircraft find it difficult to stagger inspection, as in many cases 100 per cent aircraft are used for each operation. This obviously brings the inspection round rapidly, and three or four more inspections become due at one time. This has made planning very difficult and Squadrons are to be congratulated on the manner in which the work has been carried out. Although the aircraft situation is improving, a somewhat similar state of affairs will exist for the most part of October and we are relying on Squadrons to keep up the good work and even intensify their efforts where possible to produce the effort in spite of the aircraft shortage. Due to certain Squadrons outside this Group re-arming it has meant Squadrons being allocated old aircraft thrown up as a result. This is never a pleasant position, as new aircraft are always more acceptable than old, but the way Squadrons have “tightened their belts” and got down to rendering these old aircraft serviceable to our standards without any undue complaint, reflects a very good spirit. Certain ex-Cat B which have had to be accepted put a great strain on the maintenance personnel, but it is hoped that there will not be many more of these unless they are fully modified prior to receipt.
With the lengthening of the nights and the aircraft being diverted or landing away from Base, it is often long after midday by the time the aircraft returns to its parent unit. This leaves very little time to prepare it for operations again that night. This cannot be helped and so speed is absolutely essential.
Often aircraft are damaged by enemy action and land away from Base. They may be Cat. ‘A’ or ‘AC’. Wherever possible, Engineer Officers are to send a representative down to examine these aircraft with a view to carrying out temporary repairs to fly them back to Base for the completion of the repair. So much time and labour is saved by carrying out the repair at the Parent Unit whether it be Cat. ‘A’ or ‘AC’.
[Boxed] ENGINES [/boxed]
Exhaust stud failures are not on the decline and further sets of trepanning tools are being made available. This is obviously only a palliative: the answer lies in the fitting of a more suitable type of stud and it is hoped that before long we will have the 3.5 per cent nickel steel stud which has given very good service on its trials.
All Lancaster III’s with Merlin 28’s and 38’s and Lancaster I’s with Merlin 22’s are now modified to Mod. 1087 and adjusted to 14lbs. boost for take-off. It is pleasing to note that power plant changes are being speeded up generally throughout the Group and it is only by quick thinking and speedy organisation that repairs and power plant changes can be accomplished in quick time.
[Boxed] MAN POWER [/boxed]
All Squadrons are now working much below establishment and this calls for most economical use of the man power available. The sending of a ground crew to dinner at 1230 while their aircraft is in the air is an example of how N.C.O’s i/c Flights can employ their resources more usefully.
All Electrical Officers will by now have become acquainted with the Mk.XIV Bombsight Group Servicing Van. It has already proved its usefulness and has cleared the few minor snags so far encountered on the A.P.I./A.M.U. and the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
The fitting of the Mk.XIV is proceeding in a very satisfactory manner and only 44 aircraft remain to be fitted. Every assistance should be afforded to the fitting parties in order to finish these aircraft before the end of the month, since the training of Air Bombers on the A.B.S. has ceased.
Most of the available A.P.I./A.M.U’s have now been fitted and are giving very satisfactory results. The accuracy of this aid to Navigation and other instruments depends to a large extent on the D.R. Compass, the maintenance of which must be kept on “top line”. Resistance units for the D.R. Compass Master Unit are coming through slowly and it is hoped that all Units will be supplied to their requirements in the near future.
[Boxed] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY [/boxed]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Squadron] [/boxed]
[Boxed] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Unit] [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
[Boxed] ARMAMENT. [/boxed] GOOD NEWS OF HANDLING TACKLE.
With the increased weight of bombs it has been apparent that a means of handling these heavier type weapons had to be accomplished. The rolling technique was introduced and up to the present has not proved successful compatible with the speed of handling required. The super type lorry crane known as the “COLES” is in limited supply and its use divided between all Branches on Stations.
All available forms of lifting and handling tackle were recently demonstrated at R.A.F. Station Binbrook, and at the meeting held following this demonstration it was agreed that some form of crane was a necessity and it was not imperative that it should be a prime mover. It was decided that a type known as the Neal Rapid Mobile Crane Type N. would satisfy Armament requirements and a trial was immediately arranged for one of these type cranes to be put on one week’s trial at East Kirkby. This trial has proved entirely successful and we now await further supplies.
[Boxed] SBC FILLING, HANDLING AND STORAGE [/boxed]
With the introduction of the heavier type of SBC known as the Mk. VA (150 x 4lb.) certain preparation and loading problems have arisen. The man handling of the SBC weighing some 657 lbs. when filled, presents a difficulty likewise does the filling. It is apparent that a standardised procedure is a necessity. Several schemes showing promise are at present being investigated on Units within the Group, details and results are eagerly awaited.
[Boxed] BOMB LOADS INCREASED INCENDIARY [/boxed]
Standard bomb loads giving all the necessary details of Bomb Stations, Pre-selector settings, Peg Hole and time interval and false height settings are in the course of preparation and their issue to all Units will be completed early in the month.
[Boxed] “WHITLOCK” TWIN ADAPTORS [/boxed]
Production of the “Whitlock” adaptor is progressing slowly but surely and a limited number have been diverted to this Group by Headquarters No. 1 Group. It is anticipated that with the commencement of production by other manufacturers all Units within the Group will be equipped by the end of this month, thus ensuring that a standard bomb load can be ordered for all aircraft.
[Boxed] CAMOUFLAGE STATION BOMB STORES [/boxed]
This type of camouflage has been the “headache” of Armament Officers for some time past, and authority has been received for its removal in bomb stored at the discretion of Station Commanders.
[Boxed] AFTER ESCAPE HATCH [/boxed]
The fitment of flare chutes, H.2.S., F.N. 64 Turrets and the .5” under defence gun, all centre around the bung.
Aircraft fitted H.2.S. are being fitted tricell as the modification parts become available, whilst the armoured chute remains fitted to non H.2.S. aircraft. With the introduction of the .5” under defence gun the single flare chute will take a new position to be decided after trial installation. In all Squadrons except three 75 per cent F.N.64 Turrets are being withdrawn.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “BOMBFOOLERIES”. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH HANG-UP. [/underlined]
Air Bomber failed to select switch.
[TURRET DOORS FAILED TO CLOSE [/underlined]
Rear Gunner damaged door runner.
[Underlined] ARTICULATING PIPE [/underlined]
Fracture – due to obstruction. [/boxed]
[Boxed] FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failure types by Squadron] [/boxed] [Bottom right hand corner missing]
The monthly Armament Conference was held at Waddington. Minutes have been circulated. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943.
[Page break]
[Boxed] NAVIGATION [/boxed] MINIMUM GAIN FOR BEST RECEPTION
BREAKDOWN OF D.R. AFTER LEAVING TARGET
VALUABLE GROUND TRAINING.
This month’s Navigation on the whole was satisfactory, although the general standard was not as high as the preceding month’s. D.R. Navigation and allied calculations showed a considerable improvement but concentration and accurate timing at turning points did not move in parallel. On the homeward journey the chief cause of spread when reaching GEE Range is found in the initial stages after leaving the target. Most navigators do not take full advantage of the target as a pin-point. The trouble begins after “Photoflash Gone” when for the next few minutes there appears to be a complete disregard of courses and true air speed flown. This means that over 5 or 6 minutes, an aircraft may be 20 or 30 miles away from its intended position at that time, and thus the initial error creeps in. The first 5 -10 minutes flying out of the target are most important in Navigation, and if concentration and track keeping is to be maintained, the Navigator must ensure that an accurate timed run is made from “Flash Gone” to the turning point. The average indicated air speed and course flown during this run must be carefully watched, and the next course set from D.R. position - initial displacement of position after leaving the target is certainly responsible for aircraft being out of concentration and off the prescribed track when out of GEE coverage.
[Boxed] TRAINING [/boxed]
During the month’s training period most Navigators put in some good ground work and were able to brush up on certain navigational problems. It is hoped that when these training periods are arranged all Navigators will do their utmost to increase efficiency and apply the ground training to this end. You are primarily concerned with the problem of keeping the aircraft on the prescribed track at the right time, and supplying the Air Bomber with an accurate bombing wind – this requires constant practice and, above all, accuracy in calculation.
[Boxed] WIND FINDING FOR PRACTICE BOMBING [/boxed]
Until recently most Navigators were not fully alive to the fact that they are vital members of the bombing team. In the past, many approximations and inaccuracies have been made by the Navigator when finding a practice bombing wind - this has had a corresponding effect on bombing accuracy. Simple appreciation of bombing errors will prove the necessity for accurate wind finding. If an inaccurate wind is set on the bombsight, the Air Bomber’s difficulty in tracking on to the target is increased, and bombing errors will result out of all proportion to the wind vector error. The Navigator is responsible for navigating the aircraft, [underlined] and [/underlined] for providing an accurate wind to the Air Bomber, if the aiming point is to be hit. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO INCREASE OUR BOMBING ACCURACY.
[Boxed] SPECIAL MENTION [/boxed]
F/Sgt. Lawes,C.M. of 207 Squadron, produced excellent work during the month and particularly on a recent mining sortie in the Baltic. On this occasion F/Sgt Lawes produced no less than 18 good wind velocity checks, six good Polaris position lines, and one 1st class Astro fix. This log and chart have been forwarded to H.Q.B.C. for potential publication. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Your W/T, R/T, I.F.F. and TR.1196 are all U/S. What radio facility is still available for contacting ground ?
2. What is the maximum shift in wind direction over likely to be experienced at 15,000 feet when flying over a distance of 50 miles ?
3. In what order from South to North should the following be placed:-
Hull, Hamberg, Wilhelmshaven, Manchester, Stettin, Dublin, Bremen.
[Missing] which airfield in 5 Group does the Greenwich hour [missing] equal the local hour angle ?
[Missing] on the D.R. Master Unit compensated [missing P.I.
[Missing] be set at night if the [missing] U/S and all radio [missing] [/boxed]
[Boxed] FLYING CONTROL.
[Table of aircraft landing times after operations by Station]
MONTHLY AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP – 3.67 MINUTES
Syerston still lead the Group in landing aircraft quickly after operations. It is hoped, in the near future, to put to practical test several quick landing schemes which are now in preparation. Suggestions from Stations, on the question of quick landings, will be welcomed. [/boxed]
[Underlined] A.P.I’s [/underlined]
During the month, many Navigators became proficient in the operational use of A.P.I. – this instrument is already proving the value of knowing an aircraft’s true position. Interesting analysis is being carried out on certain Squadrons showing the discrepancy between the plotted, and actual air positions. In most cases the fault seems to lie in the Navigator’s faulty computation of true air speed, and his failure to check the true course, and indicated air speed more frequently. One suggestion is, that the latitude and longitude of 2 A.P.I. readings be plotted about 6 minutes apart and compared with the D.R. calculations. This method will give the true air speed and true course flown, on which E.T.A’s and Ground speed can easily be calculated.
[Boxed] THIS MONTH’S NAVIGATION “PRUNERY” [/boxed]
During the month a sortie was abandoned for the following reasons:-
1. THE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR THOUGHT THEY WERE FLYING ON A STATIC VENT AIRCRAFT – THIS WAS NOT SO !!!
2. THE NAVIGATOR APPLIED COMPASS DEVIATION IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION AND GAVE THE PILOT TWO COURSES TO STEER WHICH AFTERWARDS PROVED TO BE 6 DEGREES OUT.THE COMBINATION OF THESE ERRORS RESULTED IN A LARGE ERROR BETWEEN THE PLOTTED AND ACTUAL AIR POSITION – THIS MEANT THAT WIND VELOCITIES WERE FOUND TO BE OVER 100 MILES PER HR.
If these careless mistakes had not been made this Navigator would have found a wind velocity of 255 degrees 70 miles per hour which was in agreement with the post-met winds.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
During September very varied results have been received on different raids. The exact difference in ranges on different dates are now difficult to assess owing to the new method used in reporting. It is certain that GEE is still providing the most valuable aid to Navigators.
The enemy is now concentrating on transmitting “noise” which is proving as much a nuisance as the previous sine waves and railings. Some noise is always present if a gain has turned up over England, but a special transmitting grass would appear with low gain. This means that over the jamming areas, signals all tend to disappear into the grass as the distance from the transmitters increases. To combat this the Navigator is tempted to increase the gain so as to increase the signal strength. Instead of increasing signal strength, the result is increased grass which swamps all signals.
It is not necessarily weak signals which limit range but the grass signal ratio – if this ratio is kept low then the range will increase – and it can only be kept low by working with the lowest possible gain. Therefore, as a general rule always use [underlined] minimum gain [/underlined] and keep the focus and transference adjusted to meet the reduced gain.
[Boxed] [Underlined] LATTICE CHARTS [/underlined]
Command have decided that the I/M Miniature Lattice Charts shall become available for the Main force aircraft. These will not be issued immediately, for charts are not yet printed in quantity. When they are issued all charts for Series 2, 3 and 5 will be contained in one book conveniently folded. (Series 4 Charts which are rarely used in this Group will continue to be issued as large sheets). Each Navigator can then carry his own book of charts covering all likely areas, and it is thought that this system will be more convenient to use in the air.
The similarity of scales between Lattice and Plotting Charts will make the transference of a fix from one to the other much easier. [/boxed]
GEOGRAPHY Few of us liked Geography at school because so much of what we had to learn had no bearing on our lives. We knew of the Alps as a mountain range somewhere North of Italy, but did they ever become real until that night when we staggered back through cloud on three engines and silently prayed that we were on track ? What were the islands of Holland until we passed over them and joyfully put the nose down for home ?
War has made us all place and name conscious, but do we make the most of our opportunities ? Every sortie should add to our knowledge of Eurpoe [sic] and beyond: the shape of the land, its mountains, its rivers and lakes, its cities. Develop a habit of studying the earth over which you fly. Try to memorise your topographical maps. Your knowledge may come in useful if you ever have to walk back. [boxed]
PAGE 7.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS BAD WEATHER INTERVENES
NAZI WAR MACHINE SLOWING DOWN.
The month’s total of sorties (915) shows a very considerable decrease on last month’s record figure of 1507. This was entirely due to circumstances which are always beyond our control – a bad patch of weather from the 7th. to the 22nd. of the month, which limited the number of sorties to 28 of which 8 were recalled before reaching the target. The number of targets attacked during the month is, therefore, not an imposing one, but we are doing our best at the present moment to make up for lost time. In passing it may be of interest to recall our own experience in 1940/41, that the return of large scale bombing after a lull has an even more depressing effect on morale than an unbroken “Blitz”.
[Boxed] INDUSTRIAL TARGETS [/boxed]
Apart from one attack on Berlin, a special small scale operation in Southern France and two nights of Gardening, the month’s targets have all been industrial centres in Western and South Western Germany. Mannheim and Hannover were both attacked twice, Munich and Bochum once each. The percentage of successful attacks (89.1) is again very satisfactory; the percentage of lost aircraft (4.4) rather higher than usual, though it may be noted that four raids alone counted for 77 pre cent of our casualties.
[Boxed] BERLIN [/boxed]
The raid on Berlin on 3/4th. was a good one: the luck of the weather was with us and a providential gap in the clouds enabled a concentrated attack to be carried out. Once again the Western and South Western parts of the city suffered the most, and while the excited and extravagant accounts of neutral reporters must be taken with a large amount of salt, there is no doubt that severe damage, most of it industrial, has been inflicted on the areas of Berlin roughly corresponding to Hammersmith and Wandsworth and a severe shock has been administered to the Berlin morale at the end of the first round of the Battle of Berlin: one of the most important results of this is that a large scale evacuation of the city, which started after the raids on Hamburg, has been considerably speeded up.
The raid on Mannheim on the 6/7th. was carried out in excellent visibility, and a strong attack developed. Photographs taken on the 7th. and 9th. show that severe damage was caused on both sides of the river, and that several important factories were hit. The weather for Munich the next night was not so good, but after a scattered start two good concentration of fires were started and particularly large explosions reported.
[Boxed] A SPECIAL OPERATION [/boxed]
On the night of 16/17th. 5 Group were entrusted with the task of attempting to destroy the viaduct at Antheor near Cannes, which carries one of the main railway lines between France and Italy. At the same time, other aircraft of Bomber Command struck at the marshalling yards at Modane, where the other French-Italian line enters the Mt. Cenis tunnel. It was hoped that by this double blow to impede the flow of reinforcements to the Germans in Italy at a time when they might most desperately be needed. The viaduct was n extremely difficult target and well defended by Nature against air attack, and in spite of the most careful planning and organisation , and the close proximity of some of the bombs, only slight damage was done to the target.
[Boxed] GERMAN WAR PRODUCTION REDUCED [/boxed]
After another lull the month finished up with a series of large scale attacks. Hannover was attacked in great strength on the night of 27/28th. On neither occasion did the full weight of the attack fall on the centre of the city, but two important factories on the outskirts received very severe damage. Mannheim was strongly attacked on the night of 23/24th., the weight of the attack falling on the Southern parts of the city and Bochum on the night 29/30th. got a good hammering. All these attacks were pressed home in the face of very determined opposition, which however, never succeeded in upsetting the pre-conceived plan of attack, in spite of German claims to the contrary, nor in preventing the major part of the bomber force getting through. Already German war production is about 25 per cent below normal as a result of our air attacks, and if the present scale of attack is maintained it will soon drop to a level, below which, so the economists say, the German war machine will no longer be able to function. With every raid that day grows closer and closer.
[Boxed] [Rolls Royce logo] ROLLS ROYCE. (CONTINUED)
[Circled] From Page 1 Col. 1 [/circled]
94 of them more recently took part in the 5 Group daylight raid on the Schneider Works at Le Creuset far into the heart of France, 93 of them returned, 376 Merlin engines, well over half a million reliable horse power. It has also been chosen for use in the Mosquito reconnaissance bomber, which made it bow to the public following on the spectacular daylight raid on Quisling’s Headquarters in Oslo.
It is not, of course, possible to divulge particulars of the numbers of Merlin engines being produced. It is an established fact that during the last War the Derby Rolls-Royce factory was responsible for the output of more aero engine horse power than all the remaining British Manufacturers combined. The same spirit and quality of product is very evident during the present conflict, and the total Merlin Horse power produced so far has already reached the staggering figure of over 54 millions. [/boxed]
[Boxed] GARDENING:-
On 2nd. September, 15 Lancasters planted 90 vegetables off the Frisians. The operation was uneventful but was a useful contribution to the plastering of this area, which is going steadily on, and which, together with the strafing of shipping by Fighter and Coastal Commands is making life a misery for the enemy’s convoys and steadily cutting down his available tonnage.
Gardening has always produced the highest yield of casualties in the Baltic. It is the only way in which we can get at the enemy’s shipping there and also at the U-boats in their training grounds. Most of the German fleet, except those ships in Norway, is also in harbours in the Easter Baltic. On this occasion it was appreciated from previous sighting reports that the Lutzow was due in the area from Norway. As usual, we shall have to wait to hear the results but there is no doubt that the perseverance of the crews in making the long trip and getting mines down in the right spot in the face of considerable opposition caused great alarm and despondency as an immediate effect and the Admiralty expressed great satisfaction at the success of the operation. [/boxed]
FOREWORD by A.O.C. (CONTINUED.)
well-trained and determined crew whose errors on operations may be little greater.
Every crew in this Group must think bombing, talk bombing and practice bombing until it has an error from 10,000 feet of less than 100 yards; and there is no reason why this standard should not be achieved provided:-
1. The Air Bomber takes a personal interest in the sight and ensures that any bombing errors due to faulty adjustments in the mechanism of the sight are immediately put right by the instrument repair staff.
2. Pilot and Navigator work together so that the wind velocity found by GEE fix has a vector error not exceeding 7 miles per hour. They must study and apply the new 5 Group instructions on wind finding by GEE fixes.
3. Pilot and Air Bomber take the aircraft over the target without skid, bearing in mind that at 20,000 feet one degree of skid introduces an error of 100 yards, and there are many pilots who are unable to make small turns without skid.
4. Finally, the Captain exercises supervision over the bombing team and insists that every bombing detail is fully analysed and the causes of errors understood and rectified. That means hard work and enthusiasm.
I repeat that a crew who, with practice bombs, can achieve an error not exceeding 100 yards from 10,000 feet has shown that it takes bombing seriously, and there is no reason why, with normal luck, it should not achieve similar results on operations. Every trip by this crew will contribute to victory.
When the whole Group can put down its bombs with this accuracy the spread of the attack will be no more than the spread of the T.I’s and should be less because the aiming point is the centre of those T.I’s which are visible.
The spread of the incendiary attack must be reduced. I give that as No. 1 problem facing the Group. If it can be solved – as I believe it can – it will represent the biggest single contribution to Victory of which the Group is capable. The first step is to realise that good bombing is the result of good team work un which Pilot, Air Bomber, Navigator and Instrument Repairer all play essential parts. The second that precision bombing means precision work by each member of the team. The third is that there is no time to waste.
B.B.C. VISIT TO 5 GROUP – “AN OUTSTANDING BROADCAST.”
On the night of the 3/4th. September, Mr. Vaughan Thomas and Mr. Reginald Pidsley, both of the B.B.C., made a recording of the raid over the German capital.
How ‘F’ for Font, the Lancaster in which they were flying was attacked by a fighter over Berlin with the result that the gunners of the recording aircraft shot down their opponent, is well known to listeners all over the world.
Within three hours of landing, the B.B.C. men were speeding back to London with their precious discs.
The recordings of the trip were broadcast three times in the English programmes and on innumerable European and Foreign transmissions. It is interesting to note that the Blue Network in the United States cancelled its prog [missing] to have this recording on Sunday, [missing] described as the outstanding [missing] war.
This month [rest of this page corner is missing]
GROUP NEWS. No. 14.
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V Group News, September 1943
5 Group News, September 1943
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Five Group Newsletter, number 14, September 1943. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, an article on the Rolls Royce Merlin and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, operations, and a BBC broadcast from 5 Group.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1943-10-13
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Anne-Marie Watson
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10 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-21
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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CC BY-NC 4.0 International license
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Mannheim
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1943-09
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
106 Squadron
1654 HCU
1660 HCU
1661 HCU
1668 HCU
207 Squadron
44 Squadron
467 Squadron
49 Squadron
5 Group
50 Squadron
57 Squadron
61 Squadron
617 Squadron
619 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
ground personnel
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
propaganda
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
take-off crash
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1315 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A O C
October has seen a fine month’s work with many important operations successfully concluded. Several of these took place in difficult conditions, reflecting the improved standard of training which crews have reached before they go on operations.
As this month marks the departure of No.51 Base on its incorporation into the newly formed 7 Group, I would like to congratulate all in the Base on the fine results which they have achieved over the past 20 months. Although they now move to 7 Group they will continue to provide crews for this Group, and since the Stirlings with which they are now equipped, are shortly to be replaced by Lancasters, it will soon be possible to relieve squadrons of much of their training commitments.
While there has been a steady improvement in the efficiency of all members of aircrew there is one matter in which the standards are still deplorably and dangerously low. I refer to the problem of security.
I am certain that if I asked any member of an aircrew whether he would, of his own free will, give information to the enemy he would hotly deny the suggestion. Yet the names of no less than 17 members of 5 Group who are now Prisoners of War, appear on a list lately captured from an enemy Headquarters, which was over-run during the Army’s advance.
The list contains the names of individuals who had passed through the normal interrogation centre, and gives a precis of the information which the interrogating officer gleaned from each; some of it is of considerable value to the enemy. I do not suggest that the information was given with any treasonable intent, but the orders state that nothing may be said at interrogation except NUMBER, RANK AND NAME, and the individuals whose names appear on this list have flagrantly disobeyed these orders.
In the aggregate very great harm has been occasioned to the Allied cause by disclosures which have been made by Prisoners of War. Some were no doubt doing no more than airing their ideas, or repeating what they had heard, hoping, by appearing to give information, to appease the interrogating officer. Unfortunately, when faced with a skilled interrogator there is no “half way house”, either you say nothing and get away with it, or you start to talk and everything you know will be dragged out of you.
There is ample evidence to show that the German Interrogation centre is conducted along the lines specified in the Geneva Convention, and that no undue pressure is brought to bear on any individual who will not talk. If, however, a Prisoner appears to be of the talkative type he will certainly be interrogated at considerable length. Anyone who gives only the details of Number, Rank and Name and thereafter keeps his mouth firmly shut, will not only be respected by the enemy, but is unlikely to be further interrogated.
I suggest that members of aircrew who may have the misfortune to find themselves Prisoners of War, should bear in mind that the Allied
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] A. O. C’S FOREWORD [/underlined]
Armies are still advancing and that in their progress towards Berlin, they will no doubt capture other lists containing the names of Prisoners and what they have said. They should ponder on the sharp retribution which will overtake those individuals when they again set foot on British soil. But this retribution will not bring to life those of their comrades who have been killed because of their failure to carry out their orders.
Unfortunately, this unworthy giving of information to the enemy has its counterpart in dangerous talk in this country. Before the first attack on the Tirpitz on the 15th September, 1944, all crews taking part had to be briefed some days in advance. They were told that on no account must a word be breathed outside, and there were very good reasons for this special warning.
Yet, within 48 hours loose talk by members of certain crews in front of individuals in no way concerned with the operation, had spread the news to other Units in the Group where it was being freely debated. A number of individuals are about to face the consequences of their folly and I cannot, at present, refer in more detail to this episode. But it shows that there are still those who fail to realise their responsibilities.
A further form of laxity is the carriage of documents in aircraft. We know that diaries containing valuable and secret information have been taken by the Germans off Bomber crews; while the other night an aircraft of this Group which had been detailed to attack Bergen, landed at a diversion airfield where the captain dropped his copy of the complete briefing instructions which he had been given before take-off and which is expressly forbidden to take into the air.
Great harm is being done by this slackness in matters of security. It reflects on the standard of discipline of aircrew, and shows the lack of a proper sense of responsibility. We cannot afford to give information to the enemy, even on matters which may appear trivial; for we are up against a powerful and experienced defence which knows well how to turn information to good account.
I ask aircrew to give this matter of security the serious thought that it deserves, and ensure that they thoroughly understand the orders on the subject and obey them.
[Underlined] PONDER ON THIS. [/underlined]
A crew of No. 61 Squadron interrogated in April, 1944, gave the enemy details of the 5 Group method of attack including our technique of marking, the part played by the Master Bomber, and even such matters as the frequencies used in the control of the operation.
[Underlined] ALSO THIS. [/underlined]
Sgt. D. was extremely well drilled in security. For this reason he would say nothing, especially as the crew had been repeatedly warned against talking by the Intelligence Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] WILHELMSHAVEN – 5TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Operations in October started with a daylight attack by a force of 221 aircraft on the Great Naval base at Wilhelmshaven.
PLAN Although previously attacked by both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F., no great or widespread damage had been done, and on this occasion, the intention was to devastate the built-up area and suburbs of the town, rather than the dock area. The bomb load was 10 x 1,000 lb H.E. with only a small proportion of incendiaries, a change from our usual 80% incendiary load.
Two aiming lines some 4,000 yards long and running roughly east to west through the town, were allotted to Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, whose aircraft were to be evenly distributed over the whole length of both aiming lines. Nos. 49, 9 and 106 Squadrons were given individual aiming points in the north east sector of the town. No. 54 Base were to place proximity markers on the coast line to the north east, to aid crews in their run-up. Bombing to be direct and visual. Failing visual identification, crews were ordered to bomb on H.2.S., or (for non-H.2.S. aircraft) on bombs dropped by H.2.S. aircraft; or as a last resort, any built up area in Germany.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud was encountered over the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered crews to bomb on H.2.S. 198 aircraft attacked the primary target area, the remainder bombed last resort targets. Bombing was consequently very scattered, and only minor points of fresh damage are reported.
An H hour of 09.00 hours involved a dark take-off, and forming up was not easy. In spite of this, and of the unfavourable weather conditions, the fighter escort reported that this was one of the easiest operations they have yet had to cover.
[Underlined] BREMEN – 6/7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Bremen, frequently the target for both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. had suffered wide-spread damage both to harbour installations and industrial premises, but a large built-up area in the town itself, remained undamaged. A force of 237 aircraft of the Group was despatched on the night of October 6/7th to devastate this area, which was probably the largest the Group has yet had to tackle since it has operated as a separate force. Two aircraft from each Squadron carried H.E. bombs and the remainder a 100% load of 4 lb incendiaries.
PLAN Four areas were selected: two of them heavily built up, on opposite banks of the river, in the centre of the town, and the other two, rather larger but not quite so heavily built up, to the S.E. and S.W. respectively of the two areas lining the river bank.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
The large marshalling yard, some 1,500 yards to the north, was chosen as a convenient marking point. Three Squadrons were allotted to each of the four areas, three of which were divided into sectors, while the fourth was covered by a single track. All crews were ordered to aim at the marking point, delaying release for a detailed number of seconds.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather, with slight haze, and the illumination and marking went according to plan. The markers fell in a sector roughly NW – SW some 200 – 300 yards from the selected point. Photographs show that considerable damage has been inflicted in the areas selected for attack, and the devastation of the old town has been extended south eastwards, and is now almost complete. The part of the town on the West bank of the river is also heavily damaged. Nevertheless, an examination of the photographic and incendiary plots show that the concentration aimed at was not achieved, and that a large proportion of the bomb loads fell in areas previously devastated. Moreover, it is obvious that many incendiary loads were dropped short of the aiming point and although a certain amount of damage was caused in the housing estate to the north of it, this area was not included in the sectors selected for attack. Many loads have also fallen to the west, outside the planned sectors. The weather conditions for the attack were most favourable, and the marking was punctual and accurate, and no satisfactory explanation for the wide bombing spread has yet been arrived at. Two obvious possibilities are that:-
(a) the plan of attack is still not being explained to crews in sufficient detail and with sufficient emphasis.
(b) crews are not adhering rigidly to the tracks allotted to them nor carrying out the required delay when dropping their bombs.
Provided we can be satisfied that these conditions are being fulfilled, we can then begin to look elsewhere for causes which result in these incendiary attacks failing to achieve the saturation aimed at.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – OCTOBER 7TH. [/underlined]
The port of Antwerp had been in Allied hands for some time, but the facilities could not yet be used for unloading supplies for the invading armies, since Walcheren Island at the mouth of the Scheldt esturary [sic] was still held by the Germans, and the approaches to the port were under fire from enemy gun batteries.
120 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases were therefore detailed to attack two point either side of Flushing, the sea wall on the east and the Dyke to the West, with the intention of flooding the island and forcing the enemy to abandon his gun positions.
PLAN Each Base was allotted an aiming point, and each Squadron within the Base was to attack separately at 10 minute intervals, making individual attacks and bombing in line astern at right angles to the dyke. The bomb load consisted of 14 x 1,000 lb bombs fused half an hour or one hour delay. Two runs were to be made, half the load to be dropped on each run. Crews were to bomb visually, using a Red T.I. dropped near the base of the dyke, as a guide to the run-up. Particular stress was laid on the necessity for reducing line error to a minimum, in view of the nature of the target.
RESULTS The attack was successful. The sea wall on the east side
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of Flushing was broken in several places. The dyke on the west side was breached at one point only, but there were many craters along its crest. A few days later the water had penetrated as far as two miles inland in both areas.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 11TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Breaches were made in the dyke and sea wall during our attack on Flushing, but the process of flooding is slow. A further force was therefore detailed to help the process, this time by attacking the dyke at Veere, on the North East side of the island. No. 55 Base provided 60 aircraft for this attack, while a second force of 113 aircraft of Nos. 53 and 55 Bases was sent to deal with four gun positions in the dock area of Flushing.
PLAN Aircraft were ordered to make individual bombing runs in line astern against the dyke, and once again emphasis was laid on the importance of reducing line error to a minimum. A red T.I. was to be dropped as a guide to visual bombing. On this occasion too, the bomb load consisted of 1,000 lb. bombs with half an hour or one hour delay. No marking was used on the gun positions, and all crews bombed visually. The bombs for this target were fused T.D. 0.025.
RESULTS [Underlined] Veere Dyke. [/underlined] This attack was also successful, and on the following day an area approximately 800 X 250 yards was seen to be flooded. Several breaches were made, one of 200 yards, a second of 100 to 150 yards, three more small breaks and in addition, four more places where the wall was cratered which would probably erode into breaks.
[Underlined] Gun Positions. [/underlined] Although good concentrations were achieved round all four aiming points, many units being destroyed by direct hits and others affected by near misses, some of the casemated positions escaped damage. These guns are almost entirely screened from blast by thick mounds and only direct hits, or very near misses near the gun apertures, are likely to put them out of action.
REMARKS The plan of flooding the Germans out of their positions on Walcheren Island started with the breaching off the sea wall at Westkapelle by other Groups early in the month. This was followed by the successful breaching of the sea wall and dyke at Flushing, and later the Veere Dyke, on the N.E. of the island, by No.5 Group, which completed the flooding of substantially the whole of the low lying areas of the island.
The importance of eliminating line error was stressed on these attacks. Their success shows that this was, in the main, achieved, though too few bomb craters are visible on the photographic cover for an accurate analysis to be made.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Brunswick has proved an elusive target for the R.A.F. in the past although it has been attacked on numerous occasions both by the R.A.F. and by the U.S.A.A.F. It was last attacked some two months ago, and on that occasion was the guinea pig for an experiment in blind bombing, entirely on H.2.S. The results were inconclusive, and only scattered incidents of damage were caused, and the guinea pig survived. On the night of the 14/15th October a strong force of 241 aircraft took off to complete the destruction of this important industrial centre.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN The plan for this attack followed what has now become our normal procedure on targets of this nature, i.e. a suitable marking point was selected (the main railway terminus) and sectors between 345°T and 080°T measured from the marking point. Bases and Squadrons were to spread their aircraft evenly along tracks in these sectors and appropriate delays for bomb release were ordered. Separate height bands were given to each Base. Illumination and marking in the normal sequence.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather and was well controlled by the Master Bomber. Flares were accurately dropped, and the marking went according to plan. Bombing was somewhat scattered early in the attack, with a tendency to creep back towards the markers. This was later corrected, and a good concentration was achieved. A large area in the centre of the town, previously undamaged and containing the majority of administrative buildings and business premises, was devastated. On this occasion, the bomb load included a proportion of H.E., 4,000 lb, 2,000 lb and 1,000 lb H.C. and M.C. bombs, and in addition to the incendiary damage, large areas have been levelled by blast. On the whole, this was a very successful attack. A proportion of the bombing has fallen outside the westerly sector, and although considerable roof damage is visible in the easternmost sector, the destruction is not so concentrated as in the central portion. It appears probable that the displacement may have been caused by the difficulty in assessing the true position of the markers. It has not been possible to plot these on night photographs on account of smoke and fires.
REMARKS (i) Many crews reported having received instructions on R/T to delay H hour by 5 minutes, and giving a different wind. Fortunately, the attack was well under way and no-one was misled. This was at first attributed to attempts by the enemy to disrupt the attack, but was later found to be due to an 8 Group force operating on the same frequency. Action has been taken to prevent a recurrence.
(ii) Many crews reported a number of incendiaries jettisoned on track on the was back from the target. This shows gross thoughtlessness and lack of regard for other aircraft in the stream, particularly having regard to the low level return. This action is absolutely inexcusable, except in an emergency.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 17TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
A force of 50 aircraft was detailed to attack the sea wall of Westkapelle, with the intention of extending the existing breach southwards, and inundating German strong points.
PLAN Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s on a given point on the wall south of the existing breach, and crews were to aim their bombs at a position midway between the markers and the edge of the breach. Planned bombing height 5,000 to 6,000 feet. Each aircraft carried a load of 14 x 1,000 lb MC/GP bombs fused half or one hour delay. Two aircraft were detailed to find a bombing wind by means of flame floats and the A.P.I. attachment.
RESULTS Although many sticks straddled the target, most of the bombing appeared to overshoot the narrow strip of land, and fell into the flood water near the village of Westkapelle. One of the A.P.I. attachments was partially unserviceable, resulting in an incorrect bombing wind being used. This resulted in a slight overshoot, and no appreciable extension of the breach was made.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NUREMBURG – 19/20TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
A force of 270 aircraft took off to attack Nuremburg, a target which has escaped lightly in previous raids.
PLAN There were three areas to be attacked, two large and one small. A convenient marking point was selected, and the bombs were to cover the two large areas by means of the delayed release, while the smaller area was to be attacked direct, with a false wind vector set on the bombsight. Sectors were distributed between Bases and Squadrons in the normal way. The marking plan followed the normal sequence and provided for one additional alternative, i.e. Wanganui flares were to be dropped if cloud conditions rendered other methods Impracticable. There were therefore four alternative methods for bombing, the Master Bomber to decide upon the one to be used. Crews were ordered to bomb:-
(i) The red T.I. with delayed release as planned.
(ii) The green T.I. backed up by reds, without the delay.
(iii) The red T.I. direct (in the event of the greens dropped by blind markers being incorrect and the Mosquitoes being able to mark the centre of the town with red T.I’s).
(iv) The Wanganui flares.
RESULTS There was 8 – 10/10ths cloud over the target, but the Master Bomber decided that the red and green T.I’s would be visible through the cloud, and did not order Wanganui. The Mosquitoes were therefore ordered to back up with their red T.I’s, the greens dropped by the blind markers, and the main force ordered to bomb them direct. It was impossible to assess the markers accurately, and night photographs show no ground detail. Although there were reports of the glow of fires through the clouds, it is probable that the attack was scattered. Unfortunately, Nuremburg appears to have escaped once more.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – 23RD OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Three gun positions in the harbour at Flushing, not previously attacked by this Group, were the targets for 112 aircraft of 53 and 55 Bases.
PLAN Each aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 lb bombs, fused .025 secs, planned bombing height 6/7,000 feet, minimum 4,000 feet. Aircraft to identify targets and aim visually.
RESULTS Visibility in the target area was poor with 10/10ths cloud, base 4,000 – 5,000 feet, with rain. Most crews had to make several orbits before they could identify the targets and obtain a good run up. Many crews reported being practically over the top of their targets before being able to identify their aiming point. Although many sticks straddled the targets, many more are reported to have overshot. Photographs show at least 70 craters in the area of the gun positions.
[Underlined] BERGEN – 28/29th OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
With the loss of France, the Germans also lost their U-boat bases on the Atlantic coast, and since then, they are known to have been
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
operating from Norway. Reconnaissance showed that strenuous efforts were being made to complete U-boat pens at Bergen, and these were the target for 244 aircraft on October 28/29th.
PLAN Green T.I’s and flares were to be dropped in the target area, and by the aid of these the Mosquito markers were to mark the marking point with T.I. red. The Master Bomber was then to assess the accuracy of the markers, and to broadcast to the main force a false bombing vector to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Six aircraft of the Flare Force acted as wind-finders. In view of the small size of the target, all crews were warned against loose bombing, to avoid endangering the lives and property of the Norwegians, and were ordered on no account to bomb unless they had a steady run-up on to the red T.I’s.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud in layers from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet was encountered over the target, with haze and poor visibility below. Flares were dropped punctually in the target area, but markers found it difficult to locate the marking point. Eventually marker No.4 dropped his red T.I’s and assessed them as within 50 yards of the marking point. The Master Bomber called the force down to bomb from between 5,000 and 8,000 feet with the wind vector as planned, provided they could get a clear run. Only 45 aircraft attacked the red T.I’s. The remainder were unable to see them or were unable to make an accurate bombing run, and did not attack, according to briefed instructions.
The attack inflicted considerable damage on the pens.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- S/Ldr. Oakley and F/Lt. de Vigne.
[Underlined] Target [/underlined] – Four gun positions in the vicinity of Flushing and Westkapelle.
PLAN No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the exact aiming points with low bursting red T.I’s, the attacks to be controlled by a Master Bomber, also provided by No.54 Base. Six aircraft of No.55 Base were to find winds for each force. These were sent back to Group, and a bombing wind corrected for the bombsight, transmitted to both forces.
RESULTS {underlined] Flushing [/underlined] - Weather 7-10/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet.
[Underlined] Western Aiming Point [/underlined] – Bombing was carried out according to Master Bomber’s instructions. Believed that a fair concentration was achieved.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Crews had difficulty in identifying the target as it was almost entirely submerged, and markers extinguished as they fell. Those who attacked bombed visually aiming at the tops of the casements, which were above the water, with unobserved results.
[Underlined] Westkapelle [/underlined] – Weather 4/10ths – 7/10ths strato cu. Clear below.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking and bombing reported as accurate – No results observed.
[Underlined] Southern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking assessed as accurate, but the main force had difficulty in seeing the T.I’s, which were partly buried in the sand dunes. As a result, there was a tendency to overshoot.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] KEMBS BARRAGE – 7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
The Kembs Barrage, which lies 6 1/2 miles below Basle, governs the flow of the Rhine between the Swiss town and Strasbourg. Apart from its navigational importance to barge traffic between Strasbourg and the upper reaches of the river, the Barrage was a weapon in the hands of the enemy which they could have used to impede the operations of our land forces in the south eastern sector of France. The sudden release of a large volume of water from the barrage and the breaching of the river banks below it would result in the flooding of large areas. The Barrage is 180 metres wide, and consists of five bays, each of 30 m. span separated by piers 5 m. thick. Each bay is closed by metal sluices, operated electrically, on a principle similar to that of sash windows.
PLAN 7 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, fused T.D. 0.025 were to bomb from high level (8,000 feet or below cloud base, minimum 5,000 feet), and six aircraft with Tallboys fused 1/2 hour delay, from low level (500 to 800 feet, 500 feet minimum). The force was to be covered by three squadrons of Mustangs, one of which was detailed to deal with light gun positions near the target. The high force was to bomb first and the low force was timed to go in after the smoke from the high force bombs had cleared.
RESULTS Weather was clear at the target, with good visibility, and the attack was carried out as planned. The defences proved to be more formidable than had been shown on recent photographs, and intense light flak was experienced, mainly coming from the eastern bank of the river. Of the high force, several aircraft experienced bomb release trouble, and as a result there were several overshoots. Two bombs were dropped as much as 600 yards west owing to hang-ups. Of the low force bombs, one fell immediately beyond the barrage, and there were two overshoots of 40/50 yards. One bomb fell close to the westernmost sluice gate, and demolished it. Visual reconnaissance later the same day, reported that the water level 2 1/2 miles up stream from the target had fallen 11 feet 4 inches and that many barges were stranded. Later, photographs showed that the iron superstructure above the first and second pillars on the west side had been completely destroyed, together with the sluice gate.
[Underlined] THE SORPE DAM – 15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Railway communications between northern and central Germany and the Ruhr have become increasingly important to the enemy since the successful attack by 5 Group on the Dortmund Ems canal. These lines not only supply the Ruhr industrial area itself, but are also the life-lines to the enemy’s main front facing our forces advancing on the Ruhr. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would result in the flooding of a considerable area, including the Neheim-Schwerte railway, one of the three main lines serving the Ruhr from the east, and would thus add to the enemy’s communications and supply problems. It was therefore decided that the Dam should be attacked by 18 aircraft of No.9 Squadron, all carrying Tallboy bombs. No immediate results were expected, owing to the peculiar nature of the Dam’s construction, but it was hoped that direct hits from Tallboys would unbalance the retaining wall of the dam, resulting in gradual erosion, finally enabling the water to break through.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN 18 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, six fused 1/2 hour delay and 12 fused 11 seconds delay, were to attack the Dam from 14/15,000 feet. The attack was to be made at right angles to the face of the Dam, to obtain maximum penetration. Winds were to be found by six aircraft, using visual pinpoint and A.P.I. These were then to be averaged and a bombing wind transmitted by the force leader. Fighter cover was provided by seven squadrons of Mustangs. When 20 miles short of the target, the force was to divide into two formations, the first composed of the 12 aircraft carrying 11 second delay bombs and the second formation, of the 6 aircraft carrying the half hour delay bombs. Aircraft were to bomb in line astern, each aircraft to position itself 100 feet below and 200 yards astern of the aircraft in front. Bombs were to be aimed at the shore of the compensating lake below the dam face, and a false height setting applied to the bombsight, so that the bombs should strike a point 50 yards short of the crest of the dam. It was appreciated that the water level in the lake was somewhat low to be certain of success, but it was nevertheless considered that there was a reasonable chance of destroying the dam.
RESULTS 16 aircraft dropped their Tallboys. Two were unfortunate enough to be “jostled” during their run up, and were unable to bomb. The force flew over 10/10ths cloud to within a short distance of the target, but were lucky to find a clear gap over the target itself. Navigation winds had to be used, as visual pinpointing was impossible. Several direct hits were registered on the crest of the dam, one fair and square on the road running about 50 yards below the crest, and several on the dam face at its western extremity. In addition to these, several bombs slightly overshot the crest and fell in the water, and should have done their fair share of damage. There appears to have been a slight vector error, which resulted in the M.P.I. of the bombs (those visible on P.R.U. cover), being displaced some 200 yards 330 degrees from the aiming point. Although the dam was not breached, the enemy has been forced to lower the level of the dam to reduce the pressure on the water side. If the water had been a little higher the dam would undoubtedly have gone.
[Underlined] TIRPITZ – 29/30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Since the last attack on September 15th the Tirpitz had been moved from Alten Fiord, to an anchorage off the small island of Haak, 4 miles West of Tromso, and some 200 miles nearer to the British Isles than her previous berth.
Possibly this move was prompted by the Germans’ fear of the ship falling into the hands of the Russians, who were rapidly over-running the Petsamo area, or possibly because they wished to get her back by stages to a German base, where major repairs and a refit could be carried out.
It was decided that, by increasing the all-up weight for take-off, and with the addition of an extra fuel load, an attack from bases in the British Isles was practicable. To achieve this, Merlin 24 engines, giving + 18 boost for take off, were installed in all Nos. 617 and 9 Squadrons’ aircraft. This involved the changing of 120 engines, and was a magnificent feat carried out in a few days. One Wellington long range tank and one Mosquito drop tank were added, giving a total fuel load of 2406 gallons. The round trip totalled 2,252 track miles.
All aircraft carried Tallboy bombs. The take off presented no difficulties, and aircraft flew at 2,000 feet to within a short distance
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of the Norwegian coast, where a rapid climb was made to negotiate the high ground. A rendezvous point was chosen within a convenient distance of the target, and here both squadrons formed up, to attack the target in two separate forces, having made a rapid climb to bombing height. All went well as far as this point.
During the approach to the target, which lay along a fiord, all bomb-aimers obtained a good view of the battleship, which was lying in the briefed position. Unfortunately, at the crucial stage of the bombing run, cloud was encountered, caused doubtless by a wind coming in off the sea and striking the high ground surrounding the Tirpitz’s anchorage. The majority of crews were able to release their bombs, some after several runs, but four aircraft were unable to obtain a satisfactory run, and returned with their bombs.
There was without doubt, one very near miss, but up to the present there is no evidence, photographic or otherwise, to show that the battleship was hit.
Once again, these two squadrons were cheated of their prey, and this time by a trick of the weather which was wholly unexpected, and certainly undeserved.
With the exception of one 617 Squadron aircraft, which was hit over the target, and forced to land in Sweden, all aircraft returned safely with a reasonable safety margin of petrol, to advanced bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
All Group Gardeners returned to battle in excellent strength this month, and successfully planted 316 vegetables in 60 sorties, bringing our share to 39% of the Command total of 808.
The plantings were all made by H.2.S. and mostly confined to the Kattegat area, and continued the good work of dislocating the enemy’s shipping routes, by dropping over carefully chosen pinpoints and channel intersections through which the shipping is known to pass. Despite the long distances involved, with frequent icing conditions over target areas, and Bases often unfit for return, it is very satisfying to note that the high standard of efficiency and determination is being maintained by the Captains and their crews, and that the average load per aircraft has been kept to the maximum of six vegetables.
One of our largest operations for some months occurred on the 24th October, when twenty-five Gardeners set course to the Eastward and planted 149 vegetables. 10 loads were supplied by No.106 Squadron and 4, 4, 4, and 3 by Nos. 57, 630, 44 and 207 Squadrons respectively. The results of this lay were very promising, and as the crews sighted some twenty ships on this occasion within the vicinity, it is earnestly hoped that they did not all reach port safely.
To round off the month’s activities Nos.619 and 106 Squadrons had the honour to add to the ‘History of Mining’ by planting in a new and important Garden on the 28th October. It is early to anticipate results but as the enemy is bound to use this hitherto virgin piece of water, it will be interesting to see how he fares.
In the light of past experience, all Gardeners must now remain on their toes for the coming winter months are bound to offer excellent opportunities to strike hard at the enemy’s shipping organisation in every possible position, and to rapidly assist in his ultimate downfall.
A total summary of the value of this mode of warfare is unfortunately on the Top Secret list at this stage of the war, and is therefore unable to be disclosed. But when it is realised that the total sorties this year have already reached 14,457, as against 5,313 in 1943, some estimation can immediately be made on its degree of vital importance and effect. The area in which this offensive can be conducted has now diminished to a corner of Europe. But inside the limits of this area is contained an enemy who is feverishly pressing hard to retain his command of that sea, and so move his troops, stores, equipment and trade from Scandinavia to Germany. By the terms of the Russian-Finnish Armistice Germany has been denied the use of enormous tonnage in shipping. This means that their Merchant Fleet, Minesweepers and other craft already busily employed, will be forced to double their work to make good the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
requirements of a nation at war. Added to this distressing state of affairs, the enemy is now hurriedly building prefabricated U-Boats, and fitting them with every device possible in order to risk another strike at our forces. But each U-Boat is useless if she has not been ‘worked up’ by a highly trained crew for weeks, in a [underlined] safe [/underlined] area for practicing her ‘Torpedo Attacks’ and ‘Diving Trials’, or is unable to be completed at her building yard for the lack of some equipment that was to have arrived by sea transport and has been [underlined] sunk en route. [/underlined]
Whoever shall be so bold as to venture forth from this area for attack on our trade, will undoubtedly meet a hot reception from the Allied Navies and Coastal Command, but in the meantime let us delay, and if possible, prevent this, by the strong and penetrating effects of our Gardening effort.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Sorties Carried Out by Squadron]
[Underlined] GROUP VISITORS. [/underlined]
On the 2nd October, Rear Admiral J.H. Edelsten, C.B.E., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (U-Boats and Trade), paid a short visit to R.A.F. Station, Woodhall, to thank the Bombing and Gardening Squadrons for their excellent work and co-operation with the Royal Navy during the past months.
Rear Admiral Edelsten gave a short address stating the vital importance of this work, and strongly congratulated the Captains and crews who had taken part. He said that the results of the precision bombing had been most effective and successful towards the war effort as a whole, in assisting to force the U-Boats to retire to more distant bases, and that minelayers were performing a vitally important task in a thoroughly efficient and successful manner. Aerial mining is denying the safe passage of enemy shipping in their own waters, which for the time being were out of reach of His Majesty’s Ships.
Accompanying Rear Admiral Edelsten, were Rear Admiral E.D.B. McCarthy, D.S.O., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (Home Station), and Captain F.A. Slocum, O.B.E., Royal Navy, Deputy Director Operations Division (Intelligence).
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TEST. [/underlined]
One of the outstanding features in the Wireless Operators (Air) domain last month was the enthusiasm shown by squadrons in carrying out the W/T Controllers’ test. During the month 67 operators carried out the tests laid down in 5G. S.I. No.13, and out of that number 65 passed as suitable for W/T Link duties. It is hoped that this enthusiasm will continue, and all Wireless Operators (Air) will eventually pass this test of their ability in accurate tuning and operating of their W/T equipment under “target-area” conditions. The operators who passed the test during October were drawn from the squadrons shown in the following table:-
[Table of Numbers of W/Ops. (Air) Passing Test by Base and Squadron]
Now that the names of all W/T Link Wireless Operators are forwarded to Group Headquarters prior to each operation, it is possible to know exactly who are our first class men, and note how they perform in the crucial test of operating over the target area.
Next month it is hoped to publish the names of all Wireless Operators who have carried out Link duties during the month.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
During the month, this part of the Wireless Operators (Air) training was curtailed to some extent by daylight operations, but some good exercises were carried out. The introduction of an 18 and 20 w.p.m. test was well received, and still further changes in this training are impending. It is proposed that squadrons be divided
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
into four sections, and each section participate once per week. An alteration to the time of the exercise is also proposed.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS. [/underlined]
With the coming winter months, and the possible decrease in the number of operational and training flights, Signals Leaders must ensure that their training rooms are properly equipped and in good preparation for the extra ground training which will be necessary. All morse keys, headsets and equipment, should be checked over to ensure that full benefit can be derived from their use. Liaison between Signals Leaders and visits to neighbouring squadron training rooms should be encouraged.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES. [/underlined]
The curtailment in the use of early warning devices did leave the Wireless Operator (Air) with more time on his hands during an operational flight, and on many occasions the W/Op. did his watching from the astrodome when not required on the W/T equipment. It is hoped that in the near future these early warning devices will again become available, and with this in view training has continued at Conversion Units. Operators on the squadrons who may have let this training lapse should take steps to bring themselves up to the highest state of efficiency in manipulation and interpretation of these devices.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS. [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to four new Signals Leaders – F/O Cheshire, who has taken over Signals Leaders duties on 227 Squadron, F/O Chapman, 463 Squadron, F/O Tyler, 50 Squadron, and F/O Smith, 189 Squadron. We also take this opportunity of saying au revoir to F/Lt. Howarth, 50 Squadron and F/O Bulmer, 463 Squadron, who have now taken up other duties. We wish them every success in their new sphere.
[Underlined] SIGNALS’ WORKSHOPS. [/underlined]
The aim of all Base and Station Signals Officers must be to make their workshops into well laid out, comfortable, well lighted and warm laboratories. It is appreciated, that, with the type of accommodation available, this will not be an easy task, but it is certainly not an insurmountable one. Furthermore, this “pepping up” of workshops must take place before the full rigour of winter is upon us.
Every one must agree that mechanics will be far happier and therefore produce far more efficient work if their workshops are comfortable. In addition, workshops in which such delicate equipment as the T.R.5043 is being serviced, must be clean, tidy and warm, if the highest standard of serviceability is to be achieved.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
It is pleasing to record that throughout the past month not one operational sortie was cancelled, and only one aircraft returned early, as the result of a signals defect. The reason for this one early return is attributed to a flight engineer, who, in an attempt to repair a mid upper hydraulic leak, disconnected the intercom. wiring, allowing it to short circuit, thus rendering the whole intercommunication system unserviceable. Under classification ‘C’ (aircraft completing
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
mission) the failures were as follows:- W/T – 6; H/F. R/T – 9; V.H.F. R/T – 21; and intercom. – 9.
Of the V.H.F. defects, 50% were attributable to broken whip aerials. We are doing all in our power to overcome this breakage of aerials. The official view is that 20° backward rate could cure the trouble, but unfortunately to obtain this necessitates lowering part of the aerial beneath the aircraft skin, with the result that very severe interference is then caused to V.H.F. by the aircraft’s own H.2.S. equipment. We are endeavouring to obtain fighter type V.H.F. aerials – at least for the flare force and marking aircraft. Meanwhile, the application of de-icing paste and ensuring that the aerial is screwed right home, with no part of the aerial thread showing above the Rubber Lord mounting are the best palliatives. The necessity for units to report these defects in accordance with A.M.O. A.869/43 is again emphasised.
There were two servicing failures during the month. In both cases the T.R. 5043 receivers were off tune. Signals Officers must do all in their power to eliminate this criminal type of defect.
[Underlined] V.H.F. CHANGEOVER. [/underlined]
The month of October saw the quick and successful changeover from T.R.1143’s to T.R.5043’s in all operational aircraft of the Group. Apart from one dynamotor overheating and one selector mechanism being jammed, there have been no serious defects. This state of affairs is very promising. It is stressed, however, that G.P.O. keystops No.2 must be fitted on all controllers’ electric type 5003, and that when fitted there must be no “play” whatsoever in the T/R/REM switch – the tolerance of a few thousandths of an inch may result in the equipment going over to transmit. In this connection, all concerned are reminded that the type 170 switch in the transmitter H.T. lead is sealed in the “off” position prior to operational take-off.
Pilots are talking enthusiastically about the wonderfully clear, but sometimes too loud R/T now obtained. The audio pre-set control in the T.R.5043 should be set back to give comfortable volume, but it is appreciated that that will not cater for every taste. Rest assured, however, we are still trying hard to get a pilot’s manual volume control.
The efficiency of our new V.H.F. R/T equipment was well described recently by a main force flight commander who said how comforting it was when still miles away from the target to hear and recognise the calm voice of W/Cdr. Woodroffe talking to his markers and flare force, and to realise several minutes before the attack that the target had already been correctly located and marked.
[Underlined] SIGNALS HITS THE HEADLINES. [/underlined]
On the 1 o’clock news on Sunday, 29th October, the B.B.C. announced that the Tirpitz had been hit by a 12,000 lb bomb. This announcement was made approximately 3 hours before the aircraft which made the attack were due to return, and was based solely on two short W/T messages transmitted soon after the attack by a 9 Squadron aircraft, while that aircraft was still well over 1000 miles away from base.
These W/T messages were two of quite a number transmitted at ranges of up to and over 1000 miles, on this target.
This is an outstanding example of the ability of the present day Wireless Operator in long range daylight W/T communication. It is
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
all the more remarkable considering that the frequency in use was in the 8 mc/s band, and required spot on tuning to ensure any measure of success.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
There is a custom, now hoary with age, of prefixing ALL Bomber Code messages with the month and day of the code used in encyphering. This means that all Bomber Code messages are prefaced by a four-figure group, and the figures are NOT part of the encyphered text. This system has been explained slowly and laboriously to all users of the code, but for all that, a simple two group message, such as “2329 XY” was recently pronounced “unbreakable” by an officer who should have known better. Had the message been transmitted simply as “XY” he would have known it at once, and robbed himself of his present glory of the “Highly Derogatory Order of the Irremovable Digit”.
[Underlined] FLIGHT PLANNING. [/underlined]
The F.P.C. has now been in use for well over twelve months, and has proved to be a very reliable and efficient arrangement, which has contributed largely to the Group’s success. Despite its obvious efficiency, there are certain faults which cannot be eradicated without the complete isolation of all the circuits involved – a formidable task (involving 169 miles of cable for main circuits, and 185 miles for reserve circuits between Group and Bases alone), which cannot be contemplated. These faults mainly comprise overhearing teleprinter chatter and induced “ringing” tones, all of which are familiar to listeners.
There is another type of fault, which is not due to equipment, but which is traceable to users of the network. This can be stated briefly as a tendency to forget that the loudspeaker was designed to cater for an audience of two or three in a small room, and to speak too fast as though taking part in an ordinary telephone conversation. This speed, allied with the extraneous noises explained above, tends to mystify rather than enlighten the listener in a large room. Slower and more carefully enunciated speech, pitched somewhat higher than normal, but without shouting, will be found to produce more satisfactory results.
One last word. The conference is not secret for the reason, already given, that the conference circuits run in multi-pair G.P.O. cables, where mutual overhearing was always liable to occur. For this reason mention of the target by name, or of turning points with reference to altitude and longitude should always be avoided. Lest this warning should result in too obscure future plannings, it should be added that civilian conversations which are frequently overheard on conferences are amplified at this Headquarters, whereas civilians who overhear part of the conference do not receive an amplified version.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
Although operations completed by the Group during October were considerably fewer than in the preceding few months, there was no let up in the work being done by the Radar Sections.
With the opening of two stations at Fulbeck and Balderton, the transfer of the Base to Syerston and 49 Squadron to Fulbeck, there was plenty of work to be done. In addition to all this, two new squadrons have now been formed and moved to the new stations. The most critical problem arising out of the formation of these squadrons has
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1933 [sic].
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
been the furnishing of Radar Mechanics, and up to this date is still causing considerable inconvenience. In order to lighten the burden on those few already there, several mechanics were withdrawn from other Bases and posted to 56 Base. In the past few days, however, a number of mechanics have been posted into 56 Base from Radio Schools, and this should alleviate the situation somewhat. It is hoped that the remaining deficiency will gradually improve and will eventually be eliminated.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
The success of the trials and experiments on H.2S. [sic] Mark III is proceeding with a vengeance at Coningsby. To relieve the strain on those mechanics doing the valuable work, action has been taken to attach temporarily a number of H.2.S. II mechanics from 53 Base Stations.
In pursuance of this experiment, a new type of scanner was procured from T.R.E. Air Tests were made immediately, and results, to say the least, were encouraging. Arrangements have now been made to have several of these scanners produced, and the first should be available about the second week of November. In the meantime, further tests are being made with the existing scanners in an endeavour to raise their efficiency. Several different ideas have been investigated, the latest of which shows considerable promise.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK II. [/underlined]
The restrictions on the use of H.2.S. remained in force during October, and this was the prime reason for the decision to remove the equipment from 53 Base Squadrons. It was felt that the time being spent by personnel in servicing the equipment there would be more valuably spent if they were transferred to 54 and 56 Bases, where acute shortages in strength existed. Simultaneously it was decided to halt the fitting of H.2.S. in 227 Squadron, and to remove what had already been installed.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Right on the heels of the decision to withdraw H.2.S. from 53 Base, came the policy to equip 53 Base and some of the 54 Base Squadrons with Loran. This policy has since been altered to include all 5 Group Squadrons. Fitting is now going ahead, and it is hoped to see the whole Group equipped by the 1st December, and also to have a large number of radar and navigation personnel trained on the equipment. It is stressed, however, that the Bomber Command school cannot hope to train more than a nucleus of mechanics between now and December, and for this reason Radar Officers should ensure that the knowledge of those attending the course at Bomber Command is imparted to the remainder of their respective sections. To facilitate easier servicing of Loran, photostatic copies of circuit diagrams, which can be placed on the walls above benches will be made in the near future.
[Underlined] GEE MARK II. [/underlined]
Much to our regret, although it was forecast in September’s Summary, the supply position of Gee had gradually deteriorated, and even now there is no indication of it improving in the near future. Every possible effort is being made to obtain components which will enable sets, which at present cannot be used, to be made serviceable. This number has fortunately been greatly reduced during the last month. In view of this acute shortage of equipment, it becomes increasingly essential that all cases of component breakdowns are brought to the notice of Sigs.7 at Air Ministry, vide A.M.O. A.869/43. A reminder
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
is also given that if no reply has been received from Air Ministry within a month dating from the originating of the report, there is no need to hold the unit or component for investigation. Secondly, if operational requirements demand that the unit be used before the month has elapsed, a record to this effect should be kept.
[Underlined] GEE SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
As mentioned at the outset of the Summary of October’s activities, the number of sorties undertaken by 5 Group were fewer than for the preceding months. Gee was reported ‘bang on’ for 96.8% of the sorties, despite the most unsatisfactory supply position, and accordingly all due credit must be given to the radar mechanics who made this possible.
[Underlined] H.2.S. SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
For the very limited number of occasions on which H2S II was used an increased serviceability of .7% over September was obtained, to bring it up to 91.4%. The time is fast approaching when scanners will require careful attention with regard to lubrication and heating. Radar Officers should ensure that the modification has been completed in all aircraft, to eliminate the danger of freezing up, which gave us so much bother last winter. It is again stressed that A.M.O. A. 869/43 action is to be taken on all occasions when components break down.
H.2.S. III suffered a slight set-back in serviceability for October, and out of the 85 sorties completed, 10 developed difficulties, giving a percentage of 88.2 serviceable.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond maintained approximately the same degree of serviceability for September and October, being 90.7 and 90.8 per cent respectively.
[Underlined] SALVETE ET VALETE. [/underlined]
The 1st of November marked the loss to the Group of our old Radar I, S/Ldr. Tom Branson. He had been with the Group for over two years, and all will agree that it was to a large degree due to his guidance and whole-hearted support that Radar is playing such a successful part in the operations conducted by the Group. We wish him the greatest success in his new work, and at the same time, extend to S/Ldr. Perrin a most hearty welcome.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month has produced the unusual phenomena of heavy raids well into Germany with negligible losses from fighters. This has been due to the very short warning that the German defences now get of the approach of a raid, and a skilful combination of Window spoofs, the Mandrel screen and other countermeasures.
We have won the first round, but the Hun is bound to stage a come-back. With the lengthening nights and deeper penetrations his job will become easier. He has a highly developed Radar system, and it is now known that, in addition to the H.E.219, considerable numbers of the M.E.110 and J.U.88 are fitted with two upward firing 20 m.m. cannon.
[Cartoon] WHERE’S THAT FLAK COMING FROM?
I WOULDN’T KNOW – I’M ONLY THE REAR GUNNER
These fighters attempt to formate some distance below the bomber’s tail, and rake it. With the loss of early warning devices, the only answer to this form of attack is a regular banking search and an ability to see the fighter during the search. The first is useless without the second. Gunners must realise that to see a fighter underneath on a dark winter’s night is a very different proposition from d=seeing a fighter coming in level astern on a clear starlit night. The importance of efficient night vision and, therefore, night-vision training, cannot be over emphasised.
With regard to combat manoeuvres, the corkscrew is still the most effective provided the fighter is seen in time. On a dark night, however, crews must be prepared for sudden unseen attacks, to which the only answer is the diving turn. Captains must ensure that they have some form of emergency signal from their gunners and that they can act on it immediately. This does not mean violent mishandling of the controls. On pilot of this Group put up an ‘black’ this month by returning to base with a large number of rivets missing from the wings of his aircraft. He was lucky to get back at all. Two doses of such handling and even a Lancaster would have succumbed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER,1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TACTICS. [/underlined]
Two last points:-
(i) The Hun has started to use jet-propelled aircraft at night. They are very easily seen, and can only be considered a threat on bright nights. Gunners should remember, however, that due to the very high speed of these aircraft, combat manoeuvres should be started at increased range.
(ii) “Stepping Down” out of a target does not mean 20°of flap and everything closed. It is a series of dives at high speed with normal boost and revs, the idea being to get down quickly and also to leave the target quickly. Some figures for the guidance of crews are being produced for distribution.
[Cartoon] KEEP OFF THE GRASS
“Detailed – 15 Took off – 9:
E.R’s – Nil: Missing – Nil”
[Underlined] Cancelled – 6 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The night attacks on German targets undertaken by the Group were again planned to destroy sectors of towns and cities that had to a large extent, escaped major damage during previous attacks. However, incendiary plots show that quite a large proportion of the bomb loads did not fall on the section of the target area they were intended for. There were quite a number of early releases causing the “creep-back” it is so important to avoid, and aircraft not adhering to the briefed [underlined] TRACKS, [/underlined] scattered thousands of incendiaries on areas which had been burned out during previous raids. Cross-trail has been practically eliminated by the use of the wind conversion factors for various T.V’s, and additional time delay.
Now that the chances of a cloud-covered target are greater than during the summer months, the Air Bomber must be prepared for a sudden change of tactics a matter of minutes before the commencement of the bombing run. If he is not sure of the “Wanganui” procedure, and cannot make the necessary alterations to the bombsight in a short space of time, the opportunity for an accurate attack will be lost.
The Group has reached a very high standard of practice bombing and if German targets are attacked with this same degree of accuracy, every bomb will fall where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] THE LORD CAMROSE TROPHY. [/underlined]
The Air Officer Commanding visited R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, to present the Lord Camrose Trophy to No.50 Squadron who have won the competition for the second consecutive period of three months, with an average crew error of 148 yards at 20,000 feet, for all high level practice bombing during that period.
The A.O.C. congratulated the Squadron upon their success which had only been achieved by the close co-operation between all members of the bombing team and the high standard of bombsight serviceability provided by the Instrument Section.
The fact that practice bombing results provide an indication of a Squadron’s efficiency and accuracy on operations was also stressed.
In conclusion, No.50 Squadron were warned that other squadrons in the Group were making a great effort to defeat them during the next three months and it will need an even greater effort on their part to retain the trophy.
W/Cdr. Frogley, O.C., No.50 Squadron, thanked the A.O.C. and assured him that the Squadron were determined not the lose the trophy, despite increasing opposition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OCTOBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
The qualification for inclusion on this list is now 75 yards at 20,000 ft. instead of 80 yards.
SQDN. OR CON. UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
9 F/O Davis Sgt. Harrison Sgt. Ward 55 yards
F/O Tweddle P/O Singer P/O Shields 73 yards
44 F/O Lewis F/Sgt. King F/Sgt. Shearman 70 yards
49 F/Lt. Le Marquand Sgt. Boyce F/O Ransome 44 yards
F/O Rowley F/O Barlow P/O Deutscher 62 yards
50 F/Lt. Enoch F/Sgt. Hugh F/O George 73 yards
61 F/O Swales Sgt. Taylor F/O Saunders 56 yards
106 F/O Bowell F/Sgt. Plumb Sgt. Peterson 74 yards
207 F/O Dougal F/Sgt. Scowen Sgt. Stewart 70 yards
617 F/O Martin F/Sgt. Day P/O Jackson 58 & 58 yards
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly P/O McKie 62 yards
630 F/O Waterfall Sgt. Dixon Sgt. Kindler 68 yards
1654 C.U. F/Lt. Dagnon Sgt. Watson F/O Mayer 72 yards
F/Sgt. Eggins Sgt. Grady F/Sgt. Cahill 51 yards
F/O Gilmour F/O Burrington Sgt. Steadman 56 yards
No.617 Squadron report the following outstanding Mk.III Low Level exercise.
F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien
8 bombs – 400 feet – Average Error 9 yards.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
This month’s figures show a decrease in the number of bombs dropped within the Group, due to the limitations imposed by unfavourable weather conditions. The errors however, have decreased considerably and much of the credit must go to the navigators, the majority of whom now realise that the prime factor in an exercise is the obtaining of an accurate wind velocity.
The outstanding result of the month is that achieved by No. 61 Squadron. After a temporary fall from grace last month, they have, during October, dropped 522 bombs for an average crew error of 131 yards. An excellent start in the first round of the Lord Camrose Trophy competition.
Nos.9 and 50 Squadrons can also be congratulated on obtaining crew errors of 135 yards and 138 yards respectively.
The Conversion Units appear in this Summary for the last time, but it is hoped that we shall be able to publish their figures as a matter of interest to the Squadrons who will eventually receive crews trained in No.75 Base.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The following article has been contributed by S/Ldr. Wonham, D.F.M., Bombing Leader, 55 Base, and outlines a practical method of obtaining maximum benefit from the limited opportunities for practice bombing available during the winter months.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING. [/underlined]
With the coming of the winter weather, practice bombing on operational squadrons will be more and more difficult to organise, and the somewhat haphazard method of laying on the maximum number of exercises which has served during the summer months is going to prove very inadequate now that early take-offs and low cloud will limit the opportunities for high level practice bombing. It is felt that a definite system should be aimed at by Flight and Squadron Commanders.
The advantage of a regular and systematic method had amply proved itself in all manner of training from the creating of a rugby team to the organisation of the crew of a battleship. On first thought it would appear that the many difficulties entailed by practice bombing training in a squadron make it impossible to use one system, but a method is necessary, and if squadrons try to adhere to a form of training on the lines of that suggested, it would be found that in a few months errors would be reduced to an even lower level than at present believed possible with the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
Firstly let us consider as average squadron with 30 crews as a permanent strength, and an intake of about 10 crews per month. On the first of any given month the categories of the crews will probably be:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 5
CAT. B 18
CAT. C 6
CAT. D 1
The 10 new arrivals would have a bombing standard on Stirlings of:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 2
CAT. B 6
CAT. C 1
CAT. D1
In actual fact when bombing from Lancaster aircraft at first, these categories fall considerably, and it is usual that a crew on its first exercise on the squadron gets an error of about 240 yards. Experience has shown that on an average, with careful analysis and instruction, this error improves to 200x on the second exercise, and 160x on the third. Consider, therefore, the average new crew as in Cat. C on arrival and a potential B after the first three exercises.
In the same way we may consider the Squadron Crews (as apart from the new arrivals) who are Category C., as potential A’s and B’s after 2 exercises, and the Category D crews as potential B’s after 3 exercises.
The target, therefore, for a Squadron Commander should be to give during the month:-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
10 New Crews 3 exercises each – 30
6 Cat. C. Crews 2 exercises each – 12
1 Cat.D. Crew 3 exercises – 3
[Underlined] TOTAL – 45 [/underlined]
This appears to be quite a large programme to complete during a winter month, and as the Category A and B crews already on the squadron also need some bombing practice, the total number of exercises completed by the squadron would be in the region of 60 to 70.
If this is to be accomplished it means taking advantage of every opportunity provided by the weather and operational needs. Base Bombing Leaders must endeavour to avoid over-crowding on the range at their disposal, and crews can assist by being on the range at the times detailed.
[Underlined] DO YOU KNOW YOUR SWITCH DRILL? [/underlined]
An aircraft returned from an abortive sortie with a full bomb-load of H.E., and it was decided that a few of the bombs would have to be jettisoned in order to get down to the safe all-up weight for landing. On reaching the jettison area, the Air Bomber put the fusing switches to “SAFE”, turned the drum-switch to “SINGLE AND SALVO”, selected the appropriate bomb stations, then pushed the jettison bars over.
[Underlined] ITEMS OF INTEREST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1661 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Price) [/underlined] now have an excellent ‘mock-up’ of the Lancaster bombing panel including the camera. Several unusual and effective ideas are incorporated and thanks are due to F/Lt. Buckley, Station Electrical Officer, for providing this excellent aid to instruction.
[Underlined] 1654 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Kennedy) [/underlined] report that No.95 Course completed 30 High Level practice bombing exercises with an average crew error 138 yards at 20,000 feet. This is an excellent result and as nine of the Captains are Australians, Waddington should produce some A+ category crews very shortly.
F/O Mason (Pilot) and F/O Barker (Air Bomber) completed a very good exercise despite the absence of wind finding aids. Their aircraft had no A.P.I. and Gee was found to be u/s, so a three-drift wind of 286 degrees 24 m.p.h. was found, and six bombs were dropped using this wind. The resulting errors were:-
Crew 111 yards
Vector 85 yards
Basic 82 yards at 20,000 feet.
Another three-drift wind, 280 degrees 30 m.p.h. was found, and a further six bombs were dropped with even better results.
Crew error 61 yards
Vector error 42 yards
Basic error 46 yards
Both winds were checked by the 90° method and the results of the exercise are a tribute to the accuracy of both the Pilot and the Air Bomber.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1660 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Wake) [/underlined] report an example of perseverance on the part of F/O Howard and crew who were detailed to drop 12 practice bombs in indifferent weather conditions. The exercise took four hours to complete and two ‘A’ category results were obtained.
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Linnett) [/underlined] issue all Air Bombers with a height correction card to allow for the difference between the T.V. of the practice bomb, and the minimum it is possible to set on the bombsight. This has helped to bring the average crew error down from 238 yards to 160 yards.
[Underlined] East Kirkby (F/Lt. Hanniball & F/Lt. Foulkes) [/underlined] are endeavouring to equip a Station Training Room where Air Bombers will have all the available training equipment concentrated in one place.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 207 53 yards
2nd 83 54 yards
3rd 630 63 yards
4th 57 65 yards
5th 97 69 yards
6th 44 72 yards
7th 9 73 yards
8th 49 79 yards
9th 463 88 yards
10th 61 92 yards
11th 619 93 yards
12th 106 98 yards
13th 50 103 yards
14th 467 118 yards
No. 227 Squadron completed 5 exercises with an average error of 162 yards.
No.207 Squadron are the winners of the Inter-Squadron Competition with an exceptionally good average for eight exercises, only just beating 83 Squadron. The results obtained by both these Squadrons are highly commendable.
No.55 Base have staged a revival during the past few months and four of their squadrons are included in the first six, a careful study of these pages will provide a few of the reasons for their success.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1660 C.U. 60 yards
2nd 1654 C.U. 65 yards
3rd 1661 C.U. 75 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 145 yards
No.1660 Conversion Unit have done well during the month, and competition between the three Conversion Units remains very keen, but No.5 L.F.S. cannot do enough bombing to compete with them and consequently are once again at the bottom of the list.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The only entry for this month comes from 55 Base:-
G/Capt. Harris (Spilsby) – 136 yards.
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Campbell (9 Sqdn) – 92 yards.
F/Lt. Foulkes (630 Sqdn) – 120 yards.
There should be more than two entries for the Leader’s competition, and a 100% entry is expected for November.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
ӿ Excluding Nos.617 and 627 Squadrons.
X Plus 14 not categorised.
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
The number of A+ category crews is a record for the Group. All crews in this category demonstrate their ability to maintain a consistently high standard of bombing and it should be given the widest publicity within the squadron.
The crew bombing category is not applied to an individual, but to the combination of Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber and it should be every Captain’s duty to discover [underlined] WHY [/underlined] his team is in C or D category.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Price (1661 C.U.) [/underlined] has returned to operational duties as Bombing Leader with No.50 Squadron, and has been replaced at Winthorpe by F/Lt. Falgate (50 Sqdn.).
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (49 Sqdn.) [/underlined] is Bombing Leader with No.227 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Lewis (92 Group) [/underlined] has been appointed Bombing Leader at No.189 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Woods (617 Sqdn.) [/underlined has completed his tour and been replaced by F/O Rumgay.
[underlined] F/Lt. Gibson (A.C.S.) [/underlined] returns to No.49 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
No.617 Squadron also dropped 209 T.I’s with an average error of 58 yards.
No.627 Squadron dropped 308 bombs and 280 T.I’s with average errors of 60 yards and 151 yards respectively.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS OF COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Manos 50 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Palmer 57 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Krinke 619 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Woollam 44 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Goodwin 467 Sqdn ‘D’
F/O ALEY, 1654 Conversion Unit, obtained 1st place and an ‘A’ category on No. 94 Course.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
The following are the figures from the Bombing Ranges for the month of October, 1944.
[Table of Bombs and T.I’s Dropped by Range]
[Underlined] TOTAL 7626 [/underlined]
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Less than half the attacks this month have been on Germany, the majority being on short range targets at the battlefront. An interesting operation was carried out on Bergen at the end of the month, which gave some navigators their first experience of navigation on the Northern Gee Chain, undisturbed by the enemy’s defences jamming. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons attacked the “Tirpitz” again in Northern Waters, making a round flight of 2400 miles. (This operation will be dealt with in another paragraph).
The standard of navigation achieved throughout the month has been good – BUT NOT EXCEPTIONAL. It has been said that one must either progress or retrogress, but never stand still. At the moment the Navigation Union of this Group is standing still, inasmuch that our standard is not improving. We have reached a standard of concentration which is good but not yet good enough. It must be our aim to improve this standard to guarantee a concentration, at any time, covering an area of not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width – and we are a long way from this as yet.
Take the raid on Nuremburg, 19/20th October, 1944, as an example. The concentration plot for this raid one hour after bombing showed that the spread, in length, was 100 miles, and in width, 42 miles. No less than 43 aircraft were out of the “tram lines”, and this only 80 minutes after bombing! What are the causes of such a spread? The following are suggested:-
(i) [Underlined] Track Keeping. [/underlined]
(a) Navigators do not find an accurate w/v at the target on which they can set course on the return journey.
(b) Navigators do not obtain D.R. check positions, by use of A.P.I. and target w/v, every 10 or 15 minutes on the return journey when out of Gee range.
(c) In consequence of (b) G/S and E.T.A. checks are not obtained regularly when out of Gee range, consequently turning points are under and over-shot.
(ii) [Underlined] Timing. [/underlined]
(a) Corner are cut to make up or gain a little time.
(b) Captains [underlined] do not [/underlined] fly at the agreed speeds and [underlined] do not [/underlined] take any notice of navigators’ warnings of being early at turning points.
(c) Navigators “sit back” and do not inform the pilot that they are running ahead of time. (It has been noted that very few aircraft are behind concentration times on the return journey).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Of all the above suggested cases, it is known (ii) (b) is the most important and is the chief cause of the spread. Pilots are entirely at fault here, but navigation is primarily YOUR responsibility, so make sure that YOUR pilot sees this paragraph. If he doesn’t believe it, tell him to go and see your Station Navigation Officer and he will put him right. Also see that your pilot is shown every concentration diagram sent from Group, or better still, show it to him yourself. Get him navigation conscious, he is the captain of the aircraft and as such must realise his responsibilities.
Station Navigation Officers have already discussed this matter and have given their suggestions for combatting these failings. These are being attended to but meantime it is requested that all Station Navigation Officers, working in conjunction with Analysis Officers, give this problem their undivided attention. Discussions, with not only navigators but also pilots, should be arranged frequently until we have achieved our aim.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT. [/underlined]
We still have only five of these attachments in the Group – all there are in the Command! No.9 Squadron have two of these and have put them to good use on operation and training flights. In some instances they have obtained amazingly low vector errors. It is doubtful whether the large vector errors, which have been occasionally obtained, are attributable to the crews concerned, because it is known that one of the instruments does not always function correctly.
The remaining three attachments are installed in Mosquito aircraft of No.627 Squadron for trial purposes. To date 24 exercises have been completed and the results fully justify our demand for a large supply of these instruments. Approximately 100 w/v’s were obtained on these trials and were compared with smoke puffs and Balloon Sonde winds. This comparison showed that an A.P.I. attachment w/v had an average vector error of only 2.64 m.p.h. These results are excellent, and there is no reason why they cannot be repeated on operations. As soon as we have more of these instruments available, and are able to equip the Mosquito Squadron completely, we shall have solved our target windfinding problems. Everything is being done to obtain these extra attachments.
It is interesting to compare the above results with those achieved by (i) Lancasters fitted with A.P.I. attachment, (ii) Lancaster fitted only with A.P.I. To date 25 practice and operational flights have been undertaken by Lancaster attachment aircraft and their average vector error, computed as for Mosquitoes, was 1.75 m.p.h. The average practice bombing vector error for main force squadrons, using only the A.P.I. was 4.75 m.p.h. for the month of September, and 4.3 m.p.h. for the month of October.
The difference between the Mosquito and Lancaster attachment errors is probably explained by the fact that in a Lancaster aircraft the job is done by two men as against the Mosquito’s one, also the Lancaster navigator can work in comfort, bright light and in a spacious compartment. All these lead to greater accuracy in work.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
All analysis officers are now installed and have settled down to their arduous task. Already they are achieving some good results. There has been a noticeable improvement in the general standard of wind finding, log and chart work and computations. An improvement on the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
general standard so soon after appointing these officers was unexpected and augers well for the future.
The number of ‘A’ and ‘A+’ Navigators in the Group has increased from 101 in September to 142 in October; and the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Navigators has decreased from 61 in September to 33 in October. This is good, but the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Category Navigators is still far too high. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must do everything in their power to reduce this figure of 33 to nil.
The standard of navigation set by this Headquarters in the Categorisation Test, which is the basis of all analyses, is high. Analysis Officers must maintain this standard and must be strict in their marking. Only by adopting this attitude will you ensure that your analyses reflect a true picture of the general standard of navigation in your particular squadron. The predominating weaknesses of each navigator, so obvious from the analysis of his log and chart, must be passed on to the Station Navigation Officer immediately and definitely within 36 hours of completing an operation. He will do the rest. The information must be passed [underlined] quickly [/underlined] however, to ensure that the navigator in question can have his faults pointed out to him before he operates again.
One final word to Analysis Officers. You have much work to do which will keep you well occupied, but even so you should make a special point of liaising with your opposite numbers in other squadrons, preferably in another Base. Much can be learnt from the liaison visit, and you are bound to pick up one or two ideas better than your own.
[Underlined] SECOND ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ”. [/underlined]
The battleship “Tirpitz” was attacked a second time by aircraft of No.9 and 617 Squadrons. Navigators of the two squadrons were therefore given another chance to show their skill – and once again they came up to expectations.
The operation was carried out as a “night gaggle”, all aircraft burning lights until within 50 miles of enemy territory. Weather was poor over the first part of the trip, which was carried out at a height of 1,000 feet. This low altitude combined with the very heavy static in the cloud, restricted the Gee range to 62N 01E in most cases, although some fixes were obtained as far as 63N. After Gee coverage, cloud made the use of Astro very difficult, and the remainder of the route over the sea was mainly on DR. Due to a change of wind landfall was made some 15 miles south of track, but the moonlight made it possible to pinpoint very accurately, and no further navigational troubles were experienced from then until the target was reached.
The return trip was uneventful, accurate navigation was made almost impossible because of the lack of aids. From the target aircraft had to fly for a total of 3 1/2 hours on D.R. Navigation before they came into Gee range once again. Loop homing facilities were made available and good use was made of them. Gee re-appeared at approximately 62° north, and from then on it was all plain sailing.
The average duration of this trip was 13 hours, and the navigators have every reason to feel satisfied with their contribution to this operation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1844.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
It has been decided that the names of the eight navigators who submit the best work for the month shall appear in this Summary. The following navigators have been picked out for their consistent accurate and methodical work. This includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks, and checking of E.T.A’s, and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Ward – 467 Squadron.
F/O. Markham – 463 Squadron.
Sgt. Berry – 106 Squadron.
Sgt. Burns – 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Lengston – 630 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Latus – 619 Squadron.
F/O. Bailey – 49 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Searle – 227 Squadron.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TRAINING IN THE CONVERSION UNITS. [/underlined]
This month has seen little change in the training programme, with the exception that still greater stress has been laid on the importance of timing. Its importance is being stressed at every “verse end”; no doubt squadrons will appreciate this when the present lot of trainees are posted to them.
Every effort has been made to get crews up to standard in their Radar training. This has been most difficult because of the weather and a sudden “torrent” of aircraft unserviceability. However, crews are receiving plenty of valuable ground training and manipulation exercises on the trainers. It is hoped that this extra ground training will partially compensate the loss of a little air training.
The Conversion Units are carrying out experiments on practice bombing wind finding, using Gee co-ordinated as a datum point. The vector errors will be compared with those obtained using a visual datum point and a Mk.XIV Sighting Head. If these experiments prove successful, then, with the introduction of the new Continental Gee chains, it may be possible to use such a method on operations when cloud prevents the using of a visual datum point. The results are eagerly awaited.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all squadrons and conversion units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 4.3 m.p.h.
Average error of Conversion Units – 5.5 m.p.h.
These figures show an improvement for the squadrons of .4 m.p.h., but
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
a deterioration for the conversion units of .5 m.p.h. The over-all average is still below 5 m.p.h., let us now go all out for reducing it below the 4 m.p.h. mark.
[Ranked Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadrons and Conversion Units]
For the fifth month in succession Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons hold the first two places. There is no doubt that this excellent performance on the part of these two squadrons is due entirely to their hard work and great keenness. There is a noticeable improvement in the errors obtained by the three squadrons of No.54 Base. This is good, but we are confident that they can do much better. We hope to see them at the top of the list next month.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Williams, DFC, DFM – No.463 Squadron Navigation Leader – posted to No.1661 Con. Unit as Navigation Leader.
S/Ldr. Walker, DFC & Bar – Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall repatriated to Canada.
S/Ldr. Crowe, DFC – Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/Lt. Martin – No.630 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Hewitt – No.630 Squadron, to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Ayles, DFC, DFM – Navigation Leader, Aircrew School, to be Station Navigation Officer, Balderton.
F/O. Swinyard, DFC – Aircrew School, to be Navigation Leader.
F/Lt. Kilbey, DFM – No.1660 Con. Unit Navigation Leader, to be Squadron Navigation Officer, No.227 Squadron.
F/Lt. Ingram, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be Navigation Leader.
F/O. Booth, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be No.189 Squadron Navigation Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Once again much greater use has been made of this efficient little aid than of its bigger brother H.2.S.
Ranges on the primary Gee chains have been much similar to those experienced during September, but areas of intensive jamming noted in Northern Holland, along the Frisians and in the Ruhr and Frankfurt areas.
Opportunity has again been afforded for operators to use the north-eastern and northern chains. Both chains gave excellent cover, with the northern chain giving target fixes. The only “moan” being that the chart coverage of the north-eastern chain is insufficient, leaving a blank area at its northern limits before the northern chain comes in.
After much trouble with the siting of Stations, preparation of lattice charts and their distribution, the Ruhr and Rheims chains have at last come into being. So far the Rheims chain has proved quite satisfactory with little or no interference. However teething troubles are still being experienced with the Ruhr chain, mainly due to the fact that two of the stations are light mobiles. When these have been changed far better reception and coverage should be obtained, and charts are to be produced covering the North Sea, and Straits of Dover, thus cutting out the changeover of the R.F. Units over the Continent. Until this is done the eastern chain transmission on the R.F.27 is to continue.
Although little or no jamming has yet been experienced on the two new chains, it does not mean to say that the Hun will not devote his time to them. Operators are therefore reminded that much time can usefully be spent reading through jamming on the trainer. You may need this experience some day.
With the positioning of Gee stations nearer and nearer the Reich and probably on Reich territory, the possibility of Gee bombing again comes to the forefront. Every opportunity must therefore be made of practicing your Gee bombing. Homing to your airfield control tower is quite satisfactory, why not do it after every flight? (Don’t forget to keep above circuit height however).
A word about Gee homing with the advent of winter and possibilities of low cloud or drissle [sic] on return. The facilities afforded by Gee in order to reach your airfield are too numerous to outline here. You have your homing lattice lines and instructions regarding losing height. These have been provided for your safety – use them intelligently and avoid the repetition of many unfortunate accidents which occurred last winter.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Yet another navigational aid has made its debut this month in the form of Loran (Long Range Navigation). Whilst not so simple to operate as its older brother Gee it has one distinct advantage – its range. As Loran does not afford adequate homing facilities it has been fitted to aircraft in addition to and not in place of Gee, giving the navigator one more “baby” to care for. Let us see that we bring it through the teething stages without much trouble and use it as intelligently as Gee has been used in the past.
To help to counteract the teething trouble it might be as well to enumerate here the main difficulties which will be experienced with Loran by most operators during training.
(i) Difficulty in identifying the pulses, particularly the sky waves.
Ground waves are steady in amplitude.
Sky waves frequently vary in amplitude and are constantly changing their general shape. This is known as SPLITTING and usually the trailing or right edge only is affected. This is not particularly serious in the taking of readings.
(ii) DANGEROUS SPLITTING of the sky waves, causing the leading or left edge of the pulses to collapse and appear ragged. This does not persist for more than two or three minutes and operators should therefore wait until the normal pulse shape reappears before attempting to take any readings.
(iii) Interference from outside sources. Navigators are warned that Loran may be affected by many wireless transmissions, but patience must be exercised when this occurs. Wait until the interferences stop before attempting to take a reading. This interference is in no way to be confused with jamming, which is hardly likely to occur at the present time.
(iv) Blinking of the pulses, i.e. signals moving from side to side at regular intervals of about 1 second. This denoted the slave station is experiencing trouble in receiving the Master Station’s transmissions. Readings are not to be taken when blinking is on.
Training in Loran is to be undertaken by operational navigators trained by B.D.U. These instructors will be withdrawn from squadrons, trained at B.D.U. and returned on completion of the course. Each squadron should have at least one per flight in the very near future.
With the present operational commitments it is hardly possible that much time will be allowed for air training and the majority of training will have to be carried out on the ground.
Unfortunately air training over this country does not allow operators much chance to use the S.S. Loran chain and training flights over the Continent have therefore been organised. It is hardly likely that time will allow many of these flights to be made. Many navigators may therefore have to train whilst on operational sorties. With the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
difficulties that are experienced with Loran, this method of training may not appear too satisfactory, but every navigator can, by devoting a proportion of his time in the operation of Loran on each sortie, attain a good standard of efficiency.
Air Bombers too are to acquaint themselves with this new aid and give as much help to the navigators as they possibly can.
Very little is known about the reception of Loran over the Continent, and we are relying on every individual operator using this equipment to bring back as much information as possible. From this information better facilities may be provided in the future. It is up to each and every one of you to see that this duty is carried out.
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
Very little can be said of the performance of H2S Mark II on operations during the month due to the severe restrictions which have been placed upon its use.
However several gardening sorties have been undertaken with the use of H2S Mark II and results have shown no decrease in the efficiency of its operators.
It must necessarily follow that under present restrictions, the training of operators will take much longer than before. In addition, little opportunity is given to operators to study the appearance of European territory on the P.P.I.
To make up for this time lost, it is all the more necessary for even greater use to be made of flying time over this country and of synthetic training.
No N.F.T. or bombing exercises should be carried out without using the equipment either for practice blind bombing or navigational purposes. Every minute spent over this country making yourself familiar with the equipment may mean the saving of valuable time over the Continent, particularly if you have the full manipulation drill at your finger tips.
It has been noted that since the restrictions have been placed on the use of H2S Mark II, considerable lack of faith in the equipment has been expressed by many operators. This it is believed has been due to the various tales which have invariably spread amongst aircrew.
To counteract this lack of faith a report has been issued to all squadrons detailing the reasons for the restrictions and if operators spend a little time in reading the report it will do a lot to dispel these rumours. In addition they will feel more determined to obtain the maximum out of H2S on the various occasions it can be used.
The performance of H2S Mark II has been of its usual high order, 83 and 97 Squadrons again having carried out several successful attacks during the month.
Experiments have been going ahead to design a perfect scanner to eliminate the serious gap which has been occurring in the picture at 6 miles. This has been achieved and with equipment fitted with the new scanner it should be possible to bomb direct on the response with greater accuracy and less difficulty than with the present indicator. Good work 54 Base!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
P.P.I. Photography has been carried out on all operations during the month and several good photographs have been obtained by Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons. Whilst the present camera leaves much to be desired, operators must remember that it is the only check on the target area if cloud conditions prevail; every effort must be made therefore to obtain successful photographs.
If the photograph is not taken at bomb release, enter on your Interrogation form the number of seconds it was taken before or after release and you will be plotted correctly.
The excuse that both set operator and plotter are busy when in the target areas cannot be accepted. This is an operational photograph and it must be taken.
Experiments are being made by this Headquarters and at Headquarters, Bomber Command, to simplify the manipulation of the present camera and also to improve the quality of photographs obtained. It is realised that if sufficiently good photographs can be obtained, navigational and target approach strip maps can be produced for the benefit of all concerned. It is therefore up to every individual operator to see that these photographs are forthcoming.
106 Squadron are progressing favourably in the training of crews for the P.F.F. Squadrons. It is realised that H2S Mark II, whilst it gives a good idea of the basic principles of H2S, does not provide the facilities of the 184 Indicator and Mark III H2S. Despite this, every effort is being made by 106 Squadron to see that crews are fully aware of the basic principles of all H2S equipment before they arrive at 83 and 97 Squadrons, leaving only the finer points and intensive blind bombing training to be carried out by those squadrons.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] 51 BASE’S LAST MONTH. [/underlined]
This month was the last in which 51 Base was part and parcel of No.5 Group. On the 3rd November the three Heavy Conversion Units became No.75 Base under the administration of the newly formed No. 7 Heavy Conversion Unit Group. No.75 Base will, however, retain a direct affiliation with No.5 Group, and except in special circumstances will provide crews for No. 5 L.F.S. and No.5 Group Squadrons in the usual way. No.5 L.F.S. will remain within No.5 Group until Heavy Conversion Units are re-armed with Lancasters instead of Stirlings.
During their period in No.5 Group, 51 Base has produced 2,000 crews for Squadrons and has used Manchester-Lancaster, Halifax-Lancaster and Stirling-Lancaster combinations for four-engined conversion. The training organisation not only covered all the basic features of operational training but also embraced latest instruction in the rapidly developing Radar devices. Despite its many problems caused by using such a variety of aircraft types, the Base met all its Squadron commitments and, this last summer during the months July – September, produced 70 crews in excess of Bomber Command’s estimate. The formation of the two new Squadrons, Nos. 189 and 227, therefore presented no crew difficulties. The accident rate during this peak period of training also continued to improve steadily.
The pinch of the approaching winter was reflected in the hours flown during October and the Base logged just over 7,000 hours compared with 8,000 hours the previous month. The average hours per crew, however, were according to the syllabi and a total of 133 crews were posted from No.5 L.F.S. to Squadrons – one in excess of the estimate for the month. No.5 L.F.S. from now on is training on the winter rate, and investments have been made to produce 115 crews in November and 100 crews in December.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING. [/underlined]
Squadrons completed 4,500 hours day operational training and 1,500 hours night operational training during the month – 1,000 hours more than in September. The organisation for training new crews and for 10/20 sortie checks has been summarised in the Headquarters Air Staff Instructional Training/24 dated 26th October. This instruction includes a revised syllabus for initial crew training and a list of the duties and responsibilities of the Squadron Training Instructors. The last of the Squadron Training Instructors took up their duties during the month and particular attention to the details contained in the Instruction is essential to ensure the smooth operation of the squadron training scheme.
Of 133 new crews posted to squadrons, 113 completed initial crew training and were passed fit to operate. The average flying time for initial training by new crews in main force squadrons was 16 hours, which excludes No.49 Squadron on A.G.L.T. training. The syllabus in Air Staff Instruction Trg/24, Appendix ‘A’ lays down 11 hours 15 minutes,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
and every effort is to be made to keep close to this figure unless individual crews reveal deficiencies which require more flying. All Bases reported that the standard of crews from 5 L.F.S. was satisfactory.
The 10/20 sortie checks are not being regularly carried out. During recent weeks a total of 76 outstanding checks have been accumulated. A total of 32 were completed during the month – 30% - a sorry figure. 53 Base has 27 checks outstanding, 55 Base 38, and 56 Base 10. This aspect of squadron training requires immediate attention and Squadron and Flight Commanders are to assist the squadron instructors in clearing the 76 checks without delay. [Underlined] These checks are COMPULSORY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
No. 1690 B.D.T. Flight exercised 2116 gunners during 929 details. The Flight did 785 hours flying which included day and night affiliation, A.G.L.T. training and a small amount of drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. Pilots average 33 hours flying, the Hurricanes 38 hours, Spitfires 27 hours, and the Martinets 14 hours. These figures were slightly less than last month, but taking into account the weather, the Flight operated more intensively during fit periods.
October 17th was a record day for the Flight. It carried out affiliations with 103 crews including 17 night details, thereby exercising 240 gunners in 24 hours. Night affiliation again showed an increase for the third successive month and a total of 94 details, in which 200 gunners were exercised, was carried out. In addition to this squadron crews had other sources for night affiliation.
The opportunity still exists for more and more night affiliation as nights grow darker and longer as the Group is nowhere near the ideal of giving all crews two affiliation exercises in a month. The Flight also assisted 51 Base by providing 10 night details.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
There was another increase in Squadron times this month by pilots (49 hours) and Flight Engineers (150 hours). This is largely due to the good work put in by 54 and 55 Bases in increasing their total hours to 316 and 377 hours respectively.
56 Base has not been able to get off the mark properly owing to the shortage of Link trainers. However, congratulations are due to 49 Squadron whose pilots reached the 50/60 mark set in last month’s summary.
53 Base with a total of only 240 hours will have to put in some time this month to catch up with the leaders. Their pilots’ times in particular are very low at 61 hours.
All pilots should now have had some experience of the Artificial Horizon toppling device. This should help to improve their appreciation of the turn and bank indicator.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Training by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots…1367 hours. Flight Engineers…1127
[Drawing] SWINDERBY, WIGSLEY & WINTHORPE LTD
FINISHED CREWS A SPECIALITY 51
SUCCESSFUL TOURS GUARANTEED
UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT
Good Luck and Many Thanks!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. OCTOBER, 1944.
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second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “WINTER’S TALE”. [/underlined]
The best place for “Second Thoughts” is in the Flight Office before you go near your aircraft. It is not much good having them when you are bogged off the perimeter track in a foot of Lincolnshire mud with six other aircraft from your own Flight queuing up behind – five minutes to go to “last time of take-off” on a raw winter night and the tractor has broken down. It is warmer by the Flight Officer fire anyway, and you have three good books to read – 5 Group Aircraft Drills, 5 Group Air Staff Instructions and Pilots and Flight Engineers Notes, (that little blue book which looks brand new because it has been in the cupboard for the last six months).
You’ve never some winter operations before; but thousands have and there is nothing new to learn. It is a matter of remembering what you’ve been told. Check your personal clothing (you get cold in the feet and finger tips first so pay plenty of attention to your boots and your gloves). See that your crew are kitted according to scale, especially the Rear Gunner, and see that your oxygen masks and helmets are tested on the rigs in the cloakroom before you go to dispersal.
[Underlined] “BEFORE YOU LEAP”. [/underlined]
That hour before take off which you spend with your aircraft in dispersal is not a dreary one because you have got plenty to do. During the winter it is not always possible to do an N.F.T. and therefore a thorough check is more essential than ever. All the points to note are covered in the Check Lists provided at the Crew Stations in every aircraft. Take a special note of the condition of the dispersal surface when you tumble out of the crew bus. Don’t allow a dispersal to accumulate dirty oil, its [sic] slippery enough at the best of times and worse still in winter. Inspect the chocks closely to make sure there is no danger of them slipping during the run up, especially if there has been “freeze” beforehand and there is frost or ice about.
Don’t roar out of dispersal in a hurry with the Flight Engineer still busily stowing “Window”. Switch on the landing light, have the Flight Engineer manning the Aldis light, and follow the marshalling airman. Check your brakes as you move out of dispersal. Taxy slowly and take the corners easily. As you taxy round check your Gyro and Artificial Horizon to ensure that they are operating (you’ve already checked the suction on both Pesco pumps before you left dispersal), and see your Pitot head heater is ON.
[Underlined] “THE TEMPEST”. [/underlined]
You have got all the Met. information you need, and it is not much good having “Second Thoughts” about something you have forgotten if you are off the ground. If you have been warned of isolated Cu.Nims. up to 24,000 feet, keep clear of them. You know the icing level, and you know your critical temperatures for icing – between 0°Cent. and -8°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
Cent. for airframe icing, and between 0° Cent. and -30° Cent. for carburettor icing. There are of course extremes to both temperatures at which you can get icing, but it is not serious if you stick to the Flight Plan and know the symptoms.
Airframe icing is obvious. You can see it and sometimes hear it cracking off the airscrews and beating against the fuselage. If this occurs, climb out of the temperature layer, keep your flying controls free by moving them slightly all the time, and if you get the perspex icing up, use the de-icing spray to clear it. Carburettor icing makes the boost drop or surge. Fly in hot air for ten minutes and then return to cold air. Repeat this procedure whenever icing occurs and remember that hot air increases tour petrol consumption by 16%.
[Underlined] “THROUGH THE OVERCAST”. [/underlined]
Home strictly to your lattice lines and observe any special instructions you have received about where you break cloud on the return from the target. Do a proper controlled descent through cloud, 20° of flap, 400 feet a minute, and don’t be over anxious for sight of the ground. Check Q.F.E. and Q.F.F. When you clear the cloud base stay on your instruments until you are in level flight. Order your crew to keep a lookout, otherwise you may, at a low altitude, forget your lateral level because you are pre-occupied in trying to read beacons or see the ground. If you break cloud at the right point on your lattice line, there will be no danger of striking high ground. Incidentally, [underlined] never [/underlined] break cloud until you have fixed your position. You should know by now the instructions contained in 5 Group Air Staff Instruction, Trg./14, Safety Measures to Prevent Aircraft Flying into High Ground.
On the circuit give the precise order “Circuit lookout” to your crew as you prepare for the Quick Landing Scheme. This is most important in winter when cloud base might well be below 1,000 feet. Do not amble in with the intention of “Getting down this time” if conditions are difficult for landing. There is no shame in an overshoot and do not be satisfied until you are sitting comfortably in the Green of the Glide Path Indicator with your approach speed right and all your drills completed. Keep your speed down to 120 on the initial approach and get it down to 105 – 110 across the boundary. It is pointless to throw away valuable distance on the runway, especially as the brakes may be less effective than normal, because the runway is wet or freezing. “Second Thoughts” in the overshoot area are usually pretty cheerless.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “V” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88 c.
15.10.44 “X” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “G” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 c.
11.10.44 “Y” – 9 Sqdn. – FW.190
Claims annotated ‘c’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
The number of combats during the month’s operations shows a big decrease on last month’s figures. The total stands at 44 combats and of these two enemy aircraft are claimed as probably destroyed and two as damaged.
The majority of the attacks emanated from astern and above, due, no doubt, to the good conditions of visibility prevailing at the time. Now that it has been confirmed from P. of W. interrogation that upward firing guns are being fitted to the majority of the long range night fighter, attacks from astern and below must again be reckoned with, and good all-round search organised, with particular attention to the dark part of the sky.
With a night fighter breaking away below the bomber, make doubly sure that the Hun is not lying in wait below you, before giving orders to the pilot to resume course. One or two people have had very unpleasant surprises, by resuming course too soon and receiving a raking attack from below.
[Underlined] “Beware the Jetties” [/underlined] At the time of going to press no sightings of the jet propelled aircraft have been reported at night, but no doubt that has yet to come. Be prepared for their excessive closing speed when giving the order to corkscrew. The jet should be distinguishable on dark nights and the con-trail on light nights.
An account of the interesting exploits of 619/”W” on the night 4/5th is given below.
“Aircraft “W” of 619 Squadron was returning at 10,000 ft. heading 273T returning from Gardening on the night 4/5th October, and had reached position 5605N 0807E when the Rear Gunner sighted a JU.88 on the starboard quarter level silhouetted against the lighter part of the sky. At that time the bomber was flying in clear visibility with 10/10ths cloud below, tops 2000 ft. and thin stratus above 15,000 ft. The JU.88 attacked from the starboard quarter on a curve of pursuit and the bomber commenced a corkscrew when the fighter
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
reached 600 yards. The corkscrew took the bomber into cloud and the fighter was lost to view. On reappearing from cloud the F/E sighted a JU.88 below camouflaged white and Rear Gunner ordered banking search, the fighter imitated all the bomber’s manoeuvres, preventing the guns from being brought to bear. As the bomber resumed course another JU.88 attacked from Port beam with heavy calibre armament. The attack came from the dark part of the sky and was not seen by the Mid Upper Gunner. The first indication of the attack was when the bomber was hit. The strikes caused a fire amidships which exploded the ammunition in the rear turret tanks in the fuselage and disabled all the hydraulic and intercommunication system. The Mid Upper immediately vacated his turret and attacked the fire with extinguishers. The Rear Gunner saw the attacking JU.88 break away starboard quarter up and fired a long burst using manual rotation and operating one gun manually by the rear sear.
By this time the aircraft was on fire from cockpit to Elsan and the Mid Upper gunner was unable to control it on his own. The Rear Gunner, seeing the Mid Upper Gunner’s flying kit ablaze came to his assistance and with the aid of the Air Bomber, stripped him of his burning harness and placed it in the Elsan. The flames were spreading through the bomb bay and had burnt a hole in the bottom of the fuselage.
