3
25
75
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18346/PBradburyDC17010025.1.pdf
d0cbdd6448b63cc6ff130948d1db9977
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Abstract
[underlined] FEB/MARCH 1946[/underlined]
S.O.S Interrupts Air-Sea Rescue Exercise
Yesterday’s air-sea rescue exercise, the first to be carried out in the East, was interrupted by a real S.O.S. from a Sunderland which got into difficulties near Singapore.
Fortunately the Sunderland did not require the airborne lifeboat, and the giant Lancaster which carried it, finally dropped it as an exercise instead of the real thing.
Airman, who may be forced to ditch their craft in Eastern waters in future, can be sure of a much speedier rescue sine the arrival in South-East Asia of a flight of air-sea rescue Lancasters equipped with airborne lifeboats.
For the first demonstration of the launching of an airborne lifeboat, three airmen were sent adrift in a rubber dinghy off Katong. Shortly after, a Lancaster roared overhead evidently locating the dinghy. Smoke floats were then dropped ahead and to the rear of the dinghy.
The dinghy inflated automatically by gas from a cylinder while the smoke floats enable the pilot of the Lancaster to judge direction and speed of the wind.
Having secured this information the pilot of the aircraft travelling against the wind released the mechanism holding the lifeboat to the body of the Lancaster, and it came floating down to the sea suspended by four parachutes. The lifeboat landed on the sea about 60 yards from the dinghy.
3750 LB. LIFEBOAT
Weighting 3.750 lb., the lifeboat was first noticed to detach itself which a backwards
movement. Then out blew a small parachute which when fully distended in the wind released the four big chutes which enables the lifeboat to reach the water right side up.
The boat itself is self-righting and unsinkable with buoyancy chambers fore and aft. It carries equipment for 10 men, including drinking water, rations, medical kit, clothing, transmitting and receiving and visual distress signals.
A collapsible mast can carry a Bermudan-rigged mainsail and foresail which, in a fresh breeze, will take the boat along at more than six knots. The lifeboats now in service are fitted with a 8.h.p. engine and carry fuel sufficient to cruise for 650 miles at a speed of five knots.
The lifeboat is dropped from a height of about 800 feet. It is dropped against the direction of the prevailing wind and ahead of the dingy so that it can drift onto it.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 25 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Description
An account of the resource
A newspaper cutting titled 'S.O.S. Interrupts Air-Sea Rescue Exercise'. There is a handwritten annotation 'Feb/March 1946'. The article describes a Sunderland getting into problems near Singapore, separately from the air-sea rescue exercise, then details the dropping of the airborne lifeboat.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Strait Times Press Ltd, Singapore
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1946
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One newspaper cutting on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Coastal Command
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Singapore
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1946
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Claire Monk
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010025
air sea rescue
Lancaster
Sunderland
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/227/16287/BCharltonRCharltonRv1.2.pdf
42c6e194348507b29908f54c2491c476
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Charlton, Raymond
Raymond Charlton
Ray Charlton
R Charlton
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. An oral history interview with Raymond "Ray" Charlton (1815764 and 201593 Royal Air Force) and a memoir. He completed a tour of operations as a flight engineer with Squadron 57, from RAF East Kirkby.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-08-05
2016-07-20
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Charlton, R
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] RAMBLINGS OF MY MEMORIES. [/Underlined]
Ray Charlton
[copy of a photograph of two bombers in flight over land]
[page break]
Accepted for Aircrew training August 1942.
Called up July 1943.
Two weeks St, Johns Wood, Jabbed etc.. and kited [sic] out then on to Paignton.
Caught out of bounds by my Sergeant Meek, exercising his dog accompanied by his wife. He said if you are caught say I sent you in, if not, good luck. When the sentry challenged me, I knocked the torch out of his hand and raced to my bed, only removing my shoes. Pulling the bedclothes up to my chin thus avoided detection. Flight Sergeant McTaggart on parade next morning asked for the culprit to step forward but I had agreed with the rest of my room mates if only verbal threats no way, but if general punishment I would confess. After a time of blustering and threatening he dismissed parade to get on with lectures. Even Sergeant Meek remarked, “Cool devil.”
In 1945 when on Officer Cadet Training Unit RAF. Grantham I boarded the train for a week end pass, who else joined my carriage although dozens were empty, Warrant Officer Mc, Taggart I with my white flash in my cap gave no recognition but he started off by saying “Don’t I know you”, I smiled and replied Yes, Paignton. He then said “oh yes there was one mystery I never solved, who did attack the sentry. I admitted my guilt. He replied quote “I would have placed you at the bottom of the list of suspects. (Goes to show.)
Having failed the mid term examination of the Pilot. Navigator. Bombaimer course by I/ %, a board chaired by an Air Commodore and four other senior officers interviewed me. The Education Officer pleaded for me to be accepted but the answer was No, having passed a similar examination in the Air Training Corp. The chairman then asked me to what do you attribute your failure to which I replied, Women and Song Sir. When I realised what I had said I awaited with horror his reaction. Coolly he said, “What no Wine” and I replied “Not on half a crown a day Sir. I was then dismissed the meeting saying I would be remustered.
Off to the island of Sheppy. Tested and accepted to be trained as a Flight Engineer.
Posted to Usworth near Washington Co Durham. At the half way atage the whole camp changed over with Bridlington.
At Bridlington I fell ill with tonsillitis. We were living in council houses the whole street had been commandeered. Missing the exams with my own intake I had to wait for the next intake sitting two weeks after my discharge from hospital.
The next posting was St. Athans [sic] South Wales.
Only one funny experience but two minor ones.
The first involved a Canadian who was training with us. Queuing in the N.A.A.F.I. produced a roll of bank notes. My thoughts were, you idiot. An hour after lights out Military Police entered our billet ordering us to stay in bed. They drew the blackout curtains and then switched on the lights. A search commenced and I asked the corporal standing near to me what they were searching for. Eventually he said money. My mind flew to the queue in the N.A.A.F.I. and another Bod whose eyes almost popped out of his head I suggested the next billet to ours and my bed space. Yes, they found the missing £80 in his locker. Next morning the Station Commander had me wheeled into his office and asked me to explain. After telling him my story he asked me to advise the Canadian how to bank the money and draw it out as and when he needed it. The lucky fellow had that amount per month from his father.
One day, two of, us were detailed to conduct an American Colonel around the airfield and point out the types of aircraft. Usually there was housed more varieties of aircraft than most dromes, including a M.E. 109. Towards the end of the inspection he asked if we had a Flying Fortress. Actually we were near to one parked very close to a Sterling so I replied “Oh yes Sir, we park it under the wind of the Stirling to keep it dry. I thought I was about to be court marshalled [sic] but after a while he smiled and thanked us both.
The third incident was a spot check F.F.I. (Freedom From Infection). We (150) were ordered into a large room, lined the walls and be ready for such an examination. When the Doctor arrived we dropped our trousers and underpants and with a pencil in his hand he proceeded to inspect by lifting the parts. One fellow drew attention to himself and when ordered to clearly
2
[page break]
state what he had said, pronounced “It has been in some funny places, but never on a perch before. Yes he was charged Contrary to good order and Military discipline.
Then to Swinderby Lincolnshire, to join a crew. Great skill was used to fit you up with a crew. Pilots were listed alphabetically and so too were we Engineers. Baker and Charlton were both third down. The aircraft to be flown were Stirlings whereas we had trained for Lancasters so a conversion course to start with. We were detailed to carry out a 3 hour 45 minute training trip with a test pilot, navigator, and engineer. Only a test pilot was available to he said he would check the three of us and it was obvious he was not in a good mood. The aircraft we were to fly was out doing Circuits and bumps so we sat at the end of the runway awaiting its final bump.
The ground crew, when it landed carried out a check and invited us to take it over. As Flight Engineer I had to sign the form F700 when satisfied after starting up the engines. Duly starting up the four engines I was unhappy with the last one, the starboard outer. Cutting all engines we all climbed out and I reported to the mechanic I was unsure whether it, was the engine or the instrument, so the engine mechanics and an instrument mechanic rechecked and again invited us back.
Remember this was only my third or fourth trip, so a novice really. Back we all climbed and proceeded to restart the engines. The same oddity showed again in the last one, the starboard outer. Out we climbed again and the engine and the instrument were rechecked and declared OK
In again we climb and the ground staff Sergeant took over and clearly indicated I was a sprog and he wanted his crew on another kite.
The test pilot asked me before we started up if I would agree to start up the offending engine first then if OK the others. I agreed but upon restart sensed the same trouble. The test pilot then asked me if the ground staff sergeant came with us would I then sign to which I could not argue. When I asked the sergeant he declined with a flow of expletives. When asked by the Test Pilot for his answer I told him that with a stream of expletives he had not the time where upon I was ordered to put him on a charge. Well, me a sprog sergeant, him an old sweat. I did so and handed him over to another Admin Sergeant.
My Pilot and I had to see the Station Commander. As my pilot said, he could only give moral support it was my baby.
The Station Commander informed us he had ordered a complete ground crew from another aerodrome to come over and strip the engine down and with a sneer said if they find nothing wrong you will be charged with L.M.F. (Lack of moral fibre) in other words Cowardice.
Some hours later we were again summoned to “God” sorry the Station Commander and he greeted us “Oh sit down fellows and I sensed I was off the hook. He held up the report, which was three or four foolscap sheets and said I will only read out the final paragraph. It read, If this aircraft had flown for more than 20 minutes it would have blown up. Apparently there was an oil blockage. The circuits and bumps only lasted 12 to 15 minutes.
The Station Commander turned to me and said, I bet that takes a load off your mind to which I replied, Well it vindicates my observations but Sir, you threatened me with a court martial what about the ground [underlined] staff [/underlined] Sergeant. He replied, he has already been posted which is a black mark. To this ‘day I still feel he should have been charged, all eight of us would have killed [sic] had I not stood firm. Much later the crew admitted my esteem had risen because those six had been together some time before I joined them when converting from 2 to 4 engines.
We then moved to convert to Lancasters at Syerston.
THEN OFF TO A SQUADRON No. 630 East Kirkby Line,s. [sic]
September 22 1944. I still have vivid memories of our first trip Kaiselautern. Our instructions were to fly in at 4000ft. The target was marshalling yards.
As we approached the sky was full of what looked like fountain sprays of many colours. This was created by Jerry inserting an excessive proportion of tracer bullets in the beltings. It was the light antiaircraft guns for reason of our height. The heavy fire was a mass of sparkling red spots. I was fascinated by the colour show and innocently asked the pilot what it was where upon he replied Flak
October 11 Th 1944. Wacherem Dykes.
3
[page break]
A daylight raid to relieve a unit of soldiers cut off when the Germans flooded the area by breaching the dykes. Shortly afterwards on leave I met an old colleague with a damaged little finger shattered by a bullet which had bounced off a mills bomb slung across his chest. When I asked him where it happened I told him I was in one of the Lancasters that had helped to get them out. DUCKS were used while we kept the Germans occupied and all he said was “Rather you than me
Incredible when you think they had only hard rations and being sniped at every time they moved, living with pigs at the farmhouse which was the only land above water for nearly a week.
During November 1944 a trial was made for formation flying using seven aircraft. Naturally our pilot was picked and on one occasion over the Wash area a Trainer Lancaster formatted upon us. When the Wing Commander called for a starboard turn I pressed my speaker button and called Straight Ahead. A voice of you know who said “announce yourself who cancelled my order”. After explaining, he ordered me to use our Vari pistol.
Needless to say I had taken a note of the aircraft number and markings. We were later told he had been suitably dealt with.
On another formation exercise briefing the Wing Commander announced Leicester to be the oblique turn point. I must have exclaimed louder than I thought and he said “Why, do you live there’ I concurred Producing an ariel map of Leicester he asked me to point out my home which I did His comment was “Well we cannot get that close but how about Humberstone Park On an oblique turn we would break formation and fly line astern. We cleared by a few, say 50 feet the line of trees on the East side, dipped lower over the park and pulled up to clear the trees on the West side. Mothers and their prams scattered. We continued without climbing up Uppingham Road which leads to Humberstone Road at about 100 feet. Banking around Lewis’s tower I, from my seat had to raise my head to see it. Then the pilot yelled out “Christ Leicester is in a hole”. He had to haul the stick back into his stomach in order to climb towards Uppingham and then to re-formate. On one raid our return whilst still over German held land daylight broke and our instructions were to fly low when we soon found ourselves over a German Army Barrack and they were being paraded. Naturally the two or three Lancasters also with us, opened up firing their front guns. We joked about the thoughts of the R S M On another similar occasion daylight came after crossing the front line and in an area with no buildings visible in any direction when suddenly we were aware of a solitary, very obviously a French man on an upright bicycle. To start with he waved, then he gave us the V sign. The pilot commented that was the rude way and pulled up the nose of the aircraft. Needless to say at 2/300 feet our slipstream hit him. His cycle skidded across the road and he was rolled across finishing up in the ditch. When he stood up with just his head and shoulders showing he shook his fist and I turned to the pilot and remarked “ I am glad I cannot lip read French.
Another raid, the target was a pocket of resistance on the Atlantic coast. It was a moonlit night and a 4000 lbs. bomb fell on to a mansion built into the cliff side, believed to be the H.Q. The blast blew the building outwards into space then returned to the original site appearing to be still intact and at that instant just crumbled completely.
Landing one day after a training trip with a blustery crosswind. Unknown to all the Wireless Operator had failed to wind in the trailing ariel. As we came in the final approach the Control Caravan Operator whose head was in the look out dome on the roof, suddenly left the caravan and dashed across the grass and flung himself down in a trench already there for emergencies . Bannister would not have kept up with him. Had he stayed he would have been beheaded when the ariel removed the dome.
Upon another night raid just after attacking the target a Fighter turned to attack us. We dodged into a convenient layer of clouds and continued in between these layers until we reached the English coast. The Debriefing Officer asked us if we had been on a different trip to the rest because they had been mauled all the way back to the Channel.
Another trip to raise eyebrows. After the Bombaimer called bombs away he corrected himself to say one 1000 lbs. bomb remained Our height was around 14,000 feet. On the return leg we dropped, as instructed to 6,000 feet when over France, when suddenly a bang occurred and we realised the bomb had fallen onto the bomb doors. Apparently the release hook
4
[page break]
had been frozen. Shining my torch, to my horror I realised it was primed when falling. The Pilot asked if I thought it would be safe to land with it but I pointed out when we landed the bomb would slide up and strike the bulkhead It would not have been a pretty sight. What to do we all called out. Being reluctant to travel to a safe dropping area in the North Sea we searched the channel below us, saw no shipping and opened the bomb doors then reclosed them. When we landed back at base all crews were asked, “who dropped the bomb in the Channel. One never or rarely, told untruths so we admitted it. It appeared there was a two man fishing, boat, mind you only French ones who were nearly Swamped and came to the English coast to complain. No action was taken aganst us.
After the introduction of the 10 ton bomb to 617 Squadron it was ordered that in the event of early recalls no, repeat no bombs to be discarded in the North Sea because the Lancasters carrying the 10 tonners were not altered apart from the bomb doors. Pilots and Engineers had to initial the order_Naturally it was not long before such a recall. The Pilot actually asked the Navigator for a new course to the dropping zone but I ‘felt obliged to remind him of the new order. That night we were No 2 to land
These landing numbers were always known before take off. No 1 called up when we approached base, the girl on control tower duty made the initial response and then over the air came the Wing Commander’s distinctive voice saying “now watch it No 1 you will be heavier so come in faster and telling us to keep clear until No 1 was down. Upon landing some way down the runway (about 1/5 way) we watched him plough through the fence at the end of-the runway, across one then two and then the third field. The Wing Commander merely turned his attention to us and said quote “You saw what happened to No 1 be more careful.
We approached and landed almost on the beginning of the runway but we were still travelling at 105 m p h as we approached the other end. The Pilot shouted, “Brace Yourselves” and braked the starboard wheel and opened up the port engines, doing a 90-degree turn. When stepping out I requested the ground crew to check the under carriage. They did this while we slept and found it to be OK The very next day after a short training trip we landed, returned to our dispersal point where the ground crew without instructions rechecked the under carriage and found a metal crack in the oleo leg.
Talking of the Ground Crew, we had a Corporal, an Edinburgh man for Engines and an L.A.C. named Enderby from Market Harborough for Airframes. On return from every operation one of them greeted us no matter what the hour. The petrol load always gave an indication of the duration. We all considered it an honour to be so greeted. I always gave them my report when I put my feet on Terra Firma, and when not flying I spent a lot of time with them acting as labourer and naturally paying for tea and wads ‘when the wagon came round.
After one trip base was reported, naturally in code whilst returning that fog blanketed Lincolnshire and we were diverted to Tarratt [sic] Rushden, a Halifax’ drome. (It was common practice to recieve messages but Taboo to transmit). I told the mechanic assigned to our aircraft, Nothing to report and to await my arrival next morning before Topping up the engines. When I arrived he boldly announced he had already done it. I was displeased but could find no problems so signed the Form 700.
Once in the air the Starboard inner behaved oddly by surging. The pilot said Feather it if you feel like it but I decided to watch it and trust. Upon return to base I asked our engine mechanic to check, informing him of the odd, behaviour and could give no reason for it. He soon found out then [sic] he opened up the engine covers. The idiot had topped up in that one engine Oil in the Coolant and Coolant in the Oil. I was so livid I went to see the Wing Commander myself and requested action to be taken against the Mechanic at Tartan [sic] Rushden. Naturally his name was on my form. They assured me he had been so dealt with.
On one trip when well on the return journey I became suspicious of the volume of petrol in No 2 Tanks. The pilot said check it through and having recalculated what should have been in I ran them dry and found them to be 100 gallons short. Our landing number that night was in the 40’s. The number indicated the minutes to add after receiving the usual coded E.T.R. (Estimated Time of Return) sent out by No 1. I said to the Pilot either we land at some other drome near the South coast or make a straight line back to Base. He decided on the latter. I recalculated the petrol position every
5
[page break]
five minutes or so and when near to Base asked for an Emergency Landing. Thy squeezed us in and as we were on Approach I patted Tom the Pilot on his shoulder and said “No Heroics One Landing No Overshoot.” They shot a measured quantity of petrol into the tanks and then Dipstick checked and found 16 gallons in each tank was the landing figure. Phew, how close can one get. A big Stink went up as expected but as I and the other Flt. Engineers said they had told us to no longer Dipstick check ourselves and no instruments could be trusted.
After that the instruments were all put into good condition and kept that way.
I and the rest of the crew agreed that the 1,000 bomber raids were the most dangerous, fortunately we only went on two.
On the first one the aircraft directly above us opened his bomb doors and released his bombs. The 4,000 Lbs. bomb actually passed between our Starboard wing and Tail unit. The string of 1,000 Lbs. bombs fell ahead of us but it was the Cookie to watch. On the 4th July 1993 I met a person who had seen a photgraph taken by another aircraft, the bomb was clearly shown.
One hairy trip, Politz the target, Soon after take off when we were over the North Sea most of the. Pilot’s instrument panel failed for no explainable reason. The only one left was the Climb and Dive but the Altimeter was U/S. The secondary panel on the Navigator’s table was still working but the readings had always been slightly out but were used by the navigator as a guide.
We all agreed to press on and it went reasonably well considering. We made serious attempts at map reading but the cloud was 9/10th thick so only occasion [sic] sightings. The navigator using Dead reckoning plodded on. When the time arrived that we should be over or near the target we realised when we did see the markers we were some 50 miles north.
My heart stood still when we turned towards the target, the sky from a low level to a height greater than ourselves was a mass of Flak (Red spots) I think I can safely say I was most apprehensive, the worst I ever felt but said nothing. Maybe we all felt the same way. As we did our final turn to fly in on the bombing run believe it or not the whole of the show (flak) was like an archway and we flew under this arch.
Upon return to base we had not received a single flak hole whereas the majority of the other planes were literally Pepper pots. The planned bombing run had taken them across the arch but because we were on another heading having been off course our luck was holding.
We were given permission to make a courtesy call at an Australian Squadron with four of our crew being Aussies. When asking for permission to land the Control Tower casually replied “Fly low over runway in use” At about 6/700 feet we did so and realised the runway was full of Bods. The Control Tower called us calling “Fly Lower over runway in use,” so we dropped to around 100 feet and the fellows on the ground looked up, waved and made other gestures. The pilot dipped the nose sharply and by george didn’t they scatter, we then circled and landed.
Apparently the Gunners had been clearing their guns whilst taxying on the runway and the bullets had caused a puncture so they were ordered to clear up the problem.
One day we landed at Waddington Station on one of our training trips, I cannot recall the reason but as we approached the drome a rain storm covering half the field was in full swing. Half the Circuit was in sunshine but the vital half was in blinding rain and do not forget we did not have windscreen wipers.
Anyway we made it down and then were instructed to await a vehicle, which would direct us. A small 5 cwt open van appeared with an illuminated sign mounted above the driver showing “Follow Me” We did and eventually to our horror realised we must be travelling at around 60 mph. Suddenly he changed the sign to –STOP- No way could we or even dare to do, so I flashed the Search Light fitted underneath and he took the message and kept rolling until we felt safe enough to brake.
The driver in such an open van must have been wet through so hence his hurry.
Another trip with its funny yet hairy experience was when the Weathermen and told us a Front stretched from the South of England, right across the Continent. Go under it across the Channel and over it on the Continent. Under it meant 7080 feet crossing the Channel and we found it impossible to climb over it in Germany. The cloud was the dangerous one (I forget the name). Anyway we made it through. Being lighter on the return trip we managed to fly over then came the channel bit. The choppy sea and being hemmed in below the
6
[page break]
Cloud at 70/80 feet the aircraft shook and even with George in and the pilot helping it was some feat to keep her out of the drink. (75% of the crews out that night were airsick but funnily one of us were. We cleared the coast around Kent on correct course and still under the cloud when the navigator called out I do not wish to worry you but there is a hill looming ahead at 600 feet. No way dare we climb into the cloud so I suggested angling the Searchlight at 45% and hope the beam hit the land giving us time to lift over the hill. Shortly the pilot’ and I noticed two little lights similar to animals eyes caught in a car head light. It moved to the right, then to the left followed by turning over and over. The pilot and I queried what it was then dismissed it as an oddity. Upon arriving back at base during debriefing the Wing Commander asked all crews present if they had travelled up the A 29 (I think that was the road). Upon checking the flying map with the road map we realised it was us whereupon the Wing Commander came over to us and read a report from the Kent Police. A complaint from a motorist, stating “I was driving down the road when I saw a very bright light, I first moved to the left and then to the right and realising I could not get around it I drove through the hedge and rolled down the embankment. The C.O.s reply was “Forced to fly low because of adverse conditions,” and it was forgotten.
I have mentioned before landing sequence. The numbers were given out in order of Seniority and experience so the more trips you did the lower your number, so naturally on our last trip we were No. 1. which we had been our privilege on several other occasions. During our return the Navigator estimated our return to base time and this was radioed in code which would be then transmitted to the rest of the two squadrons from base. With a twinkle in his eyes the pilot asked the navigator for the course to base. I believe we were at 10,000 feet or thereabouts. Setting the aircraft in a slow descent we set forth and when some 50 odd miles away he called up base and received the reply “No 1. Permission to land,” and they switched on the landing lights. We called out “No 1 Upwind” Control tower answered OK. No 1 but we cannot see you, flash your lights. We called out No 1 Cross wind. OK. replied control; we still cannot see you flash your lights again. Flashing we replied. Again taking no action. Steadily we were dropping our height and the pilot asked me for 5% Flaps which I did Calling control he called No 1. Up Wind, to which they acknowledged and said again We still cannot see you Flash your lights. Lights flashing we answered still taking no action. Then with the runway straight ahead of us we applied full flaps, wheels down and called No 1
Funnels. A good landing and went into briefing well ahead of our E.T.R. The Wing Commander was there to greet us and even smiled when he said you Devils, you did not do a circuit but have one with me, and as per his usual greetings for all end of tour flights a crate of beer two bottles each, with a mug of hot sweet tea it was a strange but welcoming mixture.
I must record this eerie experience. No idea of the date as also goes for many of the operational trip incidents.., Johnny the bombaimer upon waking up sat up in his bed and called out, “We have had it on our next trip, I have just had a dream of being shot down.” This registered on my mind and it recalled my own dream. They do say we all dream but it takes a reminder to recall it. In my dream I could see trouble in the form of a night fighter but it took evading action. The dream was like a film of the events that took place. I pointed out on the maps the position on the English and French coast lines before the navigator drew his route in. Across France and Germany I could see all the roads, railway lines, rivers, canals and forest areas. The target, even the pattern of the fires etc., were as real as the dream. The return journey was the dream unfolding. According to Johnny the outward journey was almost identical to his dream but he had not spotted the fighter so we Bought it, as was the term for being shot down. It was not unknown that in most instances of taking avoiding action the fighter pilot turned his attention to unsuspecting targets. Over a target they could spot and trail you while your eyesight was less keen due to searchlights, fires and flares.
It was usual on every night operation to be issued with two tablets to every one. These were to keep one fully alert. I only used one tablet once. We were not compelled to
7
[page break]
take them. A funny side of these tablets occurred. We were on the perimeter road awaiting our turn on to the runway for take off. The rear gunner, due to his restricted area and exposure always took his tablets as we turned onto the runway, replacing his gloves before engine run up. As we were running up the engines a signal was given cancelling the trip. Poor Mike was unable to sleep all night whilst we all snored merrily around him.
Following another trip I as per usual went to see the aircraft, which I had, handed over to the ground staff saying “Nothing to Report.” Upon approaching I noticed an interested group of people looking up to the Port wing. When at the aircraft I realised the Engineering Officer was among the crowd. He came over to me and said “Your pilot must have landed as light as a feather because take a look.” There was a hole both sides of the outer Engine casing ‘and one hole only in the inner engine casing. It was only then I realised what whatever caused it finished up in the tyre. The wheel was removed and a new one’ fitted. When the original one was deflated an incendiary bullet not completely burned out was removed. It had penetrated the rubber casing almost travelling completely through, When I told the engineering. Officer it had been one of the worst landings we had endured, even the rear gunner complained he found it incredible. Some 40 years later at a reunion a member of the association spoke to me, Starting off “I remember you; You were the bullet in the tyre Flight Engineer.” I could not remember the gentleman in question but he reintroduced himself as the Engineering Officer.
Leave in those days was a regular occurrence for aircrew. For us it was Five weeks on station, nine days leave. Upon the start of one leave I took my then girlfriend to the cinema. The Odeon in Rutland Street. After the supporting film the Pathe’ News was shown. The announcer started off by saying “The other night our Bombers were out” and the screen was showing a typical target photo, when I must have exclaimed loudly ‘Gosh Munich.” The announcer continued “and the target was Munich.” Dozens of people turned to look in amazement at me. The hardest part was explaining to the girlfriend because I had on a previous leave and by letter convinced her I was still on training.
One very foul weather day with fog, ice, snow, you name it, it was outside, we Flight Engineers were all sitting around in our office. (Each trade had its own office). The telephone rang and when answered the message was “War On” meaning an Operation that night. Details would come later, number of aircraft which pilot, petrol load, etc.. The assembled contained those of us well on with our tour and new arrivals. One of the new arrivals, yet to be Blooded said “What, even in this weather” where upon a near completed bod replied “We fly even when birds are grounded.” The Leader hearing this called out “In the line book please_” We never knew what happened to all the sixpences that such lines cost. Some good cause we hope.
On the return journey of one raid the silence was broken when the mid-upper gunner called out “Oh you Sod.” The pilot rebuked him by saying “No comments on the R T. to which the gunner replied “My bloody heel is on fire” The pilot ordered me to “Sort him out,” because I was apart from being the Fight Engineer was also the First Aider. I made my way back, not easy in flying gear and struggling by the navigator. After plugging myself into the intercom I removed the Gunners right boot to find his electrically heated suit had short-circuited at the join of the heel. After ‘applying a first aid dressing to the burn, nasty looking and smelly, I made the wiring safe to the heel but when I put back his socks and boot told him he would have a warm leg but his foot may get a little, cool. I had not long been back at my post when he again called out “It aint half drafty around my head. The pilot, a little testily said to me “Go and sort him out for goodness sake. When the mid-upper gunner explained to me his problem, I put my hand on the Perspex of his dome and at the back of –his head in line with the nape of his neck was a hole. I instantly knew it was a bullet hole but I was not prepared to tell him so and just said it was the seal of the turret. Turn sideways and move your head about unless we have trouble, meaning a fighter attack. The pilot insisted upon knowing the truth when I returned and would not be fobbed
8
[page break]
off so I wrote it down and using my torch on the paper using the sign SHH. Upon landing the Mid-upper jumped out and started to relate his trouble about the seal to the ground [underlined] staff [/underlined] whereupon I reminded him it was my responsibility to liase [sic] with the mechanics. Unbeknown to me the Bombaimer heard me say to the mechanic it was a bullet hole and would require a new turret. He clambered into the crew bus and said they ought to go by the hospital to have the midupper’s head X-rayed because he was that thick the bullet could still be in his head. (We were always nice to each other). Upon checking the next day the bullet had apparently entered from behind his head and left the other side. Everyone wondered how on earth it missed him until I came up with the theory that when he called out “Oh you sod” he must have leaned down to touch his foot.
This story, even my own family thought it was a line shoot (a fairy story) until 38 years later that gunner, Monty Blythe of Loughborough made contact for the first time after parting and related the same story apart from the first three words. O Y S. My late wife Margaret alive at that time sat listening in disbelief and admitted his story was almost word for word whereupon I told her I knew the family thought I had polished up the story whereas it was how it all happened.
One take off proved eventful. It was the practice to take off at one minute intervals. The control tower controlling the whole event. Eventually it was our turn, remembering on maximum effort two squadrons, 24 aircraft each was 48 to 50 minutes from first to last. Engines on full power, the brakes off and rolling. Once airborne we saw the aircraft ahead of us stall and fall out of the sky. By now we would be something like 1,500 to 2,000 feet up when the other hit the deck and exploded I suppose we would be in the region of 2,500 to 3,000 feet. Knowing on board, like us he had a Cookie (4,000 lbs.) bomb we held our breaths. Normally 4,000 feet was the safe height to drop such animals. Anyway it flung us about and the pilot announced he had no control. Neither the control column or the rudder bar had any effect, we were rolling about as if we were drunk but miraculously the nose kept pointing up although no instruments told us so we realised, at least I did, we were climbing be it slowly. Eventually control was regained and none of could say how long that period lasted but we registered 5,000 feet and then made all haste to get to the correct height and course. Upon return we learned that the crashed aircraft had landed on a remote farmhouse raising it to a heap of rubble. Therein lies a fantastic story. The farmer’s wife, just before the incident told her husband of her need to visit the Privy. As was the custom “it” was at the bottom of the garden quite some distance from the house. The husband lit the hurricane lamp and accompanied her. Whilst so ensconced they admitted later, heard this terrible noise, the privy shook and dust was everywhere but the building still stood. When they eventually opened the door they realised the house was no longer there. The Station Commander had a caravan on camp similar to “Monty’s “ famous type taken around for them to use, water and electricity being connected to it. The locals in the village of East Kirkby knew nothing of this until I mentioned it to them some 8 or 9 years ago. Apparently the news was suppressed.
The pilot Tommy Baker was in his way a character. When we were training on Stirling Aircraft the landing instructions were to “Wheel it in” meaning land on the two main wheels then let the tail wheel drop when losing speed. He declared it should be possible to “Three point” land it. HE DID.
Likewise when converting to Lancasters it was instructed that a “Three Point” (Stall type) landing be used. He insisted a Wheel in should be possible. Naturally he did it but what a hair raiser [sic]. The natural airlift
9
[page break]
under power kept the aircraft in the air. It literally had to be driven into the ground. Once he had done it thankfully the urge left him.
On one trip we kept we kept seeing aircraft shot down and the navigator duly logged them. We were certain they were casualties but upon return every other crew were certain they were the special shells the Germans used which behaved as if they were an aircraft even to the explosion as they hit the ground. Anyway the number we recorded tallied with the losses (either 17 or 19) and the next day a Mosquito aircraft of the photo unit actually filmed them in the areas we had logged.
October 6th 1994 [sic] Target Bremen
Recalling that last incident of being the only crew to report such brings another “Us only.” Crossing the North Sea homeward bound the water was rough and looked cold and forbidding when I suddenly saw a small light just for an instant then it was gone. The navigator duly logged it and a coded message was sent out indicating a possible dinghy in the drink. No other crew saw it and neither did we see it again. It was gratifying to be told later that two men had been picked upon the vicinity given in our report, ‘by an air sea rescue team.
One night the Bombaimer let out a shout at the same time as a bang occurred on the aircraft. We all knew it was a piece of shrapnel. The bombaimer said he had been hit so being First Aider I took hold of the collar of his battle dress and pulled him from his position in the nose to the top of the two steps at my feet. Tearing open his battle dress and his shirt all of the buttons flew off. I felt his chest and checked for damage. What I did see surprised me, a deep purple bruising about 7 or 8 inches across. Apparently just one piece of shrapnel had struck him upon his parachute harness high up on his left of his chest. I handed him two safety pins and told him to get on with his job. (On the crew photograph it is possible to see the barrel of his’ whistle is partly flattened).
Sometime in October or November 1944 we were asleep one morning following being on Ops the night before when our billet was entered by military and civilian police. After the search we demanded to know the reason and they admitted they were looking for traces of a piglet in and outside of the billets. Eventually they found evidence of bones and an Australian was questioned and he admitted to it. Back home he lived in the Bush and said he fancied a piglet which were in the field the other side of the fence of the perimeter near to our billets. Duly brought up before the Boston magistrate, the Chairman of the bench reminded him that years ago he would have been deported for such an offence to which the accused replied “Why was it rescinded M’Lord. Even the bench according to information had to smile. The bench then asked him if he would be prepared to pay for the piglet and when he agreed, the farmer stated his price, monies were handed over, had shakes and case dismissed.’
During bombing practice one night over the Wash, using 10 lbs. bombs and dropping one on each run on different headings. All went well until one bomb failed to release. Upon landing we reported to the ground [underlined] staff [/underlined] that one bomb remained but when they checked no bomb was found. Next morning a report came in of a female found dead having been struck on the head whilst walking home. That same night another aircraft also practice bombing at the same time reported a non release bomb and too found it missing. The poor lady was most unlucky when you think of the odds against.
When practising escape by parachute, a fuselage was mounted on a wooden frame with ‘slides placed below the hatches. The drill was go out head first of your respective hatch and down the chute. Poor Tom Baker, 14 Stone did not tuck his head down quick enough and became jammed by his neck and shins in the hatch opening. Only by pressing upwards, having scrambled up the chute to assist those pulling him above could we free him.
One rare occasion when we were resting and the majority were flying the return was
10
[page break]
around 5-30 am. The roar just above the nisson [sic] hut was deafening but to amazement a ground staff instrument Sergeant who shared our billet slept through it all, yet 15 to 20 minutes later a tiny ringing noise of his alarm clock resting on his kit bag roused him. He simply sat up in bed, rubbed his eyes and when he saw we were awake casually said “Good morning chaps.” He was surprised when we told him of the return of the boys. He was so used to it he was not disturbed.
I have mentioned only a little about the crew. It consisted of Four Australians and Three British in fact English. The Pilot, Navigator, Bombaimer and Wireless Operator were the Australians. The two Gunners and I, the Flight Engineer were English. Of the seven of us the Wireless Operator was the one to cause concern. The Mid-upper Gunner, a professional boxer certainly was a character but the wireless operator was a drinker and was given the title of Soaky. The problem, if that is what some called it corrected itself in an unusual way.
One evening when not flying there was dance in the Village Hall. Quite out of character Tommy the wireless operator asked me to accompany him to the dance and with some reluctance I agreed. After three or four dances of which I took the floor I realised Tommy had not done so and when I questioned him why his reply much to my surprise was that he had not been introduced to any of the females. An Aussie to say that left me speechless. I with my usual devilishment [sic] noticed three W.A.A.F’S standing unattached in the corner of the floor. Selecting one in my mind I crossed the floor and asked her to accompany me because my Wireless operator wished to be introduced. I escorted her to meet Tommy and said, Quote” Meet Tommy, Tommy meet, You tell him your name” to which she replied “Dorothy.” There you are Dorothy meet Tommy, and left them together. Several days passed and they would be seen walking along the camp roads, one on either side. About three weeks’ lapsed before they walked along the pathway but still not even holding hands. About a week later I met her by chance and I asked her how the friendship was progressing to which she replied, alright I suppose but he wants me to actually go into a’ public house. I tried to tell her they were not all dens of iniquity but she added, you see I do not drink. I advised her it would be a good idea to accept the invitation and to ask for a shandy or a lemon dash. This she did and believe it or not after a short time Tommy began to appear a normal human being with open white eyes instead of red edged slits. After one operation we lined up in the mess for flying breakfast. After every trip we were given Eggs, Bacon and usually one of sausage or beans or liver. Just ahead of me in the queue one fancy. My first lunch was steak, chips and peas with a poached egg on the steak. Cooks privilege. Fellow said to another in front of him “You might straiten your tie in the mess. The bod in question did what most of us would do, hold the knot in the left hand finger and thumb, and ensure it’s central position and with the right hand hold the tie to tighten if necessary. The fellow held the knot but failed to find the tie piece until he looked inside his battle dress blouse. A piece of shrapnel had severed the two points of his collar and the tie just below the knot. He just fainted and the fellow behind him in the queue pulled his limp body out of the line up saying “Do not hold up the queue.” He did come around but I cannot recall whether or not he faced any breakfast. Instead of coming to my home with the other three Aussies to celebrate my 21st birthday he went to Sheffield during our end of tour leave and I learned later he married his Dorothy. That was April 1945. In February 1989 I had dinner with them in their, Adelaide home together with the navigator and his English wife also Dorothy When leaving, walking with the hostess to the gate I asked her if she ever thought of the Village Hall at East Kirby [sic]. With a smile she said, “How could I ever forget it.” I, when it came to meal time was asked for my choice and was told, Not from the menu, what do you
To put matters in perspective after our end of tour leave I only met three of the boys again, the pilot, navigator, and the bombaimer, and only for two or three day and with the
11
[page break]
war over with Germany the Aussie Boys were sent home not meeting again for 35 years.
After 21 trips we lost our mid-upper gunner. He broke his wrist when he fell off the wing. We soon found another a Southampton fellow who was without a crew having been in hospital with cartilage’ trouble. He too was ’28 years old whereas we other six were one was 19 I was 20 and the others were 21 years old so he was known as Dad. When I was sent to the Isle of Sheppey, Sheerness, to remuster a friend being marched out of the camp as I was being marched in called out to me to tell me to volunteer for the first item on the Sergeant’s list on the morning parade. This I did when the Sergeant said, “I want a volunteer. He with amazement said you do not even know what it is, and then proceeded to tell me to report to the cookhouse to a W.A.A.F Corporal. Upon doing so I was asked if I could cook and answered in the negative. With a wry smile she explained the square of ovens and how to utilise them saying if you do not measure up you will be in the kitchen on chores. When the first load of food came in for cooking I went to take the dish whereupon she reprimanded me saying just tell them which oven to put it in and then later to fetch it out and place it in the hot plates. I never had to touch a thing, only detail others. Of course I had to remember where everything was and when I expected it to be cooked. Somehow everything turned out good and duly impressed the little corporal, yes about 5 feet 1 or 2 inches. I had the job for the week. We fed something like 5,000 mouths and supplied 5 alternatives on the menu.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ray Charlton Memoir
Description
An account of the resource
A twelve-page type written memoir by Ray Charlton, entitled 'Ramblings of my Memories'. It begins with his acceptance for aircrew in August 1942, continues with his call up in July 1943, and then a training period until joining a crew as Flight Engineer, flying Stirlings. Following a conversion course, he was posted to 630 Squadron at East Kirkby, flying Lancasters. There follow many anecdotes relating to his time at East Kirkby until the end of the war in Europe, when the Australian members of his crew were sent home.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Ray Charlton
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Memoir
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
File #15626: “BCharltonRCharltonRv1.pdf”
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One 12-page typewritten document
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Eileen Reddish
Steve Christian
David Bloomfield
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
630 Squadron
air sea rescue
aircrew
bombing
control caravan
control tower
flight engineer
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
military service conditions
RAF East Kirkby
RAF St Athan
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
service vehicle
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/976/16154/LManningR52870v1.1.pdf
247348241574f6d9c13acee159d9d84f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Observer’s and Air Gunner’s Log Book
Description
An account of the resource
The Observer’s and Air Gunner’s Log Book covering the period 15 June 1941 to the 16 August 1963. Manning qualified first as an Air Gunner on the 4 July 1941 and second as a flight engineer on the 1 September 1941. He was commissioned on the 4 July 1943 as a Pilot Officer and promoted to acting Flight Lieutenant in April 1944, and again to acting Squadron Leader in March 1946. He reverted to Flight Lieutenant in April 1947 but was made substantive Squadron Leader in April 1956 in the Engineering Branch. He retired 16 August 1963. There are very few entries relating to his time as a Gunner. Most entries are as Engineer.
He was stationed at RAF Stormy Down; RAF Middleton St George; RAF Linton-on-Ouse; RAF Leeming, RAF Aqir, RAF Fayid, RAF Marston Moor, RAF Snaith, RAF Holme-on-Spalding Moor, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Finingley, RAF Scampton, RAF Binbrook, RAF Henlow, RAF Seletar, RAF LLandow, RAF Swaton Morley, and RAF Medmenham. He flew in the following types manly as Engineer ; Arvo Tutor, Armstrong Whitworth Ensign, Handley Page Hannibal, Hawker Hart, Handley Page Heyford, Douglas DC 4 and 5, Handley Page Harrow, Handley Page Halifax, Miles Magister, Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, Avro Lancaster, Fairey Battle, Airspeed Oxford, de Havilland Mosquito, Avro Lincoln, Handley Page Hastings, Gloster Meteor, Avro Anson, Vickers Valletta, Vickers Wellington, Percival Prentice, Bristol Britannia and Handley Page Victor. He flew with 10 Sqaudron, 462 Squadron, 51 Squadron, and 614 Squadron. He was awarded the DFC. Pilots he flew with were Richards, Sobinski, Lewin, Turnbull, Hacking, Godfrey, Trip, Peterson, Lloyd, Bell, O’Driscoll, Allen, Declerk, Gribben, Gibsons, Wyatt, Clarke, Snow, Hardy, Haydon, McDonald, Murray, Jones, Dennis, Fisher, Connolly, Cheshire, Woolnough, Cat, McIntosh, Pope, Alcock, Smythe, Williams, Freeman, McKnight, Gillchrist, Moore, Faulkner, Carr, Espie, Brown, Price, Wiltshire, Spence, Symmons, Kirk, King, Burgess, Wilson, Pugh, Johnson, Reynolds, Roberts, Ringer, Minnis, Lowe, Everett, Renshaw-Dibb, Mathers, Sullings, Flower, Jarvis, Chopping, Widmer, Yates, Day, Spires, Huggins, Watts, Haycock, Owens, Liversidge, George , Banfield, Hunt, Porter, Goodman, Ayres, Shannon, Laytham, Lord, Rhys and Blundy,
War time operations were to Sharnhorst and Gneisenau, Cologne, St Nazaire, Kiel, Paris, Aysen Fjord, Terpitz, Trondheim, Hamburg, Mannheim, Essen, Osnabruck, Tobruk, Heraklion, Maleme, Lens, Colline Beaumont, Bourg-Leopold, Trappes, Mont-Fleury, Abbeville, Nucourt, Le Harve, Boulogne. Post war destinations were to RAF Netheravon, RAF Hemswell, RAF Scampton, RAF Lindholm, RAF Marnham, RAF St Eval, RAF Aldergrove, RAF Wyton, RAF Stradishall, RAF Binbrook, RAF Bagington, RAF Waddington, RAF Topcliffe, RAF Upwood, Kai Tak, Changi, RAF Pembrey, RAF Llandow, RAF Filton, and RAF Bruggen.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Manning, Reg
Reginald Manning
R Manning
Description
An account of the resource
Six items, concerning Pilot Officer Reg Manning DFC (567647 Royal air Force) including his flying log book and photographs. He served as an air gunner and flight engineer with 10 Squadron, 462 Squadron, 51 Squadron, and 614 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Reg Manning.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Manning, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Reg Manning's observer's and air gunner's flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
The Observer’s and Air Gunner’s Log Book covering the period 15 June 1941 to the 16 August 1963. Manning qualified first as an Air Gunner on the 4 July 1941 and second as a flight engineer on the 1 September 1941. He was commissioned on the 4 July 1943 as a Pilot Officer and promoted to acting Flight Lieutenant in April 1944, and again to acting Squadron Leader in March 1946. He reverted to Flight Lieutenant in April 1947 but was made substantive Squadron Leader in April 1956 in the Engineering Branch. He retired 16 August 1963. There are very few entries relating to his time as a Gunner. Most entries are as Engineer. He was stationed at RAF Stormy Down; RAF Middleton St George; RAF Linton-on-Ouse, RAF Leeming, RAF Aqir, RAF Fayid, RAF Marston Moor, RAF Snaith, RAF Holme-on-Spalding Moor, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Finningley, RAF Scampton, RAF Binbrook, RAF Henlow, RAF Seletar, RAF LLandow, RAF Swanton Morley, and RAF Medmenham. He flew in the following types manly as Engineer; Avro Tutor, Armstrong Whitworth Ensign, Handley Page Hannibal, Hawker Hart, Handley Page Heyford, Douglas DC 4 and 5, Handley Page Harrow, Handley Page Halifax, Miles Magister, Armstrong Whitworth Whitley, Avro Lancaster, Fairey Battle, Airspeed Oxford, de Havilland Mosquito, Avro Lincoln, Handley Page Hastings, Gloster Meteor, Avro Anson, Vickers Valletta, Vickers Wellington, Percival Prentice, Bristol Britannia and Handley Page Victor. He flew with 10 Squadron, 462 Squadron, 51 Squadron, and 614 Squadron. He was awarded the DFC. His pilots on operations were Warrant Officer Peterson, Flight sergeant Whyte, Warrant Officer O'Driscoll, Sergeant Declerk, Flight Sergeant Clarke, Sergeant Gibbons, Sergeant Wyatt, Flight Lieutenant Freeman, Flight Sergeant McKnight, Pilot Officer Gillchrist, Flight Sergeant Moore, Warrant Officer Skinner, Warrant Officer Faulkner, Flying Officer Carr and Flight Sergeant Espie. War time operations were to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Cologne, St Nazaire, Kiel, Paris, Aasen Fjord, Tirpitz, Trondheim, Hamburg, Stuttgart, Mannheim, Essen, Osnabruck, Tobruk, Heraklion, Maleme, Lens, Colline Beaumont, Bourg-Leopold, Trappes, Mont Fleury, Abbeville, Nucourt, Le Havre, Boulogne, Gibraltar, Kasfereet. Post war destinations were to RAF Netheravon, RAF Hemswell, RAF Scampton, RAF Lindholme, RAF Marnham, RAF St Eval, RAF Aldergrove, RAF Wyton, RAF Stradishall, RAF Binbrook, RAF Baginton, RAF Waddington, RAF Topcliffe, RAF Upwood, Kai Tak, Changi, RAF Pembrey, RAF Llandow, RAF Filton, and RAF Bruggen.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1942-02-12
1942-02-14
1942-02-15
1942-02-16
1942-02-22
1942-02-23
1942-02-26
1942-02-27
1942-03-03
1942-03-04
1942-03-30
1942-03-31
1942-04-27
1942-04-28
1942-04-29
1942-05-03
1942-05-04
1942-05-06
1942-05-07
1942-05-19
1942-05-20
1942-05-30
1942-05-31
1942-06-01
1942-06-02
1942-06-03
1942-06-04
1942-06-05
1942-06-19
1942-06-20
1942-06-22
1942-07-11
1942-07-12
1942-07-18
1942-07-19
1942-07-20
1942-07-21
1942-07-24
1942-07-25
1942-09-03
1942-09-15
1942-09-16
1942-09-17
1942-09-18
1942-09-29
1942-09-30
1942-10-05
1942-10-06
1942-10-12
1942-10-13
1942-10-18
1942-10-19
1942-10-23
1942-10-24
1942-10-27
1942-10-29
1942-11-05
1942-11-07
1942-11-23
1943-07-24
1943-07-26
1943-07-27
1943-07-29
1943-08-01
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-12
1944-05-27
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-06
1944-06-11
1944-06-12
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-07-15
1944-07-17
1944-09-11
1944-09-17
1945-06-19
1944-06-05
1944-07-18
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Egypt
Middle East--Palestine
Singapore
China--Hong Kong
England--Yorkshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Rutland
England--Norfolk
England--Bedfordshire
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Wiltshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Gloucestershire
England--Cornwall (County)
England--Suffolk
England--Warwickshire
Wales--Carmarthenshire
Belgium
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
Greece--Crete
Greece--Ērakleion
Libya
Libya--Tobruk
Norway
Norway--Trondheim
France
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Paris
France--Lens
France--Colline-Beaumont
France--Soligny-la-Trappe
France--Abbeville
France--Nucourt
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Essen
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Stuttgart
Gibraltar
Norway--Aasen Fjord
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Northern Ireland
North Africa
France--Ver-Sur-Mer
Scotland--Shetland
China
Greece
Great Britain
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Durham (County)
Greece
Greece--Maleme
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LManningR52870v1
10 Squadron
1652 HCU
1668 HCU
462 Squadron
51 Squadron
614 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Cook’s tour
Distinguished Flying Cross
flight engineer
Gneisenau
Halifax
Harrow
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lincoln
Magister
Me 110
Meteor
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oxford
promotion
RAF Aqir
RAF Binbrook
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Filton
RAF Finningley
RAF Hemswell
RAF Henlow
RAF Holme-on-Spalding Moor
RAF Honington
RAF Kasfereet
RAF Leeming
RAF Lindholme
RAF Linton on Ouse
RAF Marham
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Medmenham
RAF Middleton St George
RAF Pembrey
RAF Scampton
RAF Snaith
RAF St Eval
RAF Stormy Down
RAF Stradishall
RAF Swanton Morley
RAF Topcliffe
RAF Upwood
RAF Waddington
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tirpitz
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/857/OWoolgarRLA908870-160614-020001.1.jpg
210ef309ec5667ddc687258388c3466e
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/857/OWoolgarRLA908870-160614-020002.1.jpg
2d161e4278e8f248698676af56b14413
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Woolgar, Reg
Reg Woolgar
R L A Woolgar
Jimmy Woolgar
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Bombing, Aerial
Description
An account of the resource
<a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/browse?collection=87">17 items</a>. The collection consists of an oral history <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2148">interview</a> with air gunner Reginald Woolgar DFC (139398 Royal Air Force), correspondence to his father about him being missing in action and subsequently rescued from the sea, his <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2205">log book</a>, <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/854">service and release book</a> and nine photographs.<br /><br /> He flew operations as an air gunner with 49 and 192 Squadrons.<br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Reg Woolgar and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning John William Wilkinson. Additional information on John William Wilkinson is available via the <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/125319/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Woolgar, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-04
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Please scroll down to see all X items in this collection.
Reg ‘Jimmy’ Woolgar was born and schooled in Hove. He began working life as a valuations assistant and was training to be a surveyor, which was interrupted when, in December 1939, he joined the RAF. Although he had aspirations to become a pilot, he trained as a wireless operator/air gunner instead. His wireless operator training was carried out at the wireless training school, RAF Yatesbury. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/849/PWoolgarRLA1609.2.jpg His air gunnery training on Fairy Battle aircraft was conducted at RAF West Freugh. On 15 November 1940 he was promoted to sergeant and posted to No 10 OTU at RAF Upper Heyford. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/845/PWoolgarRLA1601.2.jpg Initially flying Anson aircraft and then Hampdens with C Flight, he had his first ‘Lucky Jim’ moment, on 6 February 1941, when his Hampden aircraft was forced to crash land in a field near Cottesmore, in Lincolnshire. The aircraft was written off, but he and the pilot survived with minor injuries. At the end of operational training, instead of going directly onto operasations, he spent the next 5 months as a screen operator instructor. Eventually, on 1 September 1941, he was posted to 49 Squadron, Hampdens, at RAF Scampton https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/852 where his very first operational trip (described as a baptism of fire) was to Berlin. With headwinds going out and coming back, and nil visibility, it was likely the crew would have to bail out. Fortunately, the skipper found a break in the clouds and the aircraft landed wheels down in a field near Louth. The aircraft had to be recovered back to base, transported by road, on a low loader. On another occasion, on a mine laying operation to Oslo Fjord, his aircraft was peppered with anti-aircraft fire, it returned to base with 36 bullet holes in the fuselage and mainplane. A bullet had also passed through the upright of his gun sight while he was looking through it, whilst another tore through his flying suit. The nickname ‘Lucky Jim’ was beginning to stick.
In February 1942, on an operation to Manheim, the port engine, hit by flak, cut dead. Despite jettisoning all superfluous weight, which unfortunately included all the navigation equipment, the aircraft rapidly lost height, and the pilot ditched the aircraft in the English Channel. Whilst the crew had struggled to keep the aircraft airborne, (on a single engine), it had steered on a massive curve and unbeknown to them was headed down the English Channel, before it ditched. The crew scrambled out onto the wing and managed to inflate the dingy, then had to cut the cord attaching the dingy to the aircraft using a pair of nail scissors, moments before it sunk. In the water for hours, the crew thought they were drifting near the Yorkshire coast, but were rescued by a motor anti-submarine boat, much to their surprise, near the Isle of Wight.
Operational flying was intense, Reg would feel wound up before take-off and there was much apprehension on the way out to the target. Often, they flew through intense flak that was sometimes so close they could smell it. There was always a sense of sense of relief once they came away from the target. In between operations, each day was treated as it came along with many off-duty hours spent socialising in the local hostelries https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/853
After his first operational tour (he completed two) he was commissioned and became gunnery leader with 192 Squadron in 100 Group.
After the war ended, he signed on for an extra two years and was posted to Palestine as an air movements staff officer. Luck was again on his side when, one day, he was on his way to an Air Priorities Board Meeting at the King David Hotel when the hotel was bombed, resulting in many army and civilian casualties.
After a short tour in Kenya, as Senior Movements Staff Officer, he returned to Palestine flying with 38 Squadron until August 1947. In his flying career he amassed over 1000 flying hours. For services to his country Reg was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/858
He was released from the RAF in September 1947. Initially employed as an assistant valuations officer, he studied to become a Chartered Surveyor and secured a job as a senior valuer with the City of London. He later became the planning valuer of the city. After 14 years he was made a partner at the firm St Quintin Son and Stanley. Reg retired in 1971.
08 December 1939: Joined RAF as a wireless operator/air gunner
28 August 1940: 145, 3 Wing, RAF Yatesbury - Wireless Operator training
29 October 1940 - 15 November 1940: RAF West Freugh, No 4 Bombing and Gunnery School, flying Battle aircraft
November 1940: Promoted to Sergeant
15 November 1940 - 20 August 1941: RAF Upper Heyford, No 10 Operational Training Unit flying Anson and Hampden aircraft
02 September 1941 - 24 March 1942: RAF Scampton, 49 Squadron, flying Hampden aircraft
28 April 1942 - 24 June 1942: 1485 Target Towing and Gunnery Flight flying Whitley and Wellington aircraft
02 July 1942 – 3 July 1942: RAF Manby, Air Gunnery Instructor Course
4 July – 10 July 1942: RAF Scampton, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Manchester and Oxford aircraft
25 July 1942 – 10 August 1942: RAF Wigsley, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Lancaster aircraft
3 October – 27 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington and Hampden aircraft
28 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge, Gunnery Leader Course
End of 1942: Awarded RAF Commission
09 Nov 1942 – 18 March 1943: RAF Fulbeck flying Manchester aircraft
14 May 1943 – 11 June 1944: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington aircraft
20 June 1944 – 27 July 1945 RAF Foulsham, 192 Squadron flying Halifax and Wellington aircraft
29 April 1946 – 30 August 1946: Palestine, Air Movements Staff Officer
01 September 1946 – 21 January 1947: Kenya, Senior Movements Staff Officer
30 January1947 – 10 June 1947: Ein Shemer, Palestine, 38 Squadron flying Lancaster aircraft
13 July 1947 139398 Flt Lt RLA Woolgar released from Service.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
From: - R.A.F. Station, Gosport, Hants.
To: - Whom it may concern.
Date: - 17th February, 1942.
Ref: - GOS/
[underlined]908870 Sgt. Woolgar R.L.A.[/underlined]
The above named N.C.O. has been rescued from the sea, and is not in possession of a complete suit of uniform or respirator, and is hereby authorised to proceed to his Parent Unit for completion of kitting etc.
[signature]
Station Adjutant
for Group Captain,
Commanding,
[underlined]R.A.F. STATION, GOSPORT[/underlined]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Correspondence
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
OWoolgarRLA908870-160614-02
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Title
A name given to the resource
Request to kit out Sergeant Reg Woolgar
Description
An account of the resource
Letter from RAF Gosport regarding Sergeant Reg Woolgar being rescued from the sea and requiring new kit. On reverse, address of an office in London.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1942-02-17
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page typewritten letter
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942-02-14
1942-02-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Hampshire
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Bloomfield
air sea rescue
crash
ditching
RAF Gosport
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1825/33666/MBrennanJ1210913-170405-010001.1.jpg
d705098cd546d5b5d5b8098aa148162b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Brennan, Jack
John Brennan
J Brennan
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Brennan, J
Description
An account of the resource
Twenty-four items.
The collection concerns Sergeant John Brennan DFM (1210913 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book as well as documents including a Goldfish Club certificate, notes from station and squadron operational record book with details of activities and operations, memoirs, newspaper cuttings and correspondence. In addition, contains operation order and other details for 617 Squadron's attack of German dams on 16/17 May 1943.
He flew operations as a wireless operator with 102 and 35 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by T Noble and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Rescue painting
Description
An account of the resource
Abstract collage showing outline of England, night sky with starts, an aircraft, parachute, dinghy, rescue launch and part of a face.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Artwork
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Painting
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MBrennanJ1210913-170405-010001
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air sea rescue
arts and crafts
bale out
Goldfish Club
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1446/26388/BCreamerRMCreamerRMv1.2.pdf
83afcbf3711720186a0b7817325b713f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Creamer, Robert Arthur
R A Creamer
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Creamer, RA
Description
An account of the resource
Ten items. The collection concerns Robert Creamer (1818388 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, memoir and photographs. He flew operations as an air gunner from RAF Grimsby.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Robert Creamer and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] 1 [/underlined]
DATE.
[underlined] 16-8-1943 E. ED610. P/O WALES, 1662 HCU BLYTON – SEA SEARCH [/underlined]
Search for missing aircraft and crews in the North Sea off the German Coast after mining operation of German shipping lanes. Nothing found.
4.30 HOURS.
[underlined] 22-9-1943 J2 DV 162. W/Cdr McINTYRE, D.F.C. F/LT MAJOR, MID. – HANOVER [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 21-31 hrs from 20,000 feet. Fires seen catching hold. Some of the best red fires yet seen. Photo plotted 5 min. 148o heading East.
26 Aircraft lost.
5.50 HOURS
[underlined] 23-9-1943 J2 DV 162. F/LT MAJOR. M.I.D. – MANNHEIM [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 22.10 hrs from 17,500 feet. Big red fires concentrated on east side of river.
32 Aircraft lost
7.5 HOURS.
[underlined] 27-9-1943 J2 DV 162. F/LT MAJOR. MID – HANOVER [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 22.19 hrs from 19,500 feet. PFF Target Indicators fell south of target. Just after leaving the target I saw a B17 Flying Fortress diving at an angle of about 45o firing at an ME 109 which was firing at the B17. The B17 did not attempt to evade the fighter. Confirmed by the Air Gunners.
39 Aircraft lost.
6.10 HOURS.
[page break]
[underlined] 2 [/underlined]
DATE.
[underlined] 29-9-1943 J2 DV 162 F/LT MAJOR MID – BOCHUM [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 20-57 hrs from 20,000 feet. Fires seen with smoke up to 6,000 feet.
9 Aircraft lost.
5.00 HOURS
[underlined] 1-10-1943 J2 DV 162 F/LT MAJOR MID – HAGEN [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 21-05 hrs from 19,000 feet. Sky marking seemed called for. Quiet trip. No fighters
2 Aircraft lost.
5.45 HOURS
[underlined] 2-10-1943 J2 DV 162. F/LT MAJOR M.I.D. – MUNICH [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 22-37 hrs from 20,000 feet. A good trip. Fires seen to be taking hold and very concentrated. Fires visible up to 100 miles on return journey.
8 Aircraft lost. 7.45 HOURS
[newspaper cutting entitled 25 MINUTES OF HELL] RAID ON [underlined] 2nd OCT. 1943 [/underlined]
[page break]
[underlined] 3 [/underlined]
DATE
[underlined] 4-10-1943 J2 DV 162 F/LT MAJOR. MID. – MANHEIM [underlined] [inserted] + LUDWIGSHAFEN. [/inserted]
[underlined] PRIMARY TARGET – FRANKFURT
DIVERSIONARY TARGET – MANNHEIM [/underlined]
Diversionary target bombed as briefed at 21-33 hrs from 18,500 feet. Very quiet trip. Good fires burning. Photo plotted as Aiming Point. Heading East.
Diversionary target – No Aircraft lost
Primary target – 11 Aircraft lost.
6.10 HOURS
[underlined] 7-10-1943 N DV 306. F/LT MAJOR. MID. – STUTTGART [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 00-15 hrs from 20,000 feet. Left 4 separate fires burning. Double lane of fighter flares on run in to target. Coned by searchlights on bombing run. Fired the colours of the day and escaped by violent evasive action.
4 Aircraft lost.
7.10 HOURS
[underlined] 8-10-1943 N. DV 306 F/LT MAJOR. MID. – HANOVER [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 01-38 hrs from 20,000 feet. Bombed red target indicators to south of main body of fires. Defences difficult between Osnabruck and Munster.
27 Aircraft lost.
4.40 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 4 [/underlined]
DATE
[underlined] 20-10-1943 N. DV 306. F/LT MAJOR. MID – LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 21.05 hrs from 20,000 feet. Bombed red flare with green stars on ETA. Hit by flak in Mid-Upper gun turret. Returned on 3 engines.
16 Aircraft lost.
6.30 HOURS
[underlined] 22-10-1943 N. DV 306 F/LT MAJOR. MID – KASSEL [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 21-12 hrs from 20,000 feet. Good attack. A shaky return over the North Sea at 53.48 N, 0200 E. Port inner and starboard outer engines cut out together at 4,500 feet causing a vertical dive to 2,300 feet. Returned on 2 engines. IFF used on emergency position. Both engines had iced up together while flying through cloud. The aircraft was flying on Automatic Pilot at the time as the Pilot was standing in the gangway with the Flight Engineer trying to recover from a severe attack of cramp in his thigh. He returned to his seat quickly and pulled the aircraft out of the dive with the assistance of the Flight Engineer.
43 Aircraft lost.
5.50 HOURS
[underlined] 3-11-1943 N. DV 306. F/LT MAJOR. MID. – DUSSELDORF [/underlined]
Bombed primary target at 19-46 hrs from 20,000 feet. Incendiaries taking hold from North to South. Fires seen at the Dutch Coast on the return journey.
18 Aircraft lost.
3.40 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 5 [/underlined]
[underlined] JB 604 WAS A BRAND NEW LANCASTER WHICH, WE WERE INFORMED, HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY THE RESIDENTS OF GRIMSBY FOLLOWING A “WINGS FOR VICTORY” APPEAL IN THE TOWN. [/underlined]
DATE
[underlined] 18-11-1943 J. JB 604 F/LT MAJOR. MID. – BERLIN [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 21-12 hrs from 22,000 feet. Bombed on H2S. Large explosion seen at 21-14 hrs. Hit by flak at BOSSUM. Calculated that we were running short of fuel and adjusted throttles and mixture control to give maximum fuel economy. Landed back at Waltham safely. Fuel tanks registered “EMPTY” when dipped.
9 Aircraft lost.
8.30 HOURS
[underlined] 22-11-1943 J JB 604 F/LT MAJOR. MID. – BERLIN [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 20-02 hrs from 21,000 feet. Violent reddish/yellow explosion seen at 20-03 hrs in target area. At 20-08 hrs a column of dense smoke seen rising to 8/10,000 feet. Consider attack to be very satisfactory. Hit by flak which damaged the Bomb-aimer’s panel.
26 Aircraft lost plus 6 aircraft crashed in England.
5.55 HOURS
[underlined] 2-12-1943 J. JB 604 – F/LT MAJOR. MID. – BERLIN [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 20.15 hrs from 29,000 feet. Area of about 4 x 8 miles seemed to be burning well to the east and south of the target. Hit by Flak. Just before we reached Hanover on the return journey a Lancaster flew over us from the Starboard Quarter to the Port Bow. Just after he passed over us the rear gunner fired at us but fortunately the tracer passed just over the top of us. The skipper immediately dived to port and got us out of danger 40 Aircraft lost.
6.55 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 6 [/underlined]
DATE
[underlined] 3-12-1943 J JB 604. F/LT MAJOR. MID. – LEIPZIG [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 04-08 hrs from 21,000 feet. Saw vivid red explosion at 04.07 hrs and after leaving the target saw smoke up to 12,000 feet. The fires were visible for 200 miles from the target. Photoflash U/S.
24 Aircraft lost.
7.20 HOURS
[underlined] Aircraft letter changed from “J” to “S”. [/underlined]
[underlined] 16-12-1943 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR. MID – BERLIN. [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 20.01 hrs from 21,000 feet. Cloud too thick to observe results. Judging by the large number of photoflashes seen the concentration was excellent. We were the first aircraft to land back at Waltham. 4 Lancasters crashed in collisions in the circuit at Waltham due to very low cloud and poor visibility. As we were taxying to dispersal S/Ldr Bell arrived back, saw the burning wreckage, realised the danger and called up on the R/T to flying control – “”O” Oboe going out to sea” where he remained until everyone else had landed before landing himself.
25 Aircraft lost + 34 Aircraft lost over England.
7.10 HOURS
[underlined] 20-12-1943 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR MID. – FRANKFURT [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 19-44 hrs from 20,000 feet. Very few Target Indicators seen. The only TI’s seen were well placed and the attack seemed to be a success.
41 aircraft lost.
5.20 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 7 [/underlined]
Date.
[underlined] 23-12-1943 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR. MID – BERLIN [/underlined]
A few seconds after taking off at midnight the aircraft shuddered noticeably and icy draughts of air blew round the inside of the aircraft. The Mid-Upper Gunner looked through the inspection panel into the bomb bay and discovered that the 4,000 lb bomb had fallen from its mountings and dropped onto the bomb doors forcing them partially open. At that time we were flying at 300 feet over the centre of Grimsby. The residents were lucky that the bomb doors held; otherwise there would have been considerable damage to the town and many casualties. It would also have blown our aircraft out of the sky. The 4,000 lb bomb was dropped into the North Sea at 53-35 N 00.05 W at 00.15 hrs from 3,500 feet. We then flew round for an hour to lighten the fuel load before landing safely at Waltham.
The bomb doors were damaged in the incident.
16 Aircraft lost.
1.10 HOURS
[underlined] 5-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR. MID. – STETTIN. [/underlined]
F/O HAMILTON taken as second pilot to give him operational experience. Primary target bombed at 03.48 hrs from 20,000 feet. The defences were really tricked. Fighter flares not seen for 45 mins after our attack. A very good attack. No cloud, visibility very good. Photo plotted 1 3/4 miles 165o heading E. Ground covered by snow. The streets of Stettin were clearly visible. Route Demark, Sweden and the Baltic – return same route.
16 Aircraft lost
8.10 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 8 [/underlined]
Date.
[underlined] 14-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR MID. – BRUNSWICK [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 19-15 hrs from 21,000 feet. Bombing rather scattered. Fighters active and the trip was not as easy as expected.
38 Aircraft lost.
4.50 HOURS
[underlined] 20-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR MID. – BERLIN [/underlined]
[underlined] 100th OPERATION BY 100 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 19-34 hrs from 21,000 feet. PFF marking was accurate. While on our bombing run when a JU 88 appeared directly above us and flying on the same course and speed only 200 – 300 feet above. We completed the bombing run and then dived sideway and downwards rather rapidly.
Believed to be a successful attack.
35 Aircraft lost plus 2 crashed in England.
6.30 HOURS
[underlined] 21-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR MID. – MAGDEBURG. [/underlined]
Primary target bombed at 23-04 hrs from 20,000 feet. H2S failed just before reaching target area. Camera failed. Route markers on track. Thin low cloud. Visibility above the cloud good. Most quiet and believed successful attack. PFF in the right place.
57 Aircraft lost.
7.05 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 9 [/underlined]
DATE.
[underlined] 27-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR. MID. – BERLIN. [/underlined]
Our crew were Pathfinder Force Supporters on this raid. Our bomb load was high explosive only. Primary target bombed at 20.34 hrs from 20,000 feet. Fires seen 120 miles away on the return journey. Photo-flash hung up on release wire.
33 Aircraft lost.
7.55 HOURS
N.B. The role of PFF Supporters is described on pages 235 and 236 of the book “The Berlin Raids” by Martin Middlebrook
Ref:- ISBN 0-670-80697-8. PENGUIN BOOKS LTD.
I am unable to copy it here as it would be a breach of copyright.
[underlined] 28-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR. MID. – BERLIN. [/underlined]
Our crew were PFF Supporters. Primary target bombed at 03-18 hr from 20,000 feet. Bombed centre of release point. Release point confirmed by H2S. Biggest explosion yet seen at 03-15 hrs followed by other explosions.
46 Aircraft lost plus 5 crashed in England.
6. 55 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 10 [/underlined]
DATE
[underlined] 30-1-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT MAJOR MID. – BERLIN. [/underlined]
Our crew were PFF Supporters. Primary target bombed at 20-21 hrs from 21,000 feet. Route very good. Difficult to assess result due to cloud and the colossal number of fighter flares over the target. Visibility very good at 21,000 feet. Camera unserviceable.
3 x 100 Squadron aircraft lost on this raid.
33 Aircraft lost.
5.55 HOURS
[underlined] 15-2-1944 S JB 604. F/LT MAJOR MID – BERLIN. [/underlined]
Our crew were PFF Supporters. Primary target bombed at 21-11 hrs from 21,000 feet. Red T.I.’s dropped at 21-11 hrs at release point. Release point flares at 21-12 hrs. Yellow T.I’s 21.12 1/2 hrs. H2S U/S. Ground defences appeared to be more accurate and more intense than usual.
43 Aircraft lost plus 5 crashed in England.
On this raid, the rear gunner, Sgt Fred Searle, became unconcious [sic] through lack of oxygen while we were climbing to operational height over the North Sea. I dragged him out of his turret and plugged him in to the oxygen point near the Elsan toilet where he recovered. I discovered that the oxygen economiser on the floor of the rear turret, on the starboard side, was blocked by ice. I by-passed the economiser got the rear gunner back into his turret and we completed the raid successfully. I used all the eight portable oxygen bottles in the aircraft in
[page break]
[underlined] 11 [/underlined]
15-2-1944 Contd. completing this task, which had to be carried out wearing 3 pairs of gloves as the outside temperature was minus 60o at 20,000 feet.
16-2-1944 Recommended for the DPM by Wing Commander Dilworth. Officer Commanding 100 Squadron, Grimsby
17-2-1944 Recommendation approved by Group Captain RAC Carter, Officer Commanding RAF Station Grimsby.
29-2-1944 Recommendation approved by Air Vice Marshall E.A.B. Rice. Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group. RAF.
6.10 HOURS
[underlined] 19-2-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT. MAJOR MID – LEIPZIG [/underlined]
Our crew were PFF Supporters. Primary target bombed at 03.25 hrs from 22,000 feet. Arrived over target early and bombed on H2S. After leaving the target the rear gunner saw red TI’s go down 30 seconds after we had bombed followed by lots of green T.I’s. Reflection of fires seen 40 miles away on return journey.
Reported seeing 3 Lancasters shot down.
W/O W.M. Mitchell replaced P/O I. Levene as Wop/AG on this raid as P/O Levene had completed his tour of ops.
79 aircraft lost.
6.45 HOURS
[page break]
[underlined] 12 [/underlined]
DATE
[underlined] 20-2-1944 S. JB 604. F/LT. K.A. MAJOR MID. – STUTTGART [/underlined]
Our crew were PFF Supporters. Primary target bombed at 03-56 hrs from 23,000 feet. Bombed on H2S. Fire reflections seen 100 miles away on return journey. The intercom was U/S during the whole trip.
9 Aircraft lost.
7.0 HOURS
[underlined] THE END OF OUR TOUR OF OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[underlined] AIRCRAFT FLOWN ON OPERATIONS [/underlined]
“E”. ED 610 – 1 OP – MISSING ON OPS 29-1-1944
“J2” DV 162 – 7 OPS. – REPORTED MISSING ON OPS 4-10-1943. – NOT TRUE AS WE RAIDED MANNHEIM IN HER ON THAT NIGHT.
“N”. DV 306 – 5 OPS – TRANSFERRED TO 550 SQUADRON NOV. 1943. MISSING ON OPS 15-1-1944. 141 HOURS
“J” JB. 604 – 4 OPS.
RELETTERED “S” JB 604 13 OPS – x MISSING ON OPS 24-2-1944.
x INCLUDES ONE EARLY RETURN.
22-2-1944 W/Cdr DILWORTH SIGNED MY LOG BOOK
24-2-1944 W/Cdr DILWORTH KILLED IN A RAID ON SCHWEINFURT
24-2-1944 F/O VLB JONES KILLED IN A RAID ON SCHWEINFURT WHILE FLYING “S”. JB 604.
[page break]
[underlined] 13 [/underlined]
[underlined] CREW MEMBERS [/underlined]
PILOT. F/LT K.A. MAJOR. DFC. MID.
FLIGHT ENGINEER SGT E MAYFIELD DFM.
NAVIGATOR P/O D MEAD. DFC.
BOMB AIMER P/O L PARK DFC.
WIRELESS OP/AG. P/O I LEVENE
MID UPPER GUNNER SGT R.A. CREAMER.
REAR GUNNER. SGT F SEARL.
SPARE W’OP/AG W/O W.M. MITCHELL replaced P/O I. LEVENE ON OUR LAST 2 OPS.
[underlined] The following incidents occurred during our tour of ops but the remaining crew members cannot recall the particular op on which they occurred:- [/underlined]
One day the rear gunner developed a very severe stomach upset but decided to fly on ops that night. Soon after take-off he called the skipper on the intercom to say that he was going to the elsan toilet. Shortly afterwards he called to say that it was too late as he had had an accident. He elected to continue the raid and must have been extremely uncomfortable sitting in his own excrement for many hours.
One night we took an Army Officer on a raid to Berlin, presumably so that he could make a report on the AA defences. His name was not recorded in the Operations Record Book.
[page break]
[underlined] 14 [/underlined]
On another raid we took a civilian whom, we believe, was a newspaper reported for the Daily Express. He did not enjoy the trip and said we must be mad to do it. His presence was not recorded in the Operations Record Book.
One night all the navigational aids in the aircraft became U/S (with the exception of the Pilots compass). The navigator took us to the target and back by taking star shots with the Bubble Sextant.
The rear gunner regularly took empty beer bottles, without stoppers, with him on operations. If searchlights became troublesome en route he would throw them out. Because they made a whistling noise when falling the searchlight crews would think they were bombs and would extinguish the searchlights. If not used before reaching the target they would be thrown out then.
Our Bomb-aimer went on a course at Lindholme to enable him to operate the H2S set which was coupled up to the bomb sight. Thereafter he spent a lot of time with the Navigator operating the set and on several occasions dropped the bombs blind by using the H2S.
[page break]
[underlined] 15 [/underlined]
[underlined] MISCELLANEOUS NON-OPERATIONAL MEMORIES [/underlined]
An unknown pilot hit a steamroller outside flying control while taxying a Lancaster round the perimeter track.
We were doing an air test when the mid upper gunner declared his intention to spend a penny at the elsan toilet. As soon as he descended from his turret the rest of the crew conspired to play a trick on him. When he was in full flow the pilot was told and he then pushed the control column forward gently and then pulled it back suddenly. The gunner became weightless and then fell to the floor still urinating.
At the end of February 1944 a Lancaster ran off the end of the runway, the wheels became bogged down in soft ground and the aircraft came to rest with its nose buried in the ground and the fuselage in the air at an angle of about 40o.
[page break]
[underlined] 16 [/underlined]
Before being posted to RAF Station Grimsby we carried out flying training on Lancasters at RAF Station BLYTON. One night we were practising taking off and landing in the dark when the airfield lights were extinguished suddenly and flying control called on the Radio transmitter to warn us that a German intruder aircraft was in the vicinity and to put out our navigation lights and orbit the airfield beacon. The crew used much bad language in describing the German intruder without realising that it was being overheard by the WAAFS in flying Control as the aircraft transmitter was still on.
The Skipper had to visit flying control to apologise after we landed.
After completing our tour of Operations at RAF Station Grimsby we were posted to RAF Station SANDTOFT as flying instructors on Halifax aircraft in order to train new crews. In the RAF it became known as “PRANGTOFT” because of the large number of aircraft which crashed.
I was fortunate not to lose my life in a crash there. To pass the time between flights the instructors used to play cards, usually Pontoon, in the crew room. On this particular day I was holding the bank at Pontoon when my flight became due so another instructor volunteered to swap flights with me. Just after take-off the aircraft crashed and burst into flames. There were no survivors. Half an hour later, having lost the bank, I took the next flight out and flew over the still burning wreckage.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robert Creamer's Operations and Wartime Memories
Description
An account of the resource
30 operations described in detail. His fellow crew members are listed as are incidents that occurred on the operations.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
RA Creamer
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
16 handwritten sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BCreamerRMCreamerRMv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Munich
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hannover
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Braunschweig
Poland
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1943-09-22
1943-09-23
1943-09-24
1943-09-27
1943-09-28
1943-09-29
1943-09-30
1943-10-01
1943-10-02
1943-10-03
1943-10-04
1943-10-05
1943-10-07
1943-10-08
1943-10-09
1943-10-20
1943-10-21
1943-10-22
1943-10-23
1943-11-03
1943-11-18
1943-11-19
1943-11-22
1943-11-23
1943-12-02
1943-12-03
1943-12-04
1943-12-16
1943-12-17
1943-12-20
1943-12-23
1943-12-24
1944-01-05
1944-01-06
1944-01-14
1944-01-20
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-01-27
1944-01-28
1944-01-29
1944-01-30
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1 Group
100 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
B-17
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Kassel (22/23 October 1943)
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
ground personnel
H2S
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Ju 88
Lancaster
Me 109
mine laying
missing in action
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Blyton
RAF Grimsby
RAF Lindholme
RAF Sandtoft
searchlight
target indicator
training
wireless operator / air gunner
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1414/28279/LWareingR86325v2.1.pdf
9d3140532497d80be26a8f60fae31949
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wareing, Robert
R Wareing
Description
An account of the resource
258 items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant Robert Wareing DFC* (86325 Royal Air Force) and contains his flying logbooks, prisoner of war log book, memoirs, photographs, extensive personal and official correspondence, official documents, pilots/handling notes, decorations, mementos, uniform badges and buttons. He flew operations as a pilot with 106 Squadron. After a period of instructing he returned to operations on 582 Squadron but was shot down and became a prisoner of war.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Andrew Wareing and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-10-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Wareing, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LWareingR86325v2
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book two for R Wareing, covering the period from 17 February 1942 to 25 November 1943. Detailing his Instructor duties and flying training. He was stationed at RAF Cottesmore, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Upper Heyford and RAF Desborough. Aircraft flown in were Oxford, Anson, Hampden, Wellington, Lancaster and Proctor. Carried out 1 night operation and 3 Air/Sea Rescue searches.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Leicestershire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Oxfordshire
England--Rutland
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1942-06-25
1942-06-26
1943-01-20
1943-03-11
1943-06-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Title
A name given to the resource
Robert Wareing pilot's flying log book. Two
14 OTU
16 OTU
84 OTU
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Flying Training School
Hampden
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
Proctor
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Desborough
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Upper Heyford
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/89/876/LCalvertRA1488619v1.1.pdf
a4d74b59eb8d89a89607ee6b934e1006
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Calvert, Roger
R A Calvert
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. The collection consists of an oral history interview with Flight Lieutenant Roger Alfred Calvert (b. 1923, 1488619; 152814), his logbook, navigators training course class book and 3 photographs. Roger Calvert was a navigator with 141 Squadron at RAF West Raynham flying Mosquitos on night intruder operations. For most of his operational career his pilot was Flight Lieutenant John Thatcher.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Roger Calvert and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-04-24
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Calvert, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Roger Calvert's Royal Canadian Air Force flying log book for aircrew other than pilot
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LCalvertRA1488619v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Ontario--London
England--Bedfordshire
England--Herefordshire
England--Norfolk
England--Northumberland
France--Dieppe
France--Paris
France--Pas-de-Calais
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Schleswig-Holstein
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Netherlands--IJssel Lake
Netherlands--Zeist
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Poland
Ontario
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Canadian Air Force flying log book for aircrew other than pilot of Flight Lieutenant Roger Calvert from 25 March 1943 to 6 July 1945. Detailing training and operations flown. Served at RAF Cranfield, RAF Great Massingham, RAF Ouston, RAF Twinwood Farm and RAF West Raynham. Aircraft flown were Anson, Beaufighter, Mosquito, Oxford, Tiger Moth and Wellington. He carried out a total of 32 intruder operations as a navigator with 141 Squadron from RAF West Raynham on the following targets in France, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands: Bochum, Bremen, Darmstadt, Dieppe, Dortmund, Dresden, Emden, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Kiel, Mainz, Merseberg (Leipzig), Nuremberg, Oberhausen, Osnabruck, Pante-Lunne airfield, Paris, Pas de Calais, Politz, the Ruhr, Russelhelm, Schlesvig, Steenwjik aerodrome, Stettin, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, Zeist and Zuider Zee. His pilots on operations were Squadron Leader Thatcher and Flying Officer Rimer. The log book is well annotated and contains a green endorsement and several photographs of aircraft flown and attacked. Notes include an air sea rescue sortie, the sighting of a V-2 and one Me-110 claimed.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-30
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-09-17
1944-10-04
1944-10-06
1944-10-09
1944-10-19
1944-10-26
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-04
1944-11-06
1944-11-10
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-04-22
1945-04-23
1945
141 Squadron
21 Squadron
Air Gunnery School
Air Observers School
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Beaufighter
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Initial Training Wing
Me 110
Mosquito
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Cranfield
RAF Great Massingham
RAF Ouston
RAF Padgate
RAF Torquay
RAF Twinwood Farm
RAF West Raynham
Tiger Moth
training
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/891/17977/MHuntleyR1436327-171005-03.2.jpg
e3490dd06af6b73c758e3824b0f0dd1c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Huntley, Ronald
R Huntley
Description
An account of the resource
Six items. An oral history interview with Ronald Huntley (b. 1922, 1436327 Royal Air Force), an account of the shooting down and rescue by one of the Liberator crew, and photographs of RAF high speed launches and personnel. After service as a flight mechanic on fighter aircraft, he applied to join the Air Sea Rescue service as a engine engineer on high speed launches. He was involved in the rescue of the crew of a United States Navy PB4Y-1 Liberator shot down in the Bay of Biscay in February 1944.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Ronald Huntley and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-10-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Huntley, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ron Huntley and RAF High Speed Launch 2641
Description
An account of the resource
Top left a half length portrait of a man sitting in shirt sleeves. In the background other people. Captioned 'Ron Huntley'. Bottom right - air to sea view of a high speed launch on the right heading left towards a dinghy bottom left. Captioned 'This is the rescue on Feb 15th 1944 taken from Sunderland aircraft.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-02-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MHuntleyR1436327-171005-03
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-02-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air sea rescue
ditching
Sunderland
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2154/37419/LRidingRH1525125v1.2.pdf
fd37a4f0aec84bc856e0e30c707909c9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Riding, Ronald Holford
Riding, RH
Description
An account of the resource
45 items and five photograph albums. The collection concerns Ronald Holford Riding (b. 1921, 1525125 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, correspondence, documents, photographs, and service material. He flew operations as a navigator with 69 Squadron before he was shot down in France. He evaded and worked with the resistance before crossing the Allied lines in August 1944.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Lyn Elizabeth Jolliffe and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2021-09-23
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Riding, RH
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ron Riding's Royal Canadian Air Force observers and air gunners flying log book
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LRidingRH1525125v1
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for R H Riding, navigator, covering the period from 5 January 1942 to 25 April 1948. Detailing his flying training, operations flown, instructor duties and post war flying with 1332 Heavy Conversion Unit, 242 Squadron and 230 Operational Conversion Unit. He was stationed at RCAF St Johns, RCAF Caron, RCAF Mont Joli, RCAF Rivers, RCAF Summerside, RCAF Greenwood, RAF Thornaby-on-Tees, RAF Blida, RAF Protville, RAF Gibraltar, RAF Northolt, RAF Dishforth, RAF Longtown, RAF Oakington, RAF Abingdon and RAF Lindholme. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Battle, Hudson, Baltimore, Wellington, C-87, York, Liberator, Stirling, Dakota, Oxford, Skymaster, RY3, Halifax and Lancaster. He flew a total of 54 daylight operations, 6 with 500 Squadron, 47 with 52 Squadron and one with 69 Squadron, on which he was shot down and evaded for 10 weeks. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Merrill. Targets are listed as convoy escort, anti-submarine patrols, U-boat hunt, air sea rescue, including Sardinia, Civitavecchia, Spezia, Ustica, Alicudi islands, Gozo, Catania, Sicily, Anzio and Gibraltar.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943-06-25
1943-07-20
1943-07-21
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-27
1943-09-09
1943-09-12
1943-09-17
1943-09-28
1943-10-03
1943-10-10
1943-10-19
1943-11-11
1943-11-23
1943-11-26
1943-12-01
1943-12-05
1943-12-08
1943-12-12
1943-12-15
1943-12-20
1943-12-27
1943-12-31
1944-01-13
1944-01-16
1944-01-18
1944-01-20
1944-01-21
1944-01-23
1944-01-29
1944-02-03
1944-02-04
1944-02-06
1944-02-07
1944-02-08
1944-02-10
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-27
1944-03-01
1944-03-05
1944-03-08
1944-03-12
1944-03-15
1944-03-17
1944-03-20
1944-03-22
1944-03-24
1944-03-27
1944-03-30
1944-04-01
1944-04-04
1945
1946
1947
1948
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Algeria
Canada
Gibraltar
Great Britain
Italy
Malta
Tunisia
Québec
Algeria--Blida
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Cumbria
England--London
England--Oxfordshire
England--Yorkshire
Italy--Alicudi Island
Italy--Anzio
Italy--Catania
Italy--Civitavecchia
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Sardinia
Italy--Sicily
Italy--Ustica Island
Malta--Gozo Island
Manitoba
New Brunswick--Saint John
Nova Scotia
Prince Edward Island--Summerside
Québec
Québec--Mont-Joli
Saskatchewan
New Brunswick
Manitoba--Rivers
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Cara Walmsley
242 Squadron
52 Squadron
Air Observers School
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
B-24
bale out
Battle
Bombing and Gunnery School
C-47
Cook’s tour
evading
Flying Training School
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hudson
Lancaster
navigator
observer
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
prisoner of war
RAF Abingdon
RAF Dishforth
RAF Lindholme
RAF Northolt
RAF Oakington
Second Tactical Air Force
shot down
Stirling
submarine
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
York
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1937/38338/MJolliffeFSW197221-170918-060001.2.jpg
63fbb9ae308ec82dec2845a07c67718c
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1937/38338/MJolliffeFSW197221-170918-060002.2.jpg
c9a822ac43c058b9ce4a2c76ac111695
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1937/38338/MJolliffeFSW197221-170918-060003.2.jpg
b2d7f7f657210732615fb37f244d4b38
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Jolliffe, Frank Sidney Walter
F S W Jolliffe
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-09-18
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Jolliffe, FSW
Description
An account of the resource
129 items. The collection concerns Wing Commander Frank Sidney Walter Jolliffe (b. 1923, 1314311 Royal Air Force) and contains his log books, documents and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 149 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Margaret Lowe and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] COPY – UNCLASSIFIED [/underlined]
[inserted] [handwritten notes] [/inserted]
P.M 041500Z
FM RCC SINGAPORE
TO HQFEAF
HQ 224 GP
BUTTERWORTH
SELETAR
TENGAH
JOC MIDEF
GHQ FARELF
99 BGDE
17 GHURKA DIV
1/2 GHURKA RIFLES
HQ SINGAPORE BASE DISTRICT
FOCINCFED
INFO MASTER ATTNDANT
BT
UNCLAS SAR712/RCC 4 DEC SAR JAVELIN A/C SITREP TWO PD PARA ONE SHACK ETON PLAYMATE 42 OVERFLEW SEARCH AREA OVERNIGHT DEC 03/04 AND HELD ONE STRONG SARAH SIGNAL THROUGHOUT PERIOD PD SMALL FIRE WAS SEEM 340 WRECKAGE 3 1/2 NM PD DAYLIGHT INVESTIGATION PROVED THIS TO BE OF NATIVE ORIGIN PD A NIGHT TECHNIQUE SARAH SEARCH OF A TWENTY MILE SQUARE CENTERED ON WRECKAGE DATUM PRODUCED NO RESULTS PD ON RELIEVING SHACKLETON 42 SHACKLETON 43 REPORTED TWO DEFINITE SARAH SIGNALS AND GAVE A PROBABILITY AREA OF ONE MILE RADIUS BASED ON DATUM JOHORE GRID REF 920290 PD SHACKLETON 43 WAS DEFINITE THAT THIS DATUM WAS A SECOND SARAH SIGNAL PD PARA TWO BUTTERWORTH WERE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE A SYCAMORE AN WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY BUT SENT A SARAH EQUIPPED VALETTA WHICH ARRIVED AT 1030GH AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPORTED A SARAH SIGNAL IN POSITION 950 301 WHICH WAS APPROXIMATELY CONFIRMED BY SEVERAL SHACKLETON AND VALETTA RUNS FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS PD IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE SURVIVOR IS CONTAINED WITHIN THE AREA 930280 CMM 930310 CMM
/cont'd
[page break]
(2)
960310 CMM 960280 PD AREA HAS BEEN SEARCHED BY PIONEERS AND HELICOPTERS WHITHOUT [sic] SUCCESS
PARA THREE OS JAMALUANG ASKED TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITY OF PUTTING PARTY ON PASIR MARAU BESAR BEACH BY HELICOPTER TO SWEEP WEST THROUGH AREA PD LIFT STARTED 1600GH FD
PARA FOUR A VOICE PIONEER COVERED THE SEARCH AREA INSTRUCTING THE SURVIVOR TO SWITCH OFF HIS SARAH FOR 10 SECONDS WHEN SHACKLETON PASSED OVERHEAD PD IT WAS HOPED THEREBY TO OBTAIN POSITIVE COLLAPSE AT THE SARAH SIGNAL GIVING A FIRM POSITION WHICH THE SHACKLETON COULD MARK WITH MARINE MARKERS PD NO COLLAPSE OF SIGNALS WAS HOWEVER OBTAINED PD BEFORE LEAVING THE AREA THE SHACKLETON WAS REQUESTED TO PLACE MARKERS MARINE IN POSITION JOHORE GRID 946300 BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS PD VALETA PLAYMATE 75 AND SHACKLETON 43 EVENTUALLY AGREED POSITION WITHIN 200 YARDS AS 948295 WHICH WAS CONFIRMED BY SHACKLETON PLAYMATE 44 ON TAKEOVER AT DUSK PD 44 REPORTED SINALS [sic] CEASED AT 2005 BUT WERE FAIRLY STRONG BEFORE THEN WITH RANGES UP TO 5 NMS PD ALL INFOR PASSED TO SUBCONTROL AT JEMULUANG PD
PARA FIVE CONFIRMATION OF AIR REQUIREMENT ALREADY PASSED BY PHONE AS FOLLOWS PD DEC 05 LINK CANBERRA PLAYMATE 67 ON TASK 0615 PD SHACK PLAYMATE 45 ON TASK 0630 PD BELVEDERS PEDRO JULIET KILO AND LIMA SOONEST AFTER FIRST LIGHT TO JAMALUANG PD WESSEX
PEDRO 70 ETA JEMULUANG 0900 PD TWO SIGNAL PIONEERS PLAYMATES 55 AND 56 ETA MERSING 0645/0715 PD VALETTA PLAYMATE 76 ETA DATUM 0630 FOR SARAH RELOCATION AND MARKING WITH PARACHUTES PD ONE VOICE TWIN POINEER [sic] PLATMATE 59 AND ONE ADDITIONAL TWIN PIONEER TO STANDBY AT SELETAR PD PR CANBERRA REQUIRED ON STANDBY AT TENGAH PD
PARA SIX GROUND SEARCH OF AREA CENTRED ON DATUM 948295 TO BE DIRECTED BY JAMALUANG SUB CONTROL PD IN ADDITION TO TROOPS NOW IN AREA BALACE OF 1ST/2ND GHURKAS WILL BE AVAILABLE AT JEMALUANG FOR SEARCH AT FIRST LIGHT PD TOTAL TROOPS INVOLVED APPROXIMATELY 600 PD
PARA SEVEN MARINE CRAFT C/S SAPHHIRE [sic] 55 ETD SELETAR 0200 ETA MERSING 0600 CARRYING ONE GEMINI LANDING CRAFT PD SAPPHIRE [sic] 55 CAN
/cont'd
[page break]
(3)
CARRY 50 TROOPS WITH 40 LB PACKS PD 55 TO FERRY 1000 TROOPS TO GRID 983295 AND OFFLOAD IN GEMINI PD
PARA EIGHT REPORT AT 2110 FROM SHACK
PLAYMATE 44 STATES FIRES OF SEARCH PARTY VISIBLE 2500 YARDS WEST OF DATUM PD NOTHING VISIBLE TO EAST OF DATUM PO AREA WEATHER GOOD PD IS OF OPINION THAT SARAH WAS SWITCHED OFF AT 2005 AND THAT SURVIVOR IS CONSERVING BATTERY
BT
04/1515Z
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Signal from Rescue Co-ordination Centre Singapore detailing Frank and his pilot's rescue
Description
An account of the resource
Frank was a navigator flying Javelins from Singapore. On 3 December 1962 he and his pilot ejected from their Javelin. This signal relates the rescue activities taking place while Frank was in the jungle.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1962-12-04
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Singapore
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Service material
Text
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Three typewritten pages
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MJolliffeFSW197221-170918-060001, MJolliffeFSW197221-170918-060002, MJolliffeFSW197221-170918-060003
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1962-12-03
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
air sea rescue
Shackleton
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/259/10573/BWhittleGGWhittleGGv1.2.pdf
4366a07d114b2ea1d93d31fa5bb69f5a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Whittle, Geoffrey
G G Whittle
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-26
2016-08-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Whittle, G
Description
An account of the resource
12 items. An oral history interview with Squadron Leader Geoffrey Gordon Whittle DFM (1923 – 2016, 1397166 Royal Air Force), as well as his log books, photographs and memoirs.
Geoffrey Whittle flew operations as a navigator with 101 Squadron from RAF Ludford Magna.
There is a sub-collection of 25 Air Charts, mostly of Great Britain.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Denise Field and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Sqn. Ldr. Geoffrey Whittle, DFM RAF (Ret’d)
On reaching the age of 18 in September 1941I volunteered for aircrew duties and was accepted for training as an Observer. Called up in March 1942 I undertook all of my training, which was brief to say the least, in the United Kingdom. Flying training was undertaken in Scotland during the months of November 1942/February1943, not in the best weather conditions but a very good introduction to things to come.
Passing out at a wings parade on 1st March 1943 I left that evening for 27 OTU Litchfield which started the following day. There I crewed up with my Pilot and W/AG and converted to the Wellington aircraft. That was followed by conversion to the Lancaster at Lindholm in Yorkshire. It was at Lindholm that the full crew complement was made up.
At the end of training in June we were posted to 101 Squadron based at Ludford Magna, a wartime airfield near Louth. At that time I had completed 200 flying hours one third of which was at night. Our first first operation,two nights after joining the Squadron, was a mine laying sortie to La Rochelle and our first raid on Germany was to Cologne.
As part of Bomber Command we took part in operations against Berlin, Nuremberg, Turin and Peenemunde, the German Flying Bomb Research Establishment which put back the German Flying Bomb attacks on the UK by several months.
On our 15th operation against Hannover, near to the target the aircraft was caught by searchlights attacked by a night fighter and ground AA fire all within seconds which resulted in severe damage that included an engine fire and also one within the fuselage. We managed to evade our attackers attack the target and get home. As a result all the crew were decorated with immediate awards of 2 Conspicuous Gallantry Medals, 1 DFC and 4 DFMs.
Unfortunately, on our 16th operation I suffered a perforated eardrum and was hospitalised. On their 19th trip flying with a replacement navigator the crew was shot down and 5 of the crew were killed, The Pilot and WAG survived and became POWs.
Whilst in hospital my Commission was Gazetted back dated 27th September.
After six months ground duty I returned to flying with a height restriction of 8000 feet to became part of the Air Sea Rescue Service before being earmarked for the Tiger Force scheduled to go to the Far East (which never materialised due to the war ending). In the years after the war (with a full flying category restored) I served in Aden, Egypt and Germany in a variety of roles.
I attended the RAF Staff College at Bracknell in 1959 and was then posted to Fighter Command HQ at Bentley Priory from where I took early retirement in the rank of Squadron Leader in December 1961
I initially went into banking but decided the life was not to my liking so joined NAAFI as a Trainee District Manager. During my 26 years with the Corporation I spent 18 years overseas serving in Cyprus, Libya, Singapore, Berlin and Gan and visiting several other countries like Nepal, India and Bangladesh. My final appointment was as a Departmental Manager at NAAFI Headquarters in London from where I retired in1988.
Settled in Hampshire I became a District Councillor in 1989 for East Hampshire, and after moving to Lincolnshire in January 2007, I became a District Councillor for North Kesteven Distrct Council.
Now living at Ruskington where both my son and daughter also reside I have been very lucky to have had a varied and interesting career, seen many parts of the world and now live in a lovely village with my family nearby.
Reflecting on my time in Bomber Command I had the upmost admiration for those older aircrew who had families (my pilot was 33 years old with a family). I was young ---and if not flying just enjoyed life.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Sqn. Ldr Geoffrey Whittle, DFM RAF (Ret'd)
Description
An account of the resource
A brief memoir of Geoffrey Whittle's wartime service. His training started in March 1942 in Scotland. One year later he converted to Wellingtons, then Lancasters at RAF Lindholme. He was then posted to RAF Ludford Magna. On his 15th operation over Hanover they were attacked by a night fighter and anti-aircraft fire but they managed to return. After the war he served in Germany and the Middle East. He left the RAF in 1961 and worked for the Navy, Army and Air Force Institute overseas until he retired in 1988.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Geoffrey Whittle
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BWhittleGGWhittleGGv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Hannover
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two typewritten pages
101 Squadron
27 OTU
air sea rescue
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Lancaster
navigator
Navy, Army and Air Force Institute
Operational Training Unit
pilot
prisoner of war
RAF Lichfield
RAF Lindholme
RAF Ludford Magna
Tiger force
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/377/6708/MDawsonSR142531-160516-01.2.pdf
ae8c1513e5dc9905145fdb891ce21bba
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
S.O. Book 136
Code 28-73-0
G[crown]R
[in a lozenge]
SUPPLIED
FOR THE
PUBLIC SERVICE
[page break]
Pilot.. F/Lt S.R. (Squib) DAWSON.
Navigator. F/Lt B.J. (Bunny) STARIE.
Flight Engineer. F/Sgt. ROY SHAW.
Bombardier. F/Sgt. REG (Junior) PIKE.
Wireless Operator. F/Sgt. JIMMIE (Mac) McLEISH.
Mid Upper Gunner. F/Sgt. ARCHIE BARROWMAN.
Rear Gunner. F/Sgt. BEN (Robbie) ROBERTS.
[page break]
1943 A/C MISSING
Krefeld June 21/22. (44)
1/ 4,000lb. 12/S.B.C. (90 X 4lb incend.)
Took off at 2350 in D’ & climbed over ‘drome to 20,000. Straight to target. No trouble crossing coast; gentle weaving all the way to the target. Had to waste several minutes before going in. Saw quite a lot of kites, mostly four engine jobs – no fighters. Flak over target looked bad from a distance but saw none while attacking. Went in with three other Lancs. ahead of us. Saw a kite shot down over the target. Came out with bags of revs & boost, weaving to avoid searchlight cone. No more excitement until nearly at coast when we saw kite attacked by fighters. Plenty of tracer floating around & bomber caught fire, slowed up & then dived burning furiously. Saw it crash into deck. Crossed coast without trouble & back to base O.K. Nearly formation flying with two Lancs near enemy coast.
Landed at 0400.
[page break]
Mulheim June 22/23. (35)
1/ 4,000 lb. 12/S.B.C. (90 X incend)
Took off at 2250 in ‘D’ 7 climbed over Base to 20,000. Trouble with pot Outer engine, fluctuating revs& boost at 2850 r.p.m. causing rear turret to be sticky. Flew on George to enemy coast, then gentle weave & corkscrew to target area. Saw three kites go down in flames on the way. Large concentrations of searchlights & bags of heavy flak along Northern Ruhr so increased revs & boost to step up airspeed and started more violent weaving. Through searchlights without being caught. Saw first T.I. go down and several loads of bombs. Bombed second T.I. and flew steady for photoflash to explode. Just as camera red light came on heard yell from gunners; looked out to starboard and saw four engine plane heading for us at full bore about 100feet away on same level. Did violent dive and he missed us by about six feet – going directly over our heads. Photoflash failed to drop but we wouldn’t have got photo anyway. Turned right off target & flew directly over Duisburg (as ordered!) managed to avoid more searchlight cones although caught twice for a few seconds. Fires at Krefeld still burning all over town as we passed. Saw three more kites shot down in flames; two exploded on ground third disintegrated in mid – air. Moderate weave & corkscrew all way from target to coast, losing height in 2000 ft steps. Just as we levelled out from one step a green cartridge or rocket appeared above us – probably from a foxed fighter. Crossed coast on track & E.T.A. & set course for home. Engaged George half way across. On reaching base & switching on R/T heard first seven kites call up for permission to land in about fifteen seconds. Green light on U/C failed to come on so I reported U/C failure. Only needed switching over to duplicate bulb! Landed O.K. at 0330.
[page break]
Wuppertal June 24/25. (33)
1/ 4,000lb. 12/S.B.C. (90 X 4lb incend.)
Took off 2240 in ‘E’ climbed over base to 20,000ft, through several layers of cloud giving quite severe icing. Magnetic compass different from D.R. when setting couse so steered magnetic. No trouble until position west of Cologne where we had to orbit to lose time. Saw T.i. go down 7 circled, fighter whipped underneath our tail and a Lancaster also orbiting, must no bead on us as we set course for target (north of Cologne).Bags of searchlights & flak as we crossed defended belt – but flew in & out of cloud to fox them. Saw first T.I. go down and were third onto target Target. Camera failed to turn over and flash failed to drop. Heading south away from Ruhr opened bomb-doors and jettisoned – one can of incendiaries and photoflash went. Went round defences of Cologne, weaving and corkscrewing all the way. No trouble anywhere, crossed coasts (enemy & own) on track and were first to land at Base. Saw one kite in flames over Target.
[page break]
Cologne June 28/29 (25)
1/ 4,000lb. 12/S.B.C. (90 X 4lb incend)
Took off 2300 in ‘B’ & climbed over base to 20,000ft, through layer of low stratus. No trouble on way in, steady weaving from enemy coast. Kept on track and E.T.A. all the way, lost two minutes by alteration of course before running in to target. Track marker dropped behind us, heavy barrage & predicted flak just before E.T.A. target area. Hit by small pieces of flak. On E.T.A. no T.I’s or Sky markers so carried on. T.I’s dropped behind us at zero +8!! Turned right round target area and made second run up on required heading on second T.I’s at zero +20. Through heavy flak again. Markers out so bombed on Flare. Cookie hit bomb doors. Steady weave all the way out – plenty of air – speed. Arrived at base at 4,000ft over 10/10ths cloud. Broke cloud when told over R/T but couldn’t find drome for some minutes, landed O.K.
Believe saw Mosquito (1st T.I. marker) shot down – no P.F.F. late. Saw four kites shot down; & one fighter had a go at four kites on Stbd bow on my way back. (Flak holes in both Stbd engine nacelles, dent in bomb doors. Strip of wood along bomb doors knocked off by cookie.)
[page break]
Cologne July 3/4 (32)
1/ 4,000lb. 12/S.B.C. (90 X 4lb incend)
Took off in ‘B’ & climbed over base to 20,000ft. Stbd outer overheated, very slow climb owing to high air temp & low pressure. S/C at 16,500 & climbed on track. On track & E.T.A. to target. Saw P.F.F. kite shot down (T.I’s exploding.) Gentle weaving & corkscrew all the time. Bombed first T.I. – only two or three kites before us. Flak very heavy over target & were hit by small pieces (three). Came back long route over north France & crossed English coast at Dungeness. Very uneventful all the way.
[page break]
Cologne July 8/9 (8)
1/ 4,000 lb 15/ S.B.C. (90 X4lb. incend)
Took off at 2310 in ‘B’ & climbed over base to 16,00ft – climbed on track to 20,00ft. On track & E.T.A. to target. Usual weaving & corkscrewing all the time. Flak over the target only medium – no hits. Long route back over N.France & crossed English coast at Dungeness. No GEE or George on way back. Very uneventful all the way. Saw three kites shot down.
[page break]
Gelsenkirchen July 9/10
1/ 4,000 lb. 13/S.B.A. (90 X 4lb. incend.)
Took off at 22.55 in @B’ & climbed over base to 20,000 feet. Went round by Texel 7 back across N.France, crossing coast at Beachey Head, to reading & Base. Steady weave all the time over enemy territory, climbing & diving to avoid flying in cloud layers. 10/10ths cloud all the time at different layers up to 23,00 ft. Just managed to see Sky Markers at target. Very little flak at us, a fairly quiet trip – no excitement. No cloud over England on return so no difficulty returning to Base.
[page break]
Hamburg July 24/25 (12)
1/ 4,000 lb. 4/ 1000 lb. 1/S.B.C. (12 X 20 lb. Frag.)
Took off at 2200 in ‘B’, climbed over base & climbed on track to 20,000 ft. Long sea crossing, dropped “Windows” from 50 miles past Danish coast to 50 miles past German coast on way back. Steady weave all the time over enemy territory. Four minutes late on target owing to T.I’s being late. Searchlights & flak – though heavy – were no much good. No fighters seen & no kites shot down. Came back at 175 kts I.A.S. all the way, second back to Base. Easy trip.
Photo plotted on target.
[page break]
Essen July 25/26 (25)
1/ 4000 lb 2/ 1000 lb 5/ 500 lb.
Took off at 2200 in “B” & climbed over Base to 15,00 ft & on track to 20,000 ft. Dropped “Windows” over enemy territory. Steady weave all the way. Target well defended by searchlights & guns but went in to attack between four cones with kite each held and had no trouble. Nearly pranged by another kite:- Dived to miss one from starboard to port and didn’t see other below first one – he dived to miss us. Dropped 500 lb bombs on defences on way in & out of target. First back to base. Easy trip by Ruhr standards. Saw two kites shot down, one just in front of us by night fighter – only about 600 yards away.
Fire tracks on photo.
[page break]
Hamburg July 27/28 (18)
1/ 4000 lb. 3/ 1000 lb 5/ T.I. Green.
Took off at 22.15 in ‘B’ and climbed on track to 20,00 ft. long stooge over sea. Dropped “Windows” over enemy territory. Steady weave as well. Two minutes early on target. Nearly pranged by another Lancaster weaving over target – we climbed and he went below us. Nice easy trip. Second back to Base – (trouble with Burns about our speed!) Saw two kites shot down.
Photo plotted on target.
[page break]
[underlined] Hamburg July 29/30 [/underlined] (28)
1/4000 lb. 3/1000 lb. 5/T.I. Green. 1/T.I. Red.
Took off at 22.15 in “B” & climbed over base to 5,000 feet & on track to 20,000 feet. Stooged on “George” to “Windows” area & then slight steady weave until out of area and back on “George”. No trouble attacking, flak very ineffective & slight; hundreds of searchlights but not predicted. Lovely straight & level run-up until photo-flash went but only got “fire-tracks”! More defences on coast north of Bremen on way out than before but no trouble. Backed up track marker near coast on way out. Back to Base fourth (Bums first & pleased about it) because of orders for Boost & Revs. on return!
Saw four kites shot down.
[page break]
[underlined] Hamburg Aug 2/3 [/underlined] (30)
1/4000 lb. 3/1000 lb. 4/T.I. Green.
Took off at 2345 in “B” & set course over Base at 5000 ft, climbing on track to 20,000 feet. Windows & weaving 50 miles from enemy coast. Crossed coast due North of Bremen and ran into violent thunderstorms (as per Met !!) On NC right up to 30,000 ft with amazing lightning. Course was 140°M but had to steer 240°M to get round cloud. Eventually back on course but found ourselves in centre of storm and had to come out on reciprocal courses. Dropped H.E. on heavy flak defended area estimated to be Bremen. Fires in whole area of N.W. Germany. Only saw about three kites all night. Starboard Outer engine went U/S through coolant leak and had to be feathered. “George” U/S on return journey so had to fly back all the way. Flight Engineer, Roy Shaw, took over for two periods of twenty minutes. I.A.S. 145 knots on return, last back to base by 15 mins. Brought T.1.’s back. Only one crew claimed to have bombed Hamburg out of twenty.
[page break]
[underlined] Nurnberg Aug 10/11. [/underlined] (18)
1/4000 lb. 2/5000 lb. 2/250 (incend.) 5/T.I. Green.
Took of at [missing word] in “B”, climbed over base, and on track. routed over N. France & past Mannheim in S. Germany. Saw two combats over France but quiet trip rest of way except just north of Mannheim. Plenty of searchlights & fair amount of flak there. Had to do violent evasive action before running over cloud & foxing S/L’s. Target covered by cloud and no T.1’s down, so combed estimated centre of fires & brought T.1.’s back. Incendiaries were route markers on way back, saw none to back up because of cloud so dropped them in forest area in S.W. Germany. A pretty quiet trip – not a very good attack.
Fire tracks on photo, with plenty of cloud.
[page break]
[underlined] Milan. Aug 12/13. [/underlined] (7)
1/4000 lb. 3/500 lb. 4/T.I. Green.
Took off at 21.35 in “B”, climbed over base to 5,000 ft and on track to 18,000 ft. Lost height through fighter belt south of Paris and then climbed to 20,000 feet. Saw four machines shot down over France. Not surprising – full moon almost and only 2300 when we crossed the coast so not fully dark. Quiet trip rest of the way, stooged on “George”. Plenty of pin points by moon light. Had seventeen minuits [sic] in hand at Lake Bourget so flew round lakes for quarter of an hour before crossing Alps. Whole crew stopped work and admired Mont Blanc and other mountains by moonlight. Quite a lot of snow on higher mountains. Lost height after crossing Alps to 15,000 feet & attacked at this height. Target poorly defended, vey few searchlights (one picked us up & promptly went out) and only slight flak. Turin burning on way back. Very quiet on way back, took our time & were last back to base.
Fire tracks on photo, with cloud and/or smoke.
[page break]
[underlined] Leverkusen. Aug 22/23. [/underlined] (5)
1/4000 lb. 6/1000 lb. 5/T.I. Green.
Took off at 2135 in “B” & climbed over base to 12000 ft and on track to 20,000 ft. Hardly any cloud on way out and very little opposition. Cloud became 10/10 tho [sic] over Ruhr area but found Cologne by flak bursts. Target covered by cloud and no T.I.’s visible so bombed on E.T.A. retaining T.I.’s. Saw loads of incendieris [sic] burning all over the place under the cloud. Returned faster than we expected.
Saw two machines go down in flames.
Photo’s of fields!
[page break]
[underlined] Berlin Aug 23/24. [/underlined] (58)
1/4000 lb. 3/1000 lb. 4/T.I. Gren 1/Red Spot Fire.
Taxied out in ‘P @ at 2040, rear turret went u/s so had to take reserve. Took off at 2108 in “W” – 23 mins late. Set course eight minutes behind minimum time. No trouble on way there. Cut off corner at last turning point and bombed 2 mins late! Target surrounded by searchlights & fighters but no flak. Ran off target alongside cone of S/L’s holding Stirling. Rather close to Rostock on way out and had to put nose down through S/L belt – 220 knots on clock, about 350 m.p.h. Saw S/L’s at Flensberg but all went out before we got there. Weaving steadily when one S/L came on and caught us and one shell hit us at same time. Hit F/E’s intercom socket and spattered everyone with bakelite. Knocked two port boost gauges U/S and ruined both gunner’s & W/Op’s oxygen. Came straight down thro’ S/L belt as 220 knots I.A.S. again. While stooging home tested undercarriage & tires and flaps.
Flying on George with Nav lights on, and smoking and drinking coffee when German intruder
[page break]
had a packet at us near Norwich. Missed us, all went about 10 feet above but full length of fuselage. Shook us up quite a bit as we had had no air-raid warning.
Went into land, nice touch down at beginning of flare path. No brakes! Called to F/E to cut outer engines, then inners. Told W/Op to tell Control we were overshooting before we ran off runway. Crossed road, through corn field, over ditch & through hedge into next field. Tail wheel shoved up through fuselage by ditch & finished up on bottom of rear turret & rudders.
Nothing much said about it.
Fire tracks only on photo.
[page break]
[underlined] Manheim [deleted] Aug [/deleted] [inserted] Sept [/inserted] 5/6 [/underlined] (34)
1/4000 lb. 6/500 lb. 4/T.I. Green. 1/T.I. Red. 1/Red Spot Fire.
Took off at 2000 in “L” & climbed to 7,000 round base and to 20,000 on track. Quiet trip all way. Backed up track markers – on way in Red T.I., on way back Red Spot. Caught by master S/L on bombing run but got away by violent evasive action, dropping bombs at same time! Violent weaving off target from 21,000 to 16,000 feet. Quiet trip back although surrounded by fighters. “George” U?S all the time.
Fire tracks on photo.
[page break]
[underlined] Munich [deleted] Aug. [/deleted] [inserted] Sept. [/inserted] [/underlined] (14)
1/4000 lb 2/1000 lb. 4/T.I. Green.
Took off at 2020 in “L” & climbed over base to 6,000 and on track to 20,000 feet. Routed over London – saw dozens of “V”s being flashed from ground so replied likewise. Quiet trip all the way, pretty well on track. Target area lit by dozens of S/L’s shining on cloud as well as by fires. Saw T.I.’s during run up but couldn’t see them when we bombed, so brought back T.I.’s. Fighter above our tail made us drop early but as we took violent evasive action saw he was after another Lancaster above us. Long stooge back across France with strong head wind. “George” nearly U/S (had to watch & correct it all the time) and “G” U/S. Had to get M/F fix after leaving French coast. Passed over Isle of Wight & Southampton on way to Reading. No excitement at all.
[page break]
[underlined] Hanover Sept 22/23. [/underlined] (26)
1/4000 lb. 6/1000 lb. 4/T.I. Green.
Took off at 1900 in “B” & climbed on track to 20,000 feet. No trouble on way in, but kept wandering off track. Held by searchlights over target and had to do violent evasive action to shake them off. Bombs dropped during evasive action so brought back T.I.’s. Photo showed fire tracks only. No trouble on way back.
[page break]
[underlined] Mannheim Sept 23/24 [/underlined] (32)
1/4000 lb 5/1000 lb. 4/T.I. Green. 1/Red Spot Fire.
Took off at 1945 in “B” & climbed on track. Had to climb hard to reach 20,000 before crossing enemy coast. No trouble on way to target. Used “Y” for pin-points but bombed visually. Nice steady run up through searchlights – caught but not held. No trouble on way back except that we turned too early on last leg and crossed North French coast 30 miles east of correct position.
[page break]
[underlined] Hannover. Sept 27/28. [/underlined] [underlined] Boomerang. [/underlined]
6/2000 lb.
Took off at 1900 in “B” & climbed on track to 20,000 feet. Trouble with rear turret as we crossed English coast, fixed it and carried on but it went again over North Sea. Jettisoned bombs in sea and turned back as turret was completely U/S with bad oil leak.
[page break]
[underlined] Munich Oct 2/3. [/underlined] (9)
1/4000 lb. 5/1000 lb.
Took off at 1900 in “B” & climbed on track to 20,000 feet. Went as Main Force, Blind Marker U/T, so carried no T.I.’s. Arrived at last turning point, after very quiet trip, 5 1/2 mins early so orbited twice. Lost time somewhere on last leg before timed run and bombed 8 mins late. Held by searchlights so photo showed wavy fire tracks and no ground detail. Quiet trip back to English coast, but took us longer than expected. Bandit Alert so stooged back without nav. lights. Height to fly over base was 7900 feet! Someone started panicing [sic] about low petrol state and half of them joined in. We took our turn and landed 60 gallons left! (15 mins flying.) On approach starboard under carriage wouldn’t lock down, bombadier [sic] paniced [sic] out of nose! Got it down and did steep glide approach & landed O.K.
[page break]
[underlined] Frankfurt Oct 4/5. [/underlined] (12)
1/4000 lb 5/1000 lb.
Took off in at [sic] 18.30 in “B” & climbed to 10,000 feet over base and to 20,000 feet on track. Very quiet trip, no weaving all the way to target. Went as Main Force, Bland Marker U/T so carried no T.I.’s. Weaved violently through searchlights but did perfect straight run up and got ground detail on photo. Out of target very nicely and very quiet trip back without weaving. Tail trimmer {stuck, froze} and had to push against wheel for 2 ½ hours before it unfroze. Bandit Alert over England so stooged back at 4000 feet without Nav lights. First back to base and made approach from 4000 ft! Aiming point photo.