By using fire extinguishers, personal clothing and various other means, the fire was extinguished, but approximately 5 minutes later it flared up again at the rear of the ammunition tanks on the starboard side. This was extinguished by the Rear and Mid Upper Gunners.
The Rear Gunner then went into the Mid Upper turret and the Mid Upper Gunner went forward owing to lack of flying clothing which had been burnt.
The aircraft was crash-landed and on landing it was found that the Mid Upper Gunner had received extensive burns on hands and face and was suffering from shock, and the Navigator was burnet on his right hand.
It is considered that both gunners put up an exceptionally fine show in extraordinary circumstances as the hole burnt in the aircraft made any movement extremely hazardous.”
[Underlined] “ODD GOINGS ON”. [/underlined]
A Rear Gunner got repeated number one stoppages on all four guns. This continued through much “cocking and firing” until he suddenly remembered he hadn’t put the “Fire and Safe” units to “Fire”. Having completed this small operation the guns functioned perfectly.
A Gunnery Leader took a crew on drogue firing. He put the Air Bomber into the mid upper and told him to fire one gun only. During the exercise the Gunnery Leader got the impression that both mid upper guns were firing and on mentioning this to the Air Bomber, received the reply “Well, I’m only pressing one trigger!”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Roberts 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
P/O Danahar 44 Sqdn. Cat. ‘C’.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR OCTOBER:- 2190. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TABLES. [/underlined]
Though the total of affiliation exercises is below that of last month, the Squadrons’ totals are better, which is a very good sign. The night affiliation exercises with Hurricanes and Mosquitoes show an increase on last month, but whilst credit is due in this respect, it is hoped that next month’s total will be the equivalent to one night affiliation exercises per crew throughout the Group. Successful trials have been carried out by No.54 Base using infra-red film and instructions are being issued by this Headquarters in the near future.
Bomber Command have now approved the modifications to incorporate the hydraulically operated winch for self-towed drogue in the Lancaster, and this Headquarters’ letter 5G/3204/2/1/Eng. dated 25th October, 1944, refers. It is anticipated therefore, that next month that very barren column headed “AIR TO AIR” will blossom forth with digits.
Base Gunnery Leaders are warned that in all probability two extra Mark 1C Gyros will be allotted to each Squadron in the near future. It is suggested therefore, that they take immediate steps to have the necessary parts for the rig made in workshops and wired in a similar manner to their existing assemblies, so that there will be the minimum amount of delay when these Gyros arrive.
Up to date there have been two cases of frostbite in the Group due chiefly to the metal parts of the mask and helmet not being covered. This covering is very liable to have been torn and neglected during the summer months, so that now the cold weather is upon us, Gunnery Leaders would do well to check all helmets and masks immediately to see that they are in 100% fit condition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] oiling up [Drawing]
The perfect Air Gunner climbed out of his aircraft, and turned to the Armourer. “Those guns are good enough” he said, and his Captain and his crew heard and felt happy as they knew by “good enough” the perfect Gunner meant “very good indeed”. Two other Gunners, who were by no means perfect, also heard and remarked to themselves “Old Smithy must have been born with a gun in his hand, think of all the trouble you and I have had with that turret, yet Smithy goes up a couple of times, and everything is bang on. Either he’s just plumb lucky, or he’s got a gift that way. Yes, I think he takes to it naturally”. So saying, the speaker and his friend cautiously made their way towards the Mess, cautiously, in case their Gunnery Leader or Captain should catch sight of them, and acting on experience promptly put them on some sort of training. “After all” they used to argue “Why should we have to bind at aircraft Recce etc., just like any sprogs – we are almost the original operational types, we know the answers”.
“Hope the old skipper is in a better mood this evening, Bill, he seemed to be quite shirty with me after that Daylight yesterday. Called me a bloody fool and told me to pull my finger out. Me of all people. Me! Why I told him he was lucky to have two Gunners like us in his aircraft, but even that didn’t seem to cheer him up. After all, as I said, anyone might have mistaken those Thunderbolts for 190’s, and after all, he only did two corkscrews. I suppose he’ll be binding next about that turret, just because old Smithy gets airborne and it happens to work. Things always seem to work with Smithy”. The speaker pulled his chair a little nearer to the fire.
In the meantime, the perfect Air Gunner and the Armourer had finished cleaning the guns and were packing up. “It always seems to be the same when you take over someone else’s aircraft, doesn’t it”, said the perfect Gunner. “However, they begin to look a bit more like guns now, don’t they, and I don’t think we’ve much more to worry about, goodnight, and many thanks”.
The not-so-perfect Gunners, were still sitting by the fire in the Mess. “Hulloo, here comes old Smithy – Hi Smithy, how did you manage to make those ropey guns go this afternoon?”
“Well, as a matter of fact, we only gave the turret a good D.I., and all the guns a thorough cleaning, and everything went like clockwork. There’s nothing much wrong with those guns”.
As one not-so-perfect Gunner said to the other “Old Smithy may be lucky, but he’s a secretive sort of bloke, keeps things to himself you know – just cleaned the guns and they worked my foot – why they’ll be saying we don’t know our job next – you and me!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
Throughout the year this Group has steadily climbed the Bomber Command accident ladder until in September we reached the top with a rate of 7.9 aircraft damaged for every 10,000 hours flown. This goal was achieved with 23 aircraft damaged and was largely due to a drop in the number of crashes during non-operational flying. 51 Base therefore, can feel they have pulled their weight in the struggle for accident reduction, especially as October figures again stand comparison with the squadrons.
Unfortunately it is unlikely that we will remain in that exalted position at the top of the ladder. There is every indication that the rate for October will have increased, particularly as the total number of aircraft damaged rose to 31: 10 were totally destroyed, 7 were Cat.B., and 14 were Cat.AC; in addition there were 6 Cat.A(R), but these will not count against us. The [underlined] avoidable [/underlined] accidents against which every drive is concentrated, rose in proportion. October’s figures read:-
[List of Avoidable Accidents by Squadrons, Conversion Units and Other Flights]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL – 25 Avoidable Accidents. [/underlined]
It may be argued that the number of avoidable accidents during October is merely an indication of the seasonal rise in accidents as a whole. This is probably true, but the danger lies in passing this rise off as inevitable. It is up to pilots to combat the additional difficulties of winter flying by such means as more concentration on instrument flying, increased care when taxying, and a demand for full support and co-operation from their crews. With regard to taxying, you will note that accidents in this class continue to hold a notorious position in the Summary. Read and digest the notes on taxying given under another heading in this News. A typical example from the month’s records will emphasise
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the inexcusability of such accidents. Can you find any mitigating circumstances in this one:-
(i) In broad daylight a pilot was following another aircraft round the perimeter to take off point. The leading pilot stopped, naturally, at the taxy post to do his pre-flight checks. He was immediately struck from behind by the following aircraft, the pilot of which simply states that “he did not know the other aircraft had stopped until too late”.
[Underlined] EMERGENCY AIR. [/underlined]
A “new” accident occurred in October, and details are given here so that a pitfall may be avoided. Briefly, a Lancaster pilot had to use the “emergency air” to lower his undercarriage on landing. He left the lever in the [underlined] “up” [/underlined] position, made a perfect landing and taxied to dispersal. A few hours later the undercarriage collapsed. Now, wheels can be lowered by emergency air with the lever in [underlined] any [/underlined] position, but take another look at Pilot’s Notes (Latest) and there read that the lever should be fully [underlined] down. [/underlined] Now you know!
The other accidents do not provide any special features.
51 Base now passes from 5 Group to 7 Group. The accident rate on Stirlings has been steadily reduced since January, and reflects creditably on the way Stirling problems have been tackled. At the risk of repetition, this is best shown by October’s “avoidable” figures. For the first time 51 Base total is less than the total for the squadrons. In 1654 Conversion Unit only one aircraft was damaged during the whole of the month, and even this was only damaged to a slight extent, namely Cat.A(R). A commendable effort.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Squadron with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was only one known ditching throughout the Group during October – “R” of No.467 Squadron ditched 50 miles North of Terschelling on 5th October. First the port outer engine failed at 1500 ft. followed by the port inner at 900 ft. on the outward flight to the target. The Pilot incorrectly thought that he could not jettison his particular load below 2,000 ft. and turned for home, at the same time firing a red Verey cartridge to let the concentration know that he was in trouble. The port inner engine failed at 900 ft. and not until this happened was the Wireless Operator ordered to institute W/T S.O.S. procedure. These signals were transmitted at 200 ft. and naturally were not received.
Fuel jettisoning action was taken, but the jettison cocks were not closed again the the [sic] aircraft ditched with a full bomb load and little or no buoyancy from the fuel tanks. It ditched successfully but sank in 1 1/2 minutes. The Flight Engineer did not brace his back on the rest bed and the shock threw him upwards and forwards. His head splintered the bulkhead door but he was not injured, and the inrush of cold water brought him round from his temporary stunning. (Hard heads are necessary for an awkward situation!).
All members of the crew reached the dinghy without difficulty and although the mast was broken it was repaired and erected. A sail was made from silk escape maps and with a North Easterly wind the dinghy sailed about 27 miles towards the English Coast before it was located by air.
An airborne lifeboat was dropped and the crew, transferred successfully, started the engines and set course for home. The mast was slipped without releasing the whip aerial and before this was noticed, the sea had freshened, making it impossible to rectify the mistake. As the covering aircraft lost contact with them on three occasions this mistake might easily have had more serious consequences.
The crew was finally rescued by a Naval launch after 36 hours in their dinghy and almost as long in the lifeboat.
This ditching should prove a lesson to those disbelievers in transmitting “Emergency” messaged on the failure of one engine.
Though the Rear Gunner of another aircraft saw the distress cartridge being fired, no sighting report was transmitted, nor, due to a misunderstanding, was any notice taken of the report at Interrogation. W/T silence does [underlined] not [/underlined] apply to aircraft in distress or sightings of aircraft in distress unless specifically ordered at briefing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
What have now become common errors were again made by this crew:-
(i) The dinghy radio was released from its stowage prior to ditching and was lost on impact.
(ii) Mae Wests were not inflated until after impact.
Two interesting new Air Diagrams have been issued:-
Flying Control and A.S.R. Services – A.D. 3970, Issued June, 1944.
Air Sea Rescue Services – A.D.3971, Issued June, 1944.
The Lancaster Static line parachute drill has been amended. The new diagram is numbered 3011A issued May, 1944. Note those helping the wounded man should wear their parachutes – just in case.
[Drawing] THIS
OR
THIS?
PILOTS & REAR GUNNERS –
Have YOU drawn YOUR seat type parachute?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] Flying Control Competition [/underlined] – The second quarterly Flying Control Competition has now ended and the award goes to METHERINGHAM. It is only fair to Skellingthorpe to say that they have not fallen behind but have been surpassed. Sections have, in many cases, taken serious steps to bring up to scratch the surrounds of Watch Offices. The tidiness of the grass surrounds, the layout of the car park, all raise or lower the value of Control in the eyes of visitors.
The heavy winter months ahead with their problems of snow, ice and water, will demand from every Flying Control Section the maximum serviceability of portable equipment. Night Flying Equipment should be thoroughly examined to bring it up to 100% efficiency. All lamps and accs. should be tested and necessary replacements made. Never let the responsibility for a “bogging” or a taxying accident be laid on your shoulders because equipment was unserviceable or inadequate for emergencies.
[Underlined] V.H.F. Landing Trials [/underlined] – Waddington are carrying out VHF/RT trials for Command, more particularly on the control side. The policy is a “long term” one, attempting to meet future requirements of all Commands, and future layouts of Watch Offices. Preliminary trials will probably occupy a month, after which “visitors will be admitted”.
[Underlined] Rangefinder Attachment [/underlined] – Details of a ranging instrument for the Airfield Controller have been issued to stations, to ensure that at night the A.F.C. knows whether an aircraft is inside or outside the 2000 yards safety line. The adaption consists of the insertion in the inner ring sight of a metal “thimble” in which is cut an aperture of .1225 inches, equivalent to the wing span of a four-engined bomber at 200 yards.
[Underlined] Circuit Marking [/underlined] – Trials are to be carried out at Metheringham to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions on the circuit. It has not been possible to instal [sic] permanent lighting which will cater for marking the circuit points when each runway is in use. A compromise has been effected, however, to concentrate on the main runway. The “ball-up” point and the “cross-wind” position are at present marked with the identification letters of the airfield, and it is proposed to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions by means of a bar of three lights across the outer circuit.
Bases will be informed when this installation is complete at Metheringham, and Flying Control Officers should fly over there at night to inspect and report on the efficiency of this system of marking.
In saying goodbye to 51 Base on their translation to 7 Group, one must express our best wishes for their continued good work in their new “orbit”. All three stations have recently made vast improvements in their airfield conditions. Control work at Conversion Units is much heavier than on operational units and the zeal of Control Officers at those stations to bring control conditions into line with operational stations, is to be commended.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
Landing times for October refer in the main to daylight times and an improvement has again been shown over the previous month’s average. The new form of monthly return of landings to meet the requirements of Headquarters, Bomber Command, will be used to compile future returns for these records. The return should be compiled day by day and not left to the end of the month.
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Underlined] AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP 1.59 MINUTES PER AIRCRAFT. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COAL AND COKE. [/underlined]
The fuel situation this winter is going to be very difficult [sic] This is due, of course, to the fact that we will be supplying most of the liberated countries, until they can produce their own fuel.
Equipment Officers should therefore make their stations more fuel conscious, and try to save every pound of coal and coke they can.
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT TO U.E.D. AND R.E.D. (A.M.O. A.736/43). [/underlined]
Many letters have been written upon the necessity of following the instructions laid down in A,M.O. A.736/43.
Headquarters, Bomber Command, have now dealt us a bitter blow. A list has been sent to this Headquarters, showing all stations who have not carried out the instructions, and practically every station in the Group is named.
This is a bad state of affairs, and we hope in future stations in this Group will do much better and make certain equipment is returned to the right place.
[Underlined] RADIATORS. [/underlined]
The radiator pool at Coningsby is working satisfactorily, and since it has been going, the flow of radiators to the squadrons has been better, though, of course, we could do with a lot more.
We now hear from Command that this system may be stopped, and the normal demand procedure put in its place. This matter is being dealt with between Command and Air Ministry, and we can only hope that the present system is retained.
[Underlined] DEMANDS. [/underlined]
Units should take more care making out their equipment demands; cases have been reported where, either the unit serial number or the nearest railway station has been omitted. A further point is that stations are not using the rubber stamp in the Consignee’s Block.
Equipment Officers must scrutinise their demands, before signing them, and see that the demand is made out correctly. If the section has not got the rubber stamp then it should be demanded from the Orderly Room at once.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During October, 56 Base formed, and two new squadrons were built up. With the formation of 56 Base much hard work has been entailed in the organising of Base sections once more, but these are coming along very nicely and will soon be up to the desired standard. Balderton and Fulbeck, which are sub-stations to 56 Base, provide a heavy task in themselves to bring them up to the standard of airfields which were vacated by 5 Group. It is “self-help” with a vengeance. However, even in the short time that the airfields have been occupied by 5 Group units, the improvement is most noticeable.
An interesting feature of the month is the manner in which Bases have helped each other with acceptance chekes [sic] modifications and engine changes where necessary. Acceptance checks for the new squadrons were split evenly through the Bases.
Good reports are being received as a result of pilots and flight engineers of the Test Crews at Bases attending the Test Pilots’ Course at A.V. Roe’s. All Base Major Servicing Sections are enthusiastic about the testing of their aircraft and consider that greatly improved handling is given to aircraft passing out of B.M.S.S. as a result of the excellent reports submitted after these test flights.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
Since starting the drive on improving the condition and maintenance of ground equipment and the general cleanliness of hangars and dispersals, a big improvement has been noticed throughout the Group. The cleanliness of hangars is far more important than some C.T.O’s realise. However busy a servicing section is, it can always find time to keep the hangar and its surrounds clean and tidy if the will to do so is present. The mechanical sweepers which have been issued throughout the Group have proved an asset in keeping the hangar floors swept, but we still have the odd C.T.O. who allows his maintenance hangar to get into a filthy, oily state, and complains that pressure of work is the cause. Pressure of work is never the cause of this state of affairs as it is usually due to lack of interest in this aspect of maintenance over a long period. Once a hangar and its surrounds have been made to look clean, neat and tidy, this state can be maintained by just a small amount of work daily. It is again repeated that if a Servicing Wing looks neat, well organised and tidy, it invariably is also efficient.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FAILURES. [/underlined]
Engineer faults which prevented the successful completion of operational sorties totalled 1%. This is a slight increase over the previous month, but is still a general improvement. Only one of these defects could be attributed to faulty maintenance; unfortunately
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
this maintenance defect occurred in a squadron which would otherwise have had a clear sheet. 54 Base gets the “Big Hand” this month, with only two engineer operational failures. The following squadrons are to be congratulated on having no engineer operational failures during October:- 9, 50, 83, 227, 617 and 627 Squadrons. This is a very good start indeed for the first month 227 Squadron appeared as an operational squadron.
[Underlined] 51 BASE. [/underlined]
With the passing of 51 Base, complete with Wigsley, Swinderby and Winthorpe and maintenance staffs, go many engineer officers and maintenance personnel who have worked hard for 5 Group for a very long period. The type of work which they have been carrying out has been arduous and we are very reluctant to see them pass to another Group; to the newly formed No.7 Group such officers and maintenance personnel who have worked so loyally for 5 Group will be a great asset.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Conversion Units]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ENGINE HANDLING. [/underlined]
Much controversy has taken place since Air Ministry has cleared Merlin 22’s, 24’s, 28’s and 38’s at +7 lbs. boost for cruising. It is thought by so many pilots that this extra 3 lbs. boost is something for nothing, that petrol consumption at 2650 r.p.m. and + 7 lbs. boost will be the same as 2650 r.p.m. and 4 lbs. boost; this is not the case. This is what has taken place – before the modification was incorporated, the S.U. Carburettor richened when the boost was increased above + 4 lbs. and the Stromberg Carburettors richened with boost above + 3 1/2 lbs. With Mod.582 both these carburettors will now be progressively weak throughout their range up to + 7 lbs. boost.
In all cases for economical flying it is necessary to fly at a given optimum R.A.S. This optimum R.A.S. is governed by the all-up weight of the aircraft, so crews should always attempt to obtain the I.A.S. for which they are briefed.
Boost of + 7 lbs will only be obtained up to rated altitude, this will be approximately 9,000 ft. in ‘M’ gear and 17,000 ft. in ‘S’ gear. Therefore if an I.A.S. of 170 m.p.h. is required at 8,000 ft.,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
to fly economically the boost would be increased to + 5 or 6 lbs, but the revs must be reduced below 2650; the only advantage in this case is, the throttles would be fully open. If, however, the revs were left at 2650 using + 5 or 6 lbs. boost petrol consumption would increase. A case in point – a Lancaster in this Group was fitted with flowmeters; at 10,000 ft. using 2650 + 4 the R.A.S. obtained was 200 m.p.h. and petrol consumption 228 galls/hr. The same aircraft when using 2650 + 6 at the same altitude obtained an R.A.S. of 215 m.p.h., but the petrol consumption increased to 271.2 galls/Hr. As can be seen, for the extra 15 m.p.h. the consumption was out of all proportion.
The advantage of + 7 lbs. boost will be found in the climb. When climbing at 2650 + 4 with a fully laden aircraft, the R.A.S. should be 157 m.p.h.; if this speed cannot be maintained or the aircraft becomes “heavy” to handle, the boost can be increased over the + 4 lbs. setting to obtain the optimum R.A.S. of 157 m.p.h.
If the general rule of high boost and low revs together with the optimum R.A.S. is carried out on all flights, the petrol consumption will always be good.
[Underlined] WINTER FLYING. [/underlined]
To overcome many of the “snags” of winter flying due to the inexperience of crews, a list of the most important points are set out for the guidance of Flight Engineer Leaders who must instruct and advise all Flight Engineers in their section.
1. Special care and instruction on the use of oxygen, care and maintenance of masks, and the use of the extra 12 ft. oxygen tube carried in all aircraft.
2. Have each Flight Engineer work the Dead Man’s release of the rear turret.
3. Make certain each Flight Engineer knows how to use the hot and cold air valve, and under what conditions this should be used.
4. Use of de-icing fluid for windscreens – how to operate the pump. Advise each Flight Engineer to have a can of de-icing fluid in his aircraft for use inside the cabin. [Underlined] Danger [/underlined] – this fluid is inflammable.
5. Check clothing. Warm but not bulky, electrically heated waistcoat and socks are a great advantage.
6. Care to be taken when running up – see that chocks cannot slip.
7. Check “storm window” for freedom.
8. Pulsometer pumps must be switched “ON” at 17,000 ft.
9. All Flight Engineers to know 5 Group Drill No.12 “Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill”.
10. Flight Engineers to inspect the de-icing paste on the leading edge of the control surfaces; care must be taken that this is evenly applied.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
On the 25th October a meeting of Base Armament Officers was held at Headquarters, No.5 Group, when a very lengthy discussion took place covering almost all the points affecting armament work and organisation. Every effort is being made to provide more man power, more supervision and more equipment, but all armament personnel should bear in mind the vital need for careful planning and organisation of work to eliminate unnecessary handling of stores. In this connection, a tidy and well planned bomb store will always be able to handle a greater tonnage of bombs for less man hours of work (i.e. a reasonable number of days off for everybody), than a bomb store which is allowed to become disorganised and congested, thus entailing handling stores two or three times.
To run a bomb store in this ideal way calls for clear thinking and planning by the Officer i/c and an appreciation of the work and handling schemes in use by N.C.O’s.
The new heavy transporter referred to in our last issue has at last made its appearance but unfortunately only in very small quantities. Reports from the station fortunate enough to receive the first issue show that this piece of equipment is a great time and labour saver, and in addition, ensures that the tail units of 4 lb. incendiaries carried in S.B.C’s are not damaged when loaded on to bomb trolleys.
One station, not content to sit back and wait for the arrival of these items, has produced its own transporter. The transporter has been constructed from a portion of the M.7 cluster mechanism suitably modified with two small angle brackets to slip under the drop bar of the S.B.C. This transporter has been in issue for some time and has proved entirely satisfactory and easy to handle. Details of this modification are being forwarded to Units, and Armament Officers should take the opportunity of constructing as many of these transporters as possible for use prior to the introduction of the improved type heavy transporter.
No doubt many of you can think of more and possibly better methods of simplifying the handling and transportation of clusters and S.B.C’s, so get your heads together and see what you can produce. To a great extent this problem will have to be solved by ourselves, so don’t be content to sit back and wait for someone else to find the answer. You are the people who know what is required and are in the best position for finding the solution.
[Underlined] REPORTING OF DEFECTS. [/underlined]
Many instances have occurred during the past months of Armament Officers failing to carry out the correct procedure for the reporting of defects of ammunition, explosives and their components or ancilliary equipments.
The correct procedure is laid down fully in A.P. 2608A, Appendix 12, and it is suggested that a few minutes spent with this very valuable publication would benefit the majority of Armament Officers.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “BOOBS”! [/underlined]
On two occasions this month Bomb Aimers omitted to select the isolation switch with the result that the photoflash was not released and no photographs obtained.
Two full bomb loads were returned to base, one due to the Bomb Aimer setting the distributor drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo”, and the other due to the failure of the Bomb Aimer to ensure that his Master switch was wired in the “ON” position.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The total number of operational sorties for the month of October was below previous months’ figures and details of the photographic results are shown in the analysis.
[Underlined] Technical Failures [/underlined] were not high, but it is an undeniable fact that many of those which did occur could have been avoided – Photographers, Instrument Repairers and Electricians responsible for the maintenance and testing, and Photographers who process the films should make a special effort to reduce the number of failures which occur through insufficient maintenance testing and processing.
A percentage of failures also occurs because the Bomb Release Key Switch sometimes releases the bombs but does not make a positive contact to operate the camera. Headquarters, Bomber Command, have stated that a new type of key has been designed and will be issued in due course; until the new key is fitted bomb aimers must remember to depress the key fully.
[Underlined] American K.24 Camera [/underlined] is now rapidly taking the place of the F.24; despite certain criticisms there can be no doubt that the camera will give good results, provided that a few minor details are attended to. Owing to the unbalanced weight, mainly due to the motor position, this camera is not to be stood upright on the lens cone, but is to be laid on its side; furthermore, the camera should not be lifted by the motor, otherwise there is every possibility that the motor gear will become mis-aligned. Air Ministry have been asked to provide muffs which will fit the K.24, but it is not known when these muffs will become available. However, owing to the rubber film roller, brittle film should not prove very troublesome since the main cause of torn film in the F.24 camera is the measuring roller needles.
[Underlined] Composite colour [/underlined] is now in standard use, and it is hoped to increase its use but, before doing so, Photographic N.C.O’s should ensure that all photographers are trained in making up and processing the film. It is necessary to stress once again the importance of temperature and time; failure to bear this in mind will produce out of colour balance results, A different type of colour film, called the “Ansco” has been tested by No.56 Base , but the results were inferior to those produced by Kodacolour.
[Underlined] H.2.S. Photography. [/underlined] The number of cameras now available for this type of photography has materially increased, but there is much to be done before it can be claimed that the results produced are as good as they should be. The best H.2.S. Photographic results can only be obtained by correct set operation and good quality processing and printing. It has been reported that Photographers are not sufficiently informed on the working of H.2.S. to get the best out of the results. Therefore, it is hoped that the Radar/Nav. officer will arrange demonstrations in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
[Page break]
Education [Drawing]
During October, many airmen began study, which it is hoped will be continued during the winter months. The suggested programmes and facilities drawn up by Station Education Officers were widely circulated on most stations and the response on the whole has been satisfactory. The most popular demand has been for classes at the local Technical Institutes – indeed, the Lincoln Technical College was quite unable to cope for a time with the numbers of students who wished to attend. Most of the requirements appear to have been catered for now, however. It should be stressed that the college authorities have taken considerable trouble to accommodate R.A.F. personnel and we in our turn must attend as regularly as possible to make the work they have put in worth while.
Organised study is difficult in view of the uncertain hours of duty. One solution to this problem is the correspondence course method, which does give the chance of doing the work at the student’s own convenience. A full list of courses cannot be enumerated here, but there are roughly 500, and they cater for almost all the professions as well as individual subjects. The cost is only 10/-. Your Education Officer will show you what is available.
About 700 people have enrolled for correspondence courses in this Group during the past few months, and some stations have over 100 airmen attending local evening institutes each week. These are the people who are looking to the future, and there must be many hundreds more in the Group who would benefit from something of this kind. After all, its [sic] your future, so it is up to you to prepare for your return to civilian life.
Do you ever visit your Station News Room? If you do you will realise the tremendous amount of work put in to keep it fresh and up to date, and usually the Education Officer is doing the job himself. He would welcome any suggestions and ideas for improving the room, and any practical help towards putting the ideas into practice. About half a dozen airmen who are interested, can make a great difference to the freshness and appeal of the News Room.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME
[Drawings] IS HIS NISSEN
Due to the long hours of blackout, bad weather and general deterioration of living and working conditions, all of which affect the health of personnel, operational efficiency may be reduced during the winter unless strenuous efforts are made by all concerned to offset its effects.
If initiative is used NOW to plan essential precautions, this Group can be fully prepared to operate during the winter months at an even higher pressure and even more efficiently than during the last few months.
Instructions to all Base and Station Commanders have already been issued by the Air Officer Commanding, summarising instructions which have already been issued. Indication will only be given in this article of those additional jobs we may be called upon to do which are not of a routine nature, and which merely involve the use of average common-sense.
There is an old saying that “An Englishman’s Home is his Castle”. However, the true sense of this saying is, unfortunately, not fully established during war-time, as the majority of our lives is being spent in Nissen huts or, for the more fortunate (?), in rooms shared with many others, who have various ideas of conditions in which one should eat and sleep.
A balance, therefore, has to be made and the foundation for our “War Castles” should be waterproof rooms, clean approaches to living quarters, well-prepared food, hot water supply, good entertainment and ample warm clothing, together with the sensible use of camp amenities which are provided for all and not for any one individual.
In the first years of war, ample labour and material were available for ensuring that the above conditions were met, but due to the withdrawal of labour and material to priority work in the South of England, each and every one of us will be called upon to perform duties which, hitherto, have been implemented by “Specialists”. Take, for instance, that leaking roof. It’s all very well saying that it’s about time Works and Buildings repaired it; the fact is that Works and Buildings have not the labour to meet all the requirements of daily maintenance on a present-day Bomber Station. Therefore, instead of sitting back and waiting for somebody else to do the work, we shall have to do it ourselves. Material, and technical supervision will be provided and we shall have to initiate our own repairs in our “spare time”.
If we were back in our own homes, we wouldn’t need to be told to implement maintenance or to redecorate rooms which have become shabby. We would take off our coats after our day’s work and do all within our power to make it as comfortable as possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] “AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME IS HIS NISSEN”. [/underlined]
Similarly, in peace-time, when we called at the local for “one for the road” and, due to bad navigation we encroached on the muddy part of the front garden, we wouldn’t dream of entering the house without wiping our feet or scraping the mud off. This should be kept well in mind when returning from the N.A.A.F.I., or the Mess back to our quarters, or to the places where we work.
In this respect, mud can be one of the chief factors of lowering the morale during the winter. Mud is usually introduced on to the concrete roads on stations, primarily by mechanical transport being driven off perimeter tracks and from concrete roads on to the airfield, and by certain types who will insist on taking “short cuts”. This practice must be stopped; by so doing, we shall also improve the appearance of our airfields.
In regard to clothing, facilities exist for the exchange of worn clothing which would not provide proper warmth during the winter months and would, therefore, result in health conditions which seriously affect the manpower question during this particular time of the year.
Personnel working in exposed conditions are entitled to draw protective clothing consisting of a variety of items which may be obtained on request. In Civvy Street the wise man ensures that his clothing is in a constant state of good repair and although the responsibility is usually shelved on to our mothers or wives, in war-time it is up to each individual to fend for himself.
With a little bit of research “someone” can always be found to do the necessary darning, and to execute the necessary repairs if the individual has not the maternal instinct.
To deal with all the troubles would involve writing at some length and it is again repeated that average commonsense [sic] must be used. If the powers-that-be are to be believed, this is going to be the last winter of the European War. Everyone should make a supreme effort to ensure that our living and working conditions are such that our operational efficiency is not affected, and that all precautions are introduced in time to meet the trouble which they are intended to cure.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. DUNNE DFC
P/O R.F. ADAMS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. AMEY DFC
SGT G.W. LANE DFM
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.F. GRAY, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O F.T. GRIFFIN DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.H. STEWART DFC
F/SGT R. CALOV DFM
F/SGT D.J. MORLAND DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.J.B. WILSON, DFC DSO
F/O P.H. MARTIN DFC
F/O W.A. DANIEL DFC
F/O J.A. SANDERS, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/CDR J.B. TAIT, DSO, 2 BARS, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT F. WEBSTER DFM
P/O D.H. STRACHAN DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT R.E.W. OAKLEY, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT D.S. MORGAN BEM
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
A/Cdr. A.C.H. SHARP, ADC. DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.H.B. LUCAS DFC
F/O J.E. LOGAN DFC
F/O J. CHADDERTON DFC
F/O D.A. KEEBLE DFC
W/O R.P. ALLEN DFC
F/O C.H. CALTON DFC
P/O D.D. McLEAN DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.A. MILDRED DFC
P/O N.H. LLOYD DFC
P/O A. AIREY DFC
SGT W.J. ROBINSON DFM
F/SGT A. WILSON DFM
P/O A. DICKEN DFC
F/SGT M.J. STANCER DFM
F/O K.A. MATHIESON DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.J. ORAM DFC
P/O H.M. MILNE DFC
F/SGT W.J. BEESLEY DFM
F/SGT D.P. PIERSON DFM
SGT A. DARBY DFM
F/SGT J. SHORT DFM
W/O G.F. GRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.V. HAZELDENE DFC
F/O H.B. MacKINNON DFC
P/O H. WELLAND DFC
F/O J.C. LUMSDEN DFC
F/SGT P.S. BAKER DFM
F/O C.S. PATON DFC
F/O G. POW DFC
F/SGT R.A. HAMMERSLEY DFM
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.S. TURNER DFC
P/O E.W. HALLETT DFC
S/LDR J. WOODROFFE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.T. REID DFC
F/SGT J. MORAN DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/O J.A. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L T.W. BLAIR, DSO, DFC.BAR TO DFC
W/O R.G. GOODWIN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.J. HEGARTY DFC
F/O J.A. KELLY DFC
A/S/L G.A. WATSON, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT C. BAUMBER DFM
A/F/LT J.L. COMANS, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/F/LT W.T. GEE DFC
F/SGT G.H. WIDDIS DFM
P/O M.J. BRIDGMAN DFC
F/O D.H. SHORTER DFC
P/O T.W.L. LEAK DFC
P/O J.A. PEARSON DFC
F/O J.F. THOMSON DFC
F/O J.W. NEDWICH DFC
P/O J.W. MULLER DFC
F/O R.D.H. PACKER DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/LT J.E. TAYLOR, DFM DFC
P/O C.E. THOMPSON DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.G.S. SCOTT DFM
P/O N. OWEN DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.J.C. CASSELL DFC
P/O C. JAMES DFC
F/O J.H. DECHASTEL DFC
F/O A. WILLIAMS, DFM DFC
F/O P.R. PETTIT DFC
P/O E.A. MUSTARD DFC
P/O B.W. WEBB DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT P.E. McCARTHY, DFM DFC
F/O R.O. FULLER, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT E.N. CHANDLER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O T.R. DAVIES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O G.A. CHALMERS, DFM DFC
F/LT F.G. RUMBLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O E. TWELLS DFC
F/O D.A. BELL DFC
F/O H.B.R. RHUDE DFC
P/O J.R. BELL DFC
F/O R.E. WOODS DFC
F/SGT P.W. DERHAM DFM
F/O H.V. CORNISH-UNDERWOOD DFC
P/O J.R. GURNEY DFC
F/O J.K. STOTT, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT L. HOPE DFM
P/O A. WHITELEY DFC
P/O G.F. WILSON DFC
P/O F.S. GARSIDE DFC
SGT A.J. GRIFFEE DFM
SGT H.D. CAMPBELL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT N.W. MacKENZIE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.G. GREY, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT N. LEWIS, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J. MARSHALLSAY DFC
F/LT E.F. NELLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.R. GOODMAN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT N.A. RANSHAW DFM
F/LT A.J.L. HICKOX, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W.Q. CONNOR, DFM DFC
F/O K.G. CHAMBERLAIN DFC
F/O L.N. RACKLEY DFC
P/O W. MOONEY DFC
F/SGT W.E.J. COX DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO, 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of Savings by Station]
TOTAL:- [Underlined] £3,635. 7. 6. [/underlined]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP CREST [/underlined]
Many designs for a Group Crest have been received at this Headquarters and have had continued close scrutiny and study. Due to the high standard of work produced it has not, as yet, been possible to select the winning crest, but it is hoped to do so in the near future. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Flying Hours by Squadron]
ӿ New Squadron – formed 7th October, 1944.
Squadrons are place in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
All Lancaster Squadrons are above establishment and therefore flying hours are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Boxed] The cover of this month’s News has been designed by S/Ldr. N. Mould, D.F.C., of Headquarters, No. 56 Base. All personnel with artistic tendencies are requested to submit designs for covers of future issues. So far only very few have been received, and it is hoped that during the coming month the editor will receive an increasing flow of specimen designs. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
October 1944 Secret No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1325 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, October 1944
5 Group News, October 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 27, October 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, signals, tactics, air bombing, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, oiling up, accidents, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, engineering, armament, photography, education, an Englishman's home is his Nissen, decorations, war savings and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-10
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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75 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-19
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Konstanz
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Sorpe Dam
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Bergen
Temporal Coverage
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1944-10
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Master Bomber
military living conditions
military service conditions
mine laying
navigator
Nissen hut
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS
NOVEMBER 1944 No 28
[Drawing] [9 and 617 Squadron Crests] TIRPITZ
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A.O.C.
In sending Christmas greetings to all ranks of 5 Group, I do so with the greater pleasure because through their combined efforts over the past months, the hitting power of the Group has been raised to a new high level, and greater harm inflicted on the enemy than ever before. In November the Group completed the destruction of the Tirpitz, an event which brought in messages of congratulations from all branches of the Service and from many of our Allies. In November also, the Group again cut the Dortmund Ems and Mitteland canals thus ensuring that an overwhelming burden of traffic should continue to be thrown on the German railways. While to ensure that this task should be made even more difficult the Group also took part in the general campaign against railway centres, achieving highly satisfactory results.
These results were made possible by the steady improvement in the efficiency with which attacks are undertaken, and in the greater numbers of aircraft available. To give two examples of this improved efficiency. In November last year, the average Squadron error in practice bombing from 20,000 feet was 310 yards; this November it is 160 yards. This means that the number of bombs which may be expected to fall within the central area of a target is now four times as great as it was a year ago, and this is borne out by photographs. Similar improvements in airmanship and crew discipline are shown by the reduction in landing times and in the lower accident rate. A year ago the average interval between aircraft landing at night was 3.18 minutes, and the best Station in November, 1943, only achieved 2.56 minutes. These times have now been halved, with a consequent reduction in the hazards of landing after an operation in conditions of poor visibility or low cloud, or when intruders are active.
Improvements on a like scale have been achieved in all other branches and sections and the serviceability rate is now higher than ever before, while the percentage of technical failures leading to early returns has been halved. These are most gratifying results deserving the highest praise; yet in no branch of Group activity have we yet reached the summit of our abilities or fulfilled our maximum expectations.
It is clear that the War will not now be over by Christmas although we can be fairly confident that this will be the last Christmas of the War in Europe. What is required therefore is a firm resolve to do everything in our power to reduce the number of days during which the War will continue to drag on. As a start I would ask air crews to aim at a reduction of the bombing error from 160 yards to 120 yards, and ground crews to determine that no aircraft shall remain on the ground if it can possibly be got ready in time to take off on operations. Although the ultimate release of the bombs is the province of the aircrew, the scale of their effort depends
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FOREWORD BY A.O.C. [/underlined]
upon the exertions of everybody on each Station, and it is to everyone, aircrew and ground crew, that I send this Christmas message urging them to put forward their every endeavour so that in spite of all that winter weather means, we continue to increase our pressure on the enemy, and thus hasten on his collapse.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [Drawing]
That moment when the Admiral Von Tirpitz was suddenly enveloped in smoke and flame and spray, from a cascade of Tallboy bombs was not merely the T.O.T. of an operations; it was the culmination of two months planning, training, toil and patience. After the abortive attacks on 15th September, and the 13th October, there was universal determination to try again. Statistical analysis of bombing results showed thatthree [sic] hits, and several near misses, could be anticipated, if the Bomb Aimers could get their graticules on the ship; the designers and users of the Tallboy were confident that the weapon would sink any battleship.
Time and the weather were the chief adversaries. Tromso is in the Gulf Stream, and the prevailing Westerly wind causes persistent Stratus cloud. The sky is only clear when the wind is Easterly, and about five such days could be expected in November. The end of November was the expiration of the time limit for a daylight attack this year. On the 26th of November, the sun does not rise above the horizon, and for a few days after, there would be enough twilight at mid-day to bomb. After that there would be no light until the Spring. It was obvious that there was a nice problem of long range weather forecasting, and that the slightest opportunity could not be wasted.
On the 5th of November, there was a false start, because the fickle weather set fair, and then deteriorated, but on the 11th the force once more flew to its advance bases. As this was the third week-end in succession that this avalanche had descended upon them, the inhabitants if the advanced bases had mixed feelings, which they courteously concealed. The force consisted of 36 Tallboy Lancasters, the Film Unit Lancaster, a meteorological reconnaissance Mosquito, and Transport aircraft. The Lancasters had been specially modified for the previous attempt. After the experience of the Russian operation, it was clear that the all up weight could safely be increased to 70,000 lbs. Merlin 24 power units, and extra tanks in the fuselage to bring the petrol capacity up to 2,400 gallons, had been installed. Mid-turrets, and every removeable item of equipment not needed for this operation, had been taken out. The all-up weight for take-off was then between 68,000 and 69,000 lbs. This was a most formidable striking force - - - 36 aeroplanes which could attack a target 1100 miles away, with 12,000 lb bombs.
The force took off to attack the Tirpitz for the third time at 03.00 hours on 12th November. The preliminary forecast had been poor, threatening convection cloud over the Norwegian coast, with a low freezing level, and high icing index, while there was no guarantee of the target being clear of Strato-cumulus, the meteorologists’ hoodoo. The met. reconnaissance Mosquito landed at Lossiemouth two hours before take-off, and improved this forecast, but not much. There was no convection cloud, but there were patches of Stratus. Remembering how they were cheated by the weather on the previous occasion, crews were determined, but not optimistic.
The flight plan was to fly low, less than 2,000 feet above the water, to a turning point at 65.00N 06.47E, then turn due East and climb to cross the Norwegian mountains, then lose height and turn North, flying
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
East of the mountains. It was expected that this would prevent detection by the German radar system along the Norwegian coast.
The weather was fine and clear for take-off, in pleasant contrast to the previous occasion, when it had poured with rain. This was to prove an omen. The force was distributed over three airfields to avoid congestion, and aircraft set course without delay for the rendezvous point at North Unst. All aircraft burned navigation lights to assist keeping together, and flew at 185 R.A.S., the most economical cruising speed for the first part of the flight. The engine settings were 1800 R.P.M. and about 4 1/2 lbs boost, giving a consumption of almost exactly 1 A.M.P.G. The route was studded with flame floats, which crews were using diligently for checking drift.
It was twilight at the Norwegian coast and map reading, after a long period of D.R. navigation, soon put all aircraft back on track. By the time the mountains were crossed, it was broad daylight, and large areas of Strato-cumulus were depressingly evident, while every lake was covered with Stratus. Map reading in the mountains, particularly when they are snow-covered, and the lakes are frozen, is tricky. The rendezvous, Akka Lake, was only recognisable because the sheet of cloud which covered it conformed exactly to its shape. The first view of Tromso therefore, with no cloud and no smoke, and of the Tirpitz in her anchorage, massive, black and unmistakeable, was better than any crew had dared to hope for, and the job was then as good as done.
Flak was plentiful but inaccurate, and there were no fighters. The only impediment to the bombing was the smoke which hung, black and brown over the ship from the first bomb strikes, and the guns. It was impossible to be certain of results through that smoke, but fairly late in the attack, a plume of white smoke shot up two or three hundred feet like a jet. The last aircraft to leave watched the ship heel slowly on to one side. The Film Unit aircraft was able to take photographs of the ship throughout the entire action, and the last photographs showed that the attack had been a complete success, and that the Tirpitz had capsized. This was confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft, less than two hours after the attack, who reported the bottom of the ship just above the water.
Why the Tirpitz was not adequately protected by fighters, the only protections against high level bombing, can at present be only a matter for conjecture here, and may be being more thoroughly investigated by the German High Command. The ship must have been aware of the approach of the force, at least half an hour before the attack, once the climb to bombing height was commenced from the rendezvous. It may be that the German Navy did not rate the bombing accuracy of the Royal Air Force as high as it does now, or that fighters were despatched to intercept, but too late. After the attack, which was delivered by 29 aircraft, 18 of 617 Squadron and 11 of 9 Squadron, all aircraft dived towards the sea, and until well out of range of Norwegian fighter bases, flew low. No fighters were seen at all on this operation, or for that matter on the two previous ones. All aircraft landed without incident with the exception of one, of which the crew is known to be safe.
Thus was brought to an end the inglorious career of one of the largest and most heavily armed and armoured ships afloat.
The following gives a brief outline of the career of the Tirpitz:-
(i) April 1st, 1939. Launched at Wilhelmshaven.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
(ii) March, 1942. Attacked off the Loften Islands by Naval aircraft of H.M.S. Victorious. (Unserviceable for four months)
(iii) July, 1942. Attacked by a Russian submarine. (Undergoing repairs at Trondheim until December).
(iv) After a complete refit, the earlier months of 1943 were spent in trials, cruises, and the training of the crew for naval operations.
(v) September 9th, 1943. Tirpitz raided the Island of Spitzbergen in the face of negligible opposition.
(vi) September 22nd, 1943. Midget submarines of H.M. Navy attacked and badly damaged the Tirpitz in Alten Fiord. (Next six months spent in Alten Fiord undergoing repairs).
(vii) April, 1944. Tirpitz once again ready to go to sea, when she was attacked by Naval aircraft and once again sent into retirement.
(viii) July 17th, August 22nd, 24th and 29th, 1944. With signs of completion of repairs, Tirpitz was once again attacked by Naval aircraft, this time by Barracudas, and was again rendered unseaworthy.
(ix) September 15th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters flying from Russian bases. Damaged by at least one hit.
(x) October 29th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters. On this occasion cloud over the target rendered the attack inconclusive.
(xi) November 12th, 1944. Attacked in clear weather by Lancasters of No. 5 Group carrying Tallboy bombs, and capsized at her berth West of Tromso.
The coup-de-grace was delivered without the loss of a single life of the attacking force. The success of this attack cannot be measured in terms of the thousands of gallons of fuel used, hundreds of hours flown, or the number of 12,000 lb bombs dropped. The mere existence of the Tirpitz in her Northern berth has threatened all our convoys to and from Russia and North Atlantic shipping, and has cost the lives of a number of Fleet Air Arm crews who have attacked her, and has tied down a not inconsiderable force of the British Home Fleet in Northern Bases.
As the Commander-in-Chief himself has said, there was no doubt about the ultimate fate of the Tirpitz once the crews were able to draw a bead on her, and those who took part have received many congratulations on their magnificent achievement.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
German Ports and their approaches have been the main target for our Gardeners this month; the remainder of the Command effort continued to be directed against the Kattegat area.
Penetrations to the enemy’s door step were evenly shared by all squadrons, and P.P.I. photographs reveal neat patterns of well planted vegetables in their allotted positions. 126 vegetables were successfully laid, and it is already known that great disturbances were caused off a certain German harbour; shipping came to a stand still for several days, while the local harbour master was at pains to find a safe channel “out” or “in” for his concentrated shipping traffic jam.
No.627 Squadron have now joined the Group Gardening Force, and were most unfortunate in their first sortie, owing to unexpected weather conditions in the target area. But like true Gardeners they returned to base with their valuable load. Well done, and better luck next time.
[Tables Showing Command and Group Summaries of Vegetables Planted]
[Underlined] NEWS EXTRACTS OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST SHIPPING. [/underlined]
Some German captains of coal ships are reported to have opposed successfully attempts to make them sail to Western Norwegian ports from Oslo. Colliers sent from Germany cannot be unloaded – as the coal dumps in the Oslo area are full, and therefore lose valuable time while waiting for discharge. This shows weakness in administration if ships are in fact allowed to leave Germany for places where coal is either not wanted or cannot be discharged.
It is reported that in various ports, Norwegian crews have refused to sail, and in some cases foreign crews have left their ships.
The enemy has been short of crews for his merchant ships for some time. There is little chance of his being able to find substitutes for crews which refuse to sail. If these reports are true, then dislocation to shipping must be considerable.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HOMBERG – 1ST NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith
Operations opened with a daylight attack by 226 aircraft on the synthetic oil plant at Homberg, a few miles to the North West of Duisburg.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] By the time the main force reached the target area, the target itself was covered by a layer of 10/10ths cloud, 8,000 – 10,000 feet. Gee reception was poor, and the wind-finding was consequently not up to the usual standard. The first wave arrived over the target about two minutes before the Wanganui flares went down, and were unable to attack. This illustrates the importance and the difficulty of accurate timing when marking is by Oboe. They brought their bombs back. 158 main force aircraft bombed the sky markers, which were reported as scattered. 54 were abortive, and twelve bombed alternative or last resort targets.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] (i) The chances of success of this operation were still further prejudiced by an aircraft which had its V.H.F. transmitter switched on during the entire period of control. The Master Bomber’s orders were jammed, and very few crews were able to hear his instructions. The pilot of the aircraft concerned, was gripping the press-to-speak switch continuously in the target area. Arrangements are now in hand to substitute the bombing switch on the control wheel for the existing press-to-speak switch. The bombing switch cannot possibly be operated accidentally.
Incidentally on each occasion on which intercom. has been inadvertently radiated during an operation, much unnecessary chatter has been heard, and the crews have addressed each other by their Christian or nick-names. This not only displays a low standard of crew discipline, but is also contrary to Ni.5 Group Air Staff Instruction TRG/18 which reads as follows:-
“To obviate the risk of confusion over the aircraft intercommunication system, members of aircrews are to address each other according to their duty in the aircraft, viz:-
Captain
Navigator
Bomb Aimer
Wireless Operator
Engineer
Mid-upper
Tail Gunner”
(ii) Fighter Command reported that the formation was good, reasonably compact, and easy to escort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DUSSELDORF – 2/3RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
187 aircraft of the Group took part in a combined Command attack on Dusseldorf, the chief administrative centre of the Ruhr. An undamaged portion of the built-up area on the eastside of the Ruhr was selected for attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. using both ground and skymarkers. Crews were to use their own navigation winds for bombing. A mixed load of H.E. and incendiaries was carried. Possible cloud cover of as much as 6/10ths – 9/10ths cu. and strato cu. was forecast in the target area, and crews were given separate aiming instructions for attacking the Wanganui flares.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather over the target proved to be clear, with the normal industrial ground haze. 177 aircraft attacked the primary target, aiming at the ground markers. Marking was reported as accurate, and the bombing was believed to have been well concentrated, with the exception of a few aircraft whose photographs showed that they bombed short. The sorties of these crews have been cancelled. Reconnaissance has revealed that a very heavy concentration of bombs fell in the Northern suburbs which were the target, and the whole area was virtually destroyed. This practically completes the entire destruction of Dusseldorf. In addition, all the important industrial plants in this area, including the large Rheinmetal-Borsig armament works, were severely damaged, and scarcely a building has escaped either complete destruction or heavy damage.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – 4/5TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr Smith
Deputy:- S/Ldr Churcher
The importance which the Germans attach to the Dortmund-Ems Canal as one of their main transport arteries was amply demonstrated by the fact that both branches of the canal, breached and emptied by the 5 Group raid on 23/24th September, were repaired within less than six weeks, and in full working order. The same stretch of canal was therefore attacked for a second time, by 176 main force aircraft on 4/5th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point, on the narrow island separating the two branches of the canal, was to be marked direct by Mosquitoes of No.54 Base with Red T.I’s. All aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 G.P’s and crews were ordered to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the red T.I’s.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] There was no cloud in the target area, and visibility was good. Illumination and marking was punctual, but the markers fell some two hundred yards N.N.E. of the marking point and these, together with the T.I’s dropped by the backers up, formed a concentration at which the main force aimed their bombs.
The resulting concentration was the best the Group has yet achieved. An analysis shows that all but 5% of the bombs are contained in a circle radius 530 yards about the M.P.I. This works out at 25 bombs per acre per 1,000 bombs dropped around the M.P.I. and far exceeds any previous results. Both branches of the canal were once again breached and drained, and where the eastern arm crosses the river Glane bombs have penetrated through the bed of the canal.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This attack pulverised the Eastern subsidiary channel but only the fringe fell over the Western area with the result that the damage was soon repaired. It draws attention to the serious effect of even a slight vector or marking error when attacking such small targets.
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – 6/7TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith.
This canal, which joins the Dortmund-Ems canal at Gravenhorst, connects the Ruhr with Osnabruck, Hanover, Brunswick, Magdeburg and Berlin. A section of it near Gravenhorst was selected for an attack by 248 aircraft on 6/7th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Mosquitoes were given a point to mark up against the embankment on the Northern side of the canal. A tolerance of 200 yards to either side of the embankment was allowed. Winds were to be found by aircraft of the flare force, and a vector broadcast to the main force by this Headquarters, to shift the bombing some 300 yards along the canal to the North East. With a surface wind from the West, it was hoped to lay a lozenge shaped concentration across the canal at an angle of approximately 30°.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Owing to a combination of unforeseen circumstances, this attack was abortive, and the Master Bomber ordered the force to return to base with their bombs. This operation is an example of how things can go wrong, in spite of careful planning. The snags encountered are listed below:-
(i) There were 7 H.2.S. failures amongst the aircraft of the Blind Marker and Flare Forces, an altogether exceptional number.
(ii) The target area winds were found to be much stronger than forecast, although accurate in direction. The flares were consequently scattered and too far to the East, and although two Mosquitoes found the canal junction there was insufficient illumination for them to identify the marking point.
(iii) One of the Mosquito markers eventually identified the marking point, and succeeded in dropping a Red T.I. close to the bridge nearby, but it unfortunately fell into the canal, and was extinguished before any backing up could take place.
An additional cause of confusion was the choice of Green T.I’s for both the route markers and the Primary Blind Markers, and in future different colours will be used.
[Underlined] HARBURG – 11/12TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
A force of 245 aircraft was despatched to attack the oil refinery and storage installations and the town centre at Harburg, on the South side of the River Elbe, opposite Hamburg.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] There were four aiming points, A, B, C, and D, the first three in the dock area to the North-West of the town and the fourth (D) in the town centre. All aircraft were to approach on a heading of 143° T. Approximately 70% of the force carried on H.E. load: (those attacking the oil plant) and 30% an incendiary load (for the town area).
A suitable marking point was selected, upwind of the target area. At H – 11, blind markers were to drop T.I. Green on the target, these were to be followed by flares, in the light of which Mosquitoes were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point.
[Underlined] Primary Method. [/underlined] Aircraft on aiming points A, B and C were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I’s releasing without any delay. False vectors were to be applied to the bombsight to bring the bombs onto the aiming points. Aircraft on aiming point D were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I. Red, on the ordered heading, delaying the release for 26 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather was clear, except for a thin layer of stratus at 8,000 feet, and the Master Bomber decided on the primary plan. The flares were rather late, but they were dropped accurately, and Marker 2 dropped a Red T.I. estimated as 80 yards West of the aiming point. These were backed up by further Red T.I’s in positions assessed as 200 yards North and 200 yards South. The actual positions of the markers cannot be identified on the night photographs. The main force was instructed to attack the resulting concentration of Red T.I’s according to plan. Bombing in the early stages was reported as rather scattered, but a good concentration developed later, and at the end of the attack, both target areas were well alight.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Both these targets had previously been attacked on daylight by aircraft of the U.S.A.A.F. on three recent occasions previous to the 5 Group attack, and although considerable damage by H.E. is seen in the oil refinery area, and damage to residential and business property, and the marshalling yards in the Northern half of the town, no precise statement of the damage inflicted by this night attack can at present by [sic] given.
[Underlined] DUREN – 16TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber provided by P.F.F.
Duren lay on the main road between Aix la Chappelle and Cologne, and therefore on the direct route of the Allies’ advance to the Ruhr in that sector. The entire town was a fortified area containing troops, munitions and other supplies. A force of 214 aircraft, was despatched to destroy the buildings, their contents, and the defences, and in addition to block the roads and crossings. No.1 Group also provided a force of over 200 aircraft to attack the same target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] In view of the weather conditions en route, Bases were ordered to form up in “gaggles” on a time basis, and a leader was appointed for each pair of Squadrons. Marking for the attack was controlled musical parramatta, provided by No.8 Group. Primary markers were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I’s and other P.F.F. aircraft were to keep the aiming point marked with T.I. Red and Green throughout the attack. If the T.I’s became obscured, the Master Bomber was to give aiming instructions with reference to the upwind edge of the smoke.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
In view of the proximity of American troops, very strict orders were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless:-
(i) The T.I’s could be clearly seen.
(ii) The target could be positively identified.
(iii) A timed run could be made from a positively identified position not more than 3 miles from the target.
The Master Bombing Switch was used on this occasion, as an additional precaution against the premature release of bombs. Aircraft were also ordered to home on Gee along the ‘B’ lattice line on the last leg into the target, with the release-point co-ordinated set up.
[Underlined] RESULTS [underlined] The weather was clear over the target, but there was ground haze and smoke from a previous attack. The attack was carried out according to plan. Marking was accurate and the bombing very concentrated; crews bombed either the T.I’s or the upwind edge of the smoke, according to the instructions of the Master Bomber whose controlling was reported to have been excellent. The centre of Duren was entirely devastated, only a few walls being left standing. To the South and East, scattered buildings were largely gutted or destroyed, and all roads were rendered impassable. The town marshalling yards, previously damaged in a U.S.A.A.F. raid, received a further severe mauling.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – LADBERGEN – 21/22 ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were making strenuous efforts to repair the damage inflicted on this canal by 176 of the Group on 4/5th November. It was decided to attack this target in the same place once again, to prevent this repair work from being carried out and if possible to add to the damage caused in the previous attacks.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Illumination and marking in normal sequence. Mosquitoes to mark aiming point with Red T.I. Main force crews to aim the first bomb of the stick at the Red T.I. or as ordered by the Master Bomber. Bomb load maximum load 1,000 lb. A few aircraft carried 6 X 1,900 lb G.P. bombs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 123 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes attacked. The weather in the target area was 6 – 9/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet, with good visibility below. Flares were accurate and on time, and the Mosquitoes were able to identify and mark the aiming point. The Master Bomber called the main force in to bomb as planned and the attack was concluded without a hitch.
A very satisfactory concentration was achieved round the markers, and subsequent reconnaissance shows that very great damage has been done. Both branches of the canal have been breached where they cross the River Glane, and both arms have once again been drained, flooding considerable areas of surrounding countryside, and leaving many barges high and dry. The Western embankment of the main canal has been breached in one position for about 150 feet. The subsidiary arm of the canal has been so heavily cratered that its outline can scarcely be recognised. Once again a long stretch of this important canal has been drained, many barges have been destroyed, and others lie with their cargoes high and dry on the canal bed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – GRAVENHORST – 21/22ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
The Mittelland canal, which runs from East to West from Berlin to the Ruhr, joins the Dortmund-Ems canal (which runs South to North, to connect the Ruhr with the North Sea) a few miles East of Rheine. A section of this canal, just East of its junction with the Dortmund-Ems, was selected for attack with the intention of severing both these important arteries.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A bridge across the canal was selected as the aiming point and a suitable position near the bank some 500 yards to the S.W. as a marking point. The illumination and marking plan was as usual, but in this case the markers were not to be attacked direct, but crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s dropped by the Mosquitoes, and a false vector set on the bombsight was calculated to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Ordered bombing height was 8 – 9,500 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Illumination and marking were punctual and accurate, but 8/10ths to 10/10ths strato cu, base about 4,000 feet, was encountered in the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb below cloud. 137 Lancasters and 6 Mosquitoes attacked. A good concentration developed, but there was some undershooting, which was inevitable owing to the change in height and the difficulty of vectoring when so low. Nevertheless, the canal has been breached on the West side for a distance of some 50 feet immediately South of the bridge, which was the aiming point. The canal itself has been almost emptied in this stretch and many barges are stranded. In addition many barges have been damaged by direct hits, and both banks of the canal have been heavily cratered.
[Underlined] TRONDHEIM – 22/23RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
A force of 178 aircraft took off to attack the submarine pens.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected near the pens. The usual blind marker and flare sequence was ordered, and in the light of the flares, Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s to mark the marking point. A false wind vector was to be used to shift the bombs onto the aiming point. Bombing heights, 9,000 to 12,000 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather conditions favoured a precision attack such as this: the target area was located without difficulty, and flares and two blind marker Green T.I’s were dropped accurately. Unfortunately the enemy was able to put a smoke screen into operation, which effectively obscured both the marking and aiming points, and the Mosquitoes were unable to mark. Unfortunately the target lay immediately outside a Norwegian town, thus precluding blind bombing, and the Master Bomber was reluctantly obliged to order the force to return to base with their bombs.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 26/27TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Weather conditions over the target promised to be ideal for an attack on Munich, during the night of 26/27th November, so a maximum
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
effort was ordered. The weather at bases and en route was very tricky, and the decision to go ahead with the attack was not made until the last possible moment. 278 aircraft took off, many with a visibility in the region of 1,000 yards and cloud base 600 feet. A fine achievement.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two major sectors of the town were selected, one radiating between 019° T. and 060° T, from the marking point, and the other between 081° T. and 150° T. The aircraft in the first sector to carry 1 X 1,000 MC/GP plus maximum ‘J’ incendiary clusters, and those in the second sector 4 lb incendiary clusters, with 50% of them carrying 1 X 4,000 lb bomb.
The two major sectors were sub-divided, and sector headings and appropriate delays were allotted in the usual way. No. 9 Squadron aircraft each carrying 1 X 12,000 lb H.C. bomb were spread throughout all sectors.
Illumination and marking in the normal sequence, bombing heights 16,000 – 20,000 feet.
With freezing level at 2,000 feet and a front lying approximately over the English Channel with tops generally at 20,000 feet, with occasional cu. nimb. Up to 25,000 feet, the flight plan presented a difficult problem. It was eventually decided that, after take off, aircraft should fly South over England below 2,500 feet, maintaining this height until the front had been crossed. Aircraft were to fly over the top of the front on the homeward route, losing height behind it.
The route to the target was chosen to give the enemy as little warning as possible: it lay South of Switzerland, crossed Lakes Maggiore and Como, and then went N.N.E. to the target, across the Alps. This plan was entirely successful, and the defences did not come to life until the attack was well under way.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The Master Bomber was delayed taking off, so Marker I, who was the deputy, conducted the opening phases of the attack. Illumination and blind marking went as planned. At H – 7 a Red T.I. was dropped, and assessed as almost on the marking point. At this moment the Master Bomber arrived, assumed control, and confirmed the accuracy of the Red T.I. Backers-up were called in, and marking was completed by H – 1. One Red T.I. which was assessed as wide to the North was cancelled by a Yellow T.I. The main force was then ordered to attack as planned.
Pilot’s reports were very enthusiastic about the success of this attack, but a large proportion of the night photographs plotted show ground detail to the South of the target, and it is now clear that the point marked was some 2/3,000 yards too far South. Nevertheless at least half of the attack went into the town and Southern suburbs and considerable damage should have been caused.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This was the first occasion on which the Group as a whole has used Loran, and the results were very satisfactory. The concentration on the return route showed a marked improvement on the degree of concentration previously achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATOR (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] CONTROLLED OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
W/T operating by the W/T link operators throughout November maintained a fairly high standard, and reception of their transmissions by the Main Force operators was also of a high order. 54 Base again supplied all the W/T link operators and both squadrons are to be congratulated on their efficiency. This result has been accomplished by hard training.
Two interesting incidents which took place on the night of the 11th and 22nd respectively are worthy of mention. On the night of the 11th, four minutes before the first bombing wind was due to be transmitted back to Group, sever ‘jostling’ was experienced on the frequency. Prompt action by the C.S.O. enabled this frequency to be cleared just in time for controlling to commence. We again realise just how effective this countermeasure is. On the night of the 22nd propagation conditions were such that reception at all the Group Ground Stations was practically impossible, yet when crews returned it was found that ait to air reception was perfect and 100% reception accomplished.
The Link 1 and 2 operators who carried out control duties during the month were:-
Night 4th F/O Booth 83 Squadron Link 1
F/O Chapman 83 Squadron Link 2
Night 6th F/Sgt Manderson 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Whitehead 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 11th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Utting 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 12th F/O Ward 617 Squadron Link 1 )Tirpitz
Sgt Morgan 9 Squadron Link 1 ) attack
Night 22nd Sgt Smith 97 Squadron Link 1
Sgt Moroney 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 27th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 2
F/Lt Summerscales 83 Squadron Link 3
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During the month 61 Wireless Operators took part in the test as detailed in 5G.S.I. No.13 and out of this number 54 passed as fit for W/T Link duties. Tabulated below are the number of operators per squadron who took part in these tests.
[Table of Numbers of Wireless Operator Tests by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during last month was disappointing, due to a number of squadrons not yet having all their equipment installed in their new training rooms, Signals Leaders are asked to exert pressure in the right direction to hurry along the completion of these training rooms so as to enable advantage to be taken of this organised and highly profitable training. We extend a hearty welcome to the Heavy Conversion Units of No.75 Base to take part in these exercises, and hope they will find the exercise interesting and of instructional value.
[Underlined] POINTS FOR SIGNALS LEADERS. [/underlined]
During regrading tests throughout the month it was distressing to find that very few Wireless Operators (Air) knew anything at all about the V.H.F. equipment TR.5043. Now this is definitely Signals equipment, and all Wireless Operators (Air) should know at least sufficient about the installation to enable them to rectify any simple fault which may occur in the air, such as the replacing of fuses, power leads, aerial connections etc. Particular instruction should be given to the drill for checking whether the set is on transmit or receive.
The introduction of the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule has filled a long felt want, and will be much appreciated by all Wireless Operators (Air). Like all other publications it will only fulfil [sic] its rightful purpose if it is always kept amended up to date, and the responsibility for amending all copies lies with the Signals Leader. He should ensure that all “Wilmot” signals are received and any amendments to the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule are embodied immediately.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The total percentage of Signals Failures against sorties flown for the month of November, was 1.82 which shows a decrease of 0.497 against the figure for October. It will be seen from the Signals Failure Monthly Circular that there was also a decrease during October, the percentage decrease for both months being 0.619. This achievement is really outstanding when one realises the unfavourable weather conditions the servicing personnel have encountered over this period. It all goes to show that IT CAN BE DONE – good show chaps!
There is also a bouquet this month for the Wireless Operators (Air) – there were no manipulation failures; an excellent state of affairs.
During the month not one sortie was cancelled (Class A) as the result of a signals defect. How many realise that this record has been maintained over the past 5 months?
[Underlined] I.F.F. COURSES. [/underlined]
Five courses involving 57 Wireless Mechanics drawn from all stations in the Group were held at Morton Hall during the month. Great keeness [sic] was shown and the instructor, Sergeant Ryder, reports very favourably on the standard attained. The Chief Signals Officer took the opportunity of discussing with each course the problems connected with aircraft servicing and was able to obtain some useful ‘gen’. The fact that a vast majority of our Group 1 tradesmen are still looking forward to an early return to civilian occupations was once more confirmed, and was countered by a graphic description of life in the peace-time airforce which it is hoped may have the effect of changing some of their minds.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T – TR.5043. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
The TR.5043 gave good serviceability during November, there were ten failures reported against more than 2,000 sorties. Four of the failures (all in one Base) were “NOTHING HEARD – NO FAULT FOUND”. Are Signals Officers doing all in their power to prevent this type of defect? There were two cases of Aerials Type 147 breaking; this is a decrease in comparison with the figure for October.
During the month, exhaustive experiments were carried out at Metheringham by 3 R.A.E. specialists in connection with aerial breakages. The result of these experiments is, that [underlined] all [/underlined] Lancaster aircraft TR.5043 aerials (including H.2.S. aircraft) can safely be fitted in strict accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10.
[Underlined] VOLUME CONTROLS. [/underlined]
Three different types of volume controls for operation by the pilot are now undergoing test in various Lancaster aircraft in the Group. Results to date are somewhat varied, some pilots stating that the new control in ‘bang on’ whilst others aver that the minimum position still permits incoming V.H.F. R/T Signals to interfere with intercom. We are determined to find the ideal before launching a general fitting programme.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T COURSES. [/underlined]
No.1 Radio School, Cranwell, has undertaken to give all Signals Officers in the Group a four-day course on the V.H.F. R/T set TR.5043.
The first two courses report enthusiastically on the efficiency with which this course is being run and they thoroughly enjoyed the brief opportunity to be immune from telephone calls and other diversions whilst learning all there is to know about this interesting set.
[Underlined] INADVERTENT RADIATION ON INTERCOM. [/underlined]
Yet another case has occurred of crew intercom. being radiated on V.H.F. R/T in the target area. This resulted in serious inconvenience by jamming to some extent the R/T traffic. It had been considered that all possible action had been taken to prevent this sort of thing happening. All Main Force aircraft have a switch fitted in the H.T lead to the V.H.F. Transmitter, and this switch is locked in the ‘Off’ position prior to take off. All aircraft which may be called upon to transmit on their V.H.F. R/T, have this switch in the ‘On’ position, but are equipped with a Neon light indicator positioned near the navigator which lights up whenever the V.H.F. set is transmitting. In spite of these precautions, however, an aircraft of the illuminating force inadvertently radiated intercom. on V.H.F. It seems that it will be necessary to reposition the neon indicator, and also make use of the pilot’s bomb release switch in lieu of the existing press-to-speak switch which unfortunately is in such a position on the control wheel that it can be gripped, and pressed, in the ‘On’ position accidentally. The Pilot’s bomb release switch is fitted on the control wheel in such a way that it cannot possibly be actuated accidentally.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The closing days of the month saw the final stages of the Loran fitting programme. This fitting programme almost brought back reminiscences of the Monica Mark V days, and much credit must be accorded to the wholehearted efforts of the Engineering and Radar personnel who installed the bracketry and equipment in double-quick time.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
The successful use of the equipment on the Munich operation on the night 26/27th gave a very useful fillip to enthusiasm, and effectively squashed the mutterings of the “doubting Thomases”. The serviceability figures, in view of the usual manipulation troubles and initial “bugs”, are promising. It has been found that the indicator becomes unusually temperamental when damp, but waterproof covers should clear this trouble.
Shortage of the main boxes and lack of spare components were sources of complaints, but both will be cleared almost directly.
[Underlined] A.G.L.(T). [/underlined]
Despite the spring tides at Fulbeck which threaten to engulf the Radar workshop, the A.G.L.(T) situation is well in hand. No physical success has been claimed, and the shortage of equipped aircraft is acute, but much useful data has been brought to light, which should do much to assist the final development of this device.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
Progress at Coningsby is steady. The scanner trouble has been cleared, gaps in the polar diagram have been filled in by a simple modifications [sic] which consists of strategically mounting a 16” X 6” sheet of perspex on the mirror. We [underlined] know [/underlined] it does the job all we want to know is [underlined] how [/underlined] it does it. Improvements to the scanner testing equipment have effected considerable economy in flying hours.
[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
The addendum to Monica to defeat the Hun, reached its flying trials this month which were very encouraging, and earned official sanction for the Group to experiment with Monica. All credit for this device must go to F/O Tovey of 53 Base. His prototype made all Walt Disney’s conceptions look very ordinary but he continued to work on the idea tirelessly and patiently, and with T.R.E. assistance brought forth a very workable unit, of which we hope a lot more will be heard.
[Underlined] SECURITY. [/underlined]
This month has seen the introduction of the long awaited Bomber Command Diversion Schedule. As the tag has it “The mountains shall labour and bring forth a ridiculous little mouse”. In this case at least, an eighteen month gestation has produced a noble offspring. There is one note of ridicule, introduced we imagine by some frolicsome “printer’s devil”, and this defect in the Schedule required one of the three following ‘mods’ for its eradication:-
(i) The Schedule to be mounted on a bracket and swivel fixed to the W/Op’s (Air) table.
(ii) All W/Op’s (Air) to be fitted with swivel vertebrae above the shoulders.
(iii) The even numbered pages of the Schedule to be printed “the other way up”.
The last of these three ‘mods’ has been requisitioned, and until it appears we wish you good luck and happy diversions.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED. [/underlined]
The Field Security Police have a multitude of duties,
And amongst other things these precious beauties
Sit in post offices and monitor calls,
And lap up every word that falls
From the lips of Service folk;
This is by no means a joke,
Though it may seem to be at first.
The police laugh simply fit to burst
Whenever they hear some solemn voice say,
“This is an Ops. circuit so we needn’t scramble, heh?”
And the other bloke
Says, “Oke!”
When this happens you might guess,
They take it down in shorthad, [sic] (more or less),
And after a court-marital –
To which they’re very partial –
The perpetrators of the crime
Do “time”,
Or they may, it is feared,
Be cashiered!
It all depends upon the rank,
AC Plonk or Flight Lieutenant Blank.
The moral is by now quite clear, I’m sure.
NO circuits can be trusted as secure.
When secrets must be spoken, your preamble
Must always be the magic words, “Please scramble!”
Ops. circuits only give you what you need,
And that is NOT security but Speed!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] WHAT ARE THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD NAVIGATOR? [/underlined]
A good navigator may be summed up as one who works hard all the time, uses his intelligence constantly and makes a conscious effort to be on track and on time throughout every operation.
Do you think you fill that category? To assist you in answering the first question, below is a self analysis chart for you to complete. Be honest with yourself in answering these questions.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUESTIONS. [/underlined]
(1) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] work to a system, and a regular time interval?
(2) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] make a “snap” alteration of course immediately you ascertain you are off track?
(3) Do you check your ETA’s [underlined] regularly [/underlined] every 15 minutes?
(4) When coming into Gee range to you [underlined] always [/underlined] believe the first Gee fix you obtain and act on it?
(5) When no fixing aids available, do you [underlined] always [/underlined] obtain a D.R. position every 15 minutes?
(6) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] “home” on your Southern or Eastern Lattice lines as instructed.
(7) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] check your compasses every 20 minutes?
(8) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] find a w/v over the ideal period of time, i.e. between 15 and 40 minutes.
(9) When necessary to you [underlined] always [/underlined] dog leg or alter IAS so as to arrive at each turning point exactly on time?
This is by no means a comprehensive list, but if you answer all the questions frankly, you will obtain a good assessment of your own ability. If you can say “Yes” to only 70% or less, you are below average; 80% you are average; 90% ad above you can consider yourself a good navigator.
Make a note of the points on which you lose marks, then rectify them [underlined] immediately [/underlined]. Further lists will appear in the next two summaries, so keep a note of your results on this test and by January you will have a complete assessment of yourself.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
The importance of finding accurate w/v’s, [underlined] and using them, [/underlined] has been stressed constantly for the last five years. One would therefore think that, as a result of all this “binding” every Navigator would now realise the importance of windfinding. BUT, unfortunately this is not so, Why?
We now have four “gen boxes” given us to assist in finding really accurate w/v., i.e. Gee, Loran, H.2.S. and A.P.I. All these instruments have been tested very thoroughly and have been proved accurate. All Navigators acknowledge the accuracy of these instruments and trust individual fixes and A/P’s obtained, but when it comes to joining two of these positions together, i.e. fix and Air Position, and obtained a w/v, many Navigators automatically become dubious. If the w/v obtained agrees fairly well with that forecast, or the last few w/v’s found, it is considered accurate. BUT, on the other hand if it differs by any appreciable amount, then in 7 out of every 10 instances a Navigator will say he got a “duff fix”, or else the A.P.I. is overreading!! In other words many Navigators just haven’t the confidence in themselves. Are YOU one of these? If you are, then reform yourself!
It is not generally appreciated that, even with a so-called steady wind the direction is never constant to within 30°, and the speed is never constant to within 10 or 15 miles an hour, so how can you expect to find idential [sic] w/v’s, and in any case how are you to know that there hasn’t been a sudden wind change caused by an unpredicted front or other reason?
Therefore in future, do not mistrust your fixes, A.P.I. readings and resultant w/v’s. Take great care in obtaining these readings and in plotting them accurately, but once you’ve got them treat them as correct – and [underlined] USE [/underlined] the resultant w/v!
[Underlined] COMPASSES. [/underlined]
Do [underlined] YOU [/underlined] always check your Compasses every 20 minutes? This question has been asked already, but it will bear repeating. There are now 3 instruments dependent on the serviceability of the D.R. Compass, namely H.2.S., A.P.I. and Mk.XIV Bombsight, besides of course the safety of the aircraft itself. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the D.R. Compass is fully serviceable all the time.
A recent analysis showed that very few Navigators ever pay sufficient attention to their compasses. Are YOU one of these people who take the Compasses for granted, or do you carry out your checks methodically. Do you for example, ever go out to your aircraft and assist in the swinging, or do you even ask the Compass Adjusters on their return how your compasses are? Do you always carry a compass key in your pocket? Have a look and make sure before you answer the last question. Are you thoroughly conversant with the symptoms of a toppled gyro, and do you know the procedure to be adopted to correct the gyro? [Underlined] But above all, [/underlined] do you know that you should never return early because one of your compasses is unserviceable?
An analysis is carried out after every Group concentration plan has been completed to ascertain why certain aircraft are off track. On every occasion the answer for [underlined] AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT [/underlined] is that vague phrase “COMPASSES U/S”, which, on further examination, means nothing more than “Compasses desynchronised”.
The safety of an aircraft and its crew was therefore jeopardised because the crew [underlined] forgot to check their compasses! [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Longer range targets will be the the priority this Winter and that means deep penetration into a heavily fortified Germany. Accurate Navigation will therefore be absolutely essential and this is directly dependent on the accuracy of your compasses. Be compass minded then – learn all you can about them, know your drills and manipulation procedures off by heart – and above all [underlined] CHECK YOUR COMPASS REGULARLY. [/underlined]
Use the Astro Compass when there is any discrepancy between the P.4 and D.R. Compasses.
Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must continue to drive hard on this subject, checking all new crews on their arrival See that they are thoroughly conversant with the drills, faults, remedies and manipulation procedures, and make it clear to them that on no account do they return early if one compass is unserviceable.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by the squadrons this month is 3.8 m.p.h. This is excellent. This figure shows a decrease of .5 m.p.h. We have achieved our goal of an average vector error below 4 m.p.h. Can we now possibly reduce this error to below 3 m.p.h.? If we can then all navigators can truthfully say they are contributing to very largely to the high standard of bombing we are achieving. Go to it! and see what records you can break this month.
[Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadron]
It will be noted that three squadrons of No.53 Base occupy the first three places this month, the two “old faithfuls”, Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons, still retaining their lead on the rest of the Group. No. 56 Base Squadrons are all down towards the bottom of the list. They can, and have, done very much better than this. Com on No.56 Base, let us see you at the top next month!
Apologies to No. 57 Squadron for last month. Their average vector error was inadvertently shown as 4 m.p.h., whereas it should have read 3.5 m.p.h.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators who submitted the best work this month as [sic] set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track-keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks and checking of E.T.A’s and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/O Hart – No.467 Squadron
P/O Briggs No.83 Squadron
F/O Martin No.106 Squadron
F/O Skinner No.189 Squadron
P/O Searle No.227 Squadron
F/Sgt Shapman No.207 Squadron
F/O Kay No.630 Squadron
F/Sgt Murray No. 50 Squadron
Note that P/O SEARLE appears for the second time. Good work SEARLE – keep it up!
[Underlined] TIMING. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary a long article was written on the slackness of timing on the return journey. Three causes of this “timing spread” were suggested and you were asked to eliminate them and so bring about a much needed improvement in the return journey concentration. Base, Station and Squadron Commanders and Navigation Officers were also asked to have a “drive” in this direction. Only one operation has been carried out since this letter was sent, and on this raid there was a very big improvement. In fact the concentration on the return journey was better than that going to the target!! This is good, keep it up, and make it your aim to achieve the concentration we desire, i.e. “an area covering not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width” – and no more.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Markham – No.463 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Martin – No.61 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Bennett, D.F.M. – No.617 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall. (now S/Ldr.).
F/O Bayne, D.F.C. – No.617 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. De Boos, D.F.C. – No.627 Squadron Navigation Officer, tour expired, posted to No.7 Group.
F/Lt. Tice – No.627 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
S/Ldr. Kelly, D.F.C. – Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck, missing on operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
This new navigational aid has only been used to any great advantage on one operation this month. Despite the difficulties in training and the short time since the introduction of the Loran equipment, operators made full use of the facility it affords, and it has proved without doubt a useful addition to our navigational equipment. The fact that to the present time no interference has been encountered which would make fixing difficult does not imply that the Hun will not attempt to jam the equipment and with this fact in mind every possible operator must use Loran to its fullest advantage whilst it is still possible.
There are one or two points which have arisen in the manipulation and use of this equipment which must be stressed. They are:-
(i) Loran operators are not spending sufficient time in the recognition of signals – particularly differentiation between 1st and 2nd Hop E sky waves. Perseverence [sic] and close watch of the signals on Sweep Speed 3 will ascertain whether the signals are the correct ones. It is appreciated that very little, if any, training can be carried out on the S.S. Loran Chain and operators must endeavour to use time on operations for sky wave training. If you are uncertain as to the appearance of sky waves your obvious remedy is to visit the Radar Training Room after 1630 hours any day and you can get all the gen on the sky waves by using the S.S. or North Eastern Loran Chain on a bench set. Why not make this a nightly feature until you are sure in the identification of all signals.
(ii) No system of taking position lines at regular intervals is being followed. It is no use taking a position line from one rate and keep transferring it along track for an undeterminable number of times to give you fixes with position lines from the other rate. Try taking position lines at regular intervals of say 10 minutes e.g.:-
Rate 4 at 2010 and 2020 and so on.
Rate 5 at 2011 and 2021 and so on.
(iii) The time base readings are easily upset by movement of the fine strobe control during the switching of the Sweep Speed Control through position 5, 6 and 7. Watch this carefully or else you are going to get false fixes. If necessary use your left hand for switching the Sweep Speed Control.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
(iv) Several operators reported the four dividers out of alignment but a few using commonsense [sic] and initiative correctly aligned the dividers and obtained full use of the equipment. As the dividers, particularly A, B, C and D are very critical, alignment checks must be made:-
(a) After switching on procedure has been carried out.
(b) Every two hours when LORAN is in use.
(c) After any large changes of temperature or pressure.
An Aircraft Drill has been produced and is available at all units, detailing the alignment procedure. Loran operators must know this procedure fully and screwdrivers have been made a general issue to all navigators in order that alignment corrections can be made in the air. It is important, however, that operators should know the symptoms of incorrect alignment before they attempt any correction at all. Loran Instructors or Radar Officers will supply all the “gen” on this.
A slight modification to the Loran set is being introduced shortly which enables operators to change the basic rate so that the new North Eastern Loran Chain can be used. This North Eastern Loran Chain the details of which will be available shortly, gives coverage over the whole of the North Sea and should be very useful on Northern trips. It is, however, emphasised that as this Chain is not as accurate as the Norther Gee Chain, Gee must be used to the limit of its coverage. The present charts are to a scale of one to three million and therefore hopeless for Bomber Command navigation. Representations have been made for larger scale charts and these will be distributed as soon as they are received at this Headquarters.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Welcome changes have been made this month in the Continental Gee Chain frequencies with the intention of giving far better facilities from the Ruhr and Rheims Chains. However emphasis is placed upon the correct setting up of the R.F.27 tuning dial to obtain the best reception. Great care is therefore to be exercised in setting the dial correctly when changing from one frequency to another.
The Rheims Chain continues to give excellent results with ranges reported as great as 0930E. Interference is slight and on most occasions non-existent. On the Munich operation the Chain could have been used to considerably greater advantage if suitable charts had been available in time.
The Ruhr Chain is still producing disappointing results and below the standard of the Rheims Chain. A and C Station signal strengths are fairly good. The B and D signals are weak limiting the operational value of the Chain. Sine wave jamming and Heavy Grass has been reported in the Brunswick and Cologne areas.
The Eastern Chain gave excellent results on the Harburg operation, many operators obtaining fixes in the target area. This indicates either the meteorological conditions were favourable for Gee that night, or that the enemy has transferred his jamming to other frequencies.
Representatives have again been made for the production of miniature lattice charts for the Continental Chain as the navigator nowadays has to carry no less than eighteen topographical lattice charts if he is to be prepared for any emergencies. The total area covered by these topographical lattice charts can be reproduced on approximately four miniature lattice charts.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
H.2.S. silence is still being maintained on the Group with total restriction on the use of H.2.S. Mark II and part restriction on H.2.S. Mark III. With the risk of early warning of operations, and until the efficiency of the enemy night fighter equipment is definitely ascertained, it is the policy of this Group to give the enemy as little help from H.2.S. sources as is possible.
H.2.S. operators are reminded that although the use of H.2.S. Mark II is almost totally restricted it may be possible that at some future date consent will be given to its use again. H.2.S. Mark II can be used from the enemy coast on the return journey. This relaxation of the restrictions is intended for training purposes and operators should make the best use of this time to raise their standard of efficiency. H.2.S. is and will remain the most efficient navigational aid over enemy territory because it cannot be jammed efficiently, and with the introduction of new Marks it will again come into general use. All Marks of H.2.S. are manipulated in a similar manner and thorough knowledge of Mark II will ensure more efficient use of the later Marks.
54 Base still continue to make great strides in the use of H.2.S. Mark III as an efficient bombing aid and trials are continuing to ascertain the accuracy of individual sets of H.2.S. equipment by means of ground Radar plots at positions of bombs gone on various targets. Complete analysis of every run is being made to ascertain the errors due to equipment and to the human element. Those due to the equipment can be eliminated. It is up to the individual operators to eliminate the inaccuracy due to human error.
H.2.S. Photography is proceeding satisfactorily throughout the Group, although all main force photographs, except those from 106 Squadron, are of landmarks in this country. From these training photographs it is evident that the standard is improving, and operators are taking a little more time in the manipulation of the camera. There are, however, still one or two unsatisfactory details which can be overcome:- For instance, some operators still persist in having a 10 mile zero as big as a half crown thus distorting the photograph obtained. Remember is should be the size of a sixpence. Others persist in having lights on or letting the daylight into the compartment when taking the photographs thus wasting negatives and printing material. If you persist in making these mistakes during training, far more may be made during an operational sortie due to operational stress. 54 Base have produced some excellent operational photographs, particularly those taken on the operation to Munich. These photographs show the lakes and valleys in the Alps as clearly as on a relief map. The photographs also indicate that the target and lakes nearby are very well defined on the H.2.S. Mark III P.P.I. and will no doubt prove useful for any future attacks.
Squadrons of 55 Base and 106 Squadron have carried out several mining sorties during the month, the results of which have been excellent. The importance of this work cannot be too highly stressed and H.2.S. training on these squadrons is being carried out with this type of operation in mind. There are several convenient landmarks on the East Coast which can be used for mining runs and the number of P.P.I. photographs which have been received indicate that some operators are making use of them during training. The important fact is that all operators on these squadrons must be able to release mines accurately on H.2.S. We cannot afford to lay them outside the normal channels, where they may be a danger to our own shipping.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month the German Night Fighter Force has again failed to offer effective opposition to Bomber Command’s night offensive. The German fighter controllers have been bewildered by the profusion of Window spoofs, Mosquito raids and Intruders, combined with the main attacks, and have failed to intercept the bomber stream with an effective number of fighters. Night fighter are, however, still the biggest danger, and there is no reason to suppose that, once they have contacted the bomber stream, they are any less efficient than they were last Winter. A night fighter, particularly if equipped with upward firing cannon, is a formidable adversary, and a crew must be on the top line to combat it successfully. Good crew discipline is essential. In particular, intercommunications between the pilot and gunners must be clear and concise. Idle chatter and the use of Christian names on the intercom. may mean attending interrogation at Dulag Luft instead of Base.
There are indications that the enemy may, in the very near future, send up fighters against our daylight attacks, particularly on the deeper penetrations we shall be making in the coming months. The fighter escort will deal with what it can, but crews must be prepared for small formations of enemy fighters to get through the escort. This will provide a quick and decisive answer to the ever recurrent problem of stragglers. The enemy may well use jet fighters for these attacks, but crews should remember that, although their speed is very high, there is nothing miraculous about these aircraft. In an attack they behave like conventional fighters and should be treated as such. Although they are armed with 30 m.m. cannon, these have such a low muzzle velocity that, for accurate shooting, they are not effective over 400 yards, which will give gunners a good chance of shooting back.
A final warning. A case has come to light recently where a captain admitted letting his rear gunner leave his turret over France and the sea when returning from the target. This is criminal. German night fighters are often ordered to follow the bomber stream across friendly territory, and well out to sea, and captains must remember that an operation finishes in dispersal, and not a moment sooner.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The activities of the Group in the operational sphere have mostly been intended to destroy small targets rather than to bomb areas of large cities.
Despite unfavourable weather conditions on frequent occasions, the results have been reasonably satisfactory from the Air Bomber’s point of view and the necessity of maintaining a high standard of precision bombing must be apparent. Obtaining the best possible results on precision targets at night, when visual identification is impossible, necessitates a thorough knowledge of the tactical plan and the ability to carry it out to the letter. The plots of the incendiary attacks on sectors illustrate that the majority of Air Bombers are doing their best to guide the aircraft over the marking point, but it must be realised that after the dummy bombing run on to the marker, it is essential that the aircraft should be on the briefed track as quickly as possible. As soon as the marker comes into the intersection of the bombsight graticule and is reported by the Air Bomber, the immediate reactions of the bombing team are as follows:-
(a) The Navigator commences to count off the required number of seconds consistent with the basic delay plus the delay for the incendiary bombs.
(b) The Pilot turns on to the course given by the Navigator prior to reaching the target area, and confirms that he is on the correct course.
(c) The Air Bomber does a last minute check of the bombing panel and releases the bombs on the executive word from the Navigator.
The correct observance of this procedure will ensure that the required incendiary concentration falls in the areas where the maximum amount of damage can be caused.
Now that Winter has arrived, all Air Bombers must be prepared for icing in the bomb-bay. The only preventative measure that can be undertaken is to see that the release slip heater for No.13 station is switched on at take-off, but by a careful examination of the bomb-bay after landing, it will be possible to see if any incendiaries have fallen from the S.B.C’s on to the doors and the ground crew will know what to expect when they open the bomb-doors. A careful examination of the bomb-bay after the aircraft has been flying below freezing level for some time will help to prevent any accidents on the ground after landing. It should be remembered that there will be no indication of bombs hanging-up due to icing, when the Air Bomber does his lights check.
The importance of switch drill, and accuracy in bombsight settings, must be frequently stressed by Bombing Leaders at every possible opportunity. An error of one or two degrees in bombsight levelling will give a large error on the ground, and despite the difficulty in setting the correct levelling figure on the computor [sic] box, every effort must be made to see that it is correct to the nearest degree. Constantly check your switches and bombsight on the way to the target, and remember that your target is not a town or city, but a small area in that town or city, and to hit is successfully you must be accurate as if bombing a practice target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOVEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS. [/underlined]
9 F/O Newton F/Sgt Flynn F/Sgt Grant 71
F/L Marsh F/O Carr F/Sgt Haydon 66
F/O Coater F/Sgt Boag F/Sgt Black 57
F/O Williams F/Sgt Gold Sgt Lockerbie 53
50 F/O Jones Sgt Jarmy Sgt Davis 77
F/O Ling F/Sgt Howard F/O Rutland 68
83 F/O Inniss F/O Morrison F/Sgt Dormer 73
F/L Weber Sgt Summers Sgt Thorn 76
97 F/O Greening Sgt Nutt F/Sgt Cairn 72
F/L Brooker F/O Pearce F/O Brown 42
F/O Ryan Sgt Kirkby F/O Sabine 56
F/O Royston-Piggott W/O Bate F/Sgt Madley 73
106 P/O May Sgt George F/Sgt Barling 61
207 F/O Rose Sgt Weaver Sgt Bell 75
617 F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien 63
F/O Gingles W/O Hazell F/Sgt Johnson 70
F/L Sayers P/O Weaver F/O Strom 73
F/O Martin F/Sgt Day F/Sgt Jackson 54 54
F/O Joplin F/Sgt Hebbard F/Sgt Fish 71
630 F/O Baker F/Sgt Leyden F/Sgt Taeuber 66
F/O Miller F/O Banks W/O Wildey 74
F/O Martin and crew, No.617 Squadron, have for the second successive month, obtained two crew errors of less than 60 yards at 20,000 feet. These results are obtained only by concentration on the part of Pilot and Air Bomber and are commendable efforts.
F/L Brooker and crew, No.97 Squadron, obtained the excellent result of 42 yards using the Mark XIV Bombsight.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
P/O Willmot, No.49 Squadron, obtained fifth place on the Bombing Leader’s Course, being awarded a “B” Category.
There have been no changes in the squadrons during November.
All Bombing Leaders are asked to make a point of seeing that their returns are forwarded to Group Headquarters as soon as possible after the end of each week and month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING . [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE ERROR [/underlined]
1 9 65 yards
2 ) 97 70 yards
2 ) 619 70 yards
4 630 71 yards
5 49 72 yards
6 83 73 yards
7 44 74 yards
8 207 86 yards
9 463 87 yards
10 57 88 yards
11 50 100 yards
12 467 114 yards
13 106 124 yards
14 61 125 yards
15 189 126 yards
The top place in the Group Competition has again changed hands, 9 Squadron having improved on their last month’s entry by 8 yards, and they are well ahead of the next six Squadrons who submitted entries all within 6 yards.
No. 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their excellent bombing and it is hoped that they can hold their place against the strong opposition which will be provided by other squadrons during December.
No.55 Base have repeated their recent consistently good bombing and all five squadrons are included in the first ten, 619 Squadron showing the greatest improvement with a decrease of 23 yards on their October result.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three practice bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
No. 627 Squadron dropped 409 bombs at heights lower than 1000 feet with an average error of 71 yards.
172 T.I’s were dropped producing an average error of 191 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. If you find you are getting no air supply after switching on the air control what is the first thing to check?
2. Which pistol is liable to operate even though the bomb has been released “SAFE”?
3. What is used to indicate the presence of Allied troops during close support attacks on targets near the front line?
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The two entries received in this competition have both been sent in from Strubby.
G/Capt. Jeudwine – 138 yards at 20,000 ft.
W/Cdr. Milward (619 Sqdn.) – 205 yards at 20,000 ft.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The solitary entry for this competition came from 55 Base.
F/Lt. Linnett (57 Sqdn.) – 104 yards.
F/Lt Rumgay (617 Sqddn.) has completed several excellent exercises using the S.A.B.S. which unfortunately, cannot be included in the competition.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The total number of practice bombs dropped during November shows a considerable decrease when compared with October’s figures (2577 against 3898). Adverse weather conditions made practice bombing impossible on many days during the month, but some Squadrons made maximum use of the available opportunities.
The average crew error, although slightly higher than last month, is very satisfactory and special mention must be made of 9 Squadron’s efforts which produced and average error of 122 yards.
There are occasions when considerable congestion has been caused at Bombing Ranges because of the large number of aircraft attempting to bomb at the same time. It is only possible to allocate two targets to each Base and this congestion should be reduced with closer co-operation between Squadron Bombing Leaders, and the staggering of Bombing times allocated to each aircraft.
Bombing Leaders are also reminded that night practice bombing programmes should be transmitted to Ranges before 1800 hours if possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
incendiary attacks
[Underlined] BRUINSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER [/underlined]
It is probable that with the limited time available before an operation, crews may not appreciate the complete picture of the plan of which each squadron forms a component part. It is proposed, therefore, to take one of the incendiary attacks which this Group has carried out, giving in broad outline the intention, plan and execution of the attack.
The target chosen is Brunswick, which was selected for attack by this Group on the 14/15th October. Appended is a P.R.U. photograph of the town of Brunswick, showing the damage inflicted by the attack, bounded by the red line. The smaller areas bounded by green lines represent damage prior to the 14/15th October. The attack was highly successful but nevertheless illustrated how even small deviations from the agreed plan can jeopardise success.
[Underlined] INTENTION. [/underlined]
Brunswick has always been an important communications centre due to its position on the trade route from Hamburg to Southern Germany and its importance increased with the development of inland waterways and railways. Its pre-war major industries were swiftly placed on a war footing to supply the German armed forces and the beginning of the war also saw the rapid development of major aircraft and engineering industries in the town, particularly in the Northern and Southern suburbs.
It is not surprising therefore that this town, lying as it does within range of bases in Great Britain, has received regular attention from the Allied Air Forces. Since the strategical bombing of Germany began, a total of 6129 tons of bombs have been reported as dropped on the town by Bomber Command alone. But in common with a few other towns, like STUTTGART and FRANKFURT, it bore an unusually charmed life. While bombing depended upon visual methods of target finding, this was partly explained by the lack of good water landmarks near the town, but the difficulty of finding and bombing the target persisted after the introduction of RADAR aids, as will be seen from the following summary of major Bomber Command raids this year, including two by this Group, which left the town almost unscathed.
14/15th January – 472 aircraft
22/23rd April – 256 aircraft
22/23rd May – 211 aircraft
13/14th August – 350 aircraft
These raids are additional to several A.S.A.A.F. raids directed specific factories which were in the main successful.
[Underlined] PLAN. [/underlined]
There are two main alternative methods of carrying out an incendiary attack on a town of this nature. The first is to put the T.I’s on the centre of the town and to bomb these direct. This method
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
has a number of disadvantages the most important being that T.I’s in a built up area will seldom show up as brightly as those dropped on open ground, so that any markers which may be wide of the target will almost certainly attract the bombing. This occurred on the first attack on Konigsberg. Moreover, as soon as bombing starts the markers become obscured by incendiaries and smoke, and have to be continually backed up, this adding to the risk of inaccurate markers falling outside the town.
The alternative is to select a marking point which us likely to be easily recognisable by the marker force and located somewhere on the upwind side of the target. Provided visibility is reasonable all markers should fall within 300 yards of the marking point. If each crew is then given a heading on which to fly and a number of seconds to delay the release of bombs, the whole target area should in theory be covered with an even density of incendiaries and thus be totally destroyed.
It should be noted that this system entails the most precise bombing by each crew otherwise some areas will receive too many incendiaries and others will be left unburnt. The method by which each crew is to pass precisely over the markers and thus get on to the exact heading is laid down in Air Staff Instructions, and must be known to all.
[Underlined] NARRATIVE [/underlined]
(i) [Underlined] Weather. [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear with slight ground haze.
(ii) [Underlined] Marking. [/underlined] At H – 11 the first green T.I. dropped blind as a proximity marker, went down followed almost immediately by the first flares. At H – 8 the second flare wave dropped and by this time three more green T.I’s had gone down. Mosquito Marker No.3 gave a “Tallyho” and went in to mark, his T.I. being assessed as 200 yards to the North of the marking point. The Master Bomber ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up 200 yards to the South. The backing up eventually resulted in 2 T.I’s roughly on the marking point, one 300 yards S.E. which probably fell in water and quickly went out, and one wide marker 800 yards to the West. This error was due to a variety of causes of which undue haste was probably the major. At H – 1 the markers were ordered off the target and the main force instructed to attack. The illustration shows the positions of the Red T.I’s in relation to the marking point as assessed from night photographs.
[Diagram]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS. [/underlined]
(iii) [Underlined] Main Force Bombing. [/underlined] The attack went mainly according to plan although the Master Bomber had to instruct crews to steady down as there were some wide sticks in the early stages. These few loose sticks are a regrettable feature of all attacks, and it is hard to understand crews who have carried their loads all the way to the target can allow themselves to release them in open country on the edge of the target when a few more seconds would enable them to be placed on the aiming point. At H + 8 the main force were instructed to complete bombing and return to base.
[Photograph – missing] This photograph is a still from film shot by a 463 Squadron Lancaster equipped with cine apparatus. The photograph was taken six minutes after the main force bombing started, and can be clearly picked out on the P.R.U. cover as the North East corner of the sector allotted to Nos. 50 and 61 Squadrons.
[Underlined] DAMAGE ASSESSMENT [/underlined]
The greater part of the central core of the town was contained in the central sector shown on the tracing overlay. The two boundary sectors also contain a portion of this central core, all of which was fully built up and therefore highly vulnerable to incendiary attack. Whilst the primary intention of the raid was to destroy the central core of the town, two squadrons were allotted to an area to the East and North East which is less fully built up, as a trial to see what damage could be achieved by a small force.
An examination of photographs shows that of the three markers remaining after Marker D had become extinguished, only A showed up clearly, and that markers B and C became covered by incendiaries from a load released short, and may not have been clearly visible to bomb aimers. This left the extreme Westerly T.I. clearly visible throughout the attack and as a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Photograph]
[Page break]
[Photograph with Overlay Showing Bombing Sectors] BRUNSWICK 14/15 OCTOBER.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
result all incendiary loads had a tendency to fall in the Westerly part of a central sector or else in the Western sector, or even West of this. There was also a tendency for loads to overshoot rather more than planned. As far as it is possible to estimate from available data about 90% of the loads other than those which were dropped loosely outside the area, fell within the central core of the town but only a few scattered sticks on the N.E. area. This was clearly due to crews using the Westerly marker as their datum point, thus shifting the whole area of attack some hundreds of yards to the West.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
It can be seen that the greater part of the central core of the town has been completely destroyed, and that there has also been some damage in the more Northerly sectors. Damage in the North East sector is slight due to the shifting of the marking point. The attack therefore illustrates the manner in which any marker wide of the concentration will draw on itself undue attention. It also illustrates the harm that can be done by loads of incendiaries dropped on the markers thus making them difficult to see. Apart from these two points the attack was extremely well carried out, timings were accurate, winds found were excellent and the great majority of aircraft attacked exactly on the headings laid down. Incidentally one reason for the marker which went wide was the tendency on previous attacks for some crews before H hour. As a result of experience the Mosquito markers who are marking from below 1,000 feet like to be clear of the target with a minute or two in hand. It is obviously essential that the markers should not be hurried in their task and crews must on no account bomb before H hour unless the Master Bomber calls them in earlier.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Sortied Carried Out with Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
Squadrons above establishment are calculate on an establishment of 20.
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
During the month the scheme for the Categorisation of Heavy Bomber pilots in the Group was issued. Full details are contained in this Headquarters’ letter reference 209/Trg. dated 18th November, 1944. The success of this scheme depends on co-operation between Squadron/Flight Commanders and the Squadron Instructors to see that crews are available for their initial and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks so that a Category can be awarded or revised.
The Squadron Instructor has a vital responsibility. He must be thoroughly familiar with Pilots’ Notes for the Lancaster, relevant Air Staff Instructions and in particular No.5 Group Aircraft Drills. Some Squadrons have already completed a number of Category Tests, which incidentally are done in the New Crew Check and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks. No separate test is necessary.
A preliminary examination shows that some of the Category Test Proformas have been completed accurately, others show a definite tendency to overmark. An [underlined] A+ [/underlined] Category should not be lightly awarded because it amounts to an “Exceptional” assessment. One proforma showed 100% marks for Captaincy! Section No.8 requires special care. A pilot scoring full marks for Captaincy must be faultless (and we’re all human).
The number of pilots categorised in the ten days following the introduction of the scheme is as follows:-
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
A total of 177 New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks were done during the month (including the Category tests in the above table), leaving 101 checks outstanding. Nearly half the outstanding checks were in 56 Base, where a temporary shortage of aircraft, absence of dual sets and a deficiency of a Squadron Instructor, gave the Base more than its share of problems.
Total squadron training hours amounted to 4,000 hours day, and 1,300 hours night – about 700 hours less than the previous month. (We blame the weather again). Now that the Winter is on us the old skeleton (“No training – aircraft are bombed-up”) is rattling its ancient bones. Lock it up. We’ve heard the jingle before. If the Met. gives half a chance of training, get a couple of aircraft per Flight de-bombed as soon as the operation is cancelled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION AND 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
Fighter affiliation results are encouraging. Squadrons did a grand total of 1105 exercises on 500 details – nearly two exercises per gunner in the Group.
Night affiliation by squadrons continues to climb to higher figures. This time it totalled 314 exercises of which 76 were done with 100 Group Mosquitoes, and the remainder with 1690 B.D.T. Flight. This was the fourth successive month to show an increase.
1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month was reduced from 26 aircraft to 12 by the withdrawal of the Spitfires and Martinets. It continued, however, to assist No.7 Group with day and night details for 75 Base, and a few night details for 72 Base. The Flight flew 560 hours on 670 details. Pilots averaged 23 hours, the Hurricanes 33 hours, the Spitfires 16 hours and the Martinets 9 hours.
Night affiliation by the Flight was the highest ever, rising from 94 details in October to 139 in November, thus exercising nearly 300 gunners in the hours of darkness; (a first rate performance bearing in mind the persistent bad weather).
It is satisfying to hear on the hook-up that on one night the Flight booked 33 night details. They were not all done owing to the weather, but on the night of 28th November, 22 details were completed – a record night for the Flight. On five nights on the last week of the month, 89 details were done. This shows what can be achieved when the weather is fit. Incidentally, the moon was up. Bear in mind that affiliation on dark nights provide the real test.
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S. TRAINING. [/underlined]
Unusually bad weather during the month affected No.5 L.F.S. Only two days during the month were fit for full flying, but despite this, and repairs to the perimeter track, full advantage was taken on of every opportunity and 5 L.F.S. completed the training of 92 crews for squadrons and had 11 crews within a day of finishing their course at the end of the month. The total of 92 crews was 6 crews in excess of Command estimate.
The Unit flew a total of 1344 hours. The average hours flown per aircraft on charge was 48. There were two avoidable accidents during the month. The rigorous policy of “quality and not quantity” is being followed and three crews have already been put up for disposal on the grounds of poor captaincy.
The crews posted during the month averaged 12 hours 35 minutes training at the Unit, nearly 2 hours more than the previous month. This was largely due to extra time being given to the short cross country exercise to give additional navigational instruction. Loran training has also been introduced and crews are getting 7 hours ground training on their course.
12 Instructors were recategorized by E.C.F.S. during the month. Two obtained A2 Categories and the remainder B Categories ([Underlined] Note: [/underlined] These Categories have no relation to the Pilots’ Categorisation Scheme introduced by 5 Group). The Examining Flight expressed the opinion that the standard of instruction at 5 L.F.S. was slightly above the average for Four Engined Training Units.
The next month’s commitment for 5 L.F.S. is 100 crews, less wastage. If the weather is reasonable, the Unit can do it as it always has in the past.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING (LINK). [/underlined]
[Underlined] NEW EXERCISES. [/underlined]
The exercises in the Instrument Flying Syllabus on the Link are being revised to include exercises designed to cover operational procedure, and to practice more thoroughly and stimulate the pilot’s interest in keeping his I.F. up to scratch.
[Underlined] NEW LINK TRAINERS. [/underlined]
When installation of the new Link Trainers is complete, there will be one available for each squadron in the Group. This will put the ideal squadron monthly total times for pilots (50 – 60 hours) within reach of every squadron. Many squadrons will have double the amount of Link Time available. This extra time can only be used efficiently if a Link Trainer Programme is organised and kept going by the officer detailed by the squadron for co-ordination of I.F. and Link Training (Air Staff Instruction TRG/3 refers).