[underlined] Freidreichaven Oct 7/8 [/underlined]. (23)
1/4000 lb. 2/1000 lb. 1/T.1.Red. 1/T.1.Yellow 8/S.B.C.
(4 White Flares)
Took off at 2050 in “B” & climbed to 10,000 ft over base and to 20.000 feet on track. Quiet trip most of time but did some weaving over France. Rear gunner reported gun flashes directly underneath us when we were straight & level so did steep diving turn to Starboard. Several shells arrived exactly where we [deleted] had [/deleted] would have been. We heard them explode and felt them. No damage. Run up to target was very hot with flak but not a lot of searchlights. Hit somewhere over target and damaged brake pressure line, consequently “blower” disengaged and we came back at ‘0’ boo[deleted]a[/deleted]st. Reported low brake pressure on arrival at base and told to wait. Aircraft landed with bust tyre & blocked runway. All diverted to Gravely – kept us circling for short time first. Two aircraft logged at Gravely so diverted to Oakington. First to land there – back to base by transport. “B” U/S with flak hole – through rear of port wing and
[page break]
out at leading edge, cutting main spar in half on way.
“L” & “F” bombed our T.I. and got aiming point photo, we got same smoke screen but couldn’t be plotted.
Freidreichaven was “Spoof” target while main force went to Stuttgart, only 16 aircraft on and target hotter than main target. We were Blind Markers for first time.
[page break]
[underlined] Hannover Oct 8/9. [/underlined] (31)
1/4000 lb. 4/1000 lb. 2/T.1. Yellow. 6/S.B.C. (4 White Flares)
Took off at 2245 in “Z” & climbed to 8,000 ft over base and 20,000 feet on track. Quiet trip all way but had to lose a lot of time on route – five orbits. One person dropped flares just as we were running up somewhere well to East, other blind markers in same place as us. Held by master searchlight during run-up but got away. Over a hundred S/L’s at first but they all went out ten minutes after raid began.
Uneventful trip back and landed without difficulty despite local mist.
Photo 2000 yds from aiming point
[page break]
[underlined] Frankfurt Oct 22/23 [/underlined] (44)
1/4000 lb. 4/1000 lb. 2/T.1. Yellow 6/S.B.C. (4 White Flares)
Took off at 1820 in “B” & climbed to 17,500 ft on track. Bad misting on inside of all cockpit windows which turned to ice above freezing level. Couldn’t get rid of it and consequently couldn’t see out at all. Ran into heavy CuNb and started heavy icing, which started making us lose height at 2850 revs, + 8 boost. Jettisoned 2/1000 lb bombs but it made no difference. Decided to boomerang and jettisoned H.E., retaining T.1.’s & flares, whilst loosing height.
Frankfurt was spoof target for Kassel.
[page break]
[underlined] Cologne Nov 3/4 [/underlined]. (7)
1/4000 lb 6/1000 lb. 4/T.1. Red
Took off at 1720 in “B” & climbed to 8,000 ft over base and to 20,000 ft on track. No trouble all the way, fighters probably grounded through fog. Gained time and had to orbit just outside target area. Held by searchlights during bombing run and then coned. Gunners paniced [sic] and we dropped bombs about 15 seconds early. Straight & level for photograph – forgot searchlights would ruin it! Coned all the way across the target and only got out by outdistancing the searchlights. Quiet trip all the way back.
It was only just dusk when we crossed coast in and quarter moon made it even lighter.
60 aircraft on Cologne, spoof for Dusseldorf with over 500 on.
[page break]
[underlined] Modane Nov 10/11 [/underlined] (NIL)
7/1000 lb. 6/S.B.C. (4 White Flares)
Took off at 21.05 in “B” & climbed to 20,000 ft on track. No opposition all the way over France and [underlined] none [/underlined] over the target either. Saw the Alps by moonlight for the second time. Map read on last leg to target and dropped flares on aiming point [inserted] dead on time [/inserted] Did a complete circuit and bombed the T.1.’s dropped by Visual Markers after our flares. No opposition all the way back. Stayed up at 20,000 ft & crossed a very active warm front at 24,000 ft. Lost it all over base.
Aiming point photograph.
[page break]
[underlined] Cannes Nov 11/12 [/underlined]. (7)
1/4000 lb. 6/500 lb. 1/T.1. Yellow 5/S.B.C. (4 Flares)
Took off at 1830 in “B” & climbed on track to 15,000 ft. No opposition all the way over France. Saw Alps by moonlight for third time. Got to port of track on long leg to coast and came out over Cannes itself – and one light flak gun opened up! Plenty of time in hand so headed back for turning point for timed run onto target. Half way there decided to run in on “Y” only so turned for target. Moonlight visual markers dropped their T.1.’s so bombed those straight away & brought back our flares and T.1. Bombed dead on time. Defences were three small searchlights and two light flak guns.
No trouble at all on way back but saw two aircraft shot down to starboard of us over North France.
Aiming point photos.
[page break]
[underlined] Ludwigshaven Nov 17/18 [/underlined]. (5 [deleted] [indecipherable number] [/deleted])
5/2000 lb.
Took off at 1705 in “D” & climbed to 20,000 ft on track. Severe internal icing all the way, started at freezing level (2000 ft) and didn’t clear until we descended on way back. I kept my cockpit windows free by continually wiping them with a handkerchief soaked in glycol. The mid-upper gunner, [inserted] was [/inserted] hardly able to see out of his turret the whole trip. The rear gunner’s oxygen froze up and his guns wouldn’t depress. But we carried on! Low cloud during the whole trip but it cleared over the target and we were able to get a photo. Opposition was negligible, we saw no fighters & very little flak. Searchlights caught us once but couldn’t hold us.
80 P.F.F. aircraft only on raid.
Aiming point photo.
[page break]
[underlined] Berlin Nov 18/19 [/underlined] (33)
1/4000 lb 3/1000 lb. 4/T.1. Red.
Took off at 1715 in “B” & climbed to 20,000 ft on track. No opposition all the way there & back & very little over the target. 10/10 [indecipherable word] low cloud all the time, probably kept the fighters grounded & made searchlights hopeless. Only a comparatively few guns on target and flak not concentrated. [deleted] [indecipherable letter] [deleted] Kept gaining time on way there & had to do several orbits. Winds changed coming back and we were an hour later at French coast than Flight plan times. Also 40 miles off track! Nine aircraft out of 450 missing (all Lancaster raid).
Mannheim was other target, we saw fires burning on way back. Aircraft all over Germany on way back, some went right over Ruhr!
No photo because of cloud.
[page break]
[underlined] Berlin Nov 22. [/underlined] (25)
1/4000 lb. 3/1000 lb. 4/T.1.Red. 4/T.1. Green 4/Sky-Red + Green.
Took off in “ “ & climbed to 20,000 ft on track. Thick cloud and fog on ground all the way there and back with only occasional breaks. Hardly any opposition all the way. Flak over target did not start until first aircraft dropped bombs & was not concentrated or heavy even then. I did plenty of weaving all the way, especially coming off the target. Kept pretty well on track all the way & did the trip in 5 1/2 hours although airborne a little longer. First back to base.
No photo because of cloud.
[page break]
WHO SAID “JOIN”.?
[page break]
GET A “NUMBER”!
[inserted] Notice to a Royal Air Force Volunteer Reservist to join for Service in the Royal Air Force
745833. SGT. DAWSON. S.R.
HESSLEMOUNT,
BEECHMOUNT Rd.,
BASSETT, SOUTHAMPTON.
You are hereby required to join the Volunteer Reserve Town Centre at SOUTHAMPTON
on (date) [underlined] 1 – SEP 1939 [/underlined]
1. Should you not present yourself on that date, you will be liable to be proceeded against.
2. You will report in uniform, if in your possession, and bring with you any remaining items of uniform, and small kit.
3. You should also bring with you:-
(i) National Health and Pensions Insurance Card.
(ii) Unemployment Insurance Book, or Unemployment (exempt persons) Book, or Official Receipt Card (U.I.40) in lieu of either.
(iii) If you are married: your marriage and birth certificates of children (if any), if these have not already been officially recorded.
4. You must not, however, delay rejoining [sic] because any of the foregoing are not in your possession.
[date stamp] [italics] Official Stamp (Dated) of Mobilizing Authority. [/italics] {/inserted]
[page break]
Form 1866.
ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE.
(PILOT SECTION)
NOTICE PAPER
FIVE YEARS’ RESERVE SERVICE.
Signature of applicant receiving the Notice paper [underlined] [signature] [/underlined]
NOTICE to be given to the applicant at the time of his offering to join the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve.
Date [underlined] 26th April [/underlined] 1939..
The general conditions of the Contract of Enlistment that you are about to enter into with the Crown are as follows :-
1. You will engage to serve His Majesty (as a special reservist) for a period of five years in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, provided His Majesty should so long require your services.
2. You will be liable to be called out for training as explained in Question 21 on page 3 of this Form.
3. You will be liable to be called out on permanent service as explained in Question 22 to 24 on page 3 of this Form, and to be called out to aid the civil power in the preservation of the public peace. When called out on permanent service you will form part of the Regular Air Force.
4. When called out for training or for service as explained in Questions 21 to 24 on page 3 of this Form you become subject to the Air Force Act.
5. You will be liable when called out and if medically fit, to go into the air whenever required to do so.
6. If you are in receipt of a service or disability pension you are not eligible for enlistment.
7. You will not be permitted while serving in the Royal Air Force Voluntary Reserve to join the Royal Navy, Army, or Royal Marines, the Militia, the Territorial Army, the Auxiliary Air Force, or the Reserves of those forces.
8. You will be required by the Attestation Officer to answer the questions printed on pages 2, 3 and 4 of this Form, and take the oath shown on page 4, and you are hereby warned that if you wilfully or knowingly make, at the time of your attestation, any false answer you will thereby render yourself liable to punishment.
Signature and rank of Officer or N.C.O. serving the Notice Paper [underlined] [signature] [/underlined]
ROYAL AIR FORCE VOLUNTEER RESERVE.
[underlined] Certified Copy of Attestation [/underlined]
[underlined] No. [blank] Name [blank] [/underlined]
[underlined] Questions to be put to the Recruit before enlistment into the Pilot Section of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve. [/underlined]
You are hereby warned that if, after enlistment, it is found that you have wilfully or knowingly made a false answer to any of the following questions you will be liable under the Air Force Act to a maximum punishment of two years' imprisonment with hard labour.
1. What is your name ? 1. Christian Names Stephen Rayner Surname Dawson.
2. Where were you born ? 2. In the parish of Hessle in or near the town of Hull in the county of Yorkshire
3. What was the date of your birth ? 3. 27th April 1920.
4. Are you married? 4. No
5. What is your full postal address ? 5. "Hesslemount" Beechmount Road, Bassett, Southampton
6. Are you a British subject by birth ? 6. Yes
7. Are you of pure European descent ? 7. Yes
8. Are your parents both British subjects by birth ? If not, state separately their nationality at birth. 8. Yes
9. Are you, or is either of your parents, a naturalised British subject ? 9. No
10. If so, state the date(s) of the naturalisation certificate(s). 10. [blank]
11. What is your profession or calling ? 11. Shipping Clerk
12. What is your religious denomination ? 12. Methodist
13. Are you willing to be enlisted (as a special reservist) in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve for five years provided His Majesty should so long require your services ? 13. Yes
14. Have you been convicted by the civil power? If so, give particulars and dates of all convictions. 14. No
15. Do you now belong to any of the regular or non-regular Naval, Military or Air Forces of the Crown in this or any other country, or to any Police Force ? If so, state to what unit or corps you now belong, your official number, what rank you now hold, and whether it is substantive or acting. 15. No
[page break]
16. Have you ever served in any of the regular or non-regular Naval, Military or Air Forces of the Crown in this or any other country, or in any Police Force ? If so, state the unit in which you have served, your official number, the cause of your discharge, the rank you held on discharge, and whether it was substantive or acting. 16. No
17. Have you truly stated the whole of your previous service, if any ? 17. Yes
18. Have you ever been rejected as unfit for any of the Naval, Military or Air Forces of the Crown ? If so, on what grounds ? 18. No
19. (a) Have you ever been awarded a disability pension, a gratuity or any temporary or conditional allowance for disability ? 19. (a) No
(b) Are you now in receipt of any such pension or allowance ? (b) No
20. Did you receive a notice and do you understand what it means ? Who gave it to you ? 10. Yes. Name Flight Lieut. S.F.W. Laidlaw
21. Are you aware that you will be liable to be called out for 15 days' training (involving continuous whole-time attendance) annually, and also to attend for training at week-ends, in the evenings, or at other times, as may be required ? 21. Yes
22. Are you aware that you will be liable to be called out on permanent service in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, ashore or afloat, in cases of imminent national danger or of great emergency, and also will be liable to be called out to aid the civil power in the preservation of the public peace ? 22. Yes
23. Are you aware that you will be liable (whether or not the Air Force Reserve is called out on permanent service) to be called out and to serve within the British Islands in defence of the British Islands against actual or apprehended attack : it being understood that service on any flight of which the points of departure and intended return are within the British Islands or the territorial waters thereof is to be deemed to be service within the British Islands, notwithstanding that the flight may in its course extend beyond those limits ? 23. Yes
24. Are you aware that, if called out under paras. 22 and 23 above, you will be liable to be detained in Air Force service for the unexpired portion of your service in the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, and for a further period not exceeding 12 months, if so directed by the competent Air Force authority ? 24. Yes
[page break]
[bookmark MDawsonSR142531-160516-010024 is a duplicate of bookmark MDawsonSR142531-160516-010022]
[page break]
[inserted] End of "V.R." Days. - and Beginning of "R.A.F" [/inserted]
No. 745833 Rank. SERGEANT Name. Dawson S.R.
This is to certify that the above named R.A.F. Volunteer Reservist has been issued with all Flying Kit and has been cleared of all outstanding liabilities on Posting from this School.
FLYING CLOTHING [signature]
MAPS AND PUBLICATIONS [signature]
C.F.I. [signature]
Date. 16.9.39
[underlined] DEFICIENCIES [/underlined] [blank]
Signed. [signature]
Squadron Leader,
Chief Instructor,
No. 3 ELEMENTARY FLYING TRAINING [underlined] SCHOOL. [/underlined]
[page break]
[Photograph of three RAF men in uniform]
Sgt. Pilots U/T. [Under Training] DAWSON. WILLIAMS. RAMSEY
I.T.W. HASTINGS.
SEPT 1939.
[page break]
[inserted] COME INTO THE OFFICE - H.P. HAMPDEN COCKPIT. [/inserted]
[Photograph of H.P. Hampden Cockpit]
[page break]
[Photograph of H.P. Hampden Cockpit with hand drawn diagram showing all instruments/levers etc., numbered with each item named.]
[page break]
[inserted] [two newspaper cuttings] [/inserted]
[page break]
[inserted] [two newspaper cuttings] [/inserted]
[page break]
[inserted] [one newspaper cutting] [/inserted]
[inserted] FIRST SUCCESSFUL “DROP”BY P/O GRYLLS AND SGT. DAWSON.
FEB 9th 1941
HAMPDEN AD730. No 50 SQDN
[page break]
[inserted] [two newspaper cuttings] [/inserted]
[page break]
[duplicate bookmark]
[page break]
[inserted] Air Publication 1548 THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PRISONER OF WAR [/inserted]
[page break]
[inserted] Sergeant Dawson was posted to No. 50 Squadron in December 1940. His first 14 operational flights were done as Navigator to F/O Gylls D.F.C. These two form an outstanding team. Throughout the sever winter weather conditions they attacked many highly defended targets in [deleted] fact [/deleted] the face of intence [sic] fire and searchlight[deleted]s[/deleted] defences. The could always be relied upon to attack the primary target successfully and largely due to the skill and courage of Sgt. Dawson, the safe return of the aircraft was always ensured. Sgt. Dawson continued to display the same gallantry and courage after conversion to Captain One night in June he was Captain of an aircraft detailed to attack a target in Kiel. Extremely bright donditions [sic] prevailed because of the moon and the northern lights. On the way to the target whilst crossing [deleted] the [/deleted] Denmark the aircraft was held in a cone of searchlights and attacked by 3 M.E. 110. using cannon and machine gun fire. Displaying great coolness and courage Sgt. Dawson successfully evaded the three fighter aircraft and the searchlights. He then proceeded to the target which was bombed successfully and a fire started.
Just see what you have done Steve, you clever little boy. Anyway you deserve it. [/inserted]
[inserted] RECOMMENDATION FOR D.F.M.
SEPT. 1941. {/inserted]
[page break]
[duplicate bookmark]
[page break]
GOT IT!!
H.Q No. 5 Group,
Royal Air Force,
Grantham,
Lincs.
23rd November, 1941.
Dear Dawson
I was very glad to see your Distinguished Flying Medal in the Gazette the other day. Many congratulations on a very well earned decorations [sic]. Well done.
Yours sincerely
J C Slessor
Sgt. S. R. Dawson, D.F.M.,
No. 15 B.A.T. Flight,
R.A.F. Station,
Swanton Morley.
[page break]
JOLLY FINE SHOW. WHAT!
[newspaper cutting – award of DFM]
[page break]
HOW TO SUCCEED AS AN INSTRUCTOR –
NOW 15-15 Bat Flight boys Took off upon a spree,
They taxied out and took the air And headed out to sea.
The air was still, the sun was bright So forming in a Vee
They roared along at zero feet
As happy as could be.
Now Johnson was the first to get
Just a little daring,
So diving on the leading kite
He set the pilot swearing.
Flight Sergeant Gordon found the wreck
So dived to show us whether
It could be done, he thought it could
But now he’s gone for ever.
Old Peter Woolfe at wave top height
Was banking much too steep,
His wing-tip hit the briny mass
Poor Pete’s now fast asleep.
Johnson and Smith were having fun
Flying in formation,
Their wing-tips hit and now they lie
Pending their cremation.
Flight Sergeant Dawson, D.F.M.
Was practising stall turns,
He did them good, in fact too good
For now in Hell he burns.
[page break]
- OR THE ‘BAT’ FLIGHT DITTY.
1942.
The Squadron Leader of the Flight
Turned round and flew for home,
A Boston cut across his path
And pranged him on the ‘Drome.
Now Donald Craik, a married man
Thought all the boys insane,
So working hard both day and night
Promotion quickly came.
To A.O.C. at Two Command
It came as such a blow,
So in the Auth’risation [sic] Book
Is Duty NOT C.O.
The moral of this story is
Time you must not squander,
Just stick to Beams and then it seems
You’ll be a Wing Commander.
F/LT. CRAIK AND F/SGT. JOHNSON WERE LATER KILLED IN A CRASH FOLLOWING A MID-AIR COLLISION ON THE “BEAM” IN BAD WEATHER.
IN MEMORIUM.
[page break]
JUNE – NOVEMBER 1943
[Certificate – Award of Path Finder Force Badge]
[page break]
JUNE – NOVEMBER 1943
Headquarters,
Path Finder Force,
Royal Air Force.
12th September, 1943.
To:-
Pilot Officer S.R. Dawson. (142531)
[underlined] AWARD OF PATH FINDER FORCE BADGE. [/underlined]
You have today qualified for the award of the Path Finder Force Badge and are entitled to wear the Badge as long as you remain in the Path Finder Force.
2. You will not be entitled to wear the Badge after you leave the Path Finder Force without a further written authority from me entitling you to do so.
[signature]
Air Commodore, Commanding
[underlined] Path Finder Force. [/underlined]
[page break]
“LEST WE FORGET.”
97 (Straits Settlements) Squadron,
Royal Air Force,
CONINGSBY, Lincoln.
26th July, 1944.
Dear Dawson,
Thank you for your letter enquiring about your old crew. I very much regret to inform you that the following signal has been received:-
“13/7 Telegram from IRCC quoting German information states 15/3 seven dead 1039039 F/Sgt T R Shaw 124514 F/Lt W A Meyer (DFC) 161470 P/O R C Pike (DFM) 133485 A/F/Lt B J Starie (DFC) Can/R147703 W?O2 A Mc Barrowman and two unknown. Named reclassified missing believed killed. Reclassification of the unknown pending further confirmation. Kinformed all personnel”.
It is very sad, they were such a decent bunch of fellows. We are all very proud of the wonderful job they have done.
I hope you are doing well and like your station – when will you be calling in this way? There are very few of the old Bournites left, but w ewould like to be back there.
The best of luck!
Yours sincerely,
[signature]
Flight Lieut. & Adjutant,
[underlined] No. 97 Squadron. [/underlined]
[inserted] [underlined] MY CREW. [/underlined] [/inserted]
[page break]
ANOTHER “GONG.” MORE BLURBS.
R.A.F Form 1924 [underlined] POSTAGRAM. [/underlined] Originator’s Reference Number:-
97/C.813/P.2.
To: 142531 A/F/L Dawson, S.R. DFM. DFC., Date:- 13th February 1944
Officers’ Mess, 14 OYU,
MARKET HARBOROUGH.
From: Officer Commanding No. 97 (Straits Settlements) Squadron.
Congratulations on the award of the DFC.
Originator’s Signature [signature] F/Lt. Time of Origin 10.00
[Post Office crest]
POST OFFICE TELEGRAM
[postmark]
573 4.10 HULL Q 20
FLT LT S R DAWSON OFFICERS MESS RAF
MARKETHARBRO-LEICESTER =
CONGRATULATIONS YOU CAN NOW HOLD UP YOUR HEAD =
= DICK AND LINDA +
[page break]
[watermark]
[underlined] London Gazette dated 11th February, 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Distinguished Flying Cross. [/underlined]
[underlined] Acting Flight Lieutenant Stephen Rayner DAWSON, D.F.M., [/underlined]
[underlined] (142531) R.A.F.V.R. No.97 Sqdn. [/underlined]
As pilot and captain of aircraft Flight Lieutenant
Dawson has completed numerous operations against the enemy,
in the course of which he has invariably displayed the
utmost fortitude, courage and devotion to duty.
[page break]
ANOTHER “GONG”.
[newspaper cutting re S.R. Dawson]
[page break]
MORE BLURBS.
[various newspaper cuttings re award of the DFC to S.R. Dawson]
[page break]
[newspaper cutting 9 DAYS’ DIGGING TO FIND
DUMMY 10-TON BOMB]
[page break]
THE “GRAND SLAM” OR “TALLBOY LARGE”.
MARCH 13TH 1945 AT “ASHLEY WALK” RANGE
[newspaper cutting ‘MIRACLE’ OF NEW BOMB]
[page break]
R.A.F. BOSCOMBE DOWN. A.& A.E.E.
[newspaper cutting Aeroplane and Armament Demonstration]
[page break]
BOMBING AT ‘LARKHILL RANGE’. JULY 24TH ’45.
[newspaper cutting NOVEMBER 23, 1945 599 THE AEROPLANE]
[page break]
R.A.F. BOSCOMBE DOWN. A.& A.E.E.
[newspaper cutting THE AEROPLANE 600 NOVEMBER 23, 1945]
[page break]
R.A.F. BOSCOMBE DOWN. A & A.E.E.
[inserted] [one newspaper cutting] [/inserted]
[page break]
BOMBING AT “LARKHILL RANGE”. JULY 24TH ‘45
[inserted] [one newspaper cutting] [/inserted]
[page break]
[underlined] FRIENDS [/underlined]
[inserted] [two newspaper cuttings] [/inserted]
[inserted] RAY MARLAND P.O. DAVIS RAMSEY [/inserted]
[page break]
[inserted] [two newspaper cuttings] [/inserted
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephen Dawson's memoir notebook
Description
An account of the resource
The notebook contains written accounts of 32 operations to targets in Germany, Italy and France between June and November 1943 and a list of his crew. Accounts include bomb loads and descriptions of operations including Pathfinder operations while on 97 Squadron. This is followed by Royal Air Force joining paperwork including attestation, photographs of himself and others while training. Next are photograhs and cockpit details of Hampdon aircraft as wells as newspaper articles on mine-laying and rescue operations using Lindholme gear. Included is a booklet on the responsibilities of prisoners of war. There is correspondence and other details of awards of a Distinguished Flying Medal, Distinguished flying Cross and his Pathfinder badge. There is an article on the dropping of the first Grand Slam bomb as well as an annotated article on weapons trials at the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment at Royal Air Force Boscombe Down. Also included is a poem, a letter concerning his old crew and articles about some of his friends.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Stephen Dawson
Aeroplane Magazine
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Notebook with handwritten text, newspaper cuttings, documents and b/w photographs
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Correspondence
Text. Memoir
Text. Poetry
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MDawsonSR142531-160516-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Essen
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Leverkusen
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Munich
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Friedrichshafen
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Italy
Italy--Milan
Italy--Modena
France
France--Cannes
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Trevor Hardcastle
David Bloomfield
Janice Waller
Tricia Marshall
Joy Reynard
Steve Christian
Robin Christian
97 Squadron
air sea rescue
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Grand Slam
Hampden
mine laying
Pathfinders
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Swanton Morley
searchlight
Spitfire
target indicator
training
Typhoon
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Base [underlined] Int [/underlined]
Wadd 9
Skell 10
[Indecipherable]
Base 1
minuted
V GROUP NEWS V
APRIL 1944 [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 21
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Last month I said that it was up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that we were right in our view that night bombing could be made more accurate than day bombing. During April we have gone a long way towards furnishing the proof. The concentration of bombs which was achieved during some of the attacks, notably those on the marshalling yards at La Chappelle and Juvisy, and against some of the small aircraft factories, was outstanding, and probably represents the greatest weight of bombs in a small areas which has yet been achieved in this war.
By previous standards, therefore, our results have been excellent. But there is still much more to be done before we can afford to be satisfied. We can, however, say that the system of marking, which was pioneered by W/Cdr Cheshire and 617 Squadron, has been applied with success to larger operations, including the highly successful attack on Munich. Nevertheless, in all our attacks during April we inflicted less damage than could have been caused by the weight of bombs carried, and I want crews to think carefully over the reasons which I outline below and to take note of the remedies which are being applied.
[Underlined] Communications [/underlined]
On nearly all targets a proportion of the effort was misplaced due to a failure in communications. It is recognised that the T.R. 1196 operates on an unsuitable frequency and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the wireless link which, on occasions, has proved highly satisfactory, is not well suited to the transmission of anything except short instructions in a pre-arranged code. The solution to these communication problems is the introduction of V.H.F. throughout the Group and this policy has now been approved by the Air Ministry although some little time must elapse before all squadrons are fitted. In the meantime, Wireless Operators must ensure a very high degree of efficiency in handling communications.
[Underlined] Smoke [/underlined]
The smoke given off by the bombs has, on many occasions, obscured, or partially obscured, the markers and has made bomb aiming exceedingly difficult during later stages of an attack. Delay action fuses will soon be available once more and their use on certain types of target will ensure that the aiming point is clearly visible throughout the whole run up. An additional method of avoiding the smoke nuisance by aiming off, is described below.
[Underlined] Bombing Errors [/underlined]
There is no doubt that crew bombing errors are still too large and that the pattern of bombs plotted around these precision targets bears a remarkably close relationship to the pattern of bombs plotted around the practice targets at Wainfleet. A proportion of crews obtain good results up to the performance of the sight, which is well under 100 yards. Other crews seem content with results between 200 and 300 yards and a small proportion manage to drop bombs at even greater distances from heights of 10,000 feet or below. There are many causes for these errors but all can be remedied if crews determine that every load of bombs carried out of this country shall fall fair and square on the aiming point.
In the past, the majority of errors in practice bombing have been due to wrong winds, but this source of error should be virtually eliminated by the introduction of the A.P.I. wind finding method. This method will also be used by selected crews on operations so that the bombing winds transmitted to the main force should be more accurate than in the past.
A further source of bombing error has been unserviceable instruments and many Air Bombers are still failing to take the close personal interest in their bombsight which is essential if they are to obtain good results. Although the Instrument Repairer forms the fourth member of the bombing team, it is the Air Bomber who uses the instrument and who must ensure that any difficulties, however trivial, are immediately reported so that they can be put right.
A third main source of error arises out of the manner in which the Pilot flies the aircraft. I find that a number of pilots are still attempting to turn the aircraft flat when making their final corrections during the run up and I can only say to them that such action may easily throw the bombs off by 100 or 200 yards, and that every turn, however small, must be made with the appropriate angle of bank. Far better not to turn at all at the last moment rather than risk a sked. Even a skid of 2° or 3°.
Finally there are errors due to the Air Bomber. Errors which can only be avoided by constant practice in directing the pilot over objects on the ground on every flight; by learning how to adjust in plenty of time for a drift greater or less than that set on the sight. This will become of increasing importance with the introduction of the technique described below.
The accumulative effect of all these errors results in the employment of too many aircraft on each attack, or, put another way, we knock out too few targets each night with the force available. There are many targets which could be destroyed with the effort of a single squadron if the bombing errors could be reduced to 100 yards. These are targets which, at present, have to be attacked by a Base.
I have referred above to the new technique which is being introduced for attacks against small targets on which it is essential that the whole weight of bombs should fall. In the past we have endeavoured to put a marker on the aiming point and, if there were two or more aiming points to put down two or more markers. Examples are some of the railway marshalling yards, or the dispersed hangars making up the aircraft factories at Toulouse. There are several disadvantages in this method of marking. First, the markers often fall through the roofs of buildings and are consequently difficult to see. Secondly, they may be blown out by the concentrated bombing which follows or, if not blown out, obscured by smoke.
It is now proposed that the markers shall be laid by Mosquitos on the upwind edge of the target and that the bombs shall be displaced by the simple expedient of setting a false wind vector on the sight. Recent trials at Wainfleet have shown that a displacement of 300 yards does not unduly complicate the Air Bomber’s run up. If, therefore, the target is 1000 yards long or consists of scattered buildings, one aiming point will be put down and portions of the force will be given different wind settings which will offset their bombs accurately on to the various parts of the target which it is desired to erase. By this means, the target can be scientifically covered and improved results obtained from fewer aircraft.
Success depends, however, on accurate bombing and I would again ask all crews to tackle this problem and to determine that, during May, they will not be satisfied with a bombing error, whether on the practice ranges or against small precision targets, of more than 100 yards from the aiming point or the M.P.I. if a false wind has been applied.
Nothing can more quickly bring this war to a close than the regular achievement of bombing errors of this order.
The arrival in 5 Group of Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons on attachment from P.F.F. provides the Group with the means of marking targets with great accuracy and I consequently look forward to a steady reduction throughout May in the number of aircraft which have to be detailed for the destruction of these small targets, and by this means to a steady increase in the effective aid which this Group can give in the great offensive which lies ahead.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF SERVICING
One of the major problems of the Engineering Branch is to maintain large numbers of aircraft which are of very complex design, with a limited number of tradesmen and with the use of the minimum quantity of test equipment. At the same time, the serviceability state must be high; therefore the time taken over periodical maintenance must be short and the work efficiently carried out.
Early in the war the number of really experienced tradesmen was comparatively few. All the men were exceptionally keen, and to make full use of experienced tradesmen on jobs requiring the greatest amount of skill, a reorganisation of the system of aircraft maintenance was effected.
Originally the squadrons on a station worked as independent units, each squadron being divided into two or three flights according to the number of aircraft held. Each of these flights had its own separate maintenance “set up”, with all equipment required for minor and major inspections. Each of these flights also kept its own supply of spares and tools, and minor and major inspections on aircraft were carried out by the ground crew who remained with the aircraft for all purposes including daily servicing.
This was so obviously uneconomical, not only in equipment, spares and tools, but also in the employment of skilled men and expenditure of man hours, that the new scheme was brought into force very soon after the commencement of hostilities.
The maintenance layout then consisted of the Flying Flights and a Maintenance Flight. Squadrons were still maintained as separate units, but the detailed maintenance was carried out in “M” (Maintenance Flight), i.e. minor and major inspections, acceptance checks and engine or power plant changes, whilst in the Flying Flights, daily inspections, refuelling and rectification of petty unserviceability only was necessary. The man power was of course split up accordingly, the more skilled and experienced men forming the maintenance gangs, whilst the men with less experience were employed in the flying flights.
The economy was marked and as can be visualised, only one squadron store, one pool of ground equipment for aircraft inspections and one set of test equipment for the various ancilliary trades were necessary. The economy however which made itself felt as much as anything was the saving of man-hours caused by the use of highly skilled men on detailed maintenance in the Maintenance Flight, with the result that a generally higher serviceability state was achieved.
There was a certain amount of opposition to this scheme by those who though that flights would lose their identity and spirit. This did not happen.
At a later date a further change in maintenance organisation took place. This was the formation of Station Maintenance. The resources of all squadrons on a station were pooled, and a Station Major Servicing Section was formed, catering for all major servicing work for all squadrons on the station.
These two improvements were merely forerunners of the present Base Maintenance Organisation and the advantages from the aircraft maintenance point of view are manifold.
With this scheme, squadrons do not carry out any of the detailed maintenance, this being left to the Base Major Servicing or Repair and Inspection Squadron. All tradesmen with the exception of the daily servicing squadron are controlled entirely by the Chief Technical Officer, so that by far the greatest amount of maintenance work which goes to keep the squadron at a high serviceability figure is carried out by tradesmen who, whilst working for the squadrons may not be known by members of the squadron.
It would appear therefore that those who said that we would lose the Squadron spirit etc., stood a good chance of being correct. These fears were proved groundless; the spirit has grown to embrace something which was very rare in the early days of the war. Not only have we squadron spirit which has never been as strong as it is now, but we also have pride in the station and Base achievements, and progress of the Group has naturally followed.
An extract from a letter written by a Flight Commander to the Base Maintenance Staff at his Base is typical of the spirit which exists at present. The letter refers to certain aircraft which had been modified, and brought up to operational standard in time for a specific operation, and continues:-
“It is known that in order to have these aircraft ready for operational requirements it was necessary for the staff to sacrifice much of their leisure time and to work long hours without relief.
“Occasions such as this bring forcibly to notice the excellent work being performed daily by the ground staff, and show how necessary it is for us to have their co-operation.
“We member [sic] of aircrew know that we can rely on the ground staff to help in every way possible, and we hope that we can show our appreciation by carrying out the duties in our particular sphere with the same thoroughness, perseverance, and resourcefulness which we have learned to expect from the members of ground staff.”
GARDENING
Interrogation, Easter Monday:-
“That wasn’t a U-boast, it was me – low!”.
Thus, when 5 Group staged a large scale comeback to gardening, out of six aircraft specially detailed to mine a stretch of water in the Eastern Gardens about the width of a runway, 4 (3 of 106 and 1 of 49 Squadrons) were successful despite heavy opposition, and the remaining 2 (49 Squadron) after valiant attempts, during which good use was made of firing the front guns, correctly planted in another furrow. The remaining 50 gardeners put down 244 vegetables off ports in the Gulf of Danzig. Two were missing and one returned early after jettisoning safe in the North Sea. This operation took place almost exactly on the fourth anniversary of the opening by 5 Group of Bomber Command’s mining offensive. During the four years over 30,000 vegetables have been planted, and over 1,000,000 tons of enemy shipping accounted for.
On 18/19th April, and again on 23/24th April, the approaches to Swinemunde received a total of 125 vegetables.
These attacks in the Baltic fill what was a serious gap in the mining campaign in these waters. This year intensive minelaying has been carried out by the Command to the West of Pomeranian Bay with highly successful results. One effect of this, however, was to intensify the use of mine-free waters further east as:-
(i) Training areas for all types of Warships especially U-boats.
(ii) Supply routes for vital imports and military exports to Scandinavia.
(iii) Supply routes to the North Russian front.
Press reports describe very great congestion throughout the Baltic due to closing of ports and channels; P.R.U. cover of the Western Baltic shows some of this, but was unfortunately not obtained of the 5 Group Gardens. Ground reports of sinkings are hard to come by, and take time to reach us, so for the moment we must wait for the news – which will surely come providing our mines were well and truly laid in the swept channels.
The summary of the month’s work is as follows:-
Sorties 80
Successful 77
%age successful 96.25
Mileage flown 126,880
Total vegetables planted 388
The Squadrons responsible were:- 44, 49, 57, 630, 207 and 106.
The Command effort for this month resulted in the successful planting of 2,643 vegetables in some 40 gardens ranging from South West France to the Gulf of Danzig. About half this total was planted in the Baltic, a quarter in the North Sea and the remainder in the Bay of Biscay and Channel. This is easily a record – the previous highest total for one month being 1,869, in April, 1943. A German Naval Correspondent of Transocean, states that in the Channel alone it has been necessary to treble the mine sweeping effort, but discreetly does not mention the Baltic. The problem that faces the German mine sweeping effort is to cope with a great increase in mining spread over some 2000 miles of shipping lanes. The same correspondent complains that we sometimes use 12 different types of mines necessitating the use of numbers of ships fitted with different types of sweeps to clear the same patch, [sic] of water. In fact, the number of different
(Continued in previous column)
types of mine now in use is about four times that number.
A special word of praise is due to the Armament Staffs for their complete success in the unfamiliar work of preparing and loading the vegetables. In particular, East Kirkby’s effort on the 9th April, in sending off 108 in good order, was outstanding. In some cases the weekly stock return continues to be rendered incorrectly, chiefly due to confusion about the different types sterilisers for the new and old marks of mines. The correct use of these sterilisers will literally be a matter of life and death to any of our forces who may operate in areas where we use them, and now is the time therefore, to clear up any doubts as to exactly what types are held.
Station Tracings have proved something of a stumbling block, as have some of the details required in Raid Reports. Both are designed to answer the question – “where do those mines actually fall”, using all the available evidence. Naturally the planning and success of future operations, especially the “triphibious” variety, depend to a large extent on the accuracy of this information.
5 Group News. No. 21. April, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
There has been a marked improvement in the navigation this month. Navigators are now realising how important it is to obtain constant checks on their position by intelligent use of either H2S or application of the broadcast w/v’s.
H2S navigators and bomb aimers are checking and cross checking all fixes they receive. If the navigator obtains constant D.R. positions along track, say every 15 minutes, and corrects these positions as ground speed checks are obtained, then it is impossible to obtain wrong fixes on the H 2 S. All Navigators should ensure that bomb aimers cross check every fix obtained, no matter how confident they may be. Also remember that a track made good, w/v and G/S check can be obtained from an unknown response. Very few operators make use of this.
The majority of navigators now use the broadcast w/v’s in an intelligent manner. There are a few, however, who [underlined] do not. ALL NAVIGATORS [/underlined] are to make a regular practice of obtaining a D.R. position by use of broadcast winds every 30 minutes – and do not forget to use the “Past” w/v!! If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, alter course immediately and regain track. Now that 5 Group operate alone, concentration is even more important. Station Navigation Officers must have a concentrated drive in this direction, and ensure that all H 2 S navigators are making the fullest possible use of their equipment, and also that the remainder are making full use of broadcast w/v’s, by obtaining constant D.R. positions checks on ground speed etc.
The importance of timing was discussed in last month’s “News”. We would do well however, to reconsider this subject seriously. Accurate timekeeping is more important now than ever before. The largest discrepancies in timing occur on the return journey. This is due partly to the fact that aircraft do not all bomb at the same time and therefore do not leave the target at the same time. To overcome this it may be necessary to establish a concentration point on the return journey, situated close to the target. It is obvious, however, that many navigators make no effort to achieve good timing; they merely carry on and get there “sometime or other”. There are a few pilots who consistently fly at greater speeds than those laid down, and consequently on the return journey are some 10 or 15 minutes ahead of the main force, By so doing they give the Hun a few extra minutes warning of the route home, apart from exposing themselves to individual interception. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must watch for and stem any tendency for bad time-keeping. Sufficient navigational aids are now available to ensure that you are on track and on time. Now it is up to [underlined] YOU [/underlined].
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
April has been a very good month for broadcast w/v’s, particularly since the Group began operating alone. Windfinders have been doing an excellent job. On two occasions this month more than 300 w/v’s were received from aircraft – an excellent effort. Windfinders are transmitting all the winds they obtain. If you note a sudden change in the wind direction or speed, then provided you are satisfied with the fixes used, send back [missing word] w/v immediately.
There are one or two cases, however of navigators chosen as windfinders not realising their responsibility. One navigator for instance, stated that he just couldn’t be bothered to send back w/v’s!! Another said that sufficient w/v’s were being sent back by other aircraft, so he didn’t bother either. Those few navigators who are chosen as windfinders must realise that the whole Group is navigating on the w/v’s they transmit to Base. We cannot afford to have anyone “not bothering”. So buck up chaps, the vast majority of you are doing an excellent job, but those few, who just “don’t bother” – well -- !!
Many experiments have been carried out on French targets to ascertain the most accurate and practical method of obtaining a bombing W/V, which must of course, be a w/v prevailing in the target area. The experiments have proved that the most accurate method is to use a datum point in conjunction with the A.P.I. It is hoped therefore that this method will be adopted on all future operations where practical. Any suggestions or criticisms on this subject will be welcomed.
[Underlined] ASTRO NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
It has been decided that Astro can no longer be considered as an essential aid to navigation. Much time has been devoted to teaching this subject to Navigators, but the results obtained do not justify this training. Therefore this training time is to be devoted to improving the general standard of navigation. More time is to be devoted to plotting and computing two of the weakest links in navigation at the moment.
This decision for not mean that Astro is now “dead” and can be forgotten by all., It is still a standby aid, and all navigators should keep themselves in practice. There have been isolated incidents where a Polaris shot or an Astro fix have been the means of saving an aircraft. You may find yourselves in such a predicament one night – so be ready.
All Astrographs and sextants are to be withdrawn from aircraft, but those navigators who are considered by the Station Navigation Officer as competent Astro Navigators may draw the equipment from the station stores.
[Underlined] SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS [/underlined]
(i) Many station and squadron navigation officers find it impossible to spend as much time as they would like in supervising the work of a new navigator, and teaching him all the things he should know. To overcome this [underlined] East Kirkby [/underlined] put each navigator under the care of a very experienced navigator whose responsibility it is to supervise the other at briefing, to check his log and chart the next day, and to pass on to him all useful information and “tips”. In short the senior navigator acts as a “father” to the “sprog”.
This scheme is working extremely well, and should be adopted by all squadrons.
(ii) Many navigators cannot remember to check compasses regularly. [Underlined] Dunholme [/underlined] have overcome this by marking red or green dots on the face of the Astro watch. This serves as a constant reminder to the navigator. It is recommended that compasses be checked every 20 minutes, and therefore the dots on the face of the Astro watch should be spaced accordingly.
(iii) [Underlined] Metheringham [/underlined] suggest that since Astro will no longer be used to any great extent that astrograph films should be treated and used instead of Gee charts. The procedure would be to mark on the film the lattice lines in the same way as on the Gee Charts. The film or films applicable for each night’s operation would be placed in the aircraft before take-off.
There are two great advantages:-
(a) Fixes would be plotted directly on the plotting chart, thus saving time and reducing the risk of errors.
(b) It would not be necessary to carry a large supply of Gee Charts as at present.
[Underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined]
We welcome the arrival of the 3 P.F.F. squadrons to this Group. There is no doubt that we shall be able to pick up from them many useful ideas and suggestions. These will be passed on to Squadrons as soon as possible.
It is hoped that all station navigation Officers will make a determined effort to visit these 3 squadrons whilst they are attached to the Group.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s Summary that one A.P.I. was being modified by having a “miles flown counter” fitted. This has been done & has been tested by No.617 Squadron on three 6-hour cross countries, undertaken at operational height.
The results are as follows:-
Miles flown registered on counter = 2927
Miles flown calculated by navigator = 2892
Percentage error = 1.2
These tests have proved conclusively that the over reading error in the A.P.I. is negligible.
Permission is now being obtained from Bomber Command for the fitting of the “air miles flown” counter to all A.P.I’s. The manufacturers state however, that the modification may not be retrospective.
There is still considerable difference of opinion as to the best method of using the A.P.I. One third of the Group prefer to reset, the remainder prefer the “graphical” resetting method. It is not necessary to lay down any one method of use but Station Nav Officers must ensure that all Navigators use one of the above two methods.
Station navigations officers are to discuss the use of the A.P.I. with all navigators. Any suggestions on improvements or methods of resetting etc. should be tried out immediately and if successful passed to Group Headquarters.
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Put the switch on the heading Control unit to “Manual” and by means of the setting knob adjust the line of flight marker until it corresponds to the true course as indicated by the P.4 compass. Maintain the switch on “manual” until the D.R. compass is functioning correctly, when you should switch to “Auto”.
(Continued on page 4, Column1.)
GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
(Continued from page 3 column 3)
2. To obtain ground returns, tune in brightest responses on the P.P.I. by means of brightness, contrast, gain and tuning controls. To obtain correct height set range drum at zero and adjust the range marker ring by means of the height control until it is on the first ground returns.
3. (i) Check the pinpoint yourself, visually and by the aid of D.R.
(ii) If pinpoint correct, alter course immediately to regain track by 30° if more than 10 miles off track, by 15° if less than 10 miles off track.
4. You would lose the time in hand by flying small dog legs, preferably either side of track, and of a maximum duration of 2 minutes. Dog legs to be completed before reaching a position 50 miles from the target. Navigator must use his own discretion as to the most suitable area in which to lose time.
5. (i) France (ii) Germany (French name for AACHEN) (iii) Germany (iv) Belgium (v) Czecho-Slovakia (vi) Germany (Part of Berlin).
6. Stuttgart to London.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Quinn, DFC. Sqdn Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn to Stn Nav. Officer, Skellingthorpe.
F/Lt Cunningham 50 Sqdn promoted to Sqdn Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Waterkeyn Sqdn Nav. Officer 44 Sqdn to P.F.F.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, DFM. H2S Instructor, Metheringham to Sqdn. Nav. Officer, 44 Squadron.
P/O Blackham 49 Squadron to H2S Instructor, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Bone, DFC. H2S Instructor Swinderby to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Murphy Sqdn. Nav. Officer No. 467 Sqdn. to No. 61 Squadron (with W/Cdr Doubleday)
F/O Abbott 467 Squadron promoted to Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Bonefield Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No. 9 Squadron – Missing.
F/Lt. Jones Nav. Officer, 1660 Con. Unit to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 9 Squadron.
S/Ldr. Georgeson, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer No.83. Squadron.
S/Ldr Stevens, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No.97 Squadron.
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.R. HEAD D.S.O.
[/Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. CHATTERTON D.F.C.
P/O R.T. MANNING D.F.C.
P/O J. BRADBURN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. A. WARD D.F.M.
SGT. R. MACHIN D.F.M.
SGT. R.A. FRIARS D.F.M.
P/O SANDERS D.F.C.
SGT. R.H. HUDSON D.F.M.
P/O A.W. SHINN D.F.C.
F/L. D. MILLER, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O J.E.W. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. LLOYD D.F.C.
W/CDR. A.W. HEWARD D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.S. LUDFORD D.F.C.
F/O F.A. THOMAS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. FARMILOE D.S.O.
F/O S. HALLIWELL, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O D. PAULL D.F.C.
SGT. P. MCGABNEY D.F.M.
P/O D.C. FREEMAN D.F.C.
SGT. L. CHAPMAN C.G.M.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F. GRIFFITHS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT T.W.J. HALL D.F.M.
F/O R.F. ANDERSON D.F.C.
P/O G.S. MILNE D.F.C.
F/O J.B. LATHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR. J.R. BALMER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR G.L. CHESHIRE, D.S.O. & BAR 2nd Bar to D.S.O.
S/LDR J.L. MUNRO, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/L C.K. ASTBURY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
S/LDR J.C. MCCARTHY, D.S.O. D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O W.G. BICKLEY C.G.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W. KELLAWAY, D.S.O. Bar to D.S.O.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR A.S. JOHNSON D.S.O.
The following non-immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.J. KNELL D.F.C.
F/O R.H. SMITH D.F.C.
F/L J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C.
F/O J.N.G. WYATT D.F.C.
F/SGT. K.J. DAGNALL D.F.M.
F/SGT R.N. BROWN D.F.M.
SGT. E. SULLIVAN D.F.M.
SGT. E.R. BAKER D.F.M.
F/SGT. E.G.B. COLE D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.F. PARSONS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J. MURPHY D.F.M.
F/O D.C. ARMSTRONG D.F.C.
F/SGT. A. HOLDEN D.F.M.
W/O G.A. WILKIE D.F.C.
P/O G.G. WHITEHEAD D.F.C.
F/SGT J.R. OSWICK D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. J. CHALONER D.F.M.
SGT. (NOW P/O [sic] A.E. BOASE D.F.M.
P/O H.C. DARNTON D.F.C.
P/O G. SERGEEV D.F.C.
SGT. R. JEFCOCK D.F.M.
F/SGT (NOW P/O) W.A. MOORE D.F.M.
F/L D.J. BACON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.C.B. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O E.C. WEATHERSTONE D.F.C.
P/O A. BEALE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W. FEARN D.F.C.
F/L R.V. MUNDY D.F.C.
F/L R.K. EGGINS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.H. PULLMAN D.F.C.
[/Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J. SEARS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O R.E. KNIGHTS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.C. GREENHALGH D.F.C.
S/LDR A.R. DUNN D.F.C.
F/SGT. M.D.J. PARKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT. L. BENDING D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.J. FLOWER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.O.P. BEATTY D.F.C.
P/O D.E. FREEMAN D.F.C.
P/O H. THOMAS D.F.C.
P/O L.W. MITCHELL D.F.C.
P/O C.M. LAWES D.F.C.
F/SGT. P. PULLAR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. ROBERTSON D.F.C.
P/O W.T. LOFTUS D.F.C.
P/O W. BOOTH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. R.W. JAGGS D.F.M.
F/O H. McDONALD D.F.C.
F/O C.H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O N.H. KOBELKE D.F.C.
W/O H. McCABE D.F.C.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
April has provided another milestone on our road to the fullest use being made of radiations and echoes helping to get more bombs on the target. V.H.F. R/T has been fitted to two more squadrons – W/T has provided almost 100% communication between Controllers and Main Forces – the serviceability of all Radar devices has improved.
We are grateful to all those outside the Group who have helped us so readily – particularly 92 Group and the Signals Schools with their special drive to train Wireless Operators to read morse through severe interference and to tune their W/T sets with one eye on a C.R.T.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
A hearty welcome to all those faces, both old and new, that have appeared within the Group since our last edition.
April 1944 will long be remembered in the history of 5 Group as a month of hard work, which was crowned with the success it so richly deserved. Wireless Operators (Air) played their part with the energy and determination that is always to be found when there is an extra job to be done, and a large slice of the credit for our recent achievements is due to them.
As usual, the “Back Room Boys” at stations and in our own W/T cabin at Headquarters gladly threw their weight into the fray, and we are indebted to them. Their keenness has always been an inspiration.
Several points have been brought out this month, first and foremost being the quality of morse emanating from the Controllers’ aircraft. There has been a noticeable difference between operators, which, if all past suggestions re training had been acted upon, should never re-occur.
It has been stressed time and again that ANY ONE Wireless Operator (Air) may be called upon to transmit control signals and the only way to ensure perfection is by constant practice.
In this connection, it is pointed out that the Group exercise is an ideal medium for improvement of morse (although not even a whisper of control code must be allowed to pass through the other), and during the coming month the exercise frequency will be closely watched.
Signals Leaders, get this fact thoroughly instilled into your flock – “The ultimate success or failure of future operations may depend on the ability of a Wireless Operator to send or receive signals”. Display it in your training room, convert it into morse symbols, give morse tests regularly each week for we have reached a stage in the conflict where every minute spent in training counts one hundred fold in the air.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following is a combat report from 619 Squadron for the night of 22/23 April:-
“The first indication was a contact by W/Op. on Visual Monica Mark V at 1,800 yards… E/A dropped back out of gunner’s sight and W/Op reported it 800 yards astern down… E/A broke away to starboard and disappeared from gunner’s sight, W/Op again reported E/A 1100 yards, closing slowly…E/A disappeared and was reported once again by the W/Op.”
The outcome of this combat was one JU. 88 probably destroyed. Sgt. Brady, Wireless Operator (Air) deserves the highest praise for his reporting.
You see, it can be done, and when handled in the proper manner not only SAVES YOUR AIRCRAFT but probably destroys a Hun, which reduces the total that can be put in the air against you on the following operation.
Once again, there is only one path to take to success, and that path is labelled TRAINING. Constant practice with your Early Warning devices will pay handsome dividends.
Points for Signals Leaders to include in their “daily ration” to the Section:-
(i) Spare Groups No.12 and 15 in CD.0250.
(ii) X114 and X623 are still being used by some careless operators.
(iii) Log keeping could improve (we have seen some good logs this month).
(iv) More practice – or has that been mentioned somewhere before?
F/O Cook, D.F.M., has gone to No.9 Sqdn., as Signals Leader.
F/Lts Gronow and Chambers, D.F.C. are the Signals Leaders of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons respectively, who are to be congratulated in accepting such a sudden change of procedure and dovetailing into the 5 Group system with the minimum of trouble.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
Facts and Figures about Failures
Out of a total of 2034 operational sorties during the month, 34 Signals failures were reported. Although these represent an increase over last month’s figure, this can be attributed almost entirely to the rise in Category 4 failures (miscellaneous). It is again stressed that Category 4 failures are most unsatisfactory. Most of the failures in this Category are of the type “Equipment reported u/s. O.K. on ground test. No fault found.” Every effort must be made to pin down any reported failure to some definite cause.
An investigation into failures in this Group over the past year reveals some interesting results. Apart from an unfortunate month in February, the percentage of failures shows a slight decrease over the year. This unfortunate February figure coincides with a large percentage of miscellaneous failures as well as a large percentage of T.1154/R.1155 failures. Category I (Equipment) failures show a general tendency to rise during the year. The other categories (2 and 3) have a see saw effect and no general conclusion can be made.
Intercom. failures over the year show a pronounced tendency to decrease, while T.1154/R.1155 failures show a corresponding pronounced increase. The reason for the former can be put down to the energetic drive which Signals Officers have kept up in their Squadron Maintenance Sections against this type of fault. The reason for the latter is not hard to find. During the past year the W/T installation has come into its own again and is an essential piece of equipment for the success of current operations. Whereas in the past unserviceability of the of the main W/T installation may have gone by unnoticed, now it cannot escape report.
[Underlined] THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH…. [/underlined]
Authority has finally been given for the removal of S.D.A. equipment from all Lancaster aircraft in 5 Group. This event has fortunately coincided with the partial introduction of V.H.F. (T.R.1143) installation. Command have agreed in principle that the fitting of V.H.F. is a necessity for the success of the type of operation now being undertaken by 5 Group, and every endeavour is being made to find sufficient equipment to fit all 5 Group squadrons. Careful thought has been given to the possibility of utilising the S.B.A. connectors as a small contribution to ease the very tight V.H.F. equipment production. The only small saving envisioned is the main receiver aerial and lead in; the length of the aerial will, of course, have to be shortened.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Last month saw a great improvement in the serviceability of all Radar equipment. However, before anyone relaxes and sticks his chest out, it should be remembered that the advent of warm, dry weather was a contributory cause. In addition, many sorties have been at lower altitudes than usual, which would eliminate many of those non-reproduceable faults.
(Continued on page 6, col.1)
Then and Now – and how!!
[Underlined] Then [/underlined] In Ancient times, the D.S.O.
Performed his duties staid and slow.
He did his routine work by day,
And dozed his duty nights away,
Untroubled save for threats of violence
‘Gainst those who busted wireless silence!
[Underlined] Now [/underlined] The aethor’s full of legal dope
Which we receive, (at least we hope!).
It’s also full of surplus dits
Transmitted by the brainier twits;
While brighter souls – misguided clots –
Originate redundant dots!
Amendments to a basic plan
Are never ending, and unman
The D.S.O. who, frantic, chases
Vital gen in awkward places;
And rubs – with bitter rueful tear –
His Port, or Telephonic, Ear!
Poor chap, how like a sponge his brain,
Which, like a sponge, he’ll learn to squeeze;
And fill it daily once again
With brand new gen – with practiced ease!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. APRIL, 1944. NO.21 PAGE 5.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from Page 8, col.3)
Having however, realised the existence of those contributory causes, it is possible to say that a considerable increase in serviceability was due to more efficient maintenance and manipulation. It is sincerely hoped that this improvement will continue.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 767 sorties was flown with H.2.S, with 99 defects for a serviceability rate if 87.87. This is an increase of 10% over March. With an extra effort, and the weather on our side it could be made over 90% in May.
There has been a noticeable drop in filament transformer failures, largely due to the weather and height conditions. It is not expected that we will see the end of filament transformer breakdowns until the new type is introduced. The same is true for the 2000v condensers.
The expansion of H 2 S training in Conversion Units should go a long way towards eliminating the alarming number of manipulation failures. Manipulation and maintenance failures can be eliminated by constant training.
The arrival of 83 and 97 Squadrons has given us a taste of equipment to come. These Squadrons have a few Mark III sets and every one is very pleased with their performance. To date, the serviceability of the equipment is 92.8% which is very satisfactory for a new set. In this connection a debt is owed to 8 Group for having pioneered so well and eliminated most of the teething troubles. We can now look forward to a general changeover to Mark III with confidence in our ability to maintain and use it.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond was 86% serviceable, an increase of 8% over March. This increase is of little value of W/Ops are not fully trained in the use of this equipment. The necessity for the Navigator – W/Op co-ordination cannot be overemphasised. Efforts have been made to reduce the minimum range below its present 600 – 800 yards. These have been unsuccessful, but it is believed the “back room boys” are now on the right track, so an answer should be forthcoming soon.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
As usual, Gee is top man when it comes to serviceability. In 96.5% of sorties, Gee was 100& serviceable. This reflects credit on both maintenance personnel and navigators, as it is an increase of 1.2% over last month. Gee could be made almost 100% serviceable; those last few percent are hard to get, but keep trying. The next few months of dry weather should give ample opportunity to break all records.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK IIIA [/underlined]
The expression “Ever Upwards” could be fittingly applied to Mark IIIA serviceability. This Group has watched Monica grow from an idea to a headache when the word “Switchmotor” nearly drove a Radar mechanic mad, and now to a reliable and efficient tail warning device. April serviceability was 91.6% out of 534 sorties, an increase of 1.3% on March.
An examination of combat reports provides innumerable examples of Monica’s capabilities in the hands of a trained operator. The fitting of 10 aircraft at 5 L.F.S. should relieve squadrons of a great deal of preliminary training.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK V [/underlined]
Another 5 Group “baby” (Lulu to some) is growing up, after a rather shaky beginning. Out of 299 sorties flown, 259 were trouble free for a serviceability rate of 86.7% - an increase of 5%. Now that the initial teething snags are over, it should be possible to make Mark V follow the footsteps of IIIA and push serviceability to 90%.
TACTICS
[Underlined] PRECISION ATTACKS [/underlined]
The big step made this month towards perfection of target marking, with its detailed methods of target illumination, initial marking, assessing, backing up, and controlling the force, although introducing many new ideas and problems, has brought little change in basic tactics. Indeed more attention than ever must be directed to tactics, particularly to precise orders and instructions given out for each operation. Special attention must be paid to timing and track keeping, adherence to allocated heights, compliance with instructions from the Controller and an exact knowledge of the marking method. These are dealt with separately.
[Underlined] TIMING AND TRACK KEEPING [/underlined]
The force employed on each target is now normally very much smaller than that in the past. This means that greater accuracy is needed in timing and keeping on track. It also means that if you stray a few miles off track with force of 150 aircraft or less, you are more likely to be singled out by G.C.I. than if you stray the same distance with a force of 800aircraft. Timing is vital. Only a limited number of target markers are dropped, and unless all aircraft are ready to bomb on time, these may be obscured by smoke or blown out by the bombs that drop before yours, and in any case may be difficult to locate.
[Underlined] HEIGHT BAND [/underlined]
The allocation of height bands to Bases, which means that each crew must fly at a given height, has been introduced for several reasons and entirely for your own protection. Firstly, it is intended to protect the force against a collision risk, mainly in the target area, where it may be necessary to do dog legs. Secondly, as a countermeasure against barrage flak. The Hun must now put up the same number of rounds into a very much larger area than before, thus decreasing the chance of individual aircraft being hit. Thirdly, combined with extremely accurate timing, the length of the stream can be very much shorter, and therefore less liable to interception by radio controlled fighters. To achieve the full advantage of this scheme, it must be accompanied by a drive by each Captain to make sure that Window is always thrown out correctly, particularly OVER THE TARGET AREA. If this is done, then there is no reason why crews at the lower heights need have any concern. It is, however, their duty to tighten up the normal crew search procedure and to be aware of fighters which may attack from above.
[Underlined] CONTROLLER’S INSTRUCTIONS [/underlined]
It is essential to comply strictly with the Controller’s instructions throughout the attack, and his decisions should never be questioned in the air. A wrongly timed load of incendiaries dropped whilst the Mosquitos are examining the roof tops to assess the marking, may upset the whole routine and possibly divert the main weight of the attack.
[Underlined] TARGET MARKING METHODS [/underlined]
All crews must be quite clear before leaving the briefing room of the colour of the spot-fires to be used, and the details of the controlling code. It doesn’t pay to be doubtful after you have taken off. You must be ready to carry out orders given over the target without hesitation.
(Continued in col.2)
TACTICS (Continued from Col.3)
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The fruits of good training in tail warning devices are borne out by the following Combat Report. Each month there are many similar instances of fighters which have been beaten off because the correct drill has been carried out. Each month there are also instances of fighter damage sustained, and the fighter that did it is not picked up until after the attack. It pays to practice the reporting code at least once a day!
“First indication was contact by W/Optr. on Visual Monica Mk.V, 1,800 yards, Port Quarter down. Pilot altered course and E/A followed and closed in to 800 yards. W/Optr. ordered corkscrew to Port, and at the same time E/A opened fire and scored hits on tail unit on Lancaster “G”. R/G sighted E/A at 500 yards, Port beam down 30° and opened fire. E/A fired again and missed Lancaster. W/Optr. reported E/A closing in slowly and R/G sighted it at 500 yards astern level. R/G opened fire and E/A broke away to Starboard Quarter up. Hits claimed on E/A which disappeared from Gunner’s sight. W/Optr. again reported E/A on starboard quarter up at 1,100 yards and closing slowly. Rear and Mid-Upper Gunners sighted E/A simultaneously at 500 yards, Starboard Quarter level. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits on E/A which broke away at 300 yards, diving to Port Quarter down with smoke pouring from both engines.”
The Station Commander’s comments are self-explanatory: “I consider that Mark V Monica saved this crew. The Wireless Operator’s commentary was excellent, and the crew co-operation of a very high standard.”
FLYING CONTROL (Continued from page 15)
play a part in the final choice. From the condition of the airfield right down to such small items as the cleanliness of the flare path party room will be reviewed, so if you want to top the bill S.F.C.O’s, start cracking the whip NOW.
[Underlined] BLIND LANDING EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
It has been decided by this Group to remove all S.B.A. equipment from operational aircraft and it is hoped that in the not too distant future other and better means will be introduced. The first piece of equipment which we hope to get is a P.P.I. which will be installed in the watch tower and on which will be indicated the positions of all aircraft in the circuit.
Other equipment such as Radar Landing Beam, coupled with a Radar G.P.I. Radar Homing Beacons will all follow in due course. These will naturally give Flying Control Officers more work and more responsibilities but with the increased safety of aircraft this work and the short training required will be well repaid.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
April has been a most satisfying month for the bombing crews of 5 Group. Numerous precision attacks have been carried out with a great measure of success. The front pages of the Daily Press made public the achievements of 5 Group when they printed the after-bombing photographs of the marshalling yards at JUVISY, South of Paris. Equal success rewarded the attacks at TOURS and LA CHAPPELLE. The raid on MUNICH was successful, and a fair measure of success resulted from the attacks on BRUNSWICK and SCHWEINFURT. Finally, further small factories near OSLO, BORDEAUX and CLERMONT FERRAND are now devastated.
[Underlined] HOW HAS ALL THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? [/underlined]
Firstly, of course, most credit is due to the marking success of 54 Base. The next main contribution to the Group’s success has been the intense practice bombing carried out by the squadrons for the last year.
Owing to the very limited time available for bombing training at Conversion Units the final co-ordination of the bombing team has to be carried out on the squadrons. Much credit is due to the Conversion Units for their efforts, and particular praise is due to the Lancaster Finishing School who have elevated the importance of crew practice bombing to the extent of averaging between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in all bombing exercises over the last three months!!!
However, the crews are inexperienced with both aircraft and bombsight on arrival in the squadrons and intensive training is essential to bring them into line with the precision our operations require.
[Underlined] THE MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT [/underlined]
This bombsight has proved its worth. Although it is by no means a perfect sight, it is true that provided it is expertly maintained by the Instrument Sections and carefully handled by the Air Bombers, it can put bomb loads on to a target.
Air Bombers should make sure that their bombsights [underlined] are [/underlined] serviceable. It is the most important individual item of equipment that your aircraft carried, and as such should be the most carefully maintained. Its best test is on the practice bombing range – 6 bombs aimed accurately on different headings should produce a CLOSE GROUP. If not, then SOMETHING is wrong – report it to the instrument section – help them to find out what is wrong and then test it again. It may not always be possible to get this test exercise in the air – if not you must do the next best – carry out the exhaustive N.F.T. check.
In every P.R.U. picture there are sticks off the main concentration – it is almost certain that these sticks are wide because they were aimed with an unserviceable bombsight – are they yours? Were you absolutely certain that on Juvisy, La Chappelle, Tours, Brunswick, Munich or Schweinfurt, your bombsight was functioning correctly – when did you last do practice bombing with it – did you give is a thorough check during your N.F.T. or Ground Check? Did you??
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined]
O.R.S. at Bomber Command have conducted a painstaking analysis of 5 Group’s practice and operational bombing. They report that
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING [/underlined]
(ERRORS IN YARDS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training achievements by Squadron and Conversion Units]
[Underlined] THE BEST RESULTS FOR APRIL. [/underlined]
In previous months all crew errors at 20,000 ft. of less than 150 yards were listed in this column However, in April [underlined] 103 [/underlined] such results were obtained and it is therefore impossible to record them all. The crew errors of less than 100 yards are shown this month but it is confidently expected that in future space will only permit inclusion of results of less than 75 yards. It is possible – the list below proves it – therefore it must be done!!!
Squadron or Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 ft
9 S/Ldr. Keir F/Sgt. Coates P/O. Lewis 54 yards
44 F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 99 yards
49 F/Lt. Adams F/Sgt. Underwood S/Ldr. Evans 84 yards
F/O. Edwards F/O W. Smith F/Sgt. Cavanagh 83 yards
50 P/O. Lundy F/O. Bignall F/Sgt. Jordan 90 yards
P/O. McFarlin Sgt. Ball Sgt. Elliott 75 yards
F/O. Botha Sgt. Thompson F/O. Bishton 95 yards
S/Ldr. McLeod Sgt. Price F/Lt. Cunningham 80 yards
61 P/O. Ascott F/Sgt. May F/O. Ward 98 yards
F/O. Jeavons Sgt. Graham F/Sgt. Dow 93 yards
F/O. Paul P/O. Cook P/O. Griffin 40 yards
W/Cdr. Stidolph F/O. Aley F/O. Dyer 71 yards
F/Sgt. Woolnough F/O. Ravenscroft F/O. Haggerstone 71 yards
467 F/Lt. Marshall F/Sgt. Borman F/O. Easton 96 yards
619 P/O. Roberts F/Sgt. DeViell F/Sgt. Lott 43 yards
P/O. Saunders F/O. Rosenfield F/Sgt. Greacen 84 yards
630 F/Lt. Roberts F/Sgt. Jeffery F/Sgt. Davies 75 yards
S/Ldr. Calvert F/Sgt. Hogg F/O. Beaudoin 95 yards
Sgt. Mallinson Sgt. Pomeroy Sgt. Nassau 73 yards
F/O. Joblin F/O. Beeson F/O. Lambton 80 yards
1654 F/O. McLaughlan Sgt. Leeson F/O. Phillips 90 yards
F/Sgt. Pethick Sgt. Wallace F/O. Baldwin 82 yards
P/O. Richards Sgt. Buckby Sgt. Fazackerley 93 yards
F/O. Long F/O. De Sautels Sgt. Thomas 88 yards
1661 Sgt. Marsh Sgt. Carr ? ? 98 yards
5 LFS F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 98 yards
617 F/O. Knights F/Sgt. Bell ) The best two 49 yards
S/Ldr. Munro F/Lt. Astbury ) exercises 53 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
APRIL has produced the first maximum entry for the Competition since its inception in June, 1943. Some excellent results have been submitted and hearty congratulations are due to 61 Squadron for their outstanding exercises. The results are as follows:-
PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS
1st 61 Squadron – 55 Yards 1st 50 Squadron – 59 Yards.
2nd 619 Squadron – 63 Yards 2nd 61 Squadron – 84 Yards.
3rd 49 Squadron – 71 Yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 96 Yards.
4th 50 Squadron – 80 Yards 4th 630 Squadron – 98 Yards
5th 44 Squadron – 81 Yards 5th 463 Squadron – 111 Yards.
6th (630 Squadron – 90 Yards 6th 44 Squadron – 125 Yards.
(106 Squadron – 90 Yards 7th 57 Squadron – 136 Yards.
8th 207 Squadron - 101 Yards 8th 467 Squadron – 141 Yards.
9th 9 Squadron – 112 Yards 9th 49 Squadron – 152 Yards.
10th 463 Squadron – 116 Yards 10th 106 Squadron – 163 Yards.
11th 467 Squadron – 125 Yards 11th 9 Squadron – 167 Yards.
12th 57 Squadron – 135 Yards 12th 207 Squadron – 188 Yards.
Group Captain Butler (R.A.F. Dunholme Lodge) produced a token cup to celebrate 44 Squadron’s victory in March. It is hoped that 44 will pass on the token to 61 Squadron.
It is noteworthy that the three Squadrons of 52 Base are all in the first five.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Only two entries were received this month:-
1st F/Lt. FARARA (630 Sqdn) – 85 yds.
2nd F/Lt. McDONALD (61 Sqdn) – 160 yds.
Congratulations F/Lt. Farara!!
(Continued from Page [sic]
our errors on both are similar – that means that 5 Group Bombing Teams achieve substantially the same results on German targets that they obtain at Wainfleet, Epperstone, Owthorpe and Bassingham Ranges, therefore, it merely remains to improve our results on the “home” ranges in order to obtain more hits on the “away” targets.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 106 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Wake DFC) reports that their descent from top position in the Bombing Competition is only temporary and is due to their best crews finishing about the same time. Other Squadrons are warned that 106 intend to be back at the top by the end of May.
[Underlined] 44 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Lowry) have constructed an effective Mk.XIV mock-up as follows:-
1. No suction used – Gyros are counter-balanced in Sighting Head and Computor.
2. All electric motor is used to obtain pressure.
3 Airspeed and Height operation is obtained by connecting two external sylphan tubes to the static and pitot heads of Computor Unit. Attached to sylphan tubes are adjustable thumb screws to enable airspeed and height indicators to be carried throughout their range.
This go ahead Bombing Section have also introduced the use of Navigator’s Log Books (an idea borrowed from 5 L.F.S Syerston) in which are posted all permanent information such as Bomb T.V’s Conversion of True to Indicated Wind speed tables, etc. and is also used to carry target maps and operational bomb load instructions.
[Underlined] 1661 Con. Unit. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Brewer, DFC.) have completed the installation of Mk. XIV bombsight complete, in the A.M.B.T. A really first-class job by all concerned!!!
[Underlined] 61 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. MacDonald) Competition winners for April, report that W/Cdr. STIDOLPH and crew set the pace with a Crew Error of 71 yds. This aroused competitive spirit to a marked degree in the Squadron. The following result was obtained:-
Crew Error ar 20,000 ft. – 40 yards
Navigator’s Error – 25 yards
Pilot & Air Bomber’s Error – 37 yards
The crew were:- Pilot – F/O PAUL
Air Bomber – P/O COOK
Navigator – P/O GRIFFIN
[Underlined] 9 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DFC.) reports the following excellent method of plotting crater positions from night photographs.
Plot the centre of the photograph on tracing paper pinned on to the target illustration. Mark the heading accurately from the compass rose on the tracing. Calculate distance between centre of the bombing photograph and centre of bomb craters commencing with position of bomb and flash release. The distance from this position to the centre of the photograph is the ground speed of the aircraft in feet per second multiplied by the flash setting; a deduction being allowed for the 5° aft tilt of the camera.
Forward travel of the bombs can be noted in A.P.1730A.Vol.1. to which must be added or subtracted the distance due to the wind component.
Plot this distance forward along track on the tracing paper and the approximate position of the centre of the stick is recorded. The stick length is known and should be drawn to scale. This method if accurate provided that:-
(i) the aircraft maintains heading and attitude from bomb release to explosion of flash (this can be checked by study of pre-bombing frames on the film)
(ii) There is only a small error due to cross trail - allowance can be made for this if necessary.
9 Squadron have found that their plots using this method are accurate to within 100 yards by subsequent comparisons with P.R.U. photographs.
[Underlined] 617 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/L Astbury, D.F.C) reports the following outstanding exercise:-
F/L Clayton, Pilot, F/O Watson, Air Bomber, carried out an application exercise from 20,000 ft. And averaged 73 yards. Two of the six bombs were DIRECT HITS!!
[Underlined] “G”N” [sic] FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
(I) [Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] – plotted 5,492 bombs aimed by 1,044 aircraft during April. Thus in one month 28 tons of practice bombs have been dropped at this range.
(ii) [Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] – plotted 990 bombs aimed by 200 aircraft.
(iii) [Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] – plotted 916 bombs aimed by 147 aircraft.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. What would happen to the Mk. XIV Bombsight if the Port Inner engine had to be feathered?
2. How would you use the Quadrant Plate and Pointer at 13,000 feet?
3. How could you jettison a load of incendiaries “SAFE” with reasonable certainty?
4. If the Pilot operated the Jettison toggle what would happen to your Jettison bars and what extra action is necessary to put them back to “SAFE”?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Abbott [/underlined] is now Bombing Leader at 49 Squadron. It is noted that 49 moved from hitherto unplaced position in the Competition up to [underlined] 3rd [/underlined] in April.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Stoney, DFC. [/underlined] (1660 Con.Unit) has moved to 97 Squadron for his 2nd tour of operations. Good Luck!
[Underlined] F/O Lowans, DFM. [/underlined] has moved from 49 Squadron to 54 Base where he is attached for Bombing Leader duties.
[Underlined] F/O Tibbs (207 Squadron) [/underlined] obtained “B” category on No. 79 Bombing Leaders Course.
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (619 Squadron) [/underlined] and F/O Martins (106 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on No. 80 Course.
[Underlined] P/O Ball, DFM. (1660 Con. Unit) [/underlined] has been attached to Headquarters, Bomber Command for Bombing Analysis duties.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place in H2S training during the month, the most notable being:-
(i) H2S training has been expanded at the Conversion Units to cover 12 crews per course, to meet increased demands of the squadrons.
(ii) To standardise training throughout the Group, a Ground Training Syllabus has been issued outlining the minimum amount of ground training to be carried out by H2S crews, whether trained on squadrons or Conversion Units.
(iii) Greater emphasis is being placed on the Navigational aspect of H2S to increase further the reliability of fixes and winds obtained.
A concentrated drive is being made by all Instructors to improve D.R. navigation by H2S, to ensure that failures due to lack of confidence and inability to interpret the P.P.I. are things of the past. The tendency to slur over H2S navigation must be overcome as a successful H2S bombing run is largely dependent on a correct navigational approach to the target. This does not mean however that blind bombing is to be relegated to a mere fraction of the training time; on the contrary a large part of training can be devoted to blind bombing technique when crews are able to navigate accurately by H2S and ensure that the target is reached at the correct time.
Manipulation failures still continue to be reported and every effort must be made by operators to prevent such failures being attributed to their neglect. Now that the Air Bomber is required to sit in the navigator’s compartment and manipulate the H2S equipment, manipulation failures should be on the downward path. Two heads are usually better than one and with the list of H2S faults and remedies, one of them should at least have some knowledge of the symptoms and their correction. The impression conveyed is that many of these manipulation failures are due to lack of understanding of the equipment. The Technical Radar Officer is always willing to part with “gen” providing questions are asked. Don’t be afraid to worry these officers because in the long run by asking questions about your equipment you are probably saving their time and yours.
Leica cameras are now being used to photograph the P.P.I. on training flights and several remarkable prints have been obtained. particularly [sic] on Edinburgh and London. Two squadrons are now equipped and it is eventually hoped to obtain further cameras for the remainder. With the advent of P.P.I. photography blind bombing can be carried out irrespective of cloud cover and accurate results obtained. Much information can also be obtained on the definition of built up areas and it is hoped eventually to relate individual bright responses with definite structures in these built up areas. It is therefore essential that the camera operator fills in the photographic interrogation report in a concise and accurate manner, enabling much valuable information to be obtained for use of H2S crews on future operations.
The results of the blind bombing competition have now been received and are published below. All crews who participated are to be congratulated on the excellent results obtained.
[Underlined] Final Order Captain Squadron Av. Error. in miles. [/underlined]
1 P/O Rogers 630 .33
2 F/S Canever 57 .38
3 P/O Manning 44 .42
4 F/L Smith 57 .46
5 P/O Ross 57 .46
6 P/O Higgs 44 .48
7 F/O Bayley 57 .49
8 F/L Healy, DFC. 49 .60
9 F/O Penman 106 .64
10 P/O Shinn 49 .65
11 P/O Jones, J. 49 .66
12 F/O Thomas 57 .87
13 F/L Kellaway, DSO. 630 1.12
14 F/L Roberts, DFC. 630 1.15
One point arising out of blind bombing on H2S which has been noticeable on operations during the last month is that many H2S operators who claim to mark blind are unduly influenced by the markers showing a lack of faith in the instrument. Complete confidence can only be built up by sufficient training in which advantageous use should be made of the synthetic trainer.
Talking about synthetic trainers, East Kirkby have introduced a modification to the trainer which gives correct crystal current movement and a tuning position, thus enabling operators to practice manipulation on the trainer. It is hoped to introduce this modification to other trainers in the Group as soon as the technical details are settled.
This month we welcome 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons into the Group. They have brought with them new equipment and methods and it is felt that as pioneers in H2S much can be learnt from them. It is hoped that all H2S Instructors will take the opportunity of visiting these squadrons and utilising the information gained to the benefit of their respective units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee range has improved considerably during the month and many navigators obtained fixes over targets attacked. However, there is still a tendency to neglect Gee when jamming appears.
Some navigators had opportunities of using the new North Eastern chain this month with gratifying results, many fixes being obtained further than 8° East, and off chart coverage. Providing navigators continue to give reports on the reception they receive outside the limits of the present lattice charts, something can be done to produce additional charts.
Coding has not caused any confusion, and the blinking of the “A” pulse appears to have been a success. There is one point, however, which must be borne in mind by all navigators and wireless operators regarding the use of coding in distress signals. All fixes passed for transmission during distress procedure must give the true lattice line values and therefore the coding figures must be deducted by the navigator from the indicator readings prior to passing the fix to the Wireless Operator. Watch this or you will be plotted miles away from your true position.
Manipulation failures are still too high and these can be overcome only by constant practice in setting up and correction of faults. Many navigators to whom manipulations faults have been attributed are still changing over alternator plugs with the set switched on resulting in fuses being blown. When changing the R. F. Units or alternator plugs, Gee must be switched OFF.
The following is an extract from a report on Gee which should be of interest to all navigators:-
“There seems to be a popular idea with navigators that XF’s necessarily give extra range. This is based on the fact that when they were first introduced, they gave extra ranges before the enemy had time to organise counter measures. The main advantage of XF’s is not to give extra range but to make the enemy spread his jamming over more than one frequency, tending to make it less intense on any one frequency”
Another point is that many navigators are using stud settings and RF Units which have not been detailed for the operation in question. There is even a case this month of a navigator using a chain which was not detailed, and he claimed far greater range though admitted the fixes were unpotable.
(Continued on page 14, col.2)
Link Trainer
The nil returns for 630, 617 and 627, and the very low return for 57 Squadron were due to the absence of Link Trainers at East Kirkby and Woodhall. Machines were, however, installed at these Stations at the end of the month and it is hoped these Squadrons will make up the deficiency by an increased effort next month. A revised Link Trainer Syllabus is being drafted and should be available to Units by the middle of the coming month. The amount of Link done on the squadrons still warrants improvement and it is hoped that the new Syllabus will assist in this.
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron and Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoons]
April, and the first few days of May, saw the last of the two Group Competitions – the Lancaster Seven-a-Side Rugger Trophy, and the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] The Lancaster Seven-a-Side Competition [/underlined] has had a very mixed reception. Although designed on a Group inter-squadron basis, to include every crew in each Squadron, and having a system of points that favoured squadrons fielding the greatest number of teams, no squadron outside 53 Base even began the competition. But within 53 Base it was an amazing success. 86 teams took part, and the resulting increase in fitness, and the keenness that developed, fully repaid the efforts of A/Cdre. Hesketh who originated the competition. Next season this is going to be one of the Rugger high-lights, with a smashing Boxing Day final meeting of all the squadron finalists, followed by “noggins for all” round “Ye Olde Yule Logge”.
[Underlined] The Matz Soccer Cup. [/underlined] Coningsby crowned a successful soccer season by beating Winthorpe 2 – 0 in the Matz final on the Lincoln City ground on 6th May. In their semi-final game, Coningsby met the Group “giants” – Scampton – at Waddington, and emerged successfully after a terrific duel. Winthorpe had to play three games with Metheringham before they got to the semi-final stage. Then they defeated Skellingthorpe 3 – 2, after being 2 goals down with only twenty minutes to go. The final was worthy of the competition, and produced a clean, hard fought duel, perfectly even in the first half, but with the Coningsby forwards more dangerous than their opposites in the second. Winthorpe goalie and backs are to be congratulated on their fight, they certainly kept the flag flying. Coningsby’s first goal came from a penalty, their second from a beautifully placed header into the corner of the net in classic “corner kick” style. Coningsby were minus their professional left winger, Colinridge, but his successor ably filled the bill, and the forwards were presented with many openings by a clever half back division. After the game, Mrs. Cochrane presented the cup in the stand, and the A.O.C., who had been a delighted spectator, congratulated the teams in the dressing rooms on their splendid show. Later the teams had tea together in Lincoln, and later again the Cup was christened with the traditional quart of “old and mild”, we hope.
[Underlined] The Wines Rugger Trophy. [/underlined] Dunholme are hot on the scent of this “pot”, and it will take a good side to stop them. Winthorpe are in the remaining semi-final with Waddington. It is proposed to polish off the semi-final and the final before the 14th, leaving King Willow in peaceful possession.
[Underlined] 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. [/underlined] East Kirkby reached the final by beating the redoubtable Swinderby on their own ground. It now remains for Metheringham to play Waddington and the winner to meet Scampton, to provide the other finalist. This competition must be polished off quickly, before hardening grounds make the ball a little too lively for all but the steel shinned types. This new competition has proved very successful and should provide a most interesting final.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played eight Station matches, during the month, of which they lost only one, 2 – 1 to R.A.F. Ingham. In the semi-final replay of the Lincoln and District Amateur Cup they defeated R.A.F. Wickenby 3 – 0. In the final with Lincoln Rovers on City ground they played magnificently for a 5 – 4 victory, finishing the game with only nine men. Now they are all out for the Lincoln and District League Championship. They have had a most brilliant season.
DUNHOLME had six games, of which they won four. Their two losses were to Scampton – 1 – 5, and to Headquarters 5 Group 3 – 4. Eight inter-section games were played off.
FISKERTON laid out two soccer pitches during the month and gained a considerable impetus in ensuing activity. The station team won its last three Lincoln League games. A combined league and knock-out competition is running with eleven teams competing. 49 Squadron has three teams entered. Two games per day is common; B.A.T. Flight v Echelon have already fought three pointless duels, playing extra time in the last two games. Which shows what a new pitch can do.
BARDNEY have a very strong team, and won six out of their seven April games, including Coningsby and Skellingthorpe, Matz winners and semi-finalists, among their victims. They challenge all comers to do battle! and they are keen, they even cycled to a match – and won!!
METHERINGHAM were unlucky in having three station games cancelled. They played three losing to Digby and 373 Battery, Woodhall, but beating Woodhall Spa 5 – 2. Inter-section fixtures (league and knock-out) produced 14 games, Squadron Armoury, the League champs, being knocked out by R.A.F. Regiment.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is building up steadily, the laying out of a pitch having provided a much needed stimulus. After winning the opening game against Wigsley, 3 – 1, on the new pitch, the Group lost to Skellingthorpe away. Six games yielded four wins, a draw with 93 M.U. the old rivals, and one defeat. In early May, there was much creaking of joints when an officer’s team emerged minus winter woollies and held the Group side to a mere 3 – 1 triumph.
RUGBY
DUNHOLME, finalists in the Wines Trophy, have a powerful side. They defeated Swinderby 8 – 0 in the Wines’ second round, defeated 2 A.A. Command School both away and at home, and Scampton 7 – 6 on the latter’s ground. They are all out for the Wines Trophy and beat Fiskerton 27 – 0 in the semi-final.
METHERINGHAM with a greatly improved side held Waddington to a 9 – 0 victory, and win one and lost one with R.A.F. Digby.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON certainly got in plenty of practice, with eight April games. They won five, knocking Syerston out of the Group Trophy, their victories also included Ingham, Faldingworth and 5 Group. They are in a strong position for the Trophy competition.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is most active. Through the generosity of Swinderby they hold “home” games there pending completion of their Morton Hall pitch. During April they played six games winning two, with one draw. East Kirkby proved their downfall in the Group Trophy. A friendly three game duel with Swinderby has produced one win each and one draw. It is hoped to continue hockey, even if only in inter-section “sixes” throughout the summer.
[Underlined] GENERAL JOTTINGS. [/underlined]
SOFT-BALL 0 Fiskerton have a team in the Lincoln area league. Metheringham are also running a team, playing in a Digby League. 5 Group H.Q. have a willing, if unskilled, nucleus who like to “play ball”. There should be some scope for friendly games within the Group.
TENNIS and BOWLING – Bardney and Metheringham are lucky in having village facilities available, and the games are in full swing.
CYCLING is popular in Bardney. The tough kind with a “cow’s horn” handlebar and a “tail up” racing crouch. Any ex “roadmen” are welcomed to compete in a friendly “25”. A perimeter track is the proposed venue.
CRICKET – The great concern of every captain’s heart is the pitch. The sacred sward where worms and birds both “fear to tread” is THE FOCUS OF ALL CRICKETERS THOUGHTS. May we remind stations that it will be appreciated if they will keep to the date schedule of the Group competition, and not insist on a too Velvet like patch before playing their first round.
WAR SAVINGS
FISKERTON are to be congratulated on another fine effort in National Savings this month. Last month’s increase of 143% to £884 has again been increased by 34% to £1185.
FISKERTON will doubtless be only too pleased to pass on details of their fruitful methods to other Stations – if only to get a bit of competition!!
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) Percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTALS 6309.13.4.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RECORD [/underlined]
The month of April showed a welcome drop in the number of accidents in the Group compared with March, but though there was a large increase in total flying hours, this accident rate did not improve in the same ratio, and is still well below the Group’s best standards.
In all 40 aircraft were damaged during the month, 19 of which were classed as “avoidables”. The remainder were classed as technical failures or obscure. The total of “avoidables” may be subject to alteration as one or two accidents occurring at the end of the month have not been fully investigated and are not included. At the moment they appear to be technical failures or entirely obscure.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE [/underlined]
The details of the avoidable accidents are as follows:-
Ground collision (including taxying) – 6
Swings … 2
Heavy landings …2
Low flying … 2
Overshoots landing … 2
Mid air collisions … 2
Errors of judgement landing … 1
Other errors of judgement … 2
TOTAL … 19
51 Base accounted for 11 and Squadrons 8.
[Underlined] M.T. COLLISIONS & TAXYING [/underlined]
There were again two M.T. accidents this month. In spite of strenuous efforts to stamp out this type of accident it still recurs. Next month [underlined] MUST [/underlined] be “M.T. Accident Free”.
Of the taxying accidents two occurred at night and two during the day. One of the “night” accidents was caused primarily by the pilot neglecting to use an Aldis lamp or taxying light. He struck an obstruction just off the dispersal lead in. In this instance his Flight Engineer was aware of the obstruction but did not warn his captain. Both log books were endorsed in RED.
A Lancaster pilot had just landed landed [sic] and was proceeding round the perimeter, when he told his Engineer to cut the outer engines. The Flight Engineer did so, but opened the starboard outer throttle fully before the propeller stopped turning. The engine roared into life and swung the aircraft off the perimeter. Again, the log books of both pilot and F/E were endorsed in RED.
[Underlined] SWINGS AND HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
Both Swings this month were on take off – one Stirling and one Lancaster.
In the Stirling the pupil pilot swung off the runway, throttled back completely as per drill, but did not stop before his aircraft struck another in dispersal.
The Lancaster pilot ignored all he had ever been told about take-off procedure, handed over his throttles too soon to the Flight Engineer, swung to port at “full power”, over-corrected and broke his undercarriage on a final swing to starboard. His bomb load exploded. Luckily the crew got clear before this happened.
This pilot made another mistake in running up to +4 lbs, 2650 revs. against the brakes.
Heavy landings were of the usual pattern. One occurred at Conversion Unit in unfavourable weather conditions. The other was the result of a Lancaster pilot levelling off too high and not using the engine to correct.
[Underlined] MID-AIR COLLISIONS [/underlined]
There have been four mid-air collisions in the Group in recent months – two in April. There are so many aircraft over this country both by day and night that crews must keep absolutely on their toes at all times. We hear reports of “narrow squeaks” almost every
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash, the immaculate W.A.A.F’s … “and I’d have been all right if that Stirling hadn’t backed into me”
day. The answer, of course, is to maintain a thorough look-out.
Don’t ignore the new “look-out” drill which was sent out this month. There should be no tendency to relax when an aircraft comes back into the circuit after an Op. or any other flight. The danger of collision is always present, and as the pilot is necessarily busy with his cockpit drills, it is up to the rest of the crew, especially gunners, to ensure the safety of the aircraft by keeping up a search and warning the captain of other aircraft.
[Underlined] OTHER INCIDENTS [/underlined]
A pupil pilot in a Stirling was out of line with the runway at 500’ on a good clear night. He landed anyway, off the runway, and knocked over the wind sock.
An Instructor in a Lancaster in showery weather, also found himself out of line with the runway. Instead of going round again he landed off the runway. His speed was excessive and he overshot. A deliberate ground loop placed the aircraft – CAT AC.
A Conversion Unit Mid-Upper Gunner was unloading his guns after a flight. One went off and fired a round into the “fin”. The fin had to be replaced. Gunners! make sure your guns are on “Safe” – all of them.
One Lancaster crashed this month in obscure circumstances. The aircraft was seen coming out of cloud in a high power dive. The tail fell off and then the aircraft broke up. The suggestion at the moment is that the pilot lost control in daylight in cumulo-nimbus cloud. The Accidents Investigation Branch may produce further evidence.
Further proof of the merits of the Lancaster came out this month. An aircraft returned on two engines after being badly shot up. On making an approach at a strange airfield, the pilot could not get his wheels down and went round again from a low height. Unfortunately on his second attempt the pilot overshot on a short flarepath and crashed.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Milne of 50 Squadron displayed exceptional airmanship, and also proved that the Lancaster can be flown on two engines even with a load. He lost both starboard engines while outward bound on ops., at 3,000 feet. Forced to return to Base, he jettisoned the fuel from the inboard tanks and effected a perfect approach and landing still carrying full bomb load.
F/Sgt Young, a pupil at 5 L.F.S., put up a good show which also reflects credit on his Instructor. Shortly after take-off on his first solo in a Lancaster, the starboard tyre burst. F/S. Young was diverted to Woodbridge where he made a successful landing without causing any further damage to the aircraft.
F/Sgt. White and F/Sgt Millikan, the Navigator and Air Bomber of a crew under training at Conversion Unit, set an example which would have done credit to an experienced crew. While on a high level cross country flight, their pilot passed out through lack of oxygen and lost control of the aircraft. F/Sgt Millikan regained control of the Stirling and under the direction of F/Sgt White who assumed the responsibility of captain, they flew the aircraft for 1 1/2 hours back to Base when the pilot had recovered sufficiently to land the aircraft.
The “Plumbers Union” have also distinguished themselves. F/Sgt Gledhill, a Staff Engineer of 1660 Conversion Unit, was a member of a crew of a Stirling. While the aircraft was taxying to dispersal, the port inner caught fire. The Graviner had no effect, and F/Sgt Gledhill promptly removed the engine cowling and extinguished the fire with a hand extinguisher, saving the aircraft from much more serious damage.
(Continued on page 12, col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING [/underlined]
F/Lt. Lucas of Flying Training Command visited the Group during April to advise on the subject of Clay Pigeon Shooting, this Officer is stationed at 54 Group Headquarters, and is responsible for Clay Pigeon Shooting in the I.T.W’s. It was obvious that we are getting little if any training value out of clay pigeon shooting at present, due to the lack of proper ranges and the fact that very few Gunnery Leaders have ever had instruction in the art.
A trap house was constructed at Waddington from sandbags, and seven firing points laid out; this work was done in two days. The lay-out in use at I.T.W’s has two trap houses, but this was not considered necessary for our purpose. A request has been made for an officer from Flying Training Command to be attached to the Group to give advice and instruction to all stations, and the possibility of constructing a sandbag trap house on each station is under consideration. A demonstration of the lay-out at Waddington, makes it obvious that clay pigeon shooting must be done on a properly constructed range under the supervision of an instructor; under these conditions it is an excellent quickening exercise and when gunners are proficient in hitting clays, they have confidence in themselves.
[Underlined] .5 UNDER DEFENCE GUN. [/underlined]
Six squadrons have aircraft fitted with this gun and squadrons have been asked for opinions on the value of the gun on operations, and if H 2 S is preferred to the gun, as the aircraft can obviously only have one or the other. Opinions given to date are not very favourable as several snags have been encountered during the trials carried out so far. With the gunner strapped in his seat it is difficult to follow the gun round on the beam; it is difficult for the gunner to get his head down behind the sight as it tends to push the oxygen mask upwards on the gunners face; and also considerable vibration is experienced on the sight when the gun is fired.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Combats for April numbered 81, resulting in 5 enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed, 1 as probably destroyed and 7 damaged. The maximum number for any one operation was 24 and this was on the 22/23rd April on Brunswick five claims being made on that night; 1 destroyed, 1 probable and 2 damaged. Combats on French targets were few, but these sorites are not to be treated lightly by air gunners and the most vigilant search is to be maintained at all times. Squadrons must include instruction on search during night vision training. Search from the rear turret is difficult as it entails the rear gunner standing or crouching in a most uncomfortable position for short periods to enable him to see below and astern; this must be carried out as the view below is very poor when the gunner is in the seat.
[Underlined] SELF TOWED DROGUES [/underlined]
This practice has not been carried out on the scale it was hoped for, due to a variety of reasons, the main one being the shortage of brackets for attachment to the aircraft. Some Stations have had difficulty in obtaining the material for the manufacture of these items and snags have been met in obtaining the quick release unit. Gunnery Leaders should press for this equipment to enable a consensus of opinion to be obtained on the value of the exercise. Self tow at night with the drogue illuminated is the best step and should present no difficulties when Squadrons are satisfied that the existing equipment is satisfactory.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO. 77 COURSE. [/underlined]
F/O Wyand – 9 Sqdn. – 83.8% - Cat. “B”.
F/O Fisher – 1660 C.U. – 77.8% - Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 14. [/underlined]
F/O Gross – 1660 C.U. – Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 17. [/underlined]
P/O Hammond – 619 Sqdn. – Cat. “A”.
Congratulations to P/O Hammond on obtaining first place on the course.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
49 Sqdn. “M” 20/21st April,1944 FW.190 C.
106 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 ME.109 C.
467 Sqdn. “N” 26th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “B” 29/30th April,1944 FW.190 C.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
619 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 JU. 88 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
44 Sqdn. “Z” 9/10th April,1944 ME.110 C.
207 Sqdn. “A” 22/23rd April, 1944 ME.210 C.
467 Sqdn. “W” 22nd April,1944 ME.109 C.
630 Sqdn. “J” 24th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “T” 24th April,1944 ME.109 C.
97 Sqdn. “Q” 24th April,1944 JU.88 C.
[Table of Air Training for April showing Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS (Contd. From page 11, col.3) [/underlined]
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
A Stirling made a crash landing last month and the only man injured was the rear gunner. He was also unique in that he was the only man not in his crash position.
A Squadron aircraft crashed in poor visibility. There were several diversion airfields available and the pilot was told to stand by and orbit Base. But he thought he’d come down to have a look!! He and two occupants were killed as a result.
Two aircrew baled out over the Wash. They did not take their ‘K’ type dinghy, and so threw away their last chance.
An experienced captain was recently forced to make an early return. His Flight Commander removed his pitot head cover for him when he landed.
Another “gen man” thought it unnecessary to await the ground crew’s signal to leave dispersal. He taxied into the tail of an aircraft in front of him. Both aircraft are CAT A/C!!
A very much sadder and wiser crew landed badly shot up recently. They explained they had lost the Concentration. The pilot had put red on black on one course. Yes it can still happen!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of April was 1635, of these 952 produced plottable ground detail, this increase being due to better conditions and the type of attack. It will be seen from the analysis that the percentage of failures is still excessive with a considerable increase in failures attributed to “no flash” illumination”. [sic]
There can be no doubt that, in the past, many flash failures were passing through as “flash muffled by cloud”, since it is impossible to assess bombing frames exposed by the light from fires on the ground when cloud conditions are 10/10ths. This is no attempt to draw attention to the high percentage of Armament failures; failures, whatever the cause, result in the loss of very valuable information and represent a loss in efficiency.
Photographic and Armament personnel must co-operate with each other to establish the [underlined] real cause [/underlined] of these failures; Type 35 camera controls and photo flash fuse settings must be identical with each other. It is not enough to set the control pointer to the required setting. Make sure that the timing of the control agrees with that indicated upon the setting dial before it is fitted to the aircraft; adjustments can be made to the pointer where necessary.
It is again necessary to stress that once the aircraft have returned from the attack, the production of the photographic results in the minimum period of time is essential to the Air Staff. The majority of the section personnel are aware of this fact, but improvement can be made by better organisation and attention to the following:-
(i) Ensure that everything is ready to commence processing as soon as the first magazines arrive (at one section seven minutes were lost between the time of the first magazine going into the darkroom and the lights being switched off).
(ii) The photographer detailed to receive the film magazine from the aircrew must obtain essential information and pass the first four or six magazines to the processing section in the quickest possible manner. (One section wasted valu-
{Continued on Page 14 Column 3)
[Table of Photographic Analysis Results by Squadron]
TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD MONTH FOR TRAINING BASE [/underlined]
During April, 51 Base flew more hours and passed out more crews than ever before in its existence. The Stirling Conversion Units produced a grand total of 5500 flying hours, and the Lancaster Finishing School a total of almost 1900 hours. The Lancaster Finishing School posted 109 crews to squadrons and 95 crews were posted into the Lancaster Finishing School for Lancaster training.
These results were achieved as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of maintenance personnel and instructional staffs throughout the Base, despite the fact that the first ten days of the month produced little flying owing to bad weather. The operational stations in the Group assisted by providing their airfields for circuits and landings when training base airfields were overcrowded.
With excellent co-operation between this Group and 10 and 12 Fighter Groups, Training Base flew Bullseyes on 18 nights. Crews also took part in Command Bullseyes, including three spoofs over the North Sea which, in addition to providing good D.R. practice for the Navigators, helped divert the enemy’s fighter strength from the operations against enemy centres in France.
The main concern during the month has been burst tyres on Lancasters and Stirlings, and every precaution is being taken to reduce these to a minimum, because it is fully appreciated that the minor mishap caused by a burst tyre can well lead to a serious accident. The overall total of accidents for the Base is still too high, and the staff is pressing forward strongly with an “accident reduction” drive.
The forthcoming expansion in Training Base by which 132 crews are to be produced each month, has led to a revision of the Ground Syllabus and the Flying Syllabus. The revised Flying Syllabus is not yet effective, but will come into operation during May. There has been an expansion of H 2 S training in the two Units at present equipped for this training, and when 1654 Conversion Unit at Wigsley becomes productive, the periodical shortage of H 2 S crews should cease.
AIR SEA RESCUE
It is a very easy thing, when ordered to practice Parachute or Dinghy Drills to go out to an aircraft sit around smoking for half an hour and then report back to the Flight Office “D.C.O.” These drills are the “Safety Drills” and the instinct of self preservation alone should make crews practice them until “Practice makes Perfect”.
Generally speaking parachute drills are carried out more conscientiously than Dinghy Drills, but in recent incidents in this Group it appears that even this drill is not receiving the attention it should. Note the findings of the investigating officer after a recent fatal accident. “It seems doubtful whether the crew had done the amount of parachute drill accredited to them in the “Flight Records”. In other words completed records may save you a lot of bother, but unless the records are true they are valueless and wasteful.
Let us face facts. Even [underlined] you [/underlined] may be shot down and bale-out or ditch some time or other. If you have just a rough working knowledge of the drills, some of the crew will probably save their lives, but, equally probably, some will lose their lives. If you and your crew are word and action perfect in the drill, you will live to fight again, and get a good spell of “Survivors’ leave” into the bargain. Most probably!
Saturday morning had now been set aside as the time when every available crew is to spend at least an hour on these Safety Drills. It should also be regarded as a suitable time to acquaint aircrews with the latest safety equipment and modifications. This period, however, should not be regarded as an excuse for not doing drills at other times. There’ll be the odd occasion when you are elsewhere on a Saturday morning.
One Base has issued instructions that crews are to be ordered at Briefing, from time to time, that they are to do these drills after landing from Operations – when tired and in darkness, when their physical condition is similar to that when facing a real “Bods out” or ditching, or baling our [sic] conditions. This is a very good way of doing things – you get the maximum benefit, as you are already in full flying kit, with the minimum of effort.
In March 36.9% of aircrews in all Groups who ditched in “Home Waters” were saved, while 397 lost their lives. The fact that 73 lives were lost in crews where other members were saved stresses the importance of drills. The Americans are still making better use of your Air Sea Rescue Service than you are.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT (Continued from Page 15 Col.2) [/underlined]
stations in the near future to service the F.N.64 turrets prior to their being returned to Maintenance Units – a step in the right direction at last. All Armament Officers can assist in speeding up this servicing process by ensuring that a hydraulic turret test rig and a complete set of tools are available for the party when they arrive. Don’t leave it until the day the party is expected, and so waste a day collecting the equipment from various dispersed points around the station. Do it now and ensure that the floor space at present cluttered up by these turrets is made available for more important equipment.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
A record number of sorties has been carried out during April and it was pleasing to note that note that the cancellations due to technical defects were: Early Returns .73% - Cancellations .69% - both being very definite improvements.
The number of engine failures which occur and necessitate change of an engine before the completion of its life are not decreasing at the rate we should expect now that a more reliable engine forms the bulk of our holdings. The Merlin 24 from which we expected such high performance is doing its best to produce this performance. It is however handicapped by the fact that paddle-blade propellers and AY/118 constant speed units have invariably been fitted to this type of engine, the results being that instances are occurring of over speeding and the odd case of engine disintegration. Action is in hand to fit modified C.S.U’s and this must go ahead with all possible speed.
The Merlin 28 and 38 still suffer from loss of coolant occasionally, and we still get failures due to fracture of the oil pipe to the dual drive, mainly due to the slow rate at which the modified oil pipe is being supplied.
It is pleasing to see the local improvements which are being carried out by C.T.O’s the improvement of technical sites on the “self help” scheme and the general clean-up and overhaul of equipment.
Although the introduction of a technical adjutant was mainly to allow the C.T.O. to be out amongst the aircraft more, there may be a tendency for the C.T.O’s to leave too much to the technical adjutant. This is a point which must be watched and although it is not the intention to pin the C.T.O. to his office, he must keep a tight control on correspondence, returns and technical reports and keep “au fait” with all leaflets and technical letters issued.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
It is gratifying to note that the maintenance of the Mk.XIV Bombsight improves month by month, as is evidenced by recent photographs of targets after a visit by 5 Group. Ground crews in general share in these achievements, but the instrument repairer deserves a special pat on the back for the hours well spent in tuning and levelling the Bombsights to produce these results.
The same degree of accuracy is unfortunately not apparent in the A.P.I./A.M.U. Cases are still being reported of “racing” of the A.M.I. despite the fitting of Command Modification No. 57. This “racing” can be attributed in most cases to incorrect tension of the relay spring and as no test equipment is yet available the fault cannot be laid at the door of bad maintenance. Efforts are being made to obtain the necessary tension gauges so that this fault can be cured. In the meantime units must make every effort to complete the manufacture of the Coningsby A.P.I./A.M.U. test bench, details of which were forwarded several weeks ago.
April witnessed the introduction of new equipment the responsibility of which rests on the instrument repairer. The most important is the nitrogen installation. It is not necessary to demand the ground charging equipment, but units must advise their Equipment Officer when an aircraft with nitrogen is received so that the necessary steps can be taken to obtain the charging equipment. At the same time the Group electrical officer must also be informed.
The other item of new equipment arriving in aircraft is the Mk.VIII Automatic Control, the introduction of which should ease maintenance problems. The Group servicing van has been round all operational stations to give preliminary instructions on the maintenance of this instrument and courses of three weeks’ duration will shortly become available to those personnel who have already attended the Mk.IV Control course. The question of the inferior luminous markings of the Mk.IA repeater has been brought to the notice of Headquarters Bomber Command, and it is hoped that an improvement will be made shortly.
The Electrical Sections – particularly those in Base major servicing units – continue to do a good job of work, despite the increasing number of modifications in which the Electrician is involved. Further modifications of an operational necessity are on the way, so electrical officers must give all future suggested modifications very serious consideration before submitting them to higher authority, if the electrical sections are not to be overburdened.
A word about Bumph. There appears to be a rooted objection among electrical officers to put pen, pencil or typewriter – if you can get one – to paper. Base and Station electrical officers must realise that it is impossible to get on without a certain minimum of paper work and promptness in replies is essential. If you are asked to reply to a question by a certain date make sure that your reply is one time.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability for Stirling and Lancaster]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV. (Contd. From Page 9 Column 3) [/underlined]
This dangerous habit must cease. Some navigators seem to use R.F. Units and Stud Settings as toys to be changed and switched about to see what fixes they can obtain; the result is incorrect fixes, and chaos. These navigators are playing right into the enemy’s hands, particularly if they obtain signals which do not emanate from our Gee Stations!”
All Navigators must realise the importance of the above points as it is possible that in future several operations per night may be planned with an XF possibility for each operation. If navigators persist in using XF’s which are not assigned to them and phased for their route, there will be multitudes of incorrect fixes, and possibly casualties as a result of careless navigation.
Flight Engineers
In the past the Flight Engineers have been selected from Group I or II tradesmen; having been in the R.A.F. for long periods they gained quite considerable experience of many types of aircraft and engines, and therefore the changeover to their new duties was easy.
To-day we are faced with the problem of having to train pupils who perhaps a few weeks ago, had never seen inside an aircraft. During their training in the early stages, many subjects are taught which would appear to have no bearing on their job as Flight Engineers; this must be done however, so that later in the course, when boost control, hydraulics and pneumatics are explained, the pupil will have the basic knowledge to understand them. This takes time, and as we must produce more and more Flight Engineers, time cannot be spared to train them as Fitters. They are trained as Flight Engineers but perhaps a few corners remain that can be “polished off” by the Flight Engineer Leader.
The Flight Engineer Leader in a Squadron is responsible for training new members until he is satisfied that after a personal check, they can carry out the duties as laid down in A.M.O. A.538/43. He must make them continue their practical training, and whenever possible let them be with the ground crews on Daily Inspections, or any other work on their aircraft. Only in this way will good aircraft familiarisation be gained.
The training to be carried out in Squadrons must consist of Daily and Between Flight Inspections, instructions on the electrical panel, log keeping and engine limitations. The last subject is most important; only last month an early return which could have been avoided was made by a crew in this Group. On this occasion the oil pressure dropped to 50 lbs. per square inch at 20,000 feet, but the temperature remained at 80°C. Engine limitations laid down in A.P. 2062C (Pilot’s Notes) are:-
Oil Pressure minimum 45 lbs. per sq. in.
Oil temp. maximum 90°C.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY (Continued from Page 13 Col.1) [/underlined]
able time in processing a batch of films which had not been exposed, for the simple reason that the bombs had been brought back. This was negligence on the part of the airman who took over the magazines from the aircrew.
The photographic N.C.O. is responsible for the first film analysis and must decide whether it is a success or failure. Despite repeated instructions, many instances still occur where films are sent to this Headquarters as successes when in fact they are failures, and failures which should be classified as successes. This wastes the time spent on correspondence and telephone calls. One N.C.O. stated that it was because everything was required in a rush; this is true. THE AIR STAFF MUST HAVE PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS as soon as they can be produced and in ensuring this there must be no reduction of effort. Once the prints have been despatched, all films should be carefully re-examined, to ensure that no mistakes have been made.
Now that Headquarters, Bomber Command have reduced the amount of photographic printing, an improvement in the printing quality is expected. Faint ground details which could be plotted is often lost through poor processing and printing.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
The expression “unable owing to pressure of work” has become the password for excusing a dirty and untidy bomb dump. A slovenly bomb dump is too often the hall mark of poor workmanship and the effect is cumulative until unstacked empty cases, broken trollies and transporters disposed at random are taken for granted.
It takes little longer during a fusing operation to stock the tail boxes when removing the tails, rather than strew them indiscriminately over a large area; the effort is not great but the resultant tidiness is surprising.
A scene reminiscent of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow can be avoided if only a few men are employed on cleaning up after a fusing detail. If the broken transporters, trollies and liners are not repairable, write them off for scrap metal – the country needs it.
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH [/underlined]
Nearly 7% of the total number of photoflashes carried in April have been classed as flash failure. The classification flash failure is given when:-
(i) There is no indication of illumination on frames 6, 7 and 8 (or 4, 5 and 6 in the old sequence) of the film.
(ii) The fusing wire from the fuse is brought back.
(iii) There is no indication of violent evasive action on any of the bombing frames.
(iv) The camera control is checked and found correct.
(v) The electrical circuit and release slip are found serviceable.
This figure of 7% is excessive and so much higher than any previous month that it must be assumed, as in many cases the same lot numbers were used over two consecutive months, that some of this 7% was, in fact, incorrect fuse setting and bad maintenance. Co-operation with the photographic section can solve this problem.
[Underlined] “J” CLUSTERS [/underlined]
Loading ramps and rollers for 500 lb “J” clusters should be spring cleaned so that the clusters which are now arriving in quantity may be loaded directly on the rollers, thus saving double humping.
[Underlined] SUPPLY [/underlined]
Owing to the present precarious supply position of certain weapons the C.O. and personnel of No.93 M.U. have been called upon to produce stores at a moment’s notice from nowhere. To the credit of 93 M.U. these stores always turn up, but it is realised how much extra work is entailed in meeting a rush demand.
The staff of 93 M.U. are extremely well informed regarding the requirements and difficulties of operational armament, but it is doubted if Armament Officers realise the difficulties of the M.U. who handled nearly 30,000 tons of bombs last month.
It is suggested that Armament Officers could spend a profitable day by accompanying an Austin to the M.U. and see for themselves how large scale humping is organised.
[Underlined] MANIPULATION FAILURES. [/underlined]
A marked increase in manipulation failures has been apparent this month resulting in a large number of bombs and pyrotechnics being returned to base. The more outstanding “boobs” are set out below:-
1. 2 S.B.C’s complete with contents returned to Base – distributor arm fouled by the quadrant peg card. No jettison action carried out.
2. The following stores were returned to Base due to non-[underlined] selection [/underlined]:-
2 x 4.5” photoflashes
2 x 250 lb Target Indicators
2 x 7” Hooded Flare Clusters
1 x 1000 lb M.C.
NO FURTHER COMMENT IS NECESSARY.
[Underlined] FN.64 TURRETS [/underlined]
The turret servicing party is visiting all
(Continued on Page 4 Column 2) [sic]
[Table of Failures by Squadron]
FLYING CONTROL
The high standard of landing achieved last month has been maintained during April. It is significant to note that SKELLINGTHORPE who pioneered this scheme when it was first introduced and in fact, carried out all the trials, have risen to the top of the ladder with an excellent average of 1.85 minutes.
The most outstanding figure for the month, however, is 30 aircraft landed in 36 minutes at Waddington. This is, in fact, the finest performance which has ever been put up within the Group and possibly within the Command. The following are some examples of really first-class performances for the month:-
[Table of Selected Flying Control Sessions by Stations]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
It is hoped to introduce shortly a competition embracing all Flying Control aspects. This will be judged on a quarterly basis and the condition and efficiency of every part of the Station Flying Control organisation will
(Continued on Page 6 Column 2)
[Table of April Landing Times by Station]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
Our brief this month was abundantly clear. With the Allied air offensive continuing almost uninterruptedly on a rising scale against communications targets and airfields, it appeared certain that our own role would be integrated in the common plan to wear down the Western Wall. To this end we have seen during the course of the month a revolution in our bombing technique confirming the undoubted accuracy of low level precision attacks.
The importance of hammering railway targets as a means of reducing the enemy’s capacity to meet a threat from the West was fully recognised. On 10/11th TOURS was effectively attacked, followed by JUVISY and LA CHAPELLE on 18/19th and 21/22nd respectively. The results in each case were impressive. At Tours an exceptional concentration with over 100 hits fell on the track disrupting all communications. A particularly high precedent was established at Juvisy. Here we achieved one of the greatest concentrations of craters yet obtained on a target of this type – the attack almost completely devastating the marshalling yards.
The attack on La Chappelle was no less successful. Damage is severe at the southern end of the Marshalling Yard which sustained the main weight of the attack. Large fires were still burning in the area the day following the raid, and it could be seen that tracks had been severed at several important junctions. The importance which the enemy attaches to keeping his railroads open, and the difficulties which he is experiencing in handling even high priority traffic is perhaps reflected in the fact that some 50000 Germans have now been transported into France to relieve the situation and, furthermore, German branch lines have been torn up to provide new tracks.
This wearing down process is also being applied with particular attention to the Luftwaffe itself, its sources of supply being very seriously threatened by repeated attacks on aircraft factories. On 5/6th, 605 tons of bombs were dropped on four plants at TOULOUSE. The S.N.C.A.S.E. Aircraft Assembly Plant has sustained serious damage to its three main buildings – the assembly plant, component store, and testing shop. At the A.I.A. Works, every building is more or less severely damaged, while the Aircraft Factory buildings are all damaged – amongst those completely destroyed being the components manufactory shop, components store, drawing offices, heat treatment and plate shop. The Montaudran Airfield is now without its three principal hangars, and has suffered damage to other unidentified buildings.
Coupled with the first attack on St. Medard-on-Jalles (reported later) was a raid on the KIELLER Airframe Factory near OSLO – PRU cover is not complete, but the photographs available indicate that damage is considerable in the North Eastern part of the target area, including heavy destruction in the Bayerische Motorenwerke.
It is perhaps interesting to note that following the attack on CLERMONT FERRAND Aulnat Aircraft Factory, the sick bay is almost the only building undamaged. It is open to some doubt as to whether this fact can be accepted as a tribute to our precision bombing, but whatever the position may be in this respect, it is manifest that this Repair Factory will not be available to the enemy for a long time to come.
The attack on the ST CYR Signals Equipment Depot on 10/11th was highly successful – resulting in the destruction of several of the principal buildings in the Depot.
Although the focus of attention was directed on rail centres and other special targets in the occupied zone, this concentration in policy did not imply that other forms of attack would be discontinued; still less that they were conceived independently of the supreme invasion task. In fact four “blitz” attacks were staged during the course of the month. AACHEN was singled out for attack on 11/12th. Throughout the city – particularly to the South and South West, industrial and residential damage has been fairly severe, while the Main Station and sidings, large Passenger Station, Locomotive Sheds, and Goods Depot Shed have suffered heavily. Reconnaissance following our attack on BRUNSWICK on 22/23rd is not complete, but from the photographs obtained, it can be seen that damage is considerable in the business/residential area South of the City Centre, with many hits in the South Eastern marshalling yards. A high measure of success also attended the attack on MUNICH on 24/25th.
[Underlined] RIDER [/underlined]
Until that date this Nazi birthplace had escaped serious damage, but it is now known that the town has suffered its first heavy battering. No interpretation of the reconnaissance photographs is yet available but even to the unpractised eye it is obvious that the target is severely hit. Widespread areas of devastation are apparent in the old city (which is 30 - 40% gutted) continuing in a wide sear from East to West up to and including the Main Railway Station. The Nazi Party meeting place Kreig Ministerium and Prinz Leopold Platz, to mention but a few of the important Municipal Buildings are either destroyed or severely damaged.
Fierce fighter activity was encountered in defence of SCHWEINFURT on 26/27th. Despite this violent reaction, however, the attack was pressed home, resulting in severe damage to all five ball-bearing plants, in particular to the Deutsche Star Kugalhalter where two thirds of the machine shops have been demolished. The adjoining marshalling yards have also sustained damage, and there are many incidents throughout the town.
No less important were our minelaying trips on 9/10th, 18/19th and again on 23/24th. These sorties probably lack the spectacle of a bombing attack, but their sinister loads will doubtless reap a very real contribution in the war harvest.
The culminating stage of the month was in the final raid on 29/30th against the Explosives Works at ST. MEDARD-on-JALLES. A pass had already been made at this same target the previous night, but had been frustrated by unfortunate weather conditions. So with redoubled vigour another attack was launched. On this occasion the weather chose to be our ally, and the opportunity afforded was seized to produce one of the most impressive pyrotechnic displays. For more than half an hour the target was in the throes of a succession of violent explosions. The greatest concentration of the attack fell to the North East of the works area extending across the centre of the works to the western border. A most heartening result and an inspiring conclusion to the month’s work.