[Underlined] PRIMARY OBJECT OF THE LINK TRAINER. [/underlined]
Units whose Flight Engineers have done double the time of the Pilots seem to have lost sight of the primary object of the Link Trainer; that is to keep pilots in constant practice in all forms of instrument flying. The ideal is for pilots and flight engineers times to be equal.
[Underlined] LINK TIMES. [/underlined]
Squadron Link hours generally are improving. The total pilot times were [underlined] DOUBLE [/underlined] the previous month. There are, however, still weak places in the chain, which are easily visible from the training return. Two squadrons in both 53 and 54 Bases and one in 55 Base have done less than 20 hours pilot time per month.
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots – 742 hours. Flight Engineers- 764 hours. Other Aircrew – 101 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED. [/underlined]
2.11.44 – “D” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
2.11.44 – “D” – 227 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
4/5.11.44 – “L” – 227 Sqdn. – 2 Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 630 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “J” – 467 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 227 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED. [/underlined]
4/5.11.44 – “S” – 207 Sqdn. – ME.109 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined]
6/7.11.44 – “B” – 189 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
Claims annotated ‘C’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
From a total of 84 combats during the month, 7 were claimed to have been with jet propelled aircraft of which 5 were claimed as destroyed. The other claims stand at 4 destroyed, 1 probably destroyed, and 1 damaged, all of which have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. The correct identity of the reported jet aircraft is now under consideration by the experts and no claims are being considered until a decision has been reached as to whether these phenomena are in fact jet propelled aircraft or some form of jet projectile.
Two aircraft were surprised by under attacks. The first warning being when the aircraft was hit by cannon fire. In both cases the aircraft were extensively damaged and casualties to the crew incurred. The answer to these under attacks is 100% crew co-operation and correct and frequent “Banking Search”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
W/O HANSON 97 Sqdn. Cat. ‘B’
F/O KETHRO 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT. [/underlined]
[Tables of Fighter Affiliation Results by Squadron]
Note: Figures in the above table represent “Points”.
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR NOVEMBER:- 1105. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
The Order of Merit will, in future, be based on a points system, points being allotted as follows:-
Night Affiliation with Camera and Infra Red Film 10 points
Night Affiliation without Camera 8 points
Day Affiliation with Gyro and Camera 5 points
Day affiliation with Camera 3 points
Day Affiliation without Camera 1 point
The total of night affiliation exercises continues to increase and it is hoped that the Gunnery Leaders will co-operate with Squadron and Flight Commanders to ensure that the maximum number of details are flown whenever operations and weather permit. The importance of this exercise cannot be over emphasised and the aim of every Squadron should be to achieve at least one exercise per crew per month.
It is apparent from the training returns that certain Squadrons are not making the maximum use of their Gyro camera assemblies during day affiliation exercises. These assemblies must be fitted on every possible occasion. Gunnery Analysis Officers are now established on each Squadron and it is their duty to assess the films taken during these exercises and to keep a proper for future reference for categorisation etc.
No. 53 Base are to be congratulated on setting the pace as regards outdoor night vision training. Each Squadron within the Base has fitted up a simple obstacle course which has been in use regularly by Squadron gunners. Other Bases would be well advised to follow the lead of No.53 Base in this simple, but very effective, practical form of instruction.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
Leave it to Smith [Drawing]
“Pass over yesterday’s fighter affil. reports will you Bill, and let’s see how some of those new crews are panning out. – Correct directions given – Range usually 800 yards – Range O.K. corkscrew appeared slow – Range 700 yards, corkscrew very good – Ranges generally good 600 to 650 yards – Range good – Range varied from 300 to 900 yards – gunners poor – corkscrew good. Who on earth was flying ‘N’ Nuts yesterday Bill – with two clueless gunners the crew can’t be anywhere near fit for operations?”
“One moment Dick – ‘N’ Nuts – that Clarkson – a new crew with only a Mid-Upper, but we put old Smith in there as Rear Gunner as he wants to get finished and since his old skipper went sick he’s had no crew; he only needs a half dozen to finish his second tour.”
“Smith always seems to have wads of clues, he’s certainly been operating for ages without getting himself bumped off. Quite a lot of the time as a spare too – the pilots seems to like to have him in the aircraft.”
“I suppose Bill, that Smith is O.K. Somehow we always seem to have taken it for granted. I must say he seemed very rusty when we gave him that Sighting test, didn’t he, but as he said, he’d only just come out of Sick Quarters and wasn’t feeling at all himself. We were going to give him another shot later on but somehow we never have. Let’s do it right away and clear our consciences. See if you can find him in the Gunnery Section as he’s not down for D.I. this morning, and as you go you might hand down the questions!”
Bill put his head into the Gunnery Section, W/O Smith, who was sitting by the fire greeted him enthusiastically. “Good morning, Sir, anything doing today?”
“Haven’t heard of anything as yet Mr. Smith, but in the meantime the Gunnery Leader wants you in his office.”
Mr Smith entered the Gunnery office not quite so enthusiastically. “Good morning Mr. Smith, come in and sit down. It seems a good morning to give you that sighting test again, but before we start that, what on earth happened in your fighter affil. show yesterday? – Look at this report – Range varied 300 to 900 yards. It’s appalling, isn’t it Mr. Smith?”
“Very bad indeed Sir, very bad indeed. I’ll go and chase up that new gunner in the Mid Upper right away, tell him to pull his finger out, Sir. You leave him to me Sir, I’ll see he’s ‘bang on’ in a few days.”
“But you know, Mr. Smith, he got a very good report from his Gunnery School, really a very good report. Of course, I know none of the crew have had any operational experience as yet, but that wouldn’t affect his range estimation would it?”
“Well Sir, you know how they turn them out these days, they’re not trained like us old stagers were. You leave him to me, Sir – a couple of ops and he’ll be quite O.K., in fact if you don’t mind, Sir, I’d like to start on him right away, no time like the present, Sir!” – Brr - Brr – Brr – Brr –
“One moment Mr. Smith while I answer the ‘phone” – “Gunnery Leader speaking – What – Maximum effort tonight – Flight planning at
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] LEAVE IT TO SMITH. [/underlined]
twelve. Right you are, thank you. Sorry Mr. Smith, I’m afraid you’ll have no time to teach your other gunner to-day as your crew is sure to be on the battle order and I’m afraid we’ll have to leave your sighting test over to another day as well, as I’ve got plenty to get on with at the moment.”
“Sorry about the sighting Sir, I was feeling just in the mood for a bit of sighting this morning. I’d have surprised you, Sir. Oh, and about that Mid Upper Sir, don’t you worry. I’ll be there myself Sir, and I’ll look after them all. You leave it to me, Sir. ‘N’ Nuts our aircraft again, Sir?” “Yes.” “Thank you Sir.”
‘N’ for Nuts was homeward bound. Her crew was feeling elated. They had bombed – they were well on the way back. The coast line showed ahead and beyond it the sea, pale in the moonlight.
“O.K. Mid Upper?”
“O.K. Pilot.”
“O.K. Rear Gunner?”
“On the job skip.”
“Good – we’re trusting to you Smithy if we get in trouble!”
“Skip, in this visibility, I could see a Jerry take off. Just leave it to me.”
‘N’ for Nuts was overdue. ‘N’ for Nuts was missing. In the Gunnery Section someone said “Poor old Smith, all the ops he’s done and then gets himself bumped off by flying with a sprog crew.”
Far away Unterleutnant Hans Hoffman was buying beer. His Gruppen-Fuhrer was pleased with him. He stood in front of the fire, a tankard in his hand. “Three time before I chase Lancaster, Lancaster see me coming, Lancaster corkscrew, I fire, I miss. Lancaster fire back, sometimes he hit me, sometimes not but always I miss. I am sprog. But last night things different. I see Lancaster, I chase, range 800 yards, 600, 500, 400, 300 yards, Lancaster still no corkscrew, no nothing. I press the button, I cannot miss – Lancaster go ‘pouf’. Lancaster fall in the sea. I feel I am no longer sprog. Lancaster sprog. I give my Lancaster a name to remember it by, I think of an English name, very English, I call my Lancaster ‘Schmidt’.”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
Second Thoughts for Pilots
YOUR CHARTER AGAINST ACCIDENTS – 7 GOLDEN RULES
I TAXY CAREFULLY – use the landing lamp at night.
II ON TAKE OFF – open the throttle slowly, easily & smoothly.
III NEVER BREAK CLOUD WITHOUT A FIX
IV AVOID CUMULO-NIMBUS CLOUD – it’s the hazard of the overcast.
V BEFORE LANDING – always get a corrected Q.F.E.
VI WATCH THE APPROACH ACROSS THE BOUNDARY – 105 – 110 m.p.h. without bombs – 115 m.p.h. with bombs.
VII DON’T HAVE ACCIDENTS – [/underlined] OF ANY KIND!! [/underlined]
CUT THIS OUT & PIN IT UP IN YOUR FLIGHT OFFICE
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[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
26 aircraft were damaged in accidents in the Group during November. 11 were totally destroyed, 4 are CAT. B, 7 CAT.AC, while 4 were only CAT. A. There is the possibility that two of these aircraft were lost as a result of enemy action, but out of the remainder, 21 were either destroyed or damaged [underlined] in accidents which were avoidable. [/underlined] L.F.S. damaged 2, leaving 19 to be chalked up against the squadrons. October produced 14. The Group, therefore, damaged 7 more this month. Bad weather or not, this is going the wrong way.
Here is the month’s list of avoidable accidents. Some of these accidents damaged more than one aircraft, so that the accident and damage totals do not tally:-
[Tables of Accidents for Squadrons and L.F.S.]
[Underlined] Q.F.E’S AGAIN. [/underlined]
Last winter a number of Lancasters crashed on return from long trips because pilots took no account of the dangers attending a large drop in barometric pressure after take off. Altimeters not reset to the lower pressure engendered a false sense of security and the aircraft either hit the sea when returning at low heights or undershot in bad visibility. Consequent upon these accidents Air Staff Instruction FC/19 dated 17.1.44 was issued, but what was thought to be a bogey well and truly laid has popped up again this month. Two aircraft were damaged, one in fact totally destroyed, in accidents of this nature.
One returned to a diversion airfield in very bad weather and crashed 300/400 yards short of the flarepath. The pilot says that just before hitting the ground his altimeter was reading 400 ft. He had tried to get a Q.F.E. by R/T but bad reception nullified his efforts. He then proceeded with his approach and good fortune alone prevented a fatal crash. No use was made of W/T to obtain the necessary Q.F.E., which on this particular night had dropped many millibars in a short time.
The other aircraft hit the water while making a long sea crossing on return from an operation. The pilot had been briefed that at certain positions the barometric pressure would be much lower than at the target or at base, and details were given. He came down low beneath cloud (contrary to orders at briefing which stipulated a return height
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
of 2500 ft) and hit the sea, with his altimeter still indicating some hundreds of feet. The pressure at the target was still on the instrument.
Read Air Staff Instruction FC/19 and get this Q.F.E. business buttoned up. Remember that falling pressures spell trouble. Talk to the Met. Officer anyway. You can’t know too much. Incidentally, the second of these two accidents again shows the danger of ignoring the flight plan.
[Underlined] COLLISIONS IN THE CIRCUIT. [/underlined]
Two aircraft from the same airfield returned from operations one night last month, and collided at the entrance to the funnel. – Fourteen lives were lost. The evidence put forward at the subsequent investigation was sufficient to show that the aircraft which called up first either made a very wide circuit or contacted Flying Control before reaching the call up position. The second pilot likewise, called up at the wrong positions and, further was at the wrong height when he did so. These digressions led to tragedy. The moral needs no pointing. 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme must be followed [underlined] to the letter, [/underlined] and any pilot who disregards this instruction in any way is a menace to his colleagues, who are just as keen as he is to get down to “bacon and eggs”. The importance of good flying discipline on the circuit cannot be too strongly impressed on pilots. Keeping a good lookout until the aircraft is safely back in dispersal with engines stopped is part of it.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
It is apparently impossible for a month to go past without a serious taxying accident. A feature of such incidents recently has been the failure of pilots to warn Flying Control that they are about to leave dispersal. Consequently, as happened in one particular incident this month, Flying Control did not have the chance to control the traffic on an airfield at night. This, allied with disobedience of taxying instructions and the absence of taxying lights or aldis lamp led to a bad collision at night. Sever disciplinary action is bound to follow accidents of this kind. There can be no excuse.
[Underlined] OBSCURE ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
There are four obscure crashes this month still under investigation. At present there is insufficient known about them for the cause to be commented upon.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below gives details of avoidable accidents by squadrons for November. This table is not final. It only contains those accidents which are known definitely to be avoidable. A few will remain undecided till the results of investigations now in progress are known.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] A VISIT TO FRANCE. [/underlined]
An account of the visit of a representative of this Headquarters to France will be of interest to all Armament personnel. This item under the heading “The Proof of the Pudding….” will give Armament personnel a very good idea of what devastation is wrought when bombs are delivered to the right place.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN. [/underlined]
The Armament Bulletin of December contains much valuable information, not only of interest to Armament personnel but also to Air Bombers and Air Gunners. In fact this issue contains much of particular interest to Air Bombers, so circulate your copy.
[Underlined] BOMB STORE – SUPERVISION. [/underlined]
Tour expired Aircrew Officers have become available for supervision work in bomb dumps. These officers have undergone a course of training and should be of great assistance to Armament Officers, and a further improvement in the general condition of the bomb dump is expected.
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STORE HOUSE. [/underlined]
The trials with the large incendiary store house which are being carried out at East Kirkby are now almost completed, and in the near future details of the most satisfactory lay-out will be available to Units.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Armament failures table would have shown considerable improvement had it not been for Col. ‘C’ – ‘Icing’. Col. ‘F’ – ‘Obscure’ is however, still far too popular. An improvement has been shown over last month with 23 as against 29 obscure failures. These obscure failures are causing more concern to the armament staff at this Headquarters than failures which are classed under other headings, because steps can usually be taken to remedy a known fault, whereas if the fault remains obscure it may well recur frequently before it is finally diagnosed. It is, therefore, essential that greater efforts be made to obtain all possible information regarding these obscure failures, thus tracking the “gremlin” to his lair where he can be dealt with. Column ‘A’ tells its own tale and is a matter which should be brought to the attention of Bombing Leaders.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION. [/underlined]
The armament staff at this Headquarters are always out to help the armament staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but it is felt that many of the questions passed direct to this Headquarters concerning equipment and transport etc. could well be dealt with by the appropriate branch at Station and Base level. The equipment chapter of this number of well worth reading.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE.
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the proof of the pudding….
We assembled at Headquarters, Bomber Command, for a final briefing on the programme we were going to carry out. The object of the visit was to examine French targets which had been subjected to concentrated bombing by Bomber Command aircraft.
The targets visited included the following:-
ISLE D’ADAM – storage site.
ST. LEU D’ESSERENT – flying bomb storage site in limestone caves.
WIZERNE – storage and probable firing site for flying bombs, situated in a chalk quarry.
WATTEN – probably intended for the storage and manufacture of hydrogen peroxide.
MIMOYECQUES – site tunnelled into solid chalk and probably intended for V2, or some other unknown weapon.
JUVISY – Marshalling yard.
TRAPPES – Marshalling tard.
From Le Bourget we travelled to Paris by road in two cars which had been put at our disposal by S.H.A.E.F. and which were to remain with us for the rest of the visit. Our first job in Paris was to visit the Army Headquarters and obtain sufficient rations to tide us over for five or six days, since we were not permitted to purchase food from French cafes or restaurants. We then travelled to a very comfortable hotel situated near the Arc de Triomphe, where we were to be the guests of the American Forces for our first night in Paris, and although the majority of buildings in France are without any form of heating we were lucky enough to be billeted in a hotel which had all the comforts of home. The following morning at 0930 hours we loaded our kit in the cars and set off for Isle d’Adam.
[Underlined] ISLE D’ADAM [/underlined]
This site consisted of a number of wooden storage huts with reinforced brick chimney stacks and situated in thick woods. The huts were sunk approximately 12 to 15 feet below ground level and the surrounding earth had been reinforced with sloping brick walls.
The whole site had been subjected to concentrated bombing with medium calibre bombs, all huts having been severely damaged. The majority in fact were completely demolished apart from the brick chimney stacks which were still standing. Approximately 3/4 of a mile from the storage huts was a large chateau reputed to have been used by the German officers controlling the site. This chateau had also received damage from several 1000 lb. bombs and although not entirely uninhabitable, a great deal of damage had been done to one side of the building exposing a maze of twisted steel girders and blasted concrete. The woods in which this site was situated were dotted with numerous one-man foxholes sunk approximately 4 feet deep, carefully boarded up to form a small firing aperture and provided with a small and very uncomfortable wooden seat. Having satisfied ourselves that no above-surface storage huts
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
could withstand concentrated H.E. bombing, we ploughed our way back through the mud, and set off again for St. Leu d’Esserent.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT. [/underlined]
This site had been constructed some years ago by tunnelling into the limestone and had been cleaned up in recent years and used for the storage of flying bombs. The whole cliff area had been excavated to form two main tunnels and numerous intercommunicating passages and storage bays covering many hundreds of yards. So complicated was the layout inside these tunnels that the Hun had found it necessary to number all passages and bays, and to paint arrows on the walls to prevent anyone from becoming lost; in spite of this, we did experience a certain amount of difficulty in finding our way into daylight again.
Bomber Command’s attack had resulted in three separate subsidences of the tunnel roof, one by a Tallboy hit which had completely sealed one the main tunnel and crushed two flying bombs complete with warheads. The remaining two had apparently been caused by multiple hits with 1000 lb. bombs. Unfortunately it was not possible to make a complete examination of the damage due to the presence of mines.
Many bomb trolleys and hydraulic jacks were found, the majority of which were badly damaged although there were some serviceable items. The entire area between the caves and the River Oise had been very heavily hit by H.E. and French labour was being employed in clearing up the devastation to railway lines, roads etc. The empty case of a 250 lb. Red T.I. was seen approximately 50 yards from the railway lines between the railway and the caves. Unfortunately the village of St. Leu d’Esserent was very close to the site and as must invariably happen, had received considerable damage.
Having decided that we had seen enough for one day we set off again for Amiens where we were to be billeted for the night. The procedure for obtaining a billet is very simple. Each town in France has its Town Major who is responsible, amongst other things, for the billeting of all troops either staying in or passing through the town, and it was he who furnished us with the necessary chits to obtain a night’s lodging in the official hotel. Unfortunately Amiens is one of the towns without heating and those of us who had brought additional blankets found that they came in very useful. At first we were billeted two in a room and each pair had to toss up as to who would be the lucky one to sleep in the bed, the unlucky one having to spend the night on the floor!! Fortunately several rooms were vacated later in the day which enabled us all to spend the night in comparative comfort. No food was provided at the hotel and once again we had to resort to the use of our tinned rations – hash, meat and beans.
We left Amiens at 0900 hours intending to visit the sites at Wiserne and Watten and push on to St. Omer for the night. On the way to Wizerne however, we came across a temporary flying bomb launching ramp at Crepy only 20 yards from the main road, so we took the opportunity of checking up on this structure. The ramp had been bombed and badly damaged by H.E. and, in addition, the Hun had taken the precaution of demolishing the loading end of the ramp. Nevertheless, it was possible to get a very good idea of what the finished job looked like. The ramp itself was approximately 2ft. 6 inches wide and mounted on small steel girders at an angle of approximately 35° to 40° to the horizontal. The ramp had been snapped in the centre and it was not possible therefore, to estimate to what height it had originally projected. A large crater some yards from the end of the launching ramp was mute evidence of a flying bomb which had “returned early” and two incomplete flying bombs were also seen some yards from the launching ramp.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] WIZERNE. [/underlined]
The Wizerne site situated in a chalk quarry, is reputed to have been constructed by several thousand prisoners assisted by Italian labour and work was commenced in the Summer of 1943. The centrepiece of the site is a large concrete dome approximately 300 feet in diameter and 12 feet thick on the circumference. This thickness was undoubtedly greater in the centre of the dome, and at the time of his departure, the Hun was in the process of dumping an additional layer of soil on top of the dome. Around the circumference of the dome was a collar approximately 25 feet wide reinforced by huge concrete buttresses. It is not known whether these buttresses supported this collar round its entire periphery or whether they were utilised as additional supports at the front of the quarry where the collar protruded slightly over the quarry edge. Three such buttresses were, however, plainly visible as the result of a Tallboy hit on the face of the quarry just below the collar, and which had brought down part of the cliff face.
[Photograph]
Just below and slightly to the left of the dome is a concrete structure (pointing in the direction of London) which was presumed to be a launching ramp as its vertical walls were grooved for the mounting of launching rails. This launching tunnel has been canted over several degrees by the Tallboy hit referred to above.
A series of tunnels approximately 18 feet across, had been cut through the chalk and extended inside the quarry for approximately 500 yards. These tunnels formed the workings, the main entrance of which was along the railway track below and to one side of the dome at normal ground level. At the end of these tunnels a vertical shaft approximately 100 feet deep extended to the surface. This shaft was permanently reinforced with timber and may probably have been intended as a lift shaft.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
It was in the neighbourhood of this shaft that a Tallboy had hit the edge of the quarry face and buried several hundred workers. Royal Engineers, who were making a survey of this site, were faced with the difficulty and unpleasant task of removing tons of rock and chalk to ascertain whether the bodies inside contained any useful information.
The whole area outside the excavations, which was littered with railway lines, machinery, cranes and subsidiary buildings, had been very badly damaged by H.E.
It was interesting to note that the concreting of the tunnels was in sections and no effort appeared to have been made to interlace the various sections. Consequently a hit by a 1000 lb. bomb upon the entrance had penetrated and blown one complete section of tunnelling (approximately 12 feet thick) several feet away from the rest of the tunnel.
One member of the party was fortunate enough to have paid a previous visit to this site and was able to take us to a cottage nearby where the good lady heated up our rations for us and also provided a very welcome bottle of beer with our lunch and the usual bowl of black coffee.
[Underlined] WATTEN. [/underlined]
We left Wizerne soon after lunch for the site at Watten, a building which produced one of the biggest mysteries of the trip and provoked much argument as to its intended use. The site consisted of a reinforced concrete building located at the edge of a vastly wooded forest. The building is approximately 50 feet wide and contains four floors each divided into numerous rooms, and storage bays all heavily reinforced with concrete. The whole structure is built around a skeleton of steel girders supported internally by the numerous dividing walls.
One Tallboy hit on top of the main structure had dislodged a huge piece of concrete reputed to weigh approximately 300 tons and had dropped it on to a small concrete outbuilding. Attempts had been made to repair the damage caused to the roof by this Tallboy hit, and the majority of the concrete had already been relaid. A Tallboy crater whose edge was only a few feet from the main building and which was approximately 100 feet in diameter, had apparently caused no damage to the structure.
This site had to be approached on foot and the devastation on the way to the target was indescribable. Hundreds of trees had been torn up in the forests and large areas had been completely cleared of the timber as a result of this concentrated bombing.
It was interesting to note that the Hun had made some effort to camouflage the entrance of this site, particularly over the rail track.
We arrived at St. Omer in the early evening and once again the Town Major did his stuff and found us a billet in a French hotel, again without heating. Our first job was to hand over our rations to our landlady who served these up for us on a large table in the centre of what in this country would be the public bar, the locals sitting around in their chairs taking a very great interest in all that was going on. Our entertainment that evening was provided for us at the hotel, as luckily a dance had been laid on. We were amazed to see how much the French idea of dancing differs from ours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOULOGNE. [/underlined]
On Sunday morning we set off for Mimoyecques but made a slight detour on the way and inspected the docks at Boulogne. Destruction in the dock area was very heavy, some of which had been caused by bombing, but the majority by demolition. In spite of this several large unloading points had been established. The town of Boulogne was also very badly hit, presumably by shelling, and whole areas of the town had been completely flattened. Several concrete pill-boxes were seen in the dock area, all of which were marked with a large red cross and it was believed that they were used for the German wounded.
[Underlined] MIMOYECQUES. [/underlined]
Our next target, Mimoyecques, consisted of one main tunnel approximately 1000 yards long which runs from S.E./N.W. into the chalk hillside, and running throughout the full length of the tunnel is a railway track. Lateral tunnels branch off from this main tunnel at regular intervals, all of which are approximately 16 feet wide and have cemented dome shaped roofs. These lateral tunnels join up with a further passage parallel to the main tunnel and from this passage several inclined shafts led up to what was presumed to be the firing platform. On top of the hillside are six vertical shafts descending to the bottom floor, two of which had received direct hits from small calibre bombs (the tail unit of a 500 lb G.P. was found nearby) The general appearance on top of the hill was that of a ploughed field and it was almost impossible to define individual craters. Several Tallboy craters were, however, seen, one which had pierced and blocked the tunnel in which the labourers had been working.
Here again the Major in charge of the surveying party informed us that several hundreds of workers were known to have been trapped in the tunnel, thinking that the safest place during a raid was this “bomb proof” excavation.
Engineers had just commenced to survey this site and were busy collecting all papers etc. which had been left by the Hun. One of the papers discovered was a roll of personnel employed on the construction of the site and included Russians, Flemish, French and Spanish workers and it is understood that large numbers of Russian women were employed as slave labour on this site. Several of the rooms in the hillside had been used as dormitories and heavy locks on the doors suggested that some of the workers had been locked in at night to prevent their escape. A further room had been set aside for use as a sick quarters and it was interesting to see that crepe paper bandages had been in use.
Our next two targets being Juvisy and Trappes marshalling yards both in the Paris area, we decided to return to Paris direct from Mimoyecques and not, as had previously been intended, to spend a second night at St. Omer. The fact that night life in Paris was in full swing and that our comfortable hotel was still at our disposal had nothing, of course, to do with our decision.
[Underlined] JUVISY AND TRAPPES. [/underlined]
Our first impression on visiting the marshalling yards at Juvisy and Trappes was that both targets had been very much saturated by bombing and it is impossible to give any idea of the complete devastation of the entire areas covered by the marshalling yards. It is estimated that it will take the very minimum of 12 months to bring any semblance of order into either of these targets. Locomotives had been hurled one on top of the other, lines had been turned up and flung against rolling
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Photograph] JUVISY MARSHALLING YARDS
stock, repair sheds, engine rooms and other buildings had been severely damaged. The French were rather annoyed to think that we had attacked the yards at an angle, resulting in severe damage to a neighbouring village, and not up and down the lines. Our French not being particularly good we did not make any effort to teach them the theory of bombing.
The following day we were due to return to this country but were able to spend a few hours in the morning shopping in Paris. This may sound attractive but on looking at prices in the various shops a few thousand francs did not go very far. If one wishes to purchase any small gold object such as a brooch, it is first necessary to surrender the equivalent amount of gold by weight before the purchase can be made; thus you pay a very high price for workmanship involved and not for the quality of the gold.
Transportation throughout France is very difficult. No issue of petrol is made to civilians and what few cars are seen all provide their own fuel (producer gas), and it is a common sight to see a car pull up and the driver get out and stoke up the fire before proceeding!! Taxis in Paris have completely disappeared and have been replaced by cycle taxis and handsome cabs, the cycle taxis consisting of a home made carriage of numerous designs and towed by a bicycle.
Many of the famous monuments in Paris, including the Arc de Triomphe are badly bullet scarred from snipers who held out after the city had been occupied and several incidents of street to street fighting would be seen at several points.
At 1530 hours we took off from Le Bourget for Croydon. This time the trip was far more interesting as the weather was comparatively good and we were able to get a final aerial view of bomb scarred France.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] aircrew safety
Two known ditching incidents occurred this month – a Lancaster of 83 Squadron accidentally struck the sea in the Wash and finally came to rest on a sandbank, the crew of six being saved; a Mosquito of 627 Squadron having contacted Sundburg airfield in the Shetlands, on V.H.F. disappeared without trace.
The Operational Research Section at Bomber Command Headquarters has been studying the incidents of ditching within the Command, and a copy of this report has been sent to each station under cover of letter reference 5G/251/26/ASR dated 20th November, 1944.
The report, on very sound arguments, draws the conclusion that the proportion of Command’s losses over the sea to the total can be as high as 26%. It is clearly shown that many more rescues have been made of crews who have used radio than of crews who have not, but at the same time it is pointed out that more rescues could have been effected had the crews concerned carried out the [underlined] correct [/underlined] W/T procedure and started this procedure at the [underlined] first sign of trouble. [/underlined]
The waste of valuable crews will continue until captains of aircraft realise the necessity of quick radio action when in trouble (this can always be cancelled should the emergency pass) and the need for more and more Dinghy Drill practice.
There are no grounds to suppose that aircrew are any more prepared for emergency abandonment by parachute than they are for ditching, so that a large number of casualties must also occue [sic] through lack of practice in Parachute Drills.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
American Hight Lighting is now installed at 15 U.S.A.A.F. stations and at a few stations in Bomber Command. It is essential that aircrews should be acquainted with the lay-out of this “high intensity lighting for low visibility”. Senior Control Officers should ensure that the information is given to aircrews at lectures, in case any station with the installation uses it on diversion.
On this matter of diversion, keep up your lectures on the Bomber Command Standard procedure. There are still occasions when diverted aircraft are said to use “any method except the Standard procedure”. Local divergences create hazards. If even one reply on R/T is varied, if some unusual auxiliary lights are laid, if the Airfield Lighting is misused, hazards are created for visitors, and even greater hazards for your own aircrews. They become so accustomed to the local variations that, when they are diverted, a standard lay-out “foxes” them, reduces landing times and may even imperil other aircrews if the visibility is clamping down. Overhaul the whole of your local lay-out, ensure that it complies with A.P.3024, and Air Staff Instructions, and above all, see that even if it does comply, it has not little local “extras” which will deceive a visitor.
If you have any ideas that, in your opinion, would help, submit them, but do not put them into practice until a test has been agreed upon. Remember, that however good and practical your idea may be [underlined] for local application [/underlined] it may be unsuitable for universal use and may be turned down on those grounds alone. Remember, too, that almost all existing lighting and power circuits are loaded to capacity. A few extra lights here or there may not seem much, but may turn the scales sufficiently to impair the use of the operational teleprinter at your Headquarters.
Landing times for November, set out below, are based on returns received from Stations. “Dead” times have already been deducted in accordance with instructions from Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR NOVEMBER [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT AND HOW TO GET IT. [/underlined]
Once upon a time, a man, who laboured in the town of Wadd and was named Serg Armt, finding he lacked something for the machine he worked with, straightaway sent a message to his superiors at Wadd, his Overlords at Mort and the Kings of Wick, asking for this something which his machine lacked.
But alas! – all Serg Armt received was a message from the Kings of Wick, saying “We are not a Maintenance Unit”.
Nevertheless, the men at Mort, who received the original message, immediately spoke words to Equip of Wadd who as once went and gave Serg Armt the something he required. Thus the machine had been repaired before the message from the Kings of Wick arrived at Wadd.
[Underlined] MORAL. [/underlined]
They say two sides of a triangle are together longer than the third. So in future ask the Station Equipment Officer first. That’s why he’s there.
[Underlined] RADIATOR SUPPLY. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers will see that the Radiator Group Pool system is to continue. We hope now that Command have control of issues the difficulties in getting radiators will be lessened.
[Underlined] URGENT DEMANDS. [/underlined]
A.M.O. A.481/43 has been added to by A.M.O. A.1109/44. Equipment Officers should draw the attention of all Specialist Officers to this new A.M.O.
[Underlined] NEW REGISTERS. [/underlined]
This month sees the introduction, at two Bases, of the new Manifold Voucher Registers. It is too early to give any comments on these Registers, but we hope by the end of the year to sum up their usefulness, and to overcome any faults. Base Equipment Officers should keep a watchful eye on their use, and report to Group any major difficulties that might arise.
[Underlined] LAUNDRY ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIRMEN ON POSTING. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of unnecessary discomfort is being given to airmen who have been posted without their laundry. Equipment Officers are to make sure that an airman, when posted, has been issued with kit to replace items at the laundry. Bomber Command letter BC/3000/13/E.2 dated 18th August, 1944, deals with this type of issue in detail.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
November 15th was the date by which the Air Officer Commanding required Discussion Groups to be “in full swing”. Most stations have reorganised their teams of Group Leaders which had been allowed to become somewhat out of during the Summer. It is on these leaders that the success or failure of the schemes depends, since, properly led discussion groups are popular. So often does it happen, that an officer claims that meetings are regarded by the airmen and airwomen as a ‘bind’, - when really it is his own inadequate leadership that has made his group a failure.
Leaders must make some effort to find out what the scheme sets out to do, and the best way of achieving its aims. A great deal has been written about the object of the scheme, and if officers are still in doubt about how to set about running their group, they should contact their Education Officer and find out, rather than grope blindly into the work and only obtain average results. To new group leaders – your group will improve as they get to know you, and you learn by experience how to handle them, so don’t be discouraged if your first attempt is not as successful as you would have wished.
On December 16th, there is a Group One Day Course at the Usher Art Gallery in Lincoln on “National Insurance”. Speakers are men and women who have theoretical and practical knowledge of the scheme and should provide a great deal of useful information. Leaders, apart from those detailed, are invited to attend providing they give their names to their Education Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During the month of November only an average number of sorties was carried out by the Group but the hours flown were quite extensive, as also was the work carried out by the maintenance staffs.
The outstanding achievement of the month was the manufacture and fitting of the necessary parts for the fitment of Loran, all aircraft being completed within three weeks.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FIALURES. [/underlined]
C.T.O’s are reminded that the signal reporting failures must be sent off the day following the operation, and when the signal stated that the defect is under investigation, this must be followed up by a further signal when the cause of failure is known. If C.T.O’s do the reporting correctly, much telephoning will be avoided.
The operational failures increased over the previous month and were 1.77%.
The ‘Big Hand’ goes to Nos.9, 50 and 617 Squadrons for having no operational failures due to engineering during November, this being their second trouble free month is succession.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
An improvement is noticeable throughout the Group in the maintenance of Group Equipment, though in some instances the equipment is still far short of the desired standard.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
The introduction of the Gyro Gun Sight into general service has necessitated the training of Instrument Repairers in the maintenance of the sight. A short course was instituted at Fulbeck which was attended by representatives from all Bases who profited well from the experience gained by Fulbeck personnel during the past 3 – 4 months. Details of the test equipment necessary for efficient maintenance has been circulated to all Bases and Stations, and these test sets must be manufactured locally as they are not yet available from Service sources.
The high light of the month was the sinking of the Tirpitz, and this cannot be allowed to pass without a special word of praise to those Instrument Repairers of Bardney and Woodhall who have tirelessly maintained the Bombsights. They can fell that they played their part with the aircrews in achieving this success.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
In the near future all Flight Engineers will be categorised on their ability in the air and on the ground. It is hoped that by this categorisation the standard of Flight Engineers will be improved.
The categorisation will be divided into two parts – Air and Ground. The first part, Air, will consist of the 5 Group Lancaster Drills, log keeping, a technical examination and an examination on airmanship.
The second part, Ground, will be a practical test on refuelling aircraft, Daily Inspection Airframe and Daily Inspection Engines. It is appreciated that many Flight Engineers have not had the opportunity to learn as much about their aircraft from the technical aspect as would be desired; to overcome this, instructions on Airframe and Engines will be given in each squadron. When Flight Engineers have completed the second part they will receive a Certificate of Proficiency.
Keen competition is anticipated and it should be the desire of every Flight Engineer to obtain at least an ‘A’ pass; no doubt many will get the maximum – an ‘A+’ pass.
Instructions have been issued by Headquarters, Bomber Command, with regard to the flap operation of a Lancaster. Now that a standard drill has been laid down, Flight Engineer Leaders must instruct all their Flight Engineers to use this drill on all occasions, at the same time advising them always to check the flap gauge when flaps are selected fully down; if there is a tendency for flaps to creep back, the flap control should be brought back to the neutral position, and then reselected to the fully down position. Under no circumstances should the flap control be taken to the “up” position on the final approach as this may cause the aircraft to sink.
[Boxed] [Underlined] INTER-BASE SQUASH COMPETITION. [/underlined]
A/Cdr. Pope, D.F.C., A.F.C., Base Commander. 56 Base, has very kindly offered a silver challenge cup to be contested for within the Group in an Inter-Base Squash Competition on the American system.
Details of this latest 5 Group “Racquet” have already been circulated around the Bases, and it is hoped that the battles will be well under way early in the New Year, to decide who is to wrest the Trophy from the clutches of 56 Base.
In the meantime decision of the Competition is in the lap of the Gods. But there is no doubt that, as the bridegroom said some years later “The Best Man always wins”. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The failures this month for night photography increased to 13.18% as compared with 4.92% for the previous month. This is a serious increase and while it is fully appreciated that inclement weather, particularly the incessant rain, is bound to have caused a certain number of failures, it cannot be stated that the increase quoted above entirely resulted from this cause.
During Winter months it is imperative that maintenance is thorough, and that efforts are made to eliminate all causes of technical failures, particularly those which are known as “avoidable”. Every photographer must bear in mind, that cameras are carried on operations for one purpose only, that is, to being back film which has been exposed over the target, and which, when processed, will result in plottable ground detail photographs from which the success of the raid can be assessed. Photographic personnel whether engaged upon camera maintenance or processing can, if they will make the necessary effort, reduce the number of technical failures to a much smaller figure.
In vetting the photographic failure reports which pass through this Headquarters, it is noted that when aircraft have not operated for several days there is always an increase in the failure rate immediately after a Stand Down period; furthermore, there are still too many unexplained failures, and in many cases the report is so obscure that it is of little value, mainly because the photographic personnel have failed to assess the evidence of the film correctly. This results in misleading other specialist officers to whom the film is passed. It should be the effort of all concerned to produce a photographic result which will be useful to the Air Staff, and when failures occur, get down to the proper cause and report it accurately.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Failures by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/L C.D. KEIR, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O D.T. IBBOTSON DFC
F/SGT S.W. WALTERS CGM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L C.B. OWEN, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.E. FAWKE, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.F. MALLENDER DFC
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L R. REEVE DFC
F/O M.E. ANDERTON DFC
P/O G.A. SANGSTER DFC
F/O H.F.S. MITCHELL DFC
SGT C.L.S. WILLIAMS DFM
P/O H.O. REDMOND DFC
F/O A. BOSWARD DFC
F/O H.C. CLARK DFC
P/O H.T. FORREST DFC
SGT T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT W.F. BELBEN DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C.E. BINION DFC
P/O F.G. DAVEY DFC
F/SGT F.W. STROUD DFM
F/SGT A.O. KENNEDY DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.E. DICKSON DFC
F/O D. BRADY DFC
F/O W.F. EDWARDS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.H.F. WHYTE DFC
F/O J.D. MOUAT DFC
P/O S.H.K. EYRE DFC
F/O A. SLYWCHUK DFC
P/O D.A.T. MILLIKIN DFC
P/O L.W. PETHICK DFC
F/SGT F.B. KNOTT DFM
F/O R.H.W. LAWRENCE DFC
F/SGT J.E. TAYLOR DFM
F/O A.N. FRANKLAND DFC
F/SGT K.H. SNEDDON DFM
F/O D. EGGLESTON DFC
F/O G.S. PYLE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J. CASTAGNOLA DFC
F/SGT G.P. GAUWELOOSE DFM
P/O E.C.W. ANDERSON DFC
S/L D.I. FAIRBURN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.L.P. DUNSTONE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.K.W. GLOVER DFC
F/O B.M. ACOTT DFC
P/O F. NORTON DFC
P/O R.A.E. DEAR DFC
F/L W.E. JEAVONS DFC
P/O D. STREET DFC
P/O J.F. MILLS DFC
SGT G.R. GILBERT DFM
SGT D. BOOTHBY DFM
F/O R.B. WARD DFC
SGT P.T. HADDON DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L C.P. McDONALD, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT S.R. LAMBERT DFM
F/O D.A. JENNINGS DFC
F/O A.K. IRWIN DFC
A/F/L D.W. WOOLLEY, DFM DFC
W/O A.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/L A.R. GALBRAITH DFC
F/O W. FITCH DFC
A/F/L G. ROBINSON, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
A/F/L F.P.L. BROOME DFC
F/SGT K. FORREST DFM
F/SGT H. WILSON DFM
A/F/L T. CAMPBELL DFC
F/O J. PEDEN DFC
W/O J.J.H. MAXWELL DFC
P/O W.R. DORAN DFC
P/O C.A.P. THOMPSON DFC
W/O E.H. HANSEN DFC
P/O A.P. BOULTBEE DFC
P/O A.J. TINDALL DFC
F/SGT S. OSBORNE DFM
P/O E.J. WATSON DFC
P/O W.A. REFFIN DFC
P/O W.D. KNOWLES DFC
P/O C.W. HOWE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.A. HARRIS DFC
A/F/O P.C. BROWNE DFC
A/F/O A.R. KITTO DFC
A/F/O P.A. FYSON DFC
F/O P.R.J.M. MAVAUT DFC
A/F/O J.G. THOMPSON DFC
A/F/O H. ARCHER DFC
W/O R.E. CARMICHAEL DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L S.E. PATTINSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.M. GRANT DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.A. BUCKHAM DFC
F/O A.B.L. TOTTENHAM DFC
F/O N.W. SAUNDERS DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L L.C. DEIGNAN DFC
P/O L.G. BURDEN DFC
F/O T.C. TAYLOR DFC
P/O H.R. GOODWIN DFC
P/O J.W. WAUGH DFC
F/O J.L. SAYERS DFC
F/O E.G. PARSONS DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. MARSHALL DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.D. BRIBBIN, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
NOTES: In column (a) above, A indicates the number of pence saved per head of strength.
B indicates the percentage of personnel saving.
and C indicates the total amount saved through the Unit Savings Group.
In column (b) above, the sum indicated as saved by Syerston, also includes the savings by deduction from Pay Ledgers for Fulbeck and Balderton.
In column (c) only stations with Class ‘A’ Camp Post Offices are included.
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR NOVEMBER: £7,843, 17.10d.
[Page break]
[Drawing] volte face
For day after day, and for year upon year
Of this utterly futile inordinate war
We’ve fought the unspeakable Gremlin;
From aircraft and engines, wherever they were,
We’ve harried and hounded and chased them galore,
And prevent the brutes from assemblin’.
Our aim was unvaried and clearly defined,
No quarter or mercy was ever displayed;
No cavilling, fear, or dissemblin’.
Undeterred by defeat, in our ranks you would find
A resurgence of effort – the foemen were made
To cower in their shelters a-tremblin’.
Yet with ultimate victory looming in sight,
The powers that rule us have altered their stand
And ordered a truce with the Gremlin;
And the tribe’s C.in C. is respectably dight
As a uniformed “wingco”, an officer grand,
(Or something quite closely resemblin’).
ANON. (CIRCA 1944).
[Boxed] The cover for this month’s News has been designed by Sgt. Morley of this Headquarters. Suggested designs are still invited from all personnel within the Group. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, November 1944
5 Group News, November 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 28, November 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on the end of the Tirpitz, gardening, operations, signals, navigation, this month's bouquetes, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, incendiary attacks, war effort, training, gunnery, leave it to Smith, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, armament, the proof of the pudding, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, education, engineering, photography, decorations, war savings, and volte face.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-11
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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75 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Photograph
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-20 nov 44
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Creil
France--Juvisy-sur-Orge
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Mimoyecques
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Soligny-la-Trappe
France--Watten
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Norway--Tromsø
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
1944-11
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
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Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V MAY * 1944 * SECRET * NO * 22
[Stamp]
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The results achieved by the Group during May far exceed those of any previous month. They represent a full contribution to the great effort put in by the whole of Bomber Command which, it can now be seen, was a big factor in the safe arrival on French soil of the “Armies of Liberation”.
Not only did the Group carry out more attacks, but each attack was more effective than in the past. Throughout the month, the centre of the pattern of bombs averaged only 100 yards from the aiming point. A great improvement on previous results. This improvement has been brought about mainly by the steady development of the system of marking, and I wish to pay tribute to those pilots of No.627 Squadron who have gone in low to mark the target and who have not allowed their aim to the spoilt by the light flak defences. Their accuracy has been consistently of a very high order, far exceeding tat of any other system of marking so far tried.
The Group also owes a great deal to the Master Bombers who remain throughout the attack directing the marking and assessing the bombing. With better communications, their task will become easier, and I hope that, before long, all aircraft in the Group will be fitted with V.H.F. Crews will then be able to hear the orders which are given to the Flare and Marking Forces and will know what is happening, and the reason for any hold up. Without this means of communication, it is impossible to keep crews informed when things go wrong, with the result that they have often had to delay their bombing without knowing the reason.
In spite of these great improvements, half the bombs dropped against these small precision targets fell [underlined] more than 250 yards [/underlined] from the aiming point, where they were wasted. This percentage of bombs wide of the aiming point coincides almost exactly with the percentage which fell at similar distances on the practice ranges during May. These errors are too great for, not only is the bombsight capable of achieving errors of less than 100 yards from 10,000 feet, but errors below this figure are consistently achieved by a number of crews in the Group, not only on the ranges but also on operations.
If the bombing error of all crews can be reduced to the level of the best 25%, it will be equivalent to doubling the effective striking power of the Group.
I, therefore, make a special appeal to the bombing team for practice and yet more practice; in accurate flying; in executing the small alterations of course during the bombing run, and in the quick test of the sight to ensure that it is producing the correct sighting angle and is properly aligned. These may seem small matters, but it is on details such as these, that our efficiency as a Bomber Group depends.
I want every crew to realise that each stick of bombs which can be dropped even a few yards nearer the marker, will directly affect the duration of the war. At present, more than at any other time during this war, it is the effort and accuracy of each individual crew which can expedite or delay victory. If each crew can place their centre bomb within 100 yards of the marker, the result will be overwhelming. Individual effort for greater accuracy by each crew is the keynote now. This improvement will first appear in a marked reduction in crew errors on the practice ranges.
Let each crew check their own bombing error at the end of this month and see what progress they have made towards achieving this result.
Copies Sent: Wadd. 9
Skell. 10.
Bard. 6
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has recently been fully occupied with the introduction of target markers and the more general use of high explosive bombs within the Group. This has had a detrimental effect on the investigation of gun and turret failures and it would be folly to assume that the present decrease in gunnery failures is other than a temporary relief brought about by the milder weather conditions prevalent at this time of the year.
The gun ‘Bogey’ must be beaten before next winter, and with this end in view all new evidence must be examined and forwarded to those most qualified to analyse and correct the many small faults combining to cause major unserviceability. An appeal is therefore made to all Armament Officers, Gunnery Leaders and, above all, to the gunners themselves to report all faults, however petty they may seem.
A recurring fault is often accepted as a matter of course and not reported to a higher authority, as it is assumed that “everyone knows about it”. Unfortunately, those scions of industry responsible for corrective action are often office bound due to causes beyond their control, and a serious fault is only recognised by a number of units reporting the same defect.
The failure to report defects is attributed to the feeling of competition when comparisons are printed, and as a result false records are being received. These records are, in fact, printed to avail armament specialists of figures and facts normally reserved for higher formations, so they too may have data for research and modification. It is not intended that these tables should indicate the relative efficiency of units.
[Underlined] All defect reports are gratefully received. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GUN TURRETS [/underlined]
Yet another new turret failure has recently appeared, which requires the urgent attention of all Armament Officers.
Hydraulic pipe lines located in the leading edge of the Lancaster aircraft are being fractured, and preliminary investigation has shown that there are several factors contributing to this failure:-
(i) Pressure and return pipes are positioned too close together and, in some instances, the unions are actually touching.
(ii) Pipe positioning cleats are of inferior design and are not standing up to the job. This is aggravated by the fact that there are insufficient cleats, and those that are provided are badly positioned.
(iii) The packing between the cleat and the pipe line vibrates out of position, leaving the pipe to chafe against the cleat, resulting in a fractured pipe.
At present only three small inspection panels are located between the two power plants and it is impossible to inspect the full 13 feet of pipe lines through these small panels.
Recommendations have been made to Command for:-
(a) Additional cleats.
(b) Re-positioning of existing cleats.
(c) Re-design of pipe layout.
(d) More effective packing between pipe and cleat.
An early answer is expected.
In the interim, Armament Officers should make an immediate check of all turret hydraulic pipe lines, and so ensure that the possibility of a fracture is kept to an absolute minimum.
[Underlined] HYDRAULIC MEDIA [/underlined]
Trials have been carried out this month with a mixture of 70% DTD.585 and 30% DTD.472B and although these trials were only of a short duration, the unanimous opinion appears to be that this mixture seems to be the “best yet”. A definite decrease in leaks has been apparent turret functioning has been normal, and several squadrons are of the opinion that turret speeds have, if anything, slightly improved.
Requests have been made to higher authority for permission to fill all hydraulic systems with this new mixture as soon as possible.
(Continued on Page 17, col.3)
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) Percentage of personnel saving
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Unit]
TOTAL AMOUNT SAVED £7828.0.4.
An increase of £1,518.7s.0d. over April figures.
FLYING CONTROL
Once more the average landing times for the Group have been reduced and our target of two minutes per aircraft is drawing nearer. There are still the same one or two Stations, however, who seem unable to reduce their landing figures. Circuit drill is easy and causes no difficulty whatsoever to crews. The main fault lies in a straggling return and Stations must stress continually the need for discipline in maintaining the airspeeds on which crews are briefed. It is noticed from other Groups’ figures that they are not very far behind, and since we regard ourselves as the pioneers of quick landing, then we must hold our lead.
Below are the three best performances for the moth, but at the time of going to press, these figures have all been beaten and the new record will be published in next month’s News.
[Table of Best Landing Tines by Station]
(Continued on page 3, col.2)
MAY LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties undertaken by the Group achieved still another record, some 2254 sorties being carried out during the month.
The serviceability figure still remains high, although the number of engine changes which are carried out before the engine has completed its life is still far too high. This is due to defects which have been occurring now for a long period, the main being:-
1. Failure of oil pipe between the relief valve and the dual drive.
2. Flame trap failures due to blow-back.
3. Leaking cylinder blocks due to cracks on Merlin 22’s and 24’s.
The percentage of early returns due to defects in equipment controlled by Engineer and Eng. Elect. Was 0.8% and the aircraft failing to get off provided a further 0.5%
Now that a test crew is attached to each Base Major Servicing Section, full advantage should be taken of this crew for testing aircraft with any unusual flying characteristics which are reported from time to time by squadrons. Any adjustments found necessary should be carried out by experts in the Base Major Servicing Section and not by any gang who happens to be available.
No. 55 Base has now formed and all stations in 5 Group are under Base Organisation. 55 Base is not yet functioning as such in every respect, but everything is working in the right direction and it is anticipated that the results will be good.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNITS [/underlined]
Again a record number of flying hours has been produced by the Conversion Units, and No. 5 L.F.S., and the number of hours required to produce the crews necessary has not been exceeded. Major Inspections are progressing satisfactorily, and the organisation is such that the maintenance can keep pace with the amount of flying produced. The major troubles experienced with the Stirling during the month have been coring subsequent to going over to summer grade oil, and undercarriage pylon failures which occur usually when the undercarriage is being lowered prior to landing. It is hoped that the coring troubles will be cured by returning to the use of winter grade oil, together with the fitment of the approved blank.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
Within the next few days a start will be made to modify the bomb aimer’s panels of Lancaster aircraft, details of which have been issued to all Bases. A modification gang will be formed at Scampton to undertake the alteration to all Bomb Aimers’ panels in the Group aircraft. Panels will be issued in batches of 20 at a time, so that there will be no delay in the change-over. It should be the aim of Electrical Officers to remove the old panel and fit the new in all aircraft of a squadron within 24 hours. By good co-operation it will be possible to complete all aircraft in the Group within three to four weeks.
Recent precision targets demand that the accuracy of the Mark XIV Bombsights must be given absolute priority. We must aim at errors of not more than 50 yards at 10,000 feet in the immediate future. To achieve this, greater care must be taken in the tuning, levelling and lining up of the sights, and discussions with Bomb Aimers on the analysis of practice bombing results will also help. Base Bombing Leaders have realised the necessity for this co-operation, and Electrical Officers must do all in their power to reciprocate.
Trials have recently been carried out in all squadrons with a synchroniser for the two inboard engines. This permits synchronisation within 1 r.p.m. and flight engineers state that the device is very satisfactory, particularly from the point of view of crew comfort, since the severe periodic vibration which occurs when the engines are de-synchronised is entirely eliminated, and fatigue on long flights is reduced. There has also been a marked decrease in the incidence of instrument failure, noticeably engine speed indicators. Up to the present a single lamp has been used which merely indicated de-synchronisation and a method of trial and error is necessary to obtain synchronisation. A new indicator consisting of three lamps is being tested at East Kirkby which will give an indication of which engine is running fast. This indicator will be submitted to Bomber Command after further trials have been completed.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Stirling and Lancaster Training Aircraft Serviceability by Unit]
FLYING CONTROL (Cont. from page 2)
[Underlined] WOODBRIDGE [/underlined]
Crews are now aware of the facilities available at the emergency landing field at Woodbridge. The staff at Woodbridge are only too glad to see operational crews on ‘non-emergency’ visits. Although landing instructions have been circulated and (we hope) read by all aircrew, a visit to Woodbridge or even a run down there during N.F.T. to look at the lay-out from the air will provide a more permanent image of the landing drill required. One point which is to be particularly stressed is that crews must not attempt to turn off midway along the runway at night time. They must continue right along to the end of the runway where marshalling crews are ready to direct them to dispersal.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
All Stations are now reported to be getting down seriously to improving their airfields and Watch Offices for the competition which closes on the 31st July. S.F.C.O’s must remember, however, that although 31st July is the official date for closing, inspections by the G.F.C.O. can be expected any day.
Flight Engineers
When checking logs it is found that some Flight Engineers are filling in the details on the top of their logs before they examine the aircraft. Such things as “Hatched checked and found secure”, “Auto Controls out”, “Air Intakes cold” and many other vital checks are being taken for granted. This log is for the benefit of all the crew and the safety of the aircraft; therefore these checks must be carried out on dispersal just prior to start up, and only then recorded on the log.
The Flight Engineer Leader on each Squadron must check all logs returned, and bring to the notice of all pilots and flight engineers any bad engine handling; if no notice is taken, and such combinations of revs and boost as 2700 revs + 3 lbs boost or 2850 revs + 2 lbs boost etc., continue to be used, then the Flight Engineer Leader must take these culprits to task.
5 Group has laid down a drill for climbs and engine conditions to be used on operations; therefore until any amendments to this order are published, no alterations should be made unless in case of an emergency. The above drill is being taught by No.5 L.F.S. and must be stressed from time to time by squadrons; they should bear in mind that engineers who come on to operations now have spent most of their initial training on Stirlings; the engine handling differs greatly between the two types of aircraft.
The Flight Engineer Leader must have closer liaison with his C.T.O. and report to him any little snags that crop up from time to time, instead of what happens at present – Flight Engineers talking it over between themselves. Improvements can only be brought about by reporting any defects or peculiarities to the right person.
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash the immaculate W.A.A.F’s. …”if this is your idea of a domestic night, may I never marry!”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 3
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GARDENING
On the 21/22nd of the month more vegetables were planted by any one Group than ever before. 5 Group were the authors of this horticultural masterpiece, in planting 382 out of 418 vegetables lifted. 298 of these were Mark VI’s – in which hitherto undreamed of depths of frightfulness have been reached, and some varieties of which were used for the first time this night. 4 and 6 Groups also took part in the operation, bringing the Command total for the night up to 501. Three 5 Group aircraft were missing.
The Armament staffs at the Stations concerned did a great job of work – not made any easier by having also to prepare bomb loads – and East Kirkby performed the unprecedented feat of loading 154 Mark VI vegetables.
The operation was carried out entirely on H2S. Only three failures of sets occurred.
Results? – So far the immediate effect of this attack has been fully up to expectations, namely complete paralysis of all sea-borne traffic in areas vital to the movement of both warships and supplies. Sinkings can be expected as soon as the enemy releases the shipping held up, which he is bound to do soon despite his known inability to sweep his channels clear. The link between this operation and the coming invasion is obvious and the final effects can only be seen in the light of future events.
Other Gardening by 5 Group during the month were as follows:-
48 plantings off the FRISIANS
30 plantings in the HELIGOLAND BIGHT
36 plantings at the Southern end of the KATTEGAT.
24 plantings at the Northern end of the KATTEGAT.
The last two of these are worthy of note, first for the excellent P.P.I. photographs obtained by three aircraft of 44 Squadron, which proved conclusively that their mines were right in the channel; and secondly the success of the long low level flight in daylight conditions by four aircraft of 57 Sqdn.
Facts and figures for the month are:-
Sorties 93
Successful 87
%age successful 93.5
Aircraft missing 3
Mileage flown 91,120
Total successful plantings 520
The total has only once been exceeded by the Group, in April, 1943, when the total was 543. A fine job of work, contributed to by the six H 2 S Squadrons.
Gardening by Command again broke all records, resulting in the planting of 2,749 vegetables plus a small but highly effective effort by Mosquitos of 8 Group. Bomber Command’s war against communications has, in fact, reached a new degree of intensity on land and at sea.
[Cartoon]
“THE VOICE THAT BREATHED O’ER WAINFLEET”
5 GROUP P.O.W. FUND
By now, everyone is probably aware of the formation, on a full Group basis, of the 5 Group Prisoners of War Fund.
The Fund has been formed with the object of obtaining monies for sending monthly parcels of cigarettes and tobacco to each 5 Group Prisoner of War and, where possible, regular consignments of musical instruments, gramophone records, sports equipment, books, etc.
Sending foodstuffs and comforts, such as jerseys, stockings, scarves, etc., is subject to restrictions and is only handled by the B.R.C.S. and the next-of-kin. However, it is not possible for the Red Cross to send foodstuff parcels to any specific person; they are, in fact, sent in bulk to each Camp and distributed evenly amongst all the prisoners. The Fund will, therefore, make contributions to the B.R.C.S. who are requesting the Captain of each Camp containing 5 Group Prisoners of War to put up a notice in the Camp to the effect that the parcels for 5 Group prisoners are being provided by the Fund. It will be appreciated by all that the calls upon the B.R.C.S. at the present time are enormous, and any help we can give by taking over the responsibility for providing the monies for these parcels will be greatly appreciated, and will release money for the other many calls on the Society. Similar contributions will be made to the Canadian, Australian and South African Red Cross Societies and the New Zealand Patriotic Fund.
The next-of-kin are being requested to inform this Headquarters of the type of gift they wish the fund to send and, if possible, their requirements will be met. The next-of-kin are also allowed to send four special parcels per year, and those parcels may contain quite a number of articles. Should the next-of-kin find difficulty in obtaining these articles, they may inform this Headquarters, who will lend assistance in obtaining them.
All parcels, such as cigarettes and those referred to above, originating from this Headquarters, will be marked that they are being sent by the Fund.
Each Base has taken on the responsibility of providing a certain sum of money each month. The organisation and running of the Fund is being undertaken by the Group Headquarters, in addition to their committed financial contribution. The amount of voluntary work entailed to make this scheme a success is large, and is being met mainly by parties of volunteers from all Sections of Group Headquarters.
It is hoped that every member of 5 Group will endeavour to assist the Fund by means of financial contribution. The amount of money required to ensure its success is considerable; any monies left in the Fund at the close of hostilities will be dealt with at the discretion of the Executive Committee, either to help prisoners after their return, or to send to the R.A.F. Benevolent Fund.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 4
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AIR BOMBING
The most disturbing feature of the month’s bombing is the continued high Crew errors in the summary of practice bombing. We have, over the last three months, made intensive efforts to improve our standard of bombing and the steady decrease in our bombing errors, both operational and practice, is reflected in the practice bombing figures and the P.R.U. pictures of shattered enemy targets.
However, we are not bombing as well as we MUST in order to ensure that the minimum number of bombs and aircraft are used to destroy the numerous targets awaiting our attention.
Now in what ways can we ensure that, instead of making a monthly decrease in our Crew errors of from 10 to 30 yards, we crack them down in one month by 100 yards and achieve the immediate goal of 150 yards at 20,000 feet.
The following points are designed to make practicable this target for the month:-
1. The last two weeks have seen the introduction of the A.P.I. and Datum point method of finding the bombing wind velocity. A marked decrease in Vector errors has resulted. This method of wind finding, detailed in 5 Group Aircraft Drills, will produce vector errors of less than 60 yards.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The Navigator’s Union must therefore concentrate on the perfection of this technique, and one of the main sources of bombing errors will be finally eliminated.
2. Bombsight Serviceability:- Large errors are still directly attributable to technical faults in the Mark XIV. 5 Group Aircraft Drills detail the pre-bombing checks that must be carried out by Air Bombers. Further it is important that the suction that goes into the bombsight is at least 4 1/2“. To ensure this, the reading on the ground of the gauge on the pilot’s panel, with the changeover cock at the Emergency or No.2 position, must be 5 1/2” or more when the inboard engine feeding the sight is run up to at least 1800 revs.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] It is essential that the Air Bomber teams up with the instrument man responsible for the serviceability of his bombsight. Discuss your bombing results with him, tell him whether your errors are in line, range or are random and go through the causes of particular types of error with him. Reference to paragraph 63, Chapter 9, of the Mark XIV Bombsight booklet held by your Bombing Leader will make you an authority on sources of error.
3. Flying for Bombing:- Much has been said about this most important subject. There is no other type of flying which calls for precision measured in yards, and therefore it is not something that comes automatically, but only with hard training.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Pilots must study both the services required by the bombsight and the limitations from which it suffers in its quest for the correct bombing angle.
4. Bomb Aiming:- Unless the drift is absolutely accurate and the pilot’s flying perfect, the target will not drift down the graticule length to the intersection. Therefore it will be seldom that you will have an
(Continued on page 6, Column 1)
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
(Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.)
The results of bombing for the period 28th to 31st May (inclusive) will appear next month.
[Table of Bombing Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR MAY
25 Results with Crew Errors below 100 yards at 20,000 feet.
Next month should see a record number!
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 feet.
9 W/Cdr Porter F/O Pearson F/O Logan 63 yards
P/O Campbell F/O Tyne F/O Bennett 72 yards
P/O Bunnagar F/O Isfan Sgt Henderson 93 yards
49 P/O Graves-Hook F/O Sinden F/O Johnson 92 yards
F/L Matheson F/O Matthews Sgt Launder 77 yards
F/O Hill Sgt Bell F/O Jones 78 yards
P/O Sullings F/S Haines Sgt. Christian 83 yards
P/O Green F/S Hinch F/S Neal 89 yards
50 P/O Oliver Sgt Leonard Sgt Morris 63 yards
61 P/O Street F/S Brown Sgt Waghorn 90 yards
P/O North F/S Jarvis F/S Crawley 96 yards
P/O Dear Sgt. Wray Sgt Reeve 65 yards
106 P/O Durrant F/S Buchanan Sgt Pittaway 87 yards
617 Lt. Knilans F/O Rogers ? ? 98 yards
619 P/O Aitken P/O Whiteley Sgt. Levy 85 yards
F/S Donnelly F/O Grant F/S Johnson 98 yards
F/S Bennett F/S Griffiths Sgt Lyford 53 yards
P/O McCurdy W/O Stern P/O Hawkes 23 yards
F/L Roberts F/S Deviell F/S Lott 29 yards
F/S Morcom Sgt Lebatt Sgt Whitehurst 91 yards
630 P/O Lindsay Sgt Cummings F/S Rayner 91 yards
1654 F/O Rabone F/o Bjarnason F/O Dilworth 86 & 96 yards
Sgt. King Sgt Harder Sgt Stevenson 78 yards
F/S Jeffery F/S Downie F/S Benson 90 yards
5 LFS F/S Rose Sgt Chatteris F/S Richards 38 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 5
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AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
(Continued from page 5, Column 1)
ideal run up to the release point. It is best to realise this and thus avoid these panicky last moment corrections which will upset the aircraft’s attitude at the vital moment of release. It is far better to accept a small error in line and note on your Form 3073 the amount the graticule was left or right of the target, using the known size of the target to estimate your error. Allowances can then be made in the analysis.
Further, Air Bombers must realise that it is quite impossible for a pilot to stop a 4-engined aircraft dead when making a turn in response to your corrections “LEFT, LEFT” or “RIGHT”. In any case it would be detrimental to the bombsight’s calculations.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Air Bombers must, by close co-ordination with their Pilots, develop a smooth unhurried technique on the run-up and correct inter-com patter will aid good team work.
5. [Underlined] TO AIR BOMBERS:- [/underlined] You are the men who actually fire the bomb release switch, and therefore the greatest responsibility is yours. Remember, however, that you are part of a large team, and when you reach the stage of scoring direct hits every time, remember the credit is due to
The Pilot
Navigator
Fitters and Riggers
Bombsight Maintenance Men
Armourers
And
YOU
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
Base Bombing Leaders have been appointed as follows:-
51 Base – F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.
52 Base – F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C.
53 Base – F/Lt Murtough, D.F.C.
54 Base – F/Lt Stoney, D.F.C.
55 Base – F/Lt Wonham, D.F.M.
Squadron changes are as follows:-
9 Sqdn. – F/Lt Quilter from 92 Group.
50 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Hearn, D.F.C.
106 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Morgan from 1654 Conversion Unit.
463 Sqdn. – F/O Kennedy from 467 Squadron
619 Sqdn. – F/Lt Ruddock from 6 Group.
Conversion Unit changes are:-
1654 Con. Unit – F/O McRobbie, D.F.C.
1660 Con. Unit – F/Lt Wake, D.F.C. from 106 Squadron.
1661 Con. Unit – F/O Price, D.F.C.
No. 5 L.F.S. – F/O Mercy.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Honig (57 Sqdn) and P/O Pinches (630 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on Nos.81 & 82 Courses.
Congratulations to P/O Page (1661 C.U.) on obtaining an excellent “A” category on No. 83 Course!
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
“Records are made to be broken” !! – an old saying, but very true this month. Firstly all qualifying Squadrons obtained errors below 100 yards, and secondly 619 Squadron, the stalwarts of the competition, are back at the top with a record low error.
[Underlined] PILOT AND AIR BOMBERS’ ERROR [/underlined]
1st 619 Squadron 42 yards
2nd 61 Squadron 53 yards
3rd 49 Squadron 59 yards
4th 50 Squadron 72 yards
5th 57 Squadron 80 yards
6th 207 Squadron 81 yards
7th 44 Squadron 83 yards
8th 9 Squadron 85 yards
9th 106 Squadron 86 yards
10th (630 Squadron 98 yards
(467 Squadron 98 yards
463 Squadron failed to qualify this month owing to lack of Avro Adaptors necessary to carry out 6-bomb exercises. The Squadron state, however, that they will not only qualify in June, but will win the competition.
Last month’s competition news stated that as 52 Base Squadrons obtained places in the first five. 54 Base have rightly pointed out that the 1st and 2nd places were held by Squadrons who had only just left that Base. It is interesting to note that the same two Squadrons are still on top, but have exchanged position.
Navigator’s Error has been left out this month. The Group Navigation Officer intends to run a wind-finding competition commencing in June.
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron (F/Lt Lowry) [/underlined] have now constructed a first-class bombing panel mock-up in the Bombing Office. It is of inestimable value in checking Air Bombers on panel drill and general manipulation. It is understood that great credit for both this installation and the Mark XIV mock-up referred to in last month’s News is due to F/Lt. Hodgson, Eng. Elect. R.A.F. Station Dunholme, and his instrument men.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt Walmsley) [/underlined] makes the following report on the Squadron’s bombing accuracy (see competition results).
(i) Every aircraft on the Squadron carried out at least one High Level exercise during the month.
(ii) Every morning and afternoon the N.C.O. i/c Bombsight maintenance visits the Bombing Office to report on investigations into previous bombsight failures and to interrogate Air Bombers on current ‘snags’.
(iii) As soon as possible after each operation Air Bombers assemble for their own private raid assessment. Useful suggestions that result are passed on to the appropriate authorities by the Bombing Leader.
Finally a word of thanks is due to Pilots and Navigators of the Squadron for greatly improved flying and wind finding, for bombing.
Publicity has already been given to the outstanding bombing results obtained by two 619 Squadron crews captained by F/Lt Roberts and F/O McCurdy, who obtained errors of 29 and 23 yds. respectively, converted to 20,000 feet. Special mention however, is merited by the exercise carried out at [underlined] Syerston [/underlined] by a crew doing only its first bombing detail in a Lancaster.
PILOT – F/SGT ROSE
AIR BOMBER – SGT CHATTERIS
NAVIGATOR – F/S RICHARDS
The average error for 4 bombs aimed from 12,000 feet was 29 yards – a most creditable performance!!!
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Billington) [/underlined] have introduced the following excellent scheme:-
From several 1;500,000 maps, a number of cuttings were taken of prominent and likely landfalls on the enemy held coastline. These cuttings measure approximately 5” x 5” and so cover quite an appreciable area of coastline. The landfalls shown were then painted black, with the exception of the towns and rivers or estuaries which are printed in red and blue respectively.
Each cutting was then orientated in a different direction and pasted on a large notice board. The various orientations made identification more difficult and provided useful practice in landfall recognition.
Each pinpoint was then clearly numbered and a corresponding number was attached to a 1;1,000,000 “area of operations” map in the vicinity of the pinpoint in question. At briefing, the route to the target was outlined with a suitable length of cord, and the bomb-aimers could see if the route passed over or near any of the pinpoints! The ‘numbers’ of such landfalls could then be referred to the notice board (as above). By virtue of the blacked out land masses, an impression of the landfall as it would appear either visually or on the H2S – P.P.I. tube, could easily and accurately be obtained.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
619 Squadron report that F/Lt. Buttar, a pilot, carried out an exercise as Bomb Aimer and obtained average error of 18 yards from 12,000 feet!!!!
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Where and how would you read the suction for the Mark XIV Bombsight?
2. What is the minimum suction on the ground for the Mark XIV and what minimum reading on the suction gauge is required to ensure the necessary suction for the bombsight?
3. What is the correct vectored wind velocity for the Mark XIV Bombsight for True Wind of 090°/30 m.p.h. bearing and distance of marker from Aiming Point 045°/200 yards at a height of 8,000 feet?
4. What are the T.V’s of 4 lb incendiary, 4000 lb H.C., 500 lb G.P. and 1000 lb H.C. bombs?
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
All operations this month, with the exception of two, have been of short range. Navigation has therefore been very much easier. Broadcast w/v’s have been used on only two occasions. The results were not very satisfactory in either case. On the Brunswick operation (23/24 May, 1944) nearly half of the windfinders detailed did not transmit a single W/V! Navigators in H2S aircraft must realise they are fortunate in being able to check constantly their aircraft’s position. Non-H2S Navigators are not so fortunate, and they [underlined] do need [/underlined] assistance from you luckier fellows. Bear this point well in mind, windfinders, and the next time we use broadcast winds, let us have 100% co-operation!
With the approach of summer and the consequent drop in “darkness hours available” night sorties will decrease in range. Navigation will therefore become much easier. We must [underlined] NOT [/underlined] however “slacken off” our efforts. Concentration, track and time keeping are still essential to the success of any operation. Station Navigation Officers must carefully check the work of each Navigator and curtail immediately any attempt to “slacken off”. We may be called upon to carry out long range operations at any time, therefore constant practice in the use of Broadcast Wind Velocities, obtaining D.R. positions, etc., is essential, particularly for those new crews who will be arriving at Squadrons during this coming period. To maintain and improve the present standard of navigation, it is suggested that short plotting and computation exercises (similar to those already forwarded to squadrons) should be completed two or three times every week. If they are run in a competitive spirit, they will cease to be a “bind”, and much valuable experience will be gained. Here again particular attention should be paid to the less experienced Navigator.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING [/underlined]
There has been a gradual improvement during the last few months in the accuracy of winds found on operations. The “spread” now experienced in approximately half that of 4 or 5 months ago. An analysis is being made of winds found by the wind finding aircraft on the night 24/25th April, target – MUNICH. The analysis is not yet complete, but a rough indication shows that the probable error in wind finding is now down from 17 to 9 m.p.h. A big improvement, but no one can say there wasn’t room for one! The “spread” on this raid was 60° and 30 m.p.h. 75% of the winds being within 20° and 10 m.p.h. – here again a slight improvement.
It will be seen from the foregoing figures that errors are still far too high. The main causes of such errors are as follows:-
(i) Inaccuracies in taking and plotting of Gee and H2S fixes.
(ii) Inaccuracies in reading and plotting of A.P.I. positions.
(iii) Inaccuracies in measuring the w/v.
These are elementary points and should have been mastered long ago. Nevertheless, they [underlined] do [/underlined] exist and [underlined] must [/underlined] be eliminated. This can only be done if navigators make a regular practice of checking and re-checking all their plotting. It is far better to obtain two Gee fixes and plot them correctly than to obtain four and plot them all incorrectly. There is absolutely no reason why three of four navigators flying in aircraft at the same height, place and time should find w/v’s differing by 40° and 10 – 15 m.p.h. – but this does happen – even when in Gee range. Stations and Squadrons Navigation Officers must check the winds found by all navigators on each operation, and find out what large discrepancies do occur.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
It is now a known fact that the most accurate method of finding a W/V is by the A.P.I. and datum point method. Instructions have therefore been issued that this method is to be used on all practice bombing exercises. The “vector error” in practice bombing has decreased considerably since this method was introduced. We still have a long way to go however. Not until the “vector error” is 50 yards or below can we claim to be doing our bit. This, therefore, must be our aim. It is not by any means impossible to achieve, providing we carry out the drill correctly and do not make stupid mistakes. Do not for example try and find a w/v over a period of less than ten minutes – it can’t be done!! Always see that you pass over the “datum point” on the [underlined] same [/underlined heading as the first time. This is very important, otherwise large errors creep in.
We now have available a method of checking the w/v’s found by navigators. Downham Market (near Skegness) obtain accurate w/v checks every 6 hours. They are accurate to within 5° and 2 m.p.h. These winds are forwarded to Base and Station Navigation Officers daily. It is hoped that full use is being made of this valuable means of checking navigators work. Navigators should also check with their Squadron or Station Navigation Officers the post-Met. Wind applicable for their exercise.
To foster the competitive spirit, the best 8 wind finders for each month will appear in the Monthly News, commencing next month.
Any criticisms or suggestions for the improvement of the present wind finding procedure will be welcomed. So, go to it, and let us have your opinions – now!!!
[Underlined] TRAINING BASE SUMMARY [/underlined]
During May 229 details were flown on Command and Local Bullseyes, and excellent co-operation has been forthcoming from Nos.12 (F) and 10 (F) Groups. These exercises enable navigators to practice Gee and H2S fixing and learn the troubles associated with defensive manoeuvres. Many special radar routes have been laid on especially across the coasts of Wales, N.W. England and Northern Ireland, and on several occasions squadron aircraft have come in on these exercises (one C.U. pupil on one such flight took no less than 146 H2S fixes – and plotted them!)
H2S training is being extended in the Base and Wigsley will be staring early in June. Preparations have gone on steadily all through May. A trainer, radar mechanics and a training staff are standing by waiting for the next course. At Swinderby and Winthorpe nearly half of each course is now being radar trained and it is hoped that squadrons will appreciate the trouble which has been encountered with aircraft serviceability and stress of other training. Like Gee in the early days, H2S has been thrust upon C.U’s with very little extra staff and inadequate equipment to cope with demands. The second Radar buildings will very soon be ready, and extra bench sets available, so the Group can confidently look forward to a greater number of H2S crews coming through during the summer.
Priority is being put on wind finding by A.P.I. on all exercises – particularly during bombing practices. Trouble is being experienced in fitting the complete modification to the new Stirlings, but this work is being pressed on with as fast as possible. There are now approximately 70 aircraft in the Base fitted with the A.P.I. so that most navigators will receive air practice during their course. Ground Demonstration sets are also being made for all units so that pupils may see the A.P.I’s working on the ground. They will also receive resetting practice. Coupled with A.P.I. instruction, a long D.R. plot using broadcast w/v’s is incorporated in C.U. training. Therefore navigators should be arriving on squadrons fully trained, and well “genned up”. If they are not, then let us hear about it!
The training staffs at H.C.U’s have changed considerably during the last three months. Predominance is now on youth – navigators fresh from Squadrons, and there is only a small percentage of instructors who have been off operations longer than six months. Several Instructors have lately gone to Mosquito squadrons while others have returned to operations in 5 Group and P.F.F.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Operational results on H 2S have been quite good this month, and its potentialities in gardening have at long last been recognised. In this connection, various methods of gardening with H2S have been used effectively.
Dunholme had the first opportunity of using Leica cameras for photographing the P.P.I. at the gardening areas, and proved without doubt that the vegetables were planted in the correct furrows. Unfortunately the shortage of cameras still prevents us using them on operations to any great extent. Training is also restricted to one Base.
This month we welcome 619 Squadron into our select band. It is hoped that they will prove as capable in the use of this new aid as they have in the past with Gee. The responsibilities of training are considerable, and crews in 619 Squadron will have considerable extra flying training to carry out to master H2S. It must be remembered that H2S is primarily a navigational aid, and this must be borne in mind during training; complete mastery of H2S as a navigational aid means better track keeping, better winds, and above all better bombing. By bombing I mean that crews using H2S will ensure arriving at the correct target on time.
Training at Conversions Units is improving considerably, and increasing numbers of crews are being turned out practically fully trained. Wigsley is now ready to commence training and have been fortunate in securing a synthetic trainer. This increase in H2S training reflects great credit upon all the sections concerned, and considerable benefit should be derived by the operational squadrons.
Bomber Command have recently issued a sum-
(Continued on page 8, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 7
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NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
mary on H2S navigation, proving that the most effective method of track keeping is by frequent fixing. Frequent fixing ensures a higher reliability of fixes, and in addition it has been found normal navigation is not neglected. This indicates that successful H2S navigation requires frequent checks on position (at least one fix every ten minutes) combined with the normal navigational procedure. It is realised that most H2S operators in this Group are taught to take H2S fixes every six minutes; however, this point is mentioned in order to prevent the failure of navigation by H2S due to infrequent fixing, which has occurred on several operations in the past.
Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are concentrating on blind bombing trials with H2S Mark III and he 184 Indicator, and it is eventually hoped to come to some conclusion regarding the errors of respective methods of blind bombing.
Whilst it is realised visual bombing is the most effective when targets are small and can be identified, H2S Squadrons must by no means relax in their blind bombing training.
In this direction, operators should practice bombing runs on suitable targets whenever airborne. Then the set operator can so tune his set that only the town, the course marker the range marker and the very faintest of ground returns can be seen, he can consider himself approaching proficiency. With this is mind, 55 Base have designed an extremely efficient poster of H2S Track and Ground Speed Bombing, and a copy of this is reproduced in this issue. It is hoped that Command will eventually issue this as an official poster for use on the Navigation Section of all H2S Units.
H2S photography has been rather disappointing this month. Instructions detailing the steps to be taken when photographing the P.P.I. are available on the Squadrons carrying out this training and they must be followed to obtain good quality photographs. Remember poor photographs reflect upon your set manipulation, and individual assessments of your operation of the equipment can be made from the photographs you obtain.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Operations this month produced no exceptional ranges on Gee, partly due to the fact that most targets were within normal range.
Certain discrepancies were noticed in the North Eastern Chain by navigators in this Group, and steps have been taken to ascertain the error to correct the phasing. Until such time as this is done, the error, although opinions differ as to its limits, will have to be accepted.
Instances have also occurred recently where lattice charts have been found to be inaccurate due to the colour plates slipping during printing. Whilst all Lattice Charts are hand checked, inaccurate charts have on occasions reached navigators, who have been at a loss to explain the difficulties experienced with the Gee chain.
Care is being taken to see that faulty charts are not set [sic] out to units, but in the meantime, every navigator should check his charts to see if the coloured registration crosses (either green, red, or purple) found at each corner of the printed map surface are superimposed one above the other. If one of these crosses is displaced, then the particular coloured lattice lines have been inaccurately positioned and the chart must be exchanged for a correct one.
Good D.R. navigation enabled both the above inaccuracies to be found out and one navigator actually assessed the error which he applied to all his fixes.
Against this we have the navigator who puts the whole of his navigation on to the box and this month a little story with a moral is printed. Acknowledgement for this is due to F/O Craven of 1660 Conversion Unit.
COX AND THE BOX
COX AND THE BOX
You’ve heard of Salome and Lulu,
They’re as well known as Nerve and Knox,
But listen to me while I tell you
The tale of young Cox and the Box.
For 12 months he’d listened to lectures
(Such a bind, and so orthodox),
But just at the end of his training,
An Instructor said “Now meet the Box”.
At the end of a few simple lectures,
He mused on his way to the Blocks;
“Damn the D.R. and the Astro –
Why work when you’ve got the old Box?”
Navigation henceforth seemed so easy,
Bang on! – Back to Base from Clyde Docks.
On return they repeated the warning;
“Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
On the Squadron, his first trip was simple,
From the time he heard “Out with the chocks”,
To the time that Control replied “Pancake”,
He chewed – and got round on the Box.
The next was to Essen – they bombed and came out,
But were coned, and took several hard knocks;
The kite had been hit, but what shook him most
Was to find he’d no joy on the Box.
The petrol was low, they couldn’t find Base,
But by now accustomed to shocks.
No D.R. – no air plot – he vainly looked up,
But still found no joy on the Box.
The sequel is morbid, and sad to relate,
It’s all filed away under “Cox”,
Read on if you will, and you’ll see what we say,
Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
“You had a son, in the Air Force,
In Aircrew I think, Mrs. Cox?
Well, he’s been pretty rapid and finished his trips.
And they’re sending him home – in a Box”.
EQUIPMENT
The present grave shortage of manpower is causing increasing difficulties to Maintenance Units and Station Equipment Officers should therefore ascertain by personal investigation whether all their demands are being correctly prepared. If all stations regularly raised their demands in the official manner, there would be considerable economy in manpower and time spent in satisfying demands at M.U’s. and numerous queries would be obviated. For easy reference, some of the salient points are set out as follows:-
[Underlined] Forms 600 Demands. [/underlined]
(i) Insufficient address. Units should always state full postal address, and it is important that the accounting serial number is clearly endorsed as part of the address.
(ii) Nearest railway Station muse [sic] be quoted directly beneath the address.
[Underlined] Urgent Demands (A.M.O. A.481/43) [/underlined]
(i) These demands must be placed together in a separate envelope, stamped in RED, “PRIORITY 1 C”.
(ii) Date for delivery must be quoted in all cases, and an interval of at least ten days should be given.
(iii) The endorsement must be initialled by the demanding officer.
(iv) Aircraft or engine type and serial number, or the purpose for which other items are required, must be quoted. In the case of M.T. the chassis number must invariably be given.
(v) Immediate despatch of all Urgent Demands to Equipment Parks by their transport or D.R.L.S.
[Underlined] A.O.C. or I.O.R. Signal Demands. [/underlined]
It is important that this type of demand be raised strictly in accordance with A.M.O. A.1312/42, as amended by A.M.O. A. 326/44. These demands are of the very highest priority and therefore it is essential that the method of raising the signal is uniform in every detail at all Units. Signals must be made out very clearly, and only one section may be demanded on one signal, and not more than 8 items of one particular section – and each of these items must be given a separate line (see A.M.O. A.604/40).
If all concerned comply strictly with the letter of the law in this respect, there is every reason to hope that the goods will be received with the minimum of delay with consequent reflection of increased serviceability and efficiency.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 10 Col.1)
New crews are now getting a thorough introduction to the Lancaster Dinghy and Parachute Drills at the L.F.S. and the dummy fuselage is paying high dividends. The record time for a dummy ditching at Syerston is 10 seconds. It was encouraging to hear a gunner remark as the crew stood on the starboard mainplane with their drill completed in 16 1/2 seconds – “That’s not good enough, Skipper, let’s have another go.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 8
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H.2.S TRACK & GROUND SPEED BOMBING
IDEAL BOMB
Set on Dalton Computer W/V and True Air Speed. From the measured track compute the course to make good this track. Make any alterations as necessary. Set Range Drum to 10 miles in order to know when to switch to 10/10 scale. [Diagram] No. 1
When on 10/10 scale make final corrections of heading to ensure correct tracking. Range marker is set to correct radius on range drum ground speed settings. [Diagram] No. 2
No. 3 [Diagram] Height pulse must be set against first ground return before ground speed is set on the Range Drum.
No. 4 [Diagram] Ground speed is found to be 200 m.p.h. Rotate range drum until 200 ground speed line is against range pointer. This pre-sets range marker ring to a set radius on 10/10 scale.
Note the time that range marker ring cuts response. 30 seconds plus time delay for real bombs from this time the aircraft has travelled to bomb release point. At this point bombs away. [Diagram] No. 5
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The 30 second delay release lines on the H2S range drum is calibrated for the ideal bomb. To ensure that real bombs strike the target, a time delay has to be added to 30 seconds. This time delay differs for different categories of bombs and will be given at briefing by the Bombing Leaders.
No. 6 [Diagram]
Point where range marker ring cuts response on 10/10 scale.
Distance denoting timed run of 30 plus seconds to release point.
Release Point. Bombs Away.
Forward trail of bomb carries it to objective from release point.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 9
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AIR SEA RESCUE
There was one known ditching in the Group during May. On the night 27/28th May, a Mosquito of 627 Squadron was heard to transmit “Engine on fire – ditching”. The aircraft was flying at low height over the sea after attacking the target, and later was sighted burning on the surface. Search on the following morning revealed aircraft wreckage off the enemy coast. Unfortunately no one was rescued.
This one incident does not mean that 5 Group crews are “Ditching free” or are unlikely to have to ditch in future. The most recent monthly analysis shows that 189 lives were saved from aircraft in all Commands which ditched in home waters. A total of 467 lives were lost, however, in ditchings – a high proportion of 71%. A majority of these losses occurred in ditchings when no W/T messages were received. This proves that sea crossings, even on short range targets, are still a hazard for aircraft which may have been damaged by enemy defences.
Regular practice of dinghy and parachute drills must continue. Saturday morning is the time for such practice. Several squadrons have got down to this very quickly, but others are not carrying out the instructions from this Headquarters in either the spirit or the letter.
Ten crews were tested during the month in the Safety Drill Competition. Generally crews has a good idea of what was required, but the majority revealed lack of practice. One Flight Commander provided a refreshing example. His crew drills were perfect. A Flight Commander is a busy man, and yet he and his crew made the time to set an example and give themselves a wide safety margin if ever they have to ditch.
(Continued on page 8, Column 3)
Results of the Safety Drill Competition for May are as follows:-
Place Dinghy Drills Parachute Drills
1 52 Base 55 Base
2 53 Base 54 Base
3 54 Base 52 Base
5 55 Base 53 Base
The best and worst crews were in 55 Base, and one crew with just over 50% of marks placed the Base last in order of merit. Details of Squadrons tested and marks gained are as follows:-
[Table of Safety Competition Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The Training Base Record for a Dinghy Drill is 10 seconds. The best Squadron time was [underlined] 18 seconds [/underlined], the worst [underlined] 43 seconds. [/underlined]
ENEMY AGENTS CARELESS WALKERS
With the lighter evenings and finer weather there is a great deal to be said for a country walk over the fields after working in an office all day.
You may not be interested in birds nests or flowers but even in flat country like Lincolnshire there is some amazingly pretty scenery if you will only walk to see it. If you are lucky, you may be able to take a pretty picture of scenery with you, which will make all the difference.
Do remember though, that when walking in the fields, you are really trespassing and owe a debt of gratitude to the owner or tenant of the land for letting you enjoy yourselves. Hardly any farmers will raise any objection wherever you walk, if you for your part will take just a little trouble to avoid two things,
(i) trampling on growing crops
(ii) leaving gates open.
The farmer is putting a great deal of very hard work into his land nowadays and suffering just as badly from the manpower problem as we are in the Service, perhaps even worse. You will see Mrs. Farmer nowadays doing much heavier work in the fields than many of us would care to tackle, and for very long hours too.
If you walk along the hedgerows or fence sides you will do no harm to crops; its [sic] the best place to walk too if you are interested in nature, but most important of all DO SHUT EVERY GATE you go through, even if its [sic] open when you get there. It was probably left open by someone careless ahead.
Gates left to swing in a wind soon break and farmers can’t get new ones nowadays. Cattle get through from the roadside or neighbouring fields; a flock of sheep in the wrong field can easily cause a loss of a hundred pounds or more to a farmer. He won’t want you in his fields at that price, and it’s no good blaming the sheep. The farmer’s doing a vital job of work in this war to provide our food, so help him as much as you can when you enjoy his fields and [underlined] PLEASE SHUT THAT GATE [/underlined] and don’t be a CARELESS WALKER.
ACCIDENTS
During May [underlined] over 50 [/underlined] aircraft were damaged in accidents within the Group – the majority seriously. At least 14 were written off completely, and 8 were [underlined] Cat. B [/underlined] The Cat. AC total will probably be 16, which leaves only about 12 aircraft which sustained minor damage. These are depressing figures, and are all the more regrettable because at least 20 of these accidents were “avoidable”.
Squadrons damaged 21 aircraft including six Mosquitos, and 51 Base damaged 29. One Spitfire of 1690 B.D.T.F. was also damaged.
Details of avoidable accidents during the month are as follows:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined]
Taxying…3
Swings…2
Overshoots on Landing…1
Mid-Air collision…1
Others…3
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined]
Taxying (M/T)…1
Overshoots on Landing…3
Swings…2
3 engined overshoot crashes…1
Maintenance errors…1
Others…2
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] TROPHY FOR ACCIDENT FREE SQUADRON [/underlined]
A Silver model of a Lancaster has been presented to the Group by Messrs. A.V. Roe. The Air Officer Commanding has decided to award this model Quarterly as a trophy to the Squadron or Training Unit with the least number of avoidable accidents. The first award will be made at the end of June for the period January to June and thereafter every three months. The Squadrons in the lead at the end of May are 49, 57 and 106 Squadrons.
[Underlined] TAXYING [/underlined]
Taxying accidents were fewer this month. It is notable that Training Base had only [underlined] one [/underlined] and this an M/T collision, which did minor damage, A most peculiar accident, which is classed as “Taxying” for want of a better category, occurred on a Squadron recently. A Lancaster pilot turned off the runway and stopped all his engines because of low brake pressure. He re-started his inners with the idea of proceeding to a position more favourable for towing and had just started moving when a ground crew N.C.O., entered the cockpit, grasped the throttles and commenced manipulating them. The Lancaster gathered speed, left the perimeter and finished up with a broken undercarriage when it hit an obstruction. As ground personnel are strictly forbidden to taxy aircraft this episode needs no further comment.
[Underlined] SWINGS [/underlined]
Mosquitos provided the two serious swinging accidents in Squadrons this month – one landing and one taking off. Both occurred in a cross wind.
One Stirling swung on take-off and sustained only minor damage when the tailplane struck some bushes. The pilot did the right thing after the swing started. A Stirling
(Continued on page 16, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1844. PAGE 10
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SIGNALS
[Underlined] INT QEF? [/underlined]
The R.1082/T.1083 W/T G.P. installation departed from Bomber aircraft about three years ago; with it went the crystal monitor, and we were all very pleased! Since then the Marconi G.P. installation has performed excellent service, and with operators who are kept in practice, has tuned to within a kilocycle of the required frequency.
When an aircraft is acting as W/T control for a large force, it is imperative that the W/T equipment is accurately tuned, otherwise the vital control messages are lost in the welter of interference which hems in all frequencies those nights.
On two occasions this month the control aircraft has been off frequency. This has necessitated the re-introduction of the crystal monitor as an essential item in aircraft carrying out the duties of Controller, Deputy Controller and W/T link, and good results are now once again being obtained. The crystal monitor is, however, a rather clumsy device and requires some skill. Thanks to the ingenuity of Ludford Magna we are trying out a crystal controlled T.1154, which eliminates – almost entirely – the human element. Ludford Magna id obtaining excellent operational results, which we intend to emulate. Thank you 1 Group.
[Underlined] WE HEARD [/underlined]
During the month we have obtained several excellent recordings of the intercom. and R/T in control aircraft during controlled attacks. These recordings, in addition to providing accurate minute by minute pictures of the course of attacks, have brought to light several technical difficulties and enabled them to be overcome. One, in particular, was the loud high pitched whine which had been accepted by crews as an unfortunate regular feature of V.H.F. R/T over the Continent. Thanks to the recordings this whine has been identified and almost completely eliminated. Arrangements are in hand to make permanent recordings for issue to Squadrons and training units. Main Force crews will then fully realise the many problems with which the Controller has to contend.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
As far as Aircrew Signals is concerned, the month resembled the old adage – “Came in like a lion, went out like a lamb”. And what a lion?
Nevertheless, we have derived much profit from our mistakes, and have emerged the purer for our trials, although it is to be regretted that our major “boob” occurred when our comrades from No.1 Group were helping us. We hope that on the next occasion we can prove to them that all is now well with our Operators. All Wireless Operators (Air) are fully aware by now of what is expected of a Controller’s Operator, and without any excuse for the repetition we would say [underlined] Practice makes for Perfection. [/underlined]
To improve the standard of speech throughout the Group, not only on V.H.F. but on R/T generally [underlined] and [/underlined] intercomm., it is hoped to install a Speech Training Section in our Conversion Units and at the Aircrew School at Scampton. Instructors have had a special short course a A.D.G.B. Headquarters where all Sector Controllers are taught the art of making themselves clearly understood without the need for repetition. The idea is not to produce an Oxford accent, but rather to give all crews the perfect “Mikeside Manner”, and if we can achieve this end, we shall be a step nearer to perfection.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS [/underlined]
All Signals Leaders by now will have had a copy of the schedule of equipment laid down for Signals Training Rooms. This is just one more step in the right direction, and it is hoped that all concerned have taken advantage and put in all the necessary demands.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
A few Squadrons did not produce their past form this month. Little points like not using the correct aircraft letters allocated to the Squadron, starting the exercise late, giving one message and then asking permission to close down. Now all Signals Leaders will agree that the Group exercise is an invaluable method for keeping operators on top line, and more attention must be paid to it in future.
[Underlined] RECALL SIGNALS [/underlined]
Why is it that Wireless Operators (Air) take so long to answer a recall signal? The need arose during this month to recall the few aircraft that had taken off for an operation, and considerable time elapsed before all aircraft had acknowledged the message. This state of affairs hardly ties up with Instructions in force about maintaining a continuous listening watch on Base. The Group Signals Leader would like to see an improvement, please.
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING REPORTS [/underlined]
There is another corner of the Signals Leaders’ domain that could stand a clean up with the help of our sister section, the Gunners (Bless ‘em). There is still a good deal of duff gen reaching this Headquarters on the Form “Z”. The Operator states that there were no sightings of enemy aircraft not picked up by the E.W.D; the Gunners sign that statement, but someone tells the Intelligence Officer a different story. You can help the war effort by vetting the Intelligence reports and preventing this duff gen from leaving your Station. It would save the writer’s telephone extension from overwork too.
Apart from these few moans, the general standard of Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is high. They are doing an excellent job, and playing a worthy part in the present battles. Make sure that we can continue this be profiting [sic] from our mistakes in the past, and training at every available moment.
[Underlined] POINTS TO NOTE [/underlined]
1. Has the new Bomber Command General Instruction governing attacks at night by aircraft in home and enemy waters been seen and read by all Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group?
2. M/F D/F Sections now send out an interval signal, if not already on the air. Are you au fait? Note – no DIT DITS in acknowledgement, by order.
3. Have you all met Monica’s baby brother Walter – by Pickup out of Her?
[Underlined STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt Cawdron, D.F.M., No.630 Squadron, who topped No.7 Signals Leaders’ Course.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failure percentage for the month of May has, regrettably, shown an increase over the previous month. Congratulations are however, extended to Signals Officers and their Maintenance staffs for having no maintenance failures in Sqdns throughout the month. It is interesting to see how the maintenance failure percentage has slowly decreased to zero, and it is hoped that during the forthcoming months this can be maintained. During May there were no cases of aircraft failing to take off on operational missions as the result of Signals defects. It is also gratifying to learn that there were only five “early returns” due to signals failures out of 2,254 operational sorties flown. Of the remaining 42 failures, approximately 90% of them are attributed to equipment defects. A good show, chaps – keep it up.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T FITTING [/underlined]
All stations have received during the month, a policy letter on the projected programme of V.H.F. fitting for the remainder of 5 Group Squadrons. The supply of all items of equipment, apart from connector sets, has been kept up to schedule. The first consignment of connectors is due, while the 26 Group Fitting Party should be with us any day. Fitting of 44 Squadron should therefore commence without much delay. All indications are that the flow of connector sets will be steady from then onwards.
[Underlined] RADAR CONFERENCE [/underlined]
The Radar Conference held during the month was attended by all Base Signals Officers and Radar Officers in the Group, as well as representatives of Bomber Command. The agenda
(Continued on page 12, Column 1)
ELEMENTARY MY DEAR WATSON
Flight Lieu-ten-ant Jo-seph Soap
Re-port-ed every wire-less slip
In the de-cent pi-ous hope
That R.A.E. might take a tip,
And fab-ric-ate su-per-ior mods
For fit-ing by main-ten-ance nods.
He viewd with sca-thing scorn-ful jeers
And wide su-per-ior smiles,
Dis-com-fit-ure of dull con-freres
Whose in-eff-ect-ual wiles,
And urg-ent eff-orts ne’er re-lax
To co-ver up their sec-tions’ blacks.
E-vas-ive ac-tion reaps re-ward
By kee-ping fail-ures down.
On hon-est men a-buse is poured;
Con-tume-ly is their crown.
A pa-ra-dox you must ad-mit.
The mo-ral’s there, dis-cov-er it!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1944. PAGE 11
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SIGNALS (CONT.)
was long, and a great divergence of opinion was shown on many items. All agreed, however, that the conference had cleared up numerous points, and such conferences should be held more often.
The introduction of Base Servicing was the main item on the agenda. This subject was discussed in detail, and it was agreed that Base Servicing would be introduced when appropriate accommodation and test equipment became available. Some Bases have, at present, a system of Base servicing, and are of the opinion that it produces a great saving in time. The systems now in use, however, are not all-inclusive and to make them so, many changes will be necessary. Bomber Command is at present working out the final details of a complete Base Servicing system. It is probable that they will send representatives to each Base to study the accommodation position.
Another complicated issue was the standardisation of Daily Inspections. There has long been a requirement for some D.I. card, similar to the Form 700, to standardise Daily Inspections, and to ensure that nothing is forgotten. This was not thought necessary by many Radar Officers. However, some days ago, a check was made on man-hours spent in the daily inspection on various equipments, and it was found that Bases often differed by 100 per cent. This confirms our opinion that there is a lack of standardisation which may be responsible for some of our failures. Trials are now being carried out by all Groups on D.I. cards forwarded to Command by this Headquarters. Any suggested alterations will be made to Bomber Command, and a final card is to be printed and issued. It will then be up to the Squadron Radar Officers to ensure that these cards are correctly used. H.Q.B.C. is also preparing a Form 22E for major and minor inspections of Radar equipment. This form will be similar to the present Signals Form 22, and will cover inspections of Col.7 and Col.9 equipment.
[Underlined] H 2 S FITTING [/underlined]
The fitting of H2S in the Stirlings of out Heavy Conversion Units has now been completed. This provides 41 aircraft for training in H2S and Fishpond, with the resultant increase in the number of trained H2S crews arriving at Squadron. Metheringham and Wigsley received their synthetic trainers during the month, and there is a good chance of all H2S Squadrons being so equipped by the end of June.
The introduction of H2S to 619 Squadron is now under way, and it is expected that this squadron will be completely equipped by the end of June.
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
Last month’s forecast of an increase in serviceability was no doubt greeted with laughter. However, fine weather, short range targets and greater attention to detail have brought their reward with an increase in the serviceability of all equipments except H2S Mark III.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The short range targets attacked during May provided ample opportunity for Gee to regain much of its old glory.
Serviceability was the highest yet – 96.9% an increase of 0.4% over April. The other types of Radar equipment are, however, catching up rapidly, and it appears that there is a possibility of Gee losing its leadership in the coming month.
[Underlined] MONICA IIIA [/underlined]
This equipment came the nearest to overtaking Gee, with a serviceability of 93.5% out of 745 sorties. This is very commendable indeed, and it is hoped that squadrons can maintain this high figure when the weather and target ranges are not so favourable. Congratulations to 467 Squadron, who have completed their last 134 sorties without a single Monica defect. This is a record well worth beating.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II [/underlined]
May brought us to the end of the second round in our battle for increased H 2 S. Mark II serviceability. For the first time the Group serviceability for a whole month was 90.0%. This is good. Let us now try, during the third round, to bring it up to 100%. There still remains, however, a serious number of cases of switching off and flashing on the screen, which seems to indicate that the old sources of trouble still predominate, viz., filament transformers, and H.T. condensers. H.Q.B.C. are making every effort to divert the new type filament transformers from the production lines for retrospective fitting. They have been informed however, that it will be a few weeks yet before this can be done. Crystals and cases of no signals are also assuming a large proportion of the failures, and to combat this, improved versions of valves are being tested.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK III [/underlined]
Unfortunately a setback in serviceability of H2S Mark III was experienced during May. Out of a total of 75 sorties, there were 14 difficulties reported, giving a serviceability of 81.2%. Among these failures there do not appear to be any outstanding breakdowns, but considerable work remains to the done in clearing up the various minor snags which only become evident after considerable operational experience.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond has made a favourable advance in serviceability, with an increase of almost 3% over April. A total of 937 sorties was flown of which 89.1% were serviceable. As Fishpond serviceability largely depends on H2S, an increase in H2S serviceability will cause a corresponding increase in Fishpond. In last month’s V Group News, reference was made to trials to reduce Fishpond minimum range. The filter unit which was produced has proved unsatisfactory, and at present there are no signs of this problem being solved.
TACTICS
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following extracts from combat reports show again what Monica and Fishpond can do is properly used:-
(i) “The only indication of E/A’s presence was on Visual Monica which first indicated at 2,000 yards. The W/Op. gave running commentary until E/A closed to 800 yards – fighter not identified visually by either gunners. W/Op. instructed “corkscrew to port”, tracer from fighter then seen to pass on the starboard beam – gunners still unable to make visual contact.” (467 Squadron).
(ii) “After breaking away from first contact (this was indicated by Monica) E/A continued to shadow our aircraft until time of this attack, during the period between attacks the W/Op. reported contacts on Visual Monica but no visual was obtained owing to bad visibility.” (50 Squadron)
(iii) “Contact by Fishpond at 2 1/2 miles dead astern, and the bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards, visual by both gunners at 500 yards. Both gunners opened fire at 500 yards and strikes were seen on the fuselage, followed by a bright white flash. E/A did not return fire and broke away on the starboard quarter down.” (50 Squadron)
(iv) Contact on Fishpond at 2 miles port quarter. Bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards. Visual by gunners at 400 yards; both fired short bursts before E/A disappeared from view. No return fire.” (44 Squadron)
It appears from other combat reports that some crews are getting contacts quite early (up to 2000 yards), but do not corkscrew until the fighter is at a range of 600 yards, or until the gunners obtain a visual. The outcome in several encounters of this nature has been for a gunner to order “corkscrew” and the fighter to open fire at the same moment, often causing damage to the aircraft before the manoeuvre has begun. The moral is quite obvious. If you have adequate warning of an E/A go into a corkscrew at 750 yards. This technique has put fighters off time and again.
[Underlined] WINDOW [/underlined]
Frequent reminders have been seen in these pages in recent issues emphasising the necessity for dropping Window at the correct rate. If some people have taken note of these reminders, there are still others who have yet to realise the importance of launching Window correctly. A long and interesting paper has been produced by the Window experts and will be forwarded to units in a day or so. All crews must take the opportunity of finding out all about Window from this informative paper.
[Underlined] RECORDINGS OF CREW PROCEDURES [/underlined]
An excellent portable wire recording and reproducing unit, lent to us from the USAAF has supplied us with some interesting recordings of crew intercommunication and V.H.F. R/T procedure in Controllers’ aircraft during recent attacks. Experiments are being carried out to convert these recordings into permanent records for use in squadrons and training units. One point which stands out clearly is the reluctance of the bombing force
(Continued at foot of Column 2)
[Underlined] TACTICS (Cont. from Col.3)
to comply quickly with the Controller’s orders. After he orders bombing to cease there should be no delay in withholding your bombing run. Even a Mosquito which probably has to fly low and re-mark or back up, cannot cope with a shower of bombs falling on top of it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] TRAINING WITH CINE GYRO ASSESSORS [/underlined]
This training showed a very welcome increase during May, particularly in the 51 Base units, who have now got the scheme working smoothly, but could produce even better results is [sic] more gyro assessors were available. 20 more assessors have been asked for, and it is intended to distribute them within 51 Base to reduce the amount of fitting and removal in aircraft. This, at present, is considerable, and rapid changes have to be made each time an aircraft detailed for gyro work becomes unserviceable. With the increased allotment of assessors, more aircraft will be fitted, and less wear and tear imposed on the assessors.
Squadron training with gyro assessors has also improved, but there still remain several squadrons who are lagging behind. These Units should make an effort to exercise more crews during June, and aim at giving each gunner at least one exercise during each month. 97 and 83 Squadrons have now been equipped with assessors and will commence training early in June. Squadron Gunnery Leaders have been instructed in assessing the films, and all processing can be carried out on the spot. Instances have occurred when processed films have remained in the Photos. Section 24 hours after processing; this shows a lack of co-operation between Photos. and Gunnery; it is essential that films be shown as soon as possible after landing, while details of the exercise are still fresh in the gunners’ minds. All operational units are being equipped with an “Ampro” projector, for projecting cine gyro films, and all existing silent projectors will be replaced by the “Ampro”, which is particularly suitable for film assessing. Details of the issue and exchange are contained in Bomber Command letter BC/S.23964/E.4. dated 25th March, 1944.
[Underlined] SIGHTING CHECKS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
During May, personnel from 1690 B.D.T. Flight carried out a series of sighting checks on Squadron gunners; the results are given below:-
[Table of Gunners’ Test Results by Squadron]
Squadron Average 64.64
Gunnery Conferences were also held at each Base, and all Gunnery matters, particularly training were discussed; minutes of these Conferences have been circulated to all units. The suggestions put forward at these conferences are under consideration, and decisions will be communicated to Units shortly. The suggestions that each squadron should have a training aircraft was of particular interest to Gunnery Leaders, as it will ease the problem of gyro fitting and harmonising considerably.
[Underlined] FROSTBITE [/underlined]
After a period of warm weather, and medium height attacks, the return to high level attacks on Duisburg and Brunswick produced several instances of frostbite amongst gunners. Precaution against frostbite must be observed at all times. A recent examination of gunners’ helmets in one unit revealed that quite a number had not the metal parts of the harness covered with tape, thus increasing the risk of frostbite to the face. Both the use of Lanolin and the abovementioned precaution are vital if frostbite is to be avoided.
The use of Balaclava helmets has proved successful, and a request has been made to establish this a as a stores item; this will eliminate the necessity for relying on the local knitting circle and the Comforts fund as a source of supply. While we are very grateful for the efforts of those concerned, some units had difficulty in obtaining enough to equip all gunners.
[Underlined] CLEANLINESS OF PERSPEX [/underlined]
Units are reminded that “SINEC” cleaning outfits, stores reference 336/767, are available on a scale of one per aircraft, for cleaning perspex, and gunners should avail themselves of this equipment for cleaning turret cupolas. The outfit consists of three bottles of cleaning and polishing preparations together with cleaning rags. One squadron has twenty of these outfits held in the Gunnery Section, which are issued on signature to Gunners each morning when gunners are allotted aircraft for daily inspection.
[Underlined] MARK IIIN REFLECTOR SIGHT {Stores Ref. 83/2465 [/underlined]
The above item has been introduced in sufficient quantities to equip all rear turrets in operational aircraft, letter dated 21st May, reference 5G/618/2/Armt. gives full particulars of this issue. The sight embodies a new type dimming control and has no metal hood, which improves the search position. No sunscreen is fitted to the Mark IIIN sight, but special sights are available fitted with a sunscreen. Reports from gunners who have used the sight on operations are all in favour, and Gunnery Leaders should press for the fitting of this item.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Experiments are being made to ascertain the possibilities of using a pilot type parachute in the rear turret.
Fiskerton have received the first F.N.121 rear turret on a demonstration stand. This turret includes Mark 2C Gyro Gunsight, electric motor for servo feed, and improved valve-box.
Supply of microphone heaters is held up for three months, but an allotment of 100 has been received; these will be distributed early in June.
Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Swinderby is completed.
Squadrons are now being equipped with electric gun heaters in rear turrets.
1690 B.D.T.F. personnel at Swinderby are producing a synthetic trainer for teaching the corkscrew.
Tests with infra-red cameras in rear turrets against Hurricane aircraft at night, will be made during June.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
Congratulations to S/Ldr. Patten on appointment to the C.G.I. post at Aircrew School, Scampton.
F/Lt Hamilton will fill Gunnery Leader vacancy at Aircrew School.
(Continued on page 14, Column 2)
This month’s bag:
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Squadron. A/C letter Date Type of E/A
44 Y 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
207 X 3/4.5.44. ME.110 (c)
106 Q 9/10.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
61 P 11/12.5.44.. JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
630 Z 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
57 C 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
57 T 1/2.5.44. ME.210
97 N 3/4.5.44. ME.210 or 410
57 A 7/8.5.44. ME.410 (c)
97 E 7/8.5.44. ME.109
57 L 7/8.5.44. JU. 88
57 L 7/8.5.44. T/E u/i
619 A 7/8.5.44. DO.217 (c)
630 E 12.5.44. ME.110 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
619 G 21/22.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 Q 21/22.5.44. T/E u/I (c)
207 F 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 V 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 R 27/28.5.44. ME.110
The claims marked (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Cartoon]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Read paragraphs 1 to 3 for Freshmen. The same applies to you. The 90° test for the Mark XIV Bombsight is as new to you as to the freshmen, so get it buttoned up. It has been proved that experienced pilots who can fly accurately in normal flight, and keep the top needle of the turn and bank indicator central, develop a consistent creep as soon as they commence the bombing run. Are you one of the offenders?
Take an interest in the analysis of your practice bombing results. Take an interest in the technical staff who maintain your bombsight. Talk things over with your Air Bomber. You’ve probably some these things before, and you must concentrate on them even more from now on.
Don’t expect your navigator to get accurate pinpoints on H2S unless you are assisting him by flying straight and level. If you fly unsteadily, the images he gets will be blurred and indistinct.
There’s a landing ground at Fristen near Eastbourne which you may see homeward bound sometime. This is not an airfield with facilities comparable to Woodbridge and is now unsuitable for night landings. The airfield surface is grass and the longest run, 1650 yards, has a sheer drop into the sea. Don’t use this landing ground except as a last resort in a grave “emergency”.
If your hydraulics are unserviceable and you are attempting a belly landing or a ditching, don’t use the air bottle to lower some flap otherwise the wheels will come down as well!
If you have to land using Fido, turn on your internal cockpit lights. This will help to counteract dazzle from the glare of the burners.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Flying for bombing must be your main preoccupation from now on. You are attacking small targets and are putting night precision bombing on the map. First of all learn the limitations of the Mark XIV Bombsight, and the flying errors that can creep in.
Study the 90° method of testing the Mark XIV Bombsight in flight. Don’t leave this to your Air Bomber. You play a very large part in making this test productive.
Do correctly banked turns for correction on your bombing run. Keep the top needle of the turn and bank central. Don’t slip or skid. Practice correction with your Air Bomber, and when you get the “Steady” from him, come out of your turn in the normal way. Don’t hurry the recovery from the turn.
Several pilots got into difficulties last month through flying in or near cumulo-nimbus cloud. This type of cloud is dangerous for all aircraft, and the moral is – avoid it!! Get a copy of A.P. 1980 – “How to Avoid Flying Accidents due to Weather” – it’s well worth reading.
If you experience juddering after take off it is probably due to the wheels spinning as the undercarriage retracts. Apply a touch of brake to stop the wheels. Check your cowlings in case the juddering is due to other causes.
This is old “gen” but it is still ignored. Don’t rush your throttles open on take-off, just because you are on a short runway with a full load. Your airscrews will only be slipping, and you won’t get the thrust equivalent of the power used. Open up easily and gradually. You’ll “unstick” just as soon and you won’t swing.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.B.S.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS (Cont. from page 13 Col. 3)
F/Lt. Wynyard, ex 57 Squadron, will take over Gunnery Leader’s post at 49 Squadron.
F/Lt. Harper, ex 207 Squadron will fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 1660 Con. Unit) [sic]
F/Lt. Clarke, ex 1660 Con. Unit to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 467 Squadron.
F/Lt. Cleary, ex 27 O.T.U., Lichfield, to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 44 Squadron.
F/Lt. Gross appointed Gunnery Leader at 9 Squadron.
F/O Wyand posted from 9 Squadron to 619 Squadron.
F/Lt. Howard posted to Coningsby for special duties.
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of May was 1515, of which 1045 produced plottable ground detail; it will again be noted from the analysis that the percentage of failures remains high. Many of these failures should not have occurred.
Small stocks of Kodacolour films do not permit its extensive use, but a proportion of aircraft in all squadrons except No. 54 Base, have been detailed to carry composite film. It is still necessary to centralise processing at Scampton to economise in the use of special chemicals. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases have now undertaken the assembly of their own composite film, and it is interesting to note that no major difficulties have been experienced. It is, however, obvious that all photographers do not yet realise the extreme care that is necessary when dealing with composite film assembly. Senior N.C.O’s are directly responsible for studying the preliminary instructions issued from this Headquarters, and ensuring that he whole of their staff are trained and practiced; this is particularly important in respect of processing, and when sufficient chemicals and film are available, each Base Photographic Section will commence its own processing. No deviation from these instructions will be permitted.
[Underlined] H 2 S Photography, [/underlined] the small supply of miniature cameras has retarded progress, but an improvement is expected during this month. Results have been obtained with the few cameras at our disposal, but some of them were out of focus. This is thought to be due to the focussing device. Examine this item of equipment, and ensure that the matt surface, of the glass is [underlined] towards the camera lens and the packing piece between the glass surface and the screw locking ring. [/underlined]
It is necessary to draw attention to the curious fact that there are still some photographic personnel that imagine that their only duty is F.24 night photography, and that when new methods and equipment are introduced they should be attended by increases of staff. That this attitude should be obvious id an indication of poor control on the part of certain N.C.O’s; it is, therefore, necessary to correct this idea immediately. It does not matter what photography is undertaken, the photographic section on the Station and Squadron will treat each branch with speed and efficiency. There are no trade union hours in the R.A.F. and Senior N.C.O’s are reminded that the question of priority of work, should it arise, will be given by the Senior Intelligence Officer.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
The month is remarkable for the scarcity of station reports. The change-over from winter to summer games may have some bearing on this, but reports are essential if this column is to mirror the Group activities, so next month, chaps, please let us have it by the 2nd, missing nothing from the activities of the local trout-ticklers to the best figures of the station Henry Cotton.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON’s [/underlined] final game in the Lincoln League was with Avro. They lost 5- 3 to their “case hardened” rivals, but have put up the following significant record:-
Played. 52
Won. 38
Lost. 10
Drawn. 4
Goals for 193
Goals against 113
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] completed their season with two games, losing 1 – 3 to Waddington and beating Scothern 2 – 0 at home.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] football has seen a memorable rivalry in the knock-out competition, between “B” Flight and S.H.Q. These two teams have now played four games with extra time in the last two, and still no result. The winners of this Homeric duel meet B.A.T. Flight to battle for the cup.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] wound up their season with a 4 – 2 win over the 1st Border Regiment, leaving them with the following satisfactory season result:-
Played. 18
Won. 12
Lost. 3
Drawn. 3
Goals for 65
Goals against 42
RUGGER
[Underlined] WINES RUGGER CUP [/underlined] – The Wines trophy was finally won by Winthorpe in a hard tussle with Dunholme. The result was 11 – 8 for Winthorpe after a keen game with both sides going all out. In the second half some pretty passing was produced, and it was certainly anyone’s game until the final stages when Winthorpe got on top although their right three-quarter had left the field. Air Commodore Hesketh presented the trophy to the winning team. Winthorpe are to be congratulated on reaching the final of both the Wines Cup and the Matz Soccer Trophy – well done Winthorpe.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] would [sic] up their season with three games, all of which they won. A Men’s team beat Ingham 4 – 0 at Scampton. Their next two matches were the semi-final and final of the Group Mixed Hockey Competition. In the semi-final they beat Waddington 4 – 3 in a hard fought game, and defeated East Kirkby 5 – 3 at Swinderby in the final.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
The latter stages of this Competition were rather long drawn out, and East Kirkby stood patiently by, waiting for the other finalist to be decided. Scampton and Waddington met in the semi-final, Scampton winning 4 – 3 by a last minute goal. The final was played off at Swinderby. Scampton had a very forceful forward line and led 5 – 1 until Kirkby staged a rally and added two quick goals, leaving the final score 5 – 3 for Scampton. So Scampton became the first holders of the 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. This latest addition to the Group Cups has been purchased by the officers of 5 Group Headquarters, and presented for annual competition amongst the Group Stations.
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE GROUP COMPETITION [/underlined] is going well. Sections A and B have already produced finalists. In Section B two powerful teams are to meet in the final – Swinderby and Syerston. In Round 1, Swinderby beat Dunholme by 5 wickets; in Round 2 they beat Waddington without losing any wickets. Syerston scored 115 – 0 against Skellingthorpe’s 26 all out in Round 1. In Round 2 they beat Headquarters 5 Group side, scoring 70 – 10 against Group’s 52 – 9. This last game was quite a thriller. Group batted first on a well soaked wicket, and scratched together 52. The formidable Syerston opening pair (MacKenzie (Hants) and Warburton (Lancs)) soon rattled up 30, and looked set for the night. Then inspiration came to the Group’s change bowler. MacKenzie and Warburton fell in successive overs and Todd went on to return an average of 7 for 8. Group passes out of the competition, but got a tremendous moral fillip at having “shaken ‘em”. Even the fielders, floundering (and sitting), in knee high grass, felt the flush of near-triumph. Wigsley, in Round 1, were unlucky to lose to Group. The Headquarters side were all out for 102 and Wigsley made 94 for 5, not realising until too late in the game that the 15 overs were nearly spent.
In Section A, Metheringham beat Spilsby (62 – 8; 58 – 10), and Woodhall (33 – 4) beat Bardney (32-10). East Kirkby had a bye to the second round and Coningsby beat Fiskerton to become the other semi-finalist. Metheringham (95 – 8) beat Kirkby (79 – 10) in Round 2, the other finalist not yet being decided. It should be possible to play off the Section finals and the Group final before this month end, leaving the warmer (we hope) weather for more leisurely friendly games.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] played five Station matches during May, and in addition had several inter-section matches and W.A.A.F. games.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] managed three games, losing to Swinderby in the Group Cup, beating Scampton and playing a draw with De Ashton Schools. In addition five section games were played.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] were very industrious and laid two practice wickets and two pitches in a field adjacent to the camp, and practice wickets at Watch Tower, A and B dispersal, and B.A.T. Flight Hangar. There is no better way of ensuring a full and profitable season than this adequate provision of pitches – well done Fiskerton.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined played Border Regiment, losing 43 – 62; their second games was with Woodhall in the Group Cup. Woodhall, who field a powerful side, defeated them33 – 4 against 32 – 10.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] boast a cricket pitch with fielders’ amenities, in the form of trees within whose shade the more cunning deep slips lurk. The wicket is not so kind, and emphatically earns its title “sporty”, in true village tradition. The Group side beat Wigsley in Round 1 of the Cup, but lost to Syerston. An evening game v 93 M.U. at Collingham was marred by Home Guard charging about the field in their Salute the Soldier manoeuvres. A R.A.F. – W.A.A.F. game Is planned, the only limits imposed on the R.A.F. being that they bat left-handed, bowl underhand, and take catches one handed!
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
Fiskerton beat Skellingthorpe 25 – 2 in the first match in the South Lincoln Zone Competition. The game is arousing considerable interest among non-Canadian personnel. Any station that would like to field a team is invited to contact Fiskerton or Bardney.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Tennis, Squash, Swimming, Cycling, Golf, Badminton – every game has its enthusiasts throughout the Group. Sport is doubly important just now – it’s a duty to be “fit to fight”.
ECONOMY AND SALVAGE
DUNHOLME LODGE received a “special mention” for Economy and Salvage in the Bomber Command Bulletin No. 35 for May, 1944.
Most people in this country, and probably in many other countries as well, are keyed up for the biggest military operation in history, which is scheduled to begin on “D” Day.
There is no doubt that when the plunge is made, very great demands will be made on transport for some time, and the supply of materials will be a matter of first-rate importance.
“Ah, yes”, you say, “but the plans are already made, and sufficient materials will be available and provision made for their transport when the day arrives. Anyway, what’s that got to do with my job?”.
Just this. Each of us has the opportunity day in and day out, of effecting some economy, either by means of using less of certain things than we have become accustomed to, or by ensuring that minor repairs to equipment are carried out promptly, and so preventing major repairs or renewals.
Our first aim should, therefore, be to take care of materials and equipment so that their repair or replacement is reduced to a minimum, and, secondly, when things cannot be used any longer, they are disposed of as salvage.
The most important items are Paper and Cardboard, Heavy Ferrous Metal, Drums of all types, and used Oils.
The Scots have a saying – “Every mickle makes a muckle” which, being interpreted, means “A stitch in time saves nine”!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS (CONTD:)
also on landing, and damaged another aircraft in dispersal. This accident has not yet been fully investigated.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTS [/underlined]
A Squadron pilot made a wheel landing on a long runway in a Lancaster, and did not take into account his all up weight of 55,000 lbs. He was late in applying brake, and overshot. The undercarriage broke in a ditch. There was no wind at the time. Remember the slower rate of deceleration with a heavily laden aircraft!
Two of the Stirlings which overshot were on three engines. One pupil Pilot landed on a short runway in a light wind. He should have asked Flying Control to let him use the long runway, as three-engined landings on less than 2000 yards runways are forbidden in 51 Base. Details of the other three engined overshoot are not yet available, but it follows the usual pattern – an error of judgement by and inexperienced pilot who approached too fast.
[Underlined] OTHERS [/underlined]
One pupil in a Stirling crashed while attempting to go round again from a low height, with one propeller feathered. This accident is still under investigation.
A Lancaster pilot returned from an operation this month and forgot to lower his undercarriage before landing. Such accidents are fortunately few and far between on Lancasters. Sufficient to say that the log books of both Pilot and Flight Engineer have been endorsed in RED. This aircraft had a noisy TR1196, which probably accounted for the F/Engineer not hearing the order “Wheels Down”, but….
A Lancaster was taking off when the leading edge of the port wing came loose and folded back. With great difficulty the pilot got the aircraft in the air. He made a fast approach out of necessity but the resultant heavy landing wrecked the aircraft. The primary cause of this accident was faulty maintenance, but it must be remembered that when examining leading edges for security before starting up, pilots and Flight Engineers must get [underlined] under [/underlined] the wing and see that the panel is flush with the mainplane. It is no good just looking at the screws from the front.
Included in the other accidents (not classed as avoidable) are 7 caused by tyre bursts, 3 undercarriage pylon failures in Stirlings, and 4 obscure crashes. One Lancaster landed on top of another which was about to take off, and caused fatal injuries. This accident is under investigation.
[Underlined] HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
The ‘score’ of heavy landings this month is [underlined] nil. [/underlined] – first month for a long time. This is just as it should be. Keep it up!
GIVE ALL YOU CAN TO THE 5 GROUP PRISONERS OF WAR FUND.
(SEE PAGE 4 FOR DETAILS)
TRAINING
There was a record number of crews produced by 51 Base during the month. A total of 131 crews were posted to No. 5 L.F.S. and 136 passed out from 5L.F.S. to squadrons. The Base, therefore, produced eleven crews in excess of the commitment for the month. To achieve this, the Heavy Conversion Units flew 5,650 hours and the L.F.S. the exceptionally fine figure of 2,240 hours. The weather was exceptional throughout the month, and hard work by maintenance personnel provided all units with the aircraft necessary to meet commitments.
A high light during the month was provided by 1661 Conversion Unit which put up 21 Stirlings on the night of 24/25th May, on night cross countries, Bullseye and bombing exercises. There were 21 aircraft detailed, no cancellations, no early returns and no accidents. The take off was on Operational lines and the aircraft took off at about a minute and a half intervals.
Accidents, unfortunately, marred the picture. The problem of tyre creep and busts is still a major one. Undercarriage defects have involved extensive co-operation with the manufacturers. It is hoped that “coring”, which has been a chronic complaint, will be cured as a result of the month’s investigations. Experiments are being made with tractors to tow aircraft instead of taxying, to see whether braking during taxying is the prime factor contributing to tyre defects.
H 2 S training is expanding in quantity and quality with each week. The difficulty of keeping the necessary serviceability balance between H 2 S and non-H 2 S aircraft is a serious headache for engineers. The new radar buildings will enable extra bench sets to be installed and more ground training completed.
A new syllabus for ground training has been introduced to provide instruction on better crew co-operation lines. Lecture room accommodation is inevitably an associated problem. The Instructor check staff now fly more frequently with crews under training, and some improvement in al specialist sections is apparent.
[Underlined] COMMITMENTS FOR JUNE [/underlined]
The month of June will see the summer training programme in full swing. The commitment will be 132 crews per month from the 3 Heavy Conversion Units, and 128 from No.5 LFS. From 15th June, LFS. are scheduled to produce 132 crews per month. This should be regarded as the minimum, and all Units should endeavour to exceed their commitment without loss of quality.
To ensure that the demands of No.5 L.F.S. are not excessive, and that crews will get a maximum amount of supervised training a revised Lancaster training syllabus has been produced. This will give crews at L.F.S. a total of 11 hours Lancaster flying, of which 6 hours will be dual. The instruction is confined basically to conversion to type and all cross country and affiliation exercises will be done on the squadrons. Instructors have been detached from 51 Base to supervise squadron training which will amount to 11 hrs 10 minutes, not including an experience sortie. Careful organisation by Operational bases is essential to ensure the smooth running of the supervised training in squadrons.
(Continued from previous column)
H 2 S commitments are increasing steadily, and with the fitting of H2S in 619 Squadron, approximately 50% of crews under training will now be required for H2S Squadrons. This means that 15 crews going into our Heavy Conversion Units from now on should be ear-marked for H2S training.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING DRIVE [/underlined]
A drive on bombing, and the need for the most intensive application to bombing training is paramount. The night precision bombing which this Group is carrying out will receive its foundation of consistent accuracy in 51 Base. Crews at the Aircrew School must receive a thorough grounding in the checking of the Mark XIV Bombsight and its use on operations. On all flying exercises when practice bombs are carried, the correct bombing procedure and the elimination of error is to be regarded as the main object of the flight. The bombing exercises are to be thoroughly analysed after every flight, and the Base Bombing Leader must check the progress of the bombing drive in the Base. The motto is- Think bombing, talk bombing, practice bombing, analyse bombing and BOMB ACCURATELY.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Secker and Sgt Gillespie of 619 Sqdn. set a fine example of airmanship on a recent sortie. During take-off P/O Secker found the A.S.I. was unserviceable. He continued the take-off, however, and in spite of the unserviceable instrument, set a course for the target. Sgt Gillespie, the Flight Engineer, traced the fault to a stripped nut in a pipeline. He repaired the pipeline with adhesive tape, and the crew completed a successful sortie.
P/O Dunne, pupil pilot of 1661 Conversion Unit, was taking off in a Stirling when at about 50 feet the port inner engine caught fire. He feathered the propeller and made a safe three-engined landing. This was a good show which reflects credit on his instructor.
Quick thinking and decisive action on the part of Sgt. Spears, a pupil Flight Engineer of 1654 Conversion Unit, saved a Stirling last month. Due to faulty manipulation by the 1st Engineer, all four engines cut through lack of fuel. Sgt Spears, however, tackled this failure and managed to restart the engines when the aircraft had reached 600 feet.
P/O Monaghan of 106 Squadron, showed excellent captaincy and skilled flying under very difficult conditions. He was shot up over the target, and on his return to this country could only get one leg of his undercarriage down. He made a superb landing on the one main whell [sic] in 500 yards visibility at Carnaby emergency airfield, without causing injury to the crew.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 16
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. K.L. SUMNER D.F.M.
P/O W.A. STRATIS D.F.C.
S/L S.L. COCKBAIN D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
P/O G.E. BALL D.F.C.
A/S/L J.H. EVANS, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
P/O A.G. EDGAR D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
SGT. R.D. CHANDLER D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
P/O R.J. AUCKLAND D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
83 SQUADRON
W/O K.A. LANE D.F.C.
F/L N.A. MACKIE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
97 SQUADRON
A/F/L G.S. CHATTEN D.S.O.
106 SQUADRON
S/L E. SPRAWSON D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
W/C J.F. GREY D.F.C.
463 SQUADRON
A/S/L W.L. BRILL, DFC D.S.O.
F/O D.F. WARD D.F.C.
W/C KINGSFORD-SMITH D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
F/O J.A.C. KENNEDY D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
F/O P. KELLY, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/O L.J. SUMPTER, DFM D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
SGT. H.G. BRADY D.F.M.
P/O D.A. WADSWORTH D.F.C.
SGT F.H. JOY D.F.M.
SGT. J.H. MALTBY D.F.M.
W/C J.R. JEUDWINE, OBE D.F.C.
A/S/L W.N. WHAMOND, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/L J.A. HOWARD, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT L.J. BIRCH D.F.M.
627 SQUADRON
F/L D.W. PECK, DFC D.S.O.
630 SQUADRON
P/O R.C. HOOPER D.S.O.
A/F/L T. NEILSON D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/SGT N.D. OWEN D.F.M.
F/SGT J.L. ELLIORR D.F.M.
SGT. A. FIELDING D.F.M.
SGT A.G. DENYER D.F.M.
SGT. K. PACK D.F.M.
F/O C.P. NEWTON D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
F/SGT B.H. WHITE D.F.M.
SGT. H.R. PITCHER D.F.M.
F/SGT C.W. DIMBLEBY D.F.M.
P/O R.A. McKITRICK D.F.C.
F/O J. GOURLAY D.F.C.
SGT. V.F.G. LAKER D.F.M.
P/O Q. SNOW D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
F/L R.N. GIBSON D.F.C.
P/O L.F. TAYLOR D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
P/O J.M. LAING D.F.C.
F/O W.R. FRANCIS D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
F/O G.K. KING D.F.C.
SGT. H. JOHNSON D.F.M.
[Page break]
57 SQUADRON cont.
F/O H.H. CHADWICK D.F.C.
P/O J. SHERRIFF D.F.C.
P/O W.A. WEST D.F.C.
F/SGT W. DAVIS D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
F/L A. SANDISON D.F.C.
F/O C.E. LANCE D.F.C.
106 SQUADRON
F/O H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
F/SGT W.P. AHIG D.F.M.
F/SGT J. BOADEN D.F.M.
A/S/L A.H. CROWE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
SGT L.J.B. BLOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT A.G. MEARNS D.F.M.
207 SQUADRON
P/O C.M. LAWS D.F.C.
SGT H.C. DEVENISH D.F.M.
SGT G.H. CASTELL D.F.M.
A/F/L H.J. PRYOR D.F.C.
P/O S.V. SAFELLE D.F.C.
F/SGT A. BRUCE D.F.M.
SGT. A. BARKER D.F.M.
467 SQUADRON
P/O B.R. JONES D.F.C.
P/O R.M. STANFORD D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
W/O W.J. BENNETT D.F.C.
P/O W.G. RADCLIFFE D.F.C.
F/SGT R. BATSON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.G. DOWMAN D.F.M.
463 SQUADRON
F/O A.E. KELL D.F.C.
630 SQUADRON
SGT D.J. TAYLOR D.F.M.
F/O J.H. PRATT D.F.C.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONT.)
damage, although on a rather less severe scale can be seen at the Power Station to the N.E. The attack by a small force on Annecy on 9/10 was outstandingly successful. Apart from one small building in the S.E. corner of the factory, the whole target has been almost completely destroyed. On the 24/25th the raid on Eindhoven was abandoned owing to 10/10ths cloud, but this disappointment was to some extent compensated by a successful attack on the General Motors Assembly Plant on the same night. The main building group is about 75% demolished, while damage can be identified to dockside buildings and servicing tracks.
Sea mining was undertaken on five nights during the month.
A note of extreme optimism perculated into the month’s operations by the introduction of four coastal defence battery targets. The first to be attacked was Marselines and St. Valery-en-Caux, both on 27/28. The former battery received many near misses within 50 yards, but it is difficult to speculate on the resultant damage to the primary weapons. Some damage to personnel accommodation is, however, apparent.
St. Valery was more successful 208 craters can be seen in the target area, resulting in four of the emplacements receiving direct hits, with very near misses to the remaining two positions. The following night, 28/29, the battery at St. Martin de Varreville was attacked. An extremely heavy concentration of craters throughout the battery area was achieved, with obliteration of all but one of the emplacements. The coastal defence battery at Maisy, singled out for attack on the night of 31st, had 10/10ths stratus to thank for a quiet night.
Although the true Allied design is cloaked, and little can be gained from the study of the month’s air tactics, it can at least be tendered that our offensive is producing results which are measurable and progressive.
AIR TRAINING
There was a satisfactory improvement in the number of fighter affiliation details flown by aircraft of 1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month, Squadrons and Training Units trebled the number of Gyro Assessor exercises compared with the April figure.
The fighters carried out 440 hours day affiliation (over 1700 exercises) and 251 hours other flying, which included standing patrols for “snap” interceptions of Stirlings in 51 Base, night training, air tests and drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. The posting of five Hurricane pilots in a week towards the end of the month seriously handicapped Squadron affiliation and replacements are urgently required.
Hurricane pilots of the detached elements of the Flight in the Operational Bases who were out of touch with night flying, were given a short refresher at R.A.F. Station, Cranwell. No. 52 Base showed initiative and enthusiasm by completing their night Hurricane training during the month and doing some searchlight co-operation by arrangement with 50 A.A. Brigade (5 A.A. Group). They were all set to start night affiliation with their own bombers when two of their three pilots were posted. The other Bases have yet to complete night training. This must be done in the early part of June. The absence of flame shields and V.H.F. is no restriction; neither is essential.
The following table shows the details of air training in the Group, and the flying times of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING MAY
[Table of 1690 B.D.T. Flight Flying Times by Base]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
There is a slight increase from last month in the total number of hours Link practice carried out during the month. This was, however, due entirely to an increased effort by Flight Engineers, pilot times being slightly less than the previous month. This decrease was due mainly to operational commitments, but there is still room for improvement in Link Hours. Don’t neglect your Link practice, accurate instrument flying is essential for accurate bombing.
LINK TRAINER FLYING TIMES
[Table of Link Trainer hours carried out by Squadron]
ARMAMENT (Continued from page 2 Col. 2)
[Underlined] VISIT TO STEEL FOUNDRY [/underlined]
The Armament Brach at this Headquarters was fortunate enough to pay a very interesting visit to a Steel Foundry which is casting out 1000 lb M.C. bombs for us. It is understood that this particular firm were the pioneers of the new method of casting steel bomb bodies and consequently a very comprehensive story of the evolution of the 1000 lb cast steel MC bomb was obtained from the people who really know.
The visit was of about four hours duration and all stages of the process were witnessed under the watchful eye of a very competent guide. The visit was not without its comic side; the Group Armament Officer at one time was seen diving into a heap of wet sand as a very large crucible of hot molten steel swept smartly past his ear. Incidentally the crane carrying the steel was in the very skilful hands of a member of the fair sex, which may account for the C.A.O. not seeing the crucible a little earlier.
Efforts are being made to obtain permission for all Armament Officers to have the opportunity of visiting a similar foundry.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
There is at last news of the 30 cwt van for Armament Officers, and as it is now on the establishment, a daily visit to the transport section might prevent a mis-allocation.
The Army have provided 24 lorries and 50 men to assist in handling explosives – a duty new to them, which they are performing with great zeal.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The high light of the month’s offensive was the dropping of more than 37,000 tons of bombs by Bomber Command – the greatest weight of bombs ever dropped in a single month. Our contribution to the blue print pattern of the Second Front has been a rather varied one, including attacks on railway centres, ammunition dumps, military depots, aircraft factories and explosives factories. 2254 sorties were flown, with 3.2% casualties.
The campaign against the enemy’s aircraft production, commenced in April last, was continued with unabated vigour, culminating in five successful missions. The attack against the Usine Liotard Aircraft Repair Works on 1/2 set a particularly high standard for the month. Of the three main buildings comprising the works, two were completely destroyed and the third severely damaged. On the same night an attack was launched against the same S.N.C.A.S.E. aircraft assembly plant at Toulouse. The whole factory sustained severe damage, including in particular, the destruction of the three main buildings, the assembly plant, the testing shop and the components store.
The main weight of the attack on TOURS airfield on 7/8th was distributed among the administrative buildings and the N., S., and W. hangar areas. In the former, seventeen buildings have been more than 50% destroyed – only eight out of the 41 buildings in the area remain undamaged. Damage is also severe in each of the hangar areas.
Both the Airfield and Seaplane Base at Brest/Lanveoc-Poulmic were attacked on 8/9. All five hangars at the airfield were hit, causing serious damage. Other incidents can also be identified. The principal damage at the Seaplane Base is to the main hangar and officers’ quarters, which have sustained several direct hits.
Mobility, and the resultant power of rapid concentration, which the Hun no doubt hoped would assist in countering the invasion threat, has made transportation the objective of much of May’s 37,000 tons. This Group was detailed to attack the railway yard and workshops at Lille on 10/11. Photographs taken after the attack indicate that two locomotive sheds and a car repair storage shed have been destroyed – the transhipment sheds and other buildings being severely damaged. There are also numerous hits on the tracks. Cover of Tours following our attack on the marshalling yard on 19/20, shows particularly severe damage to railway facilities and the passenger station. The goods depot is more that [sic] 50% destroyed, while the locomotive workshops and depot are severely affected. All tracks are interrupted. Weather affected our effort on the Amiens marshalling yard on 19/20, although some aircraft bombed. P.R.U. cover is awaited. In the raid on Nantes on 27/28, only half the effort could be brought to bear owing to smoke obscuring visibility. Despite this, a total of at least eighty hits were secured on the railway tracks, causing considerable dislocation. The railway junction at Saumur was attached [sic] with some effect on the night of the 31st. On this occasion also, smoke tended to obscure the target, but not before rather more than half of the attacking force had bombed, securing hits on the tracks, railway station and sheds and causing damage to the road bridge.
Two main targets were selected during the month – Duisburg on the 21/22, followed immediately by Brunswick on 22/23. At Duisburg further damage has been caused to business and residential property, especially in the town centre, and also to important industrial targets, chiefly in areas south of the docks. Brunswick, unfortunately, continued its charmed life, and apart from a few incidents near the eastern marshalling yards came through its ordeal unscathed.
It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that already the German repair system is overtaxed to such a degree that no attempt has been made to repair much of the damage to his communications.
If evidence is required of the rapid approach of invasion hour, this can surely be found in the recent shifting od the main weight of attack to the methodical disorganisation of the Western Wall itself. Not only have coastal defence batteries commanded our attention, but also ammunition dumps, military camps and powder works. The attack on the Pouderie Nationale Explosives Works at Toulouse was outstandingly successful. Extensive damage has been caused, which has virtually written off the plant. Sable-sur-Sarthe on 6/7th was equally effective. Photos taken the day following the raid show smoke emitting from the remains of the ammunition dump. All the principal buildings in the ammunition filling installation have been destroyed or damaged – the site of the storage units in the central sector of the dump being marked by large craters. The Salbris Explosives Works and Depot attacked on 7/8th sustained severe damage. Of the larger of the two factory units not one building has escaped. Despite the dispersal if the storage depot, which consist [sic] of ten separate areas, five have been damaged, three particularly severely.
The tank training centre at Mailly le Camp received our attention on the 3/4. Some 5000 troops and between 50 – 60 Tiger tanks were believed to have been housed here. The results achieved by the attack were impressive. Not one building in the group of M/T and barrack buildings has escaped damage, 34 out of a total of 47 buildings being totally destroyed. In the remaining group of 114 barrack buildings, 47 were destroyed and many of the remainder damaged. Bourg-Leopold (11/12) the largest enemy barracks in France was a most attractive target, but again the weather was fickle, with the result that the mission was abortive. It is interesting to note that Command has since attacked this target, producing very heavy damage throughout the entire barracks area. Our agenda for the month included four more pre-invasion targets of a rather miscellaneous variety – namely the Gnome and Phone Foundry at Gennevilliers, the Ball-Bearing Factory at Annecy the Phillips Works at Eindhoven and the Ford and General Motor Works at Antwerp. Very severe damage can be seen throughout the Foundry and Stamping Plant at Gennevilliers following the attack on 9/10. The adjoining Electrical Engineering Works and Tyre and Rubber Works have also suffered. In addition
(Continued on Page 17, Column 1)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties carried out during June including awards by Squadron]
ERRATUM: In the above table 463 Sqdn should occupy fifth place, with all subsequent squadrons amended accordingly.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944.
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V Group News, May 1944
5 Group News, May 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 22, May 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about armament, war savings, flying control, engineering, flight engineers, gardening, prisoner of war fund, air bombing, navigation, equipment, H2S track and ground speed bombing, air sea rescue, enemy agents and careless walkers, accidents, signals, tactics, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, photography, sports, economy and salvage, training, recent good shows, honours and awards, air training, link trainer, operations and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-05
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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20 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-26%20may%2044
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Belgium
France
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Amiens
France--Brest
France--Gennevilliers
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France--Nantes
France--Sablé-sur-Sarthe
France--Saumur
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Duisburg
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
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1944-05
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
ditching
flight engineer
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
RAF Winthorpe
rivalry
sport
Stirling
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Base Commander.
Base Int: [Stamp]
MARCH * 1944* CONFIDENTIAL * NO * 20
V GROUP NEWS V
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
March proved a record month for 5 Group, with a total of 1720 aircraft despatched, and a bomb load of 7200 tons. The month also showed a lower figure for early returns at 4.01%, and a missing rate well below the average for the past six months.
Outstanding during the month were the series of attacks on small targets, by individual Bases. These were well undertaken and caused much damage to the French aircraft industry, which is engaged on sub-contracting and repair work for the G.A.F. – work which is of increasing importance as the major factories in Germany are obliterated by the U.S. .A.F.
These attacks call for exact marking, accurate bombing and good signals communications. Much training is still necessary before every operation runs smoothly and can be undertaken with equal success on dark nights, by the aid of flares instead of the moon. That such attacks are possible is shown by the success achieved by No. 617 Squadron, who in this respect are acting as pioneers and gaining invaluable experience of a type of attack which is of growing importance.
The success which this Squadron has achieved was rewarded by a special visit from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the United States Strategic Air Forces, and General Doolittle, Commanding the 8th Bomber Force, who came to see for themselves the methods which are employed.
Further evidence of the wide interest which is being taken in these attacks can be found in the Air Intelligence Summary of the United States Strategic Forces in Europe, for the week ending April 2nd.
An article headed “R.A.F. Precision Attacks by Night”, after describing the results of many of the recent attacks, including those undertaken by all squadrons in this Group, continues as follows:-
“Relatively small formations of Lancasters, manned by experienced and carefully trained crews, are responsible for the success of these missions, an outstanding feature of which has been the economy of force used to produce the desired result. Expert navigation followed by pin point marking of the target by a single aircraft at low level, has permitted visual bombing with a precision comparable to the best results obtained in daylight.”
This praise, coming from the United States Air Force, is indeed welcome, for we recognise the magnificent results which they are achieving by day. If we think that precision bombing by night is not only possible, but in some respects easier than precision bombing by day, as well as being more economical, it is up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that our conviction is right by the only valid method – that of results. I hope that during April we shall have an opportunity of gaining further experience and providing further proof of what can be done.
With so much activity in front of the Group a heavier load than ever will be placed on the Training Base. It is going to be hard work for everyone, but it is only through their efforts that we have been able to carry out these damaging attacks. I congratulate all ranks in the Base on having achieved the full planned output of crews throughout the winter months, in spite of great difficulties of weather and an unexpected change in the type of aircraft used for conversion training. The requirements from now on are for the maximum number of crews who can be trained with the available resources.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION
For the first two years of the war, the policy of operational navigation was controlled by individual Station and Squadron Commanders. Routeing, timing, heights to fly and recommendations of the best Navigational aids then available were decided locally.
As the Command effort increased, and the enemy night defences grew stronger, it became necessary to route aircraft in concentration; thus, routeing was taken over by Bomber Command. The concentration achieved was still poor, however. There were several contributory factors:-
(i) Lack of Navigational aids which would enable all aircraft to establish their positions when over enemy territory.
(ii) Inaccurate flying of courses by Pilots due to weaving, evasive action, etc.
(iii) Inaccuracies in calculations and computations by navigators.
(iv) Due to the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, the inability of the Navigator to determine the correct wind velocities.
A concentrated drive was then made to remove these shortcomings. Gee, and later H.2.S. was introduced to enable Navigators to determine their position over enemy territory. The introduction of the A.P.I. which maintains an accurate air plot, gave the Navigator a method of recording inaccuracies of the aircraft and of the pilot which would normally pass unnoticed. Weaving was forbidden. More attention during the Navigator’s training, was given to computations and the elimination of careless mathematical errors.
H 2 S and the A.P.I., however, were not available to the entire force, and the average Navigator was still unable to determine correct wind velocities. An analysis of many raids proved that a certain number of experienced Navigators, with the required aids, could find accurate winds, and it was decided to let the whole force benefit by the experience and capabilities of these crews. The scheme was pioneered by this Group on several occasions, and the results were very successful. It was then adopted by Bomber Command for general use. The procedure is as follows
15/25 crews from each Group flying in aircraft equipped with H 2 S and A.P.I. are detailed as “wind finders”. The Navigators of these aircraft obtain wind velocity checks as often as possible, and transmit to Base all wind velocities found.
Before the operation, the Senior Met. Officer at Group prepares a chart illustrating the route, the meridian code and the estimated position of aircraft at broadcast times. Attached to this chart is a list of the wind finding aircraft. As each wind is received, it is entered in the column allotted to the particular aircraft.
The wind signals from aircraft are intercepted at Group Headquarters by the Signals Section, who keep a monitoring watch on all Base frequencies. From the time of breaking enemy R.D.F. cover, signals runners are constantly employed delivering wind messages to the Met. Office.
There is a hook up between all Group Met. Sections within the Command, and winds received from the entire force are collated. The Met. Officer sits with one eye on his chart and one eye on the clock, and five minutes before the next broadcast is due, a forecast wind is issued, and, if necessary, a corrected past wind.
As the raid progresses, and the chart fills up, so the look of satisfaction grows on the Senior Met. Officer’s face. Sometimes there are blanks when aircraft cannot obtain a wind velocity check, due to u/s equipment, or because aircraft have returned early. At other times a wind velocity obtained is not transmitted by the aircraft until long after it has left the area to which the wind velocity applies. In both instances, this gives the Met. Staff so much less information on which to base their corrections and forecasts. There have been instances when they have had no more than two or three wind velocities over a detailed area, and even then there have been large discrepancies. A good example is the Berlin raid of 24/25 March, 1944, when only 9 wind velocities were received, homeward bound, from the target to the enemy coast – 2 1/4 hours flying! In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult to give you accurate forecast winds. Crews now realise how important it is to obtain as many wind velocity checks as possible, and pass them to Base immediately. Even if the wind velocity obtained differs considerably from the forecast on the Form 2330, then providing you are confident of the fix used, send back the w/v you have found. If you have “boobed”, then the Met. Staff can, and will, see this, and no harm will be done. There will be no “strips” for the crew concerned. If, however, you obtain a w/v and [underlined] DO NOT [/underlined] send it back, then you are withholding vital information which may affect the safety of the whole Bomber Force, including your own.
The Group Met. Staff have had considerable experience of this scheme, and they are getting to know the various windfinders. One often hears a remark in the Met. Office “Old Snooks is flying in “F”57 tonight, we shall get some reliable winds from him” – and they do!! They know that each wind “Old Snooks” sends back will be reliable, and his messages are greatly treasured.
A Navigator is employed in the Met. Office whose duty it was in the past, to present to the Air Staff the effect of the corrected w/v’s on track and time keeping, and whether aircraft would arrive at the target early or late. All went well until the attack on Leipzig on the night of 19/20th February, when it was obvious from application of the broadcast winds that aircraft would arrive at the target 10 – 15 minutes early. We all know the result – 79 aircraft lost.
The obvious way to tackle this problem was to adjust the zero hour, and since we were obtaining from aircraft reliable information of true winds over enemy territory, a scheme was devised whereby the zero hour could be amended if necessary. The Duty Navigator in the Command Met. Office ascertains from application of the corrected w/v’s, whether the aircraft will arrive at the target early on time, or late, and consequently whether the zero hour needs amending. All H 2 S wind finders in this Group transmit the times at which they pass two datum points on the route. It is obvious, however, that both calculations will be valueless unless all aircraft [underlined] do [/underlined] leave the concentration point [underlined] exactly [/underlined] on time, and fly at the speeds laid down at the Flight Planning Conference. It must also be obvious to the reader, that unless wind information and times at the datum points are sent back by aircraft immediately, then there will be neither sufficient information on which to base an amendment to the zero hour, nor time in which to take necessary action.
Accurate time keeping, good concentration and correct timing of the attack, in short the success of the operation, depend on every wind finder knowing and doing his job. It’s up to you.
WHERE TO LOOK
A.O.C’s Foreword. Page 1
Aircrew Volunteers. 6
Air Bombing. 7
Air Sea Rescue. 8
Absence. 11
Accidents. 14
Armament. 15
Bombing, Air. 7
Decorations. 6
Engineering. 14
Equipment. 11
Flying Control. 5
Flight Engineers. 6
Gardening. 4
Gee. 5
Gunnery. 9
H 2 S. Page 5
Link Trainer Times. 10
Navigation, Progress of. 2
Navigation. 13
Organisation. 14
Operations. 16
Progress of Navigation. 2
Photography. 4
Public Relations. 10
Signals/Radar. 3
Second Thoughts for Pilots 10
Sports. 12
Tactics. 6
Training. 11
War Effort. 16
War Savings. 6
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
March was not the best of months from the Aircrew Signals point of view, and it is to be hoped that Signals Leaders will make every endeavour to effect an improvement in the coming month.
You may not have any connection with the following examples but is that because you know all the answers, or is it that you have not been caught out.
There was once a Wireless Operator (Air) who after 14 operational sorties, used the spelling table of CD0250 for the following – REQUEST Q.F.E. – a total of 5 Groups where 1 Group would have covered the situation. Five minutes instruction per day would prevent any unnecessary waste of ether time.
Once upon a time (in March) a Wireless Operator (Air) gave out the wrong Bomber Code, which all the simpletons in his section accepted without a murmur. It is said at this Headquarters that all the murmuring came from the Duty Signals Officer – I wouldn’t know. In days gone by (March again), a Wireless Operator (Air) did not know where to find the fuse of his Visual Monica equipment, and the aircraft had no Early Warning Device – a congratulatory message from the Luftwaffe is expected any day. Talking of Early Warning Devices, the writer knows of two Operators (no names, no Grade 1) who did not know how to cope with simple fault finding.
Now we can do better than this, and it is suggested that every Signals Leader has a daily session with all the Wireless Operators, just ten minutes every morning will pay handsome dividends.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The new system of reporting the performance of Early Warning Devices by pro-forma is working very well, thanks to the co-operation of all concerned. This is going to save a lot of time and unnecessary telephone calls, which ultimately will help the war effort. Since the last News, a new instruction on the use of I.F.F. when circling dinghies or crashed aircraft, has been brought into force, 5G/S.4403/50/Sigs, of 23rd March, refers.
On Flight Planning for Thursday, 30th March, the Air Officer Commanding outlined the danger to the Bomber Force caused by selfish captains trying to but [sic] a little extra security for themselves at the expense of their fellow captains, when they order their Wireless Operators into the Astro-dome. It is hoped that this point has now gone right home, and that there will be nor further occurrence of this practice.
Just one more item that requires the attention of all Airborne Signals types. The constant back tuning that goes on during every operation, and the passing back of wind messages during the normal transmission times. When you read the first part of these notes again, as it is hoped you will, add a reminder about back tuning and listening out, to your daily session.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
Two good points stand out for the month; they are both from No.57 Squadron.
P/O. Bracker, on the night of 24/25th did some quick thinking to get his R1155 working and receive the broadcasts.
On the same night, Sgt. Robinson saw on his Fishpond screen, two aircraft close together. He reported this, and gunners reports a combat taking place. The aircraft joined in the fight, drew the enemy aircraft’s fire and eventually shot it down.
This is an excellent example of the intelligent use of Fishpond – a good show by the W/Op and his crew.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt. Stevens, Signals Leader of No.57 Squadron, on obtaining an “A” category on No.5 Signals Leader’s Course.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures for March is considerably lower than for February, being less than 50% of the February figures. No Signals failure was responsible for a cancelled sortie, but out of the total of 24 failures reported, four were the reason for, or a contributory cause of, early returns.
The very small percentage contribution to early returns for March 0.235% against 1.30% for February is a welcome indication of a general drive to eliminate the possibility of Signals contribution in any way to a cancelled or abandoned sortie.
This does not mean that failure reports generally show a decrease. On the contrary, the conscientious reporting of any type of failure whatsoever, irrespective of whether it affects the success of the sortie or not, or even appears on the raid report, is essential.
A perusal of the details of failures for March, shows that one Squadron reported ten failures, none of which caused an early return; but they do provide the information required to enable action to be taken to institute modifications which will, in time, make failures almost impossible. The more attention which is paid to reporting failures the sooner will the improvements be incorporated.
We do not wish to take part in any competition between Groups for the lowest number of reported failures, but we must show the lowest percentage contributing to cancellations and early returns.
[Underlined] COUNTERMEASURE MANDREL [/underlined]
The fitting of Mandrel is proceeding satisfactorily. The great hold-up has been due to so many new aircraft arriving with the downward vision blister, thus denying us our original aerial position. However, Bomber Command have now authorised the removal of these blisters and, as a result, the aerial returns to its original position.
We still manage to fly a high proportion of the Command Mandrel effort.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
During the month there occurred an outstanding example of loss of security on an operation through injudicious use of R/T. Take-off was 18.13, the route was northerly, and W/T silence was not to be broken until approximately 20.45. At 19.09 an early return called up his station, stating that his instruments were u/s, and requesting permission to land after jettisoning petrol. On being told to stand by, the E.R. stated that although he was aware that boomerang procedure was to jettison the cookie, he didn’t want to fly around much longer, and suggested jettisoning the petrol and landing with cookie. The ground station then requested details as to what was wrong with the aircraft instruments. After replying, the aircraft requested instructions again, and was told to jettison incendiaries safe, and pancake. This instruction was repeated, the aircraft carried out the instructions and returned, making a final reference to his cookie as a warning to ground crews. The entire conversation lasted 23 minutes, by which time any doubts the enemy might have had of the hostile intentions of the force plotted by his long range Radar must have been completely dispersed. “It is to be assumed” say Bomber Command, “that every time a word is spoken, it is heard by the enemy”. So, on this particular night, we gave him one hour’s prior notice of the attack and that is a luxury we can’t afford.
After many representations, the British Joint Communications Board have now conceded that for INTER RAF WORKING ONLY, J – Johnny may be used in lieu of J-Jig. For combined and joint working, J-Jig must still be used. This latter point is important. The probability of joint and combined working is imminent, and strict observance of the alphabet and standard procedure will play an important part in ensuring the smooth working of our forces.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee remains high, and shows a slight improvement over February. A total of 1201 Gee sorties were flown during the month, and in 96.7% of them the equipment was completely serviceable. It is hoped that a further increase can be shown next month.
Three new Radar Workshops have been completed during the month. All squadrons now possess their own building, which should help considerably to increase serviceability.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
H 2 S serviceability improved slightly during last month, but it is still far from satisfactory; the percentage serviceable to the target and back was 76%.
The new Filament Transformers, which have now flown up to 50 sorties, give every indication of being the solution to the main causes of unserviceability; unfortunately, production difficulties will cause considerable delay in a changeover programme. The arrival of a drier season should prevent a further source of unserviceability that has been caused by dampness. It is felt that a considerable percentage on non-reproduceable faults were due to such dampness.
Manipulation failures due to lack of experience with the equipment, still assume too high a percentage, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. A new switch procedure has been drawn up and put into force which, if strictly adhered to, should result in greater serviceability.
The repositioning of the Scanner Heater
(Continued on page 4, col.3)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Failures from all causes totalled 109, equalling 6.9%; this represents a decrease of 1.4% on the month of February. These technical failures remain persistently at 6-7% and there is no doubt that many of them can be avoided with more careful inspection and maintenance.
Instructions have been issued by Eng/Elect Branch to modify all Lancaster aircraft camera circuits; this is a return to bomb door operation of the camera. Briefly this circuit is wired through the Mk. XIV bombsight panel, and incorporates a relay which safeguards the camera from premature operation through deliberate or accidental movement of the pilot’s bomb door selector arm, provided that the bombsight graticule is not switched on. Once the bombsight graticule has been switched on, the circuit from the selector arm is “live”. Therefore, when the bomb doors are selected open, the camera winds over one frame; when the Air Bomber releases the bombs, the normal camera cycle commences. During the period that the Type 35 Control motor is running, the pilot’s selector arm circuit to the camera is “dead”, and should the doors be closed before the camera cycle is completed, the frame sequence remains uninterrupted.
An effort has been made to produce an ideal circuit, and the modification now being introduced is as near to the ideal as possible; for instance, switching on the graticule late i.e. after the bomb doors have been opened, would result in the loss of the first frame, and would bring the bombing frame into position at No.6 instead of No.7. This will be bad enough with ordinary H.S. night film, but with composite colour in use, the probable loss of ground detail on the bombing frame would be serious.
The introduction of this circuit does not mean that technical failures in Type 35 Controls and camera gear boxes are overcome. Careful inspection, testing and thorough maintenance, are the only cures. It is evident from failure reports that insufficient care is being taken to ensure that camera equipment issued from the Equipment Section is entirely satisfactory before installing it into operational aircraft.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadrons]
GARDENING
The Command planted 1,472 vegetables this month, 76% being distributed off the East Frisians, in Keil Bay and the Fehmarn Belt and off the French U-boat bases; the remainder in the Channel, off Holland and on the Spanish Iron Ore Routes. 3 Group planted over half the total 6 Group nearly 400 and 4 Group nearly 300.
This is the third month of intensive high altitude gardening and reports of results now coming in are proof of its success. So far this year the casualty rate due to Bomber Command’s mining is 5 ships sunk or damaged per week, but latest reports show that this has now increased to a rate of [underlined] 1.4 ships per day. [/underlined]
The most encouraging report has come to hand from a source now in this country, who, up until recently, has been obliged to sail the German North Sea Convoy Routes, and who had to “swim for it” at least once. “Minephobia” is so acute that whenever minelaying is even suspected, all traffic is stopped for 24 hrs. The crews of mine sweepers after a six months “tour”, now get three months leave, most of which is spent in hospitals specialising in the cure of neurosis.
Now that the various methods of high altitude mining have had fair operational trial, it is possible to lay down standard rules, and various orders lately issued will be consolidated. A point which stands out from the last three months work, is that the success of high altitude mining outside Gee range has been dependent on H 2 S aircraft being available either to mark for those not so fitted, or, in restricted gardens, to do the laying.
Undoubtedly the ideal method is a D.R. run from a visual pinpoint using the Mark XIV bombsight and aided by H 2 S, but weather conditions which will permit visual pinpointing unaided by markers are the exception rather than the rule.
Commander R. A. McDonald, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Vernon, explained to aircrews of 49, 57, 630, 207, and 106 Squadrons some of the pleasant little surprises that our mines spring on the enemy’s shipping and mine sweepers (and the devices which prevent them from being sprung on our own Armament staffs). He was unfortunately prevented from visiting other Squadrons, by operations.
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from page 3, col. 3)
has been practically completed, and during the last month no scanners have frozen where this modification has been incorporated. Bomber Command is also issuing a modification covering heating of Scanner Motors, and repositioning of the Scanner Heater Switch.
[Boxed] FISHPOND [/boxed]
This device also showed an improvement during the month, but here too a great deal of work remains to be done. The serviceability percentage for March was 78%.
W/Ops and Navigators still lack the training and co-ordination required to derive the full benefit from this Warning Device. It is to their own advantage to become fully proficient in its operation. A shortened maximum range has been experimented with, and those Operators who have used it express complete satisfaction. Bomber Command have been requested to approve this modification for general installation.
[Boxed] VISUAL MONICA [/boxed]
Serviceability continues to improve, and last month reached 89.5%. It is felt, however, that this figure may still be improved.
The amount of work spent on the Switch Motors has paid great dividends, and the old theory that the Motor was to blame has been refuted. In this connection, the changeover plugs for the aerial leads have proved very valuable on the few occasions when Switch Motors have stopped.
The introduction of Mark IV A.I. as a Tail Warning Device has made available from 54 Base further supplies of Visual Monica, with which it has been possible to almost completely equip the Group with Visual Tail Warning Devices, and thus eliminate Aural Monica.
[Boxed] A.I. [/boxed]
The new addition to Bomber aircraft has now seen considerable operational work, and shows the qualities of a fine Tail Warning Device. Serviceability was 78% for the two weeks it has been in operation. This will, without doubt, be raised week by week as personnel become fully conversant with the equipment.
Operators find the equipment easy to use, due to previous experience in Visual Monica, and are very enthusiastic. The elevation part has worked very satisfactorily in No. 617 Squadron, and a general installation programme is now in hand for the other A.I. squadrons.
[Underlined] SPORTS (Contd. From page 12, col. 3) [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUTURE EVENTS [/underlined]
RUGBY – No. 1 Air Landing Brigade is of the opinion that its Brigade Rugger side can put paid to a 5 Group representative team. The challenge is being joyfully taken up; the result should be a first class game.
CRICKET – It has, unfortunately, been impossible to obtain transport for a ‘straight’ Group Cricket League. The next best thing, a Group Cricket Knock-out, is being run. Full details will be forwarded to all stations. It [sic] the meantime, stations are advised to look up friendlies as usual.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
GEE
Ranges obtained on Gee this month were average on all major operations. Many Navigators however, obtained quite remarkable fixes on special operations, and in a number of cases over the targets. Single position lines from strong signals were intelligently used, and in a few cases Gee was used by Navigators as a means of homing to the special targets.
The mere fact that signals begin to fade into the jamming appears to act as a deterrent to many navigators who forget that jamming can occur in certain local areas on the continent. Once through a local jamming area fixes may again be obtained and under no circumstances should a Navigator neglect to check the Gee Indicator to see if this is so. If a local jamming area is encountered report it at interrogation for the benefit of others.
“Coding” does not appear to have caused any serious trouble and is reported to be phased and timed accurately. However, now that further instructions have been issued, navigators and wireless operators are warned to take greater care in reading the indicator to prevent serious mistakes being made. If you are uncertain of the present day instructions check up at your section now.
Don’t forget that the Southern and South-Eastern Chains are now on a new frequency. This recent changeover should solve the problem of break through pulses which have been reported recently.
The new North Eastern Chain is now operating daily for test purposes and reports on transmissions are requested. Navigators and Wireless Operators, this chain has been provided for your benefit, let us have these reports; in doing so you are helping the technicians to provide a better facility for yourselves. It is hoped that charts to cover this chain will be issued this month.
One word about descent through cloud and the correct homing procedure to Base. Air Staff Instructions lay down the procedure to be adopted for descent through cloud and homing to Base on Gee and these instructions must be followed. Navigators should ensure that the captain follows the correct procedure. Descent through cloud must be made between the correct lattice lines and along the correct homing lattice line applicable to base. Remember – individual lattice lines have been chosen for each airfield to prevent the risk of collision, and these are to be used like railway tracks. Follow the Green Indicator to safety.
H 2 S
H 2 S training on Squadrons this month was confined mainly to the Bombing Competition, and although a considerable number of aircraft were detailed, few obtained photographs owing to unsatisfactory target conditions. Of the results received to date, the majority are within one mile of the aiming point, reflecting great credit on the crews taking part. It is hoped to publish a summary of results in the next issue of the “News”.
Training at Conversion Units is improving and many crews are now completing 10 – 15 hours air training, which should prove of considerable benefit to the squadrons.
Full use is being made of the ground trainers both as navigational and bombing aids. Emphasis must be placed on the use of H 2 S as a navigational aid, particularly in the early stages of training, and trainer cross countries should be carried out with this point in mind. Navigators and Air Bombers must aim at a high standard of efficiency in both the taking and plotting of fixes, particularly as the whole of the Bomber Force depends on this aid for accurate broadcast winds.
An investigation has been carried out this month into all manipulation failures since the beginning of the year, and it is noted that they occur during the first 20 hours of air training and are mainly due to incorrect tuning. To overcome this, Aircraft Drill No.14 was issued setting out the correct H 2 S switching, tuning and re-tuning sequences and operators are to follow this procedure at all times. It is of no practical use to switch the set on, tune and leave it whilst Gee is in range, then commence trying to identify responses when out of Gee coverage, without re-tuning. Tuning varies with the height and time the set is on, so recheck frequently.
Bomber Command intend issuing in the near future a list of faults which can be remedied in the air. However, it is pointed out at this stage, operators are still failing to check fuses when the equipment goes unserviceable. This fault is the easiest which can be remedied in the air and failure to do this is inexcusable.
As always, practice makes perfect, and to overcome manipulation failures, operators should endeavour to spend considerable time tuning and re-tuning the bench set, following the procedure laid down in the drill. This applies to trained and untrained crews alike.
H 2 S and Fishpond are inter-dependent; consequently a manipulation failure on H 2 S leaves a crew without an essential warning device. This point alone easily outweighs all other arguments which may be brought up regarding manipulation failures. H 2 S operators and Wireless Operators must therefore realise that by spending a little time in training to keep efficient on both H 2 S and Fishpond, they are contributing to the safety of their aircraft and crew.
FLYING CONTROL
33 AIRCRAFT LANDED IN 45 MINS:
March has seen a further improvement in landing times, the average for the Group for the month being 2.13 minutes per aircraft. There is still, however, room for improvement in Single-squadron Stations, and Skellingthorpe has shown that the Landing Scheme can produce a high landing rate with small numbers of aircraft; on the night 18/19th March they landed fifteen aircraft in 25 minutes; the fact that a station only has one squadron to land is no excuse for poor landing times. If all single squadron stations follow Skellingthorpe’s example, then we can look forward to an overall Group average of well below the two minute mark.
Some excellent performances have been put up by Stations in this Group during the past month. Below are some figures which are the result of good flying discipline and good airmanship. They are not “peak period” figures, but are taken over the total period.
[Table of selected Aircraft recovery times by Station]
A conference was held at this Headquarters early in the month to review the landing scheme, and improve where necessary. One point raised was the difficulty in persuading pilots to adhere to the airspeeds laid down for return from the last concentration point. If you are one of the unfortunate ones, and are allotted one of the lower airspeeds, make up your mind to stick to it, for it does eliminate that tedious and highly dangerous orbiting of the airfield on return. There are many aircraft using a small piece of sky, and although we are not often troubled with intruders yet, one Hun fighter operating around 5 Group could do a deal of damage. If you rush back, you will certainly have to waste time before landing, so why not waste it peacefully over the sea, rather than be told to go for a short cross country in a congested area.
On reviewing diversions over the past six month it is obvious that standard R/T and control drills are lacking. As the result of a conference held at Headquarters Bomber Command, a standard method of control and R/T procedure has been agreed and will be issued shortly. It is to be used when aircraft are diverted away from Base and the 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme consequently not in operation. It is important that pilots have this procedure at their fingertips. Diversions are never a pleasant end to an operational sortie, but if you can get down at your diversion airfield with the minimum trouble, it makes the task an easier one for all concerned.
FOG DISPERSAL
The fog dispersal apparatus at Fiskerton was responsible for the landing of 14 aircraft during the month. The total number of aircraft landed to date, using this installation is 48. On the 17th March, when five aircraft landed, visibility before lighting up was only 200 yards, with fog estimated to be 800 feet thick. In sixteen minutes visibility on the runway had improved from 15 – 2,000 yards. Again on the 24th, 5 Group aircraft were able to use Fiskerton, and visibility was increased from 100 yards to 1500 yards in 12 minutes. Fog Dispersal is there for your use and your safety. Landing Notes have been issued to all Units and pilots must ensure that they are fully conversant with the use of the Fog Dispersal Installation. We will shortly have another installation serviceable at Metheringham, and perhaps the day
(Continued on page 8, col. 3)
MARCH LANDING TIMES
[Table of March Landing Times by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
DECORATIONS
The following immediate awards were approved during the month.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ W.D. ERVINE D.F.C.
A/W/Cdr E.L. PORTER, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt F.H. PHILLIPS. D.F.C.
P/O H.N. DAVIES D.F.C.
A/F/L I. RADEMEYER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.B. HEALEY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L/ L.A.J. McLEOD D.F.C.
R/O T.H. BLACKHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT J. BRADFORD D.F.M.
F/SGT D. LIGHTFOOT D.F.M.
A/F/L C.J. SPRIGGS D.F.C.
A/F/L W.M. WALTON D.F.C.
P/O S.F. ATCHESON D.F.C.
A/S/L M.I. BOYLE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L E.H. MOSS D.F.C.
F/Lt B.C. FITCH D.F.C.
F/O T.D. HALLIWELL D.F.C.
SGT A.E. HARRIS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O V.H. TRIMBLEE D.F.C.
SGT G.R. PRICE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ I. WHITTAKER, DFC. Bar to D.F.C.
A/S/L H.B. MARTIN, DSO, DFC & Bar. Bar to D.S.O.
F/O L.W. CURTISS, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
F/O T.D. SIMPSON D.F.C.
F/O B.T. FOXLEE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O K. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT G.C. KING D.F.M.
F/SGT D. SCHOFIELD D.F.M.
F/SGT G.E. HEXTER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L J.C.W. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT R. PARLE D.F.M.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £7299.2.0.
TACTICS
The ill effects of weaving in the bomber stream have been recorded by an experienced Flak Liaison Officer, and his opinions are set out in 5G/1/41/Air, sent to Stations on the 27th March, 1944. All crews should read this letter.
Since the introduction of early warning devices, more attention than ever must be paid to flying straight and level unless attacked. In this connection there is a point about weaving which is perhaps not fully appreciated. A weaving aircraft is continually closing range on other aircraft in the stream and is likely to confuse Monica and Fishpond operators, who may interpret the resultant blip as an enemy fighter closing in to attack. The consequencies [sic] may then be serious, particularly on a dark night, when gunners have been known to mistake four engines for two. In these days when all crews are conscious of some collision risk, the sighting of an aircraft crossing their line of flight is, to say the least, upsetting, and in any event, is unfair to gunners who can ill afford to waste time in identifying friendly bombers which behave in a suspicious manner.
Further, the straight and level policy is enforced to enable crews more easily to keep to the track laid down. The dangers of straying from track and the concentration are known to all. All the old hands at the game have realised that weaving is out of date and leads to trouble, and are now following the straight and narrow. Why not you?
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Two points of interest have been sorted out from an investigation into combats for March. They are:-
(i) Enemy fighters rarely fire more than one burst during each attack.
(ii) Period between opening fire and breaking away is a matter of seconds.
It is clear that many enemy fighters are opening fire at about the same time as they are identified by gunners or before a defensive manoeuvre is started. Night fighters as a rule depend on surprise and accuracy of their first burst, and if this fails, there is no doubt that the advantage passes to the gunners. The main problems are therefore:-
(i) To see the fighter and recognise it before it opens fire, and
(ii) to convey the information to the pilot immediately.
Problem (i) can only be met by energetic use of early warning devices, constant recognition practice and efficient night vision by gunners.
Problem (ii) can be solved if gunners report sightings immediately to the pilot, using the standard reporting code. A second’s delay in identifying the attacker before reporting it may mean the difference between eventually shooting it down, or your sustaining damage before you have that opportunity. Remember that a defensive manoeuvre, although designed to give gunners a known deflection, is also intended to evade the fighter’s fire; therefore, in view of the apparent short duration of combats, if an aircraft is flying suspiciously, gunners should not wait to identify it before ordering a corkscrew, particularly if the suspected aircraft is within firing range.
Flight Engineers
The most important job of the Flight Engineer is to help in getting his aircraft to the target and back, in the most efficient manner possible. But there us another side of his job that must not be forgotten; it is of the greatest importance. He must assist in keeping his machine up to the best standard of serviceability.
He can only do this id he is a keen, conscientious worker. He must pay every attention to the smallest detail in his aircraft, both when he is flying and on the ground; he should be with the ground crew whenever he can while they carry out their daily inspection.
He is the “Flying Spanner”, but firstly he should be the engineer on the ground, and know that the aircraft is tuned up to the last ounce. How can he know this if he only visits his dispersal about one hour before he goes on “Ops”?
Delay has occurred many times in the rectification of defects through an aircraft landing away from the parent station; this must be altered. It must be impressed upon Flight Engineers that it is their responsibility to report to the C.T.O. of that Station any defects or trouble which have developed during flight, and which may prevent them returning to their Base at the earliest moment. It is no good to be interrogated, have a meal and go to bed forgetting to report to the C.T.O. until the next day. The report must be given in person to the Engineering Officer on duty that night; he should also be told if petrol and oil is required, and the approximate time the aircraft will take off.
In the past, aircraft have been delayed through wrong information being passed on, and so it is essential that the Flight Engineer reports all known defects to the C.T.O. Confusion and incorrect information is caused by too many inexperienced people handling the message.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BOMBING [/underlined]
March was a varied month for the Bomb Aimers in the Group, the highlight from the bombing point of view being the precision attacks by Bases on special targets deep into France.
On the whole bombing was accurate, severe damage being done by Nos. 52, 53 and 54 Bases. It is apparent therefore, that our continuous practice has not been wasted. However, no one who studies the stick craters on the P.R.U. photographs can possibly feel complacent. Many crews missed!!!
The question immediately raised by these misses is whether or not the bombsight was serviceable. It is an intricate bombsight, but anyone who doubts its capabilities should study the long list of bombing errors less than 150 yards at 20,000 feet, given on this page. It must be serviceable, though, and it can only be proven serviceable though use. Therefore you must, at every opportunity, carry out practice bombing with your sight. Whenever you fly, carry out the established N.F.T. checks – report any failings you discover in the bombsight to the Instrument Section, and when you get crew errors of 100 yds or less, thank the instrument section who have helped to make it possible.
Finally, treat all practice bombing as precision bombing – the Air Bombers in 106 Squadron have reason to be proud. In teamwork with their pilots, they won the Squadron Bombing Competition against all-comers in the Group for 3 successive months, and were runners up in March. There is a great gap between the top and bottom errors in the Competition – there should not be! It should be a neck-and-neck struggle with only a few yards separating the Squadrons in the Group.
Are [underlined] YOU [/underlined] bombing your best for your Squadron?
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Bell, D.F.C.) reports the construction and issue to all Air Bombers of a hook as per diagram.
[Diagram]
This device is used for manual release of any H.E. hang-ups, and is of a length that ensures the linkage can be raised. Further, it can be used on No. 13 Station to make certain the “Cookie” has actually left the aircraft, a visual check from the nose being impeded by the incendiary containers.
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) has had the illumination bulbs in the Mark XIV Bombsight Computor [sic] painted red to counteract the glare. This ensures minimum effect on Night Vision.
[Underlined] 1654 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Morgan) has completed the installation of the complete Mark XIV Bombsight in the A.M.B.T.
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.) have nearly completed installation of A.M.B.T. Mk. XIV, several clever modifications being introduced. Excellent co-operation has been provided by the Armament and Electrical Officer and their staffs.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS IN YARDS, CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training and Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units, with averages]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES DURING MARCH
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
44 P/O Levy Sgt Peck F/O Fox 82 & 130 yds
P/O Hobbs F/S Scott F/S Fenwick 144 yds
F/L Dorehill F/S Deacon F/S Wright 116 yds
W/O Barton F/S Barnes F/O Sparrow 125 yds
F/L Wiggin F/O Marshall F/O Maury 112 yds
50 P/O Lundy F/O Bignell F/S Jordan 125 & 145 yds
Sgt MacFarlin Sgt Ball Sgt Elliott 108 yds
57 F/L Munday F/O Evans P/O West 120 yds
106 P/O Rossel Sgt Goss F/S White 140 yds
F/O Clement F/O Gautschi F/O Wilkinson 82 & 120 yds
463 F/S Page F/O Braithwaite W/O Fair 84 yds
619 W/Cdr Jeudwine Sgt Booth Sgt Gosling 79 yds
S/L Whamond F/O Kennedy F/O Marshall 135 yds
F/L McGilvray F/O Baker F/O Drake 140 yds
F/L Moore F/O Butler F/O Wood 123 yds
F/S Schofield F/S Hexter F/S Withinshaw 147 yds
630 F/L Roberts Sgt Davies Sgt Jeffreys 140 yds
W/Cdr Deas F/O Barker Sgt Wright 120 (twice) and 143 yds
S/L Calvert F/S Hogg F/S Beaudoin 148 yds
P/O Hill Sgt Allen F/S Stancer 120 yds
1654 S/L Bloom-Jones F/O Foulkes F/L Martin 148 yds
F/O Murray F/O Towers F/S Keeble 144 yds
F/S Ayres Sgt Charteris Sgt Airey 114 yds
P/O Spencer Sgt. Gordge Agt Hugh-Games 122 yds
1661 S/L Jones F/O Seibal F/O West 140 yds
5 LFS F/S Horne Sgt Johnson F/S Shipley 88 yds
Sgt Patterson Sgt Hall Sgt Rice 121 yds
Special mention is made of W/Cdr Deas and crew, 630 Squadron, who achieved Crew Errors less than 150 yards on [underlined] three [/underlined] exercises this month.
617 Squadron obtained a total of 26 exercises in the “Less than 150 yards” category the best three being:-
[Underlined] PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR [/underlined]
F/O Kell F/O Morieson 47 yards
F/L Cooper F/O Harden 68 yards
F/O Willsher F/S Everitt 75 yards
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION
In a month where 9 Squadrons qualified in the Competition it fell to 44 Squadron to wrest the leadership from 106 Squadron who headed the table for the three months December, January and February. 44 Squadron have set a very high standard and are to be congratulated on rising from the 6th position to the top of the table.
57 Squadron have shown notable improvement in rising to 5th place, which they share with 207 Squadron.
It is expected that April will bring maximum qualification by all Squadrons in the Group and a really close struggle for the top position.
[Underlined] PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS [/underlined]
[Underlined] ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET [/underlined]
1st 44 Squadron – 85 yards 1st 630 Squadron – 120 yards
2nd 106 Squadron – 98 yards 57 Squadron – 120 yards
3rd 619 Squadron – 108 yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 134 yards
4th 630 Squadron – 119 yards 4th 44 Squadron – 138 yards
5th 207 Squadron – 141 yards 5th 207 Squadron – 154 yards
57 Squadron - 141 yards 6th 467 Squadron – 181 yards
7th 463 Squadron – 169 yards 7th 463 Squadron – 197 yards
9 Squadron – 169 yards 8th 9 Squadron – 223 yards
9th 467 Squadron – 196 yards 9th 106 Squadron – 253 yards
The following Squadrons failed to enter the necessary 8 qualifying exercises:-
10th 61 Squadron – 132 yards (5 exercises) 10th 61 Squadron – 143 yards
11th 50 Squadron – 90 yards (4 exercises) 11th 50 Squadron – 123 yards
12th 49 Squadron – 89 yards (1 exercise) 12th 49 Squadron – 92 yards
ADDITION BOMBING TRAINER
[Table of Trainer Activity by Squadron]
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
Two entries were received this month:
W/Cdr Porter 112 yards (Errors include bombsight error)
G/Cpt Pleasance 289 yards (Error of 98 yards)
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley – 122 yards
How about some competition, Bombing Leaders?
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What is the theory of Wanganui technique and what are the correct bombsight settings?
2. If the Bomb Doors were open, but the Bomb Release Test could not be extracted from the positive Fusing Device, what check would you make before manually releasing?
3. Where is the type “H” Jettison Button and when do you need to use it?
4. Why do you set [underlined] indicated [/underlined] Wind Speed on the Mk. XIV Computor. [sic]
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
F/Lt Allan has left Scampton and is passing through the Conversion Units in order to return to operations for his 2nd tour. Good Luck!
F/Lt Gibson has become tour-expired and moved to Scampton to superintend the Bombing Section of the Aircrew School.
F/O Abbott has moved from 106 Squadron to 49 Squadron. We now expect to see [underlined] 49 [/underlined] Squadron top of the Bombing Competition!!
F/O Toogood (106 Squadron), tour-expired has moved to 92 Group for Bombing Leader’s duties.
P/O Duck who obtained 14th position with “B” pass on 77 Bombing Leaders’ Course has moved from 619 to 617 Squadron.
F/O Falgate (463 Squadron) and P/O Hulland D.F.M., (1654 Con. Unit) were 8th and 12th respectively on No.78 Bombing Leaders’ Course, with “B” passes.
AIR SEA RESCUE
For two months now there has been no ditching in this Group, which shows a deal of consideration for the Air Sea Rescue Officers in the Group, but at the same time it is wondered whether crews generally have increased their knowledge to an equivalent extent – have you got all your A.S.R. gen and equipment buttoned up?
In addition to giving swimming instruction P.F.O’s are now lending a hand with dinghy instruction in the South Park Girls’ School Swimming Baths. Now that summer is almost here, this should be a real attraction, and every effort must be made for regular attendance. As a further attraction some stations have periods during the early evening so that, with the co-operation of the M.T. Sections, an evening out in Lincoln should be enjoyed by all – after the instruction is over.
[Cartoon] EMP.
It is hoped that “Q” type dinghies (which will replace the “J” type fairly soon) will shortly be available on the scale of one per Squadron for instructional purposes. This dinghy is quite a complicated bit of work, and crews should take every opportunity of getting in sailing practice on local stretches of water (remembering that the depth of water must be at least 4 feet, owing to the depth of keel). Some good fun should be had these long summer evenings – when you can afford time off from obliterating the Hun.
[Underlined] HINT TO USERS [/underlined]
The floating torch has a nasty habit of lighting at awkward moments – why not pad the torch pocket in Mae Wests and Buoyancy suits with some light-damping material, so that the light will not shine through? Whatever happens, don’t go flying over the sea without your floating torch.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL (Contd. From page 5, col. 3) [/underlined]
is not far off when an operation will be planned and will depend solely on Fog Dispersal Installations for landing of aircraft.
There will be, therefore, three Fog Dispersal airfields situated in a comparatively small area, LUDFORD MAGNA in 1 Group, FISKERTON and METHERINGHAM. The identification of these airfields as night presents a problem, for you if you mistake another airfield for your own and are listening on your local airfield frequency, there is no means of contacting you by R/T. It is essential therefore, that darky frequency is used for all R/T control at Fog Dispersal airfields.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER [/underlined]
The trainer at Fiskerton is now equipped for training with the Mark IIC Gyro Gunsight, and training of the squadron gunners is going ahead under the supervision of F/O Johnson-Biggs, ex 619 Squadron, P/O Collingwood, ex 50 Squadron, and Sgt Kennedy of 49 Squadron. The trainer is housed in a spacious blister type building equipped with a large screen on which the target aircraft is projected, together with the fixed and moving graticules which are a feature of the new sight. An F.N. 16 turret is used for manipulation, and this is fitted with all the controls of the gunsight. Very realistic conditions can be reproduced, although until a trainer is produced which will introduce conditions like the Link Trainer with its “Bumps” attachment, the gunner is still operating from a rock steady platform which does not give a true indication of his ability to hold a target in the sight. A demonstration stand is housed in the same building which has a complete Gyro Gunsight with all controls and fittings. This is used for introducing gunners to the sight during initial instruction, and enables one gunner to operate the sight on the stand whilst another gunner is operating the turret on the trainer. A new type of film is available for use with the trainer; this gives a light coloured aircraft on the screen with a dark background, differing from the film in general use for aircraft recognition training on the Jurby trainer, which project a dark aircraft on a light background.
[Underlined] FUTURE INSTALLATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Swinderby [/underlined] is the next station to have the trainer installed. This will be housed in the standard spotlight trainer building, which at present is being modified by removing the steelwork situated on the front of the screen. All the equipment is available and installation should commence within the next two weeks.
[Underlined] Winthorpe [/underlined] have received part of the equipment and the construction of the building has been commenced.
[Underlined] G.2. GUNNERY NOTES [/underlined]
On the 6th January, 1944, a letter (BC/S.24636/Trg.) was issued from H.Q.B.C. stating that the G.2 Notes were available in large quantities, and intimating that they could be demanded on the following scale.
[Underlined] Instructors’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per instructor or Gunnery Leader not already holding one.
[Underlined] Students’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per Air Gunner not already holding one. This would appear to be a straightforward matter, but certain Units within the Group are still without these very important notes for a variety of reasons; units who demanded the notes as instructed received their demands promptly, but any unit who has not received these notes may obtain single copies by contacting the G.G.O. As these notes form the basis for all instructions on sighting in the Command, it is of paramount importance that all Gunnery Leaders instructors and gunners be familiar with their contents. It has been discovered that gunners attending the Specialist Sighting Course and Air Gunner Instructors’ Course at Manby have been handicapped by a lack of preliminary knowledge of sighting due to the failure of Units to obtain the notes when the instruction was first issued.
(Continued on page 10, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
THIS MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
49 Sqdn “D” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
619 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “L” 18/19 March, 1944. ME109 c
61 Sqdn “K” 22/23 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “R” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109
106 Sqdn “N” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109
PROBABLY DESTROYED
619 Sqdn “T” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “S” 24/25/ March, 1944. ME109 c
463 Sqdn “Q” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88 c
DAMAGED
207 Sqdn “G” 1/2 March, 1944. T/E c
467 Sqdn “F” 1/2 March, 1944. FW190 c
61 Sqdn “W” 15/16 March, 1944. FW190 c
619 Sqdn “P” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
207 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. ME109 c
50 Sqdn “M” 18/19 March. 1944. ME109 c
467 Sqdn “J” 18/19 March, 1944. ME110 c
207 Sqdn “O” 18/19 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “D” 22/23 March, 1944. JU88 c
467 Sqdn “Q” 22/23 March, 1944. ME109
50 Sqdn “U” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
49 Sqdn “K” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
44 Sqdn “J” 24/25 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “H” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109 c
57 Sqdn “M” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
463 Sqdn “G” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
44 Sqdn “U” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
57 Sqdn “B” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
50 Sqdn “Z” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109 c
Claims annotated “c” have been confirmed by Command. Other claims have not been confirmed owing to late rendition of combat reports.
It is intended to publish in the “News” a table showing the amount of air training carried out by Units each month. This will chiefly consist of Fighter Affiliation exercises and air firing, and provision is made for tabulating the Fighter Affiliation under three headings, i.e. “Camera & Gyro”, “Camera only” and “Without Camera”. This table is standard throughout the Command.
To ensure that a standard method is used throughout, a fighter combat exercise is to be considered as a “Combat” between a fighter and one air gunner in a bomber aircraft. Thus, if both Mid-Upper and Tail turrets are in use two exercises would be carried out. In future monthly training returns are to state the number of exercises as defined above. It is hoped that future tables published will include attacks by fighters on “Bullseye” exercises.
[Underlined] C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Course No. 75 [/underlined]
F/O Spilsbury – 5 LFS – 82% - Cat. “A”
Sgt Boardman – 49 Sqdn – 77.2% - Cat. “C”
Gunnery Leaders are reminded that they are invited to attend the Assessment Committee held at the conclusion of each course, and Gunnery Leaders who have gunners taking the course should make an effort to attend this board and obtain first hand information of their pupil’s efforts.
Gunnery Leaders desirous of visiting the C.G.S. for this purpose are to contact the G.G.O. who will make the necessary arrangements.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING – MARCH [/underlined]
[Table of Gunnery Exercises by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHT FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Stick rigidly to your lattice lines when homing to your airfield. There was a regrettable accident during the month when a pilot in the Group arrived at the airfield on the wrong side of the circuit and crashed when he was forced to dive to avoid an aircraft on the circuit. The lattice lines are your “right of way“ in the sky.
Don’t get careless about your flaps, and remember the Lancaster flaps provide maximum lift from 25° to the fully up position. From the 25° stage to the fully down position, lift is decreasing and drag is increasing. So, remember, take your flap off in two stages and exercise great care in taking off the last 25°. Trim as you do it.
If you make a “sighting” and you are orbiting a ditched aircraft or a dinghy, switch your I.F.F. on to “distress”. Do not change height while orbiting otherwise your plot will fade and you may give the impression that you have ditched. This new Signals Instruction is to enable R.D.F. to plot you, and thus double check your position, and the position of the sighting.
Don’t get off hand about reporting defects after flight. Record any defect on Form 700. Let the ground crew or Flight Commander and the N.C.O. know. Keep them all in the picture, the Security Officer won’t jump on you for that.
By the way, when did you and your crew last go through the bombing up procedure with the Armament types? There might be a day when you have to do your own bombing up.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
If you are unlucky and get fire in the air, do not dive your aircraft in the hope of putting the flames out. It will make them spread more, making it difficult to abandon aircraft, and will produce structural strain, causing a more rapid break up as the fire develops. The “gen” for fire in the air is in the 5 Group Aircraft Drills.
You can now land from West to East as well as from East to West at Woodbridge. The landing is from East to West at all times except when you see smoke generators burning at each end of the main runway. So watch for the smoke, and then land towards the sea.
Inspect S.D. 158 periodically. It is a secret document, and therefore you won’t find it lying around the Flight office; Ops/Flying Control will oblige. Note the instruction to burn resin lights above 8,000 feet at night.
Pay the closest attention to the latest “gen” about the moveable T.O.T. and remember the importance of sticking to the air speed laid down. 5 m.p.h. either side of the specified air speed it not good enough.
Have you dropped any practice bombs yet? It is the duty of every pilot to try his hand at bombing. Team up with another pilot in your flight, and see who gets the best result.
Public Relations
[Underlined] SIX STATIONS ON THE AIR [/underlined]
No.5 Group entered the radio world in earnest during March, no fewer than six stations being visited by B.B.C. recording units.
Though the resulting broadcasts did not hit the high lights in home programmes, they were given many times, and in many languages, all over the world. They reminded our overseas troops that the R.A.F. is still doing big business!!
First, a five day visit was paid to Skellingthorpe by F/Lt W Caverhill, of the broadcasting branch at Air Ministry, accompanied by B.B.C. engineers. They prepared scripts and made records of 18 R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel, who gave short talks to be included in the B.B.C’s overseas programme “Radio News Reel”.
Bardney was visited on the night of March 18/19th by a B.B.C. recording unit, and more than a doz en [sic] records were made of the station’s contribution towards the night’s attack on Frankfurt. This picture of R.A.F. life was broadcast in both short and long versions on the General Forces programme, as well as overseas.
The success of the Bardney broadcasts prompted the B.B.C. to make a return visit to record the operation against Berlin, on the night of March 24/25th. This time, the famous commentators, Mr. Robert Dunnett and Mr. Stewart MacPherson, brought a recording unit to Coningsby. On the way, the unit stopped at Metheringham as the aircraft were taking off and filled one disc with an interesting description of the scene.
At Coningsby a number of members of ground crews and station personnel came to the microphone and described their work. Further recordings were made in the Operations Room.
Owing to weather changes, the party beat a hasty retreat from Coningsby and went to
(Continued on page 11col.1)
Negotium Perambulans In Tenebris
The Meteorological Gremlin has spectacles and grey hair,
And his mysterious lair
Is very jealously guarded;
And must be regarded
With suitable awe, by all except
The few adept.
It is chiefly a nocturnal beast, and is often found
Prowling and prowling
(Like a host of Midian)
Searching for a datum or perhaps a meridian.
In this it is frequently assisted by a tiny female mammal whose chemical formula is PA2AOC,
Whose small scurrying figure you will often see
Bearing winds to the Gremlin. It is easy to please
With an airy zephyr, or a balmy breeze
Which it consumes with avidity, and that is why
It is able to prophesy!!
ANON (Circa, 1944)
Link Trainer
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
[Underlined] GUNNERY (Continued from page 9 col 1) [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY [/underlined]
The object of this course, which lasts for 10 days, is the training of sighting instructors and instructors capable of assessing cine gyro films. Originally only Conversion Unit or Gunnery Flight personnel could attend but this restriction has recently been removed, and all Units may now nominate gunners for this course; they must show an aptitude for sighting and must have passed well in this subject on a Gunnery Leaders’ Course or Air Gunner Instructors’ course. One vacancy only is allotted to the Group per month.
[Underlined] THOSE SQUADRON GYROS [/underlined]
The Gyro Assessors held by squadrons have in some instances been leading a very quiet life tucked away nicely in the Armoury or on a shelf in a cupboard. Numerous reasons are put forward for not using the Gyro during Fighter Affiliation exercises; for instance, aircraft not modified, not enough notice given to Gunnery sections, Photo. Section unable to process film, etc., etc. None of these reasons is really serious , and all can be easily overcome by a little more co-operation from the sections concerned. Modification on the aircraft is simple, consisting of enlarging the port inner gun port in the rear turret, and can be done in half-an-hour. It is not, repeat not, necessary to blank off the servo motor, and the gyro assembly can be installed in half an hour at the most. All the electrical gear is mounted on the gyro rig and after the rig has been fitted to the gun cradle only three things remain to be done:-
(i) Connect electrical cable to supply in turret.
(ii) Connect rear sear release pipe to gyro rig.
(iii) Harmonize gun sight to camera.
All Photo. Sections CAN process the film, and there is no shortage of magazines in the Group. At 51 Base, a Corporal Armourer is available to give assistance on gyro assessors. This N.C.O. has constructed all the Gyro Assessors in use in the Group, and the present compact and efficient rig is his product. Units requiring his services should contact 51 Base Armament Officer. The Gyro Assessors are not to be left in aircraft which are engaged on night flying as two assessors have already been lost through aircraft with gyros fitted, crashing on night flying.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] M.T. SPARES [/underlined]
Concern Is being caused by the unserviceability of M.T. vehicles in general, and every effort should be made by Equipment Officers to review establishments and ensure that demands are raised regularly to keep stocks of the generally used items up to maximum. It is impracticable and uneconomical to hold stocks of the many parts which not only vary with the make of vehicles but also with the diverse models of each make of vehicle, which again vary according to the year of manufacture. Therefore all M.T. Officers must anticipate requirements for inspection overhauls and other contingencies where certain parts are known to be badly worn and will need replacement in the near future. [Underlined] At least two weeks’ [/underlined] notice of these requirements should be given to the Equipment Officer, and Forms 674 should not only state for what purpose the spares are required, but the approximate date the replacement is required; the chassis and engine number of the vehicle MUST in all cases be quoted. Demands will then be raised in accordance with A.M.O. A.481/43.
[Underlined] A.E.C. TANKER FUEL HOSES [/underlined] (Stores Ref 4K/2009) have for some considerable time been in very short supply, and the chief cause for this is the difficulty in the manufacture of sufficient protective coverings. Bomber Command have now agreed to accept these hoses without this covering and as a result it is anticipated that the supply position will improve considerably within the next two months. In the meantime, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for the repair of these hoses by the manufacturer, under Station local purchase powers.
It is understood that Messrs. Zwicky of Slough (telephone: Slough 23776) are prepared to sell these hoses to the Service, but stations are only to resort to local purchase in extreme cases, where operational efficiency is directly affected and supplies cannot be obtained through Service channels.
A meeting of Base and Station Equipment Officers was held at this Headquarters during the month, when points of mutual interest were discussed, with a view to giving even better service than in the past, to all and sundry.
Before closing the meeting, the A.O.C. spoke highly of the service given by the Equipment Branch. This, naturally, was most gratifying, for sometimes we feel that quite a lot of people look upon us as mere “dogsbodies”, and give no thought to the time, patience and methods (sometimes very unorthodox) adopted in an endeavour to produce the goods.
(Continued from page10, col. 2)
Fiskerton, where the return of aircraft was described, and aircrew were interviewed.
Dunholme received a short visit of the Hon. Herman Hodge, of the Colonial Office, and a B.B.C. recording unit, on 21st March.
Press visitors during the month included representatives of “The Star”, Sheffield, to the Sheffield Squadron at Fiskkerton, on March 15th, and Mrs K. Wilson of the “Sydney Morning Herald”, to Waddington on 31st March.
TRAINING
The Stirling is becoming slowly but surely a nicely house-trained creature. It can be taken out for long or short trips with few difficulties that delay training and rend the tempers of Lancaster loving instructors. The lurid language of February, which produced a glow like unto many batteries of sodiums, is scarcely remembered. Perhaps ‘tis Spring and everything is set for an ideal world.
The L.F.S. at Syerston achieved great success with 93 crews passed out to Squadrons and the H.C.U’s were in no way overshadowed, for they passed on 98 crews for Lancaster training. The outlook for April is therefore fairly good, and squadrons may look forward with confidence to a reasonably early increase in crews, weather permitting.
It is a matter of real regret that accidents have marred an otherwise good month, and may have dragged 5 Group to the bottom of the ladder. A promise has however, been extracted from all and sundry, that 5 Group shall move to the top in April and there will be no avoidable accidents in 51 Base. The heavy snow fall, and the resultant snow banks were chiefly responsible- or perhaps it was the determination to get on with flying and crew output, despite the snow banks.
The April programme is optimistic indeed. There is a measure of quiet confidence about, and if results come up to expectation a new high standard will have been set for Conversion Bases. The results will be seen in better trained and more experienced crews, and we hope the squadrons will not be reluctant to pay the Units a visit and express their appreciation.
Fighter Affiliation Training is now being carried out in Units with detachments of 1690 Flight (1485 regenerated) and an improvement in Gunnery standards is expected.
Synthetic Fishpond training has been introduced, and is likely to be adopted generally.
Recent changes include Group Captain Vintras to command Wigsley; Wing Commander Baxter (106) to Chief Instructor, Swinderby; Wing Commander Jennings (207) to Wing Commander Training, 51 Base; Wing Commander MacFarlane (51 Base) to Chief Instructor Wigsley, and Wing Commander Hallows (5 Group) to Chief Instructor, Winthorpe.
Squadron Leader Osborne (1660) is training Lancaster instructors at Syerston, and also Wing Commanders “Ops” from operational Bases. Squadron Leader Shields and Flight Lieutenant Wyness (1654) are training Stirling instructors at Swinderby. Both “Academies [sic] are doing well.
ABSENCE
ENEMY AGENTS – ABSENTEES
During the coming months, the Allied Forces are likely to be called upon for a maximum effort on land, sea and air, to defeat the enemy.
No. 5 Group will certainly be expected to take its full part in this effort, and there can be no doubt that at heart every man and woman serving in the Group would agree that he or she was going to do it. In spite of all these good intentions there are still far too many absentees, aircrew and ground staff alike. Not long absences, just a few hours or a few days, but absences just the same, at a time when the manpower position simply cannot afford absentees. There isn’t a Tom there now to do Dick’s work while he slips off to see the Dog-races, and there isn’t a Joan there to drive that van while Mary goes off to her sister’s wedding.
[Cartoon] WFW
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE
Of course those two extra days at home in the garden with the wife were well worth two days pay, and even a bit of C.C. as well, and that special party was well worth a day’s pay and a rep., but that isn’t the point. It’s to have days at home in the garden and special parties that we are fighting this war. There might very well not be a garden or wife at all if the Germans laid down the orders for us, and we should certainly not be the ones to enjoy any parties that were arranged.
There is this special point for aircrews to remember too. You work together as a team and your captain has to have complete confidence in each one of his crew or he cannot give his best to his job. If you have let him down by going absent once or twice during training is he going to have that confidence and is he going to feel quite certain that you’re not absent(minded) in that rear turret? It might make all the difference!
If you’re absent on the ground, you’re quite likely to be absent in the air; it’s all a matter of self-discipline, and that’s the same in each case.
In this war, no-one in the services can be a neutral; if you don’t do a day’s work for the Allies, you are doing a day’s work for the Axis, and at the end of the war your Form 121 will show just how many days you put in fighting [underlined] for [/underlined] Hitler. If you put it that way, that day’s absence doesn’t look so good, so cut it out and [underlined] don’t be an enemy agent. [/underlined]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The semi final between Coningsby and Scampton was a tremendous affair. From the kick off, Scampton’s attack went all out, and Coningsby’s defence is to be congratulated on the way they held them. Coningsby’s attack improved, and the game swung from goal to goal. Ten minutes before half time, Coningsby centre headed a goal from a corner kick. After the break, Scampton forced the pace and equalised after ten minutes with a shot that gave the Coningsby goalie no chance. Both sides were all out in an endeavour to snatch the lead. Coningsby left wing repeatedly broke away and centred, but nobody could connect. By three quarters time both teams were slackening as a result of the terrific pace; both defences, and especially the goalies, were coping brilliantly. A draw seemed inevitable. Then came the turning point; Coningsby attacked, their left half was well up the field, and instead of the usual pass to the wing he made ground, then shot hard and true for the top corner. The last 15 minutes of the game saw repeated Coningsby attacks, and five minutes from time they got a third goal. It was a magnificent game, and Coningsby are to be congratulated on entering the final via such a tremendous obstacle in the powerful Scampton team.
Round two produced a hard fought duel between Winthorpe and Metheringham. Two draws were played, 1-1 and 3-3 after extra time in each game. In the third game Winthorpe won 4 – 1, and are now due to play Skellingthorpe at Swinderby in the semi final.
[Underlined] THE LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE RUGGER COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has been a failure as a Group competition, but has been an immense success in 53 Base where 86 teams in all have taken part. Very few casualties have resulted in the large number of games played, the most serious being a broken collar bone, which is undoubtedly more than could be claimed for a Soccer competition boasting a equivalent number of entrants. The event must now be considered a 53 Base monopoly, since in spite of many appeals from this Headquarters, no other squadrons have got cracking. The inter unit play off will be at Waddington within the next few days (to be signalled to all stations) and it is hoped that Stations will provide transport for as many of their aircrew personnel as possible to witness the play off.
[Underlined] THE WINES RUGGER TROPHY [/underlined]
Round two of the competition saw Winthorpe beat Scampton 14 – 11 in a hard fought game. Dunholme beat Swinderby 8 – 0, so these two teams pass to the semi final. Round two games still undecided are – Waddington v Metheringham/Woodhall and East Kirkby v Fiskerton. It is hoped those Stations will complete the events within the next few days.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
Swinderby are now in the semi final, and the outstanding matches are – Waddington v Metheringham. Syerston v Scampton and East Kirkby v 5 Group. These three games should be decided within the next week.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played six station matches with the very fine result of 4 wins. Their only loss was with Coningsby in the Matz semi-final. They beat A.V. Roe 5 – 4 in the 3rd round of the Lincoln Amateur Cup, and drew 0 - 0 with R.A.F. Wickenby in the semi-final of the Amateur Cup.
DUNHOLME had a busy but rather unsuccessful month. They lost their 3rd round Matz Cup game 2 – 3 to Coningsby, and their 3rd round in the Amateur Cup by the same score to R.A.F. Wickenby.
CONINGSBY – The highlight of the Coningsby month, indeed to quote 54 Base excellent “GEN” – of the season, was their MATZ Cup victory over Scampton. Intersection league games were fewer than usual owing to the bad weather. 619 v 617 and 106 v 61 are also games due this month in the Base Commander’s “All Sports” Trophy.
METHERINGHAM – The duel with Winthorpe in the 2nd round of the Matz Cup was most notable. Weather caused cancellations of no fewer than 10 games, but five inter-section games were completed.
BARDNEY played 4 station matches, playing the 1st Border Regt. twice (1 win 3 – 2, 1 draw 1 – 1), beating Metheringham 3 – 2 and losing to Coningsby by the same margin. 5 inter-section games were completed.
EAST KIRKBY Station XI played 4 games, and won all four, beating Kirkby and Spilsby R.A.F.R. teams and two Field-Craft Airborne Units. In the seven inter-section events, 630 – B Flight were most successful.
SPILSBY had seven games during the month. Their R.A.F.R. Squadron beat East Kirkby R.A.F.R. Squadron 7 – 2, and the local Suffolks 9 – 3, losing 4 – 2 to Kirkby and 3 – 2 to R.A.F. Skegness.
H.Q. 5 GROUP – The Group side are still only able to play away fixtures. In March they had three games, losing to a Scampton team 2 – 3, to Skellingthorpe 0 – 4, and holding their old opponents 93 M.U. to a 2 – 2 draw.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON had only the two games completed due to cancellations by opponents. They lost to Hemswell 0 – 3 and to Winthorpe 11 – 14 in round two of the Wines Cup.
DUNHOLME have a really strong side led by F/L Waterhouse. They overwhelmed Bardney 33 – 0 in round 1 of the Wines Cup, and have since beaten Swinderby 8 – 0 in round two.
METHERINGHAM list 0 – 27 to Waddington, and were unlucky to have six games postponed, their opponents including Digby, Bardney and Coningsby.
BARDNEY had only one station game, in which they were unlucky to meet Dunholme on top of their form in the Wines Cup, and suffer a 33 – 0 defeat.
EAST KIRKBY had three games, a 630 Squadron A and B practice game, and a 57 Squadron A and B practice, followed by a station A and B trial. In spite of this preparation they were unlucky enough to forego their Wines Cup round one as Wigsley could not raise a side. They are now waiting to play Fiskerton in the second round.
HOCKEY
SCAMPTON had four games of mixed hockey, beating Spilsby 6 – 1 in round one of the Group competition, and Foldingsworth 5 – 0. They lost 2 – 3 to 368 Searchlight Battery and 1 – 5 to Rose Bros. In the second round of the cup they have now to play Syerston.
DUNHOLME had only one mixed hockey game, v Scampton in the Group competition, which they lost 1 – 4.
METHERINGHAM played a 2 – 2 draw with Waddington on their new aerodrome pitch. They are now due to play Waddington again in the Group contest.
BARDNEY neat Dunholme 4 – 1 in the Group contest, and later registered a 4 – 1 win against Waddington. They were finally knocked out of the trophy by Swinderby (5 – 1).
EADT KIRKBY had four games, three inter-station and one (a 1- 1 draw) with Spilsby G.S. They are now waiting to meet 5 Group at home in the contest.
SPILSBY played Scampton in the Group trophy, but were defeated 6 – 1.
[Underlined] ICE HOCKEY [/underlined]
54 Base boast a Canadian Cougars’ team that is certainly 100% full blooded, judging from the “GEN” account of their 5 – 4 victory over Digby Dynamites.
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
F/Lt. Rodgers (Gunnery Leader 617) now has a Woodhall Soft Ball team that challenges all comers. Roll up, roll up, and have your money ready!!
(Continued on page 4, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
Dot and Dash, the immaculate WAAFs.
“…OPERATIONS? I’VE ‘AD ‘EM!”
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Navigation generally has been of a high order this month. There is still room for considerable improvement however. A good many of the Navigators’ Charts still look very bare. Although all aircraft are equipped with Air Position Indicators, a few Navigators still do not “keep an air plot”, in that they do not plot their Air Position regularly and obtain a D.R. position. This is most important and must be done. A standard Navigational procedure to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s, has been laid down (see Air Staff Instruction Nav/14). We are constantly striving for concentration, and for obvious reasons the concentration should be on the planned track, it is therefore imperative that you constantly obtain your D.R. position by intelligent use of the broadcast w/v’s. If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, then alter course immediately and regain track.
The A.P.I. has been modified, and the error in this instrument is now very small. If the windfinders obtain accurate fixes on their H 2 S, the resultant w/v should be almost perfect. Navigators should, therefore, have every confidence in the broadcast w/v’s and make the fullest possible use of them.
Whilst track keeping is very important, it must be remembered that timing is equally important. This does not seem to be fully appreciated, and a few Navigators still persist om leaving the concentration point with “a few minutes in hand”. Other aircraft inadvertently leave the concentration point a few minutes late (possibly due to late take-off, etc.) with the result that the stream of aircraft is very much longer than it should be, and the chance of success by the German night fighter is increased. If it is calculated that the aircraft will arrive at the concentration point early, then dog-legs [underlined] must [/underlined] be carried out before reaching this position. All Navigation Officers are to check the time at the concentration point of each aircraft, and they must insist that no aircraft leaves this position with any time in hand.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
All aircraft of the Group are now equipped with the A.P.I. fully modified. Several tests have been carried out to ascertain the accuracy of this instrument now it has been modified, and the results have shown that the error is now very small, and of the order of 3 or 4 m.p.h. We must, therefore, make every use of this valuable instrument. It is considered by a few Navigators that errors arise when resetting the A.P.I. Mechanically this is not so, and any errors are due to incorrect setting by the Navigator. If the A.P.I. is reset every 30 minutes, as it should be, then the amount to be subtracted or added to the counters should not be great, and would not generally be more that 30-35 minutes of latitude or longitude. For ease and simplicity, the A.P.I. should not be reset until the latitude or longitude counters are showing an even number of minutes, e.g. 10, 20, 30, etc. It should then be a simple matter to add or subtract say 25 minutes of latitude or longitude.
It is advocated by a small section of the “Union” that the A.P.I. should be reset as little as possible, e.g. at the last Gee fix, the target, and first Gee fix, etc., but this method has several disadvantages. It will become cumbersome after a long period of D.R. e.g. the Berlin raid 24/25 March, 1944, when the wind vector from target to Enemy Coast was approx. 230 miles long. There is as great a risk of error in plotting this vector as in resetting the A.P.I. Another disadvantage is that the Air Position may run off the chart in use. This would necessitate carrying several charts.
The Air Position Indicator is a valuable instrument if correctly used. Navigators are urged to experiment with the A.P.I. in the various methods of use, and discuss with their Station Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
March was a mixed month for broadcast w/v’s. The wind finding and resultant track keeping was good, with the exception of Berlin and Nuremburg. The last two mentioned raids have been investigated, and the results are worthy of special comment.
[Underlined] Berlin. [/underlined] Average forecast w/v from Base to Target at 20,000 feet was 350/60. Average w/v transmitted was 350/90. Average true w/v was approximately 350/105. It will be noted that the winds transmitted by Aircraft were, on average, 15 m.p.h. under strength. A large percentage of windfinders obtained the accurate w/v, but only a few transmitted it. The remainder either did not send it, or, not believing there could be such a large error in the forecast w/v’s, “watered it down” and sent that. This procedure is very dangerous. Navigators must send back all w/v’s they obtain, providing they are confident the fixes used are accurate.
Another feature of the Berlin raid was the delay in aircraft sending back w/v’s. All the difficulties experienced by aircrew are fully appreciated, but every effort must be made to get the w/v’s back to Base as soon as possible.
[Underlined] Nuremburg. [/underlined] The investigation into this raid has not yet been completed, but the one outstanding feature is that the wind direction at and above 20,000 feet backed by 15° - 20° and this was a contributory factor to the Northerly trend on the return journey.
[Underlined] LIAISON VISITS [/underlined
Only a few liaison visits have been completed during the month. It is very difficult for operational Station and Squadron Navigational Officers to visit the Con. Units or Scampton Aircrew School, but every effort should be made. Make a note of all the deficiencies of Navigators, your suggestions, criticisms etc., then go and discuss them with the Con. Unit or Scampton. More good can be done by paying one liaison visit than by writing a hundred letters. Con. Unit, L.F.S. and Scampton Instructors must also pay regular visits to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
During the month, one Navigator from each Squadron was detailed to experiment with Log and Chart work. Each was asked to work almost entirely on the Chart, making only a very few log entries. This method has proved very popular. Full reports are not yet to hand, but an analysis of all reports will be sent to Stations and Squadrons in due course.
1. If the D.R. Compass topples, and the repeater rotates, what action would you take to maintain the line of flight marker on the H 2 S correctly orientated?
2. What action would you take to tune in the ground returns and set up the height marker on the H 2 S equipment if the trace on the height tube were missing?
3. You are using broadcast wind velocities, and the Bomb Aimer gives you a pinpoint which is “off track”. What two actions would you take?
4. You have received an amendment to the zero hour, but, having applied the correction, observe that you still have several minutes in hand. How and where would you lose this time?