The above achievements were contributed by 1950 Lancs and 84 Mosquitos – 88.6% of which were successful in attacking the primary, with 2.5% casualties.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Statistics by Squadron showing Availability, Sorties, Results and Points]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, April 1944
5 Group Newsletter April 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 21, April 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about process of servicing, gardening, navigation, honours and awards, signals / radar, tactics, air bombing, radar / navigation, link trainer, sports, war savings, accidents, gunnery, training, air sea rescue, engineering, armament, flying control, operations and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-04
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
16 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-25
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Tours
France--Toulouse
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Metheringham
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
AUGUST 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 25
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
In August the Group set up several new records for operations and training, and Squadrons got more hours flying out of their aircraft than ever before. Top of the list is No. 61 Squadron with a total of 105 hours per aircraft on charge, and close behind are Nos. 50 and 44 Squadrons with 103 and 101 hours respectively. These are splendid figures which reflect great credit on the maintenance staffs. The total flying for the month was 34,000 hours with 3,600 operational sorties.
A high proportion of the attacks was directed against naval targets, more especially the six ships in Brest Harbour, including the battleship Clemenceau and the cruiser Gueydon, all of which were sunk, thus preventing the enemy from carrying out his intention of blocking the harbour.
Two highly successful mining attacks were also undertaken against the ship canals at Stettin and Konigsberg. At Stettin a dredged channel crosses a six mile wide lake between the coast and the docks, and it was decided that a complete hold up of enemy shipping could best be caused by laying a considerable number of mines in this Channel. The sides of the channel were marked at the two ends and in the middle by small towers intended for lights, and between these by a double row of buoys. For the attack the area was first lit with flares and in their light, three marker aircraft laid flame floats down two sides of the canal, using the buoys as their guide, so that the aircraft carrying the mines had a well marked line in which to put them. The marking was magnificently undertaken in the face of considerable searchlight and light flak opposition and the whole operation proved an outstanding success. The average height of laying was 300 feet. The operations against the Konigsberg canal a few nights later was on a smaller scale, but two aircraft succeeded in placing all their mines in the channel again from a very low height and in the light of flares. It was after these two attacks that all Swedish shipping was withdrawn from Baltic trade.
During the month valuable support was also given to the Army in the Falaise area, and many sorties were directed against the flying bomb sites. This commitment has now happily come to an end with the capture of the flying bomb country, but the following message from the Air Ministry to Bomber Command will show the considerable part which the Command played in reducing the scale of this menace.
“The continuous and heavy bombing of the experimental stations, production plants, launching sites, storage depots and installations, which has been carried out by your Command, not only imposed on the enemy a prolonged and unwelcome delay in the launching of his campaign, but effectively limited the scale of effort which he was able to make. This notable achievement has added one more to the long list of successful operations carried out by Bomber Command.”
The month ended with two attacks by the Group on Konigsberg, capital city of East Prussia. The first attack had all the elements necessary for a decisive success but the misunderstanding by a few crews of their briefed instructions, led to the attack, which was the most concentrated ever undertaken by the Group, being centred 2000 yards from the aiming point and doing relatively little damage. As a result a further attack had to be carried out in much less favourable weather. Happily this attack was successful and resulted in the almost complete destruction of the chief port supplying the German armies in East Prussia.
The success which has, in general, attended the attacks delivered by the Group over the past six months has been largely due to the system of low level marking by Mosquito aircraft which was first tried out by Wing Commander Cheshire with No. 617 Squadron. I am sure that all in the Group will join me in congratulating him on the award of the Victoria Cross in recognition of his great gallantry over 4 years of War and 100 operational sorties.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
The end of the season weather proved most unkind, and most teams found their last month’s activities very limited. Scampton completed three games, beating Rustons and A.A. Command but losing to R.A.F. Cranwell. Dunholme lost to Ruston Bucyrus away, beat Hartsholme away, and the local Cadets at home. Metheringham managed to complete only one inter-station game, and then operations caused them to field a weak side and they were well beaten by R.C.A.F. Digby. Metheringham have now completed eleven games in the season, won five, lost five and drawn one. The outstanding teams of the season were Woodhall and Syerston, both of whom were blessed with “stars”. It was fitting for them to meet in the final of the Group Trophy, and although Syerston were unlucky in having lost S/Ldr MacKenzie, Woodhall put up a splendid effort to add the cricket Trophy to 54 Base collection.
[Underlined] SWIMMING [/underlined]
Coningsby Squadrons took advantage of the last day of summer, and held the Inter-Squadron Swimming Trophy in the Open Air Pool at Woodhall Spa in the 13th August. Events were held in Free Style, Breast and Back Stroke over the usual distances, together with plunging and diving. No.83 Squadron emerged as winners, with 26 points, the next best being Metheringham with 22.
[Underlined] BADMINTON [/underlined]
Several Stations find the Badminton Court in great demand. Dunholme have just concluded a Doubles Tournament in which Cpls Pigott and Hurst beat ACs King and Wright by 21 – 19, 18 – 21, 21 – 17. Scampton have a Badminton Club. Here is a big field for inter-station friendlies, and it is hoped Stations will not miss the opportunity of taking Badminton teams to play away matches during the coming winter. Inter-station games do much to improve the standard of play, by giving players an opportunity of comparing themselves with entirely new opposition. Mixed Doubles is a successful Badminton event, giving the W.A.A.F. another opportunity of a vigorous winter sport. A combined Badminton cum Darts cum Billiards Inter-station tourney cannot fail to be successful.
[Underlined] WINTER SPORTS [/underlined]
On September 4th a Conference of Group P.F.O’s met at this Headquarters to discuss the winter programme. The starting dates for the three knock-outs were agreed as follows:-
MATZ CUP (SOCCER) – Early November
WINES TROPHY (RUGGER) – Early December
MIXED HOCKEY – Mid October.
In the near future invitation letters for the above tournaments will be issued, and a busy season is anticipated. It is hoped that as many Stations as possible will support the Mixed Hockey Trophy; mixed hockey is an enjoyable sport and provides, together with Netball, an excellent opportunity for the W.A.A.F.
[Underlined] VARIETIES [/underlined]
Winthorpe sport an enthusiastic W.A.A.F. Soccer Eleven. Any other Station that can produce eleven Amazons is invited to roll up and meet the Winthorpians in battle.
[Underlined] TRAVELLING [/underlined]
It is hoped to obtain an early decision from Command on the 5 Group suggestion that the limit for which a station can provide sports transport be increased from 5 to 20 miles (single journey). This measure will give an immediate fillip to all inter-station sport and alleviate the task of P.F.O’s in endeavouring to get variety into the programmes.
ENGINEERING
Another record number of sorties has been carried out, which entailed in turn a record number of flying hours.
The flying hours for aircraft on charge in the Squadrons has exceeded anything which has yet been achieved, and is proof of what can be done by good technical organisation and co-operation and the will to keep aircraft serviceable on the part of Officers, N.C.O’s and men.
It has been rumoured that the establishment of tradesmen was based on the assumption that a Lancaster should produce 40 hours flying a month. The hours actually flown per Lancaster on charge has varied between 80 hours and 105 hours in Squadrons for August. This means of course that the Maintenance Personnel have worked twice as hard as the Establishment Committee calculated they would. Many problems present themselves as a result of this high pressure flying, but one point is predominant: the flying has been done, and at the month end serviceability was still 90% of the U.E. aircraft.
Quite a number of aircraft are still operating although their flying hours are in excess of 1,000. The condition and work required on the 3rd major should be watched, and full advantage must be taken of 43 Group facilities for those aircraft which will require too many man hours to overhaul locally.
The increased periodicity between inspections has been approved at 75 hours for Minor and 600 hours for Major Inspection for Lancaster aircraft. This amendment will be issued within the next few days by Bomber Command.
Of the 3,600 sorties detailed 1.66% were unsuccessful due to engineering faults. This constitutes a slight increase over the July total.
No Squadron was entirely free from unsuccessful sorties, and No.52 Base are to be congratulated on having the lowest percentage.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability by Training Unit]
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Sorties, including Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617, and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the [missing] is divided between the two Squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
Compared with July, this month’s total of combats shows a big reduction. There have been a total of 70 combats for day and night operations; the claims being:-
7 destroyed
- probably destroyed, and
4 damaged.
During the daylight operation on Bois de Cassan on 6th August, 13 combats were reported, 2 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 enemy aircraft damaged. In this operation the enemy fighters exploited the old tactics of attacking out of the sun, and all gunners should take note of this and ensure that in future daylight operations they are equipped with anti-glare glasses. In one instance a Lancaster was attacked from below and seriously damaged, two members of the crew being killed and another seriously wounded. The first intimation of the attack was when hits were registered on the Lancaster, the first burst from the enemy aircraft neutralising both rear turrets. Search must be carried out assiduously to cover all sections of the sky, above and below, by day as well as by night.
As a trial, tracer has been removed from the first 300 rounds in each belt, and gunners’ views are required after having used this sequence in combat, as to whether sighting is easier without the trace or vice versa. Gunners must appreciate that success, the destruction of the enemy fighter, will only be achieved by the correct application of the sight.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
Night affiliation with Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight has been available to Squadrons since the beginning of August. Full information and details have been sent out to Bases and Units under reference 293/Trg. dated 3rd August, 1944, and it is encouraging to note that some Squadrons have already availed themselves of these facilities. In view of the advent of longer hours of darkness which means operations of longer duration, it is most essential that gunners’ night vision and practical experience of night interception be brought to the highest standard of proficiency by constant practice. From results of recent exercises, the fighter has not been observed until a range of 150 – 200 yards. The remedies lie in the more skilful use of Early Warning Devices and better night vision.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A 400 yards range will shortly be available to the Group and Dunham Cliff. Instructions will be issued shortly. It is hoped that another 400 yards range will be sited at Wainfleet which will be more accessible to those Stations in the Eastern half of the Group.
An Air Staff Instruction has been issued for Skeet Range Shooting. This is to be adhered to closely to obtain the maximum benefit from this form of training.
Details have now been issued regarding Night Vision Training Exercises in blacked-out gymnasiums. The maximum use should be made of this training which will combine fitness with night vision training.
THIS MONTH’S BAG
[Drawings]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
44 “A” 6.8.44. FW. 190
630 “L” 12/13.8.44. JU. 88
50 “L” 16/17.8.44. ME. 410
44 “F” 25/26.8.44. ME. 410
106 “B” 25/26.8.44. JU. 88
207 “K” 25/26.8.44. ME. 110
619 “G” 29/30.8.44. ME. 109
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
57 “U” 6.8.44. ME. 109F
57 “B” 6.8.44. ME. 109F
57 “D” 6.8.44. ME. 107F
9 “B” 12.8.44. JU. 88
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING AUGUST. [/underlined]
[Table of Training Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Units]
X 49 Squadron employed on special training.
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR AUGUST:- 2136
[Underlined] No. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined] Grand total 760 hours and 712 details.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
TRAINING
During August 51 Base produced 151 crews and topped the previous month’s record by one crew. This was achieved despite several days unseasonable weather. The Base is confident that it can improve on this total for September. No. 5 L.F.S. continued to take Lancaster Conversion in its stride and completed its third month with over 2,000 hours flying.
Final training in Squadrons was abreast of the time throughout, and the Base Training Pilots and Flight Engineers did a good job in getting the crews fit for operations without any hold up despite the increased number of crews passing through their hands. 10 and 20 sortie checks were also carried out. Gunnery categorisation is now forging ahead, and towards the end of the month categorisation of Navigators was introduced. This will be followed shortly by categorisation of pilots and Flight Engineers.
The detached elements of 1690 B.D.T. Flight, comprising Martinets and Spitfires, were withdrawn from 51 Base airfields and centralised with the Hurricanes at Syerston. This did not interfere with fighter affiliation training and 1690 B.D.T. Flight as a single Unit are now providing both day and night affiliation for the Group from one Station, and in addition are affiliating with No.49 Squadron for special training. The number of details flown and gunners exercised are dealt with elsewhere in the News.
The formation of 1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit and 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit also took place during the month, and 5 Group is responsible for the training up to the present.
No.1668 Conversion Unit is due to open on the 1st September, and 1669 later in the month.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] ECONOMY IN THE USE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The war has now entered its sixth year and although things are going better for us, Equipment Officers should still strive after perfection in economy of equipment. This is an old and well known subject, but owing to its importance, it cannot be rammed home often enough.
Only by frequent review of establishments can correct provisioning be maintained. If provisioning is good, then the Station will not want and Station Sections will cease to hoard.
Therefore, all Equipment Officers can, by good provisioning, plus foresight, and good liaison with the other Sections on the Station, make every item of equipment do its correct job and prevent waste.
[Underlined] A.M.O’s OF INTEREST [/underlined]
A.738/44 (Parts III, IV and V) Civilian Repair Organisation – Repair of R.A.F. Equipment.
A.759/44 Contract Washing, Procedure for. Articles of Service clothing and equipment in the U.K.
A.774/44 Introduction of new small F.600.
A.775/44 Preparation of Carriers’ Notes.
A.806/44 Removal of components from aircraft in Category AC.
N.828/44 Revision of Scale of Watch, Clock and Instrument repair tools.
N.846/44 Revised scale of issue of Testers Insulation resistance, types A, B, C and D.
N.873/44 Introduction of Lubricator sets for Type B Mechanical Sweeper.
PHOTOGRAPHY
Condensation has again been the cause of a number of failures, and it is now considered that the majority of instances are the result of conditions at Base rather than conditions at or en route to the target. Experiments are being conducted to determine whether it is practicable to remove the register glass in the camera. So far success has attended our efforts and results are being watched carefully. If this can be done, then one of the surfaces on which condensation can form will have been eliminated.
Composite film join failures are still occurring and it has been decided to use French chalk on the linen side of the tape in order to prevent this sticking to the register glass of the camera. Photographic N.C.O’s are to select the tape used for this purpose with great care, as the quality of different rolls varies considerably.
The titling of photographs often leaves much to be desired. Operational air photographs without adequate and readable titling are useless. N.C.O’s are therefore to watch this point carefully. The printing of films could be much improved in many cases. Whilst speed is essential in the production of results, do not let the result be marred by bad workmanship. A green, badly titled print is an offence to the photographer’s eye.
The use of Standard Day Panchromatic Film on Day Operations should make for better quality results with much finer grain, but will, however, necessitate more frequent magazine loading in the changes from Day to Night Operations. Very great care must be exercised in handling the film during these changes.
Standard Day Film is to be used whenever possible for day operations.
ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
GARDENING
Business has been brisk this month In all departments of the offensive, but the Gardeners have certainly had their share of the task, and excellent results have been achieved, in High and Low Planting. The Command Gardening, totalling 1587 vegetables has been divided as follows:-
(a) A constant stream of planters directed at the U-Boat Bases on the West Coast of France.
(b) Large scale operations in the Baltic area with the object of dislocating the enemy’s sea-borne supplies for the Russian Front, and of severing all trade with Scandinavia.
[Underlined] The U-Boat Offensive. [/underlined] 5 Group, represented by 44, 97, 619 and 57 Squadrons carried out 6 operations in these areas, laying accurately by H.2.S. with slight to moderate interference from Flak.
[Underlined] Results. [/underlined] At the time of going to press, it is believed that all West Coast bases have been closed to U-Boat traffic for some time. This is more than embarrassing to a frantic enemy endeavouring to check our advances. The U-boat command must now be at pains to form any systematic plan of control for their U-boats already on patrol in the Atlantic. Individual Commanders are certain to be confused, dissatisfied and hampered by the continuous stream of contradictory instructions issuing from their superiors, on the best methods and routes for their return. Offensive patrols – already minimised to a large extent – will now have to be reduced to even shorter periods through lack of fuel, food and water; in short, lack to the North Sea Bases they will have to go, and the days of the U-boats are numbered. In co-operation with out Gardening efforts in this sector, the most striking results have been achieved by the brilliant bombing of 617 and 9 Squadrons on the Pens and Berths in these Bases. Naval Patrols have also been most successful along this stretch of water, and the future reading in Weekly Intelligence Reports should contain some interesting home truths of our enemy’s state of mind.
[Underlined] The Baltic Offensive. [/underlined] Among the many and varied targets on hand during this past month, not the least were our long and hazardous trips far into the Baltic. The nature of these operations involved dangerous low flying through heavy and light flak, concentrations of searchlights, and surprise flak ships placed in the most awkward positions. On the 16/17th August, the first strike at Stettin took place, and a special Gardening operation was co-ordinated in the main attack. 23 Lancasters were detailed from 44, 106, 57 and 97 Squadrons to pounce on the Kaiser Fahrt Channel, 97 Squadron performing marking duties ad carrying two choice vegetables apiece.
Little was known of the garden to be attacked, the only guide being the Light houses positioned in pairs, every 3 1/2 miles along the channel 157 yards wide, by about 10 miles in length. Careful timing, concise intercommunication, and cool heads were the Orders of the Day. When the force arrived the Light houses were lit, and remained so for sufficient time to reveal the line of the channel. Down went 97 Squadron to mark at mast head height with lines of flame floats. The Controller was first to mark, and laid most accurately, which was quickly confirmed by his Deputy flying between the Lighthouses at the time. The Gardeners were then called in to lay at 200 feet, meanwhile the main bomber force went for the town of Stettin, and other Groups were planting furiously to seaward. Two Gardeners were unfortunately shot down in the area – including the controller after performing an excellent task – two more were forced to jettison through flak damage, three were forced to jettison and return early with engine trouble, and two were unhappily non-starters. Out of 81 vegetables carried, 61 were successfully planted. It is estimated that a very high percentage of these now lie gracefully in the narrow waterway, including two discreetly dropped 3 1/2 miles inside the canal itself by Z/106 Squadron – a very fine piece of work. It can therefore, be said that this enterprising evolution was carried out with highly commendable skill and determination on the part of all crews in the face of intense opposition, and their combined team-work has added a further page in the history, already outstanding, of the Group’s Gardening efforts.
On the 26/27th, a similar operation took place, but this time in the Konigsberg area. Extensive planting took place to seaward in the approaches to important Baltic harbours, in which 44, 106 and 630 Squadrons took part, while four selected crews from 44, 57, 106 and 207 Squadrons made for the Konigsberg inland canal.
Illumination was provided by the main force as they retired from their target area, enabling the Gardeners clearly to identify their target. Unfortunately two aircraft were seen to be hit by flak and did not return, but R/106 and E/207 pressed home their attack with great zeal, and skilfully planted 10 of the best in the waterway. A fine example of courage and airmanship.
The main force returned to this target again on 29/30th and this time opportunity was seized to back up the previous lays in the outer gardens. 10 Lancasters representing 44, 49, 106 and 630 Squadrons completed a 100% planting of forty Mark IV vegetables with little opposition using H 2 S from high altitude. Very good records have already been received from P.P.I. photographs.
[Underlined] All is not well in the Baltic [/underlined] – The Swedish Home Service stated on the 22nd August that the State War Insurance Board had decided to stop granting war risk insurance to German Baltic Harbours for the time being, on account of the prevailing conditions.
The following tribute to the efficiency of British mining operations was paid by Rear Admiral Gadow, the Naval correspondent of the Deutsche Alhgemeine Zeitung. He wrote that the mining of the shipping routes of the North Sea had reached such a pitch of intensity that it was putting the heaviest strain on the German minesweeping flotillas.
[Underlined] General Summary [/underlined]
Sorties – 65
Successful – 53
% Successful – 81 1/2
Aircraft Missing – 4
Nights operated – 8
Mileage Flown – 96,312
Total Planted successfully – [underlined] 260 [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVAL SUPPORT [/underlined]
In close connection with the general plan of denying the U-Boat Bases to the enemy is also the all important object of preventing the enemy from totally destroying or blocking these bases before they can be used by the Allies. With such enormous forces having to be maintained in Europe it is essential that we should have every available harbour working at full pressure for the off loading of stores and equipment from suitable big ship berths, rail and roadway centres. The enemy has been quick to realise this point, and has taken every step to bring about total destruction where he can, by the use of expert demolition squads, and the subsidiary use of Block ships in harbours.
Immediate steps were necessary, and taken, in the case of Brest, by allocating Block ship targets to 5 Group Squadrons. Great care and attention to detail wrought havoc to the enemy’s intentions, as one by one, the ships at anchor in the harbour were singled out for devastating attack, and successfully sent to the bottom by pin point bombing. The 11,000 ton tanker capable of completely filling the main entrance was the first to ‘settle’ safely in her berth, quickly followed by the aged French Cruiser “Gueydon”, a Sperbrecher berthed alongside the quay, and the half completed battleship “Clemenceau”. This stripped the saboteurs of any immediate facilities, but as they had previously disclosed their intentions by sinking one tanker and two small coasters near the entrance, the job was completed by satisfactorily destroying one large Merchant Ship and a large Sperbrecher undergoing repairs in the dry docks.
Such accuracy in bombing ships, for the sorties carried out, has seldom been reached before; the Squadrons involved are to be congratulated on their work, and helping hand given to the Royal Navy, which will greatly assist the common task of feeding our armies in the future.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED [underlined] £6,625.15.5. [/underlined]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
Longer nights and longer sorties make accurate flying more important than ever. Here are three occasions when accurate flying is essential if you are to keep “ON TRACK AND ON TIME”.
(i) On the short leg out of the target. An incorrect airspeed can make you overshoot and put you several miles off track.
(ii) During the banking search. If poorly flown, or done more to one side than another, you will also wander off track.
(iii) During the corkscrew. If carelessly executed you might get on a reciprocal. It’s been done before.
[Underlined] FLYING INTO CLOUD [/underlined]
It takes all pilots 5 to 10 seconds to “settle down” on instruments after changing over from visual flying. Always go over the instruments well BEFORE entering cloud, and avoid adding that unsettled feeling to other difficulties that you may encounter. Check pitot head “ON”, Suction on both pesco pumps, all instruments O.K., and note outside air temperatures.
[Underlined] NOTES ON PURE FLYING [/underlined]
(i) Look round before starting a turn.
(ii) In turns, correct slip or skid with rudder and keep the nose in the correct position on the horizon with the elevators, not rudder.
(iii) Aileron drag produces yaw, and it is most notable when a large amount of aileron is applied. The solution is in the rudder. Use it.
[Underlined] USE OF BOMB DOOR SELECTOR LEVER [/underlined]
If the bomb door selector lever is half-up or half-down, you will get a runaway film on the camera. So make sure the lever comes right down when selecting bomb doors OPEN. Avoid selecting bomb doors open until on the bombing run, as each time they are selected open an exposure is turned over in the camera. If you have to test the bomb doors ensure that the bombsight is switched off first.
[Underlined] FIRE IN THE AIR – DON’T DIVE [/underlined]
Diving an aircraft in an attempt to put out a fire is forbidden. It invariably leads to disaster because:-
(i) The increased air flow in a dive feeds and spreads the fire.
(ii) The risk of structural failure, if the airframe is weakened by fire, is increased.
(iii) Baling out is difficult, and in a violent dive almost impossible.
[Underlined] CREW AIRMANSHIP [/underlined]
Most new captains have at least 2 – 300 hours flying experience. The crews may not have more than 100 hours. Take practical steps to ensure your crew’s airmanship is as good as your own. Remember the old adage “A chain is as strong as its weakest link”.
(Continued at foot of col. 2)
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING [/underlined]
The length of landing run depends on many variables, including airspeed at touchdown, strength of wind, all up weight, amount of flap used and strength of brakes. The bar of white lights 800 yds from the upwind end of the runway, therefore, can only be used as a measure of distance and not as a safety limit before landing.
[Underlined] Motto for the Month:- [/underlined]
“IF IN DOUBT – GO ROUND AGAIN”
HONOURS & AWARDS [Drawing]
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/Ldr F.W. THOMPSON, D.F.C. D.S.O.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt B.H. BOTHA, D.F.C. D.S.O.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.H. GOLDING D.F.C.
W/Cdr H.Y. HUMPHREYS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/Ldr L.C. DEANE, D.F.C. D.S.O.
A/W/C G.F. GEORGESON, D.F.C. D.S.O.
W/Cdr J.R. JEUDWINE, O.B.E., D.F.C. D.S.O.
A/W/C J. WOODROFFE. D.F.C.
P/O R.R. ORMISTON D.F.C.
F/O N.O. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. ETHERIDGE D.F.C.
F/S D. BRYDEN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
Sgt R.O. NORFOLK D.F.M.
[Underlined} 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.W. CLAYTON, D.F.C. C.G.M. D.S.O.
A/S/L D.J. SHANNON, D.S.O. D.F.C. &BAR BAR TO D.S.O.
W/Cdr J.B. TAIT, D.S.O., & BAR, D.F.C. 2ND BAR TO D.S.O.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C W.A. DEAS, D.F.C. & BAR D.S.O.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O H.F. ROBINSON D.F.C.
F/Sgt J. MICHAEL D.F.M.
F/Sgt C.R. BOLT D.F.M.
P/O A.W.M. BIRCHENOUGH D.F.C.
F/Sgt BOWER D.F.M.
Sgt H.O. SMITH D.F.M.
F/Sgt W.E. MILLER D.F.M.
F/Sgt. C.E. BOWYER D.F.M.
P/O F.S. COLMAN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.J. REYLAND D.F.C.
Sgt J.B. COWAN D.F.M.
P/O J. WOULD D.F.C.
Sgt K. WOOLARD D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
P/O R.L. DAVISON D.F.C.
Sgt R. WOODWARDS D.F.M.
F/Sgt D.M. MURRAY D.F.M.
P/O V.G. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
Sgt E.C. WREN D.F.M.
Sgt H.L. ROBERTS D.F.M.
Sgt J.H. DAVIDSON D.F.M.
F/Sgt K.F. LETTS D.F.M.
Sgt J. MICHIE D.F.M.
Sgt W.H.R. CHAMPION D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. LETT D.F.C.
P/O J.C. MC.KAY D.F.C.
Sgt G.J.W. PARKINSON D.F.M.
P/O J.A. JONES D.F.C.
F/O J.H. SIMPSON D.F.C.
P/O R.H. EWENS D.F.C.
F/O K.S. STOKOE D.F.C.
F/Sgt J.R. PEAKER D.F.M.
F/O L.P. MAPP D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O L. CREED D.F.C.
F/Sgt S. BROWN D.F.M.
F/Lt F.W. CHADWICK D.F.C.
F/Lt A. HAWORTH D.F.C.
P/O J. WATT D.F.C.
F/O W.F. SWINYARD D.F.C.
F/Sgt F.E. BURTON D.F.M.
F/O A.H. CRAWFORD D.F.C.
Sgt D. GROSCOP D.F.M.
P/O D.S. RICHARDSON D.F.C.
F/O H.A. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O A.R. VERRIER D.F.C.
F/Sgt L.C. HOGBEN D.F.M.
Sgt C.A. HORN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt K. VOWE D.F.M.
W/O J. GRAHAM D.F.C.
P/O A.E. STONE D.F.C.
Sgt S. BILLINGTON D.F.M.
P/O R.A. GRIFFIN D.F.C.
F/O S.A. JENNINGS D.F.C.
P/O C.W.J. FRANKLIN D.F.C.
F/O J.C. HODGKINS D.F.C.
Sgt W. DACRE D.F.M.
F/Sgt O.H. MILLAR D.F.M.
A/F/O J.E. GIBBERD D.F.C.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A.C. HELLIER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O C.W. GRAY, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O M.A. ROONEY D.F.C.
P/O C.E. HAYNES D.F.C.
P/O C.E. ERICKSON D.F.C.
P/O F.A. MARDEN D.F.C.
P/O C.W. EARNSHAW D.F.C.
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE D.F.C.
F/O W.E. SIDDLE D.F.C.
P/O N.J. CORNELL D.F.C.
F/O C. BRUDETT D.F.C.
F/O R.E. FOSTER D.F.C.
W/O J.C. PARKER D.F.C.
W/O A.C. STRICKLAND D.F.C.
W/O E. PLUNKETT D.F.C.
F/O H.A. DICKINSON D.F.C.
F/O C.J. PURSEY D.F.C.
F/Sgt C. CASSIE D.F.M.
F/Sgt D.A. LAWES D.F.M.
F/Sgt M.J. BLOWER D.F.M.
Sgt F. WILDMAN D.F.M.
Sgt A.N. JONES D.F.M.
F/Sgt F. JOHNSON [sic]
P/O C.J. DUGGIN D.F.C.
(Contd. On Page 17 Col 2)
5 GROUP NEWS, NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] SIGNALS TRAINING [/underlined]
The month of August saw the start of controlled daylight formation flying, and again the Wireless Operator (Air) came in for a fair share of the work. The Master Bomber and Base Leader’s Wireless Operator had the task of transmitting instructions to the force, and reception of their transmission was very good.
From the W/T point of view, the control of operations during August was very good. The standard of operating by Controller’s Wireless Operators was good throughout, and the work of these operators is appreciated. It was unfortunate that, on the night on which both Link 1 and Link 2 failed to reach the target area, the primary W/T frequency was heavily jammed. We are now all well aware of the tremendous effect of “Jostle” – it really does amount to complete wipe out over a large band.
The initiative shown by the Link 3 Wireless Operator in taking over control, assessing the impracticability of the primary frequency for W/T control, issuing instructions to change to the alternative, and using this channel for W/T control, was very commendable. Also, in this respect, our congratulations go to the 97 Squadron Wireless Operator who, although not detailed as a deputy link, assumed the duties of one, and acknowledged all instructions sent by the Link3. A very good show by both Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS [/underlined]
No. 54 Base again led the field in the number of Wireless Operators who carried out successful tests as laid down in No. 5 Group Signals Instruction No.13. No.55 Base have now taken up the challenge, and very soon we hope to see a healthy competition between all Bases in carrying out these tests.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
Daylight operations during the month interfered a little with the Group W/T Exercise though some Squadrons made a good attempt to carry out every exercise. This is, perhaps, the best W/T Operating practice afforded to Wireless Operators while on the Squadrons, and every effort must be made to ensure that every Wireless Operator does take part. Some good exercises were carried out, but we still have a few offenders who will not listen out before transmitting; some still send VE before callsigns, and the proper use of QVU is not made. Signals Leaders please note.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The use of Early Warning Devices during the month was curtailed quite a bit by daylight operations, but, when required on night operations, they again proved their worth, judging by the number of contacts reported. Now that Squadron Signals Leaders are being given a three days course at the Bomber Command Tactics School, some very valuable information on the tactical use of Early Warning Devices and Radio Countermeasures should be gained, and passed on to the Squadrons, thus showing W/Op (Air) the value of his efforts.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
An outstanding example and inspiration to all Wireless Operators (Air) was given by F/Lt Bean, Station Signals Officer, Coningsby, on the night of 16/17th August. The Controller detailed for the operation that night was without a complete crew, and F/Lt Bean, who had been primarily responsible for the high standard of W/T operating carried out by the Controllers’ Wireless Operators on 54 Base, and who had himself passed the test laid down in 5 Group S.I. No. 13, was detailed to carry out the duties of Controller’s Wireless Operator (Air).
Whilst over the target, the aircraft was hit and set on fire. F/Lt Bean, who was already transmitting his Captain’s instructions for the attack, sent out in plain language to the force the message “Hit and on fire”. Immediately after this transmission, he transmitted further instructions to the force to carry on the attack.
F/Lt Bean set a very fine example of coolness and devotion to duty, and it is hoped that he and all members of his crew were able to make a safe landing.
Further good shows were the commendable efforts of the two 97 Squadron Wireless Operators already mentioned, and a Wireless Operator of 44 Squadron, who, while sending an immediate sighting report of a dinghy, switched his I.F.F. to distress while over the dinghy, informed the M/F section of his action, and when leaving the area again informed the M/F Section of time of switching off. This action enabled a good fix to be taken on his aircraft. It is to be noted that an aircraft crew were rescued in this area the following day.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures against the 3,600 sorties flown in August was 1.722. This is an increase of 0.32 per cent over the figure for July. There were no failures which prevented aircraft from taking off on account of Signals defects. Two early returns were attributed to Signals “equipment failures”. The remainder of the failures reported had no adverse effect on any of the operations.
Over 80% of the total defects were due to component failures, the others being under the category “Miscellaneous”. There were no “manipulation” or “servicing” failures. The result of five of the Signals defect investigations was “No Fault Found”. This is a most unsatisfactory type of report and every effort must be made to get at the roots of such reported defects.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
During the past month, replacement TR.1143 equipment has been in very short supply. It appears that the production of this equipment is decreasing whilst the requirements of A.D.G.B. are steadily increasing. As a result is has been decided to withdraw TR.1143’s and TR.1143A’s from all 5 Group aircraft, and refit the Group with the American version of this equipment, which is known as SCR.522. The problem presenting itself with this changeover is that a complete change of frequencies is also taking place. This means that a normal, steady re-equipping of, say, six aircraft per Squadron each day cannot be done, because all aircraft must be on the same V.H.F. frequencies, and TR.1143 crystals for the new frequencies are not available.
Full quotas of SCR.522 equipment have already been received by 53 and 54 Bases, and now 52 Base have received 75% of their quota. As the equipment arrives at the Squadrons, it is being set up to the new frequencies, modified and bench tested. This will ensure that, when sufficient equipment has been received to fit all Squadrons, a 100 per cent changeover throughout the Group can be effected upon receipt of the executive from this Headquarters.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
During August the disposition of Radar personnel underwent several changes. Radar Officers have been deleted from Squadron strength and placed on Stations as Station Radar Officers. A Radar Officer has also been allocated to R. & I. at Base Stations. Where two Squadrons are based on a Station, the Station Radar Officer controls the Radar servicing of both. The Radar mechanics are divided between the Daily Servicing Section and the R. & I. Section, and thus a division is made in the two maintenance aspects. This should improve the organisation very considerably. The decision to use Wireless Operators (Ground) to assist in Radar Servicing is now being implemented, and the advantage to be derived from this new arrangement will be self-evident.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Although the policy on the use of Loran has not yet been decided upon, the intervening period between now and its installation should be utilised to train the greatest number of Radar Mechanics possible on its maintenance. The six mechanics who attended the course at Headquarter, Bomber Command, were selected as evenly as possible from Bases, and now they, with the aid of those who have had previous experience with the equipment in America, will instruct personnel within their respective Bases. Sets of equipment have been distributed to all Bases for instructional purposes. All relevant technical literature available in the form of the Bomber Command Radar Servicing Manual, Section XIII and C.D. O.526-A, has been issued.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
Numerous unexpected delays have occurred in the production of these indicators, due to the great difficulty in procuring certain components. In some cases diversion orders had to be placed, and consequently temporary bottlenecks developed. Metal screens for the C.R.T. are extremely difficult to obtain, and in an effort to complete a sufficient number of indicators to equip the two Squadrons at Skellingthorpe, all redundant screens have been collected from Stations within the Group. It is hoped that by the time this summary comes off the press, this fitting will have been accomplished as well as that of the remaining Monica IIIA and V Squadrons. We take this opportunity of commending those concerned in 53 Base for their very fine work in constructing these units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee maintained its usual high standard, during the past month, although we did not succeed in boosting it much above July’s figure (.02% to be exact). When it is remembered that at times less Gee sets were held than aircraft, all sue credit should be given to the maintenance personnel for keeping the serviceability at this high level. There were a total of 3207 sorties completed, and out pf these 88 difficulties arose, giving an overall percentage of 97.26. The difficulty in the supply position appears to be due to the shortage of crystals, and so,
(Continued on page 8, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
bearing this in mind, all crystals should be returned to Group Headquarters for repair and re-issue immediately they become unserviceable.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II AND MARK III [/underlined]
Despite the new switching procedure used on two operations during August, the serviceability of H 2 S Mark II was slightly improved. For an increase in sorties of approximately 30% (1635 sorties), 90.52% were completely serviceable. Headquarters, Bomber Command, are analysing the effect of delayed switching of the modulator at high altitudes, and will, if found necessary, take adequate steps to counteract any adverse effect it may have. It would appear, judging from the last operation on which this procedure was used, that provided this switching is done at altitudes of 2000 – 4000 feet, there would be no decrease in serviceability.
Unfortunately Mark III serviceability dropped below July’s figure by 4.73%. Of the 172 sorties completed, 19 developed defects. The percentage free from defects was therefore 88.96. Two of the faults were due to enemy action, and amongst the remaining 17 there were no outstanding component failures. Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are almost completely fitted to Mark III now, and all replacements are of this same type. Several stabilised scanners have been received but at this stage it is difficult to assess their value and efficiency.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Last month saw a slight improvement over July in the serviceability of Fishpond. 1424 sorties were completed, and of these 90.52% gave very satisfactory results. The minimum range of this device is one of the major problems and is one which requires continual attention. Where any evidence exists that the minimum range is abnormally high, immediate steps must be taken to bring it down to the shortest range possible by replacing the defective units.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA resumed its normal position in serviceability during August. There were 36 defects out of 941 sorties completed, giving a percentage of 96.18 serviceable, or an increase of 2.36% over July. The end of the Monica IIIA supply has now been reached, but our first issue of Monica IIIC is being made from Headquarters Bomber Command early in September, to Waddington. Future replacements will be Mark IIIC, and should be in good supply at a very early date.
Monica V, by relinquishing second place, which it held in July, did not by any means experience a decrease in serviceability. Rather, an increase was obtained, and out of 649 sorties completed, 96.0% functioned in the most efficient manner. This fact adds further evidence that, regardless of the odds which may exist, no problem is insurmountable when the proper thought and energy is applied.
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMBING [/underlined]
Headquarters, Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, Issue No. 6, dated September 1st, covers many of the points which would otherwise have been raised in this News.
Special attention is drawn to the responsibilities of Armament Officers in connection with bomb aiming problems. There are two courses now running. The first is the Mark XIV Bombsight Course, at present conducted in No. 4 Group. F/Lt Rogers, the Armament Officer from Winthorpe attended the first course. It is hoped that the Group will have further vacancies on subsequent courses, and it will be possible in time to give all Armament Officers the benefit of such a course. The second course is the Mark XIV Bombsight Analysis Course now being run at Bruntingthorpe. The first few vacancies on the technical courses are being allocated to Base Electrical Officers, and subsequent vacancies will be allocated to Armament Officers.
[Underlined] CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION [/underlined]
Do you circulate your copies of the Armament Bulletin to other Sections who may be interested in the various items? This is particularly applicable to Issue No.6.
[Underlined] DE-BELTING AMMUNITION [/underlined]
It looks as though we have at last found a solution to that vexing problem of de-belting and cleaning ammunition. The machines referred to on Page 29 of the Armament Bulletin are now improved and working at R.A.F. Station, Swinderby, where the Base Armament Officer will be pleased to demonstrate this equipment. Owing to the pressure of operations it is difficult to lay down a time for a visit, but Base Armament Officers should contact S/Ldr Rowed, and make arrangements to see and copy this equipment.
[Underlined] BOMB CARRIERS [/underlined]
Credit is due to R.A.F. Station, Bardney, for producing a prototype Triple Adaptor for the Lancaster centre Stations, to take 3 x 500 lb H.E. bombs.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT QUIZ [/underlined]
Do you know what the letter “G” on a bomb trolley means? If not refer to A.M.O. N.1236/43.
[Underlined] GUNS AND GUNNERY [/underlined]
With the approach of winter, gunnery problems will become more acute. In your keenness to obtain gun serviceability, do not forget that gun aiming problems as well as bomb aiming problems are Armament problems.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION [/underlined]
Co-operation should extend beyond one’s own Unit, and when stores are required urgently for operational use by other Stations, any delay in delivery means inconvenience to other Units. If this Headquarters asks you to send stores immediately by road, make certain that any delay in sending them is reduced to a minimum, and if such a delay is unavoidable, let us know – in other words keep us in the picture.
[Underlined] WAR EFFORT [/underlined]
August has been a busy month, and all previous records have been easily surpassed by the totals of 3,600 sorties and 14,952 tons of bombs dropped.
Credit is due to all Armament personnel in having the goods ready for delivery to the place where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
In order to keep up the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Hun, Bomb Dump organisation must be still further improved, and every yard of storage space used to the best advantage.
ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Fifteen months ago our chief concern was whether the Navigational standard was sufficiently high to ensure that all aircraft would reach the target. With the increase in the number of aids available, this problem has solved itself, and our main worries these days are the finer points of navigation, i.e. rigid adherence to track and timing, and the finding, and the finding of accurate winds for bombing. The standard achieved in track keeping during the last two or three months does not leave much to be desired. We must now concentrate on the two remaining difficulties, i.e. Timing and bombing wind velocities.
If we are to achieve the concentration in timing necessitated by current tactics then all aircraft must arrive at each turning point en route and at the target within ± 1 minute. It is very hard to do this, but on the other hand it must be done. Constant checking of ground speeds and revision of E.T.A’s plus a change of air speed where necessary is the only way that really accurate timing can be achieved. Every Navigator must check and re-check his E.T.A’s as often as possible and must revise the air speed as soon as it becomes evident that revision is essential.
The finding of an accurate bombing wind in the target area is equally important. Here again this is only possible if those Navigators detailed as windfinders realise their responsibility, and work to the utmost limits of accuracy, e.g. do all the plotting necessary to find the target area wind on a large scale chart, plot air positions and fixes by use of dividers and finally check all computations and plotting again and again.
Station Navigation Officers are to concentrate on these two points during the next two months and are to make sure that all Navigators realise the necessity for accurate time keeping, and the finding of accurate wind velocities in the target area.
[Underlined] BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity procedure has been used on five occasions this month. In each instance the results have been very good. It is good to note that the majority of Navigators are transmitting every wind they find. This is of course essential if the Met. Staff are to note any sudden change in the wind velocity.
It would be wise to recall the Berlin raid of March this year, when the winds experienced were 50 miles an hour stronger than forecast. This change took place very suddenly and a vast majority of Navigators suspected their instruments and refused to believe the wind velocity could have increased by such a large amount. The result was that almost all of them “watered down” their wind velocities before transmitting. The Met. Staff, having no other data to work on, had to assume that the ”watered down” wind velocities were correct. At this time not many Squadrons in the Group were equipped with H 2 S, and also aircraft were flying over a continuous sheet of cloud. Consequently the majority of aircraft had to fly on D.R. using broadcast wind velocities for a period of 4 hours. At least 50% of the aircraft were 70 miles south on the return journey, and eventually passed over the Northern fringe of the Ruhr defences, without of course, realising where they were. The results were not as disastrous as they may well have been.
This must not happen again. Once again we repeat “[sic] If you obtain a wind velocity differing from the previous found wind velocities, then provided you are confident about the fix obtained and have checked the A.P.I. you must transmit that found wind velocity. If it is wrong it will be very apparent to the Met. Staff and no harm will be done. If, however, it is right and you do not transmit it, then a great deal of harm may well be done. Read this paragraph over again very carefully and digest it well.
Now to come back to a more cheery and less threatening note. The results obtained this last month have, as was said earlier, been very good. There are still, however, one or two points which are not entirely satisfactory. The chief one is coding and transmission of wind messages. A number of instances occur where the message is coded incorrectly and sometimes this is not very apparent to the receiver of the message. Also Wireless Operators make mistakes in transmission. In each instance the message is of no use. It is very annoying to think that you have worked so hard finding an accurate wind velocity, and then nullified its value by a small slip like wrong coding or transmission. Another point is that wind finders tend to slacken off on the return journey. It is realised that fatigue is partly responsible for this, but nevertheless the wind still blows and will still play tricks on you. So [underlined] DON’T [/underlined] slacken on the return journey no matter how great the temptation.
The best wind finders on each operation were as follows:-
1. BRUNSWICK (12/13.8) – F/O REID (106 Sqdn)
2. STETTIN (16/17.8) – F/O BAILEY (630 Sqdn)
3. DARMSTADT (25/26.8) – F/S KNIGHT ( 44 Sqdn)
4. KONIGSBERG (26/27.8) – F/O YOUDALE (619 Sqdn)
5. KONIGSBERG (29/30.8) – F/O McCAMM (630 Sqdn)
Good work – keep it up!
[Underlined] GENERAL HINTS IN NAVIGATIONAL PROCEDURE [/underlined]
(i) Don’t “flap” – ever!
(ii) Always work to a system, but see that the system is good. The cycle of operations, i.e. fix, air position, alter course if necessary, wind velocity, ground speed check, new E.T.A., should not be repeated oftener than once every 10 minutes nor less than once every 20 minutes.
(iii) Check every calculation at least once. If you are a slow worker, then to ensure you have sufficient time to check all your calculations, use a 15 or 20 minutes system.
(iv) When orbiting or dog legging, before setting course, keep the pilot informed of the number of minutes in hand, e.g. “5 minutes to go” – “3 minutes to go”, etc.
(v) Remember that an aircraft requires time to alter course. The heavier the load, the longer the time required. Make allowances for this, and so avoid overshooting any of the turning points, and subsequent displacement off track.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART WORK [/underlined]
Four months ago we began a drive on more work on the chart and less in the log. The initial trials were a success, and the method was adopted throughout the Group. It was decided, however, not to force it on to the more experienced Navigators who had been used to keeping a very full log.
The reason for reducing the log work was to have more time available for the checking and re-checking of all calculations, and to enable Navigators to obtain that extra fix or ground speed check which is so often vital. A few Navigators can do all this and still keep a full log. If they wish to waste their time by recording unnecessary details, then providing their Navigation suffers in no way, there is no objection. It has been noted, however, that a few Navigators are keeping a detailed log at the expense of accurate Navigation, and constant checking. This must stop immediately. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are to watch carefully for this, and must ensure that no Navigator is wasting valuable time writing a detailed log at the expense of accurate navigation.
[Underlined] A.P.I. ATTACHMENT FOR WINDFINDING [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s News that 5 A. P. I. attachments were installed in aircraft in this Group and trials were to be carried out. The trials have now been completed, and the results achieved have come well up to expectations. More than 20 windfinding exercises were completed, and the winds found were compared with the Balloon Sonde Winds issued by the Met. Office. In every single instance the difference between the two sets of w/v’s was negligible. Practice bombing was completed after 10 of these exercises, and the average vector error obtained was 3 1/4 m.p.h.
The attachments have also been used on operations with equally good results. It is not possible to state the vector error obtained on these sorties, but the winds found by all A. P. I. attachment windfinders were very consistent.
One or two instances of completely “phoney” winds found by the attachments have occurred, however. Investigation has proved that in each case the error was attributable to incorrect tracking over the datum point on the second run up. A displacement of the datum point from the graticule of 500 yards, or a tracking error of 15 °, would give a wind error of 6 miles per hour. Errors of such proportions cannot obviously be tolerated, otherwise the attachment loses all its value.
It is obvious, therefore, that very great care is to be taken on the second run over the target to ensure that the aircraft approaches on the correct heading and the datum point is on the graticule. Such accuracy as is required can only be obtained by constant crew practice, and in view of the fact that these attachments will shortly be distributed to all Squadrons, crews are urged to practice constantly until they can achieve the required accuracy on each run up to the datum point. Windfinding is the responsibility of the Navigators, therefore, it is up to you Navigators to ensure that your pilot and Bomb Aimer practice constantly.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 6.5
Average error of Con. Units – 6.6
(Continues on page 10, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTINUED)
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.4 m.p.h. This is very good. We must now endeavour to reach the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Errors ranked by Squadron and Conversion Units]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the third month is succession. Also 207 Squadron have jumped from 16th place last month to first place this month. A very creditable performance on the part of these three Squadrons.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Creeth Base Nav. Officer, Swinderby to be Squadron Nav. Officer 83 Squadron.
F/Lt Patchett 49 Squadron Nav. Officer to be Base Navigation Officer, Swinderby.
F/Lt Catty, DFC. No. 54 Base to be Squadron Nav. Officer, No.49 Sqdn.
S/Ldr. Mason, DFC. Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby, to be Flight Commander, 97 Squadron.
F/Lt Warwick, DFC. Radar/Nav. Officer, No.1661 Conversion Unit, to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/O Bennet, DFM. No.617 Squadron, to be Sqdn. Navigation Officer.
RADAR/NAV
H2S Operators were presented with numerous opportunities of using H2S to full advantage this month in view of the long range targets that were attacked. It is gratifying to note that after the slackening off in the use of H2S which was noticed last month, operators have at last realised they were neglecting excellent opportunities for obtaining valuable experience of the set under operational conditions. That H2S has been used to advantage has been shown in the number and accuracy of winds received back from windfinding aircraft particularly on this Group’s attacks on Konigsberg. Opportunity was taken to examine some of the Navigators’ and Air Bombers’ charts on these attacks, and they indicated that excellent use had been made of H2S pinpoints en route, and in addition, track keeping, timing and concentration were extremely good. It is therefore up to Navigators, Air Bombers and H2S Instructors to see that this standard is maintained on all future operations.
With the winter months coming along, and the possible increase in the number of stand-downs due to bad weather, more and more time will be available for practice on the H2S synthetic trainers. It is realised that certain inaccuracies inherent in the trainer mechanism, make exact D.R. navigation difficult, but providing the potentiometers on the control panel are matched daily, and the trainer is run for 20 – 30 minutes before each exercise, wind vectors can be found to an accuracy of ± 10° and ± 8 m.p.h.
Standardised routes have been issued as navigational exercises for the Zuider Zee, Hamburg – Bremen and Frankfurt – Saarbrucken trainer maps, and Operators should endeavour to carry them out at frequent intervals, as if they were real flights. Fixes should be made as frequently as possible, and winds found every 15 – 20 minutes. H2S Instructors should check each exercise for accuracy of winds found, ground speed checks, adherence to planned track, E.T.A’s and reliability of fixes. Whilst it is appreciated that both the Navigators’ and set operators’ reactions to H2S may be entirely different in the air, these exercises may help to iron out a lot of difficulties, and assist in forming an accurate assessment of the capabilities of the navigational team.
A system of categorisation of H2S crews has been issued for Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons. This system depends on complete analysis of all operational and training flights, and is being done to ensure the best set operators are matched with the best equipment. It will also ensure that the best navigational teams are chosen as blind markers.
If this system is successful at 54 Base it may be possible to extend it to other H2S Squadrons and assist in ensuring that only the best crews are chosen for the two marker Squadrons.
This month we had the first opportunity of attacking a target entirely blind on H2S equipment. Unfortunately, due to numerous factors, the attack developed over a large area, but many lessons were learnt by this experience and should serve to make another such attack successful. Whilst it may not be possible to carry out this type of attack again, crews are reminded that they must take every opportunity to practice blind bombing, both on the trainer and in the air. Why not make it a habit to carry out at least one practice blind bombing run on H2S every N.F.T? Even if photographs cannot be taken you are at least developing the technique.
H2S mining has been carried out on numerous occasions during the month, and from P.P.I. photographs it is evident that the vegetables were laid in the correct gardens. A considerable collection of excellent photographs of different H2S Coastal landmarks has now been built up, and it has been suggested to Command that slides be issued of these landmarks for use at briefing. Incidentally if your garden is situated at a position which is covered by your H2S trainer maps, why not carry out your H2S briefing in the trainer room with an actual demonstration incorporating the method to be used? Crews will obtain ideal indications of the picture they can expect, and the difficulties they may experience. If you haven’t the map coverage try making your own training maps of the garden areas likely to be visited.
P.P.I. photography still continues to give a few headaches, both to Navigation and Photographic Sections. However, an improvement has been noted during the latter half of the month, and Squadrons are to be congratulated on the quality of the mining photographs taken. 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph of the French Coast near CAEN, the details of which have been confirmed by Command.
When using P.P.I. Cameras, a good photograph depends upon the complete absence of light except that from the cathode ray tube. Watch your cabin lights and the blackouts, and above all see that you give the correct exposure for the type of camera you are carrying.
PPI Photographic Interrogation Reports are being loosely filled in. If you want to be plotted in the position you actually were at the time the photograph was taken, please see you enter correct details on this form. You are probably saving yourself from an investigation at a later date.
By examination of P.P.I. photographs, several manipulation errors have come to light, particularly:
(i) Operators are still having too large a 10 mile zero in the centre of the P.P.I. on the 10/10 scan. By manipulation of the 10 mile zero control this hole should be more of the size of a sixpence, not a half crown.
(ii) Operators are not paying sufficient attention to the correct tuning of the set. They are content with the initial tuning, completely ignoring any retuning at half-hourly intervals, and before carrying out blind bombing runs.
(iii) Too much or too little gain is being employed, and consequently the responses are completely swamped by ground returns or the responses appear too faintly to be recognised or photographed.
(iv) The Contrast control is not being used to advantage. Whilst it is not the usual policy to allow untrained operators to use the contrast control, experienced operators may obtain considerable benefit by slight manipulation of the contract control, particularly when land/water definition is essential.
GEE
During the month, navigators have taken full advantage of the extended ranges now being experienced on Gee with a resultant improvement in navigation.
(Contd. At foot of Col.1)
(Contd. From Col.3)
Excellent use is being made of the frequencies on the RF27 Unit, and many operators report that fading signals are the only restrictions on range.
The new Channel Chain has come into operation this month, and so far the only indications of its range have been obtained on one operation when the average was 0530E at 4900N. No jamming was experienced.
Gee Operators are warned that the practice of calling charts be Series Numbers has been abolished. Sheets which have been re-printed are identified by the name of the chain only. A block has now been inserted to the right of the top margin for operators to insert the number of identification blinks for each chain.
A reshuffle of Gee frequencies is likely in the near future, and Gee operators should take every precaution of checking studs and frequencies before every flight in case sudden change has been made.
Once again it is necessary to warn Navigators that XF frequencies not allocated for their particular targets are not to be used by them. Fixes taken from such transmissions are likely to be in error up to 15 miles. Always ensure that when an XF transmission is given to you that it is for [underlined] your [/underlined] target.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
In spite of very heavy operational commitments during August, twelve Squadrons qualified for the competition.
52 Base are to be congratulated on winning the competition for the fourth successive month (in June the Conversion Units were included and 619 Squadron were second to 1654 Conversion Unit).
49 Squadron have won the competition for the second successive month, and 44 and 619 Squadrons tie for second place. Next month all THREE Squadrons are fighting for 1st place. Any other opposition will be welcomed.
52 Base has also provided the three entries for the “Big Chief” Competition. Group Captain Weir improved his previous month’s result and won the competition.
Next month all crews must guard against larger errors, because we are now measuring all bombs from T.2. and [underlined] not [/underlined] from the C.M.P.I. If you are careless the errors will inevitably be larger. Air Bombers must take care to set on the bombsight the wind the Navigator gives him, and the Navigator must plot his A.P.I. wind correctly to avoid getting a reciprocal wind.
Are all Bombing Leaders aware that for competition purposes, only 5 bombs need be counted, but all 6 must be included in the weekly return?
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st – 49 Squadron – 71 yards
2nd – 619 Squadron – 78 yards
44 Squadron – 78 yards
4th – 9 Squadron - 84 yards
5th – 97 Squadron - 88 yards
6th – 83 Squadron – 90 yards
7th – 630 Squadron – 91 yards
8th – 106 Squadron – 104 yards
9th – 57 Squadron – 105 yards
10th – 207 Squadron – 106 yards
11th – 50 Squadron – 116 yards
12th – 61 Squadron – 117 yards
13th – 463 Squadron, completed only 5 exercises with 121 yards error
14th – 467 Squadron, completed only 2 exercises with 89 yards error
[Underlined] “BIG CHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st G/Capt. Weir (Fiskerton) – 69 yards
2nd W/Cdr. Millward (619 Squadron) – 76 yards
3rd G/Capt. Jeudwine (Dunholme Lodge) – 125 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st – 1661 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd – 1654 C.U. – 66 yards
1660 C.U. – 66 yards
3rd – 5 L.F.S. – 92 yards
Congratulations to 1661 Conversion Unit on winning the competition for the second successive month.
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
AUGUST’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS
Once again, owing to the number of crew errors below 100 yards, only those below 80 yards can be recorded.
Sqdn. or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 (in yards)
617 F/L Iveson Sgt Chance F/O Harrison 75 and 79
F/L Orum P/O Cole P/O Brand 79
S/L Cockshott P/O Booth F/S Gosling 80
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard Sgt Fish 74 and 49
F/O Hamilton F/O Atkinson P/O Jackson 71
97 F/L Parker W/O Carvell F/S Fripp 46-48-54
61 F/O Gibberd P/O Roberts F/S Michael 70
1660 C.U. F/S Atkinson F/O Coyne Sgt Kingston 73
F/S Eakins Sgt Wente Sgt Moulds 80
F/S Croscombe Sgt Devine F/O Reeves 66
1661 C.U. F/S Barratt Sgt Berry Sgt Towle 35
F/O Dow F/O Muddle F/O Orrell 55
F/O Findlay Sgt Hemmingway F/S Larkin 76 and 67
F/O Symes Sgt Bayliss F/O Smith 70
W/O Harrison Sgt Barnett Sgt Smart 69
1654 C.U. W/O Ross Sgt Finch W/O Hayes 66 and 76
F/O Jory F/O Pooley Sgt Craig 61
5 L.F.S. P/O Arndell F/O Porter ? 60
F/S Wiley Sgt Evans Sgt Verry 72
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Diagram] Fig. 1
[Diagram] Fig. 2
This article is addressed to ALL pilots, veterans and freshmen. At the top of this page will be found a plot of 15 bombs dropped by two pilots acting as Air Bombers. For reference purposes we will call the pilot who flew the aircraft for the first 9 bombs – No. 1 Pilot, and No. 2 Pilot flew the aircraft when 9 – 16 were dropped.
Now all fifteen bombs were dropped from the same aircraft, using the same bombsight, and wind velocity which was from 230°. The time taken to drop the bombs was seventy minutes. In other words, the aircraft did not land between the two exercises, not were any settings on the bombsight altered.
If we study the two groups of bombs for a few minutes, we see that there are two very definite groups. No. 1 Pilot (as Air Bomber) has obtained a much smaller group than has No.2 Pilot. [Underlined] WHY? [/underlined] – Can [underlined] YOU, [/underlined] as a pilot give an explanation? Don’t read any further for the moment; have another look at the plot (Fig.1). Now look at the bombs plotted on the same heading (Fig.2).
From these plots we see that there is a tendency for the Air Bomber to overshoot, but also present is a large pilot error. In short, the pilot who flew the aircraft for bombs 9 – 16 was steadier and flew more accurately, more relaxed if you prefer it. This was because No.2 pilot is an experienced Lancaster pilot, whereas No.1 Pilot has not yet mastered “The flying for bombing technique”.
Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] as a pilot, see just how important you are in the bombing team? Grudgingly as Air Bombers, we have to admit that [underlined] you [/underlined] are definitely responsible for about 75% of the success of a successful exercise or operational sortie.
Remember that “flying for bombing” is an art, and only constant practice will ensure you becoming a good bombing pilot.
Remember, also that, as a pilot, flying for bombing with the Mark XIV, your worst crimes are flat turning, skidding, side-slipping and crabbing. The bombsight is fully stabilised. That means that if you bomb in a turn, you [underlined] must [/underlined] apply bank and rudder. In other words, do a PROPER TURN.
If you fly your aircraft in the correct manner on every run-up, you can be sure that [underlined] you, [/underlined] as the pilot, are contributing a great amount to cutting out errors in line.
In short, if you, as a pilot, fly your aircraft correctly, and your Air Bomber aims correctly, you automatically look after “line”. Your stick length looks after “range”.
There is another error present in [underlined] both [/underlined] exercises, and the main clue to finding it is in the above article. Bombing Leaders, Bombing Analysis Officers and Air Bombers – DO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT ERROR IS??? The answer is in another column!!!
RESULTS OF COURSES
F/O Baker (207) was 10th on No.89 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Arkieson (630) was 6th on No. 89 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Wilkie (1661) was 6th on No. 90 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Thomas (617) was 7th on No.90 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Points (61) failed to qualify as a Bombing Leader, obtaining a “C” Category.
Congratulations to F/O Soaper (5 L.F.S.) and P/O Alley (1654 C.U.) on obtaining 1st and 2nd places respectively on No.37 A.B.I. Course.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
A+ = 85 yards or less. A = 140 yards or less
B = 210 yards or less. C = 280 yards or less
D = Over 280 yards.
Congratulations to 50 Squadron on obtaining the 2 A+ categories!
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/L Campbell, D.F.C. (9 Sqdn) [/underlined] reports that No. 9 Squadron is now fully equipped with Mk. XIVA bombsights, and intend to win the Competition in September. At present they are having “teething” troubles.
[Underlined] F/O Clegg (619 Sqdn) [/underlined] is commencing a photographic album, 18” x 18”, in which is to be inserted the best photograph on any operation obtained by any one crew. Alongside the photograph is written such “gen” as bearing and distance from A.P., bearing and distance of markers from A.P. and marking technique etc.
Apologies are due to A/Cdre Sharpe, 54 Base, who carried out a dive bombing exercise in a Lightning during last month, averaging 9 yards for 6 bombs. This information was inadvertently missed last month.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] plotted 4123 bombs dropped by 841 aircraft.
[Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] plotted 1397 bombs dropped by 242 aircraft.
[Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] plotted 1901 bombs dropped by 317 aircraft.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
S/Ldr Brewer leaves 1660 C.U. to take up duties as Bombing Leader at 83 Squadron.
F/Lt McRobbie takes over 1660 Base Bombing Leader duties.
F/O Kennedy (ex 100 Group) has joined No.49 Squadron’s Bombing Section.
F/Lt McCarthy (467 Squadron) tour expired, has moved to 1654 C.U.
F/Lt Woods has succeeded F/Lt Astbury as Bombing Leader to No.617 Squadron.
[Underlined] BOMBING “LADDER” [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a Bombing “Ladder”. Top positions this month are as follows:-
617 Squadron 627 Squadron
1st F/O JOPLIN & CREW F/LT BARTLEY & CREW
2nd F/LT ORAN & CREW F/O WHITEHEAD & CREW
3rd F/LT IVESON & CREW W/CDR CURRY & CREW
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. Your Computor [sic] Box Compass over-reads by 30 ° on all headings. What type of error would result?
2. A certain type of P.F.F. technique uses sticks of flares. Is it Musical Paramatta, Paramatta, Newhaven or Wanganui?
3. If you land away with your bombs fused with ?? you must inform the Armament Officer immediately. What fuses would be used to necessitate this procedure?
4. Some Squadrons have panels modified so that they have a 32 way distributor and [underlined] two [/underlined] pre-selector boxes. Your first pre-selector box reads:-
[Underlined] PRESELECTOR [/underlined] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16.
[Underlined] STATIONS [/underlined] 7,8,9,2,11,12.
You wish to drop 2 separate sticks of 3 flares; what selector switches would you use for each stick?
[Underlined] WARNING: [/underlined] This is not as easy as it first appears. It is vitally important that crews who have to carry out more than one bombing run, know the answer. SEE THAT YOU DO!!
[Underlined] WERE YOU RIGHT??? [/underlined]
The other error present in the two exercises plotted on the opposite page is a “Linear” error common to both exercises. This was caused by a sluggish D.R. compass.
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Exercises by Conversion Unit and Base/Squadron]
There was a slight increase in Pilot’s Link Times for the month but Flight Engineers dropped a little and the overall total was 20 hours less than July. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons were engaged on other special practices throughout the month and only Flight Engineers of 617 did any Link. It’s a point to note, however, that the Link flies well on a rainy day – there were several during August.
AIR SEA RESCUE
Two ditchings occurred in the Group during August. Both crews were saved. Neither ditching was “copy book”, nor were the drills up to the required standard, but in each instance, good use was made of the time available.
[Underlined] “G” of 1654 Conversion Unit. 14th August. [/underlined]
This aircraft was engaged on Air to Sea firing on the afternoon of the 14th, when the pilot found he was unable to maintain height at t low altitude because two engines gave trouble on account of fuel shortage.
There was no time to send out distress messages, but the pilot, seeing a trawler, ditched nearby. The ditching was very well carried out and no-one was hurt, though the Flight Engineer and the two Gunners had not reached their ditching stations and therefore were not braced for the impact.
No crew member inflated his Mae West before the impact and no emergency equipment was taken out of the aircraft. The crew was not aware of the existence of a locking pin in the Dinghy Manual Release and as a result of this and the failure of the immersion switch, the dinghy had to be forced out of its stowage.
The crew were picked up by the trawler within 20 minutes and after being transferred to an H.S.L. were taken to Grimsby.
[Underlined] “J” of 97 Squadron. 15th August. [/underlined]
This aircraft was returning from a daylight operation with the two port engines u/s due to enemy action. The Port inner engine failed to feather and its windmilling action together with other damage caused the aircraft to lose height until it ditched just off the Dutch coast.
W/T distress messages were sent out and the aircraft was in V.H.F. contact with the rest of the formation. It was also escorted by the Controller in a Mosquito.
The aircraft ditched successfully and no-one was hurt though the Wireless Operator stayed too long at his set and on impact was caught in the bulkhead doorway. Again in this ditching no crew member inflated his Mae West until after impact, and no emergency equipment was taken out of the aircraft.
Within two hours of ditching A.S.R. aircraft were on the scene and a Lindholme dinghy as well as an airborne lifeboat was dropped. The crew got the airborne lifeboat under way but because of the proximity of the coast, an H.S.L. was sent out an picked up the crew before they had gone very far.
[Underlined] POINTS TO WATCH [/underlined]
(i) Inflate your Mae Wests before impact.
(ii) Get to your ditching stations smartly on the Captain’s order.
(iii) Know where your emergency equipment is and take it with you.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Due to the fact that no emergency equipment was got out of the aircraft and that the crews concerned did not inflate their Mae Wests until after impact (some members were stunned in each case) both these ditchings might have had sadder endings had not weather and light conditions been so favourable.
For the sake of your own lives don’t be half-hearted about your Safety Drills.
PRACTICE IN SAFETY DRILLS IS MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS EXPENSIVE THAN LIFE INSURANCE.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
August started with three abortive attacks on Siracourt, La Beteque and Mont Candon. Unfortunately all three areas were cloud covered and aircraft brought their bombs home.
[Underlined] BOIS DE CASSAN – DAY, 2ND AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN 100 Lancasters were to attack this target visually using Oboe Markers as a guide on their bombing run. The majority of crews bombed visually and only a few reported seeing the Oboe markers.
RESULTS Partial P.R.U. cover obtained shows that the Northern half of the target was obliterated.
[Underlined] TROSSY ST. MAXIMIN – DAY, 2ND AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber :- W/C. Simpson
PLAN The target was marked by P.F.F. Oboe Mosquitoes. The 94 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes attacked in conditions of 3-7/10ths patchy cloud.
RESULTS P.R.U. and strike photographs reveal fresh damage in the target area, a large rectangular building partially wrecked, and a number of craters to the South and South East of the target area.
[Underlined] TROSSY ST. MAXIMIN – DAY, 3RD AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Porter (Lanc.)
PLAN The aiming point was marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and crews were to bomb visually using these as a guide.
RESULTS 1 Group attacked this target 15 minutes before 5 Group, and consequently the aiming point was difficult to identify, owing to thick smoke in the target area. P.R.U. cover showed the area to have been well plastered, and certainly one and possibly three of the tunnel entrances were blocked.
[Underlined] ST. LEU – DAY, 5TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe
PLAN The aiming point was to be marked by both Oboe and 54 Base Mosquitoes and 189 Lancasters were detailed to bomb visually using the markers as a guide.
RESULTS 6/10th cloud at the target made bombing difficult. The majority of crews made runs from land marks in the target area, and consequently bombing was scattered. P.R.U. cover shows further subsidence round the Southern entrance to the caves, and road and rail communications leading to the entrance were blocked.
[Underlined] BOIS DE CASSAN – DAY, 6TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN This Flying Bomb Storage target was to be marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and 101 aircraft were to attack the aiming point visually.
RESULTS This attack was unsuccessful due to the force running into heavy Cu.b. cloud on track about 20 miles from the target. The force became disorganised, and many aircraft returned to Base because they heard an order from the Master Bomber over R/T to do so. Considerable interference was present and the Master Bomber is missing so that it is impossible to check this order. 39 aircraft carried on and bombed the target which was clear. Fighter escort found their task extremely difficult with the result that more than 12 of our aircraft were attacked by enemy fighters in the target area. Two enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed and three damaged, while the fighter escort without loss, destroyed two and damaged two.
P.R.U. cover showed that what bombing took place was good and the storage units and buildings immediately South of the aiming point were hit.
[Underlined] SECQUEVILLE BATTLE AREA – 7/8TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN This target was planned to assist land forces. In all, five aiming points were marked by Oboe Mosquitoes. The first phase of the bombing went according to plan, but after five minutes the Master Bomber ordered crews back to Base as smoke was making bombing impossible.
RESULTS The attack, though generally concentrated around the aiming point spread to the North/North East for a distance of approximately 1500 yards.
[Underlined] CHATTELERAULT – 9/10TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe (W.A/P) W/C. Simpson (E.A/P)
PLAN On this attack two aiming points were allotted and a common marking point was selected. One force was to use an over-shoot and the second force a vector. Marking to be carried out by 54 Base.
RESULTS Marking was difficult and was delayed due to hazy conditions. The marking point however, was eventually marked with reasonable accuracy and both Master Bombers ordered their forces to attack as planned. After five minutes bombing the markers became obscured by smoke and further T.I’s were dropped; these undershot by some 20 yards, and fresh bombing instructions were given to each force, who completed their bombing.
P.R.U. cover shows storage areas around both aiming points to be heavily cratered. The effect of blast and fire is seen over a considerable area. This attack shows that although a minimum quantity of marking is necessary for a good concentration, initial marking should be adequate to ensure that it will stand the smoke caused by subsequent bombing.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 10/11TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN The aiming point was marked direct by Green T.I’s. Again there was some trouble from smoke and further backing up was ordered. Owing to crew manipulation error, incorrect switches were selected and the markers fell in a long stick, approximately 1,00 yards wither side of the aiming point. Bombing however, continued on the concentration of markers.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show the Eastern bank of the river to be heavily cratered and severe damage caused to an oil and petrol storage park and also to corn silos and warehouses. This is an occasion when bad drill on the part of a member of a crew can cause scatter to what might have been an extremely concentrated attack.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – DAY, 11TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe
PLAN The Master Bomber dropped yellow T.I. cascading on the aiming point. This was to serve as a guide for crews in the run-up. A visual vector point was selected and a vector wind broadcast by the Master Bomber.
RESULTS The attack went according to plan and a good concentration was reported, although P.R.U. cover showed little damage to the submarine pens.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 11/12TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- (Northern Aiming Point) W/Cdr Simpson (Southern Aiming Point) S/Ldr Owen
PLAN Two aiming points were detailed for this target.
(i) Marshalling Yard to the South (Red Aiming Point).
(ii) Junction to the South (Green Aiming Point).
On the Northern aiming point vector bombing was employed and on the Southern direct bombing of the aiming point.
RESULTS On the Northern Aiming Point some uncertainty existed about the accuracy of marking. The force was instructed to stand off for five minutes and instructions were passed to backers up. Backing up was not accurate and a large concentration of markers resulted. Master Bombers ordered the crews to bomb the M.P.I. of the markers, which formed a triangle with sides about 500 yards, with zero wind. The correct wind vector, however, should have been 214/13 m.p.h. on the Southern Aiming Point, but bombing was completed before the Deputy Master Bomber realised his error. The direct marking went according to plan and accurate bombing followed. P.R.U. cover shows that the attack was fairly successful and that damage was inflicted around both aiming points.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 12/13TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN This attack was of an experimental nature to determine the accuracy of blind bombing on H2S.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows some fresh incidents in the town but these are mostly scattered. There is one small concentration in the Northern part of the city.
[Underlined] RUSSELSHEIM – 12/13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN Approximately 200 aircraft of this and other Groups were to attack the Opel Works at Russelsheim. A Master Bomber was provided by P.F.F. and the aiming point marked by controlled Paramatta.
RESULTS The markers were rather scattered and although results were difficult to assess it would appear that bombing was not
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
particularly concentrated. P.R.U. cover shows that new damage was caused to the South West area of the target although fires spread to woods some three miles away and to residential property to the South East.
[Underlined] FALAISE – 12/13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 25 aircraft from this Group were called for at short notice, together with 85 aircraft of other Groups to attack land positions in support of our land forces. Musical marking was carried out by P.F.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. shows very heavy cratering around the aiming point, with very few loose sticks.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 20 aircraft of 53 Base were detailed to attack oil storage. There was no marking and all crews identified the aiming point and bombed visually.
RESULTS Although several sticks were reported to have straddled the aiming point and strike photographs show bomb bursts in close proximity, P.R.U. cover showed only minor damage to the aiming point.
[Underlined] QUESNEY – 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN This was a large scale attack in which Bomber Command gave support to our land forces. Aiming points were marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and as our troops were only approximately 2000 tards from the aiming point, accurate bombing was essential.
RESULTS Crews bombed either markers or the upwind edge of the area of smoke. Apart from one stick which appeared to fall about 600 yards North of the markers, bombing was concentrated. P.R.U. photographs taken show that the area was saturated and severe destruction inflicted.
[Underlined] BREST – EVENING, 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Shipping in Brest Harbour was the target for 130 aircraft of this Group. Targets were assigned as follows:-
No.52 Base – a hulk
No.53 Base - a tanker
Nos. 54 and 55 Bases – a cruiser
PLAN All crews were to bomb visually, no markers being dropped. The Master Bomber was to precede the force to the target and broadcast the direction and lie of the ships.
RESULTS Weather at the target was clear and all Bases claimed a proportion of hits on their aiming points. P.R.U. photographs taken on the 15th August at almost half tide showed that:-
(i) The hulk was still afloat.
(ii) The tanker was awash.
(iii) The cruiser had disappeared.
Photographs taken the following day show an object in the former position of the cruiser, which may be its wreck.
GILZE RIJEN AND DEELEN AIRFIELDS – 15TH AUGUST
These airfields were allotted to this Group with approximately 100 aircraft on each.
PLAN 54 Base Mosquitoes were to drop cascading yellow T.I’s on each aiming point and these were to be used as a guide to visual bombing. The aircraft were to fly in company, led by 54 Base.
RESULTS All crews were able to identify and bomb the target visually and heavy damage was inflicted on both targets.
[Underlined] STETTIN – 16/17TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN Approximately 450 Bomber Command aircraft were to attack Stettin with full P.F.F. Marking. The marking in the early stages was reported as accurate but as the attack progressed, the marking became more scattered. The Master Bomber controlled the operation as the situation demanded although bombing spread back on track and to some woods to the North West of the target.
RESULTS From P.R.U. photographs taken, devastation could be seen through a gap in the cloud, but the extent of this has not as yet been ascertained.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 18TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 25 Lancasters were to attack oil storage – all bombing to be carried out visually.
RESULTS The weather was clear but hazy. The attack was scattered due to accurate heavy flak, making a steady bombing run almost impossible.
[Underlined] L’ISLE D’ADAM – 18TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN 160 aircraft were despatched to attack a supply depot in the forest of the L’Isle D’Adam. Oboe Mosquitoes were to mark a point three miles from the target to assist crews on their run-up. Two aiming points were allotted which were marked by 54 Base Mosquitos dropping smoke bombs.
RESULTS All crews were able to bomb visually and P. R. U. photographs show the target area to be heavily cratered.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 19TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 51 aircraft of 53 Base were to attack oil storage installations. All bombing to be carried out visually.
RESULTS Cloud made target observation difficult and the attack was somewhat scattered, although some bursts were observed near the oil storage depot.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 24/25TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN This town was to be attacked by the Group in strength. A point in the centre of the town was to be marked and each Base to use a separate false vector so that bombing would be well distributed over the town centre, around the aiming point.
RESULTS Weather conditions were perfect, and flares, although doubtful at the time, were proved by photographs to have been dropped accurately. Difficulty was experienced by the visual markers in identifying the aiming point. This was eventually recognised but before the Mosquitos could manoeuvre into position and carry out marking, the last of the flares had died out. The Master Bomber had to return early due to failure of VHF and Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 were shot down before reaching the target area. The main force therefore arrived at the target without a Master Bomber. In the absence of any marking and control, W/T Link 3 took charge and ordered the force to bomb on instruments.
P.R.U. photographs show some incidents scattered throughout the built up area. Although there was no control at the target, and the main reason for failure of the attack was due to no marking being down; the weather was favourable and the flares were accurate, and this case proves that it is impossible to spend too much time on careful study of target photographs. The visual marker, has only at the best a fleeting glance of the aiming point and he must arrive at the target with a complete and real picture in his mind of the aiming point and land marks in relation thereto.
[Underlined] KONIGSBERG – 26/27TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroofe
Konigsberg was singled out for attention by 5 Group, 174 aircraft from all Bases being detailed. Weather at the target was clear, visibility good.
PLAN The normal 5 Group technique of illumination was employed, the aiming point to be marked visually and backed up if accurate. Crews were to bomb T.I’s direct.
RESULTS Illumination was punctual, three markers identifying the target simultaneously, and dropping their markers together. The first was 350 yards North West of the aiming Point, the second 1200 yards to the North East. The Master Bomber dropped his own markers about 500 yards East of the aiming
[Underlined] O.R.S. ANALYSIS OF RAIDS [/underlined]
(a) Percentage of loose bombs.
(b) Radius of 50% circle (i.e. half the bombs dropped fell more than this distance from the centre of concentration).
(c) Distance of M. P. I. from Aiming Point.
[Table of Analysis of Raids]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
point and midway between the two previous markers. He then ordered the backers up to back these up, but the first backer up disobeyed these instructions and backed up those which had fallen 1,200 yards to the North East, which he believed to be accurate. The Master Bomber was not aware of this misplacement of the concentration and once the bombing started he found assessment difficult due to glare. As a result the concentration of bombing fell to the North East of the aiming point. This failure proves two points, firstly that the technique of one aircraft marking and this marking being assessed is the only way to achieve success. The fact that three markers dropped their load together was the primary cause for the great spread in bombing. Secondly, had the backer up obeyed the Master Bomber’s instructions implicitly, then the attack would have been misplaced by some 500 yards instead of 1500yards. There must be one Controller only at the target, and his orders must be obeyed rigidly.
[Underlined] KONIGSBERG – 29/30TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C Woodroffe.
Another heavy attack was despatched against this target the following night, and it was hoped on this raid to make up for the failure of the previous raid. 8-10/10ths strato cu, base 11,000 feet was encountered at the target.
PLAN The marking force was allowed 12 minutes to illuminate and mark the target. On this attack a marking point was chosen, and was to be marked visually with Red and Green T.I’s. Each Base was allotted a separate heading of attack and release of bombs was delayed for varying time intervals, in order to get a good distribution of bombs around the aiming point.
RESULTS The attack went according to plan and P.R.U. photographs show that almost the entire built up area of the city has been devastated, except for two small areas. This area of devastation, almost entirely by fire, stretches nearly 3,000 yards from East to West, and 2,000 yards from North to South. This area is confined to the main built up area of the city and does not extend West of the railway bridge across the river.
[Underlined] ROLLENCOURT, AUCHY LES HESDINS, BERGENEUSE – 31ST AUGUST [/underlined]
Three forces of aircraft were despatched from the Group to attack the above three flying bomb targets.
PLAN In each case 54 Base Mosquitos were to drop smoke markers as a guide for visual bombing. Weather was uncertain and aircraft were instructed to orbit if the targets were temporarily obscured by cloud.
RESULTS Some orbiting was necessary, but all three attacks were carried out according to plan. Bombing on each target was fairly concentrated and P.R.U. cover gives evidence of very extensive damage.
The most successful attack of these three was on Rollencourt.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ETAPLES – 4TH AND 5TH AUGUST [/underlined]
617 and 9 Squadrons attacked the railway bridge at Etaples in daylight on August 4th. The weather over the target was clear although some patches of cloud were encountered on the run-up.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows that four direct hits were scored on the double track bridge, whilst the single track bridge also sustained damage.
This bridge was attacked by 9 Squadron on the following day, but although conditions were good the attack was generally disappointing. Due to a miscalculation on the part of the formation leader the actual bombing heading carried out was almost parallel to the bridge itself, and consequently 75% of the sticks burst to the West of the bridge. Although there are two possible fresh hits on the Southern end of the target, the attack must be considered a failure due to the wrong heading of approach.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On the 5th August 617 Squadron attacked the submarine pens at Brest with 12,000 lb. bombs. Aiming was visual and weather at the target was good.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover confirms at least five direct hits on the pens, of which three were definite penetrations.
[Underlined] LORIENT – 6TH AND 7TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On this attack 617 Squadron were supported by No. 106 Squadron and had submarine pens for their target in daylight. The 617 Squadron leader was to drop two red T.I’s as areas markers to assist visual bombing.
RESULTS It is believed that at least two direct hits were scored on the submarine pens with a number of near misses. P.R.U. photographs show four hits on the wet pens and further damage caused by 12,000 pounders between the wet and the dry pens.
617 and 9 Squadrons were detailed to attack this target the following day, but weather prevented visual bombing and bombs were brought back to base.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 9TH AUGUST [/underlined]
In this attack 617 Squadron were allotted the submarine pens whilst 9 Squadron were given adjacent oil installations. A 9 Squadron aircraft was to precede the main force by 20 minutes to find a bombing wind by means of the API attachment. All bombing was to be carried out visually.
RESULTS [Underlined] 617 Squadron. [/underlined] 12 x 12,000 lb. bombs were dropped and P.R.U. cover confirms that a direct hit or hits on the S.E. corner of the pens caused a collapse of the roof over an area of 240 feet x 120 feet. There were also three further direct hits with possible penetration.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] reported the attack to have been fairly successful although many under-shoots and over-shoots were reported. The storage tanks are not therefore thought to have received the full weight of the attack.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 11TH AUGUST [/underlined]
The submarine pens were again the target for 617 Squadron who were carrying 2,000 lb. A.P. bombs. Bombing was to be carried out visually from beneath 16 and 18,000 feet.
RESULTS The bombing was accurate although smoke tended to become troublesome towards the end of the attack. P.R.U. cover shows at least four hits although none of these appear to have penetrated the roofs of the pens.
[Underlined] BREST – 12TH, 13TH AND 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Continuing the attacks against submarine pens, 617 Squadron visited Brest in a daylight attack in which 8 x 12,000 lb bombs were to be aimed visually at the aiming point.
RESULTS Weather at the target was clear and only one bomb reported to be wide of the target. P.R.U. cover shows that two bombs penetrated the roof, one in the centre making an opening of almost 50 feet across, whilst a third has taken off part of a corner of the roof at the Western side. There are two other possible hits which have not penetrated the roof.
[Underlined] 13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On the following day 9 Squadron supported 617 Squadron in a second attack on the pens and shipping in the harbour. 5 x 12,000 lb. bombs were carried, the remaining loads being made up of 1,000 lb. A.P. bombs.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover reveals one direct hit which may have penetrated the pens, with two other very near misses close to the Northern wall.
9 Squadron were allotted a tanker in the harbour whilst aircraft of 617 Squadron were to attack the cruiser. P.R.U. cover showed that the cruiser was still intact, but that the tanker was awash at the stern and was resting on the bottom.
[Underlined] 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
The cruiser was the target for 617 Squadron whilst 14 Lancaster of 9 Squadron were to attack a hulk which had been towed into the harbour. Weather was clear at the target. Bombing was not as good as had been experienced in previous attacks and P.R.U. cover showed that both vessels were still intact and undamaged after the attack.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE, 16TH AND 18TH AUGUST [/underlined]
617 and 9 Squadrons were detailed to attack the submarine pens but 9/10ths cloud was encountered at the target and the attack was abortive. On the 18th August, however, the Squadrons paid a second visit in good weather conditions. 6 x 12,000 lb. bombs were carried, the remaining aircraft carrying 2,000 lb. and 1,000 lb. A.P. bombs.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows at least one hit and possibly two on the roof of the pens by the 12,000 lb. bombs, but no bombs
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 16.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
appear to have penetrated.
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 24 TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Enemy E and R Boat pens were the target for 617 and 9 Squadrons in a daylight attack when 12,000 lb. bombs and 1,000 lb. bombs were carried. The attack was carried out in clear weather.
RESULTS All crews were able to identify the aiming point and bombing appeared concentrated. P.R.U. cover shows one hit in the Western half of the pen which has penetrated into the pen and blown out a large portion of the rear.
[Underlined] BREST – 27TH AUGUST [/underlined]
A hulk and Sperrbrecher were detailed for 617 and 9 Squadrons respectively for a daylight attack. Weather at the target was clear with slight haze. All crews to bomb visually.
RESULTS Hits were claimed by both squadrons on their aiming points, and these are confirmed by P.R.U. cover, which was taken on the same day. This revealed that the hulk has disappeared and that there are signs of mud displacement around the position of this vessel. The Sperrbrecher is still afloat with much debris on the decks.
Wishful Thinking
I saw a Service switchboard,
A most amazing sight,
It filled me with deep wonderment,
And thrilled me with delight.
For dainty creatures fingered
Their cords with grace and charm,
And [underlined] rarely [/underlined] gave wrong numbers,
And [underlined] never [/underlined] lost their calm.
They all had silvery voices,
Melodious and untarnished,
And each had lovely finger-nails,
Not one of which was varnished.
Their speed was quite phenomenal,
Their tact a perfect joy;
Their supervisor sat at ease,
With nothing to annoy.
They never cut subscribers off,
They always saw calls through,
And never, never argued
With their clients as others do.
Their calm serene detachment,
No traffic could abate.
They scarcely ever faltered
Or were known to hesitate.
A vision so astounding
Pure phantasy did seem.
The shock it gave awoke me
And dispersed my precious dream.
Anon. (Circa 1944)
HONOURS & AWARDS (CONTINUED)
NON IMMEDIATE AWARDS (Continued)
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt E.F. CAWDERRY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O J.K. BELL D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BENTON D.F.C.
P/O J.P. DOWN, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.M. NELSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Lt C.B. OWEN D.F.C.
F/O W.G. WISHART, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt SMITH D.F.C.
A/F/O B.J. LINDSAY D.F.C.
F/O P.J. CRANE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A. ROMANO D.F.C.
F/O J.R. GLAZEBROOK D.F.C.
F/O W.G. SEYMOUR D.F.C.
F/Sgt J.V. BEVAN D.F.M.
F/Sgt A.M. McKIE D.F.M.
F/Sgt G. HOYLAND D.F.M.
F/Sgt R.A. SNOWDEN D.F.M.
Sgt J.S. WILLIAMS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.G. FURNISS D.F.C.
F/O G.R. ANDREWS D.F.C.
P/O F. COLLIS D.F.C.
P/O F.J.A. REDMAN D.F.C.
P/O V.J. GLANN D.F.C.
P/O A.G.R. UDSON D.F.C.
F/Sgt E.J. DAWISON D.F.M.
F/Sgt C. ALLSOP D.F.M.
F/Sgt R. EDWARDS D.F.M.
F/Sgt R.S.J. CAPON D.F.M.
F/Sgt G.J. SCUFFINS D.F.M.
F/Sgt F.W. LOGAN D.F.M.
Sgt C. GIDMAN D.F.M.
Sgt A.H. ALLISON D.F.M.
Sgt W.H.A. YOUNGS D.F.M.
Sgt H.G. HALL D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt D.A. BROOM D.F.M.
P/O A.R.S. BOWMAN D.F.C.
F/Sgt M.C.J. BARBER D.F.M.
F/O F.L. MERRILL D.F.C.
P/O J.F. FREEMAN D.F.C.
W/O K.F. FLUTE D.F.C.
Sgt E.F. MARTIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.W. COULSON D.F.C.
P/O W. MACKAY D.F.C.
P/O W.L. GIBBS D.F.C.
P/O G.B. QUARTERMAINE D.F.C.
P/O J.W. McMANUS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O P. BUTLAN D.F.C.
P/O L.J. WARNER D.F.C.
P/O J.C. DOUGHTERY D.F.C.
F/O F.C. SECKER D.F.C.
P/O F.L. CHIPPERFIELD D.F.C.
P/O R.W. OLSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. SAINT-SMITH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O G.B. HEATH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.W. HILL D.F.C.
P/O H.C. RODGERS D.F.C.
F/O F.D. SPENCER D.F.C.
F/Sgt A.W. JEFFREY D.F.M.
F/Sgt G.A. DAVIES D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
Successful trials at Dunholme Lodge of an addition to the present landing scheme have resulted in its introduction throughout the Group. The addition has been effected by bringing back the call-up point to the funnel and renaming the existing call-up point “CHECK” where the pilot does actually check his Stud ‘B’. This has entailed an amendment to the Plus 1/2 and Plus 1 position which are now defined as QDM of runway plus 90 degrees. The additional position gained by moving the call-up point has minimised stacking and given the pilots further time in which to adjust their positions. The major gain made by the move is, however, that at all airfields the call-up point is very definitely marked by the first lead-in light.
Experiments are being conducted at Waddington with “American High Lights”, located in the centre of the airfield to define the various positions on the circuit. These lights give a beam of 15°and are of the type now being installed at Winthorpe for runway lighting in conditions of poor visibility.
Following the success of Spilsby’s experiment of utilising the second Duty F.C.O. to “shepherd” the aircraft on the circuit, the practice is to be made general throughout Group. “Shepherding” has resulted in regular spacing with consequent greater safety margin and improved landing times. In effect, the F.C.O. “talks down” the aircraft. For weather protection, Spilsby have given the F.C.O. a m/u turret on the roof. Their lay-out and the method of control used are worth seeing and will well repay a visit.
Landing times can still be much improved. Aircraft are still arriving at irregular intervals. S.F.C.O’s must continue to impress on crews at briefing the essential point of a regular flow of aircraft on return. Spasmodic “bunching” and unnecessary delay break down the whole principle upon which the landing scheme is based. Crew drill can give the same regular flow to one squadron airfields as to two squadron airfields, and crew drill is solely dependent on discipline of the highest order.
One final point about overshoots. The airfield controller has a large responsibility in that final instructions to overshoot if necessary will emanate from him. Although the airfield controller will always err on the safe side, there are still far too many instances of aircraft being instructed to overshoot, when in actual fact they could land with safety. This is proved time again by the fact that the overshooting aircraft rarely overhauls the aircraft on the runway until is clearing the runway.
It is also realised that the airfield controller finds difficult to access the range of approaching aircraft solely by means of
(Contd. In Col.1)
(Contd. From Col.3)
navigation lights. To assist them therefore simple range finders will be provided.
S.F.C.O’s should point out to airfield controllers that an overshoot is not without a certain amount of risk, and that whenever possible aircraft should be allowed to land, and not just be given instructions to overshoot in order to be on the safe side.
[Underlined] AUGUST LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 17
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, August 1944
5 Group News, August 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 25, August 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about sports, engineering , war effort, gunnery, training, equipment, photography, gardening, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, honours and awards, signals, armament, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, air sea rescue, link trainer, operations, special operations, flying control, wishful thinking, tactics, accidents, and the Stirling.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-08
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
18 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-29
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
England--Lincolnshire
France--Brest
France--Creil
France--Etaples
France--Falaise
France--Hesdin
France--La Pallice
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Lorient
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Siracourt
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Netherlands--Arnhem
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Tilburg
Poland--Szczecin
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Poland
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-08
1944-08-03
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
sport
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Base Commander [Initials]
Base Int:
V GROUP NEWS V
FEBRUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] * NUMBER 19
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The German night fighters have once again been forced to change their night fighting tactics, and this change has increased the importance of accurate flying, especially as regards airspeeds. Until recently, German fighters were sent to orbit over the city which the German Command thought was the one to be attacked. Owing to the ingenious selection of routes for the Bomber Force these tactics proved a failure and the Germans have now gone over to a new method, which is to give the fighters courses to steer which will intercept the bomber stream.
It is obvious that the greater the length of the stream the greater will be the chances of the fighters coming across some portion of it and it is, therefore, of the utmost importance that that all Captains should maintain the most accurate timing from the concentration point to the target. The aim should be never more than plus or minus 2 minutes from the times laid down. This standard is very far from being reached at present and a proportion fail to achieve better than plus or minus 10 minutes. If some are 10 minutes early and some 10 minutes late the effect is to spread the Lancasters over a distance of 60 miles greater than that planned, i.e. it nearly doubles the length of the bomber stream and increases in this ratio the chances of interception.
Until recently time keeping was beset by many difficulties. Each Navigator was responsible for finding his own wind vectors and from these calculating new ground speeds and E.T.A’s. The majority of aircraft were not equipped with H2S and, therefore, had little chance of finding accurate winds when outside Gee range.
This problem has now been solved by the use of the Command wind broadcast to all aircraft and by the newly introduced moveable T.O.T. In future, provided crews leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered, and fly at the speeds and heights laid down in the Flight Plan, they will arrive at the target at the correct time to commence their attack. Should they encounter winds different from those used for timing the operation, a new T.O.T. based on the new winds will be transmitted by wireless.
Responsibility for time keeping therefore, devolves primarily to the Pilot, who must not only ensure setting course from the concentration point at the right time, but must thereafter keep rigidly to the speeds laid down. In view of the enormous importance which timing has now assumed, a special drive is being undertaken to improve results and to eradicate those errors which still cause aircraft to arrive early or late, or to stray off track.
A report analysing a number of recent operations has been circulated to Squadrons and I hope this will be read by all Captains and Navigators. It shows how apparently trivial mistakes can build up into serious errors and illustrates the need for extreme care and accuracy in every stage of navigation.
Two key points are :-
(i) Captains must leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered.
(ii) They must maintain heights and speeds decided at Flight Planning.
TACTICS
[Underlined] TACTICS AND PLANNING [/underlined]
A new type of attack was introduced this month, whereby the main force and P.F.F. were divided into two forces to attack the same target with an interval of 2 – 2 1/2 hours between zero hours. It is not possible to form conclusions from the limited evidence obtained from the two attacks which were carried out, but two advantages of this scheme are obvious:
(i) P.F.F. Marking of the second phase should be accurate – observation of the location of the first phase M.P.I. providing an opportunity for visual markers to correct any apparent displacement of the attack.
(ii) A carefully timed interval may increase the difficulties of the enemy fighter force, compelling them to refuel either before or during the second phase attack.
Assessment of the results of the Schweinfurt attack, 24/25th February, points to the probable achievement of both these aims. Losses for the second phase were less than the first, although the number of combats was greater in the second phase; the M.P.I. of the attack was in fact nearer the aiming point than the first phase attack. For this type of attack to be successful, however, the temptation to bomb the centre of the fires from the first attack must be strongly resisted, and implicit faith placed in the second phase marking, whether it be coincident with the first attack or some distance away.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
Bullseyes routed North-East towards Denmark have been very helpful to the bomber force on two occasions during the month. Shielding the bombers’ Southerly courses to Schweinfurt and Augsburg, Bullseye aircraft drew many fighters from South Germany to the North, and comparatively low losses on both those night were undoubtedly partly due to this well planned diversion. Accurate timing on the part of Bullseye aircraft is essential however, if they are to simulate a concentrated bomber stream.
It is thought that Units taking part in Bullseyes are not deriving as much benefit from these exercises as is possible. The need for a more precise interrogation of crews into types of manoeuvre taken against fighter and searchlights is obvious. This Headquarters is examining the various fighter and bomber crew reports available, and endeavour will be made shortly to issue a collated summary of interceptions for each Bullseye, for tactical discussions at Stations.
The following incident which came to light a few days ago reflects the general attitude of crews towards Bullseyes:-
A Polish fighter pilot made three attacks on a bomber during a Bullseye exercise, flashing three “kills”. The fact that there was no response from the bomber during any of the attacks aroused his interest and he finally closed right in with landing lamp on, and this revealed – empty mid-upper and rear turrets.
No accusation is made against crews in this Group, but this sort of thing is most discouraging to the fighter boys, and certainly does not stimulate their interest in bomber tactics. More than this, it shows a stupid lack of interest on the part of the bomber crew. Remember that 50% of a bomber crew’s job is to bring the aircraft and themselves back safely to fight another day. This can hardly be expected if gunners throw away the only chance they have of seeing a fighter attack at night, before meeting a real Hun which flashes cannon shells instead of its landing light.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The enthusiasm of Squadrons in Monica and Fishpond training is welcomed, but there is still room for improvement. Wireless Operators must not relax until they are able to interpret the cathode tube from a mere glance. Remember that whilst you are thinking whether to report a blip or not, you can be shot out of the sky. Interpretation and reporting must be immediate and accurate. If you know your drill you can get away with it. Here’s someone who did :-
“At 2127 in the target area Monica indicated a fighter closing rapidly at 1,800 yards. Lancaster corkscrewed at 750 yards. Enemy aircraft then opened fire but tracer went above the Lancaster. Later gunners identified JU.188 at 100 yards range as they fired, tracer ricochetted [sic] off the nose of the fighter. JU.188 claimed as damaged.
[Underlined] Conclusions [/underlined]
(i) The fighter’s burst would obviously have been fatal if the Lancaster had not corkscrewed.
(ii) A standard patter was carried out throughout the attack and a corkscrew was started at the correct range on Monica.
Do [underlined] you [/underlined] know the standard patter and tactics? If not, study 5G/34/Air dated 4th February, 1944 (Appendix “A”) until you talk Monica language in your sleep.
[Underlined] TAILPIECE [/underlined]
The following is quoted without comment with apologies to A.A. Command Intelligence Review :-
“On 24 Feb. according to the Berlin radio, American bombers flew over Switzerland. This radio conversation is then stated to have been exchanged between Swiss A.A. gunners and the USAAF :-
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “Look out, you are over Switzerland.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “If you don’t turn back we shall shoot.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
(Swiss guns open fire)
[Underlined] USAAF “Your A.A. fire is about 1,000 feet too low”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “We know!”
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
Concentration this month was, on the whole, better than last month. Timing with the exception of the raids on LEIPZIG (19/20 February) and SCHWEINFURT (24/25th February) was very good. This is the combined result of the excellent effort of the Windfinders and the good use made of the broadcast w/v’s by all the Navigators.
We still have a long way to go however. Many simple mistakes are being made by Windfinders, e.g. incorrect plotting of air positions, wrong computions, errors made in measuring the w/v, messages wrongly coded, to mention a few. It will be appreciated that if plotting and compution errors are made, incorrect w/v’s will be the result, and therefore, the Senior Met. Officer at H.Q. 5 Group cannot forecast the correct w/v for use of other aircraft. Windfinders have a great responsibility and must make every effort to obtain accurate w/v checks.
The same mistakes are also being made by the rest of the force. A recent O.R.S. report stated that errors in compution are reaching a phenomenal figure. Every effort must be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate this fault. Compution of true airspeeds presents a big problem to many Navigators , the average error is approximately 5 m.p.h. Calculation of courses is another stumbling block, the average error being 2° or 3°. The combination of these errors has an adverse effect on concentration, besides nullifying much of the good work done by the Windfinders. Watch computions and calculations carefully, Navigators. Also check each calculation at least once.
One word about interpolation. The w/v’s broadcast are those applicable to the mean height band. Therefore, if you are at the top or bottom of the band, the broadcast w/v is not accurate for your height. Interpolation is the answer. Consult the Form 2330 and note the forecasted change in the wind speed and then interpolate and apply the correction to the broadcast w/v. There have been instances of the wind speed increasing by 15 m.p.h. for an increase in height of only 2,000 feet.
Many Navigators do not use the broadcast w/v’s correctly. Some do not use the corrected w/v if it is “within a few degrees and a few miles per hour” of the previous forecast w/v. There are still a few Navigators too, who do not seem capable of applying the corrected w/v when it is given to them. A plotting method to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s has been described in A.S.I. Nav/14, issued 14.2.44. All Navigators must make sure they are fully conversant with this method. Any suggestions of criticisms are welcomed.
One final word to Windfinders, you did an excellent job last month, the record achieved being 153 w/v on the night of 15/16th February, a very fine effort. Keep this up!!!
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
Many A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have been issued to the Group during the last month, and we are now in the happy position of having 100% A.P.I’s, though all are not yet fitted.
There is an inherent error in the A.P.I. This is caused by the heating in the Navigator’s cabin. A modification is now being fitted to all A.P.I’s which should reduce the error to less than one percent. It is hoped all aircraft will be fitted with the A.P.I. and the modification by the end of the next moon period.
Con. Units are also being supplied with A.P.I’s; Navigators will soon be arriving at Squadrons fully trained in the use of this instrument.
Trouble is still being experienced when re-setting the Air Position Indicator. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must have a drive on this procedure. Several Squadrons have suggested methods to be adopted when re-setting the A.P.I; any other suggestions will be welcomed.
[Underlined]LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
The present system of log keeping and chart work involves unnecessary duplication of effort. If a Navigator’s chart work is done correctly, less detail is required in the log, and the Navigator can devote more time to his primary object of navigating the aircraft to the target and back to base.
The following entries are considered by some Navigators to be superfluous because the detail already appears on the chart, (a) Position and time of all fixes, pinpoints, D. R. positions and air positions, (b) all w/v’s obtained, tracks made good and position lines.
If these entries were omitted from the log approximately 10 minutes would be saved hourly. Moreover, the Navigator’s attention would not be constantly distracted by having to refer to the log each time a fix, D.R. position etc was obtained. This scheme has been tried successfully by several Navigators in this Group.
All Navigators should consider this suggestion carefully and discuss with the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION “BLACK OF THE MONTH” (No names no Packdrills) [/underlined]
A very good example of what can happen if a Navigator boobs and there is little co-operation in the crew, occurred on a recent sortie in this Group.
The crew in question set course from Base for Position “A”, and arrived there early. It was decided to carry out a dog leg and return to Position “B” (the South Coast). When the dog-leg was almost completed as Gee fix was obtained and course altered for Position “B”. This is where the mistake was made. The Navigator gave the pilot a course to steer of 024°(M) instead of 064°(M). The Navigator then decided to “try his hand” with the H2S. It was his second operational sortie. He was hoping to pick up the English Coast line, but this did not appear. Just before E.T.A. the Navigator decided that “something was wrong”, and obtained a Gee fix. This placed the aircraft a great many miles North of Position “B”. The mistake was immediately realised and course altered for Position “B”. The aircraft arrived at this position 19 minutes after the latest time, and so the sortie was abandoned.
Apart from the glorious “boob” of the Navigator, the pilot should have realised that the course of 024° (M) was greatly in error. This is a warning to all pilots and navigators. Had the pilot studied his “Captains of aircraft” map, he would have spotted the error in the course given. Pilots should always check a course with the Navigator if it sounds “phoney”. The Navigator [underlined] must always [/underlined] recheck all his calculations and computions.
ASTRO COMPASS
It was stated in last month’s News that the Astro Compass was being modified. This has now been done with the result that only the Pole Star can be used for checking the aircraft’s course. The advantage is that the instrument is very much simpler to use. No calculation is necessary, the observer merely rotates the bearing plate until the Pole Star is in the sights, and reads off the aircraft’s course against the Red pointer.
Trials carried out by No. 49 Squadron, Fiskerton, have proved successful. The compass was found very simple to use. The checking of the aircraft’s course is now a very simple task, and can be done by any member of the crew, as no calculations are necessary.
The difficult task of finding a good position for the Astro Compass still remains however; numerous trials have been carried out but with little or no success. Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] help to solve the problem? Remember the Astro Compass can also be used for obtaining bearings, so bear this in mind when you are hunting for a new position.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What part does the Navigator play in (a) Emergency procedure, (b) S.O.S. procedure?
2. If you are 10 miles or more off track by how many degrees would you alter course to regain track?
3. What is the procedure for obtaining a Gee fix if either the “B” or “C” Strobe is missing?
4. You are not certain of your position and suddenly red flares are seen ahead of you. (a) What does this mean? (b) What immediate action would you take?
Answers to last month’s Quiz
1. (a) 3500 ft. (b) 2500 ft. (c) 1000 ft. (d) 5000 ft.
2. (a) Section “E”. (b) Section “N”.
3. Lincoln!! (by approx. 100 miles)
4. The Navigator should immediately co-operate with the W/Op, and attempt to home on to the dinghy. (The W/Op. on hearing the S.O.S. will listen for an acknowledgement from the ground listening station, and if this is not heard he will pass the intercepted message on to M/F Section “J”, saying that it has been picked up and giving his own call sign etc but not his position (this will be known by Section “J” from the aircraft’s own transmission)).
5. (i) Change the fuse. (ii) Check [underlined] all [/underlined] leads.
6. The creeping line ahead method of search is best under all conditions (see Appendix “A” to A.S.I. Ops.1/18).
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. H.C. Lobb – B.N.O. Swinderby to 8 Group P.F.F.
S/Ldr. H.L. Creeth – Radar/Nav 5 Group to B.N.O. Swinderby.
F/Lt. N.W. Mould, DFC – 57 Nav.Offr. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/O. J. Simms, DFC – 57 Sqdn appointed Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. G. Crowe, DFC – 106 Nav.Officer to S.N.O. Metheringham.
F/Lt. W.J. Beeston – Attached to 5 Group O.R.S. posted to Flying Trg. Command.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] CALLING ALL PILOT BOMBING OFFICERS ! [/underlined]
The following paragraphs are the precis of an address by Air/Cdr. Patch, C.B.E., to the first Conference of Bombing Officers :-
The post of Flight Bombing Officer was created to improve bombing in 5 Group. Enthusiasm of such officers is essential, and should be directed to keeping bombing in the forefront by constant pressure on Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders. The Squadron Bombing Leader is able to deal with the bombing problems of the Air Bomber but he has difficulty in convincing pilots that their ability should be shown in bombing flying rather than aerobatics. In 4 engined bomber aircraft, Pilots should concentrate in the first place on flying accurately over a given point on the ground. Next, Pilots must appreciate that on any given heading the bomb must be released from one point in the air. It requires most skilful flying to direct the aircraft through this point. Analysis of bombing errors showed that, excluding Vector Errors, 90% of the errors were due to bad flying, in particular in tracking and aircraft “skid”. The Mark XIV Bombsight has been designed to give tactical freedom but it is essential that a steady approach be made, accuracy depending on the final steady run. There must be no sudden alteration of aircraft attitude, no skidding, and complete accuracy of tracking.
Flight Bombing Officers must think over these practical points and decide how best to put it over to the Pilots. They must point out to Pilots that their aircraft are, in reallity [sic], sighting platforms from which, with the help of a complicated piece of mechanism – the Mark XIV Bombsight – they are to direct a tremendous bomb load against an enemy target. The conception of “area bombing” has caused bad bombing flying. If we can attain precision, not only against small targets but also large cities, we can reduce the number of raids required to obliterate Berlin and those other vital targets we must destroy.
Under operational conditions now being developed, and with the help of improving P.F.F. technique, we should be able to achieve greater accuracy at night in attacking a point of light, that is a T.I. or Wanganui Flare. The Bombing Officer’s job was to make Pilots “think bombing”, “talk bombing” and “fly bombing” until the time is reached that over the pint of beer in the Mess the main conversation is bombing accuracy.
[Underlined] N.B. [/underlined] The first Bombing Officers Air Staff Instruction was issued 11th January, 1944, No. BL/15.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Why should incendiaries not be dropped by the Main Force before Zero Hour on a Newhaven attack?
2. If an engine cut on take-off, and it was necessary to lighten the aircraft quickly, what action could the Air Bomber suggest concerning the bomb load?
3. If you were carrying a 1000 lb bomb on No. 5 Station, and it was not pre-selected on the Connell Pre-Selector, would it be released by Jettison action?
4. Why should the camera [underlined] NOT [/underlined] be operated before bombing?
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET) [/underlined]
[Table of Bombs dropped and errors found by category and Squadron]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES FOR FEBRUARY
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 ft.
9 P/O Blow F/Sgt Smith Sgt Hurrell 131 yds
44 P/O Charlesworth Sgt Frederuck F/Sgt Hill 148 yards
P/O Butt Sgt Whiter F/O Sparrow 143 yds
49 W/O Jones Sgt Blackham F/Sgt Stevenson 123 yds
61 P/O Nixon F/Sgt Garrett F/Sgt Devenish 140 yds
106 P/O O’Leary F/Sgt Snowden F/Sgt Williams 142 yds
207 P/O Briggs F/O Bujac P/O Murray 147 yds
P/O Barnett Sgt Hazel F/O Anderson 61 yds
463 P/O McKnight F/O Johnson P/O Isham 140 yds
619 Sgt Wadsworth Sgt Bengston Sgt Shenton 72 yds
1660 Sgt Newman Sgt Outram Sgt Ratner 132 yds
F/Sgt Riddle F/O Larsen Sgt Glulow 140 yds
1661 Sgt Grantham Sgt Young Sgt Hobbs 145 yds
F/Sgt Monaghan Sgt Wand Sgt Philpott 147 yds
617 Squadron obtained 18 exercises, error less than 150 yards, the best 3 being
F/Lt Wilson F/O Finlay F/O Parkin 55 yds
F/Lt Kearns F/O Daniels F/O Barclay 60 yds
P/O Knight F/Sgt Bell W/O Giller 57 yds
ADDITIONAL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of Training exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, 619 Squadron, made the only, and most creditable, effort in the Leader Competition, his Bombing Error at 20,000 feet being 79 yards!!! Congratulations.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
8 Squadrons qualified in this month’s competition, with results as follows, all errors being converted to 20,000 fett.
[Underlined] Pilots & Air Bombers Navigators [/underlined]
1st 106 Sqdn – 88 yds 1st 207 Sqdn -108 yds
2nd 50 Sqdn -125 yds 2nd 619 Sqdn -138 yds
3rd 61 Sqdn -141 yds 3rd 61 Sqdn -169 yds
4th 619 Sqdn -147 yds 4th 467 Sqdn -170 yds
5th 9 Sqdn -157 yds 5th 9 Sqdn -174 yds
6th 44 Sqdn -166 yds 6th 50 Sqdn -188 yds
7th 207 Sqdn -189 yds 7th 106 Sqdn -216 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -201 yds 8th 44 Sqdn -231 yds
9th 630 Sqdn -175 yds 9th 630 Sqdn -170 yds
(630 Sqdn completed [underlined] 5 [/underlined] exercises only)
The following Squadrons completed 1 exercise only.
10th 463 Sqdn -86 yds 10th 463 Sqdn – 95 yds
11th 49 Sqdn- 90 yds 11th 57 Sqdn -162 yds
12th 57 Sqdn-245 yds 12th 49 Sqdn -291 yds
Congratulations to 106 Squadron who have now won the Bombing Competition for 3 successive months. Nos.9, 50, and 61 Squadrons have all improved their positions considerably but 619 have relinquished their customary “runners up” place in the table. We expect a maximum entry for March and a keen effort on all Squadrons part to topple 106 from the top.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The following news items are provided by the Range Staff at Wainfleet.
1. It is emphatically denied that the entire Night Staff applied for compassionate posting after a night programme carried out at maximum height by No. 5 L.F.S.
2. [Underlined] Heard over the R/T [/underlined]
R/T Operator – “Hullo ----- Please give me a TT.”
Pilot of A/C – “Time over Target 22.26.”
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined] A TT is a tuning transmission.
3. [Underlined] Advice to Crews. [/underlined]
(i) Conform to the established R/T procedure.
(ii) Be sure you burn the correct Downward Recognition Light during NIGHT exercises.
(iii) Pass times of strike and headings QUICKLY after the exercise.
(iv) Wait for silence on R/T before calling the Range.
(v) When you query errors given by the range REMEMBER please that a Direct Hit from 20,000 feet gives the Range Staff as much pleasure as it gives you !!
4. [Underlined] A Thought for the Month. [/underlined]
DO make sure you know which target you are to bomb !! (Many Wainfleet workmen have of late doubled their insurance).
P.S. A certain Mosquito from a certain well-known Group dropped a practice bomb which hit a lorry standing in front of the Range Headquarters. A 3,500 yards error.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) have introduced the Pilot’s Miniature Route Chart for the use of Air Bombers. Thus a single map of the complete route is available and the defended localities and route markers can be recorded. Its use is primarily for dark nights when map reading using the topographical maps is difficult.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DF.C.) has originated an excellent scheme with the use of operational 3073’s. After each operation a chart is made out which shows on one sheet of paper each Bomb Aimer’s picture of the markers bombed. The full sequence of marking in the order of the times of bombing is thus available to each Air Bomber who can compare his attack and estimation of distances with the other Bomb Aimers in the Squadron.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Walmesly, D.F.C.) states that of the 300 practice bombs dropped this year, not one has been aimed below 5000 feet. Further they claim to be the only Unit in the Group (yea, verily, even in the Command) with such a record.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Keates) reports that training was concentrated on to H2S and Gunnery. Blind Bombing with H 2 S had taken a prominent part in this training.
The Squadron Bombing Leader has compiled a graph consisting of nine curves on one sheet, which shows the forwards travel in yards and seconds of groundspeed of all bombs with T.V. between 420 and 1900 feet per second, for specific heights and groundspeeds. The groups apply to the selected heights 15000, 20000 and 25000 feet and the curves in each group cover height and groundspeeds 200, 210 and 220 m.p.h. Any other combinations of height and groundspeeds could be used. All information has been extracted from 5 Group Armament Training Notes, Part 1.
The advantage of this graph is that all information is contained in one graph and considerable time and labour is saved in calculating time intervals or compiling or checking preselector figures for any kind of load within the limitations of T.V., heights and speeds selected.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
F/O Billington has succeeded F/Lt Bray as Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
F/O. Astbury, D.F.C., moves up to F/Lt. Bombing Leader, 617 Squadron, and is joined by F/O. Harden, D.F.C., and F/O. Walker, Bombing Leaders from 1660 Conversion Unit and 61 Squadron respectively.
Congratulations to F/Lt. Bell (9 Squadron) F/Lt. Wake (106 Squadron) and F/Lt. Walmsley (619 Squadron) on the award of D.F.C’s.
Congratulations also to P/O Ball (1661 Con Unit) 3rd on No. 76 Bombing Leader’s Course with an “A” category and P/O Watford (1661 Con Unit) on gaining 1st place on No. 27 A.B.I’s Course.
F/Sgt. Coates (9 Squadron) obtained “B” category on No. 76 Bombing Leaders’ Course. F/O Lyons (61 Squadron) was 9th on No. 75 Course with a “B” Pass.
GARDENING
Despite February weather, the Command planted no less than 1647 vegetables, the second highest total for any month. As all Lancasters were busy discomforting the enemy by more direct methods it fell mainly to the Stirlings of 3 Group, followed by Halifaxes of 4 and 6 Groups and, on a smaller but useful scale, Wellingtons of 1 Group, to achieve this mighty total.
KIEL BAY received over 35%. The French U-boat bases about 20%, and the Western German Estuaries, the Kattegat and Channel also received good measure. Small numbers were planted off the French South Western Iron Ore Ports and in Oslo Fjord.
A Swedish newspaper reports the closing of the ports and shipping channels as an immediate result of 4 and 6 Groups’ visits to the last named. Photographic evidence is already available of the effects of the great effort on Kiel Bay. It shows one 6000 ton liner sunk and lying on her side, and also great congestion of shipping, indicating beyond doubt that traffic has been stopped for a time. It is hard to over estimate the importance of Kiel, which is the focal point of all German traffic in Northern Waters; the annual turnover is 29,000,000 tons of war material, nearly one half of which is iron ore imported from Norway and Sweden. The amount handled [underlined] DAILY [/underlined] would fill 12 1/2 miles of railway trucks. One effect of heavy and sustained mining against this traffic would be to force the enemy to use the sea route to the West of Denmark down to the Elbe and Ems. In hard winters this is done for us by ice in the Baltic, but this winter we have been let down by this ally.
Two interesting points arise from the month’s work. First, nearly all of it has been carried out from high level with great success. A variety of techniques have been used including:- The use of P.F.F. methods (both by aircraft of that force and H 2 S aircraft from the other Groups, marking pinpoints for those not so fitted); the use of the Mark XIV Bombsight when visual means have been possible; and dropping entirely on H 2 S. Secondly, a start has been made in the mining of the enemy’s inner harbours.
We have the task in 5 Group of studying and keeping up to date with the new methods which are still in an experimental stage, and therefore, subject to frequent changes, so that when the call comes for either a small or large gardening effort we can carry it out with our traditional efficiency.
49 Squadron have already been informed of the success of their accurate attack from high level with H 2 S on the 5/6th January.
[Boxed] [Underlined] PILOTS – TAKE IT EASY! [/underlined]
Use your throttles LEISURELY at all times. Do not open up with a rush. You won’t get off the ground any quicker if you “ram” the throttles open, and you are more liable to swing. Make any correction with engines smoothly. There’s no such thing as a “short burst” of engine in proper flying. Make your maxim “EASE your throttles open. EASE your throttles back”. That applies to all aircraft including the Stirling, Lancaster and the Tiger Moth – if your Station Commander lets you get your hands on it. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 19. FEBRUARY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
SPORTS
Bad weather rendered most sports pitches u/s during the last few days of February, but there has been a full quota of matches played in spite of this. Attention is again drawn to the desirability of each Station submitting its sports resume two days or so before month end, to allow ample time for publication in this News. Several Stations have not submitted resumes this month, and so the picture is necessarily incomplete.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] proved unbeatable during the month, playing six games of which they won four (including two Matz Cup matches). However, Lincoln Rovers held them to a 2 – 2 draw, and Waddington to a 3 – 3 draw. Both these games were in the Lincoln League, Division 1, and Scampton could ill afford to drop these points since the League Championship is a neck and neck finish between them and Lincoln Rovers.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] had four Station games of which they drew one home game with R.A.F. Wickenby. The inter-section competition is now in full swing.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] beat Fiskerton at home, but lost to Ruston Bucyrus, A.V. Roe and R.A.F. Wickenby. Four games were played in the Inter-Section League.
[Underlined] EAST KIRKBY [/underlined] beat Spilsby but lost their Matz Cup game against Skellingthorpe 5 – 1. The Section League produced 5 games, and in addition there were 7 ‘friendlies’, the aircrew cadets team winning all three of their games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] Inter-Section games were plentiful. The outstanding match of the month was the Matz Round One win against Woodhall. This has been followed by a 3 – 2 victory against Dunholme, taking Coningsby into the Semi-finals.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] scored a sweeping 10 – 0 win against Bardney in the Matz Cup Round One. They proved it no fluke by holding Waddington to a 2 – 2 draw. They now boast a “Reserve XI”. In the Inter-Section events, 5 games were played. “A” Flight have a strong side and should go well towards winning the trophy generously presented by S/Ldr. Whattam.
[Underlined] SKELLINGTHORPE [/underlined] had 5 Station games and 9 in the Inter-Section events, while there were a further 3 games restricted to aircrew personnel.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] XI beat Winthorpe and Wigsley, and were unlucky to lose 3 – 5 to Scampton in Round Two of the Matz Cup. It was a splendid effort at “giant killing”.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] had 3 games of which they won two, including a 4 – 0 win against a R.A.F. side from Fulbeck.
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The second round saw Coningsby, Scampton and Skellingthorpe emerge as semi-finalists, defeating Dunholme, Swinderby and East Kirkby respectively. Winthorpe and Metheringham have still to decide their event. The semi-final draw is as follows:-
WINTHORPE [underlined] or [/underlined] METHERINGHAM v SKELLINGTHORPE
CONINGSBY v SCAMPTON
Both matches will be played on neutral ground at dates to be announced in G.R.O’s.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined] now boasts a strong side. They beat the Air Crew School 6 – 3, and ran up an astronomical total of 68 – 6 against Lincoln Home Guard. The Home Guard did better in the second game and held them to 18 – 6.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] were unlucky in having to cancel all Rugger games due to flying.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] completed only one out of four games, losing 5 – 0 to 7th K.O.S.B. after an extremely hard game.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] won three out of three games. A hard struggle with their old rivals, 93 M.U., produced a 3 – 0 win, and Winthorpe and Lincoln Home Guard were beaten 14 – 3 and 18 – 0 respectively.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] XV is doing well and won all three games played, Magnus School and Newark R.F.C. 9 – 6, and Rufford Home Guard 24 – 6.
[Underlined] LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDES [/underlined]
This competition is fast developing into a 53 Base monopoly. 9, 463 and 467 have all concluded their Squadron events now, producing F/Lt. Hadland’s team, P/O. McKnight’s team and P/O. Simpson’s team as the respective winners. In these three Squadron events, 65 crews took to the field. 50 Squadron are following suit, and three games have so far been played. Other Squadrons please note and “get cracking”! A complete Squadron event can be decided in two afternoons, and the physical “uplift” is amazing – try it and see.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] won three out of four games, suffering their only defeat at the hands of 5 Group in a “mixed” game.
[Underlined] EASY [sic] KIRKBY [/underlined] had one station event, losing to Spilsby Town. The Aircrew Cadets “A” and “B” sides fought two very close games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] lost to the Green Howards, and held K.O.S.B. to a 3 all draw.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] mixed side beat 5 Group 7 – 3. The Station side beat Lincoln Home Guard, but lost to Wigsley.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] lost 2 – 4 to O.C.T.U. Newark, but won a mixed game versus Winthorpe R.A.S.C. by 3 – 1.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] mixed side defeated Wigsley 7 – 5 on Swinderby ground, lost to Swinderby 3 – 7, and enjoyed a 3 – 2 win against Scampton.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
49 Squadron now allot one afternoon per week to physical “fitness”. Wood-chopping, country walks (pubs out of bounds) and gardening are all featured. Swimming at Lincoln is laid on each Tuesday, and for ground staff on Sundays. All that is needed now is the completion of the “gym”.
Dunholme R.A.F. Regiment keep up their water worthiness by attending Lincoln Baths.
Coningsby gym is now in full swing for badminton, boxing and gymnastics.
Metheringham gym will open this month for badminton, boxing, fencing and P.T.
[Underlined] COMPETITIONS [/UNDERLINED] The Wines Rugby Cup Competition has been launched, also a new event in 5 Group –“5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy”. There should be some keen games in both these events. New events need new trophies. Two are needed – a Lancaster seven-s-side trophy, and a Mixed Hockey Trophy. Benefactors please contact F/Lt. Stott, Headquarters 5 Group (Ext. 54)
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
Spring brings the cuckoo and cricket, a 5 Group Cricket League is being formed. It is hoped that every Station will enter a team. Details are being circulated.
TRAINING
Training on Stirlings and Lancasters in 51 Base pressed on during the month and 66 crews were posted to Squadron.
The Stirling programme has a few teething troubles and but for this there would have been a larger output of crews. Ignition and electrical failures were particularly troublesome and infectious.
The snow fall at the end of the month involved all available man and machine power on a new and unwelcome form of training – shovelling snow – and prevented a last minute spurt in training.
The incoming crews judged by ground training standards are quite good, and the Aircrew School at Scampton did a lot of the spade work in giving them a sound basic knowledge of 5 Group tactics and operational procedure.
H 2 S training has been reorganised in the Base. The present aim is to train selected crews during the ordinary Conversion Unit course. Ground training is being given, and an initial demonstration flight arranged as early as possible in the course so that the cross country exercises (day and might) are flown using H 2 S as a navigation aid. No practice bombing is now being attempted. Air Training has been held up by the unserviceability of the H 2 S Stirling.
The Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston has so far done no H 2 S training, but a synthetic trainer has been promised by Bomber Command. When it is installed crews will be able to keep in practice by dry swims before passing out to H 2 S Squadrons.
With the disbandment of No.1485 (Bombing and Gunnery) Flight, the training of Air Gunners has been incorporated in the normal Conversion Unit Course. When No.1690 (Bomber) Defence Training Flight begins its work it is hoped that the former high standard of training can be maintained.
Flight Engineers are passing through the Stirling Units twice to give them the maximum possible flying time before going to Lancaster Finishing School. This ensures that they are well experienced in the air by the time they reach their operational Squadrons.
Crews under training took part in a large scale Command Bullseye which was laid on as a diversionary feature for the operation against Stuttgart on the night 20th February. The diversion achieved the success hoped for and attracted a large proportion of the weight of the German Fighter Force away from the area in which the Squadrons were operating.
5 Group News. No. 19 February, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
H 2 S
H 2 S training has progressed favourably during the month, but unfortunately once again training in blind bombing has been held up due to bad weather and cloud over targets. Good use is being made of synthetic trainers now installed at 49, 57 and 630 Squadrons and 1660 and 1661 Conversion Units. Navigators and Bomb Aimers should look upon this ground training as an essential part of their syllabus, and endeavour to make as much use of the synthetic trainer as navigational and blind bombing aid in the limited time they have.
It is gratifying to note that many crews are becoming increasingly aware of the value of H 2 S as a navigational aid and should realise the amount of work that is carried out by the Radar Sections for their benefit. Many set operators can help to decrease this work by reporting all faults personally to either the Radar Officer or one of the Radar Mechanics, and not merely to one of the ground crew who pass it on in hushed tones to the Radar Section, but with no explanations regarding unserviceability. You, the set operators, are the ones to let the section know the faults experienced and their symptoms. It may mean the difference between a “ropey” or good set on the next flight. Cultivate this habit of personal contact and you will earn the gratitude of the Radar Section and probably pick up some useful tips.
Some operators are having trouble with poor reception. This is a complaint particularly common amongst crews under training. Like ourselves, components of H 2 S have age limits, and their deterioration may cause poor reception; but remember the set can easily go off tune and it is necessary to check tuning whenever doubts arise regarding the quality of reception.
Cupolas are also liable to give trouble with reception. Extraneous matter which has a habit of collecting in the cupola will materially affect reception, giving rise to a mushy picture. Set operators are advised to see that the cupola is clean both inside and out before every flight.
Does this happen in YOUR aircraft?
[Cartoon] GREMLIN’S GARDEN
N.C.M.
Plotting charts are now being revised every three months to give the H 2 S operator as accurate a view as possible of the shape of towns from which he should receive responses. Every set operator can help in the revising of those charts by noting any peculiarity in town shapes and passing the information to this Headquarters by means of the usual report made at interrogation.
Know your Landmarks. The following are well known H 2 S landmarks on the continent.
Can you identify them?
[Three drawn outline maps]
FLYING CONTROL
Coningsby tops the list, with Waddington a close second; it is encouraging to note that landing times of all Stations are getting more consistent, and the overall landing time of 2.75 minutes is an encouraging improvement on January’s figures. It is hoped to see, each month, a further reduction so that the Group can record an overall average of below two minutes per aircraft.
In planning operations it can now be assumed with confidence that 5 Group aircraft, sometimes in excess of 200, can be landed within one hour of the return of the first machine. Compare this period of landing with that of 12 months ago, when smaller numbers of aircraft were concerned, and when a landing hook up often used to last 80 or 90 minutes. This reduction in the landing period has meant greater safety for the crews, less fuel to be carried, and a greater tonnage of bombs available for delivery.
Reports from Eastern airfields indicate that aircraft are not adhering strictly to lattice line approach procedure. This is essentially a part of the quick landing scheme and rigid compliance with this part of the scheme must be stressed to all crews.
[Underlined] FEBRUARY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of landing times and averages by Station]
GEE
Rather poor range on Gee was experienced in operations this month, and once again XF transmissions were little used by Navigators. However it is apparent that there are still a few navigators who endeavour to get the best out of their sets and try all available means to secure fixes at maximum range. Success in track keeping and timing is the result of their efforts.
Other Navigators seem more concerned with finding reasons why ranges cannot be improved without endeavouring to improve them. This attitude is more effective than any jammer that the Hun can produce. It is therefore, up to every Navigator to use Gee to its actual and not its apparent limits. Plots of fixes made on the last three operations show the distance between the worst and best fixes to be 200 miles or more. Many of the worst ranges come from non-H2S Squadrons in which Gee is the sole navigational aid. Gee Trainers and Jammers are available on all Squadrons and Conversion Units and, therefore, it is up to every navigator, whether on Squadron or Conversion Unit, to carry out maximum training in Gee, particularly in the reading of signals through jamming.
One general complaint is that the Series3, Southern Chain miniature lattice charts do not afford full coverage and many fixes cannot be plotted. Charts covering such areas are to be issued in the near future, but in the meantime the remedy is in the Navigator’s own hands. Continue your lattice lines in pencil along the margins of the those charts you have, covering areas where fixes might be obtained, but no chart coverage is available.
With the constant lack of interest in XF transmissions, enquiries have been made, and many Navigators complain that they find it difficult to insert the XF unit into the receiver and use it in its present position. If this difficulty is arising now, it will be even greater when the new RF unit is issued, because of the attention required to secure maximum results. A little perseverance now may help in the future. However, how about a few ideas on the repositioning of the Gee receiver to obviate this complaint? They will be welcome at the Headquarters providing they are practicable.
Navigators of 630 and 57 Squadrons visited a Gee transmitter station during the month, and were given an idea of the ground organisation necessary to provide so valuable a navigational aid. The visit was much appreciated by all concerned, and it is hoped that other Squadrons and the Conversion Units will take advantage of this facility in the future.
[Underlined] FLYING ACCIDENTS [/underlined]
(Continued from page12 Col 3)
investigations into them are not yet complete. One aircraft dived to avoid another and crashed in the funnel. Another failed to get airborne by the time it reached the airfield boundary. The undercarriage hit the hedge and the Lancaster crashed. Another hit a hill while the pilot was flying low in bad weather. In others the causes are still obscure.
15 avoidable accidents occurred in 51 Base during February, of which 8 were taxying accidents. This means that more than half of the avoidable accidents in the Group occurred at Conversion Units and No.5 L.F.S.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
January’s low percentage of photographic failures was not maintained during the month of February, and the following increases occurred:-
Photographic + .02%
Armament + 2.1%
Electrical + 1.07%
It is curious that a large number of failures occurred on the first raids following the stand down period. It is expected that technical efficiency should then be at its peak, as ample time is available to effect thorough maintenance and servicing of camera equipment etc. That this is not so, points to the fact that this period is not being used to the best advantage.
During the stand down period N.C.O’s must ensure that everything possible is done to produce Type 35 Controls and camera gearboxes which are without fault. Particular attention must be given to timing the camera sequence – control contact strips – gear box spring teeth and film measuring roller needles; this applies particularly to newly issued equipment.
Photographic film processing and printing is taking [underlined] far too long to accomplish [/underlined] and NCO photographers are to check the internal section organisation. Delay always occurs when numerous Ground Detail photographs are obtained, indicating that the organisation is based on having a minimum amount of printing instead of the maximum. Station Intelligence Officers need prints to plot with a minimum of delay. Printing should therefore, be arranged to allow the S.I.O. to have the prints in batches instead of waiting to complete the whole of the work.
Every photographer must realise the importance of carrying out his tasks, with the [underlined] utmost speed and efficiency [/underlined]. The aircrews have completed their tasks, but delay in producing photographic evidence of the effect of the raid is comparable to sabotaging their efforts.
The use of Composite film (Kodacolour and H.S. Night) was carried a stage further during the month and it is hoped that in the near future other Squadrons will be using this method of recording attacks.
The problem of operating the camera when the bomb doors are opened prior to the bombing run is now considered to be solved. Aircraft of 44 Squadron are carrying out final tests which have so far been successful and the advantage of the circuit now under trial is that it does not impose exacting Drill upon the pilot and Air Bomber.
[Table of Photographic Analysis including Target Conditions and Failure Analysis by Squadron]
HONOURS & AWARDS
The following immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. G. PRATT. DFM
W/Cdr. R.L. BOWES, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. P.A. DOREHILL, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. C.D. WIGGIN. DFC
P/O. R.M. HIGGS. DFC
Sgt. R.W. JOY DFM
50 SQUADRON
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
61 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. BURGESS. DFC
207 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. GALLAGHER. DSO
F/Sgt. C.E. STEWART. DFM
463 SQUADRON
Sgt. W. HOLT. DFM
The following non-immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
9 SQUADRON
P/O. K. GILL. DFC
P/O. G.E. LOCKEY. DFC
F/Sgt. T.C. OVEREND. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/Lt. S. BURROWS. DFC
Sgt. R.W.T. TUCKER. DFM
P/O. A.G. SMYTHE. DFC
F/Sgt. J. CUSHION. DFM
F/O. S.H. LETLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON
F/O. R.E. HIDDERLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON (Continued)
P/O. L.A. COXHILL DFC
P/O. J.B. WARWICK DFC
F/O. J.D. HARRIS DFC
W/O. E.M. WEBB DFC
W/O. E.L. JONES DFC
P/O. G.P. GEORGE DFC
P/O. K.O. BARNES DFC
W/O. T.P. JUBB DFC
Sgt. G. BOAG DFM
Sgt. T. TYLER DFM
F/Sgt. J DORRIAN DFM
F/Sgt. G.A. EDY DFM
F/O. F.E. WHITTMER DFC
50 SQUADRON
P/O. J.F.C. BROWN DFC
F/Lt. K. RUSKELL DFC
F/Lt. J.A. EDWARD DFC
F/O. W. BODEN DFC
F/O. L.T. PRITCHARD DFC
F/Sgt. R.V. POOLEY DFM
F/Sgt. S.J. PROCTER DFM
W/O. E.T. McLEOD DFC
F/O. D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/Sgt. H. BROWN DFM
F/O. J.M. DICKS DFC
P/O. J.B. BLOTT DFC
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY DFC
Sgt. C.H. BROWN DFM
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. KING DFC
F/Sgt. W.L. BELL DFM
F/Sgt. J.A. THOMAS DFM
61 SQUADRON
F/Lt. N.D. WEBB DFC
106 SQUADRON
F/Lt. J.G. CLARIDGE DFC
F/O. V.L. COLE DFC
P/O. W.R.P. PERRY DFC
F/Lt. L.R. HARVEY DFC
F/O. J. FORSYTH DFC
P/O. L.G. BERRY DFC
F/Lt. R.L. WAKE DFC
207 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. P.N. JENNINGS DFC
F/Lt. J.F. GRIME DFC
F/Lt. M.J. BAUD DFC
F/Sgt. G. BROADHEAD DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. BROWN DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. JAMIESON DFM
F/Lt. W.C.T. BRAY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
467 SQUADRON
P/O. W.J.O. GRIME DFC
P/O. J.G. SIMPSON DFC
619 SQUADRON
F/O. H.W. KEAN, DFM. DFC
F/Lt. J.A. HOWARD DFC
F/Lt. P.J.F. WALMSLEY DFC
W/O. J.H. MASON DFC
630 SQUADRON
F/Lt. D.S. PATERSON DFC
P/O. A.E.A. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. A.H. GIBSON DFC
P/O. J.H. WORTHINGTON DFC
F/Sgt. J. MARTIN. DFM
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
[Underlined] RADAR WORKSHOPS [/underlined]
Although none of the Radar Workshops in this Group have quite reached the stage depicted in the picture on the opposite page, it does show what can befall a section if it is left to sweep itself out after you have all packed up for the day. It is surprising what a few minutes at the end of the day can do if everyone pitches in before leaving for town. It also helps to ward off that hopeless feeling one experiences in the morning on entering a section which looks as if our bombers had got a bit off track (Gee u/s?).
Odd pieces of timber can be scrounged on the Station (NOT packing cases – which have now supplanted the gold standard), and with these can be built trays for spare components which we trust you have saved from detonated sets and other salvage material.
Test equipment should be treated with the greatest respect and kept in its proper place when not in use.
An up-to-date serviceability and fitting board in the office or workshop can save no end of trouble and time for all concerned when information is required at short notice. It keeps all mechanics posted too, and they will add that extra little drive which helps to make the picture the board portrays a rosier one.
General interest diagrams – excluding polar diagrams of Dorothy Lamour and other homing devices – should be neatly displayed on notice boards and walls.
The use of lino is nullified if the mud is not left outside, so get hold of those foot scrapers and door mats which the equipment section will be only too pleased to provide.
So let your aim be to keep your Radar workshop clean and reasonably tidy, so that the priceless equipment you have the privilege of handling may have the best chance of ensuring more bombs on the target.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATIONS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Codes [/underlined]
The month of February saw the last of our old standby, the “X” book, and in its place comes the A.P.3026. This will be easier to understand if Wireless Operators (Air) take the trouble to study its contents during the odd spare moment.
The new edition of C.D. 0250(16) should also receive a little of your attention, as the contents have been enlarged and the spare groups decreased. Remember that any time spent in studying these new editions might well save a frantic turning over of pages and a panic in the air.
Tests will be carried out on the Group W/T exercises, embodying the additions to the C.D.0250. Operators are reminded that this is an excellent means of getting up to date with anything new, and if you are not on the exercise you can always learn something from the logs of those who were taking part.
[Underlined] Finding Messages [/underlined]
All Wireless Operators (Air) are to be congratulated on the splendid work done during the month in connection with the “wind finding scheme”, especially on the night 15/16th February when 153 wind messages were received from aircraft. There was great joy and jubilation in the Signals Cabin at this Headquarters, for the “Back Room Boys” are always in the show.
[Underlined] Tail Warning Devices [/underlined]
Training in the use of the various early warning devices should now be standardised throughout the Group, but there are Squadrons who have not sent to the Group Signals Leader their version of the synthetic training cards. These cards are the best method of obtaining a quick snappy reaction to what is seen on the screen. The combined efforts of O.R.S., T.R.E., B.D.U. and the Radar “Kings” produced a piece of equipment designed to aid the bomber crews to beat the Hun when he is met in the air. Are [underlined] you [/underlined] tackling the job with the enthusiasm it deserves? Remember, TRAINING is the only answer.
A fault finding table for Visual Monica has been prepared and will be issued to Squadrons for inclusion in the current fault finding booklet carried by all Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] Lighting of Operator’s Cabin [/underlined]
Quite recently the old complaint of lighting in the Wireless Operator’s position has cropped up again. Now, at this present stage of the war, it is quite impossible to start producing modified lighting on a large scale, and it must be left to the initiative of the individual to produce something for himself. The maintenance section of No.50 Squadron produced and excellent lighting system for the T.R.1154 and are working on the R.1155. Come along fellows, don’t leave it to one – try saving your breath on complaints and using it up on some action.
[Underlined] “Brace up” [/underlined]
Now for a final word to all airborne “key bashers”. Things are likely to get cracking in the very near future. Can you say with a clear conscience that you are ready to meet any emergency? [Underlined] If [/underlined] not, now is the time to GO TO IT INT QRL QRV K 2359
[Underlined] Stop Press [/underlined]
A tip from No.630 Squadron. Switch on your T. R. 1196 when going in on your bombing run, and then, should your intercom. go unserviceable, the change-over can be effected immediately.
SIGNALS FAILURES
There has been an alarming increase in the percentage of Signals failures during February and whilst it is true that almost 50% (13 out of a total of 29) were due to definite failures of components in the equipment, it is felt that this number could have been reduced, particularly those of a recurring nature. Special attention should be paid to the starter relay contacts in the Power Unit type 35 pending the introduction of the new type with silvered contacts in a more accessible position. Faults in the switch type 170 in the fighter warning circuit are nearly always due to an insufficient allowance of slack in the connecting cable exerting a pull on the switch during the rotation of the turret, causing a displacement of the switch contacts. This results in a point contact and an intermittent high resistance connection.
There were six failures reported in which no fault could be found. Five affected intercom, four of which were contributory to early returns. Every member of a crew can assist in diagnosing obscure intercom faults by remembering the details and symptoms of the failure and passing them on to the Signals Officer.
The object of reporting failure is to ascertain the reason why the failure occurred, and if possible to originate a modification or maintenance instruction which will tend to eliminate the type of failure. This object is defeated unless all failures are conscientiously reported, and the number of failures reported by a Squadron does not reflect upon its maintenance efficiency, but rather indicates a conscientious devotion to detail, in an effort to reduce the number of failures and increase the delivery of goods to the customer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee remains one of the most serviceable of all Radar devices; out of 1115 sorties flown, 94% of the sets were completely trouble free. This is a very good effort, but with all the experience obtained on this equipment there is no reason why the figure should not be far higher.
Another R. F. Unit is about to be introduced; these units are not, however, to be available in large quantities for some time. It is probable, therefore, than [sic] non H 2 S Squadrons will receive them first. In this connection it is of interest to learn that the Lancasters will soon have a stowage provided for the units not in use.
Authority has at last been obtained for lino to be laid on Radar workshop floors; many enterprising Squadrons have already had their floors covered, and were repaid by increased serviceability. It is hoped that no time will be wasted in so equipping all workshops.
Air Ministry has now ruled that detonators need no longer be fitted; although this will present the Hun with a considerable quantity of Gee equipment, it will be a great help to Squadrons, as many men were necessary for the fitting and removal of detonators.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The serviceability figures for H 2 S are very unsatisfactory. Last month only 68.8% were serviceable for the whole trip; the one blessing is that most of the failures occurred after the target. Main causes of failures are filament transformers, power units and manipulation. An oil filled filament transformer is now being tried, and this may be the solution to our main cause of unserviceability.
Manipulation is confined only to U/T crews but is assuming alarming proportions. Some Squadrons are still troubled by freezing scanner, and repeater motors. Bomber Command is trying to get approval for a new method of heating, but meanwhile the existing heater elements should be repositioned forward of the scanner motor.
The equipment situation is considerably improved, and with the Group Pool now at this Headquarters, Squadrons will have little difficulty in obtaining the main units of H 2 S.
(continued on Page 9 col 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
[Cartoon of Workshop]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 19. February 1944.
- Maurice levell –
IS THIS [underlined] YOUR [/underlined] RADAR WORKSHOP?
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] GUNS AND TURRETS [/underlined]
The month of February shows a notable increase in the number of gun failures still being attributed to freezing. Rare reports have been received where conclusive evidence is available that guns have frozen, while instances have occurred that gunners have attempted to operate the breech blocks by operating the triggers. Attempts have also been made to release the breech blocks by means of the manually operated rear scar release units with little or no success. It is considered that the hydraulic media in the rear scar pipes becomes either frozen or congealed, and that trouble is not brought about by ice in the breech blocks.
To provide conclusive evidence that this is so, trials have been arranged whereby a percentage of gunners operate their breech blocks at intervals of 30 minutes, with guns at “safe”, throughout the operational sortie once operational height has been gained. A percentage of guns are also to be tested during the return, and by this means it is considered a valuable comparison will be obtained.
[Underlined] GALLEY HEATERS [/underlined]
A turret heater known as the “Galley Heater” is shortly to be introduced. The first 10 heaters are being delivered to Skellingthorpe for installation in aircraft of No.50 Squadron. The inside temperature of the turret is raised by means of a steady flow of hot air via air ducts, the ducts being so arranged as to spray the air on to the guns and turret components most susceptible to freezing, and re-bounding on to the gunner’s face.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet Bombing Range. [/underlined] Extreme difficulty has been experienced during recent weeks in keeping targets and their lighting fully serviceable at Wainfleet Range. This has been due to the heavy tides experienced, causing the ingress of salt water into lighting fittings, and resulting in a depletion of vital bombing training. An all-out drive is being made which, it is hoped, will ensure one hundred percent serviceability at all times.
[Underlined] Owthorpe and Epperstone Ranges [/underlined] are available for both day and night bombing, target illumination being effected by flares.
(continued in next column)
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURE [/underlined]
It can be seen from the failures table below that certain Squadrons claim to have had comparatively few, if any, bomb or S.B.C. failures during the month; it is known from Raid Reports received that this is not a true representation of the month’s failures. It is once again emphasised that all Armament failures are to be signalled in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Part I, Section S, Leaflet No. 2, Issue No. 4.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
An Armament Officers’ Conference was held at Base Station, Scampton, on Friday, 11th February, 1944, and afforded an excellent opportunity for the Command Armament Officer, Air Commodore Bilney, to meet all Armament Officers within the Group. Minutes have been circulated.
[Underlined] MINES “A” – MKS. I – IV [/underlined]
With the introduction of numerous types of new assemblies, it has been found that the personnel who carry out the testing and preparation, need instruction on all these later assemblies. To meet this requirement, courses have been arranged and allocated to all Units within the Group.
[Underlined] FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D= TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
Link Trainer Hours
[Table of hours spent on the Link Trainer by Pilots and Flight Engineers per Squadron]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(continued from page 8 col 3)
[Underlined] VISUAL MONICA [/underlined]
Serviceability of this equipment has still not reached a satisfactory figure; last month it was approximately 81% serviceable. A large percentage of the failures were due to switch motors seizing. A great deal of time and trouble has gone into this switch motor problem, and it is hoped that the solution is close at hand. All Units will have received information regarding the Manufacturer’s methods of setting up, and soon a report will be issued summarising the findings of a local ball bearing works which has been testing these motors. In the meantime the 2-way Pye sockets will allow the Wireless Operator full coverage even though the switch motor stops.
The biggest headache is still the shortage of equipment. Many Squadrons have managed to “acquire” bits from here and there, and in this manner fit more aircraft. This unfortunately, appears to be the only way in which replacement can be maintained at present.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond, unfortunately, depends on H 2 S serviceability and manipulation by both the Navigator and Wireless Operator. In such circumstances one would expect the Fishpond serviceability to be bad, and such is the case. In spite of this general low serviceability, Squadrons which have trained their crews well are now very pleased with the results obtained, and indeed managed to show a figure of 73% serviceable.
[Underlined] A. I. [/underlined]
Trials have been going on for some time with Mark IV A.I. It is believed that this equipment will make a good “Tail Warning Device”.
There are many snags yet to be cured before both elevation and bearing can be obtained.
It is expected however, that the experts will find the answer soon, and once more 5 Group will have pioneered a first class “Tail Warning Device”.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of amount saved by Base and Unit]
TOTAL 4170.10.9
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Unit]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
You should always have a clear picture of each leg of the route in your mind. Study your track throughout briefing. Your [sic] can’t overdo this. It will prevent you accepting a completely wrong course from your Navigator. They have been known to give airspeeds for courses! It will help you as a rough guide to your track make good to take approximate bearings on defended areas each side of the route. But [underlined] don’t [/underlined] pinpoint on flak. One gun site can seem like “Happy Valley” if you are getting its undivided attention.
Always trim forward after bombing. The Lancaster becomes appreciably tail heavy after the bombs have gone. One pilot didn’t trim forward. He was a trifle shaken when the “wizard prang” he was giving all his attention to suddenly took off and orbited him. It was a sadder and wiser man who finally recovered from a stall some 8,000 feet nearer the ground.
Watch the “George” auto-control on take-off, especially taller pilots. It is possible during powerful movements to knock the auto-control lever to “In” and though “George” can fly straight and level, he can’t cope with a take-off, and you may not either with his unwanted co-operation.
By the way, when did you last do a proper Link Trainer exercise? Did you blank off the artificial horizon and carry out recovery from more extreme attitudes by use of the turn and bank indicator, A.S.I. and rate of climb? Or did you just fill in time?
If you have to “queue up” for take-off, don’t leave your engines idling. The plugs may oil up if you have long to wait. Run each engine up against the brakes to about 1600 revs. This will be sufficient to clear them, and it will also prevent overheating.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
A Pilot in this Group did his take-off drill the wrong way round. He left the boost cut-out till the end of his checks. When he did pull it down, his heavily gloved hand knocked the port outer fuel cock off, Fortunately his Engineer noticed it. He may not have done!
Keep your beam flying on the top line. Don’t just switch it on to test it on N.F.T’s Fly down the beam and do an approach each time. It’s a good scheme after training flights and N.F.T’s to find the aerodrome yourself on your own and other beams in the area.
Have you got your drills for using portable oxygen bottles weighted up? If you have any doubts at all- which you shouldn’t have – read 5 Group Aircraft Drills, No.12. Do you know how long the supply will last?
On your next N.F.T. carry out a dummy drill for an emergency. Have your Flight Engineer and Wireless Operator go down and lift the Rear Gunner out of his turret and carry him to the rest bed, using portable bottles. One pilot we know had three of his crew unconscious on the rear turret cat-walk just as he was approaching the target. They knew how to use the bottles, but had never practiced it!
Don’t wear signet rings on operations, however well dressed you may feel. You may regret your elegance. It increases the danger of frostbite if you have to bale out at altitude. It is also difficult for the M.O. to treat you for hand wounds or abrasions. Either the ring comes off – or your finger does!!
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
All Flight Engineer Leaders in the Group must have a drive on their Squadron in log keeping. So much valuable information is lost because details of small defects the recording of airspeeds, and the time of descent are omitted. It is difficult to keep a good log when the Flight Engineer is to “Window”, but if we can instil more keenness in the keeping of these logs, Flight Engineers in the long run, would benefit from the research which is given to all operational flights.
There is much discrepancy in the duration of flight from these logs. In future the time from airborne to landing must be taken from the Watch Office records and entered in the log.
This month at least one early return was made that should have been avoided. On the outward trip, the port engine showed a higher temperature than the other three; it was decided to return. On the check the next day it was found that this temperature was within the limits laid down for this type of engine; the Flight Engineer should have known this and advised the pilot that there was no danger. Another case was one engine feathered because the oil temperature gauge dropped to zero, yet both the oil pressure gauge and the coolant temperature gauge remained normal. On check it was found that the gauge was faulty.
[Cartoon] Dot and Dash – our immaculate W.A.A.F’s
“- and you needn’t say I’m jealous of this Monica of Bill’s – “
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The Group operated five times only during February, and these five operations produced 1000 sorties; to achieve this an exceedingly high percentage of aircraft held on charge flew on each of these operations, the outstanding feature being the first operation of the month, when 226 Lancasters took off from this Group. Further comment on this achievement is unnecessary as it must be obvious to any person who knows the difficulties which have to be overcome to get such a large force off the ground, what work was entailed.
March should see an even larger effort than did February, but we still have our cancellations and early returns which do not appear to reduce by very many in spite of all our efforts. The technical defects which cause early returns and cancellations are not of a recurring nature; that is why it is so difficult to overcome each single case, but in spite of these individual faults, the numbers of early returns will be at least reduced if we persevere.
Much discussion has taken place during the month on the salvage of equipment, and one point which affect all Engineer Officers in this connection is that they must make sure that full use is made of the Base facilities for the repair and testing of technical equipment. A very frequent check should be made on R. & I. stores, and station equipment sections, to ensure that items of equipment have not been returned for subsequent return to the R.E.D. when these items can be repaired within the Base facilities.
During March it is intended to review the Maintenance Schedules for both Lancaster and Stirling aircraft; committees will be set up for each type and each individual inspection item will be checked both for the Daily and Minor Inspections; as a result it is hoped to cut out many items which exist in the Daily Inspection which are unnecessary, similarly with the Minor Inspection. Many hours are at present expended inspecting items which happen to be shown as requiring inspection by the schedule where, in fact, no defects were ever found. At the same time that the schedules are being revised, the card system will be introduced which will assist greatly with carrying out inspections, and it may be no longer necessary, once the scheme is introduced, to put aircraft unserviceable for longer than a few hours for inspection purposes.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Underlined] STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Conversion Unit]
LANCASTER AIRCRAFT
[Aircraft Serviceability for 5. L.F.S.]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] HARMONIZATION [/underlined]
Standard diagrams for each turret in Lancaster aircraft for harmonization at 100 yds and 25 yds have been issued to all Squadrons (5 Group letter 5G/237/2/Trg. Dated 1st Dec. 1943). These diagrams show all dimensions including the height of boards above ground, colour scheme for the gun spots and size of gun spots. The Mid Upper Turret is harmonized on the PORT beam and in all instances the distances are measured from a point vertically beneath the gun pivots to the board. The Tail turret is harmonized with the board dead astern and the nose turret with the board dead ahead.
A good tip is to strip each gun in turn, and not have four breech blocks laid around the rear turret at the same time, as instances have occurred of the breech blocks finding their way into the wrong gun, with the result that the Gunner has had a little difficulty in getting all the guns to fire. It is essential to check the harmonization again after the gun has been trained on the gun spot and the locking device screwed tight as the gun sometimes moves slightly during the locking procedure. The best type of board is the solid wooden one, fitted with a handle for carrying, and the best place to keep the boards is in the Gunnery Office and NOT laid about the dispersal points, remember somebody else may want the board after you and will expect to find it in its proper place. The guns should be harmonized at 100 yards and the 25 yards board used only for checking, it will be realised that the danger of harmonizing at 25 yds is that a slight error at this range is a large one at 400 yards, and although it is often easier to use the short range, don’t get into the habit of doing it every time.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
These reports are showing a tendency to become very brief and a lot of valuable information is omitted; this may be due to the gunners not giving the information at interrogation, or the duty gunner not including everything that is laid down in Appendix “A” INT. 1 and 2 to Air Staff Instructions, it is not easy to remember each item in this Appendix, and it is suggested that a copy is made and used at interrogation to ensure that all the information required is obtained from the crew.
All gunners should realise that the gun freezing bogey is still very much in existence and gunners should do everything possible during the trip when freezing is suspected, to find out where the trouble is; this is not simple, but if the guns won’t fire with the firing gear, the manual release should be tried. This may not cure the trouble as the breech block may go forward and stay there, instances have occurred of the firing gear taking some few seconds to function after the triggers have been pressed. These points and the presence of ice on guns should be noted by the gunners and stated at interrogation. Will all air gunners, therefore, do their utmost to help the technical staff to solve the serious and difficult problem.
[Underlined] MARK II GYRO GUNSIGHT[/underlined]
The Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Fiskerton is being modified to take the Gyro Gunsight and training of gunners will commence as soon as this modification is complete. Considerable practice is required with this gunsight before the gunner becomes proficient in following the target accurately, due to the slight lag produced by the gyro on the moving graticule. It is found at first that when following a target which changes direction, the gunner is apt to overshoot with the sight, as the graticule carries on after the turret has stopped, and this, coupled with the foot pedals which are operated to feed the range into the sight, are both innovations which are new and must be mastered before accurate shooting can be expected.
The turret in which these sights will be installed is the F.N. 121 which has an electric motor to operate the servo mechanism, which eliminates any inter-action of trigger and turret movements. The control characteristics in the valve box have been modified to give more positive control for small turret movements at the cost of a slight reduction in the speed of the turret. No information is available at the moment regarding the speed with which the remaining Squadrons will be equipped after 49 Squadron is complete, but it is expected that the rate will be speeded up after the first Squadron has been completed.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO.73 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FINAL EXAMINATION RESULTS [/underlined]
P/O. Sandford – 467 Sqdn. – 79.2% - Cat. “A”
P/O. Powell – 619 Sqdn. – 67% - Cat “C”
[Underlined] NO.74 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE [/underlined]
F/O. Williams – 463 Sqdn. – 74.8% - Cat “C”
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn. A/C Night Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 M 19/20.2.44. DO.217
49 D 19/20.2.44. JU,88
207 F 20/21.2.44. ME.110
49 C 24/25.2.44. T/E.
463 S 25/26.2.44. FW.190
207 K 25/26.2.44. ME.410
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
50 B 15/16.2.44. JU.88
44 J 15/16.2.44. DO.217
50 H 15/16.2.44. ME.210
207 C 15/16.2.44. ME.110
9 C 15/16.2.44. T/E.
44 A 19/20.2.44. ME.210
50 J 19/20.2.44. JU.88
106 M 19/20.2.44. ME.410
619 B 19/20.2.44. ME.109
44 Y 20/21.2.44. ME.210
49 G 24/25.2.44. JU.88
49 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.210
57 P 24/25.2.44. JU.88
207 P 24/25.2.44. S/E.
9 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.100
9 S 25/26.2.44. JU.88
630 G 25/26.2.44. FW.190
All these claims have been confirmed by Command.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.19. FEBRUARY, 1944 PAGE 11.
[Page break]
M.T. & FLYING ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ‘YOU’VE HAD IT’ [/underlined]
Reporting an M.T. accident, even filling up Form 446, is easy enough if the driver does it straight away, but it gets more difficult every day he puts it off.
In the end you will find that he doesn’t report it at all, but don’t be misled; the other man will and A.D. Claims then start the ball rolling from the other end, and you will find that you are in more trouble than ever, and it’s quite a big snowball by the time it reaches you.
Will M.T. Officers and N.C.O’s i/c Transport try to impress their drivers with the necessity for keeping the following rules.
(i) If you hit an aircraft or an aircraft hits you – REPORT IT – Everybody will; it’s a BLACK, but Training are dealing with this more fully.
(ii) If you knock someone’s wall down, or even bend it, --REPORT IT – the owner may quite like it, and he’s sure to be watching out of the window.
[Cartoon] E.M.P.
(iii) If you bump a car in the blackout – REPORT IT – the owner values his car much more than you think; usually more than it’s worth.
(iv) If you knock his daughter down – REPORT IT – injuries get so much worse if no one calls to sympathise from A.D. Claims. By the way, don’t call to sympathise yourself, however pretty she may be; this is against the rules, A.D. Claims have all the luck! A.M.O. A475/42, paragraph 17 lays down quite definitely that you must not approach the civilian involved in an accident. If you can get yourself invited to tea after the whole thing is settled – well that’s different!
Very few MT accidents now require more than F.446 action if they are reported at once. Page.16 of the AMO tells you all about this.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENT RATE ALMOST TREBLED IN 3 MONTHS [/underlined]
DECEMBER - [/underlined] 10; [/underlined] JANUARY – [underlined] 18; [/underlined] FEBRUARY – [underlined] 27. [/underlined]
The exalted position held by this Group for the past three months in the Bomber Command Accident Ladder will certainly not be held for the month just finished. It has been the blackest month from the accident point of view for a long time, and the most prevalent type, viz. [underlined] Ground Collisions [/underlined] has contributed to a greater extent than ever to the long list of damaged Lancasters and Stirlings in the Group. THESE AVOIDABLE, UNECESSARY AND EXPENSIVE ACCIDENTS MUST CEASE.
The “taxying” record for the past 3 months reads as follows:-
December – 9; January – 9; February – 11.
When it is realised that at least half of the aircraft involved were [underlined] CAT. AC. [/underlined] the effect on the war effort from this type of accident alone is immediately apparent.
So much has been written in these notes recently that it is difficult to avoid repetition, but it is hoped that the new instructions issued in February have the desired effect. However, the exercise of care and foresight on the part of everybody, especially pilots, is essential at all times when taxying an aircraft if the number of accidents in this category is to be reduced. There is no doubt that if ground personnel and aircrew do their very best, taxying accidents can be brought to within reasonable limits.
Manpower, paper, time and tempers can be saved by getting your report off quickly and giving AD Claims a chance to settle the case at once.
A great deal depends on M.T. Officers ensuring that their drivers report accidents promptly. If the drivers was not at fault he will not be punished (Not often!!! Editor), but he may be if he doesn’t report it at all.
Of course it saves an awful lot of trouble not to have the accident at all. It’s worth trying!
An unusual accident occurred at a Station in No.51 Base this month. An aircraft had landed and was slowing down towards the end of the runway, when the rear gunner called up the captain and told him an aircraft was landing beside him. The quick landing scheme was in force , and just prior to the gunner’s warning, Flying Control had advised the pilot to clear the runway quickly. As a result of these warnings, the captain thought the aircraft was close behind him (it was still in the funnel) and accelerated. He had too much speed on turning off the end of the runway, and broke his undercarriage. Rear Gunners should pay particular attention to give their captains precise information as to where an aircraft landing behind actually is. If it is still in the funnel they should definitely say so.
The month’s total of all kinds of avoidable accidents is made up as follows:-
Ground Collisions- 11; Heavy Landings – 4; Overshoots on Landing – 3; Swings on take off – 3; Crashes on Overshooting – 1; Other errors of judgement – 5. Of the aircraft which made heavy landings, two were Cat. A. and two were Cat.A.C. Three of these occurred at night. In one of them the pilot was prevented from using engine [sic] to recover from the first bounce because the Flight Engineer still had his hands on the throttles after ensuring they were fully closed. He was thrown off balance and held on to the throttles. This is a point which must be watched. Another occurred after an operational trip, when the pilot was caught unawares by his flaps only partly lowering. The flap gauge must always be checked.
Investigation of 2 of the swings on take off shows that either the wrong procedure for take off was used, or the wrong action taken when the swing started. Every pilot should ensure that he thoroughly understands the 5 Group Drills on swinging.
The accidents classed as errors of judgement were almost all of a serious nature, and the
(continued on page 6 Col. 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
SELF HELP
A recent letter from Air Ministry impressed upon Command Group and Station Commanders the critical shortage of labour and materials that exists today. Notwithstanding the evidence of this on Stations in the shape of current establishment deficiencies and shortage of equipment, very few people realise how serious the position really is.
In effect, the allocation of labour for constructional work has been considerably reduced. This labour will be required to cover minor Works Services, as well as larger schemes.
[Cartoon] P/O Snooks will Help Himself any time! EMP.
Therefore, the available labour must only be used on those schemes that are essentially of an operational necessity and this can only be done at the expense of day-to-day minor services. If the minor Work Services themselves are to be carried out, it will only be possible to implement them by a “Self Help” scheme.
Now the expression “Self Help” should not be taken too literally. It does not mean that it can be taken as a good excuse to knock down the local guard room, or to pull down the intervening wall between the W.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Dining Room. A “Self Help” scheme is done by Service labour, and as such must be organised as a Service for the benefit of the Station as a whole, and not to satisfy the whim of any individual. There still seem to be a number of people who, being accustomed to “Having jam on it” in the shape of the excellent facilities normally available at a R.A.F. Station of peace-time design, think that the provision of any little extra convenience for anyone connected, however remotely, with the many activities involved in running a flying station, can justifiably be regarded as “operationally essential”. This, of course, is nonsense – ask some of our fellows who have served overseas.
The problem is, therefore, how to get a fuller effort from the available R.A.F. man and woman. There is, no doubt, very many R.A.F. personnel who are not doing the full amount of work of which they are capable and quite a lot of them have not yet grasped that they ought to do more than they are doing. Quite a few regard the acquisition of as many late passes and “forty eights” as possible as their chief aim in life, with unofficial extension to such periods of absence as a minor hobby. Quite a number of these might well contribute a few hours to “Self Help” each week, without suffering any grave hardship.
There are, on the other hand, a considerable number of individuals who continuously work to the limit of their capacity and sometimes beyond that limit (“Not you Adj. – sit down”). Everyone should feel a strong personal urge to give of their utmost to their Service tasks and to put no limit to the amount of effort which should be demanded of them. As we have now reached the stage when national resources are inadequate to provide us with every facility we need just when we want it, this extra effort must be organised and well led, to help ourselves as far as we can. This extra effort can be used on Station Maintenance, to replace broken windows, re-painting quarters and firming up paths and standings.
But, in conclusion, remember the buildings etc., on the Station are Air Ministry property so don’t knock down that Guard Room without first obtaining authority from the higher formation – it is really quite embarrassing to stand on Pay Parade and find you have no money to come.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, Col. 1) [/underlined]
It is not done at all even thought the men drown. Recently in Lincoln Swimming Bath an aircrew member who couldn’t swim took the precaution of providing himself with a Mae West and took care to fasten it properly; he then jumped into the bath from the top board – and wasn’t seen for a long time, he eventually came up shouting for help and on being pulled out immediately started blaming his Mae West, only to find that he hadn’t inflated it – it goes to show!!
[Underlined] Note for Gunners. [/underlined] If your Buoyant Suit has no pocket for a floating torch don’t take it that this means you are not to have one – have a pocket fitted. If no pockets are available, you can still wear the torch round your neck inside the suit. Similarly make sure that there is an attachment for the lanyard of the K-dinghy on your suit – if you don’t know then make enquiries [underlined] now [/underlined]
IN “Air Sea Rescue” the proverb is:-
[Underlined] “YOU CAN BE TOO LATE TO LEARN”. [/underlined]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] CARE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As one goes about the Stations, it is obvious that equipment in general is not being cared for as it might, or rather as it should. There is no doubt whatever that at the present time, especially owing to the shortage of materials, we must make the best use of that which has been given to us. There is a feeling that the Government is a good firm and that “there is plenty more where that came from”. That may be true in certain respects, but as this war goes on, demands will increase, but whether the material will be there to meet our needs is another matter; so it is up to everyone [sic] of us to safeguard, handle and use articles of equipment entrusted to us as though they were our own and we had paid for them. Can you imagine yourself buying an expensive article and then after a short time throwing it away because perhaps a small component of it had become unserviceable! Of course you wouldn’t, you would get another part and make it serviceable. Why should you not, therefore, treat Government property in the same way, and thus save materials, manpower, man-hours and money?
[Underlined] REPAIRABLE EQUIUPMENT [/underlined]
Have you read, thoroughly digested and understood AMO A.736/43? This order gives in great detail the method for disposal of repairable equipment. Amongst the many important things one has to do, none is greater than the labelling of an unserviceable article correctly, for if this is not done (i) you are likely to get it thrown back at you by the Equipment Officer – which may mean humping a heavy article back to where it came from, or (ii) you will have to wait for the new article in exchange for the old until you present it in its proper form; thus considerable manpower and time has been unnecessarily expended. Again, if the label does not state the reason for unserviceability of the item, when it gets back to the R.E.D. many more man-hours are lost investigating the cause and extent of its unserviceability, whereas had the label borne the exact cause of failure, the mechanic at the R.E.D. whose job it is to repair such equipment, could have repaired it with the minimum of delay. Special labels are available for this type of equipment (see A.M.O. N.1174/43) – ensure you have a plentiful supply, and use ‘em.
WHO?
Thoroughness is a virtue which we view
With envy, and with admiration too;
And we, in common fairness must agree,
That rarely in a fellow man have we
Encountered such tenacity and drive
As led him on a recent day to strive,
And show his humble tyros how ‘tis done
To fly an aircraft properly, and shun
The common errors that all pupils make.
Enthusiasm prompted him to take
An aircraft up, and as they turned he spoke
“A broken undercarriage is no joke,
And if you swing on take-off you will find
Your legs will go; you’ll sit on your behind!”
Then as he spoke he swung to demonstrate
And proved his words.
……….he met his forecast fate!!
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR * SEA * RESCUE
A man suffering from shock or the after effects of great mental strain usually behaves in a most peculiar manner, as his brain has become numbed and does not function properly. It is on this account that it is necessary for aircrews to practice dinghy drills and have a sound knowledge of safety and rescue equipment carried in their aircraft and also of the equipment that might be dropped to them in the sea.
A crew of this Group was recently forced down in the sea and an airborne lifeboat was dropped to them – they dug about and found the sleeping suits but did not use them as it was considered that, in the crews wet state, these would not be of any use; similarly because the “Everhot” bags had been immersed they did not attempt to use them, thinking that they would be useless! Normally these men are not the “dim clots” you are now calling them – they are an outstanding example of how dim your brain can become after a climax of mental strain, and also of how insufficient knowledge of equipment can be the cause of much unnecessary suffering. Imagine it – wet through, at sea in a small boat on a cold winter’s day, and the means of warming themselves discarded as useless!
In addition, this same crew showed abysmal ignorance of the ditching stations to be taken up – the two gunners ditched with their [underlined] backs [/underlined] to the flap jack and the flight engineer was badly out of position with his back to the rear spar. As this aircraft broke its back at the rear spar, it is logical to suppose that each of these men, had they taken up their correct stations would have been alive today – the flight engineer should have been on the rest bed and the two gunners probably broke their backs on impact, they should have been facing the other way round with their backs on the floor, and “buttocks to flap jack with feet over it”.
Many flying men still seem to have the idea that fully inflated Mae West makes escape through the upper exits of an aircraft difficult. This is not true and tests have shown that the biggest and smallest members can easily “evacuate” Lancasters and Stirlings with a fully inflated Mae West. Inflate your Mae West when your Dinghy Drills provides – experience has shown time and again that unless this is done at the proper time
(Continued on Page 13 Col. 2.)
OPERATIONS
Until the moth was half spent and the “fighter” moon had been allowed to wane, the Group was unable to stage a major attack, although 617 Squadron found two opportunities to add further to their history. Nevertheless, the 1000 sorties mark was again achieved of which 89.7% were successful in attacking the primary targets, with 3.3% casualties. The lull in operational activity, however, was not allowed to pass unprofitably, as can be evidenced in the record figure of 226 aircraft airborne on the 15/16th.
With the progress of the month it became clear that the immediate objective of the Allied Air Command was to strike and crush Germany’s air strength at its source, by a sustained and co-ordinated air offensive against factories associated with aircraft production. To this end LIMOGES featured as the Group’s first assignment on the 8/9th. Until that night, memorable as indeed it must be to those “locals” who were fortunate enough to remain spectators, The Gnome and Rhone aero-engine factory was producing in the region of 50 engines per month for the Axis. Immediate assessment of the results was greatly facilitated by excellent night photographs and a particularly impressive cine film which was eloquent testimony to the accuracy of the marking. It is now apparent from P.R.U. cover following the raid, that of the 48 bays comprising the factory, 7 only have escaped destruction or serious damage – a considerable part of the machinery being wrecked and production brought to a standstill.
On 12/13th February, ANTHEOR again bore a charmed life, and escaped with no direct hits from an attack pressed home in the face of increased opposition. A few very near misses were recorded, from which, however, the Viaduct sustained no apparent damage.
Having husbanded her main bomber strength until 15/16th., Command directed a record effort against the Reich capital. The weight of the blow appears to have fallen to the South of the city and the West of the Potsdamer Railway Station, where extensive damage can be observed.
Continuing the offensive against the enemy’s aircraft industry, LEIPZIG was singled out for a 2,300 ton raid on the 19/20th. Within a few hours of this attack, made in conditions of 10/10ths cloud, American heavies returned in daylight with yet another load for the battered city. Photographic confirmation of the results is awaited with interest.
The night following, viz 20/21st. STUTTGART received a damaging blow – the attack being carried out against an apparently weakening Luftwaffe, since little enemy fighter activity was experienced by our crews. Heavy smoke rolling South Westwards away from the target obscured the Central, South and South Western areas of the town, hindering photographic cover the next day, but fires still burning, apparently unchecked, in the Northern outskirts, gave rise to the impression (later confirmed) that severe damage had been suffered.
The strain on the German night fighter and ground defences was further aggravate on 24/25th by a two-phase attack on the important ball and roller bearing plant at SCHWEINFURT, which originally contributed something approaching 50 per cent of the total production available to Germany. This attack followed closely in the wake of a heavy daylight assault by the Americans. Guided by fires started by their predecessors, later aircraft were able to continue the bombardment which largely wrecked the group of factories as a war time centre.
The month’s activities wound up with a double blow at AUGSBURG on 25/26th. The targets included the Messerschmitt plant and experimental establishment (believed to be engaged in the production of the Me.410) and the M.A.N. Diesel Engine Factory. Following the precedent of the previous day, this important aircraft centre had been attacked in daylight a few hours before by the Americans, and the evidence of night photographs taken during the raid indicates that enormous fires were left burning throughout the area, with a vast pall of smoke shrouding the stricken city.
It is true to say that never before has the enemy’s war production been so heavily bombed, or their defences subjected to such continued strain as that imposed during the sustained attacks of the last nine days of the month, which in themselves exemplify the crushing might of the Allied co-ordinated offensive.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft, hours flow, bombs dropped, sorties carried out and results by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, February 1944
5 Group News, February 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 19, February 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about tactics, navigation, air bombing, gardening, sports, training, flying control, H2S, Gee, photography, honours and awards, signals / radar, armament, link trainer hours, war savings, flight engineers, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, engineering, gunnery, motor transport and flying accidents, self help, equipment, who?, air sea rescue, operations and the war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-02
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
16 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-23
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-02
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
civil defence
control tower
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Scampton
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Underlined] 53 Base Commander [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
JANUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] [indecipherable] * NUMBER 18
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The final battle of Germany has now been joined. The enemy has been forced to concentrate two-thirds of his whole fighter strength for the protection of his citied, thus providing a classis example of the way in which air superiority, contrary to popular opinion, is won as much by the bomber as by the fighter. Crews should know that the superiority which the Russian Air Force enjoys on the Eastern Front, with all that this means to Russian military operations, is largely their doing; and the same is true of the Italian theatre.
This massing of the German fighter strength in an attempt to stop our attacks and those of the U.S.S.A.F.E. calls for serious thought on our part. In the long run the effect of the combined R.A.F. and American attacks will reduce the German fighter production so that they will be unable to support their present first line units, and the force will slowly diminish, but this is not a result which can be expected immediately, and much hard fighting lays ahead.
Bomber attacks are planned to reach the target having encountered as little opposition as possible. This is achieved by taking advantage of weather which will keep fighters on the ground, or involve them in great hazards if they take off; by careful routeing; by feint attacks; and by the full use of the radio offensive which prevents orders reaching the German pilots. In spite of this planning, scheming and foxing, a proportion of fighters are bound to get into the bomber stream. It is then that the tactics of the individual crews win or lose the battle.
There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand it may be considered that the sole duty of a crew is to reach the target and bomb it. Therefore, it is said it is imprudent to become involved in any fighting, and a crew should do its best to avoid combat and only open fire if directly attacked, and then only after failing to shake off the fighter by manoeuvre. On the other hand, while accepting that it is the object of the bomber to reach the target, refusal to engage in combat, while possibly safeguarding the individual, may by no means be the best for the force as a whole.
The German night fighter pilot must pray fervently that crews will adopt the first policy, for then he can cruise in the bomber stream unconcerned, except to find and stalk an unsuspecting prey. He will not be shot at by a bomber, which he has failed to see below him or to one side, and he can devote his whole attention to manoeuvring for the final shot. In other words he has a job almost free from the hazards of war, and as a result he will grow fat, and gain in skill and experience, and, therefore, in his ability to do us harm.
Now consider the other policy – to shoot at every German aircraft within range. About that policy I will say this. Firstly, that it is in general the duty of every combatant officer and man of any of His Majesty’s Forces to attempt by every means in their power, to destroy such of the King’s enemies as come within range. Secondly, that execution of this duty will aid the security of the bomber force as a whole, and, therefore, of the individual crew.
The matter is not, however, entirely straightforward, and there are two situations which have to be considered. Firstly, one in which a crew sees an enemy fighter not in a position to attack them but attacking, or about to attack, another bomber. They should be prepared to go in and shoot it down. At the foot of this foreword will be found some selected combats in which crews have acted in this way. They acted rightly, and deserve the congratulations of all in the Group, for they saved the lives of other crews, and rid us of pests who, if not destroyed, will quickly become adept at the art of killing at night.
The second situation is more complicated. A crew know, from their early warning device, that a fighter is nosing after them, and will soon be in a position to attack. Should they continue on their course until it is within range, and then attempt to shoot it down? Emphatically no – because the fighter in these circumstances has certain advantages which will give him temporarily the upper hand. The crew should carry out the standard corkscrew, remembering that this is designed to give the Gunners a standard deflection shot, known to them but not to the fighter pilot. Hence the importance of keeping to the exact standard speeds, rates of turn, loss and gain in height etc., set out in 5 Group Tactical Notes. Any other manoeuvre executed in the heat of action will provide the Gunners with deflection shots which, with present equipment, they have no means of calculating, but which the fighter pilot will find no more, and probably less, difficult to assess than the corkscrew.
Thus, while the standard corkscrew can be used as a manoeuvre for disengaging from enemy fighters, it is also a manoeuvre – and in fact the only manoeuvre – which we can employ and at the same time shoot accurately. Different speeds or rates of turn, or any skid or slip, may cause the Gunner to miss by 40 feet or more. In particular, too high a speed on the downward legs will lessen the rate of turn and, therefore, provide an easier shot for the fighter.
The policy outlined above was first set out in June, 1943. Over the following four months the Group shot down 58 fighters, but recently the numbers have been less, because I believe some crews are in doubt as to the correct action to take.
There is one final point; there must be no firing at an aircraft unless it is identified beyond any reasonable doubt. There have been instances in the past of Lancasters firing on other Lancasters, and there can be no justification for this.
To sum up, every crew in the Group should know that weather – routes – spoof targets and all other devices at the disposal of Bomber Command – are used to out-manoeuvre the German Fighter Force. It can only be out-fought if every crew in the Group is ready to “FORCE HIS WAY IN AND FIGHT HIS WAY OUT”. By that means we shall reduce the power of the German fighter to do us harm, to our own lasting advantage.
Need I add that the Air Gunners are playing a more and more vital part in the success of the bomber offensive. It is their quickness of eye and hand which determines success or disaster – but they are gravely handicapped if the pilot does not keep to the standard corkscrew, and may be caught unawares if the Wireless Operator relaxes his watch on his Monica or Fishpond tube. Such, then, is the team on which we rely to defeat the enemy fighters.
[Underlined] 23/24th August, 1943. J/207. [/underlined] Twin-engined enemy aircraft attacking another aircraft at 800 yards range. Rear gunner opened fore at 700 yards. Enemy aircraft broke in two and hit the ground in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 22/23rd November, 1943. P/619. [/underlined] Rear gunner saw ME109 attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster “P” turned starboard and Rear Gunner opened fire at 200 yards range and scored hits. ME.109 reversed and dived violently to port, emitting flames. Enemy aircraft disappeared in the cloud, after which an explosion was seen. ME.109 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 26/27th November, 1943. Z/44. [/underlined] Rear gunner sighted ME.210 flying to attack another Lancaster ahead. Lancaster Z corkscrewed and both gunners opened fire at 800 y ards [sic] range. Enemy aircraft followed the corkscrew and fired a burst which went well above [sic] Both gunners kept firing short burst, registering hits. Enemy aircraft seen to disintegrate by another crew, and ME.210 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 16/17th December, 1943. A/44. [/underlined] ME.109 sighted 600 yards range parallel, following another Lancaster. ME.109 opened fire on another Lancaster who did not return fire. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits. ME.109 burst into flames and disintegrated. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 30/31st January,1944.U/44. [/underlined] Over target area Rear Gunner sights ME.210 800 yards down attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster U was corkscrewing on a Monica IIIA indication. Rear Gunner opened fire and strikes were observed. Enemy aircraft dived away with port engine on fire. Last seen entering cloud in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographs with plottable ground detail obtained during January, was 73; these were almost entirely due to the conditions prevailing during the Stettin raid. For the remaining raids, the presence of heavy cloud caused the majority of technical successful exposures to be placed into the Target Conditions category.
Failures for the month were 58, which represents 5.4%. These failures can be reduced considerably if the personnel concerned will make the necessary effort, and it is suggested that still more co-operation is needed between the Bombing Leaders, Electrical, Armament and Photographic personnel in tracing the causes and ensuring that failures are not repeated. The first step in film fault analysis is to decide the ‘bombing frame’; failure to do this correctly will normally cause the investigation to be abortive and a complete waste of time.
There is reason to think that insufficient care is being exercised when setting the fusing time on the Type 35 Control. It is of the utmost importance that the fuse setting and the Type 35 Control are identical. Squadron photographers must realise that the setting is extremely critical, and even a small misadjustment of the Control Setting Knob will normally be sufficient to cause the flash illumination to be misplaced, and may therefore be considered a ‘pick-up’, resulting in a theoretical failure.
A new method of Night Photography is being tried out by Nos. 44 and 49 Squadrons. This is the use of Kodacolour film on frames Nos. 3 and 4 and H.S. night film on the remaining frames. The object of this composite Colour and Black and White is to photograph any T.I’s and Sky Markers in colour and at the same time to procure ground detail on Frame 5 by the illumination provided by the photo flash if conditions permit. The Photographic Section, R.A.F., Scampton, have undertaken to make up and process the films, and with full co-operation of the Station Workshops, have produced some very fine work.
It is too early to forecast whether this new method will generally be adopted. Much depends on the value of interpretation, supply of Kodacolour and technical equipment, but so far results are very promising.
[Table of Photographic analysis results by Squadron]
[Table of Photographic failure analysis results by Squadron]
A.S.R. (CONTINUED)
(Continued from back page Col. 1)
follows :-
(i) 256 aircrew lost their lives when other members of their crews were saved, which gives a strong indication of incorrect dinghy drill being carried out.
(ii) 23 lost their lives after having been sighted in dinghies – weather and lack of knowledge of searching procedure were the main causes for this.
(iii) 663 are known to have come down in the sea but no S.O.S. signal was transmitted making search almost impossible.
(iv) 280 disappeared over the sea without word or trace.
The above figures show that aircrews generally have a very sad lack of knowledge of what to do in the event of an emergency over the sea, both as regards W/T procedure and dinghy drills. A tremendous amount of money has been spent building up the Air Sea Rescue Service, and in providing safety equipment for aircrews, all of which can work satisfactorily with the full co-operation of the aircrews for whose benefit they have been designed.
When you bale out over enemy territory, your future welfare depends on your own initiative [underlined] after [/underlined] you have come to earth, but the reverse holds good in baling out over the sea or ditching. Emergency incidents over the sea depend for their success on full crew co-operation and knowledge of W/T procedure and dinghy drills – all of which must be gained [underlined] before [/underlined] the incident occurs.
One hour a week spent on the study of search procedure, emergency and S.O.S. W/T procedure, and dinghy drills, is sufficient to ensure that you will never be caught unprepared in case of emergency over the sea.
[Underlined] HELP A.S.R. TO HELP YOU [/underlined]
OPERATIONS
It would perhaps not be inopportune in the first month of the New Year, to reflect on one of the most valuable technical inovations introduced this time last year, and which is to-day largely instrumental in waging the Battle of Berlin with unabated vigour. It was just a year ago that blind bombing was first on trial and an analysis of its success or otherwise was anxiously awaited. This month, with the aid of this technique, we were enabled to conduct seven raids on Berlin, and one each on Brunswick and Magdeburg. Stettin alone, to its everlasting regret, was cloud free. 1341 sorties were flown, of which 89% were successful in attacking the primary. Increased fighter activity and the long range at which targets were attacked perhaps accounted for the rather higher loss rate of 4.6%.
At the beginning of this month, Hitler declared “The Winter may be difficult. Its blows, however, cannot hit us harder than last year”. The month was not out before this illusion was shattered by a sustained series of attacks on the Nazi capital, bringing the tonnage dropped since the beginning of the Battle of Berlin, to over 24,500 tons. One is perhaps best able to appreciate the magnitude of this figure when it is borne in mind that 50,000 tons would “Hamburgise” Berlin. The latest reconnaissance to secure photographic evidence of the raids up to and including 2/3rd January, was made on 4th January, but only poor quality photographs of parts of the city (excluding in particular the centre) were obtained. These however revealed important industrial damage in the Johannisthal district to the South East, with severe damage to several less important business and residential areas. It is interesting to note that in a statement issued by Transocean on 7th January, it was estimated that the damage sustained up to that date would take some 7 1/2 years to rebuild.
Little is yet known of the remaining 4 major attacks of the month against the Reich capital on 20/21st, 27/28th, 28/29th and 30/31st, except that reports suggest they were concentrated. Ground information points to the significant fact that with the possible exception of the North Eastern outer suburbs of the city, not a district in the capital has escaped. Impressive as this picture is , it really affords no index to the scale of administrative dislocation which must be a most acute problem for the Nazis; added to which the paralysis of the focus of German was industry and transport, together with the ever increasing influence of the raids on that intangible factor, morale, would also appear to promote a depressing effect on the Hun’s capacity to wage war.
The attack on Stettin on 5/6th January, provided adequate material for our reports. The blanket of cloud, which for some time past has shrouded the continent, was absent at the target, enabling the snow outlined town to be clearly identified. The resultant attack was well concentrated, and P.R.U. cover indicates severe damage in the Southern half of the town centre, extending into the West and East basins of the dock area. Ten buildings of the large military barracks to the South of the town have been gutted, and fairly heavy damage was sustained by business and residential property. The same night a
(Continued on page 4, col. 1)
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT RATE INCREASES
Halfway through January, it was apparent that the excellent accident figure for December was not to be repeated, and the number of avoidable accidents, of all kinds, by the end of the month was nearly doubled – 18 against 10.
This month’s total is made up as follows: Ground collisions – 9; Overshoots on landing – 3; Heavy landings – 1; Swings on take-off – 1; Other errors of judgement – 3.
In spite of all that has been done and written about “ground collisions” there has been no decrease whatsoever in these avoidable accidents. This month there were again 9, and they follow much the same patter as those of December, with this difference:-
Two aircraft were damaged in dispersal while being run up by ground crew, through chocks slipping on greasy surfaces. In both instances the aircraft swung round and collided with obstacles.
It has been a long time since an accident of this type occurred in the Group. The remedy is obvious. Ground crews must examine all chocks for serviceability, keep dispersals well sanded, and, above all, never start to run up engines until the dispersal is clear of obstructions. It is the old, old story of a little foresight paying a big dividend.
During this month a taxying incident occurred in which a major contributory factor was the failure of a captain of aircraft and of ground crew to notify Flying Control quickly that a Lancaster was obstructing the perimeter track. The aircraft had become bogged in soft ground just off the track at night, and was struck by another Lancaster taxying, without an aldis lamp, and at excessive speed.
Flying Control, had they known, could have taken immediate steps to have the aircraft marked as an obstruction, and could have warned other captains of its position.
This accident adds emphasis to the warning in last Month’s News that ground crew should make every effort to let pilots know of obstructions. The captain of this particular Lancaster showed bad captaincy in not notifying Flying Control, and also in leaving his aircraft in charge of ground crew when he knew it was in a dangerous position.
Needless to say, the pilot of the moving aircraft had his log book endorsed in “RED”.
The 3 “overshoots on landing” this month bring out the usual pilot error – too fast an approach in bad visibility and failure to go round again. If the various factors of height, speed, cockpit drill etc., are not correct, it is no use “hoping you’ll stop in time”. It might be all right nine times out of ten, but the tenth means another Lancaster in a heap at the end of the runway.
One crash occurred again this month on a 3-engined overshoot. The pilot was an experienced captain with many Lancaster hours to his credit, yet he [underlined] failed to keep in trim for 3 engined flying [/underlined] on his approach. When the engines were opened up to full power, the inevitable swing caught him unawares. Result was a bad crash with fatal consequences.
Drills and instructions are not issued by this Headquarters just to be read and forgotten, so if there are any you are not sure about, now is the time to brush up your knowledge. [Underlined] You [/underlined] will reap the benefit.
Conversion Units had a bad time this month. The total of nine “avoidables” exceeds the total of all the Squadrons put together. Winthorpe had four. 1660, 1654 and 5 L.F.S. had one each. 1485 Flight had two taxying accidents.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
FRESHMEN
1. Remember the lowest fuel consumption is not obtained when you are flying at the lowest possible speed. With the increased angle of attack of the wings at a low speed, you get increased drag and consequently require a greater power output. Neither maximum endurance nor maximum range will be obtained by flying as slowly as you can, so don’t “waffle” around the sky hanging on to your props. If you are getting short of petrol and have got a long way to go, try 2000 revs + 3 boost. That will give you a healthy airspeed, economical petrol consumption and excellent range.
2. You know why you can expect climbing difficulties on warm nights? The air is thinner at a given aeronoid height and so increases the true air speed at which the aircraft must be flown and the power required to fly it. The thinner air also reduces the charge drawn in to the engine and so reduces the power available.
3. Don’t sheer off track because you see pinpoints of flak dead ahead. It may be anything up to 100 miles away and as you get closer you will find that your route will probably bypass the flak area. Flak which explodes with a large orange coloured flash is within 15 mls and is quite harmless. It is only when you can hear or feel it that it is within 250 feet and getting dangerous. If you SMELL it, well get cracking.
[Cartoon]
4. Always take a note at Briefing of the times of the other waves in the attack in case you strike trouble on the way and cannot make good your T.O.T. Aim to make good the T.O.T. of another wave. It is safer to be bombing with bags of company.
5. Give your Navigator as good a platform for his Astro shots as you give your Air Bomber for his bombing run. Hand over to “George” if your instrument flying is not 100% and let the Navigator know the moment you consider the aircraft is as stable as it is likely to be.
6. If you use Caffein tablets it is a good plan to take one as you leave the English Coast outward bound. That will see you to the target. Take another when you are clear of the defences to see you home. Never take any just before take-off. Once upon a time there was a mid-upper gunner who took four tablets 10 minutes before take-off. The “Op” was scrubbed. The gunner wasn’t seen for 24 hours after he eventually went to sleep about noon the next day. Then he was posted !
VETERANS
1. Don’t get out of touch with existing orders. You have read them once, but only by constantly referring to the Flight Order books can you be sure that you have got them buttoned up. Just one example – never take off rudder bias on the approach for a 3-engined landing. You can easily control any tendency to swing after landing, but if you have to overshoot on 3 engines, the bias is the only thing that will enable you to control the immediate swing towards the dead engine at full power. If the swing is not controlled the result is fatal.
2. Another word on overshoots. You can still overshoot even though you are in the green of the G.P.I. and the airspeed is O.K. This circumstance may arise if your initial approach has been too low and you have used the extra engine to get back into the Green. Don’t forget once you have made good the undershoot throttle back again and get your angle of descent right.
3. Don’t attempt to raise flaps after landing when you have “pulled the bottle”, because there is a danger of bursting the header tank. If in an emergency you have to raise flaps in the air after pulling the bottle, do so slowly and in stages.
4. If you have to jettison fuel, close the valve while there is still 75 to 100 gallons in each tank. It is a precaution against fire, because the last 30 gallons of jettisonable fuel runs out slowly and splashes over the airframe. Never jettison if you are going to do a wheels up landing when there is any likelihood of fire.
5. Never take off flap during an approach if you suddenly decide you don’t want flap in a very high wind. The lowering of the flap increases the lift coefficient of a wing and any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the stalling speed being increased above the approach speed.
6. Get together regularly with the other members of your crew behind a hangar or in the crew room and exchange ideas on your recent trips. There’s bound to be a few points in crew routine that need patching up. Don’t wait until there is a party in the Sergeants’ Mess before you find out that the crew have a thing or two on their minds.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
WIND MESSAGES
Bomber Command Signals Staff Instructions commence with an “Order of the Day” by the C.-in-C. which says that :- “The tradition of the Signals Service is that the safety of aircraft overrides every other consideration and every other interest…The Signals Service aspires never to lose an aircraft”.
Since this message was originated, many and varied aids have been introduced falling within the purview of the Signals Service which attain towards the achievement of this objective.
It is generally agreed that losses in the main bomber force may be considerably reduced if a high degree of concentration of aircraft during the route to and from the target, and at the target itself, can be effected.
Radar/Navigation aids fitted to many aircraft now make it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy, the velocity and direction of winds at the height and in the area of the main force. The means of communicating this to the Meteorological staffs on the ground, and of passing to every aircraft on the force the assessment of accurate winds on their route, is the responsibility of the Signals Service.
This method has been in use since towards the end of the Old Year, and, from the signals aspect, has been successful. The method used has been for wind-finding aircraft to transmit their winds to the Base D/F Station, and the ground staff to transmit the wind assessment to the main force on Group operational frequency.
The transmissions by Wind Finders to Bases gives an increase on the number of channels, with a better spread over of the volume of traffic at any one time. To ensure that every message which can possibly be received, is received, an additional watch is maintained at each Base on a normal receiver, and a watch, on each frequency in use, at Group Headquarters. The watch at Group Headquarters serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables received winds to be in the Meteorological Officers’ hands in the minimum time, and secondly, provides an additional check on the Base D/F frequencies. Any Wind Finding aircraft unable to establish satisfactory communication on its Base frequency, reverts to the Group operational frequency, and by these means we have been successful in receiving almost 100% of wind finding messages transmitted. There have been two occasions when conditions on the 3 to 4 m/c band made communication rather difficult, and in order to provide an additional channel should this re-occur, an allotment of a frequency in the 7 m/c band has been obtained. The results of this frequency on similar occasions, should they arise, are awaited with interest.
The reception of the wind assessments by the main force has been good, but could be improved. Generally, the number of messages missed has been in the region of 2.5% of the total which should have been received.
The loop aerial has proved a reliable selectivity device, and it should always be tried when other efforts to get rid of jamming fail.
GEE
The introduction of new equipment leaves Radar Sections less time for standard Gee maintenance. It is gratifying to note that, in spite of this, the serviceability remains high. There are however, numerous unnecessary faults, which render the equipment difficult to use, or completely unserviceable. Great care should be taken to prevent slipshod D.I’s, and faults such as leads off etc. Many Squadrons are still reporting divider trouble, indicating that the necessary modification has not been completed. If this is due to a shortage of equipment, ask the Equipment Officer to expedite.
AURAL MONICA
Aural Monica is slowly disappearing. Many crews would, however, like to keep Monica, even though they now have Fishpond. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the Radar Sections to maintain both installations in all aircraft.
VISUAL MONICA
This installation remains a most effective and valuable Radar aid. Serviceability is high in comparison with other equipment, but to be a first class warning device, 100 per cent serviceability is required. Switch motors have caused nearly one third of Visual Monica failures, but it is hoped that this trouble will soon be cleared, since the correct type of grease has now been found. Next month should show a large increase in serviceability. Unfortunately, there is no more equipment available, so squadrons must ensure that no sets remain unserviceable, or are destroyed, through careless maintenance. Many crews already owe much to Visual Monica. Don’t let the lack of serviceability spoil a first class device.
H 2 S
The fitting of H 2 S is greatly retarded by the shortage of scanners. It is impossible to fit all H 2 S aircraft in the existing squadrons, and so there is little likliehood [sic] of fitting new H 2 S squadrons for some time. Last month’s problem, freezing scanners, appears to have been corrected by use of anti-freeze oil and repositioning of the scanner heater. A new snag is now appearing in the slowing down of the repeater motors. Radar Sections should contact Instrument people for information regarding the correct type of oil to use on the motor bearings. A new pulse transformer has been designed and trials are being conducted. It is hoped that a large percentage of the very numerous H 2 S failures will now be prevented.
FISHPOND
Fishpond fitting still continues slowly, hampered by the connector shortage. Trained crews are getting very good results, but it is necessary to emphasise that Wireless Operators should spend considerable time on the Fishpond trainer. A few extra minutes learning to use the set correctly may well save many an unpleasant trip.
MONICA AND FISHPOND TRAINING
Now that all available sets have been fitted, a drive has started to eliminate preventable failures. Aircraft are being deprived of the protection of a tail warning device during entire sorties, simply because one plug is loose, or a fuse blown. We must make full use of every available set and to do this, Operators must be given a greater insight into the workings thereof. Fault finding tables – with sketches of what the CRT shows for various faults – are being prepared.
Various synthetic training schemes have been evolved, including a series of cards showing typical “blip” pictures with the appropriate patter printed underneath. A similar set of cards without the patter is used to test the Operator’s reactions.
An epidiascope is being used by one Squadron, and lifelike “blips” are introduced up and down the time base, and shown on the screen for brief intervals.
Which squadron will produce the best synthetic training device?
Signals and Radar officers – are you getting that occasional flight? (See A.M.O. A.1323/43). You should all have flown with Monica or Fishpond by now. Don’t forget to enter your trips in the old log book.
WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR)
[Underlined] (CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO LOOK) [/underlined]
The article on wind finding from the signals aspect, which heads this Section of the News, should be read and digested by all Wireless Operators.
The Group W/T Exercise has improved this month, but Section I are definitely superior to Section II, and should any Operators of Section II doubt the truth of this statement they may like to do a little eavesdropping. After all, the ether is free.
This month’s three star effort for air operating was the performance by Wireless Operator Sgt. Barnes Moss of No.61 Squadron (formerly of 1661 Con. Unit and 16 O.T.U.), on the night of 5/6th January. The aircraft “J”Jig was severely damaged over the target, the port outer engine being rendered unserviceable, resulting in a loss of the Gee facilities. Sgt. Barnes Moss rose to the occasion and managed 12 fixes, 1 bearing and 1 message, keeping a good log, and also receiving the odd Group broadcast at the same time. It would appear that this Wireless Operator set about his job with calm determination, and was partly responsible for the safe return of his aircraft to this country, and in doing so proved a credit to his Squadron, captain and crew.
(continued on Page 12, Col.1)
(Continued from Page 2, Col.3)
small force of our aircraft successfully laid mines.
Although for the moment we are without precise information as to the result of the raids on Brunswick on 14/15th, and against Magdeburg and Berlin on 21/22nd, preliminary reports show promise of impressive returns. These attacks will contribute to the nomadic population of the Reich, and provide a tinge of irony to the announcement in a Frankfurt paper that “Evacuees are not gypsies but Germans”.
Thus ends the first month of our “decisive year, boasting a new record tonnage dropped on Germany itself – a portent of the scale of future operations.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
It was at the beginning of May, 1943, that the initial drive on greater accuracy in practice bombing was commenced throughout the Group. Very good co-operation by the Squadrons within the Group led to most intensified training, so much so that in the months of May, June, July and August a grand total of 23,310 bombs were dropped. This total almost equalled the number of bombs that were dropped in the preceding [underlined] 4 years. [/underlined] However, one fact emerged, namely the average error was remaining at approximately the same figure, and that this figure, 220 yards, was still much too high.
September heralded the introduction of bombing analysis. F/Lt. Cooper, an expert analyst was attached to us from No. 25 Group and travelled from Squadron to Squadron to implement the Group’s very scanty knowledge of assessment of bombing. Thus, slowly we learned the way bombing errors are split into certain definite categories. The first major item which was tackled was the bombsight maintenance, which had contributed no small portion of bombing errors; and by the end of November, errors directly attributable to bombsight defects were almost eliminated.
We next learned that the main error, called Crew Error, had two components. The error caused by the failings of Pilot and Air Bomber, and the Vector Error, that is the error due to the use of faulty wind velocities.
The Pilot and Air Bomber’s error was tackled with considerable vigour until, by the end of December we were really getting down to very small proportions. 106 Squadron for instance, dropped 182 bombs from High Level during December for an average Pilot/Air Bomber error of 78 yards, an astonishingly good achievement. 619 Squadron with 101 yards, 467 with 115 yards and 50 and 463 Squadrons with 116 and 117 yards respectively were close behind.
However, and now we come to the major bombing problem, our Crew Errors were still too large because our average Vector Errors were much too high.
November/December and January has shown the gradual appreciation of this Vector Error problem, and in the Squadrons where bombing is accepted as the be-all and end-all of 5 Group (and their number is ever-increasing) the problem is a matter of real concern. The Group’s average Vector Error for November was 169 yards at 10,000 feet, in in December 162 yards, and these figures convert to roughly 13 m.p.h. A good Vector Error is considered to be 5 m.p.h. (that is 60 yards at 10,000 feet) and it is to this figure Crews must make their way.
When this is achieved, and it will come only with the greatest flying care by the pilots and the most accurate plotting, timing and computing by the Navigators, then a crew will be able to take up 6 bombs, drop them in a close group of less than 50 yards radius with the Mean Point of Impact less than 70 yards from the target. Then, and not until then, can we call ourselves BOMBER CREWS.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt.Walmsley) submits the following “Stop Press” news on the Vector Error problem.
(continued in next column)
“ F/O. Ingleby, a Navigator of 619 Squadron has spent a great deal of time on trying to find out why such large Vector Errors occur. He back-plotted a navigator’s bombing wind, [underlined] to a much larger scale, [/underlined] and discovered that a 15 seconds error in timing over 6-7 minutes gave a Vector Error of 10 m.p.h., that is 130 yards at 10,000 feet. “
The wind found, in the words of the Navigator, brought us from Nottingham to Base on E.T.A. “
Agreed that such a wind would, because an error up to 300-400 yards in track and 1/2 to 1 second in time is almost unnoticeable, but it is such small and apparently insignificant Navigation Errors that cause displacement of bombs from the target to distances up to 200 to 250 yards away.
COMPETITION BOMBING
A much better show was put up by the Squadrons this month in the Competition, the results of which are as follows:-
Pilot & Air Bombers Navigators
1st 106 Sqdn – 58 yds 1st 630 Sqdn – 87 yds
2nd 619 Sqdn – 82 yds 2nd 106 Sqdn - 124 yds
3rd 630 Sqdn – 92 yds 3rd 619 Sqdn – 183 yds
4th 57 Sqdn – 118 yds 4th 57 Sqdn – 264 yds
Further entries with less than [underlined] 8 [/underlined] qualifying exercises.
5th 50 Sqdn – 74 yds 5th 467 Sqdn -110 yds
6th 463 Sqdn -129 yds 6th 50 Sqdn – 119 yds
7th 61 Sqdn -145 yds 7th 61 Sqdn -163 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -158 yds 8th 463 Sqdn -165 yds
9th 207 Sqdn -165 yds 9th 44 Sqdn -176 yds
10th 44 Sqdn -221 yds 10th 207 Sqdn -220 yds
No entries were submitted by 9 & 49 Sqdns. Next month we want a TOTAL all-out effort!
[Table of High Level Bombing Training by Squadron showing Error Rates]
[Underlined] OUTSTANDING BOMBING DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 10,000 ft.
[Underlined] 9 W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined] F/O. Prior P/O. Gall 66 yds
[Underlined] 50 F/O. Robinson [/underlined] F/O. Lavery Sgt. Sanderson 84 yds
[Underlined] P/O. Dobbyn [/underlined] Sgt. Jackson F/O. Horner 66 yds
61 P/O. Wallis Sgt. Pardoe F/Sgt. Tozer 67 yds
F/O. Fitch F/O. Lyons. F/O. Jennings 86 yds
106 F/O. Latham F/O. Martins F/L. Williamson 89 yds
P/O. Lee F/Sgt. Hoyland F/Sgt. McKie 81 yds
P/O. Gibbs F/O. Cramp F/Sgt. Appleyard 75 yds
F/Sgt. Rosser Sgt. Goss F/Sgt. White 61 yds
F/O. Lee F/O Beven F/O. Langrish 95 & 72 yds
P/O. Pezaro Sgt. Greenwood Sgt. Wade 63 yds
[Underlined] 463 P/O. Saunders [/underlined] Sgt. Govett Sgt. Falconer 84 yds
[Underlined] F/Sgt. James [/underlined] F/Sgt. Bowes F/O. Pettitt 92 yds
630 W/Cdr. Rollinson F/Sgt. Rosser F/L. Ehrman 88 yds
1654 C.U. F/Sgt. Page F/O. Braithwaite F/Sgt. Fair 99 yds
F/Sgt. Perry Sgt. Duncombe Sgt. Hather 84 yds
Sgt. Paterson Sgt. Hall Sgt. Rice 90 yds
1661 C.U. F/Sgt. Falsted F/Sgt. Hancock Sgt. O’Connor 95 yds
617 Squadron obtained 11 exercises with less than 100 yards average error, and the following :
S/Ldr. Suggitt F/O. Davidson W/O. Gordon 30 yds
[Table of Additional Bombing Training by Squadron, including bombs dropped, error, A.M.B.T. hours, infra-red exercises, traces and T. & D. runs & indirect attacks]
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CON)
“GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS
[Underlined] 61 Squadron’s [/UNDERLINED] (F/Lt. McDonald) bombing figures for December failed to include the month’s best week of bombing because the return affecting that week was mislaid. 15 exercises were carried out, 77 bombs being dropped for an average Crew Error at 10,000 feet, of 177 yards. Vector Error averaged 126 yards and Pilot’s and Air Bomber’s error was 129 yards.
Congratulations to the Bombing Staff off [underlined] No. 5 LANCASTER FINISHING SCHOOL, R. A. F. [/underlined] Syerston, who, under the guidance of W/O. Linnett, constructed an excellent small instructional display of ‘Paramatta’ and ‘Wanganui’ attacks showing the danger of incendiaries “creep-back”.
Group Captain Evans-Evans, R.A.F. Coningsby, has pointed out that [underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Walmsley) in the first two weeks of January AIMED 36 day and 54 night Practice Bombs and not one of these 90 bombs were “aimed” below 8,000 feet.
To quote the Station Commander – “a real effort on all crews’ part to bomb as near operational height as possible.”
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S., R.A.F. Syerston [/underlined] (F/Lt.Wonham.) reports the most creditable attainment of 12,300 feet average height for all practice bombing during January. This is what we want !!!
[Underlined] 467 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. McCarthy) reports yet a further “Mod” to the Bomb Aimer’s compartment.
To quote :-
“The stationary lights do not supply illumination to points where they are needed, i.e. the lamp on the bombing instrument panel does not afford enough light to read the pre-selector box and no light is in position to check camera leads. A “wander” light has been installed above the selector box and will supply any part of the nose for any job including map reading”.
5 Group will seek permission to make this modification general as soon as possible.
Thank you, 467 !!!
It is pointed out that [underlined] 49 Squadron [/underlined] are doing a considerable amount of bombing training which does not appear in the normal returns.
This training is in the form of blind bombing using H2S, which is achieving considerable success.
[Underlined] 617 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Hay) reports that average bombing error for December was 90 yards – on one [underlined] operation [/underlined] during January the Squadron’s average error was 94 yards from 12,000 feet. Enough said !!!
In column 2 will be found an article by F/Lt. Hay on the “617” bombing team, as promised in the December issue.
“GEN” FROM WAINFLEET
Despite 8 days and 15 nights unfit for bombing training, Wainfleet plotted [underlined] 2398 [/underlined] bombs dropped by 363 aircraft during the month. All Squadrons used the range for night training, special mention being made of 617, 106, 207 and 619 Squadrons who aimed 155, 60, 51 and 50 bombs respectively.
[Boxed] LATE ENTRY FROM 49 SQUADRON FOR COMPETITION
Bombing Error – 156 yards
Navigator’s Error – 124 yards [/boxed]
THE SECRET OF 617 SQUADRON’S HIGH STANDARD OF PRACTICE BOMBING.
The S.A.B.S. – Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber Team.
The excellent results gained by crews of 617 Squadron using the SABS have only been achieved by the fullest, most practical use of the “Bombing team”. Before any bombs are dropped some four hours training on the specially adapted A.M.B.T. are carried out by the Pilot and Air Bomber to give manipulation practice to the latter, and to familiarise the pilot with the B.D.I. (Bombing Direction Indicator). The Navigator is trained to carry out compution of true height and airspeed, and settings for a given course of attack with the instruments and computers at his disposal. Some 2 - 4 hours are then spent in the air doing “dummy runs”, firstly on objects “on track”, and then choosing targets and “turning on”, and finally on to targets and setting up sight in accordance with settings computed from known navigational data. The sight is only accurate when correct height above target is set. Thus the pilot must fly at the indicated height he states he will be at, the Navigator must correctly compute this to the true height above target, and the Air Bomber set this accurately.
True height is dependent upon :-
(i) [Underlined] Sea Level Pressure at Target. [/underlined] This is gained by setting aerodrome height for practice bombing or, operationally, from Form 2330. It is the Q.F.F. which is set.
(ii) [Underlined] Indicated Height above Sea Level. [/underlined] All 617 Squadron altimeters have been accurately calibrated for every 1000’ for 140 and 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. and from the appropriate card the Navigator allows for this error, which may be up to 300’
(iii) [Underlined] Temperature. [/underlined] “Thermometer, Air, Direct Reading, Mk.I”, now fitted, does not give an accurate reading for temperature of the outside air, as (a) the stem is heated by cabin temperature, and (b) the outside air bearing against the bulb is under pressure varying with airspeed. Both factors tend to give a “warmer” reading than true. Again the Navigator computes from a special computer to get an accurate air temperature.
With these factors and the use of an ICAN computer, true height (c) can be computed. True height above target will need a deduction of target height above sea level, and there will be a further allowance (addition) to be made where stick bombing is being used.
When the pilot advises IAS with aircraft trimmed and bomb doors open, the Navigator computes a T.A.S. which is used against a Trail scale for the appropriate bomb number. Errors of + or – 5 m.p.h. make negligible ground errors. Most errors in range can be traced to (1) flying at other than the indicated height stated by the pilot, (2) incorrect compution of height and/or T.A.S., by the navigator, or (3) by incorrect settings or bad manipulation, by the Air Bomber.
The sight will automatically correct for Drift and Ground Speed if switched on with the target in the graticule, and held there by proper manipulation of the sight by the Air Bomber, and by the pilot following the direction of his B D. I., until such time as the point of release is attained. Those who remember the A.B.S., and who used it to its utmost efficiency, realise that the length of run could be considerably decreased if settings were applied before the run. As the heading of attack is generally known, the navigator just prior to the run, can pass a drift and G/S setting to the Air Bomber. So, after practice, the Air Bomber need only wind his sighting head back for a 25 second run, whereas 40 -50 seconds may be required without these settings.
Let us listen to a typical 617 Squadron bombing run :-
Pilot. “Turning on to a heading of 250°”
Nav. “250° - drift 4° port, G/Setting 17”
A/B acknowledges, directs pilot on and calls “Run stated”, at the appropriate moment. After 30 seconds of concentration, but silence, by Pilot and Air Bomber, we hear :-
A/B. “ Bombs gone, good run here, drift 3° port, G/S 16.5 “, and after time of fall “ Bomb plotted, 10 yards overshoot “.
Pilot. “Sorry, my fault, I was 120 ft. high!!
When results are received from the Range, the team assembles about the plotting table to further sort out factors causing any errors.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
A hearty welcome to F/Lt. Lowry ex 3 Group who has arrived in this Group to become Bombing Leader to 44 Squadron, R.A.F., Dunholme Lodge.
F/O. Jacombs (463 Squadron) was 1st and F/O. Abbot (106 Squadron) was 3rd, both with “A” Categories on No. 74 Bombing Leaders’ Course. This is a particularly good show on the part of these two Officers. F/O. Jones (49 Squadron) obtained a “B” category on the same Course, being 15th.
[Cartoon of two WAAFs] Dot and Dark – the immaculate W.A.A.F’s – “… and don’t you suggest he made the first Begin Approach…”]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Concentration, track keeping, and Navigation generally improved during the month. This was largely due to the efficiency of the selected wind finders and to the working of the Wind Finding Scheme as a whole. The selected wind finders’ results have been carefully analysed and it is now possible for the Met. Section at Group Headquarters to place certain degrees of reliability on the information which is passed back from individual crews. Special mention is made here of F/Lt. Townsend – Pilot, and F/O. Haxby, Navigator, of No.57 Squadron who have proved to be most reliable as wind finders; they have consistently sent back accurate wind information which was used as a basis for future winds transmitted to all 5 Group aircraft. It is hoped that all crews selected for this special duty will reach a 100% reliability standard, and send back wind information which will not only be of great value to non-wind finding crews in the Group but to many other crews in the Command.
It has been suggested in some quarters that transmitting winds from aircraft over enemy territory renders the aircraft more susceptible to Freya and Wurtzburg plotting, and therefore to greater danger from vectored fighters, flak and searchlights. As far as the losses in this Group show, there is absolutely no foundation in fact for this belief, so that crews need have no qualms about using the W/T transmitter. They should regard their transmissions as a valuable means of helping all the other aircraft to keep to the planned route.
It was particularly emphasised in the December Monthly News that all Navigators must continue to find winds whenever possible and to check accuracy of their wind finding with broadcast winds. Many crews are not doing this, but are content to use all broadcast winds without checking their accuracy. This practice is a dangerous one, and can easily lead a crew into trouble. Assume that the Navigator has rechecked his calculations and is satisfied that the course and airspeeds flown are those for which he is calculating. The winds found by this Navigator are the only ones on which a revised wind could be based should the aircraft get into difficulties as a result of using the broadcast wind. It is imperative, therefore that all Navigators check, and re-check, the wind velocity whenever a good air position and fix are obtained simultaneously. Your ability to find accurate wind velocities may mean that you will be selected as a Group wind finder, and that in consequence, the main force concentration and track keeping will be directly affected by your efficiency.
5 GROUP SPOOF ATTACK 21/22ND JANUARY
Reference must be made here to the Spoof Attack carried out by 22 aircraft of this Group on BERLIN. Theirs was not considered a desirable mission, and the success of the attack makes the job they did all the more noteworthy. It seems that this small attack drew off the enemy fighters from the stream of the main force aircraft which attacked Brunswick at the same time, and the combats recorded on the two routes bear this out.
The return from this raid was flown over 10/10ths cloud almost the whole way. Route Markers were dropped by our own aircraft along this route and winds were broadcast by 57 “C” for the assistance of the rest of the force. Only one aircraft failed to return from this attack, which emphasises the general quality of the Navigation and the careful pre-flight planning employed.
A.P.I.
Supplies of A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have now been received in the Group and they will be sufficient to equip all H 2 S aircraft. Any surplus A. P. I’s will be distributed to the non-H 2 S Squadrons. This method of distribution was decided on so that the maximum assistance in windfinding would be available in certain Squadrons. Their help will be to the benefit of all non-H 2 S squadrons.
Fitting is going on as rapidly as possible in all squadrons.
M/F FIXES
In the past many Navigators have considered that to request a fix from the W/Op means an admission of defeat in their job as a Navigator. If the security of the aircraft is in danger and the Navigator is temporarily uncertain of his position when returning from operations, then he should not hesitate to obtain a fix.
This of course must only be resorted to in emergency, otherwise aircraft which urgently require W/T assistance are unable to receive from the M/F Station until it has dealt with the first aircraft. Recently a fix was requested from Heston, (Section D) by an aircraft returning from the South from operations. This was not obtained, although a position line was given instead. (The significance of this was not appreciated by the Navigator). If a line bearing is received in reply to a request for a fix, it normally means that the aircraft is in transit with the base line of the M/F Stations. This Navigator should have requested another fix about 15 minutes later from the same M/F Station, or better still should have asked the W/Op to change over to Section N.
STRAIGHT FROM THE O R S’s MOUTH
A system of Raid Assessment has now been in operation in 5 Group since May, 1943. The system has progressed, and ways and means to improve it are considered daily. The objects of the system are (i) to try to discover [underlined] quickly [/underlined] what went right or what went wrong with each attack, and (ii) to consider over a period what lessons can be learnt. In this way, it is hoped, future attacks may be conducted with greater precision and reduced casualties.
Each Station has a copy of the teleprinted O.R.S. (R) form – the information on this form, the additional data on raid reports and the details of combats, will enable Stations to draw their own conclusions. Finally, the Group Raid Assessment Report, the statistical Chart and track keeping diagram, furnish as complete a picture of each attack as is possible at the moment.
The consideration of the salient features of each assessment means that the plans for each subsequent attack can be more carefully prepared. Aerial warfare has now become a highly scientific affair, and as with all scientific ventures, rapid future progress depends on intelligent deductions from a fund of accurate and ‘up to date’ facts.
Aircrew will, therefore, realise that the navigational and other ‘gen’ which is collected from them at interrogation is not just another ‘bind’. This ‘gen’ is of the greatest importance, and must be given with the utmost accuracy which the conditions under which it is obtained permit.
GEE
Range on Gee increased on the raids towards the end of the month, particularly on the Berlin operation of January 30/31st when fixes were obtained of XF frequencies up to 8 E, with position lines still further. If this excellent reception continues, there should be a marked improvement in concentration and timing. With regard to position lines, these may be the means of keeping within the 10 mile band of concentration, particularly if the track runs parallel to the Gee lines, and Navigators should endeavour to make the utmost use of Position Lines wherever possible.
From reports sent in after each operation it appears that some navigators are relying solely upon the XF frequencies on the RF unit 25 and not attempting to use the RF unit 24. When reception fades on the unit 25 navigators should insert the Unit 24, and at least endeavour to find out whether reception is better on this or not.
Whilst the usual technical failures still occur due to deterioration of components, serviceability on the whole has been good, but unfortunately the odd manipulation fault crops up now and again, and every effort must be made by navigators, (particularly those on H2S Squadrons) to remain proficient in the operation of the set, and in the correction of simple faults. (See the Navigation Quiz).
With the introduction of miniature lattice charts, errors in the plotting and transferring of fixed should be reduced to the minimum. However, these charts do not cover certain areas and navigators must carry the large charts for those areas until miniatures are published.
It is hoped that a North Eastern chain will be available within a month, to cover the present blank areas of the Western North Sea.
[Boxed] [Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. J.H. Evans, D.F.C. – H.Q. No.5 Group to 49 Sqdn. as Flt. Commander.
S/Ldr. J. Vivian, D.S.O., D.F.C. – No. 57 Sqdn. to H.Q. No. 5 Group as Group Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. R.H. Schofield, (H2S Instructor) – H.Q. No. 5 Group to Fiskerton. (Stn.Navigation Officer)
F/O. W.T. Haxby, D.F.C. – 57 Sqdn.to H.Q. 5 Group (Radar Nav.)
F/Lt. P.F. Bailey. – 1661 C.U. to 619 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. P.M. Materkeyn – 93 Group to 44 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. B. Asson, D.F.C. – 44 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to 10 O.T.U.
F/Lt. M.J. Baud. – 207 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to SPILSBY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/Lt. W.M. Burnside, DFC. – No 5 LFS. (Sqdn Navigation Offr.) to BARDNEY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/O. Parker. 44 Sqdn. to 207 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/O. R.O. Beattie. 207 Sqdn. to 5 L.F.S. SYERSTON [/boxed]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
Navigation (Cont.)
H 2 S
Training on H 2 S has progressed satisfactorily during the month, but once again bad weather and cloud have prevented much blind bombing, and until this training is given, crews cannot be considered fully trained.
Serviceability during this month has been quite up to standard considering the difficulties of replacement and our main worry at the present time is failure due to bad manipulation. Failures such as these can only be overcome by constant practice both in the air and on the ground. Ground training is essential, and with Ground trainers now installed at 1660 and 1661 Con. Units, and 49 57 and 630 Squadrons, there should be less reason for manipulation failures in the future.
Intelligent use was made of the H 2 S in operations this month, and many operators are finding it a great help in avoiding defended areas. Navigational fixes are being obtained up to 40 and 50 miles by some operators, but still 17% of the fixes are wrongly taken or plotted. With the advent of broadcast W/Vs there is even greater need for accuracy in D.R. and the navigator must work in close co-operation with the Air Bomber if they wish to make the most of H 2 S.
A few simple rules such as the following should result in greater accuracy in navigation with H 2 S :-
(i) Pre-flight planning must be looked upon by the Navigator and Air Bomber as an essential part of the operation, and they must work in close conjunction with each other. The Navigator should point out to the Air Bomber all features from which fixes are likely to be required, and their Flight Plan E.T.A’s. The Air Bomber must draw in the tracks on a Mercator Plotting Chart, clearly ring all recommended H 2 S landmarks and mark in their Flight Plan E.T.A’s.
(ii) This close co-operation must be maintained in flight, and the Navigator must inform the Air Bomber from time to time of the aircraft’s D.R. position and alterations in E.T.A’s, which he must mark on his chart. The Air Bomber must be allowed time to take a fix and the Navigator must cross check all fixes used. To save time and unnecessary chatter over the inter-com. the Air Bomber could be taking fixes and entering them on a log form giving time, place, bearing and distance, or, the Bomb Aimer can make a track crawl on a chart of his own, so that the Navigator will be able to choose any suitable fix at any time.
Remember, it is the reliability of fixes that matters, not the quantity.
The reliability of H 2 S is dependent upon the accuracy of the D.R. Navigation, and conversely without frequent reliable fixes the D.R. becomes increasingly inaccurate. The H 2 S must, therefore, be used to increase the accuracy of the D.R. navigation.
GARDENING
On 5/6th January, 49 Squadron provided 6 aircraft fitted with special equipment, to plant vegetables in the approaches of SWINEMUNDE. This force was detached from the main stream (bound for STETTIN) close to the gardens, and re-joined shortly after planting. This operation was the first of its kind to be carried out entirely with special equipment, and one of the first from high altitude (12,000 feet). Five out of six aircraft planted successfully on a timed run from the pinpoint. The sixth was unable to pinpoint due to failure of special equipment and descended to the lowest permissible height as briefed; being still unable to pinpoint visually, due to cloud, the vegetables were correctly jettisoned in a previously ordered position. The importance of the sea routes here is their use for supplying the Russian front – and by the look of things on the Leningrad front – for repatriation purposes. There is every indication that the vegetables went into the right “hole”, but definite information on the results is hard to come by from such distant places.
The raising of the maximum height for dropping mines to 15,000 ft., has made gardening possible, with reasonable safety, in many areas hitherto immune, and where the presence of mines will present an even worse problem to the enemy than hitherto.
The Bombing Development Unit has carried out trials which prove conclusively that, contrary to expectation, the mine has an extremely consistent flight, and figures for drift due to wind have also been found.
Allowances for Forward Travel and drift due to wind can, therefore, easily be made.
The Command planted 1100 vegetables during the month – 3 Group were responsible for 833. Gardens visited were many and varied, the most densely sown being those off the ELBE, WESER, and EMS; KIEL BAY; the FRANCH COAST U-BOAT BASES.
-“Where angels fear to tread”
In seemly and imposing state, th’elect of God conferred,
The operations staff did hang upon their spoken word.
Save which, the room all silent was, and deathly as the tomb,
(Though sound of trotting horsed permeated through the room)
Tranquility [sic]was shattered as a vulgar voice did rant
“Connect me please with Swinderby, for Swinderby I pant”
The Lords of all creation ceased. A frozen silence fell;
The D.S.O. was seized, and cast into a dungeon cell.
And there without a trial doth the poor wretch meditate,
The sins of other people, for whose crimes he’ll meet his fate.
Let those who keep the watches now resolve they never will
Repeat th’offence, the cure for which is published in the drill.
ANON. CIRCA. 1944.
LINK TRAINER
[Table showing Link Trainer use by Squadron]
ASTRO COMPASS
The astro compass is a precision instrument for checking courses against any heavenly body. In this Command, however, it is rarely used, and even then only for sights on the Pole star.
The Astro compass in its present form is a precision and somewhat complicated instrument, and it is suggested that a much simpler instrument should serve the purpose equally well. This Headquarters is experimenting with a very simplified Astro Compass, and as soon as it is ready for trials, Squadrons will be informed and asked to give their criticisms.
The DR and P4 Compasses should be checked approximately every 15 minutes, and also after every major alteration of course. If these two compasses agree within 2 degrees, then it is not considered essential to check them by use of the Astro Compass. If however, they do not agree within these limits an immediate check should be made of the D.R. Repeaters and the Master Unit. If the compasses still disagree, then a check should be made to ascertain which is correct.
NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ
1. What is the safety height over :-
(a) North Yorkshire.
(b) S.W. England.
(c) Lincolnshire.
(d) West Scotland.
2. What M/F Sections would you use if you were approaching Cornwall (a) from the Wexford region, (b) from the Cherbourg region?
3. Which is the shortest distance from Berlin – Lincoln or Leningrad?
4. Assume your aircraft is engaged on a dinghy search. The W/Op receives an S.O.S. on 500 K/Cs. What immediate action should be taken by the Navigator.
5. If none of the 6 pin sockets on the V C P give a proper picture on the screen, two separate actions can be taken by the navigator. What are they? (N.B. The V.C.P. light is on all the time.)
6. What is the recommended method of search to be used when engaged on dinghy search?
Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
TRAINING ON SQUADRONS
Checks carried out recently reveal that the standard of knowledge on tactics and the corkscrew among Air Gunners is well below the high standard required. It would appear that insufficient time is being allocated to “vetting” air gunners on arrival, and ensuring that their knowledge is retained by constant practice and instruction. It is a simple matter to get the gunners together and hold a quiz on these subjects; naturally some will be on leave, others flying or sick, but if this is carried out regularly all the gunners will receive checks.
This check can be carried out whenever gunners have a few minutes to spare and requires no equipment. All that is required is to ensure that every gunner on every Squadron knows automatically the sequence of the corkscrew manoeuvre, the correct deflection and how to give a clear picture to the remainder of the crew of what is going on during an attack. Squadron Gunnery Leaders recently attended a two day course at R.A.E. Farnborough. This was primarily concerned with the function of ice in oxygen equipment, and should have been passed on to the gunners. It included quite a few valuable tips on the care of this equipment and how to keep it working in severe icing conditions.
FIGHTING CONTROL EXERCISE
An excellent scheme for carrying out the Fighting Control exercise at night on the ground is contained in the February issue of “TEE EMM”. It will be found on page 274; it requires little equipment and can be carried out on the aerodrome, and also gives good practice in night vision training.
10 DAY SIGHTING COURSE AT NO.1 A.A.S. MANBY
This course has recently been started with the object of providing expert sighting instructions, with particular emphasis on the assessment of Gyro films.
During the first few courses it was found that adjustments to the syllabus had to be made, and now the course has settled down to what might be termed an advanced sighting course; the subject is covered more thoroughly even than the C.G.S. course, and any prospective candidate should ensure that he has a thorough knowledge of the G2 notes, as a lack of preliminary knowledge has caused the downfall of several air gunners who have attended the course.
The vacancies on this course are very few, and only gunners who are keen on sighting and have already proved their worth as instructors, should be submitted.
FLYING CLOTHING FOR AIR GUNNERS
During the two-day course which the Gunnery Leaders attended at Farnborough, a discussion was held with the officers responsible for the design and production of clothing and oxygen equipment, and most interesting “gen” was obtained. Here are a few of the new items to be produced :-
New type Oxygen Mask (H) which is much smaller, lighter in weight, causes less obstruction to downward vision and houses a much smaller microphone.
(Continued in column 3)
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBATS – 155
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 K 2/3.1.44. ME.110
61 J 2/3.1.44. ME.210
207 D 5/6.1.44. JU. 88
49 U 5/6.1.44. ME.109
49 K 14/15.1.44. TE/EA
[Underlined] 463 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 W 21/22.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 T 28/29.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 467 T 30/31.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
44 U 30/31.1.44. ME.210
[Underlined] 50 X 30/31.1.44. TE/EA [/underlined]
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 O 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 L 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 V 1/2.1.44. JU. 88
44 A 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 R 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 M 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 G 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 K 2/3.1.44. Unidentified
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
49 H 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 P 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 467 C 5/6.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
106 V 5/6.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 R 5/6.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 J 14/15.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 F 14/15.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
49 M 14/15/.1.44. JU. 88
630 Z 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
44 L 14/15.1.44. ME.110
207 M 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
207 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190
49 H 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 9 T 21/22.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 G 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 J 21/22.1.44. ME.109
207 K 21/22.1.44. ME.210
207 K 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 K 21/22.1.44. ME.109
57 O 27/28.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 M 27/28.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
49 J 28/29.1.44. TE/EA
106 G 28/29.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 B 28/29.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
49 J 30/31.1.44. ME.110
DAMAGED (Continued)
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 L 30/31.1.44.JU.88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 D 30/31.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 P 30/31.1.44. ME.109
630 P 30/31.1.44. T/E
57 G 30/31.1.44. DO.217
All except G/106 28/29th and G/57 30/31st have been confirmed by Command.
OMITTED FROM LAST MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
44 Z 16/17.12.43. T/E E/A
(confirmed by Command)
The type “E” heated lining is to have more heating elements in the knees and seat, heated gloves are to have extra heating elements, and the high wattage socks to have the heating slightly reduced.
A new glove with all the heating elements in the back to give better grip and a more positive control over the equipment when handled with the gloves on, is on the way.
A silk glove, which has had the finger tips dipped in Latex to give a coating of rubber and enable even small articles to be picked up with ease, has been experimented with.
A flap has been attached to the neck of the flying helmet in order to exclude draught; this flap is made to go inside the flying suit and form a seal around the neck, which keeps the draught out and the heat in.
With the introduction of the new oxygen mask and microphone, the inter-com lead is taken round the back of the helmet, this making for more freedom of movement.
Production on the Taylor Suit has ceased but as there is still a large number in service, the new suit will not be seen for some time.
STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER
The first of these trainers to appear in the Group is being erected at Fiskerton and by the time this “News” reaches the Squadrons, it should be in working order. The trainer provides for deflection practice and range estimation, aircraft recognition, zone sightings and also produces tracer simulation. The trainer will shortly be adapted to take the Mark II Gyro Sight as 49 Squadron have been fortunate enough to be selected for the installation of this sight. The sight is similar to the one now in use as an assessor in the Group, but has a range component which enables the range to be fed into the sight by means of foot pedals operated by the gunner. It is a reflector sight with much improved dimming controls on the graticules; in short, all the gunner has to do is to make settings on the sight for height and airspeed, place the moving graticule on the target, estimate the range, and he cannot miss.
Considerable practice is required in the manipulation of this sight, and the free gunnery trainer has been installed for that purpose.
(Continued on page 13, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.18. JANUARY, 1944. PAGE 9.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
GUNS AND TURRETS
Guns freezing, combined with sluggish turrets, due to the extreme cold conditions experienced on operational sorties, sets a problem which is, at present, being tackled in several ways.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined] The exclusion of moisture from the moving portions will, it is considered, be ensured by the fitting of gun ejection slot seals which have been issued to all units in the Group.
There is little point in fitting ejection seals if guns are being tested or cocked after being fully loaded for operations, as the ejection seal will be broken. After the seal is broken, moist air entering the ejection slot is sure to freeze under certain conditions, and a cure for this cannot be found by the application of Anti-Freeze oils.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined] From reports received, turrets appear to give various troubles, when subjected to extreme cold. Various hydraulic media are being tried to overcome these troubles, but it is the Air Gunner who can tell the Armament Staff what actually happened.
First hand information from Air Gunners to their Gunnery Leaders or Armament Officers is of vital assistance in the investigation of all suspected freezing troubles. The Air Gunner is the man who experiences the trouble, and he is the only one who can give the required information on the actual failure and the conditions prevailing at the time. A remark made, and later entered on a combat report such as “Guns would not fire during combat”, does not help in any way.
An Armament representative is always present at Interrogation, and any information passed to him there and then will greatly assist the investigation to be carried out at once. This information will surely help to diagnose the cause of the trouble.
See to it, gunners, that you give full details of all troubles experienced with either guns or turrets, to your Gunnery Leader or Armament Officer. They cannot get a story from anyone but you. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU TELL THE ARMAMENT OFFICER. He cannot reproduce what you experienced under the same conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHIC FAILURE
A small percentage of photographic failures have, on investigation, been attributed to Armament causes. It was hoped that with the introduction of the Mk.111 fuse those failures, however small in number, would disappear. A very careful analysis of the film gives indication that a certain discrepancy exists between the timing of the camera control and the E.111 Fuse. The importance of setting this clockwork fuse correctly cannot be too strongly emphasised, and all Armament Officers can help stamp out this type of failure if they ensure that all fuses M.111 are set correctly.
NEAR ENOUGH IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH
Liaison between Armament and Photographic Sections is essential. Try it and see – who knows, it might reduce the number of failures all round, and so produce vitally important plottable pictures of the target area.
SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS
The preparation of the ever-faithful S.B C. has been, and still is, the immediate concern of all Armament Sections. To prepare the bomb load and bomb up aircraft for an operation is, with the S.B.C’s now available, a matter for organisation. Difficulty can, however, be experienced on the second day when these S.B.C’s have to be filled in the limited time available.
The introduction of Conveyor Rollers has undoubtedly relieved this arduous task, but there is still room for improvement. These rollers can be put to untold uses, and with this in mind, numerous schemes are at present undergoing trials, which will, if applied in the correct manner, enable bomb loads to be prepared for the second sortie in quick time.
Full details of these schemes will be distributed to all Units in the near future. When the new equipment is received it should be subjected to a fair trial according to storage conditions available.
BOMBING RANGES
The lighting of Targets at Wainfleet Bombing Range is causing grave concern, owing to the ingress of salt water into the electric light fittings. Every effort is being made to keep the targets serviceable for night use, but after high tides, faults appear which may, therefore, make it necessary on occasions to declare certain targets unserviceable.
Representatives have been made to obtain an improved type of electric light fitting. In the event of it becoming necessary, improvised lighting has been arranged at EPPERSTONE Range.
FENTON BOMBING RANGE
A further Bombing Range, to be known as Fenton, has been allotted to the Group, making five ranges in all. Work has already commenced on this range, and when complete it is to be administered by R.A.F. Station, WIGSLEY.
FLYING CONTROL
In the table below will be seen two average landing times. The first is calculated by dividing the total period occupied by landing, from first to last aircraft, by the number of aircraft landed. This does not take into account any allowance for the time when the circuit was empty. The adjusted time shows the nett period, that is with allowances made for spasmodic return of aircraft, and the final average is the average time per aircraft based on this adjusted time.
From these two averages can be seen that whereas most Stations have got accustomed to the circuit drill of the landing scheme, there is still scope for improvement in the arrival of aircraft at the airfield.
However, the averages of 3.49 and 2.66 indicate that all Stations have really got down to the problem of landing aircraft quickly, and from reports to hand, it is encouraging to note that the scheme has met with the full approval of the aircrew. Some Stations who, at present, house only one Squadron, are not giving the results they might; this would seem to be an indication that on account of the limited number of
(continued on page 12, Col. 3)
JANUARY LANDING TIMES
[Table showing the Number of aircraft, Time, Average, Adjusted Time and Average by Station]
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Gun Turret Failures and Bombing Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
SPORTS
[Cartoons]
FOOTBALL – THE MATZ CUP
The first round of this annual knock-out is now complete, except for one match, Strubby v Scampton. In the Preliminary Round, Waddington held Scampton to “2 all”, but lost the replay. Without being too partisan, may we wish good luck to the Strubby “giant killers”.
PRELIMINARY ROUND
WADDINGTON 2 SCAMPTON 2
WADDINGTON 0 SCAMPTON 2
(re-play)
ROUND ONE
WINTHORPE 1 SYERSTON 0
WIGSLEY 0 SWINDERBY 11
BARDNEY 0 METHERINGHAM 10
DUNHOLME 2 FISKERTON 0
WOODHALL SPA 1 CONINGSBY 3
SPILSBY 2 EAST KIRKBY 3
SKELLINGTHORPE 3 H.Q. 5 GROUP 1
Scampton are again holding second place in the Lincoln League, Division 1, having won 7 out of 9 games. They were runners up in the League last year, and winners of the Matz Trophy – a fine record.
Dunholme had a busy soccer month, winning four out of five games, in addition to their Matz Cup game with Fiskerton.
Syerston, like Scampton, are all out for the Newark and District League championship. They have, to date, won six out of seven games. Intersection competition produced 12 matches during the month.
Skellingthorpe and Bardney have been busy with both inter-section games and weekly Station matches.
Metheringham lost only one out of four station games, and in inter-section matches, Squadron Armoury won all their games decisively.
Coningsby soccer has been notable for a duel between 619 and 61 Squadrons. Each Squadron has won one game each and the decider should be a real blood match.
Swinderby Station team won four out of five games, losing to O.C.T.U. Newark. Judging from their Matz Cup score, they have some big guns in the forward line.
Winthorpe had four Station games, and were unlucky to win only one, but although losing 5 – 2 to Syerston, they pulled off the Matz Cup game. There was much inter-section activity.
Wigsley were unlucky to have two Station games cancelled. Of the remaining two, they won one and lost one. The R.A.F. Regiment had several games in the inter-section matches.
RUGGER
LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE COMPETITION
It has unfortunately proved impossible to complete the squadrons knock-out phase of this competition by January 31st. To date, only 9 Squadron have completed their finals, F/Lt. Hadland’s crew beating P/O. Glover’s crew in the final by 11 – 3. Nineteen teams took part in the competition. Within 53 Base alone, 61 matches have been played and the competition has become increasingly popular as it has progressed. All squadrons are urged to play off their matches as early as possible, so that the date for the Inter-Unit competition can be re-arranged. There will be some magnificent rugger in the final games, so get cracking squadrons, so we can arrange the big play off.
Syerston Rugger side is now considerably stronger than its early season form, and won three out of four games during the month.
Metheringham played two games, beating Bardney, and losing to 7 K.O.S.B.
Coningsby beat the 9th Field Regt. R.E.D., and the S. Staffs. Regiment in no uncertain manner.
Swinderby suffered their second defeat of the season against R.C.A.F. Digby, losing 6 – 0. Several Canadian Football mannerisms crept into the game, such as the referee putting the ball into the scrum, players “blocking” their opponents, and an occasional forward throw. All of which served to fox the Swinderby team.
Winthorpe lost to Syerston, but beat both 93 M. U. and Newark R. F. C. The Winthorpe pitch has, unfortunately, been “put to the plough”, necessitating all away matches.
HOCKEY
Swinderby can put out a very strong team, and only failed to win one game, which they drew with O.C.T.U. Newark, 4 – 4.
Syerston played 7 games in all, including two mixed and two all W.A.A.F. games, winning six of them.
Coningsby played four Station games, of which they won one.
Scampton, Metheringham, Winthorpe and Wigsley, all had Station matches. Metheringham hope to have their new hockey pitch ready in a few days.
H.Q.5 Group played its first match (mixed) against Syerston on February 6th, losing 2 – 1 a very promising start for a team that has only a half-sized pitch to practice on, until permission is obtained to fell a few trees.
It is hoped to promote a Group mixed Hockey knock-out in the very near future.
CROSS-COUNTRY
Wigsley, Skellingthorpe, Dunholme Lodge and Coningsby have all had successful runs during the month. 619 Squadron took over a hundred bodies about four miles from the camp by coach and released them. S/Ldr. Churcher was first man home. Feeling fit and frisky after their first gamble, 619 now challenge all cross country teams to battle.
SWIMMING
The stations around Lincoln make good use of the baths, and it should be possible to promote an interesting gala.
FISHING
Syerston has a thriving Anglers’ Club with facilities in the River Trent and in the lake at Flintham Hall. The club boasts over 40 “line shooters”. Other Stations please note. (What about a Strubby Wild Fowlers’ Society?)
MINOR GAMES
A most popular game at Bardney is Skittle Ball, played daily inside or outside the Maintenance Hangar at Tea Van time. A P. T. I. arrives with the van, and the fun begins. 20 – 40 men take part, and it is a most enjoyable and stimulating way of spending break.
It is regretted that some Station Sports summaries are not to hand for inclusion in the News, and it is requested that all Stations will despatch their summaries to reach H.Q. within two days of the end of the month.