5. In which countries are the following towns: Strasbourg, Aix-le Chappelle, Flensburg, Ghent, Pilsen, Charlattenburg?
6. Which is the shorter distance – Stuttgart to ROME or Stuttgart to LONDON?
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. (a) Passes to W/Optr. On paper (1) Course, (2) Height, (3) I.A.S., (4) present position, (5) estimated time of ditching, (6) reason for ditching. ( )
(b) Obtain a Gee fix and pass to W/Op., on paper, the Gee co-ordinates and time of fix.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Few crews carry out correct procedure, which is – the emergency procedure when ditching is considered unavoidable, S.O.S. procedure when ditching is imminent within 15 minutes.
2. 30°
3. If B strobe is missing. Line up signals in usual manner, and take “C” reading. Then reverse signals so that B signal is on the C trace, strobe the signal and take the reading remembering to subtract 30. If “C” strobe is missing, reverse above procedure and add 30 to the “C” pulse reading.
4. (a) It means that you are heading for high ground.
(b) Turn on reciprocal course and obtain a check on your position. If no reliable aids are available in the aircraft, the Navigator should request W/Op. to obtain an M/F D/F fix.
Lines to those who went on leave on April 4th.
For you the birds tra-la do sing!
For me the heavens do glower and rain!
For you buds burst like anything!
My buds ‘gainst blight do strive in vain!
The reason’s simple why I grieve,’
And why my downtrod soul doth pine;
For you continue with your leave,
But I’ve just heard that I’ve had mine!!
ANON (Circa 1944)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ANOTHER BAD MONTH [/underlined]
The [underlined] Avoidable [/underlined] Accident Summary for March again makes bad reading – Squadrons had 9 and Training Base had 33. These figures speak for themselves, and they use pretty strong language. As a result of these accidents, 4 aircraft were CAT “E”, 6 were CAT “B”, 20 were CAT AC” and 12 were CAT “A”. Bear in mind these were only avoidable accidents. Technical failures are not included in this list. Details are as follows:-
Ground collisions (including taxying) – 15; overshoot landing – 3; crashes on 3-engined overshoots – 3; swings on take off – 5; swings landing – 4; errors of judgement landing – 5; heavy landings – 3; maintenance – 2; taking off – 1; other errors of judgement – 1: Total [underlined] 42 [/underlined].
The snow period at the beginning of the month was directly responsible for 14 of these accidents, all within 51 Base. Had there been no hard snow banks, no damage would have been done to these aircraft. The hazard had to be accepted, and no action was on these “snow” accidents. Under this heading there were 5 taxying, 7 swinging and 2 landing. This however, still leaves 19 avoidable accidents in 51 Base, in the usual categories, and 9 in squadrons – total 28, as under:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined] – Ground collisions – 3; overshoot landing – 2; maintenance errors – 2; other errors of judgement – 2.
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined] Ground collisions – 7; swings – 2; overshoot landing 1; heavy landings – 2; other landing errors – 4; crashes on 3 engined overshoots – 3.
Collisions on the ground (10) still account for more damaged aircraft than any other category. There were two more M.T. collisions this month, both due to careless driving by ground personnel, in spite of the recent drive to eliminate these costly entirely inexcusable accidents. One aircraft was damaged during compass swinging at a squadron, and two more were damaged on dispersal. In the others, only a very slight degree of carelessness was shown by aircrew. They were more unfortunate than anything else. Apart from the M.T. collisions, there has not been an instance this month of down right careless taxying, which is a step in the right direction.
The swings were by inexperienced pilots, both of whom took the correct action after the swing developed. This action avoided serious damage. One of the heavy landings was made in difficult wind conditions, the other only accentuated damage which had been started as a result of previous heavy landings; both pilots were under training.
Three aircraft crashed on 3 engined overshoots – two Stirlings and one Lancaster. It is hoped that the revised technique of dealing with three engined landings at Conversion Units will minimise these three engined accidents. The overshoot landing at Training Base was also made on three engines. The pilot hesitated between landing and going round again, decided on one, then changed his mind; he finished up in the overshoot area. Overshoots on the squadrons were made under extremely difficult circumstances. One was made on two engines, and in the other, visibility was practically nil.
(Continued on page 15, col. 3)
ORGANISATION
[Underlined] (MAY BE READ BY AIRCREW TYPES) [/underlined]
When the so-called “brained types” of the Royal Air Force are binding round the fireplace in the mess, they sometimes utter the most amazing theories on how the war can be won on a date earlier than that already forecast by Lindoe. But no one tries to make a note of what is said by these Fuehrers, except, maybe, to insert a few rude remarks in the local “Line Book”.
When, however, an observation is made that is clever and helpful, quotations are extracted and issued to the world at large. Such an extract is made in Section 1 of A.P.837 – “Principles of Administration”.
An extract from the Manual says “A good organisation requires competent management to produce satisfactory results”. In the Royal Air Force, this management of the [underlined] ORGANISATION [/underlined] is called Administration; it is the system whereby, in principle and in executive detail, the Service carries out its function ….TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY….!!!... and to work efficiently, co-operation is essential. (Co-operation, by the way, is something to which every member of a Service contributes).
Another famous quotation by Socrates, was to the effect that “A disorderly mob is no more an army than a “pranged” aircraft a fighting machine”. The bits and pieces must be [underlined] organised. [/underlined]
So, therefore, let’s have a look at organisation in action-theory is not sufficient, it must be applied.
With apologies to Tee Emm. here are a few “Do’s and Don’t s”.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] see that Orders issued are brief, complete and unambiguous. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] lay yourself open to being misunderstood. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that in your planning, you must always ask yourself who has to be consulted before you reach a decision, and who has to be informed of your decision.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] grasp the scope of the task, and foresee what it demands, with thoroughness and imagination. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] see with what other tasks run by other Sections, you must interlock. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] co-ordinate with your equals and underlings. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] plan until you are absolutely clear what is to be done. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] jump at the first solution. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] consider all the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] go off at half-cock.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] remember that in war, speed is nearly everything.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that ceaseless driving force and ceaseless supervision are essential.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] check and check again.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget, whatever your job, your ability to organise is every bit as important to the Service as a whole, whether you are throwing an aircraft about the sky, or writing Railway Warrants.
ENGINEERING
Early returns for the month of March were about average, and cancellations were much reduced. Cancellations for March were 0.98%, a considerable improvement on the 3.47% recorded for February. Early Returns for March were 4.01% for all causes, again, an improvement on February’s figures which were 6.5%.
Serviceability was generally good, the main causes of unserviceability being:-
1. Aircraft on acceptance checks.
2. Aircraft on minor inspection.
3. Aircraft landing away from base due to diversion.
The number of sorties flown by this Group is again a record, but still greater numbers will be expected during the coming months.
The maintenance statistics staff are still at Waddington and very soon experiments will proceed with a 75 hour maintenance cycle, using the revised maintenance schedule.
Much unnecessary engine running is taking place on the ground, and the method of some of the running is harsh and detrimental to the engine. C.T.O’s must ensure that all N.C.O’s and men who “run up” engines are qualified to do so, and that they have passed the necessary test.
Many cases have been noticed where on a ground run a mag drop has been experienced, and the fitter at the controls has run the engine up three or four times “hoping! It may clear. This is a waste of time, imposes heavy loads on the engine, and proves the man in the cockpit does not know his job.
Another point about ground running is that much damage is done on a ground test by inspection panels and turret covers not being secure, and being damaged by the slipstream. C.T.O’s must have a drive on this, and when they see it happening, check the man at the controls and the N.C.O. i/c aircraft.
[Underlined] RENDITION OF FORMS 765C [/underlined]
The remarks on Form 765C by the specialist officers are in many cases too brief and are of no assistance to this Headquarters in attempting to establish a cause, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the trouble which led to the forced landing or failure. This is liable to indicate, in the case of engine trouble, that the cause is not investigated thoroughly at the Station. As it is known that the cause is always investigated it is small trouble to insert more details in the paragraph provided in the 765C for Specialist’s remarks, and it will save a large amount of correspondence and telephone calls between Group and Stations. If a full technical report is to follow after rendition of the 765C then of course this should be stated in the appropriate paragraph.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Serviceability of Stirling and Lancaster aircraft by Unit]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 14.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
This has been a month of records, and on one occasion a period of sweat, toil, and almost tears.
To create a record with the existing power available, whether it be sprinting, car racing or bombing up, it is necessary to exclude wasted energy. As man power cannot be increased and new armament records must be realised, it is essential that this strive for maximum efficiency be closely investigated.
Wasted energy in the bombing up phase of operations is too often attributed to shortage of equipment, bomb trollies, small bomb containers, Whitlocks, Hampden twins, liners; even spanners. It is admitted that there is a shortage of some of these items; all the more reason why the few available should be kept serviceable; further, if failures and faults occur, an expedient system of repair must be instituted. A flat tyre on a bomb trolley, a few popped rivets on a small bomb container, small faults, easily remedied, but if allowed to accumulate they may easily cause a bottleneck in the repair section and eventually a complete breakdown.
A large percentage of the necessary repairs are caused by mishandling. Bombing up parties must not be allowed to model on the popular conception of a dockyard stevedore.
A release slip that fails is a bomb returned, and a stupendous effort is wasted, especially as it is necessary to cart the weapon back to the bomb dump. Do not therefore allow speed to interfere with the quality of workmanship.
Short cuts and new devices of local manufacture, such as tools and loading platforms save time, and time saved is man hours of effort that can be directed to raising the standard of workmanship, and thus increasing the tonnage dropped on the enemy.
New records will be set, so prepare now for every eventuality.
Load the [underlined] GOODS [/underlined] so that our colleagues the aircrew may deliver them.
[Underlined] WARNING TO WANTONS [/underlined]
A rumour is rife that by trial, a certain Group discovered that if the centre station release mechanism is plugged to the rear turret electric heating system, and the gunner turns on his heated clothing, the following incidents occur:-
(a) A large bomb goes through the bomb doors.
(b) The rear gunner is practically electrocuted.
(c) Pandemonium reigns in the aircraft.
(The Group and Unit concerned prefer to remain anonymous.)
[Underlined] FIREWORKS [/underlined]
To alleviate the somewhat chaotic state brought about by the increase in the use of target markers and indicators, and the need for an improved system of supply, it has been decided to form a pyrotechnical park at Woodhall. It is intended that this park should hold a quantity sufficient to supply any Station at short notice, and that any technical information regarding these new and unheralded devices will be available from that source.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
A word of appreciation is directed to the transport sections, who undertook many nocturnal journeys to ensure prompt deliveries of bombs in readiness for operations.
[Underlined] FAILURES [/underlined]
This month a total of 2 cancellations and 7 Early Returns were attributed to Armament. Although this represents a decided improvement on last month’s figures, it is still too high. The total of 9 abortive sorties were due to:-
(i) 3 Gunners’ “boobs”.
(ii) 1 aircraft returned early as a result of a sticky Palmer Firing Valve, the result of a tight gland nut on the valve spindle.
(iii) 1 aircraft was not bombed up in time for take-off and consequently cancelled.
(iv) 4 aircraft returned with unserviceable tail turrets due to defects in technical equipment, i.e.
(a) A broken ball bearing resulted in a seized vane oil motor.
(b) Spline shaft of the E.D.P. sheared.
(c) Pressure pipe union at the Engine Driven Pump fractured during flight – exit the last old type flex pipe in the Group.
(d) Collapsed gun ram washer.
From this analysis it can be seen that at least 5 out of 9 abortive sorties could, and should, have been avoided. After deducting the three gunners’ “boobs” and 4 failures due to defective equipment, Armament can say with satisfaction, that they were responsible for only two abortive sorties out of a total of 1720 sorties flown. (.116%) – Good show!! A record number of sorties flown, a record tonnage dropped on the Hun and an all-time low of abortive sorties.
There is, however, grave cause for alarm regarding small bomb container compartment hang-ups. Although a greater tonnage than ever before was dropped, so also was a greater tonnage returned to the bomb store, and unfortunately over 50% of the failures were caused by carelessness. Of 102 S.B.C. hang-ups there were 60 maintenance failures directly attributed to severed and trapped leads.
These maintenance failures cannot be accepted, and it is obvious that the present system of supervision during bombing up needs overhaul.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE + = H 2 S Squadron
ACCIDENTS
(Continued from page 14, col.1)
The other landing accidents occurred in 51 Base. They consisted of collapsing of Stirling under-carriages after touch-down. These have not yet been fully investigated.
The remaining “error of judgement” occurred in a squadron. The aircraft crashed in the circuit at dusk. The reason for this crash is still obscure, and has only been included because investigation at this stage does not suggest technical failure of any kind.
A fatal accident took place this month in the Waddington circuit. A Lancaster collided in mid-air with a 1 Group aircraft on its way home to base. Responsibility for the accident has not yet been allocated, but it brings home once again the necessity for keeping a thorough look-out at all times. The pilot of an aircraft is naturally preoccupied in the circuit with his cockpit drill etc., and it is up to the crew, especially the gunners to keep up a search all round. The natural tendency to look inside the circuit at the flarepath must be resisted.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 15.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The opening months of the year have each [missing word] noteworthy contributions to the Bomber Offensive, and this month has proved no exception. Not only have we established a new sortie peak of 1720, but our achievements also include the distinction of being the first Group in the field to drop over 1000 tons in one night on a single target. The high percentage of successes (89.7%) was maintained despite the set-back of two abortive operations, and losses remained a constant 3.37%.
The principal role of the Group, outside the main force “blitz” targets, has been the continuation of the offensive, commenced last month, against Germany’s aircraft production – an essential prelude to the establishment of a Second Front. This offensive has been rewarded by no mean success.
The attack on 2/3rd March against ALBERT resulted in the total destruction of the aero-engine factory of Cle Mecanique d’Albert, with the aircraft factory of S.N.C.A. du Nord more than half destroyed – an impressive result.
MARIGNANE, singled out for attack on the 9/10th, also sustained extremely severe damage, particularly to the assembly shop, heat treatment shop, offices, flight hangar, components’ store, garages, workshops and other buildings in the factory area.
The following night (namely the 10/11th), an ambitious programme was conducted against aircraft factories at CHATEAUROUX, CLERMOND FERRAND and OSSUN, and the Needle Bearing Factory at LA RICAMARIE. Interpretation of P.R.U. photographs provides evidence of the high measure of success which attended these missions. Thirteen buildings comprising the larger part of the workshops of S.N.C.A. du Sud-Ouest Chateauroux, have been destroyed or severely damaged, including the main assembly store, transformer house and other key buildings. The aircraft repair factory at CLERMOND FERRAND has received major damage throughout, including two large multi-bay buildings, compounding plant and power station – the latter now being observed to be inactive – OSSUN Factory airfield bears its scars in the form of severe damage to the two larger factory buildings and other ancillary buildings. The devastation at LA RICAMARIE is particularly acute. The eastern two thirds of the plant has suffered heavily, and every building, with one exception, has been either damaged or destroyed.
Three persistent attacks against the Sigma Aero Engine Works, LYONS, on 23/24th, 25/26th and again on 29/30th, terminated in sixteen out of the 22 buildings comprising the Factory receiving varying degrees of damage, in addition to which a neighbouring hutted encampment has been virtually destroyed.
A further two nights out of the month were devoted with great profit to the firing of Hun powder magazines. The results were impressive indeed, and upheld the high hopes of the crews. BERGERAC on 18/19th took the count in the first round. The east end of the plant is almost completely demolished, while the nitration houses and acid recovery plant are severely damaged, with evidence of severe blast throughout the Factory. ANGOULEME, attacked on 20/21st, was still burning the day following the raid, and severe damage throughout the target area, particularly to the nitro-cellulose plant, can be seen.
We, as a Group, also played a small, but nevertheless noteworthy part in the attack against the enemy’s communications supplying his Channel Ports. AULNOYE was selected as our target, and the ensuing attack on 25/26th resulted in the central portion of one of the carriage and wagon repair shop being damaged. Rather more than twenty direct hits have been secured on the tracks – and the locomotive shed to the south is half destroyed.
An outstandingly successful attack was made on 16/17th against the CLERMOND FERRAND MICHELIN PLANT – not a building of which escaped. Severe damage is displayed throughout the entire area.
Seven major attacks were undertaken during the month. STUTTGART was our first objective on 1/2nd and again on 15/16th. The heaviest concentration of damage from these attacks is seen to the North West and North East of the town centre, where many factories of high priority are situated. Throughout the town, scattered incidents to business and residential property are apparent.
FRANKFURT on 18/19th and 22/23rd, was spectacular, not only by reason of the success of the attack, but because the Group seized the unique opportunity of unloading bombs exceeding 1000 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the target. Some 12 hours after the second attack, columns of smoke were rising to 15,000 feet, and drifting southwards for at least 200 miles – a grave spectacle for dwellers in the South of the Reich. The principal damage is concentrated in the city centre, stretching a scarred arm northwards between the railway station and east harbour.
No month would be complete without an attack on the “Big City”. Limited cover only was available the day following the raid on 24/25th, but from the provisional report (which omits reference to the centre and the east), the potential results can be contemplated with some optimism. At the time of photography, fires were still burning.
For some months, rebuilding in ESSEN has been stealthily proceeding, and the night of 26/27th was selected as a favourable opportunity to disrupt this activity. PR.U. photographs are of poor quality, but fresh damage can be identified in many parts of the town, and in the workshops of Krupps. A full report is awaited.
The final bout of the month witnessed a bitter struggle with the enemy’s fighter defences throughout the deep penetration to NURNBERG on 30/31st, involving our heaviest loss so far recorded. Our aircraft, however, put up a spirited defence, shooting down a number of the enemy. The losses were not a small price to pay, even for a successful attack on this extremely important war production centre, but the casualties can perhaps be placed in their proper perspective, and to some extent minimised, when viewing the Battle of Germany as a whole. It is difficult to place any assessment on the raid owing to cloud conditions, and P.R.U. cover has not yet been obtained.
To speculate on the value of our contribution towards the opening of the Second Front is obviously vain, but there can be no doubt that the month’s activity has left its mark clearly impressed on the Reich.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of statistics on aircraft, sorties, bombing and training by Squadron]
ORDER OF MERIT in this table is now based on the number of SUCCESSFUL sorties completed, per average aircraft on charge, i.e. Total number of sorties minus Early Returns and Missing, divided by Average A/C on charge. No 617 Squadron, in view of their special task, are shown separately.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944.
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V Group News, March 1944
5 Group News, March 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 20, March 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about processes of navigation, signals/radar, photography, gardening, Gee, flying control, H2S, decorations, tactics, flight engineers, war savings, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, air sea rescue, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, public relations, link trainer, equipment, training absence, sports, navigation, accidents, organisation, engineering, armament, accidents, operations and war effort.
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1944-03
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Anne-Marie Watson
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France--Albert
France--Bergerac
France--Châteauroux
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--La Ricamarie
France--Lyon
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
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1944-03
5 Group
Absent Without Leave
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
FIDO
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Scampton
RAF Waddington
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
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Copies sent to:
Stns. 9
S Th 10
B 6.
[Indecipherable] 2
Base 1
[Stamp] Base Copy.
V GROUP NEWS V
JUNE * 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 23
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
June has proved to be a month of record achievements. For the first time in its history the Group despatched 3,000 sorties of which a very high percentage were successful. Much of this success is due to the flare and marking teams who are now getting into their stride, and there has been a similar improvement in bombing. For the first time the average crew bombing error from 20,000 feet for the whole Group is below 200 yards. If the reduction of 50 yards which was achieved during June can be repeated during July, the number of bombs falling on the average target will be increased by something in the order of 50. This can be seen by looking at any P.R.U. photograph and counting the number of craters which are shown in open fields on either side of the target.
I therefore ask all crews to continue with their efforts to reduce bombing errors in the knowledge that by doing so they will add to the striking power of the Group to an extent which could be achieved by no other means. The new orders for maintenance which have recently been issued should help the Instrument Section, upon whom so much depends, to improve the serviceability of the sight, and eliminate minor inaccuracies.
On two occasions during the month the Group came up against the main strength of the German Night Fighter Defences, and on both occasions suffered serious losses; although over the whole month the missing rate was below the average for previous months. Nevertheless these instances show the vital importance of gunnery and the need for improving results by every means in our power.
There is ample evidence that the combined power of the rear and mid-upper turrets will bring down enemy fighters if the aim is correct. As an example, there is the case of “M” of 207 Squadron whose crew on the night of June 9/8th destroyed two JU. 88 and one ME.110. Although results such as this will always remain exceptional, it should be possible to improve the accuracy of aim over the present general standard. Fighters are now available in 1690 Flight for affiliation exercises and every chance must be taken whenever the weather is suitable especially at night. The bombing team has shown how greatly it can improve its results by methodical training and analysis and I now look to the gunnery team to do likewise. I will do everything in my power to provide them with means and facilities for training, but much is a matter for each gunner. Night vision, methodical search, aircraft recognition, turret manipulation, clearing stoppages, can only be improved by hard individual work.
The effort which the Group has put in during the month had been made possible by the high standards of serviceability which have been achieved, and I congratulate all ranks who have helped to get aircraft and equipment into the air. The Armament sections have loaded a record tonnage of bombs while all other sections on each station have contributed their full share to the success achieved.
Finally, I congratulate No. 51 Base on completing more than 8,000 hours of training and passing out a record number of crews. In particular I would mention No. 5 L.F.S. who completed a month’s flying with no avoidable flying accidents.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] BASE GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
June has seen the establishment of a S/Ldr Air Gunner at each Base, and a list of the officers concerned is appended at the foot of this paragraph. Whilst these officers will be concerned with all Gunnery matters, their main functions is to improve the standard of training throughout the Group, as it has long been realised that with long periods of operations the Squadron Gunnery Leaders are fully occupied and can find little time for all the other aspects of Gunnery. The Base Gunnery Leaders will, therefore, be able to devote their time to improve training facilities and equipment, and to ensure that the equipment is available in sufficient quantity to ensure the maximum benefit being obtained from it. They will also be able to supervise the preparation of Gunners for Gunnery Leader, A.G.I. and Specialist Sighting Courses, to enable the candidates to have the best possible chance of passing these courses, thus avoiding wastage of valuable vacancies. The appointment of these Officers to S/Ldr posts offers more advancement for Gunnery Leaders, and is an indication that the importance of air gunnery is receiving recognition. We wish the officers concerned good luck in their new appointments, and hope that very shortly dividends will be paid by this new establishment.
51 BASE – S/LDR HIPKIN
52 BASE – F/LT McCURDY
53 BASE – F/LT BEALE
54 BASE F/LT HOWARD
55 BASE – F/LT BREAKEY
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
An error appeared in the Movement’s column for May, regarding 467 and 44 Squadrons, and is corrected below.
F/Lt Clarke ex 1660 Con. Unit to 44 Sqdn.
F/Lt Cleary ex 27 O.T.U. to 467 Sqdn.
Other movements are:-
S/Ldr Undery ex 1690 B.D.T.F. to H.Q. No. 5 Group.
F/Lt Cass, ex L.F.S. to 630 Sqdn.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
Considerable time is wasted in returning incorrect combat reports to Squadrons, through claims being made which do not conform to the standards laid down by Bomber Command, as issued to all Units. The Gunnery Leaders must ensure that information entered is correct in every detail and that all claims are submitted under one of the headings, i.e. “Destroyed”, “Probably Destroyed” or “Damaged”. Numerous incidents occur when information regarding Tail Warning Devices is incomplete, and it is emphasised that this is most important and must be included in combat reports. Combat reports could be forwarded to Headquarters 5 Group more quickly than at present; the standard pro-forma is now in general use and should help in the preparation of reports. Units should check that only this amended pro-forma is used for this purpose.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn. A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. ME. 410 (c)
630 “Y” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
44 “O” 9/10.6.44. ME. 109 (c)
97 “D” 9/10.6.44. DO. 217 (c)
50 “U” 15/16.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “F 21/22.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88
97 “Q” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “B” 24/25.6.44. ME 109
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
106 “G” 6/7.6.44. ME. 110 (c)
467 “X” 21/22.6.44. T/E.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
207 “J” 1.6.44. T/E (c)
57 “P” 1.6.44. JU. 88
50 “D” 6.6.44. ME. 410
9 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “V” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
97 “Q” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
106 “F” 14/15.6.44. FW. 190 (c)
207 “D” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A new type of two-piece flying suit is on trial in 53 Base, and the results will, in due course, be made available.
Replies have been received from all Units in the use of the Pilot type parachute for rear gunners and recommendations forwarded to H.Q. Bomber Command. With slight modification to the turret, this idea seems feasible, but may call for a revision in the type of clothing to be worn.
Ampro projectors are appearing in operational units for assessing Cine Gyro films. The establishment is one per station.
Units are again reminded that filters suitable for the Shadowgraph and 16 m.m. projector for use in night vision training are available. When requesting an issue of these filters from H.Q. 5 Group, units are to confirm that they have a [underlined] fully [/underlined] blacked out room for night vision training.
CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING
Instructions have now been issued to all Stations to construct a sandbag traphouse for clay pigeon shooting, and full details given for the layout of the range. Severn P.F.O’s are attending the Instructor’s Course on the 7th July, and the remainder on the 23rd July; these instructors will pass on to Unit Gunnery Leaders instructions for these practices, to ensure that at least two officers are available for conducting the exercises. Gunnery Leaders should press for the construction of the traphouses and ensure that all equipment is overhauled and ready for use.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JUNE.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
Fighter Affiliation Grand Total = 1493
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] ATTACKS ON LIMOGES MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined]
1,424 bombs were dropped. Of this total 844 craters have been counted on the P.R.U. photographs. We can therefore only consider 59% of the total number of bombs dropped.
The M.P.I. of all craters was established and a circle of radius 150 yards was drawn. Inside this circle the number of craters that could be counted totalled 152 and the remaining 692 craters were counted outside the circle. Therefore the Pilot and Air Bomber’s error for 692 bombs was greater than 150 yds.
With our 152 bombs inside the 150 yards circle we achieved 10 hits per acre and if we assume that of the bombs not counted, we obtained the same percentage inside 150 yards our hits per acre would increase to 17.
There were 211 bombs between the 150 yards and 250 yards circles. The maximum errors permissible for these bombs to get them into the 150 yards circle are:-
125 yards – average line error
160 yards – average range error
We all agree that these limits are reasonable and that crews should not have errors in excess.
Now, if the bombs had been contained in the limits of 125 yards line and 160 yds. range, our resultant average radial error about the M.P.I. would be 175 yards. This would mean that instead of sending the 96 aircraft to Limoges that we had to, we need only have sent 59 aircraft to achieve the same number of hits. We would then have had 37 aircraft free to attack the factory at ??? There were, of course, 330 bombs seen outside the 250 yards circle and great effort must be made to eliminate the errors that were responsible.
The Moral! – You must practice, practice and practice until you are a certain “A” category crew.
!!! [Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined] !!!
A+ Crews – 60 yards or less
A Crews – 100 yards or less
B Crews – 100 yds. to 150 yds.
C Crews – 150 yds. to 200 yds.
D Crews – Over 200 yards.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE: [/underlined] Plotted 1597 bombs aimed by 309 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE: [/underlined] Plotted 1510 bombs aimed by 319 aircraft.
[Underlined] WAINFLEET: [/underlined] Plotted 2056 bombs aimed by 440 aircraft.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of High Level Bombing Training Statistics by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR JUNE
In the April “News” it was threatened that owing to the improvement in Crew Errors, it may be necessary to lower the qualifying figure for the inclusion of errors in this column. June has produced the largest number of below 100 yards errors yet, and in consequence only those crews who have obtained crew errors of 80 yards or less, converted to 20,000 ft. can receive publicity.
Squadron or Con. Unit. Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
9 F/O Blackham F/O Elphick F/O Wenger 72 yards
44 F/L White Sgt Jenkins F/S Jones 66 yards
P/O Baxter W/O Young W/O Rutherford 50 yards
P/O Stewart Sgt Stubbs Sgt Wright 65 yards
49 P/O Appleyard F/S Jameson F/S Blumfield 78 yards
P/O Arnold F/O Dewar W/O Fleming 72 yards
57 F/S Clark Sgt Johnson Sgt Lugg 65 yards
83 P/O Meggeson W/O Franklin F/O Wicker 65 yards
F/O Kelly F/O Irwin Sgt Burleigh 58 & 64 yards
97 F/L Van Raalte F/O Arnold F/S Williams 52, 69 & 78 yards
S/L Ingham F/O Perkins F/L Chatten 69 yards
467 P/O Waugh F/S Southgate F/O Semple 67 yards
F/L Brine F/S Luton F/S Sutton 80 yards
617 P/O Duffy F/O Woods F/O Bell 42 yards
F/O Knights P/O Bell F/O Rhude 48 yards
P/O Jingles F/S Hazell F/O Beal 63 yards
619 P/O Johnson Sgt Vaughton F/S Tranter 79 yards
F/L Howes F/O Baker F/L Harrison 74 yards
1654 C.U. F/S Beharrie Sgt Dean Sgt Brownhall 74 yards
F/S McKechnie F/S Wallace Sgt Little 53 yards
1660 C.U. P/O Dyer F/S Howard F/S Lemaire 74 yards
F/S Millar F/O Banks W/O Wilday 70 yards
1661 C.U. F/O Franks F/O Orry Sgt Roe 78 yards
F/O Furber Sgt Le Marquand F/O Hassel 78 yards
5 L.F.S. S/L Smith Sgt Wallis Sgt Page 49 yards
F/O Edwards F/S Wallace F/O Nunn 54 yards
Congratulations to F/L Van Raalte and crew, 97 Squadron for the outstanding 3 exercises!!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 Squadron (F/Lt Hearn, D.F.C) [/underlined] report that to try and reduce bombing errors to a minimum a system of practice bomb plotting on small perspex covered boards is being inaugurated. The errors will be plotted on this board and the reason explained verbally to the Air Bomber, Captain and Navigator. In case of suspected instrument error the Bombing Section will examine the results plotted with the Instrument Section.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron (F/L Keats) [/underlined] report that a modification to permit the emergency jettisoning of smaller H.E. bombs only when a mixed load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried has been suggested by an Air Bomber and submitted for approval. An isolation switch would be incorporated in the circuit between the Connell Pre-Selector and No. 13 Station. This switch would be permanently wired down except when the special load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried, in which case it would be left up for take-off and put down by the crew when a height of 4,000 feet is reached. In the event of engine failure at take-off, the pilot could jettison the smaller H.E. bombs safe with the jettison toggle instead of the normal jettisoning of containers by Type H Jettison.
[Underlined] 52 Base [/underlined] report that [underlined] 12 [/underlined] aircraft took off between [underlined] 08.30 hours and 09.30 hours [/underlined] on 4th July to carry out High Level Practice Bombing. Early morning details can be sure of the best bombing weather!!
[Underlined] 106 Squadron (F/L Morgan) [/underlined] report the following outstanding exercise:-
Pilot:- F/O Meredith
Air Bomber:- F/O Mitchell.
As the port outer engine had to be feathered before completion of the cross country, bombing was carried out on only three engines. As Gee was thus u/s and as petrol was running short, no wind was found, but the wind velocity found on the last leg of the cross country was used for bombing. This wind velocity was found at 18,000 feet, whereas the bombing was carried out at 14,000 feet owing to having only three engines. Thus a fairly large vector error of 214 yards (Converted to 20,000 feet) resulted, but the bomb aimer’s error was only 16 yards at 14,000 feet, which is an error of 19 yards when converted to 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
Bombing Leaders in 54 Base are:-
83 Squadron – F/L Bedell
97 Squadron – F/L Rogers, D.F.C.
627 Squadron – F/L Mitchell
[Underlined] F/L Harris, D.F.C. [/underlined] has arrived from H.Q. 6 Group to take over Bombing Leader duties at No. 5 L.F.S. Syerston.
[Underlined] F/L Honnibal [/underlined] (ex 92 Group) has succeeded F/L Keats as Bombing Leader to 57 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/L Keats [/underlined] (57 Squadron) has moved to H Q 92 Group.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Clegg (44 Squadron), F/S. Booth (619 Squadron) and F/O Linnett (207 Squadron) obtained “B” Categories on No. 84 Course and F/O Nugent (61 Squadron) obtained “B” Category on No. 85 Course.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
The month of June was notorious for bad weather, numerous operations and stand-by’s. Hence the competition entries were fewer in number than of late. It has been decided to include the Conversion Units in the Competition under the same rules as for the Squadrons. It is realised, however, that they have an advantage over Squadrons in so far as they have considerably more qualifying entries from which to make selection. However it is hoped that squadrons will make determined efforts to beat the Conversion Units in July. Out [sic] congratulations are extended to 51 Base for their high standard, and their commanding positions in this, their first entry!!
PILOT AND AIR BOMBER’S ERROR AT 20,000 FEET
1st 1654 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd 619 Squadron – 62 yards
3rd 1660 C.U. – 68 yards
4th 1661 C.U. – 69 yards
5th 44 Squadron – 70 yards
6th 467 Squadron – 78 yards
7th 5 L.F.S. – 83 yards
8th 49 Squadron – 85 yards
9th 83 Squadron – 90 yards
10th 9 Squadron – 92 yards
11th (630 Squadron- 96 yards
(106 Squadron 96 yards
13th 463 Squadron- 107 yards
14th 97 Squadron – 109 yards
15th 207 Squadron – 116 yards
16th 57 Squadron – 124 yards
Non-qualifying Squadrons:-
17th 50 Squadron (6 exercises)- 106 yards
18th 61 Squadron (3 exercises)- 91 yards
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C. – 52 Base – 76 yards
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
G/Capt Johnson, D.F.C., A.F.C. – 88 yards
(R.A.F. Station, Syerston)
[Underlined] ? ? AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ ? ? [/underlined]
1. What can cause an apparent Vector error in practice bombing?
2. List the possible causes of Large Random Errors.
3. What errors in practice bombing will be caused by low suction?
4. If you set the wrong T. V. what kind of error will you get?
[Underlined] MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT – DO’S AND DON’T’S [/underlined]
DO:- (i) set Bomb T.V. (the TV’s of all bombs likely to be dropped should be recorded on the levelling card on the top right-hand corner of the computor).
(ii) Set Target height against Q.F.E. ([underlined] SEA LEVEL PRESSURE [/underlined]).
(iii) Set [underlined] INDICATED [/underlined] Wind Speed because Bombsight Computor works on Indicated Air Speed and indicated height (indicated wind can be found from true wind by SUBTRACTING 1.5% per 1000 ft of height).
(iv) Synchronise bombsight compass with Pilot’s D.R. repeater (by pressing in and turning the synchronising knob on the side of the Computor box.)
(v) Check that sufficient suction is reaching the bombsight gyros.
(vi) Remember to turn on air supply to the bombsight by means of the Bombsight Cock.
(vii) Be sure that the Pilot puts main control cock of “George” to OUT when Bombsight is to be used, or no compressed air will be available.
(viii) Keep the bombsight clean and check all the loads are correctly attached.
(ix) Liaise with the Instrument Section who maintenance [sic] your bombsight.
DON’T (i) Use the Emergency Computor until you have checked the bombsight and tried to correct the fault.
(ii)Touch the reflector glass of the Sighting Head when the gyro is running (the gyro is always running when the engines are running).
(iii) Forget to adjust the levelling scales for the all-up weight. (The Flight Engineer will know the A.U.W.).
(iv) Put any pressure on the reflector glass – even the edge of a map may lead to the toppling of the gyro when the engines are running.
(v) Let anything, not even your oxygen mask, press on the Sighting Head. (The upper part is supported on anti-vibration mountings which prevent the bearings of the gyro being damaged – the least pressure can make the alignment inaccurate).
(vi) Stow parachute, window, etc. near any of the leads to the Computor Box or Sighting Head.
(vii) Forget to liaise with the bombsight maintenance staff.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS (Continued from back page) [/underlined]
were daylight attacks) with varying degrees of success. Notable among these attacks were the operations in daylight against WATTEN and SIRACOURT on the 19th and 25th respectively. In both cases direct hits are claimed on the launching ramps involving damage which, it is hoped, will put them out of -commission at least temporarily.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
No long range sorties have been carried out during the month; in fact almost all the targets have been in Gee range. No Navigational difficulties therefore have been experienced. Broadcast winds have not been attempted during the month because of shallow penetration.
One major navigational “boob” was, however made during the month by a Navigator of No. 106 Squadron. The aircraft was detailed to attack a Ruhr target, and reached the enemy coast on track and on time. The Navigator then gave the next course to the pilot who in error steered 100° different from that given him. The Navigator was at fault in not checking the course with the pilot. The aircraft continued on the wrong course for six minutes until a Gee fix was obtained. The sortie was eventually abandoned because of the time element. This is another example of what can happen if you do not carry out the correct drills. Immediately the pilot says “on course” make it your first duty to check the true course steered.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
During the month an analysis of errors which may arise in windfinding has produced the following probable error:-
Probable Error
(i) Inability to read A.P.I. to nearest half minute of Lat. and Long. 1 mile
(ii) Inability to plot a position in Lat. and Long. accurately (e.g. Air Position and Gee fix) 1/2 mile (at least)
(iii) Inherent error in H2S fixes of at least half a mile. 1/2 mile
(iv) Inability to plot an H2S fix to within 1/2 mile because of mile scale limitations on chart 1/2 mile
(v) Probable error in synchronising of D.R. compass repeaters when airborne. 1 mile
(vi) Error in Compass swing of at least 1°. 1 mile
(vii) Probable error in measuring off length of wind vector, because of mile scale limitations, on chart. 1/2 mile
[Underlined] Total [/underlined] 5
Therefore if a wind was found over a period of 15 minutes it would be possible to obtain an error of 20 m.p.h!! Fortunately, of course, some of the errors will cancel out, but even then there will always be a residue which, multiplied by four, may still give a large error.
It will be noticed that careless errors in taking of Gee and H2S fixes, reading off A.P.I. co-ordinates, incorrect plotting etc. have not been mentioned.
The problem now is, how can we eliminate the above errors. Action has already been taken to eliminate points (iv) and (vii). Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are urged to discuss the above list with all Navigators on the Squadron, and submit any suggestions to Group Headquarters immediately.
Don’t be afraid to give us all your suggestions. Remember, the more accurate w/v’s we obtain, the more accurate the bombing, concentration and timing.
Referring back to careless errors, by far the largest of these are plotting and computing errors. A list of exercises to improve plotting and computation was forwarded to each S.N.O. some weeks ago. It is the responsibility of each S.N.O. to see that these exercises are completed at regular intervals. Short computation tests, lasting 15 – 20 minutes should be completed every morning if this is possible. There is always a spare half hour between assembly at the flights and commencing N.F.T’s. The plotting tests should be carried out at least once every fortnight, particular stress being laid on wind finding. Make it a point always that the tests are analysed immediately after completion, and the results made known as soon as possible.
Many Squadrons have adopted the above procedure, and are being well repaid. There are still one or two Squadron Navigation Officers, however, who say they are too busy to do such things. Don’t let this be your excuse – try it conscientiously and well for the next fortnight, and note the improvement in the work of your Navigator.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
All Navigators will now be conversant with the resetting modification fitted during the past months. It is hoped that maximum use is being made of this device, which should considerably simplify resetting.
Yet another modification to simplify resetting has been suggested by the Navigation Staff at Syerston. It is the fitting of a “winder handle” to the resetting knob. Only one handle need be used when resetting and, much more important, the time taken to reset will be reduced by at least 2/3rds. The above modification has been submitted to Bomber Command for approval, and as soon as this is obtained, all aircraft will be modified.
Several Squadrons have been persevering with the graphical resetting procedure, but this has not proved very successful. When the modification suggested by Syerston has been fitted to all aircraft, all objections against resetting regularly will have been overcome, and it will be possible to adopt the standard procedure of resetting the A.P.I. regularly.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
During the summer months it is hoped we may further the Navigation technique to such an extent that Navigation will be considerably simplified during the winter period. We must aim for simplification and standardisation in use of A.P.I., H2S and log and chart keeping. This will be of considerable benefit to the Conversion Units. At the present time a Navigator is taught one method at the Conversion Unit and another on the Squadron – consequently he is proficient at neither. Ideas are being collected from Squadrons and it is hoped to present to Squadrons and Conversion Units the ideal Navigation technique. Let us have your suggestions.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The results of the drive on practice bombing and wind finding have, on the whole, been satisfactory – but in certain cases they have been disappointing. The Conversion Unit Navigators have surpassed many operational Navigators. A vector error of less than 5 m.p.h. should be your aim.
Improvements have been made during the last 7 or 8 weeks, and the average vector error produced this month is 7 3/4 m.p.h. – a commendable effort on the whole but there is still room for improvement.
It was stated in last month’s News that a monthly Bombing Wind Finding Competition would be held. It was the intention to publish the best eight vector errors for the month, but so far there have been 14 instances where NIL vector error was obtained and a further 14 instances of vector errors of 2 m.p.h. and below! It has therefore been decided to issue the AVERAGE vector error obtained by each Squadron and Conversion Unit for the month. The order is as follows:-
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron]
[Underlined] Average Error: [/underlined] Squadrons – 7 m.p.h.
Con. Units – 8 m.p.h.
It will be noted that only one Squadron has achieved the ideal, i.e. a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Day, D.F.C. Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to Ops.II H.Q. 5 Group.
S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C. S.N.O. Dunholme to Base Nav. Officer, Scampton.
F/Lt. Bray, D.F.C. 207 Sqdn. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, D.F.M. 44 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Craven 50 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. R. Adams, D.F.C. 630 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Lascelles, D.F.C. 1654 C.U. Navigation Leader to be Squadron Nav. Officer No. 50 Squadron.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 5
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ARMAMENT
[Underlined] A RECORD MONTH [/underlined]
The month of June produced two new records when a total of 3000 sorties was flown, resulting in 11,708 tons of bombs dropped on enemy territory, an increase of 3,000 tons over our previous record in May. All armament personnel can be justifiably proud of their contribution, particularly as this phenomenal tonnage represents only a fraction of the tonnage actually handled during the month.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL BOMBING GEAR [/underlined]
One drop of water in the wrong place may result in several thousands of pounds of high explosive failing to reach the target – a startling yet true statement. Bad weather has necessitated leaving aircraft bombed up for several consecutive days, and as no aircraft can be guaranteed waterproof, it is quite possible that some of our recent “summer weather” has seeped into the bombing circuit.
All Armament Officers are reminded if the correct procedure to be carried out when aircraft are left bombed up after the cancellation of operations, and a quick reference to Air Staff Instructions would not be amiss at this stage. Are your electrical circuits tested each day, and do you always remove pyrotechnics from the aircraft immediately after the cancellation? Check up on these and all other relevant points, and ensure that the [underlined] full [/underlined] load reaches its destination, and not just a small fraction of it.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN [/underlined]
The Bomber Command Armament Bulletin for June has now arrived and contains some very interesting and useful information, particularly the suggestions made for improving the condition of bomb dumps in general. Page 9 of the Bulletin refers to the difficulties encountered in the storage of cluster projectiles and introduces a new type of tracking which is intended form a temporary hard standing in bomb dumps which have no suitable storage space for this particular weapon. Supplies of this Summerville tracking have already arrived at some stations in the Group and although it is, as yet, too early to express an opinion as to the efficiency of this equipment, it is considered that it will prove to be a very great asset.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Types and Squadron]
A= MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
[Underlined] GUN FREEZING [/underlined]
Although the immediate danger of gun failures due to freezing has now passed, the problem of preventing such failures is still being very carefully investigated, and to assist in this investigation samples of hydraulic fluids have been taken from gun turret systems of operational aircraft for analysis by the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
A [indecipherable] of water in suspension in hydraulic fluid is sufficient to cause the oil to freeze at a considerably higher temperature, and consequently the importance of ensuring that oil containers used to fill gun turret systems are free from water, cannot be too strongly stressed. Results of this analysis will be forwarded to all Bases and Stations when received. We hope that they will be negative.
[Underlined] AMMUNITION [/underlined]
The repeated changing of ammunition from night to daylight sequence results in all ammunition bolts being handled several times a week. If ammunition is transported in suitable containers and handled carefully when being loaded into the aircraft, no misalignment should occur.
The necessity for ensuring that only correctly aligned ammunition is loaded into gun turrets should be brought to the attention of all armourers and air gunners.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The emphasis during the past month has been on wind finding for practice bombing, and we are pleased to say that Navigators on the Training Base have risen to the occasion and produced excellent results. The most notable performances have come from Winthorpe, where seven Navigators obtained a Nil vector error. This drive on wind finding has created a desire to find equally correct winds during Navigational exercises. The result has been a big improvement in track keeping and timing.
From time to time improvements on the A.P.I. are suggested. The latest suggestion comes from F/O Richardson of No.5 L.F.S., who has suggested a modification to facilitate re-setting. This modification, if adopted, will reduce the time taken to reset the A.P.I. by at least 2/3rds. Good work Syerston!
H2S training is getting into its stride at Wigsley, and 1/3rd of each course is now being trained. Only one trainer is available at Wigsley at the moment, but as soon as the second trainer arrives it is the intention to train 50% of all crews. Winthorpe and Swinderby Conversion Units are already training half their inputs. Pupils are receiving approximately 14 hours air training, and at least 20 hours ground training. When more aircraft are available it will be the policy to train more crews rather than increase the number of flying hours per pupil.
Bullseye exercises have been seriously interrupted by bad weather, but 10 and 12 Groups have co-operated to the maximum extent on every possible occasion, and several good exercises have been completed.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “OVER KEENNESS” [/underlined]
A Navigator on a cross country flight who was endeavouring to work the Swinderby system of obtaining six minute fixes and winds, experienced Gee failure. He immediately instructed his W/Operator to obtain a M/F fix every six minutes. The W/Op. found the ether rather congested, so he attempted priority fixes – much to the concern of the M/F Section, R.O.C, 5 Group and No. 51 Base!
Public Relations
Public Relations work during June has been rather confused owing to the altered nature of the Command’s operations, and the uncertainty of many circumstances. Only a few reports were issued to the press at any length by the Air Ministry News Service.
Three war correspondents have flown in Group aircraft on operations: Mr. Ronald Walker, of the “News Chronicle” who went over Caen with S/Ldr. Fairburn of 57 Squadron on June 12/13; Mr. R.J. Kiek, of the Netherlands Press Agency, who flew over a French target with his countryman, F/O Overgaadu of No. 207 Squadron, on June 16/17; and Mr. Kent Stephenson, B.B.C. War Reporter, who unfortunately failed to return with W/Cdr. Crocker of No. 49 Squadron on June 21/22.
(Continued in Column 2)
(Continued from Column 3)
Three parties came to our stations: June 1st, Dunholme, Mrs. Billingham (Reuters), Miss Tredgold (South African Argus) and Mr. Fletcher (Sport and General Press Agency Photographer) for the visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: June 17th, Waddington, Mr. W. Farmer, of the “Melbourne Herald”; and June 22nd, Waddington, Mr. Wilkins and Miss Elizabeth Riddell (journalists) and Mr. J. Warburton (Sport and General photographer), for the visit of the Duke of Gloucester.
A party of employees of the Firma Chrome Plating Co., of Sheffield, visited the Sheffield Squadron (No.49) on June 3rd.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
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SIGNALS
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
June was quite a fair month from the aircraft signals point of view, but improvement can and must be made. It is hoped every endeavour will be made by Signals Leaders to raise the standard of Aircrew Signals operating to a high state of efficiency.
Have all Signals Leaders read and digested 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13, and acquainted all their operators with its contents?
This instruction lays down the requirements for W/T Control Operators. Endeavour should be made to bring every Operator up to the standard required. Two Squadrons have already carried out air tests with quite satisfactory results. One important point – once an operator reaches the standard required, he must, by constant practice maintain that standard, and to ensure that he does, he may be required to do an air test with Group at any time, without previous warning.
[Underlined] DAILY INSPECTIONS. [/underlined]
Signals Leaders, do you ever take a quick run out to your aircraft and check over the “Daily” done by your W/Ops?
An aircraft of this Group took off on Ops one night, was only airborne a short time when the intercom. failed. Cause – faulty 2v 20 Acc! The W/Op did not carry out the correct drill for the use of emergency intercom. as laid down in 5 Group Aircraft Drill No.11, Appendix “A”. Result – one early return and one load of bombs the Hun did not receive. Was this the only dud 2v 20 Acc. airborne that night? Or was he the unfortunate W/Op. who, through his lack of knowledge or carelessness in carrying out his emergency drill, was found out? We wonder!! It would be worthwhile checking up on these accs. in the aircraft. Yes, there was a lot of truth in the film “BOOMERANG” !
The new Wireless Operators (Air) log has now gone to the printing press and should be available for issue very soon. We hope to see some very neat and fully detailed logs returned, just to show your appreciation.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
This month’s Good Show comes from 57 Squadron, by an operator who showed coolness and initiative in fixing up his broken dinghy aerial (fixed) and operating his dinghy radio, thus enabling the rescue aircraft to “home” on his signal.
The aerial mast was broken while erecting, and the operator fixed his aerial lead into the aerial part while other members of the crew took turns at holding the aerial aloft, by the insulated part which separates the aerial from mast.
This is an excellent example of cool and intelligent thinking under very difficult circumstances.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The co-operation of W/Op. and Gunner reporting on unserviceability of Early Warning Devices is improving, but there are still the few cases of discrepancy appearing in these E.W.D. reports and Combat reports. Just a little more drive in this direction will eradicate this, so Signals Leaders and Radar Interrogators, do your stuff.
Manipulation failures are still occurring, mostly due to lack of experience, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. Efforts are being made for every Squadron to have one Early Warning Device Instructor, and quite a few Squadrons have them already. Signals Leaders, get your W/Ops over to them for that little extra instruction which means all the difference between failure and serviceability of your E.W.D. and sends your Squadron percentage of serviceability soaring.
The cards, depicting combats on Monica, sent from this Group to Headquarters Bomber Command, are now in the process of being reproduced and will soon be available for issue to Squadrons and Conversion Units.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The alteration to the time of the Group W/T exercise has met with universal approval from all Squadrons, and there has been some good operating. The reallocation of Squadrons to Sections 1 and 2 should also help to make the exercise more interesting by eliminating the possibility of any two transmitters “blotting out” each other due to their close proximity.
[Underlined] VALETE ET SALVETE [/underlined]
Our heartiest congratulations to W/Cdr. Skinner on his promotion and his appointment as Officer Commanding No. 14 Radio School. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
Our congratulations also go to S/Ldr. Andrews on his appointment as Signals Leader, 92 Group.
Five Group are poorer by two very popular officers.
44 Squadron will welcome F/O Hughes (a former 44 Sqdn. W/Op) as Signals Leader.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failures percentage against total operational sorties has shown a great decrease during the month. There were 27 failures reported out of 3,000 sorties – the percentage being 0.9, the lowest figure for many months. The maintenance personnel are to be commended for repeating last month’s record of zero maintenance failures. Out of this enormous number of sorties, only two aircraft returned early as a result of signals defects. The number of component failures (equipment) was 14. Surprisingly enough, not one condenser or resistor defect was reported; R. 1155 output valves again proved troublesome.
[Underlined] V.H.F. FITTING [/underlined]
At the time of going to press, 200 aircraft are fitted with V.H.F. equipment. The speed of fitting has placed us well ahead of schedule. Units are reporting that they are receiving a considerable number of crystals which on test have been found inactive. R.A.E., Farnborough, have evolved a modification (R.T.I.M. No.629) employing a choke unit type 45, which, in A. D. G. B. aircraft has proved quite successful. When the choke units become available, units will be notified.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
There are two main reasons why the total number of Mandrel fitted aircraft in this Group has fallen. They are (a) supplies of Col.9 not forthcoming, and (b) large scale V.H.F. fitting drive, which has absorbed all available Signals manpower in the squadrons. It is emphasised, however, that squadrons must ensure that all their complete Mandrels are fitted as soon as possible. The Countermeasure Party is still available at Group Headquarters in readiness to offer assistance.
[Underlined] CARPET II [/underlined]
Contrary to many beliefs, Carpet II is in no way connected with Persian Markets. It is, however, a new radio countermeasure device fitted to the Illuminating Force aircraft of this Group. It is quite popular with the C.S.O!
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Base Signals and Radar Officers attended a conference at Group Headquarters on 16th June, to discuss the Bomber Command proposed establishment of Radar personnel. After considerable discussion and divergence of opinion the proposals were accepted. Some alterations were suggested in connection with accommodation and holdings of spare equipment, and these were forwarded to Bomber Command. It is understood that the proposals are now being considered by the Establishment Branch at Bomber Command.
[Underlined] BOOZER [/underlined]
Sufficient Boozer equipment became available during the month to enable fitting to proceed in our two Boozer squadrons. As this equipment is in very short supply, every effort must be made to make immediate use of all that is available. Test equipment is at the moment, difficult to obtain, but a proposed re-distribution of the total Command holdings should ease this situation.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
It has become increasingly obvious from scrutiny of combat reports that Tail Warning Devices are not being watched continuously by the Wireless Operator. Originally it had been hoped that with training and experience a W/Op would be able to carry out his W/T work whilst, at the same time keeping one eye on the Tail Warning Device, but this has been found to be very difficult. The possibility of repositioning the Tail Warning Indicator so that two of the crew can watch it, has been thoroughly investigated, and found impracticable. Experiments have been made to ascertain the possibility of using a second indicator. This repeater indicator is located adjacent to the Gee indicator. An indicator standard for both Monica IIIA and V, has been designed and tested by the Group Trouble Shooting Party. It has proved quite satisfactory and Bomber Command have been asked to arrange for its early introduction. The design of a simple Fishpond repeater indicator proved too great a problem, and it is now expected that a second standard Fishpond indicator will be the only answer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee was once again the leader in serviceability, showing a new high percentage of 97.77 out of 2,639 sorties. This was obtained in spite of the decrease in new equipment available, and a consequent reduction in the spare sets which squadrons were able to hold.
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 7
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SIGNALS (CONT.)
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 1249 sorties was completed by aircraft equipped with H 2 S Mark II, and of these 103 experienced difficulty; the remaining 91.76% were serviceable throughout the sorties. The fitting of this equipment to 619 Squadron has not yet been completed, but it is proceeding as fast as circumstances will allow. The movement of the Bomber Command Fitting Party to Dunholme will ease considerably the strain of fitting now being carried out by squadron personnel. The supply of fitted aircraft is keeping pace with the number of trained crews.
Mark III H 2 S has shown a decided improvement and the 76 sorties completed resulted in a serviceability of 92.11%. Supply of this equipment is still very grim, but does show signs of improving.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
As is to be expected, this equipment followed in step with H2 S, 92.72% of the 1236 sorties being free of difficulty. Training has shown very decided improvement and the operational reports indicate that W/Ops. are having increased success with this equipment.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA remained at almost the same level as May. 830 sorties were completed, and there were 39 difficulties reported. The remaining 95.31% gave completely satisfactory results. Monica V came closer than ever to overtaking its predecessor with a percentage serviceability of 93.91. The more prevalent causes of unserviceability have been almost eliminated, and the lesser difficulties will no doubt diminish as further experience is gained by Radar personnel. The supply position of both types of Monica becomes increasingly difficult, so squadrons must do their utmost to conserve their existing equipment, and to keep all sets serviceable. The delivery of a Monica Trainer to the Aircrew School at Scampton should help squadrons considerably in their training programme.
The serviceability figures for the month are very gratifying. They indicate a decided increase in the standard of training and workmanship of Radar personnel. In these days of intensive operations, it requires hard work to keep all our equipment serviceable, but the bombing results are more than worth the effort. With the introduction of the proposed establishment, and an adequate number of Radar vans, we should be able to meet the rain and altitude trials of winter on better than equal terms.
[Underlined] TELEPHONE EXCHANGES [/underlined]
Last month’s issue of the News contained a cartoon for which we, in Signals, accept no responsibility. We are delighted, however, to be given the opportunity to refute the allegation of inefficiency which was inferred by publishing the following bouquet.
Skellingthorpe has produced some surprising figures showing the number of calls handled by the Admin PBK during a 24-hour non-operational period. A total of 3,725 calls was handled during this period, and of these 3,143 were extensions – to – extension calls. The Station Commander comments – “My opinion of our operators, always high, has gone up still further”, and – “at Skellingthorpe we have an exchange staff second to none”. We hope that this latter remark will be accepted as a challenge by other exchanges within the Group.
[Underlined] TELEPRINTER TRAFFIC [/underlined]
In April of this year, this Headquarters Signals Office was handling about 9,000 teleprinter messages per week. A drive was then inaugurated to divert traffic to less congested channels, such as D.R.L.S., and our weekly total fell in five weeks by 4,000 messages!
Now that “D” Day has passed, however, the total is commencing to rise. This must be checked, since as the Western Front develops, our commitments increase – It’s often quicker by postagram – at any rate for Admin messages.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] LANCASTER SPARES [/underlined]
This month sees a changeover in our method of demanding spares for Lancasters. Instead of demanding straight on to the M.P.O. demands are now placed on No.207 M.U. who are in a position to supply.
Equipment Officers will help No. 207 M.U. provisioning to a great extent by keeping a close watch upon demands for Lancaster spares, and ensuring that demands are going to No.207 M.U. and not to the M.F.O.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS [/underlined]
A point to watch is the serviceability of mechanical sweepers. If these machines go u/s it means that runways cannot be kept clear of flints and stones, which means a rise in consumption of tyres. The aircraft tyre situation is still acute, and every care must be taken to get the maximum amount of life out of every tyre.
Equipment officers should therefore look into the holdings of spares for mechanical sweepers, and in conjunction with the M.T. Officers provision wisely on those parts which have a habit of going u/s. This will keep the sweepers serviceable and the consumption of tyres down.
[Underlined] WINTER CLOTHING [/underlined]
Now the English summer is upon us it would be wise to overhaul items of winter clothing such as overcoats, waterproof overalls, leather jerkins etc., and get them into good trim for the forthcoming winter.
It would be better to do it now instead of waiting for the winter when these items will be in great demand.
[Underlined] BLANKETS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred where it has been found that Stations have been holding blankets far in excess of their entitlement as laid down in A.M.O. A. 700/43. A quick check of stocks may mean the release of many blankets with a subsequent saving of man-hours at the factory which manufactures them.
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT (Continued from column 2) [/underlined]
[Underlined] OXYGEN TRANSPORT CYLINDERS [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters Bomber Command letter BC/S.21459/E.6, dated 30th June, 1944.
The scale of issue of these items is 32 per squadron. Equipment Officers should make every effort to reduce any surplus holdings and return these cylinders to the M.U.
GARDENING
5 Group’s gardening this month amounted to two small but useful operations by No.44 Squadron against two of the Biscay U-Boat lairs, on the nights of 6/7th and 8/9th. Planting was done in H 2 S from high altitude and some excellent P. P. I. photographs were obtained. A total of 30 vegetables was planted.
Although the record breaking figures of April and May were not reached, the Command planted the considerable total of 1772 vegetables, in some 20 gardens. Over 1,000 were directed against the U-Boats – off their bases and in their approach routes to the Western end of the English Channel. This, combined with vigorous and successful action by air and surface striking forces has brought almost to nothing the threat to our Invasion supply lines, in spite of the massing of the U-Boats to the West of the Channel in the first few days. Nearly 600 vegetables were laid in the Channel itself, to impede enemy surface craft – principally E-Boats – in their anti-invasion operations. (Here, we gratefully admit, we were helped more than a little by the wholesale slaughter of these vermin in their harbours by the bombers). Certain North Sea gardens received some 150 vegetables, and Mosquitos of 8 Group planted a small number in the Kettegat.
During the three months preceding “D” Day well over 7,000 vegetables were planted by the Command, 5 Group being responsible for 908. These figures show that in actual quantity we distributed about one eighth of the Command total. What they do not show is that nearly all our operations were special ones, involving either exceptionally long distances (DANZIG); exceptional accuracy from very low level (KONIGSBURG CANAL); exceptional weight of attack in one night (KEIL BAY) or gardening in daylight (KATTEGAT). We do little routine gardening, and so do not get regular practice, but our recent successes show the value of keeping up to date in slack periods.
Results are beginning to come through, but details of casualties still refer to at latest three months ago; in fact, in the latest list we discover that 5 Group sank a U-Boat in April [underlined] 1943! [/underlined] Fortunately some reports get through more quickly than that, and news of the tremendous indirect effects of the pre-invasion gardening is plentiful. We hear of the route from TRELLEBORG to KIEL (150 miles) being marked with a [underlined] WRECK [/underlined] buoy every 1 – 2 miles; of Swedes and Finns laying up their ships rather than risk out mines, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare states that the mining of the Kiel Canal, backed up by the mining which preceded and followed it in the Baltic and North Sea approaches to the Canal, caused an [underlined] IRRECOVERABLE [/underlined] loss of 3 million tons of overall imports/exports to the German War Machine.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 8
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AIR SEA RESCUE
June brought a record number of operational sorties and, at the same time, an increase in the known number of incidents involving Safety Drills.
A squadron aircraft disappeared over the Irish Sea on a navigational exercise with the loss of the entire crew. Four crews had occasion to use the Parachute Drill, two were successful; in the third, four members who baled out were lost in the sea; in the fourth the rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute, and a gallant attempt by the Air Bomber to share his own parachute was un successful.
[Underlined] 9/10th June. [/underlined] S/44 Squadron returning from operations, got out of control in bad weather. Its position was uncertain, and the captain ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Four members had jumped when the pilot regained control. They fell into the Thames Estuary and were drowned. The aircraft landed at base. None of those lost attached their K-type dinghies before jumping. [Underlined] MORAL [/underlined] – If in doubt about your position always take your dinghy with you.
[Underlined] 21/22nd June. [/underlined] Z/44 Squadron was hit in the starboard elevator from extreme range by a night fighter over enemy territory. The aircraft dived sharply with the elevators jammed, and when over the vertical the pilot considered he had no hope of recovery and ordered the crew to abandon. The Air Bomber was jammed against the rear of his compartment. The Rear Gunner was caught in his turret and trapped by piles of ammunition on his lap, caused by a runaway servo feed. Four members baled out and their parachutes were seen to open. The captain eventually regained control and flew the aircraft back to base, navigated by the Air Bomber.
S/630 Squadron was badly shot up by a fighter. Wings and fuselage were riddled, and the rear turret so badly damaged it was a wonder the gunner escaped injury. The rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute.
With the assistance of two crew members, the pilot flew the aircraft back to this country where, due to damage, he found he could not turn and so was forced to bale out his crew.
At the risk of grave personal injury, the Air Bomber allowed the Rear Gunner to attach his parachute clips to the “K” Dinghy ”D” rings of his (the Air Bomber’s) harness, and the two went out together. Unfortunately, his “D” rings tore through the webbing when the parachute opened and the Gunner was lost.
[Underlined] SUCCESSFUL DITCHING [/underlined]
A/57 Squadron on the same night was returning across the North Sea at 7000 feet when all engines failed, apparently through shortage of fuel. The Captain immediately warned his crew, and ordered the Wireless Operator to transmit S.O.S. The Wireless Operator switched I.F.F. to “Distress” and transmitted “S.O.S.” and the aircraft callsign about ten times before being ordered to his ditching station.
The aircraft ditched ten minutes later. The pilot made use of his landing light which helped him to judge his height, but having no power the aircraft struck the water very severely breaking off the tail. The Captain’s harness had not been tightened sufficiently and he was flung upwards, making a large hole in the perspex and cutting his face deeply. The pilot left the aircraft by means of this self-made hole. The Flight Engineer was also flung upwards and cut his nose on the fuselage roof. The gunners were flung over the flapjack but were uninjured, falling on top of the Air Bomber who was also unhurt, and the Navigator cut the back of his head.
Exit was made from the aircraft “except-
(continued on page10, col.3)
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Place Dinghy Drill Parachute Drill [/underlined]
1 52 Base 52 Base
2 53 Base 55 Base
3 55 Base 53 Base
[Table of Drill Results by Squadron]
No crews in No. 54 Base were tested during the month.
[Underlined] Points arising from Safety Drill Tests. [/underlined]
(a) A number of crews have not thoroughly read “5 Group Aircraft Drills”.
(b) Insufficient use of made of the intercom in practicing “Safety Drills” – the more use that is made of the intercom the more informed and less worried the crew will be.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined]
The monthly summary of Ditchings in Home Waters for May, 1944, shows that 508 airmen were concerned, of whom 242 (47.2%) were saved – a marked percentage increase in lives saved.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
An aircraft of No. 207 Squadron, flown by F/O Smart, collided over the target with another Lancaster which broke cloud above on the port quarter. In spite of the fact that the entire port fin and rudder were torn away and the port tail plane, elevator and aileron badly damaged, F/O Smart completed the bombing run and showing great skill, flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
By his prompt action, F/O Sanders of No. 463 Squadron averted what could have been a serious accident. He was taking off with full bomb load when the starboard tyre burst at a speed of approximately 90 m.p.h. Displaying great skill, he controlled the swing and made a successful take off, and after completing the sortie landed his aircraft in such a way that only minor damage was sustained.
P/O. Meggeson of No. 83 Squadron showed a fine example of airmanship. The port inner of his aircraft caught fire. Though he was unable to operate the fire extinguisher or feather the propeller, by maintaining a very low airspeed, he succeeded in controlling the fire and few his aircraft back to base, where he made a successful landing.
As a result of combat with an enemy fighter, and aircraft of No. 61 Squadron, piloted by P/O Passant, was severely damaged. The starboard fin and rudder were shot away, the fuselage and starboard main plane badly damaged, and the starboard tyre burst. P/O Passant displayed great skill and determination in flying the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
Whilst making a night approach in 7 miles visibility, and aircraft struck a tree 1000 yards from the end of the runway. When the aircraft eventually landed the Pilot stated he had had a successful trip but that the aircraft felt very heavy to handle. This was not surprising as he was still carrying full bomb load when he landed.
Whilst flying at 8000 feet, all four engines of a Stirling cut. The aircraft lost height to 600 feet before the engines were re-started. The First Engineer was changing tanks when the engines cut. They started again when the Second Engineer turned the petrol on!
In broad daylight, after a clear straight run of 200 yards, a pilot taxied his aircraft into an M.T. vehicle standing on the perimeter track.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties carried out totalled exactly 3,000; this constitutes an excellent effort when it is considered that this number of sorties affected serviceability very little and a much larger number could have been laid on had the weather permitted and circumstances required them.
A large number of acceptance checks had to be carried out during the month and some excellent work was carried out by the Group Servicing Section, and the very fine spirit which exists within the Group was made evident by bases which had few acceptance checks to carry out volunteering to accept aircraft for check from other bases. This greatly decreased the period which would normally have elapsed to bring this large number of Lancasters to operational standard.
1.003% of aircraft which either failed to take off or returned early were due to technical faults for which the Engineering Branch is responsible. This 1.003% includes defects beyond our immediate control and remedial modification action is being taken in respect of many of the defects. It is good to know that not one of these aircraft failed due to a maintenance defect, and squadrons are to be congratulated on this aspect. The following squadrons had no early returns or cancellations due to Engineering defects during June, and are awarded a “big hand”:-
44, 83, 97, 467 and 619 Squadrons.
Failures are still occurring of the now famous oil pipe from relief valve to dual drive, and it is hoped that all promises made during June will reach fruition during July.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The effort which is put in by maintenance personnel to maintain this high standard of aircraft serviceability has been increased on many stations to maintain a similar high standard of serviceability of ground equipment. It is pleasing to see the drive which is progressing to maintain these essential aids to serviceability. When a “set-up” looks efficient, it invariably is efficient. Nothing looks so inefficient as a dirty hangar with trestles, wheels, cowlings and any odd items lying around the floor in pools of oil, whilst engine platforms are oil saturated and the equipment generally filthy. This state of affairs does not exist at any station in this Group, but there is considerable room for improvement on certain stations. Once a high standard of efficiency has been achieved it can easily be maintained, but don’t sit back and maintain your present standard unless it is highly efficient.
Many grand jobs have been carried out during June to keep the serviceability high and it is very difficult to pick out any single base in this News.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
During the past month a drive was made to improve the maintenance of the Mark XIV Bombsight. Results have shown a marked improvement, but we will not be satisfied until every sight in the Group can be guaranteed accurate. Much more care must be taken in the levelling and lining up, as it is in these operations that most of the errors occur. The Mark XIV Bombsight is one of those instruments which requires plenty of liaison between Electrical officers and the Air Bombers’ Union, and it has been noted that this is now very effective.
Electrical sections deserve a pat on the back for the very intensive efforts they have put in during the latter half of the month. The list of modifications does not get any shorter, yet initial checks are still being completed in 24 hours.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Stirlings and Lancasters]
Flight Engineers
[Underlined] ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUTANTS [/underlined]
Many more administrative adjutants to the Chief Technical Officer are required; these adjutants will be volunteers from tour expired commissioned Flight Engineers. They will be responsible to the C.T.O. for the efficient administration of the Servicing Wing, and for the discipline and welfare of all the technical personnel on its strength.
Apart from this new post for Flight Engineers, there are also vacancies for administrative duties in the M.T. Section on Base Stations, and the duties will generally be the same as Adjutant to the C.T.O.
It will be seen that these posts have created quite a new avenue for Flight Engineers, but every facility will be given them to improve their engineering knowledge while undertaking administrative duties as their primary roles.
Flight Engineer Leaders must bring those vacancies to the notice of the commissioned Flight Engineers who are about to finish their tour of operations.
[Underlined] NON-COMMISSIONED FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
A course of instruction for newly screened N. C. O. ‘s commenced at St. Athan on 7th June 1944. The object of this course is to train screened Flight Engineers to take up their new duties as Instructors in Heavy Conversion Units and Lancaster Finishing Schools.
Revision and technical subjects are included in the syllabus, but the course is designed mainly to teach the technique of lecturing.
As this course is most important to new instructors, it is hoped that all Flight Engineers will be enthusiastic, for much will depend on their results if the standard of lecturing is to improve in our Conversion Units and Schools.
TRAINING
Despite the bad weather towards the end of the month, 51 Base flew a total of over 8,000 hours and produced 130 crews for Squadrons.
Twice during the month, 1654 Conversion Unit, taking a leaf from the book of 1661 for May, laid on “operational” take offs for aircraft on night exercises. They got 17 and 22 off on these occasions in almost as many minutes.
Re-organisation of the Heavy Conversion Units commenced in the last week of the month to ensure that training of crews under the summer output can be increased to the highest level. Under this new system intakes of 11 every six days will go into the Heavy Conversion Units and the Group target figure for the month is 160 crews.
Each Conversion Unit now consists of 3 large flights, each of which is sub-divided into two. The Stirling Academy has also been split up into three parts, each one becoming the nucleus of a small flight at each Conversion Unit.
The Base had a very much better month from the accident point of view, and tyre bursts are now the only chronic complaint left. Undercarriage pylon failures have been reduced and coring has slipped rapidly out of the Base vocabulary.
New appointments within Base include Wing Commander Derbyshire, D.F.C., as Chief Instructor, 1660 Conversion Unit, and Wing Commander Kingsford Smith as Chief Instructor 1654 Conversion Unit.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 9) [/underlined]
ionally quickly” and all the crew members were in the dinghy almost before they knew it. The kite container was lost in transit, but all other equipment was transferred to the dinghy – a parachute found its way in, but was afterwards lost in the excitement of getting clear of the aircraft which was keeling over and threatening to come down on top of the dinghy.
This crew merely got their feet wet in boarding the dinghy but later got the seats of their pants wet because of a small hole in the dinghy which was subsequently plugged.
The pilot was weak from loss of blood, and shock, so the Air Bomber took charge and bullied the rest of the crew into activity. They say this did the world of good. The aircraft floated for about 10 minutes.
The dinghy mast was broken when being stepped, but the Wireless Operator managed to connect the aerial to the dinghy radio and almost continuous transmissions were made with other crew members holding the mast erect. Some hours later they were spotted by 91 Group Wellingtons which brought in an A.S.R. Hudson. A Lindholme dinghy was dropped, but failed to inflate though the crew managed to collect three of the ration containers. About 14 1/2 hours later a Naval Launch picked up the crew and took them into Yarmouth.
This crew had done a practice dinghy drill on the day before the incident, and attribute much of the success of this ditching to that fact.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ENEMY AGENTS – CARELESS TALKERS
On the 30th January, 1942, there was published a document of some importance – to wit A.M.C.O. A.9 of that year.
It was important because it cleared the air of a good deal of confusion on the subject of security, and it achieved this by defining the functions of Security Organisation – thereby defining what is meant by the term ‘Security’ – and it laid down the organisation by which these functions were to be performed.
Security was by no means a new subject. Prior to the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, a vast number of thoughts on the subject had already made themselves felt, chiefly in the form of posters. They bore a slogan – “CARELESS TALK COSTS LIVES” – they sought to impress the truth of this slogan by representing pictorially such distressing events as ships being blown up, aircraft being shot down, and so on, all, by implication, the result of the wrong word being spoken at the wrong time in the wrong place. These were reinforced, in lighter vein, by coloured drawings, more or less amusing, of Hitler listening beneath a table at which, presumably, two people were discussing the future plans of the Allies; of Hitler repeated ad infinitum in the pattern of the wall paper; of Hitler looking out of the frames of otherwise harmless pictures: all of them indicative of the ubiquity of Hitler, and of the truth of that apalling [sic] statement “Walls have ears”.
And since the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, these pictorial exhortations to verbal discretion have been emphasised to us, in the R.A.F., by a quantity of printed matter in the form of lectures, bulletins, reports, instructions which, if expressed in terms of tonnage of paper they consumed, or if placed end to end, or on top of each other in one column, would, one feels sure, provide much indigestible food for thought in the shape of one of those totals which impress more by number of their digits than by any meaning they are able to convey to the ordinary mind. Add to this the number of words which must have been spoken in lectures on this subject since the 30th January, 1942, the countless man-hours devoted to the study and promulgation of this gospel of silence, and our total will become more astronomical and, therefore, more meaningless than ever.
Staggering as this total would be, however, it would never reach the dimensions of those our enemies could provide in the same field of endeavour, for the very good reason that they had been at it long before we commenced piling ours up. Japan, for instance, had been preaching the gospel of silence to her people for something like twenty years before Pearl Harbour. She taught it not only to her soldiers, sailors and airmen, but to the man in the factory, the woman in her home, the pedestrian on the street; with the result, as the writings of any of the foreign newspaper correspondents, some of whom had been in the country for years, will tell you, it was next to impossible to find out anything worth knowing about the country’s strength, or her intentions.
And what of Germany? Those Germans who were not born silent, or had not achieved silence by the time Hitler took them over, had silence so thoroughly thrust upon them that they really came to understand how and to know that even the walls of their own homes could grow ears. They were left in no doubt whatever upon the value of silence when it came to discussing either the affairs of the Party or of the Fatherland.
All of which surely points to the conclusion that silence in war-time, or, in other words, Security of Information, must be a matter of very great importance. Of course it is. You know that already. The meanest intelligence, you will point out, can grasp quite easily the simple truth that, if you prevent the enemy from knowing what you are up to, you place him at a serious disadvantage; you render him, so to speak, both deaf and blind, and, therefore, easier to deal with. Any fool knows that.
They [sic] why do people talk? Why do they write home letters full of chatty information about their stations? Why does one feel so certain that, were it possible to tap, at once all the telephone lines in the vicinity of our stations all over the country, one would become possessed of a mass of service information about all sorts of things and people – whither, why and when such a squadron is moving, who have finished their tours, where people are posted to, who didn’t come back last night, who the new C.O. is, and where he comes from, what the weather is like, what are the chances of a scrub tonight, how the R.A.F. is fed, clothed, housed, organised – and so on and so on? Not to be too depressing about it, let it be stated at once that one would probably, even certainly, gain much less information than would have been the case say two years ago; but who would like to bet that there still wouldn’t be plenty to be picked up?
So, why, after all the effort that has been made, all the money that has been spent, the paper that has been used, the words that have been spoken, should this be so? Now here, it is suggested, lies the root of the matter, and if this root can be dug up and examined, the apparently indestructible weed of Service Gossip, a weed which, while harmless, perhaps, nine times out of ten, can, on that tenth time, produce enough poison to be fatal to precious lives and expensive material, can be understood, and to understand any problem is the first step towards solving it.
Let us examine it then. People talk because that is the easiest and most natural way for them to express their thoughts. They talk their thoughts, they think about their daily lives; therefore, they talk about their daily lives. Now apply that formula to the R.A.F. and what do you find? You discover a service filled, for the most part, with very young people, a number of them still in their formative years. They talk their thoughts, they think their lives, their lives are, at the moment, the R.A.F; therefore they talk about the R.A.F. To go on from here; they are young people who have been brought up in countries in which free speech, outside the debateable limits of the law of scandal, is as instinctive as breathing. They have never had occasion to practice this habit of silence - a most difficult habit to acquire – and finally, they serve in a force which has been publicised, photographed and if one may use such a word, glamourised, more than any other organisation ever has before. Flying, as the R.A.F. flies, is a continual source of wonder to the lay mind. This business of lifting tons of explosive material off the earth at one spot, transporting it at phenomenal heights to another spot hundreds of miles away, and there dropping it in spite of such discouragements as flak, fighters, the weather, and so on, is something of a miracle to the civilian, and, naturally enough, he wants to know about it. The youngsters of the R.A.F. are, of course, the horse’s mouth, which is given every encouragement to open itself, and to remain open. And when a W.A.A.F. goes home on leave Mother wants to know what it’s all like – the food, the quarters, the station, what they do there and that gives her mother something to talk about to somebody who will pass it on to somebody else who will…..why go on?
It is, you see, a personal problem. There is no mass-produced solution to it. It is every man and woman for himself, and only he and she can deal with it. How? Well, try this recipe. Try writing home letters in which you never even refer to the Station upon which you work, beyond, of course, the address in the top left hand corner. Apply the same rule when you leave your Station, even when you meet another R.A.F. type. Regard every telephone you use as a menace because it is you who are using it, and finally, when you have finished your work for the day, don’t make conversation out of it in the mess or the canteen. Try these four riles as an act of self-discipline, and never relax, and you will solve all your problem and, what is far more important, you will solve one of the great problems which confront your country. Difficult? Yes, very. Impossible? No. It has been done. There is a station which once had the privilege of guarding part of a great and important secret. It wrote its letters by the thousand, it went to the nearest town, it went on leave. But never a word got out. No less than 12,500 letters from that Station were opened over a period of three weeks, and only two minor indiscretions were discovered in them, both after the great event. If you were a stranger, you couldn’t get very far on that station without being questioned; every rumour heard on or off it was faithfully reported – just in case. The result is history, not only because the event referred to was one of the best kept secrets and, therefore, one of the most successful undertakings of the war, but because it provided proof that, with the problem fully explained to them, the A.C.2. and A.C.W.2. can keep a secret, can keep their mouths shut and their pens discreet, and can do so as a matter of conscience, and as an act of self discipline.
Now if only the civilian could be persuaded not to make the R.A.F. talk……
(Continued from Col. 3 page 12)
(c) I.A.S. within 2 m.p.h. and height within 50 feet.
It’s practice which, makes perfect.
Gunnery is the order of the day for you and your crew again. Keep a banking search going. See that your guns and gunners are in first class condition. Check up on your corkscrew and patter.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
June was not a cricketers’ month; the weather was “flaming [sic] but not in the sense of the old adage. Fielders and batsmen alike quailed before wind and rain. As a cricketers’ month it was grand for Rugger. In spite of the weather, however, several stations got in a full programme.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] – This station managed to complete the amazing total of 25 games. In addition, W.A.A.F. personnel played four games. Any challengers for an inter-station W.A.A.F. game? The Aircrew School represented the Station in five of the games, and themselves played 10 inter-course matches.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] – had five station matches, one of which, with Woodhall, was abandoned after Fiskerton had knocked up 87 for 8. Their other games were as follows:-
V Dunholme at Dunholme – Fiskerton 72 for 7 Dunholme 68 all out
V Fiskerton Village at the Camp – Fiskerton 108 for 6 Village 29 all out
V Bardney at Fiskerton – Fiskerton 62 all out Bardney 22 all out
V Scampton at Scampton – Scampton 120 for 9 Fiskerton 71 all out
In addition to this successful record several inter-section games were played.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] managed five station games, and are now getting into their stride under the captaincy of F/Lt Wardle.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] had three wins, one draw, and one loss from five games. They beat 5 Group H.Q., Welton Home Guard and Scampton, drew away with 5 Group H.Q. and suffered their only defeat at home with Fiskerton. An inter-section knock out is in full swing, with 12 teams competing.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] had an unlucky month, with four postponed matches out of the six arranged. Against Coningsby, Metheringham scored 37 for 1 (Coningsby 179 for 7) before rain stopped play. The only completed game was with R.C.A.F. Digby, who hit 60 for 6 against Metheringham 56 all out.
Inter-section games produced some close results, viz:
Flying Control 55 for 7 V R.A.F.Regt. 50 all out
“B” Flight 60 all out V “A” Flight 36 all out
Servicing Wing Fitters 60 all out V Servicing Wing Riggers 65 all out
“B” Flight 43 for 5 V “A” Flight 39 for 9
In the Base Commander’s Trophy, 106 Sqdn dismissed 617 for 70 runs, but they could not bat and the game was abandoned.
[Underlined] 5 Group H.Q. [/underlined] played five games, four of them being away, since the 5 Group pitch has not yet “settled down”. They produced the following results:
V Dunholme, at Morton. 5 Group 148 for 8 Dunholme 89 for 8 (Draw)
V Dunholme at Dunholme. Dunholme 129 for 6 5 Group 64 all out (Lost)
V Swinderby at Swinderby. Swinderby 88 for 7 5 Group 83 all out (Lost)
V 93 M.U. at Collingham M.U. 77 all out 5 Group 84 for 6 (Won)
V Newark Town at Newark Newark 77 for 8 5 Group 72 for 5 (Lost)
There were two intersection games, in one of which the “Hall” beat the rest by 136 for 8 against 99 for 8.
[Underlined] GROUP CRICKET COMPETITION [/underlined]
Woodhall beat Coningsby in the final of “A” Section, so now Syerston (winners of “B” Section) meet Woodhall in the deciding game for the Trophy. The game will probably be decided on Saturday or Sunday (July 15th or 16th) at Woodhall Spa. Woodhall have taken over the town’s local ground, and with the addition of a score board and sight screens now have one of the finest grounds in the Group. The game will be one of the features of Woodhall’s “Wings for Victory” Week, and given good weather will be a highly successful event between two of the strongest Group teams. It is hoped that the A.O.C. will be able to present the handsome silver bowl to the winning side.
[Underlined] ATHLETIC MEETINGS [/underlined]
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] ran a highly successful Athletic Meeting on Saturday, 3rd June, when favourable weather for once coincided with a stand-down. Fourteen events were contested on an inter-section basis, the trophy being a shield presented by Corporal Ward, Instrument Section. The final placings of the teams were as follows:-
Winners: Navigators – 137 points
Second Pilots – 93 points
Third W/Ops. – 83 points
Fourth Rear Gnrs. – 82 points
Fifth Air Bombers – 78 points
Sixth Engineers – 63 points
Seventh M.U.Gunners – 43 points
Mrs. McKechnie presented the shield to F/Sgt. Croft, who assisted the Navigators by winning the 440, 880 and mile. Another outstanding performance was by F/O Gantschi (Air Bomber) who won the 100, 200, 220 and Long Jump.
[Underlined] 54 BASE INTER-SQUADRON SPORTS MEETING [/underlined] was on Saturday 17th June. 83 Squadron won the Base Commander’s Trophy, scoring 35 points, but 106 Squadron, with 33 points and 617 with 32 points, were good losers. 106 Squadron, feeling fit, provided winners for the 440, 880, mile, 3 miles and Long Jump. F/Sgt. Croft again had a field day, winning the 440, mile, 3 miles, and running second in the 880 yards. There was a big crowd at the games, and enthusiasm ran high. Lord Brownlow, Lord Lieutenant of the County, presented the prizes.
[Underlined] 93 M.U. SPORTS [/underlined] 93 M.U., whose work is so completely bound up with 5 Group, ran a highly successful Field Day on June 24th. Besides the usual athletic events, side shows, boxing and dancing made up an excellent programme. They plan another Gala Day, in aid of the P.O.W. Fund on August Bank Holiday Monday, and any personnel who can reach Swinderby will be sure of an enjoyable day.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Get down to crew Gunnery problems in July. Check your knowledge of the corkscrew, polish up your patter and do all the fighter affiliation you can.
Careful trimming of your aircraft ensures accurate flying. The correct sequence of action is:-
Fly the aircraft straight and level, trim the elevators, trim all load off the rudder and finally trim out any aileron load.
2.5° of skid at 10,000 ft. means an error of 250 yards on the ground. This common bombing error is often unconsciously caused by pilots sitting tense and rigid on the bombing run. Ensure the aircraft is properly trimmed and the [underlined] relax [/underlined] and fly the aircraft naturally and carefully.
If you find it difficult to read the instruments when coned by searchlights, get your navigator to call the airspeed. Make it a standing arrangement with him.
Here are the common faults in night circuits, don’t allow these errors to “creep” in.
(i) Edging in towards the flare path on the down wind leg.
(ii) Not allowing for drift on approach.
(iii) Failing to close the throttles when touching down.
(iv) Going too far across wind before the final turn in.
Should you have to land without flaps, remember to lengthen your downwind leg as the approach will be flatter and therefore longer. Start the final turn in earlier since the turn without flap will be wider, and approach at 125 m.p.h. Touch down as soon as possible and expect a longer landing run, and be prepared to use brake progressively.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Are you brake conscious? Brake efficiency falls off with rise in temperature of – brake shoes and drums. Avoid continual use of brakes, control direction by engine and release brakes as soon as possible to allow heat to go into the air and not up into the tyres. Never apply full brake at once. This induces tyre creep.
If you have to land in a very strong, gusty wind, use only 40° of flap and aim to do a wheel landing. Make a normal approach and when the wheels touch, ease the stick [underlined] slightly [/underlined] forward and keep it steady till the tail sinks on to the ground.
A word on Met; remember that forecast height of cloud base id always height above sea level. Bear this in mind if you are forced to break cloud at a diversion aerodrome, and allow for height of ground.
Have you and your crew an “A” category for bombing? You can have if you accept nothing less than these limitations;
(a) Course within 1° (b) Bank within 2°
(Continued on page 11 Col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
The award of the Silver Model Lancaster to the Unit having the best accident rate for the six months ended June goes to No. 106 Squadron. This squadron had one accident for a total of 6,848 flying hours. Nos. 49 and 57 Squadrons also had one avoidable accident, for a total of 6,743 and 6,294 hours respectively. These squadrons are to be congratulated on a splendid achievement, It’s up to the other Squadrons to dethrone the champions during the next three months. GO TO IT!!
Altogether there was a decided improvement in the number of avoidable accidents during June.
36 aircraft were damaged in the Group by causes other than enemy action. This is a reduction of 15 compared with May, and the improvement is also reflected in the avoidable accident total which stands at 16 for June as opposed to 20 in May.
Of the aircraft damaged, 12 were CAT A, 5 CAT AC, 5 CAT B, and 14 CAT E.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS – 51 BASE RECORD [/underlined]
51 Base are to be congratulated for the lowest number of avoidable accidents for a long time; 4 aircraft were damaged under this category. The squadron total of 12 for the month was an increase of 2 over May’s total. Details are as follows:-
Squadron – Ground collisions (taxying) 3; overshoots landing 2; undershooting 1; Swings landing 1; Flying into high ground 1; Collision in air 1; errors of judgement 3; TOTAL 12.
51 Base – Swings taking off 1; Swings landing 2; Taxying 1; TOTAL 4
[Underlined] ACCIDENT CAUSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Taxying. [/underlined] 3 of the 4 taxying accidents in the Group follow the usual pattern. One struck a trestle outside dispersal at night, and no taxying light was being used. Another hit an M/T van left unattended just off the perimeter track, while a third (a Stirling) broke its tail wheel when it ran off the perimeter track. The 4th taxying accident was caused by a Flight Engineer starting up the engines of a Lancaster without permission. Brake pressure was low and the aircraft moved forward and struck another parked alongside.
[Underlined] Swings [/underlined] Three of these occurred on landing. One was a Mosquito in which the pilot, flying a Mosquito for the first time, was not quick enough in correcting. The other two landing swings were by pupil pilots on Stirlings, and were due to inexperience more than anything else. They both knew the correct drill, however, but were slow to react. The swing on take off occurred in a Stirling, when a pupil pilot opened the throttles too quickly and failed to control the violent starboard swing which followed. The undercarriage collapsed.
[Underlined] Other Accidents. [/underlined] A Lancaster returning in poor weather descended through cloud and hit a hill 500 feet above sea level. This accident has not yet been fully investigated, but preliminary evidence indicates that the pilot lost height contrary to orders at briefing.
Another Lancaster on return from Ops. in good weather hit a tree 1000 yards from the runway on his approach. The wing tip was torn off but the pilot went round again and made a good landing on his second attempt. In this instance the bombs were still on board unknown to the pilot. His Air Bomber had told him that all bombs had gone. Air Bombers please note!!
Two Lancasters overshot on landing at strange airfields on return from operations. The bomb load exploded after one of them crashed.
A formation flying collision resulted in the destruction of two aircraft this month. Number 3 of a “Vic” formation knocked the tail off the Leader.
The two remaining avoidable accidents cocurred [sic] on operational flights. One pilot lost control in cloud on return and ordered his crew to bale out. Four of them left before control was regained. They had not been told to take their ‘K’ type dinghy packs with them and landed in the sea. The aircraft made a safe landing at base.
A Mid-Upper Gunner firing at searchlights on the ground damaged the port fin of his aircraft with a burst. The solenoid had jumped from its bracket. The gunner was at fault.
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Most operations were within normal Gee range and no exceptional results have been recorded. There has, however, been a substantial decrease in jamming which may be due to the increase in the number of frequencies now in use.
Non-H 2 S squadrons are now equipped with the new R.F. Unit 27 and have had several chances of using it during the month. As yet there has been no opportunity to test its efficiency at long range, but reports indicate the signal strength to be good with little or no interference. It is hoped that the supply position in regard to these new units will improve shortly and H 2 S Squadrons can then be equipped.
Several changes in Gee transmissions have taken place recently, and it would be advisable for all navigators and wireless operators to check upon these and make sure they are using the right frequencies and aerial loading stud at the right time.
One word regarding Gee homing. It is apparent from recent operations that navigators are not checking up with Gee on the position of the markers. There is little excuse for this, as most operations at the present time are within normal Gee range and subject to little or no interference. Navigators would be well advised to check up on their homing procedure now – because sooner or later the time will come when owing to weather conditions bombs may have to be released on Gee.
With regard to Gee training, a modification is being issued shortly which will enable navigators to carry out dry swims and Gee homing procedure with the trainer. The first will be issued to Scampton Aircrew School and should prove an interesting and invaluable “toy”.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The targets this month have been rather disappointing for the H 2 S operator, and H 2 S has been little used. Whilst Gee may seem much simpler to use it is essential for all operators to use H 2 S as much as possible on these short range operations to augment training. We may switch to the longer range targets with little or no notice, and if operators have been relying to a very great extent on Gee, some difficulty with H 2 S may be experienced.
Just a word to Captains; your navigator depends to a very great extent upon the bomb aimer and his efficient manipulation of the equipment. If you are keeping him in the nose the whole of the time on these short operations he is getting little or no H 2 S training. A.S.I. BL/17 dated 26th April, 1944, details the duties of Air Bombers in H 2 S aircraft and however short the operation, Captains must see that this instruction is complied with.
One word with regard to H 2 S training on operational squadrons. With the present commitments there is very little opportunity for air training, but this does not prevent operators from obtaining as much ground training as possible. Ground trainers are available at all Units and they are yours to use at will. Squadron Navigation Officers and H 2 S Instructors should ensure that all operators get at
(Continued in Col. 2)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Continued from col.3) [/underlined]
least 30 minutes practice every day and should make periodic tests to see that operators are remaining efficient.
H 2 S operators will be interested to hear that 54 Base have been carrying out some experiments in the assessment of a Paramatta attack, and conclusions reached show that assessments can be made to within approximately 1/2 mile of the correct position. If this assessing can be carried out on operations it may prevent many attacks from developing around T.I’s a considerable distance from the aiming point. Preliminary trials are now being attempted with regard to Wanganui attacks and it is hoped that something useful may be produced for next winter’s operations.
Training at Conversion Units is progressing satisfactorily and Wigsley is now producing H 2 S trained crews.
There are still a few people in the Group who are sceptical about the amount of H 2 S. training carried out at No. 51 Base and in fairness to the effort being made by the Conversion Units, it would be advisable to outline the training being carried out by them.
Up to June 1st this year, 111 H 2 S trained crews have been produced by the Conversion Units, of which only 6 were sent to non-H 2 S squadrons (of these crews, 3 were Flight Commanders and 3 Australians).
With the increase in the number of H 2 S squadrons it became increasingly apparent that more crews would have to be trained by the Conversion Units and instructions were issued to that effect.
Despite the fact that [underlined] extra time or aircraft [/underlined] are allowed for this training, the Conversion Units are now taking 50% of the
(Continued on page 14 col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.A. DOREHILL, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O McKENZIE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.H. BOTHA D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O R.E. WALKER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O T.T. SMART D.F.C.
F/O W. McINTOSH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.S. STOUT D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H. STEERE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/L R.F. DAVIES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ G.H. PROBERT D.F.C.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L L.C.A. HADLAND D.F.C.
F/O W.W.W. TURNBULL D.F.C.
A/F/L E.M. ARMSTRON D.F.C.
F/O M.J. MAY D.F.C.
F/O F.B. HALL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.W. GREENWOOD D.F.M.
SGT J. WATERHOUSE D.F.M.
P/O A.E. GILES D.F.C.
P/O B.G.L. ROGERS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O W.A. GALL D.F.C.
F/O J.A. PRIOR D.F.C.
P/O W.F. POSSEE D.F.C.
P/O F.G. HAYLER D.F.C.
F/SGT J. LEVER D.F.M.
F/SGT W.I. WILKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT J.C. DICKINSON D.F.M.
SGT D.E. LAYSHON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.H. McFERRAN D.F.M.
F/SGT F. LOMAX D.F.M.
F/SGT J. RYAN D.F.M.
SGT J.H. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT LOMAS D.F.M.
F/O D.H. PEARCE D.F.C.
F/O McMASTER D.F.C.
P/O J.D. DUNCAN D.F.C.
P/O S.W.A. HURRELL D.F.C.
P/O H. BLOW D.F.C.
F/SGT H.F. SMITH D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT L.J. HUMMELL D.F.M.
SGT F. GARRETT D.F.M.
P/O F.B. SOAPER D.F.M.
F/SGT K.R. BLUNDELL D.F.M.
SGT R.H. BATEMAN D.F.M.
A/F/L R. McCURDY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O T.W. BLACK D.F.C.
F/SGT E. BARTON D.F.M.
F/SGT P.A. DEACON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.C. WRIGHT D.F.M.
F/SGT E.D. PRATT D.F.M.
P/O A.C. BAKER D.F.C.
F/O R.H. MAURY D.F.C.
F/O A. RIMMER D.F.C.
SGT D. CHARLES D.F.M.
F/SGT A.J. GURR D.F.M.
F/SGT W.H. BARKER D.F.M.
SGT WILLETT D.F.M.
SGT R.H. TURRELL D.F.M.
P/O J.A.W. McCALLUM D.F.C.
SGT H.G. CAPPS D.F.M.
F/SGT H.S. TILLER D.F.M.
SGT J.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
F/SGT F.H. BARNES D.F.M.
SGT E. HEDLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT M.M. SCOTT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.H. PRYOR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O J.V. REDDISH D.F.C.
F/SGT S.E. STEVENSON D.F.M.
P/O C.R. ROANTREE D.F.C.
F/SGT D. ANDREW D.F.M.
P/O BLACKHAM D.F.C.
F/SGT M.R. PRICE D.F.M.
F/SGT V.F. PITCHER D.F.M.
P/O D. JONES D.F.C.
F/O W.J.V. HAMILTON D.F.C.
F/SGT J.J. PAGE D.F.M.
P/O G.M.E. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT J.A. KIRWAN D.F.M.
W/CDR A.A. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.J. LUNDY D.F.C.
P/O L. DURHAM D.F.C.
F/O M.J. BEETHAM D.F.C.
P/O P.E. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.R. MOSSOP D.F.C.
F/O K.W. ODGERS D.F.C.
F/O P.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
F/O A.H. BIGNELL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.C.A. RODGERS D.F.M.
F/SGT N. HORSLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT A.D.F. SPRUCE D.F.M.
F/O L. HORNER D.F.C.
F/O H.S. SHORTT D.F.C.
F/O R.G.G. PAGETT D.F.C.
F/SGT D.E. WESTERMAN D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. COLLINGWOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT C. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT R. STANWIX D.F.M.
F/SGT A.L. BARTLETT D.F.M.
F/O A.S. KEITH D.F.C.
P/O A. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O J.A. WILDING D.F.C.
SGT W.M. RUNDLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. REID D.F.C.
SGT J.C. EVANS D.F.M.
P/O E.A. DOWLAND D.F.C.
P/O C.J.M. MARTIN D.F.C.
SGT T. DAVIES D.F.M.
F/O J. SIMMS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. COLLINS D.F.C.
(Continued on page 15, Column 1)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Contd. From page 13 Col.2) [/underlined]
crews passing through and giving them full H 2 S ground training with 10 – 15 hours air training. This output will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all H 2 S squadrons. These crews should reach the squadrons by the middle of August.
In the meantime H 2 S squadrons will have to put up with a quota of non H 2 S crews and continue to train them.
To further ease the training commitments of both the Conversion Units and squadrons, it is hoped that H2S training will be introduced into the Scampton Aircrew School by the middle of August. This training will consist of approximately 5 hours lectures with further time in manipulation of the H 2 S synthetic trainer. It is to be appreciated that this training will have to be in addition to the present essential navigational training carried out at the School, and navigators and air bombers must be prepared to undertake some of it in their spare time.
PHOTOGRAPHY
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL £15,498 13 9
LINK TRAINER
The number of hours link practice carried out by pilots during the month shows an increase over last month’s total. There is, however, still room for improvement in the standard of instrument flying. This can only be achieved by close co-operation between Link Instructors and Pilots.
The new Link Syllabus was distributed to Stations in the middle of the month and should now be in use at all Units. It is again emphasised that this Syllabus is progressive and if full value is to be obtained from it, Pilots and Flight Engineers must ensure that they complete all exercises, and keep an accurate record of the exercises carried out.
[Table of Link Trainer by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
(CONTINUED)
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
SGT J.T.WATTS D.F.M.
SGT F.A. SIMMONDS D.F.M.
F/O G.S. JOHNSON D.F.C.
SGT F. ROBERTS D.F.M.
F/O R. DAVIS D.F.C.
F/SGT R.W. CLEARY D.F.M.
F/O K.D. SMITH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O E.A. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
P/O J.E.R. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
SGT L.G. BOLTON D.F.M.
F/SGT C. BALDWIN D.F.M.
P/O E.H. WALKER D.F.C.
F/SGT L.W. CROMARTY D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. BUNYAN D.F.M.
P/O W.C. MacDONALD D.F.C.
F/O N.F. TURNER D.F.C.
P/O D.E. TREVETHICK D.F.C.
P/O G.A. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT. W.A. LEE D.F.M.
P/O J. BARR D.F.C.
P/O C.A. HAIGH D.F.C.
F/SGT LYNCH D.F.M.
F/O S.J. BEARD, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT C.P. STEEDSMAN D.F.M.
SGT G.M. WARD D.F.M.
SGT McQUILLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT C. WILCE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.C. BELL D.F.C.
F/O A.F. POORE D.F.C.
F/O G.E.D. TOOGOOD D.F.C.
P/O A.E. BRISTOW D.F.C.
F/SGT J. GRAVES D.F.M.
F/O R.J. ELSEY D.F.C.
F/O R.A. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT V. LYNCH D.F.M.
P/O P.J. RICHARDS D.F.C.
F/O W.R. LEE D.F.C.
F/O J.H.S. LEE D.F.C.
SGT T.C. WALLER D.F.M.
F/SGT G.R. CARLILE D.F.M.
F/O F.M. MIFFLIN D.F.C.
F/SGT A.D.J. GROOMBRIDGE D.F.M.
F/O C.J. DUNN D.F.C.
P/O R.A. HINCKLEY D.F.C.
F/O D.L. CRAMP D.F.C.
F/O D.V. GIBBS D.F.C.
F/L C.J. GINDER D.F.C.
F/SGT D. PINCKARD D.F.M.
F/SGT F. MYCOE D.F.M.
F/LT W.A. WILLIAMSON D.F.C.
F/SGT F.L. HIGGINS D.F.M.
F/O D.A. PAGLIERO D.F.C.
F/O R.L. WAKE, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT R. APPLEYARD D.F.M.
SGT V.H. BLACKWELL D.F.M.
P/O J. O’LEARY D.F.C.
F/O A.V. WITHERS D.F.C.
F/O R.P. RAMSAY D.F.C.
F/SGT S.J. HALVORSEN D.F.M.
SGT J.G. LANCASTER D.F.M.
F/SGT E. CLODE D.F.M.
SGT R.F. LAWRENSON D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.G. MYERSCOUGH D.F.M.
SGT D. FRISKEY D.F.M.
F/SGT E.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
P/O C.W. BARNETT D.F.C.
SGT W.G. LAMONT D.F.M.
F/SGT J. SKELTON D.F.M.
P/O R.G. CAMPBELL D.F.C.
P/O D.R. DEARMAN D.F.C.
P/O K.L. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/SGT E.H. BUNN D.F.M.
SGT D.C. MARK D.F.M.
SGT F.H. HAZEL D.F.M.
SGT F.C. DOWLING D.F.M.
SGT R.M. GALLOWAY D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
F/LT H.L. McCARTHY D.F.C.
F/O D.S.P. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O C.T. HARPER D.F.C.
F/O A. HOLLINGS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. CURTIS D.F.C.
F/O E.R. FREEMAN D.F.C.
F/O A.E. VOWELS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BROOKER D.F.C.
P/O H.R. MAHON D.F.C.
F/O F.B.M. WILSON D.F.C.
F/O J.E.R. REES D.F.C.
F/SGT J.B. CHILDS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.F.S. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O F. MORRIS D.F.C.
P/O A.R.T. BOYS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. GOLDSTRAW, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O H.C. CHANDLER D.F.C.
F/O D.T. CONWAY D.F.C.
F/O J.A. COLPUS D.F.C.
P/O M.F. SMITH D.F.C.
P/O N.D. MARSHALL D.F.C.
F/O F.J. NUGENT D.F.C.
F/O H.S.L. CROUCH D.F.C.
F/O G.G. ABBOTT D.F.C.
P/O A.A. TAYLOR D.F.C.
P/O A.P. SPERLING D.F.C.
F/SGT G. NOBLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O P.N. BUTTLE D.F.C.
P/O P.E. PIGEON D.F.C.
P/O H.A. WEEKS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. CLAY D.F.C.
F/O E. WILLSHER D.F.C.
W/O J. DACEY D.F.C.
F/O J.S. WATSON D.F.C.
F/SGT McCLELLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT L. EATON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.J. HENDERSON D.F.M.
F/SGT APPLEBY D.F.M.
F/SGT W. HOWARTH D.F.M.
F/O R. ADAMS D.F.M.
F/O A. HILL D.F.C.
F/LT WILSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.G. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.L. VICKERSTAFFE D.F.C.
F/O W.E.D. BELL D.F.C.
P/O G.G. TAYLOR D.F.C.
F/SGT J.A. FEATHERSTONE D.F.M.
F/O N.B. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O B.T.J. HUCKS D.F.C.
W/O C.G. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT M.H.G. KING D.F.M.
P/O J.P. HIND D.F.C.
P/O J.I. JOHNSON D.F.C.
P/O E.K. ALLEY D.F.C.
P/O R.T. BOULTBEE D.F.C.
F/O P.H. TAYLOR D.F.C.
W/O R.A. WESTAD D.F.C.
F/O T. WILKIE D.F.C.
F/O JOHNSON-BIGGS D.F.C.
F/LT R. AYTOUN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT J.H. BRYANT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.C. BLOIS D.F.C.
P/O T. SMART D.F.C.
W/O L.H. TODD D.F.C.
P/O R.T. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O G.W. BRAKE D.F.C.
W/O D. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/O A.J. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/O K.R. AMES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O F.R.G.A. HIGGINS D.F.C.
W/O H. GLASBY D.F.C.
F/SGT T.H. SAVAGE D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
All stations are to be congratulated on the excellent landing times produced this month, in which the average for the Group is below the 2 minutes per aircraft mark. In particular, Waddington recorded consistently good times for each operation. One [sic] the night of the 24/25th June this Station landed 32 AIRCRAFT IN 31 MINUTES, the average being less than 1 minute per aircraft. This is a record for the Group, and probably for the Command.
One word of warning, however; recently aircraft from another Group were diverted and on arrival at the diversion airfield proceeded to use their own Group landing scheme, with which the diversion control staff were not familiar. It is sufficient to say that confusion followed, with extreme danger to the aircraft and crews concerned. A.S.I. FC/11 contains the standard diversionary control procedure and must be adhered to.
[Underlined] STONES, CONCRETE AND METAL [/underlined]
Every stone, every sharp edge of concrete, every spent cartridge or piece of metal, constitutes a menace to tyres.
During the last 3 month there has been a very high average of tyres changed on accounts of cuts – (25 per station per month). Recently, endeavours have been made on stations to overcome this menace, but the intensified clean-up of perimeters, runways and dispersals must be maintained.
FLYING CONTROL must ensure that not the smallest break in the perimeter track or runway is overlooked, that grading does level up with the perimeter track and runways, and that any looseness in the surface of the French drains is attended to at once. Station Admin and Clerks of Works must help to the utmost.
GROUND CREWS must assist by seeing that their dispersals are thoroughly clean, and AIRCREWS watch carefully that cartridges cease to be a menace to tyres.
TRANSPORT – keep the sweepers fully serviced and see that nothing is loose on vehicles employed on the airfield.
ARMAMENT, too, can assist by ensuring that the access roads to the bomb dump are clear of stones and that wooden chocks from bomb trolleys are recovered before aircraft move. A 4” x 3” block with nails in it is not healthy treatment for a tyre!
ONLY BY FULL CO-OPERATION CAN THE ULTIMATE AIM BE ACHIEVED-AN AIRFIELD 100% SERVICEABLE.
JUNE LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
At dawn on the 6th of this month, the first Allied troops landed on the Normandy coast. A contribution towards the success of this amphibious operation was no doubt made in the effective silencing of most of the shore batteries. During the last month and again on three nights prior to D – Day this was one of the Group’s tasks. The heavy railway gun battery at WIMERAUX was attacked on the 2/3rd and although the interpretation report embraces previous attacks, there is no doubt that severe damage was inflicted; a large number of new craters being seen around the target. Both the western turntables have received direct hits.
The coastal defence batteries at MAISY (4/5th), ST PIERRE DU MONT (5/6 th) and LA PERNELLE (5/6th) next received our attention. Little could be gleaned from photographic cover as to the precise damage to the targets, but their apparent failure to contest our landing bears testimony to the success of the raids.
Another pre-invasion target was the Radar Jamming Station at FERME D’URVILLE. This target was attacked on 3/4th and, to quote A.I.C.U. “The station is completely useless”.
Our beachhead having been secured, our bombing role turned to close support of the land forces. The 21st Panzer Division was moving into CAEN to threaten the British Beaches. Two road bridges in this town were accordingly scheduled for attack on the 6/7th; both bridges were hit, and the road approaches heavily cratered, presenting an embarrassing obstacle to the Hun. On the same night an attack was directed against the ARGENTAN Railway centre. This raid also was calculated to hamper the arrival of reinforcements, which object was achieved by the severing of almost all the tracks and the destruction of many essential buildings.
During the day of the 7th, elements of the 17th Panzer Division were concentration [sic] in the FORET DE CERISY, a number of ammunition dumps, fuelling points and tank harbours having been located in this area. This was our assignment for the night 7/8th, and although results were not spectacular, many bombs fell on the aiming point.
The battle of communications continued on 8/9th against targets south of the battle area, when the marshalling yard at RENNES and rail junction at PONTAUBAULT were attacked. Severe damage was sustained at the former target while at the latter, the tracks were cut at several points.
One of the outstanding operations of the month was against the SAUMUR tunnel on the 8/9th. Already the railway junction had been attacked on 1/2nd with excellent effect, but the later attack on the tunnel left no doubt that the line would be denied the enemy for some time to come. A direct hit on the roof of the tunnel at its southern entrance has probably caused a major collapse while the tracks and embankments are severely damaged.
Our attack on the railway junction at ETAMPES on 9/10th was rendered extremely difficult owing largely to adverse weather, although hits were scored on the electrified railway north east of the junction.
The possibility of the enemy using the PARIS/ORLEANS route to effect troop movements led to a request for the destruction of the marshalling yard at ORLEANS on 10/11th. The mission was successfully undertaken, all through lines being severed and further damage sustained to rolling stock railway depots etc.
The attack on POITERS on 12/13th in which very severe damage was inflicted on the railway facilities was designed to delay the 2nd S.S. Division, believed to be moving up from South France.
On the same night support was given to our troops advancing East and West of CAEN, by the further bombing of the town’s road bridges.
The Lehr Panzer Division is reported to have visited AUNAY SUR ODON on the same night as aircraft from this Group, namely, 14/15th. AUNAY is completely obliterated – speculation is rife as to the fate of the Panzers.
Photos taken the day following the attack on the LIMOGES marshalling yard (23/24th) indicate that fires were still burning in the area, and that all tracks in the sorting sidings have been blocked.
AT VITRY LE FRANCOIS on 27/28th damage was almost entirely confined to the west end of the marshalling yard where all the tracks have been cut. Other damage throughout the yard is apparent.
For 48 hours the spotlight of war turned from the battlefield to the sea, to the harbours of LE HAVRE and BOULOGNE where a powerful force of small craft had been assembled by the enemy with a view to menacing our supply lanes. It is now reported that as a direct result of the two raids on 14/15th and 15/16th no fewer than 80 vessels have been sunk or seriously damaged. Damage to port installations is also severe.
Oil targets have been attacked sporadically since the war began, but in the knowledge that the enemy is suffering from fuel shortage we returned on three occasions to attack his resources.
At CHATELLERAULT on 15/16th a fuel dump was raided, considerable damage resulting to storage units.
The attacks on WESSELING and SCHOLVEN Synthetic Oil Plants on 21/22nd were not, however, satisfactory and, influenced by bad weather conditions, were off the mark.
During the month two gardening operations were undertaken, on 6/7th and 8/9th.
In the concluding phases of June our attention was diverted from Normandy to the rather more immediate problem of combating the flying bombs which had commenced to operate over this country on 12/13th. On the whole, weather was exceedingly unco-operative, but, despite this, 10 missions were launched (three of which,
(Continued on page 4 Col. 2)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Operations with Sorties, Accidents and Stars Awards, by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
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V Group News, June 1944
5 Group News, June 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 23, June 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about gunnery, air bombing, navigation, armament, navigation training, public relations, signals, gardening, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, and shows not so good, engineering, training, flight engineers, enemy agents - careless talkers, signals, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, radar / nav, honours & awards, photography, aircrew volunteers, war savings, link trainer, flying control, operations, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-06
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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18 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-27
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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1944-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--La Pernelle
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Paris
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Saumur
France--Vitry-le-François
Germany--Wesseling
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
5 Group
617 Squadron
627 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bomb dump
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
rivalry
service vehicle
tactical support for Normandy troops
tractor
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS V
[Picture]
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[Underlined] BASE INTELLIGENCE [/underlined] [Indecipherable]
[Drawing]
[Stamp] [Underlined] Copies to Stns [/underlined]
Base.
[Circled] [Indecipherable [/circled]
FIVE
GROUP
NEWS
JULY
No. 36
1945
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Foreword by A.O.C.
At mid-night yesterday, Mr. Attlee, our Prime Minister, our Prime Minister, announced the final cessation of the War with Japan. This is great news. At last the world is at peace. To-day, August 15th, is VJ-Day and there can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that we are all greatly relieved that the end of hostilities has at last come. Nevertheless, for some, and particularly those who had volunteered to go to the Far East, there must be a certain sense of disappointment and, no doubt, many will feel annoyed that they personally have not been able to have a crack at the Japs.
The future of 5 Group is now very much in the air and I am unable to give you the answer to the many queries you may have at the moment. I doubt if many heavy bomber Squadrons will be required as part of the occupation forces in Japan, although it is more than possible that one or two of the Squadrons will proceed somewhere out to the East in the near future. It is unlikely that the Government and the Air Ministry will be able to review the many difficult problems and agree on new policy for some days, and, until definite orders are received, all Squadrons should continue their normal training and their normal routine of work.
More than any other Group, 5 Group has had a particularly difficult time since VE-Day. The Squadrons have undergone many changes; some Squadrons have been disbanded; others moved to new Stations; there has been a vast change round of personnel to ensure that only those fit and eligible for the Far East were left in those Units proceeding overseas. Many others have left the Service but, in spite of all this change, I have noticed that many long and arduous hours of training have been put in by Squadron and Station personnel to prepare themselves for what was to have been a very hard role in the Pacific. In addition to this training, I decided to carry out a series of inspections of all Stations. I have now completed six out of the ten and have been very impressed with the high standard of smartness and efficiency which have been attained at those Stations which I have inspected. I realise that many man hours of hard work have been put in by all ranks, both in the training and preparation of Squadrons for war against Japan and also to attain such a high standard of cleanliness at Stations.
Much of the material and information contained in this “5 Group News” is now out of date, but I have, nevertheless, decided to issue it in spite of the fact that all hostilities have now ceased. I thank all ranks for their hard work and fine spirit of co-operation during these last few months, and I know full well that, if 5 Group had managed to reach the Pacific before the end of hostilities, the various Units that have been preparing themselves for War, would have put up a very fine show.
MORTON HALL,
[Underlined] 15th August, 1945. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] training
The weather, particularly at the beginning of the month, did not prove very helpful in enabling the Group to put in as many flying hours as was hoped for. The G.T.I’s Flying Training Chart shows little or no increase in night flying training from the period 6th – 11th July to the period 23rd – 29th July, while the day flying line shows a steady rise with very few breaks throughout the month.
During their visits to Stations and Squadrons throughout the Group, the G.T.I. and his training Specialist Officers have noticed a lethargic attitude in some Squadrons to Tiger training. Such phrases as “We’ve got plenty of time to go yet”, “The War will be finished before we get there”, and “Do you think we’ll go?” have been heard time and time again. It should have become apparent by now that there is only a limited time available for training and that every opportunity should be made to seize every spare hour for ground training and every period of fine weather for air training. Certain Squadrons have already found out that there is even less time than they thought left for training on this side of the world.
As for the phrase “The War will be finished before we get there” – unless crews finish their training thoroughly they won’t get there at all, and it is to be borne in mind that there are still immense areas of land and sea yet to be regained. As is well known, the Jap is a fanatical fighter and does not give up until he is dead. There are millions of Japs who have yet to be made to give up in Burma, Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra, Thailand and French Indo-China, to say nothing of Japan, China and Manchuria, where the Japs are most firmly rooted. As regards to the question “Do you think we’ll go?” – the answer is “Yes”.
The G.T.I. and the Training Specialists welcome 460 and 75 Squadrons into the Group. When the G.T.I. first visited these Squadrons and explained the number of hours flying and number of hours ground lectures required from them, one of the first remarks was “What – only 22 1/2 hours training per crew per month: that is 675 hours per Squadron … We shall get over 1,000 hours in next month”.
Whilst figures of flying times are not a perfect indication of training done, they provide a fairly sound means of assessing the training efforts of individual Squadrons. Therefore to enable Squadron Commanders to appreciate the position of their Squadron in relation to the rest of the Group, the flying times for June and July are given below:-
[Table of Flying Times by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] OTHER SPECIAL UNITS [/underlined]
[Table of Flying Times by Unit]
No. 467 Squadron is congratulated on its training effort, particularly since it has been at R.A.F. Metheringham, where it has done over 1,000 hours during July.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER [/underlined]
Tiger Squadrons in Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and R.A.F. Stations Syerston are progressing satisfactorily with Link Training in B.A.B.S. and Radio Range. No.54 Base Squadrons, however, are a long way behind and there is room for great improvement.
Nos.44 and 619 Squadrons put in a total of 90 hours before they left the Group in the middle of the month.
[Table of Aircrew Hours by Base and Squadron]
Total hours by Group – 1,285
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
Total Categorised in Group = 270
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
Group Captain Vickers, D.S.O., Chief Signals Officer, Tiger Force, who has just returned from a tour of the American Theatre of Operations, visited this Headquarters on Saturday, 4th August, and gave us a very interesting and descriptive lecture on the Signals facilities in use there. As the Tiger Force will be operating in conjunction with the American Air Forces, the existing facilities are practically those which Tiger Force will be required to adopt. A brief outline of these facilities is given below.
[Underlined] AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS [/underlined]
Group or Wing (American equivalent to our Group) have W/T control channels in the 3 mc, 6 mc and 8 mc bands, keyed simultaneously throughout the 24 hours, thus affording the air operator three channels of reception, dependent upon the time of day or night the aircraft is airborne. Broadcasts are made at half-hourly intervals and control, in general, is similar to that of our G.C.F. Weather information is broadcast on these channels every hour in the U.C.O. P.A.C. (the weather code used in that theatre).
H.F./D.F. facilities are available, but our Wireless Operators must train themselves to request QUJ instead of QDM as used in this country. H.F./D.F. fixing facilities are available in an emergency. MF/DF facilities are not available, but other aids, such as M/F Beacons, Radio Ranges and V.H.F. Homing facilities are numerous. I.F.F. is also carried and can be used for fixing purposes in an emergency. R/T communication is by V.H.F. and each Group or Wing has V.H.F./D.F. facilities for homing when within 100 miles from Base. Weather information is also broadcast by R/T at four minute intervals once aircraft are within 100 miles from Base.
[Underlined] CODES AND PUBLICATIONS [/underlined]
As all ground W/T Stations already hold C.S.P.1270 (the American Aircraft Code) the problem of supply is greatly reduced if Tiger Force adopt the same code. Wireless Operators will find this code similar to our own C.D.0250 except that it is a four letter code instead of two as in C.D.0250. The lay-out is similar and spare groups are allotted for any specific requirement. In each of these codes, which change about every four days, is an authenticator table which is used extensively. The method of authentication, while not quite similar to that in C.C.B.P.127, is on the same lines, and Wireless Operators should have no difficulty in learning the procedure. Weather information is obtained, normally by the Group or Wing W/T broadcasts, in code, using the U.C.O. P.A.C. – a code similar to our own U.C.O. Request. If a more detailed weather report is required, it can be requested, and this information is supplied in another weather code – W.A.F.3. In any message where the need for speed outweighs the need for security, Q Code or plain language can be used.
[Underlined] AIR/SEA RESCUE [/underlined]
As most operations involve long hours of flying over water, the facilities for Air/Sea Rescue are well organised. Practically every island in Allied hands has an Air/Sea Rescue Unit located on it. In addition to these units, which maintain a continuous W/T watch on two
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
exclusive distress frequencies, there is an elaborate organisation of Naval aircraft (Dumbos) at rendezvous points along the track. B.29 aircraft (Super Dumbos) are also circling rendezvous points on track, and submarines and destroyers are at pre-arranged stations on the route. Aircraft, surface vessels and submarines all maintain a continuous listening watch on the above two distress frequencies, and in addition on the international distress frequency (500 k/cs). A V.H.F. watch is also maintained so that aircraft in distress have no less than four channels of communication with rescue craft.
[Underlined] CLIMACTIC CONDITIONS AFFECTING RADIO RECEPTION [/underlined]
The climactic conditions in the theatre where Tiger Force aircraft will be located, will at times adversely affect radio reception, and Wireless Operators must be trained to overcome “atmospherics”. Morse reception through interference must be regularly practiced to enable Wireless Operators to overcome the conditions which prevail.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
W/T and R/T silence are normally maintained throughout an operation, unless otherwise ordered, or when aircraft are in an emergency or distress.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
As everyone must know by this time, the latest Bullseye exercise carried out by this Group was practically ruined by another case of inadvertent radiation of intercomm. on V.H.F. The details have been fully covered in this Headquarters letter 5G/S.14500/9/Sigs., dated 3rd August. At the risk, however, of being accused of emphasising the obvious, the main points to be noted are repeated below:-
(a) If satisfactory V.H.F. reception is not obtained by H – 10, the whole set is to be switched off. Instructions can still be obtained by W/T.
(b) All crews of Marker Force, Flare Force and Master Bomber aircraft are to be reminded of the need to watch the neon “V.H.F. R/T on transmit” indicator lamp from H – 30 until the end of the attack.
(c) Captains of Nos. 9 and 617 Squadron aircraft which require V.H.F. for landing, are to ensure that the V.H.F. H/T switch is not put in the “On” position until the aircraft are within 50 miles of Base on return.
(d) All crews must receive constant instruction on the contents of 5 Group A.S.I. Part VI, Sigs/1.
(e) The transmissions made by the Master Bomber, his deputy and the Link aircraft during the period H – 16 to H – 10 serve as the V.H.F. R/T reception test for all other aircraft. These transmissions must therefore be made in a precise, deliberate manner. All volume controls should be set at maximum volume during this period.
[Underlined] WIRLESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Tiger Training [/underlined] Throughout July the training of Wireless Operators (Air) for Tiger Force continued satisfactorily and results so far obtained are gratifying. Many Squadrons have almost finished the Ground Training Syllabus and revision will ensure that all Wireless Operators are 100% trained. The results of loop and Radio Range training have been very good – Wireless Operators obtaining good loop bearings and Pilots carrying out successful Beam flying. Perfect-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ion in this type of homing to an airfield is absolutely essential in the new theatre and only constant practice at every available opportunity will ensure this. It Is hoped to have all aircraft fitted with American type Radio Range Receiver for use by Pilots only, thus the Wireless Operator will have his Marconi equipment free to use for any other purpose. The training on “Consol” beacons has been held up due to lack of information regarding the beacons in use and for charts to cover them. It is hoped, however, to have all the information of these beacons which are in operation in the European Theatre very soon, so that air training can be carried out, but as there are not yet “Consol” facilities in the new theatre this training should come at the bottom of your priority training list.
[Underlined] Squadron Signals Training Trophy [/underlined] The result of the Squadron Signals Training Trophy competition was announced during July. The winner was No.44 Squadron, whose training room was an outstanding example of what can be done to make these rooms places where Wireless Operators can really find inspiration and interest in every phase of their work. Second and third places in the competition were won by 57 and 83 Squadrons respectively. The standard of all Signals training rooms was very high throughout, and showed that Signals Leaders and Wireless Operators really had taken a keen interest in their layout and cleanliness – Good work chaps – keep it up, and remember when you may be in a tent in some far land, that these too can be kept clean, tidy and made places of interest. The same spirit which prevailed in your training rooms here can be maintained despite all they may say about fungus, mosquitoes, sunshine and rain – not to mention some yellow rats which will soon be dealt with.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise [/underlined] This exercise has been re-arranged, thus enabling the two new Squadrons to No.5 Group to take part. The work carried out during July has been up to standard, though there are still a few cases of incorrect tuning which must be eliminated. Nos.75 and 460 Squadrons will find this exercise their introduction to 5 Group W/T Control, and practice will soon make them quite familiar with the procedure.
[Underlined] W/T Controllers’ Test [/underlined] Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their splendid efforts to get all their Wireless Operators qualified as W/T Controllers. At the end of July only four Operators of 97 Squadron and 7 of 83 Squadron had still to pass the tests laid down in 5 G. S.S.I. No.13. We should like to see a percentage of all Wireless Operators in each Squadron passing out as W/T controllers, as there is always the possibility that they may be called upon to carry out these duties.
[Underlined] Signals Leaders [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to the two new Signals Leaders to the Group, namely F/Lt Baxter, Signals Leader, No.75 (N.Z.) Squadron and F/O Moir, Signals Leader, No.460 Squadron. We hope that they are now settled down in their new quarters and will soon be familiar with 5 Group Signals technique.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
[Underlined] Gee [/underlined] The news came as a bombshell late last month, that as a result of consultations in the Theatre, and the need to conserve shipping space, Gee was not to be used by the Tiger Force. Training in this equipment for both aircrew and maintenance personnel was to cease immediately. Although the consternation of the navigators was great, the maintenance side was no less concerned, because in three years of operational development Gee became a sound and reliable equipment, easy to maintain and relatively fault free. However, the Loran and Rebecca combination will do the work of Gee from the operational point of view. We have had experience of Loran, and if our efforts to obtain Modification IV are successful, with the divider troubles elimin-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ated, we can hope for high serviceability. Few of us have had experience with Rebecca, but the equipment was developed by other Commands and with constant practice there should be little difficulty in maintenance.
[Underlined] Workshop Convoys [/underlined] At a rather sultry conference at Coningsby the final form of the workshop convoys was decided. Bomber Command rules that the 3 H.P. Motors were not to be removed from the R.V. 421B, although provision could be made to allow this to be done in the Theatre. The only major modification what was approved by Bomber Command was the installation of a scanner on the roof of the R.V.420B, this work to be carried out by Coningsby.
The task of the preparation of these vehicles for operational use fell on the No.381 M.U. detachment at Coningsby. The work included the installation of bench sets, the scanner modifications, minor re-arrangement of shelving and other work. Five convoys had to be completed in ten days, and the fact that the work is well up to schedule reflects great credit on F/O Milsom in charge of the job, and the remainder of the personnel concerned.
[Underlined] ADMONITORY SONNET [/underlined]
O, ye who venture forth in War’s array
To fight vile Nippon’s hordes, the yellow foe,
From some Pacific islet far away,
Know ye that there ye’ll find no G.P.O.?
All those of ye with gadget minds take heed,
The surplus fittings of the German war
Will vanish quite. Austere will be, indeed,
Your future days compared with those of yore.
Reproach us not in future when you find
That telephones are quantitively few,
And qualitively very far behind
The standards which in England you once knew.
One cheerful note! Be very sure we’ll fix
That telephones supplied aren’t candlesticks!
(Anon. (Circa 1945))
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION TRAINING [/underlined]
The training programme is proceeding satisfactorily. Navigators and Set Operators are making ample use of the aids available with the exception of loop and radio range bearings. These seem to be avoided like a plague, or, if they are not entirely neglected, the Navigators [underlined] do not use them. [/underlined]
They lack faith in them. Why? Providing the loop is swung satisfactorily and the Wireless Operator takes great care in obtaining his readings, the resulting bearings should be very accurate. “Alright”, you may say, “but the bearings we get are hopeless, never nearer than 10 miles to the actual position.” Well, you have the solution in your own hands – either the loops are not correctly swung or the Wireless Operator is not doing his job properly. We repeat, the solution is in your own hands.
Apart from these two aids, however, the impressive array of navigational aids are being used to full advantage. In fact, too much so in the case of Gee. A few navigators have taken a commonsense attitude towards “Gee” and so not use it unless it is required in an emergency. They navigate with the assistance of the other and more difficult-to-manipulate aids. This is sound common sense and can result in one thing only – a very high standard of efficiency. But what of those people who do not adopt this rightful attitude, who continually obtain Gee fixes even though they have serviceable H2S, Loran and loop? By pursuing this policy they will never attain a high degree of manipulation skill, nor will they gain real confidence in other aids. Therefore, leave Gee alone. Discard it altogether. Use it only in an emergency – then you will quickly gain efficiency – and confidence – in all your other “boxes of tricks”.
The Drift Sights and G.P.I’s are not yet available in sufficient quantities to allow fitting to aircraft, and it may not be possible for crews to obtain flying practice with these instruments until Squadrons receive their new aircraft, which is leaving it very late. To compensate for this crews must get the maximum ground practice. It is not quite the same thing, but nearly so. Both these instruments are easy to manipulate and it requires but a little time and effort to become proficient in their use. Therefore, get as much practice as you can, reduce the drills to habit and then you can perform the actions automatically. (A tip here- always try to reduce your work to a series of habits, it then becomes much simpler to perform. If you have to think about a thing before you can do it, you use up energy – a lot of energy. If you can do it habitually then very little energy is required. There is no need to wear yourself out navigating for a few hours – so, make a habit of each and every drill. On every occasion you obtain a fix, go through the complete cycle of obtaining a wind, G/S and E.T.A. check and altering course if necessary. Do this a few times and you have reduced the whole thing to a habit – a very good habit too, because as a result you will be a very reliable and efficient Navigator).
To sum up, Navigation training is proceeding satisfactorily, but a little more attention is required in the direction of Loop bearings, Drift Sights and G.P.I’s. Polish off these three and we may
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
consider the training situation very satisfactory.
[Underlined] FAR EASTERN NAVIGATION FLASHES [/underlined]
(a) Serviceability of Radar aids ‘out there’ is approximately 92%.
(b) Loran ranges fluctuate violently, maximum 1500 nautical miles, minimum 700 nautical miles.
(c) Wireless reception satisfactory, no undue interference from any source. Bearings and emergency fixes therefore easily obtainable and reliable.
(d) Maps and Charts for the Far East are now ready. Two copies of each sheet are being forwarded to Squadrons for perusal.
[Underlined] ASTRO COMPASS [/underlined]
Agreement has at last been reached on the position to be occupied by the Astro Compass in Lancaster aircraft. This is on the starboard side of the coaming which is just forward of the Navigator’s table. A trial installation was held at an 8 Group Station recently and this position seemed very satisfactory. It is easy to get at, very easy to manipulate and is also easily stowed.
Owing to great pressure of work it may be impossible for the Astro Compass to be mounted in this position in the existing aircraft, but some compensation will be found in the fact that the new aircraft which we shall shortly receive will have the Astro Compass correctly positioned. Crews will, therefore, not have much opportunity of practice in using this instrument in the correct position, but continue to obtain the maximum possible practice whilst it is situated in the present position, so that when you do get the new aircraft you will require only familiarisation.,
[Underlined] DRIFT SIGHT [/underlined]
A final position for the fitting of the U.S. Navy Mark VI Drift Sight into Lancaster aircraft has not yet been decided. The present approved position is aft of the flare chute; it is considered to be far from ideal. We in this Group are therefore experimenting by fitting the sight in different positions in the nose of the aircraft. The most obvious and easily accessible position has been vetoed by the larger escape hatch about to be incorporated in the production line aircraft. A second position just aft of the bomb sight is now being perfected and it is earnestly hoped that it will be satisfactory for everyone. A decision on this matter will be reached before the end of August.
Once again, however, no matter what the approved position, it will be impossible to have the sights installed in the existing aircraft, so crews must obtain the maximum practice, ground practice in this instance, on the instructional “mock up”. It is not very difficult to manipulate this new drift sight and fifteen minutes practice should be sufficient to make everyone at least partly proficient. Much experience can be gained of course, either during the short time between the arrival of the new aircraft and the “fly out”, or whilst on the “fly out”.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
(a) [Underlined] Station Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE – Waddington – S/Ldr Evans, D.F.C.
Bardney – S/Ldr Rumbles, D.F.C.
Skellingthorpe – S/Ldr Bray, D.F.C.
551 Wing - F/Lt Johnson.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
54 BASE – Coningsby – S/Ldr Baxter, D.S.O., D.F.C.
Woodhall – S/Ldr Bennett, D.F.M.
Metheringham – S/Ldr Martin, D.F.C.
552 Wing – S/Ldr Hatch, D.F.C.
553 Wing – S/Ldr Ayles, D.F.C., D.F.M.
55 BASE East Kirkby – S/Ldr St.Clair Miller, D.F.C.
Spilsby – F/Lt McKinnon, D.F.C.
SYERSTON – S/Ldr De Friend, D.F.M.
(b) [Underlined] Squadron Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE 9 Squadron – F/Lt Peasfield
189 Squadron – F/Lt Booth
463 Squadron – F/Lt Markham
617 Squadron – F/Lt Martin
54 BASE 83 Squadron – F/Lt Bowes
97 Squadron – F/Lt Woolcott
106 Squadron – F/Lt Curry
467 Squadron – F/Lt Pickard
627 Squadron – F/Lt Tyce
55 BASE 57 Squadron – F/Lt Bradley
75 Squadron – F/O Parsons
207 Squadron – F/Lt Gully
460 Squadron – F/Lt Young
SYERSTON 49 Squadron – F/O Prentice
This month we have said goodbye to two stalwarts of the “Union”, namely S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C, and S/Ldr Crowe, D.F.C. Both of them have been with us for a very considerable period and have done outstanding work. They have been responsible in no small part for the progress of Navigation in this Group during the last two years. We are very sorry to see them go, because they will be sorely missed, but we wish them every success and the very best of luck in “civvy street”.
[Underlined] BOUQUETS [/underlined]
After omitting the “bouquets” for two months, it has been decided to re-introduce them. Below is a list of the two best training efforts from each Base during the month of July. The navigators have been chosen for their consistently accurate work, rigid adherence to system, constant checking of winds, ground speeds and E.T.A’s, and log and chart work, particularly chart work, of a very high order.
53 BASE 1. F/O Burke 463 Squadron
2. F/O MacIntyre 453 Squadron
54 BASE 3. F/Lt Stevens 106 Squadron
4. F/S Barker 97 Squadron
55 BASE 5. F/S Mancer 57 Squadron
6. F/O Huggins 57 Squadron
SYERSTON 7. F/O Prentice 49 Squadron
No one is barred from this competition. We do not ask for ultra neatness; the qualifications are as stated in the introductory paragraph. All of you can produce exemplary work if you try. You have the knowledge, you have the necessary Navigational aids available, and all that is required is hard work and common sense on your part. You will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
see that it is possible for anyone to qualify as one of the seven best Navigators in the Group. You have been given knowledge, now apply it, and produce some really first-class work. We do not like to see the same name appearing each month and are always anxious to replace the “old timers” with a newcomer. Let us therefore see a new list of names next month, and YOU make sure your name is on the list.
[Underlined] ALLOCATION OF DUTIES IN THE NAVIGATION SECTION [/underlined]
Checks carried out in all Navigation Sections throughout last month have shown that a number of Navigation Officers are loath to appoint the more senior Navigators to assist them in their multifarious tasks. It is the view of a few of them that as they are responsible for the entire section they should do all the work; but this is an unwise policy. It is impossible for a Squadron Navigation Officer to carry out all the necessary work himself. Consequently it is necessary to delegate authority to the senior Navigators in the Section. In nine out of every ten cases it will be found that these people are only too willing to assist the Navigation Officer in any way. Therefore, Squadron Navigation Officers, do not take upon yourselves entirely the burden of the Navigation Section – share this responsibility with your experienced Navigators and make your task, and in fact your life, much easier to bear.
A word to you Senior Navigators – do your bit for the “Union” and give your Navigation Officer all the assistance you possibly can. Take over one or two of his minor duties, such as looking after Order Books, supervising stores etc., By such action you will help not only the Squadron Navigation Officer, but you will also improve the efficiency of your Section.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS [/underlined]
The average error for the month was 2.7 knots, an improvement of .3 knots on the last two month’s figures.
Once again we are treading the path of progress! By the combined and determined efforts pf every Navigation team the bombing vector error is being systematically reduced to what may well be considered a negligible error.
Don’t forget that we set ourselves the task of reducing this error to 2.5 knots. It can be done as five Squadrons have shown this month; press on therefore, and let us obtain our objective immediately.
[Table of Vector Errors Ranked by Squadron]
No.189 Squadron have dropped with a very big bang from 3rd place last month to bottom of the ladder this month. This month’s vector error is the highest ever obtained by No.189 Squadron since their formation. We hope they will never again obtain such a distinction. Come on now 189 Squadron, make a really determined effort this month and let us see you at the top of the ladder next month!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVOGRAPHS [/underlined]
Did you decipher the word picture couplets included in last month’s News? If you didn’t here they are:-
[Underlined] Couplet No.1 [/underlined] “Destination Tokyo – a very long hop,
Maintain track or you’ll get the chop.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.2 [/underlined] “Loran, H2S. Rebecca and Gee,
Keep your future trouble free.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.3 [/underlined] “Accurate winds so timing sound,
Target pranged, then homeward bound.”
Now, although these word pictures may have provided a very welcome diversion when reading through the News, it was our intention that they should bring home to you, with great force, the morals enclosed therein. Did they have this effect on you, and did you apply the morals immediately?
Those of you who did not decipher them and did not, therefore, get the gist of the thing, now have the answers given to you – now it is up to you to apply them immediately [underlined] and always. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place amongst the Gee transmitting stations during the past month – changes intended to standardize [sic] the system in Europe for peace time Air Force flying, for certain operations taking place in the Italian zone, and to bring all frequencies on the same RF Unit.
As the majority of these changes have taken place with little or no warning, there may still be doubt amongst some Navigators as to the correct frequencies to use for the now standardized [sic] chains. To counteract this confusion, details of the new frequencies are outlined below.
[Table of Gee Chain Frequencies and Ident Blinks]
+ New chains – not yet working.
Information relating to Gee in the Far Eastern Theatre is going to cause considerable heartburning amongst Navigators and Pilots alike, as it is now definitely known that no Gee Chain is to be provided there. To ensure that crews reach a high standard of efficiency in navigating without this aid, it is expected that instructions will shortly be issued for Gee to be taken out of all aircraft. It must, however, be emphasised that Gee is not the be all and end all of navigation and has never superceded [sic] the basic principles of navigation. Therefore, however great the loss of this aid may seem at first, air navigation will not become impossible. Other aids are available, equally as accurate, and crews must develop them to a high standard.
When this instruction is issued, Pilots, Navigators and Set Operators must therefore concentrate on Loran, to ensure a higher standard of fixing accuracy, and on Rebecca and Radio Range for more accurate homing. Only by determination and continued training can crews overcome the disadvantages which will necessarily result from the taking out of Gee.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
The training of crews in H2S Navigation and Blind Bombing is progressing satisfactorily throughout the Group despite the shortages of equipment and the lower serviceability rate.
With the expected loss of Gee, H2S is quickly becoming the most accurate method of overland navigation, and much greater importance must be paid to its homing facilities in view of the nature of the Pacific Bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
An accuracy in fixing, equal to that of Gee, is not expected but one of less than 1 1/2 miles (this is about the present error) is demanded and can be obtained, providing set operators are made aware of their responsibilities, particularly when using H2S fixes for windfinding. The less accurate a crew is in H2S fixing, the lower will be their standard in blind bombing.
No relaxation in H2S training can therefore be allowed, in fact greater effort is essential and instructors and crews alike must take every opportunity of furthering their ability in the use of H2S, both for navigational and blind bombing purposes.
On the last Bullseye, instructions were issued for all crews to blind bomb on Bristol and take a P.P.I. photograph within 30 seconds of release. The results obtained were far from gratifying, and it was noted that many operators had forgotten the most elementary principles of blind bombing and P.P.I. photography.
It is hard to realise that some crews even attempted bombing on the 30 mile scan, others had too large 10 mile zeros, and many did not make any serious attempt at obtaining a decent photograph.
Great emphasis is being placed upon Blind Bombing and P.P.I. photography in the Far East, and results such as these reflect seriously upon the upon the attitude which is being adopted in the training for the Pacific. No.5 Group has been, and is, a precision bombing Group on visual targets, it must retain that distinction in Blind Bombing. Let the results obtained on the next Bullseye prove this beyond doubt. It is up to every crew to see that it turns in the best effort possible, and Instructors must watch their briefing if this is to be achieved.
No.97 Squadron have challenged the remainder of the squadrons in 5 Group to a blind bombing competition. This competition to take place as soon as sufficient crews are blind bombing trained and the Plotting Unit at Ipswich is operating. By the use of IPSWICH and the plotting unit all crews will have the same advantages and each aircraft will be plotted within the same degree of accuracy. Conditions of the competition are to be agreed shortly and forwarded to all Units. The results should prove interesting in view of the various types of equipment which will have to be used.
[Underlined] REBECCA [/underlined]
More Rebecca equipment is becoming available daily, and many crews will soon have the opportunity of testing this aid for themselves.
With the likelihood of Gee being taken out of aircraft, Rebecca will be the main Radar homing aid, and if used correctly is far more accurate than Gee.
Training is comparatively simple and quick, but requires constant practice. Don’t let the equipment lie forgotten once you’ve learnt how to use it. Make it your job to home on Rebecca to your Base after every flight – you may have need of it someday.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran is coming into it’s [sic] own. Gee is out in the Pacific Theatre.
This is a plain statement of fact, not to be passed over lightly. Loran facilities in the Far East are not all they ought to be but providing an operator has the basic principles at his finger-tips, can take a fix accurately and can correct simple faults, navigation in the Far East should be just as simple as in Europe.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
It is known that the United States Army Air Forces are obtaining Loran with a reasonable degree of accuracy to the coast of Japan. A further Master Station and Slave are being provided to give position lines running N.E. to S.W. and coupled with the present facilities, reasonable coverage should result.
It has been evident from reports received after Cross-countries and other flying exercises that insufficient care is being taken in fixing. Complaints have been made that Loran is inaccurate over this country, fixes being in error etc. Investigations often prove that the wrong skywave has been used, or that the count has been made incorrectly. Watch these points carefully, particularly identification of skywaves, as this will be extremely important in the areas in which you may be operating in the Pacific Theatre.
[Underlined] RADAR ALTIMETER SCR718C [/underlined]
Supplies of this equipment are extremely short, and up to the present time little use has been made of the aid.
There is one little point to stress however. This altimeter can be used to show when an aircraft is over sea or over land. Over sea the reflected pulse is very steady – over land the pulse moves about most irregularly. Watch this point when you have a chance and see if you can detect your change from sea to land.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
During the month S/Ldr S.J. Abbott relinquished the post of Group Bombing Leader to go back to “Civvy Street” and his old job in the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police Force.
Never the spectacular type, as probably became his Police Force training, S/Ldr Abbott’s quiet efficiency was a contributory factor in the Group’s present high standard of bombing accuracy. Much was achieved during his 10 months spell of duty, and, in saying farewell, all of us wish him every success in his new post.
His is one job where the bowler hat will be useful anyway!!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
Far too many crews saw the end of July without achieving a bombing category. It is realised that most crews were starting July from scratch, owing to re-shuffling, but every effort must be made to categorise all crews as soon as possible.
[Underlined] AN OUTSTANDING RESULT [/underlined]
No.97 Squadron (F/Lt Coates) report a magnificent effort on the part of F/Lt Wilkinson and crew. The error achieved was a CREW error of 23 yards converted to 20,000 feet. This is really excellent, particularly so as their Air Bomber is actually a Squadron trained PILOT/FLIGHT ENGINEER; what makes the feat even more remarkable is that it was the first exercise completed by this crew.
This is an all time record for No.5 Group, and can’t possibly fall far short of the “best ever” for Mark XIV bombing.
Congratulations to:-
F/Lt Wilkinson (P) F/Sgt Salter (P/FE) F/O Collins (Nav)
not forgetting the Rear Gunner for keeping his turret still!!
[Underlined] REMOTE CONTROL INDICATORS [/underlined]
No.207 Squadron have been carrying out trials with a Remote Control attachment to the Mark XIV Sighting Head. This attachment is operated by the Navigator who feeds Sighting Angle and Drift to the Sighting Head. The object of the attachment is to cope with winds above those for which the Mark XIV is built (i.e. over 66 knots Indicated) and it is worked in conjunction with the Emergency Computor [sic] You will be hearing more of this later.
[Underlined] THE M.P.I. TRAINER [/underlined]
The purpose of this trainer is to give Air Bombers practice in judging the Mean Point of Impact of various Target Indicator Patterns. S/Ldr Graham Rogers (No.54 Base Bombing Leader) reports that the Trainer is proving extremely popular and Air Bombers are not finding it easy to judge the centre of a group both quickly and accurately. The trainer works on a similar principle to the A.M.B.T. and is about the size of a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
pin-table (hence its popularity!) Twenty slides are provided, each having a pattern of six Green T.I’s. No.1 slide being a compact group, the groups becoming more scattered as the slide number increases until finally, No.20 requires considerable thought. Errors can be measured both for Line and Range from the scales provided. It is hoped that all Air Bombers will see that they derive maximum benefit from the trainer when it is allocated to their Squadron.
[Underlined] NEW INCENDIARY BOMBS [/underlined]
Models of new incendiary bombs, which we shall use “out there” will be coming along to all Squadrons. Study these and get all the gen you can on them from your Armament Officer.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The N.C.O. i/c Wainfleet Bombing Range reports that 2,286 bombs and 667 T.I’s were plotted during the month. This number could be stepped up considerably if only Squadrons would spread their bombing times more evenly throughout the day. Early morning and evening details are the answer.
[Underlined] BEST CREW ERRORS FOR JULY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error
9 F/O Bloodworth F/S Turner F/S Walker 64 – 75
F/O Plowman F/O Frazer F/S Esterman 48 – 57
F/O Myatt F/S Cubitt F/S Smith 62
S/L Blair F/O Skinner F/O Herks 58
57 F/L Nichols F/S Knight F/S Sheldon 72
S/L King F/O Crate F/O Thom 67
F/L Karop F/S Drackett F/S Fishman 76
F/O Wood F/S Crowther F/S Streathfield 72
F/L Appleton F/S Stevens W/O Cobb 68
97 F/L Wilkinson F/S Salter (P/F.E.) F/O Collins 23
463 F/O Houngan F/S Niblock P/O Pepper 58
F/O Ferris F/S Cliff F/O Richardson 74
467 F/L Morris F/S Gillespie F/S Silver 51
617 F/O Taylor F/S Shires F/S Bache 54
F/O Young F/S Hill F/S Howell 53
F/L Martin F/S Tedder P/O Barlow 65
S/L Ward F/L Sumpter F/O Christian 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Competition Results]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Base and Squadron [/underlined]
[Underlined] No.627 Squadron [/underlined] 668 T.I’s – Average error 118 yards.
176 Practice Bombs – Average Error 81 yards.
F/O George’s average error was 54 yards for 5 exercises – good show!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] gunnery
Since our last issue, Squadrons preparing for service with the Tiger Force have completed 75-80% of the Training Syllabus. This is a remarkably good effort, and Gunnery sections concerned are to be congratulated on the fine showing and the results obtained.
During the next few weeks it is hoped that aircraft recognition will be given as much priority as possible, in order that there will be no doubt in the mind of any gunner when called upon to identify aircraft. Most gunners by now have an excellent working knowledge of the .5 and a little study in one’s spare time should be sufficient to keep in touch with this gun.
It is refreshing to note that gunners have taken an active interest in subjects dealing with the “other fellow’s jobs” and Base Gunnery Leaders report that of the many gunners questioned, quite 75% have exhibited a marked degree of “gen”.
The new type of flying suit has been tested recently and most gunners have commented with enthusiasm on this equipment. The diligence displayed during the test of this clothing has given satisfaction, and we look forward to a general issue of the new suits as and when such issue becomes possible.
Owing to the fact that all Squadrons within the Group are conforming to the Tiger Training Syllabus, the “Order of Merit” for Fighter Affiliation Exercises is now cancelled.
Trials have been carried out in the FN.82 – reports of which have been submitted to Bomber Command. In the meantime, gunners are advised to rehearse speedy exit from the FN.82 – one or two helpful points being:-
(i) Avoiding the V.O.M. adjacent to the right leg.
(ii) Ensuring the freedom of the right foot before falling out.
(iii) Familiarising oneself with the Hand Rotation Lever (This is difficult to operate in its present position and will call for practice in manipulation).
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
Total Day Affiliation = 333: Total Night Affiliation = 142.
Total Number of Affiliation Exercises for July = 475.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] tactics
Recent reports from 21st Bomber Command, U.S.A.A.F., have shown that Japanese night ground defences are rapidly assuming the proportions, if not the accuracy, of the Germans’. Superforts operating at night have reported accurate coning by radar controlled searchlights, with intense concentrations of heavy and light flak in the cones. The Japs’ task is, of course, made easier by the low altitude at which the Superforts operate at night, and also by the very low concentration rate over the target, allowing a large proportion of the attacking aircraft to be engaged individually.
Japanese night fighters have still apparently got a lot to learn, and are learning the hard way by attacking with navigation and cockpit lights burning. They have, however, had some success when attacking aircraft illuminated by searchlights, the old German “Wilde Sau” technique, and have on occasion pressed their attacks to very close range. We can expect an increase in this form of attack, as it has the advantages of not needing efficient A.I. and also, day fighters can be used.
The latest phenomenon over Japan at night is the “Ball of Fire”. Variously described as a “flaming onion” or “Fiery rocket”, it has all the hallmarks of the rocket projectile used by the Germans in the closing weeks of the war. In fact, one Superfort crew has reported “a small winged projectile with flames emitting from it”. Unless it is a great improvement on the German model it is likely to be merely an interesting addition to the other fireworks commonly seen over a target at night.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION ON THE BULLSEYE [/underlined]
The one Bullseye flown this month, on the night off the 23rd, showed once again the overwhelming advantage possessed by night-fighters in moonlight conditions. We had 154 Lancasters airborne and the fighters claimed 161 successful combats, a total amassed by only 24 Mosquitos! The fighter pilots reported that our Gunners were keeping a very poor look-out over the Channel, but improved over the land. One Mosquito carried out 12 unseen attacks, although burning navigation lights! The loss of mid-upper gunners has, of course, made the carrying out of a thorough search more difficult, but the figures show that a great many crews either have incompetent gunners or else are not taking sufficient interest in a training exercise designed to increase their chances of survival once they start operating over Japan. It cannot be overemphasised that a Group Bullseye is the best experience a crew can get without risking being shot down, and as such it should be treated as a real operation from take-off to landing. The pilot who thinks that a Bullseye is just another training bind is heading right for a posthumous Pacific Star.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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Jap Fighter Control
As yet there is no comparison between Allied and Japanese fighter control, for though the enemy early warning system is considered adequate for giving general warning of the approach of large Allied air formations to Japan, Japanese fighter control is in an undeveloped state. The limited scope of Japanese fighter operations control is demonstrated by the type of fighter reaction experienced on Allied bomber missions over Japanese-held territories and by the poor performance characteristics, for purposes of fighter control, of radar and communications equipment known to be in operational use in the Japanese Air Force. The Japanese have under development a number of special devices for use in ground and air-controlled interception and they have been conducting research and experiments in fighter control organisation and procedure. Eventually, these activities may be expected to result in fighter control operations of wider scope.
The present Japanese early warning and fighter control system for air defence, however, is in a state of development roughly comparable to German development in the period from 1939 to 1941. The Germans also used picket boats to supplement the early warning radar and their first night interception system depended on illumination of raiders by searchlights. The Japanese early warning system appears to be adequate for the purpose of giving general warning of the approach of Allied aircraft to Japan. In view of the inferior performance of the radars, however, and of the apparent lack of a well organised filtering system, it is doubtful if accurate and prompt information on pin points, courses, speeds, heights, identifications and strengths is being supplied to Japanese Air Force Control Centres.
Without such information, the operations of these Control Centres must be quite restricted, and it is not likely that they are in a position to make material changes in the disposition of fighter squadrons to meet the special tactical requirements of individual raids. As a corollary, it may be stated that Allied diversionary raids staged in connection with bomber attacks against primary targets in Japan probably have little effect on lessening the number of fighters available for attack against the main force.
Operations at Japanese Fighter Control Centres appear to consist of scrambling fighters, broadcasting warning to airborne aircraft of the presence of enemy aircraft, and ordering fighters to proceed to designated general areas in the vicinity, most often a target area, for “attack” , or in other cases to take appropriate action for evasion.
Night interceptions are accomplished by co-ordination of night fighters with searchlights and in other cases by night fighters free-lancing in the target area, often with no detection aid of any kind.
It is possible that in the immediate future the Japanese will perfect a system of air control interception based on homing fighters on to a shadowing aircraft by means of airborne detection finders. This system might be fairly effective for day operations, when spotting and closing can be done visually, but does not seem to be suited for night operations.
It is unlikely that the Japanese Air Force will be able
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] JAP FIGHTER CONTROL [/underlined]
to organise an effective system for ground control interception or fighter control, especially for night operations until such time as they have in operation ground and airborne radar more suitable for the purpose than any now in operation. It is possible, however, that the Japanese are developing specially designed fighter control radar, perhaps an adaptation of the Giant Wurzburg, and also A.I. equipment possibly adapted from Allied airborne 10-centimetre equipment.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia. W.I.S.86. [/underlined]
Further light on this subject is now cast by the capture of a document on Luzon which gives a description of Japanese fighter direction methods, as they existed in April, 1944. It is reprinted from A.T.I.S. Translations, No.156. Particularly interesting is the dependence of the Japanese on reconnaissance aircraft – which should make good targets – and on a constant speed and course of the attacking aircraft.
The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects. Various radars report to a control station which we should call a filter centre. At this location pilots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a common reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of “grid” system). The Japanese have an organisation designated an “intelligence squad” which would compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicated that D/F equipment is used in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.
Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearings and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on incoming raids.
To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar, scouting aircraft are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow and report position, type, strength, altitude etc., as an aid to directing the intercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which will act as shadows and not as attacking units. The reconnaissance aircraft represent an important cog in the intercept system.
Due to the time element required in the filter centre, the method of radio relay, and the fact that mechanical methods are utilised for computation of vectors, much time is wasted; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation is on the premise that the “enemy raids” will remain on almost constant course and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked changes in course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.
After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial “vector” and “range” on the “point of encounter” (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method; e.g. “03.10” equals “right front ten kilometres”.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia, W.I.S.87. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was no operational activity during the month. Four aircraft of No.54 Base “stood by” for a search on the 24th but were not required. This followed a report by a No.463 Squadron aircraft of what appeared to be a dinghy in the sea off the East Coast, and A.S.R. Warwicks carried out a search although there were no aircraft missing at the time.
Casual sightings are going to be just as important in the new theatre as they were over here, maybe more so, and all that is required to ensure a happy ending to someone’s troubles is:-
(a) A careful description of what is seen.
(b) The most accurate fix possible.
(c) The time of the sighting and good signals procedure.
Accurate information will assist both those below and those above – if passed quickly.
Training on all Squadrons has made good progress during the month. The Mark II Airborne Lifeboat commenced a Group tour, and a mobile parachute instruction unit is also going ahead.
Yet a third circus is lining up to spread knowledge on Air Sea Rescue and land and sea survival in all theatres.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “CAN YOU SWIM?” [/underlined]
(If you can’t you are missing a lot of fun and – by the way – if you ditch you may not reach the dinghy!! [/boxed]
As was stated in last month’s News, S/Ldr Becker left this Group to take up a Safety and Rescue appointment with Transport Command. B.B. was one of the earliest members of the team, then led by W/Cdr Dabbs, by whose efforts such vast improvements were made in Air Sea Rescue throughout Bomber Command, and to whom a lot of chaps indirectly owe their present existence.
During his long stay with No.5 Group, S/Ldr Becker played a big part in improving both training and equipment, and we wish him the best of luck in his new appointment and also when he returns to his tobacco manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
During July flying accidents in the Group rendered one aircraft Cat. B., one Cat. A., and completely destroyed four others. Three Formal Investigations were convened to inquire into the more serious ones and two of them are still incomplete. Evidence so far places three of the six accidents in the avoidable category, viz:-
Swing on take off – 1; Overshoot on landing – 1;
Crashed on overshoot on one engine (Mosquito) – 1.
In addition one aircraft burst a tyre and crashed on landing; another had an engine failure on take off and crashed with fatal results. The remaining accident in unclassified as results of the investigation are not yet to hand: the aircraft belly landed after engine failure on a three engined practice overshoot.
One accident is singled out for special mention this month as the errors made by the pilot provide lessons for all Mosquito pilots in the Group. A Mosquito with the port engine feathered returned to Base and was given permission to land (in daylight) on the 2,000 yards runway. The pilot made a [underlined] right hand [/underlined] circuit and turned in for his approach rather low. He came in too fast and purposely delayed his selection of wheels down. The aircraft levelled off 300 yards along the runway and floated for some 600 yards. At this stage the pilot [underlined] decided to go round again [/underlined] as the wheels had not locked down. Full flap had been applied. The aircraft climbed to approximately 40 feet, at which height the left wing dropped and the aircraft stalled. The pilot was killed and the Navigator seriously injured.
The greatest mistake this pilot made was to try to take a Mosquito, with one engine feathered and wheels and flaps down, round again from ground level. Pilots Notes state that going round again in only possible in these circumstances if the decision is made at an early stage in the approach when it is clear that the undercarriage and flaps can be raised and speed increased by diving in the height available. Contributory factors to this crash were the [underlined] right [/underlined] hand circuit and the low, excessively fast approach. Final approach speed should be 122 knots and circuits should be made left handed irrespective of which engine has failed.
[Underlined] CASUALTY SIGNALS AND FORMS (765C) [/underlined]
Of recent weeks some slackness in the compilation of casualty signals has been evident. Once again Units are reminded that [underlined] every type [/underlined] of damage to an aircraft, including straightforward engine failure, requires notification by signal. Under para. “G” should be stated “765(C) yes” or “765(C) no”. A.M.O. A.1348/43 gives detailed instructions on the compilation of casualty signals. This A.M.O. must be obeyed to the letter. Those Officers who are concerned in any way with signals for aircraft damage must have this A.M.O. by them at all times.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS [/underlined]
All Units have Gold Stars this month with the exception of Nos.627 Squadron (Blue) and 97 Squadron (Red). The position of No.106 Squadron is still undecided.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
The following are the main observations made during the Group Engineering Staff Inspection of Stations, prior to the A.O.C’s inspection:-
(i) On the whole the Base Servicing Sections and Servicing Wings are organised on sound and efficient lines.
(ii) The inevitable chopping and changing between Units of both aircraft and personnel is causing some dislocation in Servicing Wings.
(iii) A considerable amount of surplus equipment exists in most Servicing Wings.
(iv) M.T. Servicing leaves much to be desired on some Stations.
With regard to (ii). It is a well known fact that the standard of servicing in one Unit is not acceptable to another. The spirit behind this is natural and it cannot be expected that anyone will accept full responsibility for the serviceability of a strange part worn aircraft without a very careful and critical inspection. This applies particularly to engine, airframe, instrument and electrical trades, whose responsibility covers almost entirely the safety of the aircraft and a single point overlooked is liable to have most serious consequences for both the aircraft and crew and tradesmen concerned.
Although it is appreciated that the swopping od old aircraft is bad business, it is inevitable at this stage and in dealing with this problem the following points should be noted:-
(i) In view of possible changes it is now more important than ever that all defects are recorded on F.700.
(ii) The servicing of such aircraft on receipt should as far as possible be carried out by experienced tradesmen.
(iii) Cases of indifferent servicing by the previous holding Unit should be reported officially, the reports being confined to statement of facts.
The surplus equipment referred to in para.1 (iii) should be returned to the Equipment Section on paper and stored under arrangements made by the C.T.O. and equipment Officers pending final disposal.
The present shortage of personnel and equipment is undoubtedly reflected in the comparatively low standard of M.T. servicing. This standard has recently improved but there is still room for improvement with the existing resources. It was apparent during the inspection that some C.T.O’s were not keeping up to date with the progress of unserviceable vehicles and where this was the case, the number of unserviceable vehicles was comparatively high.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY AND FLYING HOURS [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Hours Flown by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
Further information has now been received from Headquarters Tiger Force regarding the requirements and commitments of Photography. The growing importance of careful preparation is further emphasised, and the points enumerated below will prove to be of paramount importance to all concerned.
[Underlined] F.60 CAMERAS [/underlined]
It can now be stated that the F.60 (35 mm) fully automatic camera with scanner contact, and fitted with visor mounting, will be issued on 100% basis to all aircraft proceeding with Tiger Force. This camera will supercede [sic] the Bantam and Kodak 35 mm now in use, and will entirely eliminate manipulation failures. The camera is on a fixed mounting and is operated by the Bomb Firing Key. This feature will be greatly appreciated by the Set Operator, as he will have no knobs and triggers to bother about, and we are certain that operational photography will be thereby improved.
[Underlined] F.67 CAMERAS [/underlined]
In addition to the F.60 cameras, each Squadron will be equipped with two F.67 (16 mm) cameras. This camera is similar in operation to the F.60, being fully automatic and operated by the scanner contact making one exposure per second and like the F.60 it is operated by the bomb firing key.
[Underlined] TYPE 35 CONTROL DIAL [/underlined]
The existing Bromide Paper Control Dial is considered unsuitable for use in all conditions of high humidity. Arrangements have therefore been made for the production of dials manufactured from some suitable plastic material which would stand up to the wear and tear of exacting tropical conditions. The lay-out of the dial has been arranged to suit bombs having a terminal velocity above 1200 feet per second. In order to ensure accuracy, the R.A.E., Farnborough, are checking the dials against a stop watch, and will amend the calibrations as necessary. It is anticipated that 400 of these new dials will be ready for issue at an early date.
[Underlined] TYPE 20A, 35 CONTROL [/underlined]
In future the No.20 Controls will be fitted with contact springs and will be known as type 20A. These controls will be made a general issue to Units from 1st September, when they will be coming off production at 50 per week.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC TENT – TRIALS [/underlined]
Good progress has been made by Nos. 54 and 55 Bases in the use of the photographic tent, and from the reports so far received, the tents appear very satisfactory. The chief difficulty with the equipment appears to be the limited size of the film drying drum and the fact that it has to be revolved by hand while the film is drying. For this reason the standard portable type 14B/528 complete with motor and belt is being issued instead. It is also hoped to include 3 or more table fans to ensure a speedier method of drying.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH SPEED DAY FILM [/underlined]
The poor keeping qualities of High Speed Night Film has rendered it unsuitable for use in the East, and High Speed Day Film is to be issued instead. It will be necessary in the initial stages however, to cut the present 125 exposure lengths into 14 exposure lengths until such times as the manufacturers supply the film in the requisite size.
[Underlined] CAMERA – F.24 – TRANSPORTATION [/underlined]
It can now be confirmed that cameras will be housed in their storage cases with ancillary equipment and flown out direct to the Theatre of operations. Units have been instructed to demand storage cases for the purposes from the appropriate M.U.
[Underlined] INITIAL EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As preparation against any unforeseen emergency, or the delay of equipment arriving by sea, quantities of photographic materials are to be conveyed by other methods ready for immediate use if necessary. Early in the campaign R.A.F. photographers may have to use the American type Photographic Tents pending the arrival of the standard R.A.F. equipment. Some considerable time may elapse before pre-fabricated buildings are erected, and in consequence use will have to be made of these tents until more permanent buildings are available.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL [/underlined]
Some anxiety has been experienced regarding the ever increasing problem of staff who are eligible for overseas service. The matter has been taken up with Records, and it is thought that we shall soon have a much clearer idea of the personnel required. The confirmed establishment of photographic personnel for two Squadrons proceeding with “Tiger” Force is as follows:-
1 F/Sgt. 1 Sgt. 2 Cpls. 13 A.C’s.
[Underlined] WATER SUPPLY [/underlined]
It is of interest to note that the estimated consumption of water by the Tiger Force for photographic purposes alone will be approximately 8,000 gallons per day! In order to secure this supply special well boring equipment is being taken to the area.
[Underlined] H2S PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
Results now being received show a marked improvement in H2S photographs, but it is felt that there is still room for more care and attention in the developing and printing of the films. Special attention is necessary to ensure that each film has the “Start Frame” recorded, and also that cameras are in correct focus. On the last Bullseye training exercise carried out on the night of 23/24th July, several H2S films received at this Headquarters indicate that no attempt had been made to record the “Start Frame”. As pointed out in last month’s News, frank criticism is very necessary, and W/O’s i/c Bases and N.C.O’s i/c Sections should pay particular attention to this, and thereby ensure that such “snags” are brought to light. Bullseye exercises provide excellent training of personnel and it is important that this training is used as fully as possible.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
Photography is a recognised indispensable factor in war;
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
the article of military intelligence in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica [sic], written by a great military authority, mentions photography as a main source of obtaining information form the enemy. We must always keep this in mind and realise that only by the continuous vigilance of all photographic personnel, and their extreme care and attention to detail, can this be achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] 2,000LB. MARK II WINCHES [/underlined]
In our last issue we referred to the trials being carried out with the modified Mark II, 2,000lb Bomb Winches. We are pleased to say that these trials have been successful and the modified winches can be positioned on all bomb stations in the Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] RETURNS – GENERAL [/underlined]
Again!! We request Armament Officers to ensure that [underlined] ALL [/underlined] returns to this Headquarters are made on the appropriate days and [underlined] NOT [/underlined] three or four days later. Also, please ensure that the information is accurate. The importance of accuracy cannot be over-emphasised, because all information submitted to this Headquarters is consolidated and passed on to Higher Authority. Finally, to eliminate unnecessary telephone calls to Stations, please submit “NIL” returns where applicable.
And, while we are on the subject of telephone calls, may we draw your attention to the paragraph headed “Co-operation” in Issue No.28 of this News. We repeat that we are always prepared to help the Armament Staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but please first try to settle your problems at Station and Base level. If you cannot obtain satisfaction there, then telephone us by all means. A day in this office would convince you that it was never more aptly named than by the word “Madhouse” which appears on one of our telephones.
[Underlined] DEMANDS [/underlined]
A tip! when a demand has been submitted, do not just sit back and wait. Periodically “chase” those concerned. With the end of the war in Europe, the pressure of work at Maintenance Units and Equipment Sections has, if anything, increased, but we are certain that an occasional reminder, stating fairly the reasons for your inquiry, will be received in the spirit in which it is given.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS [/underlined]
Here we would like to draw your attention to the Editorial of the August issue of the Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, in which reference is made to Forms 1022 and 1023. Especially do we concur with the last paragraph, having noticed the fall-off in the number of 1023’s received. Please note that we require a “Nil” return, but it is very unlikely that such a return will be necessary.
Having relieved ourselves of these moans and as we are talking about the BOMBER COMMAND ARMAMENT BULLETIN – you will by now have received your copy of this month’s bumper issue. It is full of most interesting information.
As this Group us carrying out an extensive training programme, we feel sure that the Booklet on the Handling etc., of Practice Bombs, mentioned in the Bulletin, will be most useful in reducing the number of accidents, and look forward to receiving our copies.
Another matter likely to be of interest to Armament
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT [/underlined]
Officers in the near future, is the article on Tropical Storage of Explosives. We recommend you study this thoroughly.
We are now beginning to receive reports on the effectiveness of our bombing of Germany. A very interesting article on this subject appears on Page 37 of the Bulletin. It is gratifying, to say the least, to know that the work of the Armament Sections throughout the War has yielded such worth while results.
To close this month’s News, we should like to wish those Armament Officers who will be leaving us for warmer climes, the best of luck in their new assignments, and hope that their job will not be a long one.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
medical
In the forthcoming operations overseas, the following information may prove of value to all personnel concerned.
[Underlined] D.D.T. [/underlined]
The above initials represent a white, crystalline powder with the full chemical name of dichloro-diphenyl-trichlorethane. It is a comparative newcomer to the field of preventative medicine, but promises to be of the greatest value in the prevention of insect-borne diseases. Supplies of D.D.T. are now adequate for its full use on operational areas overseas.
In tropical and sub-tropical areas, many diseases are conveyed by insects which fly or crawl and which transmit the diseases by biting or being crushed into skin abrasions during scratching, and so convey to man the disease which the insect carries. Any substance which will kill insects in an efficient manner will thus help to reduce the incidence of disease. To date D.D.T. is the most effective substance to be discovered.
In brief, D.D.T. exercises its lethal effect by producing paralysis of the insect followed by death. The precise way in which D.D.T. reaches the body of the insect is uncertain, but absorption through its feet is believed to be the principal route. Swallowing, during feeding, of D.D.T. is also important. The absorption of D.D.T. is hastened by incorporating it into a liquid such as Kerosene or a water emulsion. The precise way in which D.D.T. is used will vary according to the insect. Thus, it may be dissolved in Kerosene, or in a water emulsion, and used as a spray, or incorporated in a dust with talc, flour or road-dust, and dusted onto the surface requiring such treatment.
In the prevention of malaria, the anopheline mosquito which carries the parasite of malaria, is attacked in all its stages.
The young mosquito, or larva, may be killed by covering the surface of the water in which the larva breeds with a dust containing D.D.T. Large areas of water may be dusted by aircraft. The adult mosquito is more effectively killed by spraying with a solution containing D.D.T. in Kerosene.
Typhus Fever, which is conveyed to man by the body louse, can be most effectively prevented by dusting the skin of people exposed to the disease with a dust of talc and D.D.T. The louse is killed before it can bite. Underclothing, such as shirts, can be impregnated with D.D.T. and is still lethal after a number of washings. The method of dusting was used in Naples in 1943, during an outbreak of typhus, with outstanding success. The whole civil population was dusted, and for the first time in history a typhus outbreak was halted.
The above information is only of the briefest, and should not be regarded as in any way exhaustive.
[Underlined] SCHISTOSOMA JAPONICUM [/underlined]
This disease is likely to be met with in the operational
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] MEDICAL [/underlined]
area overseas.
The schistosome is a small worm, 1 to 2 1/2 cms in length and is capable of living within the body of a man for long periods. It can cause serious disease unless treated adequately.
The young worm leaves the body of man as an egg. This egg will only hatch out in [underlined] fresh [/underlined] water, and the young worm so liberated enters, and lives for a period, in the body of a small water snail. Subsequently, it leaves the snail, and in swimming about, it will readily attach itself to and enter the human skin. Thenceforth it grows to maturity in the body of man, sets up disease, and produces eggs which are voided in the urine or faeces.
With the above in mind, it is easy to see how streams, rivers and water holes can easily become infected with the young worm in an area where the native population exercises no sanitary control.
To avoid infection one should never bathe in rivers or streams which are likely to be infected. Also, water for drinking or washing should come from an approved source – that is, water which has been filtered and chlorinated.
Sea-bathing is quite safe if well away from the mouths of rivers.
[Underlined] MALARIA PREVENTION BY SUPPRESSIVE MEPACRINE [/underlined]
In view of the lessening of the incidence of malaria in the operational area, it will not be necessary for personnel travelling by sea to take suppressive meparine. Parties travelling by air, however, will still take meparine from the date of their departure from the United Kingdom, as they will be living in malarious zones en route. The improvement has been effected by American anti-malarial unites and by R.A.F. anti-malarial workers already in the theatre.
Other anti-malarial precautions, already mentioned in previous articles in this section, will continue to be necessary.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.W. BAIRD DFM
P/O A.J. WILLIAMS DFC
F/O J.A. PETERSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O A.E. BOON DFC
F/SGT F. WHITFIELD DFC
F/SGT F. STEBBINGS DFM
F/SGT H.R. LYNHAM DFM
F/SGT P.R. ASLIN DFM
P/O J.C.B. GRAN DFC
P/O J.W. SINGER DFC
F/SGT P.F. JACKSON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR R.A. NEWMARCH DSO
F/L L.W. HAYLER DFC
F/O R.T.F. COVENTRY DFC
[Underline] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. NOWRIE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.W. FIRMIN DFC
F/O W.J.K. ENDEAN DFC
F/O A.H. NISBETT DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR E.G. WARD DFC
P/O K.G.W. MANTOCK DFC
P/O A.G. WEAVER DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR I.G. FADDEN DFC
F/L P.M.P. CRAMPTON, DFM DFC
F/O J.W. ATKINSON DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR H.L. CREETH DFC
F/O J.W. HUDSON DFC
F/L A.H. GIBSON DFC
F/O G.E. GAMBLE DFC
F/O R.B. PHILLIPS DFC
F/L J.E. DUNCAN DFC
F/L J.E. CARTWRIGHT DFC
P/O L. GRIMSHAW DFC
W/O L.R. GOULBURN DFC
F/O J.F. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/L E.F. ROBERTS DFC
P/O J. RAYNER DFC
F/L F.W.A. HENDRY DFC
F/L J. MOLLISON DFC
F/SGT J.R. WHITEHEAD DFM
F/SGT J. SPRIGGS DFM
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. DANIEL DFC
CAPT. A.E. HOWES DFC
F/L G.H. EAKINS DFC
CAPT. P.C. PECHEY DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.E.W. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L M.R. CROCKER DFC
F/L F.E. WILSON DFC
P/O J.H. PECK DFC
P/O H.R. SEARLE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W. SINCLAIR DFC
S/LDR H.W. RADFORD, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.B. EASTON DFC
F/O R.C. FAULKES DFC
F/SGT H.C. ADAMS DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.G. FARTHING DFC
P/O J.E. RONALD DFC
F/O E.L. McKAY DFC
F/SGT G.R. BRADBURY DFM
W/O D. HAMILTON DFC
F/SGT S.J. HENDERSON DFM
F/SGT J.A. DADGE DFM
F/O E.G. STROM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.M. PROCTOR DFC
P/O W.L. REEVES DFC
F/O K.L. KELLY DFC
F/O K.R. HICKMOTT DFC
F/O R. DICKINSON DFC
F/SGT T.T. TURNBULL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.G. BOYDEN, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR J.E. GRINDON DSO
F/L H.B. ARCHER DFC
F/O F.E.H. MILLAR DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL [/underlined]
NO. 53 BASE … 26
NO. 54 BASE … 27
NO. 55 BASE … 23
R.A.F. Station, SYERSTON … 10
No. 75 Base (For attention Base Intelligence Officer) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command. … 6
Headquarters, Bomber Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickins, O.R.S., Headquarters, Bomber Command …1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q. P.F.F. Wyton … 1
R.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (via H.Q.D.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2. .. 2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. …1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr Nairn, Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank … 1
A/Cdr H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.) … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey …1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C. in C. , Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C., 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Vice Marshal H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middlesex … 1
W/Cdr G.W. Gilpin, D.F.C., R.A.F. Staff College, HAIFA … 1
Headquarters, No.25 Group … 8
Headquarters, Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 54, 91 Groups … 1
Headquarters No.29 Group … 9
Nos.11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No.16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby …1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No.93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College … 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No. 25 Group School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
R.A.E., Farnborough … 1
Headquarters, Tiger Force, R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middx. 1
[Underlined] INTERNAL [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. … 1
OPS. 1. … 1
S. MET. O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS.RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE …1
NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATIONS TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
Recognition Test
Here are the 17 aircraft hidden in last month’s puzzle – did you find and name them correctly?
[Drawing]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, July 1945
5 Group News, July 1945
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 36, July 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on training, signals, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, gunnery, tactics, Japanese fighter control, air crew safety, accidents, engineering, photography, armament, medical and decorations.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1945-07
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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41 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
Japan
Pacific Ocean
England--Lincolnshire
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1945-07
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
Tiger force
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
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FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
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[Blank page]
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
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[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
[Page break]
TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
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Title
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V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-07
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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22 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
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1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
searchlight
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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[Drawing]
1
9
4
5 GROUP NEWS
No 30 JANUARY
[Boxed] NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATION TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41. [/boxed]
[Page Break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Boxed] In our last issue Air Marshal Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., bade farewell to the Group after two years of command. As many know, Air Marshal Cochrane left us to take up the appointment of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Transport Command. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
It is unfortunate that his successor, Air Vice Marshal Constantine, C.B.E., D.S.O., is unable to write a Foreword this month. At the time of going to press he is suffering from a bad bout of influenza, and we wish him a speedy recovery. Air Vice Marshal Constantine has come to us from Headquarters, Bomber Command, so we are by no means strangers. In welcoming his to the Group we assure him of our close co-operation and support for the future. [/boxed]
[Page break]
Famous Last Words
[Drawing] Navigator: “Pilot, you are below the safety height for this area”
Pilot: “To hell with that, I’m not going to fly in cloud” [Drawing]
These actually were the last words that this pilot ever spoke. Immediately afterwards, the aircraft struck a hillside, six of the crew being killed. The seventh member, although badly injured, survived to tell the tale. Here is his account.
“It was on the attack on Heilbronn on the night 4/5th December, 1944. The attack was successful and after bombing we set course for position ‘D’ descending in steps as briefed. Just South of Strasbourg the Navigator told the Captain that we were below safety height and the Captain replied that he wanted to get out of cloud. This was the last speech over the intercom., and I have no idea of the height of the aircraft. Immediately after this remark the aircraft hit a hillside. I was thrown out of my turret and landed under the mid-upper turret. I eventually regained consciousness, not knowing how long I had been there or where I was. After calling out the names of the other members of the crew for 15 minutes I decided to sit in the aircraft until daylight owing to inclement weather. Daylight arrived with a heavy fall of snow, but it did allow me to find my boot which I had lost, and with great difficulty, owing to my right arm and left hand being broken, put my boot on and jump out of the aircraft. The aircraft was broken in half, the break being behind the wings. The mid-upper gunner was dead in his turret and the others were 15 – 20 yards from the aircraft. After convincing myself that all were dead I set course SW by the aid of my compass.”
Here is a perfect example of the gross disobedience and stupidity of the Captain being responsible for the death of himself and five other members of the crew. It has happened hundreds of times before and will happen as many times in future, unless YOU guard against it.
The flight plan is issued for your safety. It is the best efforts of the planning staffs to safeguard you from your twon [sic] main hazards – the enemy and the weather.
KNOW. YOUR. FLIGHT. PLAN, AND. STICK. TO. IT.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] DORTMUND EMS CANAL – 1st JANUARY. [/underlined]
The stretch of canal at LADBERGEN, newly repaired, was once again attacked, this time in daylight. Force employed – 102 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two Mosquitos of No.54 Base were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I. cascading at 5,000 feet, burning for 12 minutes at H – 4. The leading Lancasters of No.54 Base were also to drop Red T.I. on the aiming point.
[Underlined] AIMING [/underlined] (a) Using the T.I’s as a guide to identification, crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Western branch of the canal. Care was to be exercised not to overshoot, as the Western branch was the primary objective.
(b) Normal gaggle formation was to be maintained until the Bomb Aimer could see the target. During the bombing run, aircraft on the flanks would automatically converge towards the centre. Immediately after bomb release, flank aircraft were to resume normal gaggle formation. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 14 x 1000lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear, with good visibility, and crews identified the target visually. Once again the bombing was very concentrated, but results could not be assessed on the spot, as a large proportion of delay-action bombs was used. Owing to the frequency with which this target has been attacked, and the vast number of bomb craters, it is impossible accurately to estimate the degree of concentration, but it is apparent that as good a concentration was achieved on this daylight attack as on any of the night attacks.
The Western arm of the canal was breached once more, over a considerable distance, and there is much flooding both to the East and West of the canal.
[Underlined] MITTELAND CANAL – 1/2nd JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
Aerial reconnaissance showed that the Germans were making frantic efforts to put this canal back into commission. When repairs were about complete, it was decided to make a further attack on the stretch of the canal at GRAVENHORST, to deny the enemy this important artery of communications. The attack was carried out at night. Force employed – 152 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target to be marked blind by Lancasters with T.I. Green. Flares to be dropped in target area, in the light of which the aiming point was to be marked by Mosquitos with Red T.I. Crews to aim centre bomb of stick at the M.P.I. of the Red T.I. or as directed by the Master Bomber. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear, with good visibility. The blind marking and illumination went according to plan, and a very good concentration of Red T.I. was dropped 150 yards from the aiming point. Once again a very large proportion of delay-action 1,000lb MC/G.P. bombs was used. The attack was an outstanding success, and a tremendous concentration was achieved on and around the aiming point. The canal and its embankments have almost been obliterated, in fact to such an extent that their course in places can hardly be distinguished. Many barges have been destroyed or left stranded. Both this canal and the stretch of the Dortmund Ems canal at LADBERGEN, attacked during the afternoon, are still 100% unserviceable four weeks after the attack.
[Underlined] ROYAN – 4/5th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
A surprise attack was made against the German garrison at Royan, on the French West coast at the mouth of the Gironde. The 5 Group raid was later followed by an attack by No.1 Group.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected, and the target was divided into seven sectors. One or two Squadrons were allotted to each sector. Bases were to spread their aircraft evenly over the allotted sectors and height bands. Bombing was to be carried out by means of a timed overshoot of the markers. Bombing heights 6,000 – 10,000 feet. Marking and illumination sequence as normal. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 500lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: no cloud, but some ground haze. After some preliminary delay and difficulty with the marking, the Mosquitos succeeded in dropping 2 Red T.I’s 100 yards 220 degrees, and a third Red T.I. 180 yards 190 degrees from the marking point. The main force was then called in to bomb with overshoots as planned, and a good sector attack developed, in spite of some aircraft having to make more than one bombing run.
It is not possible to distinguish on the P.R.U. cover, the 5 Group from the 1 Group attack which followed soon after, but damage is well spread throughout the town, and is severe.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] The planned T.O.T. was 10 minutes, but investigation reveals that about 80% of all aircraft bombed over a T.O.T. of 5 minutes. This caused a high concentration of aircraft and was chiefly due to the unforeseen and unavoidable hitch in the preliminary marking. The result was that many of the earlier aircraft had to go round again, and some were seen flying on reciprocal courses to the planned bombing headings. The consequent risk of collision may largely have accounted for our loss of six aircraft, as the defences were practically negligible.
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 5/6th JANUARY [/underlined]
Houffalize was an enemy strong point in the Ardennes salient. The aim of this attack was to destroy enemy troops, armour and supplies concentrated in and around the village. Force employed – 131 Lancasters.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Oboe Mosquitos of No.8 Group were to mark the target with Red T.I. These T.I’s were to be backed up by four Lancasters of No.54 Base dropping Green T.I’s. The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s. or failing this, at the M.P.I. of all the Green T.I’s. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500 lb MC/G.P. Crews were warned of the proximity of allied forces, and strict instructions were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless the T.I. Red and/or Green were positively identified.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 8/10ths thin cloud inlayers 4,000/10,000 feet, with good visibility. A good concentration of Red and Green T.I’s was put down on the target, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct as planned. The majority were able to do so, but some 30 aircraft were unable to obtain satisfactory bombing runs on account of the cloud conditions and quite rightly brought their bombs back. Reconnaissance, and later the capture of the village, proved that it was virtually destroyed.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Squadron Leader Stubbs.
Two attacks were made on Munich this night, the first one by 216 aircraft of No.5 Group, and the second by some 370 aircraft of Nos. 1, 6 and 8 Groups.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind markers were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point; these were to be followed by a small number of flares. The accuracy of the Greens was to be assessed by Mosquitos of No.54 Base. This assessment was then to be passed to the Master Bomber, who was to order the backers up to drop Red T.I. in relation to this assessment. The Master Bomber was then to select the most accurate markers, on which to issue his bombing orders. Blind marking with high bursting T.I’s was to be used as an emergency.
Main force crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the most accurate T.I. with delay as ordered. Bombing heights 17,250 – 20,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 4lb incendiary clusters.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: broken medium cloud in early stages of attack. Later clear, with moderate visibility. The Lancasters dropped several Red T.I’s accurately in the target area; Mosquitos then went in dropping Green T.I’s. The most accurate one, some 200 yards North of the marking point, was then backed up on the Master Bomber’s instructions, and the main force ordered to bomb the centre of the Green T.I’s with overshoot as ordered. Crew reports indicate a heavy and successful sector attack, but no photographic cover has yet been obtained to confirm this.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 13/14th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
This was No.5 Group’s second attack on this first priority oil target, and it was confidently expected that, given favourable conditions, amends would be made for the attack which went astray on December 21/22nd, 1944.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind marking, flare illumination and Mosquito visual marking in normal sequence. Skymarking was provided for, should cloud conditions preclude visual marking. A suitable marking point was selected, and crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers as directed by the Master Bomber, using a false wind vector to bring the bombs on to the aiming point. Bombing heights 15,500 feet to 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500lb G.P.
The Master Bomber was to transmit a false wind vector to the main force at H – 5. The vector was to be calculated on a forecast bombing wind, which would be either confirmed or corrected at H-15 on W/T from 5 Group Headquarters. A vector wind, to be set on the bombsight, was issued to crews before take-off. This was based on forecast winds, and was to be used if the vector bombing wind transmitted by the Master Bomber was not received.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: there was no cloud in the target area, but a smoke screen was in operation. In addition, the snow covered ground made visual identification of the marking point difficult. Proximity T.I. Green were dropped punctually near the target, and flares followed. Several Red T.I. were dropped wide by the Mosquitos, but subsequent ones were more accurate, one 50 yards and 155 degrees and a second 300 yards 290 degrees from the marking points (plotted from night photographs). The accurate markers were backed up, and the main force was ordered to bomb as planned.
Crews reported a good concentration, but an investigation of the winds used for bombing indicated that the attack once again miscarried. A serious mistake was made in the calculation of the false vector, and the wind thus used resulted in the displacement of the M.P.I. of the bombs some 1,000 yards S.E. of the aiming point. This is borne out by plots of strike photographs. The vector wind issued by the Master Bomber was transmitted several minutes late. A fair proportion of crew, those who bombed in the first waves, used the vector wind set on the bombsight before take-off. There is therefore a prospect that a proportion of the weight of the attack fell on the target, but while no P.R.U. cover has yet been obtained, there is sufficient evidence from night photographs and analysis of the winds used, to indicate that this attack may prove to be a disappointing failure.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Success against this type of target, now amongst the most heavily defended in Germany, depends to a large extent on initial surprise. The losses incurred on this attack were 2 Lancasters, or 0.9% of the total force, but this low loss rate cannot be expected to continue, if the target has to be revisited several times before success is achieved.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Stubbs
A force of 219 aircraft was despatched to attack the priority one synthetic oil plant at LEUNA, near Merseburg.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] It was anticipated that the target would be covered by a thin layer of cloud, and therefore, in addition to the normal illumination and blind marking procedure, arrangements were made for high-bursting Red T.I’s to be dropped blind over the selected marking point, during the T.O.T. If cloud conditions permitted, Mosquitos were to mark the marking point with T.I. Green. The Master Bomber was to instruct the main force at which markers they were to aim.
The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers selected by the Master Bomber, delaying release for 12 seconds, attacking on a common heading of 120°.
Bombing Heights 15,500 – 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4000lb H.C. + maximum 500lb MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at target: 10/10ths thin stratus at about 1,000 feet. Hazy; poor visibility. Blind markers and flares went down on time, and in the light of the latter the Mosquito markers were able to identify the target area through the thin cloud. The first Green T.I., assessed as 250 yards N.W. of the marking points (and plotted 300 yards 282°) was backed up, and the Master Bomber instructed the main force to aim at the resulting concentration, delaying release for 14 seconds.
Crew reports of the attack were enthusiastic. P.R.U. photographs so far obtained only cover the Northern portion of the plant, but they reveal that this section has been heavily hit, and almost all important installations damaged. On the date of photography (21.1.45) there were no signs of productive activity, and economic experts estimate
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
that production will be restricted to about 25% for one to two months.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] It must be borne in mind that this target was attacked later in the night by other Groups in the Command. They, however, encountered worse weather in the target area, and obtained no night photographs with ground detail.
[Underlined] BRUX – 16/17th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
The synthetic oil plant at BRUX was the third oil target to be attacked by the Group within a week. Force employed – 230 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked by blind markers with T.I. Green, followed by flare illumination. If cloud conditions permitted, a selected marking point was then to be marked visually by Mosquitos with Red T.I. The Master Bomber was then, if possible, to assess the markers, and instruct the main force at which group of T.I’s they should aim. T.I. Green bursting above the cloud, were to be dropped over the target as a last resort by the Blind Markers. The main force were to aim their bombs as ordered by the Master Bomber, on a heading of 118°, delaying release by 13 seconds. Bombing heights 14,000 – 16,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + maximum MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 10/10ths strato cu; tops 3,000 feet. Two Mosquito visual markers flew below cloud and were able to identify the oil plant; they dropped their Red T.I’s but these were almost invisible from above the cloud. The Master Bomber therefore decided on sky marking, and told the Flare Forces to retain their flares. A good concentration of green skymarkers was dropped, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct either the Red T.I’s if visible or the glow of fires.
No bombing results were seen, and no indication of the accuracy of the attack could be obtained from night photographs owing to cloud. Photographic cover since obtained is partly cloud obscured, but shows very heavy fresh damage, especially to the Power Station, Cooling Tower, organic sulphur remover plant and pump houses. It is also possible that the most important Winkler Generator (Priority I) has been considerably damaged.
Despite the difficult marking conditions the results of this attack may be considered highly satisfactory.
[Underlined] ATTACKS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] BERGEN – 12th JANUARY [/underlined]
Sixteen Lancasters from each of 617 and 9 Squadrons took off to attack the U-boat pens, a floating dock and shipping at Bergen.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Three aircraft of No.617 Squadron were each to select a ship (in known positions) with Tallboy fused .5 seconds. Three more No.617 Squadron aircraft were to attack a floating dock, in which was a submarine. The remaining 617 aircraft and all No.9 Squadron aircraft were to attack the pens with Tallboy fused 11 seconds delay. No.617 Squadron (using the S.A.B.S.) were to aim direct, and No.9 Squadron (using the Mark XIV) were to select a suitable aiming point off the target and calculate a false wind vector to shift the bombs onto the target. The Squadrons were to be escorted by Mustangs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear: good visibility.
[Underlined] No.617 Squadron. [/underlined] Two of the three aircraft detailed to
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
bomb shipping attacked. The aircraft detailed to attack the floating dock found it visible only from directly overhead; it could not be seen from sufficient distance away for a satisfactory bombing run to be made, so these aircraft also attacked shipping. Of the ten aircraft whose target was the Pens, only three attacked: four did not bomb because smoke from previous bombs obscured the target, the remainder experienced other troubles.
[Underlined] No.9 Squadron. [/underlined] Fourteen aircraft attacked the primary target. One aircraft was unable to identify the selected aiming point owing to smoke, and one aircraft is missing.
No.617 Squadron claim one ship sunk; three ships received near misses. A good concentration of Tallboys was put down on the Pens, and the attack is reported as the best yet made on them. Pens No.2 and 3 were both hit, and photos show two (possibly three) direct hits.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Several snags arose during this operation. No.617 Squadron, using the S.A.B.S. must be able to see the aiming point clearly. On this occasion, several aircraft could not bomb, in spite of making several orbits, as the target was obscured by smoke from earlier bombs. No.9 Squadron were more lucky, and their offset aiming point remained visible during nearly the whole of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] STANDARD OF NAVIGATION FOR JANUARY. [/underlined]
Navigation during January (when the majority of targets were long range) was the highest standard for any month. This shows that Navigation, which has stood still for so long, is now moving again, and in the right direction. This is good – let us keep it moving, and in the same direction.
An analysis has been made of the width and length of the Bomber stream during January. To deal first with track-keeping. The average width of the streams going to the target was 25 miles; on the return journey, it was 25 1/2 miles. (The former figure does not include supporters, who normally take a different route). The maximum permissible width of the stream is 10 miles, therefore we still have a long way to go. However, considering that the majority of operations were against long range targets and that on a number of occasions the true wind velocity differed vastly from that forecast, these results are satisfactory.
Now to deal with timing. The average length of the stream going to the target was 50 miles, permissible length being 36 miles. On the return journey it was 64 miles, permissible length being 37 miles. It will be noted that the standard of timing going to the target is very good, particularly considering the deep penetrations and the varying winds encountered. On the return journey, however, the standard of timing is NOT good. Crews are STILL racing back to liberated territory. It is easier to maintain accurate timing on the return journey because Navigators know the true wind velocities and can therefore make allowances. But in a number of instances they do not make the necessary allowance, and consequently concentration suffers. It is a well known fact that aircraft who lag behind the main stream are easy prey for enemy fighters, also those who stick their necks out ahead of the mainstream give the enemy that little bit of extra warning which is so vital to him. Captains and Navigators have been told this time and again, but a few tend to completely ignore all warnings.
In the last three years Navigation has progressed beyond expectation; immense strides have been made in windfinding, track keeping, the air plot, navigational aids and navigation technique. All these improvements should have resulted in perfect timing, but they haven’t – yet! Navigators, you must do everything in your power to remove this deficiency, because only when our timing is as good as all other items of Navigation can we say that we are doing a 100% job.
At this stage it is well to recall the aim we set ourselves 3 months ago. That is, a concentration of no greater dimensions than 50 miles X 20 miles. Well, we have almost achieved that. When we do in fact achieve it, then we shall set ourselves a new goal, until finally we reach perfection. DON’T say this cannot be done, we set ourselves what was thought to be an impossible goal in practice bombing wind finding – and we achieved it. On this same reasoning there is no reason why we should not obtain perfect track keeping and timing – but remember, this depends entirely on YOU.
Read this entire paragraph through again, then set yourselves a goal – and, finally make sure you achieve it.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Station and Squadron Navigation officers must ensure that all new crews are made aware of the great importance of accurate track keeping and timing. These officers must see that all new crews know the goal we have set ourselves and that they must help us to achieve it.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by Squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly, the same as last month. We are STILL not getting any nearer our goal of 3 m.p.h. This goal can and must be obtained if we are to play our full part in the bombing team. Let us then get on with the job and achieve our goal immediately.
[Table of Ranked Average Vector Error by Squadron]
It is good to see that No.56 Base have made a big improvement in their Vector Errors and are now in the top half of the list. No. 55 Base, with the exception of one Squadron, have slipped very badly, and are now in the bottom half of the table. This is not their usual place of residence; it is to be hoped that they do not intend staying there.
An excellent example of consistently accurate windfinding was given by F/O Chorney, Navigator, No.9 Squadron. He recently arrived on the Squadron from Conversion Unit and completed, with his crew, three high level bombing exercises in the first few days on the Squadron. The Vector Errors, converted to 20,000 feet were as follows:-
First Exercise – 14 yards or 2/3 m.p.h.
Second Exercise – 16 yards or 4/5 m.p.h.
Third Exercise – 6 yards or 3/10 m.p.h.
This is really first class windfinding, and it enabled the Bomb Aimer to obtain some perfect bombing results. No. 9 Squadron are always leading the Group in bombing vector errors. What about some other Squadron making a really determined effort to oust them from their position of honour?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight Navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and E.T.A. checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
1. W/O Murray – No.50 Squadron
2. F/O Harris – No.463 Squadron
3. F/O Pilkington – No.227 Squadron
4. F/O Hassall – No. 49 Squadron
5. F/L Williamson – No.619 Squadron
6. F/S Baker – No.630 Squadron
7. F/L Hatch – No. 97 Squadron
8. F/L Westphal – No. 83 Squadron
[Underlined] MET. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
It has been the practice in this Group for nearly 3 years to get the Station Met. Officer on each Station to give a brief review of the Met. situation to Navigators every morning. Everyone has agreed that this has been most useful to Navigators, particularly the wind distribution information. Two Squadrons in the Group have improved on this system, and it is now the responsibility of each Navigator in turn to obtain from the Met. Officer the “story” for the night, and then give the information, more fully, to the Navigators. This system has a double benefit. It necessitates each individual Navigator taking a keen interest in Met., thereby considerably improving his knowledge; also it provides Navigators with valuable practice in lecturing, practice which almost everyone needs. In each Squadron the Navigation Officer is present, and he is the judge on the effectiveness of the lecture and the ability of the lecturer.
This new system has provoked great competition throughout the two Squadrons and its adoption by other Squadrons is strongly recommended. All Navigation Officers are urged to give this system a trial.
All Navigators are provided with a Form 2330 before take-off, and are asked to make observations of the weather and fill in the back of the form. This is a big task for anyone because it necessitates spending a considerable amount of time away from Navigation – time which can be ill afforded. However, it is vital that the Met. Staff obtain an accurate picture of the weather encountered on route and at the target. If they do not receive this information, then it is obvious that their future forecasting will suffer.
Here is a difficult problem which has to be solved. No. 55 Base appear to have the answer. Each Navigator is given a specific
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
area in which to make accurate observations of the weather and it is necessary for him to give information only for this area. Consequently each Navigator need only concentrate on this item for a few moments of the operation, and naturally he is therefore more determined to do that amount of work thoroughly. The result is that Navigators need only spend two minutes at the most observing the weather, while on the other hand the Met. Officer is assured much valuable and accurate information. The Met. Officers of No.55 Base are very pleased with the reports they have received under this new scheme; they consider they are more complete and accurate than those received under the old scheme.
All Bases are urged to give this method a trial.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the third and final Self Analysis Chart for you to complete. If you missed the first two for any reason look them up immediately and answer those questions too.
(i) Do you know how Gee coding is indicated on the main time base and how to apply the corrections?
(ii) On entering the aircraft do you always note the ‘A’ error of the D.R. compass?
(iii) Do you check through your Navigation Order Book regularly to ensure that you are conversant with all orders?
(iv) Do you know how to adjust the presets on the Loran receiver, and do you know what faults are attributable to wrongly adjusted presets.
(v) Do you always remember to switch on your ‘Z’ equipment before take off?
(vi) Do you always carry out your preflight test in accordance with Appendix ‘B’ of Aircraft Drill No.9.
(vii) Do you know the three standard methods for windfinding and issue of bombing winds, which were issued recently?
(viii) Do you always remember to alter your V.S.C. when you pass the central position of two isogonals; and do you check regularly that the variation has been set in the right direction? (Don’t laugh at the second half of this question, to date some 20 instances have occurred of Navigators straying badly from concentration, and one actually returning early, as a result of setting the variation the wrong way).
(ix) Do you always make sure that you fully understand the procedure for bombing windfinding and issue of bombing winds, for each operation? (This question is most important, lack of knowledge of the procedure by a large number of crews on a recent operation, had a disastrous effect on the bombing accuracy).
If you have answered all the questions truthfully you will now be able to categorise yourself. The system of marking is in the November Summary.
Did you make note of all the points on which you lost marks, and did you rectify those mistakes immediately?
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Question (v) of last month’s Summary was incorrectly worded, it should read as follows:- “Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation from which you are allowed to relax the Group timing. Do you know why you are allowed to relax Group timing from this position and why this position was chosen”.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION ORDER BOOKS. [/underlined]
All navigation order books have been standardised during the month, and by the time this Summary reaches Squadrons all new order books should be completed.
This is the first time we have had standardisation in order books. Now that we have brought them up to date we must keep them so. Squadron Navigation Officers must see that all documents marked for inclusion in the Order Book are inserted immediately.
You will find a great deal of valuable information in this book. The rigid adherence to all these orders is a necessity and is vital to the safety of the aircraft. Don’t rush through the enclosures, read them carefully and make a note of all items of major importance. Let you [sic] motto be to “read, mark, learn and digest”.
Make a habit of going through the order book once a week, thus keeping yourself up to date.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Beattie, D.F.C. Nav. Leader No.5 L.F.S. posted to Transport Command.
F/Lt. Bowes, D.F.C. No.5 L.F.S. to be Nav. Leader.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
In view of the nature of the targets attacked by this Group during the month, and to prevent early warning of the approach of a bomber stream, H2S Mark II was not used on any of the bombing operations.
It has also been necessary to cut down the use of H2S Mark III to the absolute minimum that will allow accurate approach and target marking.
Many operators have expressed strong opinions regarding these restrictions, and the view is held that H2S is redundant, or that the efficiency of crews is decreasing. Don’t be misled by these opinions but judge by results. One can bring up many arguments for and against the current policy, but few set operators will fail to agree that the whole success of many of Five Group’s attacks has been solely sue to the element of surprise. Radar silence has helped considerably to bring this about. Another factor partly due to Radar silence has been the very low loss rate suffered by the Group.
[Underlined] H2S Mark II [/underlined]
A number of Gardening operations have been carried out by Squadrons equipped with H2S Mark II during the month, and the standard attained by the crews indicated that individual operators are still maintaining their efficiency on the set, despite the difficulties in obtaining sufficient training.
P.P.I. photographs indicate that good approaches have been made and excellent lays obtained. In this connection Station Radar Navigation Officers are to be congratulated on the conscientious manner in which they are plotting the photographs of the release points. All the plots are checked at this Headquarters, and so far, only one has been found to be incorrect.
H2S mining is, and will continue, to play a great part in the strangling of the enemy’s shipping lanes and to ensure that not one single mine is laid outside these channels it is intended to develop mining teams in each of the five Squadrons of No.55 Base in the very near future. Crews will, therefore, be tested on their ability with H2S on arrival on these Squadrons, and the best will be selected to receive highly concentrated training in all aspects of mining with H2S.
These teams will be given the best possible equipment available to the main force, and every effort will be made to keep it in a high state of serviceability.
Preceeding [sic] crews have set a high standard in H2S mining in the Group, but it is hoped with the development of these mining teams an even higher standard will be reached. It is therefore up to each and everyone concerned wo make this scheme a practical success.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H 2 S Mark III [/underlined]
Despite the restrictions on the use of H2S Mark III which have been necessary, and the low serviceability, there has been some excellent blind marking during the month. The majority of the targets were small, but fortunately gave compact responses useful for blind bombing. One target in particular – BRUX - was a completely new H2S target for No.54 Base, with little or no landmarks in the vicinity to check. This in no way deterred the marker and flare force, and they were able to find and mark it with their usual precision.
The new Mark IIIE equipment has been tried successfully on operations during the month. The mark, which gives a far better definition than previous marks, and has the added advantage of sector scan, is expected to be used increasingly during the next few months, and we are confidently expecting even more accurate target marking with it in the near future.
[Underlined] H2S Photography [/underlined]
A new Air Staff Instruction relating to H2S photography has been issued recently, and all set operators should be now aware of its contents. If you are not, ask your Station Radar/Nav. for a copy and study it carefully.
It can hardly be said that the P.P.I. photographs taken during the month were of a high standard, and it is evident that set operators are not carrying out the correct photographic procedure. It is appreciated that the Bantam Camera is only makeshift equipment until the Automatic Camera arrives, but excellent results have been obtained by those operators sufficiently keen to find out where they released their T.I’s, flares, bombs or mines. P.P.I. photographs are the only means of ascertaining where the attack developed if 10/10 cloud prevailed and therefore they are as much an operational photograph as the ordinary F24 bomb release photograph. Unfortunately many crews fail to realise this, and the photographs now being received look as if they have just been taken haphazardly in the target area.
One photograph taken anywhere in the target area is insufficient for plotting purposes, and operators must see that they carry out the provisions of A.S.I. Nav.17 to the letter – i.e. one photograph on the run-up 10-15 miles away from the target, and another within 30 seconds of the T.I., flare, bomb or mine release. Unless you take these two photographs and they are plottable, the whole film will be classed as a MANIPULATION failure and questions will be asked.
The majority of P.P.I. photographic failures during the month have been due to:-
(i) Insufficient gain.
(ii) Insufficient exposure.
(iii) Failure to wind the film over (two exposures on one negative).
(iv) Failure to set shutter.
(v) Too large 10 mile zero.
In taking P.P.I. photographs remember maximum contrast is necessary so that towns may be distinguished among the ground returns, and the illumination must be sufficient to register on the film. A complete revolution of the scan must also be given for the exposure as the afterglow is too faint to produce an image, and the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
photograph is formed gradually as the scan revolves.
H2S Training
To enable crews to obtain more training in the use of H2S Mark II it has been decided to allow the equipment to be used on the return route from all operations from a position of longitude determined by this Headquarters. Station Radar/Navigation Officers are to ensure that every advantage is taken of this facility.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The Continental Gee Chains continued to give good service during January, with the majority of operators obtaining coverage on both chains to 1000E.
There were, nevertheless, many conflicting reports on jamming experienced on these chains, but many navigators expressed the opinion that the enemy was transmitting a complete set of locked spurious pulses. To ascertain if this was so it has been decided that on the Squadrons holding H2S cameras one navigator is to take photographs of the Gee tube on future operations. R.A.F. Station, Fulbeck, have carried out ground tests to decide the best exposure, and it has been found that with the green filter removed, gain normal and brilliance high, 1/25 second is sufficient. Until this evidence is forthcoming no move can be made to counteract the menace.
There is one point, however, that navigators should remember. By reference to your D.R. position, you have a sound idea of the lattice values to give a fix, and is these values are set up on the Gee Indicator there should be no difficulty in defeating locked spurious pulses jamming.
With the successful elimination of the salient in the West the “C” slave of the Cologne Chain has been returned to its original position, and the Ruhr Chain is once again transmitting. Cologne Chain Fixing Charts are therefore being withdrawn, and the Ruhr Chain Charts re-issued. In addition the maintenance periods have been re-adjusted, and the Ruhr and Rheims Chain now give 24 hours service.
The Northern Chain was again used most successfully and gave excellent coverage to 1300E, but unfortunately there is evidence of errors in the fixes given by this Chain. The Radar Navigational Aids Control were approached with information on the approximate inaccuracies and their conclusions indicate that the errors experienced are more likely to be due to natural causes than in the Transmitting Stations.
For instance at 5600N 0600E an error of ± .02 in reading on the North Eastern Chains gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 6 nautical miles. The same reading tolerance on the Northern Chain in the same area gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 17 nautical miles.
It might be argued on mathematical grounds that such errors should be evenly distributed about the true track, but the evidence of test flights etc., seems to indicate that under any given conditions most navigators will have a definite bias on one side or the other, and that this bias is influenced far more by local conditions than by the individual.
On this case the average error of all fixes was approximately 126°/10 nautical miles and it would appear the local conditions influencing the bias were:-
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
(i) Weak “A” pulse on the Northern Chain and navigators would thus set a low reading when lining up the leading edges of the pulses. The amount of this error depends on the difference in amplitude of the signals.
(ii) A wind change to Westerly giving a starboard drift.
In view of the above it is therefore considered unlikely that errors exist in the Northern Chain.
Navigators may do well to ponder over the above facts, which indicate the necessity for reading off co-ordinates accurately to ensure that no discrepancies arise when changing over from one Gee chain to another.
Work is still progressing on the damaged Eastern Chain Tower, and corrections to be made to the B, C and D readings on this chain will continue to be issued when the route taken by aircraft is in an area where considerable fixing errors are likely to be encountered.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran has proved by far the most useful Radar navigational aid during the month, excellent coverage having been obtained on all operations.
It is gratifying to note that since the introduction of this aid, increasing use if being made of the navigational facilities it affords, and navigators are quite confident as to its accuracy. With more and more reliance being placed on Loran it is anticipated that in future routeing will be more carefully considered so as to simplify fixing and if possible to run along lattice lines.
It is noted from operational reports that it is not always possible to check Loran fixes against Gee or H2S. Should any Navigation Analysis Officer note any discrepancies in Loran fixes which it is thought may be due to errors in ground stations, information will be welcome at this Headquarters. It may be possible to correct the ground stations for such an error, provided information is forthcoming.
The following are comments on the major operations carried out during the month:-
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good and maximum coverage obtained was approximately from 03.00E to the target. It is however, noted that operators are still not making maximum use of the equipment as the spread between first fixes is in the region of 8 degrees. This may be due to some navigators placing more reliance on Gee fixes. It is emphasised that operators must use Loran to its maximum coverage, particularly as training flights are not possible over this country, and Gee must only be used as a check. Sky waves can be tricky, and the more experience one has in fixing with them, the simpler the identification becomes. Jamming in this area was practically negligible and splitting of signals did not present any serious difficulties to the operators. The only jamming reported appeared to be due to static or W/T transmissions and only resulted in an increase of grass or waving of the traces.
[Underlined] PILITZ – 13/14th January, 1945. [/underlined]
The Rate 5 signal strength again restricted coverage on
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
this operation, although most operators managed to obtain fixes outside the theoretical limits of the S.S. Chain. A plot of first fixes on this operation is much more concentrated than before. This indicates that where Gee coverage is likely to be erratic, operators are resorting to Loran and trying to obtain full use of the facilities it affords. Rate 5 signals presented difficulties throughout the route due to fluctuations in strength, but spitting and jamming was practically non-existent. Routeing along R4 lattice lines where possible in this area would no doubt be helpful.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th January, 1945, and
BRUX 16/17th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good, and coverage was obtained to the target. Once again navigators expressed their preference for Gee, the first fixes plotted in the majority of cases being at the limits of Gee coverage. Set operators can do a lot to remove this prejudice by obtaining accurate Loran position lines and urging the navigator to use them in preference to Gee. It is appreciated that Gee position lines are obtained simultaneously and are simpler to plot, but with the increased attention the enemy is paying to the Continental Gee Chains, more interest shown in Loran may result in dividends.
Intermittent splitting was reported by the majority of crews, but in no way did this interfere with the fixing. A number of operators reported jamming at approximately 10E. This appeared to consist of spurious pulses or sine waves, but did not last long enough to cause any serious difficulties.
The policy adopted by this Group of instructing Loran operators to correct dividers in the air is having excellent results, and practically 75% of all alignment troubles are being cleared up during flight. Much of the success of this is due to the Loran Instructors and Radar Officers on the Squadrons and it is hoped that before long operators will be 100% efficient. To assist in this a simple fault finding table is being issued to all operators shortly.
All Loran operators will be interested to hear that steps are being taken to extend S.S. Loran coverage North for 250 miles. This will considerably simplify training over this country, and will mean that S.S. Loran can be used on night operations from Bases. It will only then be necessary to use Gee for homing and other duties requiring accurate and easy fixing.
The [sic] provide this S.S. coverage one of the Homing Chain stations has had to be closed down, and position lines only can now be obtained from this chain.
The question of serviceability checks on Loran has been discussed recently, and it has been decided that the navigator shall carry out the pre-flight tests. This in no way relieves the Air Bomber of his responsibilities in regard to Loran, and a good Air Bomber will always be present when the navigator carries out the tests. Squadron Loran Instructors must therefore ensure that both navigators and Ait Bombers are capable of carrying out the pre-flight tests.
Tests have been carried out with a fixed aerial and loading unit on the last five operations. These tests have proved quite successful and the signal strength has been equally as good as with a trailing aerial. Air Ministry have been approached for permission to manufacture the Loading Units and it is anticipated the whole of the Group will be equipped shortly. The provision of such a fixed aerial will considerably simplify the use of Loran and enable operators to fix
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
in the target area.
One further word in regard to Loran Training – Air Bombers, in view of the fact that they are the set operators, must be given equal if not more instruction than the navigators, and the Squadron Navigation and Bombing Leaders must co-operate fully in this connection.
[Underlined] Loran in Mosquitos [/underlined]
Better results are now being obtained by the Mosquito navigators. Difficulties due to an inefficient aerial system have been overcome, and Loran has been used successfully for tracking into the target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
The main interest this month from the tactical point of view was the attack on Bergen by Nos.9 and 617 Squadrons, when several aircraft were intercepted by enemy fighters when withdrawing from the target area. An escort of Mustangs accompanied the force, but was unable to come to their assistance; this was due mainly to the aircraft being dispersed over a considerable area after orbitting [sic] the target. The enemy fighters, however, did not have everything their own way. One Lancaster was attacked continuously for 16 minutes by no less than five fighters, but got away with only moderate damage, while another survived three attacks without sustaining any damage whatsoever. All crews would do well to note the points brought out by this attack.
(i) A fighter escort cannot protect stragglers or widely dispersed aircraft.
(ii) A resolute crew, well trained in gunnery and combat manoeuvres, can give a very good account of itself, even when singled out for concerted attack.
(iii) The corkscrew is a very effective combat manoeuvre in daylight as well as night.
The golden rule, however, is still DO NOT STRAGGLE. Combat manoeuvres are unnecessary and dangerous if aircraft are in gaggle.
Our night tactics of evasion and rapid loss of height from the target are still keeping our losses to fighters very low, but the last attack on Karlsruhe showed once again that if the fighters do contact the bomber stream either en route or over the target they are just as deadly as ever. Crews should, if possible, increase their vigilance near the target as the enemy, particularly since the successful jamming of his A.I. by Window and other means, is making every effort at target interception, where a concentration of aircraft is assured.
A small number of combats is still being reported with jet-propelled aircraft. Reports generally are inconclusive, but although it seems unlikely that the enemy is using jet-propelled fighters at night in any numbers, it is possible that some form of rocket or liquid jet projectile is being used. Crews should pay close attention to such phenomena and report in particular if a suspected jet fighter makes any attempt to follow the aircraft, or carry out a definite attack.
[Underlined] WISHFUL THINKING [/underlined]
A captain of aircraft was heard to remark that he had heard upward firing cannon in German night fighters were no longer being used as they interfered with the master unit for the compass. He has since been reported missing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The past month has not provided many opportunities for crews to display their bombing skill either on the Ranges or on Germany, but it is hoped that the slack periods have been used to full advantage and that new and inexperienced crews now have a full understanding of what is expected of them in the target area.