TRAINING
STIRLING TRAINED CREWS GOING TO SQUADRONS
The first of the Stirling trained Conversion Unit crews went to Squadrons by way of 5 L. F. S. during the month, and the new training policy is now in full swing. A total of 35 crews were posted to Squadrons from 51 Base in January. 45 crews went from Conversion Units to No.5 L.F.S.
The weather was fairly good, and had no great adverse effect on flying, but many unfamiliar technical snags with the Stirling had to be overcome. Serviceability was affected by the carrying out of Acceptance Checks, but these have now been nearly completed, and improved serviceability is expected during the coming month.
Three fatal accidents, involving Stirling aircraft at night, are at present under investigation. Two occurred during Bullseye Exercises, and one during local night flying.
The standard of crews coming from O.T.U’s was maintained. High Level bombing training was very much improved throughout 51 Base, and heights up to 20,000 feet were recorded on night details. H 2 S training suffered owing to an initial shortage of instructors. The aircraft position earlier in the month was also acute, and H 2 S aircraft were being employed on normal training commitments.
The majority of the Squadron crews attached to No. 5 L.F.S. for a short refresher course during the month, completed the syllabus despite some restrictions by weather, and much valuable information was obtained from this mid-tour check.
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD)
There are, however, a few entries on the other side of this month’s balance sheet, such as the two Wireless Operators who, on the night 27/28th January, when briefed to use M/F D/F Section “N” on return from operations, obtained LINE BEARINGS from Hull and Heston. The question arises, what were the Captains and Navigators doing to allow the Wireless Operators to be so dim? Then there is the Wireless Operator who, when sending an early return message, spelt the word STARBD in Bomber Code, when there exists a code group for the word. When questioned, he admitted that he “was in a bit of a spin”. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened to any of these Wireless Operators AND THEIR CREWS (Captains please note), had they been in the position in which Sgt. Barnes Moss found himself, and confronted with a big job to do. Consider then, and note well, ye who do wear the badge of Sparks, that when trouble cometh, it doth not come after friendlie warning, but is swift and sudden, and never forget – it might be YOU.
Now let us consider the question of the Wireless Operator being in the astrodome over the target area. It is difficult to see any advantage that captains gain by having him there. In fact, if they take care to study a few facts, they will see that placing the Wireless Operator in the astrodome only gives a false sense of security and endangers [underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined]
Firstly, the Wireless Operator has very little night vision, having been employed during the three hours previous in gazing at a cathode ray tube or magic eye. Just ask yourselves how you feel when emerging from a cinema into the night –“Hell, I can’t see a thing”. Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that if your Wireless Operator is off Tinsel, one of your own aircraft may be shot down by an enemy night fighter free to operate because you have cleared the obstacle out of his path. Thirdly, the majority, but not all, of the Wireless Operators in astrodome incidents, come from squadrons fitted with Monica III, where the operator would see a fighter so much plainer on the CRT than in the flesh, in spite of all the blips made by friendly aircraft. Captains who make a habit of doing this are invited to reconsider their views in the light of the above remarks.
MOVEMENTS FOR JANUARY
F/Lt. Andrews, No.467 Squadron, has completed No.4 Signals Leaders Course, and is to be congratulated on being the first Signals Leader in this Group to obtain an “A” categorisation.
F/O. Rademeyer has taken the post of Signals Leader with No. 44 Squadron, F/Lt. Barrett having completed his operational tour.
P/O’s. Worthington, Thomas and Freeman should now be installed, and working to full pressure as Fishpond Instructors at East Kirkby, Fiskerton and Metheringham respectively, and Squadrons are invited to make full use of their services.
The visits to O.T.U. by Signals Leaders are in full swing, and squadrons should benefit from the move at a later date.
Now, here is an open invitation for any Signals Leader, Deputy Signals Leader or Wireless Operator (Air) to visit the W/T cabin at this Headquarters on an operational night. The only thing you need to do to take advantage of this offer, is to give a few hours notice on the telephone (extension 54).
TACTICS
EFFECT OF WINDOW AND COUNTERMEASURES
The enemy G. C. I. system continues to be subdued by Window. To retain maximum effect, however, there must be no slacking off in the rates of dropping. The times and rates of dropping laid down for each operation must be rigidly adhered to, and Window dropping must never be regarded as just another ‘bind’. These rates have been carefully calculated, and the individual who is “too lazy” or “forgets” is jeopardising not only his own safety, but that of the whole force. The Window dropper’s slogan must be “Not too much, not too little…..”
It is interesting to study the development of the enemy’s reaction to Window, and the results of our countermeasures over the past few months. That the highly mobile fighter force controlled by HF and V.H.F./RT, organised after the initial success of Window, could be a serious menace, was soon appreciated by the planning staff, who set to work to devise new tactics. As this fighter force was being directed to target areas being attacked, the first essential was to delude the enemy as to the areas to be attacked. Spoof attacks by Mosquitoes and small forces of “heavies” were attempted, and the main force was routed to within 20-30 miles of defended areas before turning to attack another target. These spoof attacks and feints have undoubtedly drawn a number of fighters away from the main targets. A more recent attempt at delusion was to move the whole force by ordering all aircraft to alter course simultaneously at a predetermined time, so as to displace the main stream suddenly. The unprecedented manoeuvre undoubtedly upset the enemy controllers’ calculations.
Not the least important of our countermeasures are the radio jamming devices. These are many and varied, and have produced very marked results. Special Tinsel is rated highly amongst the successful jamming devices, thus Wireless Operators must comply with Tinselling instructions on all occasions. Information on the work of the Radio Countermeasures Group must obviously be guarded, but a report on the results achieved by Ground Cigar, Ground Grocer, Corona and other H.F. and VHF. countermeasure schemes, is set out in a paper BC/S.31009/Sigs., dated 3rd February, 1944, “Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command”. Aircrew should read this report, which is available in all Intelligence libraries. The extract quoted below is typical of the confusion that arises, and shows the measure of success achieved. In fact, jamming has been so complete as to force the enemy to use his National Broadcast wavelengths to get orders through to his fighters. This new step should present no difficulty to our Countermeasure Experts, who are continually a step ahead of the enemy in radio jamming.
[Underlined] “Corona (HF) [/underlined]
This countermeasure continues to annoy the enemy Controllers and harass their pilots, and on occasion has been known to lead to unprintable ruderies being addressed to the efficient young W.A.A.F. officer who frequently plays the controller’s part for us. However, one of the methods of judging the success of Corona is by noting the enemy controller’s reaction to it over the air, and it is considered an unsuccessful night if we do not succeed in drawing at least one crack which is worth recording in the line book.”
TAIL WARMING DEVICES
With the advent of Monica IIIA and Fishpond, the duties of Wireless Operator have been still further extended. It is unfortunate that the sole attention of a crew member cannot be diverted to these devices, but for the moment the Wireless Operator has under his control something which, when properly used, can have immeasurable success against enemy fighters. A high degree of training in the manipulation of the set and interpretation of the P.P.I. and cathode tubes, is called for, and a drive must be made for the Wireless Operators to have as much air practice as possible with the sets.
MONICA IIIA
Several squadrons have now had experience with Monica IIIA, and have proved that for the set to be of any value at all, certain factors are essential. A detailed knowledge by the Wireless Operator of the suppression and gain settings to give well defined blips which can be followed in to a minimum of 250 yards range, a standard reporting patter by the Wireless Operator, and a knowledge of the interpretation of blips by pilots and gunners so that there is perfect crew co-operation whenever an enemy blip is sighted. The exact procedure for using Monica IIIA is set out in an instruction which is available in all Signals Leaders’ Offices. Gunners, pilots and Wireless Operators should be given an opportunity of reading this instruction.
FISHPOND
57 Squadron, from an investigation into Fishpond results, estimate that out of 80 Fishpond sorties, 9 combats have been avoided by utilising the early warning given by Fishpond. Their knowledge and experience will shortly be made available to other Fishpond Squadrons in the form of a tactics instruction. To get a good P.P.I. picture, liaison between Wireless Operator and H 2 S operator is essential, as is also a knowledge by the Wireless Operator of H 2 S manipulation and P.P.I. settings. Captains must remember that Fishpond does not record fighters attacking from above, and should therefore see that their gunners never relax the normal crew search procedure.
[Underlined] Continued from page 10, col.1) [/underlined]
aircraft no great need for quick landing is felt. Those Stations should remember that a second Squadron is always liable to be posted in at very short notice when, under these conditions, the average landing time of two minutes per aircraft, for between 30 and 40 aircraft, would be a godsend.
The Landing Board, originally designed by R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, has been improved on by many Stations in the Group. It is gratifying to note that new suggestions and modifications are continually being submitted. They are a big help, let’s have more of them.
No. 5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 12.
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
[Drawing]
HEADQUARTERS NO. 5 GROUP
A/Cdre. H.V. SATTERLY, D.F.C. C.B.E.
HEADQUARTERS NO. 53 BASE
A/Cdre. A. HESKETH, O.B.E., D.F.C. C.B.E.
R.A.F. STATION, SCAMPTON
F/O. C.F. GIBSON. M.B.E.
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. GLOVER. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. A. LYNCH, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. K.L. HOWARD. D.F.M.
F/O. E. MERCER. D.F.C.
P/O. A. WRIGHT. D.F.C.
P/O. V.D. PURVIS. D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. J.G.DAY. D.S.O.
Sgt. A.E. KEELING. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
A/F/Lt. G.H. LAING. D.F.C.
F/O. W.T. HAXBY. D.F.C.
61 SQUADRON
F/O. J.W. EINARSON, D.F.M. D.F.C.
W/Cdr. R.M. STIDOLPH. D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
P/O. D.C. HARVEY. D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
F/O. N.E. WESTERGAARD. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.E. BROOKES. D.F.M.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/Lt. C.J. BRAIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
9 SQUADRON (Contd.)
P/O. R.W. CORKHILL. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
P/O. R.L. ASH. D.F.C.
F/O. C.R. SAVAGE. D.F.C.
F/Lt. B. ASSON. D.F.C.
Sgt. L. UNWIN. D.F.M.
F/Lt. D.A. BARRETT. D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
A/S/L/ W.F. PARKS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
Sgt. J.E. HEATH D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.W. THOMPSON. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.R. POLLOCK. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. JOSLING. D.F.C.
P/O. S.G. TOWNSEND. D.F.C.
P/O. A.R. KNOWLES. D.F.C.
F/O. R. McROBBIE. D.F.C.
P/O. R.J. GOOCH. D.F.C.
P/O. J.A. KIMBER. D.F.C.
P/O. E.J. HOWES. D.F.C.
P/O. F. NORTHCLIFFE. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.B. HUGHES. D.F.M.
P/O. W.H. SIDDONS. D.F.C.
Sgt. D.J. GRIFFITH. D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
A/S/L. E.A. BENJAMIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.F. EMERSON. D.F.M.
106 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. R.E. BAXTER. D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
Sgt. T. GEDLING. D.F.M.
F/O. J.E.F. MITCHELL. D.F.C.
P/O. J. KIRKWOOD. D.F.C.
W/O. H.F. CONELLY. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.C. METCALFE. D.F.M.
619 SQUADRON
P/O. T.A. PEATFIELD. D.F.C.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J. SIMKIN. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.T. PAGE. D.F.M.
[Page break]
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
[Tables of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Total] 25 18 5 26
WAR SAVINGS
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved. £. s. d.
H.Q. (UNIT) 5 GROUP 51.4 10.0 95. 7. 6.
£2935.2.0.
[Page break]
GUNNERY (CONTD)
(Continued from page 9, col.3)
Now 49 Air Gunners, this is the biggest thing that has hit gunnery in 25 years, and it is up to you to take every opportunity of make for 100% proficiency in the use of this new equipment. Great things will be expected from you, losses should go down and E/A destroyed go up; so go to it, and make the life of the Hun fighter short and sweet!
CENTRAL GUNNERY SCHOOL RESULTS
No. 72 COURSE
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit. Category. Exam. Results. [/underlined]
P/O. Gross “B” 90.4%
Results of No. 73 Course not yet to hand.
SQUADRON AND FLIGHT GUNNERY LEADERS
Below is a list of Squadron and Flight Gunnery Leaders at present in Squadrons and Conversion Units.
44 Squadron F/Lt. McCurdy
F/O. Neison
49 Squadron F/Lt. Cork
F/O. Hamilton
463 Squadron F/Lt. Moorhead
F/O. Kirkpatrick
467 Squadron F/Lt. Nordon-Hare
9 Squadron F/Lt. Armstrong
50 Squadron F/Lt. Gray
P/O. Beale
619 Squadron F/Lt. Howard
P/O. Hammond
61 Squadron F/Lt. Breakey
617 Squadron F/Lt. Rodger
F/O. Buckley
F/O. Chandler
106 Squadron F/Lt. Sullivan
630 Squadron F/Lt. Stead
57 Squadron F/Lt. Taylor
F/O. Ward
207 Squadron F/O. Moore
F/O. Harper
1485 Gunnery Flight S/Ldr. Undery
F/Lt. Leonard
F/O. Mills
1660 Con.Unit F/Lt. Clark
P/O. Gross
1661 Con.Unit F/Lt. Gray
1654 Con.Unit F/Lt. Hoad
F/O. Simister
No. 5 L.F.S. F/Lt. Cass
P/O. Black
Aircrew School SCAMPTON F/Lt. Patten
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
On taking an analysis of a large number of flight engineers logs a considerable discrepancy has been noticed between the fuel consumption of different aircraft. This discrepancy is not due to the varying consumptions inherent in the engines of any particular aircraft. In most cases where an aircraft has had a high fuel consumption on a specific operation, the subsequent operation with a different crew proves that this aircraft has a low consumption. This all points to manipulation.
There are many cases where far too high revs are used at too low a boost and it is apparent that many flight engineers are not paying sufficient attention to the boost and revs required for the most economical conditions.
It is not economical above full throttle height and boost below E.C.B. to reduce I.A.S. by throttle manipulation. I.A.S. should be controlled on propellor speed only, and if you are at an altitude where the ‘S’ blower is in operation, by controlling I.A.S. on the throttles you are merely strangling your engine. To quote one instance, an extract from one flight engineer’s log shows that 2850 r.p.m. was used at + 2 lbs boost at 15,000 feet in ‘S’ gear. This is an obvious case of engine strangling, and had the throttles been open to + 4 boost E.C.B. to take full advantage of the engine power available at that altitude, then the r.p.m. could have been cut down to maintain the required I.A.S. with the resultant decrease in fuel consumption. The consumption in the particular case quoted averaged 66 gallons per hour per engine which speaks for itself. Flight Engineer Leaders must bring home by means of lectures to their flight engineers instances such as this. Such manipulation may cost you an aircraft and maybe the crew, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the fuel consumption of a Lancaster is in the hands of the flight engineer, and where the flight engineer knows that incorrect revs and boost are being used for any specific condition, then he should advise the pilot accordingly; if this advice is ignored, the cause of the high fuel consumption should be reported on return. Many more instances such as that quoted have been found, and space does not allow to quote them all. Efforts are being made at this Headquarters to find other reasons for high consumption in each case, but so far high consumptions have been caused solely by incorrect engine manipulation.
EARLY RETURNS
In The case of an oil pressure gauge failure which causes quite a few early returns, this can be diagnosed quite easily. If the oil pressure drops off suddenly, and coolant and oil temperatures remain normal, the oil temperature should be watched closely, and if this remains normal, together with the coolant temperature the gauge is definitely suspect. Flight engineers should watch this sort of thing and advise the pilot accordingly.
Many early returns are caused by so called generator failure, and the following notes will be of interest to all flight engineers, and should go a long way to preventing unnecessary early returns due to this fault. These notes will be circulated separately to flight engineers.
1. [Underlined] The Voltmeter [/underlined] is the most important of the three instruments on the main control panel. In flight it normally indicates between 27 – 29 volts.
2. The Ammeters merely indicate how the generators are sharing the load, and as long as they both give a positive reading, even though unbalanced, the circuit is O.K. (i.e. +55 and +5). If the degree of unbalance is above 15 amps this matter must be reported to the Electrical Officer.
3. If one of the ammeters shows a negative reading, i.e. a discharge”, then before switching off one of the generators, reference must be made to the voltmeter. If the voltmeter reads 29 volts or under, switch off the generator giving the negative reading. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts, switch off the generator giving the positive reading.
4. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts the accumulators are being overcharged. In this case switch off the generator showing the higher current. If the voltmeter still indicates over 29 volts switch off the other generator and all non-essential loads to conserve the accumulators. The pressure head heater [underlined] must [/underlined] remain ‘ON’. After a short time, say 5 minutes, [underlined] one [/underlined] generator, preferably the one giving the lower reading, may be switched ‘ON’ again, but a careful check must be kept on the voltmeter. Both generators must [underlined] not [/underlined] be switched ‘ON’ again after they have been switched ‘OFF’.
5. [Underlined] Never [/underlined] disconnect the cables from the accumulator in flight, otherwise it may cause an explosion. If the accumulators become overheated and are gassing excessively, turn the “Ground-Flight” switch to “Ground”.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, col.3) [/underlined]
from service sources does not appear to fulfil our requirements. Coningsby has produced a most useful piece of apparatus, and details of it will be circulated to other Bases and Stations. It will be to the advantage of Electrical Officers of other Units if they pay a personal visit to Coningsby to see this test rig for themselves. Further, it is suggested that visits to other Stations will enable the best ideas to be incorporated in all instrument and electrical sections. So far as is known, the many excellent schemes which have been produced by local initiative have not been patented.
In the last month the incidence of oxygen failure has increased, but in many cases no technical fault has been found. This indicates that more “gen” in the use of oxygen must be passed on by Electrical Officers to members of aircrew. The introduction of the microphone heater and the Mk.I jet has produced very favourable results, and steps have been taken to obtain further supplies of heaters for the use of all gunners.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table showing the serviceability of aircraft by Conversion Unit and Lancaster aircraft]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
Look after your ‘K’ type dinghies, you may find them very useful one day – F/Sgt. Groves of 50 Squadron did, on the night 29/30th December. The aircraft of which he was rear gunner had been damaged on operations. The pilot could not close the bomb doors, and due to lack of petrol the captain of the aircraft, while still over the sea, was forced to decide whether to ditch the aircraft or to bale out his crew. The captain eventually had to give the order to bale out using ‘K’ dinghies, having first sent out an S.O.S. and received fixes.
F/Sgt. Grove was the first out of the aircraft and the only one saved. The indications are that at least one other member of the crew was prepared to abandon the aircraft but no more was seen or heard of the crew or the aircraft after F/Sgt. Groves had left. F/Sgt. Groves suffered considerably from exposure while in his ‘K’ dinghy, but has since recovered.
It is possible to ditch an aircraft with open bomb doors, and it has been successfully accomplished on more than one occasion. In any case the doors are liable to collapse on impact with the water, and where this has happened, crews have managed to clear the aircraft without too much trouble. While no blame is attached to the pilot of this particular aircraft, this fact should be borne in mind, and pilots should resort to the ‘K’ type dinghy only as a last resort – e.g. should the aircraft be on fire, or in danger of breaking up in the air.
Successful ditchings, in seemingly impossible sea and weather conditions have shown that, provided you have practiced your emergency procedure and dinghy drills you should have no worry in making the decision to ditch. The days are over when a successful ditching was something to be marvelled at. To-day they are a common occurrence, and experience has shown that ignorance and stupidity are to blame in almost every case of failure.
A summary of Air Sea Rescue incidents for the six month ending 31st December, 1943, show that of a total of 3271 aircrew involved, 1,078 were rescued and brought back to England; most of the remainder fared as
(continued on page 2, col 2)
ENGINEERING
The operational effort for January was very high considering the bad weather periods which were encountered during the month. The squadrons were all down in aircraft strength, but in spite of this a high total was achieved; this, of course, was only possible by many squadrons operating 100% each night. With the man power shortage it requires very hard work and long hours to maintain this effort, and now that squadrons are almost up to full strength on the new establishment, the load will be even heavier. Due, however, to the efforts of the ground crews, February should see the biggest effort ever put out from this Group.
No.54 Base, Coningsby, which formed on 1st January, 1944, is already making itself felt as a formidable and efficient formation. There is still much to do to bring the various sections up to the peak of perfection, but as these were started on sound lines, there is no doubt of their ultimate efficiency.
All operational bases and R. & I. sections have been kept extremely busy on acceptance checks recently, and as a result certain other work has had to be left. This is only a passing phase, and it is hoped that once the squadrons are up to full strength, the task will be easier by dealing with the normal replacements. The many high speed enemy action repairs which have been carried out in time to get aircraft ready for ops on the second night, including many power plant changes, which are carried out immediately the aircraft lands during the night, are so numerous that it is difficult to single out individuals for praise; it all points to the splendid morale and staying powers of the ground crews.
There are many early returns and cancellations which could be avoided and Engineer Officers must keep on with the drive to eliminate these entirely, as far as is humanly possible; they are responsible for the non-delivery of a very large tonnage of bombs when calculated over a month.
The number of failures of exhaust studs has been considerably reduced where 3.5% Nickel steel studs have been fitted, and results so far are very pleasing. When further experience has been gained it is hoped to go over to this kind of stud completely.
The introduction of the 30 lbs pressure type relief valve on the header tank in place of the thermostatic valve is gradually taking place throughout the Group, and a marked improvement is noticed by the smaller number of failures due to engines being “cooked”.
WEIGHT SHEET SUMMARIES
A new weight sheet summary as applicable to 5 Group has been issued to all Bases. Stations and Squadrons, and the use of this with the bomb load chart which accompanied it should dispel any further doubts as to what can and what cannot be carried at an all-up weight of 65,000 lbs.
CONVERSION UNITS AND NO.5 L.F.S.
The Conversion Units commenced a Stirling programme early in the month, and although the results of the first month’s work were good and called for a colossal amount of work, it is anticipated that with certain improvements, the February figures will be much higher. Great credit is due to the C.T.O’s and men under them, who have tackled this task and overcome their setbacks in an admirable manner. The programme which has been set for No. 5 L. F. S. calls for good organisation and planning on the technical side, and so far the job has been done well.
FLIGHT ENGINEER LEADER
A very necessary addition to the Group Headquarters staff is the establishment of a Flight Engineer Leader. This post has been filled by F/Lt. Gottwaltz, and Base Engineers and C. T. O.’s are requested to afford him every facility to assist in attempting to solve the carrying fuel consumption problem. A column elsewhere in this News has been allocated to Flight Engineers.
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS
It is most important the Command Modification No. 57 is completed on all aircraft fitted with A.P.I. and A.M.U. at the earliest opportunity, to eliminate errors due to inefficient cooling.
The test rig for the instruments issued
(continued on page 13, col.3 )
WAR EFFORT
[Table containing details by Squadron of averages and numbers of sorties, tonnage dropped, operational hours and losses as well as ratings]
ORDER OF MERIT IN THE FOREGOING TABLE IS BASED ON THE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED PER AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON CHARGE
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, January 1944
5 Group News, January 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 18, January 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, tactics, sports and operations.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-01
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
16 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-22 jan 44
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Germany
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-01
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
ground personnel
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
[Page break]
FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
[Page break]
TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
22 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
searchlight
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
[Picture]
[Page Break]
[Underlined] BASE INTELLIGENCE [/underlined] [Indecipherable]
[Drawing]
[Stamp] [Underlined] Copies to Stns [/underlined]
Base.
[Circled] [Indecipherable [/circled]
FIVE
GROUP
NEWS
JULY
No. 36
1945
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A.O.C.
At mid-night yesterday, Mr. Attlee, our Prime Minister, our Prime Minister, announced the final cessation of the War with Japan. This is great news. At last the world is at peace. To-day, August 15th, is VJ-Day and there can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that we are all greatly relieved that the end of hostilities has at last come. Nevertheless, for some, and particularly those who had volunteered to go to the Far East, there must be a certain sense of disappointment and, no doubt, many will feel annoyed that they personally have not been able to have a crack at the Japs.
The future of 5 Group is now very much in the air and I am unable to give you the answer to the many queries you may have at the moment. I doubt if many heavy bomber Squadrons will be required as part of the occupation forces in Japan, although it is more than possible that one or two of the Squadrons will proceed somewhere out to the East in the near future. It is unlikely that the Government and the Air Ministry will be able to review the many difficult problems and agree on new policy for some days, and, until definite orders are received, all Squadrons should continue their normal training and their normal routine of work.
More than any other Group, 5 Group has had a particularly difficult time since VE-Day. The Squadrons have undergone many changes; some Squadrons have been disbanded; others moved to new Stations; there has been a vast change round of personnel to ensure that only those fit and eligible for the Far East were left in those Units proceeding overseas. Many others have left the Service but, in spite of all this change, I have noticed that many long and arduous hours of training have been put in by Squadron and Station personnel to prepare themselves for what was to have been a very hard role in the Pacific. In addition to this training, I decided to carry out a series of inspections of all Stations. I have now completed six out of the ten and have been very impressed with the high standard of smartness and efficiency which have been attained at those Stations which I have inspected. I realise that many man hours of hard work have been put in by all ranks, both in the training and preparation of Squadrons for war against Japan and also to attain such a high standard of cleanliness at Stations.
Much of the material and information contained in this “5 Group News” is now out of date, but I have, nevertheless, decided to issue it in spite of the fact that all hostilities have now ceased. I thank all ranks for their hard work and fine spirit of co-operation during these last few months, and I know full well that, if 5 Group had managed to reach the Pacific before the end of hostilities, the various Units that have been preparing themselves for War, would have put up a very fine show.
MORTON HALL,
[Underlined] 15th August, 1945. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
The weather, particularly at the beginning of the month, did not prove very helpful in enabling the Group to put in as many flying hours as was hoped for. The G.T.I’s Flying Training Chart shows little or no increase in night flying training from the period 6th – 11th July to the period 23rd – 29th July, while the day flying line shows a steady rise with very few breaks throughout the month.
During their visits to Stations and Squadrons throughout the Group, the G.T.I. and his training Specialist Officers have noticed a lethargic attitude in some Squadrons to Tiger training. Such phrases as “We’ve got plenty of time to go yet”, “The War will be finished before we get there”, and “Do you think we’ll go?” have been heard time and time again. It should have become apparent by now that there is only a limited time available for training and that every opportunity should be made to seize every spare hour for ground training and every period of fine weather for air training. Certain Squadrons have already found out that there is even less time than they thought left for training on this side of the world.
As for the phrase “The War will be finished before we get there” – unless crews finish their training thoroughly they won’t get there at all, and it is to be borne in mind that there are still immense areas of land and sea yet to be regained. As is well known, the Jap is a fanatical fighter and does not give up until he is dead. There are millions of Japs who have yet to be made to give up in Burma, Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra, Thailand and French Indo-China, to say nothing of Japan, China and Manchuria, where the Japs are most firmly rooted. As regards to the question “Do you think we’ll go?” – the answer is “Yes”.
The G.T.I. and the Training Specialists welcome 460 and 75 Squadrons into the Group. When the G.T.I. first visited these Squadrons and explained the number of hours flying and number of hours ground lectures required from them, one of the first remarks was “What – only 22 1/2 hours training per crew per month: that is 675 hours per Squadron … We shall get over 1,000 hours in next month”.
Whilst figures of flying times are not a perfect indication of training done, they provide a fairly sound means of assessing the training efforts of individual Squadrons. Therefore to enable Squadron Commanders to appreciate the position of their Squadron in relation to the rest of the Group, the flying times for June and July are given below:-
[Table of Flying Times by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] OTHER SPECIAL UNITS [/underlined]
[Table of Flying Times by Unit]
No. 467 Squadron is congratulated on its training effort, particularly since it has been at R.A.F. Metheringham, where it has done over 1,000 hours during July.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER [/underlined]
Tiger Squadrons in Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and R.A.F. Stations Syerston are progressing satisfactorily with Link Training in B.A.B.S. and Radio Range. No.54 Base Squadrons, however, are a long way behind and there is room for great improvement.
Nos.44 and 619 Squadrons put in a total of 90 hours before they left the Group in the middle of the month.
[Table of Aircrew Hours by Base and Squadron]
Total hours by Group – 1,285
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
Total Categorised in Group = 270
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
Group Captain Vickers, D.S.O., Chief Signals Officer, Tiger Force, who has just returned from a tour of the American Theatre of Operations, visited this Headquarters on Saturday, 4th August, and gave us a very interesting and descriptive lecture on the Signals facilities in use there. As the Tiger Force will be operating in conjunction with the American Air Forces, the existing facilities are practically those which Tiger Force will be required to adopt. A brief outline of these facilities is given below.
[Underlined] AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS [/underlined]
Group or Wing (American equivalent to our Group) have W/T control channels in the 3 mc, 6 mc and 8 mc bands, keyed simultaneously throughout the 24 hours, thus affording the air operator three channels of reception, dependent upon the time of day or night the aircraft is airborne. Broadcasts are made at half-hourly intervals and control, in general, is similar to that of our G.C.F. Weather information is broadcast on these channels every hour in the U.C.O. P.A.C. (the weather code used in that theatre).
H.F./D.F. facilities are available, but our Wireless Operators must train themselves to request QUJ instead of QDM as used in this country. H.F./D.F. fixing facilities are available in an emergency. MF/DF facilities are not available, but other aids, such as M/F Beacons, Radio Ranges and V.H.F. Homing facilities are numerous. I.F.F. is also carried and can be used for fixing purposes in an emergency. R/T communication is by V.H.F. and each Group or Wing has V.H.F./D.F. facilities for homing when within 100 miles from Base. Weather information is also broadcast by R/T at four minute intervals once aircraft are within 100 miles from Base.
[Underlined] CODES AND PUBLICATIONS [/underlined]
As all ground W/T Stations already hold C.S.P.1270 (the American Aircraft Code) the problem of supply is greatly reduced if Tiger Force adopt the same code. Wireless Operators will find this code similar to our own C.D.0250 except that it is a four letter code instead of two as in C.D.0250. The lay-out is similar and spare groups are allotted for any specific requirement. In each of these codes, which change about every four days, is an authenticator table which is used extensively. The method of authentication, while not quite similar to that in C.C.B.P.127, is on the same lines, and Wireless Operators should have no difficulty in learning the procedure. Weather information is obtained, normally by the Group or Wing W/T broadcasts, in code, using the U.C.O. P.A.C. – a code similar to our own U.C.O. Request. If a more detailed weather report is required, it can be requested, and this information is supplied in another weather code – W.A.F.3. In any message where the need for speed outweighs the need for security, Q Code or plain language can be used.
[Underlined] AIR/SEA RESCUE [/underlined]
As most operations involve long hours of flying over water, the facilities for Air/Sea Rescue are well organised. Practically every island in Allied hands has an Air/Sea Rescue Unit located on it. In addition to these units, which maintain a continuous W/T watch on two
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
exclusive distress frequencies, there is an elaborate organisation of Naval aircraft (Dumbos) at rendezvous points along the track. B.29 aircraft (Super Dumbos) are also circling rendezvous points on track, and submarines and destroyers are at pre-arranged stations on the route. Aircraft, surface vessels and submarines all maintain a continuous listening watch on the above two distress frequencies, and in addition on the international distress frequency (500 k/cs). A V.H.F. watch is also maintained so that aircraft in distress have no less than four channels of communication with rescue craft.
[Underlined] CLIMACTIC CONDITIONS AFFECTING RADIO RECEPTION [/underlined]
The climactic conditions in the theatre where Tiger Force aircraft will be located, will at times adversely affect radio reception, and Wireless Operators must be trained to overcome “atmospherics”. Morse reception through interference must be regularly practiced to enable Wireless Operators to overcome the conditions which prevail.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
W/T and R/T silence are normally maintained throughout an operation, unless otherwise ordered, or when aircraft are in an emergency or distress.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
As everyone must know by this time, the latest Bullseye exercise carried out by this Group was practically ruined by another case of inadvertent radiation of intercomm. on V.H.F. The details have been fully covered in this Headquarters letter 5G/S.14500/9/Sigs., dated 3rd August. At the risk, however, of being accused of emphasising the obvious, the main points to be noted are repeated below:-
(a) If satisfactory V.H.F. reception is not obtained by H – 10, the whole set is to be switched off. Instructions can still be obtained by W/T.
(b) All crews of Marker Force, Flare Force and Master Bomber aircraft are to be reminded of the need to watch the neon “V.H.F. R/T on transmit” indicator lamp from H – 30 until the end of the attack.
(c) Captains of Nos. 9 and 617 Squadron aircraft which require V.H.F. for landing, are to ensure that the V.H.F. H/T switch is not put in the “On” position until the aircraft are within 50 miles of Base on return.
(d) All crews must receive constant instruction on the contents of 5 Group A.S.I. Part VI, Sigs/1.
(e) The transmissions made by the Master Bomber, his deputy and the Link aircraft during the period H – 16 to H – 10 serve as the V.H.F. R/T reception test for all other aircraft. These transmissions must therefore be made in a precise, deliberate manner. All volume controls should be set at maximum volume during this period.
[Underlined] WIRLESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Tiger Training [/underlined] Throughout July the training of Wireless Operators (Air) for Tiger Force continued satisfactorily and results so far obtained are gratifying. Many Squadrons have almost finished the Ground Training Syllabus and revision will ensure that all Wireless Operators are 100% trained. The results of loop and Radio Range training have been very good – Wireless Operators obtaining good loop bearings and Pilots carrying out successful Beam flying. Perfect-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ion in this type of homing to an airfield is absolutely essential in the new theatre and only constant practice at every available opportunity will ensure this. It Is hoped to have all aircraft fitted with American type Radio Range Receiver for use by Pilots only, thus the Wireless Operator will have his Marconi equipment free to use for any other purpose. The training on “Consol” beacons has been held up due to lack of information regarding the beacons in use and for charts to cover them. It is hoped, however, to have all the information of these beacons which are in operation in the European Theatre very soon, so that air training can be carried out, but as there are not yet “Consol” facilities in the new theatre this training should come at the bottom of your priority training list.
[Underlined] Squadron Signals Training Trophy [/underlined] The result of the Squadron Signals Training Trophy competition was announced during July. The winner was No.44 Squadron, whose training room was an outstanding example of what can be done to make these rooms places where Wireless Operators can really find inspiration and interest in every phase of their work. Second and third places in the competition were won by 57 and 83 Squadrons respectively. The standard of all Signals training rooms was very high throughout, and showed that Signals Leaders and Wireless Operators really had taken a keen interest in their layout and cleanliness – Good work chaps – keep it up, and remember when you may be in a tent in some far land, that these too can be kept clean, tidy and made places of interest. The same spirit which prevailed in your training rooms here can be maintained despite all they may say about fungus, mosquitoes, sunshine and rain – not to mention some yellow rats which will soon be dealt with.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise [/underlined] This exercise has been re-arranged, thus enabling the two new Squadrons to No.5 Group to take part. The work carried out during July has been up to standard, though there are still a few cases of incorrect tuning which must be eliminated. Nos.75 and 460 Squadrons will find this exercise their introduction to 5 Group W/T Control, and practice will soon make them quite familiar with the procedure.
[Underlined] W/T Controllers’ Test [/underlined] Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their splendid efforts to get all their Wireless Operators qualified as W/T Controllers. At the end of July only four Operators of 97 Squadron and 7 of 83 Squadron had still to pass the tests laid down in 5 G. S.S.I. No.13. We should like to see a percentage of all Wireless Operators in each Squadron passing out as W/T controllers, as there is always the possibility that they may be called upon to carry out these duties.
[Underlined] Signals Leaders [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to the two new Signals Leaders to the Group, namely F/Lt Baxter, Signals Leader, No.75 (N.Z.) Squadron and F/O Moir, Signals Leader, No.460 Squadron. We hope that they are now settled down in their new quarters and will soon be familiar with 5 Group Signals technique.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
[Underlined] Gee [/underlined] The news came as a bombshell late last month, that as a result of consultations in the Theatre, and the need to conserve shipping space, Gee was not to be used by the Tiger Force. Training in this equipment for both aircrew and maintenance personnel was to cease immediately. Although the consternation of the navigators was great, the maintenance side was no less concerned, because in three years of operational development Gee became a sound and reliable equipment, easy to maintain and relatively fault free. However, the Loran and Rebecca combination will do the work of Gee from the operational point of view. We have had experience of Loran, and if our efforts to obtain Modification IV are successful, with the divider troubles elimin-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ated, we can hope for high serviceability. Few of us have had experience with Rebecca, but the equipment was developed by other Commands and with constant practice there should be little difficulty in maintenance.
[Underlined] Workshop Convoys [/underlined] At a rather sultry conference at Coningsby the final form of the workshop convoys was decided. Bomber Command rules that the 3 H.P. Motors were not to be removed from the R.V. 421B, although provision could be made to allow this to be done in the Theatre. The only major modification what was approved by Bomber Command was the installation of a scanner on the roof of the R.V.420B, this work to be carried out by Coningsby.
The task of the preparation of these vehicles for operational use fell on the No.381 M.U. detachment at Coningsby. The work included the installation of bench sets, the scanner modifications, minor re-arrangement of shelving and other work. Five convoys had to be completed in ten days, and the fact that the work is well up to schedule reflects great credit on F/O Milsom in charge of the job, and the remainder of the personnel concerned.
[Underlined] ADMONITORY SONNET [/underlined]
O, ye who venture forth in War’s array
To fight vile Nippon’s hordes, the yellow foe,
From some Pacific islet far away,
Know ye that there ye’ll find no G.P.O.?
All those of ye with gadget minds take heed,
The surplus fittings of the German war
Will vanish quite. Austere will be, indeed,
Your future days compared with those of yore.
Reproach us not in future when you find
That telephones are quantitively few,
And qualitively very far behind
The standards which in England you once knew.
One cheerful note! Be very sure we’ll fix
That telephones supplied aren’t candlesticks!
(Anon. (Circa 1945))
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION TRAINING [/underlined]
The training programme is proceeding satisfactorily. Navigators and Set Operators are making ample use of the aids available with the exception of loop and radio range bearings. These seem to be avoided like a plague, or, if they are not entirely neglected, the Navigators [underlined] do not use them. [/underlined]
They lack faith in them. Why? Providing the loop is swung satisfactorily and the Wireless Operator takes great care in obtaining his readings, the resulting bearings should be very accurate. “Alright”, you may say, “but the bearings we get are hopeless, never nearer than 10 miles to the actual position.” Well, you have the solution in your own hands – either the loops are not correctly swung or the Wireless Operator is not doing his job properly. We repeat, the solution is in your own hands.
Apart from these two aids, however, the impressive array of navigational aids are being used to full advantage. In fact, too much so in the case of Gee. A few navigators have taken a commonsense attitude towards “Gee” and so not use it unless it is required in an emergency. They navigate with the assistance of the other and more difficult-to-manipulate aids. This is sound common sense and can result in one thing only – a very high standard of efficiency. But what of those people who do not adopt this rightful attitude, who continually obtain Gee fixes even though they have serviceable H2S, Loran and loop? By pursuing this policy they will never attain a high degree of manipulation skill, nor will they gain real confidence in other aids. Therefore, leave Gee alone. Discard it altogether. Use it only in an emergency – then you will quickly gain efficiency – and confidence – in all your other “boxes of tricks”.
The Drift Sights and G.P.I’s are not yet available in sufficient quantities to allow fitting to aircraft, and it may not be possible for crews to obtain flying practice with these instruments until Squadrons receive their new aircraft, which is leaving it very late. To compensate for this crews must get the maximum ground practice. It is not quite the same thing, but nearly so. Both these instruments are easy to manipulate and it requires but a little time and effort to become proficient in their use. Therefore, get as much practice as you can, reduce the drills to habit and then you can perform the actions automatically. (A tip here- always try to reduce your work to a series of habits, it then becomes much simpler to perform. If you have to think about a thing before you can do it, you use up energy – a lot of energy. If you can do it habitually then very little energy is required. There is no need to wear yourself out navigating for a few hours – so, make a habit of each and every drill. On every occasion you obtain a fix, go through the complete cycle of obtaining a wind, G/S and E.T.A. check and altering course if necessary. Do this a few times and you have reduced the whole thing to a habit – a very good habit too, because as a result you will be a very reliable and efficient Navigator).
To sum up, Navigation training is proceeding satisfactorily, but a little more attention is required in the direction of Loop bearings, Drift Sights and G.P.I’s. Polish off these three and we may
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
consider the training situation very satisfactory.
[Underlined] FAR EASTERN NAVIGATION FLASHES [/underlined]
(a) Serviceability of Radar aids ‘out there’ is approximately 92%.
(b) Loran ranges fluctuate violently, maximum 1500 nautical miles, minimum 700 nautical miles.
(c) Wireless reception satisfactory, no undue interference from any source. Bearings and emergency fixes therefore easily obtainable and reliable.
(d) Maps and Charts for the Far East are now ready. Two copies of each sheet are being forwarded to Squadrons for perusal.
[Underlined] ASTRO COMPASS [/underlined]
Agreement has at last been reached on the position to be occupied by the Astro Compass in Lancaster aircraft. This is on the starboard side of the coaming which is just forward of the Navigator’s table. A trial installation was held at an 8 Group Station recently and this position seemed very satisfactory. It is easy to get at, very easy to manipulate and is also easily stowed.
Owing to great pressure of work it may be impossible for the Astro Compass to be mounted in this position in the existing aircraft, but some compensation will be found in the fact that the new aircraft which we shall shortly receive will have the Astro Compass correctly positioned. Crews will, therefore, not have much opportunity of practice in using this instrument in the correct position, but continue to obtain the maximum possible practice whilst it is situated in the present position, so that when you do get the new aircraft you will require only familiarisation.,
[Underlined] DRIFT SIGHT [/underlined]
A final position for the fitting of the U.S. Navy Mark VI Drift Sight into Lancaster aircraft has not yet been decided. The present approved position is aft of the flare chute; it is considered to be far from ideal. We in this Group are therefore experimenting by fitting the sight in different positions in the nose of the aircraft. The most obvious and easily accessible position has been vetoed by the larger escape hatch about to be incorporated in the production line aircraft. A second position just aft of the bomb sight is now being perfected and it is earnestly hoped that it will be satisfactory for everyone. A decision on this matter will be reached before the end of August.
Once again, however, no matter what the approved position, it will be impossible to have the sights installed in the existing aircraft, so crews must obtain the maximum practice, ground practice in this instance, on the instructional “mock up”. It is not very difficult to manipulate this new drift sight and fifteen minutes practice should be sufficient to make everyone at least partly proficient. Much experience can be gained of course, either during the short time between the arrival of the new aircraft and the “fly out”, or whilst on the “fly out”.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
(a) [Underlined] Station Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE – Waddington – S/Ldr Evans, D.F.C.
Bardney – S/Ldr Rumbles, D.F.C.
Skellingthorpe – S/Ldr Bray, D.F.C.
551 Wing - F/Lt Johnson.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
54 BASE – Coningsby – S/Ldr Baxter, D.S.O., D.F.C.
Woodhall – S/Ldr Bennett, D.F.M.
Metheringham – S/Ldr Martin, D.F.C.
552 Wing – S/Ldr Hatch, D.F.C.
553 Wing – S/Ldr Ayles, D.F.C., D.F.M.
55 BASE East Kirkby – S/Ldr St.Clair Miller, D.F.C.
Spilsby – F/Lt McKinnon, D.F.C.
SYERSTON – S/Ldr De Friend, D.F.M.
(b) [Underlined] Squadron Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE 9 Squadron – F/Lt Peasfield
189 Squadron – F/Lt Booth
463 Squadron – F/Lt Markham
617 Squadron – F/Lt Martin
54 BASE 83 Squadron – F/Lt Bowes
97 Squadron – F/Lt Woolcott
106 Squadron – F/Lt Curry
467 Squadron – F/Lt Pickard
627 Squadron – F/Lt Tyce
55 BASE 57 Squadron – F/Lt Bradley
75 Squadron – F/O Parsons
207 Squadron – F/Lt Gully
460 Squadron – F/Lt Young
SYERSTON 49 Squadron – F/O Prentice
This month we have said goodbye to two stalwarts of the “Union”, namely S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C, and S/Ldr Crowe, D.F.C. Both of them have been with us for a very considerable period and have done outstanding work. They have been responsible in no small part for the progress of Navigation in this Group during the last two years. We are very sorry to see them go, because they will be sorely missed, but we wish them every success and the very best of luck in “civvy street”.
[Underlined] BOUQUETS [/underlined]
After omitting the “bouquets” for two months, it has been decided to re-introduce them. Below is a list of the two best training efforts from each Base during the month of July. The navigators have been chosen for their consistently accurate work, rigid adherence to system, constant checking of winds, ground speeds and E.T.A’s, and log and chart work, particularly chart work, of a very high order.
53 BASE 1. F/O Burke 463 Squadron
2. F/O MacIntyre 453 Squadron
54 BASE 3. F/Lt Stevens 106 Squadron
4. F/S Barker 97 Squadron
55 BASE 5. F/S Mancer 57 Squadron
6. F/O Huggins 57 Squadron
SYERSTON 7. F/O Prentice 49 Squadron
No one is barred from this competition. We do not ask for ultra neatness; the qualifications are as stated in the introductory paragraph. All of you can produce exemplary work if you try. You have the knowledge, you have the necessary Navigational aids available, and all that is required is hard work and common sense on your part. You will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
see that it is possible for anyone to qualify as one of the seven best Navigators in the Group. You have been given knowledge, now apply it, and produce some really first-class work. We do not like to see the same name appearing each month and are always anxious to replace the “old timers” with a newcomer. Let us therefore see a new list of names next month, and YOU make sure your name is on the list.
[Underlined] ALLOCATION OF DUTIES IN THE NAVIGATION SECTION [/underlined]
Checks carried out in all Navigation Sections throughout last month have shown that a number of Navigation Officers are loath to appoint the more senior Navigators to assist them in their multifarious tasks. It is the view of a few of them that as they are responsible for the entire section they should do all the work; but this is an unwise policy. It is impossible for a Squadron Navigation Officer to carry out all the necessary work himself. Consequently it is necessary to delegate authority to the senior Navigators in the Section. In nine out of every ten cases it will be found that these people are only too willing to assist the Navigation Officer in any way. Therefore, Squadron Navigation Officers, do not take upon yourselves entirely the burden of the Navigation Section – share this responsibility with your experienced Navigators and make your task, and in fact your life, much easier to bear.
A word to you Senior Navigators – do your bit for the “Union” and give your Navigation Officer all the assistance you possibly can. Take over one or two of his minor duties, such as looking after Order Books, supervising stores etc., By such action you will help not only the Squadron Navigation Officer, but you will also improve the efficiency of your Section.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS [/underlined]
The average error for the month was 2.7 knots, an improvement of .3 knots on the last two month’s figures.
Once again we are treading the path of progress! By the combined and determined efforts pf every Navigation team the bombing vector error is being systematically reduced to what may well be considered a negligible error.
Don’t forget that we set ourselves the task of reducing this error to 2.5 knots. It can be done as five Squadrons have shown this month; press on therefore, and let us obtain our objective immediately.
[Table of Vector Errors Ranked by Squadron]
No.189 Squadron have dropped with a very big bang from 3rd place last month to bottom of the ladder this month. This month’s vector error is the highest ever obtained by No.189 Squadron since their formation. We hope they will never again obtain such a distinction. Come on now 189 Squadron, make a really determined effort this month and let us see you at the top of the ladder next month!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVOGRAPHS [/underlined]
Did you decipher the word picture couplets included in last month’s News? If you didn’t here they are:-
[Underlined] Couplet No.1 [/underlined] “Destination Tokyo – a very long hop,
Maintain track or you’ll get the chop.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.2 [/underlined] “Loran, H2S. Rebecca and Gee,
Keep your future trouble free.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.3 [/underlined] “Accurate winds so timing sound,
Target pranged, then homeward bound.”
Now, although these word pictures may have provided a very welcome diversion when reading through the News, it was our intention that they should bring home to you, with great force, the morals enclosed therein. Did they have this effect on you, and did you apply the morals immediately?
Those of you who did not decipher them and did not, therefore, get the gist of the thing, now have the answers given to you – now it is up to you to apply them immediately [underlined] and always. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place amongst the Gee transmitting stations during the past month – changes intended to standardize [sic] the system in Europe for peace time Air Force flying, for certain operations taking place in the Italian zone, and to bring all frequencies on the same RF Unit.
As the majority of these changes have taken place with little or no warning, there may still be doubt amongst some Navigators as to the correct frequencies to use for the now standardized [sic] chains. To counteract this confusion, details of the new frequencies are outlined below.
[Table of Gee Chain Frequencies and Ident Blinks]
+ New chains – not yet working.
Information relating to Gee in the Far Eastern Theatre is going to cause considerable heartburning amongst Navigators and Pilots alike, as it is now definitely known that no Gee Chain is to be provided there. To ensure that crews reach a high standard of efficiency in navigating without this aid, it is expected that instructions will shortly be issued for Gee to be taken out of all aircraft. It must, however, be emphasised that Gee is not the be all and end all of navigation and has never superceded [sic] the basic principles of navigation. Therefore, however great the loss of this aid may seem at first, air navigation will not become impossible. Other aids are available, equally as accurate, and crews must develop them to a high standard.
When this instruction is issued, Pilots, Navigators and Set Operators must therefore concentrate on Loran, to ensure a higher standard of fixing accuracy, and on Rebecca and Radio Range for more accurate homing. Only by determination and continued training can crews overcome the disadvantages which will necessarily result from the taking out of Gee.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
The training of crews in H2S Navigation and Blind Bombing is progressing satisfactorily throughout the Group despite the shortages of equipment and the lower serviceability rate.
With the expected loss of Gee, H2S is quickly becoming the most accurate method of overland navigation, and much greater importance must be paid to its homing facilities in view of the nature of the Pacific Bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
An accuracy in fixing, equal to that of Gee, is not expected but one of less than 1 1/2 miles (this is about the present error) is demanded and can be obtained, providing set operators are made aware of their responsibilities, particularly when using H2S fixes for windfinding. The less accurate a crew is in H2S fixing, the lower will be their standard in blind bombing.
No relaxation in H2S training can therefore be allowed, in fact greater effort is essential and instructors and crews alike must take every opportunity of furthering their ability in the use of H2S, both for navigational and blind bombing purposes.
On the last Bullseye, instructions were issued for all crews to blind bomb on Bristol and take a P.P.I. photograph within 30 seconds of release. The results obtained were far from gratifying, and it was noted that many operators had forgotten the most elementary principles of blind bombing and P.P.I. photography.
It is hard to realise that some crews even attempted bombing on the 30 mile scan, others had too large 10 mile zeros, and many did not make any serious attempt at obtaining a decent photograph.
Great emphasis is being placed upon Blind Bombing and P.P.I. photography in the Far East, and results such as these reflect seriously upon the upon the attitude which is being adopted in the training for the Pacific. No.5 Group has been, and is, a precision bombing Group on visual targets, it must retain that distinction in Blind Bombing. Let the results obtained on the next Bullseye prove this beyond doubt. It is up to every crew to see that it turns in the best effort possible, and Instructors must watch their briefing if this is to be achieved.
No.97 Squadron have challenged the remainder of the squadrons in 5 Group to a blind bombing competition. This competition to take place as soon as sufficient crews are blind bombing trained and the Plotting Unit at Ipswich is operating. By the use of IPSWICH and the plotting unit all crews will have the same advantages and each aircraft will be plotted within the same degree of accuracy. Conditions of the competition are to be agreed shortly and forwarded to all Units. The results should prove interesting in view of the various types of equipment which will have to be used.
[Underlined] REBECCA [/underlined]
More Rebecca equipment is becoming available daily, and many crews will soon have the opportunity of testing this aid for themselves.
With the likelihood of Gee being taken out of aircraft, Rebecca will be the main Radar homing aid, and if used correctly is far more accurate than Gee.
Training is comparatively simple and quick, but requires constant practice. Don’t let the equipment lie forgotten once you’ve learnt how to use it. Make it your job to home on Rebecca to your Base after every flight – you may have need of it someday.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran is coming into it’s [sic] own. Gee is out in the Pacific Theatre.
This is a plain statement of fact, not to be passed over lightly. Loran facilities in the Far East are not all they ought to be but providing an operator has the basic principles at his finger-tips, can take a fix accurately and can correct simple faults, navigation in the Far East should be just as simple as in Europe.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
It is known that the United States Army Air Forces are obtaining Loran with a reasonable degree of accuracy to the coast of Japan. A further Master Station and Slave are being provided to give position lines running N.E. to S.W. and coupled with the present facilities, reasonable coverage should result.
It has been evident from reports received after Cross-countries and other flying exercises that insufficient care is being taken in fixing. Complaints have been made that Loran is inaccurate over this country, fixes being in error etc. Investigations often prove that the wrong skywave has been used, or that the count has been made incorrectly. Watch these points carefully, particularly identification of skywaves, as this will be extremely important in the areas in which you may be operating in the Pacific Theatre.
[Underlined] RADAR ALTIMETER SCR718C [/underlined]
Supplies of this equipment are extremely short, and up to the present time little use has been made of the aid.
There is one little point to stress however. This altimeter can be used to show when an aircraft is over sea or over land. Over sea the reflected pulse is very steady – over land the pulse moves about most irregularly. Watch this point when you have a chance and see if you can detect your change from sea to land.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
During the month S/Ldr S.J. Abbott relinquished the post of Group Bombing Leader to go back to “Civvy Street” and his old job in the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police Force.
Never the spectacular type, as probably became his Police Force training, S/Ldr Abbott’s quiet efficiency was a contributory factor in the Group’s present high standard of bombing accuracy. Much was achieved during his 10 months spell of duty, and, in saying farewell, all of us wish him every success in his new post.
His is one job where the bowler hat will be useful anyway!!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
Far too many crews saw the end of July without achieving a bombing category. It is realised that most crews were starting July from scratch, owing to re-shuffling, but every effort must be made to categorise all crews as soon as possible.
[Underlined] AN OUTSTANDING RESULT [/underlined]
No.97 Squadron (F/Lt Coates) report a magnificent effort on the part of F/Lt Wilkinson and crew. The error achieved was a CREW error of 23 yards converted to 20,000 feet. This is really excellent, particularly so as their Air Bomber is actually a Squadron trained PILOT/FLIGHT ENGINEER; what makes the feat even more remarkable is that it was the first exercise completed by this crew.
This is an all time record for No.5 Group, and can’t possibly fall far short of the “best ever” for Mark XIV bombing.
Congratulations to:-
F/Lt Wilkinson (P) F/Sgt Salter (P/FE) F/O Collins (Nav)
not forgetting the Rear Gunner for keeping his turret still!!
[Underlined] REMOTE CONTROL INDICATORS [/underlined]
No.207 Squadron have been carrying out trials with a Remote Control attachment to the Mark XIV Sighting Head. This attachment is operated by the Navigator who feeds Sighting Angle and Drift to the Sighting Head. The object of the attachment is to cope with winds above those for which the Mark XIV is built (i.e. over 66 knots Indicated) and it is worked in conjunction with the Emergency Computor [sic] You will be hearing more of this later.
[Underlined] THE M.P.I. TRAINER [/underlined]
The purpose of this trainer is to give Air Bombers practice in judging the Mean Point of Impact of various Target Indicator Patterns. S/Ldr Graham Rogers (No.54 Base Bombing Leader) reports that the Trainer is proving extremely popular and Air Bombers are not finding it easy to judge the centre of a group both quickly and accurately. The trainer works on a similar principle to the A.M.B.T. and is about the size of a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
pin-table (hence its popularity!) Twenty slides are provided, each having a pattern of six Green T.I’s. No.1 slide being a compact group, the groups becoming more scattered as the slide number increases until finally, No.20 requires considerable thought. Errors can be measured both for Line and Range from the scales provided. It is hoped that all Air Bombers will see that they derive maximum benefit from the trainer when it is allocated to their Squadron.
[Underlined] NEW INCENDIARY BOMBS [/underlined]
Models of new incendiary bombs, which we shall use “out there” will be coming along to all Squadrons. Study these and get all the gen you can on them from your Armament Officer.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The N.C.O. i/c Wainfleet Bombing Range reports that 2,286 bombs and 667 T.I’s were plotted during the month. This number could be stepped up considerably if only Squadrons would spread their bombing times more evenly throughout the day. Early morning and evening details are the answer.
[Underlined] BEST CREW ERRORS FOR JULY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error
9 F/O Bloodworth F/S Turner F/S Walker 64 – 75
F/O Plowman F/O Frazer F/S Esterman 48 – 57
F/O Myatt F/S Cubitt F/S Smith 62
S/L Blair F/O Skinner F/O Herks 58
57 F/L Nichols F/S Knight F/S Sheldon 72
S/L King F/O Crate F/O Thom 67
F/L Karop F/S Drackett F/S Fishman 76
F/O Wood F/S Crowther F/S Streathfield 72
F/L Appleton F/S Stevens W/O Cobb 68
97 F/L Wilkinson F/S Salter (P/F.E.) F/O Collins 23
463 F/O Houngan F/S Niblock P/O Pepper 58
F/O Ferris F/S Cliff F/O Richardson 74
467 F/L Morris F/S Gillespie F/S Silver 51
617 F/O Taylor F/S Shires F/S Bache 54
F/O Young F/S Hill F/S Howell 53
F/L Martin F/S Tedder P/O Barlow 65
S/L Ward F/L Sumpter F/O Christian 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Competition Results]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Base and Squadron [/underlined]
[Underlined] No.627 Squadron [/underlined] 668 T.I’s – Average error 118 yards.
176 Practice Bombs – Average Error 81 yards.
F/O George’s average error was 54 yards for 5 exercises – good show!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
Since our last issue, Squadrons preparing for service with the Tiger Force have completed 75-80% of the Training Syllabus. This is a remarkably good effort, and Gunnery sections concerned are to be congratulated on the fine showing and the results obtained.
During the next few weeks it is hoped that aircraft recognition will be given as much priority as possible, in order that there will be no doubt in the mind of any gunner when called upon to identify aircraft. Most gunners by now have an excellent working knowledge of the .5 and a little study in one’s spare time should be sufficient to keep in touch with this gun.
It is refreshing to note that gunners have taken an active interest in subjects dealing with the “other fellow’s jobs” and Base Gunnery Leaders report that of the many gunners questioned, quite 75% have exhibited a marked degree of “gen”.
The new type of flying suit has been tested recently and most gunners have commented with enthusiasm on this equipment. The diligence displayed during the test of this clothing has given satisfaction, and we look forward to a general issue of the new suits as and when such issue becomes possible.
Owing to the fact that all Squadrons within the Group are conforming to the Tiger Training Syllabus, the “Order of Merit” for Fighter Affiliation Exercises is now cancelled.
Trials have been carried out in the FN.82 – reports of which have been submitted to Bomber Command. In the meantime, gunners are advised to rehearse speedy exit from the FN.82 – one or two helpful points being:-
(i) Avoiding the V.O.M. adjacent to the right leg.
(ii) Ensuring the freedom of the right foot before falling out.
(iii) Familiarising oneself with the Hand Rotation Lever (This is difficult to operate in its present position and will call for practice in manipulation).
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
Total Day Affiliation = 333: Total Night Affiliation = 142.
Total Number of Affiliation Exercises for July = 475.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
Recent reports from 21st Bomber Command, U.S.A.A.F., have shown that Japanese night ground defences are rapidly assuming the proportions, if not the accuracy, of the Germans’. Superforts operating at night have reported accurate coning by radar controlled searchlights, with intense concentrations of heavy and light flak in the cones. The Japs’ task is, of course, made easier by the low altitude at which the Superforts operate at night, and also by the very low concentration rate over the target, allowing a large proportion of the attacking aircraft to be engaged individually.
Japanese night fighters have still apparently got a lot to learn, and are learning the hard way by attacking with navigation and cockpit lights burning. They have, however, had some success when attacking aircraft illuminated by searchlights, the old German “Wilde Sau” technique, and have on occasion pressed their attacks to very close range. We can expect an increase in this form of attack, as it has the advantages of not needing efficient A.I. and also, day fighters can be used.
The latest phenomenon over Japan at night is the “Ball of Fire”. Variously described as a “flaming onion” or “Fiery rocket”, it has all the hallmarks of the rocket projectile used by the Germans in the closing weeks of the war. In fact, one Superfort crew has reported “a small winged projectile with flames emitting from it”. Unless it is a great improvement on the German model it is likely to be merely an interesting addition to the other fireworks commonly seen over a target at night.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION ON THE BULLSEYE [/underlined]
The one Bullseye flown this month, on the night off the 23rd, showed once again the overwhelming advantage possessed by night-fighters in moonlight conditions. We had 154 Lancasters airborne and the fighters claimed 161 successful combats, a total amassed by only 24 Mosquitos! The fighter pilots reported that our Gunners were keeping a very poor look-out over the Channel, but improved over the land. One Mosquito carried out 12 unseen attacks, although burning navigation lights! The loss of mid-upper gunners has, of course, made the carrying out of a thorough search more difficult, but the figures show that a great many crews either have incompetent gunners or else are not taking sufficient interest in a training exercise designed to increase their chances of survival once they start operating over Japan. It cannot be overemphasised that a Group Bullseye is the best experience a crew can get without risking being shot down, and as such it should be treated as a real operation from take-off to landing. The pilot who thinks that a Bullseye is just another training bind is heading right for a posthumous Pacific Star.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
Jap Fighter Control
As yet there is no comparison between Allied and Japanese fighter control, for though the enemy early warning system is considered adequate for giving general warning of the approach of large Allied air formations to Japan, Japanese fighter control is in an undeveloped state. The limited scope of Japanese fighter operations control is demonstrated by the type of fighter reaction experienced on Allied bomber missions over Japanese-held territories and by the poor performance characteristics, for purposes of fighter control, of radar and communications equipment known to be in operational use in the Japanese Air Force. The Japanese have under development a number of special devices for use in ground and air-controlled interception and they have been conducting research and experiments in fighter control organisation and procedure. Eventually, these activities may be expected to result in fighter control operations of wider scope.
The present Japanese early warning and fighter control system for air defence, however, is in a state of development roughly comparable to German development in the period from 1939 to 1941. The Germans also used picket boats to supplement the early warning radar and their first night interception system depended on illumination of raiders by searchlights. The Japanese early warning system appears to be adequate for the purpose of giving general warning of the approach of Allied aircraft to Japan. In view of the inferior performance of the radars, however, and of the apparent lack of a well organised filtering system, it is doubtful if accurate and prompt information on pin points, courses, speeds, heights, identifications and strengths is being supplied to Japanese Air Force Control Centres.
Without such information, the operations of these Control Centres must be quite restricted, and it is not likely that they are in a position to make material changes in the disposition of fighter squadrons to meet the special tactical requirements of individual raids. As a corollary, it may be stated that Allied diversionary raids staged in connection with bomber attacks against primary targets in Japan probably have little effect on lessening the number of fighters available for attack against the main force.
Operations at Japanese Fighter Control Centres appear to consist of scrambling fighters, broadcasting warning to airborne aircraft of the presence of enemy aircraft, and ordering fighters to proceed to designated general areas in the vicinity, most often a target area, for “attack” , or in other cases to take appropriate action for evasion.
Night interceptions are accomplished by co-ordination of night fighters with searchlights and in other cases by night fighters free-lancing in the target area, often with no detection aid of any kind.
It is possible that in the immediate future the Japanese will perfect a system of air control interception based on homing fighters on to a shadowing aircraft by means of airborne detection finders. This system might be fairly effective for day operations, when spotting and closing can be done visually, but does not seem to be suited for night operations.
It is unlikely that the Japanese Air Force will be able
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] JAP FIGHTER CONTROL [/underlined]
to organise an effective system for ground control interception or fighter control, especially for night operations until such time as they have in operation ground and airborne radar more suitable for the purpose than any now in operation. It is possible, however, that the Japanese are developing specially designed fighter control radar, perhaps an adaptation of the Giant Wurzburg, and also A.I. equipment possibly adapted from Allied airborne 10-centimetre equipment.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia. W.I.S.86. [/underlined]
Further light on this subject is now cast by the capture of a document on Luzon which gives a description of Japanese fighter direction methods, as they existed in April, 1944. It is reprinted from A.T.I.S. Translations, No.156. Particularly interesting is the dependence of the Japanese on reconnaissance aircraft – which should make good targets – and on a constant speed and course of the attacking aircraft.
The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects. Various radars report to a control station which we should call a filter centre. At this location pilots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a common reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of “grid” system). The Japanese have an organisation designated an “intelligence squad” which would compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicated that D/F equipment is used in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.
Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearings and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on incoming raids.
To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar, scouting aircraft are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow and report position, type, strength, altitude etc., as an aid to directing the intercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which will act as shadows and not as attacking units. The reconnaissance aircraft represent an important cog in the intercept system.
Due to the time element required in the filter centre, the method of radio relay, and the fact that mechanical methods are utilised for computation of vectors, much time is wasted; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation is on the premise that the “enemy raids” will remain on almost constant course and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked changes in course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.
After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial “vector” and “range” on the “point of encounter” (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method; e.g. “03.10” equals “right front ten kilometres”.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia, W.I.S.87. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was no operational activity during the month. Four aircraft of No.54 Base “stood by” for a search on the 24th but were not required. This followed a report by a No.463 Squadron aircraft of what appeared to be a dinghy in the sea off the East Coast, and A.S.R. Warwicks carried out a search although there were no aircraft missing at the time.
Casual sightings are going to be just as important in the new theatre as they were over here, maybe more so, and all that is required to ensure a happy ending to someone’s troubles is:-
(a) A careful description of what is seen.
(b) The most accurate fix possible.
(c) The time of the sighting and good signals procedure.
Accurate information will assist both those below and those above – if passed quickly.
Training on all Squadrons has made good progress during the month. The Mark II Airborne Lifeboat commenced a Group tour, and a mobile parachute instruction unit is also going ahead.
Yet a third circus is lining up to spread knowledge on Air Sea Rescue and land and sea survival in all theatres.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “CAN YOU SWIM?” [/underlined]
(If you can’t you are missing a lot of fun and – by the way – if you ditch you may not reach the dinghy!! [/boxed]
As was stated in last month’s News, S/Ldr Becker left this Group to take up a Safety and Rescue appointment with Transport Command. B.B. was one of the earliest members of the team, then led by W/Cdr Dabbs, by whose efforts such vast improvements were made in Air Sea Rescue throughout Bomber Command, and to whom a lot of chaps indirectly owe their present existence.
During his long stay with No.5 Group, S/Ldr Becker played a big part in improving both training and equipment, and we wish him the best of luck in his new appointment and also when he returns to his tobacco manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
During July flying accidents in the Group rendered one aircraft Cat. B., one Cat. A., and completely destroyed four others. Three Formal Investigations were convened to inquire into the more serious ones and two of them are still incomplete. Evidence so far places three of the six accidents in the avoidable category, viz:-
Swing on take off – 1; Overshoot on landing – 1;
Crashed on overshoot on one engine (Mosquito) – 1.
In addition one aircraft burst a tyre and crashed on landing; another had an engine failure on take off and crashed with fatal results. The remaining accident in unclassified as results of the investigation are not yet to hand: the aircraft belly landed after engine failure on a three engined practice overshoot.
One accident is singled out for special mention this month as the errors made by the pilot provide lessons for all Mosquito pilots in the Group. A Mosquito with the port engine feathered returned to Base and was given permission to land (in daylight) on the 2,000 yards runway. The pilot made a [underlined] right hand [/underlined] circuit and turned in for his approach rather low. He came in too fast and purposely delayed his selection of wheels down. The aircraft levelled off 300 yards along the runway and floated for some 600 yards. At this stage the pilot [underlined] decided to go round again [/underlined] as the wheels had not locked down. Full flap had been applied. The aircraft climbed to approximately 40 feet, at which height the left wing dropped and the aircraft stalled. The pilot was killed and the Navigator seriously injured.
The greatest mistake this pilot made was to try to take a Mosquito, with one engine feathered and wheels and flaps down, round again from ground level. Pilots Notes state that going round again in only possible in these circumstances if the decision is made at an early stage in the approach when it is clear that the undercarriage and flaps can be raised and speed increased by diving in the height available. Contributory factors to this crash were the [underlined] right [/underlined] hand circuit and the low, excessively fast approach. Final approach speed should be 122 knots and circuits should be made left handed irrespective of which engine has failed.
[Underlined] CASUALTY SIGNALS AND FORMS (765C) [/underlined]
Of recent weeks some slackness in the compilation of casualty signals has been evident. Once again Units are reminded that [underlined] every type [/underlined] of damage to an aircraft, including straightforward engine failure, requires notification by signal. Under para. “G” should be stated “765(C) yes” or “765(C) no”. A.M.O. A.1348/43 gives detailed instructions on the compilation of casualty signals. This A.M.O. must be obeyed to the letter. Those Officers who are concerned in any way with signals for aircraft damage must have this A.M.O. by them at all times.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS [/underlined]
All Units have Gold Stars this month with the exception of Nos.627 Squadron (Blue) and 97 Squadron (Red). The position of No.106 Squadron is still undecided.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
The following are the main observations made during the Group Engineering Staff Inspection of Stations, prior to the A.O.C’s inspection:-
(i) On the whole the Base Servicing Sections and Servicing Wings are organised on sound and efficient lines.
(ii) The inevitable chopping and changing between Units of both aircraft and personnel is causing some dislocation in Servicing Wings.
(iii) A considerable amount of surplus equipment exists in most Servicing Wings.
(iv) M.T. Servicing leaves much to be desired on some Stations.
With regard to (ii). It is a well known fact that the standard of servicing in one Unit is not acceptable to another. The spirit behind this is natural and it cannot be expected that anyone will accept full responsibility for the serviceability of a strange part worn aircraft without a very careful and critical inspection. This applies particularly to engine, airframe, instrument and electrical trades, whose responsibility covers almost entirely the safety of the aircraft and a single point overlooked is liable to have most serious consequences for both the aircraft and crew and tradesmen concerned.
Although it is appreciated that the swopping od old aircraft is bad business, it is inevitable at this stage and in dealing with this problem the following points should be noted:-
(i) In view of possible changes it is now more important than ever that all defects are recorded on F.700.
(ii) The servicing of such aircraft on receipt should as far as possible be carried out by experienced tradesmen.
(iii) Cases of indifferent servicing by the previous holding Unit should be reported officially, the reports being confined to statement of facts.
The surplus equipment referred to in para.1 (iii) should be returned to the Equipment Section on paper and stored under arrangements made by the C.T.O. and equipment Officers pending final disposal.
The present shortage of personnel and equipment is undoubtedly reflected in the comparatively low standard of M.T. servicing. This standard has recently improved but there is still room for improvement with the existing resources. It was apparent during the inspection that some C.T.O’s were not keeping up to date with the progress of unserviceable vehicles and where this was the case, the number of unserviceable vehicles was comparatively high.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY AND FLYING HOURS [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Hours Flown by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
Further information has now been received from Headquarters Tiger Force regarding the requirements and commitments of Photography. The growing importance of careful preparation is further emphasised, and the points enumerated below will prove to be of paramount importance to all concerned.
[Underlined] F.60 CAMERAS [/underlined]
It can now be stated that the F.60 (35 mm) fully automatic camera with scanner contact, and fitted with visor mounting, will be issued on 100% basis to all aircraft proceeding with Tiger Force. This camera will supercede [sic] the Bantam and Kodak 35 mm now in use, and will entirely eliminate manipulation failures. The camera is on a fixed mounting and is operated by the Bomb Firing Key. This feature will be greatly appreciated by the Set Operator, as he will have no knobs and triggers to bother about, and we are certain that operational photography will be thereby improved.
[Underlined] F.67 CAMERAS [/underlined]
In addition to the F.60 cameras, each Squadron will be equipped with two F.67 (16 mm) cameras. This camera is similar in operation to the F.60, being fully automatic and operated by the scanner contact making one exposure per second and like the F.60 it is operated by the bomb firing key.
[Underlined] TYPE 35 CONTROL DIAL [/underlined]
The existing Bromide Paper Control Dial is considered unsuitable for use in all conditions of high humidity. Arrangements have therefore been made for the production of dials manufactured from some suitable plastic material which would stand up to the wear and tear of exacting tropical conditions. The lay-out of the dial has been arranged to suit bombs having a terminal velocity above 1200 feet per second. In order to ensure accuracy, the R.A.E., Farnborough, are checking the dials against a stop watch, and will amend the calibrations as necessary. It is anticipated that 400 of these new dials will be ready for issue at an early date.
[Underlined] TYPE 20A, 35 CONTROL [/underlined]
In future the No.20 Controls will be fitted with contact springs and will be known as type 20A. These controls will be made a general issue to Units from 1st September, when they will be coming off production at 50 per week.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC TENT – TRIALS [/underlined]
Good progress has been made by Nos. 54 and 55 Bases in the use of the photographic tent, and from the reports so far received, the tents appear very satisfactory. The chief difficulty with the equipment appears to be the limited size of the film drying drum and the fact that it has to be revolved by hand while the film is drying. For this reason the standard portable type 14B/528 complete with motor and belt is being issued instead. It is also hoped to include 3 or more table fans to ensure a speedier method of drying.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH SPEED DAY FILM [/underlined]
The poor keeping qualities of High Speed Night Film has rendered it unsuitable for use in the East, and High Speed Day Film is to be issued instead. It will be necessary in the initial stages however, to cut the present 125 exposure lengths into 14 exposure lengths until such times as the manufacturers supply the film in the requisite size.
[Underlined] CAMERA – F.24 – TRANSPORTATION [/underlined]
It can now be confirmed that cameras will be housed in their storage cases with ancillary equipment and flown out direct to the Theatre of operations. Units have been instructed to demand storage cases for the purposes from the appropriate M.U.
[Underlined] INITIAL EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As preparation against any unforeseen emergency, or the delay of equipment arriving by sea, quantities of photographic materials are to be conveyed by other methods ready for immediate use if necessary. Early in the campaign R.A.F. photographers may have to use the American type Photographic Tents pending the arrival of the standard R.A.F. equipment. Some considerable time may elapse before pre-fabricated buildings are erected, and in consequence use will have to be made of these tents until more permanent buildings are available.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL [/underlined]
Some anxiety has been experienced regarding the ever increasing problem of staff who are eligible for overseas service. The matter has been taken up with Records, and it is thought that we shall soon have a much clearer idea of the personnel required. The confirmed establishment of photographic personnel for two Squadrons proceeding with “Tiger” Force is as follows:-
1 F/Sgt. 1 Sgt. 2 Cpls. 13 A.C’s.
[Underlined] WATER SUPPLY [/underlined]
It is of interest to note that the estimated consumption of water by the Tiger Force for photographic purposes alone will be approximately 8,000 gallons per day! In order to secure this supply special well boring equipment is being taken to the area.
[Underlined] H2S PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
Results now being received show a marked improvement in H2S photographs, but it is felt that there is still room for more care and attention in the developing and printing of the films. Special attention is necessary to ensure that each film has the “Start Frame” recorded, and also that cameras are in correct focus. On the last Bullseye training exercise carried out on the night of 23/24th July, several H2S films received at this Headquarters indicate that no attempt had been made to record the “Start Frame”. As pointed out in last month’s News, frank criticism is very necessary, and W/O’s i/c Bases and N.C.O’s i/c Sections should pay particular attention to this, and thereby ensure that such “snags” are brought to light. Bullseye exercises provide excellent training of personnel and it is important that this training is used as fully as possible.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
Photography is a recognised indispensable factor in war;
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
the article of military intelligence in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica [sic], written by a great military authority, mentions photography as a main source of obtaining information form the enemy. We must always keep this in mind and realise that only by the continuous vigilance of all photographic personnel, and their extreme care and attention to detail, can this be achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] 2,000LB. MARK II WINCHES [/underlined]
In our last issue we referred to the trials being carried out with the modified Mark II, 2,000lb Bomb Winches. We are pleased to say that these trials have been successful and the modified winches can be positioned on all bomb stations in the Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] RETURNS – GENERAL [/underlined]
Again!! We request Armament Officers to ensure that [underlined] ALL [/underlined] returns to this Headquarters are made on the appropriate days and [underlined] NOT [/underlined] three or four days later. Also, please ensure that the information is accurate. The importance of accuracy cannot be over-emphasised, because all information submitted to this Headquarters is consolidated and passed on to Higher Authority. Finally, to eliminate unnecessary telephone calls to Stations, please submit “NIL” returns where applicable.
And, while we are on the subject of telephone calls, may we draw your attention to the paragraph headed “Co-operation” in Issue No.28 of this News. We repeat that we are always prepared to help the Armament Staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but please first try to settle your problems at Station and Base level. If you cannot obtain satisfaction there, then telephone us by all means. A day in this office would convince you that it was never more aptly named than by the word “Madhouse” which appears on one of our telephones.
[Underlined] DEMANDS [/underlined]
A tip! when a demand has been submitted, do not just sit back and wait. Periodically “chase” those concerned. With the end of the war in Europe, the pressure of work at Maintenance Units and Equipment Sections has, if anything, increased, but we are certain that an occasional reminder, stating fairly the reasons for your inquiry, will be received in the spirit in which it is given.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS [/underlined]
Here we would like to draw your attention to the Editorial of the August issue of the Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, in which reference is made to Forms 1022 and 1023. Especially do we concur with the last paragraph, having noticed the fall-off in the number of 1023’s received. Please note that we require a “Nil” return, but it is very unlikely that such a return will be necessary.
Having relieved ourselves of these moans and as we are talking about the BOMBER COMMAND ARMAMENT BULLETIN – you will by now have received your copy of this month’s bumper issue. It is full of most interesting information.
As this Group us carrying out an extensive training programme, we feel sure that the Booklet on the Handling etc., of Practice Bombs, mentioned in the Bulletin, will be most useful in reducing the number of accidents, and look forward to receiving our copies.
Another matter likely to be of interest to Armament
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT [/underlined]
Officers in the near future, is the article on Tropical Storage of Explosives. We recommend you study this thoroughly.
We are now beginning to receive reports on the effectiveness of our bombing of Germany. A very interesting article on this subject appears on Page 37 of the Bulletin. It is gratifying, to say the least, to know that the work of the Armament Sections throughout the War has yielded such worth while results.
To close this month’s News, we should like to wish those Armament Officers who will be leaving us for warmer climes, the best of luck in their new assignments, and hope that their job will not be a long one.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
medical
In the forthcoming operations overseas, the following information may prove of value to all personnel concerned.
[Underlined] D.D.T. [/underlined]
The above initials represent a white, crystalline powder with the full chemical name of dichloro-diphenyl-trichlorethane. It is a comparative newcomer to the field of preventative medicine, but promises to be of the greatest value in the prevention of insect-borne diseases. Supplies of D.D.T. are now adequate for its full use on operational areas overseas.
In tropical and sub-tropical areas, many diseases are conveyed by insects which fly or crawl and which transmit the diseases by biting or being crushed into skin abrasions during scratching, and so convey to man the disease which the insect carries. Any substance which will kill insects in an efficient manner will thus help to reduce the incidence of disease. To date D.D.T. is the most effective substance to be discovered.
In brief, D.D.T. exercises its lethal effect by producing paralysis of the insect followed by death. The precise way in which D.D.T. reaches the body of the insect is uncertain, but absorption through its feet is believed to be the principal route. Swallowing, during feeding, of D.D.T. is also important. The absorption of D.D.T. is hastened by incorporating it into a liquid such as Kerosene or a water emulsion. The precise way in which D.D.T. is used will vary according to the insect. Thus, it may be dissolved in Kerosene, or in a water emulsion, and used as a spray, or incorporated in a dust with talc, flour or road-dust, and dusted onto the surface requiring such treatment.
In the prevention of malaria, the anopheline mosquito which carries the parasite of malaria, is attacked in all its stages.
The young mosquito, or larva, may be killed by covering the surface of the water in which the larva breeds with a dust containing D.D.T. Large areas of water may be dusted by aircraft. The adult mosquito is more effectively killed by spraying with a solution containing D.D.T. in Kerosene.
Typhus Fever, which is conveyed to man by the body louse, can be most effectively prevented by dusting the skin of people exposed to the disease with a dust of talc and D.D.T. The louse is killed before it can bite. Underclothing, such as shirts, can be impregnated with D.D.T. and is still lethal after a number of washings. The method of dusting was used in Naples in 1943, during an outbreak of typhus, with outstanding success. The whole civil population was dusted, and for the first time in history a typhus outbreak was halted.
The above information is only of the briefest, and should not be regarded as in any way exhaustive.
[Underlined] SCHISTOSOMA JAPONICUM [/underlined]
This disease is likely to be met with in the operational
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] MEDICAL [/underlined]
area overseas.
The schistosome is a small worm, 1 to 2 1/2 cms in length and is capable of living within the body of a man for long periods. It can cause serious disease unless treated adequately.
The young worm leaves the body of man as an egg. This egg will only hatch out in [underlined] fresh [/underlined] water, and the young worm so liberated enters, and lives for a period, in the body of a small water snail. Subsequently, it leaves the snail, and in swimming about, it will readily attach itself to and enter the human skin. Thenceforth it grows to maturity in the body of man, sets up disease, and produces eggs which are voided in the urine or faeces.
With the above in mind, it is easy to see how streams, rivers and water holes can easily become infected with the young worm in an area where the native population exercises no sanitary control.
To avoid infection one should never bathe in rivers or streams which are likely to be infected. Also, water for drinking or washing should come from an approved source – that is, water which has been filtered and chlorinated.
Sea-bathing is quite safe if well away from the mouths of rivers.
[Underlined] MALARIA PREVENTION BY SUPPRESSIVE MEPACRINE [/underlined]
In view of the lessening of the incidence of malaria in the operational area, it will not be necessary for personnel travelling by sea to take suppressive meparine. Parties travelling by air, however, will still take meparine from the date of their departure from the United Kingdom, as they will be living in malarious zones en route. The improvement has been effected by American anti-malarial unites and by R.A.F. anti-malarial workers already in the theatre.
Other anti-malarial precautions, already mentioned in previous articles in this section, will continue to be necessary.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.W. BAIRD DFM
P/O A.J. WILLIAMS DFC
F/O J.A. PETERSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O A.E. BOON DFC
F/SGT F. WHITFIELD DFC
F/SGT F. STEBBINGS DFM
F/SGT H.R. LYNHAM DFM
F/SGT P.R. ASLIN DFM
P/O J.C.B. GRAN DFC
P/O J.W. SINGER DFC
F/SGT P.F. JACKSON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR R.A. NEWMARCH DSO
F/L L.W. HAYLER DFC
F/O R.T.F. COVENTRY DFC
[Underline] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. NOWRIE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.W. FIRMIN DFC
F/O W.J.K. ENDEAN DFC
F/O A.H. NISBETT DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR E.G. WARD DFC
P/O K.G.W. MANTOCK DFC
P/O A.G. WEAVER DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR I.G. FADDEN DFC
F/L P.M.P. CRAMPTON, DFM DFC
F/O J.W. ATKINSON DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR H.L. CREETH DFC
F/O J.W. HUDSON DFC
F/L A.H. GIBSON DFC
F/O G.E. GAMBLE DFC
F/O R.B. PHILLIPS DFC
F/L J.E. DUNCAN DFC
F/L J.E. CARTWRIGHT DFC
P/O L. GRIMSHAW DFC
W/O L.R. GOULBURN DFC
F/O J.F. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/L E.F. ROBERTS DFC
P/O J. RAYNER DFC
F/L F.W.A. HENDRY DFC
F/L J. MOLLISON DFC
F/SGT J.R. WHITEHEAD DFM
F/SGT J. SPRIGGS DFM
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. DANIEL DFC
CAPT. A.E. HOWES DFC
F/L G.H. EAKINS DFC
CAPT. P.C. PECHEY DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.E.W. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L M.R. CROCKER DFC
F/L F.E. WILSON DFC
P/O J.H. PECK DFC
P/O H.R. SEARLE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W. SINCLAIR DFC
S/LDR H.W. RADFORD, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.B. EASTON DFC
F/O R.C. FAULKES DFC
F/SGT H.C. ADAMS DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.G. FARTHING DFC
P/O J.E. RONALD DFC
F/O E.L. McKAY DFC
F/SGT G.R. BRADBURY DFM
W/O D. HAMILTON DFC
F/SGT S.J. HENDERSON DFM
F/SGT J.A. DADGE DFM
F/O E.G. STROM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.M. PROCTOR DFC
P/O W.L. REEVES DFC
F/O K.L. KELLY DFC
F/O K.R. HICKMOTT DFC
F/O R. DICKINSON DFC
F/SGT T.T. TURNBULL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.G. BOYDEN, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR J.E. GRINDON DSO
F/L H.B. ARCHER DFC
F/O F.E.H. MILLAR DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL [/underlined]
NO. 53 BASE … 26
NO. 54 BASE … 27
NO. 55 BASE … 23
R.A.F. Station, SYERSTON … 10
No. 75 Base (For attention Base Intelligence Officer) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command. … 6
Headquarters, Bomber Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickins, O.R.S., Headquarters, Bomber Command …1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q. P.F.F. Wyton … 1
R.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (via H.Q.D.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2. .. 2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. …1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr Nairn, Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank … 1
A/Cdr H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.) … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey …1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C. in C. , Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C., 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Vice Marshal H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middlesex … 1
W/Cdr G.W. Gilpin, D.F.C., R.A.F. Staff College, HAIFA … 1
Headquarters, No.25 Group … 8
Headquarters, Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 54, 91 Groups … 1
Headquarters No.29 Group … 9
Nos.11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No.16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby …1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No.93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College … 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No. 25 Group School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
R.A.E., Farnborough … 1
Headquarters, Tiger Force, R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middx. 1
[Underlined] INTERNAL [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. … 1
OPS. 1. … 1
S. MET. O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS.RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE …1
NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATIONS TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
Recognition Test
Here are the 17 aircraft hidden in last month’s puzzle – did you find and name them correctly?
[Drawing]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, July 1945
5 Group News, July 1945
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 36, July 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on training, signals, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, gunnery, tactics, Japanese fighter control, air crew safety, accidents, engineering, photography, armament, medical and decorations.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-07
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
41 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Japan
Pacific Ocean
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-07
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
Tiger force
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Copies sent to:
Stns. 9
S Th 10
B 6.
[Indecipherable] 2
Base 1
[Stamp] Base Copy.
V GROUP NEWS V
JUNE * 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 23
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
June has proved to be a month of record achievements. For the first time in its history the Group despatched 3,000 sorties of which a very high percentage were successful. Much of this success is due to the flare and marking teams who are now getting into their stride, and there has been a similar improvement in bombing. For the first time the average crew bombing error from 20,000 feet for the whole Group is below 200 yards. If the reduction of 50 yards which was achieved during June can be repeated during July, the number of bombs falling on the average target will be increased by something in the order of 50. This can be seen by looking at any P.R.U. photograph and counting the number of craters which are shown in open fields on either side of the target.
I therefore ask all crews to continue with their efforts to reduce bombing errors in the knowledge that by doing so they will add to the striking power of the Group to an extent which could be achieved by no other means. The new orders for maintenance which have recently been issued should help the Instrument Section, upon whom so much depends, to improve the serviceability of the sight, and eliminate minor inaccuracies.
On two occasions during the month the Group came up against the main strength of the German Night Fighter Defences, and on both occasions suffered serious losses; although over the whole month the missing rate was below the average for previous months. Nevertheless these instances show the vital importance of gunnery and the need for improving results by every means in our power.
There is ample evidence that the combined power of the rear and mid-upper turrets will bring down enemy fighters if the aim is correct. As an example, there is the case of “M” of 207 Squadron whose crew on the night of June 9/8th destroyed two JU. 88 and one ME.110. Although results such as this will always remain exceptional, it should be possible to improve the accuracy of aim over the present general standard. Fighters are now available in 1690 Flight for affiliation exercises and every chance must be taken whenever the weather is suitable especially at night. The bombing team has shown how greatly it can improve its results by methodical training and analysis and I now look to the gunnery team to do likewise. I will do everything in my power to provide them with means and facilities for training, but much is a matter for each gunner. Night vision, methodical search, aircraft recognition, turret manipulation, clearing stoppages, can only be improved by hard individual work.
The effort which the Group has put in during the month had been made possible by the high standards of serviceability which have been achieved, and I congratulate all ranks who have helped to get aircraft and equipment into the air. The Armament sections have loaded a record tonnage of bombs while all other sections on each station have contributed their full share to the success achieved.
Finally, I congratulate No. 51 Base on completing more than 8,000 hours of training and passing out a record number of crews. In particular I would mention No. 5 L.F.S. who completed a month’s flying with no avoidable flying accidents.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] BASE GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
June has seen the establishment of a S/Ldr Air Gunner at each Base, and a list of the officers concerned is appended at the foot of this paragraph. Whilst these officers will be concerned with all Gunnery matters, their main functions is to improve the standard of training throughout the Group, as it has long been realised that with long periods of operations the Squadron Gunnery Leaders are fully occupied and can find little time for all the other aspects of Gunnery. The Base Gunnery Leaders will, therefore, be able to devote their time to improve training facilities and equipment, and to ensure that the equipment is available in sufficient quantity to ensure the maximum benefit being obtained from it. They will also be able to supervise the preparation of Gunners for Gunnery Leader, A.G.I. and Specialist Sighting Courses, to enable the candidates to have the best possible chance of passing these courses, thus avoiding wastage of valuable vacancies. The appointment of these Officers to S/Ldr posts offers more advancement for Gunnery Leaders, and is an indication that the importance of air gunnery is receiving recognition. We wish the officers concerned good luck in their new appointments, and hope that very shortly dividends will be paid by this new establishment.
51 BASE – S/LDR HIPKIN
52 BASE – F/LT McCURDY
53 BASE – F/LT BEALE
54 BASE F/LT HOWARD
55 BASE – F/LT BREAKEY
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
An error appeared in the Movement’s column for May, regarding 467 and 44 Squadrons, and is corrected below.
F/Lt Clarke ex 1660 Con. Unit to 44 Sqdn.
F/Lt Cleary ex 27 O.T.U. to 467 Sqdn.
Other movements are:-
S/Ldr Undery ex 1690 B.D.T.F. to H.Q. No. 5 Group.
F/Lt Cass, ex L.F.S. to 630 Sqdn.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
Considerable time is wasted in returning incorrect combat reports to Squadrons, through claims being made which do not conform to the standards laid down by Bomber Command, as issued to all Units. The Gunnery Leaders must ensure that information entered is correct in every detail and that all claims are submitted under one of the headings, i.e. “Destroyed”, “Probably Destroyed” or “Damaged”. Numerous incidents occur when information regarding Tail Warning Devices is incomplete, and it is emphasised that this is most important and must be included in combat reports. Combat reports could be forwarded to Headquarters 5 Group more quickly than at present; the standard pro-forma is now in general use and should help in the preparation of reports. Units should check that only this amended pro-forma is used for this purpose.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn. A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 7/8.6.44. ME. 410 (c)
630 “Y” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
44 “O” 9/10.6.44. ME. 109 (c)
97 “D” 9/10.6.44. DO. 217 (c)
50 “U” 15/16.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “F 21/22.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
57 “G” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88
97 “Q” 24/25.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
207 “B” 24/25.6.44. ME 109
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
106 “G” 6/7.6.44. ME. 110 (c)
467 “X” 21/22.6.44. T/E.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
207 “J” 1.6.44. T/E (c)
57 “P” 1.6.44. JU. 88
50 “D” 6.6.44. ME. 410
9 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “O” 6/7.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 “V” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
97 “Q” 9/10.6.44. JU. 88 (c)
106 “F” 14/15.6.44. FW. 190 (c)
207 “D” 24/25.6.44. ME. 109
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A new type of two-piece flying suit is on trial in 53 Base, and the results will, in due course, be made available.
Replies have been received from all Units in the use of the Pilot type parachute for rear gunners and recommendations forwarded to H.Q. Bomber Command. With slight modification to the turret, this idea seems feasible, but may call for a revision in the type of clothing to be worn.
Ampro projectors are appearing in operational units for assessing Cine Gyro films. The establishment is one per station.
Units are again reminded that filters suitable for the Shadowgraph and 16 m.m. projector for use in night vision training are available. When requesting an issue of these filters from H.Q. 5 Group, units are to confirm that they have a [underlined] fully [/underlined] blacked out room for night vision training.
CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING
Instructions have now been issued to all Stations to construct a sandbag traphouse for clay pigeon shooting, and full details given for the layout of the range. Severn P.F.O’s are attending the Instructor’s Course on the 7th July, and the remainder on the 23rd July; these instructors will pass on to Unit Gunnery Leaders instructions for these practices, to ensure that at least two officers are available for conducting the exercises. Gunnery Leaders should press for the construction of the traphouses and ensure that all equipment is overhauled and ready for use.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JUNE.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
Fighter Affiliation Grand Total = 1493
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] ATTACKS ON LIMOGES MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined]
1,424 bombs were dropped. Of this total 844 craters have been counted on the P.R.U. photographs. We can therefore only consider 59% of the total number of bombs dropped.
The M.P.I. of all craters was established and a circle of radius 150 yards was drawn. Inside this circle the number of craters that could be counted totalled 152 and the remaining 692 craters were counted outside the circle. Therefore the Pilot and Air Bomber’s error for 692 bombs was greater than 150 yds.
With our 152 bombs inside the 150 yards circle we achieved 10 hits per acre and if we assume that of the bombs not counted, we obtained the same percentage inside 150 yards our hits per acre would increase to 17.
There were 211 bombs between the 150 yards and 250 yards circles. The maximum errors permissible for these bombs to get them into the 150 yards circle are:-
125 yards – average line error
160 yards – average range error
We all agree that these limits are reasonable and that crews should not have errors in excess.
Now, if the bombs had been contained in the limits of 125 yards line and 160 yds. range, our resultant average radial error about the M.P.I. would be 175 yards. This would mean that instead of sending the 96 aircraft to Limoges that we had to, we need only have sent 59 aircraft to achieve the same number of hits. We would then have had 37 aircraft free to attack the factory at ??? There were, of course, 330 bombs seen outside the 250 yards circle and great effort must be made to eliminate the errors that were responsible.
The Moral! – You must practice, practice and practice until you are a certain “A” category crew.
!!! [Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined] !!!
A+ Crews – 60 yards or less
A Crews – 100 yards or less
B Crews – 100 yds. to 150 yds.
C Crews – 150 yds. to 200 yds.
D Crews – Over 200 yards.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE: [/underlined] Plotted 1597 bombs aimed by 309 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE: [/underlined] Plotted 1510 bombs aimed by 319 aircraft.
[Underlined] WAINFLEET: [/underlined] Plotted 2056 bombs aimed by 440 aircraft.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of High Level Bombing Training Statistics by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR JUNE
In the April “News” it was threatened that owing to the improvement in Crew Errors, it may be necessary to lower the qualifying figure for the inclusion of errors in this column. June has produced the largest number of below 100 yards errors yet, and in consequence only those crews who have obtained crew errors of 80 yards or less, converted to 20,000 ft. can receive publicity.
Squadron or Con. Unit. Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
9 F/O Blackham F/O Elphick F/O Wenger 72 yards
44 F/L White Sgt Jenkins F/S Jones 66 yards
P/O Baxter W/O Young W/O Rutherford 50 yards
P/O Stewart Sgt Stubbs Sgt Wright 65 yards
49 P/O Appleyard F/S Jameson F/S Blumfield 78 yards
P/O Arnold F/O Dewar W/O Fleming 72 yards
57 F/S Clark Sgt Johnson Sgt Lugg 65 yards
83 P/O Meggeson W/O Franklin F/O Wicker 65 yards
F/O Kelly F/O Irwin Sgt Burleigh 58 & 64 yards
97 F/L Van Raalte F/O Arnold F/S Williams 52, 69 & 78 yards
S/L Ingham F/O Perkins F/L Chatten 69 yards
467 P/O Waugh F/S Southgate F/O Semple 67 yards
F/L Brine F/S Luton F/S Sutton 80 yards
617 P/O Duffy F/O Woods F/O Bell 42 yards
F/O Knights P/O Bell F/O Rhude 48 yards
P/O Jingles F/S Hazell F/O Beal 63 yards
619 P/O Johnson Sgt Vaughton F/S Tranter 79 yards
F/L Howes F/O Baker F/L Harrison 74 yards
1654 C.U. F/S Beharrie Sgt Dean Sgt Brownhall 74 yards
F/S McKechnie F/S Wallace Sgt Little 53 yards
1660 C.U. P/O Dyer F/S Howard F/S Lemaire 74 yards
F/S Millar F/O Banks W/O Wilday 70 yards
1661 C.U. F/O Franks F/O Orry Sgt Roe 78 yards
F/O Furber Sgt Le Marquand F/O Hassel 78 yards
5 L.F.S. S/L Smith Sgt Wallis Sgt Page 49 yards
F/O Edwards F/S Wallace F/O Nunn 54 yards
Congratulations to F/L Van Raalte and crew, 97 Squadron for the outstanding 3 exercises!!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 Squadron (F/Lt Hearn, D.F.C) [/underlined] report that to try and reduce bombing errors to a minimum a system of practice bomb plotting on small perspex covered boards is being inaugurated. The errors will be plotted on this board and the reason explained verbally to the Air Bomber, Captain and Navigator. In case of suspected instrument error the Bombing Section will examine the results plotted with the Instrument Section.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron (F/L Keats) [/underlined] report that a modification to permit the emergency jettisoning of smaller H.E. bombs only when a mixed load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried has been suggested by an Air Bomber and submitted for approval. An isolation switch would be incorporated in the circuit between the Connell Pre-Selector and No. 13 Station. This switch would be permanently wired down except when the special load of 4,000 H.C. and other H.E. bombs is carried, in which case it would be left up for take-off and put down by the crew when a height of 4,000 feet is reached. In the event of engine failure at take-off, the pilot could jettison the smaller H.E. bombs safe with the jettison toggle instead of the normal jettisoning of containers by Type H Jettison.
[Underlined] 52 Base [/underlined] report that [underlined] 12 [/underlined] aircraft took off between [underlined] 08.30 hours and 09.30 hours [/underlined] on 4th July to carry out High Level Practice Bombing. Early morning details can be sure of the best bombing weather!!
[Underlined] 106 Squadron (F/L Morgan) [/underlined] report the following outstanding exercise:-
Pilot:- F/O Meredith
Air Bomber:- F/O Mitchell.
As the port outer engine had to be feathered before completion of the cross country, bombing was carried out on only three engines. As Gee was thus u/s and as petrol was running short, no wind was found, but the wind velocity found on the last leg of the cross country was used for bombing. This wind velocity was found at 18,000 feet, whereas the bombing was carried out at 14,000 feet owing to having only three engines. Thus a fairly large vector error of 214 yards (Converted to 20,000 feet) resulted, but the bomb aimer’s error was only 16 yards at 14,000 feet, which is an error of 19 yards when converted to 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
Bombing Leaders in 54 Base are:-
83 Squadron – F/L Bedell
97 Squadron – F/L Rogers, D.F.C.
627 Squadron – F/L Mitchell
[Underlined] F/L Harris, D.F.C. [/underlined] has arrived from H.Q. 6 Group to take over Bombing Leader duties at No. 5 L.F.S. Syerston.
[Underlined] F/L Honnibal [/underlined] (ex 92 Group) has succeeded F/L Keats as Bombing Leader to 57 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/L Keats [/underlined] (57 Squadron) has moved to H Q 92 Group.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Clegg (44 Squadron), F/S. Booth (619 Squadron) and F/O Linnett (207 Squadron) obtained “B” Categories on No. 84 Course and F/O Nugent (61 Squadron) obtained “B” Category on No. 85 Course.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
The month of June was notorious for bad weather, numerous operations and stand-by’s. Hence the competition entries were fewer in number than of late. It has been decided to include the Conversion Units in the Competition under the same rules as for the Squadrons. It is realised, however, that they have an advantage over Squadrons in so far as they have considerably more qualifying entries from which to make selection. However it is hoped that squadrons will make determined efforts to beat the Conversion Units in July. Out [sic] congratulations are extended to 51 Base for their high standard, and their commanding positions in this, their first entry!!
PILOT AND AIR BOMBER’S ERROR AT 20,000 FEET
1st 1654 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd 619 Squadron – 62 yards
3rd 1660 C.U. – 68 yards
4th 1661 C.U. – 69 yards
5th 44 Squadron – 70 yards
6th 467 Squadron – 78 yards
7th 5 L.F.S. – 83 yards
8th 49 Squadron – 85 yards
9th 83 Squadron – 90 yards
10th 9 Squadron – 92 yards
11th (630 Squadron- 96 yards
(106 Squadron 96 yards
13th 463 Squadron- 107 yards
14th 97 Squadron – 109 yards
15th 207 Squadron – 116 yards
16th 57 Squadron – 124 yards
Non-qualifying Squadrons:-
17th 50 Squadron (6 exercises)- 106 yards
18th 61 Squadron (3 exercises)- 91 yards
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C. – 52 Base – 76 yards
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
G/Capt Johnson, D.F.C., A.F.C. – 88 yards
(R.A.F. Station, Syerston)
[Underlined] ? ? AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ ? ? [/underlined]
1. What can cause an apparent Vector error in practice bombing?
2. List the possible causes of Large Random Errors.
3. What errors in practice bombing will be caused by low suction?
4. If you set the wrong T. V. what kind of error will you get?
[Underlined] MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT – DO’S AND DON’T’S [/underlined]
DO:- (i) set Bomb T.V. (the TV’s of all bombs likely to be dropped should be recorded on the levelling card on the top right-hand corner of the computor).
(ii) Set Target height against Q.F.E. ([underlined] SEA LEVEL PRESSURE [/underlined]).
(iii) Set [underlined] INDICATED [/underlined] Wind Speed because Bombsight Computor works on Indicated Air Speed and indicated height (indicated wind can be found from true wind by SUBTRACTING 1.5% per 1000 ft of height).
(iv) Synchronise bombsight compass with Pilot’s D.R. repeater (by pressing in and turning the synchronising knob on the side of the Computor box.)
(v) Check that sufficient suction is reaching the bombsight gyros.
(vi) Remember to turn on air supply to the bombsight by means of the Bombsight Cock.
(vii) Be sure that the Pilot puts main control cock of “George” to OUT when Bombsight is to be used, or no compressed air will be available.
(viii) Keep the bombsight clean and check all the loads are correctly attached.
(ix) Liaise with the Instrument Section who maintenance [sic] your bombsight.
DON’T (i) Use the Emergency Computor until you have checked the bombsight and tried to correct the fault.
(ii)Touch the reflector glass of the Sighting Head when the gyro is running (the gyro is always running when the engines are running).
(iii) Forget to adjust the levelling scales for the all-up weight. (The Flight Engineer will know the A.U.W.).
(iv) Put any pressure on the reflector glass – even the edge of a map may lead to the toppling of the gyro when the engines are running.
(v) Let anything, not even your oxygen mask, press on the Sighting Head. (The upper part is supported on anti-vibration mountings which prevent the bearings of the gyro being damaged – the least pressure can make the alignment inaccurate).
(vi) Stow parachute, window, etc. near any of the leads to the Computor Box or Sighting Head.
(vii) Forget to liaise with the bombsight maintenance staff.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS (Continued from back page) [/underlined]
were daylight attacks) with varying degrees of success. Notable among these attacks were the operations in daylight against WATTEN and SIRACOURT on the 19th and 25th respectively. In both cases direct hits are claimed on the launching ramps involving damage which, it is hoped, will put them out of -commission at least temporarily.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
No long range sorties have been carried out during the month; in fact almost all the targets have been in Gee range. No Navigational difficulties therefore have been experienced. Broadcast winds have not been attempted during the month because of shallow penetration.
One major navigational “boob” was, however made during the month by a Navigator of No. 106 Squadron. The aircraft was detailed to attack a Ruhr target, and reached the enemy coast on track and on time. The Navigator then gave the next course to the pilot who in error steered 100° different from that given him. The Navigator was at fault in not checking the course with the pilot. The aircraft continued on the wrong course for six minutes until a Gee fix was obtained. The sortie was eventually abandoned because of the time element. This is another example of what can happen if you do not carry out the correct drills. Immediately the pilot says “on course” make it your first duty to check the true course steered.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
During the month an analysis of errors which may arise in windfinding has produced the following probable error:-
Probable Error
(i) Inability to read A.P.I. to nearest half minute of Lat. and Long. 1 mile
(ii) Inability to plot a position in Lat. and Long. accurately (e.g. Air Position and Gee fix) 1/2 mile (at least)
(iii) Inherent error in H2S fixes of at least half a mile. 1/2 mile
(iv) Inability to plot an H2S fix to within 1/2 mile because of mile scale limitations on chart 1/2 mile
(v) Probable error in synchronising of D.R. compass repeaters when airborne. 1 mile
(vi) Error in Compass swing of at least 1°. 1 mile
(vii) Probable error in measuring off length of wind vector, because of mile scale limitations, on chart. 1/2 mile
[Underlined] Total [/underlined] 5
Therefore if a wind was found over a period of 15 minutes it would be possible to obtain an error of 20 m.p.h!! Fortunately, of course, some of the errors will cancel out, but even then there will always be a residue which, multiplied by four, may still give a large error.
It will be noticed that careless errors in taking of Gee and H2S fixes, reading off A.P.I. co-ordinates, incorrect plotting etc. have not been mentioned.
The problem now is, how can we eliminate the above errors. Action has already been taken to eliminate points (iv) and (vii). Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are urged to discuss the above list with all Navigators on the Squadron, and submit any suggestions to Group Headquarters immediately.
Don’t be afraid to give us all your suggestions. Remember, the more accurate w/v’s we obtain, the more accurate the bombing, concentration and timing.
Referring back to careless errors, by far the largest of these are plotting and computing errors. A list of exercises to improve plotting and computation was forwarded to each S.N.O. some weeks ago. It is the responsibility of each S.N.O. to see that these exercises are completed at regular intervals. Short computation tests, lasting 15 – 20 minutes should be completed every morning if this is possible. There is always a spare half hour between assembly at the flights and commencing N.F.T’s. The plotting tests should be carried out at least once every fortnight, particular stress being laid on wind finding. Make it a point always that the tests are analysed immediately after completion, and the results made known as soon as possible.
Many Squadrons have adopted the above procedure, and are being well repaid. There are still one or two Squadron Navigation Officers, however, who say they are too busy to do such things. Don’t let this be your excuse – try it conscientiously and well for the next fortnight, and note the improvement in the work of your Navigator.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
All Navigators will now be conversant with the resetting modification fitted during the past months. It is hoped that maximum use is being made of this device, which should considerably simplify resetting.
Yet another modification to simplify resetting has been suggested by the Navigation Staff at Syerston. It is the fitting of a “winder handle” to the resetting knob. Only one handle need be used when resetting and, much more important, the time taken to reset will be reduced by at least 2/3rds. The above modification has been submitted to Bomber Command for approval, and as soon as this is obtained, all aircraft will be modified.
Several Squadrons have been persevering with the graphical resetting procedure, but this has not proved very successful. When the modification suggested by Syerston has been fitted to all aircraft, all objections against resetting regularly will have been overcome, and it will be possible to adopt the standard procedure of resetting the A.P.I. regularly.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
During the summer months it is hoped we may further the Navigation technique to such an extent that Navigation will be considerably simplified during the winter period. We must aim for simplification and standardisation in use of A.P.I., H2S and log and chart keeping. This will be of considerable benefit to the Conversion Units. At the present time a Navigator is taught one method at the Conversion Unit and another on the Squadron – consequently he is proficient at neither. Ideas are being collected from Squadrons and it is hoped to present to Squadrons and Conversion Units the ideal Navigation technique. Let us have your suggestions.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The results of the drive on practice bombing and wind finding have, on the whole, been satisfactory – but in certain cases they have been disappointing. The Conversion Unit Navigators have surpassed many operational Navigators. A vector error of less than 5 m.p.h. should be your aim.
Improvements have been made during the last 7 or 8 weeks, and the average vector error produced this month is 7 3/4 m.p.h. – a commendable effort on the whole but there is still room for improvement.
It was stated in last month’s News that a monthly Bombing Wind Finding Competition would be held. It was the intention to publish the best eight vector errors for the month, but so far there have been 14 instances where NIL vector error was obtained and a further 14 instances of vector errors of 2 m.p.h. and below! It has therefore been decided to issue the AVERAGE vector error obtained by each Squadron and Conversion Unit for the month. The order is as follows:-
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron]
[Underlined] Average Error: [/underlined] Squadrons – 7 m.p.h.
Con. Units – 8 m.p.h.
It will be noted that only one Squadron has achieved the ideal, i.e. a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Day, D.F.C. Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to Ops.II H.Q. 5 Group.
S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C. S.N.O. Dunholme to Base Nav. Officer, Scampton.
F/Lt. Bray, D.F.C. 207 Sqdn. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, D.F.M. 44 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Craven 50 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. R. Adams, D.F.C. 630 Squadron Nav. Officer reported missing.
F/Lt. Lascelles, D.F.C. 1654 C.U. Navigation Leader to be Squadron Nav. Officer No. 50 Squadron.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] A RECORD MONTH [/underlined]
The month of June produced two new records when a total of 3000 sorties was flown, resulting in 11,708 tons of bombs dropped on enemy territory, an increase of 3,000 tons over our previous record in May. All armament personnel can be justifiably proud of their contribution, particularly as this phenomenal tonnage represents only a fraction of the tonnage actually handled during the month.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL BOMBING GEAR [/underlined]
One drop of water in the wrong place may result in several thousands of pounds of high explosive failing to reach the target – a startling yet true statement. Bad weather has necessitated leaving aircraft bombed up for several consecutive days, and as no aircraft can be guaranteed waterproof, it is quite possible that some of our recent “summer weather” has seeped into the bombing circuit.
All Armament Officers are reminded if the correct procedure to be carried out when aircraft are left bombed up after the cancellation of operations, and a quick reference to Air Staff Instructions would not be amiss at this stage. Are your electrical circuits tested each day, and do you always remove pyrotechnics from the aircraft immediately after the cancellation? Check up on these and all other relevant points, and ensure that the [underlined] full [/underlined] load reaches its destination, and not just a small fraction of it.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN [/underlined]
The Bomber Command Armament Bulletin for June has now arrived and contains some very interesting and useful information, particularly the suggestions made for improving the condition of bomb dumps in general. Page 9 of the Bulletin refers to the difficulties encountered in the storage of cluster projectiles and introduces a new type of tracking which is intended form a temporary hard standing in bomb dumps which have no suitable storage space for this particular weapon. Supplies of this Summerville tracking have already arrived at some stations in the Group and although it is, as yet, too early to express an opinion as to the efficiency of this equipment, it is considered that it will prove to be a very great asset.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Types and Squadron]
A= MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
[Underlined] GUN FREEZING [/underlined]
Although the immediate danger of gun failures due to freezing has now passed, the problem of preventing such failures is still being very carefully investigated, and to assist in this investigation samples of hydraulic fluids have been taken from gun turret systems of operational aircraft for analysis by the Ministry of Aircraft Production.
A [indecipherable] of water in suspension in hydraulic fluid is sufficient to cause the oil to freeze at a considerably higher temperature, and consequently the importance of ensuring that oil containers used to fill gun turret systems are free from water, cannot be too strongly stressed. Results of this analysis will be forwarded to all Bases and Stations when received. We hope that they will be negative.
[Underlined] AMMUNITION [/underlined]
The repeated changing of ammunition from night to daylight sequence results in all ammunition bolts being handled several times a week. If ammunition is transported in suitable containers and handled carefully when being loaded into the aircraft, no misalignment should occur.
The necessity for ensuring that only correctly aligned ammunition is loaded into gun turrets should be brought to the attention of all armourers and air gunners.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The emphasis during the past month has been on wind finding for practice bombing, and we are pleased to say that Navigators on the Training Base have risen to the occasion and produced excellent results. The most notable performances have come from Winthorpe, where seven Navigators obtained a Nil vector error. This drive on wind finding has created a desire to find equally correct winds during Navigational exercises. The result has been a big improvement in track keeping and timing.
From time to time improvements on the A.P.I. are suggested. The latest suggestion comes from F/O Richardson of No.5 L.F.S., who has suggested a modification to facilitate re-setting. This modification, if adopted, will reduce the time taken to reset the A.P.I. by at least 2/3rds. Good work Syerston!
H2S training is getting into its stride at Wigsley, and 1/3rd of each course is now being trained. Only one trainer is available at Wigsley at the moment, but as soon as the second trainer arrives it is the intention to train 50% of all crews. Winthorpe and Swinderby Conversion Units are already training half their inputs. Pupils are receiving approximately 14 hours air training, and at least 20 hours ground training. When more aircraft are available it will be the policy to train more crews rather than increase the number of flying hours per pupil.
Bullseye exercises have been seriously interrupted by bad weather, but 10 and 12 Groups have co-operated to the maximum extent on every possible occasion, and several good exercises have been completed.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “OVER KEENNESS” [/underlined]
A Navigator on a cross country flight who was endeavouring to work the Swinderby system of obtaining six minute fixes and winds, experienced Gee failure. He immediately instructed his W/Operator to obtain a M/F fix every six minutes. The W/Op. found the ether rather congested, so he attempted priority fixes – much to the concern of the M/F Section, R.O.C, 5 Group and No. 51 Base!
Public Relations
Public Relations work during June has been rather confused owing to the altered nature of the Command’s operations, and the uncertainty of many circumstances. Only a few reports were issued to the press at any length by the Air Ministry News Service.
Three war correspondents have flown in Group aircraft on operations: Mr. Ronald Walker, of the “News Chronicle” who went over Caen with S/Ldr. Fairburn of 57 Squadron on June 12/13; Mr. R.J. Kiek, of the Netherlands Press Agency, who flew over a French target with his countryman, F/O Overgaadu of No. 207 Squadron, on June 16/17; and Mr. Kent Stephenson, B.B.C. War Reporter, who unfortunately failed to return with W/Cdr. Crocker of No. 49 Squadron on June 21/22.
(Continued in Column 2)
(Continued from Column 3)
Three parties came to our stations: June 1st, Dunholme, Mrs. Billingham (Reuters), Miss Tredgold (South African Argus) and Mr. Fletcher (Sport and General Press Agency Photographer) for the visit of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia: June 17th, Waddington, Mr. W. Farmer, of the “Melbourne Herald”; and June 22nd, Waddington, Mr. Wilkins and Miss Elizabeth Riddell (journalists) and Mr. J. Warburton (Sport and General photographer), for the visit of the Duke of Gloucester.
A party of employees of the Firma Chrome Plating Co., of Sheffield, visited the Sheffield Squadron (No.49) on June 3rd.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
June was quite a fair month from the aircraft signals point of view, but improvement can and must be made. It is hoped every endeavour will be made by Signals Leaders to raise the standard of Aircrew Signals operating to a high state of efficiency.
Have all Signals Leaders read and digested 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13, and acquainted all their operators with its contents?
This instruction lays down the requirements for W/T Control Operators. Endeavour should be made to bring every Operator up to the standard required. Two Squadrons have already carried out air tests with quite satisfactory results. One important point – once an operator reaches the standard required, he must, by constant practice maintain that standard, and to ensure that he does, he may be required to do an air test with Group at any time, without previous warning.
[Underlined] DAILY INSPECTIONS. [/underlined]
Signals Leaders, do you ever take a quick run out to your aircraft and check over the “Daily” done by your W/Ops?
An aircraft of this Group took off on Ops one night, was only airborne a short time when the intercom. failed. Cause – faulty 2v 20 Acc! The W/Op did not carry out the correct drill for the use of emergency intercom. as laid down in 5 Group Aircraft Drill No.11, Appendix “A”. Result – one early return and one load of bombs the Hun did not receive. Was this the only dud 2v 20 Acc. airborne that night? Or was he the unfortunate W/Op. who, through his lack of knowledge or carelessness in carrying out his emergency drill, was found out? We wonder!! It would be worthwhile checking up on these accs. in the aircraft. Yes, there was a lot of truth in the film “BOOMERANG” !
The new Wireless Operators (Air) log has now gone to the printing press and should be available for issue very soon. We hope to see some very neat and fully detailed logs returned, just to show your appreciation.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
This month’s Good Show comes from 57 Squadron, by an operator who showed coolness and initiative in fixing up his broken dinghy aerial (fixed) and operating his dinghy radio, thus enabling the rescue aircraft to “home” on his signal.
The aerial mast was broken while erecting, and the operator fixed his aerial lead into the aerial part while other members of the crew took turns at holding the aerial aloft, by the insulated part which separates the aerial from mast.
This is an excellent example of cool and intelligent thinking under very difficult circumstances.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The co-operation of W/Op. and Gunner reporting on unserviceability of Early Warning Devices is improving, but there are still the few cases of discrepancy appearing in these E.W.D. reports and Combat reports. Just a little more drive in this direction will eradicate this, so Signals Leaders and Radar Interrogators, do your stuff.
Manipulation failures are still occurring, mostly due to lack of experience, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. Efforts are being made for every Squadron to have one Early Warning Device Instructor, and quite a few Squadrons have them already. Signals Leaders, get your W/Ops over to them for that little extra instruction which means all the difference between failure and serviceability of your E.W.D. and sends your Squadron percentage of serviceability soaring.
The cards, depicting combats on Monica, sent from this Group to Headquarters Bomber Command, are now in the process of being reproduced and will soon be available for issue to Squadrons and Conversion Units.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The alteration to the time of the Group W/T exercise has met with universal approval from all Squadrons, and there has been some good operating. The reallocation of Squadrons to Sections 1 and 2 should also help to make the exercise more interesting by eliminating the possibility of any two transmitters “blotting out” each other due to their close proximity.
[Underlined] VALETE ET SALVETE [/underlined]
Our heartiest congratulations to W/Cdr. Skinner on his promotion and his appointment as Officer Commanding No. 14 Radio School. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
Our congratulations also go to S/Ldr. Andrews on his appointment as Signals Leader, 92 Group.
Five Group are poorer by two very popular officers.
44 Squadron will welcome F/O Hughes (a former 44 Sqdn. W/Op) as Signals Leader.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failures percentage against total operational sorties has shown a great decrease during the month. There were 27 failures reported out of 3,000 sorties – the percentage being 0.9, the lowest figure for many months. The maintenance personnel are to be commended for repeating last month’s record of zero maintenance failures. Out of this enormous number of sorties, only two aircraft returned early as a result of signals defects. The number of component failures (equipment) was 14. Surprisingly enough, not one condenser or resistor defect was reported; R. 1155 output valves again proved troublesome.
[Underlined] V.H.F. FITTING [/underlined]
At the time of going to press, 200 aircraft are fitted with V.H.F. equipment. The speed of fitting has placed us well ahead of schedule. Units are reporting that they are receiving a considerable number of crystals which on test have been found inactive. R.A.E., Farnborough, have evolved a modification (R.T.I.M. No.629) employing a choke unit type 45, which, in A. D. G. B. aircraft has proved quite successful. When the choke units become available, units will be notified.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
There are two main reasons why the total number of Mandrel fitted aircraft in this Group has fallen. They are (a) supplies of Col.9 not forthcoming, and (b) large scale V.H.F. fitting drive, which has absorbed all available Signals manpower in the squadrons. It is emphasised, however, that squadrons must ensure that all their complete Mandrels are fitted as soon as possible. The Countermeasure Party is still available at Group Headquarters in readiness to offer assistance.
[Underlined] CARPET II [/underlined]
Contrary to many beliefs, Carpet II is in no way connected with Persian Markets. It is, however, a new radio countermeasure device fitted to the Illuminating Force aircraft of this Group. It is quite popular with the C.S.O!
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Base Signals and Radar Officers attended a conference at Group Headquarters on 16th June, to discuss the Bomber Command proposed establishment of Radar personnel. After considerable discussion and divergence of opinion the proposals were accepted. Some alterations were suggested in connection with accommodation and holdings of spare equipment, and these were forwarded to Bomber Command. It is understood that the proposals are now being considered by the Establishment Branch at Bomber Command.
[Underlined] BOOZER [/underlined]
Sufficient Boozer equipment became available during the month to enable fitting to proceed in our two Boozer squadrons. As this equipment is in very short supply, every effort must be made to make immediate use of all that is available. Test equipment is at the moment, difficult to obtain, but a proposed re-distribution of the total Command holdings should ease this situation.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
It has become increasingly obvious from scrutiny of combat reports that Tail Warning Devices are not being watched continuously by the Wireless Operator. Originally it had been hoped that with training and experience a W/Op would be able to carry out his W/T work whilst, at the same time keeping one eye on the Tail Warning Device, but this has been found to be very difficult. The possibility of repositioning the Tail Warning Indicator so that two of the crew can watch it, has been thoroughly investigated, and found impracticable. Experiments have been made to ascertain the possibility of using a second indicator. This repeater indicator is located adjacent to the Gee indicator. An indicator standard for both Monica IIIA and V, has been designed and tested by the Group Trouble Shooting Party. It has proved quite satisfactory and Bomber Command have been asked to arrange for its early introduction. The design of a simple Fishpond repeater indicator proved too great a problem, and it is now expected that a second standard Fishpond indicator will be the only answer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee was once again the leader in serviceability, showing a new high percentage of 97.77 out of 2,639 sorties. This was obtained in spite of the decrease in new equipment available, and a consequent reduction in the spare sets which squadrons were able to hold.
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 1249 sorties was completed by aircraft equipped with H 2 S Mark II, and of these 103 experienced difficulty; the remaining 91.76% were serviceable throughout the sorties. The fitting of this equipment to 619 Squadron has not yet been completed, but it is proceeding as fast as circumstances will allow. The movement of the Bomber Command Fitting Party to Dunholme will ease considerably the strain of fitting now being carried out by squadron personnel. The supply of fitted aircraft is keeping pace with the number of trained crews.
Mark III H 2 S has shown a decided improvement and the 76 sorties completed resulted in a serviceability of 92.11%. Supply of this equipment is still very grim, but does show signs of improving.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
As is to be expected, this equipment followed in step with H2 S, 92.72% of the 1236 sorties being free of difficulty. Training has shown very decided improvement and the operational reports indicate that W/Ops. are having increased success with this equipment.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA remained at almost the same level as May. 830 sorties were completed, and there were 39 difficulties reported. The remaining 95.31% gave completely satisfactory results. Monica V came closer than ever to overtaking its predecessor with a percentage serviceability of 93.91. The more prevalent causes of unserviceability have been almost eliminated, and the lesser difficulties will no doubt diminish as further experience is gained by Radar personnel. The supply position of both types of Monica becomes increasingly difficult, so squadrons must do their utmost to conserve their existing equipment, and to keep all sets serviceable. The delivery of a Monica Trainer to the Aircrew School at Scampton should help squadrons considerably in their training programme.
The serviceability figures for the month are very gratifying. They indicate a decided increase in the standard of training and workmanship of Radar personnel. In these days of intensive operations, it requires hard work to keep all our equipment serviceable, but the bombing results are more than worth the effort. With the introduction of the proposed establishment, and an adequate number of Radar vans, we should be able to meet the rain and altitude trials of winter on better than equal terms.
[Underlined] TELEPHONE EXCHANGES [/underlined]
Last month’s issue of the News contained a cartoon for which we, in Signals, accept no responsibility. We are delighted, however, to be given the opportunity to refute the allegation of inefficiency which was inferred by publishing the following bouquet.
Skellingthorpe has produced some surprising figures showing the number of calls handled by the Admin PBK during a 24-hour non-operational period. A total of 3,725 calls was handled during this period, and of these 3,143 were extensions – to – extension calls. The Station Commander comments – “My opinion of our operators, always high, has gone up still further”, and – “at Skellingthorpe we have an exchange staff second to none”. We hope that this latter remark will be accepted as a challenge by other exchanges within the Group.
[Underlined] TELEPRINTER TRAFFIC [/underlined]
In April of this year, this Headquarters Signals Office was handling about 9,000 teleprinter messages per week. A drive was then inaugurated to divert traffic to less congested channels, such as D.R.L.S., and our weekly total fell in five weeks by 4,000 messages!
Now that “D” Day has passed, however, the total is commencing to rise. This must be checked, since as the Western Front develops, our commitments increase – It’s often quicker by postagram – at any rate for Admin messages.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] LANCASTER SPARES [/underlined]
This month sees a changeover in our method of demanding spares for Lancasters. Instead of demanding straight on to the M.P.O. demands are now placed on No.207 M.U. who are in a position to supply.
Equipment Officers will help No. 207 M.U. provisioning to a great extent by keeping a close watch upon demands for Lancaster spares, and ensuring that demands are going to No.207 M.U. and not to the M.F.O.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS [/underlined]
A point to watch is the serviceability of mechanical sweepers. If these machines go u/s it means that runways cannot be kept clear of flints and stones, which means a rise in consumption of tyres. The aircraft tyre situation is still acute, and every care must be taken to get the maximum amount of life out of every tyre.
Equipment officers should therefore look into the holdings of spares for mechanical sweepers, and in conjunction with the M.T. Officers provision wisely on those parts which have a habit of going u/s. This will keep the sweepers serviceable and the consumption of tyres down.
[Underlined] WINTER CLOTHING [/underlined]
Now the English summer is upon us it would be wise to overhaul items of winter clothing such as overcoats, waterproof overalls, leather jerkins etc., and get them into good trim for the forthcoming winter.
It would be better to do it now instead of waiting for the winter when these items will be in great demand.
[Underlined] BLANKETS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred where it has been found that Stations have been holding blankets far in excess of their entitlement as laid down in A.M.O. A. 700/43. A quick check of stocks may mean the release of many blankets with a subsequent saving of man-hours at the factory which manufactures them.
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT (Continued from column 2) [/underlined]
[Underlined] OXYGEN TRANSPORT CYLINDERS [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters Bomber Command letter BC/S.21459/E.6, dated 30th June, 1944.
The scale of issue of these items is 32 per squadron. Equipment Officers should make every effort to reduce any surplus holdings and return these cylinders to the M.U.
GARDENING
5 Group’s gardening this month amounted to two small but useful operations by No.44 Squadron against two of the Biscay U-Boat lairs, on the nights of 6/7th and 8/9th. Planting was done in H 2 S from high altitude and some excellent P. P. I. photographs were obtained. A total of 30 vegetables was planted.
Although the record breaking figures of April and May were not reached, the Command planted the considerable total of 1772 vegetables, in some 20 gardens. Over 1,000 were directed against the U-Boats – off their bases and in their approach routes to the Western end of the English Channel. This, combined with vigorous and successful action by air and surface striking forces has brought almost to nothing the threat to our Invasion supply lines, in spite of the massing of the U-Boats to the West of the Channel in the first few days. Nearly 600 vegetables were laid in the Channel itself, to impede enemy surface craft – principally E-Boats – in their anti-invasion operations. (Here, we gratefully admit, we were helped more than a little by the wholesale slaughter of these vermin in their harbours by the bombers). Certain North Sea gardens received some 150 vegetables, and Mosquitos of 8 Group planted a small number in the Kettegat.
During the three months preceding “D” Day well over 7,000 vegetables were planted by the Command, 5 Group being responsible for 908. These figures show that in actual quantity we distributed about one eighth of the Command total. What they do not show is that nearly all our operations were special ones, involving either exceptionally long distances (DANZIG); exceptional accuracy from very low level (KONIGSBURG CANAL); exceptional weight of attack in one night (KEIL BAY) or gardening in daylight (KATTEGAT). We do little routine gardening, and so do not get regular practice, but our recent successes show the value of keeping up to date in slack periods.
Results are beginning to come through, but details of casualties still refer to at latest three months ago; in fact, in the latest list we discover that 5 Group sank a U-Boat in April [underlined] 1943! [/underlined] Fortunately some reports get through more quickly than that, and news of the tremendous indirect effects of the pre-invasion gardening is plentiful. We hear of the route from TRELLEBORG to KIEL (150 miles) being marked with a [underlined] WRECK [/underlined] buoy every 1 – 2 miles; of Swedes and Finns laying up their ships rather than risk out mines, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare states that the mining of the Kiel Canal, backed up by the mining which preceded and followed it in the Baltic and North Sea approaches to the Canal, caused an [underlined] IRRECOVERABLE [/underlined] loss of 3 million tons of overall imports/exports to the German War Machine.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
June brought a record number of operational sorties and, at the same time, an increase in the known number of incidents involving Safety Drills.
A squadron aircraft disappeared over the Irish Sea on a navigational exercise with the loss of the entire crew. Four crews had occasion to use the Parachute Drill, two were successful; in the third, four members who baled out were lost in the sea; in the fourth the rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute, and a gallant attempt by the Air Bomber to share his own parachute was un successful.
[Underlined] 9/10th June. [/underlined] S/44 Squadron returning from operations, got out of control in bad weather. Its position was uncertain, and the captain ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Four members had jumped when the pilot regained control. They fell into the Thames Estuary and were drowned. The aircraft landed at base. None of those lost attached their K-type dinghies before jumping. [Underlined] MORAL [/underlined] – If in doubt about your position always take your dinghy with you.
[Underlined] 21/22nd June. [/underlined] Z/44 Squadron was hit in the starboard elevator from extreme range by a night fighter over enemy territory. The aircraft dived sharply with the elevators jammed, and when over the vertical the pilot considered he had no hope of recovery and ordered the crew to abandon. The Air Bomber was jammed against the rear of his compartment. The Rear Gunner was caught in his turret and trapped by piles of ammunition on his lap, caused by a runaway servo feed. Four members baled out and their parachutes were seen to open. The captain eventually regained control and flew the aircraft back to base, navigated by the Air Bomber.
S/630 Squadron was badly shot up by a fighter. Wings and fuselage were riddled, and the rear turret so badly damaged it was a wonder the gunner escaped injury. The rear gunner had a cannon shell through his parachute.
With the assistance of two crew members, the pilot flew the aircraft back to this country where, due to damage, he found he could not turn and so was forced to bale out his crew.
At the risk of grave personal injury, the Air Bomber allowed the Rear Gunner to attach his parachute clips to the “K” Dinghy ”D” rings of his (the Air Bomber’s) harness, and the two went out together. Unfortunately, his “D” rings tore through the webbing when the parachute opened and the Gunner was lost.
[Underlined] SUCCESSFUL DITCHING [/underlined]
A/57 Squadron on the same night was returning across the North Sea at 7000 feet when all engines failed, apparently through shortage of fuel. The Captain immediately warned his crew, and ordered the Wireless Operator to transmit S.O.S. The Wireless Operator switched I.F.F. to “Distress” and transmitted “S.O.S.” and the aircraft callsign about ten times before being ordered to his ditching station.
The aircraft ditched ten minutes later. The pilot made use of his landing light which helped him to judge his height, but having no power the aircraft struck the water very severely breaking off the tail. The Captain’s harness had not been tightened sufficiently and he was flung upwards, making a large hole in the perspex and cutting his face deeply. The pilot left the aircraft by means of this self-made hole. The Flight Engineer was also flung upwards and cut his nose on the fuselage roof. The gunners were flung over the flapjack but were uninjured, falling on top of the Air Bomber who was also unhurt, and the Navigator cut the back of his head.
Exit was made from the aircraft “except-
(continued on page10, col.3)
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Place Dinghy Drill Parachute Drill [/underlined]
1 52 Base 52 Base
2 53 Base 55 Base
3 55 Base 53 Base
[Table of Drill Results by Squadron]
No crews in No. 54 Base were tested during the month.
[Underlined] Points arising from Safety Drill Tests. [/underlined]
(a) A number of crews have not thoroughly read “5 Group Aircraft Drills”.
(b) Insufficient use of made of the intercom in practicing “Safety Drills” – the more use that is made of the intercom the more informed and less worried the crew will be.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined]
The monthly summary of Ditchings in Home Waters for May, 1944, shows that 508 airmen were concerned, of whom 242 (47.2%) were saved – a marked percentage increase in lives saved.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
An aircraft of No. 207 Squadron, flown by F/O Smart, collided over the target with another Lancaster which broke cloud above on the port quarter. In spite of the fact that the entire port fin and rudder were torn away and the port tail plane, elevator and aileron badly damaged, F/O Smart completed the bombing run and showing great skill, flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
By his prompt action, F/O Sanders of No. 463 Squadron averted what could have been a serious accident. He was taking off with full bomb load when the starboard tyre burst at a speed of approximately 90 m.p.h. Displaying great skill, he controlled the swing and made a successful take off, and after completing the sortie landed his aircraft in such a way that only minor damage was sustained.
P/O. Meggeson of No. 83 Squadron showed a fine example of airmanship. The port inner of his aircraft caught fire. Though he was unable to operate the fire extinguisher or feather the propeller, by maintaining a very low airspeed, he succeeded in controlling the fire and few his aircraft back to base, where he made a successful landing.
As a result of combat with an enemy fighter, and aircraft of No. 61 Squadron, piloted by P/O Passant, was severely damaged. The starboard fin and rudder were shot away, the fuselage and starboard main plane badly damaged, and the starboard tyre burst. P/O Passant displayed great skill and determination in flying the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful landing.
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
Whilst making a night approach in 7 miles visibility, and aircraft struck a tree 1000 yards from the end of the runway. When the aircraft eventually landed the Pilot stated he had had a successful trip but that the aircraft felt very heavy to handle. This was not surprising as he was still carrying full bomb load when he landed.
Whilst flying at 8000 feet, all four engines of a Stirling cut. The aircraft lost height to 600 feet before the engines were re-started. The First Engineer was changing tanks when the engines cut. They started again when the Second Engineer turned the petrol on!
In broad daylight, after a clear straight run of 200 yards, a pilot taxied his aircraft into an M.T. vehicle standing on the perimeter track.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties carried out totalled exactly 3,000; this constitutes an excellent effort when it is considered that this number of sorties affected serviceability very little and a much larger number could have been laid on had the weather permitted and circumstances required them.
A large number of acceptance checks had to be carried out during the month and some excellent work was carried out by the Group Servicing Section, and the very fine spirit which exists within the Group was made evident by bases which had few acceptance checks to carry out volunteering to accept aircraft for check from other bases. This greatly decreased the period which would normally have elapsed to bring this large number of Lancasters to operational standard.
1.003% of aircraft which either failed to take off or returned early were due to technical faults for which the Engineering Branch is responsible. This 1.003% includes defects beyond our immediate control and remedial modification action is being taken in respect of many of the defects. It is good to know that not one of these aircraft failed due to a maintenance defect, and squadrons are to be congratulated on this aspect. The following squadrons had no early returns or cancellations due to Engineering defects during June, and are awarded a “big hand”:-
44, 83, 97, 467 and 619 Squadrons.
Failures are still occurring of the now famous oil pipe from relief valve to dual drive, and it is hoped that all promises made during June will reach fruition during July.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The effort which is put in by maintenance personnel to maintain this high standard of aircraft serviceability has been increased on many stations to maintain a similar high standard of serviceability of ground equipment. It is pleasing to see the drive which is progressing to maintain these essential aids to serviceability. When a “set-up” looks efficient, it invariably is efficient. Nothing looks so inefficient as a dirty hangar with trestles, wheels, cowlings and any odd items lying around the floor in pools of oil, whilst engine platforms are oil saturated and the equipment generally filthy. This state of affairs does not exist at any station in this Group, but there is considerable room for improvement on certain stations. Once a high standard of efficiency has been achieved it can easily be maintained, but don’t sit back and maintain your present standard unless it is highly efficient.
Many grand jobs have been carried out during June to keep the serviceability high and it is very difficult to pick out any single base in this News.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
During the past month a drive was made to improve the maintenance of the Mark XIV Bombsight. Results have shown a marked improvement, but we will not be satisfied until every sight in the Group can be guaranteed accurate. Much more care must be taken in the levelling and lining up, as it is in these operations that most of the errors occur. The Mark XIV Bombsight is one of those instruments which requires plenty of liaison between Electrical officers and the Air Bombers’ Union, and it has been noted that this is now very effective.
Electrical sections deserve a pat on the back for the very intensive efforts they have put in during the latter half of the month. The list of modifications does not get any shorter, yet initial checks are still being completed in 24 hours.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Stirlings and Lancasters]
Flight Engineers
[Underlined] ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUTANTS [/underlined]
Many more administrative adjutants to the Chief Technical Officer are required; these adjutants will be volunteers from tour expired commissioned Flight Engineers. They will be responsible to the C.T.O. for the efficient administration of the Servicing Wing, and for the discipline and welfare of all the technical personnel on its strength.
Apart from this new post for Flight Engineers, there are also vacancies for administrative duties in the M.T. Section on Base Stations, and the duties will generally be the same as Adjutant to the C.T.O.
It will be seen that these posts have created quite a new avenue for Flight Engineers, but every facility will be given them to improve their engineering knowledge while undertaking administrative duties as their primary roles.
Flight Engineer Leaders must bring those vacancies to the notice of the commissioned Flight Engineers who are about to finish their tour of operations.
[Underlined] NON-COMMISSIONED FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
A course of instruction for newly screened N. C. O. ‘s commenced at St. Athan on 7th June 1944. The object of this course is to train screened Flight Engineers to take up their new duties as Instructors in Heavy Conversion Units and Lancaster Finishing Schools.
Revision and technical subjects are included in the syllabus, but the course is designed mainly to teach the technique of lecturing.
As this course is most important to new instructors, it is hoped that all Flight Engineers will be enthusiastic, for much will depend on their results if the standard of lecturing is to improve in our Conversion Units and Schools.
TRAINING
Despite the bad weather towards the end of the month, 51 Base flew a total of over 8,000 hours and produced 130 crews for Squadrons.
Twice during the month, 1654 Conversion Unit, taking a leaf from the book of 1661 for May, laid on “operational” take offs for aircraft on night exercises. They got 17 and 22 off on these occasions in almost as many minutes.
Re-organisation of the Heavy Conversion Units commenced in the last week of the month to ensure that training of crews under the summer output can be increased to the highest level. Under this new system intakes of 11 every six days will go into the Heavy Conversion Units and the Group target figure for the month is 160 crews.
Each Conversion Unit now consists of 3 large flights, each of which is sub-divided into two. The Stirling Academy has also been split up into three parts, each one becoming the nucleus of a small flight at each Conversion Unit.
The Base had a very much better month from the accident point of view, and tyre bursts are now the only chronic complaint left. Undercarriage pylon failures have been reduced and coring has slipped rapidly out of the Base vocabulary.
New appointments within Base include Wing Commander Derbyshire, D.F.C., as Chief Instructor, 1660 Conversion Unit, and Wing Commander Kingsford Smith as Chief Instructor 1654 Conversion Unit.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 9) [/underlined]
ionally quickly” and all the crew members were in the dinghy almost before they knew it. The kite container was lost in transit, but all other equipment was transferred to the dinghy – a parachute found its way in, but was afterwards lost in the excitement of getting clear of the aircraft which was keeling over and threatening to come down on top of the dinghy.
This crew merely got their feet wet in boarding the dinghy but later got the seats of their pants wet because of a small hole in the dinghy which was subsequently plugged.
The pilot was weak from loss of blood, and shock, so the Air Bomber took charge and bullied the rest of the crew into activity. They say this did the world of good. The aircraft floated for about 10 minutes.
The dinghy mast was broken when being stepped, but the Wireless Operator managed to connect the aerial to the dinghy radio and almost continuous transmissions were made with other crew members holding the mast erect. Some hours later they were spotted by 91 Group Wellingtons which brought in an A.S.R. Hudson. A Lindholme dinghy was dropped, but failed to inflate though the crew managed to collect three of the ration containers. About 14 1/2 hours later a Naval Launch picked up the crew and took them into Yarmouth.
This crew had done a practice dinghy drill on the day before the incident, and attribute much of the success of this ditching to that fact.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ENEMY AGENTS – CARELESS TALKERS
On the 30th January, 1942, there was published a document of some importance – to wit A.M.C.O. A.9 of that year.
It was important because it cleared the air of a good deal of confusion on the subject of security, and it achieved this by defining the functions of Security Organisation – thereby defining what is meant by the term ‘Security’ – and it laid down the organisation by which these functions were to be performed.
Security was by no means a new subject. Prior to the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, a vast number of thoughts on the subject had already made themselves felt, chiefly in the form of posters. They bore a slogan – “CARELESS TALK COSTS LIVES” – they sought to impress the truth of this slogan by representing pictorially such distressing events as ships being blown up, aircraft being shot down, and so on, all, by implication, the result of the wrong word being spoken at the wrong time in the wrong place. These were reinforced, in lighter vein, by coloured drawings, more or less amusing, of Hitler listening beneath a table at which, presumably, two people were discussing the future plans of the Allies; of Hitler repeated ad infinitum in the pattern of the wall paper; of Hitler looking out of the frames of otherwise harmless pictures: all of them indicative of the ubiquity of Hitler, and of the truth of that apalling [sic] statement “Walls have ears”.
And since the appearance of A.M.C.O. A.9/42, these pictorial exhortations to verbal discretion have been emphasised to us, in the R.A.F., by a quantity of printed matter in the form of lectures, bulletins, reports, instructions which, if expressed in terms of tonnage of paper they consumed, or if placed end to end, or on top of each other in one column, would, one feels sure, provide much indigestible food for thought in the shape of one of those totals which impress more by number of their digits than by any meaning they are able to convey to the ordinary mind. Add to this the number of words which must have been spoken in lectures on this subject since the 30th January, 1942, the countless man-hours devoted to the study and promulgation of this gospel of silence, and our total will become more astronomical and, therefore, more meaningless than ever.
Staggering as this total would be, however, it would never reach the dimensions of those our enemies could provide in the same field of endeavour, for the very good reason that they had been at it long before we commenced piling ours up. Japan, for instance, had been preaching the gospel of silence to her people for something like twenty years before Pearl Harbour. She taught it not only to her soldiers, sailors and airmen, but to the man in the factory, the woman in her home, the pedestrian on the street; with the result, as the writings of any of the foreign newspaper correspondents, some of whom had been in the country for years, will tell you, it was next to impossible to find out anything worth knowing about the country’s strength, or her intentions.
And what of Germany? Those Germans who were not born silent, or had not achieved silence by the time Hitler took them over, had silence so thoroughly thrust upon them that they really came to understand how and to know that even the walls of their own homes could grow ears. They were left in no doubt whatever upon the value of silence when it came to discussing either the affairs of the Party or of the Fatherland.
All of which surely points to the conclusion that silence in war-time, or, in other words, Security of Information, must be a matter of very great importance. Of course it is. You know that already. The meanest intelligence, you will point out, can grasp quite easily the simple truth that, if you prevent the enemy from knowing what you are up to, you place him at a serious disadvantage; you render him, so to speak, both deaf and blind, and, therefore, easier to deal with. Any fool knows that.
They [sic] why do people talk? Why do they write home letters full of chatty information about their stations? Why does one feel so certain that, were it possible to tap, at once all the telephone lines in the vicinity of our stations all over the country, one would become possessed of a mass of service information about all sorts of things and people – whither, why and when such a squadron is moving, who have finished their tours, where people are posted to, who didn’t come back last night, who the new C.O. is, and where he comes from, what the weather is like, what are the chances of a scrub tonight, how the R.A.F. is fed, clothed, housed, organised – and so on and so on? Not to be too depressing about it, let it be stated at once that one would probably, even certainly, gain much less information than would have been the case say two years ago; but who would like to bet that there still wouldn’t be plenty to be picked up?
So, why, after all the effort that has been made, all the money that has been spent, the paper that has been used, the words that have been spoken, should this be so? Now here, it is suggested, lies the root of the matter, and if this root can be dug up and examined, the apparently indestructible weed of Service Gossip, a weed which, while harmless, perhaps, nine times out of ten, can, on that tenth time, produce enough poison to be fatal to precious lives and expensive material, can be understood, and to understand any problem is the first step towards solving it.
Let us examine it then. People talk because that is the easiest and most natural way for them to express their thoughts. They talk their thoughts, they think about their daily lives; therefore, they talk about their daily lives. Now apply that formula to the R.A.F. and what do you find? You discover a service filled, for the most part, with very young people, a number of them still in their formative years. They talk their thoughts, they think their lives, their lives are, at the moment, the R.A.F; therefore they talk about the R.A.F. To go on from here; they are young people who have been brought up in countries in which free speech, outside the debateable limits of the law of scandal, is as instinctive as breathing. They have never had occasion to practice this habit of silence - a most difficult habit to acquire – and finally, they serve in a force which has been publicised, photographed and if one may use such a word, glamourised, more than any other organisation ever has before. Flying, as the R.A.F. flies, is a continual source of wonder to the lay mind. This business of lifting tons of explosive material off the earth at one spot, transporting it at phenomenal heights to another spot hundreds of miles away, and there dropping it in spite of such discouragements as flak, fighters, the weather, and so on, is something of a miracle to the civilian, and, naturally enough, he wants to know about it. The youngsters of the R.A.F. are, of course, the horse’s mouth, which is given every encouragement to open itself, and to remain open. And when a W.A.A.F. goes home on leave Mother wants to know what it’s all like – the food, the quarters, the station, what they do there and that gives her mother something to talk about to somebody who will pass it on to somebody else who will…..why go on?
It is, you see, a personal problem. There is no mass-produced solution to it. It is every man and woman for himself, and only he and she can deal with it. How? Well, try this recipe. Try writing home letters in which you never even refer to the Station upon which you work, beyond, of course, the address in the top left hand corner. Apply the same rule when you leave your Station, even when you meet another R.A.F. type. Regard every telephone you use as a menace because it is you who are using it, and finally, when you have finished your work for the day, don’t make conversation out of it in the mess or the canteen. Try these four riles as an act of self-discipline, and never relax, and you will solve all your problem and, what is far more important, you will solve one of the great problems which confront your country. Difficult? Yes, very. Impossible? No. It has been done. There is a station which once had the privilege of guarding part of a great and important secret. It wrote its letters by the thousand, it went to the nearest town, it went on leave. But never a word got out. No less than 12,500 letters from that Station were opened over a period of three weeks, and only two minor indiscretions were discovered in them, both after the great event. If you were a stranger, you couldn’t get very far on that station without being questioned; every rumour heard on or off it was faithfully reported – just in case. The result is history, not only because the event referred to was one of the best kept secrets and, therefore, one of the most successful undertakings of the war, but because it provided proof that, with the problem fully explained to them, the A.C.2. and A.C.W.2. can keep a secret, can keep their mouths shut and their pens discreet, and can do so as a matter of conscience, and as an act of self discipline.
Now if only the civilian could be persuaded not to make the R.A.F. talk……
(Continued from Col. 3 page 12)
(c) I.A.S. within 2 m.p.h. and height within 50 feet.
It’s practice which, makes perfect.
Gunnery is the order of the day for you and your crew again. Keep a banking search going. See that your guns and gunners are in first class condition. Check up on your corkscrew and patter.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
June was not a cricketers’ month; the weather was “flaming [sic] but not in the sense of the old adage. Fielders and batsmen alike quailed before wind and rain. As a cricketers’ month it was grand for Rugger. In spite of the weather, however, several stations got in a full programme.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] – This station managed to complete the amazing total of 25 games. In addition, W.A.A.F. personnel played four games. Any challengers for an inter-station W.A.A.F. game? The Aircrew School represented the Station in five of the games, and themselves played 10 inter-course matches.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] – had five station matches, one of which, with Woodhall, was abandoned after Fiskerton had knocked up 87 for 8. Their other games were as follows:-
V Dunholme at Dunholme – Fiskerton 72 for 7 Dunholme 68 all out
V Fiskerton Village at the Camp – Fiskerton 108 for 6 Village 29 all out
V Bardney at Fiskerton – Fiskerton 62 all out Bardney 22 all out
V Scampton at Scampton – Scampton 120 for 9 Fiskerton 71 all out
In addition to this successful record several inter-section games were played.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] managed five station games, and are now getting into their stride under the captaincy of F/Lt Wardle.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] had three wins, one draw, and one loss from five games. They beat 5 Group H.Q., Welton Home Guard and Scampton, drew away with 5 Group H.Q. and suffered their only defeat at home with Fiskerton. An inter-section knock out is in full swing, with 12 teams competing.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] had an unlucky month, with four postponed matches out of the six arranged. Against Coningsby, Metheringham scored 37 for 1 (Coningsby 179 for 7) before rain stopped play. The only completed game was with R.C.A.F. Digby, who hit 60 for 6 against Metheringham 56 all out.
Inter-section games produced some close results, viz:
Flying Control 55 for 7 V R.A.F.Regt. 50 all out
“B” Flight 60 all out V “A” Flight 36 all out
Servicing Wing Fitters 60 all out V Servicing Wing Riggers 65 all out
“B” Flight 43 for 5 V “A” Flight 39 for 9
In the Base Commander’s Trophy, 106 Sqdn dismissed 617 for 70 runs, but they could not bat and the game was abandoned.
[Underlined] 5 Group H.Q. [/underlined] played five games, four of them being away, since the 5 Group pitch has not yet “settled down”. They produced the following results:
V Dunholme, at Morton. 5 Group 148 for 8 Dunholme 89 for 8 (Draw)
V Dunholme at Dunholme. Dunholme 129 for 6 5 Group 64 all out (Lost)
V Swinderby at Swinderby. Swinderby 88 for 7 5 Group 83 all out (Lost)
V 93 M.U. at Collingham M.U. 77 all out 5 Group 84 for 6 (Won)
V Newark Town at Newark Newark 77 for 8 5 Group 72 for 5 (Lost)
There were two intersection games, in one of which the “Hall” beat the rest by 136 for 8 against 99 for 8.
[Underlined] GROUP CRICKET COMPETITION [/underlined]
Woodhall beat Coningsby in the final of “A” Section, so now Syerston (winners of “B” Section) meet Woodhall in the deciding game for the Trophy. The game will probably be decided on Saturday or Sunday (July 15th or 16th) at Woodhall Spa. Woodhall have taken over the town’s local ground, and with the addition of a score board and sight screens now have one of the finest grounds in the Group. The game will be one of the features of Woodhall’s “Wings for Victory” Week, and given good weather will be a highly successful event between two of the strongest Group teams. It is hoped that the A.O.C. will be able to present the handsome silver bowl to the winning side.
[Underlined] ATHLETIC MEETINGS [/underlined]
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] ran a highly successful Athletic Meeting on Saturday, 3rd June, when favourable weather for once coincided with a stand-down. Fourteen events were contested on an inter-section basis, the trophy being a shield presented by Corporal Ward, Instrument Section. The final placings of the teams were as follows:-
Winners: Navigators – 137 points
Second Pilots – 93 points
Third W/Ops. – 83 points
Fourth Rear Gnrs. – 82 points
Fifth Air Bombers – 78 points
Sixth Engineers – 63 points
Seventh M.U.Gunners – 43 points
Mrs. McKechnie presented the shield to F/Sgt. Croft, who assisted the Navigators by winning the 440, 880 and mile. Another outstanding performance was by F/O Gantschi (Air Bomber) who won the 100, 200, 220 and Long Jump.
[Underlined] 54 BASE INTER-SQUADRON SPORTS MEETING [/underlined] was on Saturday 17th June. 83 Squadron won the Base Commander’s Trophy, scoring 35 points, but 106 Squadron, with 33 points and 617 with 32 points, were good losers. 106 Squadron, feeling fit, provided winners for the 440, 880, mile, 3 miles and Long Jump. F/Sgt. Croft again had a field day, winning the 440, mile, 3 miles, and running second in the 880 yards. There was a big crowd at the games, and enthusiasm ran high. Lord Brownlow, Lord Lieutenant of the County, presented the prizes.
[Underlined] 93 M.U. SPORTS [/underlined] 93 M.U., whose work is so completely bound up with 5 Group, ran a highly successful Field Day on June 24th. Besides the usual athletic events, side shows, boxing and dancing made up an excellent programme. They plan another Gala Day, in aid of the P.O.W. Fund on August Bank Holiday Monday, and any personnel who can reach Swinderby will be sure of an enjoyable day.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Get down to crew Gunnery problems in July. Check your knowledge of the corkscrew, polish up your patter and do all the fighter affiliation you can.
Careful trimming of your aircraft ensures accurate flying. The correct sequence of action is:-
Fly the aircraft straight and level, trim the elevators, trim all load off the rudder and finally trim out any aileron load.
2.5° of skid at 10,000 ft. means an error of 250 yards on the ground. This common bombing error is often unconsciously caused by pilots sitting tense and rigid on the bombing run. Ensure the aircraft is properly trimmed and the [underlined] relax [/underlined] and fly the aircraft naturally and carefully.
If you find it difficult to read the instruments when coned by searchlights, get your navigator to call the airspeed. Make it a standing arrangement with him.
Here are the common faults in night circuits, don’t allow these errors to “creep” in.
(i) Edging in towards the flare path on the down wind leg.
(ii) Not allowing for drift on approach.
(iii) Failing to close the throttles when touching down.
(iv) Going too far across wind before the final turn in.
Should you have to land without flaps, remember to lengthen your downwind leg as the approach will be flatter and therefore longer. Start the final turn in earlier since the turn without flap will be wider, and approach at 125 m.p.h. Touch down as soon as possible and expect a longer landing run, and be prepared to use brake progressively.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Are you brake conscious? Brake efficiency falls off with rise in temperature of – brake shoes and drums. Avoid continual use of brakes, control direction by engine and release brakes as soon as possible to allow heat to go into the air and not up into the tyres. Never apply full brake at once. This induces tyre creep.
If you have to land in a very strong, gusty wind, use only 40° of flap and aim to do a wheel landing. Make a normal approach and when the wheels touch, ease the stick [underlined] slightly [/underlined] forward and keep it steady till the tail sinks on to the ground.
A word on Met; remember that forecast height of cloud base id always height above sea level. Bear this in mind if you are forced to break cloud at a diversion aerodrome, and allow for height of ground.
Have you and your crew an “A” category for bombing? You can have if you accept nothing less than these limitations;
(a) Course within 1° (b) Bank within 2°
(Continued on page 11 Col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
The award of the Silver Model Lancaster to the Unit having the best accident rate for the six months ended June goes to No. 106 Squadron. This squadron had one accident for a total of 6,848 flying hours. Nos. 49 and 57 Squadrons also had one avoidable accident, for a total of 6,743 and 6,294 hours respectively. These squadrons are to be congratulated on a splendid achievement, It’s up to the other Squadrons to dethrone the champions during the next three months. GO TO IT!!
Altogether there was a decided improvement in the number of avoidable accidents during June.
36 aircraft were damaged in the Group by causes other than enemy action. This is a reduction of 15 compared with May, and the improvement is also reflected in the avoidable accident total which stands at 16 for June as opposed to 20 in May.
Of the aircraft damaged, 12 were CAT A, 5 CAT AC, 5 CAT B, and 14 CAT E.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS – 51 BASE RECORD [/underlined]
51 Base are to be congratulated for the lowest number of avoidable accidents for a long time; 4 aircraft were damaged under this category. The squadron total of 12 for the month was an increase of 2 over May’s total. Details are as follows:-
Squadron – Ground collisions (taxying) 3; overshoots landing 2; undershooting 1; Swings landing 1; Flying into high ground 1; Collision in air 1; errors of judgement 3; TOTAL 12.
51 Base – Swings taking off 1; Swings landing 2; Taxying 1; TOTAL 4
[Underlined] ACCIDENT CAUSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Taxying. [/underlined] 3 of the 4 taxying accidents in the Group follow the usual pattern. One struck a trestle outside dispersal at night, and no taxying light was being used. Another hit an M/T van left unattended just off the perimeter track, while a third (a Stirling) broke its tail wheel when it ran off the perimeter track. The 4th taxying accident was caused by a Flight Engineer starting up the engines of a Lancaster without permission. Brake pressure was low and the aircraft moved forward and struck another parked alongside.
[Underlined] Swings [/underlined] Three of these occurred on landing. One was a Mosquito in which the pilot, flying a Mosquito for the first time, was not quick enough in correcting. The other two landing swings were by pupil pilots on Stirlings, and were due to inexperience more than anything else. They both knew the correct drill, however, but were slow to react. The swing on take off occurred in a Stirling, when a pupil pilot opened the throttles too quickly and failed to control the violent starboard swing which followed. The undercarriage collapsed.
[Underlined] Other Accidents. [/underlined] A Lancaster returning in poor weather descended through cloud and hit a hill 500 feet above sea level. This accident has not yet been fully investigated, but preliminary evidence indicates that the pilot lost height contrary to orders at briefing.
Another Lancaster on return from Ops. in good weather hit a tree 1000 yards from the runway on his approach. The wing tip was torn off but the pilot went round again and made a good landing on his second attempt. In this instance the bombs were still on board unknown to the pilot. His Air Bomber had told him that all bombs had gone. Air Bombers please note!!
Two Lancasters overshot on landing at strange airfields on return from operations. The bomb load exploded after one of them crashed.
A formation flying collision resulted in the destruction of two aircraft this month. Number 3 of a “Vic” formation knocked the tail off the Leader.
The two remaining avoidable accidents cocurred [sic] on operational flights. One pilot lost control in cloud on return and ordered his crew to bale out. Four of them left before control was regained. They had not been told to take their ‘K’ type dinghy packs with them and landed in the sea. The aircraft made a safe landing at base.
A Mid-Upper Gunner firing at searchlights on the ground damaged the port fin of his aircraft with a burst. The solenoid had jumped from its bracket. The gunner was at fault.
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Most operations were within normal Gee range and no exceptional results have been recorded. There has, however, been a substantial decrease in jamming which may be due to the increase in the number of frequencies now in use.
Non-H 2 S squadrons are now equipped with the new R.F. Unit 27 and have had several chances of using it during the month. As yet there has been no opportunity to test its efficiency at long range, but reports indicate the signal strength to be good with little or no interference. It is hoped that the supply position in regard to these new units will improve shortly and H 2 S Squadrons can then be equipped.
Several changes in Gee transmissions have taken place recently, and it would be advisable for all navigators and wireless operators to check upon these and make sure they are using the right frequencies and aerial loading stud at the right time.
One word regarding Gee homing. It is apparent from recent operations that navigators are not checking up with Gee on the position of the markers. There is little excuse for this, as most operations at the present time are within normal Gee range and subject to little or no interference. Navigators would be well advised to check up on their homing procedure now – because sooner or later the time will come when owing to weather conditions bombs may have to be released on Gee.
With regard to Gee training, a modification is being issued shortly which will enable navigators to carry out dry swims and Gee homing procedure with the trainer. The first will be issued to Scampton Aircrew School and should prove an interesting and invaluable “toy”.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The targets this month have been rather disappointing for the H 2 S operator, and H 2 S has been little used. Whilst Gee may seem much simpler to use it is essential for all operators to use H 2 S as much as possible on these short range operations to augment training. We may switch to the longer range targets with little or no notice, and if operators have been relying to a very great extent on Gee, some difficulty with H 2 S may be experienced.
Just a word to Captains; your navigator depends to a very great extent upon the bomb aimer and his efficient manipulation of the equipment. If you are keeping him in the nose the whole of the time on these short operations he is getting little or no H 2 S training. A.S.I. BL/17 dated 26th April, 1944, details the duties of Air Bombers in H 2 S aircraft and however short the operation, Captains must see that this instruction is complied with.
One word with regard to H 2 S training on operational squadrons. With the present commitments there is very little opportunity for air training, but this does not prevent operators from obtaining as much ground training as possible. Ground trainers are available at all Units and they are yours to use at will. Squadron Navigation Officers and H 2 S Instructors should ensure that all operators get at
(Continued in Col. 2)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Continued from col.3) [/underlined]
least 30 minutes practice every day and should make periodic tests to see that operators are remaining efficient.
H 2 S operators will be interested to hear that 54 Base have been carrying out some experiments in the assessment of a Paramatta attack, and conclusions reached show that assessments can be made to within approximately 1/2 mile of the correct position. If this assessing can be carried out on operations it may prevent many attacks from developing around T.I’s a considerable distance from the aiming point. Preliminary trials are now being attempted with regard to Wanganui attacks and it is hoped that something useful may be produced for next winter’s operations.
Training at Conversion Units is progressing satisfactorily and Wigsley is now producing H 2 S trained crews.
There are still a few people in the Group who are sceptical about the amount of H 2 S. training carried out at No. 51 Base and in fairness to the effort being made by the Conversion Units, it would be advisable to outline the training being carried out by them.
Up to June 1st this year, 111 H 2 S trained crews have been produced by the Conversion Units, of which only 6 were sent to non-H 2 S squadrons (of these crews, 3 were Flight Commanders and 3 Australians).
With the increase in the number of H 2 S squadrons it became increasingly apparent that more crews would have to be trained by the Conversion Units and instructions were issued to that effect.
Despite the fact that [underlined] extra time or aircraft [/underlined] are allowed for this training, the Conversion Units are now taking 50% of the
(Continued on page 14 col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.A. DOREHILL, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O McKENZIE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.H. BOTHA D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O R.E. WALKER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O T.T. SMART D.F.C.
F/O W. McINTOSH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.S. STOUT D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H. STEERE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/L R.F. DAVIES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ G.H. PROBERT D.F.C.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L L.C.A. HADLAND D.F.C.
F/O W.W.W. TURNBULL D.F.C.
A/F/L E.M. ARMSTRON D.F.C.
F/O M.J. MAY D.F.C.
F/O F.B. HALL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.W. GREENWOOD D.F.M.
SGT J. WATERHOUSE D.F.M.
P/O A.E. GILES D.F.C.
P/O B.G.L. ROGERS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O W.A. GALL D.F.C.
F/O J.A. PRIOR D.F.C.
P/O W.F. POSSEE D.F.C.
P/O F.G. HAYLER D.F.C.
F/SGT J. LEVER D.F.M.
F/SGT W.I. WILKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT J.C. DICKINSON D.F.M.
SGT D.E. LAYSHON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.H. McFERRAN D.F.M.
F/SGT F. LOMAX D.F.M.
F/SGT J. RYAN D.F.M.
SGT J.H. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT LOMAS D.F.M.
F/O D.H. PEARCE D.F.C.
F/O McMASTER D.F.C.
P/O J.D. DUNCAN D.F.C.
P/O S.W.A. HURRELL D.F.C.
P/O H. BLOW D.F.C.
F/SGT H.F. SMITH D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT L.J. HUMMELL D.F.M.
SGT F. GARRETT D.F.M.
P/O F.B. SOAPER D.F.M.
F/SGT K.R. BLUNDELL D.F.M.
SGT R.H. BATEMAN D.F.M.
A/F/L R. McCURDY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O T.W. BLACK D.F.C.
F/SGT E. BARTON D.F.M.
F/SGT P.A. DEACON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.C. WRIGHT D.F.M.
F/SGT E.D. PRATT D.F.M.
P/O A.C. BAKER D.F.C.
F/O R.H. MAURY D.F.C.
F/O A. RIMMER D.F.C.
SGT D. CHARLES D.F.M.
F/SGT A.J. GURR D.F.M.
F/SGT W.H. BARKER D.F.M.
SGT WILLETT D.F.M.
SGT R.H. TURRELL D.F.M.
P/O J.A.W. McCALLUM D.F.C.
SGT H.G. CAPPS D.F.M.
F/SGT H.S. TILLER D.F.M.
SGT J.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
F/SGT F.H. BARNES D.F.M.
SGT E. HEDLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT M.M. SCOTT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.H. PRYOR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
P/O J.V. REDDISH D.F.C.
F/SGT S.E. STEVENSON D.F.M.
P/O C.R. ROANTREE D.F.C.
F/SGT D. ANDREW D.F.M.
P/O BLACKHAM D.F.C.
F/SGT M.R. PRICE D.F.M.
F/SGT V.F. PITCHER D.F.M.
P/O D. JONES D.F.C.
F/O W.J.V. HAMILTON D.F.C.
F/SGT J.J. PAGE D.F.M.
P/O G.M.E. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT J.A. KIRWAN D.F.M.
W/CDR A.A. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.J. LUNDY D.F.C.
P/O L. DURHAM D.F.C.
F/O M.J. BEETHAM D.F.C.
P/O P.E. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.R. MOSSOP D.F.C.
F/O K.W. ODGERS D.F.C.
F/O P.A. CUNNINGHAM D.F.C.
F/O A.H. BIGNELL D.F.C.
F/SGT J.C.A. RODGERS D.F.M.
F/SGT N. HORSLEY D.F.M.
F/SGT A.D.F. SPRUCE D.F.M.
F/O L. HORNER D.F.C.
F/O H.S. SHORTT D.F.C.
F/O R.G.G. PAGETT D.F.C.
F/SGT D.E. WESTERMAN D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. COLLINGWOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT C. TURNER D.F.M.
F/SGT R. STANWIX D.F.M.
F/SGT A.L. BARTLETT D.F.M.
F/O A.S. KEITH D.F.C.
P/O A. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O J.A. WILDING D.F.C.
SGT W.M. RUNDLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. REID D.F.C.
SGT J.C. EVANS D.F.M.
P/O E.A. DOWLAND D.F.C.
P/O C.J.M. MARTIN D.F.C.
SGT T. DAVIES D.F.M.
F/O J. SIMMS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. COLLINS D.F.C.
(Continued on page 15, Column 1)
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV (Contd. From page 13 Col.2) [/underlined]
crews passing through and giving them full H 2 S ground training with 10 – 15 hours air training. This output will be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of all H 2 S squadrons. These crews should reach the squadrons by the middle of August.
In the meantime H 2 S squadrons will have to put up with a quota of non H 2 S crews and continue to train them.
To further ease the training commitments of both the Conversion Units and squadrons, it is hoped that H2S training will be introduced into the Scampton Aircrew School by the middle of August. This training will consist of approximately 5 hours lectures with further time in manipulation of the H 2 S synthetic trainer. It is to be appreciated that this training will have to be in addition to the present essential navigational training carried out at the School, and navigators and air bombers must be prepared to undertake some of it in their spare time.
PHOTOGRAPHY
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL £15,498 13 9
LINK TRAINER
The number of hours link practice carried out by pilots during the month shows an increase over last month’s total. There is, however, still room for improvement in the standard of instrument flying. This can only be achieved by close co-operation between Link Instructors and Pilots.
The new Link Syllabus was distributed to Stations in the middle of the month and should now be in use at all Units. It is again emphasised that this Syllabus is progressive and if full value is to be obtained from it, Pilots and Flight Engineers must ensure that they complete all exercises, and keep an accurate record of the exercises carried out.
[Table of Link Trainer by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
(CONTINUED)
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
SGT J.T.WATTS D.F.M.
SGT F.A. SIMMONDS D.F.M.
F/O G.S. JOHNSON D.F.C.
SGT F. ROBERTS D.F.M.
F/O R. DAVIS D.F.C.
F/SGT R.W. CLEARY D.F.M.
F/O K.D. SMITH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O E.A. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
P/O J.E.R. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
SGT L.G. BOLTON D.F.M.
F/SGT C. BALDWIN D.F.M.
P/O E.H. WALKER D.F.C.
F/SGT L.W. CROMARTY D.F.M.
F/SGT R.A. BUNYAN D.F.M.
P/O W.C. MacDONALD D.F.C.
F/O N.F. TURNER D.F.C.
P/O D.E. TREVETHICK D.F.C.
P/O G.A. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT. W.A. LEE D.F.M.
P/O J. BARR D.F.C.
P/O C.A. HAIGH D.F.C.
F/SGT LYNCH D.F.M.
F/O S.J. BEARD, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT C.P. STEEDSMAN D.F.M.
SGT G.M. WARD D.F.M.
SGT McQUILLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT C. WILCE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.C. BELL D.F.C.
F/O A.F. POORE D.F.C.
F/O G.E.D. TOOGOOD D.F.C.
P/O A.E. BRISTOW D.F.C.
F/SGT J. GRAVES D.F.M.
F/O R.J. ELSEY D.F.C.
F/O R.A. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT V. LYNCH D.F.M.
P/O P.J. RICHARDS D.F.C.
F/O W.R. LEE D.F.C.
F/O J.H.S. LEE D.F.C.
SGT T.C. WALLER D.F.M.
F/SGT G.R. CARLILE D.F.M.
F/O F.M. MIFFLIN D.F.C.
F/SGT A.D.J. GROOMBRIDGE D.F.M.
F/O C.J. DUNN D.F.C.
P/O R.A. HINCKLEY D.F.C.
F/O D.L. CRAMP D.F.C.
F/O D.V. GIBBS D.F.C.
F/L C.J. GINDER D.F.C.
F/SGT D. PINCKARD D.F.M.
F/SGT F. MYCOE D.F.M.
F/LT W.A. WILLIAMSON D.F.C.
F/SGT F.L. HIGGINS D.F.M.
F/O D.A. PAGLIERO D.F.C.
F/O R.L. WAKE, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT R. APPLEYARD D.F.M.
SGT V.H. BLACKWELL D.F.M.
P/O J. O’LEARY D.F.C.
F/O A.V. WITHERS D.F.C.
F/O R.P. RAMSAY D.F.C.
F/SGT S.J. HALVORSEN D.F.M.
SGT J.G. LANCASTER D.F.M.
F/SGT E. CLODE D.F.M.
SGT R.F. LAWRENSON D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J.G. MYERSCOUGH D.F.M.
SGT D. FRISKEY D.F.M.
F/SGT E.C. THOMPSON D.F.M.
P/O C.W. BARNETT D.F.C.
SGT W.G. LAMONT D.F.M.
F/SGT J. SKELTON D.F.M.
P/O R.G. CAMPBELL D.F.C.
P/O D.R. DEARMAN D.F.C.
P/O K.L. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/SGT E.H. BUNN D.F.M.
SGT D.C. MARK D.F.M.
SGT F.H. HAZEL D.F.M.
SGT F.C. DOWLING D.F.M.
SGT R.M. GALLOWAY D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON (Contd.) [/underlined]
F/LT H.L. McCARTHY D.F.C.
F/O D.S.P. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O C.T. HARPER D.F.C.
F/O A. HOLLINGS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. CURTIS D.F.C.
F/O E.R. FREEMAN D.F.C.
F/O A.E. VOWELS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BROOKER D.F.C.
P/O H.R. MAHON D.F.C.
F/O F.B.M. WILSON D.F.C.
F/O J.E.R. REES D.F.C.
F/SGT J.B. CHILDS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.F.S. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O F. MORRIS D.F.C.
P/O A.R.T. BOYS D.F.C.
F/O W.H. GOLDSTRAW, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O H.C. CHANDLER D.F.C.
F/O D.T. CONWAY D.F.C.
F/O J.A. COLPUS D.F.C.
P/O M.F. SMITH D.F.C.
P/O N.D. MARSHALL D.F.C.
F/O F.J. NUGENT D.F.C.
F/O H.S.L. CROUCH D.F.C.
F/O G.G. ABBOTT D.F.C.
P/O A.A. TAYLOR D.F.C.
P/O A.P. SPERLING D.F.C.
F/SGT G. NOBLE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O P.N. BUTTLE D.F.C.
P/O P.E. PIGEON D.F.C.
P/O H.A. WEEKS D.F.C.
P/O J.H. CLAY D.F.C.
F/O E. WILLSHER D.F.C.
W/O J. DACEY D.F.C.
F/O J.S. WATSON D.F.C.
F/SGT McCLELLAN D.F.M.
F/SGT L. EATON D.F.M.
F/SGT R.J. HENDERSON D.F.M.
F/SGT APPLEBY D.F.M.
F/SGT W. HOWARTH D.F.M.
F/O R. ADAMS D.F.M.
F/O A. HILL D.F.C.
F/LT WILSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.G. THOMPSON D.F.C.
F/O H.L. VICKERSTAFFE D.F.C.
F/O W.E.D. BELL D.F.C.
P/O G.G. TAYLOR D.F.C.
F/SGT J.A. FEATHERSTONE D.F.M.
F/O N.B. MORRISON D.F.C.
W/O B.T.J. HUCKS D.F.C.
W/O C.G. TURNBULL D.F.C.
SGT M.H.G. KING D.F.M.
P/O J.P. HIND D.F.C.
P/O J.I. JOHNSON D.F.C.
P/O E.K. ALLEY D.F.C.
P/O R.T. BOULTBEE D.F.C.
F/O P.H. TAYLOR D.F.C.
W/O R.A. WESTAD D.F.C.
F/O T. WILKIE D.F.C.
F/O JOHNSON-BIGGS D.F.C.
F/LT R. AYTOUN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT J.H. BRYANT D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.C. BLOIS D.F.C.
P/O T. SMART D.F.C.
W/O L.H. TODD D.F.C.
P/O R.T. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O G.W. BRAKE D.F.C.
W/O D. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/O A.J. WRIGHT D.F.C.
F/O K.R. AMES, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O F.R.G.A. HIGGINS D.F.C.
W/O H. GLASBY D.F.C.
F/SGT T.H. SAVAGE D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
All stations are to be congratulated on the excellent landing times produced this month, in which the average for the Group is below the 2 minutes per aircraft mark. In particular, Waddington recorded consistently good times for each operation. One [sic] the night of the 24/25th June this Station landed 32 AIRCRAFT IN 31 MINUTES, the average being less than 1 minute per aircraft. This is a record for the Group, and probably for the Command.
One word of warning, however; recently aircraft from another Group were diverted and on arrival at the diversion airfield proceeded to use their own Group landing scheme, with which the diversion control staff were not familiar. It is sufficient to say that confusion followed, with extreme danger to the aircraft and crews concerned. A.S.I. FC/11 contains the standard diversionary control procedure and must be adhered to.
[Underlined] STONES, CONCRETE AND METAL [/underlined]
Every stone, every sharp edge of concrete, every spent cartridge or piece of metal, constitutes a menace to tyres.
During the last 3 month there has been a very high average of tyres changed on accounts of cuts – (25 per station per month). Recently, endeavours have been made on stations to overcome this menace, but the intensified clean-up of perimeters, runways and dispersals must be maintained.
FLYING CONTROL must ensure that not the smallest break in the perimeter track or runway is overlooked, that grading does level up with the perimeter track and runways, and that any looseness in the surface of the French drains is attended to at once. Station Admin and Clerks of Works must help to the utmost.
GROUND CREWS must assist by seeing that their dispersals are thoroughly clean, and AIRCREWS watch carefully that cartridges cease to be a menace to tyres.
TRANSPORT – keep the sweepers fully serviced and see that nothing is loose on vehicles employed on the airfield.
ARMAMENT, too, can assist by ensuring that the access roads to the bomb dump are clear of stones and that wooden chocks from bomb trolleys are recovered before aircraft move. A 4” x 3” block with nails in it is not healthy treatment for a tyre!
ONLY BY FULL CO-OPERATION CAN THE ULTIMATE AIM BE ACHIEVED-AN AIRFIELD 100% SERVICEABLE.
JUNE LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944 PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
At dawn on the 6th of this month, the first Allied troops landed on the Normandy coast. A contribution towards the success of this amphibious operation was no doubt made in the effective silencing of most of the shore batteries. During the last month and again on three nights prior to D – Day this was one of the Group’s tasks. The heavy railway gun battery at WIMERAUX was attacked on the 2/3rd and although the interpretation report embraces previous attacks, there is no doubt that severe damage was inflicted; a large number of new craters being seen around the target. Both the western turntables have received direct hits.
The coastal defence batteries at MAISY (4/5th), ST PIERRE DU MONT (5/6 th) and LA PERNELLE (5/6th) next received our attention. Little could be gleaned from photographic cover as to the precise damage to the targets, but their apparent failure to contest our landing bears testimony to the success of the raids.
Another pre-invasion target was the Radar Jamming Station at FERME D’URVILLE. This target was attacked on 3/4th and, to quote A.I.C.U. “The station is completely useless”.
Our beachhead having been secured, our bombing role turned to close support of the land forces. The 21st Panzer Division was moving into CAEN to threaten the British Beaches. Two road bridges in this town were accordingly scheduled for attack on the 6/7th; both bridges were hit, and the road approaches heavily cratered, presenting an embarrassing obstacle to the Hun. On the same night an attack was directed against the ARGENTAN Railway centre. This raid also was calculated to hamper the arrival of reinforcements, which object was achieved by the severing of almost all the tracks and the destruction of many essential buildings.
During the day of the 7th, elements of the 17th Panzer Division were concentration [sic] in the FORET DE CERISY, a number of ammunition dumps, fuelling points and tank harbours having been located in this area. This was our assignment for the night 7/8th, and although results were not spectacular, many bombs fell on the aiming point.
The battle of communications continued on 8/9th against targets south of the battle area, when the marshalling yard at RENNES and rail junction at PONTAUBAULT were attacked. Severe damage was sustained at the former target while at the latter, the tracks were cut at several points.
One of the outstanding operations of the month was against the SAUMUR tunnel on the 8/9th. Already the railway junction had been attacked on 1/2nd with excellent effect, but the later attack on the tunnel left no doubt that the line would be denied the enemy for some time to come. A direct hit on the roof of the tunnel at its southern entrance has probably caused a major collapse while the tracks and embankments are severely damaged.
Our attack on the railway junction at ETAMPES on 9/10th was rendered extremely difficult owing largely to adverse weather, although hits were scored on the electrified railway north east of the junction.
The possibility of the enemy using the PARIS/ORLEANS route to effect troop movements led to a request for the destruction of the marshalling yard at ORLEANS on 10/11th. The mission was successfully undertaken, all through lines being severed and further damage sustained to rolling stock railway depots etc.
The attack on POITERS on 12/13th in which very severe damage was inflicted on the railway facilities was designed to delay the 2nd S.S. Division, believed to be moving up from South France.
On the same night support was given to our troops advancing East and West of CAEN, by the further bombing of the town’s road bridges.
The Lehr Panzer Division is reported to have visited AUNAY SUR ODON on the same night as aircraft from this Group, namely, 14/15th. AUNAY is completely obliterated – speculation is rife as to the fate of the Panzers.
Photos taken the day following the attack on the LIMOGES marshalling yard (23/24th) indicate that fires were still burning in the area, and that all tracks in the sorting sidings have been blocked.
AT VITRY LE FRANCOIS on 27/28th damage was almost entirely confined to the west end of the marshalling yard where all the tracks have been cut. Other damage throughout the yard is apparent.
For 48 hours the spotlight of war turned from the battlefield to the sea, to the harbours of LE HAVRE and BOULOGNE where a powerful force of small craft had been assembled by the enemy with a view to menacing our supply lanes. It is now reported that as a direct result of the two raids on 14/15th and 15/16th no fewer than 80 vessels have been sunk or seriously damaged. Damage to port installations is also severe.
Oil targets have been attacked sporadically since the war began, but in the knowledge that the enemy is suffering from fuel shortage we returned on three occasions to attack his resources.
At CHATELLERAULT on 15/16th a fuel dump was raided, considerable damage resulting to storage units.
The attacks on WESSELING and SCHOLVEN Synthetic Oil Plants on 21/22nd were not, however, satisfactory and, influenced by bad weather conditions, were off the mark.
During the month two gardening operations were undertaken, on 6/7th and 8/9th.
In the concluding phases of June our attention was diverted from Normandy to the rather more immediate problem of combating the flying bombs which had commenced to operate over this country on 12/13th. On the whole, weather was exceedingly unco-operative, but, despite this, 10 missions were launched (three of which,
(Continued on page 4 Col. 2)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Operations with Sorties, Accidents and Stars Awards, by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.23. JUNE, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, June 1944
5 Group News, June 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 23, June 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about gunnery, air bombing, navigation, armament, navigation training, public relations, signals, gardening, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, and shows not so good, engineering, training, flight engineers, enemy agents - careless talkers, signals, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, radar / nav, honours & awards, photography, aircrew volunteers, war savings, link trainer, flying control, operations, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
18 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-27
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--La Pernelle
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Paris
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Saumur
France--Vitry-le-François
Germany--Wesseling
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
5 Group
617 Squadron
627 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bomb dump
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
rivalry
service vehicle
tactical support for Normandy troops
tractor
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Base Commander.
Base Int: [Stamp]
MARCH * 1944* CONFIDENTIAL * NO * 20
V GROUP NEWS V
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
March proved a record month for 5 Group, with a total of 1720 aircraft despatched, and a bomb load of 7200 tons. The month also showed a lower figure for early returns at 4.01%, and a missing rate well below the average for the past six months.
Outstanding during the month were the series of attacks on small targets, by individual Bases. These were well undertaken and caused much damage to the French aircraft industry, which is engaged on sub-contracting and repair work for the G.A.F. – work which is of increasing importance as the major factories in Germany are obliterated by the U.S. .A.F.
These attacks call for exact marking, accurate bombing and good signals communications. Much training is still necessary before every operation runs smoothly and can be undertaken with equal success on dark nights, by the aid of flares instead of the moon. That such attacks are possible is shown by the success achieved by No. 617 Squadron, who in this respect are acting as pioneers and gaining invaluable experience of a type of attack which is of growing importance.
The success which this Squadron has achieved was rewarded by a special visit from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the United States Strategic Air Forces, and General Doolittle, Commanding the 8th Bomber Force, who came to see for themselves the methods which are employed.
Further evidence of the wide interest which is being taken in these attacks can be found in the Air Intelligence Summary of the United States Strategic Forces in Europe, for the week ending April 2nd.
An article headed “R.A.F. Precision Attacks by Night”, after describing the results of many of the recent attacks, including those undertaken by all squadrons in this Group, continues as follows:-
“Relatively small formations of Lancasters, manned by experienced and carefully trained crews, are responsible for the success of these missions, an outstanding feature of which has been the economy of force used to produce the desired result. Expert navigation followed by pin point marking of the target by a single aircraft at low level, has permitted visual bombing with a precision comparable to the best results obtained in daylight.”
This praise, coming from the United States Air Force, is indeed welcome, for we recognise the magnificent results which they are achieving by day. If we think that precision bombing by night is not only possible, but in some respects easier than precision bombing by day, as well as being more economical, it is up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that our conviction is right by the only valid method – that of results. I hope that during April we shall have an opportunity of gaining further experience and providing further proof of what can be done.
With so much activity in front of the Group a heavier load than ever will be placed on the Training Base. It is going to be hard work for everyone, but it is only through their efforts that we have been able to carry out these damaging attacks. I congratulate all ranks in the Base on having achieved the full planned output of crews throughout the winter months, in spite of great difficulties of weather and an unexpected change in the type of aircraft used for conversion training. The requirements from now on are for the maximum number of crews who can be trained with the available resources.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION
For the first two years of the war, the policy of operational navigation was controlled by individual Station and Squadron Commanders. Routeing, timing, heights to fly and recommendations of the best Navigational aids then available were decided locally.
As the Command effort increased, and the enemy night defences grew stronger, it became necessary to route aircraft in concentration; thus, routeing was taken over by Bomber Command. The concentration achieved was still poor, however. There were several contributory factors:-
(i) Lack of Navigational aids which would enable all aircraft to establish their positions when over enemy territory.
(ii) Inaccurate flying of courses by Pilots due to weaving, evasive action, etc.
(iii) Inaccuracies in calculations and computations by navigators.
(iv) Due to the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, the inability of the Navigator to determine the correct wind velocities.
A concentrated drive was then made to remove these shortcomings. Gee, and later H.2.S. was introduced to enable Navigators to determine their position over enemy territory. The introduction of the A.P.I. which maintains an accurate air plot, gave the Navigator a method of recording inaccuracies of the aircraft and of the pilot which would normally pass unnoticed. Weaving was forbidden. More attention during the Navigator’s training, was given to computations and the elimination of careless mathematical errors.
H 2 S and the A.P.I., however, were not available to the entire force, and the average Navigator was still unable to determine correct wind velocities. An analysis of many raids proved that a certain number of experienced Navigators, with the required aids, could find accurate winds, and it was decided to let the whole force benefit by the experience and capabilities of these crews. The scheme was pioneered by this Group on several occasions, and the results were very successful. It was then adopted by Bomber Command for general use. The procedure is as follows
15/25 crews from each Group flying in aircraft equipped with H 2 S and A.P.I. are detailed as “wind finders”. The Navigators of these aircraft obtain wind velocity checks as often as possible, and transmit to Base all wind velocities found.
Before the operation, the Senior Met. Officer at Group prepares a chart illustrating the route, the meridian code and the estimated position of aircraft at broadcast times. Attached to this chart is a list of the wind finding aircraft. As each wind is received, it is entered in the column allotted to the particular aircraft.
The wind signals from aircraft are intercepted at Group Headquarters by the Signals Section, who keep a monitoring watch on all Base frequencies. From the time of breaking enemy R.D.F. cover, signals runners are constantly employed delivering wind messages to the Met. Office.
There is a hook up between all Group Met. Sections within the Command, and winds received from the entire force are collated. The Met. Officer sits with one eye on his chart and one eye on the clock, and five minutes before the next broadcast is due, a forecast wind is issued, and, if necessary, a corrected past wind.
As the raid progresses, and the chart fills up, so the look of satisfaction grows on the Senior Met. Officer’s face. Sometimes there are blanks when aircraft cannot obtain a wind velocity check, due to u/s equipment, or because aircraft have returned early. At other times a wind velocity obtained is not transmitted by the aircraft until long after it has left the area to which the wind velocity applies. In both instances, this gives the Met. Staff so much less information on which to base their corrections and forecasts. There have been instances when they have had no more than two or three wind velocities over a detailed area, and even then there have been large discrepancies. A good example is the Berlin raid of 24/25 March, 1944, when only 9 wind velocities were received, homeward bound, from the target to the enemy coast – 2 1/4 hours flying! In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult to give you accurate forecast winds. Crews now realise how important it is to obtain as many wind velocity checks as possible, and pass them to Base immediately. Even if the wind velocity obtained differs considerably from the forecast on the Form 2330, then providing you are confident of the fix used, send back the w/v you have found. If you have “boobed”, then the Met. Staff can, and will, see this, and no harm will be done. There will be no “strips” for the crew concerned. If, however, you obtain a w/v and [underlined] DO NOT [/underlined] send it back, then you are withholding vital information which may affect the safety of the whole Bomber Force, including your own.
The Group Met. Staff have had considerable experience of this scheme, and they are getting to know the various windfinders. One often hears a remark in the Met. Office “Old Snooks is flying in “F”57 tonight, we shall get some reliable winds from him” – and they do!! They know that each wind “Old Snooks” sends back will be reliable, and his messages are greatly treasured.
A Navigator is employed in the Met. Office whose duty it was in the past, to present to the Air Staff the effect of the corrected w/v’s on track and time keeping, and whether aircraft would arrive at the target early or late. All went well until the attack on Leipzig on the night of 19/20th February, when it was obvious from application of the broadcast winds that aircraft would arrive at the target 10 – 15 minutes early. We all know the result – 79 aircraft lost.
The obvious way to tackle this problem was to adjust the zero hour, and since we were obtaining from aircraft reliable information of true winds over enemy territory, a scheme was devised whereby the zero hour could be amended if necessary. The Duty Navigator in the Command Met. Office ascertains from application of the corrected w/v’s, whether the aircraft will arrive at the target early on time, or late, and consequently whether the zero hour needs amending. All H 2 S wind finders in this Group transmit the times at which they pass two datum points on the route. It is obvious, however, that both calculations will be valueless unless all aircraft [underlined] do [/underlined] leave the concentration point [underlined] exactly [/underlined] on time, and fly at the speeds laid down at the Flight Planning Conference. It must also be obvious to the reader, that unless wind information and times at the datum points are sent back by aircraft immediately, then there will be neither sufficient information on which to base an amendment to the zero hour, nor time in which to take necessary action.
Accurate time keeping, good concentration and correct timing of the attack, in short the success of the operation, depend on every wind finder knowing and doing his job. It’s up to you.
WHERE TO LOOK
A.O.C’s Foreword. Page 1
Aircrew Volunteers. 6
Air Bombing. 7
Air Sea Rescue. 8
Absence. 11
Accidents. 14
Armament. 15
Bombing, Air. 7
Decorations. 6
Engineering. 14
Equipment. 11
Flying Control. 5
Flight Engineers. 6
Gardening. 4
Gee. 5
Gunnery. 9
H 2 S. Page 5
Link Trainer Times. 10
Navigation, Progress of. 2
Navigation. 13
Organisation. 14
Operations. 16
Progress of Navigation. 2
Photography. 4
Public Relations. 10
Signals/Radar. 3
Second Thoughts for Pilots 10
Sports. 12
Tactics. 6
Training. 11
War Effort. 16
War Savings. 6
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
March was not the best of months from the Aircrew Signals point of view, and it is to be hoped that Signals Leaders will make every endeavour to effect an improvement in the coming month.
You may not have any connection with the following examples but is that because you know all the answers, or is it that you have not been caught out.
There was once a Wireless Operator (Air) who after 14 operational sorties, used the spelling table of CD0250 for the following – REQUEST Q.F.E. – a total of 5 Groups where 1 Group would have covered the situation. Five minutes instruction per day would prevent any unnecessary waste of ether time.
Once upon a time (in March) a Wireless Operator (Air) gave out the wrong Bomber Code, which all the simpletons in his section accepted without a murmur. It is said at this Headquarters that all the murmuring came from the Duty Signals Officer – I wouldn’t know. In days gone by (March again), a Wireless Operator (Air) did not know where to find the fuse of his Visual Monica equipment, and the aircraft had no Early Warning Device – a congratulatory message from the Luftwaffe is expected any day. Talking of Early Warning Devices, the writer knows of two Operators (no names, no Grade 1) who did not know how to cope with simple fault finding.
Now we can do better than this, and it is suggested that every Signals Leader has a daily session with all the Wireless Operators, just ten minutes every morning will pay handsome dividends.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The new system of reporting the performance of Early Warning Devices by pro-forma is working very well, thanks to the co-operation of all concerned. This is going to save a lot of time and unnecessary telephone calls, which ultimately will help the war effort. Since the last News, a new instruction on the use of I.F.F. when circling dinghies or crashed aircraft, has been brought into force, 5G/S.4403/50/Sigs, of 23rd March, refers.
On Flight Planning for Thursday, 30th March, the Air Officer Commanding outlined the danger to the Bomber Force caused by selfish captains trying to but [sic] a little extra security for themselves at the expense of their fellow captains, when they order their Wireless Operators into the Astro-dome. It is hoped that this point has now gone right home, and that there will be nor further occurrence of this practice.
Just one more item that requires the attention of all Airborne Signals types. The constant back tuning that goes on during every operation, and the passing back of wind messages during the normal transmission times. When you read the first part of these notes again, as it is hoped you will, add a reminder about back tuning and listening out, to your daily session.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
Two good points stand out for the month; they are both from No.57 Squadron.
P/O. Bracker, on the night of 24/25th did some quick thinking to get his R1155 working and receive the broadcasts.
On the same night, Sgt. Robinson saw on his Fishpond screen, two aircraft close together. He reported this, and gunners reports a combat taking place. The aircraft joined in the fight, drew the enemy aircraft’s fire and eventually shot it down.
This is an excellent example of the intelligent use of Fishpond – a good show by the W/Op and his crew.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt. Stevens, Signals Leader of No.57 Squadron, on obtaining an “A” category on No.5 Signals Leader’s Course.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures for March is considerably lower than for February, being less than 50% of the February figures. No Signals failure was responsible for a cancelled sortie, but out of the total of 24 failures reported, four were the reason for, or a contributory cause of, early returns.
The very small percentage contribution to early returns for March 0.235% against 1.30% for February is a welcome indication of a general drive to eliminate the possibility of Signals contribution in any way to a cancelled or abandoned sortie.
This does not mean that failure reports generally show a decrease. On the contrary, the conscientious reporting of any type of failure whatsoever, irrespective of whether it affects the success of the sortie or not, or even appears on the raid report, is essential.
A perusal of the details of failures for March, shows that one Squadron reported ten failures, none of which caused an early return; but they do provide the information required to enable action to be taken to institute modifications which will, in time, make failures almost impossible. The more attention which is paid to reporting failures the sooner will the improvements be incorporated.
We do not wish to take part in any competition between Groups for the lowest number of reported failures, but we must show the lowest percentage contributing to cancellations and early returns.
[Underlined] COUNTERMEASURE MANDREL [/underlined]
The fitting of Mandrel is proceeding satisfactorily. The great hold-up has been due to so many new aircraft arriving with the downward vision blister, thus denying us our original aerial position. However, Bomber Command have now authorised the removal of these blisters and, as a result, the aerial returns to its original position.
We still manage to fly a high proportion of the Command Mandrel effort.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
During the month there occurred an outstanding example of loss of security on an operation through injudicious use of R/T. Take-off was 18.13, the route was northerly, and W/T silence was not to be broken until approximately 20.45. At 19.09 an early return called up his station, stating that his instruments were u/s, and requesting permission to land after jettisoning petrol. On being told to stand by, the E.R. stated that although he was aware that boomerang procedure was to jettison the cookie, he didn’t want to fly around much longer, and suggested jettisoning the petrol and landing with cookie. The ground station then requested details as to what was wrong with the aircraft instruments. After replying, the aircraft requested instructions again, and was told to jettison incendiaries safe, and pancake. This instruction was repeated, the aircraft carried out the instructions and returned, making a final reference to his cookie as a warning to ground crews. The entire conversation lasted 23 minutes, by which time any doubts the enemy might have had of the hostile intentions of the force plotted by his long range Radar must have been completely dispersed. “It is to be assumed” say Bomber Command, “that every time a word is spoken, it is heard by the enemy”. So, on this particular night, we gave him one hour’s prior notice of the attack and that is a luxury we can’t afford.
After many representations, the British Joint Communications Board have now conceded that for INTER RAF WORKING ONLY, J – Johnny may be used in lieu of J-Jig. For combined and joint working, J-Jig must still be used. This latter point is important. The probability of joint and combined working is imminent, and strict observance of the alphabet and standard procedure will play an important part in ensuring the smooth working of our forces.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee remains high, and shows a slight improvement over February. A total of 1201 Gee sorties were flown during the month, and in 96.7% of them the equipment was completely serviceable. It is hoped that a further increase can be shown next month.
Three new Radar Workshops have been completed during the month. All squadrons now possess their own building, which should help considerably to increase serviceability.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
H 2 S serviceability improved slightly during last month, but it is still far from satisfactory; the percentage serviceable to the target and back was 76%.
The new Filament Transformers, which have now flown up to 50 sorties, give every indication of being the solution to the main causes of unserviceability; unfortunately, production difficulties will cause considerable delay in a changeover programme. The arrival of a drier season should prevent a further source of unserviceability that has been caused by dampness. It is felt that a considerable percentage on non-reproduceable faults were due to such dampness.
Manipulation failures due to lack of experience with the equipment, still assume too high a percentage, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. A new switch procedure has been drawn up and put into force which, if strictly adhered to, should result in greater serviceability.
The repositioning of the Scanner Heater
(Continued on page 4, col.3)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Failures from all causes totalled 109, equalling 6.9%; this represents a decrease of 1.4% on the month of February. These technical failures remain persistently at 6-7% and there is no doubt that many of them can be avoided with more careful inspection and maintenance.
Instructions have been issued by Eng/Elect Branch to modify all Lancaster aircraft camera circuits; this is a return to bomb door operation of the camera. Briefly this circuit is wired through the Mk. XIV bombsight panel, and incorporates a relay which safeguards the camera from premature operation through deliberate or accidental movement of the pilot’s bomb door selector arm, provided that the bombsight graticule is not switched on. Once the bombsight graticule has been switched on, the circuit from the selector arm is “live”. Therefore, when the bomb doors are selected open, the camera winds over one frame; when the Air Bomber releases the bombs, the normal camera cycle commences. During the period that the Type 35 Control motor is running, the pilot’s selector arm circuit to the camera is “dead”, and should the doors be closed before the camera cycle is completed, the frame sequence remains uninterrupted.
An effort has been made to produce an ideal circuit, and the modification now being introduced is as near to the ideal as possible; for instance, switching on the graticule late i.e. after the bomb doors have been opened, would result in the loss of the first frame, and would bring the bombing frame into position at No.6 instead of No.7. This will be bad enough with ordinary H.S. night film, but with composite colour in use, the probable loss of ground detail on the bombing frame would be serious.
The introduction of this circuit does not mean that technical failures in Type 35 Controls and camera gear boxes are overcome. Careful inspection, testing and thorough maintenance, are the only cures. It is evident from failure reports that insufficient care is being taken to ensure that camera equipment issued from the Equipment Section is entirely satisfactory before installing it into operational aircraft.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadrons]
GARDENING
The Command planted 1,472 vegetables this month, 76% being distributed off the East Frisians, in Keil Bay and the Fehmarn Belt and off the French U-boat bases; the remainder in the Channel, off Holland and on the Spanish Iron Ore Routes. 3 Group planted over half the total 6 Group nearly 400 and 4 Group nearly 300.
This is the third month of intensive high altitude gardening and reports of results now coming in are proof of its success. So far this year the casualty rate due to Bomber Command’s mining is 5 ships sunk or damaged per week, but latest reports show that this has now increased to a rate of [underlined] 1.4 ships per day. [/underlined]
The most encouraging report has come to hand from a source now in this country, who, up until recently, has been obliged to sail the German North Sea Convoy Routes, and who had to “swim for it” at least once. “Minephobia” is so acute that whenever minelaying is even suspected, all traffic is stopped for 24 hrs. The crews of mine sweepers after a six months “tour”, now get three months leave, most of which is spent in hospitals specialising in the cure of neurosis.
Now that the various methods of high altitude mining have had fair operational trial, it is possible to lay down standard rules, and various orders lately issued will be consolidated. A point which stands out from the last three months work, is that the success of high altitude mining outside Gee range has been dependent on H 2 S aircraft being available either to mark for those not so fitted, or, in restricted gardens, to do the laying.
Undoubtedly the ideal method is a D.R. run from a visual pinpoint using the Mark XIV bombsight and aided by H 2 S, but weather conditions which will permit visual pinpointing unaided by markers are the exception rather than the rule.
Commander R. A. McDonald, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Vernon, explained to aircrews of 49, 57, 630, 207, and 106 Squadrons some of the pleasant little surprises that our mines spring on the enemy’s shipping and mine sweepers (and the devices which prevent them from being sprung on our own Armament staffs). He was unfortunately prevented from visiting other Squadrons, by operations.
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from page 3, col. 3)
has been practically completed, and during the last month no scanners have frozen where this modification has been incorporated. Bomber Command is also issuing a modification covering heating of Scanner Motors, and repositioning of the Scanner Heater Switch.
[Boxed] FISHPOND [/boxed]
This device also showed an improvement during the month, but here too a great deal of work remains to be done. The serviceability percentage for March was 78%.
W/Ops and Navigators still lack the training and co-ordination required to derive the full benefit from this Warning Device. It is to their own advantage to become fully proficient in its operation. A shortened maximum range has been experimented with, and those Operators who have used it express complete satisfaction. Bomber Command have been requested to approve this modification for general installation.
[Boxed] VISUAL MONICA [/boxed]
Serviceability continues to improve, and last month reached 89.5%. It is felt, however, that this figure may still be improved.
The amount of work spent on the Switch Motors has paid great dividends, and the old theory that the Motor was to blame has been refuted. In this connection, the changeover plugs for the aerial leads have proved very valuable on the few occasions when Switch Motors have stopped.
The introduction of Mark IV A.I. as a Tail Warning Device has made available from 54 Base further supplies of Visual Monica, with which it has been possible to almost completely equip the Group with Visual Tail Warning Devices, and thus eliminate Aural Monica.
[Boxed] A.I. [/boxed]
The new addition to Bomber aircraft has now seen considerable operational work, and shows the qualities of a fine Tail Warning Device. Serviceability was 78% for the two weeks it has been in operation. This will, without doubt, be raised week by week as personnel become fully conversant with the equipment.
Operators find the equipment easy to use, due to previous experience in Visual Monica, and are very enthusiastic. The elevation part has worked very satisfactorily in No. 617 Squadron, and a general installation programme is now in hand for the other A.I. squadrons.
[Underlined] SPORTS (Contd. From page 12, col. 3) [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUTURE EVENTS [/underlined]
RUGBY – No. 1 Air Landing Brigade is of the opinion that its Brigade Rugger side can put paid to a 5 Group representative team. The challenge is being joyfully taken up; the result should be a first class game.
CRICKET – It has, unfortunately, been impossible to obtain transport for a ‘straight’ Group Cricket League. The next best thing, a Group Cricket Knock-out, is being run. Full details will be forwarded to all stations. It [sic] the meantime, stations are advised to look up friendlies as usual.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
GEE
Ranges obtained on Gee this month were average on all major operations. Many Navigators however, obtained quite remarkable fixes on special operations, and in a number of cases over the targets. Single position lines from strong signals were intelligently used, and in a few cases Gee was used by Navigators as a means of homing to the special targets.
The mere fact that signals begin to fade into the jamming appears to act as a deterrent to many navigators who forget that jamming can occur in certain local areas on the continent. Once through a local jamming area fixes may again be obtained and under no circumstances should a Navigator neglect to check the Gee Indicator to see if this is so. If a local jamming area is encountered report it at interrogation for the benefit of others.
“Coding” does not appear to have caused any serious trouble and is reported to be phased and timed accurately. However, now that further instructions have been issued, navigators and wireless operators are warned to take greater care in reading the indicator to prevent serious mistakes being made. If you are uncertain of the present day instructions check up at your section now.
Don’t forget that the Southern and South-Eastern Chains are now on a new frequency. This recent changeover should solve the problem of break through pulses which have been reported recently.
The new North Eastern Chain is now operating daily for test purposes and reports on transmissions are requested. Navigators and Wireless Operators, this chain has been provided for your benefit, let us have these reports; in doing so you are helping the technicians to provide a better facility for yourselves. It is hoped that charts to cover this chain will be issued this month.
One word about descent through cloud and the correct homing procedure to Base. Air Staff Instructions lay down the procedure to be adopted for descent through cloud and homing to Base on Gee and these instructions must be followed. Navigators should ensure that the captain follows the correct procedure. Descent through cloud must be made between the correct lattice lines and along the correct homing lattice line applicable to base. Remember – individual lattice lines have been chosen for each airfield to prevent the risk of collision, and these are to be used like railway tracks. Follow the Green Indicator to safety.
H 2 S
H 2 S training on Squadrons this month was confined mainly to the Bombing Competition, and although a considerable number of aircraft were detailed, few obtained photographs owing to unsatisfactory target conditions. Of the results received to date, the majority are within one mile of the aiming point, reflecting great credit on the crews taking part. It is hoped to publish a summary of results in the next issue of the “News”.
Training at Conversion Units is improving and many crews are now completing 10 – 15 hours air training, which should prove of considerable benefit to the squadrons.
Full use is being made of the ground trainers both as navigational and bombing aids. Emphasis must be placed on the use of H 2 S as a navigational aid, particularly in the early stages of training, and trainer cross countries should be carried out with this point in mind. Navigators and Air Bombers must aim at a high standard of efficiency in both the taking and plotting of fixes, particularly as the whole of the Bomber Force depends on this aid for accurate broadcast winds.
An investigation has been carried out this month into all manipulation failures since the beginning of the year, and it is noted that they occur during the first 20 hours of air training and are mainly due to incorrect tuning. To overcome this, Aircraft Drill No.14 was issued setting out the correct H 2 S switching, tuning and re-tuning sequences and operators are to follow this procedure at all times. It is of no practical use to switch the set on, tune and leave it whilst Gee is in range, then commence trying to identify responses when out of Gee coverage, without re-tuning. Tuning varies with the height and time the set is on, so recheck frequently.
Bomber Command intend issuing in the near future a list of faults which can be remedied in the air. However, it is pointed out at this stage, operators are still failing to check fuses when the equipment goes unserviceable. This fault is the easiest which can be remedied in the air and failure to do this is inexcusable.
As always, practice makes perfect, and to overcome manipulation failures, operators should endeavour to spend considerable time tuning and re-tuning the bench set, following the procedure laid down in the drill. This applies to trained and untrained crews alike.
H 2 S and Fishpond are inter-dependent; consequently a manipulation failure on H 2 S leaves a crew without an essential warning device. This point alone easily outweighs all other arguments which may be brought up regarding manipulation failures. H 2 S operators and Wireless Operators must therefore realise that by spending a little time in training to keep efficient on both H 2 S and Fishpond, they are contributing to the safety of their aircraft and crew.
FLYING CONTROL
33 AIRCRAFT LANDED IN 45 MINS:
March has seen a further improvement in landing times, the average for the Group for the month being 2.13 minutes per aircraft. There is still, however, room for improvement in Single-squadron Stations, and Skellingthorpe has shown that the Landing Scheme can produce a high landing rate with small numbers of aircraft; on the night 18/19th March they landed fifteen aircraft in 25 minutes; the fact that a station only has one squadron to land is no excuse for poor landing times. If all single squadron stations follow Skellingthorpe’s example, then we can look forward to an overall Group average of well below the two minute mark.
Some excellent performances have been put up by Stations in this Group during the past month. Below are some figures which are the result of good flying discipline and good airmanship. They are not “peak period” figures, but are taken over the total period.
[Table of selected Aircraft recovery times by Station]
A conference was held at this Headquarters early in the month to review the landing scheme, and improve where necessary. One point raised was the difficulty in persuading pilots to adhere to the airspeeds laid down for return from the last concentration point. If you are one of the unfortunate ones, and are allotted one of the lower airspeeds, make up your mind to stick to it, for it does eliminate that tedious and highly dangerous orbiting of the airfield on return. There are many aircraft using a small piece of sky, and although we are not often troubled with intruders yet, one Hun fighter operating around 5 Group could do a deal of damage. If you rush back, you will certainly have to waste time before landing, so why not waste it peacefully over the sea, rather than be told to go for a short cross country in a congested area.
On reviewing diversions over the past six month it is obvious that standard R/T and control drills are lacking. As the result of a conference held at Headquarters Bomber Command, a standard method of control and R/T procedure has been agreed and will be issued shortly. It is to be used when aircraft are diverted away from Base and the 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme consequently not in operation. It is important that pilots have this procedure at their fingertips. Diversions are never a pleasant end to an operational sortie, but if you can get down at your diversion airfield with the minimum trouble, it makes the task an easier one for all concerned.
FOG DISPERSAL
The fog dispersal apparatus at Fiskerton was responsible for the landing of 14 aircraft during the month. The total number of aircraft landed to date, using this installation is 48. On the 17th March, when five aircraft landed, visibility before lighting up was only 200 yards, with fog estimated to be 800 feet thick. In sixteen minutes visibility on the runway had improved from 15 – 2,000 yards. Again on the 24th, 5 Group aircraft were able to use Fiskerton, and visibility was increased from 100 yards to 1500 yards in 12 minutes. Fog Dispersal is there for your use and your safety. Landing Notes have been issued to all Units and pilots must ensure that they are fully conversant with the use of the Fog Dispersal Installation. We will shortly have another installation serviceable at Metheringham, and perhaps the day
(Continued on page 8, col. 3)
MARCH LANDING TIMES
[Table of March Landing Times by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
DECORATIONS
The following immediate awards were approved during the month.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ W.D. ERVINE D.F.C.
A/W/Cdr E.L. PORTER, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt F.H. PHILLIPS. D.F.C.
P/O H.N. DAVIES D.F.C.
A/F/L I. RADEMEYER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.B. HEALEY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L/ L.A.J. McLEOD D.F.C.
R/O T.H. BLACKHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT J. BRADFORD D.F.M.
F/SGT D. LIGHTFOOT D.F.M.
A/F/L C.J. SPRIGGS D.F.C.
A/F/L W.M. WALTON D.F.C.
P/O S.F. ATCHESON D.F.C.
A/S/L M.I. BOYLE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L E.H. MOSS D.F.C.
F/Lt B.C. FITCH D.F.C.
F/O T.D. HALLIWELL D.F.C.
SGT A.E. HARRIS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O V.H. TRIMBLEE D.F.C.
SGT G.R. PRICE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ I. WHITTAKER, DFC. Bar to D.F.C.
A/S/L H.B. MARTIN, DSO, DFC & Bar. Bar to D.S.O.
F/O L.W. CURTISS, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
F/O T.D. SIMPSON D.F.C.
F/O B.T. FOXLEE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O K. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT G.C. KING D.F.M.
F/SGT D. SCHOFIELD D.F.M.
F/SGT G.E. HEXTER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L J.C.W. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT R. PARLE D.F.M.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £7299.2.0.
TACTICS
The ill effects of weaving in the bomber stream have been recorded by an experienced Flak Liaison Officer, and his opinions are set out in 5G/1/41/Air, sent to Stations on the 27th March, 1944. All crews should read this letter.
Since the introduction of early warning devices, more attention than ever must be paid to flying straight and level unless attacked. In this connection there is a point about weaving which is perhaps not fully appreciated. A weaving aircraft is continually closing range on other aircraft in the stream and is likely to confuse Monica and Fishpond operators, who may interpret the resultant blip as an enemy fighter closing in to attack. The consequencies [sic] may then be serious, particularly on a dark night, when gunners have been known to mistake four engines for two. In these days when all crews are conscious of some collision risk, the sighting of an aircraft crossing their line of flight is, to say the least, upsetting, and in any event, is unfair to gunners who can ill afford to waste time in identifying friendly bombers which behave in a suspicious manner.
Further, the straight and level policy is enforced to enable crews more easily to keep to the track laid down. The dangers of straying from track and the concentration are known to all. All the old hands at the game have realised that weaving is out of date and leads to trouble, and are now following the straight and narrow. Why not you?
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Two points of interest have been sorted out from an investigation into combats for March. They are:-
(i) Enemy fighters rarely fire more than one burst during each attack.
(ii) Period between opening fire and breaking away is a matter of seconds.
It is clear that many enemy fighters are opening fire at about the same time as they are identified by gunners or before a defensive manoeuvre is started. Night fighters as a rule depend on surprise and accuracy of their first burst, and if this fails, there is no doubt that the advantage passes to the gunners. The main problems are therefore:-
(i) To see the fighter and recognise it before it opens fire, and
(ii) to convey the information to the pilot immediately.
Problem (i) can only be met by energetic use of early warning devices, constant recognition practice and efficient night vision by gunners.
Problem (ii) can be solved if gunners report sightings immediately to the pilot, using the standard reporting code. A second’s delay in identifying the attacker before reporting it may mean the difference between eventually shooting it down, or your sustaining damage before you have that opportunity. Remember that a defensive manoeuvre, although designed to give gunners a known deflection, is also intended to evade the fighter’s fire; therefore, in view of the apparent short duration of combats, if an aircraft is flying suspiciously, gunners should not wait to identify it before ordering a corkscrew, particularly if the suspected aircraft is within firing range.
Flight Engineers
The most important job of the Flight Engineer is to help in getting his aircraft to the target and back, in the most efficient manner possible. But there us another side of his job that must not be forgotten; it is of the greatest importance. He must assist in keeping his machine up to the best standard of serviceability.
He can only do this id he is a keen, conscientious worker. He must pay every attention to the smallest detail in his aircraft, both when he is flying and on the ground; he should be with the ground crew whenever he can while they carry out their daily inspection.
He is the “Flying Spanner”, but firstly he should be the engineer on the ground, and know that the aircraft is tuned up to the last ounce. How can he know this if he only visits his dispersal about one hour before he goes on “Ops”?
Delay has occurred many times in the rectification of defects through an aircraft landing away from the parent station; this must be altered. It must be impressed upon Flight Engineers that it is their responsibility to report to the C.T.O. of that Station any defects or trouble which have developed during flight, and which may prevent them returning to their Base at the earliest moment. It is no good to be interrogated, have a meal and go to bed forgetting to report to the C.T.O. until the next day. The report must be given in person to the Engineering Officer on duty that night; he should also be told if petrol and oil is required, and the approximate time the aircraft will take off.
In the past, aircraft have been delayed through wrong information being passed on, and so it is essential that the Flight Engineer reports all known defects to the C.T.O. Confusion and incorrect information is caused by too many inexperienced people handling the message.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BOMBING [/underlined]
March was a varied month for the Bomb Aimers in the Group, the highlight from the bombing point of view being the precision attacks by Bases on special targets deep into France.
On the whole bombing was accurate, severe damage being done by Nos. 52, 53 and 54 Bases. It is apparent therefore, that our continuous practice has not been wasted. However, no one who studies the stick craters on the P.R.U. photographs can possibly feel complacent. Many crews missed!!!
The question immediately raised by these misses is whether or not the bombsight was serviceable. It is an intricate bombsight, but anyone who doubts its capabilities should study the long list of bombing errors less than 150 yards at 20,000 feet, given on this page. It must be serviceable, though, and it can only be proven serviceable though use. Therefore you must, at every opportunity, carry out practice bombing with your sight. Whenever you fly, carry out the established N.F.T. checks – report any failings you discover in the bombsight to the Instrument Section, and when you get crew errors of 100 yds or less, thank the instrument section who have helped to make it possible.
Finally, treat all practice bombing as precision bombing – the Air Bombers in 106 Squadron have reason to be proud. In teamwork with their pilots, they won the Squadron Bombing Competition against all-comers in the Group for 3 successive months, and were runners up in March. There is a great gap between the top and bottom errors in the Competition – there should not be! It should be a neck-and-neck struggle with only a few yards separating the Squadrons in the Group.
Are [underlined] YOU [/underlined] bombing your best for your Squadron?
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Bell, D.F.C.) reports the construction and issue to all Air Bombers of a hook as per diagram.
[Diagram]
This device is used for manual release of any H.E. hang-ups, and is of a length that ensures the linkage can be raised. Further, it can be used on No. 13 Station to make certain the “Cookie” has actually left the aircraft, a visual check from the nose being impeded by the incendiary containers.
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) has had the illumination bulbs in the Mark XIV Bombsight Computor [sic] painted red to counteract the glare. This ensures minimum effect on Night Vision.
[Underlined] 1654 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Morgan) has completed the installation of the complete Mark XIV Bombsight in the A.M.B.T.
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.) have nearly completed installation of A.M.B.T. Mk. XIV, several clever modifications being introduced. Excellent co-operation has been provided by the Armament and Electrical Officer and their staffs.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS IN YARDS, CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training and Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units, with averages]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES DURING MARCH
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
44 P/O Levy Sgt Peck F/O Fox 82 & 130 yds
P/O Hobbs F/S Scott F/S Fenwick 144 yds
F/L Dorehill F/S Deacon F/S Wright 116 yds
W/O Barton F/S Barnes F/O Sparrow 125 yds
F/L Wiggin F/O Marshall F/O Maury 112 yds
50 P/O Lundy F/O Bignell F/S Jordan 125 & 145 yds
Sgt MacFarlin Sgt Ball Sgt Elliott 108 yds
57 F/L Munday F/O Evans P/O West 120 yds
106 P/O Rossel Sgt Goss F/S White 140 yds
F/O Clement F/O Gautschi F/O Wilkinson 82 & 120 yds
463 F/S Page F/O Braithwaite W/O Fair 84 yds
619 W/Cdr Jeudwine Sgt Booth Sgt Gosling 79 yds
S/L Whamond F/O Kennedy F/O Marshall 135 yds
F/L McGilvray F/O Baker F/O Drake 140 yds
F/L Moore F/O Butler F/O Wood 123 yds
F/S Schofield F/S Hexter F/S Withinshaw 147 yds
630 F/L Roberts Sgt Davies Sgt Jeffreys 140 yds
W/Cdr Deas F/O Barker Sgt Wright 120 (twice) and 143 yds
S/L Calvert F/S Hogg F/S Beaudoin 148 yds
P/O Hill Sgt Allen F/S Stancer 120 yds
1654 S/L Bloom-Jones F/O Foulkes F/L Martin 148 yds
F/O Murray F/O Towers F/S Keeble 144 yds
F/S Ayres Sgt Charteris Sgt Airey 114 yds
P/O Spencer Sgt. Gordge Agt Hugh-Games 122 yds
1661 S/L Jones F/O Seibal F/O West 140 yds
5 LFS F/S Horne Sgt Johnson F/S Shipley 88 yds
Sgt Patterson Sgt Hall Sgt Rice 121 yds
Special mention is made of W/Cdr Deas and crew, 630 Squadron, who achieved Crew Errors less than 150 yards on [underlined] three [/underlined] exercises this month.
617 Squadron obtained a total of 26 exercises in the “Less than 150 yards” category the best three being:-
[Underlined] PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR [/underlined]
F/O Kell F/O Morieson 47 yards
F/L Cooper F/O Harden 68 yards
F/O Willsher F/S Everitt 75 yards
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION
In a month where 9 Squadrons qualified in the Competition it fell to 44 Squadron to wrest the leadership from 106 Squadron who headed the table for the three months December, January and February. 44 Squadron have set a very high standard and are to be congratulated on rising from the 6th position to the top of the table.
57 Squadron have shown notable improvement in rising to 5th place, which they share with 207 Squadron.
It is expected that April will bring maximum qualification by all Squadrons in the Group and a really close struggle for the top position.
[Underlined] PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS [/underlined]
[Underlined] ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET [/underlined]
1st 44 Squadron – 85 yards 1st 630 Squadron – 120 yards
2nd 106 Squadron – 98 yards 57 Squadron – 120 yards
3rd 619 Squadron – 108 yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 134 yards
4th 630 Squadron – 119 yards 4th 44 Squadron – 138 yards
5th 207 Squadron – 141 yards 5th 207 Squadron – 154 yards
57 Squadron - 141 yards 6th 467 Squadron – 181 yards
7th 463 Squadron – 169 yards 7th 463 Squadron – 197 yards
9 Squadron – 169 yards 8th 9 Squadron – 223 yards
9th 467 Squadron – 196 yards 9th 106 Squadron – 253 yards
The following Squadrons failed to enter the necessary 8 qualifying exercises:-
10th 61 Squadron – 132 yards (5 exercises) 10th 61 Squadron – 143 yards
11th 50 Squadron – 90 yards (4 exercises) 11th 50 Squadron – 123 yards
12th 49 Squadron – 89 yards (1 exercise) 12th 49 Squadron – 92 yards
ADDITION BOMBING TRAINER
[Table of Trainer Activity by Squadron]
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
Two entries were received this month:
W/Cdr Porter 112 yards (Errors include bombsight error)
G/Cpt Pleasance 289 yards (Error of 98 yards)
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley – 122 yards
How about some competition, Bombing Leaders?
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What is the theory of Wanganui technique and what are the correct bombsight settings?
2. If the Bomb Doors were open, but the Bomb Release Test could not be extracted from the positive Fusing Device, what check would you make before manually releasing?
3. Where is the type “H” Jettison Button and when do you need to use it?
4. Why do you set [underlined] indicated [/underlined] Wind Speed on the Mk. XIV Computor. [sic]
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
F/Lt Allan has left Scampton and is passing through the Conversion Units in order to return to operations for his 2nd tour. Good Luck!
F/Lt Gibson has become tour-expired and moved to Scampton to superintend the Bombing Section of the Aircrew School.
F/O Abbott has moved from 106 Squadron to 49 Squadron. We now expect to see [underlined] 49 [/underlined] Squadron top of the Bombing Competition!!
F/O Toogood (106 Squadron), tour-expired has moved to 92 Group for Bombing Leader’s duties.
P/O Duck who obtained 14th position with “B” pass on 77 Bombing Leaders’ Course has moved from 619 to 617 Squadron.
F/O Falgate (463 Squadron) and P/O Hulland D.F.M., (1654 Con. Unit) were 8th and 12th respectively on No.78 Bombing Leaders’ Course, with “B” passes.
AIR SEA RESCUE
For two months now there has been no ditching in this Group, which shows a deal of consideration for the Air Sea Rescue Officers in the Group, but at the same time it is wondered whether crews generally have increased their knowledge to an equivalent extent – have you got all your A.S.R. gen and equipment buttoned up?
In addition to giving swimming instruction P.F.O’s are now lending a hand with dinghy instruction in the South Park Girls’ School Swimming Baths. Now that summer is almost here, this should be a real attraction, and every effort must be made for regular attendance. As a further attraction some stations have periods during the early evening so that, with the co-operation of the M.T. Sections, an evening out in Lincoln should be enjoyed by all – after the instruction is over.
[Cartoon] EMP.
It is hoped that “Q” type dinghies (which will replace the “J” type fairly soon) will shortly be available on the scale of one per Squadron for instructional purposes. This dinghy is quite a complicated bit of work, and crews should take every opportunity of getting in sailing practice on local stretches of water (remembering that the depth of water must be at least 4 feet, owing to the depth of keel). Some good fun should be had these long summer evenings – when you can afford time off from obliterating the Hun.
[Underlined] HINT TO USERS [/underlined]
The floating torch has a nasty habit of lighting at awkward moments – why not pad the torch pocket in Mae Wests and Buoyancy suits with some light-damping material, so that the light will not shine through? Whatever happens, don’t go flying over the sea without your floating torch.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL (Contd. From page 5, col. 3) [/underlined]
is not far off when an operation will be planned and will depend solely on Fog Dispersal Installations for landing of aircraft.
There will be, therefore, three Fog Dispersal airfields situated in a comparatively small area, LUDFORD MAGNA in 1 Group, FISKERTON and METHERINGHAM. The identification of these airfields as night presents a problem, for you if you mistake another airfield for your own and are listening on your local airfield frequency, there is no means of contacting you by R/T. It is essential therefore, that darky frequency is used for all R/T control at Fog Dispersal airfields.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER [/underlined]
The trainer at Fiskerton is now equipped for training with the Mark IIC Gyro Gunsight, and training of the squadron gunners is going ahead under the supervision of F/O Johnson-Biggs, ex 619 Squadron, P/O Collingwood, ex 50 Squadron, and Sgt Kennedy of 49 Squadron. The trainer is housed in a spacious blister type building equipped with a large screen on which the target aircraft is projected, together with the fixed and moving graticules which are a feature of the new sight. An F.N. 16 turret is used for manipulation, and this is fitted with all the controls of the gunsight. Very realistic conditions can be reproduced, although until a trainer is produced which will introduce conditions like the Link Trainer with its “Bumps” attachment, the gunner is still operating from a rock steady platform which does not give a true indication of his ability to hold a target in the sight. A demonstration stand is housed in the same building which has a complete Gyro Gunsight with all controls and fittings. This is used for introducing gunners to the sight during initial instruction, and enables one gunner to operate the sight on the stand whilst another gunner is operating the turret on the trainer. A new type of film is available for use with the trainer; this gives a light coloured aircraft on the screen with a dark background, differing from the film in general use for aircraft recognition training on the Jurby trainer, which project a dark aircraft on a light background.
[Underlined] FUTURE INSTALLATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Swinderby [/underlined] is the next station to have the trainer installed. This will be housed in the standard spotlight trainer building, which at present is being modified by removing the steelwork situated on the front of the screen. All the equipment is available and installation should commence within the next two weeks.
[Underlined] Winthorpe [/underlined] have received part of the equipment and the construction of the building has been commenced.
[Underlined] G.2. GUNNERY NOTES [/underlined]
On the 6th January, 1944, a letter (BC/S.24636/Trg.) was issued from H.Q.B.C. stating that the G.2 Notes were available in large quantities, and intimating that they could be demanded on the following scale.
[Underlined] Instructors’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per instructor or Gunnery Leader not already holding one.
[Underlined] Students’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per Air Gunner not already holding one. This would appear to be a straightforward matter, but certain Units within the Group are still without these very important notes for a variety of reasons; units who demanded the notes as instructed received their demands promptly, but any unit who has not received these notes may obtain single copies by contacting the G.G.O. As these notes form the basis for all instructions on sighting in the Command, it is of paramount importance that all Gunnery Leaders instructors and gunners be familiar with their contents. It has been discovered that gunners attending the Specialist Sighting Course and Air Gunner Instructors’ Course at Manby have been handicapped by a lack of preliminary knowledge of sighting due to the failure of Units to obtain the notes when the instruction was first issued.
(Continued on page 10, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
THIS MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
49 Sqdn “D” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
619 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “L” 18/19 March, 1944. ME109 c
61 Sqdn “K” 22/23 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “R” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109
106 Sqdn “N” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109
PROBABLY DESTROYED
619 Sqdn “T” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “S” 24/25/ March, 1944. ME109 c
463 Sqdn “Q” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88 c
DAMAGED
207 Sqdn “G” 1/2 March, 1944. T/E c
467 Sqdn “F” 1/2 March, 1944. FW190 c
61 Sqdn “W” 15/16 March, 1944. FW190 c
619 Sqdn “P” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
207 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. ME109 c
50 Sqdn “M” 18/19 March. 1944. ME109 c
467 Sqdn “J” 18/19 March, 1944. ME110 c
207 Sqdn “O” 18/19 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “D” 22/23 March, 1944. JU88 c
467 Sqdn “Q” 22/23 March, 1944. ME109
50 Sqdn “U” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
49 Sqdn “K” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
44 Sqdn “J” 24/25 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “H” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109 c
57 Sqdn “M” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
463 Sqdn “G” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
44 Sqdn “U” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
57 Sqdn “B” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
50 Sqdn “Z” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109 c
Claims annotated “c” have been confirmed by Command. Other claims have not been confirmed owing to late rendition of combat reports.
It is intended to publish in the “News” a table showing the amount of air training carried out by Units each month. This will chiefly consist of Fighter Affiliation exercises and air firing, and provision is made for tabulating the Fighter Affiliation under three headings, i.e. “Camera & Gyro”, “Camera only” and “Without Camera”. This table is standard throughout the Command.
To ensure that a standard method is used throughout, a fighter combat exercise is to be considered as a “Combat” between a fighter and one air gunner in a bomber aircraft. Thus, if both Mid-Upper and Tail turrets are in use two exercises would be carried out. In future monthly training returns are to state the number of exercises as defined above. It is hoped that future tables published will include attacks by fighters on “Bullseye” exercises.
[Underlined] C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Course No. 75 [/underlined]
F/O Spilsbury – 5 LFS – 82% - Cat. “A”
Sgt Boardman – 49 Sqdn – 77.2% - Cat. “C”
Gunnery Leaders are reminded that they are invited to attend the Assessment Committee held at the conclusion of each course, and Gunnery Leaders who have gunners taking the course should make an effort to attend this board and obtain first hand information of their pupil’s efforts.
Gunnery Leaders desirous of visiting the C.G.S. for this purpose are to contact the G.G.O. who will make the necessary arrangements.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING – MARCH [/underlined]
[Table of Gunnery Exercises by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHT FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Stick rigidly to your lattice lines when homing to your airfield. There was a regrettable accident during the month when a pilot in the Group arrived at the airfield on the wrong side of the circuit and crashed when he was forced to dive to avoid an aircraft on the circuit. The lattice lines are your “right of way“ in the sky.
Don’t get careless about your flaps, and remember the Lancaster flaps provide maximum lift from 25° to the fully up position. From the 25° stage to the fully down position, lift is decreasing and drag is increasing. So, remember, take your flap off in two stages and exercise great care in taking off the last 25°. Trim as you do it.
If you make a “sighting” and you are orbiting a ditched aircraft or a dinghy, switch your I.F.F. on to “distress”. Do not change height while orbiting otherwise your plot will fade and you may give the impression that you have ditched. This new Signals Instruction is to enable R.D.F. to plot you, and thus double check your position, and the position of the sighting.
Don’t get off hand about reporting defects after flight. Record any defect on Form 700. Let the ground crew or Flight Commander and the N.C.O. know. Keep them all in the picture, the Security Officer won’t jump on you for that.
By the way, when did you and your crew last go through the bombing up procedure with the Armament types? There might be a day when you have to do your own bombing up.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
If you are unlucky and get fire in the air, do not dive your aircraft in the hope of putting the flames out. It will make them spread more, making it difficult to abandon aircraft, and will produce structural strain, causing a more rapid break up as the fire develops. The “gen” for fire in the air is in the 5 Group Aircraft Drills.
You can now land from West to East as well as from East to West at Woodbridge. The landing is from East to West at all times except when you see smoke generators burning at each end of the main runway. So watch for the smoke, and then land towards the sea.
Inspect S.D. 158 periodically. It is a secret document, and therefore you won’t find it lying around the Flight office; Ops/Flying Control will oblige. Note the instruction to burn resin lights above 8,000 feet at night.
Pay the closest attention to the latest “gen” about the moveable T.O.T. and remember the importance of sticking to the air speed laid down. 5 m.p.h. either side of the specified air speed it not good enough.
Have you dropped any practice bombs yet? It is the duty of every pilot to try his hand at bombing. Team up with another pilot in your flight, and see who gets the best result.
Public Relations
[Underlined] SIX STATIONS ON THE AIR [/underlined]
No.5 Group entered the radio world in earnest during March, no fewer than six stations being visited by B.B.C. recording units.
Though the resulting broadcasts did not hit the high lights in home programmes, they were given many times, and in many languages, all over the world. They reminded our overseas troops that the R.A.F. is still doing big business!!
First, a five day visit was paid to Skellingthorpe by F/Lt W Caverhill, of the broadcasting branch at Air Ministry, accompanied by B.B.C. engineers. They prepared scripts and made records of 18 R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel, who gave short talks to be included in the B.B.C’s overseas programme “Radio News Reel”.
Bardney was visited on the night of March 18/19th by a B.B.C. recording unit, and more than a doz en [sic] records were made of the station’s contribution towards the night’s attack on Frankfurt. This picture of R.A.F. life was broadcast in both short and long versions on the General Forces programme, as well as overseas.
The success of the Bardney broadcasts prompted the B.B.C. to make a return visit to record the operation against Berlin, on the night of March 24/25th. This time, the famous commentators, Mr. Robert Dunnett and Mr. Stewart MacPherson, brought a recording unit to Coningsby. On the way, the unit stopped at Metheringham as the aircraft were taking off and filled one disc with an interesting description of the scene.
At Coningsby a number of members of ground crews and station personnel came to the microphone and described their work. Further recordings were made in the Operations Room.
Owing to weather changes, the party beat a hasty retreat from Coningsby and went to
(Continued on page 11col.1)
Negotium Perambulans In Tenebris
The Meteorological Gremlin has spectacles and grey hair,
And his mysterious lair
Is very jealously guarded;
And must be regarded
With suitable awe, by all except
The few adept.
It is chiefly a nocturnal beast, and is often found
Prowling and prowling
(Like a host of Midian)
Searching for a datum or perhaps a meridian.
In this it is frequently assisted by a tiny female mammal whose chemical formula is PA2AOC,
Whose small scurrying figure you will often see
Bearing winds to the Gremlin. It is easy to please
With an airy zephyr, or a balmy breeze
Which it consumes with avidity, and that is why
It is able to prophesy!!
ANON (Circa, 1944)
Link Trainer
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
[Underlined] GUNNERY (Continued from page 9 col 1) [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY [/underlined]
The object of this course, which lasts for 10 days, is the training of sighting instructors and instructors capable of assessing cine gyro films. Originally only Conversion Unit or Gunnery Flight personnel could attend but this restriction has recently been removed, and all Units may now nominate gunners for this course; they must show an aptitude for sighting and must have passed well in this subject on a Gunnery Leaders’ Course or Air Gunner Instructors’ course. One vacancy only is allotted to the Group per month.
[Underlined] THOSE SQUADRON GYROS [/underlined]
The Gyro Assessors held by squadrons have in some instances been leading a very quiet life tucked away nicely in the Armoury or on a shelf in a cupboard. Numerous reasons are put forward for not using the Gyro during Fighter Affiliation exercises; for instance, aircraft not modified, not enough notice given to Gunnery sections, Photo. Section unable to process film, etc., etc. None of these reasons is really serious , and all can be easily overcome by a little more co-operation from the sections concerned. Modification on the aircraft is simple, consisting of enlarging the port inner gun port in the rear turret, and can be done in half-an-hour. It is not, repeat not, necessary to blank off the servo motor, and the gyro assembly can be installed in half an hour at the most. All the electrical gear is mounted on the gyro rig and after the rig has been fitted to the gun cradle only three things remain to be done:-
(i) Connect electrical cable to supply in turret.
(ii) Connect rear sear release pipe to gyro rig.
(iii) Harmonize gun sight to camera.
All Photo. Sections CAN process the film, and there is no shortage of magazines in the Group. At 51 Base, a Corporal Armourer is available to give assistance on gyro assessors. This N.C.O. has constructed all the Gyro Assessors in use in the Group, and the present compact and efficient rig is his product. Units requiring his services should contact 51 Base Armament Officer. The Gyro Assessors are not to be left in aircraft which are engaged on night flying as two assessors have already been lost through aircraft with gyros fitted, crashing on night flying.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] M.T. SPARES [/underlined]
Concern Is being caused by the unserviceability of M.T. vehicles in general, and every effort should be made by Equipment Officers to review establishments and ensure that demands are raised regularly to keep stocks of the generally used items up to maximum. It is impracticable and uneconomical to hold stocks of the many parts which not only vary with the make of vehicles but also with the diverse models of each make of vehicle, which again vary according to the year of manufacture. Therefore all M.T. Officers must anticipate requirements for inspection overhauls and other contingencies where certain parts are known to be badly worn and will need replacement in the near future. [Underlined] At least two weeks’ [/underlined] notice of these requirements should be given to the Equipment Officer, and Forms 674 should not only state for what purpose the spares are required, but the approximate date the replacement is required; the chassis and engine number of the vehicle MUST in all cases be quoted. Demands will then be raised in accordance with A.M.O. A.481/43.
[Underlined] A.E.C. TANKER FUEL HOSES [/underlined] (Stores Ref 4K/2009) have for some considerable time been in very short supply, and the chief cause for this is the difficulty in the manufacture of sufficient protective coverings. Bomber Command have now agreed to accept these hoses without this covering and as a result it is anticipated that the supply position will improve considerably within the next two months. In the meantime, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for the repair of these hoses by the manufacturer, under Station local purchase powers.
It is understood that Messrs. Zwicky of Slough (telephone: Slough 23776) are prepared to sell these hoses to the Service, but stations are only to resort to local purchase in extreme cases, where operational efficiency is directly affected and supplies cannot be obtained through Service channels.
A meeting of Base and Station Equipment Officers was held at this Headquarters during the month, when points of mutual interest were discussed, with a view to giving even better service than in the past, to all and sundry.
Before closing the meeting, the A.O.C. spoke highly of the service given by the Equipment Branch. This, naturally, was most gratifying, for sometimes we feel that quite a lot of people look upon us as mere “dogsbodies”, and give no thought to the time, patience and methods (sometimes very unorthodox) adopted in an endeavour to produce the goods.
(Continued from page10, col. 2)
Fiskerton, where the return of aircraft was described, and aircrew were interviewed.
Dunholme received a short visit of the Hon. Herman Hodge, of the Colonial Office, and a B.B.C. recording unit, on 21st March.
Press visitors during the month included representatives of “The Star”, Sheffield, to the Sheffield Squadron at Fiskkerton, on March 15th, and Mrs K. Wilson of the “Sydney Morning Herald”, to Waddington on 31st March.
TRAINING
The Stirling is becoming slowly but surely a nicely house-trained creature. It can be taken out for long or short trips with few difficulties that delay training and rend the tempers of Lancaster loving instructors. The lurid language of February, which produced a glow like unto many batteries of sodiums, is scarcely remembered. Perhaps ‘tis Spring and everything is set for an ideal world.
The L.F.S. at Syerston achieved great success with 93 crews passed out to Squadrons and the H.C.U’s were in no way overshadowed, for they passed on 98 crews for Lancaster training. The outlook for April is therefore fairly good, and squadrons may look forward with confidence to a reasonably early increase in crews, weather permitting.
It is a matter of real regret that accidents have marred an otherwise good month, and may have dragged 5 Group to the bottom of the ladder. A promise has however, been extracted from all and sundry, that 5 Group shall move to the top in April and there will be no avoidable accidents in 51 Base. The heavy snow fall, and the resultant snow banks were chiefly responsible- or perhaps it was the determination to get on with flying and crew output, despite the snow banks.
The April programme is optimistic indeed. There is a measure of quiet confidence about, and if results come up to expectation a new high standard will have been set for Conversion Bases. The results will be seen in better trained and more experienced crews, and we hope the squadrons will not be reluctant to pay the Units a visit and express their appreciation.
Fighter Affiliation Training is now being carried out in Units with detachments of 1690 Flight (1485 regenerated) and an improvement in Gunnery standards is expected.
Synthetic Fishpond training has been introduced, and is likely to be adopted generally.
Recent changes include Group Captain Vintras to command Wigsley; Wing Commander Baxter (106) to Chief Instructor, Swinderby; Wing Commander Jennings (207) to Wing Commander Training, 51 Base; Wing Commander MacFarlane (51 Base) to Chief Instructor Wigsley, and Wing Commander Hallows (5 Group) to Chief Instructor, Winthorpe.
Squadron Leader Osborne (1660) is training Lancaster instructors at Syerston, and also Wing Commanders “Ops” from operational Bases. Squadron Leader Shields and Flight Lieutenant Wyness (1654) are training Stirling instructors at Swinderby. Both “Academies [sic] are doing well.