There are still too many examples of bomb loads being scattered over considerable distances from the target for no apparent reason, and the manipulation failures that still happen from time to time are difficult to understand in view of the fact that the Air Bomber has plenty of time to check and double check every switch on his panel on the way to the target. Be prepared for any swift change in the tactics to be employed over the target, and if the change involves any alterations to bombsight settings, make sure that they are done accurately.
The importance of accurate “flying for bombing” has often been stressed, and if any doubts still exist among Pilots the following example should help to dispel them.
F/O McDonnell and crew, No.9 Squadron, have completed three bombing exercises since their arrival from No.5 L.F.S. and obtained the following results:-
[Table of Errors on Exercises]
Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.
These results show a fine understanding between the members of the bombing team, F/O McDonnell (P), F/O Fricker (A/B), and F/O Chorney (Nav.) which is all the more remarkable as F/O Fricker did not join the crew until the end of L.F.S. training. The errors speak for themselves and require no comment, but the fact that F/O McDonnell was a Staff Pilot at a Bombing and Gunnery School before coming to No.5 Group should provide food for thought.
Good results, operational or training, are obtainable only if every member of the bombing team realises the importance of his own contribution to the combined effort, and it is the Captain’s duty to ensure that his crew make every effort to obtain results similar to those mentioned above.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
F/O Jones has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.44 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Lowry, now tour-expired.
F/Lt. Foulkes has moved to No.617 Squadron and F/Lt. Arkieson has taken over the Bombing Leader’s duties at No.630 Squadron.
F/Lt. Wake, ex No.106 Squadron and No.1660 H.C.U. has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.61 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Nugent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
No.9 Squadron, Bardney, have carried their Bombing Analysis a step further than the majority of Squadrons in the Group, and there is no doubt that their methods are producing results.
Each crew has its own file which contains all the practice bombing results, including the Forms 3073 and signals giving the quadrant readings. In addition, a sheet of tracing paper with the graticule cross in the centre, is kept in the file and all bombs dropped by the crew are re-aligned on a common heading and transferred to the tracing paper. Therefore, when a crew has completed five exercises, there are approximately 30 bombs shown on their sheet and as they are all re-aligned on to a common heading it is easy to detect any tendency of the Air Bomber to sight slightly off the target.
These sheets do indicate that some Air Bombers consistently sight to one side of the target and steps can then be taken to eradicate this tendency.
Bombs dropped with a proven instrument error are marked in a different colour and can then be ignored when assessing the Air Bomber’s accuracy of sighting.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The following results have been received, all from No.56 Base.
S/Ldr. Walmsley, DFC – 119 yards
120 yards
150 yards (A.S.I. error)
F/Lt. Lewis (189 Sqdn.) – 123 yards
F/Lt. Gibson, DFC (49 Sqdn.) – 125 yards
No.56 Base would welcome a little competition from Bombing Leaders in other Bases.
[Underlined] BIG CHIEF COMETITION. [/underlined]
W/Cdr. Milward (No.619 Sqdn.) 61 yards.
An excellent exercise, which has seldom been beaten by any entrant in this competition.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. Which is the sighting angle flexible drive, the top or the bottom one?
2. In what respects does the normal 30 lb. I.B. differ from that used in the ‘J’ type cluster?
3. How is the heating device in No.13 bomb station controlled?
4. What are the Air Bomber’s duties in an aircraft joining the circuit after an operational flight?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BEST EXERCISES. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR CREW ERROR
9 F/O McDonnell F/O Fricker F/O Chorney 75, 63, 34
44 F/O Coventry F/S Gibson Sgt Ayre 39
57 F/O Pauline Sgt Cartwright Sgt Hole 47
61 F/O Cain F/S Lewis F/O Williams 75
F/O Crocombe F/S Devine F/O Reeves 78
227 F/O Osborne F/S Rochman F/S Kydd 74
617 F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O Mackie 72
F/L Lancey F/S Perry W/O Robin 80
619 F/O De Marco F/S Johnston F/S Sharman 65
F/O Davis F/S Page F/S Cook 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Squadron Bombing Competition Results]
No.83 Squadron head the January competition with a clear lead over the remainder of the Squadrons, six of whom failed to qualify.
No.61 Squadron have shown a great improvement over last month, when they failed to qualify. It would not be unexpected if they finish at the head of the table next month.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF CREWS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
For the month of January No.55 Base were credited with 52 ‘C’ categories, the correct number was 23.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice by Squadron]
No.627 Squadron:- 134 bombs with an average error of 77 yards, and 70 T.I’s with an average error of 139 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
The W/T control of operations during January maintained the high standard which is now characteristic of our W/T Controllers’ Operators. A pleasing feature of this operating is the accuracy of tuning and timing now being obtained by all Link aircraft. These are very important points, and this accuracy is now even more important than ever, as the time of opening W/T watch has been curtailed, thus allowing a much shorter time for the Main Force aircraft to be properly tuned to the Link aircraft. This should present no great problem to Wireless Operators, but it will require constant practice and training to maintain the standard now expected.
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During January, 48 Wireless Operators (Air) took part in the W/T Controllers’ Test, as laid down in 5G. S.S.I. No.13, and out of this number 32 passed as fit for control duties. The percentage of failures (33 1/3) is a measure of the severity of the test. The failures can be classified under two headings, viz. inaccuracy in tuning, and incorrect procedure. The first of these faults can be eliminated by practice tuning in the Squadron W/T Training Room, and the second by more thorough scrutiny of Air Staff Instructions, Part VI, Sigs/1, Page 7, para.10. Signals Leaders please note!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
Categorisation of all Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is being carried out enthusiastically by all Squadrons. The results at the end of January are as follows:-
[Table of Wireless Operator (Air) Categorisations by Squadron]
To ensure that this categorisation is being carried out in accordance with the instructions laid down in 5 Group letter 5G/S.14466/Sigs. dated
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
5th December, 1944, the Group Signals Leader, when visiting Squadrons, will check some of the Wireless Operators as to their eligibility for their category.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during January was, like the curate’s egg, good and bad in parts. The frequency (5220 kc/s) is not very suitable, being rather overcrowded, and efforts are being made to obtain another one for this exercise. The geographical position of some squadron installations, in relation to this Headquarters, makes reception of each other’s signals very difficult, but this is, perhaps, within limits, quite useful in training operators to work under difficult conditions. After each exercise a signal is now being despatched to each Base and Squadron concerned, giving a summary of the exercise.
[Underlined] APOLOGY. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary, in our appreciation of the work done by Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units in producing the type of Wireless Operator we require, we inadvertently left out the (O) A.F.U’s and 5 L.F.S. As continuity is essential throughout all training, the work done by these units is obviously on a par with the others. We regret this omission and assure these units that their work is just as much appreciated.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The signals failures percentage, against the 1,572 sorties flown during January, was 3.684. This shows an increase of 0.501 against the figure for December. Approximately 75% of the defects are attributed to faulty equipment and are, presumably, unavoidable. There was one servicing failure and one due to manipulation. Despite this increase in failures, not one sortie was cancelled as the result of a signals defect. There were three early returns, all of which were caused by faulty equipment. One revelation worthy of note is that there was only one T.R.1196 failure throughout the month – never has T.R.1196 serviceability been so high.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
The V.H.F. R/T serviceability shows a decrease against the figures for December. Of the 33 T.R.5043 defects, eight were due to broken whip aerials. Six of these aerials had been repositioned in accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10 (R.T.I.M. No.833), but owing to our inability to obtain the correct rubber grummets and paxolin plates, unsatisfactory substitutes had to be used. A very careful watch must be kept on existing non-standard V.H.F. aerial fittings. Meanwhile, further efforts are being made to obtain the correct items.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AMALGAMATION. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of attention was focussed this month on the problem of amalgamation of the Communications and Radar Maintenance Branches. Following a conference with No.56 Base representatives, a visit was paid to Linton-on-Ouse in No.6 Group, where a scheme is working with great success, and much useful information was gained. With this as a basis, an experiment was commenced in No.56 Base, from which some measure of success is expected.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EMPLOYMENT OF WIRELESS OPERATORS
(W.A.A.F.) IN RADAR. [/underlined]
Following up a suggestion by Mr. Wardley-Smith, of T.R.E., a scheme was put into effect in No.49 Squadron, Fulbeck, whereby ten Wireless Operators (W.A.A.F.) were attached to A.G.L.T. Daily Servicing Parties, and the R. & I. Section, No.49 Squadron, were warned that after one month’s training, six Radar Mechanics would be withdrawn from the squadron. A T.R.E. P.D.S. member has been attached to Fulbeck to observe the experiment, which is progressing favourably.
In view of the increasing employment of Wireless Operators in Radar duties, a series of courses was commenced at Bardney for their benefit. The duration of the course is a fortnight, and will cover Radar principles, Loran and Gee. Relevant films will be shown and practical work given. Although no startling results are expected, it is hoped to stimulate interest, and provide for any further knowledge.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
A most welcome chapter in the Loran story occurred last month, when Air Ministry decontrolled the supply of the equipment. This permitted immediate action to renew the rapidly dwindling stocks of spares and to silence the cynics who were saying that no sooner is an installation proved than the equipment goes off the market.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
As a result of the shortage of Radar personnel, the decision was made last October to curtail the fitting of H.2S. in No.53 Base, and concentrate personnel thrown up, into No.54 Base, with the object of obtaining the best from the H.2.S. available. Since that date, efforts have been made to legalise the position of these Radar mechanics. On January 19th official approval was given with the birth of the No.5 Group Special Radar Development Party, vacancies for which were given up by No.53 Base. Much good work has been done already by the party in their unofficial capacity, and continued and increasing success will be expected in the future, now that it is legalised.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gardening
The Group Gardeners operated on two nights this month, visiting the Eastern Gardens, and planted the small but effective total of 143 vegetables.
Bad weather limited the Command output to 668 vegetables, which is well below the present monthly lift, and clearly demonstrated the importance of taking every available opportunity to plant in good weather, so that the enemy’s minesweeping force may be employed to its maximum capacity and never allowed to relax for one moment.
[Underlined] COMMAND SUMMARY OF VEGETABLES PLANTED. [/underlined]
No. 1 Group – 235
No. 5 Group – 143
No. 4 Group – 137
No. 6 Group – 119
No. 3 Group – 34
[Underlined] GREAT STRENGTH RETURNS THE PENNY. [/underlined]
After months of hard work, and heavy Gardening operations, combined with the menacing effects of our Group’s bombing visits to the Oslo Fjord areas, interesting news is now coming to hand of some of the disturbing results achieved.
The main trooping ports in Oslo Fjord were closed on various occasions and the enemy has had to bring less suitable ports into use, and employ extra shipping in the effort to carry out his programme of transporting troops from Norway to Denmark. The Harbour Master of this district has been working overtime to compete with his difficulties in keeping an ‘Open Port’, and has bitterly complained that 12 mines exploded without warning between the 8th and 25th October, 1944.
A new transport the “DARES”, estimated at 7,000 tons, has joined the Oslo – Aarhus run, but she is reported to have returned to Aarhus on 2nd January with damage to her engines caused by mine. The “DONAU”, 9035 tons, also employed on this run, was sunk by sabotage in Oslo Fjord on 16th January, and the 6,360 tons “ULANGA” was last reported in floating dock as a result of bomb damage received during the bombing attack on shipping on New Year’s Eve.
Two more large transports, the “WINRICH VON KNIPRODE” (10,123 tons) and the “MAR DEL PLATA” (7,340 tons) have also been damaged by collision and marine risk, and so the enemy’s valuable fleet of twelve large transports has, for the time being, been reduced to seven.
The attack with bombs on 28/29th December also reduced the available shipping by sinking the “NORDVARD”, when 70 Germans were lost, damaging the “ANGAMOS”, an ex-Danish fruitship, and breaking the back of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
an oil lighter, the “SAONE”, now reported aground off the port of HORTEN. Three more ships were also sunk off MOSS.
THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED:-
“ROALNDSECK”, 1,845 tons, was damaged by an explosion on 17th January, after loading horses and material for Oslo; her cargo was unloaded subsequently and she was expected to dock for repairs.
The German vessel “GOTENHAFEN” was damaged by a mine prior to 27th November, 1944, and returned to Hamburg to discharge.
A minesweeper was sunk by a magnetic mine near Arundal, Norway, on 3rd January, 1945.
A German Auxiliary, believed minelayer, was mined and sunk 4 miles North of Rosnaes Light, at the Northern entrance to the Great Belt, on 5th January, 1945.
The Danish “FREDERICKSHAVN” 1,480 tons, damaged by a mine off Halls on 19th November, 1945.
The Norwegian S.S. “KONG TRYGVE”, 1,141 tons, mined at Moen and towed to Copenhagen.
The German “MARTHA HALM”, 984 tons, mined near Aarhus (probably November, 1944).
Norwegian “MARVEL”, 1,566 tons, slightly damaged by a mine off Kullen on 17th October, 1944.
“DORIANA” Danish Schooner, mined and sunk in Femersund late November, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] TRAINING ACTIVITIES DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
It was a month of snow, hail, fog and ice, but despite this the amount of training by Squadrons showed an increase on the December figures.
Squadrons did 3245 hours training – 2868 hours by day and 377 hours by night – giving an average od 180 hours per Squadron compared with 122 hours in December.
Some of the Squadrons occupying the lowest place in the training lists in December improved their position very much – in particular No.44 Squadron which recorded a total above the Squadron average.
The lowest Lancaster Squadrons were No.227 Squadron (99 hours), No.9 Squadron (124 hours), No.189 Squadron (140 hours) and No.57 Squadron (141 hours). Thus for the second consecutive month Nos. 227 and 189 Squadrons were behind in their training. No.9 Squadron is also showing low figures and for the last two months has done scarcely any air gunnery training. Fighter affiliation can always be included on bombing exercises.
No.627 Mosquito Squadron is lowest of all with 56 hours, but when its aircraft situation improves the training hours are expected to jump.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
There are now 273 pilots in the Group holding categories, leaving 142 yet to be categorised. The remaining pilots on Group strength are those not liable for categorisation because they have done more than 20 sorties in the main force and over 30 in No.54 Base Squadrons.
During the month 171 categories were given to pilots on New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks. No.54 Base showed good progress and are making up leeway rapidly now the Base has facilities for categorisation. This Base has also introduced Categorisation into No.627 Mosquito Squadron. The following table shows the state of Categorisation in the Group:-
[Underlined] RECORD OF CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisation by Base]
Total Categorised in January = [underlined] 171 [/underlined]
Total Categorised in Group = [underlined] 273 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The “percentage categorised” is based on recorded pilot strength on 31st January. This includes pilots not liable for categorisation.
[Underlined] ERRATA: [/underlined] Apologies to No.55 Base for an error which incorrectly put the Base “well behind in categorisation” in last month’s summary.
[Underlined] NO.5 L. F. S. REPORT [/underlined]
No.5 L.F.S. produced 49 crews for Squadrons at an average of 15 hours per crew, and its aircraft flew 840 hours. The crew total was the lowest in the Unit’s history because of the weather, and accommodation at Syerston is now at its maximum.
There are still approximately 160 crews to be trained by the L.F.S. before it disappears, and its last days are going to be strenuous. It is estimated by 1st April, 1945, the Staff will be able to say “D.C.O.” and pack their bags.
[Underlined] NO. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined]
There were 13 days during the month unfit for fighter affiliation – about the same as December – but fighter affiliation results were mush better. The Flight did 398 details, of which 332 were by day and 66 by night. The night details included 21 for No.75 Base.
The total hours for the Flight were 354 and the average hours per aircraft was 25. Pilots averaged 24 hours for the month.
The fine affiliation record which has been established by No.1690 B.D.T. Flight is still being marred by accidents. There were three again last month in the Flight, two the month before, and three the month before that.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
There was a further improvement in Link times. The average Squadron time has gone up from 78 hours in December to 101 hours in January but Nos. 9, 463, 97 and 617 Squadrons are still lagging behind.
[Table of Link Times by Base and Unit]
GRAND TOTAL (Including 5 LFS and 1690) = 2173:
ACTUAL AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 101 hours. REQUIRED AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 132 hours.
+ Marks the Squadrons where times are TOO LOW.
˨ 1690 B.D.T.F. and No.5 L.F.S. excluded from Base average.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “GEORGE” MARK VIII [/underlined]
The Auto Pilot Mark VIII is the latest and best type of “George”. One of our S.D. Squadrons has used it for 90% of all its operational flying time in recent months. Points to note:-
(i) Trim your aircraft BEFORE putting “George” in.
(ii) If “George flies one wing low, trim out with rudder bias.
(iii) Keep the trim indicator on the air pressure gauge central by adjusting the elevator trim.
(iv) When reporting unserviceability, give full information including behaviour of aircraft, air pressure and outside air temperature. Whenever possible take the mechanic up on an air test.
(v) Exercise “George” at every opportunity. The more it is used the better it is.
(vi) Read Pilots Noted General A.P.2095, Part IIIG – Auto Pilot, Mark VIII.
[Underlined] FIRST AID [/underlined]
Investigations into emergency landings at Woodbridge show that first aid in the air can do a lot to help the recovery of injured aircrew. Remember:-
(i) Keep the patient comfortable, warm and on oxygen.
(ii) Always use the First Aid dressing. Know when and how to apply a tourniquet.
(iii) One Ampoule of morphia is sufficient for a person in pain.
(iv) Do not remove flying clothing unless it is absolutely necessary to allow the wound to be dressed. Flying clothing provides warmth and a certain amount of splinting.
(v) The M.O. has a lot of useful tips. Talk to him.
FLY YOUR CORKSCREW – DON’T SKID ALL OVER THE SKY!
UP PORT
[Drawings]
IS LIKE THIS – [underlined] NOT [/underlined] LIKE THIS!
N.C.M.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
The first month of the year produced a “score” of 28 aircraft damaged in the Group. 11 were totally destroyed, 1 was Cat. ‘B’, 8 were Cat. ‘AC’ and 7 were Cat. ‘A’. Of the total, 14 were the result of technical failures, collisions on operations, or high winds, while one was unavoidably damaged when it hit birds in flight. 5 accidents are still “obscure”, leaving 8 accidents classed as definitely avoidable.
This shows a welcome drop in the “avoidable” rate, and even allowing for some of the “obscure” accidents eventually being classified accurately, the total is still well below the previous monthly average. This is a big step in the right direction at the beginning of the year. Here are the details:-
[Underlined] Squadrons. [/underlined]
[List of Avoidable Accident Type Numbers]
[Underlined] TAXYING ETC. [/underlined]
These accidents maintain their notorious position. Never a month but brings its depressing tale of careless taxying and M.T. collisions, and although, as a rule, severe damage is not sustained, these incidents are never excusable. Log Books are endorsed in “red” for careless taxying every month, and we can only repeat once again that it is folly and gross disobedience of orders to taxy at night without searching thoroughly ahead with taxying light or Aldis lamp.
[Underlined] HIGH GROUND ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
A Lancaster proceeded on a short navigation cross country recently. The pilot was briefed to set course over base at 4,000 feet. The aircraft left a base in this Group to fly due West for some 60 miles and back again. It must have been apparent to the pilot and navigator that the safety height near the end of the outward leg was much higher than at base, yet this crew descended through cloud and hit a hill in level flight, with all the engines under power. The hill was some 1,700 feet high. There were no survivors.
In spite of all that has been done to stamp out this “suicidal” descent through cloud, these incidents still occur, and by no means as seldom as is generally realised. All pilots and navigators take heed.
Another accident this month points almost the same moral. The results of the investigation are not yet forward, but it would appear that a Lancaster returning from an operation flew low in bad visibility, and hit a wireless mast. The pilot may have simply been trying to break cloud without checking his safety height, or he may have misread his altimeter, but in any case there is every indication that this was another completely avoidable fatal accident. Although the truth will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
never be completely known, the circumstances of this crash provide a warning to all. [Underlined] Do not [/underlined] come down to low heights in bad visibility to see the ground. Height spells safety every time, and good instrument flying clinches it.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below shows the avoidable accident position this month. This is, as usual, subject to revision when all accidents have been thoroughly investigated.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
Enemy fighter activity was comparatively slight during the month of January, 1945, and a total of only 38 combats took place over this period. Of these, 3 enemy aircraft are claimed destroyed, one of these being reported as a jet aircraft, and 5 are claimed as damaged.
Of the 38 combats, 9 were reported following the daylight operation on Bergen when Lancasters of Nos.617 and 9 Squadrons were repeatedly attacked by F.W.190’s. Crews from these Squadrons claimed 4 F.W.190’s damaged, and these have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. During these encounters the Hun made full use of the sun, and it is wondered how many Gunners went prepared, armed with spectacles, anti-glare. Each gunner is entitled to draw one pair of these spectacles on his clothing card, and it is hoped that Squadron Gunnery Leaders will check that Gunners are fully equipped.
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
14/15.1.45 “W” 189 Sqdn – ME.109
14/15.1.45 “M” 467 Sqdn – 1 Jet aircraft.
16/17.1.45 “D” 630 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
12.1.45 “U” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “W” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “S” 9 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “J” 9 Sqdn - FW.190
13/14.1.45 “M” 61 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) 10 points.
Night Affiliation (Without Camera) 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera and Gyro) 5 points
Day Affiliation (Camera only) 3 points
Day Affiliation (Without Camera) 1 point.
[Table of Air Training Scores Ranked by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
No.467 Squadron are to be congratulated on going to the top of the ladder, and also for completing 32 Night Affiliation exercises. Certain squadrons are still making scant use of their Gyro Assemblies, and it is hoped that next month’s returns will show an improvement in this respect.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] Total number of Affiliation exercises for January = 878 [/underlined]
In spite of 14 days of inclement weather which prohibited all flying, the total of Affiliation exercises shows a very creditable increase on the December total. Night Affiliation exercises are increasing steadily, and Infra-Red films are being taken more frequently. Self-towed drogue exercises have been completed by certain Squadrons, and it is hoped that next month Squadrons will use every endeavour to get the maximum number of crews carrying out this exercise. This is the one exercise where the gunner has the opportunity of firing his guns at a target whilst carrying out combat manoeuvres.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STOREHOUSES. [/underlined]
Covered storage for cluster projectiles containing 4 lb incendiary bombs has now been provided at all stations and the layouts should be in full working order.
Present stocks of clusters are low, but stations must be prepared to receive larger quantities which will test the efficiency of the organisation and layout of these stores. Full information is contained in the following letters and signal:-
5G/402/17/Org. dated 3.11.44.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 3.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 21.1.45.
Signal R.911 dated 27.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 4. 2.45.
Particular attention is drawn to the need for careful handling of uncased cluster projectiles in order to avoid damage to either the cluster tail or the tails of the 4 lb. bombs.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS. [/underlined]
We are well aware that preparing six copies of a defect report in accordance with A.P. 2608A and B.C.A.S.I’s causes a certain amount of inconvenience but unless these reports are submitted on every occasion, complete information on any one subject is not available. Instances have occurred where the ingenuity of Armament personnel has produced excellent modifications, but when forwarded to higher authority the reason for the modification is not understood because no defect reports have been rendered. Although “pen pushing” is not popular amongst Armament Technical personnel, it is, as you will see, necessary.
[Underlined] S.B.C’s. [/underlined]
Our old friend the S.B.C. is still called upon to perform its duty in delivering showers of 4 lb incendiary bombs upon our enemies. If reliable functioning of this equipment is to be ensured, the various tests and inspections laid down must be carried out conscientiously, more particularly so if S.B.C’s have not been used recently.
[Underlined] MAN-POWER. [/underlined]
The foregoing remarks will undoubtedly raise the question of lack of man-power. This deficiency is well known and aircrew cadets have been posted to units to assist armament personnel. These cadets are strong, healthy and intelligent and after elementary training, if armament personnel issue clear and concise instructions, they are quite capable of dealing with many of the jobs requiring unskilled and semi-skilled labour, thus relieving trained armament personnel to perform the more intricate technical duties.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
During the recent heavy snowstorms and frost, the fall on occasions reached five inches. Snow plans have been revised and were put into operation early, with a consequent higher degree of serviceability. Methods employed varied considerably because of local conditions and the amount of manpower available. The three methods generally used were “sand and salt”, ploughing and rolling. Sand and salt proved excellent under conditions of small falls, rolling where the fall was medium but a heavy fall required ploughing. Salting brought with it difficulties of drainage clearance and ordinary mechanical brushing was not always equal to the task. Similarly, the “Snowgo” was not of great assistance in conditions where the fall of snow was fine and a strong wind prevailed, but was of use following ploughing.
Except in the morning following the heaviest fall, stations maintained a high degree of serviceability. All stations were able to keep their runways serviceable and in only a few cases was there not a subsidiary runway available by the afternoon following overnight fall. In one or two cases lighting difficulties followed on the thaw, but were tackled promptly and except in one case were remedied at an early stage. The position was complicated by the high wind causing damage to outer circuit and funnel lighting.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
The P.W.D. has developed a new form of lighting, evolved from the F.I.D.O. installation. The apparatus is portable and is intended to assist aircraft in lining-up on the approach under conditions of poor visibility. Petrol from a 40-gallon drum is pumped manually through a 50-yards feed pipe into a pre-heater at the end of a 20-feet burner line which is pegged into the ground. The intense flame far exceeds the sodium burners in brilliancy and penetration. Following successful trials by 2nd T.A.F., various lay-outs are being tested at Balderton. When the most successful form has been found, a demonstration will be arranged.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] DITCHINGS. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred this month and another possible one was reported at the same time and in the same area. An aircraft, believed of 617 Squadron was seen to ditch on the 12th approximately 15 miles off the Norwegian coast. The ditching was seen by a number of crews and was well covered by prompt sighting reports. A Warwick standing by for just such an eventuality was quickly in position, and in making a dummy run saw the crew on the wing of the aircraft with no dinghy visible. As the airborne lifeboat was dropped, the aircraft sank. One man was seen to board the lifeboat and all but two of the others were seen to be making their way towards it. A Lindholme dinghy was then dropped to the two stationary members after which the Warwick, owing to the presence of enemy fighters had to withdraw.
In a position just North of the above ditching, an aircraft which was seen to be on fire over the target was believed to have ditched. A further lifeboat was dropped in darkness over the believed position.
In spite of intensive searches for these lifeboats and survivors from other incidents, nothing was found and it is believed that the survivors were found and picked up by the enemy.
[Underlined] HEAD INJURIES. [/underlined]
A medical report from the Emergency Landing Runways states:- “The majority of eye and face injuries are caused by perspex fragments, the eyes and upper head being involved more than the head below the eyes”. Most injuries have been caused by enemy action and the carrying of goggles (to be used whenever possible) by all crew members cannot be too strongly emphasised.
[Underlined] FIRST AID. [/underlined]
The above report also states “First Aid has, on the whole improved, but is still not up to the standard of the Americans. It was felt that poor First Aid was chiefly due to night condition, but that this is not the case has been proved by recent R.A.F. daylight raids. There is still the occasional casualty who has bled to death from a limb arterial wound and which could have been prevented by a properly placed tourniquet”.
Aircrew Safety Officers should institute a drive to improve the standard of First Aid.
[Underlined] THREE GOLDEN RULES. [/underlined]
When in doubt of your ability to:-
(i) Reach an airfield – initiate Emergency and Distress messages.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
(ii) Fly the aircraft – order your crew to “Put on parachutes”.
(iii) Land safely – order your crew to “Crash Landing Stations”.
A little time spent in studying for your own safety will afford you more time to study for your enjoyment.
[Underlined] THE DIVIDENDS. [/underlined]
Air Ministry report that 2161 aircrew (923 R.A.F. and 1238 Americans) were rescued in Home Waters during 1944 making a total, since the War began, of 5,467.
During last December 41 aircrew were rescued – this represents 19.3% of the aircrew involved in known ditchings.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
January produced only 1572 sorties; weather conditions were the retarding factor. The peack [sic] serviceability reached during January was 95.8% of Lancasters on charge: the balance of unserviceable aircraft was made up of aircraft undergoing Major Inspection and aircraft undergoing modification for special commitments. It was singularly fortunate that during this bad weather spell quite a number of aircraft became due, or almost due, for Major Inspection.
[Underlined] ENGINE FAILURES [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLAME TRAPS. [/underlined]
Much progress has been made with the methods of cleaning flame traps, and it is hoped that now local instructions have been given to C.T.O’s to remove flame traps at 150 or 225 hours according to the time available, and also to change the flame traps at any time they are suspected of being choked, that another source of engine failure has been eliminated. Under a scheme evolved by Messrs. Rolls Royce, these flame traps can be cleaned quite successfully in under half an hour. 53 Base are experimenting with their own washing bath and if successful this scheme will be introduced into each Base Major Servicing Section to cater for flame traps throughout the Base.
[Underlined] COOLING DUCTS. [/underlined]
Unfortunately, much unserviceability is being caused by the failure of the one-piece cooling duct and many hours are consumed in changing them after few flying hours. Command are controlling the supply of replacements but the situation is becoming serious owing to the extremely short life of this type of duct.
[Underlined] FAILURE OF NO.2 FUEL TANK. [/underlined]
The work entailed in changing No.2 tank is fully realised. The frequency with which these tanks spring a leak does not decrease, and many high speed tank changes have taken place to get the aircraft off on Ops to time. Although Mod.1179 was introduced with a view to reducing the number of No.2 tank failures, insufficient of these modified tanks have been received in the Service to make themselves felt.; as a result of enquiries, it seems pretty certain that many modified tanks are now coming through. No instance is known of a tank failing subsequent to the incorporation of Mod.1179.
[Underlined] CONTROL OF M.T. [/underlined]
In view of A.M.O. A.30/45, the complete responsibility of the maintenance organisation of Mechanical Transport now rests with the Engineer Branch. Due to a number of reasons which are well known to many, immediate improvements cannot be expected, nor will the position be eased without hard work and perfect co-operation. The broad policy has already been defined by Bomber Command Engineer Staff, and early in February it is anticipated that this Group will be in a position to request the attendance of the Command Engineer Officer to discuss the proposals for placing the M.T. maintenance on a sound footing. Man power is the obvious problem, and even with an increase in maintenance establishment the actual bodies will not be available for some time, if at all.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
This control of transport maintenance is an added responsibility to the already hard pressed C.T.O., but it was the natural course of events that this transfer of responsibility should take place as the first major consideration of the C.T.O. is the serviceability of aircraft, and with an inefficient mechanical transport section, the serviceability suffers considerably. C.T.O’s, in their own interests, must endeavour to give as much thought as possible to this transport problem without detracting from their personal interest in the operational efficiency of the aircraft.
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUEL GAUGES [/underlined]
A demonstration to prove the accuracy of petrol gauges was laid on at Coningsby on the 25th January, but unfortunately the weather intervened and it was agreed that it would be unsafe to carry out these trials; it was most disappointing as it was hoped that the accuracy or otherwise of these gauges would be proved once and for all. The demonstration will be laid on again at some future date, but in the meantime Flight Engineers can do much to help to prove the statement that these petrol gauges are sufficiently accurate to be relied upon. In the new Flight Engineer’s log (B.C. Form 10) on page 3 under the heading “Flowmeter Reading” four columns will be found; all Flight Engineers, in future, must record in these columns petrol gauge readings throughout the trip, paying particular attention to the reading just before landing and then checking the reading again when the aircraft is parked in dispersal. Care must be taken to read the gauge in the tail down position for this check. With the information gained from Flight Engineer’s Logs, and the results of the demonstration, it will be decided if gauge reading should replace dips to ascertain the fuel remaining in an aircraft after a trip.
[Underlined] PETROL CONSUMPTION. [/underlined]
Petrol consumption throughout the Group has shown a marked improvement over the past twelve months, but occasions still arise in squadrons where two or three aircraft use 210 gallons per hour when all other aircraft use an average of 180 gallons per hour. The Flight Engineer Leader must investigate these cases thoroughly. Points to note are air speeds, revs and boost used and A.S.I. in climb and descent. He must check the last six trips of these aircraft; if he finds high consumption in all cases he must report it to the C.T.O. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that it is the pilot and flight engineer to blame, he must report this to the Commanding Officer of the squadron who will undoubtedly see that the erring pilot and flight engineer receive instructions on engine handling.
[Underlined] FRESH RECRUITS. [/underlined]
When a new Flight Engineer reports to a squadron be must be thoroughly examined by the Flight Engineer Leader to ascertain if he is quite capable of carrying out his duties. Questions should be selected from the 5 Group Lancaster Quiz. If it is found that he is weak in any subject, instruction must be given him without delay. If convenient, the Flight Engineer Leader or his deputy should fly with him on his first N.F.T. or cross-country, to check him on aircraft drills and the way in which he handles throttles, rev levers and his fuel tank manipulation in the air. Any faults must be remedied before he becomes operational.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 L.F.S. Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
During the month of January, 54.6% of the night attempts produced successful ground detail photographs, a good figure for this time of the year, and an increase of 8% upon the previous month.
Examination of the table shown on the following page will reveal an improvement in the failures recorded, 5.62% as compared with December, 1944, 9.2% and November, 1944, 12.4%. It should, however, be clearly remembered that discarding the “bomb-door operation” of the F.24 camera is probably one of the causes for this reduction.
The descriptive list still contains many failures which should never occur, and it is hoped that the efforts of all concerned will result in a steady monthly decrease of all technical failures.
Photographers are again reminded that inability to trace the real cause generally results in a failure being classed as “obscure – photographic”. Therefore every effort must be made to root out the causes and to effect cures for future operations.
Now that all units except Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons are using 100% composite film, it will demand all the skill of the photographers and full supervision of the N.C.O’s to ensure that the attention to detail in making up the composite films, and their final processing is carried out in accordance with B.C. Composite Film Instructions. There is no room for slap dash work when working with colour film. Extreme care in making up the film, correct preparation of solutions, and exact time and temperature during processing are essential. Photographers are reminded that this branch of R.A.F. Photography was introduced by photographers of this Group, and the standards set must be maintained by all Bases.
H. 2. S. photography and the equipment, is not yet receiving the attention that is necessary. This branch of photography is as important as the normal F.24 photography, and Senior N.C.O’s are to see to it that all their staff are skilled in producing the best results in the shortest possible time. The local manufacture of perspex trays and fixed vertical enlargers should do much to solve dark-room problems.
It is not enough to produce good photographs, unless they are available for the Air Staff in the shortest possible time, and in this respect the S.I.O’s and Photographic N.C.O’s should remember that A.C.I.U. waits for all films to arrive before commencing their analysis. This is being delayed unnecessarily because some films are not reaching this Headquarters until five and six days after the raid, and in some cases failure films are as much as 14 days overdue. All films, whether ground detail, target conditions, or technical failures, must reach this Headquarters within the time limits prescribed in B.C.Ph.I’s.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS – NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Results Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding those due to Target Conditions –“T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of attempts.
NOTE + (Armt. I = Armt. [underlined] Technical [/underlined] Failures.
(Armt.II = No flash illumination – presumed flash failures.
Owing to the limited number of Day operational sorties during the month of January, 1945, a ladder will not be compiled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] decorations
Supplement No.36866 to London Gazette dated 29th December, 1944.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following promotion in, and appointments to, the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire:-
To be Additional Knight Commander of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Air Vice Marshal The Honourable Ralph Alexander Cochrane, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Officer of the Military Division of the Military Division [sic] of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Wing Commander Walter Edward Dunn (35210), Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Members of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Acting Squadron Leader Edwin Maurice Undery (79198) R.A.F.V.R.
Acting Flight Lieutenant Henry Rutter Locke (101687) R.A.F.V.R.
The KING has been graciously please to approve the award of the British Empire Medal (Military Division) to the undermentioned:-
560272 Flight Sergeant Frank Haines, Royal Air Force.
The following IMMEDIATE award were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
W/C J. WOODROFFE, DFC & BAR DSO
W/C M.A. SMITH DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O I.H. BYERS DFC
F/SGT G.F. CARTWRIGHT DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/C J.A. INGHAM, DFC, AFC DSO
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O S.V. GEORGE DFC
SGT W.T. STOKES DFM
F/L W.M. KYNOCH DFC
SGT D.J. ALLEN CGM
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT R.H. PAYNE DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] DECORATIONS [/underlined]
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.F. LEWIS DFC
F/O R.G.W. GROSS DFC
F/O B. GRIFFITHS DFC
P/O E.C. REDFERN DFC
P/O G.F. MAULE DFC
P/O W.J. SHEPPARD DFC
F/O J.D. MELROSE DFC
P/O B. TAYLOR DFC
P/O W.R. HORNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J.A. PETERSON DFC
F/O C.H. SHEPHERD DFC
F/O J.W. MOORE DFC
W/O C.B. WATTS DFC
F/O A.R. DEARDEN, DFM DFC
F/SGT R.D. KERR DFM
SGT S.G.D.L. MAJOR DFM
F/O S.A. MORRIS DFC
P/O A.M. HOLMES DFC
SGT A.L. CUNNINGHAM DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT F.A. WELLS DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.E.W. WYNARD, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O P.M. ABBOTT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H.G. McLEOD DFC
F/L H.W.T. ENOCH DFC
F/O E.R. OLIVER DFC
F/O E.H.E. HEARN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O A. GEORGE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O C. SHILLAW DFC
P/O C.V. ALLEN DFC
F/O E. GLOVER DFC
F/O N.J. MacDONALD DFC
F/O J.S. BEARD DFC
F/O M.T. CLARKE DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.J. LING DFC
F/O S. PARKER DFC
F/O H.L. INNISS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. BOOKER DFC
P/O C. SUMMERSCALES DFC
W/O M.F. INGMIRE DFC
F/L W.E. SIDDLE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L A.C. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.J. WOOLNOUGH DFC
P/O W. HARVEY DFC
W/O G.O. EDMUNDS DFC
F/L W.G. COOPER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.B. CANEVER DFC
P/O A. McCRACKEN DFC
F/SGT R. SMITH DFM
F/L C.C. SHERRING DFC
F/O H.W. HAGGERSTON DFC
F/L W.G. ROGERS DFC
F/O W.E. CLAYFIELD DFC
W/O G.A. CARVELL DFC
F/L W.M. REID, DFC BAR TO DFC
S/L W.G. WISHART, DFC & BAR DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O E.W. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.K. BRADY DFC
F/O J.A. GIDDENS DFC
F/O F. PARKER DFC
P/O N.A. FERGUSON DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. HATTAM DFC
F/O B.K. PURDY DFC
F/L G. GARDEN DFC
F/L A.R.H. MORRIS DFC
F/O G.M. DENHOLM DFC
F/O K. SCHULTZ, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.W. BOARD DFC
F/L D.J. JOHNSTONE DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O N.J. ERB DFC
F/O A.W. ALLISON DFC
SGT J. PALIN DFM
P/O V.A. BAGGOTT DFC
F/L D.F. McLAUGHLAN DFC
P/O S.J. HAYTON DFC
P/O H.R. PURSER DFC
P/O L.W. WEAVER DFC
P/O C. DEAN DFC
P/O B.F. KENT DFC
F/O S.A. SEMPLE DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.H. CHENEY DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.G. STEVENS DFC
P/O A.B. NEILSON DFC
P/O J.R. HILL DFC
P/O K.H. YOUDALE DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT W.W.M. DEBOOS, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L J.B. MITCHELL DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.R. KERR DFC
P/O W.K. GOODHEW DFC
F/O H. LONG DFC
P/O D.R. MALLISON DFC
P/O M.A. SWAIN DFC
P/O R.P. MITCHELL DFC
F/O R.L. McCANN DFC
F/SGT E.J. BROWNE DFM
W/C BLOME-JONES DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Results Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COLD WEATHER. [/underlined]
The whole country has recently had one of the coldest spells in human memory; in fact in Lincolnshire we thought it much colder. At any rate Equipment Officers managed to keep their stations fairly warm. In view of the strictness of the regulations on rationing of coal and coke they are to be congratulated.
Equipment Officers should look to their fuel stocks; there may be another cold spell.
[Underlined] THEFT. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers should check every now and again the registered mail book. A case has come to light where an N.C.O. Equipment Assistant made it his job to collect the registered mail and also by some means managed to get the blue I.V’s given to him. Thus by destroying certain of the blues he was able to get away with quite a number of watches.
So carry out surprise checks on the registered mail.
[Underlined] CONFERENCE. [/underlined]
The Group Equipment Officers’ Conference was held this month at Bomber Command. Many points of interest were discussed and the minutes which have been received at this Headquarters will be passed to Base Equipment Officers in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] A LETTER FROM “A DEAD CITY”
We publish below a letter written from Brunswick to a German Soldier on 17th November, 1944. The names and address shown are entirely fictitious, but the letter itself is authentic.
Beckenwerker Strasse 157
Braunschweig
Nov 17
My Dear Karl,
I would have replied to your last letter earlier but in consequence of the great raid on Braunschweig we were without light or water for a long time and we are still without gas. Braunschweig was completely reduced to dust and ashes by a heavy night raid on the 15th. October. We were very lucky – the Forchaus is still standing quite undamaged. The Kraft Durch Freude Hall and factory bay and a hostel were destroyed. It is said that Braunschweig is the most severely damaged town, apart from Darmstadt. Gauleiter Lauterbacher called Braunschweig “the dead city”. Its innumerable citizens were charred or burned in their cellars, there are even yet any number of missing. The numbers of dead runs to about a thousand. All the same the victims are few when considering the destruction. We are at present completely cut off from the world; as our station is destroyed, as well as the signal box and the installations, no trains are arriving here.
We are weary of the war and hope it will end soon. God keep you.
Emma.
Reference is made to the attack by aircraft of this Group on the night of 14/15th October, 1944, which was dealt with in detail and photographs published in the November issue of the NEWS.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR JANUARY, 1945 - £8,711 13. 6d.
A – Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL. [/underlined]
No. 53 Base … 28
No. 54 Base … 28
No. 55 Base … 24
No. 56 Base … 20
No. 75 Base (“For Attention Base Intelligence Officer”) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command … 6
Headquarters, Bombe Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickens, O.R.S., H.Q. B.C. … 1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q., P.F.F., Wyton … 1
P.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (vis H.Q. B.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2 …2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. … 1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr. Nairn M.A.P., Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank, S.W. 1
A/Cdr. H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.), King Charles Street, Whitehall … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey. … 1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C.-in-C., Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C. 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Commodore H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., Headquarters, No.54 Base 1
S/Ldr. D.A. Green, D.S.O., D.F.C., Bomber Command Tactical School, Finningley … 1
Headquarters, No.92 Group … 6
Headquarters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 25, 54, 91, Groups 1
Headquarters, No.29 Group … 12
Nos. 11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No. 16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No. 93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College, Beach Hotel, Weston-Super-Mare 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No.25 Group, School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
92 Group Navigation & Signals Instructors’ School, Little Horwood, Nr. Bletchley, Bucks … 1
Aircrew School, Balderton … 2
Bomber Command Instructors’ School, Finningley … 2
[Underlined] INTERNAL. [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. …1
OPS. 1 … 1
S.MET.O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS. RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE … 1
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Stamp]
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bdy.
2 Minuted.
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V Group News, January 1945
5 Group News, January 1945
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Five Group Newsletter, number 30, January 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on famous last words, operations, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, signals, gardening, training, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, gunnery, armament, flying control, aircrew safety, engineering, photography, decorations, war effort, equipment, a letter from a dead city, war savings,
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1945-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Germany--Braunschweig
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
France--Royan
Belgium--Houffalize
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Leuna
Czech Republic--Most
Norway--Bergen
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1945-01
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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[Underlined] 53 Base Commander [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
JANUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] [indecipherable] * NUMBER 18
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The final battle of Germany has now been joined. The enemy has been forced to concentrate two-thirds of his whole fighter strength for the protection of his citied, thus providing a classis example of the way in which air superiority, contrary to popular opinion, is won as much by the bomber as by the fighter. Crews should know that the superiority which the Russian Air Force enjoys on the Eastern Front, with all that this means to Russian military operations, is largely their doing; and the same is true of the Italian theatre.
This massing of the German fighter strength in an attempt to stop our attacks and those of the U.S.S.A.F.E. calls for serious thought on our part. In the long run the effect of the combined R.A.F. and American attacks will reduce the German fighter production so that they will be unable to support their present first line units, and the force will slowly diminish, but this is not a result which can be expected immediately, and much hard fighting lays ahead.
Bomber attacks are planned to reach the target having encountered as little opposition as possible. This is achieved by taking advantage of weather which will keep fighters on the ground, or involve them in great hazards if they take off; by careful routeing; by feint attacks; and by the full use of the radio offensive which prevents orders reaching the German pilots. In spite of this planning, scheming and foxing, a proportion of fighters are bound to get into the bomber stream. It is then that the tactics of the individual crews win or lose the battle.
There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand it may be considered that the sole duty of a crew is to reach the target and bomb it. Therefore, it is said it is imprudent to become involved in any fighting, and a crew should do its best to avoid combat and only open fire if directly attacked, and then only after failing to shake off the fighter by manoeuvre. On the other hand, while accepting that it is the object of the bomber to reach the target, refusal to engage in combat, while possibly safeguarding the individual, may by no means be the best for the force as a whole.
The German night fighter pilot must pray fervently that crews will adopt the first policy, for then he can cruise in the bomber stream unconcerned, except to find and stalk an unsuspecting prey. He will not be shot at by a bomber, which he has failed to see below him or to one side, and he can devote his whole attention to manoeuvring for the final shot. In other words he has a job almost free from the hazards of war, and as a result he will grow fat, and gain in skill and experience, and, therefore, in his ability to do us harm.
Now consider the other policy – to shoot at every German aircraft within range. About that policy I will say this. Firstly, that it is in general the duty of every combatant officer and man of any of His Majesty’s Forces to attempt by every means in their power, to destroy such of the King’s enemies as come within range. Secondly, that execution of this duty will aid the security of the bomber force as a whole, and, therefore, of the individual crew.
The matter is not, however, entirely straightforward, and there are two situations which have to be considered. Firstly, one in which a crew sees an enemy fighter not in a position to attack them but attacking, or about to attack, another bomber. They should be prepared to go in and shoot it down. At the foot of this foreword will be found some selected combats in which crews have acted in this way. They acted rightly, and deserve the congratulations of all in the Group, for they saved the lives of other crews, and rid us of pests who, if not destroyed, will quickly become adept at the art of killing at night.
The second situation is more complicated. A crew know, from their early warning device, that a fighter is nosing after them, and will soon be in a position to attack. Should they continue on their course until it is within range, and then attempt to shoot it down? Emphatically no – because the fighter in these circumstances has certain advantages which will give him temporarily the upper hand. The crew should carry out the standard corkscrew, remembering that this is designed to give the Gunners a standard deflection shot, known to them but not to the fighter pilot. Hence the importance of keeping to the exact standard speeds, rates of turn, loss and gain in height etc., set out in 5 Group Tactical Notes. Any other manoeuvre executed in the heat of action will provide the Gunners with deflection shots which, with present equipment, they have no means of calculating, but which the fighter pilot will find no more, and probably less, difficult to assess than the corkscrew.
Thus, while the standard corkscrew can be used as a manoeuvre for disengaging from enemy fighters, it is also a manoeuvre – and in fact the only manoeuvre – which we can employ and at the same time shoot accurately. Different speeds or rates of turn, or any skid or slip, may cause the Gunner to miss by 40 feet or more. In particular, too high a speed on the downward legs will lessen the rate of turn and, therefore, provide an easier shot for the fighter.
The policy outlined above was first set out in June, 1943. Over the following four months the Group shot down 58 fighters, but recently the numbers have been less, because I believe some crews are in doubt as to the correct action to take.
There is one final point; there must be no firing at an aircraft unless it is identified beyond any reasonable doubt. There have been instances in the past of Lancasters firing on other Lancasters, and there can be no justification for this.
To sum up, every crew in the Group should know that weather – routes – spoof targets and all other devices at the disposal of Bomber Command – are used to out-manoeuvre the German Fighter Force. It can only be out-fought if every crew in the Group is ready to “FORCE HIS WAY IN AND FIGHT HIS WAY OUT”. By that means we shall reduce the power of the German fighter to do us harm, to our own lasting advantage.
Need I add that the Air Gunners are playing a more and more vital part in the success of the bomber offensive. It is their quickness of eye and hand which determines success or disaster – but they are gravely handicapped if the pilot does not keep to the standard corkscrew, and may be caught unawares if the Wireless Operator relaxes his watch on his Monica or Fishpond tube. Such, then, is the team on which we rely to defeat the enemy fighters.
[Underlined] 23/24th August, 1943. J/207. [/underlined] Twin-engined enemy aircraft attacking another aircraft at 800 yards range. Rear gunner opened fore at 700 yards. Enemy aircraft broke in two and hit the ground in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 22/23rd November, 1943. P/619. [/underlined] Rear gunner saw ME109 attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster “P” turned starboard and Rear Gunner opened fire at 200 yards range and scored hits. ME.109 reversed and dived violently to port, emitting flames. Enemy aircraft disappeared in the cloud, after which an explosion was seen. ME.109 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 26/27th November, 1943. Z/44. [/underlined] Rear gunner sighted ME.210 flying to attack another Lancaster ahead. Lancaster Z corkscrewed and both gunners opened fire at 800 y ards [sic] range. Enemy aircraft followed the corkscrew and fired a burst which went well above [sic] Both gunners kept firing short burst, registering hits. Enemy aircraft seen to disintegrate by another crew, and ME.210 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 16/17th December, 1943. A/44. [/underlined] ME.109 sighted 600 yards range parallel, following another Lancaster. ME.109 opened fire on another Lancaster who did not return fire. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits. ME.109 burst into flames and disintegrated. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 30/31st January,1944.U/44. [/underlined] Over target area Rear Gunner sights ME.210 800 yards down attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster U was corkscrewing on a Monica IIIA indication. Rear Gunner opened fire and strikes were observed. Enemy aircraft dived away with port engine on fire. Last seen entering cloud in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographs with plottable ground detail obtained during January, was 73; these were almost entirely due to the conditions prevailing during the Stettin raid. For the remaining raids, the presence of heavy cloud caused the majority of technical successful exposures to be placed into the Target Conditions category.
Failures for the month were 58, which represents 5.4%. These failures can be reduced considerably if the personnel concerned will make the necessary effort, and it is suggested that still more co-operation is needed between the Bombing Leaders, Electrical, Armament and Photographic personnel in tracing the causes and ensuring that failures are not repeated. The first step in film fault analysis is to decide the ‘bombing frame’; failure to do this correctly will normally cause the investigation to be abortive and a complete waste of time.
There is reason to think that insufficient care is being exercised when setting the fusing time on the Type 35 Control. It is of the utmost importance that the fuse setting and the Type 35 Control are identical. Squadron photographers must realise that the setting is extremely critical, and even a small misadjustment of the Control Setting Knob will normally be sufficient to cause the flash illumination to be misplaced, and may therefore be considered a ‘pick-up’, resulting in a theoretical failure.
A new method of Night Photography is being tried out by Nos. 44 and 49 Squadrons. This is the use of Kodacolour film on frames Nos. 3 and 4 and H.S. night film on the remaining frames. The object of this composite Colour and Black and White is to photograph any T.I’s and Sky Markers in colour and at the same time to procure ground detail on Frame 5 by the illumination provided by the photo flash if conditions permit. The Photographic Section, R.A.F., Scampton, have undertaken to make up and process the films, and with full co-operation of the Station Workshops, have produced some very fine work.
It is too early to forecast whether this new method will generally be adopted. Much depends on the value of interpretation, supply of Kodacolour and technical equipment, but so far results are very promising.
[Table of Photographic analysis results by Squadron]
[Table of Photographic failure analysis results by Squadron]
A.S.R. (CONTINUED)
(Continued from back page Col. 1)
follows :-
(i) 256 aircrew lost their lives when other members of their crews were saved, which gives a strong indication of incorrect dinghy drill being carried out.
(ii) 23 lost their lives after having been sighted in dinghies – weather and lack of knowledge of searching procedure were the main causes for this.
(iii) 663 are known to have come down in the sea but no S.O.S. signal was transmitted making search almost impossible.
(iv) 280 disappeared over the sea without word or trace.
The above figures show that aircrews generally have a very sad lack of knowledge of what to do in the event of an emergency over the sea, both as regards W/T procedure and dinghy drills. A tremendous amount of money has been spent building up the Air Sea Rescue Service, and in providing safety equipment for aircrews, all of which can work satisfactorily with the full co-operation of the aircrews for whose benefit they have been designed.
When you bale out over enemy territory, your future welfare depends on your own initiative [underlined] after [/underlined] you have come to earth, but the reverse holds good in baling out over the sea or ditching. Emergency incidents over the sea depend for their success on full crew co-operation and knowledge of W/T procedure and dinghy drills – all of which must be gained [underlined] before [/underlined] the incident occurs.
One hour a week spent on the study of search procedure, emergency and S.O.S. W/T procedure, and dinghy drills, is sufficient to ensure that you will never be caught unprepared in case of emergency over the sea.
[Underlined] HELP A.S.R. TO HELP YOU [/underlined]
OPERATIONS
It would perhaps not be inopportune in the first month of the New Year, to reflect on one of the most valuable technical inovations introduced this time last year, and which is to-day largely instrumental in waging the Battle of Berlin with unabated vigour. It was just a year ago that blind bombing was first on trial and an analysis of its success or otherwise was anxiously awaited. This month, with the aid of this technique, we were enabled to conduct seven raids on Berlin, and one each on Brunswick and Magdeburg. Stettin alone, to its everlasting regret, was cloud free. 1341 sorties were flown, of which 89% were successful in attacking the primary. Increased fighter activity and the long range at which targets were attacked perhaps accounted for the rather higher loss rate of 4.6%.
At the beginning of this month, Hitler declared “The Winter may be difficult. Its blows, however, cannot hit us harder than last year”. The month was not out before this illusion was shattered by a sustained series of attacks on the Nazi capital, bringing the tonnage dropped since the beginning of the Battle of Berlin, to over 24,500 tons. One is perhaps best able to appreciate the magnitude of this figure when it is borne in mind that 50,000 tons would “Hamburgise” Berlin. The latest reconnaissance to secure photographic evidence of the raids up to and including 2/3rd January, was made on 4th January, but only poor quality photographs of parts of the city (excluding in particular the centre) were obtained. These however revealed important industrial damage in the Johannisthal district to the South East, with severe damage to several less important business and residential areas. It is interesting to note that in a statement issued by Transocean on 7th January, it was estimated that the damage sustained up to that date would take some 7 1/2 years to rebuild.
Little is yet known of the remaining 4 major attacks of the month against the Reich capital on 20/21st, 27/28th, 28/29th and 30/31st, except that reports suggest they were concentrated. Ground information points to the significant fact that with the possible exception of the North Eastern outer suburbs of the city, not a district in the capital has escaped. Impressive as this picture is , it really affords no index to the scale of administrative dislocation which must be a most acute problem for the Nazis; added to which the paralysis of the focus of German was industry and transport, together with the ever increasing influence of the raids on that intangible factor, morale, would also appear to promote a depressing effect on the Hun’s capacity to wage war.
The attack on Stettin on 5/6th January, provided adequate material for our reports. The blanket of cloud, which for some time past has shrouded the continent, was absent at the target, enabling the snow outlined town to be clearly identified. The resultant attack was well concentrated, and P.R.U. cover indicates severe damage in the Southern half of the town centre, extending into the West and East basins of the dock area. Ten buildings of the large military barracks to the South of the town have been gutted, and fairly heavy damage was sustained by business and residential property. The same night a
(Continued on page 4, col. 1)
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT RATE INCREASES
Halfway through January, it was apparent that the excellent accident figure for December was not to be repeated, and the number of avoidable accidents, of all kinds, by the end of the month was nearly doubled – 18 against 10.
This month’s total is made up as follows: Ground collisions – 9; Overshoots on landing – 3; Heavy landings – 1; Swings on take-off – 1; Other errors of judgement – 3.
In spite of all that has been done and written about “ground collisions” there has been no decrease whatsoever in these avoidable accidents. This month there were again 9, and they follow much the same patter as those of December, with this difference:-
Two aircraft were damaged in dispersal while being run up by ground crew, through chocks slipping on greasy surfaces. In both instances the aircraft swung round and collided with obstacles.
It has been a long time since an accident of this type occurred in the Group. The remedy is obvious. Ground crews must examine all chocks for serviceability, keep dispersals well sanded, and, above all, never start to run up engines until the dispersal is clear of obstructions. It is the old, old story of a little foresight paying a big dividend.
During this month a taxying incident occurred in which a major contributory factor was the failure of a captain of aircraft and of ground crew to notify Flying Control quickly that a Lancaster was obstructing the perimeter track. The aircraft had become bogged in soft ground just off the track at night, and was struck by another Lancaster taxying, without an aldis lamp, and at excessive speed.
Flying Control, had they known, could have taken immediate steps to have the aircraft marked as an obstruction, and could have warned other captains of its position.
This accident adds emphasis to the warning in last Month’s News that ground crew should make every effort to let pilots know of obstructions. The captain of this particular Lancaster showed bad captaincy in not notifying Flying Control, and also in leaving his aircraft in charge of ground crew when he knew it was in a dangerous position.
Needless to say, the pilot of the moving aircraft had his log book endorsed in “RED”.
The 3 “overshoots on landing” this month bring out the usual pilot error – too fast an approach in bad visibility and failure to go round again. If the various factors of height, speed, cockpit drill etc., are not correct, it is no use “hoping you’ll stop in time”. It might be all right nine times out of ten, but the tenth means another Lancaster in a heap at the end of the runway.
One crash occurred again this month on a 3-engined overshoot. The pilot was an experienced captain with many Lancaster hours to his credit, yet he [underlined] failed to keep in trim for 3 engined flying [/underlined] on his approach. When the engines were opened up to full power, the inevitable swing caught him unawares. Result was a bad crash with fatal consequences.
Drills and instructions are not issued by this Headquarters just to be read and forgotten, so if there are any you are not sure about, now is the time to brush up your knowledge. [Underlined] You [/underlined] will reap the benefit.
Conversion Units had a bad time this month. The total of nine “avoidables” exceeds the total of all the Squadrons put together. Winthorpe had four. 1660, 1654 and 5 L.F.S. had one each. 1485 Flight had two taxying accidents.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
FRESHMEN
1. Remember the lowest fuel consumption is not obtained when you are flying at the lowest possible speed. With the increased angle of attack of the wings at a low speed, you get increased drag and consequently require a greater power output. Neither maximum endurance nor maximum range will be obtained by flying as slowly as you can, so don’t “waffle” around the sky hanging on to your props. If you are getting short of petrol and have got a long way to go, try 2000 revs + 3 boost. That will give you a healthy airspeed, economical petrol consumption and excellent range.
2. You know why you can expect climbing difficulties on warm nights? The air is thinner at a given aeronoid height and so increases the true air speed at which the aircraft must be flown and the power required to fly it. The thinner air also reduces the charge drawn in to the engine and so reduces the power available.
3. Don’t sheer off track because you see pinpoints of flak dead ahead. It may be anything up to 100 miles away and as you get closer you will find that your route will probably bypass the flak area. Flak which explodes with a large orange coloured flash is within 15 mls and is quite harmless. It is only when you can hear or feel it that it is within 250 feet and getting dangerous. If you SMELL it, well get cracking.
[Cartoon]
4. Always take a note at Briefing of the times of the other waves in the attack in case you strike trouble on the way and cannot make good your T.O.T. Aim to make good the T.O.T. of another wave. It is safer to be bombing with bags of company.
5. Give your Navigator as good a platform for his Astro shots as you give your Air Bomber for his bombing run. Hand over to “George” if your instrument flying is not 100% and let the Navigator know the moment you consider the aircraft is as stable as it is likely to be.
6. If you use Caffein tablets it is a good plan to take one as you leave the English Coast outward bound. That will see you to the target. Take another when you are clear of the defences to see you home. Never take any just before take-off. Once upon a time there was a mid-upper gunner who took four tablets 10 minutes before take-off. The “Op” was scrubbed. The gunner wasn’t seen for 24 hours after he eventually went to sleep about noon the next day. Then he was posted !
VETERANS
1. Don’t get out of touch with existing orders. You have read them once, but only by constantly referring to the Flight Order books can you be sure that you have got them buttoned up. Just one example – never take off rudder bias on the approach for a 3-engined landing. You can easily control any tendency to swing after landing, but if you have to overshoot on 3 engines, the bias is the only thing that will enable you to control the immediate swing towards the dead engine at full power. If the swing is not controlled the result is fatal.
2. Another word on overshoots. You can still overshoot even though you are in the green of the G.P.I. and the airspeed is O.K. This circumstance may arise if your initial approach has been too low and you have used the extra engine to get back into the Green. Don’t forget once you have made good the undershoot throttle back again and get your angle of descent right.
3. Don’t attempt to raise flaps after landing when you have “pulled the bottle”, because there is a danger of bursting the header tank. If in an emergency you have to raise flaps in the air after pulling the bottle, do so slowly and in stages.
4. If you have to jettison fuel, close the valve while there is still 75 to 100 gallons in each tank. It is a precaution against fire, because the last 30 gallons of jettisonable fuel runs out slowly and splashes over the airframe. Never jettison if you are going to do a wheels up landing when there is any likelihood of fire.
5. Never take off flap during an approach if you suddenly decide you don’t want flap in a very high wind. The lowering of the flap increases the lift coefficient of a wing and any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the stalling speed being increased above the approach speed.
6. Get together regularly with the other members of your crew behind a hangar or in the crew room and exchange ideas on your recent trips. There’s bound to be a few points in crew routine that need patching up. Don’t wait until there is a party in the Sergeants’ Mess before you find out that the crew have a thing or two on their minds.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 3.
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SIGNALS
WIND MESSAGES
Bomber Command Signals Staff Instructions commence with an “Order of the Day” by the C.-in-C. which says that :- “The tradition of the Signals Service is that the safety of aircraft overrides every other consideration and every other interest…The Signals Service aspires never to lose an aircraft”.
Since this message was originated, many and varied aids have been introduced falling within the purview of the Signals Service which attain towards the achievement of this objective.
It is generally agreed that losses in the main bomber force may be considerably reduced if a high degree of concentration of aircraft during the route to and from the target, and at the target itself, can be effected.
Radar/Navigation aids fitted to many aircraft now make it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy, the velocity and direction of winds at the height and in the area of the main force. The means of communicating this to the Meteorological staffs on the ground, and of passing to every aircraft on the force the assessment of accurate winds on their route, is the responsibility of the Signals Service.
This method has been in use since towards the end of the Old Year, and, from the signals aspect, has been successful. The method used has been for wind-finding aircraft to transmit their winds to the Base D/F Station, and the ground staff to transmit the wind assessment to the main force on Group operational frequency.
The transmissions by Wind Finders to Bases gives an increase on the number of channels, with a better spread over of the volume of traffic at any one time. To ensure that every message which can possibly be received, is received, an additional watch is maintained at each Base on a normal receiver, and a watch, on each frequency in use, at Group Headquarters. The watch at Group Headquarters serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables received winds to be in the Meteorological Officers’ hands in the minimum time, and secondly, provides an additional check on the Base D/F frequencies. Any Wind Finding aircraft unable to establish satisfactory communication on its Base frequency, reverts to the Group operational frequency, and by these means we have been successful in receiving almost 100% of wind finding messages transmitted. There have been two occasions when conditions on the 3 to 4 m/c band made communication rather difficult, and in order to provide an additional channel should this re-occur, an allotment of a frequency in the 7 m/c band has been obtained. The results of this frequency on similar occasions, should they arise, are awaited with interest.
The reception of the wind assessments by the main force has been good, but could be improved. Generally, the number of messages missed has been in the region of 2.5% of the total which should have been received.
The loop aerial has proved a reliable selectivity device, and it should always be tried when other efforts to get rid of jamming fail.
GEE
The introduction of new equipment leaves Radar Sections less time for standard Gee maintenance. It is gratifying to note that, in spite of this, the serviceability remains high. There are however, numerous unnecessary faults, which render the equipment difficult to use, or completely unserviceable. Great care should be taken to prevent slipshod D.I’s, and faults such as leads off etc. Many Squadrons are still reporting divider trouble, indicating that the necessary modification has not been completed. If this is due to a shortage of equipment, ask the Equipment Officer to expedite.
AURAL MONICA
Aural Monica is slowly disappearing. Many crews would, however, like to keep Monica, even though they now have Fishpond. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the Radar Sections to maintain both installations in all aircraft.
VISUAL MONICA
This installation remains a most effective and valuable Radar aid. Serviceability is high in comparison with other equipment, but to be a first class warning device, 100 per cent serviceability is required. Switch motors have caused nearly one third of Visual Monica failures, but it is hoped that this trouble will soon be cleared, since the correct type of grease has now been found. Next month should show a large increase in serviceability. Unfortunately, there is no more equipment available, so squadrons must ensure that no sets remain unserviceable, or are destroyed, through careless maintenance. Many crews already owe much to Visual Monica. Don’t let the lack of serviceability spoil a first class device.
H 2 S
The fitting of H 2 S is greatly retarded by the shortage of scanners. It is impossible to fit all H 2 S aircraft in the existing squadrons, and so there is little likliehood [sic] of fitting new H 2 S squadrons for some time. Last month’s problem, freezing scanners, appears to have been corrected by use of anti-freeze oil and repositioning of the scanner heater. A new snag is now appearing in the slowing down of the repeater motors. Radar Sections should contact Instrument people for information regarding the correct type of oil to use on the motor bearings. A new pulse transformer has been designed and trials are being conducted. It is hoped that a large percentage of the very numerous H 2 S failures will now be prevented.
FISHPOND
Fishpond fitting still continues slowly, hampered by the connector shortage. Trained crews are getting very good results, but it is necessary to emphasise that Wireless Operators should spend considerable time on the Fishpond trainer. A few extra minutes learning to use the set correctly may well save many an unpleasant trip.
MONICA AND FISHPOND TRAINING
Now that all available sets have been fitted, a drive has started to eliminate preventable failures. Aircraft are being deprived of the protection of a tail warning device during entire sorties, simply because one plug is loose, or a fuse blown. We must make full use of every available set and to do this, Operators must be given a greater insight into the workings thereof. Fault finding tables – with sketches of what the CRT shows for various faults – are being prepared.
Various synthetic training schemes have been evolved, including a series of cards showing typical “blip” pictures with the appropriate patter printed underneath. A similar set of cards without the patter is used to test the Operator’s reactions.
An epidiascope is being used by one Squadron, and lifelike “blips” are introduced up and down the time base, and shown on the screen for brief intervals.
Which squadron will produce the best synthetic training device?
Signals and Radar officers – are you getting that occasional flight? (See A.M.O. A.1323/43). You should all have flown with Monica or Fishpond by now. Don’t forget to enter your trips in the old log book.
WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR)
[Underlined] (CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO LOOK) [/underlined]
The article on wind finding from the signals aspect, which heads this Section of the News, should be read and digested by all Wireless Operators.
The Group W/T Exercise has improved this month, but Section I are definitely superior to Section II, and should any Operators of Section II doubt the truth of this statement they may like to do a little eavesdropping. After all, the ether is free.
This month’s three star effort for air operating was the performance by Wireless Operator Sgt. Barnes Moss of No.61 Squadron (formerly of 1661 Con. Unit and 16 O.T.U.), on the night of 5/6th January. The aircraft “J”Jig was severely damaged over the target, the port outer engine being rendered unserviceable, resulting in a loss of the Gee facilities. Sgt. Barnes Moss rose to the occasion and managed 12 fixes, 1 bearing and 1 message, keeping a good log, and also receiving the odd Group broadcast at the same time. It would appear that this Wireless Operator set about his job with calm determination, and was partly responsible for the safe return of his aircraft to this country, and in doing so proved a credit to his Squadron, captain and crew.
(continued on Page 12, Col.1)
(Continued from Page 2, Col.3)
small force of our aircraft successfully laid mines.
Although for the moment we are without precise information as to the result of the raids on Brunswick on 14/15th, and against Magdeburg and Berlin on 21/22nd, preliminary reports show promise of impressive returns. These attacks will contribute to the nomadic population of the Reich, and provide a tinge of irony to the announcement in a Frankfurt paper that “Evacuees are not gypsies but Germans”.
Thus ends the first month of our “decisive year, boasting a new record tonnage dropped on Germany itself – a portent of the scale of future operations.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 4.
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AIR BOMBING
It was at the beginning of May, 1943, that the initial drive on greater accuracy in practice bombing was commenced throughout the Group. Very good co-operation by the Squadrons within the Group led to most intensified training, so much so that in the months of May, June, July and August a grand total of 23,310 bombs were dropped. This total almost equalled the number of bombs that were dropped in the preceding [underlined] 4 years. [/underlined] However, one fact emerged, namely the average error was remaining at approximately the same figure, and that this figure, 220 yards, was still much too high.
September heralded the introduction of bombing analysis. F/Lt. Cooper, an expert analyst was attached to us from No. 25 Group and travelled from Squadron to Squadron to implement the Group’s very scanty knowledge of assessment of bombing. Thus, slowly we learned the way bombing errors are split into certain definite categories. The first major item which was tackled was the bombsight maintenance, which had contributed no small portion of bombing errors; and by the end of November, errors directly attributable to bombsight defects were almost eliminated.
We next learned that the main error, called Crew Error, had two components. The error caused by the failings of Pilot and Air Bomber, and the Vector Error, that is the error due to the use of faulty wind velocities.
The Pilot and Air Bomber’s error was tackled with considerable vigour until, by the end of December we were really getting down to very small proportions. 106 Squadron for instance, dropped 182 bombs from High Level during December for an average Pilot/Air Bomber error of 78 yards, an astonishingly good achievement. 619 Squadron with 101 yards, 467 with 115 yards and 50 and 463 Squadrons with 116 and 117 yards respectively were close behind.
However, and now we come to the major bombing problem, our Crew Errors were still too large because our average Vector Errors were much too high.
November/December and January has shown the gradual appreciation of this Vector Error problem, and in the Squadrons where bombing is accepted as the be-all and end-all of 5 Group (and their number is ever-increasing) the problem is a matter of real concern. The Group’s average Vector Error for November was 169 yards at 10,000 feet, in in December 162 yards, and these figures convert to roughly 13 m.p.h. A good Vector Error is considered to be 5 m.p.h. (that is 60 yards at 10,000 feet) and it is to this figure Crews must make their way.
When this is achieved, and it will come only with the greatest flying care by the pilots and the most accurate plotting, timing and computing by the Navigators, then a crew will be able to take up 6 bombs, drop them in a close group of less than 50 yards radius with the Mean Point of Impact less than 70 yards from the target. Then, and not until then, can we call ourselves BOMBER CREWS.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt.Walmsley) submits the following “Stop Press” news on the Vector Error problem.
(continued in next column)
“ F/O. Ingleby, a Navigator of 619 Squadron has spent a great deal of time on trying to find out why such large Vector Errors occur. He back-plotted a navigator’s bombing wind, [underlined] to a much larger scale, [/underlined] and discovered that a 15 seconds error in timing over 6-7 minutes gave a Vector Error of 10 m.p.h., that is 130 yards at 10,000 feet. “
The wind found, in the words of the Navigator, brought us from Nottingham to Base on E.T.A. “
Agreed that such a wind would, because an error up to 300-400 yards in track and 1/2 to 1 second in time is almost unnoticeable, but it is such small and apparently insignificant Navigation Errors that cause displacement of bombs from the target to distances up to 200 to 250 yards away.
COMPETITION BOMBING
A much better show was put up by the Squadrons this month in the Competition, the results of which are as follows:-
Pilot & Air Bombers Navigators
1st 106 Sqdn – 58 yds 1st 630 Sqdn – 87 yds
2nd 619 Sqdn – 82 yds 2nd 106 Sqdn - 124 yds
3rd 630 Sqdn – 92 yds 3rd 619 Sqdn – 183 yds
4th 57 Sqdn – 118 yds 4th 57 Sqdn – 264 yds
Further entries with less than [underlined] 8 [/underlined] qualifying exercises.
5th 50 Sqdn – 74 yds 5th 467 Sqdn -110 yds
6th 463 Sqdn -129 yds 6th 50 Sqdn – 119 yds
7th 61 Sqdn -145 yds 7th 61 Sqdn -163 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -158 yds 8th 463 Sqdn -165 yds
9th 207 Sqdn -165 yds 9th 44 Sqdn -176 yds
10th 44 Sqdn -221 yds 10th 207 Sqdn -220 yds
No entries were submitted by 9 & 49 Sqdns. Next month we want a TOTAL all-out effort!
[Table of High Level Bombing Training by Squadron showing Error Rates]
[Underlined] OUTSTANDING BOMBING DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 10,000 ft.
[Underlined] 9 W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined] F/O. Prior P/O. Gall 66 yds
[Underlined] 50 F/O. Robinson [/underlined] F/O. Lavery Sgt. Sanderson 84 yds
[Underlined] P/O. Dobbyn [/underlined] Sgt. Jackson F/O. Horner 66 yds
61 P/O. Wallis Sgt. Pardoe F/Sgt. Tozer 67 yds
F/O. Fitch F/O. Lyons. F/O. Jennings 86 yds
106 F/O. Latham F/O. Martins F/L. Williamson 89 yds
P/O. Lee F/Sgt. Hoyland F/Sgt. McKie 81 yds
P/O. Gibbs F/O. Cramp F/Sgt. Appleyard 75 yds
F/Sgt. Rosser Sgt. Goss F/Sgt. White 61 yds
F/O. Lee F/O Beven F/O. Langrish 95 & 72 yds
P/O. Pezaro Sgt. Greenwood Sgt. Wade 63 yds
[Underlined] 463 P/O. Saunders [/underlined] Sgt. Govett Sgt. Falconer 84 yds
[Underlined] F/Sgt. James [/underlined] F/Sgt. Bowes F/O. Pettitt 92 yds
630 W/Cdr. Rollinson F/Sgt. Rosser F/L. Ehrman 88 yds
1654 C.U. F/Sgt. Page F/O. Braithwaite F/Sgt. Fair 99 yds
F/Sgt. Perry Sgt. Duncombe Sgt. Hather 84 yds
Sgt. Paterson Sgt. Hall Sgt. Rice 90 yds
1661 C.U. F/Sgt. Falsted F/Sgt. Hancock Sgt. O’Connor 95 yds
617 Squadron obtained 11 exercises with less than 100 yards average error, and the following :
S/Ldr. Suggitt F/O. Davidson W/O. Gordon 30 yds
[Table of Additional Bombing Training by Squadron, including bombs dropped, error, A.M.B.T. hours, infra-red exercises, traces and T. & D. runs & indirect attacks]
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 5.
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AIR BOMBING (CON)
“GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS
[Underlined] 61 Squadron’s [/UNDERLINED] (F/Lt. McDonald) bombing figures for December failed to include the month’s best week of bombing because the return affecting that week was mislaid. 15 exercises were carried out, 77 bombs being dropped for an average Crew Error at 10,000 feet, of 177 yards. Vector Error averaged 126 yards and Pilot’s and Air Bomber’s error was 129 yards.
Congratulations to the Bombing Staff off [underlined] No. 5 LANCASTER FINISHING SCHOOL, R. A. F. [/underlined] Syerston, who, under the guidance of W/O. Linnett, constructed an excellent small instructional display of ‘Paramatta’ and ‘Wanganui’ attacks showing the danger of incendiaries “creep-back”.
Group Captain Evans-Evans, R.A.F. Coningsby, has pointed out that [underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Walmsley) in the first two weeks of January AIMED 36 day and 54 night Practice Bombs and not one of these 90 bombs were “aimed” below 8,000 feet.
To quote the Station Commander – “a real effort on all crews’ part to bomb as near operational height as possible.”
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S., R.A.F. Syerston [/underlined] (F/Lt.Wonham.) reports the most creditable attainment of 12,300 feet average height for all practice bombing during January. This is what we want !!!
[Underlined] 467 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. McCarthy) reports yet a further “Mod” to the Bomb Aimer’s compartment.
To quote :-
“The stationary lights do not supply illumination to points where they are needed, i.e. the lamp on the bombing instrument panel does not afford enough light to read the pre-selector box and no light is in position to check camera leads. A “wander” light has been installed above the selector box and will supply any part of the nose for any job including map reading”.
5 Group will seek permission to make this modification general as soon as possible.
Thank you, 467 !!!
It is pointed out that [underlined] 49 Squadron [/underlined] are doing a considerable amount of bombing training which does not appear in the normal returns.
This training is in the form of blind bombing using H2S, which is achieving considerable success.
[Underlined] 617 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Hay) reports that average bombing error for December was 90 yards – on one [underlined] operation [/underlined] during January the Squadron’s average error was 94 yards from 12,000 feet. Enough said !!!
In column 2 will be found an article by F/Lt. Hay on the “617” bombing team, as promised in the December issue.
“GEN” FROM WAINFLEET
Despite 8 days and 15 nights unfit for bombing training, Wainfleet plotted [underlined] 2398 [/underlined] bombs dropped by 363 aircraft during the month. All Squadrons used the range for night training, special mention being made of 617, 106, 207 and 619 Squadrons who aimed 155, 60, 51 and 50 bombs respectively.
[Boxed] LATE ENTRY FROM 49 SQUADRON FOR COMPETITION
Bombing Error – 156 yards
Navigator’s Error – 124 yards [/boxed]
THE SECRET OF 617 SQUADRON’S HIGH STANDARD OF PRACTICE BOMBING.
The S.A.B.S. – Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber Team.
The excellent results gained by crews of 617 Squadron using the SABS have only been achieved by the fullest, most practical use of the “Bombing team”. Before any bombs are dropped some four hours training on the specially adapted A.M.B.T. are carried out by the Pilot and Air Bomber to give manipulation practice to the latter, and to familiarise the pilot with the B.D.I. (Bombing Direction Indicator). The Navigator is trained to carry out compution of true height and airspeed, and settings for a given course of attack with the instruments and computers at his disposal. Some 2 - 4 hours are then spent in the air doing “dummy runs”, firstly on objects “on track”, and then choosing targets and “turning on”, and finally on to targets and setting up sight in accordance with settings computed from known navigational data. The sight is only accurate when correct height above target is set. Thus the pilot must fly at the indicated height he states he will be at, the Navigator must correctly compute this to the true height above target, and the Air Bomber set this accurately.
True height is dependent upon :-
(i) [Underlined] Sea Level Pressure at Target. [/underlined] This is gained by setting aerodrome height for practice bombing or, operationally, from Form 2330. It is the Q.F.F. which is set.
(ii) [Underlined] Indicated Height above Sea Level. [/underlined] All 617 Squadron altimeters have been accurately calibrated for every 1000’ for 140 and 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. and from the appropriate card the Navigator allows for this error, which may be up to 300’
(iii) [Underlined] Temperature. [/underlined] “Thermometer, Air, Direct Reading, Mk.I”, now fitted, does not give an accurate reading for temperature of the outside air, as (a) the stem is heated by cabin temperature, and (b) the outside air bearing against the bulb is under pressure varying with airspeed. Both factors tend to give a “warmer” reading than true. Again the Navigator computes from a special computer to get an accurate air temperature.
With these factors and the use of an ICAN computer, true height (c) can be computed. True height above target will need a deduction of target height above sea level, and there will be a further allowance (addition) to be made where stick bombing is being used.
When the pilot advises IAS with aircraft trimmed and bomb doors open, the Navigator computes a T.A.S. which is used against a Trail scale for the appropriate bomb number. Errors of + or – 5 m.p.h. make negligible ground errors. Most errors in range can be traced to (1) flying at other than the indicated height stated by the pilot, (2) incorrect compution of height and/or T.A.S., by the navigator, or (3) by incorrect settings or bad manipulation, by the Air Bomber.
The sight will automatically correct for Drift and Ground Speed if switched on with the target in the graticule, and held there by proper manipulation of the sight by the Air Bomber, and by the pilot following the direction of his B D. I., until such time as the point of release is attained. Those who remember the A.B.S., and who used it to its utmost efficiency, realise that the length of run could be considerably decreased if settings were applied before the run. As the heading of attack is generally known, the navigator just prior to the run, can pass a drift and G/S setting to the Air Bomber. So, after practice, the Air Bomber need only wind his sighting head back for a 25 second run, whereas 40 -50 seconds may be required without these settings.
Let us listen to a typical 617 Squadron bombing run :-
Pilot. “Turning on to a heading of 250°”
Nav. “250° - drift 4° port, G/Setting 17”
A/B acknowledges, directs pilot on and calls “Run stated”, at the appropriate moment. After 30 seconds of concentration, but silence, by Pilot and Air Bomber, we hear :-
A/B. “ Bombs gone, good run here, drift 3° port, G/S 16.5 “, and after time of fall “ Bomb plotted, 10 yards overshoot “.
Pilot. “Sorry, my fault, I was 120 ft. high!!
When results are received from the Range, the team assembles about the plotting table to further sort out factors causing any errors.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
A hearty welcome to F/Lt. Lowry ex 3 Group who has arrived in this Group to become Bombing Leader to 44 Squadron, R.A.F., Dunholme Lodge.
F/O. Jacombs (463 Squadron) was 1st and F/O. Abbot (106 Squadron) was 3rd, both with “A” Categories on No. 74 Bombing Leaders’ Course. This is a particularly good show on the part of these two Officers. F/O. Jones (49 Squadron) obtained a “B” category on the same Course, being 15th.
[Cartoon of two WAAFs] Dot and Dark – the immaculate W.A.A.F’s – “… and don’t you suggest he made the first Begin Approach…”]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 6.
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NAVIGATION
Concentration, track keeping, and Navigation generally improved during the month. This was largely due to the efficiency of the selected wind finders and to the working of the Wind Finding Scheme as a whole. The selected wind finders’ results have been carefully analysed and it is now possible for the Met. Section at Group Headquarters to place certain degrees of reliability on the information which is passed back from individual crews. Special mention is made here of F/Lt. Townsend – Pilot, and F/O. Haxby, Navigator, of No.57 Squadron who have proved to be most reliable as wind finders; they have consistently sent back accurate wind information which was used as a basis for future winds transmitted to all 5 Group aircraft. It is hoped that all crews selected for this special duty will reach a 100% reliability standard, and send back wind information which will not only be of great value to non-wind finding crews in the Group but to many other crews in the Command.
It has been suggested in some quarters that transmitting winds from aircraft over enemy territory renders the aircraft more susceptible to Freya and Wurtzburg plotting, and therefore to greater danger from vectored fighters, flak and searchlights. As far as the losses in this Group show, there is absolutely no foundation in fact for this belief, so that crews need have no qualms about using the W/T transmitter. They should regard their transmissions as a valuable means of helping all the other aircraft to keep to the planned route.
It was particularly emphasised in the December Monthly News that all Navigators must continue to find winds whenever possible and to check accuracy of their wind finding with broadcast winds. Many crews are not doing this, but are content to use all broadcast winds without checking their accuracy. This practice is a dangerous one, and can easily lead a crew into trouble. Assume that the Navigator has rechecked his calculations and is satisfied that the course and airspeeds flown are those for which he is calculating. The winds found by this Navigator are the only ones on which a revised wind could be based should the aircraft get into difficulties as a result of using the broadcast wind. It is imperative, therefore that all Navigators check, and re-check, the wind velocity whenever a good air position and fix are obtained simultaneously. Your ability to find accurate wind velocities may mean that you will be selected as a Group wind finder, and that in consequence, the main force concentration and track keeping will be directly affected by your efficiency.
5 GROUP SPOOF ATTACK 21/22ND JANUARY
Reference must be made here to the Spoof Attack carried out by 22 aircraft of this Group on BERLIN. Theirs was not considered a desirable mission, and the success of the attack makes the job they did all the more noteworthy. It seems that this small attack drew off the enemy fighters from the stream of the main force aircraft which attacked Brunswick at the same time, and the combats recorded on the two routes bear this out.
The return from this raid was flown over 10/10ths cloud almost the whole way. Route Markers were dropped by our own aircraft along this route and winds were broadcast by 57 “C” for the assistance of the rest of the force. Only one aircraft failed to return from this attack, which emphasises the general quality of the Navigation and the careful pre-flight planning employed.
A.P.I.
Supplies of A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have now been received in the Group and they will be sufficient to equip all H 2 S aircraft. Any surplus A. P. I’s will be distributed to the non-H 2 S Squadrons. This method of distribution was decided on so that the maximum assistance in windfinding would be available in certain Squadrons. Their help will be to the benefit of all non-H 2 S squadrons.
Fitting is going on as rapidly as possible in all squadrons.
M/F FIXES
In the past many Navigators have considered that to request a fix from the W/Op means an admission of defeat in their job as a Navigator. If the security of the aircraft is in danger and the Navigator is temporarily uncertain of his position when returning from operations, then he should not hesitate to obtain a fix.
This of course must only be resorted to in emergency, otherwise aircraft which urgently require W/T assistance are unable to receive from the M/F Station until it has dealt with the first aircraft. Recently a fix was requested from Heston, (Section D) by an aircraft returning from the South from operations. This was not obtained, although a position line was given instead. (The significance of this was not appreciated by the Navigator). If a line bearing is received in reply to a request for a fix, it normally means that the aircraft is in transit with the base line of the M/F Stations. This Navigator should have requested another fix about 15 minutes later from the same M/F Station, or better still should have asked the W/Op to change over to Section N.
STRAIGHT FROM THE O R S’s MOUTH
A system of Raid Assessment has now been in operation in 5 Group since May, 1943. The system has progressed, and ways and means to improve it are considered daily. The objects of the system are (i) to try to discover [underlined] quickly [/underlined] what went right or what went wrong with each attack, and (ii) to consider over a period what lessons can be learnt. In this way, it is hoped, future attacks may be conducted with greater precision and reduced casualties.
Each Station has a copy of the teleprinted O.R.S. (R) form – the information on this form, the additional data on raid reports and the details of combats, will enable Stations to draw their own conclusions. Finally, the Group Raid Assessment Report, the statistical Chart and track keeping diagram, furnish as complete a picture of each attack as is possible at the moment.
The consideration of the salient features of each assessment means that the plans for each subsequent attack can be more carefully prepared. Aerial warfare has now become a highly scientific affair, and as with all scientific ventures, rapid future progress depends on intelligent deductions from a fund of accurate and ‘up to date’ facts.
Aircrew will, therefore, realise that the navigational and other ‘gen’ which is collected from them at interrogation is not just another ‘bind’. This ‘gen’ is of the greatest importance, and must be given with the utmost accuracy which the conditions under which it is obtained permit.
GEE
Range on Gee increased on the raids towards the end of the month, particularly on the Berlin operation of January 30/31st when fixes were obtained of XF frequencies up to 8 E, with position lines still further. If this excellent reception continues, there should be a marked improvement in concentration and timing. With regard to position lines, these may be the means of keeping within the 10 mile band of concentration, particularly if the track runs parallel to the Gee lines, and Navigators should endeavour to make the utmost use of Position Lines wherever possible.
From reports sent in after each operation it appears that some navigators are relying solely upon the XF frequencies on the RF unit 25 and not attempting to use the RF unit 24. When reception fades on the unit 25 navigators should insert the Unit 24, and at least endeavour to find out whether reception is better on this or not.
Whilst the usual technical failures still occur due to deterioration of components, serviceability on the whole has been good, but unfortunately the odd manipulation fault crops up now and again, and every effort must be made by navigators, (particularly those on H2S Squadrons) to remain proficient in the operation of the set, and in the correction of simple faults. (See the Navigation Quiz).
With the introduction of miniature lattice charts, errors in the plotting and transferring of fixed should be reduced to the minimum. However, these charts do not cover certain areas and navigators must carry the large charts for those areas until miniatures are published.
It is hoped that a North Eastern chain will be available within a month, to cover the present blank areas of the Western North Sea.
[Boxed] [Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. J.H. Evans, D.F.C. – H.Q. No.5 Group to 49 Sqdn. as Flt. Commander.
S/Ldr. J. Vivian, D.S.O., D.F.C. – No. 57 Sqdn. to H.Q. No. 5 Group as Group Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. R.H. Schofield, (H2S Instructor) – H.Q. No. 5 Group to Fiskerton. (Stn.Navigation Officer)
F/O. W.T. Haxby, D.F.C. – 57 Sqdn.to H.Q. 5 Group (Radar Nav.)
F/Lt. P.F. Bailey. – 1661 C.U. to 619 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. P.M. Materkeyn – 93 Group to 44 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. B. Asson, D.F.C. – 44 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to 10 O.T.U.
F/Lt. M.J. Baud. – 207 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to SPILSBY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/Lt. W.M. Burnside, DFC. – No 5 LFS. (Sqdn Navigation Offr.) to BARDNEY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/O. Parker. 44 Sqdn. to 207 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/O. R.O. Beattie. 207 Sqdn. to 5 L.F.S. SYERSTON [/boxed]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
Navigation (Cont.)
H 2 S
Training on H 2 S has progressed satisfactorily during the month, but once again bad weather and cloud have prevented much blind bombing, and until this training is given, crews cannot be considered fully trained.
Serviceability during this month has been quite up to standard considering the difficulties of replacement and our main worry at the present time is failure due to bad manipulation. Failures such as these can only be overcome by constant practice both in the air and on the ground. Ground training is essential, and with Ground trainers now installed at 1660 and 1661 Con. Units, and 49 57 and 630 Squadrons, there should be less reason for manipulation failures in the future.
Intelligent use was made of the H 2 S in operations this month, and many operators are finding it a great help in avoiding defended areas. Navigational fixes are being obtained up to 40 and 50 miles by some operators, but still 17% of the fixes are wrongly taken or plotted. With the advent of broadcast W/Vs there is even greater need for accuracy in D.R. and the navigator must work in close co-operation with the Air Bomber if they wish to make the most of H 2 S.
A few simple rules such as the following should result in greater accuracy in navigation with H 2 S :-
(i) Pre-flight planning must be looked upon by the Navigator and Air Bomber as an essential part of the operation, and they must work in close conjunction with each other. The Navigator should point out to the Air Bomber all features from which fixes are likely to be required, and their Flight Plan E.T.A’s. The Air Bomber must draw in the tracks on a Mercator Plotting Chart, clearly ring all recommended H 2 S landmarks and mark in their Flight Plan E.T.A’s.
(ii) This close co-operation must be maintained in flight, and the Navigator must inform the Air Bomber from time to time of the aircraft’s D.R. position and alterations in E.T.A’s, which he must mark on his chart. The Air Bomber must be allowed time to take a fix and the Navigator must cross check all fixes used. To save time and unnecessary chatter over the inter-com. the Air Bomber could be taking fixes and entering them on a log form giving time, place, bearing and distance, or, the Bomb Aimer can make a track crawl on a chart of his own, so that the Navigator will be able to choose any suitable fix at any time.
Remember, it is the reliability of fixes that matters, not the quantity.
The reliability of H 2 S is dependent upon the accuracy of the D.R. Navigation, and conversely without frequent reliable fixes the D.R. becomes increasingly inaccurate. The H 2 S must, therefore, be used to increase the accuracy of the D.R. navigation.
GARDENING
On 5/6th January, 49 Squadron provided 6 aircraft fitted with special equipment, to plant vegetables in the approaches of SWINEMUNDE. This force was detached from the main stream (bound for STETTIN) close to the gardens, and re-joined shortly after planting. This operation was the first of its kind to be carried out entirely with special equipment, and one of the first from high altitude (12,000 feet). Five out of six aircraft planted successfully on a timed run from the pinpoint. The sixth was unable to pinpoint due to failure of special equipment and descended to the lowest permissible height as briefed; being still unable to pinpoint visually, due to cloud, the vegetables were correctly jettisoned in a previously ordered position. The importance of the sea routes here is their use for supplying the Russian front – and by the look of things on the Leningrad front – for repatriation purposes. There is every indication that the vegetables went into the right “hole”, but definite information on the results is hard to come by from such distant places.
The raising of the maximum height for dropping mines to 15,000 ft., has made gardening possible, with reasonable safety, in many areas hitherto immune, and where the presence of mines will present an even worse problem to the enemy than hitherto.
The Bombing Development Unit has carried out trials which prove conclusively that, contrary to expectation, the mine has an extremely consistent flight, and figures for drift due to wind have also been found.
Allowances for Forward Travel and drift due to wind can, therefore, easily be made.
The Command planted 1100 vegetables during the month – 3 Group were responsible for 833. Gardens visited were many and varied, the most densely sown being those off the ELBE, WESER, and EMS; KIEL BAY; the FRANCH COAST U-BOAT BASES.
-“Where angels fear to tread”
In seemly and imposing state, th’elect of God conferred,
The operations staff did hang upon their spoken word.
Save which, the room all silent was, and deathly as the tomb,
(Though sound of trotting horsed permeated through the room)
Tranquility [sic]was shattered as a vulgar voice did rant
“Connect me please with Swinderby, for Swinderby I pant”
The Lords of all creation ceased. A frozen silence fell;
The D.S.O. was seized, and cast into a dungeon cell.
And there without a trial doth the poor wretch meditate,
The sins of other people, for whose crimes he’ll meet his fate.
Let those who keep the watches now resolve they never will
Repeat th’offence, the cure for which is published in the drill.
ANON. CIRCA. 1944.
LINK TRAINER
[Table showing Link Trainer use by Squadron]
ASTRO COMPASS
The astro compass is a precision instrument for checking courses against any heavenly body. In this Command, however, it is rarely used, and even then only for sights on the Pole star.
The Astro compass in its present form is a precision and somewhat complicated instrument, and it is suggested that a much simpler instrument should serve the purpose equally well. This Headquarters is experimenting with a very simplified Astro Compass, and as soon as it is ready for trials, Squadrons will be informed and asked to give their criticisms.
The DR and P4 Compasses should be checked approximately every 15 minutes, and also after every major alteration of course. If these two compasses agree within 2 degrees, then it is not considered essential to check them by use of the Astro Compass. If however, they do not agree within these limits an immediate check should be made of the D.R. Repeaters and the Master Unit. If the compasses still disagree, then a check should be made to ascertain which is correct.
NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ
1. What is the safety height over :-
(a) North Yorkshire.
(b) S.W. England.
(c) Lincolnshire.
(d) West Scotland.
2. What M/F Sections would you use if you were approaching Cornwall (a) from the Wexford region, (b) from the Cherbourg region?
3. Which is the shortest distance from Berlin – Lincoln or Leningrad?
4. Assume your aircraft is engaged on a dinghy search. The W/Op receives an S.O.S. on 500 K/Cs. What immediate action should be taken by the Navigator.
5. If none of the 6 pin sockets on the V C P give a proper picture on the screen, two separate actions can be taken by the navigator. What are they? (N.B. The V.C.P. light is on all the time.)
6. What is the recommended method of search to be used when engaged on dinghy search?
Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
TRAINING ON SQUADRONS
Checks carried out recently reveal that the standard of knowledge on tactics and the corkscrew among Air Gunners is well below the high standard required. It would appear that insufficient time is being allocated to “vetting” air gunners on arrival, and ensuring that their knowledge is retained by constant practice and instruction. It is a simple matter to get the gunners together and hold a quiz on these subjects; naturally some will be on leave, others flying or sick, but if this is carried out regularly all the gunners will receive checks.
This check can be carried out whenever gunners have a few minutes to spare and requires no equipment. All that is required is to ensure that every gunner on every Squadron knows automatically the sequence of the corkscrew manoeuvre, the correct deflection and how to give a clear picture to the remainder of the crew of what is going on during an attack. Squadron Gunnery Leaders recently attended a two day course at R.A.E. Farnborough. This was primarily concerned with the function of ice in oxygen equipment, and should have been passed on to the gunners. It included quite a few valuable tips on the care of this equipment and how to keep it working in severe icing conditions.
FIGHTING CONTROL EXERCISE
An excellent scheme for carrying out the Fighting Control exercise at night on the ground is contained in the February issue of “TEE EMM”. It will be found on page 274; it requires little equipment and can be carried out on the aerodrome, and also gives good practice in night vision training.
10 DAY SIGHTING COURSE AT NO.1 A.A.S. MANBY
This course has recently been started with the object of providing expert sighting instructions, with particular emphasis on the assessment of Gyro films.
During the first few courses it was found that adjustments to the syllabus had to be made, and now the course has settled down to what might be termed an advanced sighting course; the subject is covered more thoroughly even than the C.G.S. course, and any prospective candidate should ensure that he has a thorough knowledge of the G2 notes, as a lack of preliminary knowledge has caused the downfall of several air gunners who have attended the course.
The vacancies on this course are very few, and only gunners who are keen on sighting and have already proved their worth as instructors, should be submitted.
FLYING CLOTHING FOR AIR GUNNERS
During the two-day course which the Gunnery Leaders attended at Farnborough, a discussion was held with the officers responsible for the design and production of clothing and oxygen equipment, and most interesting “gen” was obtained. Here are a few of the new items to be produced :-
New type Oxygen Mask (H) which is much smaller, lighter in weight, causes less obstruction to downward vision and houses a much smaller microphone.
(Continued in column 3)
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBATS – 155
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 K 2/3.1.44. ME.110
61 J 2/3.1.44. ME.210
207 D 5/6.1.44. JU. 88
49 U 5/6.1.44. ME.109
49 K 14/15.1.44. TE/EA
[Underlined] 463 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 W 21/22.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 T 28/29.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 467 T 30/31.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
44 U 30/31.1.44. ME.210
[Underlined] 50 X 30/31.1.44. TE/EA [/underlined]
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 O 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 L 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 V 1/2.1.44. JU. 88
44 A 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 R 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 M 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 G 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 K 2/3.1.44. Unidentified
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
49 H 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 P 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 467 C 5/6.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
106 V 5/6.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 R 5/6.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 J 14/15.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 F 14/15.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
49 M 14/15/.1.44. JU. 88
630 Z 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
44 L 14/15.1.44. ME.110
207 M 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
207 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190
49 H 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 9 T 21/22.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 G 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 J 21/22.1.44. ME.109
207 K 21/22.1.44. ME.210
207 K 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 K 21/22.1.44. ME.109
57 O 27/28.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 M 27/28.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
49 J 28/29.1.44. TE/EA
106 G 28/29.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 B 28/29.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
49 J 30/31.1.44. ME.110
DAMAGED (Continued)
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 L 30/31.1.44.JU.88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 D 30/31.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 P 30/31.1.44. ME.109
630 P 30/31.1.44. T/E
57 G 30/31.1.44. DO.217
All except G/106 28/29th and G/57 30/31st have been confirmed by Command.
OMITTED FROM LAST MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
44 Z 16/17.12.43. T/E E/A
(confirmed by Command)
The type “E” heated lining is to have more heating elements in the knees and seat, heated gloves are to have extra heating elements, and the high wattage socks to have the heating slightly reduced.
A new glove with all the heating elements in the back to give better grip and a more positive control over the equipment when handled with the gloves on, is on the way.
A silk glove, which has had the finger tips dipped in Latex to give a coating of rubber and enable even small articles to be picked up with ease, has been experimented with.
A flap has been attached to the neck of the flying helmet in order to exclude draught; this flap is made to go inside the flying suit and form a seal around the neck, which keeps the draught out and the heat in.
With the introduction of the new oxygen mask and microphone, the inter-com lead is taken round the back of the helmet, this making for more freedom of movement.
Production on the Taylor Suit has ceased but as there is still a large number in service, the new suit will not be seen for some time.
STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER
The first of these trainers to appear in the Group is being erected at Fiskerton and by the time this “News” reaches the Squadrons, it should be in working order. The trainer provides for deflection practice and range estimation, aircraft recognition, zone sightings and also produces tracer simulation. The trainer will shortly be adapted to take the Mark II Gyro Sight as 49 Squadron have been fortunate enough to be selected for the installation of this sight. The sight is similar to the one now in use as an assessor in the Group, but has a range component which enables the range to be fed into the sight by means of foot pedals operated by the gunner. It is a reflector sight with much improved dimming controls on the graticules; in short, all the gunner has to do is to make settings on the sight for height and airspeed, place the moving graticule on the target, estimate the range, and he cannot miss.
Considerable practice is required in the manipulation of this sight, and the free gunnery trainer has been installed for that purpose.
(Continued on page 13, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.18. JANUARY, 1944. PAGE 9.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
GUNS AND TURRETS
Guns freezing, combined with sluggish turrets, due to the extreme cold conditions experienced on operational sorties, sets a problem which is, at present, being tackled in several ways.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined] The exclusion of moisture from the moving portions will, it is considered, be ensured by the fitting of gun ejection slot seals which have been issued to all units in the Group.
There is little point in fitting ejection seals if guns are being tested or cocked after being fully loaded for operations, as the ejection seal will be broken. After the seal is broken, moist air entering the ejection slot is sure to freeze under certain conditions, and a cure for this cannot be found by the application of Anti-Freeze oils.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined] From reports received, turrets appear to give various troubles, when subjected to extreme cold. Various hydraulic media are being tried to overcome these troubles, but it is the Air Gunner who can tell the Armament Staff what actually happened.
First hand information from Air Gunners to their Gunnery Leaders or Armament Officers is of vital assistance in the investigation of all suspected freezing troubles. The Air Gunner is the man who experiences the trouble, and he is the only one who can give the required information on the actual failure and the conditions prevailing at the time. A remark made, and later entered on a combat report such as “Guns would not fire during combat”, does not help in any way.
An Armament representative is always present at Interrogation, and any information passed to him there and then will greatly assist the investigation to be carried out at once. This information will surely help to diagnose the cause of the trouble.
See to it, gunners, that you give full details of all troubles experienced with either guns or turrets, to your Gunnery Leader or Armament Officer. They cannot get a story from anyone but you. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU TELL THE ARMAMENT OFFICER. He cannot reproduce what you experienced under the same conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHIC FAILURE
A small percentage of photographic failures have, on investigation, been attributed to Armament causes. It was hoped that with the introduction of the Mk.111 fuse those failures, however small in number, would disappear. A very careful analysis of the film gives indication that a certain discrepancy exists between the timing of the camera control and the E.111 Fuse. The importance of setting this clockwork fuse correctly cannot be too strongly emphasised, and all Armament Officers can help stamp out this type of failure if they ensure that all fuses M.111 are set correctly.
NEAR ENOUGH IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH
Liaison between Armament and Photographic Sections is essential. Try it and see – who knows, it might reduce the number of failures all round, and so produce vitally important plottable pictures of the target area.
SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS
The preparation of the ever-faithful S.B C. has been, and still is, the immediate concern of all Armament Sections. To prepare the bomb load and bomb up aircraft for an operation is, with the S.B.C’s now available, a matter for organisation. Difficulty can, however, be experienced on the second day when these S.B.C’s have to be filled in the limited time available.
The introduction of Conveyor Rollers has undoubtedly relieved this arduous task, but there is still room for improvement. These rollers can be put to untold uses, and with this in mind, numerous schemes are at present undergoing trials, which will, if applied in the correct manner, enable bomb loads to be prepared for the second sortie in quick time.
Full details of these schemes will be distributed to all Units in the near future. When the new equipment is received it should be subjected to a fair trial according to storage conditions available.
BOMBING RANGES
The lighting of Targets at Wainfleet Bombing Range is causing grave concern, owing to the ingress of salt water into the electric light fittings. Every effort is being made to keep the targets serviceable for night use, but after high tides, faults appear which may, therefore, make it necessary on occasions to declare certain targets unserviceable.
Representatives have been made to obtain an improved type of electric light fitting. In the event of it becoming necessary, improvised lighting has been arranged at EPPERSTONE Range.
FENTON BOMBING RANGE
A further Bombing Range, to be known as Fenton, has been allotted to the Group, making five ranges in all. Work has already commenced on this range, and when complete it is to be administered by R.A.F. Station, WIGSLEY.
FLYING CONTROL
In the table below will be seen two average landing times. The first is calculated by dividing the total period occupied by landing, from first to last aircraft, by the number of aircraft landed. This does not take into account any allowance for the time when the circuit was empty. The adjusted time shows the nett period, that is with allowances made for spasmodic return of aircraft, and the final average is the average time per aircraft based on this adjusted time.
From these two averages can be seen that whereas most Stations have got accustomed to the circuit drill of the landing scheme, there is still scope for improvement in the arrival of aircraft at the airfield.
However, the averages of 3.49 and 2.66 indicate that all Stations have really got down to the problem of landing aircraft quickly, and from reports to hand, it is encouraging to note that the scheme has met with the full approval of the aircrew. Some Stations who, at present, house only one Squadron, are not giving the results they might; this would seem to be an indication that on account of the limited number of
(continued on page 12, Col. 3)
JANUARY LANDING TIMES
[Table showing the Number of aircraft, Time, Average, Adjusted Time and Average by Station]
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Gun Turret Failures and Bombing Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
SPORTS
[Cartoons]
FOOTBALL – THE MATZ CUP
The first round of this annual knock-out is now complete, except for one match, Strubby v Scampton. In the Preliminary Round, Waddington held Scampton to “2 all”, but lost the replay. Without being too partisan, may we wish good luck to the Strubby “giant killers”.
PRELIMINARY ROUND
WADDINGTON 2 SCAMPTON 2
WADDINGTON 0 SCAMPTON 2
(re-play)
ROUND ONE
WINTHORPE 1 SYERSTON 0
WIGSLEY 0 SWINDERBY 11
BARDNEY 0 METHERINGHAM 10
DUNHOLME 2 FISKERTON 0
WOODHALL SPA 1 CONINGSBY 3
SPILSBY 2 EAST KIRKBY 3
SKELLINGTHORPE 3 H.Q. 5 GROUP 1
Scampton are again holding second place in the Lincoln League, Division 1, having won 7 out of 9 games. They were runners up in the League last year, and winners of the Matz Trophy – a fine record.
Dunholme had a busy soccer month, winning four out of five games, in addition to their Matz Cup game with Fiskerton.
Syerston, like Scampton, are all out for the Newark and District League championship. They have, to date, won six out of seven games. Intersection competition produced 12 matches during the month.
Skellingthorpe and Bardney have been busy with both inter-section games and weekly Station matches.
Metheringham lost only one out of four station games, and in inter-section matches, Squadron Armoury won all their games decisively.
Coningsby soccer has been notable for a duel between 619 and 61 Squadrons. Each Squadron has won one game each and the decider should be a real blood match.
Swinderby Station team won four out of five games, losing to O.C.T.U. Newark. Judging from their Matz Cup score, they have some big guns in the forward line.
Winthorpe had four Station games, and were unlucky to win only one, but although losing 5 – 2 to Syerston, they pulled off the Matz Cup game. There was much inter-section activity.