ABSENCE
ENEMY AGENTS – ABSENTEES
During the coming months, the Allied Forces are likely to be called upon for a maximum effort on land, sea and air, to defeat the enemy.
No. 5 Group will certainly be expected to take its full part in this effort, and there can be no doubt that at heart every man and woman serving in the Group would agree that he or she was going to do it. In spite of all these good intentions there are still far too many absentees, aircrew and ground staff alike. Not long absences, just a few hours or a few days, but absences just the same, at a time when the manpower position simply cannot afford absentees. There isn’t a Tom there now to do Dick’s work while he slips off to see the Dog-races, and there isn’t a Joan there to drive that van while Mary goes off to her sister’s wedding.
[Cartoon] WFW
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE
Of course those two extra days at home in the garden with the wife were well worth two days pay, and even a bit of C.C. as well, and that special party was well worth a day’s pay and a rep., but that isn’t the point. It’s to have days at home in the garden and special parties that we are fighting this war. There might very well not be a garden or wife at all if the Germans laid down the orders for us, and we should certainly not be the ones to enjoy any parties that were arranged.
There is this special point for aircrews to remember too. You work together as a team and your captain has to have complete confidence in each one of his crew or he cannot give his best to his job. If you have let him down by going absent once or twice during training is he going to have that confidence and is he going to feel quite certain that you’re not absent(minded) in that rear turret? It might make all the difference!
If you’re absent on the ground, you’re quite likely to be absent in the air; it’s all a matter of self-discipline, and that’s the same in each case.
In this war, no-one in the services can be a neutral; if you don’t do a day’s work for the Allies, you are doing a day’s work for the Axis, and at the end of the war your Form 121 will show just how many days you put in fighting [underlined] for [/underlined] Hitler. If you put it that way, that day’s absence doesn’t look so good, so cut it out and [underlined] don’t be an enemy agent. [/underlined]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The semi final between Coningsby and Scampton was a tremendous affair. From the kick off, Scampton’s attack went all out, and Coningsby’s defence is to be congratulated on the way they held them. Coningsby’s attack improved, and the game swung from goal to goal. Ten minutes before half time, Coningsby centre headed a goal from a corner kick. After the break, Scampton forced the pace and equalised after ten minutes with a shot that gave the Coningsby goalie no chance. Both sides were all out in an endeavour to snatch the lead. Coningsby left wing repeatedly broke away and centred, but nobody could connect. By three quarters time both teams were slackening as a result of the terrific pace; both defences, and especially the goalies, were coping brilliantly. A draw seemed inevitable. Then came the turning point; Coningsby attacked, their left half was well up the field, and instead of the usual pass to the wing he made ground, then shot hard and true for the top corner. The last 15 minutes of the game saw repeated Coningsby attacks, and five minutes from time they got a third goal. It was a magnificent game, and Coningsby are to be congratulated on entering the final via such a tremendous obstacle in the powerful Scampton team.
Round two produced a hard fought duel between Winthorpe and Metheringham. Two draws were played, 1-1 and 3-3 after extra time in each game. In the third game Winthorpe won 4 – 1, and are now due to play Skellingthorpe at Swinderby in the semi final.
[Underlined] THE LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE RUGGER COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has been a failure as a Group competition, but has been an immense success in 53 Base where 86 teams in all have taken part. Very few casualties have resulted in the large number of games played, the most serious being a broken collar bone, which is undoubtedly more than could be claimed for a Soccer competition boasting a equivalent number of entrants. The event must now be considered a 53 Base monopoly, since in spite of many appeals from this Headquarters, no other squadrons have got cracking. The inter unit play off will be at Waddington within the next few days (to be signalled to all stations) and it is hoped that Stations will provide transport for as many of their aircrew personnel as possible to witness the play off.
[Underlined] THE WINES RUGGER TROPHY [/underlined]
Round two of the competition saw Winthorpe beat Scampton 14 – 11 in a hard fought game. Dunholme beat Swinderby 8 – 0, so these two teams pass to the semi final. Round two games still undecided are – Waddington v Metheringham/Woodhall and East Kirkby v Fiskerton. It is hoped those Stations will complete the events within the next few days.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
Swinderby are now in the semi final, and the outstanding matches are – Waddington v Metheringham. Syerston v Scampton and East Kirkby v 5 Group. These three games should be decided within the next week.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played six station matches with the very fine result of 4 wins. Their only loss was with Coningsby in the Matz semi-final. They beat A.V. Roe 5 – 4 in the 3rd round of the Lincoln Amateur Cup, and drew 0 - 0 with R.A.F. Wickenby in the semi-final of the Amateur Cup.
DUNHOLME had a busy but rather unsuccessful month. They lost their 3rd round Matz Cup game 2 – 3 to Coningsby, and their 3rd round in the Amateur Cup by the same score to R.A.F. Wickenby.
CONINGSBY – The highlight of the Coningsby month, indeed to quote 54 Base excellent “GEN” – of the season, was their MATZ Cup victory over Scampton. Intersection league games were fewer than usual owing to the bad weather. 619 v 617 and 106 v 61 are also games due this month in the Base Commander’s “All Sports” Trophy.
METHERINGHAM – The duel with Winthorpe in the 2nd round of the Matz Cup was most notable. Weather caused cancellations of no fewer than 10 games, but five inter-section games were completed.
BARDNEY played 4 station matches, playing the 1st Border Regt. twice (1 win 3 – 2, 1 draw 1 – 1), beating Metheringham 3 – 2 and losing to Coningsby by the same margin. 5 inter-section games were completed.
EAST KIRKBY Station XI played 4 games, and won all four, beating Kirkby and Spilsby R.A.F.R. teams and two Field-Craft Airborne Units. In the seven inter-section events, 630 – B Flight were most successful.
SPILSBY had seven games during the month. Their R.A.F.R. Squadron beat East Kirkby R.A.F.R. Squadron 7 – 2, and the local Suffolks 9 – 3, losing 4 – 2 to Kirkby and 3 – 2 to R.A.F. Skegness.
H.Q. 5 GROUP – The Group side are still only able to play away fixtures. In March they had three games, losing to a Scampton team 2 – 3, to Skellingthorpe 0 – 4, and holding their old opponents 93 M.U. to a 2 – 2 draw.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON had only the two games completed due to cancellations by opponents. They lost to Hemswell 0 – 3 and to Winthorpe 11 – 14 in round two of the Wines Cup.
DUNHOLME have a really strong side led by F/L Waterhouse. They overwhelmed Bardney 33 – 0 in round 1 of the Wines Cup, and have since beaten Swinderby 8 – 0 in round two.
METHERINGHAM list 0 – 27 to Waddington, and were unlucky to have six games postponed, their opponents including Digby, Bardney and Coningsby.
BARDNEY had only one station game, in which they were unlucky to meet Dunholme on top of their form in the Wines Cup, and suffer a 33 – 0 defeat.
EAST KIRKBY had three games, a 630 Squadron A and B practice game, and a 57 Squadron A and B practice, followed by a station A and B trial. In spite of this preparation they were unlucky enough to forego their Wines Cup round one as Wigsley could not raise a side. They are now waiting to play Fiskerton in the second round.
HOCKEY
SCAMPTON had four games of mixed hockey, beating Spilsby 6 – 1 in round one of the Group competition, and Foldingsworth 5 – 0. They lost 2 – 3 to 368 Searchlight Battery and 1 – 5 to Rose Bros. In the second round of the cup they have now to play Syerston.
DUNHOLME had only one mixed hockey game, v Scampton in the Group competition, which they lost 1 – 4.
METHERINGHAM played a 2 – 2 draw with Waddington on their new aerodrome pitch. They are now due to play Waddington again in the Group contest.
BARDNEY neat Dunholme 4 – 1 in the Group contest, and later registered a 4 – 1 win against Waddington. They were finally knocked out of the trophy by Swinderby (5 – 1).
EADT KIRKBY had four games, three inter-station and one (a 1- 1 draw) with Spilsby G.S. They are now waiting to meet 5 Group at home in the contest.
SPILSBY played Scampton in the Group trophy, but were defeated 6 – 1.
[Underlined] ICE HOCKEY [/underlined]
54 Base boast a Canadian Cougars’ team that is certainly 100% full blooded, judging from the “GEN” account of their 5 – 4 victory over Digby Dynamites.
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
F/Lt. Rodgers (Gunnery Leader 617) now has a Woodhall Soft Ball team that challenges all comers. Roll up, roll up, and have your money ready!!
(Continued on page 4, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
Dot and Dash, the immaculate WAAFs.
“…OPERATIONS? I’VE ‘AD ‘EM!”
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Navigation generally has been of a high order this month. There is still room for considerable improvement however. A good many of the Navigators’ Charts still look very bare. Although all aircraft are equipped with Air Position Indicators, a few Navigators still do not “keep an air plot”, in that they do not plot their Air Position regularly and obtain a D.R. position. This is most important and must be done. A standard Navigational procedure to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s, has been laid down (see Air Staff Instruction Nav/14). We are constantly striving for concentration, and for obvious reasons the concentration should be on the planned track, it is therefore imperative that you constantly obtain your D.R. position by intelligent use of the broadcast w/v’s. If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, then alter course immediately and regain track.
The A.P.I. has been modified, and the error in this instrument is now very small. If the windfinders obtain accurate fixes on their H 2 S, the resultant w/v should be almost perfect. Navigators should, therefore, have every confidence in the broadcast w/v’s and make the fullest possible use of them.
Whilst track keeping is very important, it must be remembered that timing is equally important. This does not seem to be fully appreciated, and a few Navigators still persist om leaving the concentration point with “a few minutes in hand”. Other aircraft inadvertently leave the concentration point a few minutes late (possibly due to late take-off, etc.) with the result that the stream of aircraft is very much longer than it should be, and the chance of success by the German night fighter is increased. If it is calculated that the aircraft will arrive at the concentration point early, then dog-legs [underlined] must [/underlined] be carried out before reaching this position. All Navigation Officers are to check the time at the concentration point of each aircraft, and they must insist that no aircraft leaves this position with any time in hand.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
All aircraft of the Group are now equipped with the A.P.I. fully modified. Several tests have been carried out to ascertain the accuracy of this instrument now it has been modified, and the results have shown that the error is now very small, and of the order of 3 or 4 m.p.h. We must, therefore, make every use of this valuable instrument. It is considered by a few Navigators that errors arise when resetting the A.P.I. Mechanically this is not so, and any errors are due to incorrect setting by the Navigator. If the A.P.I. is reset every 30 minutes, as it should be, then the amount to be subtracted or added to the counters should not be great, and would not generally be more that 30-35 minutes of latitude or longitude. For ease and simplicity, the A.P.I. should not be reset until the latitude or longitude counters are showing an even number of minutes, e.g. 10, 20, 30, etc. It should then be a simple matter to add or subtract say 25 minutes of latitude or longitude.
It is advocated by a small section of the “Union” that the A.P.I. should be reset as little as possible, e.g. at the last Gee fix, the target, and first Gee fix, etc., but this method has several disadvantages. It will become cumbersome after a long period of D.R. e.g. the Berlin raid 24/25 March, 1944, when the wind vector from target to Enemy Coast was approx. 230 miles long. There is as great a risk of error in plotting this vector as in resetting the A.P.I. Another disadvantage is that the Air Position may run off the chart in use. This would necessitate carrying several charts.
The Air Position Indicator is a valuable instrument if correctly used. Navigators are urged to experiment with the A.P.I. in the various methods of use, and discuss with their Station Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
March was a mixed month for broadcast w/v’s. The wind finding and resultant track keeping was good, with the exception of Berlin and Nuremburg. The last two mentioned raids have been investigated, and the results are worthy of special comment.
[Underlined] Berlin. [/underlined] Average forecast w/v from Base to Target at 20,000 feet was 350/60. Average w/v transmitted was 350/90. Average true w/v was approximately 350/105. It will be noted that the winds transmitted by Aircraft were, on average, 15 m.p.h. under strength. A large percentage of windfinders obtained the accurate w/v, but only a few transmitted it. The remainder either did not send it, or, not believing there could be such a large error in the forecast w/v’s, “watered it down” and sent that. This procedure is very dangerous. Navigators must send back all w/v’s they obtain, providing they are confident the fixes used are accurate.
Another feature of the Berlin raid was the delay in aircraft sending back w/v’s. All the difficulties experienced by aircrew are fully appreciated, but every effort must be made to get the w/v’s back to Base as soon as possible.
[Underlined] Nuremburg. [/underlined] The investigation into this raid has not yet been completed, but the one outstanding feature is that the wind direction at and above 20,000 feet backed by 15° - 20° and this was a contributory factor to the Northerly trend on the return journey.
[Underlined] LIAISON VISITS [/underlined
Only a few liaison visits have been completed during the month. It is very difficult for operational Station and Squadron Navigational Officers to visit the Con. Units or Scampton Aircrew School, but every effort should be made. Make a note of all the deficiencies of Navigators, your suggestions, criticisms etc., then go and discuss them with the Con. Unit or Scampton. More good can be done by paying one liaison visit than by writing a hundred letters. Con. Unit, L.F.S. and Scampton Instructors must also pay regular visits to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
During the month, one Navigator from each Squadron was detailed to experiment with Log and Chart work. Each was asked to work almost entirely on the Chart, making only a very few log entries. This method has proved very popular. Full reports are not yet to hand, but an analysis of all reports will be sent to Stations and Squadrons in due course.
1. If the D.R. Compass topples, and the repeater rotates, what action would you take to maintain the line of flight marker on the H 2 S correctly orientated?
2. What action would you take to tune in the ground returns and set up the height marker on the H 2 S equipment if the trace on the height tube were missing?
3. You are using broadcast wind velocities, and the Bomb Aimer gives you a pinpoint which is “off track”. What two actions would you take?
4. You have received an amendment to the zero hour, but, having applied the correction, observe that you still have several minutes in hand. How and where would you lose this time?
5. In which countries are the following towns: Strasbourg, Aix-le Chappelle, Flensburg, Ghent, Pilsen, Charlattenburg?
6. Which is the shorter distance – Stuttgart to ROME or Stuttgart to LONDON?
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. (a) Passes to W/Optr. On paper (1) Course, (2) Height, (3) I.A.S., (4) present position, (5) estimated time of ditching, (6) reason for ditching. ( )
(b) Obtain a Gee fix and pass to W/Op., on paper, the Gee co-ordinates and time of fix.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Few crews carry out correct procedure, which is – the emergency procedure when ditching is considered unavoidable, S.O.S. procedure when ditching is imminent within 15 minutes.
2. 30°
3. If B strobe is missing. Line up signals in usual manner, and take “C” reading. Then reverse signals so that B signal is on the C trace, strobe the signal and take the reading remembering to subtract 30. If “C” strobe is missing, reverse above procedure and add 30 to the “C” pulse reading.
4. (a) It means that you are heading for high ground.
(b) Turn on reciprocal course and obtain a check on your position. If no reliable aids are available in the aircraft, the Navigator should request W/Op. to obtain an M/F D/F fix.
Lines to those who went on leave on April 4th.
For you the birds tra-la do sing!
For me the heavens do glower and rain!
For you buds burst like anything!
My buds ‘gainst blight do strive in vain!
The reason’s simple why I grieve,’
And why my downtrod soul doth pine;
For you continue with your leave,
But I’ve just heard that I’ve had mine!!
ANON (Circa 1944)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ANOTHER BAD MONTH [/underlined]
The [underlined] Avoidable [/underlined] Accident Summary for March again makes bad reading – Squadrons had 9 and Training Base had 33. These figures speak for themselves, and they use pretty strong language. As a result of these accidents, 4 aircraft were CAT “E”, 6 were CAT “B”, 20 were CAT AC” and 12 were CAT “A”. Bear in mind these were only avoidable accidents. Technical failures are not included in this list. Details are as follows:-
Ground collisions (including taxying) – 15; overshoot landing – 3; crashes on 3-engined overshoots – 3; swings on take off – 5; swings landing – 4; errors of judgement landing – 5; heavy landings – 3; maintenance – 2; taking off – 1; other errors of judgement – 1: Total [underlined] 42 [/underlined].
The snow period at the beginning of the month was directly responsible for 14 of these accidents, all within 51 Base. Had there been no hard snow banks, no damage would have been done to these aircraft. The hazard had to be accepted, and no action was on these “snow” accidents. Under this heading there were 5 taxying, 7 swinging and 2 landing. This however, still leaves 19 avoidable accidents in 51 Base, in the usual categories, and 9 in squadrons – total 28, as under:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined] – Ground collisions – 3; overshoot landing – 2; maintenance errors – 2; other errors of judgement – 2.
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined] Ground collisions – 7; swings – 2; overshoot landing 1; heavy landings – 2; other landing errors – 4; crashes on 3 engined overshoots – 3.
Collisions on the ground (10) still account for more damaged aircraft than any other category. There were two more M.T. collisions this month, both due to careless driving by ground personnel, in spite of the recent drive to eliminate these costly entirely inexcusable accidents. One aircraft was damaged during compass swinging at a squadron, and two more were damaged on dispersal. In the others, only a very slight degree of carelessness was shown by aircrew. They were more unfortunate than anything else. Apart from the M.T. collisions, there has not been an instance this month of down right careless taxying, which is a step in the right direction.
The swings were by inexperienced pilots, both of whom took the correct action after the swing developed. This action avoided serious damage. One of the heavy landings was made in difficult wind conditions, the other only accentuated damage which had been started as a result of previous heavy landings; both pilots were under training.
Three aircraft crashed on 3 engined overshoots – two Stirlings and one Lancaster. It is hoped that the revised technique of dealing with three engined landings at Conversion Units will minimise these three engined accidents. The overshoot landing at Training Base was also made on three engines. The pilot hesitated between landing and going round again, decided on one, then changed his mind; he finished up in the overshoot area. Overshoots on the squadrons were made under extremely difficult circumstances. One was made on two engines, and in the other, visibility was practically nil.
(Continued on page 15, col. 3)
ORGANISATION
[Underlined] (MAY BE READ BY AIRCREW TYPES) [/underlined]
When the so-called “brained types” of the Royal Air Force are binding round the fireplace in the mess, they sometimes utter the most amazing theories on how the war can be won on a date earlier than that already forecast by Lindoe. But no one tries to make a note of what is said by these Fuehrers, except, maybe, to insert a few rude remarks in the local “Line Book”.
When, however, an observation is made that is clever and helpful, quotations are extracted and issued to the world at large. Such an extract is made in Section 1 of A.P.837 – “Principles of Administration”.
An extract from the Manual says “A good organisation requires competent management to produce satisfactory results”. In the Royal Air Force, this management of the [underlined] ORGANISATION [/underlined] is called Administration; it is the system whereby, in principle and in executive detail, the Service carries out its function ….TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY….!!!... and to work efficiently, co-operation is essential. (Co-operation, by the way, is something to which every member of a Service contributes).
Another famous quotation by Socrates, was to the effect that “A disorderly mob is no more an army than a “pranged” aircraft a fighting machine”. The bits and pieces must be [underlined] organised. [/underlined]
So, therefore, let’s have a look at organisation in action-theory is not sufficient, it must be applied.
With apologies to Tee Emm. here are a few “Do’s and Don’t s”.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] see that Orders issued are brief, complete and unambiguous. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] lay yourself open to being misunderstood. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that in your planning, you must always ask yourself who has to be consulted before you reach a decision, and who has to be informed of your decision.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] grasp the scope of the task, and foresee what it demands, with thoroughness and imagination. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] see with what other tasks run by other Sections, you must interlock. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] co-ordinate with your equals and underlings. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] plan until you are absolutely clear what is to be done. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] jump at the first solution. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] consider all the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] go off at half-cock.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] remember that in war, speed is nearly everything.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that ceaseless driving force and ceaseless supervision are essential.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] check and check again.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget, whatever your job, your ability to organise is every bit as important to the Service as a whole, whether you are throwing an aircraft about the sky, or writing Railway Warrants.
ENGINEERING
Early returns for the month of March were about average, and cancellations were much reduced. Cancellations for March were 0.98%, a considerable improvement on the 3.47% recorded for February. Early Returns for March were 4.01% for all causes, again, an improvement on February’s figures which were 6.5%.
Serviceability was generally good, the main causes of unserviceability being:-
1. Aircraft on acceptance checks.
2. Aircraft on minor inspection.
3. Aircraft landing away from base due to diversion.
The number of sorties flown by this Group is again a record, but still greater numbers will be expected during the coming months.
The maintenance statistics staff are still at Waddington and very soon experiments will proceed with a 75 hour maintenance cycle, using the revised maintenance schedule.
Much unnecessary engine running is taking place on the ground, and the method of some of the running is harsh and detrimental to the engine. C.T.O’s must ensure that all N.C.O’s and men who “run up” engines are qualified to do so, and that they have passed the necessary test.
Many cases have been noticed where on a ground run a mag drop has been experienced, and the fitter at the controls has run the engine up three or four times “hoping! It may clear. This is a waste of time, imposes heavy loads on the engine, and proves the man in the cockpit does not know his job.
Another point about ground running is that much damage is done on a ground test by inspection panels and turret covers not being secure, and being damaged by the slipstream. C.T.O’s must have a drive on this, and when they see it happening, check the man at the controls and the N.C.O. i/c aircraft.
[Underlined] RENDITION OF FORMS 765C [/underlined]
The remarks on Form 765C by the specialist officers are in many cases too brief and are of no assistance to this Headquarters in attempting to establish a cause, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the trouble which led to the forced landing or failure. This is liable to indicate, in the case of engine trouble, that the cause is not investigated thoroughly at the Station. As it is known that the cause is always investigated it is small trouble to insert more details in the paragraph provided in the 765C for Specialist’s remarks, and it will save a large amount of correspondence and telephone calls between Group and Stations. If a full technical report is to follow after rendition of the 765C then of course this should be stated in the appropriate paragraph.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Serviceability of Stirling and Lancaster aircraft by Unit]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 14.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
This has been a month of records, and on one occasion a period of sweat, toil, and almost tears.
To create a record with the existing power available, whether it be sprinting, car racing or bombing up, it is necessary to exclude wasted energy. As man power cannot be increased and new armament records must be realised, it is essential that this strive for maximum efficiency be closely investigated.
Wasted energy in the bombing up phase of operations is too often attributed to shortage of equipment, bomb trollies, small bomb containers, Whitlocks, Hampden twins, liners; even spanners. It is admitted that there is a shortage of some of these items; all the more reason why the few available should be kept serviceable; further, if failures and faults occur, an expedient system of repair must be instituted. A flat tyre on a bomb trolley, a few popped rivets on a small bomb container, small faults, easily remedied, but if allowed to accumulate they may easily cause a bottleneck in the repair section and eventually a complete breakdown.
A large percentage of the necessary repairs are caused by mishandling. Bombing up parties must not be allowed to model on the popular conception of a dockyard stevedore.
A release slip that fails is a bomb returned, and a stupendous effort is wasted, especially as it is necessary to cart the weapon back to the bomb dump. Do not therefore allow speed to interfere with the quality of workmanship.
Short cuts and new devices of local manufacture, such as tools and loading platforms save time, and time saved is man hours of effort that can be directed to raising the standard of workmanship, and thus increasing the tonnage dropped on the enemy.
New records will be set, so prepare now for every eventuality.
Load the [underlined] GOODS [/underlined] so that our colleagues the aircrew may deliver them.
[Underlined] WARNING TO WANTONS [/underlined]
A rumour is rife that by trial, a certain Group discovered that if the centre station release mechanism is plugged to the rear turret electric heating system, and the gunner turns on his heated clothing, the following incidents occur:-
(a) A large bomb goes through the bomb doors.
(b) The rear gunner is practically electrocuted.
(c) Pandemonium reigns in the aircraft.
(The Group and Unit concerned prefer to remain anonymous.)
[Underlined] FIREWORKS [/underlined]
To alleviate the somewhat chaotic state brought about by the increase in the use of target markers and indicators, and the need for an improved system of supply, it has been decided to form a pyrotechnical park at Woodhall. It is intended that this park should hold a quantity sufficient to supply any Station at short notice, and that any technical information regarding these new and unheralded devices will be available from that source.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
A word of appreciation is directed to the transport sections, who undertook many nocturnal journeys to ensure prompt deliveries of bombs in readiness for operations.
[Underlined] FAILURES [/underlined]
This month a total of 2 cancellations and 7 Early Returns were attributed to Armament. Although this represents a decided improvement on last month’s figures, it is still too high. The total of 9 abortive sorties were due to:-
(i) 3 Gunners’ “boobs”.
(ii) 1 aircraft returned early as a result of a sticky Palmer Firing Valve, the result of a tight gland nut on the valve spindle.
(iii) 1 aircraft was not bombed up in time for take-off and consequently cancelled.
(iv) 4 aircraft returned with unserviceable tail turrets due to defects in technical equipment, i.e.
(a) A broken ball bearing resulted in a seized vane oil motor.
(b) Spline shaft of the E.D.P. sheared.
(c) Pressure pipe union at the Engine Driven Pump fractured during flight – exit the last old type flex pipe in the Group.
(d) Collapsed gun ram washer.
From this analysis it can be seen that at least 5 out of 9 abortive sorties could, and should, have been avoided. After deducting the three gunners’ “boobs” and 4 failures due to defective equipment, Armament can say with satisfaction, that they were responsible for only two abortive sorties out of a total of 1720 sorties flown. (.116%) – Good show!! A record number of sorties flown, a record tonnage dropped on the Hun and an all-time low of abortive sorties.
There is, however, grave cause for alarm regarding small bomb container compartment hang-ups. Although a greater tonnage than ever before was dropped, so also was a greater tonnage returned to the bomb store, and unfortunately over 50% of the failures were caused by carelessness. Of 102 S.B.C. hang-ups there were 60 maintenance failures directly attributed to severed and trapped leads.
These maintenance failures cannot be accepted, and it is obvious that the present system of supervision during bombing up needs overhaul.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE + = H 2 S Squadron
ACCIDENTS
(Continued from page 14, col.1)
The other landing accidents occurred in 51 Base. They consisted of collapsing of Stirling under-carriages after touch-down. These have not yet been fully investigated.
The remaining “error of judgement” occurred in a squadron. The aircraft crashed in the circuit at dusk. The reason for this crash is still obscure, and has only been included because investigation at this stage does not suggest technical failure of any kind.
A fatal accident took place this month in the Waddington circuit. A Lancaster collided in mid-air with a 1 Group aircraft on its way home to base. Responsibility for the accident has not yet been allocated, but it brings home once again the necessity for keeping a thorough look-out at all times. The pilot of an aircraft is naturally preoccupied in the circuit with his cockpit drill etc., and it is up to the crew, especially the gunners to keep up a search all round. The natural tendency to look inside the circuit at the flarepath must be resisted.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 15.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The opening months of the year have each [missing word] noteworthy contributions to the Bomber Offensive, and this month has proved no exception. Not only have we established a new sortie peak of 1720, but our achievements also include the distinction of being the first Group in the field to drop over 1000 tons in one night on a single target. The high percentage of successes (89.7%) was maintained despite the set-back of two abortive operations, and losses remained a constant 3.37%.
The principal role of the Group, outside the main force “blitz” targets, has been the continuation of the offensive, commenced last month, against Germany’s aircraft production – an essential prelude to the establishment of a Second Front. This offensive has been rewarded by no mean success.
The attack on 2/3rd March against ALBERT resulted in the total destruction of the aero-engine factory of Cle Mecanique d’Albert, with the aircraft factory of S.N.C.A. du Nord more than half destroyed – an impressive result.
MARIGNANE, singled out for attack on the 9/10th, also sustained extremely severe damage, particularly to the assembly shop, heat treatment shop, offices, flight hangar, components’ store, garages, workshops and other buildings in the factory area.
The following night (namely the 10/11th), an ambitious programme was conducted against aircraft factories at CHATEAUROUX, CLERMOND FERRAND and OSSUN, and the Needle Bearing Factory at LA RICAMARIE. Interpretation of P.R.U. photographs provides evidence of the high measure of success which attended these missions. Thirteen buildings comprising the larger part of the workshops of S.N.C.A. du Sud-Ouest Chateauroux, have been destroyed or severely damaged, including the main assembly store, transformer house and other key buildings. The aircraft repair factory at CLERMOND FERRAND has received major damage throughout, including two large multi-bay buildings, compounding plant and power station – the latter now being observed to be inactive – OSSUN Factory airfield bears its scars in the form of severe damage to the two larger factory buildings and other ancillary buildings. The devastation at LA RICAMARIE is particularly acute. The eastern two thirds of the plant has suffered heavily, and every building, with one exception, has been either damaged or destroyed.
Three persistent attacks against the Sigma Aero Engine Works, LYONS, on 23/24th, 25/26th and again on 29/30th, terminated in sixteen out of the 22 buildings comprising the Factory receiving varying degrees of damage, in addition to which a neighbouring hutted encampment has been virtually destroyed.
A further two nights out of the month were devoted with great profit to the firing of Hun powder magazines. The results were impressive indeed, and upheld the high hopes of the crews. BERGERAC on 18/19th took the count in the first round. The east end of the plant is almost completely demolished, while the nitration houses and acid recovery plant are severely damaged, with evidence of severe blast throughout the Factory. ANGOULEME, attacked on 20/21st, was still burning the day following the raid, and severe damage throughout the target area, particularly to the nitro-cellulose plant, can be seen.
We, as a Group, also played a small, but nevertheless noteworthy part in the attack against the enemy’s communications supplying his Channel Ports. AULNOYE was selected as our target, and the ensuing attack on 25/26th resulted in the central portion of one of the carriage and wagon repair shop being damaged. Rather more than twenty direct hits have been secured on the tracks – and the locomotive shed to the south is half destroyed.
An outstandingly successful attack was made on 16/17th against the CLERMOND FERRAND MICHELIN PLANT – not a building of which escaped. Severe damage is displayed throughout the entire area.
Seven major attacks were undertaken during the month. STUTTGART was our first objective on 1/2nd and again on 15/16th. The heaviest concentration of damage from these attacks is seen to the North West and North East of the town centre, where many factories of high priority are situated. Throughout the town, scattered incidents to business and residential property are apparent.
FRANKFURT on 18/19th and 22/23rd, was spectacular, not only by reason of the success of the attack, but because the Group seized the unique opportunity of unloading bombs exceeding 1000 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the target. Some 12 hours after the second attack, columns of smoke were rising to 15,000 feet, and drifting southwards for at least 200 miles – a grave spectacle for dwellers in the South of the Reich. The principal damage is concentrated in the city centre, stretching a scarred arm northwards between the railway station and east harbour.
No month would be complete without an attack on the “Big City”. Limited cover only was available the day following the raid on 24/25th, but from the provisional report (which omits reference to the centre and the east), the potential results can be contemplated with some optimism. At the time of photography, fires were still burning.
For some months, rebuilding in ESSEN has been stealthily proceeding, and the night of 26/27th was selected as a favourable opportunity to disrupt this activity. PR.U. photographs are of poor quality, but fresh damage can be identified in many parts of the town, and in the workshops of Krupps. A full report is awaited.
The final bout of the month witnessed a bitter struggle with the enemy’s fighter defences throughout the deep penetration to NURNBERG on 30/31st, involving our heaviest loss so far recorded. Our aircraft, however, put up a spirited defence, shooting down a number of the enemy. The losses were not a small price to pay, even for a successful attack on this extremely important war production centre, but the casualties can perhaps be placed in their proper perspective, and to some extent minimised, when viewing the Battle of Germany as a whole. It is difficult to place any assessment on the raid owing to cloud conditions, and P.R.U. cover has not yet been obtained.
To speculate on the value of our contribution towards the opening of the Second Front is obviously vain, but there can be no doubt that the month’s activity has left its mark clearly impressed on the Reich.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of statistics on aircraft, sorties, bombing and training by Squadron]
ORDER OF MERIT in this table is now based on the number of SUCCESSFUL sorties completed, per average aircraft on charge, i.e. Total number of sorties minus Early Returns and Missing, divided by Average A/C on charge. No 617 Squadron, in view of their special task, are shown separately.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, March 1944
5 Group News, March 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 20, March 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about processes of navigation, signals/radar, photography, gardening, Gee, flying control, H2S, decorations, tactics, flight engineers, war savings, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, air sea rescue, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, public relations, link trainer, equipment, training absence, sports, navigation, accidents, organisation, engineering, armament, accidents, operations and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-03
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
17 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-24
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France--Albert
France--Bergerac
France--Châteauroux
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--La Ricamarie
France--Lyon
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-03
5 Group
Absent Without Leave
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
FIDO
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Scampton
RAF Waddington
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V MAY * 1944 * SECRET * NO * 22
[Stamp]
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The results achieved by the Group during May far exceed those of any previous month. They represent a full contribution to the great effort put in by the whole of Bomber Command which, it can now be seen, was a big factor in the safe arrival on French soil of the “Armies of Liberation”.
Not only did the Group carry out more attacks, but each attack was more effective than in the past. Throughout the month, the centre of the pattern of bombs averaged only 100 yards from the aiming point. A great improvement on previous results. This improvement has been brought about mainly by the steady development of the system of marking, and I wish to pay tribute to those pilots of No.627 Squadron who have gone in low to mark the target and who have not allowed their aim to the spoilt by the light flak defences. Their accuracy has been consistently of a very high order, far exceeding tat of any other system of marking so far tried.
The Group also owes a great deal to the Master Bombers who remain throughout the attack directing the marking and assessing the bombing. With better communications, their task will become easier, and I hope that, before long, all aircraft in the Group will be fitted with V.H.F. Crews will then be able to hear the orders which are given to the Flare and Marking Forces and will know what is happening, and the reason for any hold up. Without this means of communication, it is impossible to keep crews informed when things go wrong, with the result that they have often had to delay their bombing without knowing the reason.
In spite of these great improvements, half the bombs dropped against these small precision targets fell [underlined] more than 250 yards [/underlined] from the aiming point, where they were wasted. This percentage of bombs wide of the aiming point coincides almost exactly with the percentage which fell at similar distances on the practice ranges during May. These errors are too great for, not only is the bombsight capable of achieving errors of less than 100 yards from 10,000 feet, but errors below this figure are consistently achieved by a number of crews in the Group, not only on the ranges but also on operations.
If the bombing error of all crews can be reduced to the level of the best 25%, it will be equivalent to doubling the effective striking power of the Group.
I, therefore, make a special appeal to the bombing team for practice and yet more practice; in accurate flying; in executing the small alterations of course during the bombing run, and in the quick test of the sight to ensure that it is producing the correct sighting angle and is properly aligned. These may seem small matters, but it is on details such as these, that our efficiency as a Bomber Group depends.
I want every crew to realise that each stick of bombs which can be dropped even a few yards nearer the marker, will directly affect the duration of the war. At present, more than at any other time during this war, it is the effort and accuracy of each individual crew which can expedite or delay victory. If each crew can place their centre bomb within 100 yards of the marker, the result will be overwhelming. Individual effort for greater accuracy by each crew is the keynote now. This improvement will first appear in a marked reduction in crew errors on the practice ranges.
Let each crew check their own bombing error at the end of this month and see what progress they have made towards achieving this result.
Copies Sent: Wadd. 9
Skell. 10.
Bard. 6
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has recently been fully occupied with the introduction of target markers and the more general use of high explosive bombs within the Group. This has had a detrimental effect on the investigation of gun and turret failures and it would be folly to assume that the present decrease in gunnery failures is other than a temporary relief brought about by the milder weather conditions prevalent at this time of the year.
The gun ‘Bogey’ must be beaten before next winter, and with this end in view all new evidence must be examined and forwarded to those most qualified to analyse and correct the many small faults combining to cause major unserviceability. An appeal is therefore made to all Armament Officers, Gunnery Leaders and, above all, to the gunners themselves to report all faults, however petty they may seem.
A recurring fault is often accepted as a matter of course and not reported to a higher authority, as it is assumed that “everyone knows about it”. Unfortunately, those scions of industry responsible for corrective action are often office bound due to causes beyond their control, and a serious fault is only recognised by a number of units reporting the same defect.
The failure to report defects is attributed to the feeling of competition when comparisons are printed, and as a result false records are being received. These records are, in fact, printed to avail armament specialists of figures and facts normally reserved for higher formations, so they too may have data for research and modification. It is not intended that these tables should indicate the relative efficiency of units.
[Underlined] All defect reports are gratefully received. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GUN TURRETS [/underlined]
Yet another new turret failure has recently appeared, which requires the urgent attention of all Armament Officers.
Hydraulic pipe lines located in the leading edge of the Lancaster aircraft are being fractured, and preliminary investigation has shown that there are several factors contributing to this failure:-
(i) Pressure and return pipes are positioned too close together and, in some instances, the unions are actually touching.
(ii) Pipe positioning cleats are of inferior design and are not standing up to the job. This is aggravated by the fact that there are insufficient cleats, and those that are provided are badly positioned.
(iii) The packing between the cleat and the pipe line vibrates out of position, leaving the pipe to chafe against the cleat, resulting in a fractured pipe.
At present only three small inspection panels are located between the two power plants and it is impossible to inspect the full 13 feet of pipe lines through these small panels.
Recommendations have been made to Command for:-
(a) Additional cleats.
(b) Re-positioning of existing cleats.
(c) Re-design of pipe layout.
(d) More effective packing between pipe and cleat.
An early answer is expected.
In the interim, Armament Officers should make an immediate check of all turret hydraulic pipe lines, and so ensure that the possibility of a fracture is kept to an absolute minimum.
[Underlined] HYDRAULIC MEDIA [/underlined]
Trials have been carried out this month with a mixture of 70% DTD.585 and 30% DTD.472B and although these trials were only of a short duration, the unanimous opinion appears to be that this mixture seems to be the “best yet”. A definite decrease in leaks has been apparent turret functioning has been normal, and several squadrons are of the opinion that turret speeds have, if anything, slightly improved.
Requests have been made to higher authority for permission to fill all hydraulic systems with this new mixture as soon as possible.
(Continued on Page 17, col.3)
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) Percentage of personnel saving
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Unit]
TOTAL AMOUNT SAVED £7828.0.4.
An increase of £1,518.7s.0d. over April figures.
FLYING CONTROL
Once more the average landing times for the Group have been reduced and our target of two minutes per aircraft is drawing nearer. There are still the same one or two Stations, however, who seem unable to reduce their landing figures. Circuit drill is easy and causes no difficulty whatsoever to crews. The main fault lies in a straggling return and Stations must stress continually the need for discipline in maintaining the airspeeds on which crews are briefed. It is noticed from other Groups’ figures that they are not very far behind, and since we regard ourselves as the pioneers of quick landing, then we must hold our lead.
Below are the three best performances for the moth, but at the time of going to press, these figures have all been beaten and the new record will be published in next month’s News.
[Table of Best Landing Tines by Station]
(Continued on page 3, col.2)
MAY LANDING TIMES
[Table of Landing times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The number of sorties undertaken by the Group achieved still another record, some 2254 sorties being carried out during the month.
The serviceability figure still remains high, although the number of engine changes which are carried out before the engine has completed its life is still far too high. This is due to defects which have been occurring now for a long period, the main being:-
1. Failure of oil pipe between the relief valve and the dual drive.
2. Flame trap failures due to blow-back.
3. Leaking cylinder blocks due to cracks on Merlin 22’s and 24’s.
The percentage of early returns due to defects in equipment controlled by Engineer and Eng. Elect. Was 0.8% and the aircraft failing to get off provided a further 0.5%
Now that a test crew is attached to each Base Major Servicing Section, full advantage should be taken of this crew for testing aircraft with any unusual flying characteristics which are reported from time to time by squadrons. Any adjustments found necessary should be carried out by experts in the Base Major Servicing Section and not by any gang who happens to be available.
No. 55 Base has now formed and all stations in 5 Group are under Base Organisation. 55 Base is not yet functioning as such in every respect, but everything is working in the right direction and it is anticipated that the results will be good.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNITS [/underlined]
Again a record number of flying hours has been produced by the Conversion Units, and No. 5 L.F.S., and the number of hours required to produce the crews necessary has not been exceeded. Major Inspections are progressing satisfactorily, and the organisation is such that the maintenance can keep pace with the amount of flying produced. The major troubles experienced with the Stirling during the month have been coring subsequent to going over to summer grade oil, and undercarriage pylon failures which occur usually when the undercarriage is being lowered prior to landing. It is hoped that the coring troubles will be cured by returning to the use of winter grade oil, together with the fitment of the approved blank.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
Within the next few days a start will be made to modify the bomb aimer’s panels of Lancaster aircraft, details of which have been issued to all Bases. A modification gang will be formed at Scampton to undertake the alteration to all Bomb Aimers’ panels in the Group aircraft. Panels will be issued in batches of 20 at a time, so that there will be no delay in the change-over. It should be the aim of Electrical Officers to remove the old panel and fit the new in all aircraft of a squadron within 24 hours. By good co-operation it will be possible to complete all aircraft in the Group within three to four weeks.
Recent precision targets demand that the accuracy of the Mark XIV Bombsights must be given absolute priority. We must aim at errors of not more than 50 yards at 10,000 feet in the immediate future. To achieve this, greater care must be taken in the tuning, levelling and lining up of the sights, and discussions with Bomb Aimers on the analysis of practice bombing results will also help. Base Bombing Leaders have realised the necessity for this co-operation, and Electrical Officers must do all in their power to reciprocate.
Trials have recently been carried out in all squadrons with a synchroniser for the two inboard engines. This permits synchronisation within 1 r.p.m. and flight engineers state that the device is very satisfactory, particularly from the point of view of crew comfort, since the severe periodic vibration which occurs when the engines are de-synchronised is entirely eliminated, and fatigue on long flights is reduced. There has also been a marked decrease in the incidence of instrument failure, noticeably engine speed indicators. Up to the present a single lamp has been used which merely indicated de-synchronisation and a method of trial and error is necessary to obtain synchronisation. A new indicator consisting of three lamps is being tested at East Kirkby which will give an indication of which engine is running fast. This indicator will be submitted to Bomber Command after further trials have been completed.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Stirling and Lancaster Training Aircraft Serviceability by Unit]
FLYING CONTROL (Cont. from page 2)
[Underlined] WOODBRIDGE [/underlined]
Crews are now aware of the facilities available at the emergency landing field at Woodbridge. The staff at Woodbridge are only too glad to see operational crews on ‘non-emergency’ visits. Although landing instructions have been circulated and (we hope) read by all aircrew, a visit to Woodbridge or even a run down there during N.F.T. to look at the lay-out from the air will provide a more permanent image of the landing drill required. One point which is to be particularly stressed is that crews must not attempt to turn off midway along the runway at night time. They must continue right along to the end of the runway where marshalling crews are ready to direct them to dispersal.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
All Stations are now reported to be getting down seriously to improving their airfields and Watch Offices for the competition which closes on the 31st July. S.F.C.O’s must remember, however, that although 31st July is the official date for closing, inspections by the G.F.C.O. can be expected any day.
Flight Engineers
When checking logs it is found that some Flight Engineers are filling in the details on the top of their logs before they examine the aircraft. Such things as “Hatched checked and found secure”, “Auto Controls out”, “Air Intakes cold” and many other vital checks are being taken for granted. This log is for the benefit of all the crew and the safety of the aircraft; therefore these checks must be carried out on dispersal just prior to start up, and only then recorded on the log.
The Flight Engineer Leader on each Squadron must check all logs returned, and bring to the notice of all pilots and flight engineers any bad engine handling; if no notice is taken, and such combinations of revs and boost as 2700 revs + 3 lbs boost or 2850 revs + 2 lbs boost etc., continue to be used, then the Flight Engineer Leader must take these culprits to task.
5 Group has laid down a drill for climbs and engine conditions to be used on operations; therefore until any amendments to this order are published, no alterations should be made unless in case of an emergency. The above drill is being taught by No.5 L.F.S. and must be stressed from time to time by squadrons; they should bear in mind that engineers who come on to operations now have spent most of their initial training on Stirlings; the engine handling differs greatly between the two types of aircraft.
The Flight Engineer Leader must have closer liaison with his C.T.O. and report to him any little snags that crop up from time to time, instead of what happens at present – Flight Engineers talking it over between themselves. Improvements can only be brought about by reporting any defects or peculiarities to the right person.
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash the immaculate W.A.A.F’s. …”if this is your idea of a domestic night, may I never marry!”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
GARDENING
On the 21/22nd of the month more vegetables were planted by any one Group than ever before. 5 Group were the authors of this horticultural masterpiece, in planting 382 out of 418 vegetables lifted. 298 of these were Mark VI’s – in which hitherto undreamed of depths of frightfulness have been reached, and some varieties of which were used for the first time this night. 4 and 6 Groups also took part in the operation, bringing the Command total for the night up to 501. Three 5 Group aircraft were missing.
The Armament staffs at the Stations concerned did a great job of work – not made any easier by having also to prepare bomb loads – and East Kirkby performed the unprecedented feat of loading 154 Mark VI vegetables.
The operation was carried out entirely on H2S. Only three failures of sets occurred.
Results? – So far the immediate effect of this attack has been fully up to expectations, namely complete paralysis of all sea-borne traffic in areas vital to the movement of both warships and supplies. Sinkings can be expected as soon as the enemy releases the shipping held up, which he is bound to do soon despite his known inability to sweep his channels clear. The link between this operation and the coming invasion is obvious and the final effects can only be seen in the light of future events.
Other Gardening by 5 Group during the month were as follows:-
48 plantings off the FRISIANS
30 plantings in the HELIGOLAND BIGHT
36 plantings at the Southern end of the KATTEGAT.
24 plantings at the Northern end of the KATTEGAT.
The last two of these are worthy of note, first for the excellent P.P.I. photographs obtained by three aircraft of 44 Squadron, which proved conclusively that their mines were right in the channel; and secondly the success of the long low level flight in daylight conditions by four aircraft of 57 Sqdn.
Facts and figures for the month are:-
Sorties 93
Successful 87
%age successful 93.5
Aircraft missing 3
Mileage flown 91,120
Total successful plantings 520
The total has only once been exceeded by the Group, in April, 1943, when the total was 543. A fine job of work, contributed to by the six H 2 S Squadrons.
Gardening by Command again broke all records, resulting in the planting of 2,749 vegetables plus a small but highly effective effort by Mosquitos of 8 Group. Bomber Command’s war against communications has, in fact, reached a new degree of intensity on land and at sea.
[Cartoon]
“THE VOICE THAT BREATHED O’ER WAINFLEET”
5 GROUP P.O.W. FUND
By now, everyone is probably aware of the formation, on a full Group basis, of the 5 Group Prisoners of War Fund.
The Fund has been formed with the object of obtaining monies for sending monthly parcels of cigarettes and tobacco to each 5 Group Prisoner of War and, where possible, regular consignments of musical instruments, gramophone records, sports equipment, books, etc.
Sending foodstuffs and comforts, such as jerseys, stockings, scarves, etc., is subject to restrictions and is only handled by the B.R.C.S. and the next-of-kin. However, it is not possible for the Red Cross to send foodstuff parcels to any specific person; they are, in fact, sent in bulk to each Camp and distributed evenly amongst all the prisoners. The Fund will, therefore, make contributions to the B.R.C.S. who are requesting the Captain of each Camp containing 5 Group Prisoners of War to put up a notice in the Camp to the effect that the parcels for 5 Group prisoners are being provided by the Fund. It will be appreciated by all that the calls upon the B.R.C.S. at the present time are enormous, and any help we can give by taking over the responsibility for providing the monies for these parcels will be greatly appreciated, and will release money for the other many calls on the Society. Similar contributions will be made to the Canadian, Australian and South African Red Cross Societies and the New Zealand Patriotic Fund.
The next-of-kin are being requested to inform this Headquarters of the type of gift they wish the fund to send and, if possible, their requirements will be met. The next-of-kin are also allowed to send four special parcels per year, and those parcels may contain quite a number of articles. Should the next-of-kin find difficulty in obtaining these articles, they may inform this Headquarters, who will lend assistance in obtaining them.
All parcels, such as cigarettes and those referred to above, originating from this Headquarters, will be marked that they are being sent by the Fund.
Each Base has taken on the responsibility of providing a certain sum of money each month. The organisation and running of the Fund is being undertaken by the Group Headquarters, in addition to their committed financial contribution. The amount of voluntary work entailed to make this scheme a success is large, and is being met mainly by parties of volunteers from all Sections of Group Headquarters.
It is hoped that every member of 5 Group will endeavour to assist the Fund by means of financial contribution. The amount of money required to ensure its success is considerable; any monies left in the Fund at the close of hostilities will be dealt with at the discretion of the Executive Committee, either to help prisoners after their return, or to send to the R.A.F. Benevolent Fund.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
The most disturbing feature of the month’s bombing is the continued high Crew errors in the summary of practice bombing. We have, over the last three months, made intensive efforts to improve our standard of bombing and the steady decrease in our bombing errors, both operational and practice, is reflected in the practice bombing figures and the P.R.U. pictures of shattered enemy targets.
However, we are not bombing as well as we MUST in order to ensure that the minimum number of bombs and aircraft are used to destroy the numerous targets awaiting our attention.
Now in what ways can we ensure that, instead of making a monthly decrease in our Crew errors of from 10 to 30 yards, we crack them down in one month by 100 yards and achieve the immediate goal of 150 yards at 20,000 feet.
The following points are designed to make practicable this target for the month:-
1. The last two weeks have seen the introduction of the A.P.I. and Datum point method of finding the bombing wind velocity. A marked decrease in Vector errors has resulted. This method of wind finding, detailed in 5 Group Aircraft Drills, will produce vector errors of less than 60 yards.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The Navigator’s Union must therefore concentrate on the perfection of this technique, and one of the main sources of bombing errors will be finally eliminated.
2. Bombsight Serviceability:- Large errors are still directly attributable to technical faults in the Mark XIV. 5 Group Aircraft Drills detail the pre-bombing checks that must be carried out by Air Bombers. Further it is important that the suction that goes into the bombsight is at least 4 1/2“. To ensure this, the reading on the ground of the gauge on the pilot’s panel, with the changeover cock at the Emergency or No.2 position, must be 5 1/2” or more when the inboard engine feeding the sight is run up to at least 1800 revs.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] It is essential that the Air Bomber teams up with the instrument man responsible for the serviceability of his bombsight. Discuss your bombing results with him, tell him whether your errors are in line, range or are random and go through the causes of particular types of error with him. Reference to paragraph 63, Chapter 9, of the Mark XIV Bombsight booklet held by your Bombing Leader will make you an authority on sources of error.
3. Flying for Bombing:- Much has been said about this most important subject. There is no other type of flying which calls for precision measured in yards, and therefore it is not something that comes automatically, but only with hard training.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Pilots must study both the services required by the bombsight and the limitations from which it suffers in its quest for the correct bombing angle.
4. Bomb Aiming:- Unless the drift is absolutely accurate and the pilot’s flying perfect, the target will not drift down the graticule length to the intersection. Therefore it will be seldom that you will have an
(Continued on page 6, Column 1)
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING
(Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.)
The results of bombing for the period 28th to 31st May (inclusive) will appear next month.
[Table of Bombing Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units]
THE BEST RESULTS FOR MAY
25 Results with Crew Errors below 100 yards at 20,000 feet.
Next month should see a record number!
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 feet.
9 W/Cdr Porter F/O Pearson F/O Logan 63 yards
P/O Campbell F/O Tyne F/O Bennett 72 yards
P/O Bunnagar F/O Isfan Sgt Henderson 93 yards
49 P/O Graves-Hook F/O Sinden F/O Johnson 92 yards
F/L Matheson F/O Matthews Sgt Launder 77 yards
F/O Hill Sgt Bell F/O Jones 78 yards
P/O Sullings F/S Haines Sgt. Christian 83 yards
P/O Green F/S Hinch F/S Neal 89 yards
50 P/O Oliver Sgt Leonard Sgt Morris 63 yards
61 P/O Street F/S Brown Sgt Waghorn 90 yards
P/O North F/S Jarvis F/S Crawley 96 yards
P/O Dear Sgt. Wray Sgt Reeve 65 yards
106 P/O Durrant F/S Buchanan Sgt Pittaway 87 yards
617 Lt. Knilans F/O Rogers ? ? 98 yards
619 P/O Aitken P/O Whiteley Sgt. Levy 85 yards
F/S Donnelly F/O Grant F/S Johnson 98 yards
F/S Bennett F/S Griffiths Sgt Lyford 53 yards
P/O McCurdy W/O Stern P/O Hawkes 23 yards
F/L Roberts F/S Deviell F/S Lott 29 yards
F/S Morcom Sgt Lebatt Sgt Whitehurst 91 yards
630 P/O Lindsay Sgt Cummings F/S Rayner 91 yards
1654 F/O Rabone F/o Bjarnason F/O Dilworth 86 & 96 yards
Sgt. King Sgt Harder Sgt Stevenson 78 yards
F/S Jeffery F/S Downie F/S Benson 90 yards
5 LFS F/S Rose Sgt Chatteris F/S Richards 38 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
(Continued from page 5, Column 1)
ideal run up to the release point. It is best to realise this and thus avoid these panicky last moment corrections which will upset the aircraft’s attitude at the vital moment of release. It is far better to accept a small error in line and note on your Form 3073 the amount the graticule was left or right of the target, using the known size of the target to estimate your error. Allowances can then be made in the analysis.
Further, Air Bombers must realise that it is quite impossible for a pilot to stop a 4-engined aircraft dead when making a turn in response to your corrections “LEFT, LEFT” or “RIGHT”. In any case it would be detrimental to the bombsight’s calculations.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Air Bombers must, by close co-ordination with their Pilots, develop a smooth unhurried technique on the run-up and correct inter-com patter will aid good team work.
5. [Underlined] TO AIR BOMBERS:- [/underlined] You are the men who actually fire the bomb release switch, and therefore the greatest responsibility is yours. Remember, however, that you are part of a large team, and when you reach the stage of scoring direct hits every time, remember the credit is due to
The Pilot
Navigator
Fitters and Riggers
Bombsight Maintenance Men
Armourers
And
YOU
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
Base Bombing Leaders have been appointed as follows:-
51 Base – F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.
52 Base – F/Lt Walmsley, D.F.C.
53 Base – F/Lt Murtough, D.F.C.
54 Base – F/Lt Stoney, D.F.C.
55 Base – F/Lt Wonham, D.F.M.
Squadron changes are as follows:-
9 Sqdn. – F/Lt Quilter from 92 Group.
50 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Hearn, D.F.C.
106 Sqdn. – F/Lt. Morgan from 1654 Conversion Unit.
463 Sqdn. – F/O Kennedy from 467 Squadron
619 Sqdn. – F/Lt Ruddock from 6 Group.
Conversion Unit changes are:-
1654 Con. Unit – F/O McRobbie, D.F.C.
1660 Con. Unit – F/Lt Wake, D.F.C. from 106 Squadron.
1661 Con. Unit – F/O Price, D.F.C.
No. 5 L.F.S. – F/O Mercy.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
F/O Honig (57 Sqdn) and P/O Pinches (630 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on Nos.81 & 82 Courses.
Congratulations to P/O Page (1661 C.U.) on obtaining an excellent “A” category on No. 83 Course!
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
“Records are made to be broken” !! – an old saying, but very true this month. Firstly all qualifying Squadrons obtained errors below 100 yards, and secondly 619 Squadron, the stalwarts of the competition, are back at the top with a record low error.
[Underlined] PILOT AND AIR BOMBERS’ ERROR [/underlined]
1st 619 Squadron 42 yards
2nd 61 Squadron 53 yards
3rd 49 Squadron 59 yards
4th 50 Squadron 72 yards
5th 57 Squadron 80 yards
6th 207 Squadron 81 yards
7th 44 Squadron 83 yards
8th 9 Squadron 85 yards
9th 106 Squadron 86 yards
10th (630 Squadron 98 yards
(467 Squadron 98 yards
463 Squadron failed to qualify this month owing to lack of Avro Adaptors necessary to carry out 6-bomb exercises. The Squadron state, however, that they will not only qualify in June, but will win the competition.
Last month’s competition news stated that as 52 Base Squadrons obtained places in the first five. 54 Base have rightly pointed out that the 1st and 2nd places were held by Squadrons who had only just left that Base. It is interesting to note that the same two Squadrons are still on top, but have exchanged position.
Navigator’s Error has been left out this month. The Group Navigation Officer intends to run a wind-finding competition commencing in June.
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron (F/Lt Lowry) [/underlined] have now constructed a first-class bombing panel mock-up in the Bombing Office. It is of inestimable value in checking Air Bombers on panel drill and general manipulation. It is understood that great credit for both this installation and the Mark XIV mock-up referred to in last month’s News is due to F/Lt. Hodgson, Eng. Elect. R.A.F. Station Dunholme, and his instrument men.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt Walmsley) [/underlined] makes the following report on the Squadron’s bombing accuracy (see competition results).
(i) Every aircraft on the Squadron carried out at least one High Level exercise during the month.
(ii) Every morning and afternoon the N.C.O. i/c Bombsight maintenance visits the Bombing Office to report on investigations into previous bombsight failures and to interrogate Air Bombers on current ‘snags’.
(iii) As soon as possible after each operation Air Bombers assemble for their own private raid assessment. Useful suggestions that result are passed on to the appropriate authorities by the Bombing Leader.
Finally a word of thanks is due to Pilots and Navigators of the Squadron for greatly improved flying and wind finding, for bombing.
Publicity has already been given to the outstanding bombing results obtained by two 619 Squadron crews captained by F/Lt Roberts and F/O McCurdy, who obtained errors of 29 and 23 yds. respectively, converted to 20,000 feet. Special mention however, is merited by the exercise carried out at [underlined] Syerston [/underlined] by a crew doing only its first bombing detail in a Lancaster.
PILOT – F/SGT ROSE
AIR BOMBER – SGT CHATTERIS
NAVIGATOR – F/S RICHARDS
The average error for 4 bombs aimed from 12,000 feet was 29 yards – a most creditable performance!!!
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Billington) [/underlined] have introduced the following excellent scheme:-
From several 1;500,000 maps, a number of cuttings were taken of prominent and likely landfalls on the enemy held coastline. These cuttings measure approximately 5” x 5” and so cover quite an appreciable area of coastline. The landfalls shown were then painted black, with the exception of the towns and rivers or estuaries which are printed in red and blue respectively.
Each cutting was then orientated in a different direction and pasted on a large notice board. The various orientations made identification more difficult and provided useful practice in landfall recognition.
Each pinpoint was then clearly numbered and a corresponding number was attached to a 1;1,000,000 “area of operations” map in the vicinity of the pinpoint in question. At briefing, the route to the target was outlined with a suitable length of cord, and the bomb-aimers could see if the route passed over or near any of the pinpoints! The ‘numbers’ of such landfalls could then be referred to the notice board (as above). By virtue of the blacked out land masses, an impression of the landfall as it would appear either visually or on the H2S – P.P.I. tube, could easily and accurately be obtained.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
619 Squadron report that F/Lt. Buttar, a pilot, carried out an exercise as Bomb Aimer and obtained average error of 18 yards from 12,000 feet!!!!
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Where and how would you read the suction for the Mark XIV Bombsight?
2. What is the minimum suction on the ground for the Mark XIV and what minimum reading on the suction gauge is required to ensure the necessary suction for the bombsight?
3. What is the correct vectored wind velocity for the Mark XIV Bombsight for True Wind of 090°/30 m.p.h. bearing and distance of marker from Aiming Point 045°/200 yards at a height of 8,000 feet?
4. What are the T.V’s of 4 lb incendiary, 4000 lb H.C., 500 lb G.P. and 1000 lb H.C. bombs?
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
All operations this month, with the exception of two, have been of short range. Navigation has therefore been very much easier. Broadcast w/v’s have been used on only two occasions. The results were not very satisfactory in either case. On the Brunswick operation (23/24 May, 1944) nearly half of the windfinders detailed did not transmit a single W/V! Navigators in H2S aircraft must realise they are fortunate in being able to check constantly their aircraft’s position. Non-H2S Navigators are not so fortunate, and they [underlined] do need [/underlined] assistance from you luckier fellows. Bear this point well in mind, windfinders, and the next time we use broadcast winds, let us have 100% co-operation!
With the approach of summer and the consequent drop in “darkness hours available” night sorties will decrease in range. Navigation will therefore become much easier. We must [underlined] NOT [/underlined] however “slacken off” our efforts. Concentration, track and time keeping are still essential to the success of any operation. Station Navigation Officers must carefully check the work of each Navigator and curtail immediately any attempt to “slacken off”. We may be called upon to carry out long range operations at any time, therefore constant practice in the use of Broadcast Wind Velocities, obtaining D.R. positions, etc., is essential, particularly for those new crews who will be arriving at Squadrons during this coming period. To maintain and improve the present standard of navigation, it is suggested that short plotting and computation exercises (similar to those already forwarded to squadrons) should be completed two or three times every week. If they are run in a competitive spirit, they will cease to be a “bind”, and much valuable experience will be gained. Here again particular attention should be paid to the less experienced Navigator.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING [/underlined]
There has been a gradual improvement during the last few months in the accuracy of winds found on operations. The “spread” now experienced in approximately half that of 4 or 5 months ago. An analysis is being made of winds found by the wind finding aircraft on the night 24/25th April, target – MUNICH. The analysis is not yet complete, but a rough indication shows that the probable error in wind finding is now down from 17 to 9 m.p.h. A big improvement, but no one can say there wasn’t room for one! The “spread” on this raid was 60° and 30 m.p.h. 75% of the winds being within 20° and 10 m.p.h. – here again a slight improvement.
It will be seen from the foregoing figures that errors are still far too high. The main causes of such errors are as follows:-
(i) Inaccuracies in taking and plotting of Gee and H2S fixes.
(ii) Inaccuracies in reading and plotting of A.P.I. positions.
(iii) Inaccuracies in measuring the w/v.
These are elementary points and should have been mastered long ago. Nevertheless, they [underlined] do [/underlined] exist and [underlined] must [/underlined] be eliminated. This can only be done if navigators make a regular practice of checking and re-checking all their plotting. It is far better to obtain two Gee fixes and plot them correctly than to obtain four and plot them all incorrectly. There is absolutely no reason why three of four navigators flying in aircraft at the same height, place and time should find w/v’s differing by 40° and 10 – 15 m.p.h. – but this does happen – even when in Gee range. Stations and Squadrons Navigation Officers must check the winds found by all navigators on each operation, and find out what large discrepancies do occur.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
It is now a known fact that the most accurate method of finding a W/V is by the A.P.I. and datum point method. Instructions have therefore been issued that this method is to be used on all practice bombing exercises. The “vector error” in practice bombing has decreased considerably since this method was introduced. We still have a long way to go however. Not until the “vector error” is 50 yards or below can we claim to be doing our bit. This, therefore, must be our aim. It is not by any means impossible to achieve, providing we carry out the drill correctly and do not make stupid mistakes. Do not for example try and find a w/v over a period of less than ten minutes – it can’t be done!! Always see that you pass over the “datum point” on the [underlined] same [/underlined heading as the first time. This is very important, otherwise large errors creep in.
We now have available a method of checking the w/v’s found by navigators. Downham Market (near Skegness) obtain accurate w/v checks every 6 hours. They are accurate to within 5° and 2 m.p.h. These winds are forwarded to Base and Station Navigation Officers daily. It is hoped that full use is being made of this valuable means of checking navigators work. Navigators should also check with their Squadron or Station Navigation Officers the post-Met. Wind applicable for their exercise.
To foster the competitive spirit, the best 8 wind finders for each month will appear in the Monthly News, commencing next month.
Any criticisms or suggestions for the improvement of the present wind finding procedure will be welcomed. So, go to it, and let us have your opinions – now!!!
[Underlined] TRAINING BASE SUMMARY [/underlined]
During May 229 details were flown on Command and Local Bullseyes, and excellent co-operation has been forthcoming from Nos.12 (F) and 10 (F) Groups. These exercises enable navigators to practice Gee and H2S fixing and learn the troubles associated with defensive manoeuvres. Many special radar routes have been laid on especially across the coasts of Wales, N.W. England and Northern Ireland, and on several occasions squadron aircraft have come in on these exercises (one C.U. pupil on one such flight took no less than 146 H2S fixes – and plotted them!)
H2S training is being extended in the Base and Wigsley will be staring early in June. Preparations have gone on steadily all through May. A trainer, radar mechanics and a training staff are standing by waiting for the next course. At Swinderby and Winthorpe nearly half of each course is now being radar trained and it is hoped that squadrons will appreciate the trouble which has been encountered with aircraft serviceability and stress of other training. Like Gee in the early days, H2S has been thrust upon C.U’s with very little extra staff and inadequate equipment to cope with demands. The second Radar buildings will very soon be ready, and extra bench sets available, so the Group can confidently look forward to a greater number of H2S crews coming through during the summer.
Priority is being put on wind finding by A.P.I. on all exercises – particularly during bombing practices. Trouble is being experienced in fitting the complete modification to the new Stirlings, but this work is being pressed on with as fast as possible. There are now approximately 70 aircraft in the Base fitted with the A.P.I. so that most navigators will receive air practice during their course. Ground Demonstration sets are also being made for all units so that pupils may see the A.P.I’s working on the ground. They will also receive resetting practice. Coupled with A.P.I. instruction, a long D.R. plot using broadcast w/v’s is incorporated in C.U. training. Therefore navigators should be arriving on squadrons fully trained, and well “genned up”. If they are not, then let us hear about it!
The training staffs at H.C.U’s have changed considerably during the last three months. Predominance is now on youth – navigators fresh from Squadrons, and there is only a small percentage of instructors who have been off operations longer than six months. Several Instructors have lately gone to Mosquito squadrons while others have returned to operations in 5 Group and P.F.F.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Operational results on H 2S have been quite good this month, and its potentialities in gardening have at long last been recognised. In this connection, various methods of gardening with H2S have been used effectively.
Dunholme had the first opportunity of using Leica cameras for photographing the P.P.I. at the gardening areas, and proved without doubt that the vegetables were planted in the correct furrows. Unfortunately the shortage of cameras still prevents us using them on operations to any great extent. Training is also restricted to one Base.
This month we welcome 619 Squadron into our select band. It is hoped that they will prove as capable in the use of this new aid as they have in the past with Gee. The responsibilities of training are considerable, and crews in 619 Squadron will have considerable extra flying training to carry out to master H2S. It must be remembered that H2S is primarily a navigational aid, and this must be borne in mind during training; complete mastery of H2S as a navigational aid means better track keeping, better winds, and above all better bombing. By bombing I mean that crews using H2S will ensure arriving at the correct target on time.
Training at Conversions Units is improving considerably, and increasing numbers of crews are being turned out practically fully trained. Wigsley is now ready to commence training and have been fortunate in securing a synthetic trainer. This increase in H2S training reflects great credit upon all the sections concerned, and considerable benefit should be derived by the operational squadrons.
Bomber Command have recently issued a sum-
(Continued on page 8, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
mary on H2S navigation, proving that the most effective method of track keeping is by frequent fixing. Frequent fixing ensures a higher reliability of fixes, and in addition it has been found normal navigation is not neglected. This indicates that successful H2S navigation requires frequent checks on position (at least one fix every ten minutes) combined with the normal navigational procedure. It is realised that most H2S operators in this Group are taught to take H2S fixes every six minutes; however, this point is mentioned in order to prevent the failure of navigation by H2S due to infrequent fixing, which has occurred on several operations in the past.
Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are concentrating on blind bombing trials with H2S Mark III and he 184 Indicator, and it is eventually hoped to come to some conclusion regarding the errors of respective methods of blind bombing.
Whilst it is realised visual bombing is the most effective when targets are small and can be identified, H2S Squadrons must by no means relax in their blind bombing training.
In this direction, operators should practice bombing runs on suitable targets whenever airborne. Then the set operator can so tune his set that only the town, the course marker the range marker and the very faintest of ground returns can be seen, he can consider himself approaching proficiency. With this is mind, 55 Base have designed an extremely efficient poster of H2S Track and Ground Speed Bombing, and a copy of this is reproduced in this issue. It is hoped that Command will eventually issue this as an official poster for use on the Navigation Section of all H2S Units.
H2S photography has been rather disappointing this month. Instructions detailing the steps to be taken when photographing the P.P.I. are available on the Squadrons carrying out this training and they must be followed to obtain good quality photographs. Remember poor photographs reflect upon your set manipulation, and individual assessments of your operation of the equipment can be made from the photographs you obtain.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Operations this month produced no exceptional ranges on Gee, partly due to the fact that most targets were within normal range.
Certain discrepancies were noticed in the North Eastern Chain by navigators in this Group, and steps have been taken to ascertain the error to correct the phasing. Until such time as this is done, the error, although opinions differ as to its limits, will have to be accepted.
Instances have also occurred recently where lattice charts have been found to be inaccurate due to the colour plates slipping during printing. Whilst all Lattice Charts are hand checked, inaccurate charts have on occasions reached navigators, who have been at a loss to explain the difficulties experienced with the Gee chain.
Care is being taken to see that faulty charts are not set [sic] out to units, but in the meantime, every navigator should check his charts to see if the coloured registration crosses (either green, red, or purple) found at each corner of the printed map surface are superimposed one above the other. If one of these crosses is displaced, then the particular coloured lattice lines have been inaccurately positioned and the chart must be exchanged for a correct one.
Good D.R. navigation enabled both the above inaccuracies to be found out and one navigator actually assessed the error which he applied to all his fixes.
Against this we have the navigator who puts the whole of his navigation on to the box and this month a little story with a moral is printed. Acknowledgement for this is due to F/O Craven of 1660 Conversion Unit.
COX AND THE BOX
COX AND THE BOX
You’ve heard of Salome and Lulu,
They’re as well known as Nerve and Knox,
But listen to me while I tell you
The tale of young Cox and the Box.
For 12 months he’d listened to lectures
(Such a bind, and so orthodox),
But just at the end of his training,
An Instructor said “Now meet the Box”.
At the end of a few simple lectures,
He mused on his way to the Blocks;
“Damn the D.R. and the Astro –
Why work when you’ve got the old Box?”
Navigation henceforth seemed so easy,
Bang on! – Back to Base from Clyde Docks.
On return they repeated the warning;
“Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
On the Squadron, his first trip was simple,
From the time he heard “Out with the chocks”,
To the time that Control replied “Pancake”,
He chewed – and got round on the Box.
The next was to Essen – they bombed and came out,
But were coned, and took several hard knocks;
The kite had been hit, but what shook him most
Was to find he’d no joy on the Box.
The petrol was low, they couldn’t find Base,
But by now accustomed to shocks.
No D.R. – no air plot – he vainly looked up,
But still found no joy on the Box.
The sequel is morbid, and sad to relate,
It’s all filed away under “Cox”,
Read on if you will, and you’ll see what we say,
Use D.R. – don’t go round on the Box”.
“You had a son, in the Air Force,
In Aircrew I think, Mrs. Cox?
Well, he’s been pretty rapid and finished his trips.
And they’re sending him home – in a Box”.
EQUIPMENT
The present grave shortage of manpower is causing increasing difficulties to Maintenance Units and Station Equipment Officers should therefore ascertain by personal investigation whether all their demands are being correctly prepared. If all stations regularly raised their demands in the official manner, there would be considerable economy in manpower and time spent in satisfying demands at M.U’s. and numerous queries would be obviated. For easy reference, some of the salient points are set out as follows:-
[Underlined] Forms 600 Demands. [/underlined]
(i) Insufficient address. Units should always state full postal address, and it is important that the accounting serial number is clearly endorsed as part of the address.
(ii) Nearest railway Station muse [sic] be quoted directly beneath the address.
[Underlined] Urgent Demands (A.M.O. A.481/43) [/underlined]
(i) These demands must be placed together in a separate envelope, stamped in RED, “PRIORITY 1 C”.
(ii) Date for delivery must be quoted in all cases, and an interval of at least ten days should be given.
(iii) The endorsement must be initialled by the demanding officer.
(iv) Aircraft or engine type and serial number, or the purpose for which other items are required, must be quoted. In the case of M.T. the chassis number must invariably be given.
(v) Immediate despatch of all Urgent Demands to Equipment Parks by their transport or D.R.L.S.
[Underlined] A.O.C. or I.O.R. Signal Demands. [/underlined]
It is important that this type of demand be raised strictly in accordance with A.M.O. A.1312/42, as amended by A.M.O. A. 326/44. These demands are of the very highest priority and therefore it is essential that the method of raising the signal is uniform in every detail at all Units. Signals must be made out very clearly, and only one section may be demanded on one signal, and not more than 8 items of one particular section – and each of these items must be given a separate line (see A.M.O. A.604/40).
If all concerned comply strictly with the letter of the law in this respect, there is every reason to hope that the goods will be received with the minimum of delay with consequent reflection of increased serviceability and efficiency.
[Underlined] AIR SEA RESCUE (Continued from page 10 Col.1)
New crews are now getting a thorough introduction to the Lancaster Dinghy and Parachute Drills at the L.F.S. and the dummy fuselage is paying high dividends. The record time for a dummy ditching at Syerston is 10 seconds. It was encouraging to hear a gunner remark as the crew stood on the starboard mainplane with their drill completed in 16 1/2 seconds – “That’s not good enough, Skipper, let’s have another go.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
H.2.S TRACK & GROUND SPEED BOMBING
IDEAL BOMB
Set on Dalton Computer W/V and True Air Speed. From the measured track compute the course to make good this track. Make any alterations as necessary. Set Range Drum to 10 miles in order to know when to switch to 10/10 scale. [Diagram] No. 1
When on 10/10 scale make final corrections of heading to ensure correct tracking. Range marker is set to correct radius on range drum ground speed settings. [Diagram] No. 2
No. 3 [Diagram] Height pulse must be set against first ground return before ground speed is set on the Range Drum.
No. 4 [Diagram] Ground speed is found to be 200 m.p.h. Rotate range drum until 200 ground speed line is against range pointer. This pre-sets range marker ring to a set radius on 10/10 scale.
Note the time that range marker ring cuts response. 30 seconds plus time delay for real bombs from this time the aircraft has travelled to bomb release point. At this point bombs away. [Diagram] No. 5
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The 30 second delay release lines on the H2S range drum is calibrated for the ideal bomb. To ensure that real bombs strike the target, a time delay has to be added to 30 seconds. This time delay differs for different categories of bombs and will be given at briefing by the Bombing Leaders.
No. 6 [Diagram]
Point where range marker ring cuts response on 10/10 scale.
Distance denoting timed run of 30 plus seconds to release point.
Release Point. Bombs Away.
Forward trail of bomb carries it to objective from release point.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
There was one known ditching in the Group during May. On the night 27/28th May, a Mosquito of 627 Squadron was heard to transmit “Engine on fire – ditching”. The aircraft was flying at low height over the sea after attacking the target, and later was sighted burning on the surface. Search on the following morning revealed aircraft wreckage off the enemy coast. Unfortunately no one was rescued.
This one incident does not mean that 5 Group crews are “Ditching free” or are unlikely to have to ditch in future. The most recent monthly analysis shows that 189 lives were saved from aircraft in all Commands which ditched in home waters. A total of 467 lives were lost, however, in ditchings – a high proportion of 71%. A majority of these losses occurred in ditchings when no W/T messages were received. This proves that sea crossings, even on short range targets, are still a hazard for aircraft which may have been damaged by enemy defences.
Regular practice of dinghy and parachute drills must continue. Saturday morning is the time for such practice. Several squadrons have got down to this very quickly, but others are not carrying out the instructions from this Headquarters in either the spirit or the letter.
Ten crews were tested during the month in the Safety Drill Competition. Generally crews has a good idea of what was required, but the majority revealed lack of practice. One Flight Commander provided a refreshing example. His crew drills were perfect. A Flight Commander is a busy man, and yet he and his crew made the time to set an example and give themselves a wide safety margin if ever they have to ditch.
(Continued on page 8, Column 3)
Results of the Safety Drill Competition for May are as follows:-
Place Dinghy Drills Parachute Drills
1 52 Base 55 Base
2 53 Base 54 Base
3 54 Base 52 Base
5 55 Base 53 Base
The best and worst crews were in 55 Base, and one crew with just over 50% of marks placed the Base last in order of merit. Details of Squadrons tested and marks gained are as follows:-
[Table of Safety Competition Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined] The Training Base Record for a Dinghy Drill is 10 seconds. The best Squadron time was [underlined] 18 seconds [/underlined], the worst [underlined] 43 seconds. [/underlined]
ENEMY AGENTS CARELESS WALKERS
With the lighter evenings and finer weather there is a great deal to be said for a country walk over the fields after working in an office all day.
You may not be interested in birds nests or flowers but even in flat country like Lincolnshire there is some amazingly pretty scenery if you will only walk to see it. If you are lucky, you may be able to take a pretty picture of scenery with you, which will make all the difference.
Do remember though, that when walking in the fields, you are really trespassing and owe a debt of gratitude to the owner or tenant of the land for letting you enjoy yourselves. Hardly any farmers will raise any objection wherever you walk, if you for your part will take just a little trouble to avoid two things,
(i) trampling on growing crops
(ii) leaving gates open.
The farmer is putting a great deal of very hard work into his land nowadays and suffering just as badly from the manpower problem as we are in the Service, perhaps even worse. You will see Mrs. Farmer nowadays doing much heavier work in the fields than many of us would care to tackle, and for very long hours too.
If you walk along the hedgerows or fence sides you will do no harm to crops; its [sic] the best place to walk too if you are interested in nature, but most important of all DO SHUT EVERY GATE you go through, even if its [sic] open when you get there. It was probably left open by someone careless ahead.
Gates left to swing in a wind soon break and farmers can’t get new ones nowadays. Cattle get through from the roadside or neighbouring fields; a flock of sheep in the wrong field can easily cause a loss of a hundred pounds or more to a farmer. He won’t want you in his fields at that price, and it’s no good blaming the sheep. The farmer’s doing a vital job of work in this war to provide our food, so help him as much as you can when you enjoy his fields and [underlined] PLEASE SHUT THAT GATE [/underlined] and don’t be a CARELESS WALKER.
ACCIDENTS
During May [underlined] over 50 [/underlined] aircraft were damaged in accidents within the Group – the majority seriously. At least 14 were written off completely, and 8 were [underlined] Cat. B [/underlined] The Cat. AC total will probably be 16, which leaves only about 12 aircraft which sustained minor damage. These are depressing figures, and are all the more regrettable because at least 20 of these accidents were “avoidable”.
Squadrons damaged 21 aircraft including six Mosquitos, and 51 Base damaged 29. One Spitfire of 1690 B.D.T.F. was also damaged.
Details of avoidable accidents during the month are as follows:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined]
Taxying…3
Swings…2
Overshoots on Landing…1
Mid-Air collision…1
Others…3
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined]
Taxying (M/T)…1
Overshoots on Landing…3
Swings…2
3 engined overshoot crashes…1
Maintenance errors…1
Others…2
[Underlined] 10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] TROPHY FOR ACCIDENT FREE SQUADRON [/underlined]
A Silver model of a Lancaster has been presented to the Group by Messrs. A.V. Roe. The Air Officer Commanding has decided to award this model Quarterly as a trophy to the Squadron or Training Unit with the least number of avoidable accidents. The first award will be made at the end of June for the period January to June and thereafter every three months. The Squadrons in the lead at the end of May are 49, 57 and 106 Squadrons.
[Underlined] TAXYING [/underlined]
Taxying accidents were fewer this month. It is notable that Training Base had only [underlined] one [/underlined] and this an M/T collision, which did minor damage, A most peculiar accident, which is classed as “Taxying” for want of a better category, occurred on a Squadron recently. A Lancaster pilot turned off the runway and stopped all his engines because of low brake pressure. He re-started his inners with the idea of proceeding to a position more favourable for towing and had just started moving when a ground crew N.C.O., entered the cockpit, grasped the throttles and commenced manipulating them. The Lancaster gathered speed, left the perimeter and finished up with a broken undercarriage when it hit an obstruction. As ground personnel are strictly forbidden to taxy aircraft this episode needs no further comment.
[Underlined] SWINGS [/underlined]
Mosquitos provided the two serious swinging accidents in Squadrons this month – one landing and one taking off. Both occurred in a cross wind.
One Stirling swung on take-off and sustained only minor damage when the tailplane struck some bushes. The pilot did the right thing after the swing started. A Stirling
(Continued on page 16, Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1844. PAGE 10
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] INT QEF? [/underlined]
The R.1082/T.1083 W/T G.P. installation departed from Bomber aircraft about three years ago; with it went the crystal monitor, and we were all very pleased! Since then the Marconi G.P. installation has performed excellent service, and with operators who are kept in practice, has tuned to within a kilocycle of the required frequency.
When an aircraft is acting as W/T control for a large force, it is imperative that the W/T equipment is accurately tuned, otherwise the vital control messages are lost in the welter of interference which hems in all frequencies those nights.
On two occasions this month the control aircraft has been off frequency. This has necessitated the re-introduction of the crystal monitor as an essential item in aircraft carrying out the duties of Controller, Deputy Controller and W/T link, and good results are now once again being obtained. The crystal monitor is, however, a rather clumsy device and requires some skill. Thanks to the ingenuity of Ludford Magna we are trying out a crystal controlled T.1154, which eliminates – almost entirely – the human element. Ludford Magna id obtaining excellent operational results, which we intend to emulate. Thank you 1 Group.
[Underlined] WE HEARD [/underlined]
During the month we have obtained several excellent recordings of the intercom. and R/T in control aircraft during controlled attacks. These recordings, in addition to providing accurate minute by minute pictures of the course of attacks, have brought to light several technical difficulties and enabled them to be overcome. One, in particular, was the loud high pitched whine which had been accepted by crews as an unfortunate regular feature of V.H.F. R/T over the Continent. Thanks to the recordings this whine has been identified and almost completely eliminated. Arrangements are in hand to make permanent recordings for issue to Squadrons and training units. Main Force crews will then fully realise the many problems with which the Controller has to contend.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
As far as Aircrew Signals is concerned, the month resembled the old adage – “Came in like a lion, went out like a lamb”. And what a lion?
Nevertheless, we have derived much profit from our mistakes, and have emerged the purer for our trials, although it is to be regretted that our major “boob” occurred when our comrades from No.1 Group were helping us. We hope that on the next occasion we can prove to them that all is now well with our Operators. All Wireless Operators (Air) are fully aware by now of what is expected of a Controller’s Operator, and without any excuse for the repetition we would say [underlined] Practice makes for Perfection. [/underlined]
To improve the standard of speech throughout the Group, not only on V.H.F. but on R/T generally [underlined] and [/underlined] intercomm., it is hoped to install a Speech Training Section in our Conversion Units and at the Aircrew School at Scampton. Instructors have had a special short course a A.D.G.B. Headquarters where all Sector Controllers are taught the art of making themselves clearly understood without the need for repetition. The idea is not to produce an Oxford accent, but rather to give all crews the perfect “Mikeside Manner”, and if we can achieve this end, we shall be a step nearer to perfection.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS [/underlined]
All Signals Leaders by now will have had a copy of the schedule of equipment laid down for Signals Training Rooms. This is just one more step in the right direction, and it is hoped that all concerned have taken advantage and put in all the necessary demands.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
A few Squadrons did not produce their past form this month. Little points like not using the correct aircraft letters allocated to the Squadron, starting the exercise late, giving one message and then asking permission to close down. Now all Signals Leaders will agree that the Group exercise is an invaluable method for keeping operators on top line, and more attention must be paid to it in future.
[Underlined] RECALL SIGNALS [/underlined]
Why is it that Wireless Operators (Air) take so long to answer a recall signal? The need arose during this month to recall the few aircraft that had taken off for an operation, and considerable time elapsed before all aircraft had acknowledged the message. This state of affairs hardly ties up with Instructions in force about maintaining a continuous listening watch on Base. The Group Signals Leader would like to see an improvement, please.
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING REPORTS [/underlined]
There is another corner of the Signals Leaders’ domain that could stand a clean up with the help of our sister section, the Gunners (Bless ‘em). There is still a good deal of duff gen reaching this Headquarters on the Form “Z”. The Operator states that there were no sightings of enemy aircraft not picked up by the E.W.D; the Gunners sign that statement, but someone tells the Intelligence Officer a different story. You can help the war effort by vetting the Intelligence reports and preventing this duff gen from leaving your Station. It would save the writer’s telephone extension from overwork too.
Apart from these few moans, the general standard of Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is high. They are doing an excellent job, and playing a worthy part in the present battles. Make sure that we can continue this be profiting [sic] from our mistakes in the past, and training at every available moment.
[Underlined] POINTS TO NOTE [/underlined]
1. Has the new Bomber Command General Instruction governing attacks at night by aircraft in home and enemy waters been seen and read by all Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group?
2. M/F D/F Sections now send out an interval signal, if not already on the air. Are you au fait? Note – no DIT DITS in acknowledgement, by order.
3. Have you all met Monica’s baby brother Walter – by Pickup out of Her?
[Underlined STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt Cawdron, D.F.M., No.630 Squadron, who topped No.7 Signals Leaders’ Course.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
The W/T failure percentage for the month of May has, regrettably, shown an increase over the previous month. Congratulations are however, extended to Signals Officers and their Maintenance staffs for having no maintenance failures in Sqdns throughout the month. It is interesting to see how the maintenance failure percentage has slowly decreased to zero, and it is hoped that during the forthcoming months this can be maintained. During May there were no cases of aircraft failing to take off on operational missions as the result of Signals defects. It is also gratifying to learn that there were only five “early returns” due to signals failures out of 2,254 operational sorties flown. Of the remaining 42 failures, approximately 90% of them are attributed to equipment defects. A good show, chaps – keep it up.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T FITTING [/underlined]
All stations have received during the month, a policy letter on the projected programme of V.H.F. fitting for the remainder of 5 Group Squadrons. The supply of all items of equipment, apart from connector sets, has been kept up to schedule. The first consignment of connectors is due, while the 26 Group Fitting Party should be with us any day. Fitting of 44 Squadron should therefore commence without much delay. All indications are that the flow of connector sets will be steady from then onwards.
[Underlined] RADAR CONFERENCE [/underlined]
The Radar Conference held during the month was attended by all Base Signals Officers and Radar Officers in the Group, as well as representatives of Bomber Command. The agenda
(Continued on page 12, Column 1)
ELEMENTARY MY DEAR WATSON
Flight Lieu-ten-ant Jo-seph Soap
Re-port-ed every wire-less slip
In the de-cent pi-ous hope
That R.A.E. might take a tip,
And fab-ric-ate su-per-ior mods
For fit-ing by main-ten-ance nods.
He viewd with sca-thing scorn-ful jeers
And wide su-per-ior smiles,
Dis-com-fit-ure of dull con-freres
Whose in-eff-ect-ual wiles,
And urg-ent eff-orts ne’er re-lax
To co-ver up their sec-tions’ blacks.
E-vas-ive ac-tion reaps re-ward
By kee-ping fail-ures down.
On hon-est men a-buse is poured;
Con-tume-ly is their crown.
A pa-ra-dox you must ad-mit.
The mo-ral’s there, dis-cov-er it!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22 MAY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
was long, and a great divergence of opinion was shown on many items. All agreed, however, that the conference had cleared up numerous points, and such conferences should be held more often.
The introduction of Base Servicing was the main item on the agenda. This subject was discussed in detail, and it was agreed that Base Servicing would be introduced when appropriate accommodation and test equipment became available. Some Bases have, at present, a system of Base servicing, and are of the opinion that it produces a great saving in time. The systems now in use, however, are not all-inclusive and to make them so, many changes will be necessary. Bomber Command is at present working out the final details of a complete Base Servicing system. It is probable that they will send representatives to each Base to study the accommodation position.
Another complicated issue was the standardisation of Daily Inspections. There has long been a requirement for some D.I. card, similar to the Form 700, to standardise Daily Inspections, and to ensure that nothing is forgotten. This was not thought necessary by many Radar Officers. However, some days ago, a check was made on man-hours spent in the daily inspection on various equipments, and it was found that Bases often differed by 100 per cent. This confirms our opinion that there is a lack of standardisation which may be responsible for some of our failures. Trials are now being carried out by all Groups on D.I. cards forwarded to Command by this Headquarters. Any suggested alterations will be made to Bomber Command, and a final card is to be printed and issued. It will then be up to the Squadron Radar Officers to ensure that these cards are correctly used. H.Q.B.C. is also preparing a Form 22E for major and minor inspections of Radar equipment. This form will be similar to the present Signals Form 22, and will cover inspections of Col.7 and Col.9 equipment.
[Underlined] H 2 S FITTING [/underlined]
The fitting of H2S in the Stirlings of out Heavy Conversion Units has now been completed. This provides 41 aircraft for training in H2S and Fishpond, with the resultant increase in the number of trained H2S crews arriving at Squadron. Metheringham and Wigsley received their synthetic trainers during the month, and there is a good chance of all H2S Squadrons being so equipped by the end of June.
The introduction of H2S to 619 Squadron is now under way, and it is expected that this squadron will be completely equipped by the end of June.
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
Last month’s forecast of an increase in serviceability was no doubt greeted with laughter. However, fine weather, short range targets and greater attention to detail have brought their reward with an increase in the serviceability of all equipments except H2S Mark III.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The short range targets attacked during May provided ample opportunity for Gee to regain much of its old glory.
Serviceability was the highest yet – 96.9% an increase of 0.4% over April. The other types of Radar equipment are, however, catching up rapidly, and it appears that there is a possibility of Gee losing its leadership in the coming month.
[Underlined] MONICA IIIA [/underlined]
This equipment came the nearest to overtaking Gee, with a serviceability of 93.5% out of 745 sorties. This is very commendable indeed, and it is hoped that squadrons can maintain this high figure when the weather and target ranges are not so favourable. Congratulations to 467 Squadron, who have completed their last 134 sorties without a single Monica defect. This is a record well worth beating.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II [/underlined]
May brought us to the end of the second round in our battle for increased H 2 S. Mark II serviceability. For the first time the Group serviceability for a whole month was 90.0%. This is good. Let us now try, during the third round, to bring it up to 100%. There still remains, however, a serious number of cases of switching off and flashing on the screen, which seems to indicate that the old sources of trouble still predominate, viz., filament transformers, and H.T. condensers. H.Q.B.C. are making every effort to divert the new type filament transformers from the production lines for retrospective fitting. They have been informed however, that it will be a few weeks yet before this can be done. Crystals and cases of no signals are also assuming a large proportion of the failures, and to combat this, improved versions of valves are being tested.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK III [/underlined]
Unfortunately a setback in serviceability of H2S Mark III was experienced during May. Out of a total of 75 sorties, there were 14 difficulties reported, giving a serviceability of 81.2%. Among these failures there do not appear to be any outstanding breakdowns, but considerable work remains to the done in clearing up the various minor snags which only become evident after considerable operational experience.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond has made a favourable advance in serviceability, with an increase of almost 3% over April. A total of 937 sorties was flown of which 89.1% were serviceable. As Fishpond serviceability largely depends on H2S, an increase in H2S serviceability will cause a corresponding increase in Fishpond. In last month’s V Group News, reference was made to trials to reduce Fishpond minimum range. The filter unit which was produced has proved unsatisfactory, and at present there are no signs of this problem being solved.
TACTICS
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following extracts from combat reports show again what Monica and Fishpond can do is properly used:-
(i) “The only indication of E/A’s presence was on Visual Monica which first indicated at 2,000 yards. The W/Op. gave running commentary until E/A closed to 800 yards – fighter not identified visually by either gunners. W/Op. instructed “corkscrew to port”, tracer from fighter then seen to pass on the starboard beam – gunners still unable to make visual contact.” (467 Squadron).
(ii) “After breaking away from first contact (this was indicated by Monica) E/A continued to shadow our aircraft until time of this attack, during the period between attacks the W/Op. reported contacts on Visual Monica but no visual was obtained owing to bad visibility.” (50 Squadron)
(iii) “Contact by Fishpond at 2 1/2 miles dead astern, and the bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards, visual by both gunners at 500 yards. Both gunners opened fire at 500 yards and strikes were seen on the fuselage, followed by a bright white flash. E/A did not return fire and broke away on the starboard quarter down.” (50 Squadron)
(iv) Contact on Fishpond at 2 miles port quarter. Bomber corkscrewed at 800 yards. Visual by gunners at 400 yards; both fired short bursts before E/A disappeared from view. No return fire.” (44 Squadron)
It appears from other combat reports that some crews are getting contacts quite early (up to 2000 yards), but do not corkscrew until the fighter is at a range of 600 yards, or until the gunners obtain a visual. The outcome in several encounters of this nature has been for a gunner to order “corkscrew” and the fighter to open fire at the same moment, often causing damage to the aircraft before the manoeuvre has begun. The moral is quite obvious. If you have adequate warning of an E/A go into a corkscrew at 750 yards. This technique has put fighters off time and again.
[Underlined] WINDOW [/underlined]
Frequent reminders have been seen in these pages in recent issues emphasising the necessity for dropping Window at the correct rate. If some people have taken note of these reminders, there are still others who have yet to realise the importance of launching Window correctly. A long and interesting paper has been produced by the Window experts and will be forwarded to units in a day or so. All crews must take the opportunity of finding out all about Window from this informative paper.
[Underlined] RECORDINGS OF CREW PROCEDURES [/underlined]
An excellent portable wire recording and reproducing unit, lent to us from the USAAF has supplied us with some interesting recordings of crew intercommunication and V.H.F. R/T procedure in Controllers’ aircraft during recent attacks. Experiments are being carried out to convert these recordings into permanent records for use in squadrons and training units. One point which stands out clearly is the reluctance of the bombing force
(Continued at foot of Column 2)
[Underlined] TACTICS (Cont. from Col.3)
to comply quickly with the Controller’s orders. After he orders bombing to cease there should be no delay in withholding your bombing run. Even a Mosquito which probably has to fly low and re-mark or back up, cannot cope with a shower of bombs falling on top of it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] TRAINING WITH CINE GYRO ASSESSORS [/underlined]
This training showed a very welcome increase during May, particularly in the 51 Base units, who have now got the scheme working smoothly, but could produce even better results is [sic] more gyro assessors were available. 20 more assessors have been asked for, and it is intended to distribute them within 51 Base to reduce the amount of fitting and removal in aircraft. This, at present, is considerable, and rapid changes have to be made each time an aircraft detailed for gyro work becomes unserviceable. With the increased allotment of assessors, more aircraft will be fitted, and less wear and tear imposed on the assessors.
Squadron training with gyro assessors has also improved, but there still remain several squadrons who are lagging behind. These Units should make an effort to exercise more crews during June, and aim at giving each gunner at least one exercise during each month. 97 and 83 Squadrons have now been equipped with assessors and will commence training early in June. Squadron Gunnery Leaders have been instructed in assessing the films, and all processing can be carried out on the spot. Instances have occurred when processed films have remained in the Photos. Section 24 hours after processing; this shows a lack of co-operation between Photos. and Gunnery; it is essential that films be shown as soon as possible after landing, while details of the exercise are still fresh in the gunners’ minds. All operational units are being equipped with an “Ampro” projector, for projecting cine gyro films, and all existing silent projectors will be replaced by the “Ampro”, which is particularly suitable for film assessing. Details of the issue and exchange are contained in Bomber Command letter BC/S.23964/E.4. dated 25th March, 1944.
[Underlined] SIGHTING CHECKS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
During May, personnel from 1690 B.D.T. Flight carried out a series of sighting checks on Squadron gunners; the results are given below:-
[Table of Gunners’ Test Results by Squadron]
Squadron Average 64.64
Gunnery Conferences were also held at each Base, and all Gunnery matters, particularly training were discussed; minutes of these Conferences have been circulated to all units. The suggestions put forward at these conferences are under consideration, and decisions will be communicated to Units shortly. The suggestions that each squadron should have a training aircraft was of particular interest to Gunnery Leaders, as it will ease the problem of gyro fitting and harmonising considerably.
[Underlined] FROSTBITE [/underlined]
After a period of warm weather, and medium height attacks, the return to high level attacks on Duisburg and Brunswick produced several instances of frostbite amongst gunners. Precaution against frostbite must be observed at all times. A recent examination of gunners’ helmets in one unit revealed that quite a number had not the metal parts of the harness covered with tape, thus increasing the risk of frostbite to the face. Both the use of Lanolin and the abovementioned precaution are vital if frostbite is to be avoided.
The use of Balaclava helmets has proved successful, and a request has been made to establish this a as a stores item; this will eliminate the necessity for relying on the local knitting circle and the Comforts fund as a source of supply. While we are very grateful for the efforts of those concerned, some units had difficulty in obtaining enough to equip all gunners.
[Underlined] CLEANLINESS OF PERSPEX [/underlined]
Units are reminded that “SINEC” cleaning outfits, stores reference 336/767, are available on a scale of one per aircraft, for cleaning perspex, and gunners should avail themselves of this equipment for cleaning turret cupolas. The outfit consists of three bottles of cleaning and polishing preparations together with cleaning rags. One squadron has twenty of these outfits held in the Gunnery Section, which are issued on signature to Gunners each morning when gunners are allotted aircraft for daily inspection.
[Underlined] MARK IIIN REFLECTOR SIGHT {Stores Ref. 83/2465 [/underlined]
The above item has been introduced in sufficient quantities to equip all rear turrets in operational aircraft, letter dated 21st May, reference 5G/618/2/Armt. gives full particulars of this issue. The sight embodies a new type dimming control and has no metal hood, which improves the search position. No sunscreen is fitted to the Mark IIIN sight, but special sights are available fitted with a sunscreen. Reports from gunners who have used the sight on operations are all in favour, and Gunnery Leaders should press for the fitting of this item.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Experiments are being made to ascertain the possibilities of using a pilot type parachute in the rear turret.
Fiskerton have received the first F.N.121 rear turret on a demonstration stand. This turret includes Mark 2C Gyro Gunsight, electric motor for servo feed, and improved valve-box.
Supply of microphone heaters is held up for three months, but an allotment of 100 has been received; these will be distributed early in June.
Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Swinderby is completed.
Squadrons are now being equipped with electric gun heaters in rear turrets.
1690 B.D.T.F. personnel at Swinderby are producing a synthetic trainer for teaching the corkscrew.
Tests with infra-red cameras in rear turrets against Hurricane aircraft at night, will be made during June.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
Congratulations to S/Ldr. Patten on appointment to the C.G.I. post at Aircrew School, Scampton.
F/Lt Hamilton will fill Gunnery Leader vacancy at Aircrew School.
(Continued on page 14, Column 2)
This month’s bag:
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Squadron. A/C letter Date Type of E/A
44 Y 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
207 X 3/4.5.44. ME.110 (c)
106 Q 9/10.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
61 P 11/12.5.44.. JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
630 Z 3/4.5.44. ME.109 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
57 C 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
57 T 1/2.5.44. ME.210
97 N 3/4.5.44. ME.210 or 410
57 A 7/8.5.44. ME.410 (c)
97 E 7/8.5.44. ME.109
57 L 7/8.5.44. JU. 88
57 L 7/8.5.44. T/E u/i
619 A 7/8.5.44. DO.217 (c)
630 E 12.5.44. ME.110 (c)
57 T 21/22.5.44. JU. 88
619 G 21/22.5.44. JU. 88 (c)
630 Q 21/22.5.44. T/E u/I (c)
207 F 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 V 22/23.5.44. JU. 88
106 R 27/28.5.44. ME.110
The claims marked (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Cartoon]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Read paragraphs 1 to 3 for Freshmen. The same applies to you. The 90° test for the Mark XIV Bombsight is as new to you as to the freshmen, so get it buttoned up. It has been proved that experienced pilots who can fly accurately in normal flight, and keep the top needle of the turn and bank indicator central, develop a consistent creep as soon as they commence the bombing run. Are you one of the offenders?
Take an interest in the analysis of your practice bombing results. Take an interest in the technical staff who maintain your bombsight. Talk things over with your Air Bomber. You’ve probably some these things before, and you must concentrate on them even more from now on.
Don’t expect your navigator to get accurate pinpoints on H2S unless you are assisting him by flying straight and level. If you fly unsteadily, the images he gets will be blurred and indistinct.
There’s a landing ground at Fristen near Eastbourne which you may see homeward bound sometime. This is not an airfield with facilities comparable to Woodbridge and is now unsuitable for night landings. The airfield surface is grass and the longest run, 1650 yards, has a sheer drop into the sea. Don’t use this landing ground except as a last resort in a grave “emergency”.
If your hydraulics are unserviceable and you are attempting a belly landing or a ditching, don’t use the air bottle to lower some flap otherwise the wheels will come down as well!
If you have to land using Fido, turn on your internal cockpit lights. This will help to counteract dazzle from the glare of the burners.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
Flying for bombing must be your main preoccupation from now on. You are attacking small targets and are putting night precision bombing on the map. First of all learn the limitations of the Mark XIV Bombsight, and the flying errors that can creep in.
Study the 90° method of testing the Mark XIV Bombsight in flight. Don’t leave this to your Air Bomber. You play a very large part in making this test productive.
Do correctly banked turns for correction on your bombing run. Keep the top needle of the turn and bank central. Don’t slip or skid. Practice correction with your Air Bomber, and when you get the “Steady” from him, come out of your turn in the normal way. Don’t hurry the recovery from the turn.
Several pilots got into difficulties last month through flying in or near cumulo-nimbus cloud. This type of cloud is dangerous for all aircraft, and the moral is – avoid it!! Get a copy of A.P. 1980 – “How to Avoid Flying Accidents due to Weather” – it’s well worth reading.
If you experience juddering after take off it is probably due to the wheels spinning as the undercarriage retracts. Apply a touch of brake to stop the wheels. Check your cowlings in case the juddering is due to other causes.
This is old “gen” but it is still ignored. Don’t rush your throttles open on take-off, just because you are on a short runway with a full load. Your airscrews will only be slipping, and you won’t get the thrust equivalent of the power used. Open up easily and gradually. You’ll “unstick” just as soon and you won’t swing.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.B.S.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS (Cont. from page 13 Col. 3)
F/Lt. Wynyard, ex 57 Squadron, will take over Gunnery Leader’s post at 49 Squadron.
F/Lt. Harper, ex 207 Squadron will fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 1660 Con. Unit) [sic]
F/Lt. Clarke, ex 1660 Con. Unit to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 467 Squadron.
F/Lt. Cleary, ex 27 O.T.U., Lichfield, to fill Gunnery Leader’s post at 44 Squadron.
F/Lt. Gross appointed Gunnery Leader at 9 Squadron.
F/O Wyand posted from 9 Squadron to 619 Squadron.
F/Lt. Howard posted to Coningsby for special duties.
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of May was 1515, of which 1045 produced plottable ground detail; it will again be noted from the analysis that the percentage of failures remains high. Many of these failures should not have occurred.
Small stocks of Kodacolour films do not permit its extensive use, but a proportion of aircraft in all squadrons except No. 54 Base, have been detailed to carry composite film. It is still necessary to centralise processing at Scampton to economise in the use of special chemicals. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases have now undertaken the assembly of their own composite film, and it is interesting to note that no major difficulties have been experienced. It is, however, obvious that all photographers do not yet realise the extreme care that is necessary when dealing with composite film assembly. Senior N.C.O’s are directly responsible for studying the preliminary instructions issued from this Headquarters, and ensuring that he whole of their staff are trained and practiced; this is particularly important in respect of processing, and when sufficient chemicals and film are available, each Base Photographic Section will commence its own processing. No deviation from these instructions will be permitted.
[Underlined] H 2 S Photography, [/underlined] the small supply of miniature cameras has retarded progress, but an improvement is expected during this month. Results have been obtained with the few cameras at our disposal, but some of them were out of focus. This is thought to be due to the focussing device. Examine this item of equipment, and ensure that the matt surface, of the glass is [underlined] towards the camera lens and the packing piece between the glass surface and the screw locking ring. [/underlined]
It is necessary to draw attention to the curious fact that there are still some photographic personnel that imagine that their only duty is F.24 night photography, and that when new methods and equipment are introduced they should be attended by increases of staff. That this attitude should be obvious id an indication of poor control on the part of certain N.C.O’s; it is, therefore, necessary to correct this idea immediately. It does not matter what photography is undertaken, the photographic section on the Station and Squadron will treat each branch with speed and efficiency. There are no trade union hours in the R.A.F. and Senior N.C.O’s are reminded that the question of priority of work, should it arise, will be given by the Senior Intelligence Officer.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
The month is remarkable for the scarcity of station reports. The change-over from winter to summer games may have some bearing on this, but reports are essential if this column is to mirror the Group activities, so next month, chaps, please let us have it by the 2nd, missing nothing from the activities of the local trout-ticklers to the best figures of the station Henry Cotton.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON’s [/underlined] final game in the Lincoln League was with Avro. They lost 5- 3 to their “case hardened” rivals, but have put up the following significant record:-
Played. 52
Won. 38
Lost. 10
Drawn. 4
Goals for 193
Goals against 113
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] completed their season with two games, losing 1 – 3 to Waddington and beating Scothern 2 – 0 at home.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] football has seen a memorable rivalry in the knock-out competition, between “B” Flight and S.H.Q. These two teams have now played four games with extra time in the last two, and still no result. The winners of this Homeric duel meet B.A.T. Flight to battle for the cup.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined] wound up their season with a 4 – 2 win over the 1st Border Regiment, leaving them with the following satisfactory season result:-
Played. 18
Won. 12
Lost. 3
Drawn. 3
Goals for 65
Goals against 42
RUGGER
[Underlined] WINES RUGGER CUP [/underlined] – The Wines trophy was finally won by Winthorpe in a hard tussle with Dunholme. The result was 11 – 8 for Winthorpe after a keen game with both sides going all out. In the second half some pretty passing was produced, and it was certainly anyone’s game until the final stages when Winthorpe got on top although their right three-quarter had left the field. Air Commodore Hesketh presented the trophy to the winning team. Winthorpe are to be congratulated on reaching the final of both the Wines Cup and the Matz Soccer Trophy – well done Winthorpe.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] would [sic] up their season with three games, all of which they won. A Men’s team beat Ingham 4 – 0 at Scampton. Their next two matches were the semi-final and final of the Group Mixed Hockey Competition. In the semi-final they beat Waddington 4 – 3 in a hard fought game, and defeated East Kirkby 5 – 3 at Swinderby in the final.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
The latter stages of this Competition were rather long drawn out, and East Kirkby stood patiently by, waiting for the other finalist to be decided. Scampton and Waddington met in the semi-final, Scampton winning 4 – 3 by a last minute goal. The final was played off at Swinderby. Scampton had a very forceful forward line and led 5 – 1 until Kirkby staged a rally and added two quick goals, leaving the final score 5 – 3 for Scampton. So Scampton became the first holders of the 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. This latest addition to the Group Cups has been purchased by the officers of 5 Group Headquarters, and presented for annual competition amongst the Group Stations.
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE GROUP COMPETITION [/underlined] is going well. Sections A and B have already produced finalists. In Section B two powerful teams are to meet in the final – Swinderby and Syerston. In Round 1, Swinderby beat Dunholme by 5 wickets; in Round 2 they beat Waddington without losing any wickets. Syerston scored 115 – 0 against Skellingthorpe’s 26 all out in Round 1. In Round 2 they beat Headquarters 5 Group side, scoring 70 – 10 against Group’s 52 – 9. This last game was quite a thriller. Group batted first on a well soaked wicket, and scratched together 52. The formidable Syerston opening pair (MacKenzie (Hants) and Warburton (Lancs)) soon rattled up 30, and looked set for the night. Then inspiration came to the Group’s change bowler. MacKenzie and Warburton fell in successive overs and Todd went on to return an average of 7 for 8. Group passes out of the competition, but got a tremendous moral fillip at having “shaken ‘em”. Even the fielders, floundering (and sitting), in knee high grass, felt the flush of near-triumph. Wigsley, in Round 1, were unlucky to lose to Group. The Headquarters side were all out for 102 and Wigsley made 94 for 5, not realising until too late in the game that the 15 overs were nearly spent.
In Section A, Metheringham beat Spilsby (62 – 8; 58 – 10), and Woodhall (33 – 4) beat Bardney (32-10). East Kirkby had a bye to the second round and Coningsby beat Fiskerton to become the other semi-finalist. Metheringham (95 – 8) beat Kirkby (79 – 10) in Round 2, the other finalist not yet being decided. It should be possible to play off the Section finals and the Group final before this month end, leaving the warmer (we hope) weather for more leisurely friendly games.
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] played five Station matches during May, and in addition had several inter-section matches and W.A.A.F. games.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] managed three games, losing to Swinderby in the Group Cup, beating Scampton and playing a draw with De Ashton Schools. In addition five section games were played.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] were very industrious and laid two practice wickets and two pitches in a field adjacent to the camp, and practice wickets at Watch Tower, A and B dispersal, and B.A.T. Flight Hangar. There is no better way of ensuring a full and profitable season than this adequate provision of pitches – well done Fiskerton.
[Underlined] BARDNEY [/underlined played Border Regiment, losing 43 – 62; their second games was with Woodhall in the Group Cup. Woodhall, who field a powerful side, defeated them33 – 4 against 32 – 10.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] boast a cricket pitch with fielders’ amenities, in the form of trees within whose shade the more cunning deep slips lurk. The wicket is not so kind, and emphatically earns its title “sporty”, in true village tradition. The Group side beat Wigsley in Round 1 of the Cup, but lost to Syerston. An evening game v 93 M.U. at Collingham was marred by Home Guard charging about the field in their Salute the Soldier manoeuvres. A R.A.F. – W.A.A.F. game Is planned, the only limits imposed on the R.A.F. being that they bat left-handed, bowl underhand, and take catches one handed!
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
Fiskerton beat Skellingthorpe 25 – 2 in the first match in the South Lincoln Zone Competition. The game is arousing considerable interest among non-Canadian personnel. Any station that would like to field a team is invited to contact Fiskerton or Bardney.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Tennis, Squash, Swimming, Cycling, Golf, Badminton – every game has its enthusiasts throughout the Group. Sport is doubly important just now – it’s a duty to be “fit to fight”.
ECONOMY AND SALVAGE
DUNHOLME LODGE received a “special mention” for Economy and Salvage in the Bomber Command Bulletin No. 35 for May, 1944.
Most people in this country, and probably in many other countries as well, are keyed up for the biggest military operation in history, which is scheduled to begin on “D” Day.
There is no doubt that when the plunge is made, very great demands will be made on transport for some time, and the supply of materials will be a matter of first-rate importance.
“Ah, yes”, you say, “but the plans are already made, and sufficient materials will be available and provision made for their transport when the day arrives. Anyway, what’s that got to do with my job?”.
Just this. Each of us has the opportunity day in and day out, of effecting some economy, either by means of using less of certain things than we have become accustomed to, or by ensuring that minor repairs to equipment are carried out promptly, and so preventing major repairs or renewals.
Our first aim should, therefore, be to take care of materials and equipment so that their repair or replacement is reduced to a minimum, and, secondly, when things cannot be used any longer, they are disposed of as salvage.
The most important items are Paper and Cardboard, Heavy Ferrous Metal, Drums of all types, and used Oils.
The Scots have a saying – “Every mickle makes a muckle” which, being interpreted, means “A stitch in time saves nine”!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS (CONTD:)
also on landing, and damaged another aircraft in dispersal. This accident has not yet been fully investigated.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTS [/underlined]
A Squadron pilot made a wheel landing on a long runway in a Lancaster, and did not take into account his all up weight of 55,000 lbs. He was late in applying brake, and overshot. The undercarriage broke in a ditch. There was no wind at the time. Remember the slower rate of deceleration with a heavily laden aircraft!
Two of the Stirlings which overshot were on three engines. One pupil Pilot landed on a short runway in a light wind. He should have asked Flying Control to let him use the long runway, as three-engined landings on less than 2000 yards runways are forbidden in 51 Base. Details of the other three engined overshoot are not yet available, but it follows the usual pattern – an error of judgement by and inexperienced pilot who approached too fast.
[Underlined] OTHERS [/underlined]
One pupil in a Stirling crashed while attempting to go round again from a low height, with one propeller feathered. This accident is still under investigation.
A Lancaster pilot returned from an operation this month and forgot to lower his undercarriage before landing. Such accidents are fortunately few and far between on Lancasters. Sufficient to say that the log books of both Pilot and Flight Engineer have been endorsed in RED. This aircraft had a noisy TR1196, which probably accounted for the F/Engineer not hearing the order “Wheels Down”, but….
A Lancaster was taking off when the leading edge of the port wing came loose and folded back. With great difficulty the pilot got the aircraft in the air. He made a fast approach out of necessity but the resultant heavy landing wrecked the aircraft. The primary cause of this accident was faulty maintenance, but it must be remembered that when examining leading edges for security before starting up, pilots and Flight Engineers must get [underlined] under [/underlined] the wing and see that the panel is flush with the mainplane. It is no good just looking at the screws from the front.
Included in the other accidents (not classed as avoidable) are 7 caused by tyre bursts, 3 undercarriage pylon failures in Stirlings, and 4 obscure crashes. One Lancaster landed on top of another which was about to take off, and caused fatal injuries. This accident is under investigation.
[Underlined] HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
The ‘score’ of heavy landings this month is [underlined] nil. [/underlined] – first month for a long time. This is just as it should be. Keep it up!
GIVE ALL YOU CAN TO THE 5 GROUP PRISONERS OF WAR FUND.
(SEE PAGE 4 FOR DETAILS)
TRAINING
There was a record number of crews produced by 51 Base during the month. A total of 131 crews were posted to No. 5 L.F.S. and 136 passed out from 5L.F.S. to squadrons. The Base, therefore, produced eleven crews in excess of the commitment for the month. To achieve this, the Heavy Conversion Units flew 5,650 hours and the L.F.S. the exceptionally fine figure of 2,240 hours. The weather was exceptional throughout the month, and hard work by maintenance personnel provided all units with the aircraft necessary to meet commitments.
A high light during the month was provided by 1661 Conversion Unit which put up 21 Stirlings on the night of 24/25th May, on night cross countries, Bullseye and bombing exercises. There were 21 aircraft detailed, no cancellations, no early returns and no accidents. The take off was on Operational lines and the aircraft took off at about a minute and a half intervals.
Accidents, unfortunately, marred the picture. The problem of tyre creep and busts is still a major one. Undercarriage defects have involved extensive co-operation with the manufacturers. It is hoped that “coring”, which has been a chronic complaint, will be cured as a result of the month’s investigations. Experiments are being made with tractors to tow aircraft instead of taxying, to see whether braking during taxying is the prime factor contributing to tyre defects.
H 2 S training is expanding in quantity and quality with each week. The difficulty of keeping the necessary serviceability balance between H 2 S and non-H 2 S aircraft is a serious headache for engineers. The new radar buildings will enable extra bench sets to be installed and more ground training completed.
A new syllabus for ground training has been introduced to provide instruction on better crew co-operation lines. Lecture room accommodation is inevitably an associated problem. The Instructor check staff now fly more frequently with crews under training, and some improvement in al specialist sections is apparent.
[Underlined] COMMITMENTS FOR JUNE [/underlined]
The month of June will see the summer training programme in full swing. The commitment will be 132 crews per month from the 3 Heavy Conversion Units, and 128 from No.5 LFS. From 15th June, LFS. are scheduled to produce 132 crews per month. This should be regarded as the minimum, and all Units should endeavour to exceed their commitment without loss of quality.
To ensure that the demands of No.5 L.F.S. are not excessive, and that crews will get a maximum amount of supervised training a revised Lancaster training syllabus has been produced. This will give crews at L.F.S. a total of 11 hours Lancaster flying, of which 6 hours will be dual. The instruction is confined basically to conversion to type and all cross country and affiliation exercises will be done on the squadrons. Instructors have been detached from 51 Base to supervise squadron training which will amount to 11 hrs 10 minutes, not including an experience sortie. Careful organisation by Operational bases is essential to ensure the smooth running of the supervised training in squadrons.
(Continued from previous column)
H 2 S commitments are increasing steadily, and with the fitting of H2S in 619 Squadron, approximately 50% of crews under training will now be required for H2S Squadrons. This means that 15 crews going into our Heavy Conversion Units from now on should be ear-marked for H2S training.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING DRIVE [/underlined]
A drive on bombing, and the need for the most intensive application to bombing training is paramount. The night precision bombing which this Group is carrying out will receive its foundation of consistent accuracy in 51 Base. Crews at the Aircrew School must receive a thorough grounding in the checking of the Mark XIV Bombsight and its use on operations. On all flying exercises when practice bombs are carried, the correct bombing procedure and the elimination of error is to be regarded as the main object of the flight. The bombing exercises are to be thoroughly analysed after every flight, and the Base Bombing Leader must check the progress of the bombing drive in the Base. The motto is- Think bombing, talk bombing, practice bombing, analyse bombing and BOMB ACCURATELY.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Secker and Sgt Gillespie of 619 Sqdn. set a fine example of airmanship on a recent sortie. During take-off P/O Secker found the A.S.I. was unserviceable. He continued the take-off, however, and in spite of the unserviceable instrument, set a course for the target. Sgt Gillespie, the Flight Engineer, traced the fault to a stripped nut in a pipeline. He repaired the pipeline with adhesive tape, and the crew completed a successful sortie.
P/O Dunne, pupil pilot of 1661 Conversion Unit, was taking off in a Stirling when at about 50 feet the port inner engine caught fire. He feathered the propeller and made a safe three-engined landing. This was a good show which reflects credit on his instructor.
Quick thinking and decisive action on the part of Sgt. Spears, a pupil Flight Engineer of 1654 Conversion Unit, saved a Stirling last month. Due to faulty manipulation by the 1st Engineer, all four engines cut through lack of fuel. Sgt Spears, however, tackled this failure and managed to restart the engines when the aircraft had reached 600 feet.
P/O Monaghan of 106 Squadron, showed excellent captaincy and skilled flying under very difficult conditions. He was shot up over the target, and on his return to this country could only get one leg of his undercarriage down. He made a superb landing on the one main whell [sic] in 500 yards visibility at Carnaby emergency airfield, without causing injury to the crew.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 16
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. K.L. SUMNER D.F.M.
P/O W.A. STRATIS D.F.C.
S/L S.L. COCKBAIN D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
P/O G.E. BALL D.F.C.
A/S/L J.H. EVANS, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
P/O A.G. EDGAR D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
SGT. R.D. CHANDLER D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
P/O R.J. AUCKLAND D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
83 SQUADRON
W/O K.A. LANE D.F.C.
F/L N.A. MACKIE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
97 SQUADRON
A/F/L G.S. CHATTEN D.S.O.
106 SQUADRON
S/L E. SPRAWSON D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
W/C J.F. GREY D.F.C.
463 SQUADRON
A/S/L W.L. BRILL, DFC D.S.O.
F/O D.F. WARD D.F.C.
W/C KINGSFORD-SMITH D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
F/O J.A.C. KENNEDY D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
F/O P. KELLY, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/O L.J. SUMPTER, DFM D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
SGT. H.G. BRADY D.F.M.
P/O D.A. WADSWORTH D.F.C.
SGT F.H. JOY D.F.M.
SGT. J.H. MALTBY D.F.M.
W/C J.R. JEUDWINE, OBE D.F.C.
A/S/L W.N. WHAMOND, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/L J.A. HOWARD, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
F/SGT L.J. BIRCH D.F.M.
627 SQUADRON
F/L D.W. PECK, DFC D.S.O.
630 SQUADRON
P/O R.C. HOOPER D.S.O.
A/F/L T. NEILSON D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/SGT N.D. OWEN D.F.M.
F/SGT J.L. ELLIORR D.F.M.
SGT. A. FIELDING D.F.M.
SGT A.G. DENYER D.F.M.
SGT. K. PACK D.F.M.
F/O C.P. NEWTON D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
F/SGT B.H. WHITE D.F.M.
SGT. H.R. PITCHER D.F.M.
F/SGT C.W. DIMBLEBY D.F.M.
P/O R.A. McKITRICK D.F.C.
F/O J. GOURLAY D.F.C.
SGT. V.F.G. LAKER D.F.M.
P/O Q. SNOW D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
F/L R.N. GIBSON D.F.C.
P/O L.F. TAYLOR D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
P/O J.M. LAING D.F.C.
F/O W.R. FRANCIS D.F.C.
57 SQUADRON
F/O G.K. KING D.F.C.
SGT. H. JOHNSON D.F.M.
[Page break]
57 SQUADRON cont.
F/O H.H. CHADWICK D.F.C.
P/O J. SHERRIFF D.F.C.
P/O W.A. WEST D.F.C.
F/SGT W. DAVIS D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
F/L A. SANDISON D.F.C.
F/O C.E. LANCE D.F.C.
106 SQUADRON
F/O H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
F/SGT W.P. AHIG D.F.M.
F/SGT J. BOADEN D.F.M.
A/S/L A.H. CROWE, DFC Bar to D.F.C.
SGT L.J.B. BLOOD D.F.M.
F/SGT A.G. MEARNS D.F.M.
207 SQUADRON
P/O C.M. LAWS D.F.C.
SGT H.C. DEVENISH D.F.M.
SGT G.H. CASTELL D.F.M.
A/F/L H.J. PRYOR D.F.C.
P/O S.V. SAFELLE D.F.C.
F/SGT A. BRUCE D.F.M.
SGT. A. BARKER D.F.M.
467 SQUADRON
P/O B.R. JONES D.F.C.
P/O R.M. STANFORD D.F.C.
617 SQUADRON
W/O W.J. BENNETT D.F.C.
P/O W.G. RADCLIFFE D.F.C.
F/SGT R. BATSON D.F.M.
F/SGT M.G. DOWMAN D.F.M.
463 SQUADRON
F/O A.E. KELL D.F.C.
630 SQUADRON
SGT D.J. TAYLOR D.F.M.
F/O J.H. PRATT D.F.C.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONT.)
damage, although on a rather less severe scale can be seen at the Power Station to the N.E. The attack by a small force on Annecy on 9/10 was outstandingly successful. Apart from one small building in the S.E. corner of the factory, the whole target has been almost completely destroyed. On the 24/25th the raid on Eindhoven was abandoned owing to 10/10ths cloud, but this disappointment was to some extent compensated by a successful attack on the General Motors Assembly Plant on the same night. The main building group is about 75% demolished, while damage can be identified to dockside buildings and servicing tracks.
Sea mining was undertaken on five nights during the month.
A note of extreme optimism perculated into the month’s operations by the introduction of four coastal defence battery targets. The first to be attacked was Marselines and St. Valery-en-Caux, both on 27/28. The former battery received many near misses within 50 yards, but it is difficult to speculate on the resultant damage to the primary weapons. Some damage to personnel accommodation is, however, apparent.
St. Valery was more successful 208 craters can be seen in the target area, resulting in four of the emplacements receiving direct hits, with very near misses to the remaining two positions. The following night, 28/29, the battery at St. Martin de Varreville was attacked. An extremely heavy concentration of craters throughout the battery area was achieved, with obliteration of all but one of the emplacements. The coastal defence battery at Maisy, singled out for attack on the night of 31st, had 10/10ths stratus to thank for a quiet night.
Although the true Allied design is cloaked, and little can be gained from the study of the month’s air tactics, it can at least be tendered that our offensive is producing results which are measurable and progressive.
AIR TRAINING
There was a satisfactory improvement in the number of fighter affiliation details flown by aircraft of 1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month, Squadrons and Training Units trebled the number of Gyro Assessor exercises compared with the April figure.
The fighters carried out 440 hours day affiliation (over 1700 exercises) and 251 hours other flying, which included standing patrols for “snap” interceptions of Stirlings in 51 Base, night training, air tests and drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. The posting of five Hurricane pilots in a week towards the end of the month seriously handicapped Squadron affiliation and replacements are urgently required.
Hurricane pilots of the detached elements of the Flight in the Operational Bases who were out of touch with night flying, were given a short refresher at R.A.F. Station, Cranwell. No. 52 Base showed initiative and enthusiasm by completing their night Hurricane training during the month and doing some searchlight co-operation by arrangement with 50 A.A. Brigade (5 A.A. Group). They were all set to start night affiliation with their own bombers when two of their three pilots were posted. The other Bases have yet to complete night training. This must be done in the early part of June. The absence of flame shields and V.H.F. is no restriction; neither is essential.
The following table shows the details of air training in the Group, and the flying times of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING MAY
[Table of 1690 B.D.T. Flight Flying Times by Base]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
There is a slight increase from last month in the total number of hours Link practice carried out during the month. This was, however, due entirely to an increased effort by Flight Engineers, pilot times being slightly less than the previous month. This decrease was due mainly to operational commitments, but there is still room for improvement in Link Hours. Don’t neglect your Link practice, accurate instrument flying is essential for accurate bombing.
LINK TRAINER FLYING TIMES
[Table of Link Trainer hours carried out by Squadron]
ARMAMENT (Continued from page 2 Col. 2)
[Underlined] VISIT TO STEEL FOUNDRY [/underlined]
The Armament Brach at this Headquarters was fortunate enough to pay a very interesting visit to a Steel Foundry which is casting out 1000 lb M.C. bombs for us. It is understood that this particular firm were the pioneers of the new method of casting steel bomb bodies and consequently a very comprehensive story of the evolution of the 1000 lb cast steel MC bomb was obtained from the people who really know.
The visit was of about four hours duration and all stages of the process were witnessed under the watchful eye of a very competent guide. The visit was not without its comic side; the Group Armament Officer at one time was seen diving into a heap of wet sand as a very large crucible of hot molten steel swept smartly past his ear. Incidentally the crane carrying the steel was in the very skilful hands of a member of the fair sex, which may account for the C.A.O. not seeing the crucible a little earlier.
Efforts are being made to obtain permission for all Armament Officers to have the opportunity of visiting a similar foundry.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
There is at last news of the 30 cwt van for Armament Officers, and as it is now on the establishment, a daily visit to the transport section might prevent a mis-allocation.
The Army have provided 24 lorries and 50 men to assist in handling explosives – a duty new to them, which they are performing with great zeal.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The high light of the month’s offensive was the dropping of more than 37,000 tons of bombs by Bomber Command – the greatest weight of bombs ever dropped in a single month. Our contribution to the blue print pattern of the Second Front has been a rather varied one, including attacks on railway centres, ammunition dumps, military depots, aircraft factories and explosives factories. 2254 sorties were flown, with 3.2% casualties.
The campaign against the enemy’s aircraft production, commenced in April last, was continued with unabated vigour, culminating in five successful missions. The attack against the Usine Liotard Aircraft Repair Works on 1/2 set a particularly high standard for the month. Of the three main buildings comprising the works, two were completely destroyed and the third severely damaged. On the same night an attack was launched against the same S.N.C.A.S.E. aircraft assembly plant at Toulouse. The whole factory sustained severe damage, including in particular, the destruction of the three main buildings, the assembly plant, the testing shop and the components store.
The main weight of the attack on TOURS airfield on 7/8th was distributed among the administrative buildings and the N., S., and W. hangar areas. In the former, seventeen buildings have been more than 50% destroyed – only eight out of the 41 buildings in the area remain undamaged. Damage is also severe in each of the hangar areas.
Both the Airfield and Seaplane Base at Brest/Lanveoc-Poulmic were attacked on 8/9. All five hangars at the airfield were hit, causing serious damage. Other incidents can also be identified. The principal damage at the Seaplane Base is to the main hangar and officers’ quarters, which have sustained several direct hits.
Mobility, and the resultant power of rapid concentration, which the Hun no doubt hoped would assist in countering the invasion threat, has made transportation the objective of much of May’s 37,000 tons. This Group was detailed to attack the railway yard and workshops at Lille on 10/11. Photographs taken after the attack indicate that two locomotive sheds and a car repair storage shed have been destroyed – the transhipment sheds and other buildings being severely damaged. There are also numerous hits on the tracks. Cover of Tours following our attack on the marshalling yard on 19/20, shows particularly severe damage to railway facilities and the passenger station. The goods depot is more that [sic] 50% destroyed, while the locomotive workshops and depot are severely affected. All tracks are interrupted. Weather affected our effort on the Amiens marshalling yard on 19/20, although some aircraft bombed. P.R.U. cover is awaited. In the raid on Nantes on 27/28, only half the effort could be brought to bear owing to smoke obscuring visibility. Despite this, a total of at least eighty hits were secured on the railway tracks, causing considerable dislocation. The railway junction at Saumur was attached [sic] with some effect on the night of the 31st. On this occasion also, smoke tended to obscure the target, but not before rather more than half of the attacking force had bombed, securing hits on the tracks, railway station and sheds and causing damage to the road bridge.
Two main targets were selected during the month – Duisburg on the 21/22, followed immediately by Brunswick on 22/23. At Duisburg further damage has been caused to business and residential property, especially in the town centre, and also to important industrial targets, chiefly in areas south of the docks. Brunswick, unfortunately, continued its charmed life, and apart from a few incidents near the eastern marshalling yards came through its ordeal unscathed.
It is interesting to note that there is some evidence that already the German repair system is overtaxed to such a degree that no attempt has been made to repair much of the damage to his communications.
If evidence is required of the rapid approach of invasion hour, this can surely be found in the recent shifting od the main weight of attack to the methodical disorganisation of the Western Wall itself. Not only have coastal defence batteries commanded our attention, but also ammunition dumps, military camps and powder works. The attack on the Pouderie Nationale Explosives Works at Toulouse was outstandingly successful. Extensive damage has been caused, which has virtually written off the plant. Sable-sur-Sarthe on 6/7th was equally effective. Photos taken the day following the raid show smoke emitting from the remains of the ammunition dump. All the principal buildings in the ammunition filling installation have been destroyed or damaged – the site of the storage units in the central sector of the dump being marked by large craters. The Salbris Explosives Works and Depot attacked on 7/8th sustained severe damage. Of the larger of the two factory units not one building has escaped. Despite the dispersal if the storage depot, which consist [sic] of ten separate areas, five have been damaged, three particularly severely.
The tank training centre at Mailly le Camp received our attention on the 3/4. Some 5000 troops and between 50 – 60 Tiger tanks were believed to have been housed here. The results achieved by the attack were impressive. Not one building in the group of M/T and barrack buildings has escaped damage, 34 out of a total of 47 buildings being totally destroyed. In the remaining group of 114 barrack buildings, 47 were destroyed and many of the remainder damaged. Bourg-Leopold (11/12) the largest enemy barracks in France was a most attractive target, but again the weather was fickle, with the result that the mission was abortive. It is interesting to note that Command has since attacked this target, producing very heavy damage throughout the entire barracks area. Our agenda for the month included four more pre-invasion targets of a rather miscellaneous variety – namely the Gnome and Phone Foundry at Gennevilliers, the Ball-Bearing Factory at Annecy the Phillips Works at Eindhoven and the Ford and General Motor Works at Antwerp. Very severe damage can be seen throughout the Foundry and Stamping Plant at Gennevilliers following the attack on 9/10. The adjoining Electrical Engineering Works and Tyre and Rubber Works have also suffered. In addition
(Continued on Page 17, Column 1)
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties carried out during June including awards by Squadron]
ERRATUM: In the above table 463 Sqdn should occupy fifth place, with all subsequent squadrons amended accordingly.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.22. MAY, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, May 1944
5 Group News, May 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 22, May 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about armament, war savings, flying control, engineering, flight engineers, gardening, prisoner of war fund, air bombing, navigation, equipment, H2S track and ground speed bombing, air sea rescue, enemy agents and careless walkers, accidents, signals, tactics, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, photography, sports, economy and salvage, training, recent good shows, honours and awards, air training, link trainer, operations and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-05
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
20 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Poetry
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-26%20may%2044
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Amiens
France--Brest
France--Gennevilliers
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France--Nantes
France--Sablé-sur-Sarthe
France--Saumur
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Duisburg
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-05
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
ditching
flight engineer
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
RAF Winthorpe
rivalry
sport
Stirling
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Picture]
V
GROUP
NEWS
No 26 SEPTEMBER 1944
Copies sent to Stns.
[Stamp] Base Copy.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
FOREWORD BY A.O.C.
September was a most successful month and a reward for the hard work which all ranks have put in throughout the Summer. The Group secured two prizes for which many have striven since the early days of the War, the Tirpitz and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The attack on the Tirpitz was splendidly undertaken by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons and appears to have been highly successful in spite of a most efficient smoke screen. The attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal has earned the following message from the Secretary of State for Air.
“The War Cabinet have instructed me to convey to you and to all concerned their congratulations on the outstanding success achieved in the recent attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Pressed home with great determination against strong opposition and in difficult weather it constituted yet another major blow against German War economy.”
These two attacks have once more shown the remarkable efficiency of the 12,000 lb. “Tallboy” bomb when it hits the target.
The Group has achieved an equally high measure of success in attacks against German cities. During September alone, an area of nearly 3,000 acres has been burnt out. Such results can only be achieved if the marking is accurately placed and if the incendiaries are spread evenly over the whole area to be burnt. With a small force of Group strength there are no loads to be spared and if incendiaries go wide or are over-concentrated on certain sectors, it must be at the expense of the total area destroyed. Examples are Stuttgart where too high a percentage of loads fell wide of their sectors and Kaiserslautern where crews allowed themselves to be deflected inwards by the fires raging in the central sector, thus allowing the equally important areas on either side to escape.
I want to impress on crews that area bombing calls for every bit as much accuracy as attacks on the smallest factory or railway targets. In attacks on these targets during the Summer crews achieved remarkably small errors, and similar accuracy is needed on these large targets if they are to be burnt out from end to end leaving no gaps calling for an uneconomical return visit. Each crew in fact is given a small area of his own to burn and if his load falls on his neighbour’s patch, his own area may well escape destruction, and this has happened on some of our recent attacks.
The problems of lining up the aircraft on the correct heading after allowing for drift and of carrying out the overshoot procedure, are not easy to solve but instructions have recently been issued which should help crews in this matter. If an even spread of incendiaries can be achieved we should be able, with our normal effort, to burn out nearly 1,000 acres on each attack. This will represent a tremendous achievement, and one which will bring nearer the end of the War.
No.51 Base has also put out a great effort in training 161 crews during the month. This has enabled all squadrons to be kept up to establishment and had provided a margin from which new squadrons are already starting to be formed. I congratulate all concerned.
[Page break]
[Drawing] OPERATIONS
[Underlined] BREST – 2ND SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Humphreys.
Operations in September opened with an attack on the dry docks and shipping in Brest Harbour by 67 Lancasters of Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, in daylight on September 2nd. There was no marking for this attack, which was carried out visually and according to plan. Officers who have since visited Brest say that the concentration of bomb craters around the two docks in such that it is almost impossible to get across this area on foot. Both ships are shattered by many bombs.
[Underlined] DEELEN AIRFIELD – 3RD SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
103 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, plus No. 106 Squadron, took off to attack Deelen airfield in daylight. Two Mosquitoes from No.54 Base went ahead of the main force to mark the target with smoke. One Mosquito fitted with an A.P.I. was detailed to find a bombing wind and pass it to the Master Bomber Two smoke bombs were assessed as being on the aiming point but no trace of markers was seen on strike photographs. No. 106 Squadron bombs were fused T.D. 0.025 while both 52 and 55 Bases carried a load of 1,000 lb. and 500 ln bombs all fused half an hour delay, with the object of avoiding smoke and thereby allowing each crew to have a clear run up to the target. This was the first occasion on which we have used the half hour delay fuse against an airfield target. Unfortunately there was much cloud so that the experiment was not conclusive.
RESULTS Only partial cover was obtained, but concentrations of bombs were seen to have fallen on the S.W. and Eastern intersections of the runways, and at least 60 craters are seen in the partial cover of the runways.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Wing Commander Simpson.
The United Stated Forces investing Brest were meeting stiff opposition from the defences around Brest. These enemy batteries were the target for 60 aircraft of No. 53 Base in daylight on September 5th. There were four aiming points, A.B.C. and D, to be marked by 7 Mosquitoes of No.627 Squadron. Crews were to bomb visually.
RESULTS All aiming points were attacked, a fair concentration being achieved, with the exception of some loose bombing on A. and B., several bombs falling as much as 400 – 500 yards to the West. A full interpretation from photographic cover was unobtainable owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the Lancaster and previous attacks.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH – 9/10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
Nos. 52 and 55 Bases provided 113 Lancasters to attack this target on the Western fringe of the Ruhr; in conditions of cloudless weather and good visibility.
PLAN For this attack, as area of the town was selected and a suitable marking point chosen, upwind from it. The marking point was to be marked with T.I’s dropped by Mosquitoes in the light of flares, after which the
[Page break]
main force, tracking over the T.I’s on pre-determined headings through a sector of 90° were to aim their bombs at the T.I., but delay release for a certain number of seconds. The aircraft were divided throughout the sector and each division given its own band. In this way the incendiary load would be spread evenly over the selected target area.
Should the 54 Base Mosquitoes find it impossible to locate their marking point then they were to back up yellow Oboe T.I’s dropped in the centre of the target area by P.F.F. Mosquitoes, and the main force were to bomb the yellow and red direct, without delaying release. The Oboe T.I’s were dropped on time, but visual marking was delayed owing to the first and second flare waves dropping their flares too far to the South and South East over open country. The Master Bomber, therefore, ordered the third flare wave to drop their flares on the Oboe T.I’s, and by their aid, Marker II was able to identify and mark the marking point. The main force were then called in to attack.
RESULTS Photographs show enormous volumes of smoke coming from a very large number of fires scattered throughout the centre of the built up area of the town. Large new areas of complete devastation, mostly by fires, are seen all around the main railway station. This was a successful attack, but the Mosquito markers would have been aided had a more conspicuous marker point been chosen.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
Defences at Le Havre which were holding up the besieging Allied Forces were attacked by 108 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases in cloudless weather in daylight on September 10th. Aiming points were marked by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and the attack went according to plan.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that all areas have been heavily cratered in a widespread fashion. It was noticeable that there were no craters North of the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 11TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
A force of 101 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, plus 106 Squadron, again attacked the defences at Le Havre in good weather in daylight on 11th September. Here again the marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and P.R.U. cover confirms the success of the attack, showing that all aiming points were well covered. Once again no bombs were seen outside the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 11/12TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
The weather in the target area was clear with some ground haze.
PLAN The “fanning out” method employed against Munchen Gladbach was again planned for this attack, each Base being allotted a separate sector. On this occasion, leading aircraft of the flare force assumed the additional role of blind markers and, in addition to illuminating the target for the Mosquitoes, were to drop T.I. green in the centre of the target area. Mosquitoes were then to mark the marking point with T.I. Red, and the main force in their allotted height bands were again to aim their bombs at the Red, delaying release. To ensure the distribution of the incendiary load over the whole of the required area the first wave was to delay 20 seconds, the second wave 10 seconds, and the third wave 8 seconds. As on a previous occasion the green T.I’s from the Lancaster markers were to be backed up by the Mosquitoes, if the latter were unable to locate their own marking point, and the centre of
[Page break]
these two sets of T.I’s was to be bombed direct by the main force. Flares were dropped accurately and on time, and the markers successfully dropped their red T.I’s on the marking point. The attack then proceeded according to the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographs show the main area of the city to be completely gutted. On the whole a highly successful attack but something went wrong with the Northern edge which has escaped devastation. Investigation into the reason is not yet complete.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 12/13TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
The target was heavily attacked by a force of 195 Lancasters from all Bases, in good weather on 12/13th September.
PLAN The target had suffered severe and wide spread damage from previous R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. attacks, and so a plan of attack was required to cover the remaining comparatively undamaged areas.
A marking point was therefore chosen, and sectors allotted to each Base in which bombing headings were to be evenly distributed, in order to cover the whole of the undamaged area.
No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the big railway yards with T.I. Red and Red Spot fires, with the help of illumination from the flare force.
Appropriate delays were ordered, and blind markers were again dropped by 54 Base Lancasters as an initial guide to the Mosquitoes, and as an insurance if the latter failed to locate their marking point.
Flares were dropped accurately and punctually. Marking was completed successfully and the attack was carried out in accordance with the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows new areas of damage round the aiming point, in the Bad Constadt district, and at Fueurbach to the North of Stuttgart, in addition to several important industrial works.
Plots show that, although a fair concentration of incendiaries was obtained within the sectors planned, the main weight in the later part of the attack tended to spread to the East and North. The reasons for this are being investigated.
[Underlined] BOULOGNE – 17TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Provided by P.F.F.
The garrison at Boulogne was putting up a heavy resistance against the Canadians attacking the town and harbour, and two forces comprising 199 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the specific aiming points.
PLAN All aiming points were marked by full P.F.F. Oboe marking. The first two forces were timed to attack in two separate waves, the first at 0830 hours and the second at 0940 hours. In view of the proximity of our own troops, crews were carefully briefed to make their run up from a well defined pin-point on the coast and use was made of the Navigator’s Master Bomber switch.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows well bombing concentrated around the aiming points.
[Page break]
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN – 18/19TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
207 Lancasters from all Bases and 7 Mosquitoes took part in a heavy and devastating attack on the town and harbour installations at Bremerhaven, in cloudless weather conditions, with good visibility.
PLAN There were five aiming points, lying in a rough direction from N.N.W. to S.E.E. on the Eastern bank of the river. Marking procedure for this target was to be similar to that for the preceding targets, but its shape restricted the use of sectors and it was therefore planned that part of the force would attack on defined tracks over the Mosquitoes’ T.I’s, with the appropriate delay in the release of the bombs, whilst others would aim direct at these T.I’s with a false wind vector applied to the bombsight. Illumination and marking was carried out without any hitches, and the attack was completed according to plan.
RESULTS The two most closely built up areas North and South of the harbour entrances have been completely devastated. Most of the warehouses and dockside buildings have been gutted. This was a model for an incendiary attack.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH AND RHEYDT – 19/20TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Gibson.
A further heavy attack was carried out on this target by 227 aircraft from all Bases in the Group, the intention being to complete the destruction of this enemy industrial centre.
PLAN There were three forces – Red (53 Base plus 106 Squadron), Green (52 Base), and Yellow (55 Base), each force being allotted separate height bands and its own Marking Point, each of which was to be illuminated by flares and marked with Red, Green and Yellow T.I’s respectively. The aiming point of the Red force was the primary target and was to be fully controlled. If the green or yellow targets could not be successfully attacked aircraft were to be ordered to attack the red target.
There was a hitch with the marking for the Red Force. In the light of accurately placed flares, the Master Bomber went in to drop his T.I’s on the Red Marking Point, but his markers hung up. He then called the markers to come in. Number one marker had trouble with exhaust studs and Markers 2 and 3 could not identify. As no Red markers were down, the Master Bomber ordered the Red Force to bomb the green T.I’s which were dropped on time. Later, however, Marker number one identified and marked his target. The order to bomb the green T.I’s was cancelled and the force were then ordered to bomb the red T.I’s. The yellow marking point was punctually and accurately marked, and the Yellow force completed their attack as planned.
RESULTS Considerable additional damage over the whole N.W. perimeter of the town is revealed adding to the already severe and widespread damage. This almost completes the destruction of the town. There is little additional damage in Rheydt.
Plots of night photographs and the incendiary plot show that although the incendiary sticks dropped early in the attack fell near the aiming point, a spread rapidly developed both to the South and W.S.W. and at the end of the attack, an area from S.E. to West was covered. No markers were plotted in these areas. No explanation for this wide spread beyond and outside the planned sectors has yet been arrived at.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, HANDORF AIRFIELD AND MUNSTER – 23/24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Red Target: Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Green Target: Squadron Leader Owen.
A large force comprising 254 aircraft from all Bases in the Group was detailed to attack these targets, the first two being the primaries and the last, Munster, an alternative, should the weather present difficulties for marking and attack. Unfortunately 10/10ths cloud was encountered in the target area with base 8,000 ft.
PLAN No.53 Base plus 106 Squadron and 617 Squadron were ordered to attack the red target (Dortmund-Ems Canal) and Nos. 52 and 55 Bases the green target (Handorf Airfield). If the red target were not marked, the red force, excluding the Tallboy aircraft, were to attack the green target, or if the green target was not marked, the yellow target. Similarly, the green force were to attack the yellow target as an alternative.
RESULTS [Underlined] Dortmund-Ems Canal [/underlined] – Although the portion of the canal marked and attacked was some 7 miles North of the planned aiming point, a very successful attack ensued, and both branches of the embanked portion of the canal were breached. A stretch of 18 miles of the canal is now dry, and over 100 barges are stranded. A splendid result. Of the red force, 82 Lancasters attacked the primary, and 12 the alternative.
[Underlined] Handorf Airfield [/underlined] – The marker force experienced difficulty in identifying the target area, and after an unsuccessful attempt, the main force was ordered to bomb the alternative. 20 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes claim to have attacked the primary, and 61 Lancasters attacked the alternative. There was no new damage to the alternative.
[Underlined] CALAIS – 24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
30 Lancasters of 53 Base were ordered to attack defence positions at Calais in daylight on 24th September. Marking was to be carried out throughout the attack by Oboe Mosquitoes of P.F.F.
RESULTS Weather conditions were unfavourable, there being 10/10ths cloud, base between 2/3,000 feet. In view of this the Master Bomber cancelled the attack. This order was not received by 8 aircraft of the force, who carried out the attack visually having identified their respective aiming points.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE – 26/27TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Force employed – 216 Lancasters, 11 Mosquitoes. Weather conditions experienced over the target were 8 – 10/10ths cloud 6 – 8,000 feet.
PLAN In order that the whole weight of the attack should fall on previously undamaged areas of the town, a marking point was selected, to be marked with red T.I’s and each Base was allotted a sector or track, radiating from the marking point. Main force crews were to aim their bombs at the red T.I’s and delay for the detailed number of seconds. The usual blind marking technique was ordered to ensure against the failure of the Mosquitoes to locate and mark the aiming point visually.
Cloud conditions and poor visibility prevented the visual markers from identifying the marking point and consequently the secondary plan was resorted to.
[Page break]
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs reveal a large area of gutted buildings extending over many blocks. This devastation spreads on both sides of the main East to West road through the city around the closely built up area, for a distance of 1,500 yards by 500 yards to 1,000 yards. There are many scattered incidents of destruction beyond this central area, and a large number of commercial and administrative buildings have been destroyed. This is a great triumph for the blind markers.
[Underlined] KAISERLAUTERN – 27/28TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
207 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes from all Bases in the Group were to attack the industrial centre and railway workshops. The attack was carried out in weather conditions of 2 – 8/10ths thin stratus at 3,000 feet and 10/10ths cloud at 7,000 feet.
PLAN The railway workshops were to be attacked with ‘J’ bombs using a false wind vector on the bombsight, and the town by the normal method of overshooting.
RESULTS The illumination and marking on both areas were accurate and punctual.
The damage inflicted on the town, confined chiefly to a narrow belt across the centre of the area id disappointing in relation to the number of aircraft used. Investigation shows that over 70% of the aircraft bombed on headings within a small sector, and were not evenly spread over the whole sector as planned, thus little damage was sustained by the Northern and Southern outskirts. Greater attention should be paid at briefing to explaining the details of the plan of attack, and the importance of aircraft adhering to their briefed bombing headings must be strongly emphasised. The attack on the railway workshops achieved a greater measure of success.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACK BY NO. 617 AND NO. 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ – SEPTEMBER 15TH. [/underlined]
Previous attempts made by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and midget submarines to sink the Tirpitz had proved unsuccessful. It was considered that a force of Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs and other special bombs would have a good chance of inflicting severe damage to the battleship, if not sinking her, provided the element of surprise could be achieved, so that aircraft could carry out their bombing run before the smoke screen, which was known to be capable of covering the ship and fiord in which she lay within 10 minutes, could be brought into operation.
On September 11th, 38 Lancasters and 2 Liberators took off and with the exception of one aircraft of No. 9 Squadron, which had to return to base, all arrived at Archangel or in that area. Weather conditions were appalling, with rain and low cloud, and some crews were unable to locate the advanced base and had to land on other airfields and even in open country. But for a very high standard of airmanship many more aircraft might have been damaged or lost.
It was hoped that by approaching the target from the South, the necessary element of surprise would be achieved. Tallboy aircraft were to attack first, as it was essential that they should see and aim at the Tirpitz visually. The aircraft carrying the special bombs did not depend on visual sighting of the target. A separate plan and aiming data were provided for them. The plan consisted of the selection of two clearly identifiable landmarks close to the target, at which the bomb aimers could aim, using false settings on their bombsights. Two lakes, one on either side of the fiord were chosen for this purpose. Each aircraft was given a separate track, with the intention of covering an area of 750 yards X 750 yards with the target at its centre.
The flight plan proceeded as detailed until the approach to the target area, when the Tallboy force had to make a last minute alteration of course, as they were west of track.
[Page break]
The leading Tallboy aircraft saw the Tirpitz clearly when 8 minutes flying time away from it, but by the time the first bombing run was made, the smoke screen was already in operation, and later aircraft found the target area completely obscured. Some aircraft were able to aim their bombs before the last traces of the Tirpitz disappeared under the smoke screen, but others had to aim at the gun flashes and light flak seen through the smoke screen. Others, unable to identify the target, took their bombs back to the advanced base.
The six aircraft carrying the special load aimed their bombs at the planned aiming points, but were unable to observe any results.
The majority of bombing frame photographs are unplottable due to smoke but the release point frames of thirteen of the Tallboy aircraft have been plotted, and the calculated strike position of the bombs indicate that at least one direct hit, and three near misses are probable. Neither the bombing nor release point frames of the aircraft carrying the special load are plottable, as they are obscured by smoke.
Subsequent P.R.U. photographs show a large rent in the starboard side of the ship forward, covering much of the forecastle. Apart from this hit the explosion of some 6,000 lbs of Torpex at a depth of 60 feet within a few yards of the ship’s side cannot fail to have given her a severe shaking, and at least one of the near misses was very close.
This was a highly successful operation carried through in spite of considerable difficulties.
[Page break]
[Drawing] GARDENING
The Group Gardening effort this month has been on a small scale, and has only called for two operations in which a total of 77 vegetables were successfully planted, although crews stood by for other operations which were cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions.
It is interesting to note that in our first operation this month, the Gardeners from 44 Squadron were co-ordinated into the main force attack on an important German Port, and planted visually by the light of the Flare Force, close to the docks in a channel 800 yards wide, from 12,000 feet.
The second operation, performed by 57 and 630 Squadrons, was a normal H 2 S high lay off the entrance to important German shipping channels where 53 selected vegetables were successfully planted. Unfortunately H/57 had trouble with H 2 S equipment after trying local repairs to within 20 minutes of the target, and then correctly returned with a complete load.
The Command effort totalled 748 vegetables, mostly planted in the Baltic and Kattegat area, with the object of continuing the present dislocation of enemy shipping routes, and preventing troop movements from Scandinavia to the mainlands of the European offensive.
It can be estimated that at present the figures for vegetables planted per ships sunk, stand at 47 to 1. This is an encouraging figure when taking into account the number of Gardening sortied made, and bearing in mind that this does not include the loss to war effort while sweeping measures are put in hand and completed in each area, or the number of ships that are severely damaged and can only be repaired under difficult conditions, or the all-important morale effect on those who “go down to the sea in ships”.
The following extract from the “News Digest” of 28th September reveals the present state of our enemy’s imagination:
“Norway – German fear of Paratroops. British bombers have recently flown over Oslofjord dropping mines.”
“…The Germans are nervous because they think that paratroops were dropped at the same time as the mines. After the first attack some weeks ago, Oslo harbour was closed to all traffic for two days. Since then many attacks have been made, and the harbour has been closed every time. Even the Bygde ferries have, at times, had to stop their traffic. Large-scale raids have been carried out in Cjelleras, and even as far away as Lillestrom there have been raids for paratroops”.
It is also reported that all ships entering narrow channels in the Kiel area have to place two strong cables round their bottoms, and so sail until they are out of the area. This is done in order to facilitate the salvaging of a ship by cranes or other salvage devices in case she is bombed or mined.
In other words, our enemy has developed the minephobic complaint to a very high degree, and with our present increase in stocks he will receive further innoculations [sic] as, and where, we may decide in the future.
[Page break]
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties, Tonnage and Hours by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
[Page break]
[Drawing] TACTICS
The main tactical development of this month has been the withdrawal of early warning devices, i.e. MONICA and BOOZER, and the limitation in the use of H.2.S. It is now known that Hun night fighters can home upon these devices. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no alternative but to withdraw them. MONICA is in the process of modification and may be reissued eventually, but in its absence, crews must exert the utmost vigilance in their search.
It must be appreciated that, although German C.G.I. is getting very much shorter warning of an approaching raid, the number of targets to which a bomber force may be going is also decreasing, making the night fighter controller’s job easier. He also has his night fighter squadrons concentrated into a smaller area and their transfer from one area to another is consequently easier. Bearing these factors in mind, there can be no doubt that the German night fighter will constitute our main problem during the coming months. The following steps should be taken to ensure utmost efficiency in combatting the enemy’s defensive measures.
(i) [Underlined] Night Vision Training. [/underlined]
No opportunity should be lost of training crews in night vision. Night vision efficiency is something which can be improved with practice. Remember, with the withdrawal of the early warning devices, it is now your eyes and night vision versus the night vision aided by A.I. of the enemy night fighter. On the other hand, you have seven pairs of eyes where he has one. This advantage must be exploited to the utmost.
(ii) [Underlined] Increased Banking Search. [/underlined]
Surprise remains the night fighter’s most important weapon. The only effective counter to surprise from behind and below is a constant banking search, and captains must increase the frequency with which they carry out this banking search.
(iii) [Underlined] Corkscrew. [/underlined]
The 5 Group Corkscrew continues to be a very effective fighting manoeuvre. A scrutiny of recent combat reports, however, reveals that there is little doubt that the Hun night fighters now expect the corkscrew and anticipate it. Out of 94 combats reported the enemy fighter opened fire only 37 times, and in many cases was seen to make a feint attack, sufficient to persuade the Lancaster’s captain to corkscrew, and then to hold off and wait until the manoeuvre was completed. The existence of a combat report proves that the corkscrew was successful, but it is considered that where no combat report exists, i.e. where the bomber has been shot down, the fighter’s tactics have been successful. In other words, he waited until the corkscrew has been completed and the aircraft has resumed course, and has then closed in and opened fire.
You are no longer safe in assuming, therefore, that one cycle of a corkscrew will throw off the fighter. Should the gunners lose the fighter in a corkscrew, a banking search should be carried out as soon as course is resumed, to ensure that he is not directly under the
[Page break]
aircraft.
A new German night fighter, the H.E.219, is now known to carry two fixed astral guns, oblique upwards firing. It is believed that these fire at an angle of 65° upwards and forwards and are fired by the pilot. This adds further weight to the necessity for constant banking search.
To summarise:-
1. Learn how to use your eyes at night!
2. Carry out the correct search to find the enemy.
3. When you have found him – don’t lose him!
[Cartoon]
THE MAN WHO EMNTIONED THE TARGET AT FLIGHT PLANNING!
[Underlined] WITH APOLOGIES TO H.M. BATEMAN [/underlined]
[Page break]
[Drawing] SIGNALS
[Underlined] W/T DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
On the night 27/28th. September, 217 aircraft of this Group attacked Kaiserslautern. In accordance with recent practice, very strict W/T, R/T and Radar silence was ordered en route to and from the target. Wireless Operators should have been well aware of the vital need for strict W/T silence on this occasion, in view of the unusual measures taken. In spite of this, however, five Wireless Operators of this Group broke W/T silence during the period 0114 to 0325. Their transmissions took the form of such senseless remarks as “INT WOP – HOW ARE YOU – BANG ON – IMI – GOOD SHOW – INT CUP OF TEA.”
What satisfaction these inane natterbugs got out of their efforts it is hard to see. The enemy, deprived of his usual means of detecting the stream, might easily have obtained bearings on these continuous transmissions, with the result that five brainless Operators would have been the direct cause of the loss of several Group aircraft and many of their comrades.
Despite energetic enquiry and investigation, it has not been possible – so far – to track down the culprits; they are obviously not the type who would own up. If they are found, however, they may rest assured that never again will they have the opportunity to jeopardise their comrades. That such incidents must never occur again has been made perfectly plain.
The Wireless Operators of 5 Group have had the privilege, since the attack on the Dams, of a fair amount of interesting W/T operating. This makes it all the more incomprehensible, therefore, that a few of them should adopt this culpable form of keybashing. It is known, however, that the vast majority of Wireless Operators are responsible men, who feel just as strongly about this “black” as does the C.S.O. It is hard that their good name should have been sullied by the action of so few, and all must now combine to ensure that such flagrant breaches of W/T discipline never occur again.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS. [/underlined]
The hope expressed in last month’s summary that a healthy competition between Bases would develop, has now materialised. In fact, it is almost a full time job for one man at Group Headquarters to book and supervise these exercises. Signals Leader should note that many a good exercise is spoilt by failure of the Operators to pay attention to detail. Before an operator takes part in any of these exercises, he should know 5 G.S.I. No. 12 backwards. In this connection, the main points to watch are:-
(1) The number of times call signs should be sent.
(2) How often the text of a message should be repeated.
In next month’s issue, it is intended to publish a table showing the number of exercises completed by Bases.
[Underlined] REGRADING. [/underlined]
The Group Signals Leader examined a large number of wireless Operators during the month, and claimed he was more or less up to date on regrading before proceeding on leave. Perhaps it is not generally known that the main purpose of this leave was to see for the first time Gilmour Junior – of the ‘transmitter’ variety we believe. It is known, however, that during the past fortnight quite a formidable queue of W/Ops Grade II has been forming, and every endeavour will be made to deal with these as soon as possible.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GROUP EXERCISES. [/underlined]
These have taken place regularly throughout the month, and the high standard of operating maintained. They still reveal, however, that morse practice and more morse practice is essential. It is hoped that the recent quiet spell has been taken advantage of in this connection.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Signals failure percentage continues to increase, the figure for September being 2.459. Over the past 3 months the percentage has risen steadily. On reading through the defects summary however, it can be seen that over 90% of the trouble is still attributable to component failures. The long spell of no maintenance faults has broken, one Squadron having no less than three such failures. There are still quite a number under the heading miscellaneous – the “remarks” column being “No fault found”. This type of alleged failure must stop. There were two manipulation failures which could easily have been avoided, in one case an incorrect VHF channel was selected, in the other, the type 51 Junction box switch was in the wrong position.
It is most gratifying to see that not one failure of VR.101, i.e. output valve V8, was reported throughout the month. It appears that the recent glut of V8 failures can be attributed either to faulty manufacture or wartime materials.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
There have been many essential changes in the V.H.F. policy during the past month, the reason being, an operation on HANDORF airfield, night 23/24th September, when very heavy FREYA interference was experienced on the TR.1143 equipment. This setback made it quite clear that the series noise limiting diode modification had to be carried out on all the new SCR.522 equipments prior to their debut into 5 Group Lancasters and Mosquitoes. The modification is quite simple, the only difficulty being the realigning of the four I.F. stages and all Squadrons not possessing a suitable 12 m/c oscillator. It was decided, therefore, that the Americans be asked to incorporate the modifications for us, and this they most willingly agreed to. The result is, at the time of going to press, only 35 of the 435 SCR.522’s held, now require to be modified.
For 100% suppression of all noise, it has also been found necessary to filter the 150 volt Dynamotor output with a 5 uf electrolytic 200 volts D.C.W. Capacitor. If this equipment is readily available through R.A.F. sources, in such a large quantity the modification will be carried out locally. Failing this the U.S. Air Force has again expressed willingness to assist.
[Underlined] NOISE SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION. SCR.522. [/underlined]
Briefly the Noise Limiting modification functions as follows:- A double diode is inserted in series with the output from the 2nd Detector, one section of the valve is biassed by a portion of the average D.C. voltage developed by this detector. When normal speech is being received, the bias is such as to allow the diode to conduct, i.e. the diode becomes a low impedance. When any pulse waveform is impressed on the incoming required signal the diode anode is biassed more negative and cuts off; hence it offers a high impedance to the interfering pulse. The other half of the valve holds the A.V.C. to zero until the average D.C. voltage developed by the A.V.C. diode exceeds the delay voltage. The A.V.C. voltage, after the modification, is derived from the primary of the last I.F. transformer. Changes are also made in the I.F. Grid circuits, to reduce cross modulation effects caused by the grid current as the result of high noise voltage pulses.
[Underlined] BLIND MARKING – CONINGSBY’S SPECIAL RADAR EFFORT. [/underlined]
The story may now be told of the work done at Coningsby to improve the performance of MK.III H2S. During the latter half of July, it was decided that efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of our offensive Radar devices. Hs” MK.III was selected for particular attention, the main requirement was for an accurate Blind Bombing Instrument, and immediate steps were taken to improve MK.III H2S to enable it to perform this function. T.R.E. aided us in every way possible, to enable this commitment to be undertaken without impairing operational serviceability.
The greatest difficulty which had to be overcome was the tendency of the presentation on the screen to disintegrate or disappear at the shorter ranges. It was felt by T.R.E. that this was due to the inefficiency of the scanners, and therefore, scanners received the first attention. Those which had previously
[Page break]
given the best results were carefully selected, and thorough checks made against specifications, at the same time the best Units of the equipment were subjected to a detailed and exacting overhaul for power output, tuning, and accurate calibration of height and range markers. When one complete installation had been fully tested in this manner, it was placed in an aircraft, and one of the most experienced crews commenced bombing trials on Wainfleet, and on several inland towns. The results obtained on these trials are compared here with results which were obtained previous to these experiments. The average error obtained at Wainfleet for 5 bombs was 316 yards as compared to a previous error of 1,193 yards. A second crew dropped 6 bombs with an average error of 1.6 miles with the ordinary Mk. III H 2 S equipment, and on using the improved equipment reduced this error to 800 yards. On inland towns the bombing results were similar to those on Wainfleet, an average error of 700 and 500 yards being obtained with the special equipment, whilst errors of 1,600 and 2,000 yards were obtained with the standard equipment.
It was decided from these figures that the experiments and improvements were making more accurate bombing possible, and a further 6 aircraft were similarly equipped, and the best Operators assigned to these aircraft. Further training and trials were carried out, and the results gave additional proof that the experiments were on the right road. The final assurance that all this concentration on improvements and selection of all Units and Operators was improving the bombing was soon forthcoming. The operations were conducted against Konigsberg, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe were most successful, the average error of the proximity markers being 550 yards.
These results do not by any means mark the successful conclusion of the experiments, but rather indicate that we are just beginning, and the coming few months will see an ever increasing improvement in both equipment and crews.
It is desired at this point to express our appreciation for the assistance which has been rendered by T.R.E. and H.Q.B.C. and for the close co-operation by all concerned at Coningsby without whose help none of this work would have been possible.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee maintained its usual high standard of serviceability through September. Of the 2386 sorties reported for the month, 62 difficulties were experienced for a percentage serviceable of 97.4 as compared with 97.26 for August.
The supply of Gee remains a very critical problem, although the position has eased up slightly. The new aerial loading unit is apparently becoming available shortly, and a few have already been received in new aircraft. The supply of R.F. Units Type 27 has also improved and an effort is being made to fit all Squadrons completely in the near future.
A modification which enables the simultaneous presentation of signals and calibration pips on the screen has been submitted by 617 Squadron, and forwarded to Headquarters Bomber Command for approval.
[Underlined] H 2 S. [/underlined]
Although for obvious reasons the use of H 2 S Mark II was restricted this month, a total of 819 sorties was completed and out of these 90.7 per cent were free of technical difficulty. A switch unit which allows the equipment to be switched on and off at altitude has been developed by T.R.E. This should soon be in production.
H.2.S. Mark III is not so badly affected by this restriction, and during September, a total of 135 sorties was reported. Twelve difficulties were experienced, which brings serviceability back to 91.2 per cent, an increase of 2.3 above last month. The work which has been undertaken on the H.2.S. Mark III at Coningsby has served to familiarise the Radar Mechanics even more with the equipment, and the benefits thus derived should bring the serviceability to a much higher standard from day to day.
[Page break]
[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
Unfortunately Monica has had to be removed from all aircraft, but it is hoped only temporarily, pending the introduction of a modification developed by 53 Base and T.R.E. This modification is being pursued at T.R.E. with the assistance of a Radar Officer from this Group.
Before it was restricted, Monica IIIA reached its highest serviceability. Of the 139 sorties completed, only one defect was experienced, giving a percentage serviceable of 99.3. This provides a record which will require a great deal of effort if it is to be bettered on the re-installation of the equipment.
Monica V was, however, not far behind, for out of 99 sorties only one difficulty occurred, giving a serviceability of 99 per cent – another record which we will endeavour to equal.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond, due to the restriction on H 2 S, was also used to a lesser extent during September. Despite this, it rendered a very satisfactory service for 722 sorties out of 796 reported, a percentage of 90.7. Training of operators has increased the usefulness of the equipment, and every effort should be made to aid those operators in quickly interpreting the picture on the screen.
[Underlined] A. G. L. (T) [/underlined]
During the second week of September, A.G.L. (T) became operational and up to the end of the month 70 sorties had been completed. Of these, 20 developed difficulty which gives a percentage serviceable of 71.5. Nine of these defects were due to components in the A.G.L. (T) installation itself, whilst H 2 S, Fishpond and the power supply were responsible for the remaining eleven.
Although this standard of serviceability leaves a great deal to be desired, October should bring about an encouraging improvement, in view of the experience which has now been gained by servicing personnel. It is very gratifying to note the enthusiasm with which this new device has been received, on the part of both the air and ground crews. As it becomes increasingly familiar and serviceability steadily climbs, this enthusiasm will grow and the full benefit will be derived from it.
[Page break]
[Drawing] AIR BOMBING
The month of September has provided some excellent results from the attacks on German towns, and despite adverse weather conditions on one or two occasions the determination of crews provided better results than were, at first anticipated.
Incendiaries formed the greater part of the bomb loads, and the previous difficulties experienced in aiming the 4 lb I.B. have been largely overcome by the use of the new wind conversion factors for bombs of low T.V. However, it is still very necessary for Air Bombers to adhere strictly to the “delay release” times supplied at briefing, and Bombing Leaders must ensure that the importance of this is stressed.
Another point which cannot be stressed too often is the necessity for not dropping any bombs until either the Controller has given the order to bomb, or ‘H’ hour has arrived and no instructions have been received from the Controller. You will be briefed to adopt the latter alternative is it has been decided that there will be no orbiting in the target area. The reasons for these instructions should be apparent; the difficulties of the Mosquito markers are greatly increased if a few stray ‘cookies’ are dropping while they are searching for the marking point, and a load of 4 lb. I.B’s can be very dazzling to the low-flying markers.
The destruction of towns and cities behind the actual battle-front will have a direct effect upon the results of the hard battles which the ground forces will have to undertake soon. The enemy will be denied the use of his most essential means of transport, shelter for his reserves, and what remains of his armament production in the previously attacked areas. To achieve this, all Air Bomber must make sure that their bombs hit the areas they are intended for, and that means constant practice, a thorough knowledge of all equipment, and the ability to conform strictly to the plan of attack.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
Although the amount of practice bombing has increased considerably during the past six months, there is still a large number of details being cancelled because of snags which could have been avoided.
Now that the winter months are approaching, and opportunities for bombing will decrease, it is essential that the best advantage be taken of every chance to complete an exercise.
Quite a large number of faults which cause an abandonment of an exercise could have been prevented if the air bomber had thoroughly checked his equipment before take-off.
First of all make certain that the auto-selector box on the Light series carrier has been reset to No.1. The ground crew will usually attend to that, but there are occasions when it has been missed.
Examine the bombs and change any that have damaged tail fins. At the same time see that the safety pins have been withdrawn.
Test your bombsight on the ground and make sure that you have an emergency computor [sic]. In the event of a bombsight failure you can still derive some benefit from the exercise.
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
The provision of Bombing Analysis Officers on Squadrons and Conversion Units has proved of great value during the past few months, ensuring speedy
[Page break]
assessment of exercises and the abolition of inevitable errors which occurred when Bombing Leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to this very important duty.
However, there are still one or two points not receiving the attention required:-
(i) Crews must be given a detailed analysis of their exercises. It is not always possible to have the Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber present during the actual analysis, but they should see the plot as soon as possible.
(ii) Form 3073 must be completed, and the details supplied must be accurate. It will then afford the Analysis Officer, and the Bombsight Maintenance Staff, the maximum amount of assistance. It should be possible for the Squadron Commander to pick up a Form 3073 relating to an analysed exercise and thereby obtain a complete account of the bombing and any relevant comments from the Bombing Leader.
(iii) Do not forget that new crews have had very little experience in bombing from a Lancaster, and an accurate analysis will be of the greatest assistance to them.
(iv) When a bombsight fault has been discovered, inform the Instrument Section [underlined] immediately, [/underlined] and give them all the information you can. If necessary, produce the bomb plot and explain the errors. The Bombsight maintenance staff will appreciate all the assistance you can give them.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What action would you take if you obtained maximum starboard drift on the sighting head with zero wind set on the computor [sic]?
2. What is the procedure on landing at a strange airfield with 500 lb bombs (37 pistol) still on the aircraft?
3. Why is it essential to conform to the briefed air speed when making a “Wanganui” attack?
4. How does the Flight Engineer check the suction and what readings would you require to ensure that the bombsight was serviceable?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Mansbridge [/underlined] has left Group Headquarters and is now on a Staff Officers’ Course.
[Underlined] F/Lt Abbott [/underlined] (49 Squadron) is carrying out Group Bombing Leader’s duties.
[Underlined] S/Ldr Murtough [/underlined] (53 Base) has gone to Manby to take charge of the Bombing Leaders’ Courses.
[Underlined] F/Lt McCarthy [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) has gone to 53 Base and has been replaced by [underlined] F/Lt Kennedy [/underlined] (463 Squadron)
[Underlined] F/O Grime [/underlined] is doing Bombing Leader’s duties at 463 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt Harris [/underlined] (5 L.F.S.) has met with an unfortunate accident, and [underlined] F/O Wilkie [/underlined] (1661 C.U.) has taken over the Bombing Section at Syerston.
[Underlined] COURSES [/underlined]
The Group had three Air Bombers on No.91 Bombing Leaders’ Course, F/O Moreton (106 Squadron) was 6th, P/O Muhl (207 Squadron) 8th, and F/O Pyle (1661 C.U.) 10th, all obtaining “B” categories.
The bombing analysis courses are proceeding satisfactorily, and our
[Page break]
candidates have all received excellent assessments. If any Squadron or Conversion Unit has not appointed a Bombing Analysis Officer who has completed the course, please apply for an early vacancy.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 97 61 yards
2nd 630 64 yards
3rd 619 71 yards
4th 83 74 yards
5th 467 77 yards
6th 207 81 yards
7th 9 89 yards
8th 49 90 yards
9th 463 93 yards
10th 61 113 yards
11th 44 114 yards
12th 50 117 yards
13th 57 118 yards
14th 122 yards
September has produced a 100% entry in the Squadron Bombing Competition and 97 Squadron are at the top with an average error, for 8 exercises, of 61 yards.
This is an excellent result and 97 are to be congratulated, more especially as quite a lot of their bombing was carried out by Flight Engineers.
With the exception of 619 Squadron, 52 Base have slipped down the ladder, but assurances have been received from 44 and 49 Squadrons that this is only a temporary lapse, and every effort will be made to return to their former positions.
106 Squadron are handicapped by having many unexperienced crews on their strength and consequently are at the bottom of the list. However, the keenness which is apparent on the station is sure to produce better results.
Competition should be very keen during October; 97 Squadron will be ‘all out’ to keep on top, and it will need a very special effort from the “Main Force” to depose them. Given suitable weather, all records should be broken.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1654 56 yards
2nd 1660 65 yards
3rd 1661 72 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 85 yards
1661 Conversion Unit, after leading for two successive months, have gone down to third place, and 1654 Conversion Unit have taken over the top position with an average error of 56 yards.
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
The only entry this month comes from 51 Base:-
G/Capt Coats (Swinderby) – 103 yards
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has only produced one entrant also:-
F/Lt Foulkes (630 Squadron) – 158 yards
[Page break]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Errors by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Page break]
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
Wainfleet plotted 4945 bombs and 111 T.I’s dropped from 921 aircraft.
It is obvious that the Range staff have had a busy time, and to ensure accurate plotting, crews must conform to range procedure.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Wonham [/underlined] (55 Base) extends a hearty welcome to 44 and 619 Squadrons. The rivalry between the Squadrons, on Practice Bombing matters, is very keen and errors have shown a steady decrease during the past few months.
[Underlined] F/Lt Foulkes [/underlined] (630 Squadron) has equipped an excellent Bombing Analysis room. Points concerning Bombing, which need stressing, are emphasised by humorous cartoons, and the room itself is kept very clean and tidy.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
* Excluding 617 and 627 Squadrons.
A+ 85 yards or less.
A 140 yards or less.
B 210 yards or less.
C 280 yards or less.
D Over 280 yards.
The number of “D” category crews has decreased from 41 in August, to 15 for this month. This is a considerable improvement, but it is not good enough – there should be no “D” crews on an Operational Squadron, and Bombing Leaders must give careful attention to these errors.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
9 F/O Marsh F/O Carr - 78
44 P/O Evans Sgt Harper F/S Hunter 73
49 F/O Furber F/S Gentleman F/O Hassell 75
50 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 79
97 F/O Woolnough W/O Shearwood F/O Haggerston 57
F/L Shorter F/S Betts P/O Aveline 57 – 79
467 F/O Jones F/S Burns F/S Michelmore 74
617 F/L Knights F/O Rogers F/O Playford 74
F/O Levy F/S Peck F/O Fox 78
F/O Stout F/O Rupert F/O Graham 59
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard F/S Fish 70
F/L Hamilton F/O Rogers P/O Jackson 72
F/O Leavitt Sgt Oldham F/O Withams 73
619 F/O Cottman F/S Coster F/S Murray 71
1654 F/O Gray F/O Aitken Sgt Adams 62
F/O Denton F/O Goebel Sgt Kneebone 77
F/O Brammer Sgt White W/O Davies 69
P/O Dockworth F/S Quealy F/S Kenward 43
F/O Langridge F/O Cavanagh F/S Diggins 65
[Page break]
OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS (continued)
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
1660 P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowen Sgt Ransom 56
Sgt Sargent Sgt Walters F/S Symes 67
Sgt Keen Sgt Hurst Sgt Fidler 62
Lt Evenson Sgt BJorcy P/O Carling 61
P/O Penman F/S Dash P/O Pointon 78
F/S Cox F/S Smitherwaite Sgt Taylor 68
F/O Downing F/O Harrison P/O Semark 64
Lt Howes Sgt Johnston F/O Butterfield 78
1661 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 78
F/O James Sgt Longhurst P/O Jeffreys 70
F/O Gillegin Sgt Jenden Sgt Elliott 58
P/O Smith F/S Scott F/O Sweeney 77
F/O Caryer F/O Arnett P/O Grassie 71
5 L.F.S. P/O Aryton Sgt Herkes F/S Bardsley 65
P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowers Sgt Ransom 78
Owing to the large number of crew errors below 100 yards, it is only possible to publish those below 80 yards. Congratulations are due to F/L Shorter and crew (97 Squadron), F/S Wonders and crew (50 Squadron) and P/O Le Marquand and crew (now of 49 Squadron) for their consistently good bombing during the month.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” BOMBING TROPHY [/underlined]
The “Lord Camrose” trophy remains at Skellingthorpe for another three months.
50 Squadron’s average crew error for the months of July, August and September is 148 yards at 20,000 feet. Well done 50 Squadron!
463 Squadron are the runners up with an average error of 153 yards at 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The complete summary of practice bombing results for the month of September provides some very interesting facts and comparisons.
The number of bombs dropped is the best ever, and 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their magnificent effort in dropping 789. However, it will be noted that 61 Squadron dropped only 96 and assuming the Squadron strength to be 25 crews, that gives an average of 4 bombs per crew for one month. This compares unfavourably with the other Squadrons in the same Base, and it is essential that crews have the maximum amount of bombing training permitted by operational commitments and weather conditions.
Crew errors have declined slightly this month, the average being 9 yards less than that of August. This is a step in the right direction and it is hoped that there will be a steady reduction in errors until we can get our average error down to less than 150 yards. It can be done, 50 Squadron have proved it by obtaining an average crew error of 148 yards for the last three months.
The number of bombsight errors has increased from 42 in August to 90 in September, but the proportion of bombsight errors to exercises completed remains the same. Close co-operation between the Bombing Analysis Officer and the Instrument Section will help to bring bombsight serviceability up to a satisfactory level.
Our practice bombing has improved considerably during the past six months, from 275 to 183 yards at 20,000 feet and this improvement is apparent in the results of the attacks on German targets. However, it is possible to reach an even higher standard of accuracy but it means constant practice on the part of every member of the bombing team.
[Page break]
[Drawing] NAVIGATION
Almost all attacks this month have been on German objectives and navigators have done a good job on these longer range targets. Radar restrictions have necessitated flying considerable distances outside Gee range, and with winter approaching we must be prepared to fly even greater distances on D.R. alone. To achieve the high standard of navigation necessary for correct timing at the target, your D.R. navigation must be as sound and as complete as possible.
Mathematical accuracy, constant checking of D.R. positions and constant w/v checks, are the keynote of efficient D.R. navigation. Unfortunately very few navigators comply with all these points, and cases still occur of navigators not obtaining one D.R. position between their last Gee fix and the target.
Timing has been stressed frequently but on the coming long range operations it will be of paramount importance. By comparing forecast winds with winds found it is nearly always possible after the first hour’s flying to tell whether the aircraft will arrive at the target on time or not. If no moveable zero hour is being employed, then the earlier you can adjust your air speed, the easier it will be for you to arrive at the target at your scheduled time. During the winter months of last year it was not unusual to experience a spread of 15 – 20 minutes in the time over the target or along the route. With the concentration of enemy defences YOU CANNOT afford to fly in a bomber stream some 60 miles in length.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity scheme has not been used this month. Crews detailed to find correct bombing winds have put in some very good work, however, particular mention being due to 49 Squadron on the night 26/27th (Karlsruhe).
[Underlined] EXAMPLE OF GOOD “PILOT” NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
On the night of 27/28th September, 1944 (Kaiserlauten) F/O Nunns, Pilot of 630 Squadron gave an excellent example of “Pilot” Navigation. His aircraft was hit by flak on the return journey when some 150 miles inside France. He ordered the crew to abandon aircraft and was about to bale out himself when he managed to regain control. He decided to bring the aircraft back to base himself. Levelling out the aircraft and putting in “George” he went back to the navigator’s compartment and studied the log and chart carefully. From the information on the chart he was able to ascertain the aircraft’s present approximate position, and from the flight plan the courses to steer to reach base and the times on each leg. He flew the courses stated for the requisite amount of time and (strangely enough!) reached the base area. He was able to identify the beacons en route from the navigator’s flimsy and was thus able to “map read” the last few miles to base by this method.
This was a great effort and praise is due to both the pilot and also to his navigator who must have kept a complete and tidy chart to enable F/O Nunns to reach base the way he did.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF NAVIGATORS. [/underlined]
During the month of August it was decided to categorise navigators. Navigation does not lend itself easily to categorisation, mainly because it is impossible to lay down a procedure which will cater for every eventuality. It therefore will depend upon common sense and judgement of navigation officers.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
It is essential that all navigator’s operational logs and charts are thoroughly analysed immediately after each raid, and the results of that analysis made known to the navigation team as soon as possible, so that mistakes made will not be repeated. The analysis of logs and charts has always been the responsibility of Station and Squadron Navigation Officers; the present frequency of operations makes this an impossible task. It has therefore been decided to appoint one Navigation Analysis Officer to each Squadron, whose whole time duty it will be to analyse very thoroughly each log and chart.
By these appointments it is hoped to bring to light the errors and omissions of each navigator within 24 hours of completing a sortie. The Station Navigation Officer will thus be able to point out to each Navigator the “error of his ways” immediately, and will thus ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
Navigation Officers have a very big job in front of them and much hard work will be required.
[Underlined] APPROACH OF WINTER – WHAT IT MEANS! [/underlined]
Apart from all the well-known discomforts, the approach of winter means that OLD MAN WIND – the Navigator’s greatest enemy – will start hitting out again in force and will do all he can to land you in mischief. Low pressure systems are more prevalent in winter time, and therefore stronger winds have to be combated. Longer range targets means passing over territory which cannot at the moment, be too well explored by the Met. man, therefore you may pass over a front with a consequent wind change or run into a low pressure system which has not been forecast by the Met. Section. All this means that every individual Navigator must have a very thorough understanding of wind system. He must be able to interpolate for wind changes and must anticipate any sudden change of wind velocity. In last month’s summary attention was drawn to the Berlin raid of last Winter. We do not want this to happen again.
Get to know the wind system; visit the Met. man regularly and discuss the subject with him. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers should arrange constant lectures on this subject for the benefit of their Navigators. Wind is your biggest enemy.
[Underlined] O.R.S. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
A word about the O.R.S. information which is taken from you at interrogation. Numerous instances are occurring of incorrect information being forwarded to Group Headquarters. For example, an aircraft’s position is given as 4720N when it should be 4920N. These inaccuracies are obvious but other smaller inaccuracies are not so obvious. The concentration diagrams prepared from this information do not present a true picture of the situation, also many statistics prepared by O.R.S. are equally inaccurate and are therefore of no value.
All this O.R.S. information is collected and collated for your benefit and ultimate safety so do make sure that you give the CORRECT information and SEE that the Interrogator logs it correctly.
[Underlined] ATTACK ON TIRPITZ. [/underlined]
Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons had an opportunity during the month of showing their skill as “real” Navigators. The occasion was the attack on Tirpitz in Northern Waters and the landing at advanced bases in Russia. This operation, undertaken under difficult weather conditions and in total darkness, called for a very high standard of Navigation. It was anticipated that Gee would be received as far as 63° or 64°N; this was in fact correct. The remaining 1,000 miles over enemy occupied territory and enemy waters had to be tackled without the aid of Radar fixing facilities. Map reading was of course the most accurate method of fixing available, but this was very difficult over mountainous country studded with lakes and rivers. Nevertheless Air Bombers did some excellent work. Good use was also made of drifts
[Page break]
and astro shots. Unfortunately the low pressure system which could not be accurately positioned by Met., was encountered over the most difficult part of the route. This meant that winds became much stronger than forecast and also a considerable lowering of cloud base. Nevertheless, practically all the Navigators noted this sudden strengthening and varying of the wind velocity and were able to combat it successfully.
It was anticipated that a little trouble might be experienced with the P4 Compasses in these Northern latitudes. Every precaution was therefore taken before the aircraft left this country, compasses were swung and as much deviation was removed before take-off for this operation. It was gratifying to note, however, that not one single instance of compass failure or excessive deviation occurred.
The Air Bombers and Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons did an excellent job on this operation, under the most difficult conditions. They brought back with them much valuable information on the performance of compasses, Northern chain Gee range at varying heights etc. – information which will be of considerable importance in the planning of future operations.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING W/VS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is shown below.
Average Error of Squadrons – 4.7
Average Error of C. Units – 5.0
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1.8 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.6 m.p.h. This is excellent and the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h. has been reached. Let us now try and reduce this ideal over-all to 4 m.p.h.
[Table of Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the fourth month is succession. A very creditable performance. There still appears to be little improvement in the errors obtained by the three Squadrons from 54 Base. Come along now, let us see them at the top of the list next month.
[Page break]
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. Mould, DFC – Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to be Base Nav. Officer, Syerston.
S/Ldr. Bray, DFC – Station Nav. Officer, Dunholme to be Station Nav. Officer, Strubby.
S/Ldr. Warwick, DFC – Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby missing on operations.
[Cartoon] “HERE IS THE BOMBING WIND – AND THIS IS P/O VECTOR READING IT!”
N.M.
[Page break]
[Drawing] RADAR NAV.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The most outstanding feature regarding 2 S this month has been the severe restrictions placed upon its use for operations.
It is realised that with these restrictions of H 2 S, navigation is bound to suffer slightly, particularly during the autumn months as no one can be too certain of the ranges on Gee. Operators must therefore make the best of the limited use of H 2 S on each operation. This Headquarters will welcome any ideas on how to obtain maximum efficiency from H 2 S during the limited periods it is available.
There are one or two points regarding the restrictions which must be stressed at the present time. Firstly, operators, if they are allowed to use H 2 S on any part of the flight, must make sure that it is switched on below 6,000 feet or else circuit breakdowns may occur. Secondly, close watch must be maintained on the scanner position when turned off, as wander is likely particularly during tactical manoeuvres.
It must be pointed out that despite restrictions on H 2 S on operations, no relaxation in training can be allowed and every effort must be made to see that operators remain proficient in its use. Experiments are being carried out to develop some kind of sector scan and if successful, operators may be able to make use of H 2 S throughout the whole flight. Sector scan requires a high standard of proficiency in H 2 S particularly in the interpretation of the P.P.I., and although training in sector can cannot be given at the moment, operators may do well to bear the problem in mind.
Experiments are also going ahead with the Mark II H 2 S scanner to try and improve the bombing picture on the P.P.I. This is being done by altering the pitch of the scanner to concentrate the beam and alter the polar diagram. If successful it may be possible to modify other Mark II equipment gradually. This will only be done if the range is not seriously restricted and its navigational use is not affected.
Blind bombing technique in the Group has developed further in the past few weeks and considerable success has been obtained by 83 and 97 Squadrons on the last few operations. To indicate the high standard which these two Squadrons have attained, a resume’ of their flare and blind marking errors on operations is given.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 26/27 AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
This was the first operation on which the specially selected H 2 S Mark III equipment was used and F/Lt. Baker, Blind Marker crew of 97 Squadron dropped his marker 400 yds. south of the Aiming Point. Had the whole attack been based on this marker it might have been slightly more successful.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 29/30th AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
An extremely successful operation with the centre of the blind illuminating flares being plotted extremely close to the centre of the town. The blind proximity marker released by a crew of 97 Squadron was reported 600 yds. south of the aiming point although no photograph was obtained.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. 11/12th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
An excellent operation with highly successful blind illumination
[Page break]
provided by 83 and 97 Squadrons. The direct release method of marking and blind bombing was used and photographs gave the following results:-
F/O TAYLOR 97 SQUADRON AIMING POINT.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O EATON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/LT. BAKER 97 SQUADRON 1.75 n.m.
[Underlined] STUTTGART. 12/13th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Blind marking was carried out by the direct release method with a G.P.I. check from PFORZHEIM. The following successful results were obtained:-
F/LT. AMES 97 SQUADRON 600 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,000yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. SHORTER 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds From Town Centre.
F/O. SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. LAING 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18/19th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A most successful sortie. Of the Primary Blind Markers F/Lt. Kelly of 83 Squadron dropped his T.Is. 500 yds. from the Aiming Point whilst F/Lt. Laing and F/Lt. Lines of 97 Squadron both had errors of less than 1 nautical mile. The Flare Force too was remarkably accurate, illuminating the target area to such effect that the Mosquito aircraft had no difficulty in marking the Aiming Point. The Flare Force photographs showed that F/O Gamble, 83 Squadron, F/O Price, 83 Squadron and F/O Canever of 97 Squadron had Aiming Points, whilst S/Ldr. Hatcher had an error of 1,400 yds.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH 19/20th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Technical failures prevented the plotting of many flare force photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows considerable damage in the target area, proving that the flare force illumination was of its usual high order.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE. [/underlined]
Cloud prevented the plotting of photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows very extensive damage in the most closely built up area of the town. P.P.I. photographs indicate that the accuracy of the blind markers was to the order of 1,000 yds. and 400 yds. respectively.
[Underlined] KAIDERSLAUTERN. [/underlined]
Using the direct release method with a G.P.I. check on SAABRUCKEN, W/C. Ingham of 83 Squadron dropped his flares 1,500 yards, F/Lt. Edwards, 83 Squadron 1.3 miles and F/O Simpson 1.25 miles respectively from the flare aiming point. By this illumination, the low level Mosquitos were able to mark the target accurately.
Great credit is due to the two marking Squadrons for the success obtained on these operations. The majority of the results were obtained on the specially selected and tuned up sets thus proving that not only have crews to be selected, but also the equipment. In addition, the results have been obtained only through particularly extensive training, and the enthusiasm of the crews carrying it out.
If we are to maintain these excellent results, the two squadrons must be provided with crews of a suitable type; Crews selected are carrying on high tradition and are directly responsible for the success of all future operations.
[Underlined] P.P.I. PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
The standard of P.P.I. photography has been raised slightly during the month and several good photographs have been received at this Headquarters. F/Lt. Dobbie of 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph
[Page break]
of KAISERLAUTERN when on the operation to KARLSRUHE. This was of considerable assistance to set operators in their identification of this target on a later raid.
Very little gardening has been carried out this month. But so far the results received are up to the usual 5 Group standard. A paper on the plotting od H 2 S mining photographs has been received and copies are being sent to the gardening squadrons for their attention. This report supplements the report S.121 on the plotting of “Y” photographs and is based on data from No. 4 and 6 Groups who have carried out the majority of H 2 S gardening sorties.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Increased importance has been placed on the use of Gee this month due to the restrictions placed on the use of H 2 S. Thus the necessity for that very last fix is again well to the forefront. Operators must make every effort to read through the jamming and make maximum use of position lines where fixes cannot be obtained.
On the majority of operations during the month a considerable increase in ranges have been noticed due to the swift advance of the allied armies, capturing large areas of country in which Gee jamming equipment was sited. This at once extended the ranges obtainable over France and Belgium to the limits of the territory held, but no marked improvement was shown further north where enemy interference in Holland and N. West Germany, though varying in intensity from day to day, was nearly always at maximum intensity when heavy bombers were operating.
On the Eastern Chain it has been noted that the enemy has transferred a considerable amount of his jamming to the 27 unit and that greater range is being obtained on the Unit 25. Weakness of pulses only restricts range on the Unit 25.
The average range on the North Eastern Chain has been stabilised at about 6°E with the limiting factor being the weakness of the “A” pulse.
The Southern Chain appears to be giving the best results now that German jamming has ceased with fixes as far as 7°E. These ranges may drop during the Autumn due to meteorological conditions. The limiting factor on this chain appears to be the weakness of the “C” pulse.
There have been few reports on the Channel chain, but it would appear that the limits of its coverage are between 5 and 6° with little jamming. The general complaint on the use of this chain are that the topographical lattice maps suppled are unsuited for heavy bomber navigation.
Two Squadrons had the opportunity of using the Northern Chain at its extreme limits this month. The flight was carried out at low level and signals were received as far as 64 °N, but the small cut of the lattice lines did not enable fixes to be plotted accurately at that range. These results were as much as expected, and confirm the reports of Costal [sic] Command who do the most flying in that area.
The low level at which we are now flying over France may restrict Gee range somewhat but it is thought that the short ranges obtained by navigators on the operation on KAISERLAUTERN was due to the poor propagation properties of the atmosphere. These properties are most noticeable during the months of October and November, and it may well be that our Gee range on the present chains may be restricted to 5°E throughout these months.
However, to counteract this we have news of further chains which are being provided on the Continent and as soon as information is received at this Headquarters it will be passed to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Tests are still being carried out by Bomber Command as to the suitability of the use of the Homing and S.S. Chains for Bomber Command Navigation.
Until the results of these tests are known no action is being taken regarding the training of navigators.
[Page break]
[Drawing] ENGINEERING
Large number of movements have taken place or about to take place which are liable to upset calculations, but it is apparent that the operational effort has not suffered as a result. 52 Base is about to leave the Group complete with R.A.F. Stations, Scampton, Fiskerton and Dunholme. The good work which we associate with such stations will now be associate with other stations within the Group. 55 Base now comprises as many squadrons as 53 Base, i.e. five full squadrons each, and No. 5 L.F.S., Syerston, comes within a Base Organisation.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL DEFECTS. [/underlined]
The operational effort was not quite so high as the previous month, but the aircraft were available had the weather given us a fair chance. The percentage of operational failures due to Engineer faults was 0.94 which is an improvement on the previous months. Out of this total, 0.24% were abortive sorties and 0.7% were early returns. Special mention must be made to No. 54 Base as a whole and they are given the ‘Big Hand’ for producing the record of having no operational failures due to matters concerning the Engineers during September. 49 Squadron also are to be congratulated for similar reasons.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE – 5 GROUP SERVICING SECTION [/underlined]
Appreciation of the efforts of No. 5 Group Servicing Section is recorded and the good work which is carried out by them under very often difficult conditions. C.T.O’s should realise the personal problems and difficulties of these mobile parties which are moved about at a moment’s notice to wherever the ‘shoe pinches’ within the Group. The sum total of the work carried out by these few men during the last four months comprises eight Major Inspections, thirty initial checks and 120 rebuilt power plants. During September two gangs were in operation as Major Inspection gangs solely for the first time, and their activities within the Group are apparent. Apart from the above work, four base hydraulic bays have been completed, two during the last four months. The instrument personnel have built and installed 110 second pilot’s instrument panels in Stirling aircraft of Conversion Units during the last three months.
[Underlined] FORMS 765C. [/underlined]
The remarks by the Specialist Officer concerned at para. 11 of the 765C are still far too brief and in many cases incomplete, and invariably give no indication whether relevant modifications are embodied or not. It is pointed out once more that care and thought in rendering Forms 765C will prove of assistance in attempting to establish the cause of failures and recommending action for preventing recurrences of such failures.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
Bombsight maintenance continues at a high standard throughout the Group, and accuracy of a high order is being achieved, mainly due to the effective liaison existing between Electrical Officers and Bombing Leaders. Bombing Analysis courses are now open to Base Electrical Officers, and two have, up to the time of writing, completed the course. The course has proved very valuable in assisting Electrical Officers in diagnosing the causes of bombing errors, particularly instrument errors, and we can now look forward to an even higher standard of accuracy. As it will be a long time before all Electrical Officers will be able to attend the course Base Electrical Officers should instruct their junior officers in the art of analysing a bombing plot.
Mk.XIVA bombsights are now arriving in large numbers and the Group Instrument Servicing Van is having a busy time in instructing personnel in
[Page break]
the differences between the XIV and the XIVA. The new computor [sic] is not all that could be desired, the great majority of them (about 95%) needing retuning or the replacing of defective parts, and are generally requiring about twice the number of man hours to rectify. The matter has been taken up with higher authority and it is hoped that results of our ‘moans’ will soon be evident. In the meantime a thorough check must be given to every computor [sic] and 1022 action taken in every case of faulty design, or workmanship.
A word or two regarding defect action would not come amiss. Far too many defective items of equipment are being returned to stores without 1022 or 1023 action being taken. It must be impressed again on all officers that it is only by taking the correct official procedure that rectification action can be taken. It is of no earthly use just to tell the Group Specialist Officer that such and such is giving trouble if there is no 1022 backing. The Group Specialist Officer of course wants to know what is giving trouble but any report that he may make will be shot down if it is not supported by a 1022. A case in point concerns the low insulation of gun heaters. Only two cases have been reported to Command out of the hundred or so which have occurred. So let us have some more 1022’s.
After putting in a considerable amount of work in their respective sections the Electrical and Instrument personnel of 52 Base have had to evacuate their quarters and move to Syerston and start again from scratch. No doubt their experience will serve them well in producing even better sections.
Command Modification No. 74 is now completed throughout the Group and a word of praise must be given to those men who formed the Group pool to produce the modified bomb aimer’s panels. They worked long hours and did an excellent job of work. All Bases were represented so they will each have a good man to start their own modification gang cracking.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Training Unit Serviceability]
[Page break]
Many applications have been made in the past by Flight Engineers to change over to Transport Command; This Command is now prepared to accept Flight Engineers for flying duties provided they have completed two operational tours and one tour of instructional duties. Flight Engineers who are eligible should make application through the usual channels at their unit.
Log keeping has improved throughout this Group, but it is noticed that many engineers do not record atmospheric temperatures and airframe serial letter and numbers; this has been pointed out before. Flight Engineer Leaders must insist that this omission is remedied.
Defect reports still come through showing the cause as manipulation trouble on the part of the Flight Engineer, in many cases these result in a cancellation or early return. Points for the Flight Engineer Leader to instruct on are as follows:-
[Underlined] Starter Motor burnt out: [/underlined] if correct drill had been used this would have been avoided.
[Underlined] Overheating of Engines: [/underlined] early returns are made because of supposed overheating; on examination, these temperatures prove to be within the engine limitations.
[Underlined] Misbehaviour of Engines: [/underlined] black smoke from exhaust; on this trip other crews reported same conditions but attributed this to atmospheric conditions on flying through cloud. Had this Flight Engineer checked all his gauges he would have been able to inform his Captain that engines were quite normal and this early return would have been avoided.
[Page break]
[Drawing] AIR SEA RESCUE
With the liberation of countries in Western Europe, the flow back to England of aircrew who have been shot down is increasing – not only in numbers, but in speed. It is strongly rumoured that one, who was shot down on the outward trip, managed, with the assistance of a jeep and a flip from Paris, to arrive back before the Main Force!
These evaders tell amazing stories – some are good and reveal level-headedness, fine crew discipline and a sound knowledge of Safety Drills. Others are the reverse, and the following extracts from reports by 5 Group aircrew tell their own story.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 6th June, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “We’ve been hit kids, get out”.
“My parachute was only fixed by the right buckle”.
“Informant had known for some time that the left clip was loose, but had neglected to have it repaired”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 24/25th July, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “Get to Hell out of this as quickly as possible”.
“The informant did not leave his turret (Mid-Upper) very speedily as he experienced some difficulty in locating the footbar”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 3/4th May, 1944. [/underlined]
“The W/Op noticed as he passed, that the Navigator’s altimeter was reading 1,000 feet. He therefore pulled his rip cord while still in the aircraft. He gathered the canopy in his arms and went out head first, receiving a kick on the behind from the pilot”.
[Cartoon] DO YOU KNOW YOUR DRILLS? – OR DO [underlined] YOU [/underlined] HAVE TO BE KICKED OUT?? N.M.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 7/8th August, 1944. [/underlined]
“The Mid Upper Gunner was moving so quickly that he overshot the exit and fell against the rear turret. He returned with some difficulty to the exit, which he opened. He then took his parachute from his stowage and fastened it on”.
“The pilot had to go back from his seat for his parachute which the Navigator had failed to give him”.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR ESCAPE HATCH! [/underlined]
There have been too many incidents where the front hatch has
[Page break]
jammed or taken a long time to open. The Air Bomber’s pre-flight drill calls for a check on this hatch. A check does not mean that the Air Bomber looks to see that the hatch is there, but means that he is to check its ease of release and that it is correctly fastened afterwards.
The parachute drill (5 Group Aircraft Drills) states that the hatch is to be JETTISONED, not pulled up inside the aircraft where it is liable to obstruct the exit.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR PARACHUTE! [/UNDERLINED]
An unfortunate incident occurred during the month when a Hurricane Pilot, not wearing his own parachute, collided with a Martinet and was forced to abandon his aircraft.
The pilot did not get clear until he was at about 3,000 ft. and, although he pulled the rip cord immediately, he was killed on impact with the ground.
An examination of the parachute harness also showed that it was far too loose for the wearer.
Each member of air-crew flying fighters or bombers, must check his parachute for serviceability and fitting before every flight.
[Underlined] EVASION [/underlined]
No less than 25 aircrew of No. 50 Squadron, missing since the beginning of May, are reported to have evaded capture and returned safely to this country.
Successful evasion depends upon:
(i) Your will to evade.
(ii) Your physical fitness.
(iii) An up to date knowledge of the military situation.
(iv) the latest advice which your Intelligence Officer will give you.
Consider these things beforehand and avoid Dulag Luft.
[Page break]
[Drawing] PHOTOGRAPHY
The total number of failures on Night Photography has decreased to 5.93%. Failures on Day Photography amount to 4.07%. The decrease over the previous month in respect of Night Photography has occurred chiefly on the Armament side. The prevailing target conditions, when smoke from incendiary loads obscured the target, has made it impossible in many cases to determine whether a flash has or has not exploded correctly. This is a recurrence of conditions which existed during last winter. Manipulation failures have shown an increase in the last two months, in 83 and 97 Squadrons. In the past this type of failure has been very low in this Group, and it is to be hoped that the steps now being taken by the Bombing Leaders will eliminate them in these two Squadrons.
The supply of High Speed Night Film has now materially increased and Squadrons are to use this film on all operations. In view of the fact that we are now entering a period of the year when light conditions will often be poor, the use of this film will help to ensure sufficient exposure. It will, of course, save a lot of magazine reloading.
The supply of H 2 S cameras has grown considerably during the past month and promises to continue doing so. These cameras are not constructed for service work or to be handled by service personnel; great care will therefore have to be exercised in the handling and operating of them. A number of H 2 S photographs received have been unsharp and sometimes of poor quality. This poor workmanship will have to be remedied and a special effort by Photographic N.C.O’s in this direction is required.
No. 5 Group Headquarters now hold a K.20 camera for use on hand held obliques. Any station requiring the use of this camera is to inform the Group Photographic Officer who will make arrangements for the camera to be forwarded. Two days’ notice will be required.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Drawing] ARMAMENT
[Underlined] WINTER [/underlined]
Once more the annual reminder which you are no doubt tired of hearing, but a warning which must be even more carefully heeded this year than ever before.
Listed below are a few points which will require your personal attention during the coming months if an increase in failures is to be avoided.
[Underlined] Gun Heaters. [/underlined] Are all your aircraft fitted with gun heaters? The Electrical Officers are giving this matter their personal attention and the fitting of heaters is going ahead. Take a personal interest in this matter yourself, see that the Electrical Branch are given every assistance.
[Underlined] Duct Heaters. [/underlined] New aircraft are now arriving with ducted heating to both rear and mid-upper turrets. Have you any of these aircraft? If so, go and have a look at one and get the “gen” on how it works.
[Underlined] Browning Guns. [/underlined] Has your gun maintenance been allowed to slip during the summer months? If so, now is the time to tighten up. All new guns must be very carefully checked; all grease must be removed, particularly from the breach block, firing pin and spring, etc. and guns must be lubricated in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Pt.2, Section 14, Leaflet No.6, Issue No. 1.
[Underlined] Gun Covers. [/underlined] Have you an adequate supply of gun and turret covers? All Units should now have manufactured the cover for the Direct Vision Aperture in the F.N. 120. This Headquarters’ letter 634/4/Armt. dated 12th May, 1944 refers.
[Underlined] Cluster Projectiles. [/underlined] Wet Cluster Projectiles may cause functioning failures due to ice accretion on the mechanism or from rust. See that full use is made of all available tarpaulins. Recommendations have been made to Headquarters, Bomber Command for an increase in establishment of Covers, Water proof, Large and Small.
[Underlined] Bomb Trollies. [/underlined] Are all your trollies fitted with mud guards to prevent S.B.C. release slips from becoming splashed with mud and water during transportation?
[Underlined] Welfare. [/underlined] During Winter months Armourers will be working long hours in bad weather conditions. See that they are properly equipped with warm clothing, gloves, oil skins, and gum boots etc. A warm and contented man will work better than one half frozen.
[Underlined] SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS. [/underlined]
The month of September saw the return, after a long absence, of the Small Bomb Container. With the introduction of the Cluster Projectile, relief was felt by all Armament Officers as it was thought we had seen the last of the “very difficult to handle” Small Bomb Container. Unfortunately the shortage of Cluster Projectiles has necessitated our return to this item of equipment, consequently a large number of headaches have resulted.
With the introduction of the new Twin Adaptors the Incendiary load has been considerable [sic] increased and it is now possible to carry 20 S.B.C’s on the Lancaster. This increase in bomb load means that far more work is entailed in the preparation of the required number of S.B.C’s for an
[Page break]
operation and it has been found necessary to seek outside labour to assist in the filling. Unfortunately it is still necessary to fill the Mk. VA. S.B.C. by hand, but small numbers of 50 pack Incendiaries are now being received and it is hoped that in the near future the boxes of 30 x 4lb. Incendiaries will entirely disappear. This step will be welcomed by all.
[Cartoon] THIS – OR THIS?? N.M.
[Underlined]
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES – HANDLING. [/underlined]
The organisation for the handling of Cluster Projectiles still requires a lot of attention on some Stations. Quantities of Roller Conveyors are now held on all Stations and this equipment, suitably raised from the ground on tail unit boxes or cluster projectile cases, provides an excellent method for the handling and fusing of cluster projectiles.
This equipment, suitably laid out, can provide multi unloading, fusing and loading points, and can cut down the man handling required to the barest minimum, and the saving in time will be considerable.
[Underlined] SALVAGE. [/underlined]
The problem of returning salvage has now become a major one, and when one considers that approximately, 4,000 boxes of 4lb. Incendiaries are thrown up from one operation on a 2 Squadron Station, it is obvious that careful attention must be given to the organisation for the return of this salvage. All 2 Squadron Station have now been supplied with additional labour kindly loaned to us by the Army. This additional labour, if correctly employed, should prevent the accumulation of any large quantity of salvage. When lorries deliver explosives to you let your motto be “They shall not return empty.”
All smaller salvage, i.e. nose plugs, transit caps from tail pistols etc., should be placed in bins and not left lying around to form a permanent menace to bomb trolley tyres. Bins are easily obtainable and sufficient should be placed in the bomb store to enable an ample supply to be available at all fusing and handling points.
[Underlined] HEAVY TYPE TRANSPORTERS. [/underlined]
There is at present a deficiency of approximately 2,500 transporters in this Group, including those sent away under Bomber Command’s instructions, for modification. Bomber Command have promised that every effort is being made to expedite the manufacture of new type heavy transporters and early issues are expected. In the meantime, continual care must be exercised in the loading of cluster projectiles on to bomb trolleys to ensure that no tail units are damaged.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BOOBS – BOMBING LEADERS PLEASE NOTE. [/underlined]
Two boobs by Air Bombers this month were responsible for complete bomb loads being returned to Base.
1. Bomb Aimer failed to fully rotate the Distributor Drum Switch with the result that no contact was made – FULL
[Page break]
BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
2. Bomb Aimer set drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo” – FULL BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
Eight other manipulation failures resulted in 8 photoflashes being returned due to the Isolation switch not being made.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
Is your A.P. 2264A fully amended? If so where would you find the information on the Bomb, Smoke, Aircraft, 100 lb. Mk.1?
[Drawing] WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
TOTAL: £5,722.14s. 3d.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – Manipulation. B – Maintenance. C – Icing. D. – Technical. E – Electrical. F. – Obscure.
[Page break]
[Drawing] GUNNERY
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BAG [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“E” 630 11/12 Sept. T/E
“B” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“T” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“O” 83 23rd Sept. S/E
“R” 630 23rd Sept. T/E
“U” 207 26/27 Sept. ME410
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“H” 50 11/12 Sept. ME110
“D” 207 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“X” 467 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“J” 106 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“J” 61 11/12 Sept. ME.109
“Y” 9 26/27 Sept. ME.410
Confirmation of these claims, by Headquarters Bomber Command, is awaited.
There was a total of 119 combats during the month’s operations which shows a slight increase on last month’s figure. Of these 8 are claimed as destroyed 3 as probably destroyed and 4 as damaged. The largest number of combats occurred on the night 11/12th September, when Darmstadt was the target. Out of 39 combats the Group claimed 3 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 2 damaged – an excellent return. During the month, tracer was removed from the first 300 rounds, with a view to assisting the gunner in his sighting. Reports have since been submitted by Bases, and these are now under consideration. If the test has convinced gunners that accurate shooting can only be applied through the sight, it has certainly been worth while.
Early Warning Devices, with the exception of Fishpond, have been temporarily suspended, so once again the gunner has got to rely on his ability to see under night conditions and on his mental alertness. Even with the E.W.D. several instances occurred of enemy aircraft approaching and attacking unobserved, and without the E.W.D’s we must expect more instances of this. To arm ourselves against this, we must make use of every opportunity of training under night conditions, either at night with night affiliation, or simple exercises on the ground, or by day in the Night Vision rooms. Whilst on the subject of night vision, it is painful to have to record that two instances of Lancaster firing on Lancaster were reported during the month. In each instance the aggressor was identified as a Lancaster by the gunners. It was fortunate that no serious casualties resulted from these attacks, but it does stress the fact that more aircraft recognition under night conditions is called for.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred of guns being fired in dispersals and seriously damaging other aircraft. Gunners must make certain that all guns are on “SAFE” before unloading or testing.
Instructions are to be issued shortly regarding the wearing of Pilot type parachutes by rear gunners. This will come into force when sufficient quantities of this type of parachute are available.
Fighter affiliation exercises with Gyro Camera have shown a big increase on last month’s figures, and Squadrons are to be congratulated. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future, to issue an extra Gyro Camera assembly to each Squadron.
[Underlined] SQUADRON GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
9 Squadron F/Lt Gabriel
50 Squadron F/Lt Mills
61 Squadron F/Lt Glover
463 Squadron F/Lt Winston
467 Squadron F/O Ellis
44 Squadron F/Lt Clarke
619 Squadron F/Lt Waterhouse
83 Squadron S/Ldr Poole
97 Squadron S/Ldr Sherring
106 Squadron F/Lt Sullivan
617 Squadron F/Lt Armstrong
57 Squadron F/Lt Taylor
630 Squadron F/Lt Cass
207 Squadron F/Lt Wardle
49 Squadron F/Lt Wynyard
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training by Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR SEPTEMBER:- [underlined] 2535 [/underlined]
* 49 Squadron employed on special training.
[Page break]
[Drawing] TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD OUTPUT [/underlined]
This was the last month of the full Summer Training Programme, and the number of crews produced was the highest on record. A total of 162 pilots (161 full crews) was posted to Squadrons and provided ample surplus for the forthcoming expansion.
Weather was patchy towards the end of the month, but despite this and some difficulties with power plants and tyres, the Stirling Conversion Units flew an average of 2,000 hours each. No. 5 L.F.S. did a total of just over 2,000 hours. The accident rate improved for the third successive month.
No.1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit is getting into its stride and flew 700 hours. The first course is due to pass out early next month. No. 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit which also formed under the control of 5 Group, made rapid progress once the Staff had the airfield to themselves. The first course enters on 7th October.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION [/underlined]
Fighter Affiliation continued to increase and 1690 B.D.T. Flight gave day and night affiliation on over 1,000 details, exercising 2450 gunners compared with 2100 for August.
Night affiliation with Hurricanes is growing from infancy into a robust child. 1690 B.D.T. Flight affiliated with 60 Squadron crews at night, exercising 120 gunners, double the total last month. The Hurricanes averaged 41 hours per aircraft.
The monthly target for night affiliation from now on is 600 details. If 300 crews do two night details each, and 9 of the 12 Hurricanes average 3 details each on approximately 21 fit nights in a month, the results will be 600 details, 1200 gunners exercised, and a figure ten-fold greater than this month!
Incidentally, 1690 B.D.T. Flight packed its bags once again, and is now located at R.A.F. Station, Metheringham.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING [/underlined]
The provision of an instructor for each Squadron, instead of instructors allocated to Bases, will give Squadrons a greater opportunity of supervising closely all new crews, and picking up any deficiencies which arise because of the shortness of the course at the L.F.S.
It is essential that Squadron Training Pilots forward their reports on new crews through the usual channels to Base Headquarters so that the Base Air Staff Officer can submit to this Headquarters at the end of each month a summary of opinion on the standard of training and points requiring attention. 10 and 20 sortie checks are essential for all crews in Squadrons throughout the Group, and Squadron Training Pilots are to give them special attention.
No.106 Squadron now has a new function as the “Nursery” for the two P.F.F. Squadrons in 54 Base. Outstanding crews under training in 51 Base and L.F.S. are being selected for P.F.F. duties in 5 Group, and are posted to 106 Squadron for experience and training, after which they proceed to either 83 or 97 Squadron to provide the necessary experience and for supervising the new crews.
[Page break]
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base, Squadron and Conversion Unit]
GRAND TOTAL:- Pilots: 1463 hours
F/Engineers: 965 hours
There was again an increase in Link Trainer Times for the month by both Pilots and Flight Engineers. The Pilots went up by about 100 hours and the Flight Engineers by about 40 hours.
Every little helps, but 140 hours among 21 Units represents an average increase of about 7 hours per Unit.
It should be possible to increase this four-fold now that the more doubtful weather is approaching. Each Squadron in particular should get its Pilots’ Link times up to the 50/60 hour mark.
[Underlined] SPECIAL NOTE [/underlined]
Pilots and Link Trainer Instructors should take special note of the modification to topple the Artificial Horizon and spin the Directional Gyro, and make sure it is used on every exercise.
[Page break]
[Drawing] ACCIDENTS
The 26 aircraft damaged during August gave us a rate of 7.3 per 10,000 flying hours, one of the best rates the Group has ever attained, and good enough to put us in second place in the Command Accident ladder.
September’s total is 23, made up as follows:- 6 Cat. AC; 5 Cat. B; 12 Cat. E. Quite a number of aircraft were damaged to a lesser extent and repaired more or less “on the spot”. They, happily, do not count against us, and the “rate” should be close to August’s good figures. Flying hours will decide.
11 of the month’s accidents were avoidable.
[Underlined] SQUADRONS: [/underlined] Overshoots landing – 2; Heavy Landings – 1; Miscellaneous – 2.
[Underlined] 51 BASE: [/underlined] Swings Landing – 2; overshoots landing – 2; Taxying – 1.
[Underlined] 1690 Flight: [/underlined] Miscellaneous – 1.
None of these accidents have any special features except perhaps the collision between a Hurricane engaged on affiliation with a Lancaster, and a Master of another Group. From details at present available the Hurricane pilot appears to have been “shooting away” the Master who was taking close an interest in the exercise. Both single aircraft engined aircraft crashed, but the Master pilot escaped by parachute. 1690 pilots take note. Extreme care is required when dealing with these other aircraft which very often have pupil pilots aboard, and do not always do what you would expect.
In addition to the accidents above, there have been 7 minor taxying accidents in the Group this month. In each instance the damage was soon repaired, but that is not the point. Each one was completely avoidable, and required a certain amount of valuable time and labour to put right. With the coming of the darker nights and poorer weather it is most important, yes, essential, that this tendency to careless taxying is stamped out. Last winter’s taxying story was a sorry tale. It must not be duplicated this year.
The period for the second award of the Silver Lancaster has just ended. As soon as all accident reports are forward the result will be published. It looks like another close race.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
The above table includes minor avoidable accidents which are not listed in the review above. The damage was Cat. A in each instance. 51 Base Units are not given STAR awards.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS for PILOTS
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take your place in the drive on instrument flying. Nights grow longer and you’ll be getting both dark take-offs and dark returns.
(ii) Give yourself 5 – 10 minutes on your primary instruments – Turn and Bank, A.S.I. and Altimeter – on every N.F.T. Cover up the artificial horizon and cage the gyro.
(iii) Practice the corkscrew on instruments. Its [sic] easy to “mock up” a hood for instrument flying in day-light. Fold a map, fit it on your helmet and draw goggles on to your forehead. The goggles and strap will hold the map in place. Don’t forget to have a member of the crew keeping a look out for other aircraft.
(iv) Get your quota of Link hours in. The new device to topple the artificial horizon and spin the gyro will put you on your mettle.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take things steadily on the ground. The autumn and winter in the past have always produced a sorry tale of bogged aircraft and taxying accidents.
(ii) Look up Air Staff Instruction F.C. 24 for the duties and responsibilities of all aircrew when taxying.
(iii) Use the landing light on the Lancaster and man the Aldis light. Modifications to the landing light are under consideration in an attempt to further increase its usefulness as an aid to taxying.
(iv) Remember you get the illusion at night that you are taxying slowly when you are in fact going fast. CO-OPERATION – CAUTION – CONTROL are the three principles to apply to taxying.
[Underlined] THE LAST 100 FEET. [/underlined]
(i) Wind velocity decreases proportionately from 1,500 feet to ground level because of the friction of the ground. This is most pronounced at night.
(ii) Its [sic] possible to have a wind of gale force at 1,500 feet and dead calm at ground level at night. Its [sic] also possible for the wind direction to be 50° different between 1,500 feet and the ground.
(iii) So watch your approaches. In a very strong wind, increase your air speed by 5/10 m.p.h. and check for drift. The last 100 feet can be difficult if you don’t appreciate the circumstances.
(iv) A word on landings. Your Check Landing Card is a valuable record for [underlined] YOU. [/underlined] Don’t wait until your crew complains your landings are not too good. Inspect your Check Landing Card once a fortnight and see that it is up to date.
[Page break]
[Drawing] FLYING CONTROL
This month has seen the introduction of a Bomber Command Standard Landing Procedure which aims to provide a simple and standard landing drill, and which will give reasonably good landing times. It is hoped that this procedure will be adopted by other Commands, and that it will eventually be used at every airfield in the British Isles. This Group, however, has been permitted to retain its two R/T channels of communication, and the landing procedure, previously employed by 5 Group, has been substantially modified to bring it in to line with the new Standard Procedure.
In the near future, it is hoped that a directif will be issued to all Flying Control Officers laying down a standard technique of handling aircraft. At present there are two schools of thought. One in which one officer in the Watch Office controls aircraft on both Studs ‘A’ and ‘B’. Secondly where one officer in the Watch office feeds aircraft into the circuit on Stud ‘A’ and a second officer controls aircraft on Stud ‘B’, and gives instructions where necessary should aircraft be too closely or too loosely spaced. Trials are at present being carried out on both these schemes and the details will be issued on which scheme proves itself to be the safest and most efficient.
One word here about flying discipline. At some stations in the Group, breaches of flying discipline in the circuit are reports to Squadron Commanders, who take immediate action with the aircrew concerned. No matter how good or how safe a landing procedure might be, if crews don’t play fair and obey instructions to the letter then one might just as well give up the idea of trying to speed up the rate of landing, and at the same time maintain an adequate safety margin. If every crew takes its turn, plays fair and used its common-sense it will be landed within the minimum time and with perfect safety.
[Underlined] Marking Circuit Points. [/underlined]
It is appreciated that in the past there has been some difficulty in determining when an aircraft exactly reaches the various points of call around the circuit. The problem of marking these points to suit all runways is not an easy one, and several experiments have been carried out as yet with little success. It is hoped, however, that the end is now in sight and that very soon “call-up” and “check” points for use with every runway will be marked around the circuit.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Page break]
[Drawing] EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] UNIT RETURNS. [/underlined]
Cases have occurred where serviceable equipment returned to the U.E.D. has arrived in an unserviceable state. In most cases the cause has been careless packing. Equipment Officers should realise that this almost amounts to sabotage as not only is time and labour wasted at the receiving end, but equipment, which has taken the manufacturers valuable man-hours to make, is useless to the service until more man-hours are spent in repair.
Therefore watch this and thus save labour.
[Underlined] Q. FORM. [/underlined]
The Q Form has been amended and the old “U” has been broken down into “U.1” (awaiting spares, work held up) and “U.2” (awaiting spares but work proceeding). Up to now this Group has had a good record, so Equipment Officers should continue to keep both “U.1” and “U.2” out of the Q Form.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS. [/underlined]
Instances are still occurring where Mechanical Sweepers are unserviceable for some considerable time owing to the delay in obtaining spares. Owing to the very acute rubber shortage it is essential that runways be swept regularly. All Bases should ensure that at least one set of brushes and other frequently required spares are held, and Equipment Officers should give the subject their personal attention.
[Underlined] SURPLUS FIRE CRASH TENDER. [/underlined]
Several Bases are holding one surplus Crash Tender for use within the Group in an emergency. When this is required it is frequently found that the vehicle is unserviceable and in consequence a Station is left with only one Crash Tender standing by, which is totally inadequate. It is essential that these vehicles are kept serviceable, and all demands for spares required to render vehicles serviceable are to be sent by I.O.R. signal and hastened where any undue delay occurs.
[Page break]
[Drawing] DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. R. HARTLEY CGM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.E.P. OXBORROW DFC
F/O. B.J. DOBSON DFC
F/O. J.E. WHITE DFC
F/O. W.C. FREESTONE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L. D.R. STUBBS DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. P. AINLEY DFC
P/O. A.C. MCKELLAR DFC
SGT. L.J. CHAMPION DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. M. MCNEILL DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
S/L. H.B. LOCKE, DFC DSO
S/L. S.M.P. PARKES DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. C.W. KIPFER DFC
F/O. H.E. SAYEAU DFC
F/O. W.N. REDMAN DFC
F/L. M.H. PARRY AFC DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. R.C. DAVIE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. P.N. HERBERT DFC
F/O. F.N. CHANDLER DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/S. C.H. STEWART DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C G.W. CURRY, DFC DSO
The following NON_IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. HANCOCK DFC
SGT. T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT. J.H. MCCREERY DFM
F/O. R.W. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. P.E. PLOWRIGHT DFC
W/O. R. LAWSON DFC
F/O. S.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/O. S.J. MANCEKIVELL, DFM DFC
F/O. J.S. MIDDLETON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. N.H. STEPHENSON DFC
P/O. E.P. BURDEN DFC
P/O. J. HALL DFC
P/O. J.S. DEAN DFC
P/O. W. FARADAY DFC
P/O. R.B. FARREN DFC
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
1st Lt. J.F. STEVENS DFC
F/O. A.V. PATCHETT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. E. BERRY
F/O. J.C.D. GUTHRIE DFC
F/S. L. HOWARTH DFM
F/O. D.T. WATKINS DFC
P/O. G. EARNSHAW DFC
P/O. J.L. BENDIX DFC
W/O. G.W. MORREY DFC
P/O. J.H. COLE DFC
F/S. R. VICKERSTAFFE DFM
F/S. N.F. BACON DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/Underlined]
P/O. A.E. NICKLIN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. ANDERSON, DFM DFC
F/L. J. BREAKLEY DFC
W/O. J.A. LEWIS DFC
W/O. T. DOWYER DFC
P/O. A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/S. E.A. DAVIDSON DFM
SGT. A. KANE DFM
[Page break]
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. J. HARRISON DFM
P/O. J.H. WILKINSON DFC
F/S. H.D.K. LEWIS DFM
P/O. J.W. SCOTT DFC
S/L. W.A.G. GALLIENNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L. C.A.S. DREW, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/S. B.A. MANNING DFM
F/S. F. COOPER DFM
S/L. J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
F/L. D.H. PIDDING, D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
W/O. C.A. RUSSELL DFC
F/L. R.W. WESTON DFC
F/S. N. MACHIN DFM
F/O. O. HALLIKAS DFC
F/O. A. DRINKALL DFC
F/L. J.N.C. WRIGHT, DRF. BAR TO DFC
P/O. G.K. CHAPMAN DFC
F/S. R.C.T. LODGE DFM
P/O. M. MACDONALD DFC
P/O. W WARBURTON DFC
F/O. G.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. W.M. REID DFC
F/S. R.C. WOOLLFORD DFM
F/S. D. BOLLAND DFM
F/S. H. TOWNSLEY DFM
P/O. G.D. HOOTON DFC
F/S. K.S. RANDLE DFM
P/O. C.W. LACY DFC
F/O. J.J. ROGERSON DFC
F/L. C.W. SHIRES DFC
W/O. J.T. STANTON, DFM DFC
F/O. R.L.C. LASHAM DFC
F/S. D.P. GANNINGS DFM
F/L. T.H. MACKEPEACE DFC
F/S. R.J. BOWEN DFM
F/O. B.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
W/O. E.K. PIERCY DFC
P/O. B.F. DURRANT DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.T.H. GIDDENS DFC
F/O. R.Y. KENYON DFC
F/S. D.A. DEAR DFM
F/S. W. CHARLESWORTH DFM
F/S. K.E. BOONE DFM
P/O. F.W. BLAKE DFC
P/O. C.A. SKINNER DFC
P/O. A.W. HALLAM DFC
P/O. S. JOHNSON DFC
F/O. R.K. ESSERY DFC
P/O. S.W. CARTER DFC
P/O. J.M. DENTON DFC
F/O. R.W. JEW
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined] (Contd.)
P/O. G.V. MALON DFC
P/O. D.G.J. GRIFFITHS DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.W. MUDDLE DFC
F/O. K. SCHULTZ DFC
F/O. E.T. PICKERD DFC
SGT. A.V. WING DFM
P/O. G.F. FLANAGAN DFC
F/O. J.D.H. BILLAM DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. H.C.J. BENTLEY DFC
F/O. B. HAWES DFC
F/O. A.T. YOUDAN DFC
P/O. J. WESLEY DFC
P/O. L.S. AINSWORTH DFC
F/O. D.L. HARRIS DFC
F/O. J.S.A. MARSHALL DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. D. RODGER DFC
W/O. A. RUSHTON DFC
W/O. R. SMITH DFC
W/O. J.W. HUTTON DFC
F/O. S.R. CLARKE DFC
F/S. W. HUME DFM
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. N.D. KENNEDY DFC
F/O. K.R. MAKIN DFC
F/L. S.E.J. JONES, DFM DFC
F/S. T. FLEETWOOD DFM
F/S. P.V.J. LOWEN DFM
P/O. J.G. NOBLE DFC
F/S. T. AITKEN DFM
F/O. R.W. WOOD DFC
SGT. H. WATERSON DFM
SGT. A. MCINULTY DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. L.C.E. De VIGNE DFC
F/O. A.E. RICHARDS DFC
S/L. R.F. ELLIOTT, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O. S.F. PARLATO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. R.O. CULVERT, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/L. E.R. BUTLER, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/O, A. KUZMA DFC
P/O. D.W. ALLEN DFC
P/O. A.J. PAYNE DFC
P/O. A.J. LUCAS DFC
[Page break]
A TRIP TO RUSSIA
On the 11th September, 1944, Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons together with two Liberators attached from Transport Command, took off for YAGODNIK, an airfield near Archangel. The Liberators re-fuelled at Lossiemouth before leaving, and the hospitality extended by this Station was very much appreciated by the ground staff who were passengers in these aircraft.
The weather at first was good, but when about 150 miles from Archangel considerable low cloud and rain were encountered. Aircraft flew just above tree tops over the most desolate country imaginable – lakes, forests and swamps. Map reading was impossible; weather conditions alone made this too difficult, and in addition it was found that maps of the area were inaccurate – many villages and even railway lines being omitted.
The Archangel area was reached after about 10 hours flying, and with endurance becoming low and with no radio aids available, it was necessary for aircraft to land quickly. Some were fortunate enough to locate airfields quickly, whilst others searched through cloud and heavy rain.
Several aircraft landed at a small airfield named KEG ISLAND. Some of the crews of these aircraft originally thought they had landed at YAGODNIK and were unable to find out the whereabouts of the other aircraft. For some time they thought they were the sole survivors of the force. Later, however, all aircraft were located, though in all six had crash landed. In spite of this nobody was hurt and in the weather conditions it must be considered miraculous that no lives were lost. It was a great tribute to the skill of the pilots and navigators that so many masterly landings were made.
The Russians had originally expected some 250 guests but last minute alterations had increased this to 325. In addition, the crews of the crashed aircraft had to be located and collected from outlying districts.
In the circumstances the Russians performed wonders in giving all available help. A major diversion in this country often causes somewhat of an upheaval, but the Russians placed transport aircraft at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and even dropped a parachutist to direct the crew of one aircraft which had crash landed in a morass. In this particular case the “blind led the blind” for a while as the guide lost his way!
Eventually all crews and serviceable aircraft collected at Yagodnik where accommodation and re-fuelling facilities existed. Yagodnik is an island and is in the middle of the river Dvina, about 20 miles from Archangel It can only be reached from that city by air or river. The accommodation consisted of a paddle steamer which was moored to the river bank, and several underground huts. These huts provide warmth in winter but the absence of any kind of ventilation and the fact that a large brick fireplace forms a major part of the accommodation leads to a degree of stuffiness difficult to bear, and appears to form a breeding ground for various forms of life. The first few nights produced a large number of bug eaten victims until a form of insert [sic] killer, generously given by some American friends in the this country, was used.
Entertainment was provided by the Russians in the form of cinema shows, dances, etc., and on one occasion a lecture on a Russian composer which started 55 minutes late, lasted for 75 minutes, and was a complete mystery from start to finish to the British members of the audience.
The mush publicised football match also took place and proved a huge success. A football match in Russia produces much ceremony including the exchange of bouquets by the opposing captains before the start of game, and a tune somewhat similar to “See the conquering hero comes” has to be played each time the home team scores a goal. Apparently it is also possible for
[Page break]
the weary player to be replaced by a reserve – or was it the fear of possible repercussions that caused two members to retire from the game and be replaced by the Commanding Officer and the local Station Commander? The latter was so fed with passes by his triumphant tam that a glancing blow off his knee which scored a goal must have caused him considerable relief as it enabled the game to be continued under normal conditions! In spite of all this our Allies showed that they thoroughly understood the game and were indeed very capable players.
The major job of servicing and re-fuelling the aircraft for the operation was tackled by the maintenance crews in a whole hearted manner – they worked for 48 hours almost without a break and their keeness and cheerfulness was what one would expect of such a grand team. It was refreshing to see all trades helping where help was most needed. The following instances will give some idea of what difficulties were overcome. With bowsers available it took exactly 18 hours to re-fuel the aircraft alone. A spare engine was carried in the Liberators and as no crane was available to remove this from the aircraft, a ramp of trees with blankets on top had to be built so that the engine could be slid down.
Meantime a Mosquito had arrived in Yagodnik for P.R.U. duties and after a favourable report from the pilot the operation took place on the 15th September.
Both take off and landing were in accordance with the usual 5 Group high traditions, 28 aircraft taking off in 23 minutes and 27 landing in 30 minutes – one aircraft having flown direct to U.K.
The details of the operation are given elsewhere. As aircraft became re-fuelled and serviceable they returned to the U.K., until finally the two Liberators remained and they were held up for about a week.
While waiting for their aircraft to be re-fuelled some of the crews went into Archangel by minesweeper and were entertained by the R.A.F. Mission there. This measure of hospitality extended to them can be gained by the fact that one member on his return decided to jump in the river fully clothed, in an endeavour to return to the city. The sobering influence of the Dvina soon dissuaded him.
The final return to the U.K. was made under variable but much better conditions than the outward journey.
Finally a few impressions of this Northern outpost of the U.S.S.R. as seen in a fleeting visit may be interesting. It is of course, quite impossible to form balanced judgements, or to provide a real comparison between social and economic conditions seen in Archangel and those to which we are accustomed in Great Britain. After all, Archangel is far to the North of the vast land mass which constitutes the U.S.S.R., and was for some period cut off from the rest of Russia by the Finnish-German advances. Bearing all this in mind, it can hardly be described as a health resort. There was not a great deal of food, the clothing of the civilians was poor, and the roads, houses, sanitation and drainage, the latter where they existed, were far below anything generally to be seen in this country. However, we found that the organisation to provide the essentials of war was good, and all the technical teams we encountered were capable and willing workers. The system of privilege is apparent; extra food and clothing are the reward of rank in the armed forces and of position in civil works. But even in the inferior living conditions at Archangel we found among the Russians an intense patriotism, and a belief in the future of Russia after the war. All Russians’ energies seem directed towards the future.
Our hosts, with the limited facilities at their disposal, did all they could for our comfort, and for this we were all very grateful.
[Page break]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP NEWS” [/underlined]
The cover of this month’s News was designed by S/Ldr. N Floyd Wilson of Headquarters No. 5 Group. Each month the cover will be changed, and all artists in the Group are invited to submit specimen designs. The best design will be selected each month and will be adopted for the cover of the current issue. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, September 1944
5 Group News, September 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 26, September 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, war effort, tactics, signals, air bombing, navigation, radar navigation, engineering, air sea rescue, photography, armament, war savings, gunnery, training, accidents, second thoughts for pilots, flying control, equipment, decorations and a trip to Russia.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
56 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-17
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Le Havre
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway--Kåfjord (Troms fylke)
Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
fuelling
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Pathfinders
petrol bowser
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2008/31478/PDentJ20020015.1.jpg
005a196bea6821ceb1222365920f03a6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dent, John. Album
Description
An account of the resource
Twenty four items from an album including two covers. Contains photographs of aircraft, aircrew, airmen and other military and civilian people. Includes some photographs of London Victory parade on 8 June 1946.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Dent, J
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Vickers Viking and RAF and air sea rescue launch
Description
An account of the resource
Left page - forward part of a Vickers Viking with several personnel in a group standing in front. Some men are wearing greatcoats and one a flying suit. Captioned 'A.M. Film Unit 26.1.47, Vickers Armstrong Wisley, photographing "King Flight" before S Africa Tour, Queens a/c and Kings&Queen separate a/c'.
Right page - front quarter view of an RAF air sea rescue launch at sea. Captioned 'Air Sea Rescue Launch Vospers'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1947-01-26
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs mounted on two album pages
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PDentJ20020015
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Surrey
England--Byfleet
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1947-01-26
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
air sea rescue
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1765/30828/LLayneWH963102v1.2.pdf
92e993a538036ec434cab6f9f4840a3d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Layne, Wally
Walter Henry Layne
W H Layne
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-06-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Layne, WH
Description
An account of the resource
100 items. The collection concerns Walter 'Wally' Layne (b. 1916, 963012, 40348 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, prisoner of war diary, personal and official correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 97 Squadron and became a prisoner of war after being shot down.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by D Layne and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wally Layne's observer's and air gunner's flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLayneWH963102v1
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Copenhagen
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Rutland
England--Yorkshire
France--Brest
France--Dunkerque
France--Lorient
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hamm (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Helgoland
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leverkusen
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Wuppertal
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Amsterdam
Norway--Oslo
Wales--Gwynedd
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1941-07-06
1941-07-07
1941-07-08
1941-07-09
1941-07-12
1941-07-13
1941-07-17
1941-07-18
1941-07-20
1941-07-21
1941-07-24
1941-07-28
1941-07-29
1941-08-06
1941-08-07
1941-08-16
1941-08-17
1941-08-18
1941-09-02
1941-09-03
1941-09-06
1941-09-07
1941-09-20
1941-09-21
1941-09-29
1941-09-30
1941-10-10
1941-10-13
1941-10-20
1941-10-21
1941-10-23
1941-10-29
1941-10-30
1941-10-31
1941-11-08
1941-11-09
1942-01-02
1942-01-03
1942-01-10
1942-01-11
1942-01-14
1942-01-15
1942-02-06
1942-02-24
1942-02-25
1942-02-26
1942-02-27
1942-02-28
1942-03-09
1942-03-10
1942-03-11
1942-03-13
1942-03-23
1942-03-24
1943-04-02
1943-04-03
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-08
1943-04-09
1943-04-10
1943-04-13
1943-04-14
1943-05-12
1943-05-13
1943-05-14
1943-05-23
1943-05-24
1943-05-25
1943-05-26
1943-05-29
1943-05-30
1943-06-28
1943-06-29
1943-07-08
1943-07-09
1943-07-12
1943-07-13
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-26
1943-08-10
1943-08-11
1943-08-12
1943-08-13
1943-08-17
1943-08-18
1943-08-22
1943-08-23
1943-08-27
1943-08-28
1943-08-31
1943-09-01
1943-09-03
1943-09-04
1943-09-05
1943-09-06
1943-09-07
1943-09-22
1943-09-23
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for Walter Henry lane, wireless operator/air gunner, covering the period from 19 October 1940 to 23 September 1943, when he was shot down and became a prisoner of war. He was stationed at RAF Penrhos, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Lindholme, RAF Swinderby, RAF Skellingthorpe, RAF Waddington, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Woodhall and RAF Bourn. Aircraft flown in were Dominie, Whitley, Battle, Anson, Hampden, Manchester, and Lancaster. He flew total of 63 operations 36 with 50 Squadron and 27 with 97 Squadron. Targets were Brest, Hamm, Bremen, Cologne, Keil, Karlsruhe, Copenhagen, Oslo, Berlin, Hamburg, Dunkirk, Amsterdam, Essen, St Nazaire, Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, Lorient, Duisburg, Frankfurt, Spezia, Pilsen, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Wuppertal, Turin, Nuremberg, Milan, Peenemunde, Leverkusen, Mönchengladbach, Mannheim, Munich, and Hannover. His pilots on operations were Flight Lieutenant Fox, Sergeant Mudd, Pilot Officer Carter, Squadron Leader Mulford, Pilot Officer Helmore, Pilot Officer Bartley, Sergeant Flight Sergeant Lord and Flying officer Fletcher DFM.
14 OTU
1661 HCU
50 Squadron
97 Squadron
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
crash
Dominie
Gneisenau
Hampden
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Manchester
mine laying
missing in action
Operational Training Unit
prisoner of war
RAF Bourn
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Lindholme
RAF Penrhos
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Swinderby
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodhall Spa
RAF Yatesbury
Scharnhorst
shot down
target indicator
training
Whitley
wireless operator