Wigsley were unlucky to have two Station games cancelled. Of the remaining two, they won one and lost one. The R.A.F. Regiment had several games in the inter-section matches.
RUGGER
LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE COMPETITION
It has unfortunately proved impossible to complete the squadrons knock-out phase of this competition by January 31st. To date, only 9 Squadron have completed their finals, F/Lt. Hadland’s crew beating P/O. Glover’s crew in the final by 11 – 3. Nineteen teams took part in the competition. Within 53 Base alone, 61 matches have been played and the competition has become increasingly popular as it has progressed. All squadrons are urged to play off their matches as early as possible, so that the date for the Inter-Unit competition can be re-arranged. There will be some magnificent rugger in the final games, so get cracking squadrons, so we can arrange the big play off.
Syerston Rugger side is now considerably stronger than its early season form, and won three out of four games during the month.
Metheringham played two games, beating Bardney, and losing to 7 K.O.S.B.
Coningsby beat the 9th Field Regt. R.E.D., and the S. Staffs. Regiment in no uncertain manner.
Swinderby suffered their second defeat of the season against R.C.A.F. Digby, losing 6 – 0. Several Canadian Football mannerisms crept into the game, such as the referee putting the ball into the scrum, players “blocking” their opponents, and an occasional forward throw. All of which served to fox the Swinderby team.
Winthorpe lost to Syerston, but beat both 93 M. U. and Newark R. F. C. The Winthorpe pitch has, unfortunately, been “put to the plough”, necessitating all away matches.
HOCKEY
Swinderby can put out a very strong team, and only failed to win one game, which they drew with O.C.T.U. Newark, 4 – 4.
Syerston played 7 games in all, including two mixed and two all W.A.A.F. games, winning six of them.
Coningsby played four Station games, of which they won one.
Scampton, Metheringham, Winthorpe and Wigsley, all had Station matches. Metheringham hope to have their new hockey pitch ready in a few days.
H.Q.5 Group played its first match (mixed) against Syerston on February 6th, losing 2 – 1 a very promising start for a team that has only a half-sized pitch to practice on, until permission is obtained to fell a few trees.
It is hoped to promote a Group mixed Hockey knock-out in the very near future.
CROSS-COUNTRY
Wigsley, Skellingthorpe, Dunholme Lodge and Coningsby have all had successful runs during the month. 619 Squadron took over a hundred bodies about four miles from the camp by coach and released them. S/Ldr. Churcher was first man home. Feeling fit and frisky after their first gamble, 619 now challenge all cross country teams to battle.
SWIMMING
The stations around Lincoln make good use of the baths, and it should be possible to promote an interesting gala.
FISHING
Syerston has a thriving Anglers’ Club with facilities in the River Trent and in the lake at Flintham Hall. The club boasts over 40 “line shooters”. Other Stations please note. (What about a Strubby Wild Fowlers’ Society?)
MINOR GAMES
A most popular game at Bardney is Skittle Ball, played daily inside or outside the Maintenance Hangar at Tea Van time. A P. T. I. arrives with the van, and the fun begins. 20 – 40 men take part, and it is a most enjoyable and stimulating way of spending break.
It is regretted that some Station Sports summaries are not to hand for inclusion in the News, and it is requested that all Stations will despatch their summaries to reach H.Q. within two days of the end of the month.
TRAINING
STIRLING TRAINED CREWS GOING TO SQUADRONS
The first of the Stirling trained Conversion Unit crews went to Squadrons by way of 5 L. F. S. during the month, and the new training policy is now in full swing. A total of 35 crews were posted to Squadrons from 51 Base in January. 45 crews went from Conversion Units to No.5 L.F.S.
The weather was fairly good, and had no great adverse effect on flying, but many unfamiliar technical snags with the Stirling had to be overcome. Serviceability was affected by the carrying out of Acceptance Checks, but these have now been nearly completed, and improved serviceability is expected during the coming month.
Three fatal accidents, involving Stirling aircraft at night, are at present under investigation. Two occurred during Bullseye Exercises, and one during local night flying.
The standard of crews coming from O.T.U’s was maintained. High Level bombing training was very much improved throughout 51 Base, and heights up to 20,000 feet were recorded on night details. H 2 S training suffered owing to an initial shortage of instructors. The aircraft position earlier in the month was also acute, and H 2 S aircraft were being employed on normal training commitments.
The majority of the Squadron crews attached to No. 5 L.F.S. for a short refresher course during the month, completed the syllabus despite some restrictions by weather, and much valuable information was obtained from this mid-tour check.
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD)
There are, however, a few entries on the other side of this month’s balance sheet, such as the two Wireless Operators who, on the night 27/28th January, when briefed to use M/F D/F Section “N” on return from operations, obtained LINE BEARINGS from Hull and Heston. The question arises, what were the Captains and Navigators doing to allow the Wireless Operators to be so dim? Then there is the Wireless Operator who, when sending an early return message, spelt the word STARBD in Bomber Code, when there exists a code group for the word. When questioned, he admitted that he “was in a bit of a spin”. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened to any of these Wireless Operators AND THEIR CREWS (Captains please note), had they been in the position in which Sgt. Barnes Moss found himself, and confronted with a big job to do. Consider then, and note well, ye who do wear the badge of Sparks, that when trouble cometh, it doth not come after friendlie warning, but is swift and sudden, and never forget – it might be YOU.
Now let us consider the question of the Wireless Operator being in the astrodome over the target area. It is difficult to see any advantage that captains gain by having him there. In fact, if they take care to study a few facts, they will see that placing the Wireless Operator in the astrodome only gives a false sense of security and endangers [underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined]
Firstly, the Wireless Operator has very little night vision, having been employed during the three hours previous in gazing at a cathode ray tube or magic eye. Just ask yourselves how you feel when emerging from a cinema into the night –“Hell, I can’t see a thing”. Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that if your Wireless Operator is off Tinsel, one of your own aircraft may be shot down by an enemy night fighter free to operate because you have cleared the obstacle out of his path. Thirdly, the majority, but not all, of the Wireless Operators in astrodome incidents, come from squadrons fitted with Monica III, where the operator would see a fighter so much plainer on the CRT than in the flesh, in spite of all the blips made by friendly aircraft. Captains who make a habit of doing this are invited to reconsider their views in the light of the above remarks.
MOVEMENTS FOR JANUARY
F/Lt. Andrews, No.467 Squadron, has completed No.4 Signals Leaders Course, and is to be congratulated on being the first Signals Leader in this Group to obtain an “A” categorisation.
F/O. Rademeyer has taken the post of Signals Leader with No. 44 Squadron, F/Lt. Barrett having completed his operational tour.
P/O’s. Worthington, Thomas and Freeman should now be installed, and working to full pressure as Fishpond Instructors at East Kirkby, Fiskerton and Metheringham respectively, and Squadrons are invited to make full use of their services.
The visits to O.T.U. by Signals Leaders are in full swing, and squadrons should benefit from the move at a later date.
Now, here is an open invitation for any Signals Leader, Deputy Signals Leader or Wireless Operator (Air) to visit the W/T cabin at this Headquarters on an operational night. The only thing you need to do to take advantage of this offer, is to give a few hours notice on the telephone (extension 54).
TACTICS
EFFECT OF WINDOW AND COUNTERMEASURES
The enemy G. C. I. system continues to be subdued by Window. To retain maximum effect, however, there must be no slacking off in the rates of dropping. The times and rates of dropping laid down for each operation must be rigidly adhered to, and Window dropping must never be regarded as just another ‘bind’. These rates have been carefully calculated, and the individual who is “too lazy” or “forgets” is jeopardising not only his own safety, but that of the whole force. The Window dropper’s slogan must be “Not too much, not too little…..”
It is interesting to study the development of the enemy’s reaction to Window, and the results of our countermeasures over the past few months. That the highly mobile fighter force controlled by HF and V.H.F./RT, organised after the initial success of Window, could be a serious menace, was soon appreciated by the planning staff, who set to work to devise new tactics. As this fighter force was being directed to target areas being attacked, the first essential was to delude the enemy as to the areas to be attacked. Spoof attacks by Mosquitoes and small forces of “heavies” were attempted, and the main force was routed to within 20-30 miles of defended areas before turning to attack another target. These spoof attacks and feints have undoubtedly drawn a number of fighters away from the main targets. A more recent attempt at delusion was to move the whole force by ordering all aircraft to alter course simultaneously at a predetermined time, so as to displace the main stream suddenly. The unprecedented manoeuvre undoubtedly upset the enemy controllers’ calculations.
Not the least important of our countermeasures are the radio jamming devices. These are many and varied, and have produced very marked results. Special Tinsel is rated highly amongst the successful jamming devices, thus Wireless Operators must comply with Tinselling instructions on all occasions. Information on the work of the Radio Countermeasures Group must obviously be guarded, but a report on the results achieved by Ground Cigar, Ground Grocer, Corona and other H.F. and VHF. countermeasure schemes, is set out in a paper BC/S.31009/Sigs., dated 3rd February, 1944, “Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command”. Aircrew should read this report, which is available in all Intelligence libraries. The extract quoted below is typical of the confusion that arises, and shows the measure of success achieved. In fact, jamming has been so complete as to force the enemy to use his National Broadcast wavelengths to get orders through to his fighters. This new step should present no difficulty to our Countermeasure Experts, who are continually a step ahead of the enemy in radio jamming.
[Underlined] “Corona (HF) [/underlined]
This countermeasure continues to annoy the enemy Controllers and harass their pilots, and on occasion has been known to lead to unprintable ruderies being addressed to the efficient young W.A.A.F. officer who frequently plays the controller’s part for us. However, one of the methods of judging the success of Corona is by noting the enemy controller’s reaction to it over the air, and it is considered an unsuccessful night if we do not succeed in drawing at least one crack which is worth recording in the line book.”
TAIL WARMING DEVICES
With the advent of Monica IIIA and Fishpond, the duties of Wireless Operator have been still further extended. It is unfortunate that the sole attention of a crew member cannot be diverted to these devices, but for the moment the Wireless Operator has under his control something which, when properly used, can have immeasurable success against enemy fighters. A high degree of training in the manipulation of the set and interpretation of the P.P.I. and cathode tubes, is called for, and a drive must be made for the Wireless Operators to have as much air practice as possible with the sets.
MONICA IIIA
Several squadrons have now had experience with Monica IIIA, and have proved that for the set to be of any value at all, certain factors are essential. A detailed knowledge by the Wireless Operator of the suppression and gain settings to give well defined blips which can be followed in to a minimum of 250 yards range, a standard reporting patter by the Wireless Operator, and a knowledge of the interpretation of blips by pilots and gunners so that there is perfect crew co-operation whenever an enemy blip is sighted. The exact procedure for using Monica IIIA is set out in an instruction which is available in all Signals Leaders’ Offices. Gunners, pilots and Wireless Operators should be given an opportunity of reading this instruction.
FISHPOND
57 Squadron, from an investigation into Fishpond results, estimate that out of 80 Fishpond sorties, 9 combats have been avoided by utilising the early warning given by Fishpond. Their knowledge and experience will shortly be made available to other Fishpond Squadrons in the form of a tactics instruction. To get a good P.P.I. picture, liaison between Wireless Operator and H 2 S operator is essential, as is also a knowledge by the Wireless Operator of H 2 S manipulation and P.P.I. settings. Captains must remember that Fishpond does not record fighters attacking from above, and should therefore see that their gunners never relax the normal crew search procedure.
[Underlined] Continued from page 10, col.1) [/underlined]
aircraft no great need for quick landing is felt. Those Stations should remember that a second Squadron is always liable to be posted in at very short notice when, under these conditions, the average landing time of two minutes per aircraft, for between 30 and 40 aircraft, would be a godsend.
The Landing Board, originally designed by R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, has been improved on by many Stations in the Group. It is gratifying to note that new suggestions and modifications are continually being submitted. They are a big help, let’s have more of them.
No. 5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 12.
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
[Drawing]
HEADQUARTERS NO. 5 GROUP
A/Cdre. H.V. SATTERLY, D.F.C. C.B.E.
HEADQUARTERS NO. 53 BASE
A/Cdre. A. HESKETH, O.B.E., D.F.C. C.B.E.
R.A.F. STATION, SCAMPTON
F/O. C.F. GIBSON. M.B.E.
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. GLOVER. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. A. LYNCH, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. K.L. HOWARD. D.F.M.
F/O. E. MERCER. D.F.C.
P/O. A. WRIGHT. D.F.C.
P/O. V.D. PURVIS. D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. J.G.DAY. D.S.O.
Sgt. A.E. KEELING. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
A/F/Lt. G.H. LAING. D.F.C.
F/O. W.T. HAXBY. D.F.C.
61 SQUADRON
F/O. J.W. EINARSON, D.F.M. D.F.C.
W/Cdr. R.M. STIDOLPH. D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
P/O. D.C. HARVEY. D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
F/O. N.E. WESTERGAARD. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.E. BROOKES. D.F.M.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/Lt. C.J. BRAIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
9 SQUADRON (Contd.)
P/O. R.W. CORKHILL. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
P/O. R.L. ASH. D.F.C.
F/O. C.R. SAVAGE. D.F.C.
F/Lt. B. ASSON. D.F.C.
Sgt. L. UNWIN. D.F.M.
F/Lt. D.A. BARRETT. D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
A/S/L/ W.F. PARKS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
Sgt. J.E. HEATH D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.W. THOMPSON. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.R. POLLOCK. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. JOSLING. D.F.C.
P/O. S.G. TOWNSEND. D.F.C.
P/O. A.R. KNOWLES. D.F.C.
F/O. R. McROBBIE. D.F.C.
P/O. R.J. GOOCH. D.F.C.
P/O. J.A. KIMBER. D.F.C.
P/O. E.J. HOWES. D.F.C.
P/O. F. NORTHCLIFFE. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.B. HUGHES. D.F.M.
P/O. W.H. SIDDONS. D.F.C.
Sgt. D.J. GRIFFITH. D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
A/S/L. E.A. BENJAMIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.F. EMERSON. D.F.M.
106 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. R.E. BAXTER. D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
Sgt. T. GEDLING. D.F.M.
F/O. J.E.F. MITCHELL. D.F.C.
P/O. J. KIRKWOOD. D.F.C.
W/O. H.F. CONELLY. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.C. METCALFE. D.F.M.
619 SQUADRON
P/O. T.A. PEATFIELD. D.F.C.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J. SIMKIN. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.T. PAGE. D.F.M.
[Page break]
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
[Tables of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Total] 25 18 5 26
WAR SAVINGS
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved. £. s. d.
H.Q. (UNIT) 5 GROUP 51.4 10.0 95. 7. 6.
£2935.2.0.
[Page break]
GUNNERY (CONTD)
(Continued from page 9, col.3)
Now 49 Air Gunners, this is the biggest thing that has hit gunnery in 25 years, and it is up to you to take every opportunity of make for 100% proficiency in the use of this new equipment. Great things will be expected from you, losses should go down and E/A destroyed go up; so go to it, and make the life of the Hun fighter short and sweet!
CENTRAL GUNNERY SCHOOL RESULTS
No. 72 COURSE
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit. Category. Exam. Results. [/underlined]
P/O. Gross “B” 90.4%
Results of No. 73 Course not yet to hand.
SQUADRON AND FLIGHT GUNNERY LEADERS
Below is a list of Squadron and Flight Gunnery Leaders at present in Squadrons and Conversion Units.
44 Squadron F/Lt. McCurdy
F/O. Neison
49 Squadron F/Lt. Cork
F/O. Hamilton
463 Squadron F/Lt. Moorhead
F/O. Kirkpatrick
467 Squadron F/Lt. Nordon-Hare
9 Squadron F/Lt. Armstrong
50 Squadron F/Lt. Gray
P/O. Beale
619 Squadron F/Lt. Howard
P/O. Hammond
61 Squadron F/Lt. Breakey
617 Squadron F/Lt. Rodger
F/O. Buckley
F/O. Chandler
106 Squadron F/Lt. Sullivan
630 Squadron F/Lt. Stead
57 Squadron F/Lt. Taylor
F/O. Ward
207 Squadron F/O. Moore
F/O. Harper
1485 Gunnery Flight S/Ldr. Undery
F/Lt. Leonard
F/O. Mills
1660 Con.Unit F/Lt. Clark
P/O. Gross
1661 Con.Unit F/Lt. Gray
1654 Con.Unit F/Lt. Hoad
F/O. Simister
No. 5 L.F.S. F/Lt. Cass
P/O. Black
Aircrew School SCAMPTON F/Lt. Patten
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
On taking an analysis of a large number of flight engineers logs a considerable discrepancy has been noticed between the fuel consumption of different aircraft. This discrepancy is not due to the varying consumptions inherent in the engines of any particular aircraft. In most cases where an aircraft has had a high fuel consumption on a specific operation, the subsequent operation with a different crew proves that this aircraft has a low consumption. This all points to manipulation.
There are many cases where far too high revs are used at too low a boost and it is apparent that many flight engineers are not paying sufficient attention to the boost and revs required for the most economical conditions.
It is not economical above full throttle height and boost below E.C.B. to reduce I.A.S. by throttle manipulation. I.A.S. should be controlled on propellor speed only, and if you are at an altitude where the ‘S’ blower is in operation, by controlling I.A.S. on the throttles you are merely strangling your engine. To quote one instance, an extract from one flight engineer’s log shows that 2850 r.p.m. was used at + 2 lbs boost at 15,000 feet in ‘S’ gear. This is an obvious case of engine strangling, and had the throttles been open to + 4 boost E.C.B. to take full advantage of the engine power available at that altitude, then the r.p.m. could have been cut down to maintain the required I.A.S. with the resultant decrease in fuel consumption. The consumption in the particular case quoted averaged 66 gallons per hour per engine which speaks for itself. Flight Engineer Leaders must bring home by means of lectures to their flight engineers instances such as this. Such manipulation may cost you an aircraft and maybe the crew, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the fuel consumption of a Lancaster is in the hands of the flight engineer, and where the flight engineer knows that incorrect revs and boost are being used for any specific condition, then he should advise the pilot accordingly; if this advice is ignored, the cause of the high fuel consumption should be reported on return. Many more instances such as that quoted have been found, and space does not allow to quote them all. Efforts are being made at this Headquarters to find other reasons for high consumption in each case, but so far high consumptions have been caused solely by incorrect engine manipulation.
EARLY RETURNS
In The case of an oil pressure gauge failure which causes quite a few early returns, this can be diagnosed quite easily. If the oil pressure drops off suddenly, and coolant and oil temperatures remain normal, the oil temperature should be watched closely, and if this remains normal, together with the coolant temperature the gauge is definitely suspect. Flight engineers should watch this sort of thing and advise the pilot accordingly.
Many early returns are caused by so called generator failure, and the following notes will be of interest to all flight engineers, and should go a long way to preventing unnecessary early returns due to this fault. These notes will be circulated separately to flight engineers.
1. [Underlined] The Voltmeter [/underlined] is the most important of the three instruments on the main control panel. In flight it normally indicates between 27 – 29 volts.
2. The Ammeters merely indicate how the generators are sharing the load, and as long as they both give a positive reading, even though unbalanced, the circuit is O.K. (i.e. +55 and +5). If the degree of unbalance is above 15 amps this matter must be reported to the Electrical Officer.
3. If one of the ammeters shows a negative reading, i.e. a discharge”, then before switching off one of the generators, reference must be made to the voltmeter. If the voltmeter reads 29 volts or under, switch off the generator giving the negative reading. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts, switch off the generator giving the positive reading.
4. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts the accumulators are being overcharged. In this case switch off the generator showing the higher current. If the voltmeter still indicates over 29 volts switch off the other generator and all non-essential loads to conserve the accumulators. The pressure head heater [underlined] must [/underlined] remain ‘ON’. After a short time, say 5 minutes, [underlined] one [/underlined] generator, preferably the one giving the lower reading, may be switched ‘ON’ again, but a careful check must be kept on the voltmeter. Both generators must [underlined] not [/underlined] be switched ‘ON’ again after they have been switched ‘OFF’.
5. [Underlined] Never [/underlined] disconnect the cables from the accumulator in flight, otherwise it may cause an explosion. If the accumulators become overheated and are gassing excessively, turn the “Ground-Flight” switch to “Ground”.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, col.3) [/underlined]
from service sources does not appear to fulfil our requirements. Coningsby has produced a most useful piece of apparatus, and details of it will be circulated to other Bases and Stations. It will be to the advantage of Electrical Officers of other Units if they pay a personal visit to Coningsby to see this test rig for themselves. Further, it is suggested that visits to other Stations will enable the best ideas to be incorporated in all instrument and electrical sections. So far as is known, the many excellent schemes which have been produced by local initiative have not been patented.
In the last month the incidence of oxygen failure has increased, but in many cases no technical fault has been found. This indicates that more “gen” in the use of oxygen must be passed on by Electrical Officers to members of aircrew. The introduction of the microphone heater and the Mk.I jet has produced very favourable results, and steps have been taken to obtain further supplies of heaters for the use of all gunners.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table showing the serviceability of aircraft by Conversion Unit and Lancaster aircraft]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
Look after your ‘K’ type dinghies, you may find them very useful one day – F/Sgt. Groves of 50 Squadron did, on the night 29/30th December. The aircraft of which he was rear gunner had been damaged on operations. The pilot could not close the bomb doors, and due to lack of petrol the captain of the aircraft, while still over the sea, was forced to decide whether to ditch the aircraft or to bale out his crew. The captain eventually had to give the order to bale out using ‘K’ dinghies, having first sent out an S.O.S. and received fixes.
F/Sgt. Grove was the first out of the aircraft and the only one saved. The indications are that at least one other member of the crew was prepared to abandon the aircraft but no more was seen or heard of the crew or the aircraft after F/Sgt. Groves had left. F/Sgt. Groves suffered considerably from exposure while in his ‘K’ dinghy, but has since recovered.
It is possible to ditch an aircraft with open bomb doors, and it has been successfully accomplished on more than one occasion. In any case the doors are liable to collapse on impact with the water, and where this has happened, crews have managed to clear the aircraft without too much trouble. While no blame is attached to the pilot of this particular aircraft, this fact should be borne in mind, and pilots should resort to the ‘K’ type dinghy only as a last resort – e.g. should the aircraft be on fire, or in danger of breaking up in the air.
Successful ditchings, in seemingly impossible sea and weather conditions have shown that, provided you have practiced your emergency procedure and dinghy drills you should have no worry in making the decision to ditch. The days are over when a successful ditching was something to be marvelled at. To-day they are a common occurrence, and experience has shown that ignorance and stupidity are to blame in almost every case of failure.
A summary of Air Sea Rescue incidents for the six month ending 31st December, 1943, show that of a total of 3271 aircrew involved, 1,078 were rescued and brought back to England; most of the remainder fared as
(continued on page 2, col 2)
ENGINEERING
The operational effort for January was very high considering the bad weather periods which were encountered during the month. The squadrons were all down in aircraft strength, but in spite of this a high total was achieved; this, of course, was only possible by many squadrons operating 100% each night. With the man power shortage it requires very hard work and long hours to maintain this effort, and now that squadrons are almost up to full strength on the new establishment, the load will be even heavier. Due, however, to the efforts of the ground crews, February should see the biggest effort ever put out from this Group.
No.54 Base, Coningsby, which formed on 1st January, 1944, is already making itself felt as a formidable and efficient formation. There is still much to do to bring the various sections up to the peak of perfection, but as these were started on sound lines, there is no doubt of their ultimate efficiency.
All operational bases and R. & I. sections have been kept extremely busy on acceptance checks recently, and as a result certain other work has had to be left. This is only a passing phase, and it is hoped that once the squadrons are up to full strength, the task will be easier by dealing with the normal replacements. The many high speed enemy action repairs which have been carried out in time to get aircraft ready for ops on the second night, including many power plant changes, which are carried out immediately the aircraft lands during the night, are so numerous that it is difficult to single out individuals for praise; it all points to the splendid morale and staying powers of the ground crews.
There are many early returns and cancellations which could be avoided and Engineer Officers must keep on with the drive to eliminate these entirely, as far as is humanly possible; they are responsible for the non-delivery of a very large tonnage of bombs when calculated over a month.
The number of failures of exhaust studs has been considerably reduced where 3.5% Nickel steel studs have been fitted, and results so far are very pleasing. When further experience has been gained it is hoped to go over to this kind of stud completely.
The introduction of the 30 lbs pressure type relief valve on the header tank in place of the thermostatic valve is gradually taking place throughout the Group, and a marked improvement is noticed by the smaller number of failures due to engines being “cooked”.
WEIGHT SHEET SUMMARIES
A new weight sheet summary as applicable to 5 Group has been issued to all Bases. Stations and Squadrons, and the use of this with the bomb load chart which accompanied it should dispel any further doubts as to what can and what cannot be carried at an all-up weight of 65,000 lbs.
CONVERSION UNITS AND NO.5 L.F.S.
The Conversion Units commenced a Stirling programme early in the month, and although the results of the first month’s work were good and called for a colossal amount of work, it is anticipated that with certain improvements, the February figures will be much higher. Great credit is due to the C.T.O’s and men under them, who have tackled this task and overcome their setbacks in an admirable manner. The programme which has been set for No. 5 L. F. S. calls for good organisation and planning on the technical side, and so far the job has been done well.
FLIGHT ENGINEER LEADER
A very necessary addition to the Group Headquarters staff is the establishment of a Flight Engineer Leader. This post has been filled by F/Lt. Gottwaltz, and Base Engineers and C. T. O.’s are requested to afford him every facility to assist in attempting to solve the carrying fuel consumption problem. A column elsewhere in this News has been allocated to Flight Engineers.
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS
It is most important the Command Modification No. 57 is completed on all aircraft fitted with A.P.I. and A.M.U. at the earliest opportunity, to eliminate errors due to inefficient cooling.
The test rig for the instruments issued
(continued on page 13, col.3 )
WAR EFFORT
[Table containing details by Squadron of averages and numbers of sorties, tonnage dropped, operational hours and losses as well as ratings]
ORDER OF MERIT IN THE FOREGOING TABLE IS BASED ON THE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED PER AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON CHARGE
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944.
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V Group News, January 1944
5 Group News, January 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 18, January 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, tactics, sports and operations.
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1944-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-22 jan 44
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
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England--Lincolnshire
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1944-01
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
ground personnel
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
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Base Commander [Initials]
Base Int:
V GROUP NEWS V
FEBRUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] * NUMBER 19
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The German night fighters have once again been forced to change their night fighting tactics, and this change has increased the importance of accurate flying, especially as regards airspeeds. Until recently, German fighters were sent to orbit over the city which the German Command thought was the one to be attacked. Owing to the ingenious selection of routes for the Bomber Force these tactics proved a failure and the Germans have now gone over to a new method, which is to give the fighters courses to steer which will intercept the bomber stream.
It is obvious that the greater the length of the stream the greater will be the chances of the fighters coming across some portion of it and it is, therefore, of the utmost importance that that all Captains should maintain the most accurate timing from the concentration point to the target. The aim should be never more than plus or minus 2 minutes from the times laid down. This standard is very far from being reached at present and a proportion fail to achieve better than plus or minus 10 minutes. If some are 10 minutes early and some 10 minutes late the effect is to spread the Lancasters over a distance of 60 miles greater than that planned, i.e. it nearly doubles the length of the bomber stream and increases in this ratio the chances of interception.
Until recently time keeping was beset by many difficulties. Each Navigator was responsible for finding his own wind vectors and from these calculating new ground speeds and E.T.A’s. The majority of aircraft were not equipped with H2S and, therefore, had little chance of finding accurate winds when outside Gee range.
This problem has now been solved by the use of the Command wind broadcast to all aircraft and by the newly introduced moveable T.O.T. In future, provided crews leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered, and fly at the speeds and heights laid down in the Flight Plan, they will arrive at the target at the correct time to commence their attack. Should they encounter winds different from those used for timing the operation, a new T.O.T. based on the new winds will be transmitted by wireless.
Responsibility for time keeping therefore, devolves primarily to the Pilot, who must not only ensure setting course from the concentration point at the right time, but must thereafter keep rigidly to the speeds laid down. In view of the enormous importance which timing has now assumed, a special drive is being undertaken to improve results and to eradicate those errors which still cause aircraft to arrive early or late, or to stray off track.
A report analysing a number of recent operations has been circulated to Squadrons and I hope this will be read by all Captains and Navigators. It shows how apparently trivial mistakes can build up into serious errors and illustrates the need for extreme care and accuracy in every stage of navigation.
Two key points are :-
(i) Captains must leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered.
(ii) They must maintain heights and speeds decided at Flight Planning.
TACTICS
[Underlined] TACTICS AND PLANNING [/underlined]
A new type of attack was introduced this month, whereby the main force and P.F.F. were divided into two forces to attack the same target with an interval of 2 – 2 1/2 hours between zero hours. It is not possible to form conclusions from the limited evidence obtained from the two attacks which were carried out, but two advantages of this scheme are obvious:
(i) P.F.F. Marking of the second phase should be accurate – observation of the location of the first phase M.P.I. providing an opportunity for visual markers to correct any apparent displacement of the attack.
(ii) A carefully timed interval may increase the difficulties of the enemy fighter force, compelling them to refuel either before or during the second phase attack.
Assessment of the results of the Schweinfurt attack, 24/25th February, points to the probable achievement of both these aims. Losses for the second phase were less than the first, although the number of combats was greater in the second phase; the M.P.I. of the attack was in fact nearer the aiming point than the first phase attack. For this type of attack to be successful, however, the temptation to bomb the centre of the fires from the first attack must be strongly resisted, and implicit faith placed in the second phase marking, whether it be coincident with the first attack or some distance away.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
Bullseyes routed North-East towards Denmark have been very helpful to the bomber force on two occasions during the month. Shielding the bombers’ Southerly courses to Schweinfurt and Augsburg, Bullseye aircraft drew many fighters from South Germany to the North, and comparatively low losses on both those night were undoubtedly partly due to this well planned diversion. Accurate timing on the part of Bullseye aircraft is essential however, if they are to simulate a concentrated bomber stream.
It is thought that Units taking part in Bullseyes are not deriving as much benefit from these exercises as is possible. The need for a more precise interrogation of crews into types of manoeuvre taken against fighter and searchlights is obvious. This Headquarters is examining the various fighter and bomber crew reports available, and endeavour will be made shortly to issue a collated summary of interceptions for each Bullseye, for tactical discussions at Stations.
The following incident which came to light a few days ago reflects the general attitude of crews towards Bullseyes:-
A Polish fighter pilot made three attacks on a bomber during a Bullseye exercise, flashing three “kills”. The fact that there was no response from the bomber during any of the attacks aroused his interest and he finally closed right in with landing lamp on, and this revealed – empty mid-upper and rear turrets.
No accusation is made against crews in this Group, but this sort of thing is most discouraging to the fighter boys, and certainly does not stimulate their interest in bomber tactics. More than this, it shows a stupid lack of interest on the part of the bomber crew. Remember that 50% of a bomber crew’s job is to bring the aircraft and themselves back safely to fight another day. This can hardly be expected if gunners throw away the only chance they have of seeing a fighter attack at night, before meeting a real Hun which flashes cannon shells instead of its landing light.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The enthusiasm of Squadrons in Monica and Fishpond training is welcomed, but there is still room for improvement. Wireless Operators must not relax until they are able to interpret the cathode tube from a mere glance. Remember that whilst you are thinking whether to report a blip or not, you can be shot out of the sky. Interpretation and reporting must be immediate and accurate. If you know your drill you can get away with it. Here’s someone who did :-
“At 2127 in the target area Monica indicated a fighter closing rapidly at 1,800 yards. Lancaster corkscrewed at 750 yards. Enemy aircraft then opened fire but tracer went above the Lancaster. Later gunners identified JU.188 at 100 yards range as they fired, tracer ricochetted [sic] off the nose of the fighter. JU.188 claimed as damaged.
[Underlined] Conclusions [/underlined]
(i) The fighter’s burst would obviously have been fatal if the Lancaster had not corkscrewed.
(ii) A standard patter was carried out throughout the attack and a corkscrew was started at the correct range on Monica.
Do [underlined] you [/underlined] know the standard patter and tactics? If not, study 5G/34/Air dated 4th February, 1944 (Appendix “A”) until you talk Monica language in your sleep.
[Underlined] TAILPIECE [/underlined]
The following is quoted without comment with apologies to A.A. Command Intelligence Review :-
“On 24 Feb. according to the Berlin radio, American bombers flew over Switzerland. This radio conversation is then stated to have been exchanged between Swiss A.A. gunners and the USAAF :-
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “Look out, you are over Switzerland.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “If you don’t turn back we shall shoot.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
(Swiss guns open fire)
[Underlined] USAAF “Your A.A. fire is about 1,000 feet too low”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “We know!”
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NAVIGATION
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
Concentration this month was, on the whole, better than last month. Timing with the exception of the raids on LEIPZIG (19/20 February) and SCHWEINFURT (24/25th February) was very good. This is the combined result of the excellent effort of the Windfinders and the good use made of the broadcast w/v’s by all the Navigators.
We still have a long way to go however. Many simple mistakes are being made by Windfinders, e.g. incorrect plotting of air positions, wrong computions, errors made in measuring the w/v, messages wrongly coded, to mention a few. It will be appreciated that if plotting and compution errors are made, incorrect w/v’s will be the result, and therefore, the Senior Met. Officer at H.Q. 5 Group cannot forecast the correct w/v for use of other aircraft. Windfinders have a great responsibility and must make every effort to obtain accurate w/v checks.
The same mistakes are also being made by the rest of the force. A recent O.R.S. report stated that errors in compution are reaching a phenomenal figure. Every effort must be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate this fault. Compution of true airspeeds presents a big problem to many Navigators , the average error is approximately 5 m.p.h. Calculation of courses is another stumbling block, the average error being 2° or 3°. The combination of these errors has an adverse effect on concentration, besides nullifying much of the good work done by the Windfinders. Watch computions and calculations carefully, Navigators. Also check each calculation at least once.
One word about interpolation. The w/v’s broadcast are those applicable to the mean height band. Therefore, if you are at the top or bottom of the band, the broadcast w/v is not accurate for your height. Interpolation is the answer. Consult the Form 2330 and note the forecasted change in the wind speed and then interpolate and apply the correction to the broadcast w/v. There have been instances of the wind speed increasing by 15 m.p.h. for an increase in height of only 2,000 feet.
Many Navigators do not use the broadcast w/v’s correctly. Some do not use the corrected w/v if it is “within a few degrees and a few miles per hour” of the previous forecast w/v. There are still a few Navigators too, who do not seem capable of applying the corrected w/v when it is given to them. A plotting method to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s has been described in A.S.I. Nav/14, issued 14.2.44. All Navigators must make sure they are fully conversant with this method. Any suggestions of criticisms are welcomed.
One final word to Windfinders, you did an excellent job last month, the record achieved being 153 w/v on the night of 15/16th February, a very fine effort. Keep this up!!!
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
Many A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have been issued to the Group during the last month, and we are now in the happy position of having 100% A.P.I’s, though all are not yet fitted.
There is an inherent error in the A.P.I. This is caused by the heating in the Navigator’s cabin. A modification is now being fitted to all A.P.I’s which should reduce the error to less than one percent. It is hoped all aircraft will be fitted with the A.P.I. and the modification by the end of the next moon period.
Con. Units are also being supplied with A.P.I’s; Navigators will soon be arriving at Squadrons fully trained in the use of this instrument.
Trouble is still being experienced when re-setting the Air Position Indicator. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must have a drive on this procedure. Several Squadrons have suggested methods to be adopted when re-setting the A.P.I; any other suggestions will be welcomed.
[Underlined]LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
The present system of log keeping and chart work involves unnecessary duplication of effort. If a Navigator’s chart work is done correctly, less detail is required in the log, and the Navigator can devote more time to his primary object of navigating the aircraft to the target and back to base.
The following entries are considered by some Navigators to be superfluous because the detail already appears on the chart, (a) Position and time of all fixes, pinpoints, D. R. positions and air positions, (b) all w/v’s obtained, tracks made good and position lines.
If these entries were omitted from the log approximately 10 minutes would be saved hourly. Moreover, the Navigator’s attention would not be constantly distracted by having to refer to the log each time a fix, D.R. position etc was obtained. This scheme has been tried successfully by several Navigators in this Group.
All Navigators should consider this suggestion carefully and discuss with the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION “BLACK OF THE MONTH” (No names no Packdrills) [/underlined]
A very good example of what can happen if a Navigator boobs and there is little co-operation in the crew, occurred on a recent sortie in this Group.
The crew in question set course from Base for Position “A”, and arrived there early. It was decided to carry out a dog leg and return to Position “B” (the South Coast). When the dog-leg was almost completed as Gee fix was obtained and course altered for Position “B”. This is where the mistake was made. The Navigator gave the pilot a course to steer of 024°(M) instead of 064°(M). The Navigator then decided to “try his hand” with the H2S. It was his second operational sortie. He was hoping to pick up the English Coast line, but this did not appear. Just before E.T.A. the Navigator decided that “something was wrong”, and obtained a Gee fix. This placed the aircraft a great many miles North of Position “B”. The mistake was immediately realised and course altered for Position “B”. The aircraft arrived at this position 19 minutes after the latest time, and so the sortie was abandoned.
Apart from the glorious “boob” of the Navigator, the pilot should have realised that the course of 024° (M) was greatly in error. This is a warning to all pilots and navigators. Had the pilot studied his “Captains of aircraft” map, he would have spotted the error in the course given. Pilots should always check a course with the Navigator if it sounds “phoney”. The Navigator [underlined] must always [/underlined] recheck all his calculations and computions.
ASTRO COMPASS
It was stated in last month’s News that the Astro Compass was being modified. This has now been done with the result that only the Pole Star can be used for checking the aircraft’s course. The advantage is that the instrument is very much simpler to use. No calculation is necessary, the observer merely rotates the bearing plate until the Pole Star is in the sights, and reads off the aircraft’s course against the Red pointer.
Trials carried out by No. 49 Squadron, Fiskerton, have proved successful. The compass was found very simple to use. The checking of the aircraft’s course is now a very simple task, and can be done by any member of the crew, as no calculations are necessary.
The difficult task of finding a good position for the Astro Compass still remains however; numerous trials have been carried out but with little or no success. Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] help to solve the problem? Remember the Astro Compass can also be used for obtaining bearings, so bear this in mind when you are hunting for a new position.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What part does the Navigator play in (a) Emergency procedure, (b) S.O.S. procedure?
2. If you are 10 miles or more off track by how many degrees would you alter course to regain track?
3. What is the procedure for obtaining a Gee fix if either the “B” or “C” Strobe is missing?
4. You are not certain of your position and suddenly red flares are seen ahead of you. (a) What does this mean? (b) What immediate action would you take?
Answers to last month’s Quiz
1. (a) 3500 ft. (b) 2500 ft. (c) 1000 ft. (d) 5000 ft.
2. (a) Section “E”. (b) Section “N”.
3. Lincoln!! (by approx. 100 miles)
4. The Navigator should immediately co-operate with the W/Op, and attempt to home on to the dinghy. (The W/Op. on hearing the S.O.S. will listen for an acknowledgement from the ground listening station, and if this is not heard he will pass the intercepted message on to M/F Section “J”, saying that it has been picked up and giving his own call sign etc but not his position (this will be known by Section “J” from the aircraft’s own transmission)).
5. (i) Change the fuse. (ii) Check [underlined] all [/underlined] leads.
6. The creeping line ahead method of search is best under all conditions (see Appendix “A” to A.S.I. Ops.1/18).
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. H.C. Lobb – B.N.O. Swinderby to 8 Group P.F.F.
S/Ldr. H.L. Creeth – Radar/Nav 5 Group to B.N.O. Swinderby.
F/Lt. N.W. Mould, DFC – 57 Nav.Offr. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/O. J. Simms, DFC – 57 Sqdn appointed Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. G. Crowe, DFC – 106 Nav.Officer to S.N.O. Metheringham.
F/Lt. W.J. Beeston – Attached to 5 Group O.R.S. posted to Flying Trg. Command.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 2.
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AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] CALLING ALL PILOT BOMBING OFFICERS ! [/underlined]
The following paragraphs are the precis of an address by Air/Cdr. Patch, C.B.E., to the first Conference of Bombing Officers :-
The post of Flight Bombing Officer was created to improve bombing in 5 Group. Enthusiasm of such officers is essential, and should be directed to keeping bombing in the forefront by constant pressure on Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders. The Squadron Bombing Leader is able to deal with the bombing problems of the Air Bomber but he has difficulty in convincing pilots that their ability should be shown in bombing flying rather than aerobatics. In 4 engined bomber aircraft, Pilots should concentrate in the first place on flying accurately over a given point on the ground. Next, Pilots must appreciate that on any given heading the bomb must be released from one point in the air. It requires most skilful flying to direct the aircraft through this point. Analysis of bombing errors showed that, excluding Vector Errors, 90% of the errors were due to bad flying, in particular in tracking and aircraft “skid”. The Mark XIV Bombsight has been designed to give tactical freedom but it is essential that a steady approach be made, accuracy depending on the final steady run. There must be no sudden alteration of aircraft attitude, no skidding, and complete accuracy of tracking.
Flight Bombing Officers must think over these practical points and decide how best to put it over to the Pilots. They must point out to Pilots that their aircraft are, in reallity [sic], sighting platforms from which, with the help of a complicated piece of mechanism – the Mark XIV Bombsight – they are to direct a tremendous bomb load against an enemy target. The conception of “area bombing” has caused bad bombing flying. If we can attain precision, not only against small targets but also large cities, we can reduce the number of raids required to obliterate Berlin and those other vital targets we must destroy.
Under operational conditions now being developed, and with the help of improving P.F.F. technique, we should be able to achieve greater accuracy at night in attacking a point of light, that is a T.I. or Wanganui Flare. The Bombing Officer’s job was to make Pilots “think bombing”, “talk bombing” and “fly bombing” until the time is reached that over the pint of beer in the Mess the main conversation is bombing accuracy.
[Underlined] N.B. [/underlined] The first Bombing Officers Air Staff Instruction was issued 11th January, 1944, No. BL/15.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Why should incendiaries not be dropped by the Main Force before Zero Hour on a Newhaven attack?
2. If an engine cut on take-off, and it was necessary to lighten the aircraft quickly, what action could the Air Bomber suggest concerning the bomb load?
3. If you were carrying a 1000 lb bomb on No. 5 Station, and it was not pre-selected on the Connell Pre-Selector, would it be released by Jettison action?
4. Why should the camera [underlined] NOT [/underlined] be operated before bombing?
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET) [/underlined]
[Table of Bombs dropped and errors found by category and Squadron]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES FOR FEBRUARY
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 ft.
9 P/O Blow F/Sgt Smith Sgt Hurrell 131 yds
44 P/O Charlesworth Sgt Frederuck F/Sgt Hill 148 yards
P/O Butt Sgt Whiter F/O Sparrow 143 yds
49 W/O Jones Sgt Blackham F/Sgt Stevenson 123 yds
61 P/O Nixon F/Sgt Garrett F/Sgt Devenish 140 yds
106 P/O O’Leary F/Sgt Snowden F/Sgt Williams 142 yds
207 P/O Briggs F/O Bujac P/O Murray 147 yds
P/O Barnett Sgt Hazel F/O Anderson 61 yds
463 P/O McKnight F/O Johnson P/O Isham 140 yds
619 Sgt Wadsworth Sgt Bengston Sgt Shenton 72 yds
1660 Sgt Newman Sgt Outram Sgt Ratner 132 yds
F/Sgt Riddle F/O Larsen Sgt Glulow 140 yds
1661 Sgt Grantham Sgt Young Sgt Hobbs 145 yds
F/Sgt Monaghan Sgt Wand Sgt Philpott 147 yds
617 Squadron obtained 18 exercises, error less than 150 yards, the best 3 being
F/Lt Wilson F/O Finlay F/O Parkin 55 yds
F/Lt Kearns F/O Daniels F/O Barclay 60 yds
P/O Knight F/Sgt Bell W/O Giller 57 yds
ADDITIONAL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of Training exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, 619 Squadron, made the only, and most creditable, effort in the Leader Competition, his Bombing Error at 20,000 feet being 79 yards!!! Congratulations.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 3.
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AIR BOMBING (CONT)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
8 Squadrons qualified in this month’s competition, with results as follows, all errors being converted to 20,000 fett.
[Underlined] Pilots & Air Bombers Navigators [/underlined]
1st 106 Sqdn – 88 yds 1st 207 Sqdn -108 yds
2nd 50 Sqdn -125 yds 2nd 619 Sqdn -138 yds
3rd 61 Sqdn -141 yds 3rd 61 Sqdn -169 yds
4th 619 Sqdn -147 yds 4th 467 Sqdn -170 yds
5th 9 Sqdn -157 yds 5th 9 Sqdn -174 yds
6th 44 Sqdn -166 yds 6th 50 Sqdn -188 yds
7th 207 Sqdn -189 yds 7th 106 Sqdn -216 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -201 yds 8th 44 Sqdn -231 yds
9th 630 Sqdn -175 yds 9th 630 Sqdn -170 yds
(630 Sqdn completed [underlined] 5 [/underlined] exercises only)
The following Squadrons completed 1 exercise only.
10th 463 Sqdn -86 yds 10th 463 Sqdn – 95 yds
11th 49 Sqdn- 90 yds 11th 57 Sqdn -162 yds
12th 57 Sqdn-245 yds 12th 49 Sqdn -291 yds
Congratulations to 106 Squadron who have now won the Bombing Competition for 3 successive months. Nos.9, 50, and 61 Squadrons have all improved their positions considerably but 619 have relinquished their customary “runners up” place in the table. We expect a maximum entry for March and a keen effort on all Squadrons part to topple 106 from the top.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The following news items are provided by the Range Staff at Wainfleet.
1. It is emphatically denied that the entire Night Staff applied for compassionate posting after a night programme carried out at maximum height by No. 5 L.F.S.
2. [Underlined] Heard over the R/T [/underlined]
R/T Operator – “Hullo ----- Please give me a TT.”
Pilot of A/C – “Time over Target 22.26.”
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined] A TT is a tuning transmission.
3. [Underlined] Advice to Crews. [/underlined]
(i) Conform to the established R/T procedure.
(ii) Be sure you burn the correct Downward Recognition Light during NIGHT exercises.
(iii) Pass times of strike and headings QUICKLY after the exercise.
(iv) Wait for silence on R/T before calling the Range.
(v) When you query errors given by the range REMEMBER please that a Direct Hit from 20,000 feet gives the Range Staff as much pleasure as it gives you !!
4. [Underlined] A Thought for the Month. [/underlined]
DO make sure you know which target you are to bomb !! (Many Wainfleet workmen have of late doubled their insurance).
P.S. A certain Mosquito from a certain well-known Group dropped a practice bomb which hit a lorry standing in front of the Range Headquarters. A 3,500 yards error.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) have introduced the Pilot’s Miniature Route Chart for the use of Air Bombers. Thus a single map of the complete route is available and the defended localities and route markers can be recorded. Its use is primarily for dark nights when map reading using the topographical maps is difficult.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DF.C.) has originated an excellent scheme with the use of operational 3073’s. After each operation a chart is made out which shows on one sheet of paper each Bomb Aimer’s picture of the markers bombed. The full sequence of marking in the order of the times of bombing is thus available to each Air Bomber who can compare his attack and estimation of distances with the other Bomb Aimers in the Squadron.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Walmesly, D.F.C.) states that of the 300 practice bombs dropped this year, not one has been aimed below 5000 feet. Further they claim to be the only Unit in the Group (yea, verily, even in the Command) with such a record.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Keates) reports that training was concentrated on to H2S and Gunnery. Blind Bombing with H 2 S had taken a prominent part in this training.
The Squadron Bombing Leader has compiled a graph consisting of nine curves on one sheet, which shows the forwards travel in yards and seconds of groundspeed of all bombs with T.V. between 420 and 1900 feet per second, for specific heights and groundspeeds. The groups apply to the selected heights 15000, 20000 and 25000 feet and the curves in each group cover height and groundspeeds 200, 210 and 220 m.p.h. Any other combinations of height and groundspeeds could be used. All information has been extracted from 5 Group Armament Training Notes, Part 1.
The advantage of this graph is that all information is contained in one graph and considerable time and labour is saved in calculating time intervals or compiling or checking preselector figures for any kind of load within the limitations of T.V., heights and speeds selected.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
F/O Billington has succeeded F/Lt Bray as Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
F/O. Astbury, D.F.C., moves up to F/Lt. Bombing Leader, 617 Squadron, and is joined by F/O. Harden, D.F.C., and F/O. Walker, Bombing Leaders from 1660 Conversion Unit and 61 Squadron respectively.
Congratulations to F/Lt. Bell (9 Squadron) F/Lt. Wake (106 Squadron) and F/Lt. Walmsley (619 Squadron) on the award of D.F.C’s.
Congratulations also to P/O Ball (1661 Con Unit) 3rd on No. 76 Bombing Leader’s Course with an “A” category and P/O Watford (1661 Con Unit) on gaining 1st place on No. 27 A.B.I’s Course.
F/Sgt. Coates (9 Squadron) obtained “B” category on No. 76 Bombing Leaders’ Course. F/O Lyons (61 Squadron) was 9th on No. 75 Course with a “B” Pass.
GARDENING
Despite February weather, the Command planted no less than 1647 vegetables, the second highest total for any month. As all Lancasters were busy discomforting the enemy by more direct methods it fell mainly to the Stirlings of 3 Group, followed by Halifaxes of 4 and 6 Groups and, on a smaller but useful scale, Wellingtons of 1 Group, to achieve this mighty total.
KIEL BAY received over 35%. The French U-boat bases about 20%, and the Western German Estuaries, the Kattegat and Channel also received good measure. Small numbers were planted off the French South Western Iron Ore Ports and in Oslo Fjord.
A Swedish newspaper reports the closing of the ports and shipping channels as an immediate result of 4 and 6 Groups’ visits to the last named. Photographic evidence is already available of the effects of the great effort on Kiel Bay. It shows one 6000 ton liner sunk and lying on her side, and also great congestion of shipping, indicating beyond doubt that traffic has been stopped for a time. It is hard to over estimate the importance of Kiel, which is the focal point of all German traffic in Northern Waters; the annual turnover is 29,000,000 tons of war material, nearly one half of which is iron ore imported from Norway and Sweden. The amount handled [underlined] DAILY [/underlined] would fill 12 1/2 miles of railway trucks. One effect of heavy and sustained mining against this traffic would be to force the enemy to use the sea route to the West of Denmark down to the Elbe and Ems. In hard winters this is done for us by ice in the Baltic, but this winter we have been let down by this ally.
Two interesting points arise from the month’s work. First, nearly all of it has been carried out from high level with great success. A variety of techniques have been used including:- The use of P.F.F. methods (both by aircraft of that force and H 2 S aircraft from the other Groups, marking pinpoints for those not so fitted); the use of the Mark XIV Bombsight when visual means have been possible; and dropping entirely on H 2 S. Secondly, a start has been made in the mining of the enemy’s inner harbours.
We have the task in 5 Group of studying and keeping up to date with the new methods which are still in an experimental stage, and therefore, subject to frequent changes, so that when the call comes for either a small or large gardening effort we can carry it out with our traditional efficiency.
49 Squadron have already been informed of the success of their accurate attack from high level with H 2 S on the 5/6th January.
[Boxed] [Underlined] PILOTS – TAKE IT EASY! [/underlined]
Use your throttles LEISURELY at all times. Do not open up with a rush. You won’t get off the ground any quicker if you “ram” the throttles open, and you are more liable to swing. Make any correction with engines smoothly. There’s no such thing as a “short burst” of engine in proper flying. Make your maxim “EASE your throttles open. EASE your throttles back”. That applies to all aircraft including the Stirling, Lancaster and the Tiger Moth – if your Station Commander lets you get your hands on it. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 19. FEBRUARY, 1944. PAGE 4.
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SPORTS
Bad weather rendered most sports pitches u/s during the last few days of February, but there has been a full quota of matches played in spite of this. Attention is again drawn to the desirability of each Station submitting its sports resume two days or so before month end, to allow ample time for publication in this News. Several Stations have not submitted resumes this month, and so the picture is necessarily incomplete.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] proved unbeatable during the month, playing six games of which they won four (including two Matz Cup matches). However, Lincoln Rovers held them to a 2 – 2 draw, and Waddington to a 3 – 3 draw. Both these games were in the Lincoln League, Division 1, and Scampton could ill afford to drop these points since the League Championship is a neck and neck finish between them and Lincoln Rovers.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] had four Station games of which they drew one home game with R.A.F. Wickenby. The inter-section competition is now in full swing.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] beat Fiskerton at home, but lost to Ruston Bucyrus, A.V. Roe and R.A.F. Wickenby. Four games were played in the Inter-Section League.
[Underlined] EAST KIRKBY [/underlined] beat Spilsby but lost their Matz Cup game against Skellingthorpe 5 – 1. The Section League produced 5 games, and in addition there were 7 ‘friendlies’, the aircrew cadets team winning all three of their games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] Inter-Section games were plentiful. The outstanding match of the month was the Matz Round One win against Woodhall. This has been followed by a 3 – 2 victory against Dunholme, taking Coningsby into the Semi-finals.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] scored a sweeping 10 – 0 win against Bardney in the Matz Cup Round One. They proved it no fluke by holding Waddington to a 2 – 2 draw. They now boast a “Reserve XI”. In the Inter-Section events, 5 games were played. “A” Flight have a strong side and should go well towards winning the trophy generously presented by S/Ldr. Whattam.
[Underlined] SKELLINGTHORPE [/underlined] had 5 Station games and 9 in the Inter-Section events, while there were a further 3 games restricted to aircrew personnel.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] XI beat Winthorpe and Wigsley, and were unlucky to lose 3 – 5 to Scampton in Round Two of the Matz Cup. It was a splendid effort at “giant killing”.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] had 3 games of which they won two, including a 4 – 0 win against a R.A.F. side from Fulbeck.
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The second round saw Coningsby, Scampton and Skellingthorpe emerge as semi-finalists, defeating Dunholme, Swinderby and East Kirkby respectively. Winthorpe and Metheringham have still to decide their event. The semi-final draw is as follows:-
WINTHORPE [underlined] or [/underlined] METHERINGHAM v SKELLINGTHORPE
CONINGSBY v SCAMPTON
Both matches will be played on neutral ground at dates to be announced in G.R.O’s.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined] now boasts a strong side. They beat the Air Crew School 6 – 3, and ran up an astronomical total of 68 – 6 against Lincoln Home Guard. The Home Guard did better in the second game and held them to 18 – 6.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] were unlucky in having to cancel all Rugger games due to flying.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] completed only one out of four games, losing 5 – 0 to 7th K.O.S.B. after an extremely hard game.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] won three out of three games. A hard struggle with their old rivals, 93 M.U., produced a 3 – 0 win, and Winthorpe and Lincoln Home Guard were beaten 14 – 3 and 18 – 0 respectively.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] XV is doing well and won all three games played, Magnus School and Newark R.F.C. 9 – 6, and Rufford Home Guard 24 – 6.
[Underlined] LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDES [/underlined]
This competition is fast developing into a 53 Base monopoly. 9, 463 and 467 have all concluded their Squadron events now, producing F/Lt. Hadland’s team, P/O. McKnight’s team and P/O. Simpson’s team as the respective winners. In these three Squadron events, 65 crews took to the field. 50 Squadron are following suit, and three games have so far been played. Other Squadrons please note and “get cracking”! A complete Squadron event can be decided in two afternoons, and the physical “uplift” is amazing – try it and see.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] won three out of four games, suffering their only defeat at the hands of 5 Group in a “mixed” game.
[Underlined] EASY [sic] KIRKBY [/underlined] had one station event, losing to Spilsby Town. The Aircrew Cadets “A” and “B” sides fought two very close games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] lost to the Green Howards, and held K.O.S.B. to a 3 all draw.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] mixed side beat 5 Group 7 – 3. The Station side beat Lincoln Home Guard, but lost to Wigsley.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] lost 2 – 4 to O.C.T.U. Newark, but won a mixed game versus Winthorpe R.A.S.C. by 3 – 1.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] mixed side defeated Wigsley 7 – 5 on Swinderby ground, lost to Swinderby 3 – 7, and enjoyed a 3 – 2 win against Scampton.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
49 Squadron now allot one afternoon per week to physical “fitness”. Wood-chopping, country walks (pubs out of bounds) and gardening are all featured. Swimming at Lincoln is laid on each Tuesday, and for ground staff on Sundays. All that is needed now is the completion of the “gym”.
Dunholme R.A.F. Regiment keep up their water worthiness by attending Lincoln Baths.
Coningsby gym is now in full swing for badminton, boxing and gymnastics.
Metheringham gym will open this month for badminton, boxing, fencing and P.T.
[Underlined] COMPETITIONS [/UNDERLINED] The Wines Rugby Cup Competition has been launched, also a new event in 5 Group –“5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy”. There should be some keen games in both these events. New events need new trophies. Two are needed – a Lancaster seven-s-side trophy, and a Mixed Hockey Trophy. Benefactors please contact F/Lt. Stott, Headquarters 5 Group (Ext. 54)
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
Spring brings the cuckoo and cricket, a 5 Group Cricket League is being formed. It is hoped that every Station will enter a team. Details are being circulated.
TRAINING
Training on Stirlings and Lancasters in 51 Base pressed on during the month and 66 crews were posted to Squadron.
The Stirling programme has a few teething troubles and but for this there would have been a larger output of crews. Ignition and electrical failures were particularly troublesome and infectious.
The snow fall at the end of the month involved all available man and machine power on a new and unwelcome form of training – shovelling snow – and prevented a last minute spurt in training.
The incoming crews judged by ground training standards are quite good, and the Aircrew School at Scampton did a lot of the spade work in giving them a sound basic knowledge of 5 Group tactics and operational procedure.
H 2 S training has been reorganised in the Base. The present aim is to train selected crews during the ordinary Conversion Unit course. Ground training is being given, and an initial demonstration flight arranged as early as possible in the course so that the cross country exercises (day and might) are flown using H 2 S as a navigation aid. No practice bombing is now being attempted. Air Training has been held up by the unserviceability of the H 2 S Stirling.
The Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston has so far done no H 2 S training, but a synthetic trainer has been promised by Bomber Command. When it is installed crews will be able to keep in practice by dry swims before passing out to H 2 S Squadrons.
With the disbandment of No.1485 (Bombing and Gunnery) Flight, the training of Air Gunners has been incorporated in the normal Conversion Unit Course. When No.1690 (Bomber) Defence Training Flight begins its work it is hoped that the former high standard of training can be maintained.
Flight Engineers are passing through the Stirling Units twice to give them the maximum possible flying time before going to Lancaster Finishing School. This ensures that they are well experienced in the air by the time they reach their operational Squadrons.
Crews under training took part in a large scale Command Bullseye which was laid on as a diversionary feature for the operation against Stuttgart on the night 20th February. The diversion achieved the success hoped for and attracted a large proportion of the weight of the German Fighter Force away from the area in which the Squadrons were operating.
5 Group News. No. 19 February, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
H 2 S
H 2 S training has progressed favourably during the month, but unfortunately once again training in blind bombing has been held up due to bad weather and cloud over targets. Good use is being made of synthetic trainers now installed at 49, 57 and 630 Squadrons and 1660 and 1661 Conversion Units. Navigators and Bomb Aimers should look upon this ground training as an essential part of their syllabus, and endeavour to make as much use of the synthetic trainer as navigational and blind bombing aid in the limited time they have.
It is gratifying to note that many crews are becoming increasingly aware of the value of H 2 S as a navigational aid and should realise the amount of work that is carried out by the Radar Sections for their benefit. Many set operators can help to decrease this work by reporting all faults personally to either the Radar Officer or one of the Radar Mechanics, and not merely to one of the ground crew who pass it on in hushed tones to the Radar Section, but with no explanations regarding unserviceability. You, the set operators, are the ones to let the section know the faults experienced and their symptoms. It may mean the difference between a “ropey” or good set on the next flight. Cultivate this habit of personal contact and you will earn the gratitude of the Radar Section and probably pick up some useful tips.
Some operators are having trouble with poor reception. This is a complaint particularly common amongst crews under training. Like ourselves, components of H 2 S have age limits, and their deterioration may cause poor reception; but remember the set can easily go off tune and it is necessary to check tuning whenever doubts arise regarding the quality of reception.
Cupolas are also liable to give trouble with reception. Extraneous matter which has a habit of collecting in the cupola will materially affect reception, giving rise to a mushy picture. Set operators are advised to see that the cupola is clean both inside and out before every flight.
Does this happen in YOUR aircraft?
[Cartoon] GREMLIN’S GARDEN
N.C.M.
Plotting charts are now being revised every three months to give the H 2 S operator as accurate a view as possible of the shape of towns from which he should receive responses. Every set operator can help in the revising of those charts by noting any peculiarity in town shapes and passing the information to this Headquarters by means of the usual report made at interrogation.
Know your Landmarks. The following are well known H 2 S landmarks on the continent.
Can you identify them?
[Three drawn outline maps]
FLYING CONTROL
Coningsby tops the list, with Waddington a close second; it is encouraging to note that landing times of all Stations are getting more consistent, and the overall landing time of 2.75 minutes is an encouraging improvement on January’s figures. It is hoped to see, each month, a further reduction so that the Group can record an overall average of below two minutes per aircraft.
In planning operations it can now be assumed with confidence that 5 Group aircraft, sometimes in excess of 200, can be landed within one hour of the return of the first machine. Compare this period of landing with that of 12 months ago, when smaller numbers of aircraft were concerned, and when a landing hook up often used to last 80 or 90 minutes. This reduction in the landing period has meant greater safety for the crews, less fuel to be carried, and a greater tonnage of bombs available for delivery.
Reports from Eastern airfields indicate that aircraft are not adhering strictly to lattice line approach procedure. This is essentially a part of the quick landing scheme and rigid compliance with this part of the scheme must be stressed to all crews.
[Underlined] FEBRUARY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of landing times and averages by Station]
GEE
Rather poor range on Gee was experienced in operations this month, and once again XF transmissions were little used by Navigators. However it is apparent that there are still a few navigators who endeavour to get the best out of their sets and try all available means to secure fixes at maximum range. Success in track keeping and timing is the result of their efforts.
Other Navigators seem more concerned with finding reasons why ranges cannot be improved without endeavouring to improve them. This attitude is more effective than any jammer that the Hun can produce. It is therefore, up to every Navigator to use Gee to its actual and not its apparent limits. Plots of fixes made on the last three operations show the distance between the worst and best fixes to be 200 miles or more. Many of the worst ranges come from non-H2S Squadrons in which Gee is the sole navigational aid. Gee Trainers and Jammers are available on all Squadrons and Conversion Units and, therefore, it is up to every navigator, whether on Squadron or Conversion Unit, to carry out maximum training in Gee, particularly in the reading of signals through jamming.
One general complaint is that the Series3, Southern Chain miniature lattice charts do not afford full coverage and many fixes cannot be plotted. Charts covering such areas are to be issued in the near future, but in the meantime the remedy is in the Navigator’s own hands. Continue your lattice lines in pencil along the margins of the those charts you have, covering areas where fixes might be obtained, but no chart coverage is available.
With the constant lack of interest in XF transmissions, enquiries have been made, and many Navigators complain that they find it difficult to insert the XF unit into the receiver and use it in its present position. If this difficulty is arising now, it will be even greater when the new RF unit is issued, because of the attention required to secure maximum results. A little perseverance now may help in the future. However, how about a few ideas on the repositioning of the Gee receiver to obviate this complaint? They will be welcome at the Headquarters providing they are practicable.
Navigators of 630 and 57 Squadrons visited a Gee transmitter station during the month, and were given an idea of the ground organisation necessary to provide so valuable a navigational aid. The visit was much appreciated by all concerned, and it is hoped that other Squadrons and the Conversion Units will take advantage of this facility in the future.
[Underlined] FLYING ACCIDENTS [/underlined]
(Continued from page12 Col 3)
investigations into them are not yet complete. One aircraft dived to avoid another and crashed in the funnel. Another failed to get airborne by the time it reached the airfield boundary. The undercarriage hit the hedge and the Lancaster crashed. Another hit a hill while the pilot was flying low in bad weather. In others the causes are still obscure.
15 avoidable accidents occurred in 51 Base during February, of which 8 were taxying accidents. This means that more than half of the avoidable accidents in the Group occurred at Conversion Units and No.5 L.F.S.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
January’s low percentage of photographic failures was not maintained during the month of February, and the following increases occurred:-
Photographic + .02%
Armament + 2.1%
Electrical + 1.07%
It is curious that a large number of failures occurred on the first raids following the stand down period. It is expected that technical efficiency should then be at its peak, as ample time is available to effect thorough maintenance and servicing of camera equipment etc. That this is not so, points to the fact that this period is not being used to the best advantage.
During the stand down period N.C.O’s must ensure that everything possible is done to produce Type 35 Controls and camera gearboxes which are without fault. Particular attention must be given to timing the camera sequence – control contact strips – gear box spring teeth and film measuring roller needles; this applies particularly to newly issued equipment.
Photographic film processing and printing is taking [underlined] far too long to accomplish [/underlined] and NCO photographers are to check the internal section organisation. Delay always occurs when numerous Ground Detail photographs are obtained, indicating that the organisation is based on having a minimum amount of printing instead of the maximum. Station Intelligence Officers need prints to plot with a minimum of delay. Printing should therefore, be arranged to allow the S.I.O. to have the prints in batches instead of waiting to complete the whole of the work.
Every photographer must realise the importance of carrying out his tasks, with the [underlined] utmost speed and efficiency [/underlined]. The aircrews have completed their tasks, but delay in producing photographic evidence of the effect of the raid is comparable to sabotaging their efforts.
The use of Composite film (Kodacolour and H.S. Night) was carried a stage further during the month and it is hoped that in the near future other Squadrons will be using this method of recording attacks.
The problem of operating the camera when the bomb doors are opened prior to the bombing run is now considered to be solved. Aircraft of 44 Squadron are carrying out final tests which have so far been successful and the advantage of the circuit now under trial is that it does not impose exacting Drill upon the pilot and Air Bomber.
[Table of Photographic Analysis including Target Conditions and Failure Analysis by Squadron]
HONOURS & AWARDS
The following immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. G. PRATT. DFM
W/Cdr. R.L. BOWES, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. P.A. DOREHILL, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. C.D. WIGGIN. DFC
P/O. R.M. HIGGS. DFC
Sgt. R.W. JOY DFM
50 SQUADRON
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
61 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. BURGESS. DFC
207 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. GALLAGHER. DSO
F/Sgt. C.E. STEWART. DFM
463 SQUADRON
Sgt. W. HOLT. DFM
The following non-immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
9 SQUADRON
P/O. K. GILL. DFC
P/O. G.E. LOCKEY. DFC
F/Sgt. T.C. OVEREND. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/Lt. S. BURROWS. DFC
Sgt. R.W.T. TUCKER. DFM
P/O. A.G. SMYTHE. DFC
F/Sgt. J. CUSHION. DFM
F/O. S.H. LETLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON
F/O. R.E. HIDDERLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON (Continued)
P/O. L.A. COXHILL DFC
P/O. J.B. WARWICK DFC
F/O. J.D. HARRIS DFC
W/O. E.M. WEBB DFC
W/O. E.L. JONES DFC
P/O. G.P. GEORGE DFC
P/O. K.O. BARNES DFC
W/O. T.P. JUBB DFC
Sgt. G. BOAG DFM
Sgt. T. TYLER DFM
F/Sgt. J DORRIAN DFM
F/Sgt. G.A. EDY DFM
F/O. F.E. WHITTMER DFC
50 SQUADRON
P/O. J.F.C. BROWN DFC
F/Lt. K. RUSKELL DFC
F/Lt. J.A. EDWARD DFC
F/O. W. BODEN DFC
F/O. L.T. PRITCHARD DFC
F/Sgt. R.V. POOLEY DFM
F/Sgt. S.J. PROCTER DFM
W/O. E.T. McLEOD DFC
F/O. D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/Sgt. H. BROWN DFM
F/O. J.M. DICKS DFC
P/O. J.B. BLOTT DFC
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY DFC
Sgt. C.H. BROWN DFM
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. KING DFC
F/Sgt. W.L. BELL DFM
F/Sgt. J.A. THOMAS DFM
61 SQUADRON
F/Lt. N.D. WEBB DFC
106 SQUADRON
F/Lt. J.G. CLARIDGE DFC
F/O. V.L. COLE DFC
P/O. W.R.P. PERRY DFC
F/Lt. L.R. HARVEY DFC
F/O. J. FORSYTH DFC
P/O. L.G. BERRY DFC
F/Lt. R.L. WAKE DFC
207 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. P.N. JENNINGS DFC
F/Lt. J.F. GRIME DFC
F/Lt. M.J. BAUD DFC
F/Sgt. G. BROADHEAD DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. BROWN DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. JAMIESON DFM
F/Lt. W.C.T. BRAY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
467 SQUADRON
P/O. W.J.O. GRIME DFC
P/O. J.G. SIMPSON DFC
619 SQUADRON
F/O. H.W. KEAN, DFM. DFC
F/Lt. J.A. HOWARD DFC
F/Lt. P.J.F. WALMSLEY DFC
W/O. J.H. MASON DFC
630 SQUADRON
F/Lt. D.S. PATERSON DFC
P/O. A.E.A. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. A.H. GIBSON DFC
P/O. J.H. WORTHINGTON DFC
F/Sgt. J. MARTIN. DFM
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
[Underlined] RADAR WORKSHOPS [/underlined]
Although none of the Radar Workshops in this Group have quite reached the stage depicted in the picture on the opposite page, it does show what can befall a section if it is left to sweep itself out after you have all packed up for the day. It is surprising what a few minutes at the end of the day can do if everyone pitches in before leaving for town. It also helps to ward off that hopeless feeling one experiences in the morning on entering a section which looks as if our bombers had got a bit off track (Gee u/s?).
Odd pieces of timber can be scrounged on the Station (NOT packing cases – which have now supplanted the gold standard), and with these can be built trays for spare components which we trust you have saved from detonated sets and other salvage material.
Test equipment should be treated with the greatest respect and kept in its proper place when not in use.
An up-to-date serviceability and fitting board in the office or workshop can save no end of trouble and time for all concerned when information is required at short notice. It keeps all mechanics posted too, and they will add that extra little drive which helps to make the picture the board portrays a rosier one.
General interest diagrams – excluding polar diagrams of Dorothy Lamour and other homing devices – should be neatly displayed on notice boards and walls.
The use of lino is nullified if the mud is not left outside, so get hold of those foot scrapers and door mats which the equipment section will be only too pleased to provide.
So let your aim be to keep your Radar workshop clean and reasonably tidy, so that the priceless equipment you have the privilege of handling may have the best chance of ensuring more bombs on the target.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATIONS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Codes [/underlined]
The month of February saw the last of our old standby, the “X” book, and in its place comes the A.P.3026. This will be easier to understand if Wireless Operators (Air) take the trouble to study its contents during the odd spare moment.
The new edition of C.D. 0250(16) should also receive a little of your attention, as the contents have been enlarged and the spare groups decreased. Remember that any time spent in studying these new editions might well save a frantic turning over of pages and a panic in the air.
Tests will be carried out on the Group W/T exercises, embodying the additions to the C.D.0250. Operators are reminded that this is an excellent means of getting up to date with anything new, and if you are not on the exercise you can always learn something from the logs of those who were taking part.
[Underlined] Finding Messages [/underlined]
All Wireless Operators (Air) are to be congratulated on the splendid work done during the month in connection with the “wind finding scheme”, especially on the night 15/16th February when 153 wind messages were received from aircraft. There was great joy and jubilation in the Signals Cabin at this Headquarters, for the “Back Room Boys” are always in the show.
[Underlined] Tail Warning Devices [/underlined]
Training in the use of the various early warning devices should now be standardised throughout the Group, but there are Squadrons who have not sent to the Group Signals Leader their version of the synthetic training cards. These cards are the best method of obtaining a quick snappy reaction to what is seen on the screen. The combined efforts of O.R.S., T.R.E., B.D.U. and the Radar “Kings” produced a piece of equipment designed to aid the bomber crews to beat the Hun when he is met in the air. Are [underlined] you [/underlined] tackling the job with the enthusiasm it deserves? Remember, TRAINING is the only answer.
A fault finding table for Visual Monica has been prepared and will be issued to Squadrons for inclusion in the current fault finding booklet carried by all Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] Lighting of Operator’s Cabin [/underlined]
Quite recently the old complaint of lighting in the Wireless Operator’s position has cropped up again. Now, at this present stage of the war, it is quite impossible to start producing modified lighting on a large scale, and it must be left to the initiative of the individual to produce something for himself. The maintenance section of No.50 Squadron produced and excellent lighting system for the T.R.1154 and are working on the R.1155. Come along fellows, don’t leave it to one – try saving your breath on complaints and using it up on some action.
[Underlined] “Brace up” [/underlined]
Now for a final word to all airborne “key bashers”. Things are likely to get cracking in the very near future. Can you say with a clear conscience that you are ready to meet any emergency? [Underlined] If [/underlined] not, now is the time to GO TO IT INT QRL QRV K 2359
[Underlined] Stop Press [/underlined]
A tip from No.630 Squadron. Switch on your T. R. 1196 when going in on your bombing run, and then, should your intercom. go unserviceable, the change-over can be effected immediately.
SIGNALS FAILURES
There has been an alarming increase in the percentage of Signals failures during February and whilst it is true that almost 50% (13 out of a total of 29) were due to definite failures of components in the equipment, it is felt that this number could have been reduced, particularly those of a recurring nature. Special attention should be paid to the starter relay contacts in the Power Unit type 35 pending the introduction of the new type with silvered contacts in a more accessible position. Faults in the switch type 170 in the fighter warning circuit are nearly always due to an insufficient allowance of slack in the connecting cable exerting a pull on the switch during the rotation of the turret, causing a displacement of the switch contacts. This results in a point contact and an intermittent high resistance connection.
There were six failures reported in which no fault could be found. Five affected intercom, four of which were contributory to early returns. Every member of a crew can assist in diagnosing obscure intercom faults by remembering the details and symptoms of the failure and passing them on to the Signals Officer.
The object of reporting failure is to ascertain the reason why the failure occurred, and if possible to originate a modification or maintenance instruction which will tend to eliminate the type of failure. This object is defeated unless all failures are conscientiously reported, and the number of failures reported by a Squadron does not reflect upon its maintenance efficiency, but rather indicates a conscientious devotion to detail, in an effort to reduce the number of failures and increase the delivery of goods to the customer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee remains one of the most serviceable of all Radar devices; out of 1115 sorties flown, 94% of the sets were completely trouble free. This is a very good effort, but with all the experience obtained on this equipment there is no reason why the figure should not be far higher.
Another R. F. Unit is about to be introduced; these units are not, however, to be available in large quantities for some time. It is probable, therefore, than [sic] non H 2 S Squadrons will receive them first. In this connection it is of interest to learn that the Lancasters will soon have a stowage provided for the units not in use.
Authority has at last been obtained for lino to be laid on Radar workshop floors; many enterprising Squadrons have already had their floors covered, and were repaid by increased serviceability. It is hoped that no time will be wasted in so equipping all workshops.
Air Ministry has now ruled that detonators need no longer be fitted; although this will present the Hun with a considerable quantity of Gee equipment, it will be a great help to Squadrons, as many men were necessary for the fitting and removal of detonators.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The serviceability figures for H 2 S are very unsatisfactory. Last month only 68.8% were serviceable for the whole trip; the one blessing is that most of the failures occurred after the target. Main causes of failures are filament transformers, power units and manipulation. An oil filled filament transformer is now being tried, and this may be the solution to our main cause of unserviceability.
Manipulation is confined only to U/T crews but is assuming alarming proportions. Some Squadrons are still troubled by freezing scanner, and repeater motors. Bomber Command is trying to get approval for a new method of heating, but meanwhile the existing heater elements should be repositioned forward of the scanner motor.
The equipment situation is considerably improved, and with the Group Pool now at this Headquarters, Squadrons will have little difficulty in obtaining the main units of H 2 S.
(continued on Page 9 col 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
[Cartoon of Workshop]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 19. February 1944.
- Maurice levell –
IS THIS [underlined] YOUR [/underlined] RADAR WORKSHOP?
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] GUNS AND TURRETS [/underlined]
The month of February shows a notable increase in the number of gun failures still being attributed to freezing. Rare reports have been received where conclusive evidence is available that guns have frozen, while instances have occurred that gunners have attempted to operate the breech blocks by operating the triggers. Attempts have also been made to release the breech blocks by means of the manually operated rear scar release units with little or no success. It is considered that the hydraulic media in the rear scar pipes becomes either frozen or congealed, and that trouble is not brought about by ice in the breech blocks.
To provide conclusive evidence that this is so, trials have been arranged whereby a percentage of gunners operate their breech blocks at intervals of 30 minutes, with guns at “safe”, throughout the operational sortie once operational height has been gained. A percentage of guns are also to be tested during the return, and by this means it is considered a valuable comparison will be obtained.
[Underlined] GALLEY HEATERS [/underlined]
A turret heater known as the “Galley Heater” is shortly to be introduced. The first 10 heaters are being delivered to Skellingthorpe for installation in aircraft of No.50 Squadron. The inside temperature of the turret is raised by means of a steady flow of hot air via air ducts, the ducts being so arranged as to spray the air on to the guns and turret components most susceptible to freezing, and re-bounding on to the gunner’s face.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet Bombing Range. [/underlined] Extreme difficulty has been experienced during recent weeks in keeping targets and their lighting fully serviceable at Wainfleet Range. This has been due to the heavy tides experienced, causing the ingress of salt water into lighting fittings, and resulting in a depletion of vital bombing training. An all-out drive is being made which, it is hoped, will ensure one hundred percent serviceability at all times.
[Underlined] Owthorpe and Epperstone Ranges [/underlined] are available for both day and night bombing, target illumination being effected by flares.
(continued in next column)
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURE [/underlined]
It can be seen from the failures table below that certain Squadrons claim to have had comparatively few, if any, bomb or S.B.C. failures during the month; it is known from Raid Reports received that this is not a true representation of the month’s failures. It is once again emphasised that all Armament failures are to be signalled in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Part I, Section S, Leaflet No. 2, Issue No. 4.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
An Armament Officers’ Conference was held at Base Station, Scampton, on Friday, 11th February, 1944, and afforded an excellent opportunity for the Command Armament Officer, Air Commodore Bilney, to meet all Armament Officers within the Group. Minutes have been circulated.
[Underlined] MINES “A” – MKS. I – IV [/underlined]
With the introduction of numerous types of new assemblies, it has been found that the personnel who carry out the testing and preparation, need instruction on all these later assemblies. To meet this requirement, courses have been arranged and allocated to all Units within the Group.
[Underlined] FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D= TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
Link Trainer Hours
[Table of hours spent on the Link Trainer by Pilots and Flight Engineers per Squadron]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(continued from page 8 col 3)
[Underlined] VISUAL MONICA [/underlined]
Serviceability of this equipment has still not reached a satisfactory figure; last month it was approximately 81% serviceable. A large percentage of the failures were due to switch motors seizing. A great deal of time and trouble has gone into this switch motor problem, and it is hoped that the solution is close at hand. All Units will have received information regarding the Manufacturer’s methods of setting up, and soon a report will be issued summarising the findings of a local ball bearing works which has been testing these motors. In the meantime the 2-way Pye sockets will allow the Wireless Operator full coverage even though the switch motor stops.
The biggest headache is still the shortage of equipment. Many Squadrons have managed to “acquire” bits from here and there, and in this manner fit more aircraft. This unfortunately, appears to be the only way in which replacement can be maintained at present.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond, unfortunately, depends on H 2 S serviceability and manipulation by both the Navigator and Wireless Operator. In such circumstances one would expect the Fishpond serviceability to be bad, and such is the case. In spite of this general low serviceability, Squadrons which have trained their crews well are now very pleased with the results obtained, and indeed managed to show a figure of 73% serviceable.
[Underlined] A. I. [/underlined]
Trials have been going on for some time with Mark IV A.I. It is believed that this equipment will make a good “Tail Warning Device”.
There are many snags yet to be cured before both elevation and bearing can be obtained.
It is expected however, that the experts will find the answer soon, and once more 5 Group will have pioneered a first class “Tail Warning Device”.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of amount saved by Base and Unit]
TOTAL 4170.10.9
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Unit]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
You should always have a clear picture of each leg of the route in your mind. Study your track throughout briefing. Your [sic] can’t overdo this. It will prevent you accepting a completely wrong course from your Navigator. They have been known to give airspeeds for courses! It will help you as a rough guide to your track make good to take approximate bearings on defended areas each side of the route. But [underlined] don’t [/underlined] pinpoint on flak. One gun site can seem like “Happy Valley” if you are getting its undivided attention.
Always trim forward after bombing. The Lancaster becomes appreciably tail heavy after the bombs have gone. One pilot didn’t trim forward. He was a trifle shaken when the “wizard prang” he was giving all his attention to suddenly took off and orbited him. It was a sadder and wiser man who finally recovered from a stall some 8,000 feet nearer the ground.
Watch the “George” auto-control on take-off, especially taller pilots. It is possible during powerful movements to knock the auto-control lever to “In” and though “George” can fly straight and level, he can’t cope with a take-off, and you may not either with his unwanted co-operation.
By the way, when did you last do a proper Link Trainer exercise? Did you blank off the artificial horizon and carry out recovery from more extreme attitudes by use of the turn and bank indicator, A.S.I. and rate of climb? Or did you just fill in time?
If you have to “queue up” for take-off, don’t leave your engines idling. The plugs may oil up if you have long to wait. Run each engine up against the brakes to about 1600 revs. This will be sufficient to clear them, and it will also prevent overheating.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
A Pilot in this Group did his take-off drill the wrong way round. He left the boost cut-out till the end of his checks. When he did pull it down, his heavily gloved hand knocked the port outer fuel cock off, Fortunately his Engineer noticed it. He may not have done!
Keep your beam flying on the top line. Don’t just switch it on to test it on N.F.T’s Fly down the beam and do an approach each time. It’s a good scheme after training flights and N.F.T’s to find the aerodrome yourself on your own and other beams in the area.
Have you got your drills for using portable oxygen bottles weighted up? If you have any doubts at all- which you shouldn’t have – read 5 Group Aircraft Drills, No.12. Do you know how long the supply will last?
On your next N.F.T. carry out a dummy drill for an emergency. Have your Flight Engineer and Wireless Operator go down and lift the Rear Gunner out of his turret and carry him to the rest bed, using portable bottles. One pilot we know had three of his crew unconscious on the rear turret cat-walk just as he was approaching the target. They knew how to use the bottles, but had never practiced it!
Don’t wear signet rings on operations, however well dressed you may feel. You may regret your elegance. It increases the danger of frostbite if you have to bale out at altitude. It is also difficult for the M.O. to treat you for hand wounds or abrasions. Either the ring comes off – or your finger does!!
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
All Flight Engineer Leaders in the Group must have a drive on their Squadron in log keeping. So much valuable information is lost because details of small defects the recording of airspeeds, and the time of descent are omitted. It is difficult to keep a good log when the Flight Engineer is to “Window”, but if we can instil more keenness in the keeping of these logs, Flight Engineers in the long run, would benefit from the research which is given to all operational flights.
There is much discrepancy in the duration of flight from these logs. In future the time from airborne to landing must be taken from the Watch Office records and entered in the log.
This month at least one early return was made that should have been avoided. On the outward trip, the port engine showed a higher temperature than the other three; it was decided to return. On the check the next day it was found that this temperature was within the limits laid down for this type of engine; the Flight Engineer should have known this and advised the pilot that there was no danger. Another case was one engine feathered because the oil temperature gauge dropped to zero, yet both the oil pressure gauge and the coolant temperature gauge remained normal. On check it was found that the gauge was faulty.
[Cartoon] Dot and Dash – our immaculate W.A.A.F’s
“- and you needn’t say I’m jealous of this Monica of Bill’s – “
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The Group operated five times only during February, and these five operations produced 1000 sorties; to achieve this an exceedingly high percentage of aircraft held on charge flew on each of these operations, the outstanding feature being the first operation of the month, when 226 Lancasters took off from this Group. Further comment on this achievement is unnecessary as it must be obvious to any person who knows the difficulties which have to be overcome to get such a large force off the ground, what work was entailed.
March should see an even larger effort than did February, but we still have our cancellations and early returns which do not appear to reduce by very many in spite of all our efforts. The technical defects which cause early returns and cancellations are not of a recurring nature; that is why it is so difficult to overcome each single case, but in spite of these individual faults, the numbers of early returns will be at least reduced if we persevere.
Much discussion has taken place during the month on the salvage of equipment, and one point which affect all Engineer Officers in this connection is that they must make sure that full use is made of the Base facilities for the repair and testing of technical equipment. A very frequent check should be made on R. & I. stores, and station equipment sections, to ensure that items of equipment have not been returned for subsequent return to the R.E.D. when these items can be repaired within the Base facilities.
During March it is intended to review the Maintenance Schedules for both Lancaster and Stirling aircraft; committees will be set up for each type and each individual inspection item will be checked both for the Daily and Minor Inspections; as a result it is hoped to cut out many items which exist in the Daily Inspection which are unnecessary, similarly with the Minor Inspection. Many hours are at present expended inspecting items which happen to be shown as requiring inspection by the schedule where, in fact, no defects were ever found. At the same time that the schedules are being revised, the card system will be introduced which will assist greatly with carrying out inspections, and it may be no longer necessary, once the scheme is introduced, to put aircraft unserviceable for longer than a few hours for inspection purposes.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Underlined] STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Conversion Unit]
LANCASTER AIRCRAFT
[Aircraft Serviceability for 5. L.F.S.]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] HARMONIZATION [/underlined]
Standard diagrams for each turret in Lancaster aircraft for harmonization at 100 yds and 25 yds have been issued to all Squadrons (5 Group letter 5G/237/2/Trg. Dated 1st Dec. 1943). These diagrams show all dimensions including the height of boards above ground, colour scheme for the gun spots and size of gun spots. The Mid Upper Turret is harmonized on the PORT beam and in all instances the distances are measured from a point vertically beneath the gun pivots to the board. The Tail turret is harmonized with the board dead astern and the nose turret with the board dead ahead.
A good tip is to strip each gun in turn, and not have four breech blocks laid around the rear turret at the same time, as instances have occurred of the breech blocks finding their way into the wrong gun, with the result that the Gunner has had a little difficulty in getting all the guns to fire. It is essential to check the harmonization again after the gun has been trained on the gun spot and the locking device screwed tight as the gun sometimes moves slightly during the locking procedure. The best type of board is the solid wooden one, fitted with a handle for carrying, and the best place to keep the boards is in the Gunnery Office and NOT laid about the dispersal points, remember somebody else may want the board after you and will expect to find it in its proper place. The guns should be harmonized at 100 yards and the 25 yards board used only for checking, it will be realised that the danger of harmonizing at 25 yds is that a slight error at this range is a large one at 400 yards, and although it is often easier to use the short range, don’t get into the habit of doing it every time.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
These reports are showing a tendency to become very brief and a lot of valuable information is omitted; this may be due to the gunners not giving the information at interrogation, or the duty gunner not including everything that is laid down in Appendix “A” INT. 1 and 2 to Air Staff Instructions, it is not easy to remember each item in this Appendix, and it is suggested that a copy is made and used at interrogation to ensure that all the information required is obtained from the crew.
All gunners should realise that the gun freezing bogey is still very much in existence and gunners should do everything possible during the trip when freezing is suspected, to find out where the trouble is; this is not simple, but if the guns won’t fire with the firing gear, the manual release should be tried. This may not cure the trouble as the breech block may go forward and stay there, instances have occurred of the firing gear taking some few seconds to function after the triggers have been pressed. These points and the presence of ice on guns should be noted by the gunners and stated at interrogation. Will all air gunners, therefore, do their utmost to help the technical staff to solve the serious and difficult problem.
[Underlined] MARK II GYRO GUNSIGHT[/underlined]
The Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Fiskerton is being modified to take the Gyro Gunsight and training of gunners will commence as soon as this modification is complete. Considerable practice is required with this gunsight before the gunner becomes proficient in following the target accurately, due to the slight lag produced by the gyro on the moving graticule. It is found at first that when following a target which changes direction, the gunner is apt to overshoot with the sight, as the graticule carries on after the turret has stopped, and this, coupled with the foot pedals which are operated to feed the range into the sight, are both innovations which are new and must be mastered before accurate shooting can be expected.
The turret in which these sights will be installed is the F.N. 121 which has an electric motor to operate the servo mechanism, which eliminates any inter-action of trigger and turret movements. The control characteristics in the valve box have been modified to give more positive control for small turret movements at the cost of a slight reduction in the speed of the turret. No information is available at the moment regarding the speed with which the remaining Squadrons will be equipped after 49 Squadron is complete, but it is expected that the rate will be speeded up after the first Squadron has been completed.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO.73 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FINAL EXAMINATION RESULTS [/underlined]
P/O. Sandford – 467 Sqdn. – 79.2% - Cat. “A”
P/O. Powell – 619 Sqdn. – 67% - Cat “C”
[Underlined] NO.74 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE [/underlined]
F/O. Williams – 463 Sqdn. – 74.8% - Cat “C”
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn. A/C Night Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 M 19/20.2.44. DO.217
49 D 19/20.2.44. JU,88
207 F 20/21.2.44. ME.110
49 C 24/25.2.44. T/E.
463 S 25/26.2.44. FW.190
207 K 25/26.2.44. ME.410
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
50 B 15/16.2.44. JU.88
44 J 15/16.2.44. DO.217
50 H 15/16.2.44. ME.210
207 C 15/16.2.44. ME.110
9 C 15/16.2.44. T/E.
44 A 19/20.2.44. ME.210
50 J 19/20.2.44. JU.88
106 M 19/20.2.44. ME.410
619 B 19/20.2.44. ME.109
44 Y 20/21.2.44. ME.210
49 G 24/25.2.44. JU.88
49 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.210
57 P 24/25.2.44. JU.88
207 P 24/25.2.44. S/E.
9 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.100
9 S 25/26.2.44. JU.88
630 G 25/26.2.44. FW.190
All these claims have been confirmed by Command.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.19. FEBRUARY, 1944 PAGE 11.
[Page break]
M.T. & FLYING ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ‘YOU’VE HAD IT’ [/underlined]
Reporting an M.T. accident, even filling up Form 446, is easy enough if the driver does it straight away, but it gets more difficult every day he puts it off.
In the end you will find that he doesn’t report it at all, but don’t be misled; the other man will and A.D. Claims then start the ball rolling from the other end, and you will find that you are in more trouble than ever, and it’s quite a big snowball by the time it reaches you.
Will M.T. Officers and N.C.O’s i/c Transport try to impress their drivers with the necessity for keeping the following rules.
(i) If you hit an aircraft or an aircraft hits you – REPORT IT – Everybody will; it’s a BLACK, but Training are dealing with this more fully.
(ii) If you knock someone’s wall down, or even bend it, --REPORT IT – the owner may quite like it, and he’s sure to be watching out of the window.
[Cartoon] E.M.P.
(iii) If you bump a car in the blackout – REPORT IT – the owner values his car much more than you think; usually more than it’s worth.
(iv) If you knock his daughter down – REPORT IT – injuries get so much worse if no one calls to sympathise from A.D. Claims. By the way, don’t call to sympathise yourself, however pretty she may be; this is against the rules, A.D. Claims have all the luck! A.M.O. A475/42, paragraph 17 lays down quite definitely that you must not approach the civilian involved in an accident. If you can get yourself invited to tea after the whole thing is settled – well that’s different!
Very few MT accidents now require more than F.446 action if they are reported at once. Page.16 of the AMO tells you all about this.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENT RATE ALMOST TREBLED IN 3 MONTHS [/underlined]
DECEMBER - [/underlined] 10; [/underlined] JANUARY – [underlined] 18; [/underlined] FEBRUARY – [underlined] 27. [/underlined]
The exalted position held by this Group for the past three months in the Bomber Command Accident Ladder will certainly not be held for the month just finished. It has been the blackest month from the accident point of view for a long time, and the most prevalent type, viz. [underlined] Ground Collisions [/underlined] has contributed to a greater extent than ever to the long list of damaged Lancasters and Stirlings in the Group. THESE AVOIDABLE, UNECESSARY AND EXPENSIVE ACCIDENTS MUST CEASE.
The “taxying” record for the past 3 months reads as follows:-
December – 9; January – 9; February – 11.
When it is realised that at least half of the aircraft involved were [underlined] CAT. AC. [/underlined] the effect on the war effort from this type of accident alone is immediately apparent.
So much has been written in these notes recently that it is difficult to avoid repetition, but it is hoped that the new instructions issued in February have the desired effect. However, the exercise of care and foresight on the part of everybody, especially pilots, is essential at all times when taxying an aircraft if the number of accidents in this category is to be reduced. There is no doubt that if ground personnel and aircrew do their very best, taxying accidents can be brought to within reasonable limits.
Manpower, paper, time and tempers can be saved by getting your report off quickly and giving AD Claims a chance to settle the case at once.
A great deal depends on M.T. Officers ensuring that their drivers report accidents promptly. If the drivers was not at fault he will not be punished (Not often!!! Editor), but he may be if he doesn’t report it at all.
Of course it saves an awful lot of trouble not to have the accident at all. It’s worth trying!
An unusual accident occurred at a Station in No.51 Base this month. An aircraft had landed and was slowing down towards the end of the runway, when the rear gunner called up the captain and told him an aircraft was landing beside him. The quick landing scheme was in force , and just prior to the gunner’s warning, Flying Control had advised the pilot to clear the runway quickly. As a result of these warnings, the captain thought the aircraft was close behind him (it was still in the funnel) and accelerated. He had too much speed on turning off the end of the runway, and broke his undercarriage. Rear Gunners should pay particular attention to give their captains precise information as to where an aircraft landing behind actually is. If it is still in the funnel they should definitely say so.
The month’s total of all kinds of avoidable accidents is made up as follows:-
Ground Collisions- 11; Heavy Landings – 4; Overshoots on Landing – 3; Swings on take off – 3; Crashes on Overshooting – 1; Other errors of judgement – 5. Of the aircraft which made heavy landings, two were Cat. A. and two were Cat.A.C. Three of these occurred at night. In one of them the pilot was prevented from using engine [sic] to recover from the first bounce because the Flight Engineer still had his hands on the throttles after ensuring they were fully closed. He was thrown off balance and held on to the throttles. This is a point which must be watched. Another occurred after an operational trip, when the pilot was caught unawares by his flaps only partly lowering. The flap gauge must always be checked.
Investigation of 2 of the swings on take off shows that either the wrong procedure for take off was used, or the wrong action taken when the swing started. Every pilot should ensure that he thoroughly understands the 5 Group Drills on swinging.
The accidents classed as errors of judgement were almost all of a serious nature, and the
(continued on page 6 Col. 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
SELF HELP
A recent letter from Air Ministry impressed upon Command Group and Station Commanders the critical shortage of labour and materials that exists today. Notwithstanding the evidence of this on Stations in the shape of current establishment deficiencies and shortage of equipment, very few people realise how serious the position really is.
In effect, the allocation of labour for constructional work has been considerably reduced. This labour will be required to cover minor Works Services, as well as larger schemes.
[Cartoon] P/O Snooks will Help Himself any time! EMP.
Therefore, the available labour must only be used on those schemes that are essentially of an operational necessity and this can only be done at the expense of day-to-day minor services. If the minor Work Services themselves are to be carried out, it will only be possible to implement them by a “Self Help” scheme.
Now the expression “Self Help” should not be taken too literally. It does not mean that it can be taken as a good excuse to knock down the local guard room, or to pull down the intervening wall between the W.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Dining Room. A “Self Help” scheme is done by Service labour, and as such must be organised as a Service for the benefit of the Station as a whole, and not to satisfy the whim of any individual. There still seem to be a number of people who, being accustomed to “Having jam on it” in the shape of the excellent facilities normally available at a R.A.F. Station of peace-time design, think that the provision of any little extra convenience for anyone connected, however remotely, with the many activities involved in running a flying station, can justifiably be regarded as “operationally essential”. This, of course, is nonsense – ask some of our fellows who have served overseas.
The problem is, therefore, how to get a fuller effort from the available R.A.F. man and woman. There is, no doubt, very many R.A.F. personnel who are not doing the full amount of work of which they are capable and quite a lot of them have not yet grasped that they ought to do more than they are doing. Quite a few regard the acquisition of as many late passes and “forty eights” as possible as their chief aim in life, with unofficial extension to such periods of absence as a minor hobby. Quite a number of these might well contribute a few hours to “Self Help” each week, without suffering any grave hardship.
There are, on the other hand, a considerable number of individuals who continuously work to the limit of their capacity and sometimes beyond that limit (“Not you Adj. – sit down”). Everyone should feel a strong personal urge to give of their utmost to their Service tasks and to put no limit to the amount of effort which should be demanded of them. As we have now reached the stage when national resources are inadequate to provide us with every facility we need just when we want it, this extra effort must be organised and well led, to help ourselves as far as we can. This extra effort can be used on Station Maintenance, to replace broken windows, re-painting quarters and firming up paths and standings.
But, in conclusion, remember the buildings etc., on the Station are Air Ministry property so don’t knock down that Guard Room without first obtaining authority from the higher formation – it is really quite embarrassing to stand on Pay Parade and find you have no money to come.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, Col. 1) [/underlined]
It is not done at all even thought the men drown. Recently in Lincoln Swimming Bath an aircrew member who couldn’t swim took the precaution of providing himself with a Mae West and took care to fasten it properly; he then jumped into the bath from the top board – and wasn’t seen for a long time, he eventually came up shouting for help and on being pulled out immediately started blaming his Mae West, only to find that he hadn’t inflated it – it goes to show!!
[Underlined] Note for Gunners. [/underlined] If your Buoyant Suit has no pocket for a floating torch don’t take it that this means you are not to have one – have a pocket fitted. If no pockets are available, you can still wear the torch round your neck inside the suit. Similarly make sure that there is an attachment for the lanyard of the K-dinghy on your suit – if you don’t know then make enquiries [underlined] now [/underlined]
IN “Air Sea Rescue” the proverb is:-
[Underlined] “YOU CAN BE TOO LATE TO LEARN”. [/underlined]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] CARE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As one goes about the Stations, it is obvious that equipment in general is not being cared for as it might, or rather as it should. There is no doubt whatever that at the present time, especially owing to the shortage of materials, we must make the best use of that which has been given to us. There is a feeling that the Government is a good firm and that “there is plenty more where that came from”. That may be true in certain respects, but as this war goes on, demands will increase, but whether the material will be there to meet our needs is another matter; so it is up to everyone [sic] of us to safeguard, handle and use articles of equipment entrusted to us as though they were our own and we had paid for them. Can you imagine yourself buying an expensive article and then after a short time throwing it away because perhaps a small component of it had become unserviceable! Of course you wouldn’t, you would get another part and make it serviceable. Why should you not, therefore, treat Government property in the same way, and thus save materials, manpower, man-hours and money?
[Underlined] REPAIRABLE EQUIUPMENT [/underlined]
Have you read, thoroughly digested and understood AMO A.736/43? This order gives in great detail the method for disposal of repairable equipment. Amongst the many important things one has to do, none is greater than the labelling of an unserviceable article correctly, for if this is not done (i) you are likely to get it thrown back at you by the Equipment Officer – which may mean humping a heavy article back to where it came from, or (ii) you will have to wait for the new article in exchange for the old until you present it in its proper form; thus considerable manpower and time has been unnecessarily expended. Again, if the label does not state the reason for unserviceability of the item, when it gets back to the R.E.D. many more man-hours are lost investigating the cause and extent of its unserviceability, whereas had the label borne the exact cause of failure, the mechanic at the R.E.D. whose job it is to repair such equipment, could have repaired it with the minimum of delay. Special labels are available for this type of equipment (see A.M.O. N.1174/43) – ensure you have a plentiful supply, and use ‘em.
WHO?
Thoroughness is a virtue which we view
With envy, and with admiration too;
And we, in common fairness must agree,
That rarely in a fellow man have we
Encountered such tenacity and drive
As led him on a recent day to strive,
And show his humble tyros how ‘tis done
To fly an aircraft properly, and shun
The common errors that all pupils make.
Enthusiasm prompted him to take
An aircraft up, and as they turned he spoke
“A broken undercarriage is no joke,
And if you swing on take-off you will find
Your legs will go; you’ll sit on your behind!”
Then as he spoke he swung to demonstrate
And proved his words.
……….he met his forecast fate!!
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR * SEA * RESCUE
A man suffering from shock or the after effects of great mental strain usually behaves in a most peculiar manner, as his brain has become numbed and does not function properly. It is on this account that it is necessary for aircrews to practice dinghy drills and have a sound knowledge of safety and rescue equipment carried in their aircraft and also of the equipment that might be dropped to them in the sea.
A crew of this Group was recently forced down in the sea and an airborne lifeboat was dropped to them – they dug about and found the sleeping suits but did not use them as it was considered that, in the crews wet state, these would not be of any use; similarly because the “Everhot” bags had been immersed they did not attempt to use them, thinking that they would be useless! Normally these men are not the “dim clots” you are now calling them – they are an outstanding example of how dim your brain can become after a climax of mental strain, and also of how insufficient knowledge of equipment can be the cause of much unnecessary suffering. Imagine it – wet through, at sea in a small boat on a cold winter’s day, and the means of warming themselves discarded as useless!
In addition, this same crew showed abysmal ignorance of the ditching stations to be taken up – the two gunners ditched with their [underlined] backs [/underlined] to the flap jack and the flight engineer was badly out of position with his back to the rear spar. As this aircraft broke its back at the rear spar, it is logical to suppose that each of these men, had they taken up their correct stations would have been alive today – the flight engineer should have been on the rest bed and the two gunners probably broke their backs on impact, they should have been facing the other way round with their backs on the floor, and “buttocks to flap jack with feet over it”.
Many flying men still seem to have the idea that fully inflated Mae West makes escape through the upper exits of an aircraft difficult. This is not true and tests have shown that the biggest and smallest members can easily “evacuate” Lancasters and Stirlings with a fully inflated Mae West. Inflate your Mae West when your Dinghy Drills provides – experience has shown time and again that unless this is done at the proper time
(Continued on Page 13 Col. 2.)
OPERATIONS
Until the moth was half spent and the “fighter” moon had been allowed to wane, the Group was unable to stage a major attack, although 617 Squadron found two opportunities to add further to their history. Nevertheless, the 1000 sorties mark was again achieved of which 89.7% were successful in attacking the primary targets, with 3.3% casualties. The lull in operational activity, however, was not allowed to pass unprofitably, as can be evidenced in the record figure of 226 aircraft airborne on the 15/16th.
With the progress of the month it became clear that the immediate objective of the Allied Air Command was to strike and crush Germany’s air strength at its source, by a sustained and co-ordinated air offensive against factories associated with aircraft production. To this end LIMOGES featured as the Group’s first assignment on the 8/9th. Until that night, memorable as indeed it must be to those “locals” who were fortunate enough to remain spectators, The Gnome and Rhone aero-engine factory was producing in the region of 50 engines per month for the Axis. Immediate assessment of the results was greatly facilitated by excellent night photographs and a particularly impressive cine film which was eloquent testimony to the accuracy of the marking. It is now apparent from P.R.U. cover following the raid, that of the 48 bays comprising the factory, 7 only have escaped destruction or serious damage – a considerable part of the machinery being wrecked and production brought to a standstill.
On 12/13th February, ANTHEOR again bore a charmed life, and escaped with no direct hits from an attack pressed home in the face of increased opposition. A few very near misses were recorded, from which, however, the Viaduct sustained no apparent damage.
Having husbanded her main bomber strength until 15/16th., Command directed a record effort against the Reich capital. The weight of the blow appears to have fallen to the South of the city and the West of the Potsdamer Railway Station, where extensive damage can be observed.
Continuing the offensive against the enemy’s aircraft industry, LEIPZIG was singled out for a 2,300 ton raid on the 19/20th. Within a few hours of this attack, made in conditions of 10/10ths cloud, American heavies returned in daylight with yet another load for the battered city. Photographic confirmation of the results is awaited with interest.
The night following, viz 20/21st. STUTTGART received a damaging blow – the attack being carried out against an apparently weakening Luftwaffe, since little enemy fighter activity was experienced by our crews. Heavy smoke rolling South Westwards away from the target obscured the Central, South and South Western areas of the town, hindering photographic cover the next day, but fires still burning, apparently unchecked, in the Northern outskirts, gave rise to the impression (later confirmed) that severe damage had been suffered.
The strain on the German night fighter and ground defences was further aggravate on 24/25th by a two-phase attack on the important ball and roller bearing plant at SCHWEINFURT, which originally contributed something approaching 50 per cent of the total production available to Germany. This attack followed closely in the wake of a heavy daylight assault by the Americans. Guided by fires started by their predecessors, later aircraft were able to continue the bombardment which largely wrecked the group of factories as a war time centre.
The month’s activities wound up with a double blow at AUGSBURG on 25/26th. The targets included the Messerschmitt plant and experimental establishment (believed to be engaged in the production of the Me.410) and the M.A.N. Diesel Engine Factory. Following the precedent of the previous day, this important aircraft centre had been attacked in daylight a few hours before by the Americans, and the evidence of night photographs taken during the raid indicates that enormous fires were left burning throughout the area, with a vast pall of smoke shrouding the stricken city.
It is true to say that never before has the enemy’s war production been so heavily bombed, or their defences subjected to such continued strain as that imposed during the sustained attacks of the last nine days of the month, which in themselves exemplify the crushing might of the Allied co-ordinated offensive.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft, hours flow, bombs dropped, sorties carried out and results by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944.
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Title
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V Group News, February 1944
5 Group News, February 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 19, February 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about tactics, navigation, air bombing, gardening, sports, training, flying control, H2S, Gee, photography, honours and awards, signals / radar, armament, link trainer hours, war savings, flight engineers, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, engineering, gunnery, motor transport and flying accidents, self help, equipment, who?, air sea rescue, operations and the war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-02
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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16 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-23
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
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1944-02
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
civil defence
control tower
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Scampton
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator