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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/20634/BCleggPVWilsonDv1.1.pdf
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Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
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Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-07-02
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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[underlined] A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII. [/underlined] Page 1.
(A Veteran from 617 Squadron – David Wilson).
Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar – Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot, A.V. Roe & Co Ltd.
April 8th 1946 to August 23rd 1947 (killed in Tudor crash)
David James Baikie Wilson was born on January 16th 1917, in Highgate, London, to his Scottish mother and Norfolk-born father. His mother came from a tough sea-faring family called Baikie living in [inserted] Brisbane Street, [/inserted] Greenock, on the River Clyde, to the west of Glasgow. From her, David inherited a great resolution of character, and from his father he acquired a brilliant academic brain – a combination that does not often lead to its owner becoming a test-pilot.
David was the only child in the family, and his mother inserted the name of her Sea-Captain father, James Baikie, between “David” and “Wilson” to perpetuate the family name – as is the wont of many Scottish families.
David’s father and mother had moved down to North London prior to the birth, and remained in that area while he grew up. Attending the local Kingsbury County School, and later Berkbeck College in Fetter Lane, David soon proved himself extremely bright, academically, obtaining [inserted] School Certificate [/inserted] “Distinctions” in Pure Maths, General Physics and Chemistry and “Credits” in Advanced Maths, French, History and English. He left the College with Higher School Certificate in Pure and Applied Maths, Chemistry and Physics, and then went straight to London University, to try to gain a degree in some of these subjects. True to his academic form, he gained a B.Sc. (General) in Chemistry, Physics and Pure Maths in July 1937 and then studied Chemistry for a further two years, gaining a “First” in the “Special” B.Sc. category and [inserted] starting work at the British Oxygen Company in November 1938. [/inserted]
Combining a taste for something more exciting, with his studying, David was already very keen
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on aircraft and flying, and as the inevitable War loomed up he joined the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), and was called up for deferred service in January 1940, training at Hendon (his nearest RAF base) for six months until June that year. Then he was called up properly to attend initial RAF training and selection, and spent the next two months being drilled and graded – as David had hoped – for pilot training in the Commonwealth. September 1940 saw him arrive in Southern Rhodesia at No 25 Elementary Flying Training School at Salisbury, and his pilot training started on September 18th with his first flight there in a Tiger Moth flown by his instructor, Flt/Sgt Marsden.
[Underlined] Pilot Training in Rhodesia [/underlined]
Flying in the [inserted] dry, [/inserted] sunny climate of Southern Rhodesia, David was able to [inserted] thoroughly [/inserted] enjoy his airborne experiences, and progress rapidly with the training routine. He went solo after 18 hrs 25 mins dual flying – indicative not so much of his own ability but the steady and rigorously adhered to procedures followed at the EFTS there, to cut down the early accident rate. It was not a spectacular time in which to go solo – rather the opposite – but David learned slowly but surely, and once learned, he never forgot, becoming a very sure-handed pilot.
Training progressed rapidly – David making three or four flights a day at times, and a lot of attention was paid to aerobatics, spinning, forced landing practice, and even night flying on the Tiger Moth! Some instrument flying was also done on the Tiger, and – a curious exercise – “abandoning an aircraft in flight”. His qualifying Cross-Country on October 31st was from Salisbury to Gatooma and back, and then he was posted out the same day, categorised a “Average” as a pilot, and recommended for “twin-engined types” in furthur training. He had gained his “Wings” on the Tiger Moth.
After a weeks’ leave, David now attended the No 21 S.F.T.S. at [inserted] Kumalo, [/inserted] Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, to start training on Oxford aircraft. He had by now clocked up 65 hrs flying, 28 hrs 30 min of which
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was solo. His first flight in an Oxford was now made on November 11th 1940, with his [inserted] new [/inserted] instructor, Flying Officer Wood. David actually failed his first solo test on the Oxford, but managed all right on the second occasion, on November 14th, and from there on never looked back. As the training progressed, he passed a “Height-Test”, “Navigation”, “Navigator Test”, “Cross-Country”, “Low-flying”, “triangular cross-country on instruments”, “Formation”, “Progress”, and finally his passing-out test by the Chief Flying Instructor, Sqd. Ldr Hendrikz. With a total of 115 hrs now (55 hr 55 mins solo), David passed the first stage of the twin-engined Oxford Course on Dec 18th 1940, again classified as “Average” as a pilot.
The second stage started on December 30th now concentrating on tactical flying – making reconnaissance sorties, low-level bombing practice, and a lot of instrument and cross-country flying. There were night landings by floodlight, and many more low-level bombing runs at 1,000 ft, during which David’s mean bomb-dropping error crept down from 126 yds to 88 yds, and finally to 42 yds on average. Then they indulged in a bit of aerial gunnery from the Oxford, firing 90 rounds off from the Oxford’s single target gun. Near the end of the course, there were “ZZ” approaches, photography – “stereo pairs”, and “line-overlap”, and finally, formation flying. David passed out of No 21 S.F.T.S on February 12th 1941, with an “Average” grading again, having now flown 163 hrs 35 mins, of which 99 hrs 15 mins was solo. He was now posted to No 11 Operational Training Unit on Wellington bombers, at Bassingbourn, back in England.
[Underlined] Operations with 214 Squadron [/underlined]
At Bassingbourne [sic] David rapidly completed a further 75 hrs 40 mins flying on Wellington IO and IA aircraft, starting on May 21st 1941. He solo-ed on the Wellington after some 21 hrs 10 mins “dual” and “2nd pilot” flying, and then started to do a lot of night flying ranging from “circuits and bumps” to cross-country flying, mock bombing raids, air-to-air firing [inserted] and [/inserted] a North Sea Sweep. [Deleted] and [/deleted] Cross-country instrument flying was invariably from Bassingbourne [sic] to Wittering and Andover
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to Upper Heyford and return. At the end of all this, on June 26th 1941, David passed out of the O.T.U. and was posted to No 214 [inserted] (Federated Malay States) [/inserted] Squadron based at RAF Stradishall in Suffolk. This Squadron – as its name implies – was supported by the Malay Federation in WWII and several aircraft were paid for by funds raised in the States, including a Wellington II, W5442* coded BU-V, which David Wilson flew the first evening he arrived at the Squadron. After having an “Air Test” with one of the Flight Commanders, Sqd. Ldr. Field, in the morning of July 9th, David flew as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader that same evening on his first operation – carrying a 4,000 lb “dookie” to drop on Osnabruk.** The raid was carried out by a total of 57 Wellingtons from No 3 Group, and, as discovered after the War, not many bombs fell on the target area. Two Wellingtons were lost that night, but David returned safely.
Only five days later, David was off on his next operation – this time to Bremen, to drop three 500 lb bombs and clusters of incendiaries. After this, raids followed in quick succession every two or three nights; Cologne, Rotterdam, Mannheim, Hamburg, Hanover, Duisburg, Keil, etc. Each time David was flying as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader, or to a Sgt. Foxlee. On the night of July 25/26th, after raiding Hamburg with Sgt. Foxlee, they had to divert to Debden on the return, as their own base had poor weather and low visibility. The same thing happened on August 12th, on their return from Hanover, but this time David and Sqd. Ldr. Field diverted to Newmarket instead.
At this time, these attacks were mostly being directed at German ports, shipping and naval bases, or railway yards, but [inserted] their [/inserted] accuracy – or [inserted] the [/inserted] damage [inserted] caused [/inserted] - at this stage in the war, in hindsight, did not reach any great measure of success.
David recorded his longest operational flight so far on September 7th 1941, when he acted as Second pilot again for a Pilot Officer Barnard, and they bombed Berlin, taking 8 hrs 15 mins for the entire flight. Two sorties later – and on his own 6th operation – David was
* This Wellington was named “Sri Guroh” and had already completed some 25 successful raids before David flew it.
** See appendix 4 for details.
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the Captain of the aircraft for the first time, and this particular trip was a short one across the Channel to Le Havre. He flew a Wellington IC, N2850, but there was ten tenths cloud over the target, and they eventually dropped their bombs in the sea before returning to base
After this, David was the Captain on all his future operations, which included an attack on Hamburg on the night of September 29th carrying a 4,000 lb High Capacity blast bomb – and flying W5442, the old aircraft of the O.C. “B” flight, Sqd Ldr Field.
David was now allocated Wellington IC X9979 for his own crew to use, and this “Wimpy” stayed with him from October 2nd 1941 right up to the end of David’s tour of operations on January 31st 1942.
Many of his raids in October over the German sea ports were plagued by solid cloud cover, or bad weather, and they often bombed “blind” over the top of the targets. On November 7th David set out for Berlin again with six 500 lb bombs, but there was extremely bad cloud and icing over Germany, and Berlin, and so he unloaded his bombs over Osnabruck instead, on the return journey. This was one of Bomber Command’s biggest raids on Berlin to date, and there would be no more large raids on the capital until January 1943. The weather was equally bad over England on the return, and David [inserted] had to [/inserted] divert to another airfield.
Back [inserted] on [/inserted] September 1st, David and others in 214 Squadron began a series of low-level bombing practices, flying over their ranges at [inserted] Foxcote at [/inserted] 200 ft and dropping six bombs at a time. By December 9th they were dropping up to eight practice bombs a time, and on the 11th David, again flying at only 200 ft, dropped a massive 4,000 lb bomb from this low altitude! The end of the year 1941 arrived with David bombing Brest on December 23rd and 27th, trying to hit the Port area.
In January 1942, David was sent to Brest on four more occasions, having to divert to land at Harwell on one of these raids because of bad weather on the return. On January 21st he flew to Bremen to drop a 4,000 lb HC bomb, and then on the 28th came the final “Op” of the Tour – a raid on Münster. The cloud cover was again so bad that they returned home without dropping the bombload, and diverted to Waterbeach to land. David had safely completed his first Operational Tour, having flown
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289 hrs 50 mins in all with 214 Squadron, of which 199 hrs 35 mins were on actual operations. * He was now graded as “Above Average” as a pilot by 214’s C.O., Sqd. Ldr. Carr.
[Underlined] Becoming a Flying Instructor [/underlined]
For his traditional rest from operations, David was now posted to No1 Flying Instructors School at Church Lawford, near Rugby. He arrived there on February 24th 1942,[inserted] to start on the No22 War Course, and [/inserted] to be trained to teach others how to fly multi-engined aircraft. This course here lasted to April 21st, and during this time he was given intensive instruction on Oxford I’s and II’s, and (surprisingly enough) on some single-engined pre-war Avro Tutors!
David underwent day and night instruction, his mentor being a Flt. Lt. Mann, and sessions of any of the half dozen Avro Tutors were interspersed with the twin-engined flights on Oxford trainers. Between March 27th and April 2nd, he was sent down to Upavon to pass the 24th “Beam Approach” Course with flying honours (being graded “Above Average” again, and “Fit to Instruct”). This Course, in fact, was run as part of the Central Flying Scool [sic] of the RAF.
Then it was back to Church Lawford on the Oxford and Tutor, until he was finally passed out as a qualified instructor on April 20th 1942, rated as “Average” on both single and twin-engined aircraft.
[Inserted] David had been commissioned as a Pilot Officer out in Rhodesia, and on completion of this Course was made up to a Flying Officer, preparatory to commencing duties as an Instructor at RAF College Cranwell. [/inserted]
He arrived at Cranwell on May 1st [inserted] as a “B” Category Flying Instructor [/inserted] to start to instruct pupils at the College [inserted] Flying Training School [/inserted] how to fly the Oxford. Most of these were ordinary Leading Aircraftsmen (LAC’s) or Corporals, or Lieutenants (presumably the College Officer Cadets). By late June, a few Miles Master II single-engined trainers had been acquired, and David instructed on these as well. And at the
* See appendix 4 for details.
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end of July he was posted to No 7 Flying Instructors School at Upavon. This time to train others how to become “Instructors”!
David was becoming restless to be back on operations again, but had to put up with the daily round of flying Oxfords, Magisters and Masters again at Upavon, until the beginning of November 1942, when the CFI, Wing Cmdr GFR Donaldson, graded him out as “Above Average” again on David’s posting to 196 Squadron – a brand new night-bomber squadron formed on November 7th at Driffield in Yorkshire.
[Underlined] Second Tour, with 196 Squadron [/underlined]
David reported to 196 Squadron at Driffield on November 7th, and then was immediately sent off on a new Course called the “Captains of Aircraft” at Cranage [inserted] near Holmes Chapel [/inserted] in South Cheshire. It was the 12th intake at this Course, and David was lectured there on Navigation, and had to undertake six long cross-country exercises on Ansons, flown by a Course pilot, with David and two others on board having to act as Navigators in turn. The Course was an adjunct of the RAF’s Central Navigation School, and was intended to refine operational Captain’s navigating skills, for posting them to Coastal Command, or to Bomber stations where new 4-engined bombers with only one pilot were the norm.
While he was posted to Cheshire over the Christmas period of 1942/43 [inserted] Dec 21st to January 3rd [/inserted], David had some chance to attend some local functions and festivities, as he did not have time to return to his parents in Hendon. It was while the Station was giving a Dance for local people that David met a Cheshire girl called Elsie, who worked at a nearby I.C.I. Works connected with the Salt industry Elsie was a very personable girl, with a number of boyfriends, and David was a shy and quiet person, but the two became immediate friends, and kept up correspondence with each other when David re-joined 196 Squadron (now moved to Leconfield) after Christmas. One other course David had to attend for a few days, was at Westcott in Buckinghamshire, at No 1 Engine Control Demonstration Unit (E.C.D.U), to learn “Engine Handling”
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and “Petrol Consumption” there on the Wellington Mk III. (No flying was involved). Finally, on January 14th 1943, he took to the air at Leconfield on Wellington X HE179, to try some “circuits and bumps” on this new Mark of the bomber He then had a few “working-up” flights to get his [inserted] brand- [/inserted] new crew shaken down, trying out air-to-air firing with his gunners, and practice bombing using [inserted] new [/inserted] infra-red photography to record the results.
David’s first sortie with 196 Squadron [inserted] and the Squadron’s second operation [/inserted] was on the night of February 7th 1943, when he dropped seven 500 lb bombs on a new type of “area-bombing” raid on French ports with German U-Boat pens. This directive had been issued by the War Cabinet on January 14th, and because the new U-boat pens of solid concrete were too thick to penetrate, the towns themselves were obliterated instead (the French civilians had been warned to evacuate them).
Some 323 aircraft bombed Lorient that night, with the [inserted] new [/inserted] Pathfinders marking the target well. Seven aircraft were lost, two being Wellingtons. David’s crew obtained a good infra-red photograph of the bomb bursts.
It was back again to Lorient on February 13th, this time forming part of a raid of 466 aircraft in all, and dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs for the first time on a Bomber Command target. The French town of Lorient received more devastation, but the U-boat pens survived. Then it was Cologne on the 14th, and Emden on the 17th, but the latter raid was abandoned by David’s aircraft, due to heavy cloud cover. Just six Wellingtons had been sent to Emden that night to test the infra-red bomb sights, but only three found the target, and bombed it. David brought all his bomb load back.
Before February finished, David had been to Cologne again on the 26th (where two of his three 500 lb bombs “hung up” and he had to return to base with them) and St Nazaire on the 28th (again dropping a “mix” of 500 lb bombs and incendiaries).
In March David went to Hamburg, Essen (twice) Duisberg and Bochum, dropping a 4,000 lb “Cookie” on one of the Essen raids. This was the beginning of the “Battle of the Ruhr”, devised now by Bomber Command to paralyse German Industry. There was an increasing flow of new four-engined bombers to the Squadrons, and a build-up of the Pathfinder
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Force and their new marking techniques using Mosquitos guided by Oboe equipment, * and Lancasters etc, to continue illuminating the markers dropped by the “Mossies”. All this now led to ever more accurate raids on the German Ruhr industrial zone.
The first Essen raid, on March 5th, was well marked by the Pathfinder Force (PFF), and David’s Wellington was in the second of three waves over the target – the Krupps industrial complex. This night marked Bomber Command’s 100,000th sortie of the war, and it is likely that David’s 4,000 lb bomb was one of the many that helped destroy an area of the Krupps works that night. A week later he was over the same target again, with the more usual mixture of 500 lb bombs (many fuzed for a long delay action) and incendiaries. Even more of Krupps was reduced to rubble that night.
David normally flew with a crew of four in his aircraft, and his regular crew consisted of Pilot Officer Parkin, Sgt. Wakeley, Flt. Sgt, Allen and Sgt. Lund. Occasionally he would take another Sgt. Pilot on board to give him operational experience for the odd flight or two (before he went off to captain his own aircraft). His O.C. in “A” Flight was Sqd Ldr Ian R.C. Mack, and the 196 Squadron C.O. at this time was Wing Cmdr. A.E. Duguid.
David only had one “Op” in April, to Kiel on the 4th, but May was another intensive month, with successful visits to Dortmund, Duisburg, Bochum and Düsseldorf. Most of the aircraft sent on these raids were now four-engines types, and of 110 Wellingtons sent to Dortmund, six were lost. The equivalent numbers [inserted] of Wellingtons [/inserted] sent to the other three points were: Duisburg 112 (10); Bochum 104 (6); and Düsseldorf 142 (6). The last two raids did not have the desired effects as the Germans were now starting decoy markers and fires outside the cities, to lure the PFF and bombing aircraft away. But the Duisburg raid had been highly successful, the Port and August Thyssen steel factories being badly hit.
[Inserted] On May15th [inserted] 1943 [/inserted] the [deleted] Press [/deleted] [inserted] London Gazette [/inserted] released the news that David had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (D.F.C.), for (as the citation stated) “completing numerous [inserted] operational [/inserted] missions, flying on many occasions to targets such as Cologne, Berlin, Kiel and Hamburg, where the fiercest opposition is encountered.
“Since the beginning of his operational career, his single aim has been to press home his attacks as accurately and efficiently as possible, and in this he has had many successes. His courage, skill and determination against all hazards have been an inspiration to the Squadron”. [/inserted]
In June 1943, David flew sorties to Düsseldorf, Krefeld and Wuppertal, using his normal Wellington X HE901 on most flights (he
* “Oboe” was a system in which radio beams were sent out from English points, to cross over a specific target, and the RAF aircraft fitted with the receiving equipment could tell exactly when to drop their markers.
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had previously used HE170 and MS488 for long spells at a time, all with 196 Squadron’s code letters ZO-. Two of his crew had been commissioned by now – Wakeley and Allen had been made Pilot Officers. (David himself was now a Flight Lieutenant). The Düsseldorf raid was very successful, and that on Krefeld equally so, devastating the city centres. Just prior to the Krefeld raid on June 21st, some “Monica” sets had been fitted to some of 196 Squadron’s Wellingtons, HE901 being one of them. David and his crew had conducted air teats with the new equipment on June 16th and 17th, and aerial exercises with fighters, to try out the operational aspects. “Monica” was the code name given to equipment which, installed in RAF bombers, would give warning of the approach of German night-fighters from the rear. This radar equipment gave out its own transmissions however, and later in the war, when a German Ju88 night fighter landed by mistake at Woodbridge on July 15th 1944, it was discovered that its “Flensburg” radar transmission detector set could “home in” from 50 miles away onto an RAF aircraft using Monica. The increasing losses of Allied bombers was being blamed on Monica, [inserted] “H2S” radar, [/inserted] and “I.F.F.” (Identification Friend or Foe) signals emanating from their aircraft, and instructions were immediately given to remove all “Monica” sets, use “H2S” only sparingly, and switch off “IFF” altogether over German territory.
The raid on Wuppertal on June 24th 1943, in which David dropped an entire load of incendiaries, devastated the Elberfeld half of the town (the other half had already been hit). Some 94% of the town was destroyed that night. 630 aircraft having taken part, and 6 Wellingtons out of 101 being lost (together with 28 Lancasters, Halifaxes or Stirlings).
David now made the last operational sortie of his second Tour, to Cologne again on July 3rd 1943. He was flying Wellington X HE901 [deleted] again [/deleted], with a new member of crew, Flt. Lt. Reaks (who had replaced P/O Allen), and the PFF successfully marked the industrial area of the town, on the East bank of the Rhine. Again, David’s load consisted entirely of incendiaries, and they bombed the target accurately, but on returning to England after a flight lasting 5 hrs 5 mins, had to divert to Westcott, Bucks, because
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of ground fog and bad weather in the North. This raid was noted for something else – the beginning of mass night-time attacks by German night-fighters over the target area – something not met before by the RAF – where the Luftwaffe units attacked from above, using the mass of fires, target indicators (T.I.’s) and searchlights below as illumination for the bombers. On this raid 30 aircraft were lost out of 653 despatched – 12 being claimed by the Luftwaffe night fighters. In hindsight David was lucky to finish his second Tour at this point, as the RAF raids over Germany began to meet increasing fighter opposition, leading to many losses.
[Underlined] Lancaster Conversion Unit [/underlined]
Again classed as “Above Average” [inserted] in his recent capacity as “Master Bomber” of 196 Squadron [/inserted], David Wilson was now posted to a Lancaster Conversion Unit [inserted] No 1660 [/inserted] at RAF Swinderby, to convert to flying four-engined heavy bombers. The reason he had had a shorter Tour than usual at 196 Squadron was because the Squadron was moving [inserted] its [/inserted] base down South now, and re-equipping with Stirling bombers. David neither liked the Stirling, nor the future role of the Squadron, which was to be on glider-tug and troop dropping rôles, and so he had quickly opted to go for a Lancaster Squadron posting. [Inserted] He had in fact volunteered to join 617 Squadron (now known as the “Dambusters”), who were now looking for a few more seasoned and “Above Average” graded pilots to replace the eight lost on their famous raid of May 16th/17th. Only men of exceptional experience and calibre would be accepted, and all crews had to show a very high accuracy in their bombing experience. David’s name had gone forward for consideration by 617’s C.O., Wing Cmdr. Guy Penrose Gibson, V.C., DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar, who was still in charge but about to be posted onto a temporary staff duty as a rest (against his wishes!). Provided he converted to the Lancaster successfully, he would be accepted. [/inserted]
And so Flt. Lt. David Wilson started at Swinderby on July 23rd 1943, learning the tricks of flying the mighty Lancaster – an aircraft that would endear itself to him for life. The Course was not long, only five weeks, and finished on August 30th, when David had completed his multi-engine transition to the big Avro machine designed by Roy Chadwick. The Lancasters at the Unit were old Mk I’s from early production runs by A.V. Roe & Co Ltd at Manchester, or Metropolitan-Vickers at Trafford Park, and some had originally been laid down as Manchesters, and converted on the line.
David firstly had “circuits and landings” practice, then “stalling”, “three and two engine flying”, “fire action”, and “three-engine overshoots”. Then came cross-country exercises, “time and distance”
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runs (practicing dropping bombs after a measured run-in from a known geographical position) “corkscrewing” (to avoid fighters at night), and “fighter affiliation” (practice in being “attacked” by fighters). Finally David made some bombing runs, dropping four bombs on Wainfleet Sands, then eight (getting a mean error of only 71 yds from the target), and finally a round-the-UK cross-country flight at night, from Swinderby to Ely, Bicester, Sidmouth, St. Tudwells (where he dropped two bombs, and hit the target), Strangford [inserted] Lough [/inserted] in N. Ireland Dumfries in Scotland, Aberdeen and back home! A large part of the return trip was flown on three-engines, the whole flight taking 5 hrs 35 mins – just like a typical raid over Germany.
Wing Cmdr. Everitt, the CO. of 1660 Conversion Unit, passed David out [inserted] on August 30th [/inserted] as “Above Average” once again on the Lancaster this time, and David thus had his posting to 617 Squadron confirmed, and joined them the same day at Coningsby, Lincolnshire. [Deleted] – the already famous 617 Squadron, otherwise known now as the “Dambusters”. [/deleted]
[Underlined] Joining the “Dambusters” [/underlined]
David Wilson joined 617 Squadron on August 30th 1944, the date the Squadron moved its home from Scampton to Coningsby, in Lincolnshire. Since its famous [inserted] first [/inserted] raid on the German dams on the night of May 16th/17th 1944, [sic] the Squadron had [inserted] briefly [/inserted] returned to [deleted] a rest period, and started [/deleted] operations again on July 15, raiding power stations in Northern Italy and landing [inserted] at Blida [/inserted] in N. Africa afterwards. [Inserted] (Blida was a [inserted] captured [/inserted] Allied aerodrome a few miles south-west of Algiers, in French North Africa). The Squadron’s third raid had been on the Italian port of Leghorn on the way back from Blida. And its fourth was a mass leaflet raid on major Italian cities on July 29th 1943, after which the aircraft landed at Blida again. (This time they positioned back to England without raiding any target on the way). [/inserted] With its high level of training [deleted] and accuracy [/deleted] in bomb dropping especially [inserted] at low level [/inserted] the Squadron was now being used for attacks on major targets which required a great deal of accuracy in placing their weapons. These targets by definition, were also likely to be very heavily defended.
David was airborne on September 1st, the second day after he arrived at Coningsby, and was promptly sent off on a low-level cross country. (With the “Dambusters”, low level meant just that – at 200 to 330 ft altitude! [inserted] all the way [/inserted]). Wing Cmdr Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar had just relinquished command of the Squadron [inserted] on August 3rd) [/inserted] to [inserted] Acting [/inserted] Wing Cmdr George Holden, DSO, DFC [inserted] and Bar? [/inserted]
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and there were 10 [deleted] complete [/deleted] Lancaster [deleted] crews [/deleted] pilots left at that moment out of the original 21 that had been in the Squadron when the raid on the Dams was mounted. * Apart from David, the other new pilots [inserted] ① who had joined 617 since the Dams raid were F.O. W.H. Kellaway, DSO; at the end of June; P.O. B. [deleted] (“Bunny”) [/deleted] W. Clayton, DFC, CGM, early in July; [deleted] and [/deleted] Flt. Lt. R.A. Allsebrook, DSO, DFC, also early in July; [inserted] and Flt. Lt. E.E.G. [inserted] (“Ted”) [/inserted] Youseman, DFC, at the end of July. (Ted came from David Wilson’s old 214 Squadron). [/inserted]. All these pilots – like David – brought their old crews along with them as well, and so all eight men in each Lancaster found themselves suddenly flying with the famous “Dambusters”. One of these new arrivals had also crashed on August 5th on Ashley Walk Bombing Ranges, when it hit the slipstream of another Lancaster, but luckily the crew survived, but with the exception of one gunner did not fly with 617 again. [/inserted]
The [inserted] surviving [/inserted] Lancasters which had been used for the Dams raid were in the process of being returned to A.V. Roe & Co to have the special fittings removed and the enlarged (bulged) bomb doors put in their place. For the purpose of keeping the crews in training, however, other Lancasters had to be borrowed or drafted in, and the Lancaster which David flew on September 1st was one such – ED735 (KC-R) from 44 Squadron (where it had been called KM-K). This Lancaster had just [inserted] ② been fitted with new “deep-section bomb doors by Avros, to take the new 12,000 lb High Capacity Blast bombs, and was sent to the A&AEE at Boscombe Down this month, to measure the Position Errors. [/inserted]
The Dambusters had moved from a grass airfield at Scampton, to one with hard runways at Coningsby and were sharing the latter airfield now with other Lancaster Squadrons. [Deleted] No 619 [/deleted] (Another Lancaster Squadron that would henceforth [deleted] to [/deleted] work closely with 617 was No 619 [inserted] - based nearby at Woodhall Spa - [/inserted] ) David flew Lancaster EE144 (KC-S) on September 14th – this aircraft was normally used by Sqn Ldr. Holden.
David was [inserted] then [/inserted] engaged in intensive low-level cross-country flying for the first two weeks of September, working himself and his crew up to the required accuracy of bombing, air firing, and low-level navigating as befitted the high standards expected of the specialist squadron. Two of these flights were on aircraft that had originally been on the Dams raid – ED886 (AJ-O flown then by P.O. Bill Townsend) and ED921 (AJ-W of Flt. Lt. Les Munro). These had been altered back to carry normal bombs, and in common with 617’s other permanent Lancasters were now fitted with new radio altimeters which could be set to give the pilot warning of dropping below, say, 75 ft above the ground (where a “hiccuph” could mean flying into the deck”).
All this preparation was for 617’s next scheduled raid on one of the War’s earliest, and by now most heavily defended targets – the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It had been decided to try to breach this by moonlight, and at low level. The canal was of vital importance to the German War industry, as it joined the steel plants of the Ruhr
*(for Note see over →③
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[Underlined] footnote ③ FOOTNOTE [/underlined]
* The original [inserted] 21 [/inserted] pilots of 617 Squadron at the time of their first operation – the Dams raid – consisted of Wing Cmdr. Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Flt. Lt. J.V. Hopgood, DFC; Flt. Lt. H.B. Martin, DSO and Bar, DFC and two Bars, AFC; Sqd Ldr. H.M. Young, DFC; Flt. Lt. W. Astell, DFC; Flt. Lt. D.J.H. Maltby, DSO, DFC; Sqd. Ldr. Henry Maudslay, DFC; P.O. L.G. Knight, DSO; Flt.Lt. D.J. Shannon, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Sqd. Ldr. J.C. McCarthy, DSO, DFC; Sgt. [inserted] V.W. [/inserted] Byers; Flt Lt R.N.G. Barlow; P.O. Geoff Rice, DFC; Flt. Lt. J.L. Munro, DSO, DFC; F.O. W.C. Townsend, CGM, DFM; Flt Sgt. K.W. Brown, CGM; Flt. Sgt. Cyril [inserted] T [/inserted] Anderson; P.O. [inserted] Warner [/inserted] Ottley; P.O. [inserted] L.J. [/inserted] Burpee (all of whom had flown on the raid); and P.O. W. [inserted] G. [/inserted] Divall and Flt. Lt. Harold [inserted] S. [/inserted] Wilson (both of whom had not been included on the Dams raid).
The [inserted] eight [/inserted] killed on the raid were Hopgood, Young, Astell, Maudsley, Byers, Barlow, Ottley [inserted[ and [/inserted] Burpee; Guy Gibson, of course, had now been rested from “Ops”; Cyril Anderson had decided to return to his original Squadron, and Bill Townsend had been posted away to 1668 Conversion Unit. All this left just 10 of the original pilots.
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with the Baltic, enabling iron ore from Sweden to be barged to the steelworks, and finished parts (Eg of U-boats) to be sent North to the German ports.
It was lucky for David that he was still getting into training at that moment. On a cross-country on September 13th, he practiced low-level bombing from 300ft and 500 ft, and gained a mean error of 73 yds from the target centre; and on September 14th he dropped bombs on the ranges from 200, 300, [inserted] and [/inserted] 400 ft high, and got his average error down to 36 yds.
David was assigned to “B” Flight, under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.L. (“Les”) Munro (a survivor of the Dams raid who had been hit by flak en route to the Sorpe Dam and had had to turn back because the radio/intercom had been destroyed). But due to his “working-up” period, he was not selected for the raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal on September 14th/15th. This was meticulously planned – as usual – and eight of 617’s Lancasters would take part, dropping new 12,000 lb High Capacity thin-cased, bombs from low level (fuzed for an adequate delay). The crews selected were the new C.O., George Holden, Dave Maltby, Les Knight, Dave Shannon, Harold Wilson [inserted] (no relation to David) [/inserted], Athelsie Allsebrook, Geoff Rice and Bill Divall. All but Holden, and Allsebrook [deleted] and Divall [/deleted] were survivors of the original 617 Squadron, and they set off on the evening of the 14th, but en route to the target received news back from a “recce” Mosquito in front, that the weather was too bad over the target area for low-level bombing. Regretfully they turned for home, but as they did so at low level over the North Sea, Maltby’s Lancaster hit someone else’s slipstream, dipped a wing into the sea, cartwheeled – and that was that. Maltby and his crew all perished.
Back home at Coningsby, they re-planned the raid for the next evening, the 15th, and Mick [deleted] y [/deleted] Martin just back from leave, filled Maltby’s place. [Inserted] David Wilson flew two more cross-country flights on this day, using one of the original Dams raid Lancasters, ED886 (AJ-O) [deleted] glued back again [/deleted] They were his last practices, and he was not called up for the raid that night. [/inserted] As the [inserted] others [/inserted] flew low over darkened Holland, Holden, flying with [inserted] Guy Gibson’s old crew [/inserted] and leading the two flights, was hit by flak and he climbed to avoid a church steeple in a small town while the others behind swung low around the outside of the built-up area. Holden’s Lancaster, trailing flames, went down and his 12,000 lb bomb exploded with a blinding flash of light.
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It was his 30th birthday.
Over the target area, a ground mist obscured the markers they dropped, there was a lot of light flak about, and the escorting Mosquitos found it difficult to silence the flak, and the 617 pilots found it very difficult to see the canal. Allsebrook, who now acted as leader, dropped his bomb and helped to direct others onto the target, but then disappeared. He had been shot down leaving the area. Knight, flying low, hit some trees which damaged his two port engines, and asked Mick Martin’s permission to jettison the bomb. He tried desperately to get home, but after allowing his crew to bale out over Holland, was killed trying to crash land the Lancaster alone.
Rice tried in vain for an hour to find the target, was holed by flak, jettisoned his bomb and managed to return home to Coningsby. Harold Wilson was hit by flak too, and had to crash-land his Lancaster with the bomb on board. It went up soon after, killing all on board before they could escape. Divall was [inserted] also hit and crashed. [/inserted]
// Dave Shannon flew around for 70 minutes, before he managed to spot the Canal and drop his bomb. It hit the towpath and did not seem to breach the canal banks. And Mick Martin flew around for a long 90 minutes, repeatedly getting hit by flak, and finally dropping his bomb on his 13th run in. He was two hours overdue when he landed back at Coningsby, to find only Shannon and Rice there before him. There were just the three Lancasters back, out of the eight that had set off. And nothing to show for the losses.
Next day Mick Martin was made a Squadron Leader by the A.O.C. No 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshal the Honourable Ralph Cochrane, and temporarily given command of 617 Squadron. Martin immediately volunteered to go back to the Canal the next night, and said there were six of them left who could try it (Martin himself, Shannon, Rice, Les Munro, Joe McCarthy and Ken Brown). In addition to these Martin could now call on the newly posted Captains - David Wilson, Ted Youseman and Bunny Clayton.
Fortunately Sir Ralph insisted on the three latest survivors being rested for 617’s next raid, on the Antheor Viaduct near Cannes in the South of France, on September 16th. And because
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this operation followed on without a break, the three “new boys”, and [inserted] the three veterans, [/inserted] Munro, McCarthy and Brown [deleted] (all had taken part on the original Dams raid) [/deleted] were supported by six Lancasters from 619 Squadron as well, and all placed under 619’s C.O., Wing. Cmdr. Abercromby.
[Underlined] The Anthéor Viaduct [deleted] preparing for the Tirpitz [/deleted] [/underlined]
It was against this backdrop of tragedy that David Wilson now flew his first “Op” for 617 Squadron. The atmosphere couldn’t have been worse, but morale was still high. Other Squadrons were [inserted] now [/inserted] beginning to call 617 the “Suicide Squadron”, and there were [inserted] noticeably [/inserted] fewer requests from other pilots to transfer to it [deleted] now [/deleted]! However, the intensive training, and the work involved in the briefing to the raids, kept David’s mind off all that (and the fact that his namesake, Harold Wilson, had died the night before).
This was 617’s seventh operation (including the first abortive Dortmund-Ems sortie), and the target was difficult to find, not counting hard to bomb accurately when they reached it. The main railway link between Central and Southern France and Italy, ran along the coast from Fréjus/St. Raphael to Cannes, and a typical curving viaduct lifted it across a ravine at a point just east of Cap du Dramont, a few miles on the Cannes side of St. Raphael. This little place was called Anthéor, and was 617’s next headache.
David flew in [inserted] company with the other 617 veterans, [/inserted] his “B” Flight Commander, Flt. Lt. John Leslie Munro, DFC, [inserted] RNZAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth Charles McCarthy, DSO, DFC, [inserted] RCAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth William Brown, CGM, RCAF, and two other “new boys”, Flt. Lt. “Ted” Youseman DFC, and Pilot Officer “Bunny” Clayton, DFC, CGM. Although the target was on France’s South coast, they were expected to return to England on this raid – not land in N. Africa.
David took Lancaster JB 139 on this raid, (coded KC-X and recently transferred from 49 Squadron). His bomb load included one 4,000 lb “Blockbuster” and three 1,000 lb bombs, and his crew consisted of Flt Sgt Hurrel, F.O. Parkin, Flt. Sgt. Barrow, P.O. Allen, Sgt Lowe and Sgt Mortlock. When they found their target, they jockeyed for position down the
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ravine to the sea, and David [inserted] and the others [/inserted] released their bombs from 300 ft. [Inserted] The idea was to lob the bombs onto or between the arches of the bridge, but all seemed to go through the arches instead. [/inserted] The viaduct seem [sic] unscathed, however, - although it and the rail tracks were peppered with holes – and they flew back in the knowledge it would probably need further attempt.
After a flight of 10 hrs 20 mins, David Wilson put his Lanc down at Predannack in Cornwall, to refuel, before flying back to Coningsby later.
[Underlined] Preparing for another Dams raid [/underlined]
Mick Martin was firmly in charge of the Squadron now, interviewing new would-be 617 pilots, thinking about a method of them taking flares with them on future raids to mark the target and make it easier for all to bomb, and liaising with the A.O.C. 5 Group with regard to future targets for 617.
In fact Cochrane was scheming up another attack on a dam, this time the big installation at Modane in Northern Italy, which lay deep in the hills. But Cochrane duped even Mick Martin for a time – he pretended it was to be a raid on the German battleship Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord, and this required flying over the hills, down the steep slope, across a short stretch of water and then over the ship (in reality, the dam in Italy)!
So Martin went looking for a suitable site to practice on, and found a hillside near Bangor in N. Wales, near the coast, where he could get 617 to try flying down the face of the slope to level out over the sea. He experimented with putting down his landing flaps, to 40° or so, but found although the Lanc would sink down the hillside better, he had to exceed the max speed with flaps down by some 60 mph, and thus risk [inserted] their [/inserted] collapse – with undoubted fatal results to aircraft and crew.
David flew in [inserted] Mick Martin’s [/inserted] Lancaster (EE150 [inserted] coded KC-Z [/inserted]) to the scene on September 18, with Dave Shannon, (one of the three Flight Commanders, with Munro and McCarthy) in the cockpit beside him, and the two of them took it in turns to try flying up and over the hills that Mick Martin had found. Next day David was up in the Midlands [inserted] in the same aircraft [/inserted], this time with his
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own Flight Commander, Les Munro, the two of them doing practice runs across the Derwent reservoir at very low level, and then they tried the hill near Bangor again, Les trying it out and handing over to David. It was all intensely demanding work, and the adrenalin flowed very freely!
Between September 19th and 23rd, the “dams” type training intensified, David flying dummy attacks over Derwent reservoir in ED735 (KC-R) [inserted] on the 19th, [/inserted], then on September 20th he used Guy Gibson’s old aircraft ED932 (AJ-G) of Dams raid fame to take up one of the special “Upkeep” weapons that they still held in store and he dropped this on a dummy low-level attack in the Wash. (Guy Gibson’s old aircraft, unlike the majority that had survived the Dams raid, had [inserted] not yet [/inserted] been converted to have the bulged bomb-doors, and the old cylindrical “Upkeep” canister was used on the original Barnes Wallis-designed release mechanism). Then, in the next three days came low-level cross-country formation flying, dropping bombs on the Wainfleet ranges. David dropped the first lot (of four bombs), getting a mean error of 64 yds, and on the second occasion dropped eight bombs from 800 ft high. Then came a night time cross country at low level on astro fixes only, and finally a trip to Castle Kennedy, and Turnberry in Ayrshire, carrying 14 [inserted] staff [/inserted] passengers in connection with these trials.
However, the very next day, September 24th, came a complete change of policy, and training. The reason was the development of a new, more accurate bomb-sight, and its ability to deliver two large new weapons that Dr Barnes Wallis had been developing recently – the 12,000 lb streamlined “Tallboy” bomb, and its big brother, the 22,000 lb “Grand Slam”. The Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, had been agonising over the future rôle of 617 Squadron with Sir Ralph Cochrane, and had concluded that it should stay in the latter’s 5 Group, and now become a “Special Duties” Squadron. Cochrane, on his part, decided to press ahead with Wallis’ new weapons, and get 617 equipped as fast as possible with the new bob-sight, to start dropping these expensive weapons.
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[Underlined] The Stabilising Automatic Bomb-Sight. [/underlined]
This SABS sight had been developed at the RAE at Farnborough back in 1941 by a man called Richards, and used the gyro principle in its stabilising system. It had been held up in its development by the fact that although it was a great deal more accurate than its predecessors, it did require a very careful straight and level approach at high altitude, on the run in to the target. Consequently the likelihood of Bomber Command taking heavier casualties from flak and fighters because of this, had resulted in its being “shelved” for the time being. But now, the development of these special weapons merited another look at it. A certain Sqd. Ldr. Richardson was now despatched post haste from the RAE to 617 Squadron at Coningsby, to see the SABS fitted, and perfected, in their Lancasters.
From September 24th, therefore, everything changed in David’s training. No longer was it low-level dams-type exercises, but he flew in EE150 [inserted] (KC-Z) [/inserted] this day, with Joe McCarthy acting as Captain for some of the time, making [inserted] the first [/inserted] high level dummy runs with the new SABS fitted. The next day, David took Bunny Clayton up with him, and Sqd Ldr. Richardson (by now dubbed “Talking Bomb” by the Squadron, for his propensity to talk bomb-sights from the moment he woke, until the moment he went to sleep), to check out the SABS in EE150 again.
Sqd Ldr Richardson was busy fitting the new SABS into all the aircraft, and then checking the installation by flying with it. He also knew that it took two to be accurate – the pilot on the one hand (to fly at a given height, and airspeed, on the final run in), and the bomb aimer on the other (who had to feed the correct data into the sight, and advise the pilot when he strayed off the necessary heading/approach speed). With the Squadron C.O. (Mick Martin), Richardson then evolved a system of each pilot being checked out, by someone senior, and each bomb-aimer being paired with different pilots – cross-checking the results against each other.
Thus David [sic] third flight (on September 26th) was with Mick Martin (now elevated to Sqd. Ldr. status),
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and they did high level bombing (HLB) from 6,000 ft gaining an average bombing error of 60 yds (this altitude was not “high” in the view of most other squadrons – but where 617 was normally flying below tree-tops and between haystacks, 6,000 ft really was “high” to them!
Next day (the 27th) David had two training sorties – one taking up Ken Brown to show him the ropes, dropping bombs at Wainfleet from 10,000 ft this time, and recording a mean error of 61 yds; the next sortie being with Bunny Clayton and flying at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft, recording an error of 50 yds. (It was getting better!)
Next day David took Geoff Rice up, and also made a sortie by himself. On the latter he dropped three bombs from 10,000 ft, but an error in the altimeter setting led to a mean drop error of 143 yds this time. All this showed how essential it was to get all the readings correct, and here they ran into the problem of calculating the exact [inserted] ground level [/inserted] barometric pressure reading over the target so as to be able to correct the altimeters to give their exact height. Another problem was to obtain absolutely accurate outside air temperatures, and the exact speed of the Lancaster (determined by a combination of airflow and Static Pressure vents in the instrumentation, and known errors (Position Errors) in the Static Pressure System (caused by the location of the vents in the fuselage airflow). All this was essential but complicated and the RAE and A&AEE had to make tests on the Lancasters to give 617 the most effective results, and to increase the accuracy of information fed into the SABS.
For a few days the weather held up training, but it resumed in October with a vengeance. David was flying different Lancasters on each sortie, a new [inserted] Mark III [/inserted] DV246 (KC-U) that had just been delivered, ED932 (Gibson’s old aircraft now recoded AJ-V) [inserted] for low-level sorties [/inserted], JB139 (KC-X), ED915 (AJ-Q), or EE146 (KC-K). He [inserted] sometimes [/inserted] went up three times a day, usually it was twice each day, and his bombing errors read consecutively: 74 yds from 10,000 ft, 182 yds (10,000 ft) then only 21 yds from a 200 ft high low-level sortie, 26 yds (200 ft), 96 yds (10,000 ft), 88 yds (10,000 ft), 101 yds [deleted] (10,000 ft) [/deleted], 86 yds [deleted] 10,000 ft) [/deleted], 57 yds (all at 10,000ft)
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60 yds (from 12,000 ft), 47 yds (1,000 ft), and so on. They had great difficulty getting the accuracy to any greater limits – which really was going to be essential if Barnes Wallis’ big, expensive bombs were to be dropped (These had streamlined aerodynamic fins, and would spin at an increased speed as they dropped, giving different trajectories to the normal, unstreamlined weapons).
Slowly the results of the RAE and A&AEE testing were incorporated on the Lancasters, and Sqd Ldr Richardson’s observations, and things at last began to come together.
Mick Martin went up with David and acted as the bomb-aimer himself on October 16th, flying in ED932 on a low-level sortie. He managed a mean error of 105 yds from 250 ft altitude – not very good! (He obviously then appreciated the level of accuracy David’s normal bomb-aimer could achieve – of 21 to 26 yds!)
David tried a run at 15,000 ft on October 17th – getting an error of 70 yds. But next day doing exactly the same, he only registered a mean error of 128 yds. (On both occasions he was flying ED932, now fitted up with the SABS system).
In the meantime, Mick Martin had been told by Cochrane to get the Squadron up to strength again in pilots and crews, and a good deal of interviewing had been carried out. Martin knew now that an extremely high degree of training and ultimate accuracy in dropping the new bombs was going to be needed, but the crews were going to have to be well blooded already with records to show that they could unflinchingly carry out day after day, the steady, straight run in to the target, whatever flak or defending fighter status. He sought only the very best and bravest of men, therefore, and rejected many applications on instinct. By the first week or so in October, however, he had selected a few more, including Pilot Officer F.E. Willsher – a young fair-haired boy of 19, only a year out of the school classroom; Flt. Lt Thomas Vincent O’Shaughnessy; Flying Officer Gordon Herbert Weeden; [deleted] and [/deleted] Warrant Officer “Chuffy” Bull; Flying Officer
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Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, [inserted] Flt Lt. R.S.D. Kearns, DFC, DFM; [/inserted] Pilot Officer Nicholas R Ross; [inserted] Sqd. Ldr William [inserted] R [/inserted] Suggett (to take over “A” Flight) [/inserted]; and Flying Officer J. (“Paddy”) Gingles. They all soon settled into the training routine, although both Ross and Bull hit trees on low-flying exercises, narrowly avoiding disaster each time.
David Wilson took up young Willsher on October 9th, to show him how the SABS worked on a 10,000 ft high-level bombing run, and in the afternoon of the same day, he flew ED932 at low level all through the Lake District and the Scottish Glens, taking 5 hrs 30 mins for the cross country. On the 11th he tried the SABS at 12 000 ft and got his error down to 60 yds, and then over the next few days he used it at 1,000 ft (Error=47 yds), 250 ft (with Mick Martin acting as bomb aimer again (Error=105 yds), then at 15,000 ft (Error=70 yds, with Sqd Ldr Richardson on board), then 15,000 ft again (128 yds). And so it went on with David flying his new Lancaster DV 246 [inserted]KC-U) [/inserted], or the two originals from the Dams raid, ED932 (AJ-V), or ED 924 [inserted] (AJ-Y) [/inserted], which had been flown by Cyril Anderson.
David took “Talking Bomb” down to the RAE at Farnborough on October 18th to have some modifications made to the SABS, then he flew the Sqd. Ldr. (who had been a Great War pilot in the RFC) up to the bombing range at West Freugh (near Stranraer) where they checked the bombsight out again at 14,000 ft and 8,000 ft.
As October drew to a close, the bugs seemed to be getting ironed out of the SABS system, as the various modifications were made to it, and after the sight went U/S two days running on practice bombing on 22nd and 23rd, at long last, on the afternoon of the 23rd, David flew over West Freugh again at 14,000 ft and dropped one 4,000 lb “Cookie” this time. It hit the 3-storey target building [inserted] at Braid Fell [/inserted] fair and square in the middle, demolishing it! (Average error = Zero!). On his next run, on the 25th, he dropped six 1,000 lb bombs from 14,000 ft, hit the target with one, gained a very near miss with a second, and put the other four close by ([inserted] Mean [/inserted] Error = 79 yds). Things were getting better!
[Underlined] Restarting Operations [/underlined]
November started off the same way – with more
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high and low level exercises. David had been allocated Guy Gibson’s old aircraft (ED932, AJ-V) on a permanent basis now, and he flew it on most of the practices. He did a run at 12,000 ft and dropped four [inserted] bombs (with [/inserted] an average error of 146 yds), then three bombs from 2,000 ft (53 yds), and then switched to one of Mick Martin’s latest ideas – bombing a PFF red Target Indicator from 15,000 ft. He scored a “bullseye” on it on November 5th (appropriately for Guy Fawkes night!), and with things now obviously getting to the stage where 617 Squadron was ready for operations with the SABS, David showed a VIP around his aircraft on November 6th (believed to be Roy Chadwick, Avro’s Chief Designer) and flew him back to Ringway in the afternoon.
Cochrane at Group had meanwhile decided it was time to test the SABS in action, and so Mick Martin was informed [inserted] that [/inserted] they were to raid the Anthéor Viaduct in Southern France again on November 11th – this time from 8,000 ft to avoid the flak from recently installed German defences.
On the morning of November 11th, David made one more practice flight in ED932, dropping 6 bombs from 15,000 ft and getting his mean error down to 89 yds. It was the best they could do, and he [inserted] then [/inserted] prepared for the evening’s operation. The Squadron despatched 11 aircraft, starting at 18.15, with Ted Youseman first off, and each being bombed-up with one 12,000 [inserted] lb [/inserted] H.C. Blast bomb. Mick Martin himself was leading the raid, and Dave Shannon and Les Munro were also flying, but Shannon had engine failure on take-off and had to abort. The others all got off safely – O’Shaughnessy, Rice, Bull, Clayton, Brown, Kearns, and David Wilson – and set course for Anthéor (David had two new members of his → [inserted] crew on this “op” – Flying officer Chandler and Warrant officer Holland, who were to stay with him ‘for some time (“Chan” Chandler had already survived 8 days in a dinghy in the N-Sea, after ditching in a 49 Sqd Hampden, returning from Düsseldorf in the early hours of July 1st, 1941). [/inserted]
They found the viaduct in half moonlight this time, but there were guns and searchlights to avoid, and there was another similar viaduct just to the West, in the bay by Agay, and this confused some crews sufficiently enough to aim at that. There were no direct hits, but Mick Martin’s bomb hit the railway line to one side of the viaduct, and several more got near misses, David’s bomb [inserted] being 30 yds out. [/inserted] But the viaduct survived, and the 10 Lancasters flew on to Blida again,
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in Algeria. There had been some ships just off the shore at Anthéor which had opened fire on some of the Lancasters, but none had been hit, and they all landed safely in N. Africa. They had a four day break there (taking full advantage of it as they had done before, to sample the local wines and unrationed food and fruit. [sic] They left on November 15th for Rabat in Morocco, and on the 17th flew home from Morocco to Coningsby, via the Bay of Biscay, loaded with Forces Christmas mail for home and fruit and wine. But one Lancaster never made it back – Ted Youseman and his crew were probably picked off by a German fighter, and were believed to have ditched in the sea south-west of Brest, perishing in the process.
{Underlined] New C.O.; new ideas. [/underlined]
While they had been away in N. Africa, a new C.O. had arrived to take command from Mick Martin (who had only been in charge on a temporary basis). His name – Wing Commander Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, DSO and Bar, DFC – and he had dropped a rank from Group Captain, in order to take over 617. Mick Martin had some burning ideas now about marking targets first with flares, so the rest could bomb with the SABS system, and so did Cheshire too. He was to change 617’s role quite dramatically with his ideas – how dramatically, and how successfully none of them would have guessed in their wildest dreams!
After they were once more back at Coningsby, David tried out his SABS from 18,000 ft now, gaining an error of 137 yds for [inserted] dropping [/inserted] six bombs, and made a few routine air tests of his Lancaster (ED932) early in December. Cheshire also loaned out from 617 crews with McCarthy Clayton, Bull and Weeden, for a few days to the Special Duties Squadrons at Tempsford. They were needed to make pinpoint drops of guns and ammunition to the French Resistance [inserted] near Doullens (on the River Outhie in Northern France) [/inserted] on December 10th. The raid went badly, flak bringing down both Bull and Weeden’s aircraft with two of Bull’s crew, and all in Weeden’s being killed. McCarthy couldn’t find the target, and so he and Clayton went back on December 11th, and were successful this time. Cheshire and 617
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had lost two more valuable crews.
Almost immediately after this, 617 was detailed to bomb a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais, and Group decided to try out the SABS again at night, but this time, working on Martin and Cheshire’s ideas, arranged for the P.F.F to mark the wood concerned with incendiaries. [Inserted] → Mick Martin [inserted] – as Cheshire’s Deputy - [/inserted] had now taken over as O.C. “B” flight from Les Munro, and David Wilson was now flying as Mick’s right hand man. [/inserted] Nine Lancasters were [inserted] therefore [/inserted] sent off from 617 Squadron on December 16th, [inserted] led by Cheshire with Martin as his Deputy [/inserted] to bomb the “Ski-site” ** at Flixecourt on the Somme between Abbeville and Amiens. A single PFF Mosquito used the “Oboe” beam system of marking the target [inserted] with incendiaries [/inserted], and all nine 617 Lancasters dropped their single 12,000 ln H.C. Blast bombs as close to the burning wood as possible. David dropped his, and his bomb-aimer took a photograph of the aiming point to check on their return. [Inserted] His sortie lasted for 3 hrs 40 mins in all. [/inserted] Subsequent “recce” pictures showed the Squadron had collectively achieved a mean error of 94 yds – but the “Oboe” Mosquito had marked 350 yds from the target – and so all the bombs were wide! Cheshire was not amused.
David was up again on December 18th, doing a practice drop from 2,500 ft (Error-70 yds), and on the [inserted] morning of the [/inserted] 20th from 15,000 ft (Error=60 yds). This was a good, consistent result from differing altitudes and in different aircraft (ED932 and ME557). In fact ME557 [inserted] (KC-O) [/inserted] was a brand new Lanc, and David took a Ministry of Aircraft Production official up on the practice to check the [inserted] Napier [/inserted] compressors [inserted] supplying air to the SABS system [/inserted]. * It was also one of the first Lancasters fitted out to carry Barnes Wallis’ new 12,000 ln Tallboy streamlined bomb to be delivered to 617.
The next operation was on [inserted] the evening of [/inserted] December 20th to [inserted] the Cockerill steelworks [/inserted] [deleted] an armaments factory [/deleted] in a residential area of Liege, in Belgium. The bombing had to be accurate to avoid civilian casualties, so eight PFF Mosquitos preceded eight 617 Lancasters. The Mosquitos marked the target, but [deleted] as [/deleted] low cloud prevented the markers being seen, [inserted] Cheshire dived low to see for himself, and found the markers were well off the target. He therefore ordered [/inserted] the force [inserted] to [/inserted] return without bombing. David (and the [inserted] others [/inserted]) brought their 12,000 lb H.C. bombs back, and Geoff Rice was shot down by a night fighter, miraculously surviving alone out of his crew, to be taken prisoner. One more of the original 617 founders had gone.
* Recoded later as KC-S, this was the aircraft in which Flt. Lt. “Bill” Reid, VC, was shot down on July 31st 1944 (he survived).
** So-called because of the shape of the curved ramp V1 launch site.
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Two days later, on December 22nd, David was off again [inserted] (in AJ-V) [/inserted] to attack a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site near Bellencombre, south-east of Dieppe, this time taking Flying Officer Len Sumpter, DFC, DFM as his [inserted] bomb-aimer [/inserted] [deleted] crew [/deleted] instead of F.O. Parkin. Sumpter had flown on the original Dams raid, been rested, and had just come back for a second tour with 617, [inserted] normally flying with Dave Shannon [/inserted]. But the PFF Mosquitos failed again, and David brought all 11 x 1,000 lb bombs back. There were no casualties, fortunately, but Cheshire was not impressed by these PFF failures
David had a few days leave, and resumed flying on the 31st, after Christmas. He missed the new attempt by 617 on December 30th to bomb Flixecourt again, with 10 Lancasters helped by six PFF Mosquitos. Once more the markers were 200 yds off target, 617 accurately straddled them, but because [inserted] of their accuracy [/inserted] missed the main target.
[Underlined] Sorting out the marking problem; a new base [/underlined]
At the beginning of January 1944, David was up on bombing practices again – high level from 15,000 ft (with an average error of 127 yds – and one bomb that toppled); then another of the same height with a better error (98 yds). That was on the morning of the 4th, and in the evening David was one of 11 Lancasters put up for attacking another Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais area [inserted] – this time at Fréval. [/inserted] With the others, he bombed a PFF Target Indicator that they had dropped at very low level this time – but the T.I. was four miles from the target, however, and David brought a photo back to prove it. He blamed the PFF once more! This was obviously not good enough, and whereas 617 Squadron was now trained up to be the RAF’s most accurate bombing squadron, it was the Pathfinders who were now plainly not up to scratch! It was no good having accurate bombing on inaccurate target markers, and so Cheshire, Martin and Bob Hay (Flt. Lt. Robert Claude Hay, DFC and Bar, RAAF – 617’s bombing leader, and Mick Martin’s own bomb-aimer from the first raid on the Dams) put their heads together to work out their own in-house method of marking a target, and then bombing it with the rest of the Squadron. But they first had to prove that the System worked, and to do this they needed Cochrane’s
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permission from Group to discontinue using PFF assistance Cheshire, with his innocently youthful and matter-of-fact ways, soon got this.
Meanwhile, determined to get everyone’s accuracy up even further, David and the rest of 617 went on practicing, day after day, over the next 17 days of January. They made high-level bombing runs, low-level cross country flights, and usually pin-pointed targets all the way round in woodland areas – just like the V1 Flying Bomb sites. David flew these separate and original 617 Lancasters during this period – ED915, ED924 and his own ED932
On January 9th, after a practice over the Wainfleet Sands at low level, he and the others landed at Woodhall Spa – to be their new base from now onwards. Cochrane had decided that 617, with its special techniques, top priority targets – and more importantly, the forthcoming new Tallboy and 10-ton Grand Slam bombs they were to use – deserved a special one-squadron base secluded away from other camps. Woodhall Spa was a one-squadron aerodrome, and so 619 Squadron there moved to Coningsby (which could hold several squadrons), and 617 transferred in the reverse direction on January 9th 1944. → [Inserted] A few more pilots joined 617 at this time, including Lt. Nick Knilans, DSO, DFC (USAF), Flying Officer Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, and Flying Officer J.L. Cooper. [/inserted]
Over the next few days, operations now from Woodhall Spa and billeted in the delightful Petwood House Hotel (which served as the Officer’s Mess) David flew on low-level cross country sorties, but this time in formation. He flew his (and Guy Gibson’s old aircraft) ED932 for the last time on January 18th [inserted] across to Coningsby, [/inserted] and this veteran Lancaster was left there to be used by 61 Squadron in future (it survived the war intact, only to be eventually scrapped). On the 20th, David started some new tactics that Cheshire was devising – low flying over the Wash at only 60 ft high, and then flying across, and down, the aerodrome’s flarepath at 60 ft, practicing the tactics of dropping more Target Indicators onto a cluster dropped already by the leader (using the runway lights as imaginary markers). It was during this practicing on → [inserted] the 20th that O’Shaughnessy misjudged his height and hit a sea wall at Snettisham, crashing on the beach. He and one of his crew were killed, but the rest (one badly injured) survived to fight again. The Squadron had lost another [inserted] good [/inserted] pilot. [/inserted]
Next day, January 21st, Cheshire announced he had got permission to strike at a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site again – but this time without using the PFF at all. That evening, they set out with even greater excitement than usual, for they knew they had to get a good result
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this time, to substantiate all their training.
David took another of his old mounts, JB139 [inserted] (KC-X) [/inserted], on this raid, and 617 put up 12 aircraft in all. The target was at Hallencourt, a few miles South of Abbeville, and Cheshire and Martin carried out their own new “Pathfinder” technique. First of all the leading pair dropped [inserted] Red Spot [/inserted] flares from 7,000 ft, then dived down [inserted] to about 400 ft, [/inserted] using their illumination of the target area to drop long-burning Target Indicators right on top of the Ski-site.* The rest of 617 then flew over, dropping their bombs on the T.I’s. David, in fact, carried 2 x 1,000 lb, 13 x 500 lb bombs and 6 flares in his Lancaster, and, in common with others, would have used the flares if necessary to help Cheshire and Martin to go on marking the target if their first T.I’s had gone out. But David didn’t need to use the flares on this occasion, nor did he drop all his bombs – only 7 x 500 lb and 1 x 1,000 were let go, and he brought the rest back. He got a good photograph of the aiming point [inserted] from his bombing level of 13,000ft, [/inserted] and when the crews got back to Woodhall Spa, they were jubilant. It had worked, and later “recce” pictures confirmed they had blasted the main target area – for a change!
Once again, in the next few days, David was hard at Cheshire’s new tactics again, doing low-level [inserted] (60 ft high) [/inserted] runs over Uppingham Reservoir, and practicing aiming at the flarepath at their base – or carrying out “Tomato” exercises (as they now referred to them). Then on January 25th came their second “Op” using their own marking [inserted] techniques [/inserted] on a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site. Now it was Fréval [inserted] again [/inserted], and David was one of 12 617 Lancasters to head for the target, flying a Mk I (DV385, KC-A). [deleted] from 50 Squadron for a few days [/deleted] He carried 13 x 500 lb and 2 x 1,000 lb bombs and Cheshire and Martin dived in low again aided by a green Target Indicator dropped [inserted] in the general target area by the PFF, [/inserted] marked the target [inserted] with Red Spot flares [/inserted] in very gusty wind conditions, and David and the rest dropped their bombs exactly on target. It was a case of two out of two “bullseyes” for 617, and there were no losses from either raid.
[Underlined] Picking off the targets [/underlined]
Cochrane now realised that Cheshire and 617
* Cochrane had insisted that the marking had to be done from above 2,500 ft, but Cheshire and Martin had worked out the dive-bombing technique down to 400 ft!
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were now thoroughly capable of using their low-marking techniques on any number of specialised targets – and Cheshire had eventually told him of their habit of dive-bombing their Lancasters right down to 400 ft over the target. So Cochrane now picked a beauty for them – the new engine works at Limoges, in mid-western France. This was to be on February 8th, and so in the days leading up to this, David found himself practicing once again, this time dropping bombs on the ranges from 1,500 ft, 2,000 ft, then at 8,000 ft, 10,000 ft and finally 14,500 ft (at West Freugh). At low-level his mean error was 222 yds, but at 10,000 ft he got it down to 39 yds, and at West Freugh to 65 yds.
Finally, the 8th dawned, and in the evening 12 Lancasters took off for the Gnome et Rhône aero engine works at Limoges. Cheshire and Martin left 15 minutes before the rest – led by Dave Shannon and consisting of David, Ken Brown, Bob Knights (a new pilot), Knilans, Ross, Kearns, Willsher Clayton and Suggitt.
Para // Cheshire had worked out a special technique for this raid , as most of the workers were French, and the factory was close to a built-up area where many of them lived. There was cloud right along their route, but it broke just before they reached Limoges, on the River Vienne. Cheshire then flew over the factory roof three times, down to about 100 ft to warn all the night shift workers to leave, and take shelter. His aircraft, DV380 (Coded KC-N) had had some modifications to accommodate an RAF Film Unit crew, led by Sqd Ldr. Pat Moyna. Half its fuselage door was cut away to instal [sic] two 35mm movie cameras, and two large mirrors were fitted underneath to reflect as much light as possible (had Roy Chadwick, the Lancaster’s designer known, he would doubtless have considered it as sacrilege)!
After Cheshire’s third run, his crew could see the French workers streaming out of the factory, to their air raid shelters, and after waiting a few minutes, Cheshire went in to drop his cascading incendiary markers and Red Spot fires directly on top of the centre of the factory roofs. The Film crew had a beanfeast, obtaining some of the most remarkable shots of the War, as the cascades of light lit up the factory, river and railway yards nearby.
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Mick Martin then followed Cheshire in, flying his Lancaster DV402 (coded KC-P), and dropped his markers on top of Cheshires – After that Cheshire told the main force overhead to bomb, and he cruised around the area at 5,000 ft, to let the film crew record the event. They had a grandstand view, as the other 10 Lancasters (David was flying ME559, KC-Q) unloaded their weapons on the factory. Five of them carried 12,000 lb H.C. Blast bombs, the other seven – like David – [inserted] each [/inserted] dropped 12 x 1,000 lb bombs, and most of them were within the factory perimeter. David reckoned his stick fell slightly off target, and straddled the railway lines away from the factory.
Cheshire then ordered all crews home, but he flew around the burning, smoking factory in the moonlight at 100ft (or less) for half an hour, letting the Film crew complete a unique task. Even Cheshire’s crew got fidgety, trying to egg him on gently to start for home. As Moyna said afterwards: “Cheshire seemed as unconcerned as an assistant arranging a group photograph in a studio”! Finally, they turned out to the Bay of Biscay, and flew back over the sea. They all arrived back safely – Cheshire about an hour behind the rest. And the main achievement (for Cheshire) was a perfect record on film to show the AOC and all the others at Bomber Command HQ, illustrating how effective low-level marking could be.
[Underlined] Third attempt at Anthéor. [/underlined]
After the attack on Limoges, David’s next flight with 617 was another operation on February 12th – back to the Anthéor viaduct again. The Squadron had already attacked it twice, and the USAF once, but it was still intact and carrying almost 100,000 tons of German supplies down to the Italian Front each week. All these attacks had, however, served only to get the Germans to defend it more heavily each time, and the defences were formidable this time.
Once again 617 fielded 10 Lancasters for the “Op”. but Cheshire was concerned about the range at their disposal, for Cochrane refused permission for them to carry on to Sardinia this time, saying he needed 617 back in the UK after the raid. In order to squeeze every gallon of petrol into their tanks, they flew
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their Lancasters down to Ford aerodrome, between Bognor Regis and Littlehampton on the South Coast, using it as an advance base to refuel. Then Cheshire and Martin took off ahead of the others, climbing through bad icing conditions, and arrived some five minutes ahead of the main force.
It was a pitch black night and the narrow valley was full of all types of ack ack guns, which opened up in an absolute hail of flak. Cheshire tried three times to dive down the valet over the viaduct, and drop his load of markers and flares, but each time he was blinded by the flak and forced off course and out to sea. Martin then had a go, and Cheshire tried to get back inland to draw off the fire as he ran in, but was out of position as Mick slid down the dark ravine. As Mick levelled out over the viaduct, a 20mm cannon shell exploded through the bomb-aimers’s cupola, and Bob Hay was killed instantly, and the Flight Engineer, Ivan Whittaker injured in his legs.
Cheshire ordered Martin to fly on to Sardinia, and land there (where he had wanted the entire Squadron to go), and then he went in again himself, this time at 5,000 ft, above the ravine and out of range of the cannon fire. There was still a mass of heavy flak bursts, and David [inserted] in Lancaster ED763 (KC-D), [/inserted] and the others flying overhead thought it looked impossible for anyone to survive in that holocaust. Cheshire managed to drop some of his Red Spot markers, but they drifted to the beach side of the viaduct. With time over the target limited by having to return to the UK, Shannon up above now commenced the high-level bombing, and David and the others followed. David dropped his single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb [inserted] from 9,500 ft [/inserted] and turned for home. Only one of these weapons dropped close to the viaduct, the rest falling closer to the beach, and once again the bridge remained intact! Finally, after a flight lasting seven hours exactly *, David touched down at Ford again, to refuel and rest, before flying back to Woodhall Spa that morning. [Deleted] The Lancaster he had used this time was ED763 (KC-D). [/deleted]
But fate had not finished with the Squadron yet, for next morning, as the 617 crews left Ford to fly up to Woodhall Spa, Sqd. Ldr. Bill
* David’s previous sortie to Limoges lasted 7 hrs 25 mins altogether but this was from Woodhall Spa. It took about an hour each way from there down to Ford.
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Suggitt climbed out to the West, and turned to starboard in DV382 (KC-J) to set course to the North-east. He had to climb up through the clouds shrouding [inserted] the [/inserted] South Downs, and just after 08.30 a tractor driver at Duncton Hill Farm saw the Lancaster impact on Littleton Down, above him. Wreckage spread everywhere, and all Suggitt’s crew died instantaneously, although Suggitt himself died two days later, still in a coma. Flight Sgt. John Pulford, DFM, the last but one survivor of Guy Gibson’s original raid crew, died in the crash. (The last survivor, Flt. Lt. Richard Trevor-Roper DFC, DFM, was killed on a 97 Squadron operation just 20 days later).
[Underlined] Improving the techniques. [/underlined]
After Mick Martin returned from Sardinia later, his Lancaster temporarily patched up, Cochrane sent him off for a rest period – much against his will. But Cochrane preferred living Flight Commanders to dead ones, and he had few survivors left now, of the original 617 founding pilots.
Then came some top-level Group and Command meetings – at one of which Cheshire appeared on the one hand, proposing greater use of his and Martin’s low-level marking techniques (preferably using Mosquitos in future), and on the other hand Air Vice Marshal Don Bennett [inserted] of 8 Group [/inserted] was strongly defending his PFF high-level marking (and being generally dismissive of 617 Squadron’s techniques).
Cochrane, however, gave Cheshire some leeway in his 5 Group, and set a string of targets now for 617 to attack where Cheshire could devise the necessary low-level marking himself. With Martin gone now, Cheshire took Les Munro as his Deputy, and Les became “B” Flight Commander, with David Wilson as his right hand man. Cheshire did not yet put in a bid for two Mosquitos (but he was busy making the necessary high-level contact in the RAF in order to obtain them quickly and painlessly when he needed them). He knew that the light, fast and manoeuvrable Mosquito would help to make diving onto the target so much easier, and also assist in avoiding the defensive flak.
The last half of February 1944 passed for David with no more than four training flights or air tests
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being flown, due to bad weather. The last of these, on February 29th, was a bomb-dropping exercise from 15,000 ft, where David’s crew scored a 100 yd average error. Then came another practice from 10,000 ft on the morning of March 2nd, followed by 617’s next operation the same evening – this time to the aero-engine works at Albert in the Pas de Calais, between Amiens and Bapaume. Because this was believed to be heavily defended (repairing as it did, vital BMW engines for Focke Wulf FW 190 fighters) Cochrane ordered Cheshire not to mark below 5,000 ft this time. This was Leonard Cheshire’s 75th operation, and David Wilson’s 67th, yet 617’s three Flight Commanders – Dave Shannon, Joe McCarthy and Les Munro were some way behind these totals themselves. Both McCarthy and Munro were now promoted to Squadron Leaders.
David’s aircraft, DV246 (KC-U) was loaded up completely this time with [inserted] 248 x 30 lb [/inserted] incendiaries, and Cheshire and Munro (as deputy) went ahead to position themselves down to 5,000 ft so as to identify the target when the flares were dropped by the leading 617 Lancasters [inserted] of the 13 flying [/inserted] overhead. Cheshire went in under the flares to drop his markers, but his aircraft’s SABS bombsight went U/S on the approach, and while he stood off [inserted] for his bomb-aimer [/inserted] to try to get it working, he called in Munro to drop markers [inserted] just [/inserted] as the flares burnt out. Munro’s markers were spot on, and 617 bombed the factory from higher up, practically all their bombs and certainly David’s load of incendiaries [/inserted] (dropped from 9,200 ft) [/inserted] hitting the factory dead-centre. It was a text book operation, and Cheshire’s diary entry was almost right when he wrote: “This factory will produce no more engines for the Hun!”
Two nights later, on March 4th, 617’s target was the small, but important [inserted] La Ricamerie [/inserted] needle-bearing factory at St. Etienne (to the South-west of Lyon). It was a very small target, in a narrow valley with 4,000 ft hills on either flank, and once again in a built-up area, meaning it had to be picked out surgically, without harming the French citizens if possible.
Again, 15 Lancasters were put up that night, Cheshire and Munro leading (the latter on three engines, as one had packed up after take off). But there was ten-tenths cloud over the target, as David Wilson recorded. He was carrying a Sqd Ldr. Doubleday that night in his usual mount, JB139 (KC-X), and 1,000 lb
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bombs. But Cheshire couldn’t mark the target because of the bad weather, and so they all brought their bombs back that night. David’s flight there and back lasted exactly four hours.
Six days later, with better weather forecast, 617 tried to hit St. Etienne again. This time 16 Lancasters set off for La Ricamerie factory – on the same night that 5 Group bombed the Michelin works at Clermont-Ferrand. This time Cheshire made six attempts to mark at very low level in the blackness, dropping them accurately on the last run, but they bounced beyond the factory. Munro followed, and dropped short, Shannon tried and his markers bounced beyond, and finally Arthur Kell (a new Australian pilot) made a low-level dive and planted incendiaries in the factory. The rest of 617 then bombed the incendiaries (to Cheshire’s commands), and David unleashed his 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] from X “X-Ray” on the second run in [/inserted] in two sticks, [inserted] dropping them from 8000 ft. [/inserted] When they returned safely, David’s bob-aimer believed they had missed the target, but when “Recce” photographs were obtained, 617 was delighted to see the target had been completely destroyed, and there was no damage to the built-up area outside!
There was no more training at the moment, and the next “Op” was on March 15th, to an aero-engine works at Woippy, on the Northern outskirts of Metz (on the R. Moselle, East of Paris). It was freezing cold weather and 617 and 619 Squadrons sent a combined 22 Lancasters up this night, but the target was hidden by cloud [deleted] again [/deleted]. David was carrying a single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb in his [inserted] JB139 [/inserted] X “X-Ray” again, but there was no hope of bombing, and so they all brought their bombs back. This was a longer sortie – 5 hrs 30 mins – and one [inserted] 617 [/inserted] crew, flying with Flying Officer Duffy, were attacked by three night fighters on their return leg, and claimed all three shot down!
Next day, March 16th, 617 was off again, this time to bomb the Michelin tyre factory at Cataroux, Clermont-Ferrand. The 15 Lancasters they put up were joined by six from 106 Squadron that were fitted with [inserted] the [/inserted] new [inserted] H2S [/inserted] radar bombing equipment. These latter aircraft dropped the flares this time, and Cheshire
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Made his usual low-level dives over the Cataroux Michelin factory to warn the [inserted] French [/inserted] workers to take cover, dropping his markers on the third run – but a little short. He was being extremely careful once more, because the factory had these major sheds in its complex, but a fourth large building – the French workers canteen – had “on no account to be damaged, if possible”, (Group’s instructions). Cheshire then called in his three Flight Commanders, Munro, Shannon and McCarthy, and they all managed to drop their markers directly on the factory sheds. To do this, they had to have a constant rain of flares to illuminate the target, and David Wilson in JB139 released his six, to help their aim. Then Cheshire called up the others to bomb the newly laid markers and David released his [inserted] single [/inserted] 12,000 Blast bomb *, right on target, and turned for home. This trip lasted 6 hrs 40 mins in all, with the separate run-ins to drop flares, and then the weapon, and with poor weather conditions back at Woodhall Spa, David landed at Coningsby on the return, positioning back to base [inserted] later [/inserted] in the morning.
The “recce” pictures next morning showed the works entirely in flames – and yet the canteen was intact! In fact Cheshire had once again carried Sqd Ldr Pat Moyna and his Film Unit in his Lancaster, and filmed the progress of the bombing from low-level.
Off again on March 18th, David was one of 13 Lancasters this time from 617 Squadron, to bomb the French [inserted] “Poudrerie Nationale” [/inserted] explosives factory at Bergerac, on the R. Dordogne east of Bordeaux. Cochrane had meanwhile told Cheshire that he would try to obtain two Mosquitos, to carry on the low-level marking in greater safety, and therefore until they came, Cheshire must not do any more low-level marking below 5,000 ft. On this raid therefore, six other 5 Group Lancasters, using H2S, joined 617 Squadron, and Cheshire marked from 5,000 ft – spot on – followed by an equally accurate Munro. Shannon and McCarthy both marked an ammunition dump close by. Then the others started to bomb, and before David [inserted] (in JB139 again) [/inserted] dropped his 12,000 lb weapon on the factory [inserted] from 10,000 ft [/inserted], Bunny Clayton dropped his on the nearby
* Six crews carried this weapon on the raid (those with the most accurate bombing averages). This weapon was now referred to as “The Factory Buster”.
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ammunition dump, which exploded in a 15-second long, gigantic flash that blinded everybody. Cheshire, down below, looked up and saw the rest of 617’s Lancasters silhouetted above him against the sky. Then David’s bomb slammed into the powder works, and it disappeared in turn beneath a series of vast explosions. “The powder works”, Cheshire noted, “would appear to have outlived their usefulness!”
This route also took 6 hrs 40 mins from take-off to touch-down, and two days later (as usual now) on [inserted] March [/inserted] 20th, David was off again [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] to another explosives works – this one at Angoulême, [inserted] North-east of Bordeaux [/inserted]. The pattern was repeated, six 5 Group Lancasters using H2S to drop flares, Cheshire leading 617’s total force of 14 Lancasters and marking from 5,000 ft again. This explosives factory, on a bend on the R. Charente there, performed in the same manner as the one at Bergerac. David dropped 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb from 8,300 ft on top of this works, and the factory was completely – and spectacularly – destroyed. Some 6 hrs 5 mins later, David was safely back at Woodhall Spa, as were all 617 crews, and the Film Unit in Cheshire’s aircraft again.
[Underlined] Lyon – third time lucky [/underlined]
The fact that 617 would never leave a “demolition job” half-finished was becoming equally well known to Germans and British alike. The Germans were, in fact, beginning to draft in more defences to the vital plants in France that were supplying their War Effort. But nowhere was this reputation more tested than with their attack on the SIGMA aero-engine works near Lyon on the night of March 23rd 1944. Again six Lancasters of 106 Squadron were to act as the Flare droppers, and 617 put up 14 aircraft.
Cheshire told the 106 crews when to drop their flares, but the first lot were too far North, the second try fell short to the South, and final corrections failed to illuminate the actual target. Cheshire now had to send in his own 617 flare droppers, at altitude, and he just managed one dive over the target at 5,000 ft before they went out. He was not sure his markers had hit, but ordered the rest of 617 to bomb them. David was carrying 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this time, all fitted with long delay fuses (for the safety of the French
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civilians), so Cheshire had to fly around on his own afterwards to assess the results. They exploded eventually, and certainly something had been hit fair and square.
On the return, all but one 617 aircraft diverted to Tangmere – a fighter station near Chichester – only Nick Ross getting back to Woodhall Spa [inserted] (David’s sortie had lasted 6 hrs 45 mins by this time). [/inserted] There was very limited accommodation, and Cheshire and his Flight Commanders slept with some of the 617 crews in their billets, and on the floor – being last in that morning! When they returned to Woodhall Spa after resting, it was to discover that their target was untouched – they had bombed the wrong factory!
So, next day, March 25th, they went back again to finish the job. This time there were 22 Lancasters in all, including the half dozen from 106 Squadron, but Cheshire had re-organized the Flare-dropping force this time, putting 617’s Kearns in charge of all such flare usage – be it by 106 or 617 Squadron. Cochrane had allowed Cheshire to mark at low-level this time, if required, and as the flares went down Cheshire once again realised they were off target. Eventually he and Kearns got them back on the right target, and Cheshire and McCarthy simultaneously marked underneath. Cheshire then realised they had dropped their spot markers on the wrong buildings, and went in again, his second lot of red spot incendiaries again overshooting. Finally he called in McCarthy again, who hit the target with his last markers, and Cheshire ordered these to be bombed by the rest. Due to problems of communication, however, all the 617 crews orbiting overhead then bombed the early markers – missing the target once again! David’s load this time consisted entirely of 500 lb incendiary clusters and they obtained a good aiming point photograph – proving once back home again 7 hrs 20 mins later, that they had missed the right aero engine works for the second time!
Once more, therefore, 617 set out again on March 29th to try and complete the demolition job. This time 106 and 617 put up 19 Lancasters, and Cheshire was ordered to mark from 5,000 ft again. The flares
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dropped by 106 this time failed to ignite, and Kearns therefore ordered 617 crews to drop their flares. These were accurate, and Cheshire then marked carefully, getting his spot fires just a few yards out of the target centre. When David and the rest above bombed these, their average error put their bombs within the target area this time. David was carrying 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this occasion, [deleted] flying his usual X “X-ray” [/deleted], and his crew knew immediately that they had at last scored a “bulls-eye”. It took just 7 hrs this time, before they were back at base, third time lucky!
[Underlined] Mosquito marking; and marshalling yards. [/underlined]
Two days before this operation – the last that Cheshire flew and marked in a Lancaster – Cochrane said he had obtained the use of two Mosquitos for marking in future. Cheshire went to see them at Coleby Grange on the 27th, and then later on the day he returned from Lyon (the 30th) he had an hour’s dual instruction on it before flying it to Woodhall Spa. He decided that [inserted] McCarthy [/inserted], Shannon, Kearns and Fawke should join him on the Mosquitos as pilots, and they did some rapid dual instruction and test flights. And within two weeks Cochrane had given them two more Mosquitos.
David Wilson was on a few days leave at the beginning of April, and missed the next operation to the aircraft repair plant at Toulouse-Blagnac aerodrome on April 5th. This was the first time Cheshire used his Mosquito to do the target marking, and this time he was marking not just for 617 Squadron – in the lead – but for the whole of 5 Group which joined in the raid for the first full scale rest of operations to come. In addition to Cheshire’s Mosquito, 617 Squadron fielded 17 Lancasters, and 5 Group put up another 127 altogether. Cheshire found the target clear of cloud, and dived three times, dropping his markers right on target, despite considerable flak of all types. But the Mosquito was fast and agile, and the flak was inaccurate because of this. Munro and McCarthy had marked with Lancasters, and then 617 and other 5 Group Lancasters unloaded their bomb
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loads on the aircraft factory, and on other nearby targets too. All were destroyed, but Cheshire had to leave the scene early, as he was not sure of the range of the Mosquito at low altitude, without extra wing tanks.
When David returned from leave, he was immediately scheduled on the next raid on April 10th, this time to the Luftwaffe’s Signals Equipment Depôt at St. Cyr, by Versailles. He was given the new Lancaster, LM485 (KC-N), which Les Munro had flown in the Toulouse raid on the 5th, and bombed-up with 1 x 8,000 lb and 6 x 500 lb bombs. This raid was just carried out by 617, using Cheshire’s Mosquito and 17 Lancasters, and Cheshire eventually dive-bombed the target [inserted] down to 700 ft [/inserted] with his markers, after having trouble finding it in the dark. But he was spot on again, and David and the rest bombed the target [inserted] from 13,600 ft, [/inserted] destroying most of it.
Discussions at Bomber Command HQ now led to the C-in-C, Harris, agreeing now to let Cochrane have his own Pathfinder Force, within 5 Group, built around the special marking techniques developed by 617 Squadron. Thus Cochrane now received back two Lancaster Squadrons – 83 and 97 – which had originally been seconded to 8 PFF Group, and one Mosquito Squadron – 627 – [inserted] also [/inserted] from 8 Group, (much against the wishes of their A.O.C., Don Bennett).
The object now was to use the Mosquito squadron, and 617’s Mosquitos, for marking large targets, have the Lancasters of 83 and 97 Squadrons dropping the flares and acting as back-ups, and use 617 as the lead bombing squadron, and the others to bomb from a higher level. The next target was just such a place – the marshalling yards at Juvisy, 10 miles South of Paris.
David, meanwhile, had been back over the ranges again with 617, honing their skills all the time. He had “Talking Bomb” up with him on one high level from 15,000 ft, did some low-level flying, and then, on April 18th, was off to Juvisy with 201 other Lancasters in the Group, plus 617’s four Mosquitos [inserted] flown by Cheshire, Fawke, Shannon and Kearns.) [/inserted] Flying LM 485 [inserted] (KC-N) [/inserted] again, David was designated (as was the whole of 617 Sqd) to mark the target for the [inserted] Group’s Lancasters. [/inserted], and carried 6 x Red Spots,
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[inserted] 6 x 1,000 lb, and [/inserted] 4 x 500 lb bombs. The railway yards were on the West bank of the R. Seine, just on the south-east corner of Orly aerodrome, and [deleted] they covered such a large aera that the raid was split into two waves – one to attack the Southern half, the next (one hour later) to attack the Northern section. [/deleted] Cheshire found the Southern aiming point under flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadrons above (although he had suffered a compass [inserted] failure [/inserted] in the Mosquito). He marked the yards successfully, and was backed up by the other [deleted] of the [/deleted] 617 Mosquitos, and David and the 617 Lancasters then unloaded their markers and bombs from 6,500ft fairly accurately on the target, [deleted] David and his 617 colleagues being the most [/deleted] with the rest of 5 Group – being trained in area (rather than spot) bombing – then carpeting the whole area. [Deleted] soon marked for the second wave, in Northern half of the yards, and again the results were accurate. [/deleted] The combined 5 Group method was becoming one of Bomber Command’s [inserted] most [/inserted] successful weapons!
On [inserted] the morning [/inserted] April 20th, David made his highest practice bombing run yet on Wainfleet Ranges – from 20,000 ft this time. He did not know it, but Cochrane was anticipating the arrival shortly of Barnes Wallis’ new Tallboy Bomb, and the higher it would be accurately dropped, the deeper it would penetrate in the ground before exploding, and creating an “earthquake” effect – bringing any building crashing (even if made of solid concrete).
The same evening (April 20th) David took part in another massed 5 Group attack – this time on the marshalling yards on the North side of Paris, at Porte de la Chapelle, just up the line from the Gare du Nord. He was flying LM485 (KC-N) this evening, and because these yards were very close to the residential tenement blocks surrounding them, extreme care was needed in dropping both markers and bombs. This raid was also even bigger than the one in Juvisy, because 5 Group also borrowed the services of some 8 Group PFF Mosquitos to drop markers by their Oboe equipment (using converging radio beams from UK stations), before 617’s Mosquitos, and Lancasters [inserted] of [/inserted] all three 5 Group marking Squadrons (617, 83 and 97) did their marker and bomb dropping, and then the 5 Group’s Lancasters bombed the target. There was a total of
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247 Lancasters, and 22 Mosquitos in all involved this night, and the raid was split into two waves, each about an hour apart, which attacked the Southern and Northern halves of the yards separately.
The Oboe markers were a little late over the target and there were inevitably some communication problems with all the aerial units involved, and Cheshire trying to control the different facets of the operation. But these were overcome, and another accurate blitzing of the target was achieved. David dropped [inserted] 6 x Red Spots, 6 x 1,000 lb and 4 x 500 lb [/inserted] bombs this time [inserted] from 6500 ft [/inserted], and achieved a direct hit on the aiming point. His sortie lasted 4 hrs 10 mins this time, and once again, all 617 aircraft – Mosquitos and Lancasters, returned safely, although 6 Lancasters from the other squadrons were lost. On the subject of Squadron losses, 617 itself was now very much below the average of most squadrons in this respect, helped no doubt by its training, and the fact that it had concentrated recently on French targets, rather than those in the most heavily defended parts of Germany. There were other reasons too – such as Cheshire’s acquaintance with an RAF officer who was [inserted] the [/inserted] Senior Controller of Beachy Head radar station, near Eastbourne. This had some new American equipment that gave long range cover for Fighter Command deep into France and the Low Countries, and the officer suggested that it could be used at night to warn 617’s Lancasters if they were being stalked by German nightfighters. Cheshire then had 617’s Lancasters fitted with special crystal pick-ups and the latest VHF sets (all with Cochrane’s approval) and from there on, they had valuable radar protection on their missions into the Continent.
[Underlined] Tallboys, and “Taxable”. [/underlined]
The next operation Cochrane planned for 617 was an attack on a German railway centre, and the first he chose was Braunschweig (Brunswick), to the east of Hannover, on the evening of April 22nd. This was historically important, as it was the first time that 617 and 5 Group employed their low-level marking activities over German soil. David, however, missed this operation, and the next ones on Munich [inserted] on April 24th [/inserted] (marshalling yards again) and the German
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tank and troop park at Mailly-le-Camp (May 3rd) – because he was busily engaged in working [inserted] up [/inserted] himself and a few [inserted] other [/inserted] specially selected 617 crews on the Barnes Wallis Tallboy bomb technique. For the most accurate bombing crews on the squadron had been selected to drop these new 12,000 lb weapons (and later, the 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs too).
It is worth recording, however, that the Braunschweig raid saw 238 Lancasters and 17 Mosquitos of 5 Group, and 10 Lancasters of 1 Group take part, The result was not good, chiefly because there was low cloud and although 617 marked the yards successfully (in the light of flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadron Lancasters above), other H2S aimed markers were inadvertently dropped farther South, and much of the main force bombed these. One Lancaster of 5 Group had left its radio transmitter on, and it jammed every direction Cheshire tried to give to the other crews. Four Lancasters were lost, but none from 617.
The Munich raid, on April 24, was by contrast an immense tactical success. A mixed force of 260 aircraft once more struck the railway yards there (as well as spreading out over other areas of the town) after Cheshire and 617 Mosquitos had marked the target, [inserted] and Cheshire flew around at low level through a considerable curtain of flak and searchlights. Diversionary raids were flown to Karlsrühr (by the main force), and on Milan (a spoof “Window” dropping exercise by six 617 crews), and the only casualty 617 suffered this time was Flt. Lt. J.L. Cooper (a recent joiner from 106 Squadron). His Lancaster was shot down en route to Munich as Aichstetten, just North-east of Lake Constance, and although his bomb-aimer was killed, the rest of the crew survived to be taken prisoner. [Inserted] Eight other Lancasters of 5 Group were also lost this night. [/inserted] They were lucky to be in Bavaria – for there was now a large price on the heads of 617 crews caught in France!
[Inserted] After this raid on Munich, Cochrane ordered 617 crews to have a weeks complete leave, and most used the rest to good effect. But one or two stayed behind, David Wilson being one.
One factor worth noting about this raid was that Cheshire could not obtain extra fuel tanks for 617’s four Mosquitos. They had to fly these to Manston, refuel on the runway and take off without warming up the engines, to be sure of getting to Munich. None of them believed they could get back to Manston, and yet all just made it – despite a German night fighter in the circuit when they landed! [/inserted]
The Mailly raid upset 617’s and 5 Groups recent success patterns with a vengeance – but it was [inserted] just [/inserted] one of these things (C’est la Guerre”). Mailly was a large French military training area South of Chalons-sur-
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Marne (itself just a few miles [inserted] South-east [/inserted] of Rhiems). Here, it was known the Germans had a Panzer division and their equipment in transit.
Cheshire and 617’s other three Mosquito pilots, Shannon, Fawke and Kearns, were ordered to mark at Mailly, but 617’s Lancasters were not detailed for this raid – which was just as well. Cheshire marked the target perfectly, and ordered the 5 Group Controller to order the first wave of Lancasters to bomb. But things started to go wrong then, as the [inserted] latter’s [/inserted] radio was subsequently found to be seriously off frequency, and his VHF set was being drowned by an American Forces broadcast. After some delay they started to bomb, but because the second wave was held back, Shannon and Kearns had to remark the target in the face of considerable flak. The second wave also bombed accurately, but in the delays caused by the lack of communication, and while Cheshire had to get the Deputy Controller to take over, German night fighters began to arrive in large numbers, and harried the Lancasters all the way back to Northern France. All the 617 crews returned safely, but 42 Lancasters were lost out of the 340 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitos sent on the raid by 5, 1 and 8(PFF) Groups. (This was an 11.6% loss rate – some three times the normal)!
David missed Braunschweig and Munich, because on April 22nd (the day after his return from La Chappelle) he took his old JB139 (originally KC-X, but now changed to KC-V) down to Boscombe Down to carry out trials with Barnes Wallis’ 12,000 ln Tallboy bomb. Sqd Ldr Richardson (“Talking Bomb”) was also there and over the next four days, David took him up several times daily, making high-level trials dropping prototype Tallboys from 18,000 ft each time. On the 26th he returned to Woodhall Spa, carrying seven of the scientists concerned with these tests. He had to break off the special Tallboy dropping exercises in May, however, as all 617’s crews were now engaged on one of their most boring exercises – yet [deleted] as [/deleted] it turned out, it was to be perhaps their most successful and decisive of all – Operation “Taxable”.
The [deleted word] squadron was being trained up to conduct a major “spoof” exercise on the day before D-Day.
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This would entail [inserted] two waves, each of 8 [/inserted] [deleted] 16 [/deleted] Lancasters, flying on instruments in short overlapping circuits, and dropping “Window” to try to indicate to the German shore defences that an invasion fleet was heading their way. (And of course it would be in a very different direction to that taken by the real fleet). The whole operation, once started, would have to be kept up [deleted] continuously [/deleted] for some four hours or more. [Deleted] to seem on the German radar as if a vast number of ships was slowly advancing in their direction. [/deleted] The continuous orbiting by the Lancasters had to be at low level [inserted] 3,000 ft [/inserted], start at a pre-arranged time near Dover, and advance gradually over a group of 18 surface vessels flying barrage balloons, as the vessels sailed beneath them towards the coast below Calais. Bundles of “Window” would have [inserted] to be dropped out every 12 seconds during the four hours. [/inserted]
The month of May, 1944 was probably the most boring in the Squadron’s history, as they practised, day after day, and usually for an hour or so at a time, the intricate navigational exercises that would enable them to fly these continuous orbits. David flew a total of 26hrs 20 mins altogether on these exercises, between May 6th and June 4th, in his Lancaster I, LM485 (KC-N). As the continuous orbiting was going to be a taxing operation, each Lancaster would have to have two crews on board, one relieving the other at the halfway point. David had as his relief pilot a Pilot Officer Sanders and his crew, and after May 13th they always flew together.
On May 18th, David tested out a new “automatic pilot” (or “George”) that Avro’s had fitted to his aircraft, to alleviate the strain of the exercise. These were fitted to all the other Lancasters. At the end of May the Squadron flew up to Yorkshire to practice over the North Sea, and dovetail the second wave of 8 Lancasters into the tricky take-over from the first wave – to keep dropping the “Window” without any gaps (lest the German radar show some strange interruptions in the “fleet’s” progress).
Finally, all was ready on the night of June 5th, and the first wave of 617’s Lancasters set off at about 23.00, the first wave finishing their intricate movements halfway across the Channel
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between Dover and the Pas de Calais coast at around 02.30, and being relieved by the second wave, who finished at around 05.00, after daybreak and by which time they were in sight of the French coast. Another Squadron, No 218, used six Stirling bombers fitted with G-H blind bombing radar units, working in the same fashion but a little more to the East of 617.
In the event, as David noted in his log book, the exercise was “believed very successful”. His total sortie lasted for 4 hrs 40 mins, and the entire Squadron was heartily glad when it was over!
[Underlined] Effect of the Tallboy raids [/underlined]
Two days later, 617 Squadron was back on its normal type of bombing operations again, but this time the raid was laid on suddenly, at short notice, to try to prevent a German Panzer Division reaching the D-Day bridgehead. They were moving up from Bordeaux, and Cochrane ordered 617 to take the newly arrived Tallboy bombs, and try to block a rail tunnel on their route. This was at Saumur, on the R. Loire West of Tours, on the South side of the river just before the railway crossed the Loire on a long, low bridge.
The Squadron was hurriedly bombed up with the 12,000 lb streamlined Tallboy, which had a casing of hardened chrome molybdenum steel and a filling of some 5,000 lbs of Torpex D1 explosive. It was some 21 feet long, and 3ft 2 ins in diameter, with four aerodynamically shaped fins, offset slightly to the airflow in order to spin the bomb as it dropped.
David flew his usual Lancaster (KC-N), which accommodated the Tallboy in its bombay, and had the latest deep-section bomb-doors which closed around the bomb and were also flush with the fuselage – except at the rear end, where they left a [inserted] small semi-circular [/inserted] gap around the bombs tail-fin. The rest of 617’s earlier Lancasters [inserted] in the “DV” or “JB” serial range [/inserted] had been similarly modified, or exchanged for newer aircraft with “ME” or “LM” serials. David’s crew – which had changed slightly over the last few months with postings, etc – consisted of → [inserted] Flying Officer G.A. Phillips (Flight Engineer), F/O J.K. Stott (Navigator), F/O D.W. Finlay (Bomb Aimer/Front Gunner) Warrant Officer H.G. Allen (Radio Operator), Flt. Sgt. H.D. Vaughan (Mid-upper gunner), and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler (Rear-gunner), [/inserted] [deleted] F.O. [inserted] D.W. [/inserted] Finlay, W.O. [inserted] H.G. [/inserted] Allen, Flt Sgt. [inserted] H.D. [/inserted] Vaughan, and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler, [/deleted] and everyone was looking forward to seeing what these new “Earthquake” bombs could accomplish.
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Cheshire marked the target in his Mosquito, as usual, dropping his markers by the light of the flares from four Lancasters of 83 Squadron above, and placing his Red Spots by the tunnel mouth at the Southern end. He was followed in by his other two Mosquitos (Shannon had had to return home with engine trouble, soon after take-off), and then he called up the 25 Lancasters of 617 that were circling above (this raid was a “maximum strength” affair)!
David’s bomb-aimer released their Tallboy at the → [inserted] end of his seventh run-in over the tunnel. On all the earlier 6 runs his bomb-aimer was unable to see the markers clearly at the tunnel’s South end. He waited for the North end to be marked – the secondary aiming point – and then bombed on the seventh run-in. His Tallboy fell away at the [/inserted] end of a careful, steady run-in, and – like the others – they were disappointed to see only a small red splash [inserted] of light [/inserted] below, as it buried itself deep in the ground – not the blinding, white flash that their 12,000 lb Blast bombs always made, lighting up the countryside. Because of this the 617 crews were a little doubtful whether the tunnel, or railway cutting had been hit properly, until “Recce” pictures [inserted] arrived] [/inserted] next day. These were remarkable. David had written in his log: “Operations – Railway Tunnel at Saumur. 12,000 lb Special. Poor shot, but tunnel badly damaged” [inserted] and his sortie had lasted exactly 6 hrs 20 mins [/inserted]. Which crater applied to which 617 crew was impossible to verify, but the aerial reconnaissance pictures showed all the huge round craters clustered around the Southern end to the tunnel. Two Tallboys had hit the railway lines fairly and squarely in the middle, on the tunnel approach (wrecking an overhead road bridge too), three had landed on the top edges of the cutting by the tunnel mouth, cascading earth onto the lines, but one (and to this day, nobody knows who dropped this) hit the hill above the tunnel some 50 [deleted] hundred [/deleted] yards from the tunnel mouth, and did just what Barnes Wallis had predicted – [deleted] buried itself in [/deleted] penetrated the ground right down by the tunnel roof, and blew an enormous crater in the hillside, exposing the tracks at the bottom and dumping thousands of tons of rubble on them. The 617 crews were greatly heartened by the result, and there had been no casualties.
The next Tallboy raid was on June 14th, and this time Cochrane had sought Barnes Wallis’ advice about using the weapon on German E-boat pens at coastal ports like Le Havre. These torpedo boats were proving a pest at night amongst the convoys of ships off the Normandy beach-head, and so the idea [inserted] was both [/inserted] of dropping the Tallboys to create “tidal waves” to swamp the E-boats
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in harbour.
The raid was Bomber Command’s first daylight raid since June 1943, and was to be a big one on the Port area of Le Havre. Two waves of Lancasters, from 1 and 3 Groups, were to attack in the evening, and at dusk (it was almost Midsummer’s day), but 617 were to go in first with Cheshire and two other marker Mosquitos, followed by 22 Lancasters each carrying the Tallboy bombs.
The 617 aircraft took off, with a fighter escort of Spitfires accompanying them, as it was still broad daylight over the target area. There was heavy flak over Le Havre, but Cheshire [deleted] Shannon and Fawke [/deleted] dived his Mosquitos right down into the thick of it, getting down to 7,000ft over the Pens, and dropped his Red Spot markers by the E-boar quayside Shannon, Fawke and the leading Lancasters who were watching, marvelled at the way Cheshire flew through a dense curtain of all types of A.A. fire, and survived.
Cheshire then told his other Mosquito pilots not to bother marking (as the first Spots he had laid were very visible), and told 617 to start to bomb on these. David’s Flight Commander, Les Munro, then led the Lancasters in at around 17,700 ft (several had already been hit in the engines and wings by flak, and turned back), and David and his crew [inserted] in LM 485 [/inserted] recorded a “Direct-Hit” with their Tallboy on the E-boat [deleted] Pens and [/deleted] wharves. All the 15 Tallboys dropped by 617 hit the target area (one went right through the roof of a large concrete E-Boat Pen), and the E-boats were literally blasted out of the water onto dry land, or blown apart. The post-raid photos showed 617 had wreaked immense damage in the Port area, and the subsequent two waves of 199 Lancasters in all, blitzed the rest of Le Havre, rendering the German Naval presence completely ineffective after that. Again, 617 had no losses.
With this success behind them, Cochrane sent them up again next day (June 15th 1944) to do the same at Boulogne. For these Tallboy operations, David always had a seven-man crew (rather than the old six-man complement), and he had now added a Sgt. King to his regulars. Still using [inserted] LM485 [/inserted] (KC-N), David was up with 21 other 617 Lancasters that evening. There was thick cloud over
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Boulogne this time, and Cheshire (his Mosquito heavily patched up from its ordeal by flak the previous day) dived down below the cloud to drop his markers from around 6,000 ft, once more in a hail of anti-aircraft gunfire. Although his Mosquito was hit several times he survived again, and his markers hit the E-Boat Pen area. He ordered the 617 Lancasters in, but as it was now dark and the cloud had thickened up at 13,000 ft, 10 of the crews could not see Cheshire’s markers below the overcast, and regretfully turned for home taking their precious Tallboys back (they had strict instructions never to waste them!). The remaining 12, however, (mostly more experienced, and leading crews) dived below the clouds, enduring the same barrage of flak that Cheshire had, and lined up over the Pens to drop their bombs. David was one of these, following Les Munro in, and himself followed by McCarthy, Kearns, Clayton, Howard, Poove, Knights, Stout, Hamilton and two others. Most of their aircraft were hit by flak, but David dropped his Tallboy from 8,000 ft, and recorded “Believed Good Shot”. His aircraft was hit by flak, and holed as well.
All the 617 crews got back to base (David was only airborne for 2 hrs 35 mins altogether – against 3 hrs 40 mins for the previous Le Havre raid), but several crew members of other aircraft were injured. Following 617 in to attack had been 133 other Lancasters and 130 Halifaxes, aided by 11 Mosquitos of 8 (PFF) Group, and these had bombed the rest of Boulogne. Only one Halifax [inserted] had been lost [/inserted], out of all the aircraft taking part, and in the two raids taken together, 617 had been largely responsible for the wrecking of some 133 German boats (mostly E-boats).
[Underlined] V2 sites. [/underlined]
The moment they had returned from the Boulogne raid, there was a lot of patching up of the aircraft to do. David’s KC-N was too badly holed to be quickly back in service, and so he was allocated another – DV 380, Wing. Cmdr. Cheshire’s original Lancaster (KC-N), but now re-coded KC-X.
The very morning they had returned from Boulogne, Cochrane had alerted Cheshire to get ready for a
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very important operation that evening (the 16th). Cheshire had only just got to bed but was told to get up again and attend an intelligence briefing right away. The V1 Flying Bombs had started dropping on London, and Intelligence sources had warned the War Cabinet of the imminent firing of two other secret weapons at London – the V2 rockets, and in the V3’s case, huge shells fired through incredibly long [inserted] “Super” [/inserted] gun barrels being built across the Channel in France (a forerunner of the Iraqi “Super”-guns of 1991). The concrete blockhouses hiding these weapons had to be attacked with Tallboys immediately, as the War Cabinet thought on the one hand they might have to order the evacuation of London, and on the other – if aimed at Portsmouth and Southampton, etc, they might interfere [inserted] with [/inserted] the invasion of France, and put it in jeopardy.
The result of all this was that [inserted] David and the other [/inserted] [deleted] the [/deleted] Squadron crews were aroused, and after briefing, stood by all day at their aircraft dispersals, waiting for the signal that the cloud cover over the target had cleared. The Lancasters were bombed-up, but then had to be unloaded, one by one on a rota, to avoid straining their undercarriages. Food was brought out to dispersals, but late in the evening the raid was cancelled – the cloud was still unbroken over the target. Not long after, they were stood-to again, and then stood-down, and so it went on over three days!. Eventually the crews were living in a detached state of limbo, with too little sleep and their metabolic clocks thoroughly upset.
Finally, on June 19th, the cloud cleared and they were off at last. The first target for 617 was a large concrete structure to the [inserted] West of [/inserted] Watten (North-west of St. Omer), on the edge of the Forêt d’Eperlecques. [Inserted] This was one of two large “Bunker” sites for launching V2’s, consisting of huge [inserted] semi- [/inserted] underground concrete bunkers, with large armoured doors. Both these sites were constructed to initially fire the vertical-standing V2 rockets at London, but they were intended later to launch V2’s with nuclear or chemical war-heads, directly as the USA. [/inserted] David took off from Woodhall Spa [inserted] in DV380 (KC-X) [/inserted], with 18 other Lancasters, and Cheshire and Shannon in their Mosquitos. As it was a daylight raid, they were escorted again by Spitfires, and Cheshire went down to 8,000ft over Calais, to find the target beyond the town. He was engaged by a terrific flak barrage, so dived flat out down to 2,000 ft, and released smoke markers (for daylight use) on the target.
* The remains of this structure, called “Blockhaus”, are kept today as a tourist museum.
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Having come through the barrage miraculously unscathed, Cheshire’s markers then failed to ignite, so Shannon then went in through a haze that was developing as the day wore on. He dropped the last of the smoke markers, and as Cheshire believed they were close enough to the blockhouse, ordered 617 to bomb it. David dropped his [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] like the others, from 18,000 ft, but it “hung-up” momentarily, and recorded a near-miss on his aiming point – the smoke indicators. The rest dropped their weapons close to or on top of the markers, but when the raid was over and “Recce” pictures obtained, it was established that the markers had been some 70 yds wide of the target. Some Tallboys had dropped far enough away from the markers to fall beside (and one on top of) the concrete structure, and this proved sufficient to encourage the Germans not to use the site afterwards. * For some reason (perhaps connected with the repeated bombing-up and down over the three day wait) several Tallboys besides those on David’s Lancaster also “hung-up” – including those of Knilans, Ross and Howard (two of these were “freed”, but one had to be brought back).
Next day, the 20th, the second of these large “Bunker” sites, at Wizernes (just to the South-West of St. Omer) was given to 617, and this time 17 Lancasters set off, with Cheshire and two more Mosquitos in the lead David was still flying DV380, but he had only flown as far as Orfordness, near Woodbridge when Cheshire, in front of them, received information the cloud cover was too thick over the target, and recalled the Squadron (complete with Tallboys).
Two days later, they tried again, and reached the target area this time, but there was ten-tenths cloud over the area, and once more they brought [deleted] back [/deleted] the Tallboys back. Not to be outdone, 617 made a third attempt [inserted] the morning of [/inserted] June 24th, and this time the clouds had cleared. [Inserted] Again they had a fighter escort, [/inserted] and two Mosquitos led 16 Lancasters to the quarry in the North-facing hill near Wizernes station and Cheshire dived in to mark. His markers hung up, however, and he called Fawke in behind him. The flak was intense, and Fawke’s Mosquito and several 617 Lancasters above were hit, but David dropped his Tallboy from 17,400ft, recording a “Good Shot”. On the run in, John Edwards’ Lancaster DV413 (KC-G) was hit, and went
* After Allied troops had captured this site in Autumn 1944 → Barnes Wallis persuaded Bomber Command to let several Lancasters drop the new 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs on this structure in mid November, to test their destructive force. [/inserted]
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down out of control, [inserted] some crew baling out on the way. [/inserted] The Lancaster exploded as it levelled out, [inserted] its pilot fighting [/inserted] desperately to effect a crash-landing, [deleted] in a field [/deleted], and the rest of the crew were trapped [deleted] out [/deleted] amongst the debris, or flung out onto the field where it pancaked. Only the Navigator, Wireless Operator and Bomb-aimer survived, to become POWs. The rest of the Squadron returned safely, albeit many of the aircraft had flak damage.
As David’s aircraft was also damaged, he promptly air-tested his old aircraft, LN485 (now itself repaired), the same afternoon (June 24th), and next day he was off [inserted] in it [/inserted] with 617 to attack a huge underground storage area for V1 Flying Bombs – at Siracourt, just South of the main road from St. Pol-sur-Ternoise to Hesdin (and East of Le Touquet). The Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, 2 Mosquitos – and a North American Mustang fighter flown by Cheshire.
Para // There was quite a story behind the acquisition of the Mustang, but suffice to say that the Station Commander at Woodhall Spa, together with Cheshire’s friendship with the American Air Force Generals Spaatz and Doolittle, resulted in their sending a Mustang over [inserted] on the morning of the 25th [/inserted] for Cheshire to try out. The 617 ground crews had to work hard to modify the under wing bomb attachments, to fit the necessary smoke markers and the Squadron navigator had to plot Cheshire’s courses for him, and help him jot down the information on his knee pad – for the Mustang was a single-seater. Cheshire had never flown one before, nor a single-engined aircraft for some time, and by the time it had been prepared he was adamant that he would use it on that evening’s raid. He also knew that he had no time to do “circuits and bumps” in it, to get to know its landing techniques – his first take-off would have to be on the operation, and his landing back would have to be in the dark!
As the Mustang was a fast aircraft, David and the other 16 Lancasters and two Mosquitos took off ahead of Cheshire, and by the time they arrived at Siracourt, their C.O. was there, diving in to mark the concrete roof of the underground site with smoke indicators, and followed in by Shannon and Fawke. Then the 617 “gaggle” was called in to drop their Tallboys on the smoke, and David recorded a “Direct Hit” [inserted] from 18,800ft [/inserted], together with some of the others, while other Tallboys fell close by. Someone’s bomb pierced the
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16 ft thick concrete roof of the structure, [inserted] resulting in a spectacular collapse of the walls and ceiling, and others undermined the sides. [/inserted]
Three hours and five minutes after take-off, David was back on the ground at his base, and all had returned safely, including Cheshire in the Mustang.
There were still more sites to attack, but bad weather and thick clouds prevented 617 Squadron from further attacks for some days. [Deleted] In the days [/deleted] During this period, David only managed to get in one practice “Formation flight” and an “Air Test” (involving air-to-sea firing practice). Several times they stood by from dawn [inserted] onwards [/inserted], but raids were cancelled by the late afternoon. The urgency was in everyone’s minds, as the V1’s were now landing in London and the South-East in increasing numbers.
Finally the weather cleared again for the morning of July 4th, and they were briefed to attack a new V1 launch site located in underground caves in the limestone hill overlooking the River Oise, at St. Leu-d’Esserent, a little village North-west of Chantilly. These caves had been used before the war by French mushroom-farmers, but were now reinforced with concrete to store the V1’s, and their launching rails. [Deleted] and the gigantic barrels of the V3 guns [/deleted]
David’s Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, Cheshire in the Mustang, and his back-up in a single Mosquito for this daylight raid. Fawke in the Mosquito went ahead to get weather information, and then Cheshire arrived, dived very low over the caves and dropped his smoke markers accurately on top. Les Munro led in the Lancasters above, through fairly heavy, [deleted] and [/deleted] accurate, flak which caught several aircraft, but the Tallboys started to rain down on the site. One hit the main building, others dropped in the cave mouths and around the entrances to the site, all destroying a great deal of machinery. Many Germans [deleted] workers [/deleted] were trapped underground and some were entombed forever. David [inserted] flying in LM484 again, [/inserted] described his Tallboy hit [inserted] from 18,700ft [/inserted] as a “Fair Shot”, obtaining a good photograph of this exploding near the cave mouth. Once the limestone dust and debris had started to hide the target, some Lancasters had difficulty finding the aiming point, one was hit in all four engines and had to jettison the [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] over the Channel on the run home [inserted] and [/inserted] one had its bombsight go u/s. Thus only 11 out of the 17 dropped Tallboys on the target,
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but the results were once again spectacular – although in many of these Tallboy raids, these were only seen at first hand after the Allies had captured the area, later in 1944.
All 617 crews returned safely [inserted] David’s own sortie lasting 4hrs 05 mins this time [/inserted], although some had been injured by shrapnel from Flakbursts. [Deleted] but [/deleted] Bomber Command sent in another force of [inserted] 5 Group [/inserted] Lancasters later that same evening – totalling some 231, with 15 Mosquitos for marking. German night-fighters were very active, and shot down 13 of the Lancasters around the target area – a high price to pay.
[Underlined] Last “Op” with 617 – V3 Site. [/underlined]
Two days later, [inserted] on July 6th 1944 [/inserted], David took off on his last operation with 617 Squadron, this time another daylight raid on a V3 site at Mimoyecques, where several “super-guns” were being set up. Cheshire flew his Mustang again, with a Mosquito to back him up, and the usual “gaggle” of 17 617 Lancasters followed higher up (usually around the 18,00 ft level). The “gaggle” was so named by Cheshire, but referred to the pattern 617 was now adopting in its bombing formations – normally four parallel rows of Lancasters (four or five to a row), each of the leaders flying at carefully planned 200 ft or 300 ft vertical separation from each other, and behind each of them, every subsequent Lancaster flying [inserted] in turn [/inserted] at 400 ft lower than the one in front. Thus the “gaggle” had the best chance of avoiding each others bombs in the run-up to the targets, and had a better sighting of the target as it began to become obscured from the markers and first hits. Generally speaking, if the Lancasters adhered closely to this box formation (which was not always possible), the last aircraft’s Tallboys should have released before the first started to explode (they were frequently given delayed-action fuzes).
The V3 site at Mimoyecques was in the chalk hills behind Calais, and Cheshire once again went in very low and dropped his markers on top of the tunnels. The rest then dropped their Tallboys, and David’s went down on target [inserted] from 19,000 ft [/inserted], but the burst wasn’t seen by his crew. Then he flew LM 485 (KC-N) back to
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Woodhall Spa, joining the others who all arrived safely. “Recce” photos later showed the V3 site to have been hit and straddled by the Tallboys and completely wrecked, once more entombing some Germans.
[Inserted] Sub heading [underlined] Leaving 617 Squadron [/underlined] [/inserted]
After landing from this short flight (David had been airborne only 2 hrs 45 mins on this last occasion), [deleted] their C.O. [/deleted] Cheshire was summoned to Cochrane’s Group HQ. Cochrane looked at Cheshire, and said quietly to him: “I’ve been looking at the records, and see you’ve sone 100 trips now. That’s enough, it’s time you had a rest!” And he told Cheshire it was no use arguing! He also added that his three Flight Commanders, [inserted] Dave [/inserted] Shannon, [inserted] Joe [/inserted] McCarthy and [inserted] Les [/inserted] Munro had to come off as well, with David Wilson too. Mimoyecques had been David’s own 90th Operation [/deleted] as well [/deleted], and although the Flight Commanders had done fewer trips, they had [inserted] all [/inserted] been flying on “Ops” continuously for some two years.
So David was rested simultaneously with his CO and Flight Commanders. He had joined 617 in time for its seventh operation (and its first visit to the Anthéor viaduct) on September 16th 1943, and had been with the Squadron for over two months before Cheshire had arrived to take over from [inserted] Mick Martin [/inserted] the temporary C.O. When he joined there had been 10 of the original Dams raid pilots still flying in 617, but when he left, the last three – the Flight Commanders – left with him. It was the end of an era in 617, and David was very proud to have fought and lived alongside those famous names. As for himself, he has never really had the recognition that he deserved for his part in the 40 Operations mounted by 617 between September 16th 1943 and July 6th 1944, but this is no doubt because he was an inherently shy man – though a very tough one in his quiet [inserted] Scottish [/inserted] way.
With all of them being suddenly rested from 617, the 5 Group A.O.C. began to confer some long deserved awards on them. Cheshire had been given a second Bar to his DSO on April 18th 1944 (while with 617) and now, two months after leaving, he was awarded the Victoria Cross, for four years of continuous bravery (unique because it was not for one specific act of gallantry). Shannon was awarded a Bar to his DSO, and Munro was awarded a DSO (McCarthy had just been awarded a Bar [inserted] to his DFC. [/inserted] David was justly awarded a Bar to his DFC (gazetted on June 29th
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1944. This was [inserted] then [/inserted] followed up on November 26th 1944 by his second decoration with 617 – a DSO. (The delay in the award of the DSO was probably occasioned by the departure of Wing Cmdr Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, VC, DSO and two Bars, DFC, M.I.D., and the arrival and settling-in of his successor at 617, Wing Cmdr J.B. (“Willie”) Tait, DSO and Bar, DFC, MID).
The citation for David Wilson’s Bar to his DFC read: “Since the award of his first DFC in May 943, this officer has completed a third tour of operational duty, during which his experience, determination and devotion to duty have been displayed in the course of many sorties As a captain of aircraft, he can always be relied upon to complete his tasks in the face of the heaviest enemy opposition. He has a long and distinguished record of operational flying.”
And when the DSO was gazetted on November 26th this citation said: “This officer has taken part in numerous missions over enemy territory, including attacks on Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne and Mannheim. He is now in his 3rd Tour, and has completed many sorties demanding a high standard of skill and accuracy. He has proved himself to be an ideal leader and his example has been most inspiring.”
“. [sic]
It is interesting to look back on David’s three tours of operations to see the difference in training required by any pilot flying with 617, and the other squadrons. In his time with 214 Squadron (his first tour) David flew a total of 289 hrs 50 mins, of which 199 hrs 35 mins was on operations, and just 90 hrs 15 mins doing Squadron training and exercises, etc. In this case the training hours amounted to 31% of the total. With 196 Squadron, training hours (34hr 35mins out of a total of 135 hrs 40 mins) amounted to 25%. But in 617 Squadron, David’s training accounted for 239 hrs 45 mins out of 420 hrs 55 mins – or a massive 57% of his total time! For each operational hour flown, he had flown over an hour’s worth of practice – nearly all bomb-aiming. This just illustrates the degree to which Guy Gibson (who started it), followed by Mick Martin and Geoffrey Cheshire, had insisted on the very highest level of low and high-level bombing accuracy.
At the end of his third tour, David had flown 90 missions, lasting for a total of 481 hrs 50 mins, and trained for a further 364 hrs 35 mins in these squadrons.
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[Inserted] As for David’s Lancaster [deleted] that [/deleted] [inserted] in which [/inserted] he finished his days [deleted] in [/deleted] at 617 (LM485, KC-N), this aircraft survived a further V1 site attacks, two attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway (as KC-U), and further raids on Norway, etc, [deleted] in 1945, [/deleted] surviving the War to be scrapped in October, 1945. His other favourite, JB139 (KC-X, and later -V) was shot down over Brest on August 5th 1944, piloted by Don Cheney, R.C.A.F., who survived, with three of his crew (four were killed). The remains of the Lancaster can still be seen in the shallow water of St. Anne-la-Palud Bay, nearby. [/inserted]
[Underlined] Marriage, No5 L.F.S, and the E.T.P.S. [/underlined]
Now that David had obtained a welcome break from operations, he and Elsie were married on July 22nd 1944, and he snatched a quick two weeks leave before finally saying goodbye to 617 Squadron [inserted] at a mammoth farewell party [/inserted] on August 7th, and reporting to his new posting, No5 Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston, Notts, the next day.
David was now made [inserted] up to [/inserted] a Squadron Leader, and [deleted] at first [/deleted] put in charge of “B” Flight at 5 LFS. He was later [deleted] at Syerston until March 13th 1945, becoming [/deleted] appointed the Chief Flying Instructor of the whole School on October 4th, and remained its CFI until he ended his posting there on March 13th 1945. During this time he put many other budding Lancaster pilots through their paces on the School’s well worn (and operationally expired) Lancasters. They were mostly Flying Officers, but there were a few Warrant Officers, Pilot Officers and Flight Lieutenants, and the odd Squadron Leader converting onto the four-engined bombers.
David put all his pupils through the full training steps, which included “stalling practice”, “steep turns”, “three and two engine flying”, “three engine overshoots and landings”, apart from routine circuits and bumps, and night flying.
On several occasions he managed a trip in a Lancaster, or the unit’s Oxford “hack”, to visit 617 at Woodhall Spa, usually taking Sqd Ldr. Poore over as well (both of them had served with the Dambusters). And a number of the Lancasters David taught on at the LFS had once flown in 617 Squadron.
In March 1945, having come to the end of his
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Posting to the LFS, David applied to go on one of the Engine Test Pilot’s Courses at Boscombe Down. He was accepted on the No 3 Course there, and started the Course on March 15th 1945.
This was the third and last of the early Courses to be held at Boscombe Down, due mainly to the construction of hard runways on the aerodrome, leading to a veritable log-jam of aircraft taking off or landing on the restricted grass areas.
David’s Course lasted until October 2nd that year – a period of 6 1/2 months – and David was one of 31 test-pilots to complete it successfully. Amongst other subsequently famous names on the course with him were [inserted] Lt. [/inserted] Peter Twiss RN (to become Chief Test-Pilot for Fairey Aviation), [inserted] Sqd. Ldr. [/inserted] Charles McClure, who then took over from “Roly” Falk as Wing Cmdr. And Chief Test-Pilot at the R.A.E. at Farnborough, Flt. Lt. J.O. Lancaster who went to Boulton Paul, Saunders Roe, and finally Armstrong Whitworth; Ron Clear, from Airspeeds; and Lt. Cmdr. J.B.V. Burgerhorst, who went to Fokkers.
Five of the 31 on the Course were to lose their lives testing aircraft (the corresponding losses on the 1st Course were 5 out of 13, [deleted] and [/deleted] on the 2nd 7 out of 28, and the 4th, 7 out of 33). This eventual “loss” rate from the early courses was on average almost 23% , illustrating the high price paid in the lives of exceptionally brave and talented young men, by the advancement of Britain’s and other countries’, aviation industries.
As described in the chapters in these Volumes about Jimmy Owell, Ricky Esler and Jimmy Nelson, etc, the ETPS Course proceeded for David along the normal lines. The previous Commandant, Gp. Capt. J.F. McKenna [inserted] AFC [/inserted], had just been killed in a Mustang at the beginning of David’s Course, and his place was taken by Gp Capt. H.J. Wilson, AFC, who had been a senior test-pilot at the RAE. The Assistant Commandant was Wing Cmdr H.P. “Sandy” Powell, AFC, who also acted as the Chief Test-flying Instructor.
David flew the [inserted] range of [/inserted] ETPS aircraft, which at that time included an Oxford, Harvards, Lancaster
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Swordfish, Mosquitos, Tempest [inserted] I and II and V, [/inserted] Spitfire IX and XXI Boston, [deleted] Sptifire IX [/deleted], [inserted] and the [/inserted] Meteor I. The last machine was the first jet aircraft that David had flown, but it provided no undue problems for him.
By the beginning of October, David had passed the difficult classroom studies, and the flying examinations, with ease, and after qualification, he accepted a post as test-pilot in “B” Squadron ( [deleted] the [/deleted] multi-engine aircraft) at the A & AEE at Boscombe Down, to last until his demob on March 15th 1946.
At the A & AEE, he started flying there on January 10th 1946, and undertook some firing trials on a new Avro Lincoln, flew a Lancaster to measure “speed/power curves”, practiced bombing runs in a Mosquito VI, and carried out other tests on a Halifax III, Dakota, Warwick, etc. Then his Service career was over, and David was demobbed.
[Underlined] A Career at A.V. Roe & Co. [/underlined]
With his brilliant academic qualifications, his war-time record, and qualifications now as a test-pilot, David Wilson [inserted] now [/inserted] had a great deal to offer the world. He was immediately offered a job at RAF Cranwell, and in fact the College was very keen to employ him, but David had written to Sir Roy Dobson, Managing Director now of A.V. Roe & Co. Ltd. at Manchester, to seek a post there – not necessarily in the Flight Test Dept., but perhaps connected with the Design side.
Sir Roy offered David the post of “Manager – Aerodynamic Development and Testing”, and David promptly accepted, starting work at Woodford [inserted] on April 8th 1946 [/inserted] at a salary of £800 per annum, with the promise of an early rise to £900 p.a. He was now 29 years of age, and had a total of 1807 flying hours to his credit.
David’s new job was immediately very tied up with examination of the Tudor airliner designs – both the Mark I and Mark II that were on order for BOAC and BSAA. A considerable amount of aero-dynamic research was going on into the problems affecting these designs, and several establishments
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Apart form Avro’s were engaged in a dramatic race to find the answers. The description of these problems can be found in the stories of Bill Thorn and Jimmy Orrell in these Volumes, but suffice to say that David and his Dept. were soon very busy liaising with Roy Chadwick, [deleted] the [/deleted] Avro’s Chief Designer (and from February 1947, their Technical Director), and the Test-pilots at Woodford to try to overcome the Tudor’s bad stalling characteristics, and excessive drag problems.
Once settled in at Woodford, David decided he had better keep his hand in at flying, and so [inserted] he had a medical on January 1st 1947, and [/inserted] took out a Civilian Flying Licence (No 24644) on March 26th 1947, not valid for flying Public Transport aircraft, but enough to cover him for test-flying at Woodford.
[Inserted] It was also early in 1947 before David and his wife were called to Buckingham Palace to receive the DSO he had won in 617 Squadron – so great had been the queue of people at the end of the War. As he was now a civilian, David had to receive the decoration in civilian clothes. [/inserted]
David was by now living at 3, Leith Rd, Sale, Cheshire, some miles from Woodford and closer to the Southern side of Manchester, and he and his wife Elsie now had a baby daughter, Carol. He was very satisfied with his work at Woodford, and he was starting to fly as Second pilot to Ken Cook and others, and rapidly getting the taste of flying back again. → [Inserted] For instance he went up with Ken on November 25th 1946 [inserted] and Reg Knight on November 27th [/inserted] in the Anson C.Mk XIX Series 2 VL 310, to conduct “Trailing Static Tests”[inserted] “Asymmetric and P.E.” tests. On December 1st he was flying with Reg Knight in Tudor I G-AGPF, doing tests at 25,000’. [/inserted] On December 30th and 31st he was up again with Ken in the Anson XII NL172 doing “Trimmer Setting” tests with the C of G fully forward and full aft, and “Single-engine” tests loaded up to 10,000 lbs weight.
In January 1947, David was flying with Ken again, doing “Trim” tests and “Loop swinging” on York MW322, checking “Stalling speeds” [inserted] and “P.E’s” [/inserted] on Avro XIX G-AGNI, and conducting “Pressurization and Heating” trials on the Tudor I G-AGRJ. And in May 1947 he was flying with Reg Knight in the Tudor I G-AGRI, Anson VM172 and Tudor IV G-AHNI, carrying out “stalls”, “stabilities”, “levels” and other aero-dynamic tests. [/inserted] And it was because of his flying ability, coupled with his interest in sampling the stalling characteristics of the new Tudor II, and observing the reaction of the [inserted] newly-shaped [/inserted] wool-tufted wing fillets fitted to it that he flew as Second-pilot with Bill Thorn on [inserted] that fateful [/inserted] August 23rd 1947. He was not originally → [inserted] scheduled to be the No 2 pilot on this flight as Bill had intended to take Reg Knight up with him. But Reg (see the next Chapter) had to go down to see his mother at Nuneaton, at very short notice, due to a dispute she was having over a new house. And Fate thus decreed that David would take his place. [/inserted]
So Bill Thorn and David Wilson taxied out in G-AGSU that sunny Saturday morning at a little after 10.50 (GMT), carrying Roy Chadwick (Avro’s Technical Director) and Stuart Davies (now the Chief Designer), with their Flight Engineer Eddie Talbot, and radio operator J. Webster. And soon after lift off on the main runway, Bill Thorn got into difficulties with Britain’s largest passenger aircraft (at that time), because of the aileron circuits being mistakenly reversed during work in the factory. The Tudor tilted right over onto
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Its starboard wing, the tip touched the ground and the Tudor II sideslipped slowly into a field, crumpling the wing, sliding along the stubble on its belly, and then decelerating into a group of oak trees surrounding a deep pond. The trees broke up the fuselage and wings, and the long nose of the Tudor fractured, and dropped the cockpit end into the pond, drowning the two pilots. But for the presence of water, they would undoubtedly have survived.
Thus, David’s career with Avro’s came to a sudden halt, along with the great Chief Test-pilot sitting beside him, and the man in the back who had designed all these magnificent machines, - and the Lancaster bomber in which David had spent so much of an eventful wartime career, and survived because of its strength and performance. Certainly, if he had to die, he could not have died in the company of any greater men than these.
Roy Dobson, who should have been on the test flight himself, but had skipped it because he was called to his office for an urgent ‘phone call, tried to cope with the tragedy that afternoon from his office at Woodford. The relatives of the other occupants, dead or injured, were contacted by various means, but David’s wife Elsie was mistakenly overlooked for a time. With a young daughter to bring up, and a home to try to keep together, things looked bleak. But when Sir Roy realised how difficult things were, he went out of his way to do all he could for Elsie. He had Avro’s arrange to pay off the mortgage, [inserted] and [/inserted] and give her a monthly sum for quite some time. He sent presents for Carol from time to time, and used to bring them back for the little girl from his overseas trips.
Sir Roy was greatly affected by the accident, and genuinely grief-stricken over the deaths of his life-long friend and colleague, Roy Chadwick, and Bill Thorn and David Wilson. He advised Elsie Wilson to brief a good solicitor and sue A.V. Roe & Coe for damages, so that she could be awarded compensation, and although Elsie found this difficult, and at times could hardly understand what was going on, eventually she was awarded damages and these were held by the Court in 2 1/2 % War Loan on trust for her daughter, with the income being paid regularly.
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In fact David’s daughter Carol was eventually offered a Dr. Barnes Wallis Scholarship, had her mother wanted to accept this (out of the two per year that the great aircraft and bombs designer had set up out of his own money). This could have entitled Carol to attend Christ’s Hospital (Girls School,) in Hertfordshire, but Elsie declined, in order to keep the family close together.
David was buried in Woodford Church, near Roy Chadwick and Bill Thorn, and where Sir Roy and Lady Dobson now also lie. The funeral was a very grand affair, attended by hundreds of colleagues of the crew from all walks of life, the Ministries, RAF and 617 Squadron, and other Aviation companies. Afterwards, Sir Roy said of David:
“He was a brilliant young man, and a technician of extraordinary aptitude and ability, who would soon have made his mark on the company. His loss is going to be most severely felt”.
And it was, no less than by his daughter Carol, who to this day remains devoted to the war hero father she scarcely remembers, and her mother Elsie, who has remarried, but still lives in Cheshire not many miles from Woodford, and under the flight path to Ringway Airport.
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P1
[Underlined] Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC & Bar [/underlined]
[Underlined] List of Operations (3 Tours) [/underlined]
[Underlined] With No 214 Sqd: [inserted] (Wellington IC). [/inserted] Target Bomb load make-up Total Bombs dropped [/underlined]
1941 July 9* Osnabrück. 1 x 4000 4,000
July 14* Bremen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries. 1,500 +
July 17* Cologne 1 x 4000 4,000
July 20* Rotterdam 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, + Incendiaries 2,500 +
July 23* Mannheim 1 x 4000 4,000
July 25* Hamburg ? ?
Aug 12* Hanover ? ?
Aug 16* Duisburg ? ?
Aug 19* Kiel 6 x 500 3,000
Aug 22* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 27* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 31* Cologne 1 x 1000, 5 x 500 3,500
Sep 2* Frankfurt 1 x 4000. (Retd, engine trouble) –
Sep 7* Berlin ? ?
Sep 8* Kassel ? ?
Sep 11 Le Havre ? ?
Sep 15 Brest 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Sep 17 Karlsruhe 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500 3,000
Sep 29 Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HCMI 4,000
Oct 3 Antwerp 1 x 1,000, 6 x 500, 1 x 250 4,250
Oct 10 Cologne 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 12 Bremen ? ?
Oct 13 Dusseldorf 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 21 Bremen 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500 3,500
Oct 23 Kiel 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, 1 x 250 2,750
Oct 31 Bremen Bad Wx, retd with bombs. –
Nov 7 Berlin 6 x 500 (Bad Wx, Osnabruck bombed) 3,000
Nov 9 Hamburg 6 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Dec 23 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Dec 27 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
1942 Jan 2 Brest ? ?
Jan 8 Brest ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
Jan 11 Brest 6 x 500, 3,000
Jan 21 Bremen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Jan 26 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Jan 28 Munster ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
[Underlined] TOTAL = 36 MISSIONS Total hours with Squadron = 289:50 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 199:35 [/underlined]
* Flying as Second-pilot on these raids (Rest as Captain).
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P2
[Underlined] With No 196 Squadron. (Wellington X) [/underlined]
1943 Feb 7 Lorient 7 x 500 3,500
Feb 13 Lorient 3 x 500, 6 Containers 1,500 +
Feb 14 Cologne 3 x 500 6 Containers
Feb 17 x Emden ? Bad Wx. Bombs returned. –
Feb 26 Cologne 3 x 500, +Incendiaries (2 x 500 bombs hung up, returned) 500 +
Feb 28 St. Nazaire 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 3 Hamburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 5 Essen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Mar 12 Essen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 26 Duisburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 29 Bochum 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Apr 4 Kiel 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 4 Dortmund 2 x 500, 6 x SBC 1,000 +
May 12 Duisburg 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 13 Bochum 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 25 Düsseldorf 2 x 500, 7 x SBC 1,000 +
June 11 Düsseldorf ? ?
Jun 21 Krefeld ? ?
Jun 24 Wuppertal (Elberfeld) Incendiaries only. ?
Jul 3 Cologne Incendiaries only ?
[Underlined] Total = 20 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 135:40 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 101:05 [/underlined]
[Underlined] With 617 Squadron. (Lancaster I and III) [/underlined]
1943 Sep 16 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 4,000, 3 x 1,000 7,000
Nov 11 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 12,000, HC 12,000
Dec 16 Flixecourt xx 1 x 12,000 HC 12,000
Dec 20 Liege 1 x 12,000 HC Bomb returned, raid abortive (due PFF) –
Dec 22 Abbeville-Amiens. xx 11 x 1,000. Bombs brought back (due PFF failure) –
1944 Jan 4 Pas de Calais (Flying Bomb Site) ? Bombs dropped 4 miles from target due PFF error ?
Jan 21 Hallencourt. xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500, 6 Flares. Only 1 x 1,000 and 7 x 500 dropped 4,500
Jan 25 Fréval (Pas de Calais) xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500 8,500
Feb 8 Limoges 12 x 1,000 12,000
Feb 12 Antheor Viaduct 1 x 12,000 12,000
x Daylight raid.
xx Flying bomb site. (V1 weapon).
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P3
[Underlined] With 617 Sqd cont’d [/underlined]
1944 March 2 Albert All Incendiaries ?
March 4 St. Etienne. ? Bad Wx. Returned –
March 10 St. Etienne 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 15 Woippy (near Metz). 1 x 12,000. Bad Wx. Returned. –
March 16. Clermont Ferrand 1 x 12,000, 6 Flares 12,000
March 18 Bergerac 1 x 12,000 12,000
March 20 Angouleme 1 x 8,000, 1 x 1,000 9,000
March 23 Lyons 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 25 Lyons ? x 500, Incendiaries ?
March 29 Lyons 1 x 8,000. 1 x 1,000 9,000
Apr 10 St. Cyr. 1 x 8,000, 6 x 500 11,000
Apr 18 Juvisy 4 x 1,000, 4 x Red Spots 4,000
Apr 20 La Chapelle 12 x 1,000 12,000
Jun 5 D-Day decoy mission
Jun 8 Saumur Tunnel 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 14 Le Havre Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 15 Boulogne Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 19 Watten xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 20 Wizernes xx – Tallboy Raid recalled over Channel –
Jun 22 Wizernes xx Tallboy Bad Wx. Bomb brought back. –
Jun 24 Wizernes xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 25 Siracourt xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 4 St. Leu d’Esserent. Xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 6 Mimoyecques xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
[Underlined] Total – 34 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 420:55 [/underlined]
[Underlined Total hours on “Ops” = 181:10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total (3 tours) = 90 Operational Flights. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours with Squadrons = 846:25 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours on Operations = 481:50 [/underlined]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII
Description
An account of the resource
Biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar (1917 - 1947). He flew operations as a pilot with 214, 196 and 617 Squadrons before becoming Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot at A V Roe & Co Ltd. He was killed 23 August 1947 in the Avro Tudor crash.
Creator
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Peter V Clegg
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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handwritten sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Personal research
Identifier
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BCleggPVWilsonDv1
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1945
1946
1947-08-23
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
Conforms To
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Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Liège
England--Cheshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Suffolk
France--Albert
France--Angoulême
France--Bergerac
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Creil
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Lorient
France--Lyon
France--Mimoyecques
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Étienne (Loire)
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Siracourt
France--Watten
France--Woippy
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Osnabrück
France--Watten
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
11 OTU
1660 HCU
1668 HCU
196 Squadron
214 Squadron
5 Group
617 Squadron
8 Group
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Boston
C-47
Chadwick, Roy (1893-1947)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
final resting place
Flying Training School
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
grief
H2S
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lincoln
Meteor
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
Pathfinders
pilot
promotion
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Church Lawford
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranage
RAF Cranwell
RAF Driffield
RAF Leconfield
RAF Stradishall
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Upavon
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Spitfire
Stirling
Tallboy
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2044/33127/PProbynEA17010016.2.jpg
142674867bb54df6bb4a68666d985c9f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Probyn, Ernest. Scrapbook
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-23
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Probyn, EA
Description
An account of the resource
42 items. Scrapbook containing photographs and clippings.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ernest Probyn's Log book Extract
Description
An account of the resource
A page from Ernest's logbook, dated June 1944. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Boon.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06
Format
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One photocopied sheet on an album page
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
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PProbynEA17010016
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France--Saumur
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Normandy
France--Merville (Nord)
France--Le Havre
Germany--Wesseling
France--Limoges
France
Germany
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06
61 Squadron
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
forced landing
Ju 88
Me 110
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodbridge
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/231/3604/PSpencerAHG1701.1.jpg
65cd99eb9fc28251abf8fb8fadf3114d
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/231/3604/ASpencerAHG170227.1.mp3
6b18db56623f80f8bd93869166ae985a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Spencer, Arthur
Arthur Humphrey George Spencer
Arthur H G Spencer
A H G Spencer
A Spencer
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history with Flight Lieutenant Arthur Humphrey George Spencer (b. 1921, 1311996 and 145359 Royal Air Force), a memoir and an essay. Arthur Spencer trained in the United States and flew two tours of operations as a navigator with 97 Squadron at RAF Woodhall spa and RAF Bourn. He later became 205 Group's Navigation Officer. He flew with British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) after the war.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Arthur Spencer and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-02
2017-02-27
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Spencer, AHG
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
PL: My name’s Pam Locker and I’m in the home of Mr Arthur Humphrey George Spencer *********** on the 27th of February 2017 at 10 o’clock. And if I could just start off by saying a very enormous thank-you on behalf of the Bomber Command Digital Archive for agreeing to talk to us and to share your memories. So if I could start by — Perhaps you could tell me a little bit about your family and how you first became involved with Bomber Command.
AS: Ok, well, I was born in Salisbury, Wilts, but my parents must have moved to Southampton before my memory begins and I was brought up in Southampton. I enjoyed school. I went to a very large Boys’ Grammar School and I was in my first year in the Sixth Form at the time of the Munich crisis and there was obviously going to be a war and as I finished school, the war broke out. In fact the first year of the war was during my last year at school. Obviously the Air Force were recruiting madly at the time of the Battle of Britain and I had grown up on the literature of the First World War. Siegfried Sassoon, Wilfred Owen and that sort of thing and realised that warfare in the trenches was pretty horrible. Richard Aldington wrote a very good novel called “Death of a Hero” which I still think is one of the best novels ever written and, so I volunteered for the Air Force and after the usual waiting around period, I found myself in the Air Force. Initially as a, an under training pilot but I didn’t make the grade as a pilot, although I got more than half way through the course. I was very late washing out as the Americans called it. I was in Florida. And so I re-mustered as a navigator and was sent back to Florida, to the United States Naval Air Station Pensacola, to undergo a navigation course. I never failed to be horrified at the inadequacy of the practical training on that course. If I’d had been at an RAF or RCAF Navigation School, I’d have had about a hundred and fifty hours in the air, undertaking navigation exercises. At Pensacola, I had less than thirty hours of flying. All of it over the Gulf of Mexico and never once experienced navigating an aircraft. The American naval way of doing things was to send up about eight people together and two of them would practice taking sun shots with a sextant, two of them would practice using the drift meter, two of them would be firing guns and two of them doing something else which I’ve forgotten, but completely inadequate. However, the theoretical side of the course, the classroom side, was excellent. It was run by an American naval officer, navigator, assisted occasionally by the RAF liaison officer and I did have a very, very good theoretical background. We were told, towards the end of the course, that the top six to, in the final examination, would ferry an aircraft home, so my first flight as a navigator was ferrying a Ventura across the Atlantic. We went to — the top six went to Dorval and then flew, after crewing up with a very experienced American civil pilot and an equally experienced wireless operator and a second pilot, who was, like ourselves, had just finished his course. We were allocated a Ventura. Little two-engined aircraft which we had to deliver to Prestwick. We, all the aircraft being ferried across at that time flew to Gander in Newfoundland and then these little aircraft had to wait for a tail wing component to get across the Atlantic. Now I was stuck there with another navigator who’d been an acquaintance at Pensacola, but not a particular friend, but because we were stuck there for a fortnight together waiting for a tail wing, we became very good friends and by co-incidence, he was sent to the same squadron as myself and when he retired from a very senior position in industry, he came to live in Somerset and so we remained lifelong friends. And, he died a couple of years ago. His family were good enough to ask me to make the eulogy at his funeral and his wife is now in a nursing home near Taunton. We try and see her every third week because her son lives in Australia and her daughter lives in Germany so we are the local contact. His name is George Brantingham and I mention this because he plays a fairly important part in a later stage of the story. Anyway, we got across the Atlantic successfully and after further training, I got to Bomber Command Operational Training Unit at Upper Heyford. Number 16 OTU. And one of the most important things you do at Operational Training Unit is to crew up into a crew. And in the literature, you find horrific stories of people being put into a hanger, twenty pilots, twenty navigators, twenty wireless operators and so on and being told, ‘Sort yourselves out.’ And I read this sort of thing time and time again. It was much more civilised fortunately at Upper Heyford. We were told that the course would be four weeks ground school and then the pilots would go off to a satellite airfield to learn to fly Wellingtons and then they’d come back and we would spend the last six weeks of the course flying cross-countrys and so on together. And we’d only been there two or three days when George, my friend, George Brantingham said to me, ‘I’ve got myself a pilot.’ Well I hadn’t really thought about it at that stage but I said, ‘You were quick off the mark, George. Who is it?’ And he told me it was a Sergeant Tracy, a larger than life American who’d gone north over the border to join the RCAF. And so at the next opportunity, I contacted George and said, ‘I hear you’ve got yourself a navigator. Can you recommend a pilot to me?’ And he thought for a minute and he said, ‘Well I reckon young Jimmy Munro is about the best pilot on our course.’ At the earliest opportunity, I found Jimmy. A very fresh-faced eighteen year old Canadian and I said, ‘Have you got a navigator yet?’ ‘No.’ ‘What about taking me on?’ ‘Ok that’s fine.’ And that conversation is probably why I’m here today. If I’d had a different pilot I might well not have been. But he was, as Bill Tracy had said, an incredibly good pilot. He’d grown up on the Ottawa River in a little hamlet called Fitzroy Harbour and part of his boyhood was canoeing on the Ottawa River and he handled a Lancaster just as well as he handled a canoe. And so we got through our OTU successfully. Went to Swinderby, just outside of Lincoln, to convert to Lancasters and so to 97 Squadron, fairly late in December, before Christmas, but fairly late in December 1942. Can I stop there a minute?
AS: Talk about —
PL: Re-starting, re-starting recording with Mr Spencer.
AS: Right, well, 97 Squadron in fact didn’t unleash us against the enemy right away. They gave us quite a bit more training before they decided to let us fly Lancasters, one of their precious Lancasters, on Operations. 97 by the way, was one of the very first squadrons to be equipped with Lancasters and part of their history was the daylight Augsburg raid of 1942. And some of the crew who took part in that raid were still at Woodhall Spa when we joined the squadron. Our first Operation, like all first Operations was mine-laying down on the Gironde estuary, near Bordeaux, and then we set about operating mainly to the Ruhr, Hamburg, Nuremberg, Munich, Wilhelmshaven. All in my Log Book. And the incident I want to talk about a little bit, is on the 19th of March 1943, when I flew with one of the Dambusters. Co-incidentally, he was also Munro but whereas my pilot was Sergeant Munro, this was Flight Lieutenant Les Munro, which is a name you may possibly have come across before now. Well, the three crews went from our squadron to join 617, but they started intensive low-level flying training before they left, before they left Woodhall Spa. And on one of these occasions, Flight Lieutenant Munro’s navigator was quite badly gashed across the forehead in what we would now call, nowadays call a bird strike. Now these three crews weren’t screened, was the word which we used for Operations, they were still taking part in Operations, and he was scheduled to go on Operations, but he didn’t have a navigator. Jock Rumbles, his navigator was too badly injured to go, so I was allocated to him. And that morning I flew an air test with him. You nearly always did an air test before you flew Operations at night. Twenty-five minutes. But Operations were cancelled before we even got to briefing. So although I flew with him, I didn’t operate with him. At the time I was very glad not to, because it was regarded as a bit dicey operating away from your own crew. You were very much a Unit as a crew but in retrospect it would be nice to be able to say I’d flown an Operation with one of the Dambusters. But I didn’t think that at the time, I was glad not to go. Well we continued flying, building up Operations ‘till we moved down to Bourn in April 1943 to join Pathfinder Force. We had another intensive period of training. Normally when crews joined the Pathfinder Force they went to Upwood, the Pathfinder Training School, but because we moved as a squadron, the Unit’s instructors came to us and we did a lot of intensive training. I remember Bennett. He was frequently with the squadron. He was the AOC at Pathfinder Force, of course. And one of the things he said was, ‘Of course the really important people in the crew are the navigators and bomb aimers. The pilots are only the chauffeurs to get them there.’ Which was very good for our morale, of course, as navigators. And by the time we’d finished our Pathfinder Training, it was May. Nights were very, very short indeed. And so virtually all our early Pathfinder Operations were to the Ruhr and the Ruhr took about three hours, three and half, four hours. Anywhere else in Germany took much longer. You couldn’t get there and back under cover of darkness. So we went to the Ruhr. Can we stop a second again there?
PL: Of course.
PL: Re-starting the tape.
AS: Pathfinder Force had been formed sometime fairly early in 1942. It happened after all Bomber Command had been equipped with cameras which took automatic photos when bombs were released. And when these early pictures were analysed, it was found that something like five percent of the aircraft dropped their bombs within three miles of the target, or something like that. Some infinitely small number of bombs were getting anywhere near the target and one of the measures adopted was to form Pathfinder Force which was then equipped with the, what was then the state of the art radar operation and all the other new instruments that were coming in and our job was to go in and either light up a target or more frequently mark it with bombs which were called target indicators which would burst barometrically at three thousand feet over the target because frequently the target couldn’t be seen once bombs started going down with so much smoke and dust coming up. But these target indicators hung on a parachute at about three thousand feet but they only lasted six minutes so they had to be backed-up fairly frequently. And the main Force coming along behind would bomb on the target indicator, not worry about finding an actual building or railway yard or docks or something like that to — Anyway, as I say, our early Operations in Pathfinder Force were all the Ruhr because the nights were so short. And we expected to be going to the Ruhr on the 16th of June. We’d done an air test in the morning and a bit naughtily we’d been shooting up a train just outside of Cambridge, diving at it, flying alongside it and the passengers were obviously enjoying it, they were waving back to us enthusiastically and the engine-driver was obviously enjoying it too, because he leaned out of his cabin and gave us a sign. [laughs] And er, but when it got a bit close into Cambridge, we decided we’d better go home, so we flew back to base. And when we got back to base, there was the Flight Commander’s van waiting in dispersal and we thought, ‘Oh dear. We’re in trouble,’ because we were flying quite low enough for people to see our identification letters, ‘OF-J Johnny’, and there must have been some senior officer on board, we thought, who’d got on the phone, the blower we would have called it then, as soon as he got into Cambridge and complained about these young idiots who were risking their lives in an expensive aircraft. However the Flight Commander was not there for that reason. The Flight — Jimmy opened the window and the Flight Commander called up, ‘Jimmy. You’re to take a week’s kit and fly up to Scampton after lunch.’ ‘Ok. What for?’ ‘I don’t know. You’ll get all the gen when you get there.’ So we weren’t in trouble. We found, when we got back to the mess, that four crews were going to Scampton. Now Scampton of course was the home of the Dambusters. So our attitude was, a little bit ambivalent. On the one hand, what a compliment to be one of only four crews in Pathfinder Force to be selected to take part in some special Operation. On the other hand, were we really awfully keen to be, take part in some Operation with a squadron which had only done one Operation, but on it, had lost about forty-five percent of it’s aircraft. [laughs] So, as I say, our thoughts were a bit ambivalent but there was nothing we could do about it. So we packed our kit after lunch and flew up to Scampton and when we got there, we were eventually four aircraft as I say. I’ll name the four captains. Jimmy, now a Pilot Officer, Pilot Officer Jones, Pilot Officer Munro, Pilot Officer Jones, who’d been one of the other crews that joined 97 from Swinderby in, at Christmas and two older pilots who were just coming back to 97 for a second tour. Because 97, a two-flight squadron at Bourn, at Woodhall Spa, had grown to a three-flight squadron at Bourn, so a lot of new crews coming in. So four crews were taken along to a briefing room and there, an elderly captain, a Group Captain, told us why we were there. When I say elderly, he was about thirty-five. But, er. [laughs] You know, we were all in our teens and young twenties so he seemed elderly. I’ve researched him since, and actually and I’ve found he was thirty-four at the time. [laughs] Anyway, he told us that we would be assisting Five Group, they were, of course based all round Lincoln, on a special Operation which would take place in the near future and we would be lighting the target and marking it for the aircraft of Five Group who would provide the main Force. Ok. Where? Well he either couldn’t or wouldn’t tell us when. ‘It’ll be in the next few nights, because you need a full moon to reach a pin-point target.’ And he also told us that for the next couple of nights, we would be practising over Wainfleet Sands which was a bombing range on the Wash. And that we weren’t allowed to go into Lincoln, which seemed a pity, but, still, we were confined to camp. Well after a couple of nights practising over Wainfleet Sands, we — going back a little bit, we were told as the Pathfinder crews, we had to decide the plan of attack. And what we decided was that two aircraft, ours and Pilot Officer Jones would go in first and lay a line of flares either side of the target and the other two would come along and mark it behind us. Aft er a couple of days practice, we went to briefing, and I think it was the only time I ever went for a morning briefing, and we were told where the target was, and it was the old airship shed at Friedrichshafen on Lake Constance. And they were manufacturing there some new radar devices which would no doubt improve the defences of the Ruhr and it would be in our own interest to make sure that this attack was well-carried out. But that if it didn’t occur in the next few nights, it wouldn’t take place at all because it needed good weather and a full moon. And then at the end of the briefing, almost off-handedly, we were told, ‘Well. Friedrichshafen is much too far into Germany for you to get there and back under cover of darkness so you’ll fly straight on over the Mediterranean to Algiers. Algiers and Tunisia of course having recently, having been taken by Operation Torch, the attack on the west side of Africa. Mainly French and American but it had given us airfields in North Africa which we could use. And after briefing, we could go to stores and draw some tropical kit. Which we did. None of us of course had badges of rank on this basic tropical kit which caused one or two problems when we were in Algiers, but I’ll come to that later. Well the afternoon was a lovely afternoon and we thought, ‘Ok.’ But we kept in touch with the Met Office and they got increasingly pessimistic as the afternoon went on and very close they said, ‘No. It’s not going to happen tonight.’ So we wasted our time the next day and the Met Office were becoming more optimistic and it looked as though we would go and apparently a Met Flight, Meteorological Flight, a Spitfire, went out over southern Germany and reported that the weather was good, so Operations were on. So we loaded up our kit and we took off that night at twenty to ten. That was Double British Summer Time of course and as we took off from Scampton, which incidentally was an all grass airfield. There were no runways there which surprised us that the Dambusters had been operating from an air— and of course we had a terrifically heavy load, over two thousand two hundred gallons of petrol in order to do the long flight to Algiers, so it was quite a struggle getting the thing into the air but we all got into the air and as we looked round, there were aircraft coming up from all the other Lincolnshire airfields and we set off and flew to Reading which was the first turning point. And from Reading to Selsey Bill, down on the south coast and we got there too early to cross over to France. We would have arrived in daylight and fighters patrolling the south coast came up and flew around us and waggled their wings at us which we took to mean they were wishing us good luck. And as darkness began to fall, one or two more adventurous spirits certainly set course earlier than I intended to let my pilot go but I’d done my calculations very carefully and we would get to the French coast at darkness, not into daylight. I had no wish to be over the French coast in daylight. We crossed the French coast at a little seaside town called Cabourg and I thought perhaps I’m the only person of the, what, five hundred airmen above Cabourg who’s been there before because at one stage of my education, about the third year of Grammar School, the Headmaster had said to my parents, ‘He’s doing very well in most subjects but his French is not very wonderful.’ And that was an understatement. And he recommended an exchange with a French boy and the school being right on the French coast, along the south coast, many exchanges took place every year, of course, and I was lucky enough to go three times to the same little town in Normandy, and the nearest seaside town was Cabourg, so I was taken to Cabourg quite a lot as a fourteen, fifteen, sixteen year old. Anyway we crossed at Cabourg and the Germans fired off light flak at us but light flak burns out at about twelve or thirteen thousand feet and we were up at about twenty thousand so we sneered at it a little bit and put our noses down to, as we’d been ordered to do, to go quickly through the fighter battle on the French coast and the next turning point was Orléans. Very badly blacked-out and then we turned east towards Switzerland and the weather deteriorated a bit but I’d got a drift on and an occasional light and I was pretty certain that whatever the weather, we’d see the Rhine, because even at that far from the mouth of the Rhine, it’s still a very big river. And just about as, on the ETA, Estimated Time of Arrival I’d given the pilot, he and the bomb aimer shouted, simultaneously, ‘Rhine coming up.’ And there was Basle. Basle of course is part of Switzerland. We shouldn’t have been over Switzerland but we briefed to go over Switzerland, so there we were. And we flew along the, roughly along the border between Switzerland and Germany to a point on the south side of the lake. The south side of the lake being in Switzerland and we were to orbit a little headland on the south side of the lake and then we had worked out it would take three minutes to cross the lake and three minutes before Zed, the time at which the Operation was due to begin, we set out and made our way across the lake. As we crossed the lake, the bomb aimer looking down vertically, was able to say, ‘Crossing the coast now.’ And I then counted down twelve seconds and after twelve seconds, start releasing our flares. Well, I couldn’t do any more then and I stood up in the astrodome and looked out and watched the flares bursting underneath us and when the fourth flare went, and there was no sign of other flares, they were on our left-hand side, I thought, ‘Oh goodness, have I committed some dreadful boob?’ Because there was terrific responsibility, of course, upon me and the navigator of the other aircraft. But as our fourth flare went down, a line of steerers [?] started appearing about half a mile away on the left-hand side, on our port side, and there was this enormous aircraft hangar clearly illuminated between the two lines of flares. And we were going to drop twelve flares initially and we continued and as we dropped our last flare, and I still couldn’t tell you which happened first, but two things happened, a green target indicator had burst right over the roof of the factory and we were coned in searchlights. Now, coned in searchlights is not a very nice experience I can assure you. We had been coned three or four times before and it seems to take an eternity to get out of this cone, if you’re lucky enough to get out of it. So, eventually we, Jimmy twisted and turned and twisted and turned but we couldn’t seem to shake it off and he turned about and put the nose right down and we dived out over the lake and shook them off. And we were supposed to go back to the lake after we’d finished our first, but we didn’t expect to go back to it like — that method, but there we were circling over the lake and after a few minutes, the Master of Ceremonies as he was called, master bomber, the Group Captain, had called for us to go in and lay a second line of flares and again we were coned but we got out of the cone fairly quickly that time and we had a couple of bombs, the small bombs we were carrying, we dropped those and back out over the lake and after about twenty minutes, the Master of Ceremonies declared that the raid was over and we should make our way to Algiers. He reminded us that we were very close to the Alps so that we should climb hard through the Alps and, ‘See you in Algiers.’ So we climbed hard through the Alps and, which was a lovely experience, I mean, you may well have crossed the Alps in a modern airliner at thirty thousand feet with the lights on, as I have, and looked down and thought, ‘Well. There are the Alps.’ But when you’re only just above the top and there’s no light in the aircraft and the full moon is shining, absolutely lovely. Wonderful experience. I shall remember all my life. We crossed the Italian coast somewhere close to Genoa and then we got down low, down to the sea, to keep beneath the Italian radar in Sardinia or Corsica and made for Algiers. When we got to Algiers, there was a terrific fog and we thought, ‘Well, the sixty aircraft are going to be directed out to sea and the crews are all going to be baled out,’ because you couldn’t see a thing and people were calling up, ‘I’ve only ten minutes petrol left.’ And there were no modern aids there of course. But there was an American flying control officer with enormous initiative and he got on the end of the runway in a jeep and fired Very cartridges up through the mist. And I shall always remember what he shouted, ‘The first man to make home base wins.’ [laughs] A baseball expression I assume. And the sixty aircraft landed with — one of them, there was a dead bomb aimer on board, who’d been hit by flak over the target, one from Woodhall Spa actually with the squadron that had been formed there when we left. And so we had a couple of days in Algiers. A lot of sunshine. Eating some of the fruit that we hadn’t seen for years in England and then on the way back we bombed Spetzia which was a bit of an anti-climax really because the, only two of the Pathfinder aircraft were serviceable. Two of them had to stay and come home more slowly. Ten of the main Force aircraft had been damaged over the target so we dropped our bombs fairly quickly on Spetzia and back to Scampton. It was an anti-climax really after the — and there we are. We flew back to Bourn that evening after sleeping for the day and Bennett was there to meet us, the AOC, and he was absolutely livid. Relations between him and Cochran were notoriously bad. Cochran was the AOC of the Group, Five Group. And he said, ‘It’s nonsense using four aircraft. If one had been shot down or — you should have used twenty.’ And he felt that the Pathfinders had only been used so that they could be blamed if something went wrong. He was not a happy man. And there we are. That was Operation Bellicose. The raid on — The first shuttle service operation. It was thought at the time that it might be followed by quite a few more but it wasn’t because of the difficulty of serving Lancasters in Algiers. You would have needed a whole force of ground crew out there to — So it wasn’t a one-off, it did happen, I think once more, with a very small group of aircraft but didn’t become a habit. Can we stop there again?
PL: Re-starting tape.
AS: The attack on Spezia, on return from Friedrichshafen, was in fact our thirtieth operation which is the end of a tour. And we expected to go off on our three weeks’ Leave. In Pathfinder Force the arrangements were for a tour of operations were a bit different from those in the rest of Bomber Command. In the main Force, you did thirty operations, then you were given a rest which was said to be at least six months. You were probably an instructor at an OTU and then you could go back for a second tour of twenty operations. But in Pathfinder Force, they didn’t see the point in dispersing a crew after thirty operations. Having got an experienced crew together, hopefully a successful crew together, why not keep them together. So after thirty operations, you got three weeks’ Leave and then you came back and did another fifteen. Not twenty. And to recompense you for going straight through, this was then reckoned to be two tours. Anyway we got back from Spetzia, our thirtieth operation, confidently expecting to go on Leave the next day but the pressure was on and the flight commander, Wing Commander Alabaster said, ‘You’ll have to do two more operations before you can go on Leave.’ So we did two more operations. Both to Cologne. And then we drew our railway warrants and ration cards and went off on three weeks’ glorious Leave and got back in time for the Battle of Hamburg. The first raid on, of the big raids on Hamburg had already taken place while we were still on Leave, on the last night of our Leave. And I’d have liked to have been on that one because as you may know, that was the first night that Window was used. These metallic strips that people dropped. Well they were still very effective when we went the next night and the next night. But I’d have liked to have been able to say I was on the first Windows Operation, but I wasn’t. I was on the second. So at the Battle of Hamburg, and a trip to the Ruhr as well, and then — I’ve lost my place in my Log Book but I shall find it in a moment. [a short pause as he turns pages] It was pretty obvious to us that after Hamburg, Butch Harris, the AOC of Bomber Command, would be looking at Berlin as his next main target. And we got to the middle of August, and you could usually get some idea of targets from the bomb load and the petrol load which was published first thing in the morning on the list of crew, the Order of Battle as it was called. And it looked, for all the world, as though it was a suitable bomb and petrol load for Berlin. And we were a bit astounded because it was full moon and at that time, flying far over Germany in the full moon was not very healthy. The German Fighter Force was becoming increasingly skilful and morale dropped a little bit in the squadron at the thought of going to Berlin in the night of the full moon. But there again, there was nothing we could do about it so we went to briefing and there was a red line — at the end of the briefing room there was a great map across the end wall of course, and there was a red tape attached to the map, going well on the way towards Berlin, but not to Berlin itself. And we were eventually told that the target was Peenemünde. No one had ever heard of Peenemünde of course. So briefing continued and we were told that this was a very important German radar research station. Not a word about rockets of course. And we went through all the usual briefing, the Met Officer, the navigation officer on the route, the bombing leader on the bomb load, the signals officer on the signals to be used, so on and — intelligent officer on defences. But there were a number of additional things. We were told that there would be an attack by seven or eight Mosquitoes on Berlin, which would hopefully keep the Fighter Force away from us. We were told that there would be a massive number of night fighters operating over Germany that night. We were told that we’d be dropping our bombs and target indicators not from twenty thousand feet as we usually did but from eight thousand feet and that there would be a master bomber. And this was the first time a master bomber was being used on a really big Operation. Obviously Guy Gibson kept in touch with his nineteen aircraft on the Dams raid and on that Friedrichshafen raid, we had a master bomber, but it was only sixty aircraft. And this was the first time that a really large force of nearly six hundred aircraft had a master bomber who circled the target and explained to the main force, which were the most accurately placed target indicators to aim for. And also, told when the aiming point was to be changed because the aiming point for the first wave, and we were in the first wave, was the dwelling quarters of the scientists and technicians working at Peenemünde and the second wave was the attack on the factory and the third wave was the attack on the experimental station. So we had our briefing and went and had an operational meal and drew parachutes and escape kit and got dressed and out to the aircraft and a chap with the ground crew as usual and we took off at twenty fifty. Ten to nine. Which was Double British Summer Time, so it was still light when we crossed the coast at Southwold. And out across the North Sea. Again, a lovely night. You know the navigator of course worked behind a black-out curtain over his maps and charts but I couldn’t resist popping out frequently to have a look at the sun and the moon as it came up, shimmering on the sea, silver, and there was hardly any wind and it was absolutely beautiful. And there we were going off to deliver bombs to people. It took about an hour and ten minutes to cross the North Sea and as we approached the Danish coast, there was some activity over on our starboard side and searchlights and flak and the searchlights coned an aircraft and eventually the flak got very close and the aircraft burst into flame and flaming bits started dropping into the sea. And I sometimes give lectures on this to groups like Probus and so on and I always say that I ought really to have felt enormous sympathy for that crew and I probably did but foremost in my mind was the thought, ‘What a rotten bit of navigation.’ Because if they were ahead of us, there must have been another Pathfinder crew. In fact there were other Pathfinder crews and yet their navigator had allowed them to wander over Flensburg, the northern-most town in Germany which was very heavily defended. And they’d paid the price for it. However there was nothing we could do about it so we continued on our way. It took about twelve minutes to cross Denmark and then down over the Baltic Sea. Masses of islands of course. Hundreds of islands, so navigation was a very simple matter. As we got close to Peenemünde, I’d given the bomb aimer and the pilot the ETA and there was a shout from the bomb aimer, ‘There’s a smoke screen ahead.’ And so there was. I’d popped out and had a look and there was a smoke screen over, as we thought, right over the target. And so it was. But a smoke screen blows in line and when you’re like my four fingers, and when you’re looking at it from a distance you can’t see, but as you get increasingly over the top, you can see down, so as we got nearer to the target, we could in fact see the target.
PL: So there were gaps in the smoke screen where you could see down.
AS: Yes, yes. Oh yes, yes. They weren’t — The smoke containers which sent the smoke up were spaced across. They couldn’t have them absolutely close together so there were gaps between these lines of smoke, the wind blew the smoke across, but — So there were some TIs already down. The —
PL: TIs?
AS: The master bomber informed us which were the most accurately placed, so we place our TIs and our bomb, one four thousand pounder there. Hopefully over the living quarters of the scientists and technicians. And there was no defences whatsoever. It was probably the easiest trip we did. And on over the target to take our photo. You had to stay straight and level for twenty-five seconds once your bombs had gone so that the photo could be taken. And then we turned away. We didn’t fly exactly back on the same route because of course we’d have been flying on to the incoming aircraft but just south and once again, out over Denmark I made sure that my pilot stayed well clear of Flensburg. Back across the North Sea, dropped down to — we’d climbed after bombing at eight thousand feet. Back down to where we could take off our oxygen masks and have a cup of coffee and the radio officer had got some light music on the wireless and we had our sandwiches and so back to Bourn. And 97 Squadron had sent eighteen aircraft. One of them had returned early with engine trouble, the other seventeen got back. Not a scratch on them. And so, went to the parachute section first thing to — after a word with the ground crew while we were waiting for transport. Get rid of parachute, back to de-briefing and we were all fairly delighted it looked as if it had been a successful Operation. But one of the things we’d been told at briefing, which I should have said before, the very last thing was that it was essential that this Operation should be successful and if it were not successful, we should have to go again the next night and the next night irrespective of casualties. Now, the first night, you can rely on surprise but if you had to go a second or third time, you couldn’t. So that did concentrate the mind a little bit. So, and so to bed. Operational meal, traditional eggs and bacon and so to bed. Now I’ve always been an early waker-up. Quarter past six this morning. Quarter past six virtually every morning. And I was an early waker-up during the war and even if we were not back ‘till three or four o’clock in the morning. Most of the squadron would sleep through ‘till lunchtime. I never once missed my breakfast. I wouldn’t say I was first up in the morning but I was always in the Mess by nine o’clock. I’d get up about eight and have a shower, because you always felt dirty after a night out in a bomber. They were pretty dirty smelly things, these big bombers. And I would go to breakfast and then I would normally sort of spend the morning hanging around waiting for the crew, the rest of the crew to come round. I’d write up my Log Book, I’d catch up with my correspondence, I’d try the crossword in one of the posh papers and I might practice my snooker skills ‘cause there was no one else in the billiard room. And so on. But that morning, I didn’t do any of those things, I walked up to the Intelligence library to have a look at the photographs, to see how successful, with the thought of that threat still hanging over us. And when I got there, I knew of course from what I’d seen the night before, that it was likely to be successful. And so it proved to be but what absolutely astounded me was that we’d lost over forty aircraft. But I didn’t — Apart from the chap that we’d seen chopped out over Flensburg, we didn’t see any sign of any defences. But what had happened of course, that these German fighters had been circling over Berlin and then the attack was on Peenemünde. It’s only about twenty minutes flying from Berlin to Peenemünde, so those fighters which still had enough petrol and many didn’t, many had to land and refuel, but some of them were able to fly up to Peenemünde and they got in the third wave. And the third wave lost about twenty percent of their aircraft. One in five. The second wave was somewhere in between the two. I think they lost about eight or nine percent of their aircraft, but not as bad as the third wave. So Bomber Command did lose a lot of aircraft that night. And, but at least it was successful. We didn’t have to go again. And that was our fortieth Operation, so we had five more to do to finish our tour. It really was Berlin the next two but by that time, the full moon had gone and we did a couple over to Berlin and we went to, I think, to Nuremberg and once to the Ruhr. And then our last trip was coming up. We did our forty-fourth trip on the 31st of August. Our last trip was coming up and we were briefed to go on the 1st of September to Berlin but Operations were cancelled and the same happened on the 2nd we were briefed to go to Berlin and Operations were cancelled. Now the corporal in charge of our ground crew, a young married man, and the ground crew of course, used to work outside in appalling conditions, not in a warm hangar but out at dispersal. And, they, this corporal was due to go on Leave when we got back on the 2nd after our final Operation, but it was cancelled on the 1st, he wouldn’t go on Leave. When it happened again on the 2nd he wouldn’t go on Leave. He insisted on staying until we had completed our forty-fifth Operation. Well, on September the 3rd, that morning, the invasion of the mainland of Italy started. And we thought, ‘Oh. It would be a nice cushy trip to Milan or Turin for our final Operation,’ because they were really a long way but they were fairly cushy targets. The Italian defences weren’t very wonderful. And. But it wasn’t. We didn’t know of course, but apparently an agreement had already been made with the Italian government that the Italians would surrender and we would stop bombing their major cities. It was Berlin again, by a long route back over Sweden again. Over neutral territory. And we got back and that was our forty-fifth Operation. And most of us decided that, that was enough, but unfortunately Jimmy and two of the gunners stayed with him and it wasn’t. And so there we are. That’s the end of my life in Bomber Command.
PL: That is absolutely wonderful. Thank you very much indeed. Can I just ask you a couple of other things?
AS: Um hum.
PL: The first. So what did you do, so after the war, what did you go on to do then, after you left Bomber Command?
AS: Well, as I said, Bomber Command was equipped with the state of the art radar. And just after I finished Operations, and I mention the fact that Africa had now been cleared of the Germans, and if one listened to the news during ’42, ’43, you heard about a Bomber Force from the Middle East attacking Tobruk, and Benghazi, and it was pretty obvious that when airfields became available, these aircraft would move over to Italy. And, an advert, it wasn’t phrased as an advert, a notice appeared in Daily Routine Orders, asking for someone to instruct in this state of the art radar overseas. Now it didn’t state where overseas, but one didn’t need to be a genius to realise it was going to be the Mediterranean theatre and that these aircraft — so I thought, ‘Well that sounds interesting.’ And I’d only recently been Commissioned. I was a Pilot Officer and it was advertised as a Flight Lieutenant vacancy so I thought, ‘Well, have ago at this.’ And I applied and after the usual air force delay, I found I was accepted and I went home to Southampton on a week’s Embarkation Leave and when I got back, the squadron were kind enough to divert an aircraft, ‘cause I had to go to Blackpool which was the Embarkation Centre, they diverted across country to take me up to Blackpool, which would have saved a nasty train journey. And, I, eventually, we were kitted out for overseas there and had various inoculations and so on, after about a fortnight in Blackpool, up to Liverpool early one morning to get aboard a troop ship which went a long way out into the Atlantic to avoid the — ‘cause the Germans were still in France of course and they had aircraft operating from the south of France against convoys, but we didn’t see any sign of them and back into the Mediterranean and we docked in Algiers and I was in a transit camp there for two or three days and then down to Tunis which was Headquarters of the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. And there, a Wing Commander looked after me and told me what I was going to do. And apart from the six Wellington squadrons they had, they had one Liberator squadron which was a South African squadron and a Halifax squadron and the Halifax squadron was going to be equipped with the same sort of apparatus that we had in Pathfinder Force and act as what they were going to call a Target Marking Force once they’d got across to Italy. Now that squadron was still in, in the desert, so after spending Christmas at, at Tunis, the Wing Commander and a mate of his, they found out that my French was pretty good so they took me down to Bône market, hoping to get some turkeys for Christmas, for the Mess. But, at the government’s expense, we flew this aircraft down to Bône but went to the market but there were no turkeys. We found a bag of fresh carrots. And I suppose fresh vegetables were something of a relief to people who were living on rations. And we took those back. They were gratefully accepted. And I remember on Christmas Day, I went for a swim in the Mediterranean with a WAAF officer. It was pretty cold, but we wanted to say we’d swum on Christmas Day and we also went and found the amphitheatre at Carthage which is very close to Tunis and I knew a little bit about the Punic wars and so on. So we went and explored Carthage, the amphitheatre at Carthage. And a few days after Christmas, before the New Year, I went down to join this Halifax squadron in the desert, at El Adem, just outside of Tobruk and they were merely sort of kicking their heels really because, waiting to go across to Italy. They would occasionally operate against Crete port installations where the Germans were still in Occupation of Crete. But they weren’t doing very much and I couldn’t do very much with them at that stage, ‘cause they didn’t have any equipment of course. I talked to them, but not very much. Eventually the ground crew all went off, back to the Delta, to go by ship across to Italy and we were left for a week. More or less living on our own devices with no ground crew and the CO, the Wing Commander didn’t have a crew so I was crewed up with him as a navigator and flew across to Italy and the night before we went, we even took the tents down and slept under the wing of the Halifax for the night and the Khamsin was blowing at the time so there was sand everywhere and during that week, a dirty old Arab who used to appear on a donkey which was much too small for him, and he’d have a bucket of eggs, tiny little eggs, but he would barter a half a dozen eggs for a cupful of sugar, so at least you could get a few eggs to fry. And. Anyway we flew over to Italy. All the airfields literally were around Foggia, that area which — [pause as he turns pages] This area around here, it’s, in fact, you’ve got the Apennines running up the middle and a few airfields there but there’s a lot of hills that side of Italy, of course but there were masses of airfields round there and we flew to one of those called Celone and eventually the squadron was equipped with the apparatus so that I got on with my work but eventually I was posted away from the squadron, back to the Group Headquarters because my responsibilities were to the whole Group, not to that squadron. And I decided that having read my Siegfried Sassoon about ‘scarlet Majors at the Base’ ‘And when the war was done, and the youth stone dead, he’d toddle safely home and die - in bed’ and you know, the Hotspur’s criticism of a staff officer assented popinjay in Henry 1V and I decided I ought to do a few Operations. Bennett had insisted on his Staff Operations operating occasionally. In fact on one night, two staff officers turned up and went with the same crew. Much to my surprise. And they went with a pilot with whom I’d done a training exercise once and frankly I wouldn’t have wanted to fly with him on Operations and neither of them came back. The whole crew went missing. Anyway, I felt as staff officer, I would set a good example by going occasionally. And a very interesting Op came up. I used to go to the meeting of the — air staff meeting every morning and there was a guard’s officer there who was responsible for liaison with the Resistance. And he came one morning and said that the Resistance in southern France were going to mount an attack on a German airfield and they would welcome a diversion by an attack on the airfield that night and I thought, ‘That sounds interesting. So. I’ll go along.’ And I went along with this Target Marking Force and dropped flares over this and there were obviously things happening on the ground and this was just before the invasion, so, as a result of that, the French gave me a Légion d’Honneur. [laughs] Which I’ll come back to in a moment. And I did two more with the Target Marking Force and two more in the Wellingtons because the Wellingtons increasingly were, as the Germans withdrew, were being used for supply-dropping over Yugoslavia and so I did a daylight with the Wellingtons over Yugoslavia, dropping supplies to what appeared to be a crowd of bandits in the hills above Sarajevo, who waved enthusiastically to us as the parachutes dropped down. And then a night one, dropped on a big cross, up in the hills behind Trieste and so that was quite interesting really. And eventually after about a year, the air force decided my, I’d done enough, that people were now fully trained and so they sent me home and I thought they’d forgotten about me. They sent me on Leave when I got home. I was on Leave for about five or six weeks. And of course the air force never really forget about you. I eventually got a telegraph to report to such and such a Wing Commander at Astral House, London and I went up and he said, ‘Well what do you want to do now?’ Which surprised me a bit because in the forces, they usually tell you what you’re going to do. [laughs] You know, I must have looked a bit perplexed, so he said, ‘How do you fancy going to Transport Command?’ And I said, ‘Alright. It’s a flying job?’ ‘Yes.’ So I went to Transport Command and flew Dakotas from Croydon to the continental capitals of liberated Europe. And during the Transport Command Training, one had been given the opportunity to get a Civil Air Navigator’s Licence. You had to get a certain percentage of the exams and you had to take an extra paper in Civil Aviation in the war but I did that and got mine. So just after Christmas ’46, there was an advert, again not really an advert, a notice in DRO saying that BOAC were again recruiting navigators. Anyone interested give their name to the Adjunct So I thought, ‘Well this is a good opportunity.’ And so I went off to BOAC. Everyone — there were an enormous number of people of course joining BOAC from the air force at the time and we all came to Whitchurch, just outside of Bristol to their Civil Training School and after a few weeks there, I was, a month, six weeks, I was posted to the flying boats at Poole Harbour. So I could live at home in Southampton and flying to Singapore and back. To Singapore and back took eighteen days for the crew in those days. Took five days for the passengers. No, three days to Singapore and five days to Australia. It was a different world. I sometimes, again, lecture to groups like Probus and Rotary about it because Civil Aviation was so different in those days. So there we are. End of story. Any questions? [laughs]
PL: Many, many questions. So, so then once, so that’s, that’s basically what you did then, you were in Civil, Civil Aviation for a few years.
AS: For eighteen months, yes.
PL: For eighteen months. And then — So how did you get into teaching?
AS: Well, I — in fact I had a place at Southampton University before the war and I didn’t take it up, but I went to a Training College because I wanted to get through fairly quickly. And the Training College in Winchester was giving a shortened course of eighteen months so I didn’t do what they called the Emergency Teacher’s Certificate of a year, but I did eighteen months and I was then qualified a teacher. And the school where I did my final Teaching Practice, the Head offered me a job. So. Which was just outside of Southampton and so I was with him for about seven years and then I came to a more senior post in Bristol. Bristol was one the earliest Authorities to go Comprehensive and then I got a Deputy Headship at the Thornbury. Which is ten miles north of Bristol. Quaint old town. And quite a long time as Deputy Head and I was, someone hinted to me that I ought to apply for this new school at Weston-Super-Mare and —
PL: Which is called —
AS: Priory School. You may have passed it.
PL: And that was a ground-breaking new school.
AS: Oh yeah. You may have passed it, if you came round the Bay, when you turned off the motorway, did you turn right by the Magistrates Court?
PL: I can’t remember.
AS: Almost immediately — or did you come right through — no, you didn’t come right through—
PL: I hugged the — I went on a windy road hugging the, the coast.
AS: Around the coast? Well, you almost certainly passed Priory School. Did you pass Sainsbury’s?
PL: Yes.
AS: Well it’s opposite Sainsbury’s. That’s Priory School, where they’ve just acquired two and a half million pounds to build a new science block and who have they invited to open it? [laughs] And what are they going to call it? The Spencer Science Centre. And the teachers who were trying to teach me science in the 1930s would turn in their graves at the thought of a science centre being named after me.
PL: Well, congratulations. What an accolade.
AS: Well, it’s rather nice isn’t it.
PL: It is. And your — ‘cause I think this is important as part of your story to include. So your school and your experience was used as a case study by the Open University.
AS: Yes. Shall I get the book and show you?
PL: I would love to see the book. Wait one minute though.
AS: Yes.
PL: I just want to, just to sort of wrap up the interview. There’s two questions I want to ask you. The first is, how your family fared during the war. I was interested to hear you say that they were based in Southampton.
AS: Yes.
PL: So did they — everybody stayed in Southampton did they, because —
AS: Yes. I think — The bombing raids on Southampton occurred just after I had left to join the Air Force. Well, there were several daylight raids but the night raids, the big night raids were just after. And after the first one, my father who was working there, continued there but he sent my mother up to Salisbury where we had — which is where I was born. Where we still had relatives. So she was there only during the first one. By the time I was coming home on Leave of course, they were both back in Southampton because the bombing raids were over. One of the things I noticed with my father, who was not a particularly demonstrative person, did come down to the station and see me off each time I went back from Leave and I’ve thought about that quite lot since then.
PL: Very touching.
AS: I didn’t have any brothers or sisters. I was a spoilt only child. [laughs]
PL: They must have been incredibly proud of you. So my last question, which is a question that we’re asked to ask all of our veterans and our volunteers who speak to us is, your feelings about how Bomber Command were treated after the war. Would you like to make any comments about it.
AS: I was a bit surprised that when most of the Great War leaders were made Peers, Harris was not made a Peer. It didn’t worry me a great deal that there wasn’t a memorial. After all, a memorial is only a piece of stone or something with a list of names on. Part of the past. You know that was my only surprise really, that Harris was, didn’t receive the accolade that the other war leaders, Montgomery and so on received. But, Dresden of course, was held against Bomber Command but there was a lot of industry going on in Dresden. There’s a book by an academic at Exeter University, about Dresden, I think it’s out on loan to someone at the moment, but there’s a lot in there about all the industries going on at Dresden at the time. There we are.
PL: Well is there anything else, before we finish, that you’d like to record? About any of your experiences.
AS: No. I probably forgot one or two things on the way through but — [laughs]
PL: I’m sure it doesn’t matter. Well, I’d just like to say again a huge thank-you. That was an absolutely fascinating interview. Thank you very much indeed.
AS: Tell my wife that when she comes. [laughs]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Arthur Spencer
Type
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Sound
Conforms To
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Pending review
Identifier
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ASpencerAHG170227
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Creator
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Pam Locker
Date
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2017-02-27
Format
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01:11:54 audio recording
Language
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eng
Description
An account of the resource
Arthur Spencer joined the Royal Air Force after leaving school. He began pilot training in Florida but then re-mustered as a navigator and trained in Pensacola. He completed two tours of operations as a navigator with 97 Squadron at RAF Woodhall Spa and RAF Bourn. He later became 205 Group's Navigation Officer. He describes dropping target indicators and Window. He was based in Algiers for some time and describes life there. He was awarded the Légion d’Honneur for providing air support for the Resistance in Italy. After the war, he worked for BOAC and then as a teacher.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Algeria
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
United States
Algeria--Algiers
England--Lincolnshire
Florida--Miami
Florida--Pensacola
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina--Sarajevo
Italy--Trieste
North Africa
Florida
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Contributor
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Cathy Brearley
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
16 OTU
97 Squadron
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
C-47
crewing up
ground crew
Master Bomber
military ethos
mine laying
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Pathfinders
RAF Bourn
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Resistance
searchlight
target indicator
training
Ventura
Wellington
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/147/46456/SHarriganD[Ser -DoB]v240002.mp3
efdbfb1e6fa09c97c42e6282e336d83e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Cole, Colin
C Cole
Colin Cole
Description
An account of the resource
31 items. The collection relates to Warrant Officer Colin Cole (1924 – 2015 RAF Volunteer Reserve 1605385) who served with 617 Squadron. The collection contains two oral history interviews his, logbook, service documents, medals, memorabilia from the Tirpitz and six photographs.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Six items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties or to comply with intellectual property regulations. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-01-27
2015-07-27
Identifier
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Cole, C
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
JM: Well, good morning. This is Julian Maslin interviewing Colin Cole at his home at Bardney. Colin, I know you were a wireless operator on 617 Squadron. I wonder if I could just ask you just to say a little about your background and then go ahead and tell us the story that you have about the disposal of munitions at the end of the war. Colin —
CC: Right. Yes. I can do that. As far as my background is concerned I came in to the RAF in December of 1942 and to train as a wireless operator air gunner and I first went to Blackpool and then on to various training stations and my first entry in to Lincolnshire was when I joined number 617 Squadron at Woodhall Spa in August 1944. Right. Now, what would you like —
JM: I’d like you to say a little if you could about how you were involved in the operation to dispose of munitions. Particular types of munition at the end of the war.
CC: Oh right. Yes. The, yes after the dams raid there were a number of the mines, they called them Upkeeps, the Upkeep mines left over and they sort of gathered together what few there were left. I think there were around about ten or fifteen that needed disposing of. They were ended up at Scampton and in a rather unstable condition and there were arrangements made to dispose of them. Now, how I came to be involved in this was that they brought three aircraft down from Scotland which were, had already been converted for the original dams raid and so that they could carry the mines out to sea and drop them in a safe, in a safe place. The reason I was involved was that all that was needed really was a pilot. You didn’t need a whole crew but in that day and age every aircraft that flew, every Lancaster that flew had to carry a wireless operator. So I was seconded from 617 Squadron at Binbrook to go to Scampton and fly on, well as it turned out only two or three of these missions to dispose of the Upkeep mines. Now, the idea was that they should be loaded on to the aircraft, you know, in the normal way and dropped out to sea. The place they looked at dropping them was on the Atlantic Shelf. Just over the Atlantic shelf so that they dropped in to deep water and either exploded or just dropped to the bottom of the sea and there’s probably many of them still left down, left down there to this day you know. So that, that was basically all we did. I did two or three runs on these things and we’d drop them, you know sort of quite without any trouble at all and, and got rid of them. The, what was I going to say? [pause] There’s not really anything more to say about that apart from the aircraft, oh this was by the way in September 1945. ’46 sorry. September 1946 and onwards over the Christmas period and there were, there were others taking part in this of course and finished by about February of 1947 and then the aircraft were just scrapped and that was it. Yeah.
JM: You raise a number of points here that I’d like to explore.
CC: Yeah. Ask me questions.
JM: You don’t remember do you which aircraft by their squadron letters or whatever? I mean —
CC: I can remember by the squadron letters. The one I flew in was AJG.
JM: That was Gibson’s aircraft.
CC: The answer to that is going to be no.
JM: Oh.
CC: Gibson’s aircraft, as far as we can reckon was converted back into in a normal Lancaster and ended up with 467 Squadron at Waddington. Now the AJG that we had there had been originally a dams aircraft which was I think AJC. It had been converted back into a normal Lancaster. It had gone to Metheringham and it was used there for a bit and then it was converted back again into a dams aircraft when it was thought that the war may needs to drop more of these.
JM: Right.
CC: Mines, you know.
JM: Right.
CC: They were a sort of, and it was converted back and for some reason somebody painted AJG on it. But according to the code letters which stayed with the aircraft you know from the date of manufacture which I can’t remember off hand what it was it wasn’t the original AJG after all that [laughs] Everybody says that you know.
JM: Yes, you would.
CC: Yeah. And at the time nobody knew what Gibson’s aircraft was. It was only after the film came out in 1954 that all that came up to the —
JM: Yeah.
CC: Fore again, you know. I mean it was just another, just another old aircraft.
JM: Do you remember the letters of any of the other aircraft that were used because I think you said there were two or three?
CC: There were. Good question. I shall have to tell you that afterwards.
JM: Ok.
CC: I can look. I can look them up you know. Sort of —
JM: Moving on you said you’d been seconded from Binbrook to Scampton.
CC: Yes.
JM: Does that mean that 617 was actually transferred to Binbrook at one point?
CC: It was. It, 617 was destined for Tiger Force.
JM: Yes.
CC: In 1945, and we trained for Tiger Force and then the Japanese war ended and we still carried on training because we went out to India under South East Asia Command and then we only stayed out there for about what January, February, March, four months when India was, Mr Ghandi was jumping up and down about independence and he sent us back [laughs] We came back and we were posted. Posted to Binbrook. Yes.
JM: And the, the crew, the pilot that you flew with on, on these disposal operations was that pilot somebody who had extensive service with 617 or a recent arrival?
CC: No, it wasn’t actually. The, the pilots that, and that in the plural at that time my main secondment to Scampton was not for the mines at all but for pilots training for conversion on to Lincolns. And that was my main job there was flying with all sorts of pilots to train on to Lincolns and this was a sort of little job that came along while I was there.
JM: Perhaps we could return to the subject of Lincolns a bit later but I had —
CC: Yes.
JM: I had a feeling that perhaps there would have been quite a rush of people to get the opportunity to fly in a Dambusters Lancaster on a trip like this even, just as passengers Or am I being a bit nostalgic about that?
CC: No. Not particularly.
JM: Just a job was it?
CC: It was just a, yes I mean as I say and I can repeat this that it wasn’t until 1954 ’55 when the film came out that all this arose.
JM: Right.
CC: You know. I mean I can’t remember the squadron ever talking a lot about the dams raid that [pause] you know, we all knew about it of course.
JM: Yes.
CC: But no. It wasn’t [laughs] It was totally different. A different story you know.
JM: So when you went up to drop the mines did you drop them from low level as in the raid or from —
CC: Oh no. No. No. I think we dropped them from about eight thousand feet. Something like that. Just dropped them, you know. There was no spinning. They didn’t. They weren’t spun or anything like that. Just dropped them.
JM: They weren’t fused.
CC: Oh no. No. No. Ours didn’t go bang but I don’t know whether one or two did you know sort of on hitting the sea but no. Just [laughs] yeah.
JM: Well, that’s lovely. I wonder if I you could just turn your memory to the idea of training pilots to convert to Lincolns at Scampton because I’m sure that would be an extremely valuable piece of history. As far as I’m aware there’s not an awful lot written about that. Could you tell us a little bit about what the training programme was and how it went and any stories that you may have from that occasion?
CC: Well, there wasn’t really. The Lincoln was just a big Lancaster really, you know. It wasn’t like training on, I suppose on to a completely new aircraft. They only did circuits and landings. They didn’t do any cross-country work or anything like that and apart from one or two crews most of the pilots came on their own if you know what I mean. So, you know, posted on their own just to, I think it was just to get the feel of the aircraft. The fact that it was different in size and all that sort of thing you know. It was really. But I didn’t have any part in the, you know. I mean they naturally flew with an instructor, you know, sort of and as far as I can remember they weren’t there for all that long, you know. Only a few weeks of sort of getting used to the aircraft and then back on to the squadron.
JM: We know from history that when aircraft were introduced they often had initial teething problems and there often quite a few accidents before these wrinkles were ironed out. Was that the case for the Lincoln or was it seamless?
CC: Not particularly. It was, it was only an overgrown Lancaster in, in its sense if you know what I mean. It wasn’t a completely new aircraft. I didn’t hear of any, a lot of accidents. Not particular accidents. I think there was. I think there was an odd, you know later on there was an odd collision you know and that sort of thing but no great, no great teething troubles at all. So don’t know.
JM: I I know from previous conversations with you that one of the most important operations that you took part in when you were with 617 was the attack on the Tirpitz.
CC: Yes.
JM: I was wondering whether you’d be kind enough to tell us a little bit about that experience.
CC: Yes. Yes, I can. Right. Well, I didn’t take part in the first two attempts. They went in the September and I think it was the October. August and October one of which they went to Russia and flew from there. And then when the final attack came they brought the, the Tirpitz down to Tromso, Tromso Fjord and that made it within striking distance of Lossiemouth providing we carried extra fuel tanks and so the aircraft were modified. All had new engines. The front turrets, sorry the mid-upper turrets were taken off and we didn’t, we only carried a crew of six and two additional fuel tanks were placed in the fuselage. And that, and that was it. It was going to be a long trip, you know. The one in which we sank was it was that we went on the 11th of November up to Lossiemouth from, from Woodhall Spa and the following day we flew from Lossiemouth up to Tromso and, and back which was a trip that took just over thirteen hours. So, you know it had to be carefully planned and that. The only problem I can remember we had was it was a very very clear night. There was a big area of high pressure and the temperature dropped to minus goodness knows what on the night that we were going to take off. So what they had to do was we had to run the aircraft up to the point of take-off and then they sprayed it for de-icing and then we’d take off and that. And several of the aircraft of 9 squadron didn’t go because they’d run out of de-icing fluid [laughs] But anyway, that’s another story. The trick was that we flew at low level up the Norwegian coast and the reason for that was to avoid the radar that the Germans had all along the coast except in one particular spot about halfway up which was known. And we went through that area, over Sweden and then climbed to twelve, thirteen thousand feet over the target. Apart from that, you know it was a clear run in and we dropped our bomb which was said according to records to have dropped near the forward bow and was considered to have helped in the fact that it overturned. Well, in that context it, I can say because has also been recorded that our rear gunner when we were leaving the target the smoke and that cleared a bit from the aircraft itself and he came on to the intercom and said, ‘Skip, she’s turning over.’ So it was the first indication we had you know of, of the ship turning over from that point of view and then we just flew back. We weren’t hit at all, our aircraft and we just flew back to England. We had a, you now we had a diversion. The weather wasn’t too good at Lossiemouth and we had a diversion to an airfield called Fraserburgh at which we landed and that was that.
JM: I have a recollection of on a previous conversation with you, you told me that the bomb was held in place by some large straps and I believe it may have been part of your duties to to recover those straps.
CC: Oh yes. Yes.
JM: Could you tell us a little bit about that please?
CC: Yeah. There is. There are, for the Tallboys there are some straps which were fixed around the bomb itself in the bomb bay which when the bomb was released the straps came apart and dropped to such an extent that they failed the bomb doors when [pause] when they were being shut. So it was the wireless operators job to go back sort of over the main spar and get hold of the toggle which, which was straight and pull the straps up while the pilot shut the bomb doors and that. But yes, that was, apparently that was a problem. An initial problem that they had and talking to an historian of 9 Squadron he said that yes Barnes Wallis actually came down to 9 Squadron to sort the problem out. And he devised this system of a toggle on these straps to pull them up so —
JM: That’s very interesting but have I got this correct? This would have meant that you were actually looking down through the open —
CC: Oh yes. You could. Well, you could see through a hole.
JM: Right. At this most powerful battleship which was shooting up at you.
CC: Well yes [laughs] that’s true.
JM: How did you feel at that moment when, when you were doing that? Was it just a job to be done or were you —?
CC: Well, I think it was just a job to be done really you know. Sort of [pause] yes. It’s like everything else. Afterwards it all sort of blows up into an historical event if you know what I mean but at the time you just sort of, that’s what you’re doing, you know.
JM: And, and was it the same feelings that you had when you knew you’d been ordered to attack the Tirpitz again because as you say it was the third operation. Was it the same, another job or were you in any way concerned that it was going to be a particularly difficult job?
CC: We, no we, we weren’t but I gather that the pilots were told that there was a danger with it being at Tromso. There was a, there was a fighter airfield at Bardufoss which is just down the road from there and there was a possibility that we might get fighter intervention wouldn’t we. But the rest of the crews weren’t told. Weren’t told about it you know. So we just [pause] because that ties up with I remember our skipper saying we dropped the bomb and photos taken and, you know all the stuff that goes with it and that, he says, ‘Right,’ he said, ‘Let’s, let’s the hell get out of here.’ You know [laughs] so that was obviously why. You learn these things afterwards as I say. Yeah.
JM: Because really, I mean if the fighters had intervened then the squadrons involved could have taken heavy losses and obviously the authorities were prepared to take the risk.
CC: Oh absolutely. Yes. Yes. It would have done but yeah what, I mean one of the dangers of course with that, was well I wouldn’t say not so much them actually shooting a normal Lancaster down. In fact, we had two fuel tanks, well the tanks were empty but they were still full of fuel gas you know and would have, would have naturally made it much more difficult if they’d been hit by bullets or anything like that I suppose.
JM: Well, this has been fascinating. I I would like to ask you just a little bit more about —
CC: Sure.
JM: Life on the squadron. You were on 617 Squadron and down the road at Woodhall Spa. Could you tell us a little bit about what the daily atmosphere was like as you were going about your training? Your preparations and so forth.
CC: In actual fact quite relaxed. Of course, all the officers were at the Petwood and you know which is the main story these days about 617 being at Woodhall Spa. But in actual fact of course we were on the other side of the aerodrome at Tattershall Thorpe and I don’t think you know where Thorpe camp is now.
JM: Well, we are actually volunteers at Thorpe camp.
CC: Oh well there you are.
JM: I should have said.
CC: Well, we were there of course. Yeah. You know. Sort of, yes we were in the woods [laughs] in, well in Nissen huts actually you know sort of converted into quarters. Day to day we just went down to the fly. We did a lot of sort of training and bombing runs at Wainfleet that’s now no longer there. No longer with us, you know. But spent a lot of time over Wainfleet and it was a lot of analysis of how close and that the practice bombs were dropped and and that sort of thing and one or two odds and ends that we got on. One thing we didn’t know very much about that we, I think it was in the November. Probably the November time. They were looking at dropping commandos in dinghies over Norway and the idea was to drop them on these dinghies with parachutes. Now, that’s all we knew and we did one or two trips, you know. Sort of nothing happened about it but and that was all we knew about it. It never took, it never took place you know. So —
JM: That would have been extremely difficult and hazardous an operation.
CC: Oh God. They could have [unclear] How they were going to do it I don’t know. There is, I think there is a bit of detail about you know. And the only other thing we had a few days down, our crew had a few days down at Boscombe Down where they were testing smoke. You know how the Red Arrows issue smoke out? They were looking for that sort of thing for the sort of bombing master to —
JM: Right.
CC: And it was a lot of boffins down there trying smoke flares and smoke. Mixing smoke with the exhausts and and all that sort of thing and we went down there to fly a Lanc. An old Lanc you know to —
JM: Who was your captain on those? On your time on 617?
CC: Sorry?
JM: Who was the captain? The pilot.
CC: Oh Leavitt. John Leavitt.
JM: Right.
CC: Yes. Yes.
JM: And did you take part in any of the operations that used the Grand Slam?
CC: No, because they didn’t, well not with a Grand Slam on but flying probably a ordinary Lanc because they didn’t carry a wireless operator or wireless equipment because of the, but there was you know a sort of shadow aircraft.
JM: Right. I’ve heard about that.
CC: Yeah. So that was the only way that I sort of went. Yes. But not actually drop, not actually to drop one. No.
JM: I believe the officer commanding 617 at that time would have been Wing Commander Tait would it not? Could you say a little bit about what he was like? He seems to have been quite a highly respected but somewhat distant figure. Would that be fair comment?
CC: He tended, well yes of course as NCOs you don’t come up against them. Against him you know. You normally only come and get your own signals leader for normal, you know. I mean you do see him but [pause] Yes. I met him quite, quite a bit at events after the war you know. Sort of. And I think he tended to be a bit reserved. Not shy. Yes, reserved probably, you know. He didn’t converse a great deal although you know I mean as far as commanding the flights on raids he seemed fine, you know, sort of thing. But he left us in the December ’44. But yeah. So —
JM: Now you started the conversation by, well once or twice referring to the famous film of the Dambusters.
CC: Oh yes. Yeah.
JM: I would like to just to ask you two final questions if I may relating to that. One of them was whether you have any memories of how you felt and how others felt who had served on the squadron at the time that the film was made? And secondly, there has recently been a follow up programme.
CC: Yes.
JM: Have you seen that?
CC: Oh, I’ve seen that. Yes.
JM: Whether you have any comments on that.
CC: Yes. Yes. Yeah. Of course, they, yes and in the follow up programme they said of course there was a lot of mistakes and that. Well, there would be you know. Much of the stuff was top secret still early in 1950s you know. And that’s why they when you look at the original film the, the sort of mines they dropped were round and not cylindrical you know. Sort of things like that and bits and pieces that film makers sort of do. Nothing, I don’t think there was anything to get all het up about if you know what I mean. Probably some would say, ‘Oh, Tait didn’t do that.’ Or Nigger didn’t do something or other [laughs] which was the name of course now that they’re having to try to avoid.
JM: Yes.
CC: But I did actually because they put the film on late didn’t they?
JM: Yes.
CC: Well, I wasn’t going to watch it you know and I thought yes I will and watch and see if they took any bits out but they didn’t you know. They left all the, but I think at one time it was tended to cut little bits out you know. Where reference to the COs dog was made but it, they didn’t, they left everything in. I mean it was just a dog you know. There was no disrespect for anything else. Never even been thought about it you know. It was just how it was in those days, you know. But there we are. That’s [pause] but yes I watched the remake of it. Yes. It wasn’t bad actually. I thought it was, you know sort of [pause] There we are. I don’t know what the new film is going be be like if it ever comes out.
JM: Colin, thank you very much. Your memory is pin sharp going back all those years and it’s been a privilege to listen to you so thank you so much for your interview.
CC: That’s alright. What did you ask me about the other aircraft?
JM: Yes. The other, the Lancaster.
CC: I can nip in to the other room.
JM: Yes that.
CC: And just get it if you like.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Colin Cole
1016-Cole, Colin
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SHarriganD[Ser#-DoB]v24
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Julian Maslin
This Interview was recorded by Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1944-08
1944-11-12
1945
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Norway
Atlantic Ocean
England--Lincolnshire
Norway--Tromsø
Scotland--Moray
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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eng
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Sound
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00:32:24 audio recording
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Pending OH summary
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Colin Cole took part in the attack that sunk the Tirpitz. He describes how the aircraft was adapted for the operation and flew via Lossiemouth. Colin disposed of the Upkeep 'bouncing bombs' as part of his service with the RAF. They were dropped on the Atlantic Shelf and then the adapted Lancasters were scrapped. He trained for Tiger Force.
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Julie Williams
617 Squadron
aircrew
bouncing bomb
Grand Slam
Lancaster
Lincoln
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
Operation Guzzle
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Scampton
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Tallboy
Tiger force
Tirpitz
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/8788/PKirbyH1511.2.jpg
f2f26de792cac70f6b6c69e353b3a563
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/8788/AKirbyH150710.1.mp3
415d0a343bc572167309ea13248509d0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Kirby, Harold
Harold V A Kirby
H V A Kirby
Harold Kirby
H Kirby
Description
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Nine items. Two oral history interviews with Warrant Officer Harold Kirby (1923 - 2022, 1637087 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs and documents. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 467, 97 and 156 Squadrons.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-07-10
2015-09-21
2016-06-11
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Kirby, H
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Warrant Officer Harold Kirby 1637087 was born in Kilbourne, Loncon in 1923, his job after leaving school was in the accounting department at London Electric Supplies. He initially tried to volunteer for the RAF but failed the medical, at that time. He was subsequently drafted in 1942. Skill training started with training as a Flight Mechanic, but during this was asked to volunteer to rain as a Flight Engineer. His first posting was as an Aircraft Fitter at No.460 Squadron, RAF Binbrook, although only for 6 months.
After Flight Engineer training at St Athan and then training on the Short Stirling and then the Lancaster with 1661 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Winthorpe, the first solo flight for the crew, the port landing gear would not lock, during the landing the gear collapsed, although there were no injuries.
First operational unit was No.467 Squadron at RAF Waddington a mainly Australian Squadron, the crew were here for July and August 1944, One operation 3/4th August 1944, to the V1 storage site at Trossy Saint Maximin had another bomber flying above their aircraft and dropping their bombs, one going through the wing, narrowly missing vital structures, this resulted in a gear up landing, due to hydraulic loss, but again there were no injuries resulting.
He was then posted along with the crew to No 97 Squadron, based at RAF Coningsby a pathfinder squadron, tasked to mark the targets for other aircraft,
In total two tours were completed before the end of the European war, after finishing as a Flight Engineer, Harold trained as a RADAR mechanic, before leaving the RAF.
Andy St.Denis
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
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NM: So, this is a recording from Harold Kirby in Pinner, my name is Nigel Moore doing the interview, and this interview is taking place on July the 10th at Mr Kirby’s home in Pinner. So, Mr Kirby, thanks for doing this, and can you tell me something about your life growing up and life before the RAF?
HK: Yes, I’m, I was born in Kilburn, and my parents moved out to Kingsbury when I was eight years old, and I went to Kingsbury County School there. At the time we moved, 1931, it was all countrified there and we had to walk across fields to Burnt Oak to, for shopping, but soon got built up. So that was my early days, and then I got married after the war and lived in Kingsbury for a while until we moved out to Pinner in 1960, that’s right.
NM: So, what about your upbringing and childhood and pre-service life as a youth?
HK: I was not very outgoing at the time, but I had a special friend, Tony, who was more outgoing and he involved me in lots of activities, but I can’t say that I did very much exciting at those days, although we did used to cycle ‘round quite a lot, both of us. So, that was, up to the war, really. [Pause] and, certainly –
NM: Okay. How did you come to join the RAF?
HK: Ah, well, I, my two school friends and myself wanted to fly with the RAF, they were accepted but I was turned down on medical grounds, they became navigators and went off, and then I was called up in, ah, August 1942, and was first, after the initial square-bashing, went to, was posted to Halton, to train as a flight mechanic, one of the first inputs of conscripts to be trained at Halton, yeah. Well, after I’d passed out as a flight mechanic, I had sufficient marks to go straight on to do a fitter’s airframe course, also at Halton, and during the time there, I, we were asked if we would volunteer to become flight engineers, they were getting a bit short, which I did, passed the medical that time, and, but initially, I was posted as a fitter to 460 Squadron, which was at Binbrook, although initially, we and three others went to place called Brayton and found that the 460 Squadron had moved to Binbrook two weeks earlier [slight laugh] but eventually, we were taken there over, stayed there overnight and then taken to Binbrook, and I was there for a bit, six months, mainly repairing aircraft, until I got a call to go to the Saint Athan to train as a flight engineer. I, after I’d passed out from there, I was posted to heavy conversion unit at [pause] Winthorpe and I was, I crewed up with an otherwise all-Australian crew, and one thing that happened there was – this was on Stirlings – on the first pilot’s [pause] flight by himself without an instructor, we couldn’t get the wheels down, and it was my job to wind them down, which I did successfully, but the port undercarriage wouldn’t lock, so we were asked to fly to Woodbridge, you heard of it? It was placed where they had especially long, long runways and also facilities for dealing with crashed aircraft. Well, we duly got, would crashed, Woodbridge, crashed, ah, landed, but the port undercarriage gave way and we spun ‘round, no-one was hurt, and the instructor came down immediately and made my pilot fly back. Other than that, that, everything was okay, and we went to the Lancaster flying school, and eventually landed up at 467 Squadron, which was then at Wadd – Waddington. The, ah, yes, on the first operation, we were coming back, and the rear gunner suddenly shouted ‘Corkscrew!’, and the pilot immediately took action, dived, and a twin-engined aircraft overtook us and flew off in the distance, we didn’t see it again, but he initially, he shot at us, and a bullet went through the rear gunner’s turret and his clothing and cut off his heating supply and he was very aggrieved about that because it got a bit cold! [slight laugh] Anyway, we got back safely. Then, on the [pause] yes, the eleventh operation, it was a daylight one at Trossy Saint Maximin, the, it was a storage site for V1s, and we had done the bombing round and the mid upper shouted, ‘There’s a Lanc above us just opened his bomb doors!’ Before we could do anything, we heard two thumps, one was louder than the other, and a bomb went through the port wing, took away the undercarriage and the – shut off the engine, so I, well, I, I had to keep a look-out because the, I’m sure the wing was mov – waving more than it should do, anyway, we, with three engines, we got left behind. At one stage, this was over France, the rear gunner said ‘There’s two single-engined aircraft approaching from the starboard quarter,’ he said to the upper gunner, ‘I’ll take the first, you take the second,’ but seconds later, which seemed hours, he said, ‘It’s alright, they’re Spitfires,’ [slight laugh] and one of them escorted us back to the coast and we decided, or at least the pilot decided, to land at Wittering, which, at that time, had a grass runway, and we’d landed there and he got told off for making a big groove in their run – runway. So, but that was the, really, the main thing that happened there. Then, on the sixteenth operation, or after the sixteenth operation, we were posted to 97 Squadron, the Pathfinder Squadron. After the war, I had some correspondence from a pilot’s son, this was well after the war, and in it was a cutting from a newspaper which a pilot had a long [?] talk with a reporter, and he said then, whether it was true or not, that he actually volunteered to become Pathfinders because of the increase in pay, but I don’t know if that’s true or not, but all the crew joined him and we went on to the 97 Squadron, but nothing really much happened there, we were quite successful in getting back what with [?] the time, and in the end we managed forty-four operations altogether. [Pause] Well, after the war finished, we were sent on end-of-tour leave because we’d practically finished the second tour, and, but the rest of the crew were all recalled before I was, to go off back to Australia, so I never really had a chance to say a proper goodbye, but after that [unclear], they were, we were given opportunities to choose what we wanted to do; I chose a radar mechanic’s course because it was a nice long one and sounded interesting, that was at Yatesbury, and I eventually completed the course, was posted to West Ruislip, where I was put in an office and didn’t any, do any radar mechanicking! [laughs] And, but I was fortunate that I was able to live out, live at home, ‘cause my parents at Kingsbury, and commuted until I got my demob, which was six weeks or so later, I’m not sure of the actual date, and so, that is my war service.
NM: Okay, can I take you back to your days in Halton?
HK: Yes.
NM: Tell me a little bit about your days training as a fitter.
HK: Well, we were lost in [?], up the hill on one side of the main road, and every morning, we walked down, or marched down, to the, the workshops on the other side of the main road. That, that was about all, except that there was one amusing instance; because there, there were no youngsters there at the time, they had some drums which they thought could be used, and they asked for volunteers to train as, as drummers to help us down the march. It, they got instructions, that went off quite reasonably until the instructor thought, the, the bandmaster or whoever it was, thought we could practise by ourselves. Now, one of the chaps was actually a drummer in a small group, and he decided to invent a, a rhythm, which wasn’t the one that we were taught, and it went – oh, how did it go? Anyway, it was the first time that we did it, we, it was a conga rhythm [laughs], I think it’s the first and only time that a squad’s been conga’d down to the workshops! [laughs] But, apart from that, Halton was quite reasonably enjoyable.
NM: And was it while you were at Halton, or was it while you were at Binbrook on 460 Squadron, that you volunteered to become a flight engineer?
HK: It was while we were at Halton we were asked if we would volunteer, yes.
NM: So you first of all went off to Binbrook on 460 Squadron?
HK: Hmm?
NM: You first of all went to 460 Squadron?
HK: 460 Squadron, yeah.
NM: At Binbrook. Tell me a little bit about, about Binbrook.
HK: Well, then again, it was for, fortunately a, a peacetime station, so we were quite comfortably billeted. Well, that, that, of course, was an Australian squadron as well, so I, I did quite well in knowing the Australians. Each morning, went to the hangars and carried out any repairs and inspections that were necessary, quite enjoyed that, really. Yes, there was a sergeant there, Australian sergeant, apparently he was colour blind, and he, he was telling me that initially, he, he was asked to put camouflage on an aircraft, and when his instructor saw it, he said ‘If you could see that as I could see it, you’d have a fit!’ [Laughs] Yeah, but that, that, sorry, he was quite, quite a good chap [unclear], but –
NM: So, you went from Binbrook to Saint Athans to train -
HK: That’s right, yes.
NM: As a flight engineer.
HK: That’s right.
NM: Describe your training.
HK: I, actually, initially, there are few of us, instead of given instructions on a Lancaster, we were started to give us instructions on a York aircraft, but I think it was decided that that sort of job would be given to people who’d already been flying, so we then transferred and did the rest of the course on, on Lancasters. It was [pause] well, was quite enjoyable, I can’t say that there were any real troubles there. [Pause] I’m sorry, I –
NM: That’s fine, that’s okay.
HK: Unless there’s something specific, it’s difficult to remember.
NM: Right, okay, no, that’s absolutely fine, that’s fine. And you, how long did you spend in Saint Athan training, and what type of year was it, and time of year?
HK: It was in December, it would have been ’43, and we were there ‘til about May, I think, in ’44, and then we went to, as I said, to train, initially on Stirlings, before going onto Lancasters and then the squadron.
NM: So you crewed up at the OCU at Winthorpe, did you say?
HK: Yes.
NM: How did the crewing up process go? How did you end up with the crew that you ended up with?
HK: Well, it was just the usual way, and, in the RAF, from, we were in a large hall, and Bill Ryan, the, came up to me and said, would I like to join his crew? And he came, well, then, he introduced, introduced me to the rest, and we got on quite well.
NM: So you were the last to join the crew, were you?
HK: Yes.
NM: And were they an all-Australian crew?
HK: All-Australian, yeah.
NM: And you were the only Englishman there?
HK: That’s right, yes.
NM: So, why do you think he asked you? Why do you think he asked you?
HK: I have no idea! [laughs] Perhaps I was the last one, I don’t know, but we got on quite well, actually. I was the youngest, Bill Ryan was twenty-eight, I think. [Pause] The [pause] bomb aimer came from Queensland, he was about thirty-three, wireless operator was not much older than I was, I, I did have pictures of them [sound of leafing through pages].
NM: We can come onto that afterwards, if you want.
HK: Afterwards, yeah. [leafing sounds continue] Give some names.
NM: Let’s go through their names on the record and we can look at the photographs after the interview.
HK: Yeah, right.
NM: So, you go through the names.
HK: Hmm, yes.
NM: Talk, go through the names and describe the names.
HK: Yes, well, there was Bill Ryan, Les Sabine, the navigator, he came from New South Wales, as did Johnny Nichols, the wireless operator, and Jim McPhee was bomb aimer, Norm Johnstone, the mid upper gunner, and myself, and then there was Jim Newing, but we always called him Bert so we didn’t get mixed up with Jim McPhee, the bomb aimer, he was the rear gunner, he came from Perth in western Australia, and, although I lost touch with the crew after the war, some fifty years later, I and my wife went to Perth, and I looked up the telephone directory, there was H.W. Newing, which was his name, and the telephone, and I rang up on the off chance and said ‘Have you ever been to England?’ and he said ‘Yes, who’s speaking?’ I said ‘Harold Kirby’ and he immediately said ‘Oh, our flight engineer!’ [Slight laugh] And he was able to come to the hotel and we had quite a long chat, unfortunately, we had to go off the following day, but by then, I had his address and telephone number, and we went back to Perth all summer, few years later, and he came and took us to meet his wife and have lunch, and so, that, that was very nice. Unfortunately, he’s passed away.
NM: Okay, sad to hear that. So, you went to Lancaster flying school, you say, after you, your?
HK: Yes, at Syerston, that was.
NM: That was, okay, at Syerston. And how long were you there for?
HK: Oh, just a matter of a week or so, I think. I don’t, I can’t remember that.
NM: So, you then joined 467 Squadron at Waddington?
HK: That’s right.
NM: Tell me about squadron life in 467, what was that like?
HK: What was that like? I think I was glad I’d been to 460 Squadron and got used to a lot of the Australians, so it didn’t come as a bit of a shock, but [pause] apart from those two instances that I mentioned, I think we were quite fortunate, getting away unscathed.
NM: So, can you describe general operations, then, on 467 at Waddington?
HK: Well, I, the pilot and navigator, this before an operation, they had a, an initial briefing, and then after that, the rest of the crew joined them to have a general briefing. We were – then we all had to get ready for going off, we had a, a meal beforehand. Coming back, we were debriefed, and contrary to, contrary to what other, I’ve read about other squadrons, we never got rum or anything like that, we just got coffee, and then we went to bed and waited for the next operation. I do remember that, on one occasion, I slept for about eighteen hours non-stop, virtually, that was after two or three night operations on the trot.
NM: So, when you found you were being posted to Pathfinders at –
HK: Yes.
NM: - Coningsby, at 97 Squadron, what was your feeling?
HK: Really, nothing much, we, I didn’t know much about them, and I just wanted to keep with the rest of the crew, suppose.
NM: So, was – how did Coningsby and the Pathfinders differ from a main force station at Waddington and 467?
HK: I can’t say that it was terribly different, different. We were quite fortunate in, again, that, as Waddington was, and Binbrook beforehand and then Coningsby, they were all peacetime stations and we were very comfortably housed, not like some squadrons who had to cope with a lot of mud [slight laugh]! Oh, yes, at Coningsby, we had to be capable of taking over some of the other tasks, such as, I was asked to keep the aircraft on the straight and level for a while, presumably in case the pilot couldn’t hold it, which, that was what I did, although the rear gunner said it was more like a switchback than straight and level [slight laugh]! Then I had to learn the Morse code and do some gunnery practice, and also bomb aiming, so that, that was quite a change. In fact, towards the end of the war, the normal bomb aimer went and helped the navigator with the screens that they had then, and I did the bomb aiming, so it, that was a change. [Pause] Can’t say that there’s much more to add.
NM: So the extra training that you had, then, for, for flying training for straight and level flying and for gunnery and Morse code and bomb aiming, what, how did those extra training comes about?
HK: I remember the bomb, bomb aiming, there was a sort of a, a map that sort of moved on the floor and we were practising sort of with the bomb sights, and then also, in, there was a bombing range at Wainfleet in the Wash, I think I did a, a few goes at that, and then as far as gunnery, we dropped a flare in the water and I was in the nose turret and had a go and see if I could shoot that, and so [pause] I do remember once, I think this was at, at Waddington, for some reason, the brakes failed as we were taxiing ‘round, and the pilot was able to steer by controlling the engines. The normal practice when you start off is to keep the brakes on and push the throttle forward to get maximum speed, power, and then suddenly take the brakes off and shoot off. Well, this time, we had no time to do that, we got slowly to the take-off point and got the green lights and pushed the throttles forward and, fortunately [laughs], took off okay! And then, again, we thought we’d go back to Woodbridge, which we did, and I repaired the brakes and we got back to base. [Pause]
NM: What did you feel about the different roles that you were asked to play, then, between flight engineer and gunnery and bomb aiming?
HK: Well, I quite enjoyed it, the change, yes.
NM: So your crew, altogether, did forty-four operations?
HK: Yes.
NM: And you all stayed together for the whole time?
HK: No, all except the mid upper gunner and the wireless operator, they decided they wouldn’t go on to the second tour, and so we had spare chaps to do that, but I can’t really remember much about them.
NM: How did the crew feel about losing two stalwarts and getting two replacements?
HK: Well, don’t think we were terribly happy, but that was, you know, if they didn’t want to go on, well, that was it. I preferred to carry on rather than go to a training squadron because that could be a bit dicey sometimes.
NM: What would you say about life in Bomber Command overall?
HK: Overall, I had quite a good time, really. [Pause] No, I don’t think I would have chosen anything else, I was quite happy with what I was doing. Bit dicey at times, but that was it.
NM: Do you keep, keep in touch at all with, or – you’ve spoken about the rear gunner you’ve met in Australia, do you keep in touch with squadron associations, reunions?
HK: Oh, I, I kept up with the squadron association, and Path – not, yes, Pathfinder Association, while it was still in force, and then I belonged to the Aircrew Association, we had monthly meetings, and –
NM: Were they locally here?
HK: That was at, that’s at Hemel Hempstead, but there’s another ex-Pathfinder who flew in Mosquitos who lived in Hatch End, and we take it in turns to drive to Hemel, but we were quite fortunate, really, because a lot of the branches had to close because lack of members, but as it’s open to post-war fliers as well, we’ve got quite a few in, in our association, and they help to keep the thing going, in fact, I think all the, apart from one, are post-war fliers, or the, I’m trying to say, the people that control, the – sorry, I, I get mixed up with words sometimes [laughs]! Yeah, but anyway, we keep going.
NM: Okay, that’s fair [?]. How do you think Bomber Command has been treated since the war?
HK: Not very well; in fact, I think in the end, we were quite happy to get the memorial. [Pause] Lot of work has been done to get it organised.
NM: Okay, shall we call it a day there?
HK: Hmm?
NM: Shall we finish the interview there? Are you happy with that, or was there anything else you’d like to talk about with your time in Bomber Command?
HK: I think I’ve covered most things. [Pause] I was telling you about my two friends that joined up before I did, both got shot down, one unfortunately on the Nuremburg raid, and the other one, who was on Stirlings, got shot down over France but parachuted to safety and was looked after by the French until he was – the Americans came. But, so, I was quite fortunate, really.
NM: So, did you find out about your friend’s loss during the war, or was it after the, only after the war, did you find?
HK: It was during the war, yes, I kept in touch with my particular school friend’s mother or parents and heard when he’d got shot down; they didn’t know what had happened to him at the time, of course, yes. [Pause] So I did keep up with that school friend after he’d come back from – to England. One peculiar thing happened was, at the time before he got shot down, he, he’d sent me a picture of him and a bomb aimer, his bomb aimer, and I was showing this to my crew, and my bomb aimer said ‘I know that chap, we’ve been doing training together in Canada!’ But he stayed on to do some training others and so he, he didn’t come, get to this country until well after my school friend’s bomb aimer had come here, but both the bomb aimer and my friend were the only two that managed to get out of the aircraft when it was shot.
NM: And you finished up doing a radar mechanic’s course?
HK: Yes.
NM: After the war.
HK: Ah, yes.
NM: Tell me a little bit about that.
HK: Well, that was quite enjoyable, learning how the radar worked, and after the war, instead of going back – well, I did go back for a while to my original job, which was in an accounts department, in an accounts department in an electric supplier, I decided I wanted to do something a bit more technical, and the GEC at the time were advertising for people for their laboratories, and I went along and got a job in their patents department, and trained – well, I did evening classes, got BSc, then went on to do the patent agent’s exams and stayed there until I retired, retired in ’83 but went on and did five more years part-time, until they moved the whole place to Chelmsford, I decided that was enough [slight laugh].
NM: And you’ve been retired ever since?
HK: Hmm?
NM: You’ve been retired ever since?
HK: Yes.
NM: Okay, I think that’s probably a very good note to finish on.
HK: [Laughs] Yes!
[Recording beeps: interview paused and restarted]
NM: Just continuing the interview with Mr Kirby.
HK: Yes, there were a couple of instances which I remember now, not actually connected with the enemy, but we were due to fly to Munich to bomb something at Munich, and we had to, we were rooted over the Alps in moonlight, which was a beautiful sight to see, and then another occasion, we flew to one of the eastern countries, oh, I could tell you exactly where it is [sound of leafing through pages], and we had to fly over Sweden at the time, and, yes. No, I can’t [pause as HK continues leafing through pages] Ah, Politz. Yes, I had to fly over Sweden, which was quite exciting ‘cause it was all lit up, they did shoot, but we were told that not to worry, they weren’t going to shoot at us. [Laughs] But those are just two instances I happen to remember.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Harold Kirby. One
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Nigel Moore
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-10
Format
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00:42:44 audio recording
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Sound
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
AKirbyH150710, PKirbyH1511
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Pending revision of OH transcription
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Description
An account of the resource
Harold Kirby joined up the Royal Air Force encouraged by two friends, but ended up training as a flight mechanic at RAF Halton on medical grounds. Harold became them airframe fitter, volunteered as a flight engineer, passed the physical but was then posted as a fitter at RAF Binbrook for six months with 460 Squadron. He was then at RAF Saint Athan to train as a flight engineer, then to RAF Winthorpe Heavy Conversion Unit with an all-Australian aircrew. Harold recollects a crash landing at RAF Woodbridge, followed by attending Lancaster Finishing School at RAF Syerston. He was then posted to 467 Squadron at RAF Waddington. Discusses bombing operations over France V-1 weapons sites, a bomb falling through a wing, and crash landing at RAF Wittering. Harold was eventually posted to 97 Pathfinder Squadron at RAF Coningsby, owing to his array of skills and multiple qualifications. Discusses post war training as radar mechanic, employment at the General Electric Company and reunions with his Australian aircrew.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
Language
A language of the resource
eng
460 Squadron
467 Squadron
8 Group
97 Squadron
aircrew
bomb struck
bombing
crash
crewing up
fitter airframe
flight engineer
flight mechanic
forced landing
ground crew
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mechanics airframe
military ethos
military living conditions
military service conditions
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Binbrook
RAF Coningsby
RAF Halton
RAF St Athan
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Wittering
RAF Woodbridge
recruitment
Stirling
training
V-1
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York
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/502/8396/ACuthbertJ160507.1.mp3
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Cuthbert, John
J Cuthbert
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Cuthbert, J
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Three items. An oral history interview with John Cuthbert (3006396 Royal Air Force) and two photographs. He flew operations as a mid-upper gunner with 189 Squadron from RAF Fulbeck.
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2016-05-07
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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GC: This interview is being conducted on behalf of the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archives. My name’s Gemma Clapton. The interviewee today is John Cuthbert and the interview is taking place at Ramsey in Harwich on the 7th May 2016. Also present is Sandra. I’d like to say thank you very much for talking to me today and could we start. Just tell me a little bit about life before the war and how you joined up
JC: Before the war. Yes. Well, I, I’d left school for some time and in fact had had a couple of jobs when I went with a friend of mine to Chelmsford, joined a radio course, a government sponsored radio course at the Chelmsford Technical College which I found a bit difficult at times although the radio side was ok. The idea was to train people up to take the place of technicians who had gone into the air force so it was a crammed four month course. In fact I came eleventh out of forty so I was quite pleased with that and some stayed on at Marconi’s at Chelmsford and others went on to Murphy Radio at Welwyn Garden City which I did. I went on to Welwyn Garden City where there was a very large ATC squadron. I was going to join the navy because it’s a naval port here and my friends were in the navy but I joined the ATC and we heard there was some flying going on at a little airfield called Panshanger, about five miles away and we used to hurtle off on our bikes and get a flight in a Tiger Moth. So that was the very first bit of flying I did in a Tiger Moth but I got ticked off for moving the wrong bit because you were sitting behind the pilot and he was a bit grumpy that day I think and subsequently I attended a summer camp with the ATC at RAF Westcott which was an Operational Training Unit with Wellingtons and we had the chance of flying on a cross country in one of those so I flew a four hour cross country in a, in a Wellington, which was great. Shared the crews flying rations. Chewing gum and barley sugar which we never had of course and I thoroughly enjoyed it and I volunteered for air crew at that time and you could go up for Cardington. You know it was RAF Cardington you attended for two or three days for medicals and all sorts of things and I didn’t think I’d pass to be honest. I didn’t think I’d pass the medical. On the train going to Cardington there were chaps sitting opposite me, rugby players and all this sort of thing and I felt about that size and I thought hmmn but in the event I did get accepted and some of the big chaps didn’t. Strange isn’t it? Yes, I got, I saw later on a document later on which said PNB material which is pilot/navigator/bomb aimer but I wanted to go in as a wireless operator because it was my trade and it was my hobby and so I duly got called up for training as a wireless operator/air gunner and completed all the initial training which incidentally didn’t get off to a very good start because the first Monday of the new course you were put on fatigues. Not a very good start for the course but, and there were various jobs from sweeping the NAAFI. The worst one was delivering coke to all the huts because there was hundreds of huts. Guess which one I got? I got the coke delivery with some other lads so we had to load up this flat truck lorry with sacks of coke and deliver them to the huts around the camp and half way through the afternoon it started to rain so you can imagine what state we were in and part of the route took us past station sick quarters and at the end, it was a lot of huts put together and at the end of one of the huts was a conservatory type affair and inside were two or three chaps in beds, white sheets, sitting up, reading books. I was wet, dirty and I said, ‘You lucky blighters.’ The next minute a lorry went around a corner, a sharpish corner and a load of sacks came over and propelled me on to the road and the medico came dashing out from sick quarters ‘cause they saw it happen and I wanted to get back on the lorry but they wouldn’t let me do that. They dragged me into sick quarters and laid me out on one of their nice clean beds, examined me, couldn’t find anything broken. They said, ‘Well you’ve got to be kept in in case you’ve got concussion,’ so I finished up in sick quarters, in a bed, in a room on my own feeling rather sorry for myself but I thought never wish anything on yourself. [laughs]. I thought that was very funny afterwards but of course I had to start a new course then because I’d missed, I was in there a week. Nothing wrong with me and they let me go. No, I didn’t get any sick leave. I was just discharged into the, into the course. So, anyway the rest of it went all ok. I got fatigues again of course the next Monday and I thought this is like Groundhog Day you know but it wasn’t. It was, I did some sweeping somewhere or other which was quite mild. I enjoyed the course though. We had to work hard. At the end of it we were to go on leave and then return or be posted to a radio school which was the bit I was looking forward to but instead of that we were called to the NAAFI for a meeting with a lot of top brass who came down and said, ‘Well, you chaps, you’ve finished this course,’ he said, ‘But I’m afraid that the radio schools are pretty full and you’ll be kicking about for some while,’ he said, ‘But what we do want is some air gunners. They’re fitting new turrets to the underside of the aircraft.’ This, well they did experiment with this but it wasn’t continued with. That was a lot of eyewash. There were no such thing during the war of mid under turrets. Not on British aircraft. They were just short of air gunners and they wanted the whole course to remuster. We would have been sent on leave, returned to Bridgenorth where we’d done our training. There was an elementary air gunner school there and on completion of that we would go to air gunners school and if we passed we’d be sergeant air gunners and the next move would be Operational Training Unit and then a squadron and this appealed to most of them. I didn’t particularly want to be an air gunner. I was good on the old keys you see and a friend of mine, I’d better not give his name but came from Brightlingsea said, ‘You’ll be the only one left here, John if you don’t remuster. You’ll be all on your tod,’ he said. So, in the end I agreed and remustered with the rest of the course and my friend Jack he later came in to the hut where we were getting ready to go on leave and he was a big chap, rugby player and he was crying. His eyes weren’t good enough for straight air gunner so he had to stay. Isn’t that strange? I met him after the war when I was on Transport Command down at Holmsley South. I met him in the sergeant’s mess and he’d got his signals brevvy up. I said, ‘Oh you made your signals course then Jack.’ He said, ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘What did you do? Did you get on ops?’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘I was instructor on the Isle of Man.’ I said, ‘You got me flying over hunland,’ I said, ‘Getting shot at left, right and centre and you’re enjoying the fleshpots of Douglas.’ ‘That’s right, John,’ he said. [laughs]. I said, ‘Well if I’d got the chop I’d have come back and haunted you.’ [laughs] But anyway he did, he did do the course and, but he never got on a squadron. So there we are but the rest of it was quite exactly as the top brass said. We went on leave, we came back and did Elementary Air Gunner School at Bridgenorth. Went on leave, came back and we were posted, I was posted to number 3 Air Gunner’s School at Castle Kennedy near Stranraer in Scotland. We used to fly up and down Luce Bay shooting at a drogue towed by a Martinet with a very frightened pilot, [laughs] I imagine he was anyway. Although there was a long, a long cable between the towing aircraft and the drogue that we fired at but that was all good fun. The only trouble was that we that were on Ansons, flew Ansons there. There was the pilot, the instructor and three UT air gunners so you each took it in turn to go in to the turret and fire and the ammunition was tipped with different coloured paint so that you knew which gunner had made which holes in it or none whatever the case may be and it was a strange little, it was a Bristol turret. As you elevated the guns up you went down and vice versa so it wasn’t, it wasn’t a lot of room in it so if you did anything wrong you got, it wasn’t easy. There would be the instructor yelling at you from the astrodome further up telling you to get the seagull out of your turret and all this sort of thing but it was very enjoyable and I passed out third in the course which I was quite pleased with at that considering I didn’t want to be an air gunner to start with. There was one unfortunate, well one unfortunate incident while we were there. The pilots were all Polish and they all wanted to be Spitfire pilots so when we’d finished the exercise, whatever it was, it was a lot of very low flying which was all great fun but this particular day this one went into a farmhouse and they were all killed and the three UT gunners in it were the only Scottish lads on the course and they were the ones in Scotland. They were the ones that were killed. I had to attend the boarding ceremony on the station. So, so that was that. We duly went on leave as sergeant air gunners or most of us did anyway and I think we went, we went, yes we went to Operational Training Unit then at Upper Heyford but that was where the ground schooling was done there which was quite a lot of that as you can imagine. Then we went over to the satellite airfield at Barford St John near Banbury of Banbury Cross fame, for the flying in Wellingtons so I was back in the Wellingtons. That was good fun. We crewed up there of course. That was quite remarkable, the crewing up. It’s, I think we were the only country who did it. You were just all put in to a hangar and said get on with it. Gunners, pilots, navigators. Well, I was in, I had an air gunner mate so we were together so there were two air gunners and the skipper was looking for two air gunners and we sort of collided with him and that was that. He was a big tall chap. I’ll have to show you a photograph. Wore a moustache. In fact he was known as The Count on the squadron because he could have been a Count. He was a public schoolboy but he was one of the lads, you know. He wasn’t, he wasn’t at all snooty with it and we found a bomb aimer and a wireless operator, Bill. And we hadn’t got a navigator. There was one who we eventually had but he’d been on a previous course and the aircraft had crashed and he’d walked out of it. We thought that might have been a bit of an omen [laughs]. Some funny things you think of. Anyway, Frank Johnson was the navigator and he was a damned good navigator. Anyway, we were crewed up and the first flying was circuits and bumps, of course with an instructor. First time we’d all flown together and I always remember the first, after the first hour of circuits and bumps the instructor got up to get out down the old ladder and we all pretended to follow him [laughs] because the skipper would be taking us but he turned out to be a very very good pilot of course and we did our day circuits and bumps and then our night circuits and bumps which was a bit more difficult ‘cause you got in to a Wellington in the front, under the nose and the propellers were very close to the fuselage and you had to go dead straight to the aeroplane otherwise you’d rather lose your head. In more ways than one. But that was fun and then we went back to Upper Heyford for ground school. It had a very complicated fuel system the Wellington and more than one crew were lost because they’d thought to have run out of petrol and in fact there was another tankful somewhere but they’d opened the wrong cocks, you know. So this, I forget, I think his name was Fry, Flight Lieutenant Fry, he was a genius. He’d fixed up a ground replica of this petrol system with pipes and levers and everything and fans and we all had to learn it. We all had to learn the fuel system by doing this, you know, this model. If you did anything wrong the fans would stop. So we got quite good at that but we didn’t have any trouble with the Wellington. The only thing that concerned me a little bit about them was at night when you did a night cross country or any night flying. They’ve got fabric covered wings, the Wellingtons. They were made of a geodetic construction but it was all fabric covered and they filled the tanks up in the wing and invariably some got spilled all over this fabric and as you took off sparks would be flying past from the engine and if you were in the astrodome looking out you wondered why you didn’t catch fire but they never did of course. It was flitting past too quickly but that was, that was an interesting point about the Wellington but we used to have some good cross countries in those. Four hours as a rule and a nice meal when you, before you took off and another one when you got back so that was good. From there, we all passed out there with flying colours and the next thing, I think we went to a, kicked our heals for a week or two at a, some place waiting for, but the next move was to a Heavy Bomber Conversion Unit on Stirlings, big four engine things but we couldn’t go directly. We had to wait out turn and eventually we were posted to RAF Swinderby on these confounded Stirlings which were very, very fine aircraft but the ones we had were well past their sell by date and I don’t think we ever flew without something going wrong and we were jolly glad to see the back of Swinderby I can tell you. All sorts of things happened. I mean, one of the worst ones I was in the rear turret, we were doing night circuits and bumps, two hour detail and we’d done about half of it and we were doing a landing and I thought, hello the old runway is still whizzing past fast. The brakes had failed. There was a yell from the skipper, ‘Brace, brace.’ Well, I was in the rear turret. I couldn’t do much but just hang on. The runway finished, the grass started, we went through a hedge, across a field and finished up with the bombing hatch over the Newark Lincoln Road so we were out of there a bit smartish because they had a habit of catching fire, these Stirlings. We plodded back to the peritrack and the transport came around to pick us up and we thought we were back to the mess for a meal now. No. No. Around the peritrack to another Stirling to finish the detail so we did another hour of night circuits and bumps so that didn’t, didn’t encourage me at all with those things. On another occasion the, it had an electric undercarriage, not an hydraulic one and if there was any failure at all with it you had to wind it up by hand or the flight engineer did. Well, no we hadn’t got a flight engineer there. Or did we? Yes, we picked him up, that’s right, we picked a flight engineer up at Con Unit. We didn’t, we didn’t have a flight engineer at the Operational Training Unit. They were still learning about engines somewhere. But yeah this damned thing wouldn’t wind down so we were pealing around for half an hour trying to get the undercarriage down so that was interesting. But the worst things that happened to us in a Stirling was on a cross country. This was October, November time and it was over Scotland and we were on our way home, on the homeward leg and the starboard outer engine overheated. Apparently they get, the oil gets super cool and thick and doesn’t circulate so the engine gets, and it’s called coring apparently. Anyway, they had to switch the engine down but that was alright but what wasn’t right was the propellers wouldn’t feather. It wouldn’t feather and stop so it was windmilling so not only had we lost an engine it was still being driven by windmilling causing a terrific lot of drag. Fortunately, we’d got the screen flight engineer with us instructing our flight engineer and he assisted on the way back. We called up. It was a system during the war called Darkie. They wouldn’t allow it now but the posters was of a little black boy. ‘If you’re in trouble call Darkie.’ Well we called Darkie but he wasn’t in unfortunately so we called Group or got on the radio and called Group and they said that we should try and zigzag home going near airfields which we did. We eventually got back to Swinderby and came in to land and the skipper, he’d learned or heard in the mess that you took the trim off if you lost, you know, were in really serious trouble with an engine and it would, it would straighten, help to straighten it up but it didn’t. It had the opposite effect and we swung towards a group of trees and there was a, ‘Brace. Brace,’ from the skipper again and the navigator, one of his jobs when you were landing and taking off was give the airspeed and a Stirling stalled at ninety miles an hour and I can hear Frank’s voice now saying, ‘Ninety. Ninety. Ninety,’ and I was just waiting to crash and then suddenly it was, ‘ninety five,’ and apparently the screen engineer and the skipper were pushing on the rudder to keep it straight and we overshot, went around again and came in safely and landed and when we got back to the control room they said, ‘We didn’t expect to see you lot again.’ So, [laughs] so that was the dark humour I’m afraid but that put me right off Stirlings that did. We were very glad to see the back of them. We did finish the course and I think we lost about five crews while we were there. All crashing. Not altogether the crew’s faults. You know, just and that invariably happened on a Saturday night and that was a Saturday night when we did our little performance so perhaps we were intended to go in. I don’t know. But the next posting was to RAF Syerston. Number 5 Lancaster Finishing School and it was like going from a clapped out old banger to a Rolls Royce, flying Lancasters. Yeah, that was really good. We had some very enjoyable times there. We had to do quite a lot of flying. Practice high level bombing and fighter affiliation where you have a camera instead of a gun and a Spitfire makes attacks on you and that’s all good fun. It is for the gunners and the pilot but not for the rest of the crew. They’re being chucked about all over the place. There was one amusing little incident while we were at Lancaster Finishing School. We came across, one afternoon coming back from somewhere or other, we came across a Flying Fortress flying back to its base somewhere I suppose and we came up to it and we had to slow down to keep, not keep up with it but to keep station with it and to exaggerate this and to show off a bit we dropped the undercarriage and put some flap down to slow the Lancaster down and we did the usual thumbs up and all this sort of thing and then up with the wheels, in with the flaps and zoomed off. I reckon they thought, ‘Show offs,’ but there we are. I’m afraid the skipper did do that a bit. The one I didn’t like him doing though was, which he did quite a bit on the squadron if we had to do any air sea firing we used to chuck a flame float in the water and then we’d fire at it as we went around but if he spotted any ships he generally introduced himself, you know, by going very low but what I didn’t, what I was scared of, he was going to do this with Royal Naval ships ‘cause I know from my experience at home that anything that flew was fired at. I don’t think they’d heard of aircraft recognition. They just fired at everything that flew. In fact they did bring a Fortress down in the river here during the war. It was out, stuck in the mud for ages wasn’t it? So, I had visions of the skipper doing a show off beat up on a destroyer or something and getting a few rounds up our backsides but on one occasion there was a whole line of, it was a very nice sight, of destroyers in line of stern and we got down the same level as level as them and flew along and so I think they flashed good luck to him on the aldis lamp but I had visions of them opening fire on us. I thought, I hope they know what a Lancaster looks like but there we are. So we passed out there ok and then, yes the skipper was anxious to get on a Pathfinder squadron. They did one tour of forty ops if they survived that long and you had to learn each other’s jobs and all about marking and all that sort of thing which we did. We swotted it all up and we duly went for our interview. It was a wing commander, I think, took it and we were all gathered in front of him answering questions and the skipper, his name was Clem Atting, by the way, his name. He had a scarf on. Weren’t supposed to wear scarves like that and the wing commander said, ‘Are you warm enough, Atting?’ ‘Yes, thank you sir. Yes. Very well.’ ‘Well take that bloody scarf off,’ he said [laughs]. So our interview went downhill from then on and needless to say we did not get to a Pathfinder squadron. We were posted to 189 at Fulbeck-in-the-mud we called it. Well when we got there we were issued with gumboots and I’d never, never heard of that before. We were issued with gumboots. So there we were and we were in wooden huts there though. They weren’t nissen huts. They were wooden huts and I remember, you know, that’s right we went there with four other crews because we went in convoy with another truck. There were four crews ‘cause they’d lost four aircraft and when we piled out of the aircraft er out of the trucks waiting to go to some billet somewhere I was hailed by a resident air gunner from the other side of the road, ‘Hello John.’ He said, ‘You’re a chop replacement.’ [laughs] I thought, ‘Good afternoon to you too.’ Well, we know we were obviously or else we wouldn’t have been sent there but I thought what a greeting, you know. We eventually got in our huts and I can very clearly see it now. The beds weren’t made up obviously, it was just, I just laid the biscuits out, flopped on it ‘cause we were a bit weary by that time and I looked back and on the wall there were twenty eight ticks. Was it thirty or, thirty well I think I’ve got in my notes somewhere that it was reduced to thirty three but I don’t think it was thirty three when we were there. I think it was thirty. Anyway, I thought crikey if this crew who were in this hut had done twenty eight, they were on their twenty ninth and they were shot down what hope have we got, you know? We don’t know anything ‘cause it is, it’s luck though really. Its luck. Absolute luck. I know you’ve got to know all your stuff but it is really luck whether you go down on your first or your last. I mean there were very experienced crews who were shot down when we were on the squadron. On one, on our first raid to Horten Fjord in Norway the master bomber was shot down who was in charge of the raid but there we are. Yes, there was another crew in the hut and they were just finishing theirs. They were just finishing. In fact they did finish their tour while we were there but they left behind their flight engineer who was slightly bad I think. Leo Doyle, I think his name was. He had a revolver in his flying boot and he didn’t want to go on leave and have a rest like you did after a tour. He wanted to join 617 squadron, you know and carry on which he eventually did and I met him after he’d been on it for a while and he said, ‘They’re mad,’ he said, ‘They’re quite mad.’ He said, I think he said they were doing a raid on Flushing and they were in line of stern in daylight and they were just getting shot up as they went in, you know. They didn’t take any evasive action. They were just making sure they hit the target so I mean he was, he was a bit flak happy but that was almost too much for him I think [laughs]. Dear of dear. I always remember him. But yeah, we, we’d, as I say our first, first raid was to Horten Fjord. It was a U-Boat base for the North Atlantic and we duly did our stuff there. It was a long sea trip and the Pathfinders marked the coast where we crossed, where we should cross in case you got off course over the sea, made sure you crossed at the right place but we avoided that like the plague because there was a night fighter station just around the corner at Kristiansand and we thought they could well be buzzing around there so we crossed a bit further east but I think we sighted a ME109. I think that was the occasion I sighted an ME109 astern of us but it didn’t attack us and we kept quiet as well. The second one was not quite so clever. That was at Ladburgen on the Dortmund Ems canal. It was at a place where the water was higher than the surrounding countryside and so the banks were very important and 5 Group’s job was to go there periodically and knock them down and we were, fortunately or unfortunately, that was our second raid. That wasn’t the first time they’d been there but obviously that was our first one there and there was a terrific lot of flak. Naturally they wanted to stop us. They got a bit grumpy about us knocking all this stuff down but we got, we got back ok. I can’t remember. I’ve got some notes here about them but the next one was to Bohlen and that was an oil refinery. Most of our raids were on oil refineries because at that time the Germans were very short of oil towards the end of the war and no we didn’t do much of this flattening of cities and things. We only did a couple of those I suppose. But Bohlen, that was a long trip but uneventful. The next one was to Harburg which was eventful. It was a great big oil refinery on the River Ems. It was both sides. it was a huge, huge place and we were routed in past the Frisian Islands who all had a go at us as we went past which I thought it was a bit uncharitable and then we turned right smartly, right over the middle of Hamburg which again, I thought was a bit silly because they all thought we were going to bomb Hamburg and of course everything went off there and I could see from the turret that the whole place was well alight. It was like day. Flames and flares and everything. It was, it was like hell. You know. Like flying into hell and as we came in I noticed that there was a JU88 poking about. It was so bright I could see the markings on the wings. I warned the skipper. I said, ‘A JU88 starboard quarter up. Prepare to corkscrew starboard,’ and at the same time Eddie Jordan the bomb aimer was giving his, ‘Left. Left. Steady. Right a bit’ and at the same time as he said, ‘Bombs gone.’ I said, ‘Corkscrew starboard. Go,’ as this blooming thing came in and I opened fire and it broke away. I don’t know whether I, I think I must have hit it but he didn’t hit us. That was the main thing. The purpose was to evade it, avoid it. Not to shoot down German aeroplanes but to not get shot down yourself but obviously if you could hit him you would. But we dived out of there at a terrific speed and into the darkness and comparative quiet and the skipper got his, got the heading for home, you know, or first leg of going home and off we went . I think the rest of the, when we got back to Fulbeck we found that there were four, there were four missing. Four of our lads were shot down including some very good friends of ours who arrived on the squadron with us you know, when we arrived. Flying Officer Smith. I can’t remember his Christian name. It was D. It might have been David but I’m not sure now but he did a remarkable thing. He, whilst doing this fighter affiliation at Lancaster, at er when we first got to the squadron you think you’re all ready to go into ops but you don’t. You do quite a lot of training and the drill was when you’d finished the exercise was to take the Spitfire back to Metheringham where it came from because he wouldn’t know where he was and then you know, a guy would go down and well on this occasion a Spitfire formated a bit too close and took about seven foot off the wing off the Lanc and Smithy baled the crew out, one of whom always said he’d have time to do his bottom straps up on his parachute. Well he didn’t. He went straight through his parachute harness and was killed when he hit the ground of course and the Spitfire wasn’t damaged and followed the parachute out to see but there was nothing on the end of it. And Smithy landed the Lancaster safely and it had, you know he was on the Harburg raid with us and he got shot down.
GC: You talk about your crew. Tell us a bit about what they were like. What kind of characters they were.
JC: Well, the other gunner, he was a good friend of mine. Much the same sort of type. Bit shorter than me. The flight engineer was quite old. Bert Shaw. He, he must have been nearly thirty. We were, I mean, I was nineteen, eighteen or nineteen. Skipper was twenty two. The others were about that age. I think I was the youngest but Bert, he was very nice. He was married and he was, he drove a fire engine in civvy life but he was very domesticated and he ironed our collars and things for us. He loved doing them. It was just as well because we couldn’t do it and the bomb aimer, he was Eddie Jordan. He was a nice chap. Very well spoken and educated. Like the skipper. Not that we weren’t but you know, he, they were a little bit, I think, better than ourselves. The wireless op Bill Mobley he was a good mate of mine. Got into a few scrapes. They borrowed the, him and a mate of his borrowed the flight commander’s motorbike one night and pranged it. Finished up in Wroughton Hospital and the next day the skipper said, ‘I think we aught to give Bill a look,’ and I said, ‘Well are we going over in the car?’ ‘Oh no,’ he said, ‘We’ll fly over and so we did a low level attack on Wroughton Hospital. How we didn’t get, well he did get caught eventually. He, he, when you take off in a Lancaster you climb steadily until you get a good height before you bank. The skipper thought he was in a Spitfire and used to go off like, unfortunately one day the station commander was in the control tower when this Lancaster flew just overhead and he said, ‘Who’s that?’ ‘Flying officer Atting, sir.’ So Flying Officer Atting was sent to the naughty aircrew school at Sheffield for a week or was it a fort, a week I think. Flight lieutenants and above, flying officers and above went there to the naughty boys school and they had great fun there apparently. The first night he was there they, it was in a famous old hall and they took the fish down from the cabinets, set fire to some furniture and were toasting them apparently [laughs] But we went on leave so we thought it was a jolly good idea this Sheffield business but when we got back off leave and Clem came back and he said, ‘I’ll show you where we were.’ So we hopped aboard our aeroplane and duly went over to Sheffield and he showed us at very close quarters [laughs] the school.[laughs] It’s funny we didn’t all finish up there to be honest but you know, we should get into bits of bother but some things we got away with and it will probably catch up with me when they hear all this but some of it, when we were on ops we dropped stuff called Window. You’ve probably heard all about it. Strips, well it was in packs, packages and they were put down the flare chutes, down the chutes and when they got in the slipstream they burst open and scattered. Well, the skipper and the bomb aimer had girlfriends in this village not too far from Fulbeck and one afternoon we were stooging around flying and they thought they’d give them a look and I mean a look. Dear oh dear. We, I remember looking up at the church tower as we came past and we Windowed the village and they must have known who it was because at that time, or hitherto the markings, we were CA 189 squadron, our squadron letters were CA in big red letters on the aircraft followed by the letter L or E or whatever and they decided to outline it in orange which I thought was a bit unfair really but anyway they were done and of course they stuck out like a sore thumb. I don’t know which raid it was.
[pause]
Ah yes I think it was a place called Lutzkendorf, another oil refinery job and we were diverted to Manston because of fog everywhere and the next morning we took off to go fly back to Fulbeck and again this Window stuff, dropped by somebody else before it had burst open hit all our aerials and took them away so we couldn’t contact anyone on RT and another one of the other squadrons said, ‘Well follow us, you know. We’ll take you back.’ So we did. What we did we didn’t know was that this other character was going to visit his auntie on the way back [laughs] which was down in a valley so we duly followed him down and saw his auntie and flew back to Fulbeck and later on in the day there was a complaint. The adjutant received a complaint from a wing commander who was having his breakfast looking down on two, two Lancasters. Reported us. And the adjutant thought it was great fun and tore the complaint up into the wpb. So that was that. He was really good at that. He looked after us very well, did our adj. I got caught at home on leave cycling without my hat by a snotty provo flight lieutenant who didn’t know the front, the back of an aeroplane and I had to show him my pass of course, 189 Squadron, Fulbeck. The next day when I got back from leave the skipper said, ‘By the way,’ he said, ‘The adj has had a complaint from the provo marshall about you.’ I said, ‘Oh?’ ‘Cycling without a hat.’ He said, ‘Don’t worry,’ he said, ‘It was duly filed.’ Considering most, a lot of his time was taken up writing letters to the families you know so to get one about someone not wearing a hat I can only just imagine what he thought. Well there we are.
GC: Sounds like you had more fun than serious stuff.
JC: Well we did have a lot of fun. We, the skipper was always, I mean you’d be wondering what to do one afternoon and the door would burst open. ‘Let us leap into the air,’ he would say. I don’t know what sort of excuse he gave to anybody to get and so off we’d go. Mind you there were official high level bombing practices and fighter affiliation with a Spitfire. One afternoon we were coming back from a high level bombing exercise which we couldn’t do because there was cloud everywhere and this Spitfire came up, went like that. And I went like that. And I said to the skipper, ‘I think he wants to play games,’ so we sort of meant to play around a bit and he went off and started making attacks on us and for half an hour we chucked that Lanc around the fire, around the sky and it was great fun. Well, it was for the gunners as I say and for the pilot. The rest of the crew were groaning and moaning. Hanging on tight. And I think Eddie Jordan had a bit of tooth trouble so that as we dived down that started making his tooth ache. So they didn’t think it was very funny but at the end of it he got in right close and went like that as much to say, you did alright. So that was good fun. But it wasn’t all like that you know. There was some dodgy bits. Really dodgy bits. Yeah. One of the other daylights we did was to Essen. That was a thousand bomber raid and that was quite a sight and we never did see the ground. It was covered in cloud and we had to bomb on a sky marker. Can’t remember the name of it. Wanganui flare I think they called them but you had to bomb on a certain heading otherwise you’d be all over the place and when we left, I always remember this, when we left the cloud which had been all flat there was a big bump in, over Essen and we never even saw the ground. So that was one occasion where we did what you might call open bombing, didn’t have a specific thing to hit. After that came Wurzburg. Now this was the, we didn’t, we didn’t go to Dresden. I’ve got a note in my diary that the boys have gone to Dresden. We didn’t. We were obviously stood down for some reason. Probably been the night before because you didn’t get to do two consecutive nights ‘cause you couldn’t really ‘cause you didn’t get up till lunchtime. You’d have to get up, have lunch and go straight into briefing so there was generally a night free but we went to Wurzburg which was a big open city and I don’t know why we went there but after the war I read it was troop concentrations. The Russians wanted us to sort it out and that was the only time we carried incendiaries, carried a cookie which was a four thousand pounder like a huge big dustbin and incendiaries and when we left the place the place was alight but on the way back we got into a bit of a spot of bother we were diverted, well we were routed home between Karlsruhe and Stuttgart. Two places to avoid like the plague. And we were poodling along in the dark minding our own business, halfway home and suddenly bump, the radar searchlight went straight onto us. The blue one. So I thought, ‘Hello. We’re in trouble here.’ That’s hastily followed by five ordinary ones so we are immediately floodlit and that was smartly followed by all the ackack guns in what we found out later was Karlsruhe. We’d gone right slam bang over Karlsruhe. We’d been flying straight and level for ages so they must have had us tuned up a treat so how they didn’t knock us out of the sky I’ll never know. It felt as though someone was banging the aircraft with a fourteen pound sledgehammer all over it. You couldn’t hear the engines, you know. I thought they’d all stopped you know one of those funny sort of things that happen you see and the skipper did everything with that Lancaster that, things you would do in a Spitfire short of rolling it and eventually we emerged into the darkness. The lights went out, the guns stopped and it felt awfully silent and the skipper called us all up in turn to see if we were alright and then he sent the flight engineer around with a torch to see if there was anything, damage anywhere. He couldn’t see anything obviously bad and we continued home rather silently but at lunchtime the next day we went down to the aeroplane to do our daily inspections and things and it was like a pepper pot. It had got shiny new squares of aluminium all over it where the lads had filled up, covered the holes up and I thought, ‘Blimey,’ I looked up at the mid upper turret and there were two or three right, right under that. They went in one side, straight across the aircraft and out the other side. It’s only aluminium and these were red hot bits of steel and they were, well why we weren’t seriously hit, or the engines, none of the engines were damaged.
GC: Was there a, or what was the main difference between day and night? Was there, was there did you prefer to do day or do night? Was one more dangerous than the other?
JC: Well, daylight was dangerous in that you could be seen. On the other hand you could see. You could see fighters but the daylight, I don’t think we had a fighter escort over Essen because there was too many of us. There was another one over Nordhausen which I’ll mention next but on that we had a fighter escorts, Typhoons, and they went in front of us strafing all the airfields, keeping them on the ground and then escorting us but we didn’t have [pause], later on we went to Flensburg. We didn’t have a fighter escorts then so I don’t know. Sometimes we did. But it could be very dodgy. A friend of mine, Basil Martin, unfortunately he’s dead now but he was on a squadron in 3 Group and they did a lot of daylights over France leading up to D-Day and after D-Day and they had quite a lot of fighter trouble. In fact, they had, I remember him telling me once there were three of them flying to the target in broad daylight and an ME109 came after them and shot the back one down, then the next one down and his gunner shot that one, shot the ME109 down. They didn’t get a medal for it though. They just got to the target and back again but there were a lot of very short, obviously into France, so very short operations and at one time they, you had to do, or so I heard after the war, that you had to do two of those to count as one ‘cause most of our trips were pretty long you know, sort of ten hours, ten and a half hours. Quite a long while. Yes. Yeah, that was the incident at Karlsruhe. Strangely, the earlier time that 189 lost four aeroplanes was when they went to Karlsruhe. Lost four. We were replacements for the ones that were shot down over Karlsruhe so they were trying to have a go at us as well you see. It’s strange isn’t it?
GC: Did you get superstitious about things like that?
JC: Well, I don’t know. You do get a bit that way. I always put my right flying boot on first and if I didn’t I took them both off and put them on again and people had lots of silly things that you did [pause]. But then nobody queried it.
GC: You also, you also talked about quote ‘hijinks’ in this Lancaster. What was it really like because a Lancaster is a big plane to be throwing around quite so willy nilly.
JC: Yes. Indeed. Well, I’ll tell you something we did one day which, nobody believed us anyway, so I might as well tell you and I couldn’t put it in my logbook otherwise we would have all been court martialled but it’s in my diary. We’d been up for some high level bombing practice over Wainfleet range which is in the Wash. There was an area there where you dropped [prunes?] as we called them. They were smoke ones in the day and at night they were flash and a chap, or I think there were two of them, sat in concrete bunkers taking a bearing on your hits so they could tell you what you’d missed or hit. Well, we got over Wainfleet range and you couldn’t see a thing. We were up at about eighteen thousand feet so the skipper said, ‘Well we’ll do a bit of three engine flying,’ so feathered the starboard outer and that meant, I was in the rear turret that meant I couldn’t use my turret. Then he did the port outer which, I mean the Lancaster will fly quite happily on two engines and then he did the starboard inner and I thought, ‘Oh hang on.’ I wound my turret by hand on the beam so that if necessary I could open the back doors and go out because we had, we had a pilot type chute then for the rear turret. You didn’t have to get out the turret but in the mid upper turret you had to get out, go a few of yards down the fuselage, get your parachute out of a housing, clip it on and then go to the door and, you know it was a bit of a palaver which a lot of people never made of course but anyway we’re flying on one engine. That was the port inner left. And he said, ‘Feather port inner.’ And the poor old Bert Shaw, his voice was getting drier and drier you know, he said, ‘Feathering port inner, skipper,’ faithfully doing as he was told and that meant shutting the engine down and then feathering it so they wouldn’t windmill. So there were four fans stopped. Poor old Bill Mobley, the wireless op, he’d got all this gear on. He thought, ‘That’s gone a bit quiet.’ He looked out the astrodome and saw four propellers stopped. He said, ‘You bloody fool,’ he said, ‘I’ve got all my electric gear on here.’ Well they wouldn’t have had enough on the batteries to unfeather so he shut everything off in a hurry and then came the dramatic words, ‘Unfeather starboard outer,’ and fortunately there was enough power to turn the props and it windmilled and fired. There was a puff of smoke came past the turret and I thought, ‘We’re alright now,’ and all four were running but we weren’t diving down very fast but apparently the skipper had seen a photograph of a Lancaster with all four engines feathered allegedly beating up the control tower but of course that was a trick photograph but the engines were all feathered. They were all stopped and feathered so it must have been done. So he, being a very, if someone could do it he’ll do it, you know. He’ll have a go.
GC: I must admit I’d heard that and you’ve just confirmed ‘cause everybody went, ‘No it can’t be done.’ I had heard it so. You just, you just proved it.
JC: Oh yes. We didn’t have, we weren’t engineless for very long because as I say the wireless op exploded. He should have told him what he was going to go ‘cause he’d got his radio gear on and all the nav equipment and everything.
GC: Yeah.
JC: All draining from the batteries which we wanted for that initial restart but I did quietly tell the fitter engines once ‘cause we used to have a beer with them, you know and he didn’t believe us and I thought, well that’s fair enough. I know it was true, the rest of the crew knew it was true but no one dare breathe a word officially about it or we would all have been, well the skipper would have been court martialled. That’s for sure. So that was, I suppose, the silliest thing we did. Although, I did something very silly once. In the mid upper turret there was, they were electrically fired and there was cut out gear so that you couldn’t’ shoot your fins off or kill the rear gunner or people up in the front you know and there was taboogie which lifted them clear as you went around. Well, we were up one day. We put a, put a smoke float out to shoot at and the blooming things wouldn’t work and I thought, ‘Oh hell.’ So I thought, well I can still fire them ‘cause I can fire them manually by pushing the [sear in] underneath the screw with my toggle and I waited until we were clear and did it and I thought, ‘What the hell am I doing?’ And your mind plays tricks then. Everything went silent and I thought, ‘I’ve shot the blooming aeroplane down,’ and I hastily looked around at all the wing tips and everything and everything was all quiet and I never said a word. I reported that the guns wouldn’t fire and they were all put right but a few rounds had been fired and they would know that but nothing ever happened. I was lucky there. I could have done some damage to the aeroplane just because I wanted to fire the guns. Well, you know all the trouble you go to go out there and do everything and then you can’t do it but the bomb aimer had a slight accident once too because he, he was in charge of the front turret although I don’t think he ever went in it but you had to go out and do a DI on your guns every day and I was in the mid upper turret and I heard a single shot and that was from the front turret and that was Eddie had done it. He’d, because you cock and fire but you have to have the the fire on safety not on safe of course but to get around that you’ve got fire to put a breechblock forward and pull it back and take a round out. Anyway, this single shot went across the airfield, I don’t know where it finished up. We looked anxiously ahead of the aeroplane because out in dispersal but it must have passed over the airfield somewhere but we never heard of anyone being shot so we, we didn’t say too much about that.
GC: There was probably a cow lying in a field somewhere shot by a Lancaster.
JC: That was a bit funny that but there we are.
GC: What was it, I mean you, you’re a upper gunner which was quite a unique place? What was that like?
JC: Well it was, you were very exposed of course. You got a very good view of everything. I mean you could look all around three hundred and sixty degrees whereas in the rear turret your vision was limited to dead astern and each side although there was bits of equipment and stuff in the way. You couldn’t really see properly. The only proper way to see was straight ahead and there the, it was a clear vision channel, clear vision panel where the Perspex had been removed so you could see out better but your visibility wasn’t as good as in the mid upper which was just all Perspex so you had to make sure that was really clean. It was, it was quite a good, quite a good position I suppose but as I say very exposed I suppose but you could see what was going on. Wasn’t altogether a good idea. One of the scariest things was, that I found and no doubt other people thought so too was they never seemed to notice them but you could be flying along at night, pitch dark and suddenly on the beam there’d be a sudden big flare like a full moon, a new moon hanging in the sky. It was a German night fighter. You knew it was, you knew it was a fighter there, it was a great temptation to stare at the damned thing but you didn’t know because he was going to fly across and see who was silhouetted against these flares so you had to look into the dark part of the sky to see what he was up to and in the meantime your aeroplane seemed to be illuminated. Although it was all matt paint it used to shine and I thought you know he must see us and you’d stare and stare and look around and try and, but that was the scariest thing because you knew that a German night fighter had just done that and just dropped that flare with the very intention of seeing who he could see silhouetted against the light because it was a brilliant like a new full moon and it seemed to hang there for hours but in fact it was only a few minutes but it seemed ages before it fizzled out and then you’d get back to darkness.
[pause]
Yes, Nordhausen, that was another daylight. That was, in actual fact it was the place where they were making these rockets underground so we weren’t, obviously couldn’t do anything about that but there was lots of barracks there. A lot of troops and we, apparently the SS was supposed to have moved in and had made their headquarters there and so it was decided to give them a visit for breakfast and there was about two hundred and fifty of us from 5 Group with fighter escort who’d gone in front, spraying the airfield and when we left the whole place was alight. Blew the whole place up, the railway system you know which blew it up but there was an unfortunate incident. This is something you’d see from an upper turret. I was watching an aircraft from 49 squadron who were with us at Bardney. There were always two squadrons on RAF stations. We were with 49 squadron and their letters were EA and I was watching this. It was EA F-Freddie and I saw its bomb doors open. It was behind us and down like that, saw its bomb doors open and the cookie just came out and then the whole lot blew up. It had been hit by, hit by flak and it just, I could feel the heat from it. Or I fancied I could. You know, it was, it just fell away you know. No one got out of it of course. They would have all been killed instantly and I looked it up, I’ve got a book showing all the losses, 5 Group, Bomber Command losses and that was set in there of course, Nordhausen EA F. All black cross against all of them. I looked up the one of Smithy’s crew that was shot down at Harburg and I think, I can’t remember exactly, some of them were killed. Smithy and another one of the crew were very badly injured and they were taken to a prisoner of war camp. Why they weren’t taken to hospital I don’t know. Perhaps it was easier to take them to a prisoner of war camp where they died a few hours later. So they must have been in a bad way. So they, they were killed. But I was really sad about that because they, we knew them so well. You know they’d been with us. They’d joined the squadron with us and he’d done that jolly good landing with a damaged Lancaster and then well I imagine that was their fourth trip. That was our fourth but but that was the only one I actually saw blow up in daylight but at night you see rumours abounded that the Germans were firing up a shell called a scarecrow which burst with a lot of flame and smoke. The idea being to put the wind up the aircrew that it was an aircraft going down but after the war the Germans said, ‘We never had any such thing.’
GC: You didn’t see one.
JC: So what we thought, what we thought was a scarecrow was an aircraft. They said, ‘We never had any such thing.’ It was a rumour that was very strong. Oh that’s a scarecrow gone off. Look. But it was, in a way I suppose it was a bit of comfort because you’d think that wasn’t an aeroplane that was a scarecrow but I’m afraid it wasn’t. We had to mark, I had to tell the navigator of any aircraft going down because he marked them on his chart for use after the war to track down the, which they did, of course, they tracked down all these people. And they even tracked down some aircrew who were unfortunately handed over to the gestapo and the SS and some of them were shot and I mean that’s completely against the Geneva Convention but wherever they knew who it was who did it they caught them and they were brought to trial at Nuremberg.
GC: What else can you remember about serving during World War 2? What was life like on and off the base as well?
JC: Oh, well it was strange really because on the squadron you were living a perfectly normal, peaceful life. You’d go to the pictures, go to the mess, have a few beers or if you were stood down you could go in to Nottingham or somewhere, stay the night, have a few beers and it was a perfectly normal life and then someone would stick their head around the door and say there’s a war and you’d have to go down to the mess or somewhere to have a look at the battle order to see if you were on and if you were well that’s, you went to briefing and had your flying meal. The last supper as it was irreverently referred to and away you went and so suddenly you were transported from a peaceful English village to the middle of a war and back again. If you were lucky.
GC: How did you, when, when you came back like from an op what was the plane like? Was it quiet? Were people chatting or -
JC: We didn’t chat. That’s the remarkable thing when you see these films of, especially American ones they’re all yacketing away. There wasn’t a word over the intercom unless it was necessary. There were certain navigation beacons and things during the war which flashed letters and I’d report those to the nav to help his navigation and in the rear turret you could take a drift so he could check the wind. That was a big trouble, not knowing the direction of the wind because Group would give you a wind but it wasn’t always, it wasn’t always terribly accurate and you only wanted to be a few degrees off and you’d be miles out. So that was the navigation was, I think we did remarkably well but you could see, I could see the target from miles away. You know, there was a glow in the sky for a start because everyone’s been there before you. The Pathfinders have been there, been down and had a look, dropped what they called primary blind markers, there’d would be flares dropped all over the place. Light the whole place up. There’d be searchlights on looking for the aeroplanes and the whole place would be full of activity so a good quarter of an hour before you got there you’d hear all this chatter over the VHF about putting the target indicators down and the master bomber would be controlling all this as though it was a picnic you know. It was quite remarkable and you were still a quarter of an hour away. So by the time you got there you knew everybody [laughs] everyone would be well awake but you could see it quite clearly and you’d think to yourself you’ve got to go through all that lot and hopefully out the other side and if you were early you had to drop your bombs between two very specified times and if you were early you had to do an orbit and come in again which was not a terribly good idea but you had to do it. We did that once. We did that over Komotau. We got there a bit early and I remember thinking I’ll have to have a, keep a sharp look out here going around for a meander around first but of course in daylight it’s nothing like that. There’s just smoke and fire. That’s all you see. There’s not the, I don’t know it’s not the darkness there. Strange. But, as I say, life on the, you know, it’s strange, you just carried on normally. You’d go down to the section in the morning see if any, see what was doing. Do the aircraft, do your DI on the aircraft and have your meals in the mess. You wouldn’t know where the boys were going if you weren’t on, you know. You wouldn’t know that till they got back. You’d say, I remember watching when I got, first got on the squadron I wanted to see. I stood down by the flights one evening as they took off and two squadrons of Lancasters so that was about what thirty odd aircraft all in line around the peritrack going slowly past, then turning onto the runway where there was a black and white chequered caravan and there would be a group of people there waving goodbye to their friends or whatever and you’d get a green from the caravan and the brakes would be on, the engines would be revved up and then the brakes would come off and you’d surge forward to give you an initial kick down the runway. There would be a wave from these people. I don’t know whether they were pleased to see us go or what I don’t know but there was always a crowd there. WAAFs and all sorts giving you a wave and away you’d go down the runway hoping you get off ‘cause they were heavy. You’d got ten tonnes of petrol and six tons of high explosive and if there wasn’t much wind and you were on a short runway it was a bit iffy. It was a bit iffy. You wouldn’t miss the village by much.
GC: Do you remember anything else from serving?
JC: About life on the -
GC: Just life or ops or the crew.
JC: Well, there was another. The next raid we went to was Komotau in Czechoslovakia. That was an awfully long way to go. That was another oil refinery and when we got back over the coast there was thick fog everywhere and we were diverted to Gaydon. We’d never heard of it and the nav said to the wireless op, ‘Are you sure it’s Gaydon?’ [laughs]. And we were getting a bit short of petrol and everywhere over the countryside was just grey and another advantage of being in the mid upper turret I saw in the distance on the port side they looked like bees around a honey pot. I said, ‘There’s some aircraft over on the port side, skipper,’ and we flew over and there they were. There was our squadron and another one all milling around. That was still thick fog and it was a Canadian Operational Training Unit with Wellingtons and the poor chap on the caravan at the end all he could do was fire white very lights to show where the runway started and you knew the heading ‘cause you could see that from your paperwork and we came in, descended through this murk and fortunately there was a runway at the other end of it and we landed safely but we left two or three of the squadron in the fields around. We brought the crew back. We were stuck there for ages and didn’t even get a cup of tea. We were just stuck with our aeroplanes and I thought I don’t think much of this and eventually we, the fog cleared and we took off and got back to, got back to base but that was a bit, a bit naughty that. There were no facilities there at all for a safe landing. It was a case of dropping down through the fog and hoping you were over the runway and in, pointing in the right direction and as I say a lot of them didn’t. The other daylight we did was a place called Flensburg which was on the Danish German border on the bit of land that sticks up and I think we were after some shipping there in the harbour. When we got there there was a hospital ship in the harbour too and when we got there it was ten tenths of cloud so we had to bring them back or we should have brought them back. There was an area in the North Sea for dropping bombs safe you know which shipping were advised of and kept clear of but unfortunately some of the idiots with us were just dropping them as soon as they got over the sea and our aircraft, I mean I looked up and said, ‘Starboard skipper,’ and he was on the, and there were these blooming bombs dropping down. We could have easily been hit, hit with a bomb and shot, you know, knocked from the sky. We religiously went to this area in the North Sea where you should jettison your bombs and even then that was ten tenths of cloud and skipper went down through the cloud in case there were some ships there, there wasn’t and there was splashes going on all over the place from people dropping bombs through the cloud but that was, it’s disappointing when that happened. You go there, done everything and then you bring them back or come back. Quite often, well reading my diary it happened three or four times, we got out to dispersal and the raid would be cancelled for some reason and you’d be all psyched up for it and it was disappointing not to go, you know. You had to unwind then and go back to being in a village again. I mean it was strange. It was, being out at dispersal was the worst time, I think. You didn’t know what to say, what to do and then a verey cartridge would go off. In we go. As soon as you got on board the engine started. You were alright. You were, you were there and you knew what you were going, you knew where you were going and you knew what you had to do and you’re perfectly, perfectly happy.
GC: Can you remember the moment you found out the war was over? Can you remember what that felt like?
JC: Yes. I could remember that fairly well because we went out to a pub and there was no beer and we cycled around for all afternoon and there was no beer anywhere. It was an anti-climax really. You were so used to doing that, that way of life that when it stopped you felt you’d missed it in some ghoulish sort of way. I can’t quite explain it but, I don’t know, it’s like anything that you’re doing regularly and then it suddenly stops. However horrible it was you still miss it and I did miss it, I must say but we were kept busy. We had to, well one of the nicest jobs we did was bringing back prisoners of war. We flew in a field near Brussels and twenty [emotional]. Excuse me.
GC: Do you want to stop?
JC: There was twenty four of them at a time with their little bags of stuff and one of them crashed unfortunately. I don’t know why. Whether they got, ‘cause you had to be careful where they, where they were put because of the balance of the aircraft and one of them took off and crashed almost immediately and killed everybody on board. There was twenty four POW’s and the crew which wasn’t a good sign. But that was the only action that I know of. We brought them back. I can’t remember where we brought them back to. [pause] It was a little airfield. Dunsfold. Dunsfold. And there were ladies there to see to, you know I thought there would be flags flying and all this but there was a tent and some ladies, you know Women’s Voluntary Services or something making them some tea and supposedly dishing out railway warrants and one thing and another. I thought what a homecoming. I thought they’d be all, it was strange really I, ‘cause the ones we had were all ex-aircrew, well air crew. I mean, I don’t know what they’d been through of course individually but they didn’t look at all happy about going into an aeroplane. Perhaps their memories of the last time they were in it weren’t very good and they’d left on fire or something. They didn’t look at all happy really. Tried to chat to them and then as I say when we landed they all trooped out into this tent. All very well, you know, I know I didn’t expect the band to be playing but you know, I thought there’d be -
GC: Yeah.
JC: Some officers there or something to welcome them back. Perhaps that had already been done at Brussels. I don’t know. I don’t think they’d been hanging about long. I think they, you know as soon as they were released I think they were sent to this airfield. There were a lot of them. I mean there were eighteen thousand aircrew injured or POW’s. There was about ten thousand prisoners. We were told that they had a file on us all over there. Well, a lot of us you know. We weren’t allowed to take, we had to empty our pockets completely. Not a bus ticket or a cinema ticket or anything and we had emergency pack with barley sugar and chewing gum and fishing gear. I don’t know if anyone ever did catch anything with that. Silk maps of the countryside you were going to try and get out of. A whole load of stuff in a plastic case and that’s all you had. You had to hand everything else in. That was put in a bag and you collected it when you got back. Well, people were, I mean we had lectures on all this and when you were interrogated they’d say, ‘What’s on at,’ and they’d mention your local cinema, you know, ‘What’s on at the Regal this week,’ and all this sort of thing and you’d think well if he knows that he must know this you know and it was just a way of getting information out of you but as I say we weren’t allowed to have a bus ticket or a cinema ticket or anything in your pocket. There was money in this thing as well by the way and a compass of course so you could attempt to evade. Oh that’s another thing we did on the squadron. There was escape and evasion exercises. You’d be taken out, this happened two or three times, we were taken out in lorries, there were no signposts anywhere, taken out in lorries and dropped and you had to make your way back to camp. Unfortunately, we were dropped quite close to Newark and Nottingham and places like that and a lot of people bombed off into the town [laughs] so they weren’t a hundred percent successful but I did my own evasion, escape and evasion one night. I was on the old pits not thinking of anything in particular and the skipper put his head around the door and said, ‘Anyone want to go into Newark for a pint? He said, ‘I’ve got to go in on the motorbike. I’ll bring you back.’ So no one else said, I said, ‘Yeah. Ok,’ ‘cause they had lovely fish and chips in Newark and the beer wasn’t bad either so I went on the back of the motorbike with the skipper into Newark. We arranged a rendezvous for the return, 11 o’clock I think it was or half eleven which I attended but no one else did unfortunately. He didn’t turn up. So, I’ve got a heck of a walk here, back to Fulbeck. About twelve miles I think from Newark and I didn’t know the way either. It was a network of little roads all around that part of Lincoln you know. There’s no big main road as such. Anyway, I struck off due east I think and I thought well I must eventually come across it and walked and walked and walked and eventually saw a familiar looking nissen hut and, which was the washrooms and things on the outskirts of the airfield so I knew that I was, I was home. So, I went and had a drink. I remember putting my, cupping my hands under the tap and I had a go at him the next day. He apologised. He said, ‘I’m sorry, John,’ he said, ‘Things got a bit out of hand,’ he said, ‘I couldn’t get back until later,’ So whether he did ever turned up at the rendezvous I don’t know but I walked home back to Fulbeck. That wasn’t our only walk. We walked from Nottingham to Syerston Lancaster Finishing School. That was a whole crew of us. We’d overstayed our leave a bit at, in Nottingham, missed the last train, ‘cause we used to cycled into a place, leave your bike against the wall, get on the train and I mean your bike was there the next day. Nobody pinched bikes in those days but on this occasion we had to walk all the way back to Syerston and when we got back to camp we were on the early morning flying detail. Couldn’t have been worse really. We got some breakfast and then got into the air and that was that. Oh dear oh dear. So that was, life had its ups and downs you see, Gemma. It had its up and downs. In more ways than one of course. The last raid, believe it or not, was the same place we went on the first one. We went to Norway again to a place called Tonsberg but this was another oil refinery and as we got closer, I mean we’d normally bomb at about eighteen thousand feet. Something like that. The master bomber told the force to reduce height to, I think it was fifteen and then down to ten and I thought this is silly this is and then to eight. Eight thousand feet which put you in range of all the light flak that they hose up at you and I thought, and I mean it was like, literally flying into a, you think well we’ll never get out the other side without being hit by something and as we went in a searchlight came on us and the skipper said, ‘Shoot that out, John,’ because we were so low, you see and he banked the aircraft and I fired and it went out so that was that. One searchlight less. But we went in and bombed and we came out alright but I don’t think we lost any but there were aircraft lost due to this flak but during briefing the thing came up about this searchlight and the interrogating officer said, ‘Fired at, what eight thousand feet?’ And I said, ‘Well it went out.’ I didn’t say well the skipper instructed me to fire at it but he didn’t say anything, the skipper. He should have said, ‘Well I instructed him to fire,’ but he didn’t and I thought oh well. It did go out. I thought to myself the range of these bullets is quite, quite a long way and there’s no, gravity’s going to help them on their way and if they just hear a few bullets scattering around they’ll probably put it out and they did you see. I don’t suppose I hit the light. I probably scared the living daylights out of the crew.
GC: I was going to say how aware of other squadrons were you or what else was going on in the war?
JC: Well of course you’d read the papers. You see, we were in 5 Group and people said there’s 5 Group and there’s Bomber Command and it’s true we did have our own sort of little things. We had our own corkscrew procedure which was different to Bomber Command and a lot of the raids were 5 Group squadrons like the one at Nordhausen. That was just 5 Group squadrons. But having said that I mean a lot of the raids were from everybody, you know and we all used 100 Group. They had Lancasters and Flying Fortresses and all sorts and they did all these trick things with radio to fool the Germans, you know. For two or three weeks the German night fighter force was controlled by a flying officer in Uxbridge. German speaking flying officer in Uxbridge before they twigged that, you know, they knew it was being done. There were all sorts of tricks there was, with strange names, strange code names and some aircraft had different equipment to others. 49 squadron who we were, we were with at Fulbeck had Village Inn which was a radar equipment fixed to the rear turret which showed when a fighter was coming after you which was quite handy but we never had it. But they didn’t lose any aircraft well apart from the one that I saw blow up. That was from flak. That wasn’t from fighters. They didn’t lose aircraft like we did. I saw the flight engineer from one of the crews who was shot down over Harburg and he met the German night fighter pilot who shot them down and he’d made, it was a head on attack and that’s something you don’t read in the books because you’d never get a head on attack at night cause you’d never see them quickly enough but there was so much, it was so light from all the fires and flares they were doing head on attacks. That’s remarkable isn’t it? Well the one that came after us wasn’t. It was a normal sort of attack but the sneaky thing they did they was they had a gun, an upward firing gun the JU88s musicschragge or something they called it and they used to creep under the, under you and then just fire a few rounds into your wing where your petrol tanks were. So we used to do banking searches quite frequently so you could look down and see if there was anything going on but even that they knew about of course and they’d follow you around so that wasn’t foolproof but at least they knew you were alert and you know we were having a go. Having a look. I think that helps. If there’s one that’s going straight and level and not doing anything he’d going to be an easier target than the one who’s manoeuvring about the sky. There was one, well it wasn’t amusing for the poor WAAF but we got back. I don’t know which, I can’t remember what raid it was but anyway we got back to dispersal, we’d got out of the aeroplane and we were waiting for the truck to turn up and pick us up and it duly arrived and just as she got out a JU88 came over the airfield strafing the runway and everybody and everything and we just sort of looked lazily, you know. It was just part of the night for us but she dashed in to the arms of the skipper and we gave him a cheer of course. Poor girl. She was scared out of her wits. Well it was a bit scary I suppose for her. It’s not something that usually happens and this chap was firing and doing all sorts of things and they used to drop these anti-personnel butterfly bombs all over the place which was a bit, a bit naughty I thought because they used to come in and shoot aircraft down when they were coming in to land which I thought was very uncharitable. On the coast at night there were two searchlights like that that guided you back in over Lincolnshire and we avoided them like the plague and you were supposed to put your nav lights on to avoid collisions which we never did. Never put our nav lights on so perhaps that’s the sort of reason you get away with it, you know. But collisions, there were a lot of aircraft lost through collisions. When you think of it, in the night, no lights. I remember in the mid upper turret, well I don’t know whether if we were going out or coming home but I think we were coming home and I looked up and there was another Lancaster just slowly crossing us, ever so close, I reckon if I could put our hand out I could have touched his blister, you know his H2S blister and I daren’t say anything to the skipper ‘cause if he’d have dived his tail would have come up and hit him and I thought if we just keep going we’re going to miss and so we went like that and I, just afterwards, when it had cleared, I said, ‘We just had a near miss skipper.’ Nobody else saw it. It was really really close. We were just on a slightly different course and nearly at the same height within a foot or two. So that’s another you know a bit near. If he’d been a bit lower or we’d have been a bit higher we’d have collided. Surprising how many there were when you read of the crews that were lost due to accident. A lot of them over this country. Not over there. Over this country which is a bit remarkable. You said what did we do? One thing I did do after the war we did this Exodus, Operation Exodus, bringing prisoners of war back and on another occasion the crew had to go to Italy, to Bari to bring people back from there but the gunners, for some reason, didn’t go because they wanted to get more people on board I suppose but they brought us back some cherry brandy and stuff so we didn’t mind but what I did while I got the hut free was something I wanted to do. I’d got, in the Mae West’s, you know the inflatable thing the thing that inflated them was a little CO2 bottle. It was a cast iron bottle with a little neck on and when you pulled a lever down it broke the neck off and filled the thing up with air or carbon dioxide or something. Anyway, I thought if I filled the thing up with cordite that would be an ideal jet. So I wanted to make a jet propelled glider you see because the Australians were letting stuff off. They’d got hold of something, fireworks and things and I got a, got a cartridge and emptied it and carefully fed the, because the cordite was a little, little tiny rods, put it through the hole until it filled up and then left a little trail to a safe distance of the hut, the nissen hut and this was on the concrete step aimed out into space you see. I’d made a glider out of a cornflake packet that I’d scrounged and I got this all fixed up, lit it and it sort of worked. It fizzed across the floor, lit the thing, zoomed off, the glider fluttered down a few yards away and the CO2 thing headed off towards the officers mess the other side of the airfield and so I thought it was time to pack up and go. I got on my bike and went down to the mess and read the paper.
GC: Has he always been this much of a rogue?
SP: Yes. Yes.
JC: And that was a bit of fun.
SP: Yes. You used to wave your handkerchiefs at the air you told me.
JC: The other thing we did what we found out was to if you want to evacuate a nissen hut is to get a verey cartridge and take one of the shells out of the stars and drop it down the chimney when their bogie stove was alight and that shoots the bottom out, most of the contents of the bogie stove and everybody goes flying out. It was great fun. Oh dear of dear.
GC: It’s nice to know you was taking yourselves so seriously.
JC: Pardon?
GC: It’s nice to know you was taking it all so seriously. [laughs]
JC: Well, you know you’ve got too really. Frank Johnson, we had some reunion, crew reunions after. Three or four. And Frank, the navigator said to me that he’d been approached by from some quite high authority in government with a big questionnaire about morale of air crew during the war and I and I thought about that I thought well no one was sad or anything like that. In fact we were generally up to hijinks and then Frank said, ‘I put down that, practical jokes mainly from air gunners,’ he said. [laughs]. I think we kept ourselves alive really by laughing down and of course we had quite a, beer was quite plentiful then. Not very strong unfortunately but that was a favourite pastime either in the mess or down at the local, you know the local pub in the village and we didn’t have a cinema at Fulbeck. We didn’t have very much there at all. That was a bit dead really apart from the odd pub but Bardney did. They had a cinema there and we used to see things, films there. I went back to, well a summer camp with the ATC and of course visited some of the old airfields and we were at Binbrook one year and one of the other officers wanted to go to a place that he was in during the war. Forget the name of it now. He said, ‘You were up this way John, weren’t you? I said, ‘Yeah. Bardney.’ He said, ‘That’s not all that far away.’ So we duly went to Bardney. There wasn’t much left of it then. There was the old hangars were still there and a control tower and a sad looking windsock and I said, ‘Well the pub down the hill,’ I said, ‘Was called the Jolly Sailor,’ which was known as the Hilarious Matlow when we were there and we went down and went in for a pint and it was, instead of being little rooms as it was it was one big bar which killed it really but anyway, I ordered a couple of pints up and an old boy sidled up and he said, ‘You’ve just been up at the airfield haven’t you?’ I said, ‘Yes,’ I said, ‘Do you want,’ I thought he was on the [earhole] for a pint you see so, ‘No. No. No,’ he said, ‘I don’t want a drink.’ He said, ‘I can always tell,’ he said, ‘When you come [that thing there?] he said. So I said, he said, ‘What flight were you in?’ I said, ‘A flight. Squadron Leader Stevens. Yes that’s right,’ he said, ‘I knew him,’ and he knew the wing commander. He knew. We used to rattle the stuff off his mantelpiece apparently when we took off. But he was, you know, he was a nice old boy. He was obviously one of the locals who was there during the war. He must have put up with us when we went in the pub. But it was different and I don’t even know if it’s still there now because I’ve had it up on google and I can’t even see the pub anymore. I think it’s been knocked down or something. Isn’t that dreadful?
GC: Dreadful.
JC: I don’t know. All the memories of these places. If they could tell a story.
GC: Ah but that’s what you’re doing at the moment.
JC: Yes. We, after the war we had to start on Tiger Force training for the Far East which I wasn’t looking forward to to be honest. Fighting the Japanese. They didn’t play fair did they? And it consisted of long cross countries as a squadron in a gaggle. We didn’t fly in formation. We flew in a gaggle right over France and Germany and around and home and to do that, to prepare for long flights we shared our poor old flight engineer Bert Shaw. He was due for retirement anyway I think and we got a pilot flight engineer. There were lots of spare pilots about at the time. Young lad. Never done much. They put them through a quick flight engineer’s course at St Athan and sent them to the squadrons and we had one. He was such a nice chap. I can’t think of his name. Isn’t that awful? I have a photograph of him in one of the books, war books I’ve got. Anyway, he flew with us as a flight engineer. Well on one occasion and I was now the official rear gunner by the way. I was in the rear turret. We were coming back over France and I was awake because I noticed smoke whizzing past the turret you see. So I thought, hello, something’s going wrong up front you see so I called up the skipper and said, ‘One of your engines is on fire, skipper,’ and he relayed the message to the flight engineer who was down in the bombing hatch cooking his logbook for four engine flying so when the skipper said, ‘One of your engine’s is on fire,’ he thought he was pulling his leg. He said, ‘Well you’d better put the kettle on.’ [laughs] I said, ‘No.’ I said, ‘It’s getting thick here.’ And anyway he came up and shut it down and feathered the propeller and the smoke abated. Bits and pieces came past and that was that. Went home the rest of the way on three engines but that, that was funny that was. Very funny.
GC: I’m just going to stop it for a moment because I’ve just spotted -
[machine pause]
GC: Just looking at the battery. But go on.
JC: Right [pause] ok. Yes. Well we eventually poor old squadron was sent to RAF Metheringham to disband which was all very sad. We had to take our aeroplanes with us. The ground staff got there in about a quarter of an hour I suppose. We got over Metheringham and there was ten tenths of fog. Absolute thick fog and we poodled around for about half an hour. We got all our stuff on board. Bikes and things in the bomb bay and they eventually decided to light up half the Fido for us. You know the old fog intensive dispersal or something. They lit up one side and it really did work. It just burnt the fog off. We came in, landed and we were there till November kicking our heels. I only flew, I was the only one of the crew who flew again, who flew from Metheringham and I was the Squadron Leader Stevens’s rear gunner when he wanted to go somewhere and my services were called upon but that was the only time I flew from Metheringham and the crew dispersed. The skipper went flying somewhere, the bomb aimer was commissioned and went off somewhere in charge of a radar unit and we were sent to a place ‘cause I wanted to go on to Transport Command and we were sent to the MT section of a little OTU at Whitchurch. I forget the name of the RAF station but I couldn’t drive. I had to drive, I suddenly had to learn to drive because I was, I was up at the station and the billets were about a mile down the road in a disperse place and it was bitterly cold and I wanted to get some blankets for the bed so I took, I pinched a [fifteen underweight?] truck, went down to the domestic site, picked up my blankets and as I did some of the other lads came out and said, ‘Are you going back to the station?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ I said, I said, ‘I haven’t driven before.’ He said, ‘Oh it doesn’t matter.’ He said and they all piled in and I got in the front bit and drove them back. That was quite, quite a bit of a laugh there. Anyway, eventually I got on to Transport Command. I was posted to Holmsley. RAF Holmsley South, near Bournemouth. Had some fun down there. Some friends of mine took a boat out at night off the beach and got out quite a way and they realised that the people had taken the plugs out so people wouldn’t pinch the boats and they just [laughs] they had to dry out in the boiler room when they got back. And then I got posted to, we flew to Lyneham. You’ve all heard of Lyneham. That was the big transport place. We were there about a week and then I was posted to Waterbeach. RAF Waterbeach which was the nearest I ever got to home, as an air quartermaster flying with different crews. There were two flights we did there. There was United Kingdom - Changi in a York. That was in Singapore. And to Delhi with the freight. Freight run. And that, that was great fun. I did quite a few trips. It took five days to get to Singapore and a days there and five days back but we never did it in eleven days. There was always something went wrong. We had more trouble with Yorks than we ever had on Lancasters. I mean we only had that just one engine fire but with the Yorks we had to fly from the passenger run was from Lyneham because we’d go, we went from Waterbeach to Lyneham, picked up the passengers and went through customs and everything and the first leg was down to Luqa, RAF Luqa in Malta and from there to Habbaniya in Iraq and then to Maripur in India, down to Ceylon as it was and then across to Changi in Singapore. That was five legs. Getting up earlier and earlier every morning because you were losing time you see and then you had a day off and then you reversed it coming back but as I say we never did it. We had various problems. One of the engines seized up over the Med coming across to Malta. So we stuck at Malta for a week which was great fun of course. The only thing else, oh I was often the only NCO in the crew. The rest were all commissioned you know and they’d be in the mess and I’d be in the sergeant’s mess but apart from that it was alright. We all used to meet up during the day. The first trip I ever did we went, we got to Malta and they said, ‘You’re coming with us, John.’ So changed in to civvies. They took me down to Valetta, sat me outside a café place, table and chairs and they brought out something I hadn’t seen, of course, since the beginning of the war which was a plate of fancy cakes, ‘There you are, John,’ they said, ‘Tuck in.’ So it was all things like that. Things we hadn’t seen let alone eaten. That was good fun though flying like that but they, it was a bit dodgy especially the last leg from Ceylon to Changi. It was around Malaya there was terrific cumulous clouds. I mean these days they just fly over the top but we couldn’t get up there so you had, you couldn’t go through it because they was too dangerous. They could just pick you up and chuck you all over the place and so you had to go underneath and that wasn’t always very practical so there were some dodgy bits. The other time we had a bit of trouble it was a freighting run and we were coming back across the Mediterranean to Lyneham from where was it? Castel Benito. That’s right, in Libya and I noticed, just freighting run this was and I noticed the port inner engine, the exhaust which I could see very plainly from the window didn’t look right to me. It was, it was the wrong sort of colour you know and as the flight progressed so it got brighter and brighter and I got the skipper to come down and have a look. Ivor Lupton. I’ll always remember his name and he had a look. He said, ‘Keep an eye on it, John and if it gets any worse tell me.’ Well it did get worse. Flames started coming out of it so the flight engineer shut it down, feathered it and we made an emergency landing at an airfield called Estree in France where they hadn’t got any Merlin engines and we were stuck there for a week and had great fun there. We were in the transit mess but it wasn’t too bad. The food was alright and I paid a flying visit to Marseilles with, I can’t remember, was it the navigator or the wireless op? Anyway, he’d obviously got some business going on in, where’s the name of the place. Oh dear isn’t that awful? I’ve forgotten the name of the place on the coast of France further east. I said, ‘How are we going to get there?’ He said, ‘We’ll hitch.’ So we got on the road and we hitched and an old French car stopped, got in the back and the driver complete with, he hadn’t got any onions but that was the only thing he hadn’t got. And we went hurtling off in this old car through little villages, chickens scattering, you know. It was like something out of a film and, Marseilles that’s where we went and we eventually got there and he did his, what he had to do, got some nefarious thing going on. I had a wander around just and then we came back by the same method, getting a hitch. The French were delighted to give us a lift but they were very old cars and very dangerous and they’d be talking to you with their head, and we thought yeah, have an occasional look [laughs]. So that was a very adventurous time we had on the, on the Yorks. There was one or two incidents where we had a bit of bother but you know it was exciting part. Nice. I was rather sad to leave it all really but I thought well they won’t want air quartermasters forever. They’re called dolly birds now aren’t they but I had to work out, even on the passenger run, I had to work out the weight and balance clearance and all that sort of stuff so that the centre of gravity of the aircraft fell between two points so I had to find the water, weight of water, petrol and everything and passengers and you know it was quite an important job but I enjoyed it so I was rather sad when the last, the last thing came which involved, not for me personally but involved a rather dramatic encounter with HM customs but I can’t go in to that now. We haven’t got enough battery left [laughs]
GC: [?]
JC: So there we are. My RAF career in a nutshell.
GC: Well can I just say it has been an absolute pleasure and a great honour. That has been beautiful. Thank you very much.
JC: Pleasure.
GC: Thank you.
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Interview with John Cuthbert
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Gemma Clapton
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IBCC Digital Archive
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2016-05-07
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Sound
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ACuthbertJ160507
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Pending review
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
John Cuthbert joined the RAF and initially trained as a wireless operator / air gunner but re-mustered as an air gunner. After training he was posted to 189 Squadron at RAF Fulbeck and flew operations as a mid-upper gunner. He talks about his light-hearted experiences with his crew as well as some of the tragedies he saw.
Contributor
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Julie Williams
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
Germany
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Karlsruhe
Temporal Coverage
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1944
1945
Format
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02:06:23 audio recording
189 Squadron
49 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
Anson
bombing
crewing up
fear
Heavy Conversion Unit
Ju 88
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
military living conditions
military service conditions
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operational Training Unit
radar
RAF Bardney
RAF Fulbeck
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Wainfleet
Scarecrow
searchlight
Stirling
superstition
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
wireless operator / air gunner
York
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1287/17229/PHarperL1901.1.jpg
b15c864ba39a5f20db6c24984d37c6c5
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1287/17229/AHarperL190521.1.mp3
46073482bffd601b5d01a9f978128194
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
DE: So this is an interview with Len Harper for the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. My name Is Dan Ellin. We’re in Len Harper’s home in Chapel St Leonards. It’s the 21st of May 2019. Put that there and then we’ll try and forget about it. So, Len could you tell me a little bit about your early life before you joined the RAF?
LH: Yes. Well, before I just went to the ordinary primary school, which I enjoyed and I left school at the age of fourteen, and from then on I was out of work but I managed to find myself a job and by the end of 19 — Come on. Come on.
Other: Alright.
[recording paused]
LH: I decided that the RAF was the place for me. So having worked in a shop Wednesday afternoon was always our half day off and I told my brother, who worked with me, I said, ‘Tell mother that I shan’t be home for this afternoon.’ Instead of that I went off to Hanley in the Potteries and joined the Royal Air Force. That was in the April of 1939. From then on that’s where it started. I joined the Royal Air Force and I went down to Cardington where I did all my foot slogging, and then from Cardington I was sent to the Wireless Training School at Yatesbury in Wiltshire, and that’s where I took my course on radio repairs etcetera and I passed the course at the end of 1939. Of course, then the war had started in the September. And from then onwards I was posted from, from Yatesbury. I went to RAF station Wittering which was a lovely RAF station and I was there for two years when I was posted to India and Burma. That is a short account of my RAF.
DE: Okey dokey. What was, what was training like? Can you remember?
LH: Training was very, very good really. It was very good indeed. We did, we did learn and it was, it was easy to learn. I mean nothing was too complicated. I know I started, I started at the RAF Wireless School at Yatesbury in the September, and a three month course took me through to the end of December which was then supposed to have passed us through to the, to the training that we’d had. And of course I went straight on to radio maintenance, which I enjoyed very, very much indeed and that’s how it started with me. I had two years. Two years in, at RAF station Wittering. And from then I was posted to, overseas to South Africa and from South Africa to Bombay, India.
DE: Ok.
LH: And Burma.
DE: So what, what did your work entail when you were at Wittering? What was, what was your, what was the job like?
LH: It was repairing radio. Repairing. Mostly it was damaged radios that were damaged during the overseas work and we had a real full time job in trying to get everything going as quick as you could when the aircraft came down. This wanted doing, that wanted doing, and it had to be done.
DE: So was it lots of soldering and changing valves and things like that?
LH: Absolutely. That.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Oh yes. A lot of that. It was good really. I don’t know why I didn’t take it on after the war but I didn’t and that was it. And then in the February 1942 I was on leave to go abroad when I went to South Africa for three days strangely enough. And then from South Africa I went through to Bombay where I was there for what should, what should I say? About two years there and then I was posted to Burma. And from Burma I went almost down the east, east coast picking up various jobs that were required of me to do with regards to radio repairs. But India was quite nice. Well, what shall I say? A rare place. It wasn’t what I expected. We were looked on, some of us were looked on as fighters and what not. We wanted to get rid of India, sort of thing. Others thought the world of us. And we went on like that. And then of course I was posted overseas to Burma where I spent eighteen month. And it was illness that brought me back from Burma, back in to India and then I came back and did another year in India doing the same job that I’d done right the way through.
DE: What was the illness that you had?
LH: It was, what was it? Oh, I can’t think [pause] I’m just trying to think of it. I can’t —
DE: Dysentery or —
LH: It was dysentery.
DE: Right.
LH: Dysentery is correct. Yes. Yes. I had dysentery which I had, I’ve never even got rid of it. I even get yet touches of it nowadays. At my hundredth birthday. But it wasn’t that that took me out of the Force. I automatically left the Force in 1945, and my wife didn’t want me to go back. And having plenty of conversation I thought well she doesn’t want to go back in to the Women’s Royal Air Force so I tore my papers up and that was it and I went to work on the railway.
DE: What did you do on the railway?
LH: I was a railway signalman on the Derby-Crewe line. I enjoyed that. It was very, very nice. I could have stayed on there but once again lines were being taken up and we were knocked out and that was it. Good old days. And from then onwards I went in to various industries. I did work in the man-made fibres division with the ICI. I was there for approximately eleven years, and after then I didn’t see any sense in stopping. I learnt what I wanted to learn and I left and I went into the newspaper business. And that’s how it went on. Going from place to place. It was a good life really because I’ve always been interested in trains and —
[pause]
LH: I’m trying to think what else happened.
DE: That’s ok. We can, we can go back over some of this stuff and you might, you might think of some more things to say. I’m rather interested in why you decided to join the RAF.
LH: Yes. Well, it was rather strange because my brother joined the RAF in January 1939, and he came home after a while and said how good it was, this, that and the other. I said, ‘Oh, I might have a go myself.’ Which I did. I liked the idea of it. So, in the April of ’39 I decided to go and join the RAF, which I did and I’m glad I did. I could have stayed in the RAF for years if, if my wife would have liked the idea. But she didn’t want the idea of being [pause] well, what should I say? Being under the RAF.
DE: Sure, yes. When did you meet her? When did you marry?
LH: I met her long before I joined the RAF. We were married. We married in February 1942 but I met my wife long before that. And she joined, she joined the RAF. She was from Nottingham and there we were.
DE: So it must have been fairly hard. Only getting to see each other when you both had leave, I imagine.
LH: Oh, yes. Yes. We always managed to get together when leave was on the records. Yes. We did.
DE: What did she think when you got your posting to India?
LH: She didn’t like the idea at all but of course she was already in the Women’s Royal Air Force so it didn’t make much of a difference to her. We were, she put up with it and I explained to her that it was all for the best, which it was really. But to go out to India was rather strange. I never thought I should be sent out to India because I went to Bombay where we [pause] and then from Bombay I went [pause] I went to Quetta. I was at Quetta for three, four months taking a wireless course. And then we were posted. I was posted down to Calcutta. And from Calcutta I went through to the postal region, and I went into Burma. To a place called Dohazari. A very nice place. And I was there for two years until I got this dysentery and I had to go back in to India and I went to central India, to Agra where I was hospitalised there for eight months.
DE: What were conditions like in the hospital?
LH: Pretty good. Pretty good really. Oh yes. They did look after us. There’s no doubt about that [pause]. I had plenty of time to get about and I had some good times. I had, well I met a lot of people in India. I went to Bhopal, to Agra, to Quetta and all various places. And I got to know quite a lot of the Indian people and to me they were, they were quite, quite a nice lot in my opinion. But of course there was this time when they were wanting to get out of the British Raj and this, that and the other, and you didn’t know who you could really rely on for a friendship. And there it was. But Burma was a strange place. The Burmese didn’t like us. They liked the Japanese more than they liked, liked us. However, we got over that and as I say the third time I had to, I was posted back in to India with dysentery.
DE: So, were you part of the Third Tactical Air Force over there in Burma?
LH: Yes. Yes.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Definitely. Went down as far as Rangoon and it was quite good out there but Burma seemed a funny place. They didn’t like us. They liked the Japanese. They were more fond of the Japanese than they were of the British troops and I thought, well, that’s what I thought. That was my opinion.
DE: What were the living conditions like out there?
LH: Out in —
DE: In, in Burma.
LH: Pretty jungalised. We more or less lived like we should have done in the, in the jungle but it’s quite good. It was. We had some good food. We had our own, we had our own cooks and what not, so we didn’t do too bad. I suppose if I hadn’t had dysentery I shouldn’t have got back out of Burma.
DE: So, it was, it was airstrips in the —
LH: Yes.
DE: In the forest.
LH: Yes. Yes, it was. Actually it was a very interesting time. I mean people said oh this, that and the other, it was terrible but I didn’t find it terrible. I mean, you took it as it came and that was it. You knew what you’d got to put up with. You knew what you had to do, and you did it. And then of course when I went back in to India I was posted to a place called Santa Cruz just outside Bombay which was more or less, well it was like being on the Underground in London. It was very very good. And then from then on of course I came back in to, in to England.
DE: What was, what was the transport like? I mean, you say you liked trains. You must have used trains a bit and then obviously the, the troop ships.
LH: Well, trains. I could do with trains all the time. I was really a train man. I was brought up on the railways. I mean I was in a signal, signal box on the Derby-Crewe line for eleven months and I really got to know the railway. And I liked it very much. Training was good and you could move about if you wanted to or you could stay where you were. I moved from Derby-Crewe down in to Uttoxeter, and then back to Ashbourne and then from then it was wiped out. The junction was wiped out altogether and I was made redundant.
DE: Was that the cuts? The Beeching cuts.
LH: It was Beeching’s cuts.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Yes. It certainly was.
DE: What were the troop ship transports like that took you out to India and brought you home again?
LH: They were pretty groggy, let’s put it that way. As long as you did as you were told you were alright. But I didn’t like it at all. But then again if you did as you were told you were alright. The troop ships. No.
DE: Were they long journeys?
LH: Well, we started off from South Wales. Went up to Glasgow and from Glasgow back down to the, what was it, the Mediterranean. Then we were sent in to Freetown. We were there for a week because the Germans were outside waiting for us to get out and make after us. But we did go and we finished off going down to South Africa. South Africa we went to, to Bombay, and that’s how I got to know India. Karachi was, Karachi was quite nice. I liked India actually.
DE: What in particular?
LH: I liked the country. I liked some [emphasis] of the people. I met some very nice friends. And that was the main reason and I could get about the country which I did, and that was it. I could have stayed in India.
DE: You didn’t, you didn’t mind the climate then.
LH: No. No. The climate. No. Never worried me a little bit. Not a bit. As I can say I never wore, never wore a sunhat all the time I was in India. I still wore my old RAF hat. And I got some very nice friends.
DE: Was that other RAF personnel or, or —
LH: Well, Anglo-Indian most of them.
DE: Right.
LH: Most, most of the ones but I worked with them. We were BBC but we had taken a part of the Indian radio over and of course we met a lot of the Anglo Indians who had been drafted in to the Force and we got to know them very, very well.
DE: And this was, you were still working on the wirelesses, the radios from the aircraft.
LH: Oh yes. Yes.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Yes, definitely.
DE: So what sort of aircraft were they flying?
LH: We were flying, well mostly it was, what shall I say? We saw a lot the Bedfords, Blenheims, and Spitfires. Anything that came down that wanted repairs to radios we did it.
DE: Did you ever fly?
LH: Not to the extent of work flying. No. I did fly. We often used to manage to get lifts, you know around the countryside but I wasn’t aircrew.
DE: No.
LH: No.
DE: Did you ever consider it?
LH: I did think about it. As a matter of fact I was offered the chance to take a commission. The only thing that stopped me was the fact I knew I should have to do another two years out in India and I didn’t want to do that so I didn’t take it.
DE: What was the contact with your wife like?
LH: Oh, she was, she was in the RAF and of course she could get home from Nottingham back in to Ashwood. She was quite happy and she left the WAAFs before I left the RAF, and it was through that that I didn’t go back.
DE: Yeah.
LH: I wish I had have stayed in the RAF.
DE: But did you used to write to each other?
LH: Oh yes. Yes, we had. We did.
DE: How long did a letter take?
LH: Not too long. About a couple of, a couple of weeks sometimes. Sometimes you got a quick reply. Your answers would come a lot quicker. Correspondence was pretty good during the war. And then of course when I finished, I finished up with going to work on the railway [pause] which I did between Oxford and Uttoxeter. Pomfrey Junction, Leek and various places.
DE: I’ll just pause this.
[recording paused]
LH: But India is the fact that I only saw India, the places that I visited. I mean New Delhi, Delhi. I went there. Fatehpur Sikri, the forbidden city. That was all boarded up.
DE: What was it like?
LH: Pardon?
DE: What was it like?
LH: Well, we never, we never managed to get in to Fatehpur Sikri. We could go around it. I don’t know why it was, it was, it was shut off from the country. It was really quite a nice place. There was the pink city. Jahal. The best place I liked was the central India, was Agra, and of course I saw places that they advertise in the papers nowadays. It costs thousands of pounds to get there whereas I had it all free. Especially through the Taj Mahal. I did enjoy that.
DE: So you did some sightseeing then.
LH: Pardon?
DE: You did see some sights then.
LH: Oh, yes.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Yes. I did.
DE: Did you take a camera?
LH: Yes, I had a camera, and I had a bicycle which I bought to get around the countryside, where ever I wanted to. And I got in with some very nice friends who had been to India for years. And they took us in alright. We got on very well.
DE: So, you went, you went exploring when you had some leave then.
LH: Oh yes.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Yes. I went all over the country, even right down as far, as far as Ceylon [pause] They were good old days, you know when I look back. Really, really good holidays. You can come in Mike, don’t worry about upsetting us.
Other: I was looking to see where your photographs are.
DE: I’ll just pause it again.
[recording paused]
DE: So, I’ll just start recording again. I’ve —
Other: I’ve got the tea coming.
DE: Ok. I’ve been suggested that I should ask you about being chased out of Burma.
LH: Oh yes. We were chased out of Burma soon after we got in there. We’d just got in, more or less settling down and we were chased right out again. But we went back and that was it.
DE: What was it, what was it like when you were retreating from the Japanese?
LH: It was rather strange because the only thing they had between us was about a four foot wide, four foot, four hundred foot river. The River Ramu. And that was as far and they used to shout across to us across the river and they got two of our fellas because we brought their, all their stuff back with us when we left.
DE: So it was quite, quite a close run thing then at times.
LH: Oh, yes. Yes.
DE: Thank you. I’ll just pause it again because there’s tea.
[recording paused]
LH: [unclear] was the place in Burma that we went to. Cox’s Bazaar. That was a place. Ramu, The River [unclear]. That was all on the, all on the west coast.
DE: So, were you involved in the Battle of Kohima then? That sort of —
LH: No.
DE: No.
LH: No. I’m not really involved in any of the big battles. We had times when we, we had to be careful and this, that and the other but, no. It’s, I was pretty lucky actually. I’d say very lucky. I don’t know. [pause] Yes. But like everything, I mean say you think about these things. You try to remember all that you’ve seen and it’s impossible to remember everything. Oh, I liked Delhi. I liked Mandodari. That was very nice there. And what was it? Agra was very very nice. And so was Bhopal. That was nice. We were there just before they had that trouble in Bhopal.
DE: Going back to to Burma what did you think about the Japanese? What was your attitude to them?
LH: Well, we didn’t see a lot of them. We heard a lot of them but we didn’t see a lot of them and we were sort of one side the river and they were the other side of the river and that was it. And then we were suddenly moved off and we went back, we went back in to India. Well, I’d say we were pushed off really.
DE: When you were, when you were being pushed out of Burma. Burma. Were you, were you worried about being taken prisoner?
LH: No. No. We were lucky in that respect in as much that we, Burma we, we did hold the border. We held the border very well there and it was just a hop across on to the ferry and back into India. But then the second time when we went in of course we went right down as far as Rangoon, and of course the Japanese were pushed right out. But I did meet a few Japanese. A few Japanese prisoners. They didn’t like being taken prisoners. They seemed all right. I mean, they were only humans like we were but they seemed to be funny people. They thought nothing of committing suicide and things like that which we wouldn’t even dream of. I’m just trying to think of the point where we were stationed.
[pause]
LH: A lot of it has gone through my head and that. I can’t just recall it.
DE: Yeah.
LH: It’s seventy years ago.
DE: It is. Yeah. It’s a fair old while.
LH: But it’s nice of you to come and have a talk about things. Is there anything else that’s —
DE: Well, I’ve got, there’s other things we could talk about. So, where were you when the war ended? Where, were you on —
LH: When the war ended I was in central India. That’s when, that’s when it ended in India and Burma and we were, I was then enroute back to England and I remember passing, passing Malta and then we went through, right through until we got to England.
DE: So, did you, did you hear about Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
LH: Oh yes. We heard all about that.
DE: Yeah.
LH: Yeah.
DE: What were your thoughts?
LH: I thought it was scandalous. I’d never ever even think that they used bombs like that but of course that was it.
DE: So, did you celebrate the end of the war then?
LH: We did, yes. We celebrated well. I finished up at Morecambe strangely enough. We were all posted off to a camp outside Morecambe and we did a real good celebration there. A very good celebration. And from Morecambe I went home on disembarkation leave and I went there. I was there in 1940, ‘45. Christmas. I never went back. Never went back, which I ought to have done. I never went back in to the RAF.
DE: What was demob like?
LH: Ok. I went straight on to the railway when I, when I came out of the RAF [pause] But I did, I met quite a nice lot of people.
DE: Sure.
LH: In India.
DE: What did you think about the Partition of India?
LH: Well, we didn’t know really a lot about it. We knew what was happening and you could tell at the time that you’d got to be careful what you said and what you did and that was that. You never used to mention politics. You thought it better to remain silent. I mean you was always the British Raj this that, the British Raj that and they were going to do this and they were going to do that, but it never came off. I know there was a very good hairdresser in Agra I got to know. He used to do my hair pretty well.
[pause]
A place called Juhu, just outside Bombay. That was a very nice place. I could have stayed in India.
DE: So they offered you a promotion.
LH: Yeah. I could really have stayed in India.
DE: What would you have been doing then if you’d have stayed?
LH: I don’t know what I should have been. I should have had to take a commission I think. I think that was the only way that I could have stayed in.
DE: So then would you —
LH: It was when they said it would mean I would have to do another extra two years in India I thought oh no, that’s not for me. Bombay was a nice place in parts. I’ve got some photographs there which I took because I always had the camera with me.
[pause]
LH: Well, I think that’s about all I can recall.
DE: That’s really interesting. Thank you. Just one other question that I usually ask is is have you any thoughts about the way the Second World War has been remembered? I mean you said it’s seventy years ago now.
LH: In the way that, well I don’t remember very much of the end of the Second World War because as I say we were coming home from India at the time when it had happened in India and Burma, and we were getting back to England. But with regard to celebrating should I say, the end of the Second World War in England, it had already been done more or less. We all went back to our normal stations. I went, I went back to Cardington and then from Cardington back to Wittering and from Wittering I was demobbed. But it didn’t seem a lot to us, the celebration of the end of the Second World War.
DE: But what about the way it’s been remembered in the history books and on television?
LH: A lot of it was true. A lot of it was false. A lot of it was just made up as one might say. I know, my experience, the fact that I came out and I was posted back to the Army in Yatesbury, to the RAF in Yatesbury and I went back to my Unit and everything went just as normal. It was there that I was recommended I should stay in the Royal Air Force, but of course you know what. It didn’t happen. The one thing about it, we did see the world.
DE: Yes. Because you said you had three days in South Africa.
LH: Yes. That was a strange lot. We got off the boat, went walking around the city and this, that and the other and back to the boat. Back again in to the city. And on the third day we weren’t allowed out. We knew we were moving. We knew we moved from South Africa. We went on to Bombay then. Mumbai as it is now. All I remember of Bombay is the fact that in the harbour when we got there we’d nothing but a sea of floating turbans. Everybody had thrown their turbans into the sea. They were good old days, they were bad old days but I think [emphasis] the good seemed to mix in enough with the bad for it to say well it was just as you saw it.
DE: So even with retreating from the Japanese and being ill for eight months it was a, it was a good time.
LH: It was. It was, yes. It definitely was. The only Japanese we actually saw were prisoners. We didn’t see many of those. I had some good times, had some bad times. Taking it, taking it all in it wasn’t all too bad. I can’t say I didn’t enjoy it. I did enjoy it. It was an experience. An experience which thousands of people would never experience. The only thing was, as I said if it hadn’t been for my wife I should have stayed in.
DE: Yes.
LH: Full time. But I didn’t.
DE: What did she do in the, in the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force?
LH: She was a typist. She was just outside Newton. Outside, just out Nottingham and of course she wasn’t far from home. She could get home when she had a couple of days off and she was very, very happy about that but she left the Air Force before I did. Aye.
[pause]
DE: And I’m just wondering why you’ve, why you’re living here now? When did you move?
LH: Pardon?
DE: When did you move here?
LH: From [pause] I went to, I was born in Reading, and we moved down into Reading from Derbyshire. We were there for ten years in to the cottage where I was born. My aunt who lived in it bought the place and she left it to us in her will when she passed away. The only thing about Reading was the fact we couldn’t get a bungalow to suit my wife. She couldn’t climb stairs so we decided that we’d see what Lincoln had got. But having been six or seven months at Wainfleet during the war we went to Wainfleet. We went all around and we found this place in Chapel St Leonards and we liked it. My wife liked it so we decided that we would stay and we did.
DE: Right.
LH: I’ve always enjoyed it here. I still like it. I still like Chapel St Leonards. I like Lincolnshire.
DE: We haven’t talked about your time at Wainfleet. What were you doing there?
LH: Oh, at Wainfleet I was on the bombing range.
DE: Right.
LH: I was doing radio repairs on the bombing range. It was a crude place but mind you we didn’t half soup up some aircraft. It altered quite a bit after a while. It was just, it was just like a hut on the bombing on the side of the runway [pause] and we we held the radio communications for the station. Mango, Mango. That was our call sign.
DE: Was it, was it very busy then, the bombing range?
LH: It was very busy indeed. Very, busy. It was.
DE: And were they, were they dropping live, live bombs or —
LH: Practice, yes. Live bombs on the proper bombing range but practice bombs. They dropped quite a few of those. That was the days of the Blenheims. Most of them were Blenheims, and the Wellingtons. I always remember all those.
DE: And how accurate were they? How close to the targets did they get?
LH: They were pretty good. They got pretty good at it.
DE: So were you in communication with them when they were doing?
LH: Yes.
DE: Right.
LH: Yes. Oh yes. Radio communication. I can see it all now.
DE: So, how did it work? Were they told how well they’d done and how close they’d got to the target?
LH: Yes. Yes. They were given a report sheet as to what they’d missed and what they’d hit and it all added up I suppose to whatever they did. Of course that was the days of, like I say the American heavy bombers, our Blenheims and what not.
DE: Yeah. So, I suppose being posted to India when you were you, you didn’t see the big bomber fleets of Lancasters and Halifaxes.
LH: No. Only Halifaxes. Halifaxes. Saw all those aircraft in the hangars at the base.
DE: Did you ever work on radar?
LH: Yeah. Oh, yes. Yes, we had radar. We had a lot of radar repairs to do. We went down to the Isle of Wight for that.
[pause]
DE: What was that like to work on?
LH: Quite good really. You could see how things were developing. You could see as it was going to be the, well the means of communication in the end which it was.
DE: So, did you do any work with the navigation aids like Gee and H2S and things like that or —
LH: No.
DE: No.
LH: No. We used to go up in the bombers and test radios when we’d repaired them or when they wanted repairing. We used to go up with the, with the bombers. It was very [unclear] But I never really wanted to, to be in the flying crew. I don’t know why. I didn’t mind the odd journey in an aircraft. That was great. Absolutely was wonderful. Has it been of interest to you?
DE: It’s been fantastic. Thank you very much. Yes.
LH: Anything, anything else you would like to know?
DE: Well, usually the last thing I say is is there anything else that you would like to tell?
LH: Not really. Not as, not as I know of. Except I’ve had all the encouragement with my in-laws and family in doing the jobs that I wanted to do and, and there we are. But with regards to finishing with the Royal Air Force well it just, it came as I’ve told you if it hadn’t been for my wife who didn’t like the idea of [pause] what should I say, being out with me in the aircraft, and having our own, our own aircraft err our own houses, she didn’t like that idea at all. That’s what really put it down.
DE: Yeah. Right, well, I shall, I shall switch the recording off. Can I just say thank you very much again for —
LH: It’s been a pleasure.
DE: For the interview.
LH: I only hope I’ve told you enough to make you realise it was worth coming for.
DE: Well, there’s, there’s nearly, nearly an hour’s worth on the tape so—
LH: Oh.
DE: Right. So thank you very much.
Other: I want to ask you a question.
DE: Oh, ok. I should —
Other: You’ve mentioned Wainfleet.
DE: We have mentioned Wainfleet.
Other: Right. And was it the sergeant or the corporal coming on the motorbike?
DE: Oh, not had that. Is there a story about a non-commissioned officer on a motorbike at Wainfleet?
LH: Oh yes. Yes.
DE: Right.
LH: We, we were on a radio station and this corporal, Corporal Green he had a BSA motorcycle, and he often wondered I think why we were always busy working when he came. We got the beat of his engine, you see. We knew somebody was there so we were all ready for him. That was the —
Other: You used to speak to him on the radio.
LH: The good old days. The good old days.
DE: I shall leave it there then. Thank you very much.
LH: Thank you.
DE: Cheers.
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Interview with Len Harper
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Dan Ellin
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IBCC Digital Archive
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2019-05-21
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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AHarperL190521, PHarperL1901
Format
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00:55:02 audio recording
Description
An account of the resource
Len Harper registered for the air force in April 1939, influenced by the positive experience of his brother who had joined in January. Upon completing training at the Wireless Training School, RAF Yatesbury, he was posted to RAF Wittering, where he undertook radio maintenance for two years. Harper was posted to India in 1942, after marrying his wife, a Women’s Auxiliary Air Force typist based at RAF Newton, in February. He describes servicing radios for Blenheims and Spitfires, sightseeing with his friends, and sensing the political tensions. After two years, he was posted to Burma, where he completed radio maintenance for the Third Tactical Air Force. He recalls his impressions of the country, the living conditions in the jungle, and retreating from the Japanese. Eighteen-months later, an illness caused him to return to India, where he was hospitalised with dysentery for eight months. Harper returned home and despite enjoying his work, left the air force in 1945 following the wishes of his wife. Finally, he describes his service at RAF Wainfleet, his post-war career, and how fondly he remembers his time in India.
Contributor
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Tilly Foster
Carolyn Emery
Spatial Coverage
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Burma
Great Britain
India
South Africa
England--Bedfordshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Wiltshire
Temporal Coverage
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1939
1940
1941
1942-02
1943
1944
1945
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Blenheim
ground personnel
love and romance
military living conditions
RAF Cardington
RAF Newton
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Wittering
RAF Yatesbury
recruitment
Spitfire
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/503/8397/ADavidsonRE151126.1.mp3
2d503b4ee6f044b92ca558c27cadbaaf
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Davidson, Roy Eric
Roy Davidson
Roy E Davidson
R E Davidson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Davidson, RE
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Roy Davidson (-2022). He served with 61 Squadron.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
MC: This interview is being conducted on behalf of the International Bomber Command Centre, the interviewee is Roy Davidson, the interviewer is Mike Connock, and the interview is taking place at Roy Davidson’s house in Lincoln. Right, I think we’ll start with, if you could just tell me a bit about where you were born Roy, when and where you were born.
RD: I was born in Lincoln in 1933, my mother worked as a bus conductress, and then at Marks and Spencers, my father was unknown, and I went to school in Lincoln, a City School, the old City school on Monks Road. Went to work at the Lincoln Corporation, became pensions manager for Lincolnshire County Council, the holiday camp that was in 19[inaudible].
MC: Yes, can I stop you when, when you obviously you were born in ‘33, so what was life like as a child then between ‘33 and say, ‘39?
RD: I lived on terrace, a terrace house in St Nicolas Street.
MC: A good childhood?
RD: Yes, yes, yes.
MC: Yes.
RD: It was quite a place.
MC: Yes, so obviously when war broke out, you were six.
RD: Living in St Nicolas Street, I was on the flight path for Scampton and I used to hear the Lancs coming over, of course you don’t realise at six year old what’s going on but you could hear them coming over, you could hear the engines playing up sometimes, you could hear them coming back, [inaudible] opposite St Nicolas Church on the final, on the final approach for Scampton, and I used to listen to the aircraft coming over but didn’t realise what was going on.
MC: So obviously that was up to ‘39, and then obviously during the war you were sort of, you know, a youngster and -
RD: Yes, that’s right.
MC: Growing up, so by ‘45 at the end of the war you were?
RD: I was twelve year old.
MC: You were twelve years old, so what was life like for a young man during the war?
RD: Ok, well, different in that, well at that age you don’t realise what’s going on, do you really, I mean the thing I remember about the war in St Nicolas Street was the old air raid shelter, they used to build these air raid shelters on, on the roads, on the main roads, on the main street playing football against it, against the air raid shelter [laughs]. But when I was at school, if there was an air raid alert, we used to go to the Wesley Chapel.
MC: Yes, so therefore you, what age were you when you left school then?
RD: I left school when I was fifteen.
MC: What did you do?
RD: Went to work for Lincoln City Council, in the pension, the superannuation as they called it in those days, department with a guy called Bert Joyce, who was my boss, who was a super chap, he was a great, I think he was the chairman of the Lincoln amateur dramatic society, and Gilbert and Sullivan society, so that’s how my interest in Gilbert and Sullivan came from him. And the thing I remember about the City Council was a guy called Harry Rogers who was a deputy treasurer, he was a keen golfer and so was I, and he came in the office one day with Pete Hopkinson, the chief accountant, and said, I was in charge then and he said, ‘are you busy?’ ‘yes I’m really snowed under’. He said ‘we’re looking to have a person to make up a three ball [inaudible]’, so I said, ‘I’ve no chance, I’m too busy’. He said, ‘look, I’m the boss and I’m ordering you to come and play’, and during this round of golf, [inaudible] score the Mercado, there you go he was a great Gilbert and Sullivan fan and I’ve seen it two or three times.
MC: So are you?
RD: Yes, I was yes.
MC: So obviously you got, as a National Serviceman you got your call up papers.
RD: Yes in 1951 and I was, I went to Padgate, It was [laughs], the thing I remember about Padgate was, one of the unique things was you couldn’t take food out of the cookhouse, on Sunday morning, people were having a lie in, so one of us was nominated to go to cookhouse, we used to get a stack of bread, put it on our head and put a hat on, walk back to the [pause], you didn’t want the bottom slice.
MC: Yes [laughter] so at that time did you know you were going to be aircrew, I mean.
RD: No after I’d been in about, I went in August, about 2 months, the doors had been opened.
MC: Was it basic training at Padgate?
RD: Yes, well I’d just finished my drill course, normal reception course, when the door opened, they were looking for National Service aircrew, so I volunteered, went down to RAF Hornchurch, was offered pilot or navigator for eight years, signal engineer, gunner national service, so doing my national service I was very tempted half a dozen times to sign up. Frank was always on me sign on Roy sign on, but I tried to get a national service commission in the Fleet Air Arm, I fancied that, went down to HMS Daedalus on the Solent for interviews. But the thing I remember about the interviews at Leigh was, there was a Naval engineer board and there were around a hundred of us and, when it was your turn, you went to the top table there were three piles of cards, you picked [inaudible], went out for five minutes, and had to come back and had to give a five minute talk on what was the subject on the three cards, I got constitutional monarchy, mass production and colour televisions, no chance [laughter].
MC: So that was for the Fleet Air Arm?
RD: That was for the Fleet Air Arm, yes in there.
MC: So you, you obviously volunteered for your air gunner then?
RD: Yes, yes.
MC: Yes, and so following that, obviously your air gunner training started.
RD: Yes, I went to RAF Lakenfield, did a 20 hours flying, it’s in the log book there.
MC: Yes.
RD: At Lakenfield and the thing about Lakenfield was we, I was, I played top class table tennis in those days, I played John Leach the world champion once, and we had a very good table tennis team and we thought we were going to win the RAF cup, we got to the quarter final and we were playing West Kirby at Liverpool, and as I was on the train to West Kirby at Manchester. I stuck my head out of the window, and somebody shouted the King had died, he died that morning, and so we got to West Kirby and all leave was cancelled, all social activities were cancelled, I had to get back next day for an examination at the, on sighting at the gunnery school, and we started the match at 7.30 in the morning. I played my two and went back [inaudible] Lime Street at Liverpool, we got back to Lakenfield, but the thing was about that, my, we thought we were going to win the RAF cup and my posting, every fortnight the flights passed out, one went to Bomber Command, two weeks later, Coastal Command, two weeks later Bomber Command. Mine was scheduled for Coastal Command, but we were in the quarter final of the RAF cup and they, when, you could play if you were stationed you’d left up to three months after you’ve left, the Bomber Command Station was Scampton the Coastal Command was St Mawgan down in Cornwall, we thought we were going to win the RAF cup, therefore they re-flighted me held me back a fortnight, so that it was a Bomber Command posting instead of Coastal Command posting, otherwise I should have been down on Shackleton’s. These things happen and then we got knocked out.
MC: So your gunnery training was on Lincoln’s was it?
RD: It was on Lincoln’s yes.
MC: You started on Lincoln’s, [inaudible]
RD: I went to Scampton, Scampton was a 230 OCU in those days, it was just closing as we arrived and then they moved it to Waddington, so I went with it to Waddington, and did my training on the OCU at Waddington and then was posted to a squadron at Waddington, 61 Squadron.
MC: So you joined 61 Squadron, how many, how long were you doing your gunnery training, how long was that, how long did that take?
RD: If you could look at the dates on there, Mike, it shows you flights doesn’t it?
MC: I was just looking where you went to 61 Squadron in April ‘52, that would be right. [pause] So what about the flying, Lincoln flying did you -
RD: I enjoyed it was about 600 hours in a Lincoln, I wouldn’t have missed it for the world really. At the OCU at Scampton the way you crewed up was interesting.
MC: Oh yes that was, yes, I was going to ask that.
RD: You were all in a room, there were eight crews, eight gunners, eight signallers, eight flight engineers, sixteen navigators, and eight pilots and you just wandered round and chatted to whoever came to chat to you, and Frank Ercliff came across and he said, chatting away, he said, you know, ‘yes, you’re a nice sort of guy, would you like to join my crew?’ and that was it, that’s the way your crews were made up and he was a smashing guy.
MC: They did that throughout the war.
RD: Yes, its mentioned in, got a book on Lancaster’s and Lincoln’s.
MC: So were there any other National Servicemen on your crew?
RD: I think Ken Gibbs was.
MC: Yes.
RD: I think, I think he was, the way Danny joined us was half way through my two years, the flight engineer Ken was de-mobbed and Danny joined us, Danny Sinclair.
MC: And was Danny, was Danny?
RD: I think.
MC: Was he a three year man or -
RD: I reckon so, I’m not sure, I don’t think he was National Service but he stayed with us, we got on ever so well.
MC: Yes because as a National Serviceman, you did have the option of making it three years didn’t you?
RD: Yes I did, that’s right, yes, and I think Danny probably did.
MC: Yes.
RD: Yes, but my skipper Frank was on to me 3 or 4 times, you ought to, I think at one stage I thought I will sign on and with my flying hours, I will go again for the Naval Air Service, I think, with my experience of flying at that stage of my, I might have got in the Fleet Air Arm.
MC: Or coastal command?
RD: Or coastal command, yes.
MC: Yes, so what about, did you, did you get abroad with the Lincoln did you?
RD: Yes I went to where the Exercise Sunray at Shallufa, here’s the medal to prove it. Ismailia and Calica, there were hostilities then so they were out of bounds, we went to the WO’s and JO’s club at Fayed, on sand yachting. In 19-, we took off at Shallufa at 0015 hours on the first of January 1952.
MC: What was that for?
RD: That was for Exercise Sunray.
MC: Oh right.
RD: Kingpin, on the first of January ‘52 I think it was.
MC: And that was to Shallufa.
RD: ‘52 or ‘53, call it ‘53.
MC: Yes ‘53, yes [pause] yes, so you, so you flew into Idris in January ‘53?
RD: Yes and stayed the night there, then flew on to Shallufa, the thing I remember about that flight along the North African Coast, Benghazi, and Alemaine, flying just off the coast, on a beautiful day looking down at the debris on the desert in some places, flew into Shallufa, I were a month there on exercise had a few days in Cyprus from Shallufa.
MC: And Nicosia?
RD: Nicosia yes.
MC: You obviously did a lot of hours, what about the, you obviously had one or two mishaps, you certainly had, the crash you had did you?
RD: Ah, that was at Waddington, yes.
MC: So was that after you came back?
RD: That was after we came back yes.
MC: So what happened there with that?
RD: We were there to see, well part of the exercise we were to see firing off of the, we used to fly off the coast at Wainfleet, there was a bombing tower at Wainfleet. We flew about five miles out to sea and threw an aluminium sea marker out the turret a stain, big stain and we used to fire at this, [inaudible] and I became a select gunner, he assessed how many bullets hit the target. But the thing I remember about Shallufa, back to Shallufa was, we were air to ground firing down at targets and the local occupants or whatever you call them now, from the rear turret, when you fired the cartridge ejected into the, into the slipstream and down they went, if you catch any of these things these cartridge shells, and we had, the targets were set big white sheets and as you flew over the target, the pilot would tell you ‘target coming up now’, and it was way, way passed, so we had a system, Frank and I, he says, ‘target ready’, and I had to start firing about ten seconds before the target appeared [laughter].
MC: [laughter]
RD: So I got some hits and I became a select gunner.
MC: You had a good team?
RD: Well yes, these occupants of, Egyptians catching these shells, from the mid upper turret, well we didn’t do any secret firing from the mid upper turret, air to ground firing from the mid upper, mid upper the cartridge shells went into two bags by your legs, but in the rear turret they ejected out of the turret. And we [pause] -
MC: All the Arabs use to collect the shells?
RD: Whether we hit any I don’t know but yes, it was a dicey business.
MC: So all the hours you did, you did obviously, mainly exercises and training.
RD: Yes, we did a lot of air to sea firing off Wainfleet, air to ground firing in Shallufa, and we had one short spell of air to air firing [inaudible] drove off Cyprus.
MC: Oh right.
RD: So we practised all three targets.
MC: So when was the, if you’re alright to talk about it, the incident that you crashed?
RD: That was in September ‘52.
MC: Waddington, oh was it? Oh so that was before you went to Shallufa was it?
RD: Well no, I went to Shallufa in January, January ‘52.
MC: ‘53?
RD: ‘53, yes.
MC: So the, so you had, this is mixed up, ah September the 6th, ‘52 yes.
RD : Ah.
MC: Well that’s, well that
RD: Before Shallufa was it?
MC: Ah yes, 3rd September, yes, so you, what actually happened?
RD: We came, we came in to land, we were overshooting on, we came into land on three engines, we feathered one engine, so we’d got three engines, we’d just stopped one engine feathered, and we were three engine overshoot and we decided to land. As we landed, there was a very, very strong cross wind, we got a very heavy landing and the wind turned the aircraft and we were heading, we thought, towards the main field dump and the number 4 hanger and Frank, I was in the rear turret, but Frank knocked Ken’s hand away, and was following through on the throttles, the flight engineer and opened the engines up. Well of course, we had lost all our stalling speed on three engines, you can’t accelerate, and we staggered across the airfield, just missed number, number 4, it was number 4 or number 5, just missed the hanger anyway. Went over the roof of the married quarters, we were as close to the married quarters roof as we are sat here, and across into a field into the middle of the married quarters. Frank shouted ‘brace brace’, what we did Mike is, we used to do these escape drills one week to Scampton, where there was a Lincoln wired up to create any sort of [inaudible], and next week to Cranwell, to the baths at Cranwell to do the wet dinghy drills. So you would act instinctively which was what it was all about. On the wet dinghy drills you got a maewest, a maewest suit tied tight between your legs, and you jumped in, you went down and the suit didn’t and it was a bit [gasp] and my job was always to upright the one man dinghy, which came out the wing. We used to practice releasing the dinghy at Scampton on the mock up and I had to right, and the damn dinghy always inflated, was set to inflate, always inflated upside down, so I had to get on the dinghy and throw myself backwards to right the dinghy, and I was under the dinghy then [laughs], its funny, that was at Scampton, but this was at Cranwell, aye Cranwell. So it was one day at Scampton, next day at Cranwell but the, so Frank opened up the, well we staggered across the airfield, we’d got flaps down, and we staggered across the airfield and crashed into the married quarters.
MC: So Frank actually tried to open the throttles to go off again.
RD: Yes, yes.
MC: You know but it wasn’t successful.
RD: Yes, yes, and I think, I don’t know whether he got a severe reprimand or not, I don’t know, but all I do know is that we flew the first flight afterwards, was two or three days later and talk about funny tummies. We flew with the Squadron leader of Shallufa to see how the squadron, mine laying off the coast of Norway, and the ships, it was dark and the ships on the horizon seemed to be higher than you.
MC: Yes.
RD: Optical illusion, then they said that we had the choice of not flying together with Frank or staying with Frank, we all decided to stay with him, because there was no doubt about that.
MC: So you flew for quite a while without Frank then?
RD: Yes, yes, he was suspended.
MC: Yes, couple of months I suppose.
RD: Yes.
MC: You flew a couple of months without Frank, and then you all elected to fly with him.
RD: To fly with him again yes, except the flight engineer, they moved him across to another crew.
MC: Oh did they?
RD: Because he was on this throttle business, Frank was moving to closing the throttles and Ken was behind him doing, and Frank knocked his hand away. He shouldn’t have been able to do that. So we went into the married quarters.
MC: So you don’t, did Frank, was he suspended or did he just [inaudible]
RD: I think he was, they grounded him for a while, and -
MC: I mean, It must have been a traumatic experience.
RD: Oh yes, yes.
MC: So you all go out again?
RD: We had an ATC Cadet with us flying and they all went out the front end except for me, and, as I said I went out the rear door but the aircraft was on fire when I got out, you don’t know much more about it, you just get as far away as you can.
MC: Did you have any, anything on board, any armaments on board, any bombs or anything like that?
RD: Fortunately not because I had been air sea firing off, and I’d used all my ammunition so we’d no live ammunition on board.
MC: So had you flown many operations, many flights in that aircraft? Did you have a regular aircraft?
RD: No, we didn’t no.
MC: It was all different.
RD: No, [inaudible]
MC: So, as you say, unique in National Service Aircrew.
RD: Yes.
MC: And then of course you did the Coronation.
RD: Coronation flypast when she reviewed the RAF at Odiham.
MC: You did a lot of training for that?
RD: Yes, yes, you’ll see formation flying.
MC: Yes, so yes that would be in ‘53 wouldn’t it? Yes, that was, obviously you went to Shallufa, came back from Shallufa in ‘52, didn’t you? And then ‘53 was the -
RD: Queens Coronation. That cutting you’ve got there, 800 aircraft.
MC: Oh that started, sorry.
RD: it shows you how many aircraft were on the ground and how many in the air.
MC: Yes, so you had quite a lot of aircraft in the air.
RD: That was us, we were Red Two, flying in formation in Lincolns, that’s some of the flight formation and I was from the rear turret, and the aircraft behind me is probably 20 yards behind me, I were making rude gestures at the pilots in the aircraft behind me [laughter], but we had plus or minus 15 seconds I think it was, on the, on the arrival part so we went over the Queen in perfect formation then it was absolute chaos, there were aircraft fast ones and slow ones, aircrafts all over the sky, and we, we flew over Brighton and came up the East Coast back to Waddington. [pause] When I was in Shallufa, we were coming home from Shallufa, we flew back to Idris and then we were held up for a day at Idris, because it was the day of the East Coast floods. We didn’t know anything about these floods and they were playing cards, and we were suddenly put back a day so we had another day at Shallufa, at Idris, and then we flew back and came up the East Coast. You could see all the floods, no idea what was going on. The panic was, we had some cherry brandy on board I think, for the officers mess [laughter], which we ought not to have had, and it was touch and go whether we got into Waddington, because we thought we were going to have to go to Lynham, now the customs at Lynham were a bit more strict than those at Waddington. I think we got into Waddington with half a pint of fuel left, we just made it.
MC: So you did a lot of formation flying then?
RD: Yes, yes.
MC: Practising for the Queens Coronation flight.
RD: Originally, ones sent on the runway, off he went, then another one, by the time the ninth went, there were nine of us there were, the first one was a long way away, so they then decided to put all nine aircraft on the runway, stack them like that, and one went and when he was halfway down the runway, the second one went, and therefore the slipstream was a bit tricky.
MC: When was the Coronation flypast then that would be in?
RD: It’s on there, look.
MC: Oh 15th of July [pause]. Ah yes, that’s right; here we go, so you were airborne for quite some time
RD: Yes.
MC: So that was from Waddington
RD: From Waddington, there were nine, it gives you in there the formation of the number on the flight, number of Lincolns, we flew with nine from Upwood and Helmswell think it was. Its shows you the [pause], It’ll tell you the numbers it has in it [pause].
MC: So how many aircraft did you say were in the Coronation Flypast?
RD: Well the total about 800.
MC: 800, yes, and there was as many on the ground as well at least [inaudible].
RD: There was more on the ground yes, I mean I shouldn’t think there’s that many aircraft left in the RAF now.
MC: Yes [laughter]
RD: But it tells you there, pass it to me Mike, I’ll show you, [inaudible] ground, there look.
MC: Yes there’s quite a lot of aircraft isn’t there, you know, from Oxfords, Ansons, Lincolns, [inaudible] Shackletons.
RD: And the funny, I’ll tell you a story about that.
MC: And the Avro Vulcan prototype, that was interesting, yes.
RD: [laughter] The ground crew drew lots to fly on the flypast, because only nine aircraft, there were more ground crew so they drew lots, there was a large Taffy guy with us, and we gave him a sickness bag or whatever you call them and he was ill, the slipstream was so bad, there was so many aircraft, he was ill from the moment we took off to the moment we landed, and we landed, still clutching his bag, he fell out the rear door just in front of me, collapsed against the rear wheel of the Lincoln and he said, ‘I could watch the bloody thing on television’. I can hear him saying that now, ‘I could watch the bloody thing on television’, god, he was poorly, I felt ever so sorry for him. He was delighted because he’d drawn lots and he was chosen to fly with us, so there were nine aircraft from Waddington from our squadron anyway, I think 100 had got some as well but yes, ‘could have watched the bloody thing on television’, he said.
MC: So what other squadrons were there at Waddington when you were there?
RD: 49.
MC: Oh 49 was at Waddington, yes, yes.
RD: and 100.
MC: [inaudible] come from Scampton.
RD: And 100 and 61.
MC: Three, three squadrons.
RD: Because that guy from Norway who wrote to you, didn’t he?
MC: Yes.
RD: Said that could you tell him anything about his father, and you sent it to me because you knew I had been there at that time, and his Dad wasn’t on our squadron, and I can’t think he was on any of the other two squadrons, because you got to know the pilots on the other two squadrons as well, and I wrote to him and he mentioned as he was a six year old boy walking with his Dad, down the main street at Waddington when he saw the Lincoln I was in crash. I mean, there’s a chance in a million that, he was delighted, I’ve got the correspondence there, delighted that I’d got in touch with him and he really was -
MC: [inaudible] oh good.
RD: yes, so I took a copy of all the correspondence [inaudible]
MC: So when did you finish your flying? It must have been shortly after the coronation.
RD: ‘53, August ‘53, I asked, the squadron were going to Nairobi on the Mau Mau, and I asked to stay on, I asked to stretch my National Service and stay with the crew but they wouldn’t let me.
MC: So the crew remained and you were replaced?
RD: I was replaced yes, Danny went to Nairobi.
MC: Oh right.
RD: But I was de-mobbed and, didn’t want to be de-mobbed but [laughter].
MC: You didn’t [laughter] That was a shame yes, so obviously, after that you went back to your normal job.
RD: Yes, I became Pensions Manager at the County Council.
MC: Oh right.
RD: In charge of the 13,000 contributors and about 13,000 pensioners as well. I had a staff of 13, and I stayed there until I retired.
MC: Oh right.
RD: And when I retired, I’d been, other than the two years in the RAF, I’d been 49 years, I was the longest serving employee on the County Council payroll.
MC: So having joined the RAF, you were stationed at Lincoln, near Lincoln?
RD: Yes.
MC: That could have gone anywhere, couldn’t it?
RD: But I stayed on Bomber Command for the table tennis, they thought they were going to win the RAF cup, I could still play for them when I was at Scampton, even though we were a Lakenfield team. If I’d have been camped at Mawgan, not a cat in hells chance of getting back, it didn’t work out, we got beat.
MC: So, going back slightly your gunnery training, so obviously you were Sergeant aircrew?
RD: Yes.
MC: When, when were you made a sergeant, was that after your gunnery training?
RD: Yes, I can remember now.
MC: Before you joined your squadron?
RD: Yes, yes.
MC: Before you went to the OCU?
RD: Before OCU, but I, the thing about that was the brevet, you know the air gunners one, I was so proud of that, that I walked down the main street at Hull, like this [laughter] sideways, walking sideways, with these wings, but -
MC: In Hull
RD: Yes, Lakenfield you see.
MC: Oh of course yes, I see what your saying now, yes.
RD: So I walked down the high street in Hull sideways [laughter].
MC: Its lovely, yes.
RD: Whilst I was in the RAF, my navigator Caz Percula got married, married a girl from Dinington, they married in Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, and the crew went to his wedding. Well I don’t know much about it, I mean, they were so hospitable, got all a load of stuff about for his wedding, and -. Then you’ll find this interesting, I saw Frank in ‘53 when I was de-mobbed and I heard about him because a guy Jack Hinchcliff played at Torksey, and he knew, he was a driving of the heavy goods tester and Frank was when he came out of the RAF, and he used to talk to me about Frank being at Blackpool, he knew he was at Blackpool. I got a phone call one day from Torksey, would I ring this number and speak to a Mr Hurcliff, and I said to Eileen, ‘well, Frank said no that’s not his number the std was for Ipswich not Blackpool’. I didn’t know he’d move to Ipswich to be near his son, and Frank had rung the six golf courses round, he knew I played golf, from days gone by and rang the six golf courses round Lincoln, have you got a Roy Davidson on your, and Torksey said we have but they wouldn’t give him my number, but they gave me his number, I rang him up, that, that, I saw him in ‘53, and that was 2003, 50 years.
MC: So you didn’t meet for 50 years?
RD: No, no and then we got very friendly, he stayed here to come to reunions.
MC: Yes.
RD: and -
MC: So basically, did you ever get the crew together again, all told, because you had, you, Frank, and Danny?
RD: No when we were at Waddington, he was a flying officer, I’m yes sir, no sir, on base, but off the base, you are a crew and the set ups different, used to go round Frank’s for meals. When I met him after 50 years, his wife had died and his daughter Wendy was about 4 year old when I last saw her, is married to an American Army [inaudible] and they used to come and stay with us, and his wife had died and he met this lady, Joan, and we got an invitation to his wedding. The bride was about 90 and the bridegroom about 92 or something you know, in the 80’s, and we went to his wedding, we went to his birthday party, and to his wedding and then went to his funeral as well, the obituary things in there.
MC: So when you got together in 2003, obviously Danny was at the reunion?
RD: Well what happened then
MC: Were there any other crew there?
RD: No what happened then was Danny was a member of the aircrew association, as I was, and it showed Frank joining, he’d just joined then, and I’d not been a member long, and Danny spotted my name and Franks name on the new arrivals, new, and got in touch with us, so then Danny myself and Frank. Danny knew where the [pause] David Leeson, the navigator was from Brigg, and I rang, oh there was an aircrew listing of Lincolnshire members of the Association and there was a Leeson. So I rang this number, it wasn’t him, and this guy said, ‘leave it with me, I’ll do what I can to find him’, and he rang me back and he said yes there is a David Leeson who’s living near Wolverhampton, and so I rang him and it was the David Leeson I wanted to speak to, you know that he’s not well at all now. He knew Caszis, the Polish guy, Caz Pecula, he knew his number in London, Basingstoke, so I rang him, he was the other navigator and at one stage on the reunion, there was myself, Frank, Danny and Ken the flight engineer, there were four of us out of the six but the two navigators couldn’t make it, and David’s not very well and Caz, the one whose wedding we went to [inaudible].
MC: Its interesting that you only had a crew of six, I never realised that, you know, I mean obviously I suspect early days in the Lincoln, they would have had seven wouldn’t they?
RD: Yes, yes.
MC: But
RD: Yes, [inaudible] in the middle turret, yes, the middle of the turret was a strange contraption, it rotated, I don’t know if you knew this, as the turret rotated you know, and when the guns are facing the back of the pilots head, it’s on a cam.
MC: Yes, its called a scarf ring.
RD: That’s right yes, so you don’t shoot the tail plane, you shoot the pilot [laughter], yes.
MC: Yes [laughter]. But you did both you did mid-upper turret and [inaudible].
RD: Yes, I trained on the mid-upper turret and the rear turret.
MC: Yes, but when the Lincolns that you flew, did they still have the mid-upper turret?
RD: Just for a while, yes.
MC: Yes.
RD: That would have fired 20mm cannon shells; the rear turret was point five Brownings.
MC: Point fives.
RD: Yes. Two, point five Brownings and we used to, we didn’t do much flying mid-upper, because it was the H2S Radar placed [inaudible] you know.
MC: Yes, yes.
RD: And they took the turrets out, so I was rear turret, and we used to land in the rear turret, until we had the crash, and they stopped me landing, I was de-mobbed soon afterwards anyway.
MC: So you used to vacate the rear turret when you landed were you saying, oh you
RD: After we had the crash, before we had the crash I used to land in the rear turret.
MC: Was there a reasoning behind that? I don’t know.
RD: No, no, I don’t know why they stopped me flying in the rear; it was only for about a month or so because I was de-mobbed [inaudible].
MC: Yes, because you were de-mobbed then, yes.
RD: But [pause]
MC: Thing about a rear turret?
RD: There was a thing, the thing of the rear turret was if you had to eject from the aircraft in the rear turret, you rolled out backwards. Oh I’ll tell you, let me tell you a funny tale, on the night flights, you had in flight pack, food, but you couldn’t have it in the turret, it was just outside the turret, just there, just within the fuselage, and the fuselage was cold, you were warm in the turret so when you got your in-flight pack in the turret it was, not like a block of ice, but cold. In the in-flight pack was a boiled egg, that was fairly solid, frozen, so I used to lob it out the turret, so if you got hit on the head with a hard boiled egg in Lincolnshire, I probably threw it out the turret.
MC: So your suit was, you obviously had a heated suit in the rear turret?
RD: Yes, I was ok, well we hadn’t got heated suits, the turret was warm.
MC: Oh was it.
RD: Other than when the aircraft in Egypt, when the thing had broken down, it was cold then but in the war they had heated, yes.
MC: Heated suits.
RD: Yes, and then we used to get a, another thing we got a bar of chocolate for every two hours we flew but, you didn’t get the chocolate until the end of the month, if you remember you were flying [laughter].
MC: [laughter]
RD: So you’d come home with about 30 bars of chocolate, I wasn’t with Eileen then, [inaudible] she was very keen on chocolate.
MC: So when did you meet Eileen then?
RD: About 1956 was -
MC: Ah yes.
RD: I knew, I knew
MC: You were a civilian?
RD: I knew Dennis, I knew Dennis, Eileen’s brother, before I knew Eileen. I used to go out before our Eileen, because when I said to my friends when I first met her, it was always Denny Worrall’s sister, this is Eileen, it was always Dennis, remember Dennis?
Eileen: Dennis yes.
RD: Sister.
Eileen: Oh.
RD: I’d say its, Denny Worrall’s sister, I played tennis with Dennis so instead of saying this is Eileen, this is Denny Worrall’s sister.
MC: When did you get married then?
RD: 1960.
MC: Good memory?
RD: When did we get married, Eileen?
Eileen: Sorry, what was what?
RD: When did we get married? 19?
Eileen: When did we get married? in err -
RD: This is Denny Worrall’s sister [laughter].
Eileen: We got married in 2000 [inaudible]
RD: 1960.
Eileen: 1960, we had our Golden Wedding, didn’t we?
RD: This is Denny Worrall’s sister, Mike, that’s your five minute probation, five minute talk.
MC: Yes, you’ve got, as you said recently, you went to the Fleet Air Arm for your testing, then you did the, that was part of your testing was this five minute preparation talk, and then you, and then obviously in August ’51, you volunteered, you volunteered for aircrew.
RD: [inaudible] five years [inaudible] National Service at RAF Lakenfield.
MC: So going back to some of the flying you did on 61 squadron, you say the Wing Commander flying was Willy?
RD: Willy Tate was Wing Commander.
MC: Willy Tate of the Tirpitz, yes, yes.
RD: And he, we always reckoned he flew, he flew, very occasionally to mates to keep his flying time, he had to do so many hours.
MC: Yes, and your different exercises, like Exercise Kingpin.
RD: Kingpin, Radar bombing on the Ruhr, that was quite a sight.
MC: When were you flying over the Ruhr?
RD: Over the Ruhr at night yes.
MC: And then you did night flights training, long nose Meteors.
RD: Yes, with the Radar.
MC: Yes.
RD: I used to sit in the rear turret on exercise and see this aircraft catching you up, and when I fired, on my guns, was the call sign watsit [unclear], but it was a call sign so when I pressed the tit, my call sign flashed to him, if mine flashed to him, before his flashed to me I’d shot him down and it was all bona fide. We, when we came into land, we were de-briefed as they were during the war time, it was a proper de-briefing, and there used to be a mass dash for Birmingham, we were dispersed at Birmingham and then came into land at Waddington. If you were at Birmingham first, you got the pan nearest the main hanger at Waddington, if you last you were at the other side of the airfield, so it was all as during the war.
MC: So you did pathfinder training as well, marking -
RD: We had path finding instructions, the master bombers they went in like they did during the war, and we got on the RT bomb on the red marker he dropped a flare.
MC: Yes.
RD: They used to mark the target, Gibson were one, wasn’t he? He was killed flying Meteors.
MC: So you did [inaudible] bombing targets in Wainfleet, Donna Nook.
RD: Yes, yes there must be a sea full of fire axes off the coast of Wainfleet, because on the door behind me, the two doors that came like that, there was the fire axe strapped to the door, and as you fired, the doors were like that, they went like that you know, overlapped, and therefore there was a gap by the side, and I went to fire, I lost two or three fire axes like that yes, as you fired the juddering.
MC: They came loose?
RD: They came loose and you’d got a gap then, if you’re firing on the beam, out went the fire axe. Those escape drills, the Lincoln wired up for, halfway down the page escape drills, there’s the wet dinghy drills.
MC: Oh at RAF Cranwell yes, yes. But you did parachute jumps?
RD: You were offered [laughter] nobody took it up, there’s Caz Percula, he was marvellous, there is a newspaper cutting somewhere, I don’t know much about it, I’ve got a photograph on the back of there, the wedding party.
MC: Caz Percula he was your -
RD: Navigator.
MC: Navigator, yes.
RD: David Leeson was the guy on the radar, Caz was the actual navigator but he was an RAF tennis champion as I say, he played at Wimbledon,so I played tennis for Bomber Command and he played tennis for the RAF. Tiger Moth, that was funny and Frank used to say, ‘let’s go for a ride in the moth’, he put it down as continuation training, there was no navigation aids, so we used to fly down across the field up the high street looking over the sky, down Portland Street, back up, that’s Waddington, that was the way.
MC: So you had a Tiger Moth on the station?
RD: Tiger Moth on the station, yes.
MC: Just the one?
RD: Just the one, yes.
MC: Yes, yes, yes.
RD: Skeet shooting, we used to have to return the cartridges, I could take 50 cartridges out go down the range fire at the, the skeets you had to take back 50 empty cartridge shells.
MC: Could anybody do this or was it just air gunners?
RD: No it was just the gunner, we had the flight simulator as well the mock up, that corkscrewed.
MC: You did, I mean obviously you practised corkscrews?
RD: Oh yes.
MC: [laughter]
RD: And Danny was on his RT and suddenly he would call, ‘what the hell’s going on?’ you know, the corkscrew, like that, and of course first time he knew about it was we were moving and he was on his RT, he couldn’t hear me talking to the pilot. Coronation review flypast.
MC: Yes, you talked about the flypast the Coronation Flypast, you did Spithead did you, Navy at the Spithead, Spithead review?
RD: Well that, that’s when she reviewed the Navy at Spithead.
MC: Ah right, yes.
RD: She reviewed the RAF at Odiham.
MC: Yes, yes [pause], now you mentioned about the ground crew collapsed, you were saying he could have watched it on the -
RD: On the bloody television. We got thrown out of a nightclub in Nicosia, we got thrown out, two of them were riding round the dance floor on bikes [laughter], this orderly sergeant brought out by David, I was orderly Sergeant, he was orderly officer and I fell asleep during the afternoon and missed the six o’clock parade, now any other officer I’d have been in serious trouble but David took it for me didn’t report it.
MC: What’s WO’s and JO’s in club fayed, Warrant Officers and Sergeants, Junior officers?
RD: Yes, Sergeants and Warrant Officers, WO’s and JO’s, yes, at Fayed. You had to check for your boots for snakes, that was a basic requirement first thing in the morning, knock your boots, that you got a snake inside it. Return to Idris. Yes that delayed 24 hours, that strong head wind, that was the weekend of the East Coast floods.
MC: Yes, yes.
RD: We came in over Canvey Island, what the hell’s going on down there, we had no idea, while we’d been held up, cherry brandy at Lynham customs. Hardboiled egg, there’s a bit about the hardboiled egg.
MC: Yeah [laughter]
RD: You get it on, from 20,000 feet.
MC: A hardboiled egg yes.
RD: Another mission on board and got 4 days [inaudible] severe rep, [inaudible].
MC: So you were in hospital for a while after the crash?
RD: 4 days, just 4 days.
MC: Yes, so you just had a -
RD: [inaudible] damage, new engineer Ken Lang, the other ones that were in the crash had been de-mobbed and Danny joined us, it was funny with Danny, inside you used to go in the aircraft through the rear door with me and we used to take over with engines running, and if they’d done a five hour flight, as I say, used to come into the pan, we would, the crew would replace the crew getting out, and inside the rear door was a little step ladder which hooked on, and up the ladder you went in the rear door, but the ladder was never there, so I was fit I could jump in the door with the engines running because the slipstream was, but Danny couldn’t get up was too fat [laughter]
MC: Just go back to that, you’re saying a crew would land an aircraft with the engines running and they swapped crews?
RD: Yes, with the engines running.
MC: [inaudible] taken off.
RD: With the engines running.
MC: With the engines still running? oh I never realised that.
RD: As I was saying you get a bit of slipstream.
MC: Yes, yes.
RD: And the door was a bit high poor old Danny couldn’t, so we used to haul him in, grab an arm each and pull him in [laughter] [inaudible]
MC: So the C/O is Hoochella, you flew with him?
RD: Huchala.
MC: Huchala, you flew with him, used to fly quite low did he?
RD: Yes he was a strange guy, fly, there’s a photograph on the back of there of the squadron party.
MC: You say you were mine laying off Norway.
RD: Yes we were yes, fairly low and it was dark and optical illusions that the boats, the lights of the boats on the horizon seemed to be higher than you, and we’d just had the crash, that was the first flight after the crash, so you got tummy wobbles anyway, you know, because they got you back in the air as soon as they could and you got the ooooooh.
MC: Oh after the crash yes, you were [inaudible]
RD: It was the first one first flight after the crash.
MC: Oh my word, yes, yes.
RD: He was a Canadian flew us, Huchala, Squadron leader Huchala, he was he guy that was getting the squadrons flying hours in and that’s why we flew, we did so much flying, see 600 odd hours in 18 months is a lot of flying really.
MC: Yes yes, [pause] its interesting. You mentioned GCA at Mildenhall and Sculthorpe, is that ground controlled approach?
RD: Well, yes, we the PA [inaudible] sticks out, near the pilot, and you take the cover off and it records your airspeed, and they’d left the cover off erroneously so we had no idea how fast we were going and therefore we couldn’t land at Waddington, because the runway was about only half of the length of the one at Mildenhall, so we went to Mildenhall, made sure that we were going faster than we’d normally go, to make sure we didn’t run out of runway at the end, and that why we went to Mildenhall.
MC: Oh right, I was going to say did somebody -
RD: There was all hell to pay, somebody got a rocket yes.
MC: Get in trouble for that?
RD: One of the ground crew yes.
MC: Yes, goodness me.
RD: I saw a joke, he made me laugh in somewhere, these old ladies talking to the pilot, it was a flight engineer, and she said to the guy, she said, ‘what’s he doing’, this bloke was inspecting, moving bits around and, and this guy said to this old lady, ‘oh he’s the pilot, he’s trying to find the door’, he thought she was nervous, thinking who is he, it’s the pilot trying to find the door [laughter].
MC: So Frank tried to get you to stay on?
RD: Yes.
MC: I mean was that when you were due for a de-mob?
RD: No two or three times he wanted me to stay on, ‘you ought to stay on, Roy’.
MC: So did you have that option when you were, when you came to the end of your National Service?
RD: No, I think I would, if I’d have a post I would have taken it, but they didn’t try to tempt me I would have had to say I’m interested based on re-muster.
MC: Yes yes.
RD: But I wouldn’t have missed it for the world.
MC: Yes?
RD: I had a great time, I think with playing table tennis as well If you’re a sportsman, I always remember at Padgate when I was on recruit training, we played football at eight o’clock in the morning, two teams, one in our team was Peter Broadbent, he used to play for Wolves, and you had skins and vests, you tossed up and if you lost the toss you were skins, this is on a November morning in the middle of winter, you know. [pause] yes, the photographs at the back there.
MC: Yes its interesting Roy, thanks very much for your time.
RD: That’s ok, no problem at all.
MC: And well get this put on the digital archives.
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Interview with Roy Eric Davidson
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Mike Connock
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IBCC Digital Archive
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2015-11-26
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Sound
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ADavidsonRE151126
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Pending review
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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eng
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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00:56:42 audio recording
Description
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Roy was born in Lincoln in 1933 and was six years old when war broke out.
He left school at the age of 15 and went to work for Lincoln City Council in the Pension department and was called up for National Service in 1951, doing basic training at RAF Padgate.
Roy volunteered for aircrew, and went to gunnery training at RAF Lakenfield. He joined 61 Squadron in April 1952.
Roy took part in Exercise Sunray in Shallufa in 1953 and then in Exercise Kingpin, which was radar bombing on the Ruhr.
He also took part in the Queen’s coronation flight on 15th July 1953.
Roy flew in the Avro Lincoln throughout his service until he was demobbed.
After he was demobbed, Roy returned to Lincoln Council as Pensions Manager, working for 49 years until his retirement.
Contributor
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Vivienne Tincombe
61 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
childhood in wartime
crash
Lincoln
RAF Shallufa
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
sport
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/914/11156/AKnottS151001.1.mp3
378d56e9297935f50b102ccca94f5736
Dublin Core
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Title
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Knott, Sidney
S Knott
Description
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An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Sidney Knott DFC (1268143 Royal Air Force). He flew 64 operations as an air gunner with 467 and 582 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-10-01
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Knott, S
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Transcription
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AS: My name is Adam Sutch. I’m conducting an interview for the International Bomber Command Centre. I’m interviewing Mr Sidney Knott. A Bomber Command aircrew member of 467 Squadron during the Second World War. Also present is his daughter Mrs Jean Mangan. Sidney, I’m really grateful to you for agreeing to this interview. Could we start by discussing your time before the war? Before you joined the Air Force. When you were growing up. Schooling and that sort of thing
SK: Yeah. Yeah. Well I was a, I was a youth of the 20s and 30s and I lived in Southend on Sea. I lived in Leigh on Sea which is in the borough of Southend on Sea, Essex. And [pause] things were quite, you know, you imagine what things were like between the wars. It wasn’t very [pause] My father was a joiner. He had his own business. He worked for his father and he, when grandfather died my father took his business over. Just a one man business. And my mother ran a fruit and greengrocery shop. And then when I came up, I left school at fourteen but I lost about fifteen months schooling when I was ten and eleven through an operation. And I worked in in the greengrocer’s shop. And then, of course in 1940, when invasion was imminent, where we lived notice was, I remember, I can see it now. It was on a Sunday and they put up notices on the shop’s windows and saying that we were to be prepared to leave within one hour and only allowed to take one suitcase with us. And as soon as people read this notice, well in twenty four hours from being a busy area full of people suddenly there was hardly, there was only the shopkeepers left. And the Battle of Britain was going on and my father came to me and said one day, well you know we had nothing to, had hardly any work to do because there was no people, many left there. And I used to do my paper round and that was how I got my pocket money. So my father came to me and he said one day, of course he was in the First World War and he was wounded twice and he was in the Essex Regiment. And when he got wounded the second time he was sent back to France in the Suffolks, and he come to me and he had a rough time in the army being wounded several times. And he, he come to me and he says, ‘You don’t want to go in the army.’ Because he was worrying about being called up. This was before I was eligible to be called up and he said, ‘You won’t get in the navy. You’d better see if you can get in the Air Force.’ So I said, ‘Alright.’ He said, because he said, my father was quite a proud man, he never went outdoors without a tie on and he used to say, ‘In the Air Force they wear a collar and tie all the time.’ So, [laughs] so he said, ‘See if you could get in the Air Force.’ So I found out they were, in Southend there was no recruiting for the for the Air Force in Southend so I had to get on a bus and go to Romford. And there was a, there was a recruiting office there, it recruited all sections and I, that’s how I joined the Air Force. And my education was very poor because I lost a lot of schooling and left at fourteen. I did do a little bit of after school work. You know, night classes when I was about sixteen to eighteen. And because I was, what was I when the war started? I was [pause] how old was I when the war started? Eighteen?
JM: Eighteen.
SK: Eighteen. That’s right. And so, you know, that was the background before then. That’s how I joined the Air Force. But they were recruiting for wireless ops at the time. This is ground wireless ops you see. And then I wasn’t good enough for that so he said, ‘We can have you for general duties.’ So I jumped at it and I joined the Air Force as a general duties wallah.
AS: In 1940.
SK: I got my number in 1940. I was sent home on deferred service and was actually called up on the, I think it was the 6th of January ’41. Went to Blackpool, you know, for to do my square bashing. And that was my early life. And then I was, after square bashing we were, a group of us were posted to Horsham St Faiths in Norfolk. And we were only there twenty four hours and they pushed us out to the satellite and we was on a, well we were sent to Blickling Hall. We was living in the cow sheds and things like that. In the outbuildings of Blickling Hall. But the airfield, the airfield was at Oulton. And it was just a grass airfield and we had two squadrons of Blenheims there that were really only just forming from being kicked out of France. And of course some of the crew, the ground crews were still wandering back after being got home from France and had a bit of leave and had been assessed as fit to go back to the squadron. And as I say the Blenheims were doing, that was 2 Group then and they were doing such things as Channel sweeps and things like that. And bombing the coastal ports like Brest and other French coastal docks and so on.
AS: Against the barges and things like that.
SK: Pardon?
AS: Against the barges and things like that.
SK: Oh yes. Yes. You see. That sort of thing. Yes. And then, while I was there doing all sorts of things I was put on, I was on the fire section while I was there and while I was on the fire section I had two duties. One was the fire section to look after Blickling Hall. And we had to eat at Blickling Hall. There was no, on this airfield, all there was on the airfield was two, about two Nissen huts where the fitters were and we had one little brick building where we had, there was no flying control. They had a duty pilot and he just used to have to log the aircraft as they took off and landed and that was his job. It was one of the aircrew that was grounded at the time and that was his duties. And I was put on a crash tender, and we used to stand alongside the duty pilot. There’d be the crash tender, the blood wagon side by side and we had to attend all, any crashes. We were, well I had to attend three crashes while I was there but that’s, that’s going to longer stories. But then, from there during the time, it came up on daily orders that we were to, they were recruiting for air gunners because in the pipeline four-engine bombers were — that was going to be the future. And so they thought, well I mean they had the Wellington bomber and they needed a gunner. And of course the Blenheim had three crew and they had a gunner on them. It was wireless op/gunner. And then the Wellingtons had, excuse me, Wellingtons had five crew with one gunner. But the wireless op was also a spare gunner. And they asked for volunteers so I volunteered and two of us went from this camp, were sent to Horsham St Faiths to see the station commander there.
AS: Who was that?
SK: I don’t know who it was at the time. I can’t tell you anyhow [laughs] I’ve got no record of that.
AS: No worries. Sorry. Go on.
SK: But we didn’t have to go, no test or anything like that and he said, ‘Oh you want to,’ he said, ‘Alright,’ he said, ‘Ok,’ and it was assigned to us and we awaited our call. And then we, that’s how we joined up. I didn’t have to pass any tests or anything there. And then from there we waited our call and it was the end of 1941. Somewhere about October I would have thought, may have been September, I was called to go to Regent’s Park in London because that was the recruiting centre. The initial centre for aircrew. And then from there we were sent to a, after a short course there we were issued with our white flashes. That means aircrew under training which we wore in our forage caps. And then we went down to St Leonards. Part of Hastings and we was in the big marina. Marine Hotel it was. It belonged to Southern Railway at the time but it was commandeered and we, we were posted there at the Initial Training Wing to do the ground work for an air gunner. And the initial gunners, we had quite an extensive course. We had to learn basic navigation. As regards to signals you had to learn the Morse code and read the lamp at, I think six words a minute and there was, you know, you had lots of extra duties. All to do with being a good crew member. And then when that came to the end of that course well of course I didn’t pass the maths you see. They said, ‘You failed on the maths.’ My maths. And of course I wasn’t very good at that sort of thing. So anyway our next posting to go on, they weren’t available to take us, that was to an air gunnery course, because the weather was bad and a sudden influx of people, there was nowhere to put them. So they said we are going to put you on an extended course to do — for several weeks we did just maths, drill and PT [laughs] And from there there was, I wasn’t the only one I must say, I was pleased about that, that didn’t pass on the first issue but they passed us on the second time. And they said, well, and then we were posted to a Gunnery School and I went to, to Manby up here in Lincolnshire to the 1 Air Armament School as it was called and I did my gunnery course there. And I passed my course at gunnery. This course. And I remember it because when we had to do, because Manby was very strict. A lot of bull at Manby. And on passing out parade we had to form on the parade ground where every Friday, every Friday we reported on the parade ground but this one was the passing out parade when you were awarded your brevet. And, and I remember I had to be marker because I was two thirds down the course. And so that’s my position. I passed two thirds down the course. But they were a grand lot of chaps. And then we passed out from there and then I was sent to, from there I was sent to an OTU and that was to Finningley in Yorkshire. I forget the number of the OTU but that’s where we went to. Finningley. And we had to do quite an extensive course there and that’s where I got crewed up. And our crewing up was quite funny really because there was quite a few of us sent to, there was about twelve gunners sent down there because most of these crews that were there we found out were Blenheim crews, which had three crews. They had a pilot, they had a navigator, called an observer and the wireless op/air gunner. And then they were posted to the OTU to take the conversion course on to Wellingtons. And then [pause] so they had to take on two more crew and that would be the rear gunner and a bomb aimer. Right. And the crewing-up procedure was, after about a fortnight because after the fortnight we were just doing section work where the gunners were in one place, pilots, engineers all in their own sections. Then we had to meet all together and the CO of the station said, ‘Well, now you’ve got to get crewed-up. So sort yourselves out.’ So we all just stood there and, you know one or two had got in mind who they wanted, you know to crew-up with and so on. But I remember one of the chaps, one of these gunner friends that I’d got to know said to me, ‘Well you’d better,’ you’d better, you know, ‘Get going.’ He said, ‘Otherwise you’ll be left with that young kid over there.’ You know, he was a pilot. ‘That young kid over there.’ Because he could see some of them getting crewed-up, ‘I’m crewed-up.’ But I’m not, I wasn’t one to push forward so I just waited. And then quite, at the end a chap come over to me and I see he was, he was a wireless op/air gunner and he said to me, he introduced himself like, and he said, ‘I’m Johnny Lloyd,’ and he said, ‘Would you like to join our crew as a gunner? And would you like to come and meet my pilot?’ So I said, ‘Oh yeah. Ok.’ You know. So that’s how I met my first pilot. That’s him there. And he was eighteen months younger than me. And that was the young kid [laughs] they said I’d be left with. And I’ve often thought afterwards of those twelve chaps that were there I wonder how many of us got through, you know. And, you know he was the young kid you’ve got to put up with so I was quite pleased about that. So that was our, so we did all our training there on the Wellington and then we had to go over to, now what was that place called? Near Bawtry it was. A satellite to Finningley, to do, to do cross country’s. Right. Where you, you’re left on your own to do the cross country’s, you know. That was big deals. And so we, that was about a three or four week course over there. Then you go back to Finningley afterwards and await a posting. Well, we waited at Finningley for quite, we were sent on leave then for a while and then when we got back to Finningley we were still hanging about. Finished our course, waiting for a posting and we was quite, there quite a long time and then suddenly it came through that we were posted to, to Scampton. Right. And so I thought oh yes, yes. This was, what’s the time now? It’s about, it’s about, I don’t know, May, June, July. Somewhere about July or August. Something like that. August perhaps, ’42. Yes. And he said, he said [pause] so we gets to, so we gets to Scampton and we find out that Scampton where we are forming a new crew, a new squadron, sorry. A new squadron. And there was already two squadrons already there fully operating. And we was the juniors coming in and as I say, and we found out our first part of forming up we had no aircraft. We had no ground crew. But our leaders were there. We had some leaders. We had to get to know our leaders and our section commanders and so on and we got to know people for the first couple of weeks and then, then we were sent — we’d got to join this Flight. 1661 I think it was. Conversion flight. That was at Scampton. And it was only a grass airfield at Scampton and there were two fully operational aircraft there err squadrons there. 49 Squadron and 83 Squadron were there. And then we found out we’ve got to do this course because we were posted to 467 Squadron. An Australian squadron. And so anyway we, we trained on Manchesters and then after, of course Manchesters were the forerunners of the Lancaster but it only had the two engines. Well when they put the four engines on it they called it the Lancaster and took off the third fin to make it look nice. And so that, that was, you know that was how we got crewed-up there and of course when we were there from a Wellington crew we had to take on two extra people again to make a seven crew. So we had to take on an extra gunner and, and a flight engineer. And then we flew in the Manchesters and there was quite a few on the course there. And then we had to do some bullseyes. Bullseyes are mock operations where we, like mock, they were raid diversions in a way because we used to fly within reach of the Dutch coast and then turn back and come home. But you did everything as if you was going on an op and you would divert. We were diverters to draw the fighters up to us so the main force could creep in and perhaps go in through southern France. So we had a good training there and we used to come over to, of course Scampton as I said was still grass. But unknown to us we were going to be posted to Bottesford, right. Which is just in Lincolnshire but it’s in three counties. The actual airfield I think was in three counties because Bottesford was a very dispersed sort of airfield. So it was Leicester, Nottingham and Lincolnshire. The postal address I think was Nottingham. But we were quite, we were quite close to [pause] what’s the town called? Grantham.
JM: Grantham.
SK: Grantham. And so, anyway we used to go over to Woodhall Spa to do our landing on, on the runways because the satellite stations, as Bottesford was called was built during the war and they built them as dispersed stations. They realised the stations that were built during the war period in the 30s were all quite cramped and in one section they found that was a dangerous thing so they built these dispersal stations. Well, when they built them of course, I mean aircraft were going to be bigger so they wanted more space so they had bigger airfields. And so that’s why we went over to Woodhall Spa which was, had runways to learn the different way of landing on runways as to, to grass. And then, anyway when we got to the, we were [pause] got to Bottesford, we left Scampton a few days before Christmas. That’s ’42. And we first flew at Bottesford about two or three days before Christmas. We had a lot of training to do when we got to Bottesford because unknown to us, the ground crew, they’d sent new aircraft into Bottesford, new Lancasters, into Bottesford and they sent ground crew there to, to learn their trade on Lancasters. And they had a month to do it. Like we was learning at 1661 conversion flight. We were learning from the aircrew side. They were learning it from the ground crew side. And because we thought that how can we be a squadron with hardly any, with no aircraft. No ground crew. Anyway, so we got there and we, I talked to one chap and he said, ‘Yes,’ he said, ‘I’d only, I’d only been a mechanic on Magisters,’ which was a single engine aircraft. A little tiny thing, you see. And of course when he come to see the Lancaster, a great big thing, it frightened the life out of him [laughs] you see, and we had a lot to learn. Anyway, the squadron became operational and we operated from there. I finished my first tour and the squadron, the crew I was with we were the first crew to finish a full tour on 467. We, we, there was two other crews that we were quite friendly with. They finished one trip behind us so we beat them by three days. But we claimed that right to be the first then to finish a full tour. And that, that went on to the concluding the, my first tour there. And this was taking place between, shall we say the 1st of January and my last one, my last trip was on the 30th of May. And we were posted away on the 6th of June. And we were posted away. Do you want me to carry on? As screen gunners. As screen gunners. And we said, ‘Well what’s a screen gunner?’ We’d never heard of it before. They said, ‘Oh, you’ll find out.’ So we didn’t know. So five of the crew were posted to the same place. I think it was 17 OTU, I think that was the number, to, to Silverstone. And the navigator was posted to Wing. And he said that was the saddest moment of his life when he had to leave the crew. And we got posted by air and I remember when we got there we had dropped him off at Wing first and then our aircraft flew on and landed us at Silverstone. Well, Silverstone was only just, the OTU at Silverstone had only just moved there and it wasn’t really organised properly. And it took them a month to get organised and when they did get organised they found out they had a satellite as well which was called Turweston. So as all gunners were sent over to Turweston because the gunnery courses and I think the bombing courses were going to be sent from there. And we found out what a screen duty, what a screen gunner’s duty was. We were to be instructors without being taught by — not, not classroom instructors. Field instructors. To pass on our knowledge and, and to take new recruits, new crews coming through from their OTU because that’s what Turweston was. An OTU. And to take them on air firing and, and cine camera work. Well, we had a little training aircraft attacking us as a fighter and so on and so forth and we used to take them up in the air to do that sort of thing, you know. But that’s what a screen gunner was. And of course you were supposed, that was supposed to be a six month rest. Well, we had casualties while we was on there. But after that, so we were posted away in early June and I stayed there ‘til the middle of January and you were supposed to have a six months rest. And then a chap come to me who was one of the staff pilots there. Like us he was a screened pilot. He was an officer, and he said to me, ‘I’m forming a new squadron,’ He’d obviously been told he’s got to go back on ops and he said, ‘Would you be interested in joining my crew?’ So I said, oh you know it came quite out of the blue. And I thought, well I’d done about seven and a half months I think it was and I felt well I’ve gone over my six months. I could be called back at any time and, mind you we had a good bunch of lads, of air gunners there. We all lived in one hut as screen gunners. And it was, I thought well, you know what do I do? But I thought I’ve got to move on I think because if not [pause] So I liked this chap anyway. Although he was a flight lieutenant I liked him. Right.
AS: What was his name?
SK: Walker. Flight Lieutenant Walker. Clive Walker. He came from Bolton. He was the son of a known name in Bolton that had a big tannery works up there. And anyway, he, he approached me and I said [pause] and he said, he saw I was hesitating a bit. He said, ‘Well look, can you think it over? Can I give you twenty four hours to think it over?’ So I said, ‘Oh thank you. Good.’ And at that he approached me because he, I’d just been on, taking some air gunners on air firing and we used to take about four or five air gunners in one aeroplane and then change the gunners in the air and, you know they would be firing at a drogue, you know. Towed by a little light aircraft. And then we could, we were controlling the, the you know it was whilst we were in the air we was in control of these gunners. Well, so anyway when I got back to my billet I kept thinking about it. And I went to a friend I was quite pally with, one of the gunners and I said to him, ‘Clive, Clive Walker’s just approached me about going back on ops with him and I keep thinking, shall I go?’ And the chap said to me and that was Bill Harley, his name was and he said to me, ‘He’s asked me as well.’ So anyway we sat down on our beds and we had a chat and I said, ‘Well, if you go I’ll go.’ So he said, ‘Alright, we’ll both go.’ So the next day we told him yes, we’ll go with him. Alright. I think Bill err Clive Walker, he had a dog on the station. It was a corgi, you know. I didn’t like it. A yappy little thing. I didn’t think much of him as a dog but a nice looking dog but Bill loved this dog. He used to look after the dog a lot. He liked the dog anyway. And he, I think, I don’t know whether the dog swayed the argument [laughs] but we went, we went, and said the next day, ‘Yes. We’ll go.’ So he said he was very pleased about that and he said that and after a little while we were called. And then of course we were taken back to [pause] where did we go? Let’s see. We had to, mind you we had to leave Lincolnshire then. Do you want to go on because it’s not Lincolnshire?
AS: It’s great. Carry on.
SK: Anyway, we had to go to [pause] I think it come under Northampton. Let me see. What’s the name of the place? Turweston. Now was it Turweston? Wait a minute. No. No. No. No. No. Wait a minute. No. That’s where we were. Turweston. Then we had to, when we got the posting we had to go to Little Staughton in Bedfordshire. Little Staughton was 8 Group, Pathfinder Group. So there again when I joined 467 it was a new squadron and we found out that Pathfinders were forming a new squadron and of course as most of us had been off for over a year now from a squadron we had to do refresher courses. So we were sent to different places all around to do refresher courses. We went to Binbrook, up there and did a gunnery and the bomb aimers had to do a bombing course up there. And so we did various other stations around. And then we finished up at Little Staughton and that’s where we operated from.
AS: Which squadron were you?
SK: 582 Squadron. A new squadron. It was formed on April Fool’s Day 1944. And we operated from there, right. I did twenty nine trips on 467. But I did, and I did thirty five trips on 582. So that’s sixty four in total. And —
AS: Wow.
SK: And then of course that’s, we got through ok. You know. So that’s basically my, my flying life and then we didn’t know we was on our last trip and on our last trip was to Bremer in Northern Germany there. Bremer, Bremer. How you say it? And after I landed back somebody said, ‘This is your last trip.’ I don’t know whether perhaps our skipper knew. He hadn’t told me. So we just, you know thought — really? You know. It just came quite suddenly, you know. And that’s the last time I flew in the RAF. And then after sending on leave for a while, we were on leave for a little while, they sent us right up to Northern Scotland for, to be, for an attestation sort of course to reclassify you now to a different job. The only two jobs they we were offering at the moment was to be in the transport section or airfield controller. So I jumped for airfield controller and I did my, my course down at Watchfield in Oxford as an airfield controller. And then when I passed that course I was posted to West Raynham in Norfolk and [pause] as the airfield controller there. They were very pleased to see me because there were only two, two airfield controllers there and they were having to, it’s a twenty four hour station so — and you had to be relieved for your meals so they were never off duty. So when I got there I was welcomed. And so I was there then. That was the longest station I was on because otherwise we was, you know, we seemed to be always on the move. And that’s where I met my wife. At that station.
AS: Was she a WAAF?
SK: She was a WAAF. And then I got demobbed from that station when the war had all finished and so on. And then I went back to work, sort of thing and forgot all about the Air Force then. And I took, as I thought, having a green grocers shop I’ve always got a chance to know how to sell a cabbage. So my uncle was in wholesale greengrocery business and I fancied, I fancied to, to be more in the wholesale business than a retail business. I didn’t want to go and serve women coming in to the shop and arguing about the size of a cabbage so I went in the wholesale department, right. And we, because I was keen on getting back and playing a bit of football and we could have Saturday afternoons off then. And it was interesting, you know. When I was up West Raynham after the war finished suddenly it all came out, the orders came from the hierarchy everyone’s got to play sport. You’ve got to get playing sport again. Well I loved my football until I was called up and then, and then I found I hadn’t kicked a ball for six years. And of course I suppose I would have been in my prime then so I thought, I wonder if I can kick a football? So, anyway the sergeant’s mess got up a team and said we’ll have a try you know and we formed a sergeant’s mess team and we played different sections and goodness knows what else. And I got back playing football and then when I was started playing football that’s why I wanted my Saturday afternoons off. And then after a while it went on that I went to work in London in Spitalfields Market. And I worked as a salesman in Spitalsfield Market. That’s a wholesale fruit and vegetable market there. And I finished my working life there. It’s [pause] so you know that’s basically my life story. You know. In a nutshell [laughs] It’s quite interesting though that different things, you know little things creep up in your life doesn’t it? So if that’s any help to you there you are.
AS: That’s fabulous. Shall we pause there for a second?
SK: Yeah. Yeah.
[recording paused]
AS: Sidney, I’d like to pick up on a few questions that come to mind from, from your interview so far. Could you tell me a bit more about the air gunnery training? Did people ever hit anything firing at drogues? What was the standard like?
SK: I got a standard in my [pause] how did they put it in that? Stop the tape a minute.
[recording paused]
AS: Ok. So tell me a little bit more about the gunnery training and the assessment.
SK: Well the gunnery training was when you’re air firing at a drogue they, you had a little light aircraft come alongside you, flying with you on your beam. So you could turn your turret around onto the beam. As much as ninety degrees. And you’d fire at a drogue which was let out behind. Behind the little tug. And as we took up about four gunners, I think it was at a time we’d take one [pause] we’d take one and we’d, the first gunner would have his bullets. The rounds were dipped in a coloured paint. So the tips were red, yellow, green I think. Or whatever they were. There was about four different colours. And you had two hundred rounds each to fire. So you had little short bursts of two second bursts and then you’d undo your breach and you’d see what colour you are. Because once you lost your colour you had to stop. Right. And that’s how it was done. Right. So that when a drogue came down and it was assessed the bullet would leave a little hole in the drogue with the colour around like a little round circle. And that’s how you was assessed. Two hundred rounds — how many hits you got. And of course it was all done on a beam because that’s where deflection come in and deflection was allowing for the time for your bullet to get from the gun to the aircraft. If you fire direct at him you’ve missed him because it’s gone behind him. Although the speed of the bullet is fast it’s enough to miss the aircraft, you see. So anyway that’s how, that’s how gunnery was assessed. Right. And then also when you were doing cine camera work you had magazines. Two magazines. Each gunner was allowed two magazines. And he had these little aircraft and they did flat attacks you know. They’d be on the beam and they would come in just like this and then pass underneath you. And you had to see how good your manipulation was because gunnery training is a bit like [pause] it’s a bit like, think of yourself as a snooker player. A snooker player, if he wants to be really good like these professional snooker players they have to train for hours a day and keep training. And that’s what you had to do. For gunnery you’ve got to keep training to get your control of your turret because at the turret you’ve got to turn your turret and you’ve got to angle your guns at the same time. Right. And it’s manipulation and it’s, it’s a question of having really good manipulation. And it’s just a matter of continue working at it, you know. And, and it was a Fraser Nash 20 turret I was in with four machine guns. And I had them while I was on OTU flying the Welllingtons. And it was the same as that, exactly the same turrets when I got on the Lancasters. Later on because I’d finished flying by August. Finished operational flying by August. I don’t know what the, I haven’t got the date in my mind but I know it was August ’44 I’d finished flying. And oh where were we? I’m losing my track now.
AS: Did you have ground training turrets? Ground training aids as well or was it all airborne?
SK: Well, I’m talking, I’ve been talking about airborne. Ground training — no. We did, we did a bit of training. I mean you start off by, when you’re at even your initial training when you first join up we used to get, we was at Blackpool but we went up to Fleetwood and they had some rifle butts up there somewhere on the downs, on the seashore. Somewhere near there. And we used to, we were give five rounds to fire a rifle. Right. But then prior to that, I didn’t mention in the chat but prior to that when, when the forerunner of the Home Guard came out it was called the Local Defence Volunteers. And Anthony Eden came on the radio and said, ‘We’re calling for volunteers,’ because the invasion was imminent, ‘We’re calling for volunteers. Will you report to the police station.’ So me and my old mate said, ‘Yes. Let’s go.’ You know. So we went down and we signed on and we were, we was a Local Defence Volunteers. And of course we had nothing much to start with and gradually you got little bits and pieces and then just, it was just, renamed it after a little while because they had such wonderful support that they turned it in and renamed it the Home Guard. And then of course, as soon as it was made the Home Guard that was about the time I was called up. Right. But then we had other training firing machine guns. Not much done on the ground but when we was at, when we was at air gunnery school we used to fly at Mablethorpe, along the beach at Mablethorpe because from Manby to Mablethorpe wasn’t far. We used to fly along the beach and we’d turn the guns on to the beam and there was targets put in the water. You know, this deep of water like, you know because it’s tidal there and targets were put there for you to fire at, right. And that was just for one gunner because that’s when we had [pause] No. We weren’t crewed-up there so no we must have had several gunners then. That’s right. And we, so it was done at Mablethorpe beach. Right. And then to get your, to get your results of the targets from Mablethorpe beach there the people in charge of the sight down there used to go back out on horseback to pick up the targets, you know. I remember that. Don’t kill the horses, you know.
AS: It can’t have given you much time.
SK: Pardon?
AS: It can’t have given you much time because the target comes from the front of the aeroplane.
SK: Yeah. Yes.
AS: And you’ve got very very little time to —
SK: That’s right. Well, yeah. Yeah That’s what, that was some of the training we did. We did two or three. That was part of our air gunnery training when we was at Manby. And then, as I say OTU you did the training with the trailing of the drogue and so on. Basically that was the training, you know.
AS: How about the aeroplanes that you were flying in training?
SK: Well —
AS: Were they mechanically reliable or old and worn out? Or —
SK: Yes. Old and worn out mostly, you know. The longer the war it didn’t, if the thing was operational it wasn’t put on training exercises, you know. On the training stations. It wasn’t so bad. I didn’t notice any problems when we was at Manby when we had, we had Wellingtons there. So luckily I had a good training because I was on Wellingtons all the time and with the same turret and something but when we got to, to being screen gunners we had very poor aircraft there. They had a job to keep them, you know. They’d say, ‘Yes. Your aircraft’s ready.’ We’d go out there as a crew and you find out, oh no. You’d be sitting out there waiting for an hour and a half before it was finished. And I had a, had one crash flying at while I was a screen gunner because I was flying, flying with a sprog pilot. That is a pilot going through the course. And we burst a tyre just as we lifted off on exercise. And so I, I said, well I didn’t say nothing. I thought we’d burst a tyre there and the aircraft just screwed a little bit to the left and I thought well we might as well do the exercise whatever happens because we’d burn up a bit of fuel. So, so finished the exercise and I said to the pilot afterwards, I said, ‘I want you to throttle back a bit and when you throttle back to lower the wheels and we want to inspect the tyres,’ I said. ‘I think we burst the tyre as we lifted off.’ So he said, ‘I thought the thing screwed a bit to the left,’ you know, ‘To port.’ So we, we checked the, so he did, he lowered the aircraft — the wheels down. The undercarriage down. And the port, the port tyre was blown to smithereens. And so he put it up and I said ok. Well, he said, so he said, ‘I’ll let base know.’ So we flew back over base and then we called up and said we appeared to have burst a tyre on take-off, you know. So usual old thing come from that. Put flying control in a panic. So they said the usual thing of, ‘Stand by. Stand by.’ So we, we carried on circuit and we were watching down below and we saw, we know our flight commander in charge of the course. He was, he was a good man really but we used to think he was a hard nut. But he had a little van you know and we could see his van suddenly appeared and it was at the end of the runway, you know. And we were told to fly over. He wanted to inspect it. Yeah. So he, he flew it over and he said, ‘Yes. You have blown your tyre.’ That’s the message we got back. We knew that. We’d had a look at it. So anyway, he said, I thought perhaps he might let us land with wheels up on the grass but he didn’t. He was struggling to, he didn’t want to lose an aircraft so he said, ‘No. Land on the runway and try to keep the leg off as long as you can until last moment.’ So anyway, I went forward. I had a word with the pilot and I said, ‘I’ll assist you as I can,’ and I had to look after my gunners which I got them all sorted out in the, in the fuselage. And of course it wasn’t enough points for them to all know what was going on. So the one with the most sense, as I thought, I gave him the, so he could listen to the intercom and he was to tell the others what’s going on and we [pause] So I said, ‘I’ll come forward,’ and I remember when we were doing all our circuits and bumps when we were under instruction ourselves as a crew they always had, the instructor always called out the airspeed for him. For when he was perhaps doing his stuff and by calling out the airspeed it’s one less job he’s got to watch. So I said, ‘I’ll come forward and I’ll call out the airspeed for you and anything else I can do.’ Oh he thought that was a good idea so that’s what I went forward and sat alongside him. He brought it in but at the last minute he a bit over corrected trying to keep the leg up and instead of what you might expect you’d swing around on the broken leg he went the other way and the wing hit the ground and damaged the wing a bit but we kept upright. We didn’t tip over on our nose. We kept upright and because we were slow, we were lost enough speed to keep us flat and level and I said to the crews, ‘Don’t panic.’ I said, ‘We’ll get out nice and slowly,’ you know. I said, ‘We don’t want any broken limbs.’ There was no fire. I mean I was sitting up in the cockpit with him and I said to the skipper, checking everything’s switched off. I said, ‘All switches off.’ And he checked everything. All switches off so there’s no fuel running about and I could see there was no, it all looked, there was no imminent fire. So we got out quite slowly and by that time our officer commanding was standing outside with his, with his van you know. So I got out and got all my gunners together and with the pilot because he had, he was flying with his own crew, you see. That was their training as well. To learn how to be a captain controlling the crew because he was on the course. And he was, he was a flight lieutenant believe it or not so he must have been somewhere on a training station for years you know and then suddenly said, ‘It’s time you went on ops.’ And he, anyway I walked over to, to our commanding officer there and I said to him, no. ‘No injuries sir. We’re all ok.’ He said to me, he said, he said, ‘You took a long time to get out of that aircraft.’ I said, ‘Well, we’ve got no broken limbs. No casualties.’ So I I sort of went away with a flea in my ear sort of thing, you know. I thought I’d done quite well. So that was one I had like that. And then my other gunner that I got to know which I joined up on the second crew with, he had another trouble when we had an aircraft that caught fire after he’d been airborne a little while. And he of course, we used to control it all from the astrodome halfway down the turret. Halfway down the airframe. The fuselage. And we only just used to sit and we used to control it all by the thing and I used to control the, the screen gunner used to control the tug, the flying you know, the towing the target or if it’s a little fighter going to attack us. We did that by Aldis lamp you see. Using a green for go and red for stop. No. Red was, red was exercise complete. You know. Thank you very much. But we had the green for stand by and then flashing green for attack, you know. That sort of thing. And so there was always little accidents going on, on the OTU because the aircraft weren’t at their best. They weren’t at their best. And in fact a gunner I got very friendly with also, he was one of the three crews that were going through. He was, he was sent as a screen gunner afterwards. He come only two or three days after us. That’s why we had a good lot of gunners there. And he, his wireless op was sent on from, from Turweston. Turweston yeah. When we was doing this. They crashed on take-off and were killed instantly. And that was one. So we had casualties while we was, you know, screened so we thought well might as well go back on ops. So that’s how we volunteered for our second tour.
AS: When you passed out as an air gunner.
SK: Yeah.
AS: Did you know you were going to Bomber Command and how did you feel about it?
SK: No. No. When you passed out from where? From OTU?
AS: Yeah. Yeah.
SK: Oh from OTU we were told we were going to, as I said, up the road here.
JM: Scampton.
SK: Scampton. Yeah. Scampton. Good job I’ve got a prompter. To Scampton. And we was, we were told we were going on a conversion course. That’s what we were told. When we was on a conversion we were told we were actually posted to 467.
AS: In Bomber Command.
SK: Yeah. In Bomber Command, you see. Yeah.
AS: What was it like?
SK: Mind you the OTUs were like Bomber Command. They were OT, Bomber Command’s OTUs I believe. Yeah.
AS: So you knew fairly early on that you’d end up bombing Germany.
SK: Well yeah.
AS: Yeah.
SK: When we, when I joined the first crew, when I said they were a Blenheim crew they thought they were going to the Middle East as a Blenheim crew. Because at that time they were just phasing out the Blenheims and sending them to the Middle East. And they were so surprised when they come and they were going to be made into a Wellington crew you see. So it’s, that’s how the war, you know, evolved really, you know. You never knew.
AS: What was it like being an all English crew in an Australian squadron?
SK: Well the reason we were all English crew. One Irish.
AS: Sorry. I do apologise.
SK: British.
AS: British.
SK: We were British, weren’t we? But our crew we had one Irish. He come from Belfast. We had one from Bolton. One from [pause] where did Ted come from? Bradford.
JM: Bradford.
SK: Bradford. The pilot come from the Cotswolds. I come from Essex. Johnny Lloyd. I don’t know where Johnny Lloyd, I’m not quite sure. He was our wireless op. I’m never quite sure where he come from. So we British. A British crew there. Oh and then we had, we didn’t have the, the flight engineer we got on our, when we first crewed up on our first 467. Our flight engineer really didn’t fit in the crew. And I don’t know what happened to him afterwards. He never operated with us. We did all our training with him at Scampton but when we come to be posted to 467 he suddenly disappeared. So we had to make do with what they called odd bods. If there was an engineer that hadn’t got a crew on the squadron or whatever it was or if not they had to pinch one off another crew that wasn’t flying that night.
AS: All the way through your tour?
SK: Well we had, we didn’t have a lot. We had, I think four different engineers that I can remember. So they were split over twenty nine. Twenty nine ops. One was an Australian. He was pinched off another crew. And our crew, we never had any sickness in our crew at all apart from the engineer which I mentioned. But only once the Irish chap, coming back from Belfast. Coming back from Belfast the boat, the sea was so rough they couldn’t sail the boat and he got back twenty four hours late. Well, we was on that first night so we had to pinch, we had to be given another bomb aimer and they took one from another crew. And he was an observer with the O badge, you know. And he was a good chap. We liked him but he came, he didn’t get through his tour. He failed, failed to return on one occasion. Yeah. Does that answer that question? I don’t know.
AS: Absolutely.
SK: Yeah. Yeah.
AS: What was it like being surrounded Australians? Was it very different from — ?
SK: We weren’t surrounded by Australians. I didn’t really, I didn’t really say everything.
AS: No.
SK: A lot of our leaders when we were first formed up at Scampton we found most of our leaders were New Zealanders. Believe it or not. We had the two Flights. A and B Flight. And we was put into A Flight when we got to Bottesford. And that was Squadron Leader Pape and he was a New Zealander. And then when we formed a third Flight in March we, we had our flight commander was another new Zealander. Flight Lieutenant Field. Squadron Leader Field, sorry. And our, and our officer commander, he was actually RAF. He was, he formed, he made the squadron. There was no doubt about that. He was a wonderful leader and he joined the RAF in about 1936 if my memory’s right. But he was actually born in Brazil and, you know. I think he had, I’m not sure if he had British parents or what but he was actually in the RAF. So there was, we had quite a few new Zealanders there. Not many Canadians although there was a few odd Canadians there. And then to get the squadron going, being a new squadron how they, they sent in from different, other squadrons perhaps some experienced pilots because you can’t, you want, you want some experienced crews around you and with say six, six or eight trips to do, right. And so they were sent in to finish their tours with us. So we didn’t have a lot of Australians there. And when the Australians were coming you’d find a pilot would come with his navigator and then the rest we would make up with British. With Royal Air Force. Right. And then we had one or two gunners coming through on their own and they would join a crew. But also, we got through, we was pushed through our tour very quickly. The RAF crews were. We had no rest at all. You know. It was the hardest work I ever did. But they held back a little bit on the Australian chaps coming. Trying to build up the crew, the Australian crew. The Australian squadron. Right. But I don’t think I ever come across a whole, not in my time, a whole crew of all Australians. But they were, if an Australian pilot come through, looking through the book I can see they had a different colour uniform to us so you could always tell them that they had the darker blue one, you see, the Australians. And the New Zealanders as well. So you can see them when you look at old pictures. You could say oh look he’s got three. There’s three Aussies there. The rest were made up of RAF. That’s how it worked you see. So, but that’s why we were not, got through my first tour rather quickly, you know.
AS: Going through at such a rate.
SK: Yeah.
AS: Did, did you start to feel really worn down by it all or were you glad to be going through it so fast?
SK: You didn’t think about it. You were just, it was just what the order was. Whatever the order was you did, you know. It seemed that we was always on you know. Because I mean the weather’s, a lot of people forget what the weather was like. The weather we had in the war or the war winters were very hard. Very hard winters.
AS: That, that actually touches on something I’d like to talk about.
SK: Yeah. Yeah.
AS: Did you have any experience of FIDO or the emergency landing grounds?
SK: I didn’t have it myself. There was three places in the country wasn’t there had them? One was at Manston and another one was in Suffolk.
AS: Woodbridge.
SK: Woodbridge. Yes. The other one was further up country wasn’t it? Was it in Yorkshire? But there was three in the country there. No. I never had. Never had any experience of that. I’ve spoken to. I did speak to some chaps that landed in it, you know. It’s not — you know, a dicey thing to land in. Flames burning both sides of you, you know. Makes the runway look quite small, you know when you’re coming in, you know.
AS: On your, on your first tour as you say the weather could close in.
SK: Yeah. Yeah.
AS: Close down.
AS: What was it like coming back when the weather had closed in?
SK: Well Bottesford was in what did they called it? The Vale of Belvoir was it?
JM: Belvoir.
SK: Belvoir. In the Vale of Belvoir right. Right. And it was a frost hollow. So it wasn’t so bad. It wasn’t too bad in the middle of the winter because our take off times you had more darkness. Put it that way. We were controlled by the moon. We wanted darkness. Right. And, but sometimes the moon would be coming up before you got back or something like that you know. So we were controlled. What was the actual question you asked me?
AS: What was it like when you came back to find the fog had come in or — ?
SK: Oh yes. Well, yes. Well, it was a frost hollow there so, but most mists like we’ve had recently actually they’d come in in the late hours of the night, you know they form. And then you’ve got them at dawn break, you know. And it wasn’t until you got shorter night hours when you’re coming back at daybreak perhaps or, you know, just prior to then and then it was a bit difficult. But only once did we get diverted. And we got diverted, it’s a long story there [laughs] but we’d done a long trip. That was, I’m pretty sure that was the time we went to the Skoda works down in Czechoslovakia and we, we found that quite a hard trip. Very hard for the gunners. Because, you see, I used to, if you were in the flak belts and you got ack-ack flying around you. I used to think you were better off if you were in the pitch dark because it got so intense looking out for fighters. It was, you know. And you gained experience to know how to [pause] you could smell danger by what was going on around you, you know. And we always had a good understanding. We used to, especially in the first crew because we were all sergeants in the first group. Just sergeants. In the second crew we had four officers and three sergeants. It wasn’t quite so cosy if you know what I mean there. We couldn’t do our crew meetings sitting on our beds. We used to have crew meetings after. The next day and, and if anything we could have improved on, you know. We all had our say and all that. And you could, there was lots of little things you could do to save your skin, I suppose, you know. That sort of thing. Because, you know, you’re flying in a block. You’re not flying in formation. It’s a block. It’s, you can get statistics where you can get the actual measurements. It’s a wide block and it’s that deep and you’re flying as a gaggle anyhow, right. And the reason it was like that, deep like that was because you got at the time on that first tour the Wellingtons were still flying. They could only convert them to Lancasters as the Lancasters became available. And you had, shall we say over a target you’d have the Wellingtons at fourteen thousand feet. You’d have the Stirlings at sixteen. Halifax at eighteen. And we’d try to get to twenty if we could but we couldn’t always get there but you know it just depends on the weather. So that, that’s why you got the depths of it like that. So then they used to stagger it a bit so you weren’t dropping bombs on the ones underneath you and things like that. But when you’re flying at night and your night vision was most important to you for gunners. And there’s always a dark side to the sky. There’s always a dark side. However pitch dark it is one side is darker than the other. And it’s nearly always darker underneath for a start and then the south was nearly always the darker than the north. Right. Because if you got the stars you don’t realise how brilliant the stars can be. Right. So we always used to think if we’d got a long leg to fly on, flying in this gaggle, this stream which I’d say to the skipper, you know, we had a message to say creep over to the, if that was the stream going through there and the dark side was this side shall we say we’d creep over a little bit this way. Right. We’re still in the gaggle but we’d creep over a little bit this way. So the track would be down the middle. Right. But we’d go over to this side. Not that side. So you’ve less chance of being seen. Right. So there was all them little things you learned. You weren’t taught. You couldn’t be taught operational flying. You just had to grin and bear it and learn it yourself. And the only way you learned it was by discussions afterwards, you know and by little tiny things to say how you’d go about it.
AS: What was your attitude, or your skipper’s attitude to weaving? Did —
SK: Oh yeah. In, in those days you did weave. You weaved a lot and of course it was it was so, so a gunner couldn’t get his bearing on you. Because, you know it only takes two seconds to shoot you down. Two seconds. And you’ve got to be, if you’re on a eight or nine hour flight. Long flights in the winter. It’s a lot, a lot of time that’s going on there you know. So —
AS: Did, did you, did you ever have any exposure to wakey wakey pills?
SK: Yeah.
AS: To keep you awake.
SK: Oh yeah. I used to take them. If it was only, if it was up to the Ruhr or places like that according to your, you worked out you was given your briefing to, to know what routes because you didn’t go just straight there and back. You had different ways to, tactics to do. You had to fly on. And oh I’ve lost track now.
AS: Wakey wakey pills.
SK: Oh wakey wakey pills. Yes. So going to the Ruhr it could be four hours. It could be six hours. Right. So, and so possibly not then but if you were going further afield where you’ve got an eight hours, anything over a seven hour trip you needed something to keep awake. But you’ve got to realise you’ve been at work since 8 o’clock in the morning. Right. You’ve been up since 8 o’clock in the morning. You’ve been to a meal and from half past nine that morning you started work. You had your, you’d know by 11 o’clock whether you was on that night. Right. And then you had things to do like we always went out to the aircraft. You’d find what aircraft you’d got. We didn’t have regular aircraft. You had to fly on what was available. I think I worked it out, I think it was fourteen different aircraft we flew in in twenty nine trips. I think it was fourteen. So you didn’t have a regular aircraft so you always went out there to have a look but you got to know aircraft. You know. Perhaps you might do a training trip in one because training never stopped. So if you was on that night you’d have to go out there and you’d look at it and make sure the turret, had it been serviced? You know. Check on it. Make sure the armourers hadn’t missed anything because they were hard pressed and then also give, give, of course we had no Perspex in the front. We had a canopy over the top. Give it a clean. A bit of a sides we had so clean that up. And then you had to do a night flying test. So that had to take place between a bit before you went for briefing or then you would have your briefing. Mostly you would have a meal beforehand. You know, ,a flying meal beforehand. Then you got your briefing. Sometimes it was the other way around accordingly, you know, how it worked out. So there was no, there was never any spare time. And if you weren’t on that night you’re bound to have a flying exercise to do. We never, exercises never stopped. There was always new equipment coming out that some training had to be done on. You were, you’d be put on air firing. We used to, we used to go to, that’s Lincolnshire. Wainfleet. The Wainfleet.
AS: Wainfleet ranges. Yeah.
SK: That range there. And we used to drop our eleven pound smoke bombs from twenty thousand feet onto a target down below. You had to pre-book it, you know and arrange your time and then you were, you were given a slot to bomb at, you know. And then we had gunnery places I told you. Where did we used to go? We went, we had gunnery exercises. Perhaps we went to Mablethorpe then. I don’t think so. I don’t know where we went. I can’t think but there was always exercises right to even if you’ve only got one trip to have done you were still given exercises to do and you were kept busy because it took your mind off any casualties you’d had. That’s what it was done for.
AS: Yeah.
SK: You were never, you’d never get any time to rest at all but then occasionally a squadron would be given perhaps a forty eight hour stand down. And that’s when it was, well that’s right, you know. You got the message. It was good then. The squadron would be stood down. It gives the squadron time to recover, you know. So that’s that. So anything you want to ask me now?
AS: Yeah. On the wakey wakey pills still.
SK: Oh the wakey wakey. I didn’t say that. So I used to take them if it was a long trip but I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t take them until after we’d done the bombing. Then you’ve got to be, the way home is always worse than the way out, you know. That’s the more dangerous place, coming home. More dangerous is coming back because they could be waiting for you. Especially if it was a long trip because they’d had time to go down, refuel and come up again. So I used to take the wakey wakey pills and I found out they used to make you quite tired for a quarter of an hour after you took them. Whether it was the thought of it or not I don’t know but I thought they always made me tired first. But then they did help you to keep yourself awake because it’s no good falling asleep for a time because it was very unsociable hours we were working and we worked long hours you know. And you could only do it if you were young, you know. And of course we were all young lads, you see. So.
AS: What, what was, I knew they were all different but can you give me an idea of what the debriefing was like afterwards?
SK: Debriefing. Yeah. It varied, I think on squadrons because some said when they come back they used to have a tot of rum and things like that but I don’t think we ever had that. But a cup of tea was more, was better than anything else. Of course when you, when you’ve only done one or two trips you want to keep talking about it, you know. You think, you know, fancy I’ve done that, you know and so on, you’d talk about that. But we, certainly that was one of the first things we got out in our crew is we’ve got to get to bed and forget what’s happened because we might be on the next night. Because your entire, you’d be two nights on and one night off. That’s how it was going. You weren’t always given that. You couldn’t be. But you had to be prepared for that. So from touch down we aimed to get to bed within, into our bunks in two hours. And if we could do it in two hours we were lucky. You know, we’d done well. And the initial crews, the early crews, the ones in the earliest stages would be three or four hours getting to bed, you know. And then that affected them the next day. So you’ve got to, you’d get out your aircraft, you wait for transport. Transport was good. They were nearly always waiting for you. You’d get back to the locker room. You’ve got to stow your gear and it’s no good being excited about it. I know it did happen to some of them that they were so thankful they got back they took the gear off and just threw it in the locker. But the most important thing is, especially the gunners is you have to hang up your suit, your electric suit and see that it’s in your locker. You had long lockers. And it aired in your locker. See. Because any dampness you’d get a short in it you see.
AS: Yeah.
SK: So we always made sure that we got [pause] got into our, into the locker room and stowed all our kit away properly, you know. And then you go to debriefing and when you get to debriefing it depends who’s in front of you. You know. If you had a lot, a lot of bombers on that night there’s only perhaps two or three intelligence officers there to debrief you. Right. So you walk in and the first thing you look for — whose got the tea? You know. And then there would be some WAAFs there that would bring you a cup of tea. So you had a cup of tea and you might, I don’t know whether, there was nothing to eat. You just had this tea. Two mugs of tea would go down that quick. And then if you’re lucky you’d go straight in but if not you’ve got to wait till your, a table’s available for you to sit down. And then debriefing of course. They debrief the pilot and the navigator. The navigator’s the one they’re debriefing really, with the pilot as well because the navigator has got a complete log of everything that has gone on. What you’ve got to remember is the moment you took off every one of those aircraft flying was a separate unit. No one knew what, what he was doing or what’s happening in that aircraft until he came back over base. They didn’t know where he was or anything. So the navigator had a complete log of everything that went on in the aircraft. Right. Just like a ships log. And we were closer to the navy than we were to the army although we came out of the army originally. Right. So we used to get the debriefing done and then you go for your meal. Right. Yeah. Your meal. And you always had an egg when you came back. You always found an egg. It was wonderful just to have an egg you know and that. And then, and when we was at Bottesford after we’d come out the mess there we had at least a half mile to walk back to the billet because we were dispersed. We was right out in the sticks. It might, it seemed longer than that to me but there was only just a small road to go down. Just enough to carry a van down you know. There were no big lorries in them days much. And then that’s what we tried to do. To try to get back to our billet within two hours. So is that the answer? Is that alright?
AS: Brilliant.
SK: Ok.
AS: Wonderful.
SK: Any more questions?
AS: I have hundreds of questions, Sidney.
SK: Oh [laughs]
AS: A couple more perhaps. Did, did you, because you are a man who survived two tours of operations.
SK: Yeah.
AS: At different times of the war.
SK: Yeah.
AS: Did you notice a real difference in how you operated between the first tour and the second tour?
SK: Yeah. Oh yes. Of course. Yes, it did. That’s why we had, that’s why we had to go on to a refresher course. As I said when, we crewed up but as a crew we had to go on to a refreshing course. And we did all sorts of courses. We was, I don’t know how long they were for. I’d have to check my logbook really but I think, I think it might have been even two months before we operated you know because first, navigational aids were coming through. Different navigational aids and so on. And your, your tactics were different, you know. Your tactics were different. You had to keep altering them all the time, you know. So yes, there was a big difference. Yeah. Yeah. And of course then they made more, more officers were coming through in crews and that’s what split crews. When you was all sergeants you were one unit together but when you had officers, not that we didn’t mix together but you had to, you couldn’t, you had to live apart. You didn’t live together. You lived apart. You ate apart and so on. Whereas when we were sergeants everything was done together. You was just a little unit on your own, you know.
AS: Well it seems from, from what you’ve said about your first crew at least that you were a very tight knit, staying alive club. That’s what you wanted to do.
SK: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
AS: Put a lot of —
SK: We got good results and all. We had some very good results. I remember when we didn’t know we’d finished because you were supposed to do thirty trips. Right. But our pilot had done one second dickie trip. Right. He did it with our squadron leader and he did it to Essen. Because you know what they say? When we, when we was at OTU and people used to come, come to you and say to you at OTU and say, ‘What’s it like flying on ops?’ You haven’t got an answer. You’ve got to find out for yourself. We used to say, ‘When you’ve got Essen in your logbook you’ll know what it’s like.’ That was the answer, you know. So Essen was the most heavily defended target in the Ruhr. Where the Krupps works were. And getting in and out was, you know, it seemed almost impossible. It was amazing how you got through. So that’s what we, that was our answer when we were screen gunners to tell them. Not very helpful but you couldn’t, you can’t teach them. You can’t teach them operational flying. You can teach them everything else but, you know because it was a different feeling. It’s a fear factor comes into it you see. How do you react? You know. There’s somebody there is trying to blow you out of the sky. Another fighter coming up trying to set you alight and blow you to pieces you see. So it’s, it was a fear factor there you know and people act differently, you know. And one never knows, you know. I can tell you a little story when I was [pause] is it alright if I carry on? When I was at ITW down at St Leonards we’d finished our course. Wait a minute. Where was I going to get to, to tell you? We finished our course. Oh wait a minute. I’ve forgotten what I was going to say now. What was we talking about?
AS: We, we were talking about the fear factor. And you were going to tell me a story.
SK: Oh. A story. Yeah. Oh yes. Yes. The fear factor. Yeah. Right. Got it. Well we had to wait a long time down at ITW down at, down in Eastbourne. And they said it’s all, it’s been posted. ITV has been posted. And we was put on a train at 7 o’clock in the morning. We never knew where we were going. And we finished up in Bridlington, you see, that’s Yorkshire. And then we passed our course there and [pause] what was the question again?
AS: We were talking about the fear factor.
SK: Fear factor. Fear factor.
AS: And how people react. Yeah.
SK: Yeah. How people react. The fear factor. Yeah. And oh yes while we was there so they couldn’t, they couldn’t find anywhere to train. The air gunners couldn’t find anywhere else to go forward. We had to wait for our tour because the weather was so bad they couldn’t get through to flying. So we had several weeks there doing different things, sort of thing, you know. And so the fear factor. I keep wandering off don’t I? The fear factor is —
AS: We can come back to that if you like.
SK: No. Wait a minute. The fear factor was that I thought to myself when you, when you sign on as aircrew you haven’t got any knowledge or any idea of what it’s like to fly. None of us had ever been, had had our feet off the ground. We didn’t know what it was like to fly. So I thought to myself a lot of people coming in how are people going to cope with it? Would they be airsick? You see. Well airsickness is not like seasickness. But airsickness is only, you only get airsickness if you’re, you know, doing rough flying. But when it comes to flying over enemy territory you get this fear factor, you see. So they thought well these chaps have never been off the ground. We’d better give them a test to see how they cope with flying. So we was at Bridlington, on the seafront and they decided, ‘We’ll put them through an air sickness test.’ And they got some swings what they had in the fairgrounds right. Big swings. And they put some boards along the top of them and you had to like, you laid down on the board, on the board. And then some of the course there had to keep these thing going, you know. And you had to get the thing so it went perpendicular. Like that. And you had to, to go for twenty minutes. And I mean, a lot of boffins come down and the boffins were standing at the side of us and asking us questions. They were standing here. So as we went up and down they spoke to you as you went up past, you see, ‘How do you feel?’ ‘Do you feel ill?’ ‘Would you like fish and chips?’ ‘What did you have for lunch,’ you know. Trying to make you feel sick. Right. And so this was all done on Bridlington sea front and I often thought to myself if any of the locals had seen us, ‘With a war going on what are these chaps doing having fun down there?’ See. So that’s, they did bring out the airsickness ‘cause they couldn’t tell. Some chaps did get sick in the air and its just the fear factor, you know. The fear factor of what might be ahead of them. They didn’t know you see. So they wanted to find out if there was any way they could train them but I’m sure that the tests they put us through was far greater than they would have been in reality like, you see.
AS: It’s a marvellous, marvellous story.
SK: Yeah.
AS: The fear.
SK: I passed my test by the way on that screening.
AS: Of course. Of course. But the fears that one had on, on operations. What, what was the greatest enemy do you think? Was it the flak or the fighters or the weather?
SK: Well both. Well all. There was three things you mentioned there, they’re all. It just depends at the time doesn’t it? You know. It’s, they’re all, all. Which is the worst? Well, I always thought, as I mentioned before fighters I always thought were the worst for me as a gunner because with the shells bombing around you, you know there’s no fighters there. That’s the [laughs] that’s the way I looked at it right. And my job in the back there was to make sure a fighter didn’t creep up on us you know because the German tactics changed as well as ours. And their approach to, their approach to attacking us changed. Where in the, on the first tour they all attacked us from behind, underneath and just came up to us and fired from the back. Right. Aiming at the rear gunner and the aircraft. Right. Between my tours they did the Peenemunde raid. Right. And that’s the first time the Germans used a new system. They called it the sugar music. Sugar music. I think that’s what they called it. They, they used to have a gunner in the night fighter and he was like we were. Firing from a swivel. From a swivel or a turret, you know. At us. Then they thought, well why don’t we have a, rather like the Spitfires had, fixed guns. So they fixed a gun at a thirty degree angle. Firing at that angle upwards. Right. And the pilot could fire it. Right. That’s what they did. So they used a different tactic. They’d fly underneath you where it was always darkest and then when they got underneath they used to lift up. Lift themselves up. They were mostly JU88s they weren’t fast like Spitfires or anything like that but they were just a bit faster than the Lancaster so they could keep up with you, overtake you, but they used to the throttle back and then when they got their gun right they’re aiming for your petrol tanks between the two engines. Right. And that’s how we lost so many through firing. And that started between our tours so tactics had to alter. But Air Ministry never told us about that. We never knew that. Except that we were getting, we were seeing more flamers going down. Set alight by flame. Been set alight. When there’s no ack-ack around about it must be a fighter you see. So you sort of realise something was going on but they never told us and I never knew about these guns until after the war finished. Amazing really. What I, they had the idea what you don’t know about you don’t worry about I suppose. You see.
AS: [unclear ] what, as for both of your crews really was your tactic to just not open fire if you saw somebody?
SK: I I I believed in that. I felt, you see, according to how light it was how far could you see? Right. Guns were harmonised. The four guns. Usually about two hundred and fifty yards right. So they were all supposed to hit on another at two hundred and fifty yards. Right. But sometimes you wouldn’t see an aircraft at that, not [pause] because he’s what, three times smaller than you are. He’s flying in the dark. You’re flying, so he can see you and he can see you and he can see your exhaust pipes just glowing red, you know. If he got in a certain position he could see them. So, you know, it’s — yeah where was I again?
AS: Whether or not you opened fire if you saw one.
SK: Oh yes. Whether I opened fire. Yeah. So I would think, it might have been, you don’t want to make a fight with him. You want to keep away from him. And my idea was if you, you could sense something and if you had any, you’d say to the pilot something like, are we, ‘Get to the darkest side you can,’ you know in as few words as we can. It don’t, ‘It don’t look right.’ ‘Things don’t look right,’ you know. So that, and then if they were like that, they were looking for simple targets. If they could find a crew that didn’t respond to anything you know that’s the one they’d go for, you see. So it was just, just a knowledge at the time really. I suppose. You know.
AS: When you’re flying backwards over a target that’s, that’s been bombed could you, did you look away? Could you preserve your night vision?
SK: I tried, the most important, the thing you were trying to do is don’t look at the target. Because that’s the only time it’s lighter underneath. Right. But avoid looking at the target. Don’t spoil your night vision. We had night vision training and it takes full twenty minutes to get your full night vision, you know. Twenty minutes. I know you can improve it in ten or something like that but, but it’s a full, full twenty minutes to get your full night vision and one flash of light can spoil it you see. And that’s another thing you didn’t want to do. So it’s very tempting to look to see where your bombs are falling, you know but I used to look away. And that’s the only time you looked upwards instead of downwards you know. Or sideways, you know. But that’s something you had to learn to do.
AS: Did you test fire your guns?
SK: In, in the very early stages we were allowed to do it when you were over, over the sea. Right. And then it got stopped doing it because they said there was a danger that you might give your position away and there was a danger that other aircraft might be not too far away from you. And so on. And they said, ‘No. You’re not to do it anymore.’ But we used to do. Test them. Just a short burst and so on but that got stopped. That was an order that came through to stop. So —
AS: Could you, I mean it’s a bit of a silly question because it depends to a great extent on how dark the sky was. But could you often see many other aircraft?
SK: Yes. Oh yes.
AS: Over the target? Or —
SK: Oh over the target you wonder where they all come from. You thought you was all alone. But when you were over the target aircraft were everywhere, you know. Above you. Below you. A pilot was always looking. You don’t want to see somebody with the bomb doors open just above you, you know. But yes its — yes it’s [pause] Ok?
AS: Yeah. As a crew did you ever talk about what you were doing? About the fact that you were bombing the enemy or did you just treat it as a job and just get on with it.
SK: Well it was a job of work. A job you were trained to do. It’s [pause] it’s something that we were right to do. And we had, we had targets to, we had targets to officially aim for, you know. But when you’re fighting an enemy things can go wrong, you know. I mean they had the problem of creep back. Creep back was where you, if you had a target area there and it was marked by the Pathfinders and then the bombers coming in and then they’re getting knocked about a bit. They let the bombs go a bit quicker you know. That sort of thing you know. So they used to put tactics. You’d put your, go forward, mark the forward there to allow for the creep back. You see. There was all things like that. But we were given a job to do and we thought it was the right job to do, you see. Yeah.
AS: And you said towards the end of the first part of the interview that you were demobbed and didn’t really think about it.
SK: We switched off.
AS: Yeah.
SK: It’s what happened. It’s what happened with the government and everything. They wanted everybody to forget everything. It’s like they destroyed all the aircraft. You know. All these aircraft we had. They were just got rid of them and so on and made you forget. That’s why they said on the stations what I said, got to bring sport back. They had sport everything. You’ve got to do. Play cricket. You’ve got to play football. There’s badminton, you know. And there was running races. Everybody had to be in to sport you see because that’s what the, that’s what the Services were before the war you see. So that’s you had a, you forgot all about. In fact my daughters, I’ve got three daughters, I don’t think they know much about what I did until they read the book. So there we are.
AS: Well, hopefully we’ve got a tape as well. One, one final question if I may and it’s not about your aircrew duties. It’s when you did aerodrome control. And I have a reason for this because my mum used to do it as well.
SK: Oh yes.
AS: What was your —
SK: She’d be in flying control.
AS: She was in flying control.
SK: Yes. Yes. I was in the caravan at the end of the runway.
AS: Oh Ok.
SK: Yeah.
AS: So, what did your duties entail?
SK: Right. As flying control. First of all you logged every aircraft as they took off and when they landed and you brought them on to the runway with an Aldis lamp and gave them permission to take off and then when they were landing, with your binoculars you’ve checked that their wheels are down properly. That their tyres looked in good nick and so on and also to recognise the aircraft as its coming to land and so on, you know. So that’s what your duties were. Yeah.
AS: Brilliant. Thank you.
SK: I’ve got a little bit about [pause] I’ll show you this then because I suppose you’ll want to finish then I’ll have said enough. I’ll show you one other thing. I think you’ll be able to keep it if I can show you something. Are you alright for time?
AS: I I have years for this, Sidney.
SK: Oh alright. Now where is it?
[Pause. Shuffling papers]
SK: Now where is it? No. That’s not it [pause] This was a battle order when we went to the Skoda works. Right.
AS: At Pilsen, yeah.
SK: At Pilsen. And that’s when we got diverted to Boscombe Down. I told you the one occasion.
AS: Yeah.
SK: We got diverted to Boscombe Down and our squadron, which is 5 Group, right. And a squadron should only be two Flights. And a squadron should be six aircraft to a Flight. So you should have twelve aircraft. But you had extra aircraft so you got six serviceable. Right. Well, when the war was going on and Bomber Command was building they formed, our squadron formed a third flight. Right. C Flight.
AS: Yeah.
SK: And we was in A flight when we were at the start. And then when it got to [pause] when it got to, they wanted to start a third Flight it was C Flight and the idea of that was how you build a new squadron is you build it up to three Flights and then when you’re going and alright and you’ve got, that’s eighteen aircraft and you’ve got two or three spares. Then you can take that flight away and it starts a new squadron.
AS: Yeah.
SK: But then you go back to your two flights. Well this time we was up to three Flights because we found out the first, it was the 1st of March, I think, we started our C Flight on our squadron there. And this was the 16th 17th of April right. And this is when we, it’s —these are all the pilots. There’s us up there. The other two pilots with us — one was on leave and Bally was the other that came, just followed us off here. That’s our wing commander. He was on that night. Going down, Mackenzie [pause] No. Stuart was RAAF. You asked about that.
AS: Yeah.
SK: Tillerson. Desmond. All RAF. Wilson. All RAAF I should say.
AS: Yeah.
SK: Sinclair. Wilson again. There was two Wilsons on our squadron. And Parsons. And Manifold. So by that time the captains were getting more, more Australians but we were — but they had RAF in their crews. Right. And this is the number of ops that crew had done. There. That’s the time they took off. The time they bombed. The height they bombed at.
AS: Six thousand feet.
SK: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That was, that was our height to bomb at because there was nobody there. We came down to that height to bomb because there were no defences there and yet we had the hardest trip coming back then ever. That’s the time we landed. We diverted, we got the diversion call come when we was crossing the sea. I know we were just crossing the French coast on our way back. I could go on forever. Because when we was at Bottesford you have to put me back on track in a minute, when we was at Bottesford we were, the station was confined to barracks because we had a Diphtheria scare on, on the squadron and they confined everyone to barracks. No one to leave. But we were able to fly on ops. And when we when we, when we landed at Boscombe Down they knew all about it so the MO had phoned through and said, ‘They’re aliens,' you know. That sort of thing. ‘You’ve got to be careful with them.’ So we were sent up to they wouldn’t allow us in the mess. They found us empty huts and we had to lay down and they found us some, what we called biscuits you know to lay on. Mattresses. And we laid down on them and they rustled up some — because Boscombe down was an experimental station for the RAF. Right. And it was only a grass airfield but that was in Hampshire. And they had to get — we lost two aircraft that night. Stuart. And where’s the other one? Failed to return. One there. Oh up here. “And diverted to Boscombe Down in Wiltshire on return as Bottesford was fog bound.” What I mentioned before. We lost thirty five aircraft. Bomber Command lost thirty eight aircraft from this raid and yet there was no defences at the target. A hundred and ninety nine were killed in action. Fifty two prisoners of war and thirteen, there were thirteen evaders. Right. How they — they must have come down in France somewhere and managed to get back through Spain I should think.
AS: So you could have dropped some aircrew with Diphtheria into the prisoner of war camp.
SK: Yes. We were, we were all the what, you know — what do you call it? They hadn’t got enough of the, would it be serum or something?
JM: Oh No. No. Inoculations.
SK: Inoculations. They hadn’t got enough of them, you see. But when you get a big outbreak like that and so they, they was able to test you to see whether you were positive or negative or something. Do they scratch you or something? I don’t know how they do it, put it like that. But our crew was alright but then we were poorly we were still allowed to fly. And the MO at briefing said to us that night, he said, ‘If any of you unfortunately crash and come down in German you must tell them that you are Diphtheria carriers.’ We said, ‘Blimey we wouldn’t tell them that,’ [laughs] You’re asking for a bullet in your head straight away, aren’t you? You know [laughs] So we didn’t agree with the MO one bit. I remember that. So you can keep this bit if you like.
AS: Thank you.
JM: Well, that’s not in the book is it? It’s not subject to copyright?
SK: I don’t know. Maybe. Yeah but —
JM: Oh.
SK: Yeah.
JM: In which case you can’t digitise that I’m afraid.
AS: Ok. We can —
SK: Well you can have a look at it anyway.
AS: We can sort that out.
SK: You must sort it out. I don’t know.
AS: What interests me on there as well.
SK: Yeah.
AS: Is two things. One — did you climb back to height after you’d bombed?
SK: What? In this? On this one. Yeah.
AS: On that one. Yeah.
SK: You would have done. Yes.
AS: And the “Froth Blower” on there. The code name. Is that the squadron or the target code name?
SK: That. No. That would be the target code name you see. “Froth Blower.” Yeah. Yes.
AS: Ok.
SK: I think that would be in the book there. But you see how many aircraft we put up there? And look. They can’t beat that now. We took off at minute intervals.
AS: Yeah.
SK: Minute intervals. And we got fourteen up there till this last one. And I remember Manifold. He was an Aussie but he went on and he did fifty trips. He finished his tour on fifty and he went on to Pathfinders afterwards and he [pause] he, when he went to start his aircraft one engine wouldn’t start. And they had to rush around and take the spare one standing by. So he lost fifteen minutes or whatever it was. But that’s, that was, that’s good flying control. That was a good bloke at the end of the runway did that one.
AS: Fast on the finger.
SK: Yeah. Yeah. Getting them all on there. To get heavy aircraft down at the end of the runway like that, you know.
AS: So at least on that squadron if you had one you’d have a standby aircraft fully fuelled and fully bombed.
SK: You would try to. It didn’t always happen. But there was at that time. At that time there was. Yeah. Yeah. I did a little thing here I wrote down. I think I’ve got it here somewhere. I’m sure I’ve got it here. Printed out. Perhaps I haven’t got it.
[Pause. Shuffling papers]
AS: Do you know how long we’ve been talking for?
SK: No.
JM: Two hours.
AS: Nearly two hours.
SK: Oh I’m sorry.
AS: No. Not at all. Don’t apologise. It’s wonderful.
SK: [unclear ]
AS: I was just saying shall we, shall we draw stumps there. At least for the tape.
SK: Yeah. Yeah.
AS: And maybe we can do another.
Dublin Core
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Title
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Interview with Sidney Knott
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Adam Sutch
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-10-01
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
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Sound
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AKnottS151001
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Pending review
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01:51:57 audio recording
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eng
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Description
An account of the resource
Sidney Knott was from Leigh on Sea and recalls the day, with invasion apparently imminent, that signs were put up on the local shops advising people that they had to be ready to move within an hour and taking only one suitcase with them. Sidney’s father had been injured several times during the First World War and advised his son to join the RAF rather than the army. Sidney had had an interrupted education so was advised he would be accepted for general duties. He was posted to Blickling Hall where he was on crash duty but later remustered as an air gunner. Initially he was posted with 467 Squadron based at RAF Bottesford. His was the first crew to complete a full tour on the squadron. After his tour he was posted to RAF Silverstone. He was then approached to join a new squadron and do a further tour of operations. His crew joined 582 Squadron, Pathfinders based at RAF Little Staughton. He completed sixty four operations in both tours. He talks about the fear factor of operations, the instinct over the target looking out for threats and coping with the tiredness.
Contributor
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Julie Williams
Spatial Coverage
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Bedfordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Norfolk
Temporal Coverage
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1940
1941
1944
17 OTU
467 Squadron
582 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
animal
bombing
fear
ground personnel
Lancaster
Manchester
military service conditions
Operational Training Unit
Pathfinders
RAF Bottesford
RAF Finningley
RAF Little Staughton
RAF Manby
RAF Scampton
RAF Silverstone
RAF Turweston
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
training
Wellington
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Base [underlined] Int [/underlined]
Wadd 9
Skell 10
[Indecipherable]
Base 1
minuted
V GROUP NEWS V
APRIL 1944 [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 21
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Last month I said that it was up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that we were right in our view that night bombing could be made more accurate than day bombing. During April we have gone a long way towards furnishing the proof. The concentration of bombs which was achieved during some of the attacks, notably those on the marshalling yards at La Chappelle and Juvisy, and against some of the small aircraft factories, was outstanding, and probably represents the greatest weight of bombs in a small areas which has yet been achieved in this war.
By previous standards, therefore, our results have been excellent. But there is still much more to be done before we can afford to be satisfied. We can, however, say that the system of marking, which was pioneered by W/Cdr Cheshire and 617 Squadron, has been applied with success to larger operations, including the highly successful attack on Munich. Nevertheless, in all our attacks during April we inflicted less damage than could have been caused by the weight of bombs carried, and I want crews to think carefully over the reasons which I outline below and to take note of the remedies which are being applied.
[Underlined] Communications [/underlined]
On nearly all targets a proportion of the effort was misplaced due to a failure in communications. It is recognised that the T.R. 1196 operates on an unsuitable frequency and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the wireless link which, on occasions, has proved highly satisfactory, is not well suited to the transmission of anything except short instructions in a pre-arranged code. The solution to these communication problems is the introduction of V.H.F. throughout the Group and this policy has now been approved by the Air Ministry although some little time must elapse before all squadrons are fitted. In the meantime, Wireless Operators must ensure a very high degree of efficiency in handling communications.
[Underlined] Smoke [/underlined]
The smoke given off by the bombs has, on many occasions, obscured, or partially obscured, the markers and has made bomb aiming exceedingly difficult during later stages of an attack. Delay action fuses will soon be available once more and their use on certain types of target will ensure that the aiming point is clearly visible throughout the whole run up. An additional method of avoiding the smoke nuisance by aiming off, is described below.
[Underlined] Bombing Errors [/underlined]
There is no doubt that crew bombing errors are still too large and that the pattern of bombs plotted around these precision targets bears a remarkably close relationship to the pattern of bombs plotted around the practice targets at Wainfleet. A proportion of crews obtain good results up to the performance of the sight, which is well under 100 yards. Other crews seem content with results between 200 and 300 yards and a small proportion manage to drop bombs at even greater distances from heights of 10,000 feet or below. There are many causes for these errors but all can be remedied if crews determine that every load of bombs carried out of this country shall fall fair and square on the aiming point.
In the past, the majority of errors in practice bombing have been due to wrong winds, but this source of error should be virtually eliminated by the introduction of the A.P.I. wind finding method. This method will also be used by selected crews on operations so that the bombing winds transmitted to the main force should be more accurate than in the past.
A further source of bombing error has been unserviceable instruments and many Air Bombers are still failing to take the close personal interest in their bombsight which is essential if they are to obtain good results. Although the Instrument Repairer forms the fourth member of the bombing team, it is the Air Bomber who uses the instrument and who must ensure that any difficulties, however trivial, are immediately reported so that they can be put right.
A third main source of error arises out of the manner in which the Pilot flies the aircraft. I find that a number of pilots are still attempting to turn the aircraft flat when making their final corrections during the run up and I can only say to them that such action may easily throw the bombs off by 100 or 200 yards, and that every turn, however small, must be made with the appropriate angle of bank. Far better not to turn at all at the last moment rather than risk a sked. Even a skid of 2° or 3°.
Finally there are errors due to the Air Bomber. Errors which can only be avoided by constant practice in directing the pilot over objects on the ground on every flight; by learning how to adjust in plenty of time for a drift greater or less than that set on the sight. This will become of increasing importance with the introduction of the technique described below.
The accumulative effect of all these errors results in the employment of too many aircraft on each attack, or, put another way, we knock out too few targets each night with the force available. There are many targets which could be destroyed with the effort of a single squadron if the bombing errors could be reduced to 100 yards. These are targets which, at present, have to be attacked by a Base.
I have referred above to the new technique which is being introduced for attacks against small targets on which it is essential that the whole weight of bombs should fall. In the past we have endeavoured to put a marker on the aiming point and, if there were two or more aiming points to put down two or more markers. Examples are some of the railway marshalling yards, or the dispersed hangars making up the aircraft factories at Toulouse. There are several disadvantages in this method of marking. First, the markers often fall through the roofs of buildings and are consequently difficult to see. Secondly, they may be blown out by the concentrated bombing which follows or, if not blown out, obscured by smoke.
It is now proposed that the markers shall be laid by Mosquitos on the upwind edge of the target and that the bombs shall be displaced by the simple expedient of setting a false wind vector on the sight. Recent trials at Wainfleet have shown that a displacement of 300 yards does not unduly complicate the Air Bomber’s run up. If, therefore, the target is 1000 yards long or consists of scattered buildings, one aiming point will be put down and portions of the force will be given different wind settings which will offset their bombs accurately on to the various parts of the target which it is desired to erase. By this means, the target can be scientifically covered and improved results obtained from fewer aircraft.
Success depends, however, on accurate bombing and I would again ask all crews to tackle this problem and to determine that, during May, they will not be satisfied with a bombing error, whether on the practice ranges or against small precision targets, of more than 100 yards from the aiming point or the M.P.I. if a false wind has been applied.
Nothing can more quickly bring this war to a close than the regular achievement of bombing errors of this order.
The arrival in 5 Group of Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons on attachment from P.F.F. provides the Group with the means of marking targets with great accuracy and I consequently look forward to a steady reduction throughout May in the number of aircraft which have to be detailed for the destruction of these small targets, and by this means to a steady increase in the effective aid which this Group can give in the great offensive which lies ahead.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF SERVICING
One of the major problems of the Engineering Branch is to maintain large numbers of aircraft which are of very complex design, with a limited number of tradesmen and with the use of the minimum quantity of test equipment. At the same time, the serviceability state must be high; therefore the time taken over periodical maintenance must be short and the work efficiently carried out.
Early in the war the number of really experienced tradesmen was comparatively few. All the men were exceptionally keen, and to make full use of experienced tradesmen on jobs requiring the greatest amount of skill, a reorganisation of the system of aircraft maintenance was effected.
Originally the squadrons on a station worked as independent units, each squadron being divided into two or three flights according to the number of aircraft held. Each of these flights had its own separate maintenance “set up”, with all equipment required for minor and major inspections. Each of these flights also kept its own supply of spares and tools, and minor and major inspections on aircraft were carried out by the ground crew who remained with the aircraft for all purposes including daily servicing.
This was so obviously uneconomical, not only in equipment, spares and tools, but also in the employment of skilled men and expenditure of man hours, that the new scheme was brought into force very soon after the commencement of hostilities.
The maintenance layout then consisted of the Flying Flights and a Maintenance Flight. Squadrons were still maintained as separate units, but the detailed maintenance was carried out in “M” (Maintenance Flight), i.e. minor and major inspections, acceptance checks and engine or power plant changes, whilst in the Flying Flights, daily inspections, refuelling and rectification of petty unserviceability only was necessary. The man power was of course split up accordingly, the more skilled and experienced men forming the maintenance gangs, whilst the men with less experience were employed in the flying flights.
The economy was marked and as can be visualised, only one squadron store, one pool of ground equipment for aircraft inspections and one set of test equipment for the various ancilliary trades were necessary. The economy however which made itself felt as much as anything was the saving of man-hours caused by the use of highly skilled men on detailed maintenance in the Maintenance Flight, with the result that a generally higher serviceability state was achieved.
There was a certain amount of opposition to this scheme by those who though that flights would lose their identity and spirit. This did not happen.
At a later date a further change in maintenance organisation took place. This was the formation of Station Maintenance. The resources of all squadrons on a station were pooled, and a Station Major Servicing Section was formed, catering for all major servicing work for all squadrons on the station.
These two improvements were merely forerunners of the present Base Maintenance Organisation and the advantages from the aircraft maintenance point of view are manifold.
With this scheme, squadrons do not carry out any of the detailed maintenance, this being left to the Base Major Servicing or Repair and Inspection Squadron. All tradesmen with the exception of the daily servicing squadron are controlled entirely by the Chief Technical Officer, so that by far the greatest amount of maintenance work which goes to keep the squadron at a high serviceability figure is carried out by tradesmen who, whilst working for the squadrons may not be known by members of the squadron.
It would appear therefore that those who said that we would lose the Squadron spirit etc., stood a good chance of being correct. These fears were proved groundless; the spirit has grown to embrace something which was very rare in the early days of the war. Not only have we squadron spirit which has never been as strong as it is now, but we also have pride in the station and Base achievements, and progress of the Group has naturally followed.
An extract from a letter written by a Flight Commander to the Base Maintenance Staff at his Base is typical of the spirit which exists at present. The letter refers to certain aircraft which had been modified, and brought up to operational standard in time for a specific operation, and continues:-
“It is known that in order to have these aircraft ready for operational requirements it was necessary for the staff to sacrifice much of their leisure time and to work long hours without relief.
“Occasions such as this bring forcibly to notice the excellent work being performed daily by the ground staff, and show how necessary it is for us to have their co-operation.
“We member [sic] of aircrew know that we can rely on the ground staff to help in every way possible, and we hope that we can show our appreciation by carrying out the duties in our particular sphere with the same thoroughness, perseverance, and resourcefulness which we have learned to expect from the members of ground staff.”
GARDENING
Interrogation, Easter Monday:-
“That wasn’t a U-boast, it was me – low!”.
Thus, when 5 Group staged a large scale comeback to gardening, out of six aircraft specially detailed to mine a stretch of water in the Eastern Gardens about the width of a runway, 4 (3 of 106 and 1 of 49 Squadrons) were successful despite heavy opposition, and the remaining 2 (49 Squadron) after valiant attempts, during which good use was made of firing the front guns, correctly planted in another furrow. The remaining 50 gardeners put down 244 vegetables off ports in the Gulf of Danzig. Two were missing and one returned early after jettisoning safe in the North Sea. This operation took place almost exactly on the fourth anniversary of the opening by 5 Group of Bomber Command’s mining offensive. During the four years over 30,000 vegetables have been planted, and over 1,000,000 tons of enemy shipping accounted for.
On 18/19th April, and again on 23/24th April, the approaches to Swinemunde received a total of 125 vegetables.
These attacks in the Baltic fill what was a serious gap in the mining campaign in these waters. This year intensive minelaying has been carried out by the Command to the West of Pomeranian Bay with highly successful results. One effect of this, however, was to intensify the use of mine-free waters further east as:-
(i) Training areas for all types of Warships especially U-boats.
(ii) Supply routes for vital imports and military exports to Scandinavia.
(iii) Supply routes to the North Russian front.
Press reports describe very great congestion throughout the Baltic due to closing of ports and channels; P.R.U. cover of the Western Baltic shows some of this, but was unfortunately not obtained of the 5 Group Gardens. Ground reports of sinkings are hard to come by, and take time to reach us, so for the moment we must wait for the news – which will surely come providing our mines were well and truly laid in the swept channels.
The summary of the month’s work is as follows:-
Sorties 80
Successful 77
%age successful 96.25
Mileage flown 126,880
Total vegetables planted 388
The Squadrons responsible were:- 44, 49, 57, 630, 207 and 106.
The Command effort for this month resulted in the successful planting of 2,643 vegetables in some 40 gardens ranging from South West France to the Gulf of Danzig. About half this total was planted in the Baltic, a quarter in the North Sea and the remainder in the Bay of Biscay and Channel. This is easily a record – the previous highest total for one month being 1,869, in April, 1943. A German Naval Correspondent of Transocean, states that in the Channel alone it has been necessary to treble the mine sweeping effort, but discreetly does not mention the Baltic. The problem that faces the German mine sweeping effort is to cope with a great increase in mining spread over some 2000 miles of shipping lanes. The same correspondent complains that we sometimes use 12 different types of mines necessitating the use of numbers of ships fitted with different types of sweeps to clear the same patch, [sic] of water. In fact, the number of different
(Continued in previous column)
types of mine now in use is about four times that number.
A special word of praise is due to the Armament Staffs for their complete success in the unfamiliar work of preparing and loading the vegetables. In particular, East Kirkby’s effort on the 9th April, in sending off 108 in good order, was outstanding. In some cases the weekly stock return continues to be rendered incorrectly, chiefly due to confusion about the different types sterilisers for the new and old marks of mines. The correct use of these sterilisers will literally be a matter of life and death to any of our forces who may operate in areas where we use them, and now is the time therefore, to clear up any doubts as to exactly what types are held.
Station Tracings have proved something of a stumbling block, as have some of the details required in Raid Reports. Both are designed to answer the question – “where do those mines actually fall”, using all the available evidence. Naturally the planning and success of future operations, especially the “triphibious” variety, depend to a large extent on the accuracy of this information.
5 Group News. No. 21. April, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
There has been a marked improvement in the navigation this month. Navigators are now realising how important it is to obtain constant checks on their position by intelligent use of either H2S or application of the broadcast w/v’s.
H2S navigators and bomb aimers are checking and cross checking all fixes they receive. If the navigator obtains constant D.R. positions along track, say every 15 minutes, and corrects these positions as ground speed checks are obtained, then it is impossible to obtain wrong fixes on the H 2 S. All Navigators should ensure that bomb aimers cross check every fix obtained, no matter how confident they may be. Also remember that a track made good, w/v and G/S check can be obtained from an unknown response. Very few operators make use of this.
The majority of navigators now use the broadcast w/v’s in an intelligent manner. There are a few, however, who [underlined] do not. ALL NAVIGATORS [/underlined] are to make a regular practice of obtaining a D.R. position by use of broadcast winds every 30 minutes – and do not forget to use the “Past” w/v!! If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, alter course immediately and regain track. Now that 5 Group operate alone, concentration is even more important. Station Navigation Officers must have a concentrated drive in this direction, and ensure that all H 2 S navigators are making the fullest possible use of their equipment, and also that the remainder are making full use of broadcast w/v’s, by obtaining constant D.R. positions checks on ground speed etc.
The importance of timing was discussed in last month’s “News”. We would do well however, to reconsider this subject seriously. Accurate timekeeping is more important now than ever before. The largest discrepancies in timing occur on the return journey. This is due partly to the fact that aircraft do not all bomb at the same time and therefore do not leave the target at the same time. To overcome this it may be necessary to establish a concentration point on the return journey, situated close to the target. It is obvious, however, that many navigators make no effort to achieve good timing; they merely carry on and get there “sometime or other”. There are a few pilots who consistently fly at greater speeds than those laid down, and consequently on the return journey are some 10 or 15 minutes ahead of the main force, By so doing they give the Hun a few extra minutes warning of the route home, apart from exposing themselves to individual interception. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must watch for and stem any tendency for bad time-keeping. Sufficient navigational aids are now available to ensure that you are on track and on time. Now it is up to [underlined] YOU [/underlined].
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
April has been a very good month for broadcast w/v’s, particularly since the Group began operating alone. Windfinders have been doing an excellent job. On two occasions this month more than 300 w/v’s were received from aircraft – an excellent effort. Windfinders are transmitting all the winds they obtain. If you note a sudden change in the wind direction or speed, then provided you are satisfied with the fixes used, send back [missing word] w/v immediately.
There are one or two cases, however of navigators chosen as windfinders not realising their responsibility. One navigator for instance, stated that he just couldn’t be bothered to send back w/v’s!! Another said that sufficient w/v’s were being sent back by other aircraft, so he didn’t bother either. Those few navigators who are chosen as windfinders must realise that the whole Group is navigating on the w/v’s they transmit to Base. We cannot afford to have anyone “not bothering”. So buck up chaps, the vast majority of you are doing an excellent job, but those few, who just “don’t bother” – well -- !!
Many experiments have been carried out on French targets to ascertain the most accurate and practical method of obtaining a bombing W/V, which must of course, be a w/v prevailing in the target area. The experiments have proved that the most accurate method is to use a datum point in conjunction with the A.P.I. It is hoped therefore that this method will be adopted on all future operations where practical. Any suggestions or criticisms on this subject will be welcomed.
[Underlined] ASTRO NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
It has been decided that Astro can no longer be considered as an essential aid to navigation. Much time has been devoted to teaching this subject to Navigators, but the results obtained do not justify this training. Therefore this training time is to be devoted to improving the general standard of navigation. More time is to be devoted to plotting and computing two of the weakest links in navigation at the moment.
This decision for not mean that Astro is now “dead” and can be forgotten by all., It is still a standby aid, and all navigators should keep themselves in practice. There have been isolated incidents where a Polaris shot or an Astro fix have been the means of saving an aircraft. You may find yourselves in such a predicament one night – so be ready.
All Astrographs and sextants are to be withdrawn from aircraft, but those navigators who are considered by the Station Navigation Officer as competent Astro Navigators may draw the equipment from the station stores.
[Underlined] SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS [/underlined]
(i) Many station and squadron navigation officers find it impossible to spend as much time as they would like in supervising the work of a new navigator, and teaching him all the things he should know. To overcome this [underlined] East Kirkby [/underlined] put each navigator under the care of a very experienced navigator whose responsibility it is to supervise the other at briefing, to check his log and chart the next day, and to pass on to him all useful information and “tips”. In short the senior navigator acts as a “father” to the “sprog”.
This scheme is working extremely well, and should be adopted by all squadrons.
(ii) Many navigators cannot remember to check compasses regularly. [Underlined] Dunholme [/underlined] have overcome this by marking red or green dots on the face of the Astro watch. This serves as a constant reminder to the navigator. It is recommended that compasses be checked every 20 minutes, and therefore the dots on the face of the Astro watch should be spaced accordingly.
(iii) [Underlined] Metheringham [/underlined] suggest that since Astro will no longer be used to any great extent that astrograph films should be treated and used instead of Gee charts. The procedure would be to mark on the film the lattice lines in the same way as on the Gee Charts. The film or films applicable for each night’s operation would be placed in the aircraft before take-off.
There are two great advantages:-
(a) Fixes would be plotted directly on the plotting chart, thus saving time and reducing the risk of errors.
(b) It would not be necessary to carry a large supply of Gee Charts as at present.
[Underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined]
We welcome the arrival of the 3 P.F.F. squadrons to this Group. There is no doubt that we shall be able to pick up from them many useful ideas and suggestions. These will be passed on to Squadrons as soon as possible.
It is hoped that all station navigation Officers will make a determined effort to visit these 3 squadrons whilst they are attached to the Group.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s Summary that one A.P.I. was being modified by having a “miles flown counter” fitted. This has been done & has been tested by No.617 Squadron on three 6-hour cross countries, undertaken at operational height.
The results are as follows:-
Miles flown registered on counter = 2927
Miles flown calculated by navigator = 2892
Percentage error = 1.2
These tests have proved conclusively that the over reading error in the A.P.I. is negligible.
Permission is now being obtained from Bomber Command for the fitting of the “air miles flown” counter to all A.P.I’s. The manufacturers state however, that the modification may not be retrospective.
There is still considerable difference of opinion as to the best method of using the A.P.I. One third of the Group prefer to reset, the remainder prefer the “graphical” resetting method. It is not necessary to lay down any one method of use but Station Nav Officers must ensure that all Navigators use one of the above two methods.
Station navigations officers are to discuss the use of the A.P.I. with all navigators. Any suggestions on improvements or methods of resetting etc. should be tried out immediately and if successful passed to Group Headquarters.
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Put the switch on the heading Control unit to “Manual” and by means of the setting knob adjust the line of flight marker until it corresponds to the true course as indicated by the P.4 compass. Maintain the switch on “manual” until the D.R. compass is functioning correctly, when you should switch to “Auto”.
(Continued on page 4, Column1.)
GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
(Continued from page 3 column 3)
2. To obtain ground returns, tune in brightest responses on the P.P.I. by means of brightness, contrast, gain and tuning controls. To obtain correct height set range drum at zero and adjust the range marker ring by means of the height control until it is on the first ground returns.
3. (i) Check the pinpoint yourself, visually and by the aid of D.R.
(ii) If pinpoint correct, alter course immediately to regain track by 30° if more than 10 miles off track, by 15° if less than 10 miles off track.
4. You would lose the time in hand by flying small dog legs, preferably either side of track, and of a maximum duration of 2 minutes. Dog legs to be completed before reaching a position 50 miles from the target. Navigator must use his own discretion as to the most suitable area in which to lose time.
5. (i) France (ii) Germany (French name for AACHEN) (iii) Germany (iv) Belgium (v) Czecho-Slovakia (vi) Germany (Part of Berlin).
6. Stuttgart to London.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Quinn, DFC. Sqdn Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn to Stn Nav. Officer, Skellingthorpe.
F/Lt Cunningham 50 Sqdn promoted to Sqdn Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Waterkeyn Sqdn Nav. Officer 44 Sqdn to P.F.F.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, DFM. H2S Instructor, Metheringham to Sqdn. Nav. Officer, 44 Squadron.
P/O Blackham 49 Squadron to H2S Instructor, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Bone, DFC. H2S Instructor Swinderby to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Murphy Sqdn. Nav. Officer No. 467 Sqdn. to No. 61 Squadron (with W/Cdr Doubleday)
F/O Abbott 467 Squadron promoted to Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Bonefield Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No. 9 Squadron – Missing.
F/Lt. Jones Nav. Officer, 1660 Con. Unit to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 9 Squadron.
S/Ldr. Georgeson, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer No.83. Squadron.
S/Ldr Stevens, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No.97 Squadron.
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.R. HEAD D.S.O.
[/Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. CHATTERTON D.F.C.
P/O R.T. MANNING D.F.C.
P/O J. BRADBURN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. A. WARD D.F.M.
SGT. R. MACHIN D.F.M.
SGT. R.A. FRIARS D.F.M.
P/O SANDERS D.F.C.
SGT. R.H. HUDSON D.F.M.
P/O A.W. SHINN D.F.C.
F/L. D. MILLER, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O J.E.W. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. LLOYD D.F.C.
W/CDR. A.W. HEWARD D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.S. LUDFORD D.F.C.
F/O F.A. THOMAS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. FARMILOE D.S.O.
F/O S. HALLIWELL, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O D. PAULL D.F.C.
SGT. P. MCGABNEY D.F.M.
P/O D.C. FREEMAN D.F.C.
SGT. L. CHAPMAN C.G.M.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F. GRIFFITHS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT T.W.J. HALL D.F.M.
F/O R.F. ANDERSON D.F.C.
P/O G.S. MILNE D.F.C.
F/O J.B. LATHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR. J.R. BALMER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR G.L. CHESHIRE, D.S.O. & BAR 2nd Bar to D.S.O.
S/LDR J.L. MUNRO, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/L C.K. ASTBURY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
S/LDR J.C. MCCARTHY, D.S.O. D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O W.G. BICKLEY C.G.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W. KELLAWAY, D.S.O. Bar to D.S.O.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR A.S. JOHNSON D.S.O.
The following non-immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.J. KNELL D.F.C.
F/O R.H. SMITH D.F.C.
F/L J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C.
F/O J.N.G. WYATT D.F.C.
F/SGT. K.J. DAGNALL D.F.M.
F/SGT R.N. BROWN D.F.M.
SGT. E. SULLIVAN D.F.M.
SGT. E.R. BAKER D.F.M.
F/SGT. E.G.B. COLE D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.F. PARSONS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J. MURPHY D.F.M.
F/O D.C. ARMSTRONG D.F.C.
F/SGT. A. HOLDEN D.F.M.
W/O G.A. WILKIE D.F.C.
P/O G.G. WHITEHEAD D.F.C.
F/SGT J.R. OSWICK D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. J. CHALONER D.F.M.
SGT. (NOW P/O [sic] A.E. BOASE D.F.M.
P/O H.C. DARNTON D.F.C.
P/O G. SERGEEV D.F.C.
SGT. R. JEFCOCK D.F.M.
F/SGT (NOW P/O) W.A. MOORE D.F.M.
F/L D.J. BACON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.C.B. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O E.C. WEATHERSTONE D.F.C.
P/O A. BEALE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W. FEARN D.F.C.
F/L R.V. MUNDY D.F.C.
F/L R.K. EGGINS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.H. PULLMAN D.F.C.
[/Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J. SEARS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O R.E. KNIGHTS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.C. GREENHALGH D.F.C.
S/LDR A.R. DUNN D.F.C.
F/SGT. M.D.J. PARKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT. L. BENDING D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.J. FLOWER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.O.P. BEATTY D.F.C.
P/O D.E. FREEMAN D.F.C.
P/O H. THOMAS D.F.C.
P/O L.W. MITCHELL D.F.C.
P/O C.M. LAWES D.F.C.
F/SGT. P. PULLAR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. ROBERTSON D.F.C.
P/O W.T. LOFTUS D.F.C.
P/O W. BOOTH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. R.W. JAGGS D.F.M.
F/O H. McDONALD D.F.C.
F/O C.H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O N.H. KOBELKE D.F.C.
W/O H. McCABE D.F.C.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
April has provided another milestone on our road to the fullest use being made of radiations and echoes helping to get more bombs on the target. V.H.F. R/T has been fitted to two more squadrons – W/T has provided almost 100% communication between Controllers and Main Forces – the serviceability of all Radar devices has improved.
We are grateful to all those outside the Group who have helped us so readily – particularly 92 Group and the Signals Schools with their special drive to train Wireless Operators to read morse through severe interference and to tune their W/T sets with one eye on a C.R.T.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
A hearty welcome to all those faces, both old and new, that have appeared within the Group since our last edition.
April 1944 will long be remembered in the history of 5 Group as a month of hard work, which was crowned with the success it so richly deserved. Wireless Operators (Air) played their part with the energy and determination that is always to be found when there is an extra job to be done, and a large slice of the credit for our recent achievements is due to them.
As usual, the “Back Room Boys” at stations and in our own W/T cabin at Headquarters gladly threw their weight into the fray, and we are indebted to them. Their keenness has always been an inspiration.
Several points have been brought out this month, first and foremost being the quality of morse emanating from the Controllers’ aircraft. There has been a noticeable difference between operators, which, if all past suggestions re training had been acted upon, should never re-occur.
It has been stressed time and again that ANY ONE Wireless Operator (Air) may be called upon to transmit control signals and the only way to ensure perfection is by constant practice.
In this connection, it is pointed out that the Group exercise is an ideal medium for improvement of morse (although not even a whisper of control code must be allowed to pass through the other), and during the coming month the exercise frequency will be closely watched.
Signals Leaders, get this fact thoroughly instilled into your flock – “The ultimate success or failure of future operations may depend on the ability of a Wireless Operator to send or receive signals”. Display it in your training room, convert it into morse symbols, give morse tests regularly each week for we have reached a stage in the conflict where every minute spent in training counts one hundred fold in the air.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following is a combat report from 619 Squadron for the night of 22/23 April:-
“The first indication was a contact by W/Op. on Visual Monica Mark V at 1,800 yards… E/A dropped back out of gunner’s sight and W/Op reported it 800 yards astern down… E/A broke away to starboard and disappeared from gunner’s sight, W/Op again reported E/A 1100 yards, closing slowly…E/A disappeared and was reported once again by the W/Op.”
The outcome of this combat was one JU. 88 probably destroyed. Sgt. Brady, Wireless Operator (Air) deserves the highest praise for his reporting.
You see, it can be done, and when handled in the proper manner not only SAVES YOUR AIRCRAFT but probably destroys a Hun, which reduces the total that can be put in the air against you on the following operation.
Once again, there is only one path to take to success, and that path is labelled TRAINING. Constant practice with your Early Warning devices will pay handsome dividends.
Points for Signals Leaders to include in their “daily ration” to the Section:-
(i) Spare Groups No.12 and 15 in CD.0250.
(ii) X114 and X623 are still being used by some careless operators.
(iii) Log keeping could improve (we have seen some good logs this month).
(iv) More practice – or has that been mentioned somewhere before?
F/O Cook, D.F.M., has gone to No.9 Sqdn., as Signals Leader.
F/Lts Gronow and Chambers, D.F.C. are the Signals Leaders of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons respectively, who are to be congratulated in accepting such a sudden change of procedure and dovetailing into the 5 Group system with the minimum of trouble.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
Facts and Figures about Failures
Out of a total of 2034 operational sorties during the month, 34 Signals failures were reported. Although these represent an increase over last month’s figure, this can be attributed almost entirely to the rise in Category 4 failures (miscellaneous). It is again stressed that Category 4 failures are most unsatisfactory. Most of the failures in this Category are of the type “Equipment reported u/s. O.K. on ground test. No fault found.” Every effort must be made to pin down any reported failure to some definite cause.
An investigation into failures in this Group over the past year reveals some interesting results. Apart from an unfortunate month in February, the percentage of failures shows a slight decrease over the year. This unfortunate February figure coincides with a large percentage of miscellaneous failures as well as a large percentage of T.1154/R.1155 failures. Category I (Equipment) failures show a general tendency to rise during the year. The other categories (2 and 3) have a see saw effect and no general conclusion can be made.
Intercom. failures over the year show a pronounced tendency to decrease, while T.1154/R.1155 failures show a corresponding pronounced increase. The reason for the former can be put down to the energetic drive which Signals Officers have kept up in their Squadron Maintenance Sections against this type of fault. The reason for the latter is not hard to find. During the past year the W/T installation has come into its own again and is an essential piece of equipment for the success of current operations. Whereas in the past unserviceability of the of the main W/T installation may have gone by unnoticed, now it cannot escape report.
[Underlined] THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH…. [/underlined]
Authority has finally been given for the removal of S.D.A. equipment from all Lancaster aircraft in 5 Group. This event has fortunately coincided with the partial introduction of V.H.F. (T.R.1143) installation. Command have agreed in principle that the fitting of V.H.F. is a necessity for the success of the type of operation now being undertaken by 5 Group, and every endeavour is being made to find sufficient equipment to fit all 5 Group squadrons. Careful thought has been given to the possibility of utilising the S.B.A. connectors as a small contribution to ease the very tight V.H.F. equipment production. The only small saving envisioned is the main receiver aerial and lead in; the length of the aerial will, of course, have to be shortened.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Last month saw a great improvement in the serviceability of all Radar equipment. However, before anyone relaxes and sticks his chest out, it should be remembered that the advent of warm, dry weather was a contributory cause. In addition, many sorties have been at lower altitudes than usual, which would eliminate many of those non-reproduceable faults.
(Continued on page 6, col.1)
Then and Now – and how!!
[Underlined] Then [/underlined] In Ancient times, the D.S.O.
Performed his duties staid and slow.
He did his routine work by day,
And dozed his duty nights away,
Untroubled save for threats of violence
‘Gainst those who busted wireless silence!
[Underlined] Now [/underlined] The aethor’s full of legal dope
Which we receive, (at least we hope!).
It’s also full of surplus dits
Transmitted by the brainier twits;
While brighter souls – misguided clots –
Originate redundant dots!
Amendments to a basic plan
Are never ending, and unman
The D.S.O. who, frantic, chases
Vital gen in awkward places;
And rubs – with bitter rueful tear –
His Port, or Telephonic, Ear!
Poor chap, how like a sponge his brain,
Which, like a sponge, he’ll learn to squeeze;
And fill it daily once again
With brand new gen – with practiced ease!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. APRIL, 1944. NO.21 PAGE 5.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from Page 8, col.3)
Having however, realised the existence of those contributory causes, it is possible to say that a considerable increase in serviceability was due to more efficient maintenance and manipulation. It is sincerely hoped that this improvement will continue.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 767 sorties was flown with H.2.S, with 99 defects for a serviceability rate if 87.87. This is an increase of 10% over March. With an extra effort, and the weather on our side it could be made over 90% in May.
There has been a noticeable drop in filament transformer failures, largely due to the weather and height conditions. It is not expected that we will see the end of filament transformer breakdowns until the new type is introduced. The same is true for the 2000v condensers.
The expansion of H 2 S training in Conversion Units should go a long way towards eliminating the alarming number of manipulation failures. Manipulation and maintenance failures can be eliminated by constant training.
The arrival of 83 and 97 Squadrons has given us a taste of equipment to come. These Squadrons have a few Mark III sets and every one is very pleased with their performance. To date, the serviceability of the equipment is 92.8% which is very satisfactory for a new set. In this connection a debt is owed to 8 Group for having pioneered so well and eliminated most of the teething troubles. We can now look forward to a general changeover to Mark III with confidence in our ability to maintain and use it.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond was 86% serviceable, an increase of 8% over March. This increase is of little value of W/Ops are not fully trained in the use of this equipment. The necessity for the Navigator – W/Op co-ordination cannot be overemphasised. Efforts have been made to reduce the minimum range below its present 600 – 800 yards. These have been unsuccessful, but it is believed the “back room boys” are now on the right track, so an answer should be forthcoming soon.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
As usual, Gee is top man when it comes to serviceability. In 96.5% of sorties, Gee was 100& serviceable. This reflects credit on both maintenance personnel and navigators, as it is an increase of 1.2% over last month. Gee could be made almost 100% serviceable; those last few percent are hard to get, but keep trying. The next few months of dry weather should give ample opportunity to break all records.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK IIIA [/underlined]
The expression “Ever Upwards” could be fittingly applied to Mark IIIA serviceability. This Group has watched Monica grow from an idea to a headache when the word “Switchmotor” nearly drove a Radar mechanic mad, and now to a reliable and efficient tail warning device. April serviceability was 91.6% out of 534 sorties, an increase of 1.3% on March.
An examination of combat reports provides innumerable examples of Monica’s capabilities in the hands of a trained operator. The fitting of 10 aircraft at 5 L.F.S. should relieve squadrons of a great deal of preliminary training.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK V [/underlined]
Another 5 Group “baby” (Lulu to some) is growing up, after a rather shaky beginning. Out of 299 sorties flown, 259 were trouble free for a serviceability rate of 86.7% - an increase of 5%. Now that the initial teething snags are over, it should be possible to make Mark V follow the footsteps of IIIA and push serviceability to 90%.
TACTICS
[Underlined] PRECISION ATTACKS [/underlined]
The big step made this month towards perfection of target marking, with its detailed methods of target illumination, initial marking, assessing, backing up, and controlling the force, although introducing many new ideas and problems, has brought little change in basic tactics. Indeed more attention than ever must be directed to tactics, particularly to precise orders and instructions given out for each operation. Special attention must be paid to timing and track keeping, adherence to allocated heights, compliance with instructions from the Controller and an exact knowledge of the marking method. These are dealt with separately.
[Underlined] TIMING AND TRACK KEEPING [/underlined]
The force employed on each target is now normally very much smaller than that in the past. This means that greater accuracy is needed in timing and keeping on track. It also means that if you stray a few miles off track with force of 150 aircraft or less, you are more likely to be singled out by G.C.I. than if you stray the same distance with a force of 800aircraft. Timing is vital. Only a limited number of target markers are dropped, and unless all aircraft are ready to bomb on time, these may be obscured by smoke or blown out by the bombs that drop before yours, and in any case may be difficult to locate.
[Underlined] HEIGHT BAND [/underlined]
The allocation of height bands to Bases, which means that each crew must fly at a given height, has been introduced for several reasons and entirely for your own protection. Firstly, it is intended to protect the force against a collision risk, mainly in the target area, where it may be necessary to do dog legs. Secondly, as a countermeasure against barrage flak. The Hun must now put up the same number of rounds into a very much larger area than before, thus decreasing the chance of individual aircraft being hit. Thirdly, combined with extremely accurate timing, the length of the stream can be very much shorter, and therefore less liable to interception by radio controlled fighters. To achieve the full advantage of this scheme, it must be accompanied by a drive by each Captain to make sure that Window is always thrown out correctly, particularly OVER THE TARGET AREA. If this is done, then there is no reason why crews at the lower heights need have any concern. It is, however, their duty to tighten up the normal crew search procedure and to be aware of fighters which may attack from above.
[Underlined] CONTROLLER’S INSTRUCTIONS [/underlined]
It is essential to comply strictly with the Controller’s instructions throughout the attack, and his decisions should never be questioned in the air. A wrongly timed load of incendiaries dropped whilst the Mosquitos are examining the roof tops to assess the marking, may upset the whole routine and possibly divert the main weight of the attack.
[Underlined] TARGET MARKING METHODS [/underlined]
All crews must be quite clear before leaving the briefing room of the colour of the spot-fires to be used, and the details of the controlling code. It doesn’t pay to be doubtful after you have taken off. You must be ready to carry out orders given over the target without hesitation.
(Continued in col.2)
TACTICS (Continued from Col.3)
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The fruits of good training in tail warning devices are borne out by the following Combat Report. Each month there are many similar instances of fighters which have been beaten off because the correct drill has been carried out. Each month there are also instances of fighter damage sustained, and the fighter that did it is not picked up until after the attack. It pays to practice the reporting code at least once a day!
“First indication was contact by W/Optr. on Visual Monica Mk.V, 1,800 yards, Port Quarter down. Pilot altered course and E/A followed and closed in to 800 yards. W/Optr. ordered corkscrew to Port, and at the same time E/A opened fire and scored hits on tail unit on Lancaster “G”. R/G sighted E/A at 500 yards, Port beam down 30° and opened fire. E/A fired again and missed Lancaster. W/Optr. reported E/A closing in slowly and R/G sighted it at 500 yards astern level. R/G opened fire and E/A broke away to Starboard Quarter up. Hits claimed on E/A which disappeared from Gunner’s sight. W/Optr. again reported E/A on starboard quarter up at 1,100 yards and closing slowly. Rear and Mid-Upper Gunners sighted E/A simultaneously at 500 yards, Starboard Quarter level. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits on E/A which broke away at 300 yards, diving to Port Quarter down with smoke pouring from both engines.”
The Station Commander’s comments are self-explanatory: “I consider that Mark V Monica saved this crew. The Wireless Operator’s commentary was excellent, and the crew co-operation of a very high standard.”
FLYING CONTROL (Continued from page 15)
play a part in the final choice. From the condition of the airfield right down to such small items as the cleanliness of the flare path party room will be reviewed, so if you want to top the bill S.F.C.O’s, start cracking the whip NOW.
[Underlined] BLIND LANDING EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
It has been decided by this Group to remove all S.B.A. equipment from operational aircraft and it is hoped that in the not too distant future other and better means will be introduced. The first piece of equipment which we hope to get is a P.P.I. which will be installed in the watch tower and on which will be indicated the positions of all aircraft in the circuit.
Other equipment such as Radar Landing Beam, coupled with a Radar G.P.I. Radar Homing Beacons will all follow in due course. These will naturally give Flying Control Officers more work and more responsibilities but with the increased safety of aircraft this work and the short training required will be well repaid.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
April has been a most satisfying month for the bombing crews of 5 Group. Numerous precision attacks have been carried out with a great measure of success. The front pages of the Daily Press made public the achievements of 5 Group when they printed the after-bombing photographs of the marshalling yards at JUVISY, South of Paris. Equal success rewarded the attacks at TOURS and LA CHAPPELLE. The raid on MUNICH was successful, and a fair measure of success resulted from the attacks on BRUNSWICK and SCHWEINFURT. Finally, further small factories near OSLO, BORDEAUX and CLERMONT FERRAND are now devastated.
[Underlined] HOW HAS ALL THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? [/underlined]
Firstly, of course, most credit is due to the marking success of 54 Base. The next main contribution to the Group’s success has been the intense practice bombing carried out by the squadrons for the last year.
Owing to the very limited time available for bombing training at Conversion Units the final co-ordination of the bombing team has to be carried out on the squadrons. Much credit is due to the Conversion Units for their efforts, and particular praise is due to the Lancaster Finishing School who have elevated the importance of crew practice bombing to the extent of averaging between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in all bombing exercises over the last three months!!!
However, the crews are inexperienced with both aircraft and bombsight on arrival in the squadrons and intensive training is essential to bring them into line with the precision our operations require.
[Underlined] THE MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT [/underlined]
This bombsight has proved its worth. Although it is by no means a perfect sight, it is true that provided it is expertly maintained by the Instrument Sections and carefully handled by the Air Bombers, it can put bomb loads on to a target.
Air Bombers should make sure that their bombsights [underlined] are [/underlined] serviceable. It is the most important individual item of equipment that your aircraft carried, and as such should be the most carefully maintained. Its best test is on the practice bombing range – 6 bombs aimed accurately on different headings should produce a CLOSE GROUP. If not, then SOMETHING is wrong – report it to the instrument section – help them to find out what is wrong and then test it again. It may not always be possible to get this test exercise in the air – if not you must do the next best – carry out the exhaustive N.F.T. check.
In every P.R.U. picture there are sticks off the main concentration – it is almost certain that these sticks are wide because they were aimed with an unserviceable bombsight – are they yours? Were you absolutely certain that on Juvisy, La Chappelle, Tours, Brunswick, Munich or Schweinfurt, your bombsight was functioning correctly – when did you last do practice bombing with it – did you give is a thorough check during your N.F.T. or Ground Check? Did you??
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined]
O.R.S. at Bomber Command have conducted a painstaking analysis of 5 Group’s practice and operational bombing. They report that
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING [/underlined]
(ERRORS IN YARDS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training achievements by Squadron and Conversion Units]
[Underlined] THE BEST RESULTS FOR APRIL. [/underlined]
In previous months all crew errors at 20,000 ft. of less than 150 yards were listed in this column However, in April [underlined] 103 [/underlined] such results were obtained and it is therefore impossible to record them all. The crew errors of less than 100 yards are shown this month but it is confidently expected that in future space will only permit inclusion of results of less than 75 yards. It is possible – the list below proves it – therefore it must be done!!!
Squadron or Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 ft
9 S/Ldr. Keir F/Sgt. Coates P/O. Lewis 54 yards
44 F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 99 yards
49 F/Lt. Adams F/Sgt. Underwood S/Ldr. Evans 84 yards
F/O. Edwards F/O W. Smith F/Sgt. Cavanagh 83 yards
50 P/O. Lundy F/O. Bignall F/Sgt. Jordan 90 yards
P/O. McFarlin Sgt. Ball Sgt. Elliott 75 yards
F/O. Botha Sgt. Thompson F/O. Bishton 95 yards
S/Ldr. McLeod Sgt. Price F/Lt. Cunningham 80 yards
61 P/O. Ascott F/Sgt. May F/O. Ward 98 yards
F/O. Jeavons Sgt. Graham F/Sgt. Dow 93 yards
F/O. Paul P/O. Cook P/O. Griffin 40 yards
W/Cdr. Stidolph F/O. Aley F/O. Dyer 71 yards
F/Sgt. Woolnough F/O. Ravenscroft F/O. Haggerstone 71 yards
467 F/Lt. Marshall F/Sgt. Borman F/O. Easton 96 yards
619 P/O. Roberts F/Sgt. DeViell F/Sgt. Lott 43 yards
P/O. Saunders F/O. Rosenfield F/Sgt. Greacen 84 yards
630 F/Lt. Roberts F/Sgt. Jeffery F/Sgt. Davies 75 yards
S/Ldr. Calvert F/Sgt. Hogg F/O. Beaudoin 95 yards
Sgt. Mallinson Sgt. Pomeroy Sgt. Nassau 73 yards
F/O. Joblin F/O. Beeson F/O. Lambton 80 yards
1654 F/O. McLaughlan Sgt. Leeson F/O. Phillips 90 yards
F/Sgt. Pethick Sgt. Wallace F/O. Baldwin 82 yards
P/O. Richards Sgt. Buckby Sgt. Fazackerley 93 yards
F/O. Long F/O. De Sautels Sgt. Thomas 88 yards
1661 Sgt. Marsh Sgt. Carr ? ? 98 yards
5 LFS F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 98 yards
617 F/O. Knights F/Sgt. Bell ) The best two 49 yards
S/Ldr. Munro F/Lt. Astbury ) exercises 53 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
APRIL has produced the first maximum entry for the Competition since its inception in June, 1943. Some excellent results have been submitted and hearty congratulations are due to 61 Squadron for their outstanding exercises. The results are as follows:-
PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS
1st 61 Squadron – 55 Yards 1st 50 Squadron – 59 Yards.
2nd 619 Squadron – 63 Yards 2nd 61 Squadron – 84 Yards.
3rd 49 Squadron – 71 Yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 96 Yards.
4th 50 Squadron – 80 Yards 4th 630 Squadron – 98 Yards
5th 44 Squadron – 81 Yards 5th 463 Squadron – 111 Yards.
6th (630 Squadron – 90 Yards 6th 44 Squadron – 125 Yards.
(106 Squadron – 90 Yards 7th 57 Squadron – 136 Yards.
8th 207 Squadron - 101 Yards 8th 467 Squadron – 141 Yards.
9th 9 Squadron – 112 Yards 9th 49 Squadron – 152 Yards.
10th 463 Squadron – 116 Yards 10th 106 Squadron – 163 Yards.
11th 467 Squadron – 125 Yards 11th 9 Squadron – 167 Yards.
12th 57 Squadron – 135 Yards 12th 207 Squadron – 188 Yards.
Group Captain Butler (R.A.F. Dunholme Lodge) produced a token cup to celebrate 44 Squadron’s victory in March. It is hoped that 44 will pass on the token to 61 Squadron.
It is noteworthy that the three Squadrons of 52 Base are all in the first five.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Only two entries were received this month:-
1st F/Lt. FARARA (630 Sqdn) – 85 yds.
2nd F/Lt. McDONALD (61 Sqdn) – 160 yds.
Congratulations F/Lt. Farara!!
(Continued from Page [sic]
our errors on both are similar – that means that 5 Group Bombing Teams achieve substantially the same results on German targets that they obtain at Wainfleet, Epperstone, Owthorpe and Bassingham Ranges, therefore, it merely remains to improve our results on the “home” ranges in order to obtain more hits on the “away” targets.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 106 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Wake DFC) reports that their descent from top position in the Bombing Competition is only temporary and is due to their best crews finishing about the same time. Other Squadrons are warned that 106 intend to be back at the top by the end of May.
[Underlined] 44 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Lowry) have constructed an effective Mk.XIV mock-up as follows:-
1. No suction used – Gyros are counter-balanced in Sighting Head and Computor.
2. All electric motor is used to obtain pressure.
3 Airspeed and Height operation is obtained by connecting two external sylphan tubes to the static and pitot heads of Computor Unit. Attached to sylphan tubes are adjustable thumb screws to enable airspeed and height indicators to be carried throughout their range.
This go ahead Bombing Section have also introduced the use of Navigator’s Log Books (an idea borrowed from 5 L.F.S Syerston) in which are posted all permanent information such as Bomb T.V’s Conversion of True to Indicated Wind speed tables, etc. and is also used to carry target maps and operational bomb load instructions.
[Underlined] 1661 Con. Unit. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Brewer, DFC.) have completed the installation of Mk. XIV bombsight complete, in the A.M.B.T. A really first-class job by all concerned!!!
[Underlined] 61 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. MacDonald) Competition winners for April, report that W/Cdr. STIDOLPH and crew set the pace with a Crew Error of 71 yds. This aroused competitive spirit to a marked degree in the Squadron. The following result was obtained:-
Crew Error ar 20,000 ft. – 40 yards
Navigator’s Error – 25 yards
Pilot & Air Bomber’s Error – 37 yards
The crew were:- Pilot – F/O PAUL
Air Bomber – P/O COOK
Navigator – P/O GRIFFIN
[Underlined] 9 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DFC.) reports the following excellent method of plotting crater positions from night photographs.
Plot the centre of the photograph on tracing paper pinned on to the target illustration. Mark the heading accurately from the compass rose on the tracing. Calculate distance between centre of the bombing photograph and centre of bomb craters commencing with position of bomb and flash release. The distance from this position to the centre of the photograph is the ground speed of the aircraft in feet per second multiplied by the flash setting; a deduction being allowed for the 5° aft tilt of the camera.
Forward travel of the bombs can be noted in A.P.1730A.Vol.1. to which must be added or subtracted the distance due to the wind component.
Plot this distance forward along track on the tracing paper and the approximate position of the centre of the stick is recorded. The stick length is known and should be drawn to scale. This method if accurate provided that:-
(i) the aircraft maintains heading and attitude from bomb release to explosion of flash (this can be checked by study of pre-bombing frames on the film)
(ii) There is only a small error due to cross trail - allowance can be made for this if necessary.
9 Squadron have found that their plots using this method are accurate to within 100 yards by subsequent comparisons with P.R.U. photographs.
[Underlined] 617 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/L Astbury, D.F.C) reports the following outstanding exercise:-
F/L Clayton, Pilot, F/O Watson, Air Bomber, carried out an application exercise from 20,000 ft. And averaged 73 yards. Two of the six bombs were DIRECT HITS!!
[Underlined] “G”N” [sic] FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
(I) [Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] – plotted 5,492 bombs aimed by 1,044 aircraft during April. Thus in one month 28 tons of practice bombs have been dropped at this range.
(ii) [Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] – plotted 990 bombs aimed by 200 aircraft.
(iii) [Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] – plotted 916 bombs aimed by 147 aircraft.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. What would happen to the Mk. XIV Bombsight if the Port Inner engine had to be feathered?
2. How would you use the Quadrant Plate and Pointer at 13,000 feet?
3. How could you jettison a load of incendiaries “SAFE” with reasonable certainty?
4. If the Pilot operated the Jettison toggle what would happen to your Jettison bars and what extra action is necessary to put them back to “SAFE”?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Abbott [/underlined] is now Bombing Leader at 49 Squadron. It is noted that 49 moved from hitherto unplaced position in the Competition up to [underlined] 3rd [/underlined] in April.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Stoney, DFC. [/underlined] (1660 Con.Unit) has moved to 97 Squadron for his 2nd tour of operations. Good Luck!
[Underlined] F/O Lowans, DFM. [/underlined] has moved from 49 Squadron to 54 Base where he is attached for Bombing Leader duties.
[Underlined] F/O Tibbs (207 Squadron) [/underlined] obtained “B” category on No. 79 Bombing Leaders Course.
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (619 Squadron) [/underlined] and F/O Martins (106 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on No. 80 Course.
[Underlined] P/O Ball, DFM. (1660 Con. Unit) [/underlined] has been attached to Headquarters, Bomber Command for Bombing Analysis duties.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place in H2S training during the month, the most notable being:-
(i) H2S training has been expanded at the Conversion Units to cover 12 crews per course, to meet increased demands of the squadrons.
(ii) To standardise training throughout the Group, a Ground Training Syllabus has been issued outlining the minimum amount of ground training to be carried out by H2S crews, whether trained on squadrons or Conversion Units.
(iii) Greater emphasis is being placed on the Navigational aspect of H2S to increase further the reliability of fixes and winds obtained.
A concentrated drive is being made by all Instructors to improve D.R. navigation by H2S, to ensure that failures due to lack of confidence and inability to interpret the P.P.I. are things of the past. The tendency to slur over H2S navigation must be overcome as a successful H2S bombing run is largely dependent on a correct navigational approach to the target. This does not mean however that blind bombing is to be relegated to a mere fraction of the training time; on the contrary a large part of training can be devoted to blind bombing technique when crews are able to navigate accurately by H2S and ensure that the target is reached at the correct time.
Manipulation failures still continue to be reported and every effort must be made by operators to prevent such failures being attributed to their neglect. Now that the Air Bomber is required to sit in the navigator’s compartment and manipulate the H2S equipment, manipulation failures should be on the downward path. Two heads are usually better than one and with the list of H2S faults and remedies, one of them should at least have some knowledge of the symptoms and their correction. The impression conveyed is that many of these manipulation failures are due to lack of understanding of the equipment. The Technical Radar Officer is always willing to part with “gen” providing questions are asked. Don’t be afraid to worry these officers because in the long run by asking questions about your equipment you are probably saving their time and yours.
Leica cameras are now being used to photograph the P.P.I. on training flights and several remarkable prints have been obtained. particularly [sic] on Edinburgh and London. Two squadrons are now equipped and it is eventually hoped to obtain further cameras for the remainder. With the advent of P.P.I. photography blind bombing can be carried out irrespective of cloud cover and accurate results obtained. Much information can also be obtained on the definition of built up areas and it is hoped eventually to relate individual bright responses with definite structures in these built up areas. It is therefore essential that the camera operator fills in the photographic interrogation report in a concise and accurate manner, enabling much valuable information to be obtained for use of H2S crews on future operations.
The results of the blind bombing competition have now been received and are published below. All crews who participated are to be congratulated on the excellent results obtained.
[Underlined] Final Order Captain Squadron Av. Error. in miles. [/underlined]
1 P/O Rogers 630 .33
2 F/S Canever 57 .38
3 P/O Manning 44 .42
4 F/L Smith 57 .46
5 P/O Ross 57 .46
6 P/O Higgs 44 .48
7 F/O Bayley 57 .49
8 F/L Healy, DFC. 49 .60
9 F/O Penman 106 .64
10 P/O Shinn 49 .65
11 P/O Jones, J. 49 .66
12 F/O Thomas 57 .87
13 F/L Kellaway, DSO. 630 1.12
14 F/L Roberts, DFC. 630 1.15
One point arising out of blind bombing on H2S which has been noticeable on operations during the last month is that many H2S operators who claim to mark blind are unduly influenced by the markers showing a lack of faith in the instrument. Complete confidence can only be built up by sufficient training in which advantageous use should be made of the synthetic trainer.
Talking about synthetic trainers, East Kirkby have introduced a modification to the trainer which gives correct crystal current movement and a tuning position, thus enabling operators to practice manipulation on the trainer. It is hoped to introduce this modification to other trainers in the Group as soon as the technical details are settled.
This month we welcome 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons into the Group. They have brought with them new equipment and methods and it is felt that as pioneers in H2S much can be learnt from them. It is hoped that all H2S Instructors will take the opportunity of visiting these squadrons and utilising the information gained to the benefit of their respective units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee range has improved considerably during the month and many navigators obtained fixes over targets attacked. However, there is still a tendency to neglect Gee when jamming appears.
Some navigators had opportunities of using the new North Eastern chain this month with gratifying results, many fixes being obtained further than 8° East, and off chart coverage. Providing navigators continue to give reports on the reception they receive outside the limits of the present lattice charts, something can be done to produce additional charts.
Coding has not caused any confusion, and the blinking of the “A” pulse appears to have been a success. There is one point, however, which must be borne in mind by all navigators and wireless operators regarding the use of coding in distress signals. All fixes passed for transmission during distress procedure must give the true lattice line values and therefore the coding figures must be deducted by the navigator from the indicator readings prior to passing the fix to the Wireless Operator. Watch this or you will be plotted miles away from your true position.
Manipulation failures are still too high and these can be overcome only by constant practice in setting up and correction of faults. Many navigators to whom manipulations faults have been attributed are still changing over alternator plugs with the set switched on resulting in fuses being blown. When changing the R. F. Units or alternator plugs, Gee must be switched OFF.
The following is an extract from a report on Gee which should be of interest to all navigators:-
“There seems to be a popular idea with navigators that XF’s necessarily give extra range. This is based on the fact that when they were first introduced, they gave extra ranges before the enemy had time to organise counter measures. The main advantage of XF’s is not to give extra range but to make the enemy spread his jamming over more than one frequency, tending to make it less intense on any one frequency”
Another point is that many navigators are using stud settings and RF Units which have not been detailed for the operation in question. There is even a case this month of a navigator using a chain which was not detailed, and he claimed far greater range though admitted the fixes were unpotable.
(Continued on page 14, col.2)
Link Trainer
The nil returns for 630, 617 and 627, and the very low return for 57 Squadron were due to the absence of Link Trainers at East Kirkby and Woodhall. Machines were, however, installed at these Stations at the end of the month and it is hoped these Squadrons will make up the deficiency by an increased effort next month. A revised Link Trainer Syllabus is being drafted and should be available to Units by the middle of the coming month. The amount of Link done on the squadrons still warrants improvement and it is hoped that the new Syllabus will assist in this.
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron and Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoons]
April, and the first few days of May, saw the last of the two Group Competitions – the Lancaster Seven-a-Side Rugger Trophy, and the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] The Lancaster Seven-a-Side Competition [/underlined] has had a very mixed reception. Although designed on a Group inter-squadron basis, to include every crew in each Squadron, and having a system of points that favoured squadrons fielding the greatest number of teams, no squadron outside 53 Base even began the competition. But within 53 Base it was an amazing success. 86 teams took part, and the resulting increase in fitness, and the keenness that developed, fully repaid the efforts of A/Cdre. Hesketh who originated the competition. Next season this is going to be one of the Rugger high-lights, with a smashing Boxing Day final meeting of all the squadron finalists, followed by “noggins for all” round “Ye Olde Yule Logge”.
[Underlined] The Matz Soccer Cup. [/underlined] Coningsby crowned a successful soccer season by beating Winthorpe 2 – 0 in the Matz final on the Lincoln City ground on 6th May. In their semi-final game, Coningsby met the Group “giants” – Scampton – at Waddington, and emerged successfully after a terrific duel. Winthorpe had to play three games with Metheringham before they got to the semi-final stage. Then they defeated Skellingthorpe 3 – 2, after being 2 goals down with only twenty minutes to go. The final was worthy of the competition, and produced a clean, hard fought duel, perfectly even in the first half, but with the Coningsby forwards more dangerous than their opposites in the second. Winthorpe goalie and backs are to be congratulated on their fight, they certainly kept the flag flying. Coningsby’s first goal came from a penalty, their second from a beautifully placed header into the corner of the net in classic “corner kick” style. Coningsby were minus their professional left winger, Colinridge, but his successor ably filled the bill, and the forwards were presented with many openings by a clever half back division. After the game, Mrs. Cochrane presented the cup in the stand, and the A.O.C., who had been a delighted spectator, congratulated the teams in the dressing rooms on their splendid show. Later the teams had tea together in Lincoln, and later again the Cup was christened with the traditional quart of “old and mild”, we hope.
[Underlined] The Wines Rugger Trophy. [/underlined] Dunholme are hot on the scent of this “pot”, and it will take a good side to stop them. Winthorpe are in the remaining semi-final with Waddington. It is proposed to polish off the semi-final and the final before the 14th, leaving King Willow in peaceful possession.
[Underlined] 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. [/underlined] East Kirkby reached the final by beating the redoubtable Swinderby on their own ground. It now remains for Metheringham to play Waddington and the winner to meet Scampton, to provide the other finalist. This competition must be polished off quickly, before hardening grounds make the ball a little too lively for all but the steel shinned types. This new competition has proved very successful and should provide a most interesting final.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played eight Station matches, during the month, of which they lost only one, 2 – 1 to R.A.F. Ingham. In the semi-final replay of the Lincoln and District Amateur Cup they defeated R.A.F. Wickenby 3 – 0. In the final with Lincoln Rovers on City ground they played magnificently for a 5 – 4 victory, finishing the game with only nine men. Now they are all out for the Lincoln and District League Championship. They have had a most brilliant season.
DUNHOLME had six games, of which they won four. Their two losses were to Scampton – 1 – 5, and to Headquarters 5 Group 3 – 4. Eight inter-section games were played off.
FISKERTON laid out two soccer pitches during the month and gained a considerable impetus in ensuing activity. The station team won its last three Lincoln League games. A combined league and knock-out competition is running with eleven teams competing. 49 Squadron has three teams entered. Two games per day is common; B.A.T. Flight v Echelon have already fought three pointless duels, playing extra time in the last two games. Which shows what a new pitch can do.
BARDNEY have a very strong team, and won six out of their seven April games, including Coningsby and Skellingthorpe, Matz winners and semi-finalists, among their victims. They challenge all comers to do battle! and they are keen, they even cycled to a match – and won!!
METHERINGHAM were unlucky in having three station games cancelled. They played three losing to Digby and 373 Battery, Woodhall, but beating Woodhall Spa 5 – 2. Inter-section fixtures (league and knock-out) produced 14 games, Squadron Armoury, the League champs, being knocked out by R.A.F. Regiment.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is building up steadily, the laying out of a pitch having provided a much needed stimulus. After winning the opening game against Wigsley, 3 – 1, on the new pitch, the Group lost to Skellingthorpe away. Six games yielded four wins, a draw with 93 M.U. the old rivals, and one defeat. In early May, there was much creaking of joints when an officer’s team emerged minus winter woollies and held the Group side to a mere 3 – 1 triumph.
RUGBY
DUNHOLME, finalists in the Wines Trophy, have a powerful side. They defeated Swinderby 8 – 0 in the Wines’ second round, defeated 2 A.A. Command School both away and at home, and Scampton 7 – 6 on the latter’s ground. They are all out for the Wines Trophy and beat Fiskerton 27 – 0 in the semi-final.
METHERINGHAM with a greatly improved side held Waddington to a 9 – 0 victory, and win one and lost one with R.A.F. Digby.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON certainly got in plenty of practice, with eight April games. They won five, knocking Syerston out of the Group Trophy, their victories also included Ingham, Faldingworth and 5 Group. They are in a strong position for the Trophy competition.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is most active. Through the generosity of Swinderby they hold “home” games there pending completion of their Morton Hall pitch. During April they played six games winning two, with one draw. East Kirkby proved their downfall in the Group Trophy. A friendly three game duel with Swinderby has produced one win each and one draw. It is hoped to continue hockey, even if only in inter-section “sixes” throughout the summer.
[Underlined] GENERAL JOTTINGS. [/underlined]
SOFT-BALL 0 Fiskerton have a team in the Lincoln area league. Metheringham are also running a team, playing in a Digby League. 5 Group H.Q. have a willing, if unskilled, nucleus who like to “play ball”. There should be some scope for friendly games within the Group.
TENNIS and BOWLING – Bardney and Metheringham are lucky in having village facilities available, and the games are in full swing.
CYCLING is popular in Bardney. The tough kind with a “cow’s horn” handlebar and a “tail up” racing crouch. Any ex “roadmen” are welcomed to compete in a friendly “25”. A perimeter track is the proposed venue.
CRICKET – The great concern of every captain’s heart is the pitch. The sacred sward where worms and birds both “fear to tread” is THE FOCUS OF ALL CRICKETERS THOUGHTS. May we remind stations that it will be appreciated if they will keep to the date schedule of the Group competition, and not insist on a too Velvet like patch before playing their first round.
WAR SAVINGS
FISKERTON are to be congratulated on another fine effort in National Savings this month. Last month’s increase of 143% to £884 has again been increased by 34% to £1185.
FISKERTON will doubtless be only too pleased to pass on details of their fruitful methods to other Stations – if only to get a bit of competition!!
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) Percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTALS 6309.13.4.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RECORD [/underlined]
The month of April showed a welcome drop in the number of accidents in the Group compared with March, but though there was a large increase in total flying hours, this accident rate did not improve in the same ratio, and is still well below the Group’s best standards.
In all 40 aircraft were damaged during the month, 19 of which were classed as “avoidables”. The remainder were classed as technical failures or obscure. The total of “avoidables” may be subject to alteration as one or two accidents occurring at the end of the month have not been fully investigated and are not included. At the moment they appear to be technical failures or entirely obscure.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE [/underlined]
The details of the avoidable accidents are as follows:-
Ground collision (including taxying) – 6
Swings … 2
Heavy landings …2
Low flying … 2
Overshoots landing … 2
Mid air collisions … 2
Errors of judgement landing … 1
Other errors of judgement … 2
TOTAL … 19
51 Base accounted for 11 and Squadrons 8.
[Underlined] M.T. COLLISIONS & TAXYING [/underlined]
There were again two M.T. accidents this month. In spite of strenuous efforts to stamp out this type of accident it still recurs. Next month [underlined] MUST [/underlined] be “M.T. Accident Free”.
Of the taxying accidents two occurred at night and two during the day. One of the “night” accidents was caused primarily by the pilot neglecting to use an Aldis lamp or taxying light. He struck an obstruction just off the dispersal lead in. In this instance his Flight Engineer was aware of the obstruction but did not warn his captain. Both log books were endorsed in RED.
A Lancaster pilot had just landed landed [sic] and was proceeding round the perimeter, when he told his Engineer to cut the outer engines. The Flight Engineer did so, but opened the starboard outer throttle fully before the propeller stopped turning. The engine roared into life and swung the aircraft off the perimeter. Again, the log books of both pilot and F/E were endorsed in RED.
[Underlined] SWINGS AND HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
Both Swings this month were on take off – one Stirling and one Lancaster.
In the Stirling the pupil pilot swung off the runway, throttled back completely as per drill, but did not stop before his aircraft struck another in dispersal.
The Lancaster pilot ignored all he had ever been told about take-off procedure, handed over his throttles too soon to the Flight Engineer, swung to port at “full power”, over-corrected and broke his undercarriage on a final swing to starboard. His bomb load exploded. Luckily the crew got clear before this happened.
This pilot made another mistake in running up to +4 lbs, 2650 revs. against the brakes.
Heavy landings were of the usual pattern. One occurred at Conversion Unit in unfavourable weather conditions. The other was the result of a Lancaster pilot levelling off too high and not using the engine to correct.
[Underlined] MID-AIR COLLISIONS [/underlined]
There have been four mid-air collisions in the Group in recent months – two in April. There are so many aircraft over this country both by day and night that crews must keep absolutely on their toes at all times. We hear reports of “narrow squeaks” almost every
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash, the immaculate W.A.A.F’s … “and I’d have been all right if that Stirling hadn’t backed into me”
day. The answer, of course, is to maintain a thorough look-out.
Don’t ignore the new “look-out” drill which was sent out this month. There should be no tendency to relax when an aircraft comes back into the circuit after an Op. or any other flight. The danger of collision is always present, and as the pilot is necessarily busy with his cockpit drills, it is up to the rest of the crew, especially gunners, to ensure the safety of the aircraft by keeping up a search and warning the captain of other aircraft.
[Underlined] OTHER INCIDENTS [/underlined]
A pupil pilot in a Stirling was out of line with the runway at 500’ on a good clear night. He landed anyway, off the runway, and knocked over the wind sock.
An Instructor in a Lancaster in showery weather, also found himself out of line with the runway. Instead of going round again he landed off the runway. His speed was excessive and he overshot. A deliberate ground loop placed the aircraft – CAT AC.
A Conversion Unit Mid-Upper Gunner was unloading his guns after a flight. One went off and fired a round into the “fin”. The fin had to be replaced. Gunners! make sure your guns are on “Safe” – all of them.
One Lancaster crashed this month in obscure circumstances. The aircraft was seen coming out of cloud in a high power dive. The tail fell off and then the aircraft broke up. The suggestion at the moment is that the pilot lost control in daylight in cumulo-nimbus cloud. The Accidents Investigation Branch may produce further evidence.
Further proof of the merits of the Lancaster came out this month. An aircraft returned on two engines after being badly shot up. On making an approach at a strange airfield, the pilot could not get his wheels down and went round again from a low height. Unfortunately on his second attempt the pilot overshot on a short flarepath and crashed.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Milne of 50 Squadron displayed exceptional airmanship, and also proved that the Lancaster can be flown on two engines even with a load. He lost both starboard engines while outward bound on ops., at 3,000 feet. Forced to return to Base, he jettisoned the fuel from the inboard tanks and effected a perfect approach and landing still carrying full bomb load.
F/Sgt Young, a pupil at 5 L.F.S., put up a good show which also reflects credit on his Instructor. Shortly after take-off on his first solo in a Lancaster, the starboard tyre burst. F/S. Young was diverted to Woodbridge where he made a successful landing without causing any further damage to the aircraft.
F/Sgt. White and F/Sgt Millikan, the Navigator and Air Bomber of a crew under training at Conversion Unit, set an example which would have done credit to an experienced crew. While on a high level cross country flight, their pilot passed out through lack of oxygen and lost control of the aircraft. F/Sgt Millikan regained control of the Stirling and under the direction of F/Sgt White who assumed the responsibility of captain, they flew the aircraft for 1 1/2 hours back to Base when the pilot had recovered sufficiently to land the aircraft.
The “Plumbers Union” have also distinguished themselves. F/Sgt Gledhill, a Staff Engineer of 1660 Conversion Unit, was a member of a crew of a Stirling. While the aircraft was taxying to dispersal, the port inner caught fire. The Graviner had no effect, and F/Sgt Gledhill promptly removed the engine cowling and extinguished the fire with a hand extinguisher, saving the aircraft from much more serious damage.
(Continued on page 12, col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING [/underlined]
F/Lt. Lucas of Flying Training Command visited the Group during April to advise on the subject of Clay Pigeon Shooting, this Officer is stationed at 54 Group Headquarters, and is responsible for Clay Pigeon Shooting in the I.T.W’s. It was obvious that we are getting little if any training value out of clay pigeon shooting at present, due to the lack of proper ranges and the fact that very few Gunnery Leaders have ever had instruction in the art.
A trap house was constructed at Waddington from sandbags, and seven firing points laid out; this work was done in two days. The lay-out in use at I.T.W’s has two trap houses, but this was not considered necessary for our purpose. A request has been made for an officer from Flying Training Command to be attached to the Group to give advice and instruction to all stations, and the possibility of constructing a sandbag trap house on each station is under consideration. A demonstration of the lay-out at Waddington, makes it obvious that clay pigeon shooting must be done on a properly constructed range under the supervision of an instructor; under these conditions it is an excellent quickening exercise and when gunners are proficient in hitting clays, they have confidence in themselves.
[Underlined] .5 UNDER DEFENCE GUN. [/underlined]
Six squadrons have aircraft fitted with this gun and squadrons have been asked for opinions on the value of the gun on operations, and if H 2 S is preferred to the gun, as the aircraft can obviously only have one or the other. Opinions given to date are not very favourable as several snags have been encountered during the trials carried out so far. With the gunner strapped in his seat it is difficult to follow the gun round on the beam; it is difficult for the gunner to get his head down behind the sight as it tends to push the oxygen mask upwards on the gunners face; and also considerable vibration is experienced on the sight when the gun is fired.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Combats for April numbered 81, resulting in 5 enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed, 1 as probably destroyed and 7 damaged. The maximum number for any one operation was 24 and this was on the 22/23rd April on Brunswick five claims being made on that night; 1 destroyed, 1 probable and 2 damaged. Combats on French targets were few, but these sorites are not to be treated lightly by air gunners and the most vigilant search is to be maintained at all times. Squadrons must include instruction on search during night vision training. Search from the rear turret is difficult as it entails the rear gunner standing or crouching in a most uncomfortable position for short periods to enable him to see below and astern; this must be carried out as the view below is very poor when the gunner is in the seat.
[Underlined] SELF TOWED DROGUES [/underlined]
This practice has not been carried out on the scale it was hoped for, due to a variety of reasons, the main one being the shortage of brackets for attachment to the aircraft. Some Stations have had difficulty in obtaining the material for the manufacture of these items and snags have been met in obtaining the quick release unit. Gunnery Leaders should press for this equipment to enable a consensus of opinion to be obtained on the value of the exercise. Self tow at night with the drogue illuminated is the best step and should present no difficulties when Squadrons are satisfied that the existing equipment is satisfactory.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO. 77 COURSE. [/underlined]
F/O Wyand – 9 Sqdn. – 83.8% - Cat. “B”.
F/O Fisher – 1660 C.U. – 77.8% - Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 14. [/underlined]
F/O Gross – 1660 C.U. – Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 17. [/underlined]
P/O Hammond – 619 Sqdn. – Cat. “A”.
Congratulations to P/O Hammond on obtaining first place on the course.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
49 Sqdn. “M” 20/21st April,1944 FW.190 C.
106 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 ME.109 C.
467 Sqdn. “N” 26th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “B” 29/30th April,1944 FW.190 C.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
619 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 JU. 88 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
44 Sqdn. “Z” 9/10th April,1944 ME.110 C.
207 Sqdn. “A” 22/23rd April, 1944 ME.210 C.
467 Sqdn. “W” 22nd April,1944 ME.109 C.
630 Sqdn. “J” 24th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “T” 24th April,1944 ME.109 C.
97 Sqdn. “Q” 24th April,1944 JU.88 C.
[Table of Air Training for April showing Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS (Contd. From page 11, col.3) [/underlined]
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
A Stirling made a crash landing last month and the only man injured was the rear gunner. He was also unique in that he was the only man not in his crash position.
A Squadron aircraft crashed in poor visibility. There were several diversion airfields available and the pilot was told to stand by and orbit Base. But he thought he’d come down to have a look!! He and two occupants were killed as a result.
Two aircrew baled out over the Wash. They did not take their ‘K’ type dinghy, and so threw away their last chance.
An experienced captain was recently forced to make an early return. His Flight Commander removed his pitot head cover for him when he landed.
Another “gen man” thought it unnecessary to await the ground crew’s signal to leave dispersal. He taxied into the tail of an aircraft in front of him. Both aircraft are CAT A/C!!
A very much sadder and wiser crew landed badly shot up recently. They explained they had lost the Concentration. The pilot had put red on black on one course. Yes it can still happen!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of April was 1635, of these 952 produced plottable ground detail, this increase being due to better conditions and the type of attack. It will be seen from the analysis that the percentage of failures is still excessive with a considerable increase in failures attributed to “no flash” illumination”. [sic]
There can be no doubt that, in the past, many flash failures were passing through as “flash muffled by cloud”, since it is impossible to assess bombing frames exposed by the light from fires on the ground when cloud conditions are 10/10ths. This is no attempt to draw attention to the high percentage of Armament failures; failures, whatever the cause, result in the loss of very valuable information and represent a loss in efficiency.
Photographic and Armament personnel must co-operate with each other to establish the [underlined] real cause [/underlined] of these failures; Type 35 camera controls and photo flash fuse settings must be identical with each other. It is not enough to set the control pointer to the required setting. Make sure that the timing of the control agrees with that indicated upon the setting dial before it is fitted to the aircraft; adjustments can be made to the pointer where necessary.
It is again necessary to stress that once the aircraft have returned from the attack, the production of the photographic results in the minimum period of time is essential to the Air Staff. The majority of the section personnel are aware of this fact, but improvement can be made by better organisation and attention to the following:-
(i) Ensure that everything is ready to commence processing as soon as the first magazines arrive (at one section seven minutes were lost between the time of the first magazine going into the darkroom and the lights being switched off).
(ii) The photographer detailed to receive the film magazine from the aircrew must obtain essential information and pass the first four or six magazines to the processing section in the quickest possible manner. (One section wasted valu-
{Continued on Page 14 Column 3)
[Table of Photographic Analysis Results by Squadron]
TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD MONTH FOR TRAINING BASE [/underlined]
During April, 51 Base flew more hours and passed out more crews than ever before in its existence. The Stirling Conversion Units produced a grand total of 5500 flying hours, and the Lancaster Finishing School a total of almost 1900 hours. The Lancaster Finishing School posted 109 crews to squadrons and 95 crews were posted into the Lancaster Finishing School for Lancaster training.
These results were achieved as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of maintenance personnel and instructional staffs throughout the Base, despite the fact that the first ten days of the month produced little flying owing to bad weather. The operational stations in the Group assisted by providing their airfields for circuits and landings when training base airfields were overcrowded.
With excellent co-operation between this Group and 10 and 12 Fighter Groups, Training Base flew Bullseyes on 18 nights. Crews also took part in Command Bullseyes, including three spoofs over the North Sea which, in addition to providing good D.R. practice for the Navigators, helped divert the enemy’s fighter strength from the operations against enemy centres in France.
The main concern during the month has been burst tyres on Lancasters and Stirlings, and every precaution is being taken to reduce these to a minimum, because it is fully appreciated that the minor mishap caused by a burst tyre can well lead to a serious accident. The overall total of accidents for the Base is still too high, and the staff is pressing forward strongly with an “accident reduction” drive.
The forthcoming expansion in Training Base by which 132 crews are to be produced each month, has led to a revision of the Ground Syllabus and the Flying Syllabus. The revised Flying Syllabus is not yet effective, but will come into operation during May. There has been an expansion of H 2 S training in the two Units at present equipped for this training, and when 1654 Conversion Unit at Wigsley becomes productive, the periodical shortage of H 2 S crews should cease.
AIR SEA RESCUE
It is a very easy thing, when ordered to practice Parachute or Dinghy Drills to go out to an aircraft sit around smoking for half an hour and then report back to the Flight Office “D.C.O.” These drills are the “Safety Drills” and the instinct of self preservation alone should make crews practice them until “Practice makes Perfect”.
Generally speaking parachute drills are carried out more conscientiously than Dinghy Drills, but in recent incidents in this Group it appears that even this drill is not receiving the attention it should. Note the findings of the investigating officer after a recent fatal accident. “It seems doubtful whether the crew had done the amount of parachute drill accredited to them in the “Flight Records”. In other words completed records may save you a lot of bother, but unless the records are true they are valueless and wasteful.
Let us face facts. Even [underlined] you [/underlined] may be shot down and bale-out or ditch some time or other. If you have just a rough working knowledge of the drills, some of the crew will probably save their lives, but, equally probably, some will lose their lives. If you and your crew are word and action perfect in the drill, you will live to fight again, and get a good spell of “Survivors’ leave” into the bargain. Most probably!
Saturday morning had now been set aside as the time when every available crew is to spend at least an hour on these Safety Drills. It should also be regarded as a suitable time to acquaint aircrews with the latest safety equipment and modifications. This period, however, should not be regarded as an excuse for not doing drills at other times. There’ll be the odd occasion when you are elsewhere on a Saturday morning.
One Base has issued instructions that crews are to be ordered at Briefing, from time to time, that they are to do these drills after landing from Operations – when tired and in darkness, when their physical condition is similar to that when facing a real “Bods out” or ditching, or baling our [sic] conditions. This is a very good way of doing things – you get the maximum benefit, as you are already in full flying kit, with the minimum of effort.
In March 36.9% of aircrews in all Groups who ditched in “Home Waters” were saved, while 397 lost their lives. The fact that 73 lives were lost in crews where other members were saved stresses the importance of drills. The Americans are still making better use of your Air Sea Rescue Service than you are.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT (Continued from Page 15 Col.2) [/underlined]
stations in the near future to service the F.N.64 turrets prior to their being returned to Maintenance Units – a step in the right direction at last. All Armament Officers can assist in speeding up this servicing process by ensuring that a hydraulic turret test rig and a complete set of tools are available for the party when they arrive. Don’t leave it until the day the party is expected, and so waste a day collecting the equipment from various dispersed points around the station. Do it now and ensure that the floor space at present cluttered up by these turrets is made available for more important equipment.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
A record number of sorties has been carried out during April and it was pleasing to note that note that the cancellations due to technical defects were: Early Returns .73% - Cancellations .69% - both being very definite improvements.
The number of engine failures which occur and necessitate change of an engine before the completion of its life are not decreasing at the rate we should expect now that a more reliable engine forms the bulk of our holdings. The Merlin 24 from which we expected such high performance is doing its best to produce this performance. It is however handicapped by the fact that paddle-blade propellers and AY/118 constant speed units have invariably been fitted to this type of engine, the results being that instances are occurring of over speeding and the odd case of engine disintegration. Action is in hand to fit modified C.S.U’s and this must go ahead with all possible speed.
The Merlin 28 and 38 still suffer from loss of coolant occasionally, and we still get failures due to fracture of the oil pipe to the dual drive, mainly due to the slow rate at which the modified oil pipe is being supplied.
It is pleasing to see the local improvements which are being carried out by C.T.O’s the improvement of technical sites on the “self help” scheme and the general clean-up and overhaul of equipment.
Although the introduction of a technical adjutant was mainly to allow the C.T.O. to be out amongst the aircraft more, there may be a tendency for the C.T.O’s to leave too much to the technical adjutant. This is a point which must be watched and although it is not the intention to pin the C.T.O. to his office, he must keep a tight control on correspondence, returns and technical reports and keep “au fait” with all leaflets and technical letters issued.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
It is gratifying to note that the maintenance of the Mk.XIV Bombsight improves month by month, as is evidenced by recent photographs of targets after a visit by 5 Group. Ground crews in general share in these achievements, but the instrument repairer deserves a special pat on the back for the hours well spent in tuning and levelling the Bombsights to produce these results.
The same degree of accuracy is unfortunately not apparent in the A.P.I./A.M.U. Cases are still being reported of “racing” of the A.M.I. despite the fitting of Command Modification No. 57. This “racing” can be attributed in most cases to incorrect tension of the relay spring and as no test equipment is yet available the fault cannot be laid at the door of bad maintenance. Efforts are being made to obtain the necessary tension gauges so that this fault can be cured. In the meantime units must make every effort to complete the manufacture of the Coningsby A.P.I./A.M.U. test bench, details of which were forwarded several weeks ago.
April witnessed the introduction of new equipment the responsibility of which rests on the instrument repairer. The most important is the nitrogen installation. It is not necessary to demand the ground charging equipment, but units must advise their Equipment Officer when an aircraft with nitrogen is received so that the necessary steps can be taken to obtain the charging equipment. At the same time the Group electrical officer must also be informed.
The other item of new equipment arriving in aircraft is the Mk.VIII Automatic Control, the introduction of which should ease maintenance problems. The Group servicing van has been round all operational stations to give preliminary instructions on the maintenance of this instrument and courses of three weeks’ duration will shortly become available to those personnel who have already attended the Mk.IV Control course. The question of the inferior luminous markings of the Mk.IA repeater has been brought to the notice of Headquarters Bomber Command, and it is hoped that an improvement will be made shortly.
The Electrical Sections – particularly those in Base major servicing units – continue to do a good job of work, despite the increasing number of modifications in which the Electrician is involved. Further modifications of an operational necessity are on the way, so electrical officers must give all future suggested modifications very serious consideration before submitting them to higher authority, if the electrical sections are not to be overburdened.
A word about Bumph. There appears to be a rooted objection among electrical officers to put pen, pencil or typewriter – if you can get one – to paper. Base and Station electrical officers must realise that it is impossible to get on without a certain minimum of paper work and promptness in replies is essential. If you are asked to reply to a question by a certain date make sure that your reply is one time.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability for Stirling and Lancaster]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV. (Contd. From Page 9 Column 3) [/underlined]
This dangerous habit must cease. Some navigators seem to use R.F. Units and Stud Settings as toys to be changed and switched about to see what fixes they can obtain; the result is incorrect fixes, and chaos. These navigators are playing right into the enemy’s hands, particularly if they obtain signals which do not emanate from our Gee Stations!”
All Navigators must realise the importance of the above points as it is possible that in future several operations per night may be planned with an XF possibility for each operation. If navigators persist in using XF’s which are not assigned to them and phased for their route, there will be multitudes of incorrect fixes, and possibly casualties as a result of careless navigation.
Flight Engineers
In the past the Flight Engineers have been selected from Group I or II tradesmen; having been in the R.A.F. for long periods they gained quite considerable experience of many types of aircraft and engines, and therefore the changeover to their new duties was easy.
To-day we are faced with the problem of having to train pupils who perhaps a few weeks ago, had never seen inside an aircraft. During their training in the early stages, many subjects are taught which would appear to have no bearing on their job as Flight Engineers; this must be done however, so that later in the course, when boost control, hydraulics and pneumatics are explained, the pupil will have the basic knowledge to understand them. This takes time, and as we must produce more and more Flight Engineers, time cannot be spared to train them as Fitters. They are trained as Flight Engineers but perhaps a few corners remain that can be “polished off” by the Flight Engineer Leader.
The Flight Engineer Leader in a Squadron is responsible for training new members until he is satisfied that after a personal check, they can carry out the duties as laid down in A.M.O. A.538/43. He must make them continue their practical training, and whenever possible let them be with the ground crews on Daily Inspections, or any other work on their aircraft. Only in this way will good aircraft familiarisation be gained.
The training to be carried out in Squadrons must consist of Daily and Between Flight Inspections, instructions on the electrical panel, log keeping and engine limitations. The last subject is most important; only last month an early return which could have been avoided was made by a crew in this Group. On this occasion the oil pressure dropped to 50 lbs. per square inch at 20,000 feet, but the temperature remained at 80°C. Engine limitations laid down in A.P. 2062C (Pilot’s Notes) are:-
Oil Pressure minimum 45 lbs. per sq. in.
Oil temp. maximum 90°C.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY (Continued from Page 13 Col.1) [/underlined]
able time in processing a batch of films which had not been exposed, for the simple reason that the bombs had been brought back. This was negligence on the part of the airman who took over the magazines from the aircrew.
The photographic N.C.O. is responsible for the first film analysis and must decide whether it is a success or failure. Despite repeated instructions, many instances still occur where films are sent to this Headquarters as successes when in fact they are failures, and failures which should be classified as successes. This wastes the time spent on correspondence and telephone calls. One N.C.O. stated that it was because everything was required in a rush; this is true. THE AIR STAFF MUST HAVE PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS as soon as they can be produced and in ensuring this there must be no reduction of effort. Once the prints have been despatched, all films should be carefully re-examined, to ensure that no mistakes have been made.
Now that Headquarters, Bomber Command have reduced the amount of photographic printing, an improvement in the printing quality is expected. Faint ground details which could be plotted is often lost through poor processing and printing.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
The expression “unable owing to pressure of work” has become the password for excusing a dirty and untidy bomb dump. A slovenly bomb dump is too often the hall mark of poor workmanship and the effect is cumulative until unstacked empty cases, broken trollies and transporters disposed at random are taken for granted.
It takes little longer during a fusing operation to stock the tail boxes when removing the tails, rather than strew them indiscriminately over a large area; the effort is not great but the resultant tidiness is surprising.
A scene reminiscent of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow can be avoided if only a few men are employed on cleaning up after a fusing detail. If the broken transporters, trollies and liners are not repairable, write them off for scrap metal – the country needs it.
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH [/underlined]
Nearly 7% of the total number of photoflashes carried in April have been classed as flash failure. The classification flash failure is given when:-
(i) There is no indication of illumination on frames 6, 7 and 8 (or 4, 5 and 6 in the old sequence) of the film.
(ii) The fusing wire from the fuse is brought back.
(iii) There is no indication of violent evasive action on any of the bombing frames.
(iv) The camera control is checked and found correct.
(v) The electrical circuit and release slip are found serviceable.
This figure of 7% is excessive and so much higher than any previous month that it must be assumed, as in many cases the same lot numbers were used over two consecutive months, that some of this 7% was, in fact, incorrect fuse setting and bad maintenance. Co-operation with the photographic section can solve this problem.
[Underlined] “J” CLUSTERS [/underlined]
Loading ramps and rollers for 500 lb “J” clusters should be spring cleaned so that the clusters which are now arriving in quantity may be loaded directly on the rollers, thus saving double humping.
[Underlined] SUPPLY [/underlined]
Owing to the present precarious supply position of certain weapons the C.O. and personnel of No.93 M.U. have been called upon to produce stores at a moment’s notice from nowhere. To the credit of 93 M.U. these stores always turn up, but it is realised how much extra work is entailed in meeting a rush demand.
The staff of 93 M.U. are extremely well informed regarding the requirements and difficulties of operational armament, but it is doubted if Armament Officers realise the difficulties of the M.U. who handled nearly 30,000 tons of bombs last month.
It is suggested that Armament Officers could spend a profitable day by accompanying an Austin to the M.U. and see for themselves how large scale humping is organised.
[Underlined] MANIPULATION FAILURES. [/underlined]
A marked increase in manipulation failures has been apparent this month resulting in a large number of bombs and pyrotechnics being returned to base. The more outstanding “boobs” are set out below:-
1. 2 S.B.C’s complete with contents returned to Base – distributor arm fouled by the quadrant peg card. No jettison action carried out.
2. The following stores were returned to Base due to non-[underlined] selection [/underlined]:-
2 x 4.5” photoflashes
2 x 250 lb Target Indicators
2 x 7” Hooded Flare Clusters
1 x 1000 lb M.C.
NO FURTHER COMMENT IS NECESSARY.
[Underlined] FN.64 TURRETS [/underlined]
The turret servicing party is visiting all
(Continued on Page 4 Column 2) [sic]
[Table of Failures by Squadron]
FLYING CONTROL
The high standard of landing achieved last month has been maintained during April. It is significant to note that SKELLINGTHORPE who pioneered this scheme when it was first introduced and in fact, carried out all the trials, have risen to the top of the ladder with an excellent average of 1.85 minutes.
The most outstanding figure for the month, however, is 30 aircraft landed in 36 minutes at Waddington. This is, in fact, the finest performance which has ever been put up within the Group and possibly within the Command. The following are some examples of really first-class performances for the month:-
[Table of Selected Flying Control Sessions by Stations]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
It is hoped to introduce shortly a competition embracing all Flying Control aspects. This will be judged on a quarterly basis and the condition and efficiency of every part of the Station Flying Control organisation will
(Continued on Page 6 Column 2)
[Table of April Landing Times by Station]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
Our brief this month was abundantly clear. With the Allied air offensive continuing almost uninterruptedly on a rising scale against communications targets and airfields, it appeared certain that our own role would be integrated in the common plan to wear down the Western Wall. To this end we have seen during the course of the month a revolution in our bombing technique confirming the undoubted accuracy of low level precision attacks.
The importance of hammering railway targets as a means of reducing the enemy’s capacity to meet a threat from the West was fully recognised. On 10/11th TOURS was effectively attacked, followed by JUVISY and LA CHAPELLE on 18/19th and 21/22nd respectively. The results in each case were impressive. At Tours an exceptional concentration with over 100 hits fell on the track disrupting all communications. A particularly high precedent was established at Juvisy. Here we achieved one of the greatest concentrations of craters yet obtained on a target of this type – the attack almost completely devastating the marshalling yards.
The attack on La Chappelle was no less successful. Damage is severe at the southern end of the Marshalling Yard which sustained the main weight of the attack. Large fires were still burning in the area the day following the raid, and it could be seen that tracks had been severed at several important junctions. The importance which the enemy attaches to keeping his railroads open, and the difficulties which he is experiencing in handling even high priority traffic is perhaps reflected in the fact that some 50000 Germans have now been transported into France to relieve the situation and, furthermore, German branch lines have been torn up to provide new tracks.
This wearing down process is also being applied with particular attention to the Luftwaffe itself, its sources of supply being very seriously threatened by repeated attacks on aircraft factories. On 5/6th, 605 tons of bombs were dropped on four plants at TOULOUSE. The S.N.C.A.S.E. Aircraft Assembly Plant has sustained serious damage to its three main buildings – the assembly plant, component store, and testing shop. At the A.I.A. Works, every building is more or less severely damaged, while the Aircraft Factory buildings are all damaged – amongst those completely destroyed being the components manufactory shop, components store, drawing offices, heat treatment and plate shop. The Montaudran Airfield is now without its three principal hangars, and has suffered damage to other unidentified buildings.
Coupled with the first attack on St. Medard-on-Jalles (reported later) was a raid on the KIELLER Airframe Factory near OSLO – PRU cover is not complete, but the photographs available indicate that damage is considerable in the North Eastern part of the target area, including heavy destruction in the Bayerische Motorenwerke.
It is perhaps interesting to note that following the attack on CLERMONT FERRAND Aulnat Aircraft Factory, the sick bay is almost the only building undamaged. It is open to some doubt as to whether this fact can be accepted as a tribute to our precision bombing, but whatever the position may be in this respect, it is manifest that this Repair Factory will not be available to the enemy for a long time to come.
The attack on the ST CYR Signals Equipment Depot on 10/11th was highly successful – resulting in the destruction of several of the principal buildings in the Depot.
Although the focus of attention was directed on rail centres and other special targets in the occupied zone, this concentration in policy did not imply that other forms of attack would be discontinued; still less that they were conceived independently of the supreme invasion task. In fact four “blitz” attacks were staged during the course of the month. AACHEN was singled out for attack on 11/12th. Throughout the city – particularly to the South and South West, industrial and residential damage has been fairly severe, while the Main Station and sidings, large Passenger Station, Locomotive Sheds, and Goods Depot Shed have suffered heavily. Reconnaissance following our attack on BRUNSWICK on 22/23rd is not complete, but from the photographs obtained, it can be seen that damage is considerable in the business/residential area South of the City Centre, with many hits in the South Eastern marshalling yards. A high measure of success also attended the attack on MUNICH on 24/25th.
[Underlined] RIDER [/underlined]
Until that date this Nazi birthplace had escaped serious damage, but it is now known that the town has suffered its first heavy battering. No interpretation of the reconnaissance photographs is yet available but even to the unpractised eye it is obvious that the target is severely hit. Widespread areas of devastation are apparent in the old city (which is 30 - 40% gutted) continuing in a wide sear from East to West up to and including the Main Railway Station. The Nazi Party meeting place Kreig Ministerium and Prinz Leopold Platz, to mention but a few of the important Municipal Buildings are either destroyed or severely damaged.
Fierce fighter activity was encountered in defence of SCHWEINFURT on 26/27th. Despite this violent reaction, however, the attack was pressed home, resulting in severe damage to all five ball-bearing plants, in particular to the Deutsche Star Kugalhalter where two thirds of the machine shops have been demolished. The adjoining marshalling yards have also sustained damage, and there are many incidents throughout the town.
No less important were our minelaying trips on 9/10th, 18/19th and again on 23/24th. These sorties probably lack the spectacle of a bombing attack, but their sinister loads will doubtless reap a very real contribution in the war harvest.
The culminating stage of the month was in the final raid on 29/30th against the Explosives Works at ST. MEDARD-on-JALLES. A pass had already been made at this same target the previous night, but had been frustrated by unfortunate weather conditions. So with redoubled vigour another attack was launched. On this occasion the weather chose to be our ally, and the opportunity afforded was seized to produce one of the most impressive pyrotechnic displays. For more than half an hour the target was in the throes of a succession of violent explosions. The greatest concentration of the attack fell to the North East of the works area extending across the centre of the works to the western border. A most heartening result and an inspiring conclusion to the month’s work.
The above achievements were contributed by 1950 Lancs and 84 Mosquitos – 88.6% of which were successful in attacking the primary, with 2.5% casualties.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Statistics by Squadron showing Availability, Sorties, Results and Points]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944
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V Group News, April 1944
5 Group Newsletter April 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 21, April 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about process of servicing, gardening, navigation, honours and awards, signals / radar, tactics, air bombing, radar / navigation, link trainer, sports, war savings, accidents, gunnery, training, air sea rescue, engineering, armament, flying control, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-04
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Anne-Marie Watson
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-25
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Tours
France--Toulouse
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
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1944-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Metheringham
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Base Commander [Initials]
Base Int:
V GROUP NEWS V
FEBRUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] * NUMBER 19
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The German night fighters have once again been forced to change their night fighting tactics, and this change has increased the importance of accurate flying, especially as regards airspeeds. Until recently, German fighters were sent to orbit over the city which the German Command thought was the one to be attacked. Owing to the ingenious selection of routes for the Bomber Force these tactics proved a failure and the Germans have now gone over to a new method, which is to give the fighters courses to steer which will intercept the bomber stream.
It is obvious that the greater the length of the stream the greater will be the chances of the fighters coming across some portion of it and it is, therefore, of the utmost importance that that all Captains should maintain the most accurate timing from the concentration point to the target. The aim should be never more than plus or minus 2 minutes from the times laid down. This standard is very far from being reached at present and a proportion fail to achieve better than plus or minus 10 minutes. If some are 10 minutes early and some 10 minutes late the effect is to spread the Lancasters over a distance of 60 miles greater than that planned, i.e. it nearly doubles the length of the bomber stream and increases in this ratio the chances of interception.
Until recently time keeping was beset by many difficulties. Each Navigator was responsible for finding his own wind vectors and from these calculating new ground speeds and E.T.A’s. The majority of aircraft were not equipped with H2S and, therefore, had little chance of finding accurate winds when outside Gee range.
This problem has now been solved by the use of the Command wind broadcast to all aircraft and by the newly introduced moveable T.O.T. In future, provided crews leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered, and fly at the speeds and heights laid down in the Flight Plan, they will arrive at the target at the correct time to commence their attack. Should they encounter winds different from those used for timing the operation, a new T.O.T. based on the new winds will be transmitted by wireless.
Responsibility for time keeping therefore, devolves primarily to the Pilot, who must not only ensure setting course from the concentration point at the right time, but must thereafter keep rigidly to the speeds laid down. In view of the enormous importance which timing has now assumed, a special drive is being undertaken to improve results and to eradicate those errors which still cause aircraft to arrive early or late, or to stray off track.
A report analysing a number of recent operations has been circulated to Squadrons and I hope this will be read by all Captains and Navigators. It shows how apparently trivial mistakes can build up into serious errors and illustrates the need for extreme care and accuracy in every stage of navigation.
Two key points are :-
(i) Captains must leave the concentration point at the exact time ordered.
(ii) They must maintain heights and speeds decided at Flight Planning.
TACTICS
[Underlined] TACTICS AND PLANNING [/underlined]
A new type of attack was introduced this month, whereby the main force and P.F.F. were divided into two forces to attack the same target with an interval of 2 – 2 1/2 hours between zero hours. It is not possible to form conclusions from the limited evidence obtained from the two attacks which were carried out, but two advantages of this scheme are obvious:
(i) P.F.F. Marking of the second phase should be accurate – observation of the location of the first phase M.P.I. providing an opportunity for visual markers to correct any apparent displacement of the attack.
(ii) A carefully timed interval may increase the difficulties of the enemy fighter force, compelling them to refuel either before or during the second phase attack.
Assessment of the results of the Schweinfurt attack, 24/25th February, points to the probable achievement of both these aims. Losses for the second phase were less than the first, although the number of combats was greater in the second phase; the M.P.I. of the attack was in fact nearer the aiming point than the first phase attack. For this type of attack to be successful, however, the temptation to bomb the centre of the fires from the first attack must be strongly resisted, and implicit faith placed in the second phase marking, whether it be coincident with the first attack or some distance away.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
Bullseyes routed North-East towards Denmark have been very helpful to the bomber force on two occasions during the month. Shielding the bombers’ Southerly courses to Schweinfurt and Augsburg, Bullseye aircraft drew many fighters from South Germany to the North, and comparatively low losses on both those night were undoubtedly partly due to this well planned diversion. Accurate timing on the part of Bullseye aircraft is essential however, if they are to simulate a concentrated bomber stream.
It is thought that Units taking part in Bullseyes are not deriving as much benefit from these exercises as is possible. The need for a more precise interrogation of crews into types of manoeuvre taken against fighter and searchlights is obvious. This Headquarters is examining the various fighter and bomber crew reports available, and endeavour will be made shortly to issue a collated summary of interceptions for each Bullseye, for tactical discussions at Stations.
The following incident which came to light a few days ago reflects the general attitude of crews towards Bullseyes:-
A Polish fighter pilot made three attacks on a bomber during a Bullseye exercise, flashing three “kills”. The fact that there was no response from the bomber during any of the attacks aroused his interest and he finally closed right in with landing lamp on, and this revealed – empty mid-upper and rear turrets.
No accusation is made against crews in this Group, but this sort of thing is most discouraging to the fighter boys, and certainly does not stimulate their interest in bomber tactics. More than this, it shows a stupid lack of interest on the part of the bomber crew. Remember that 50% of a bomber crew’s job is to bring the aircraft and themselves back safely to fight another day. This can hardly be expected if gunners throw away the only chance they have of seeing a fighter attack at night, before meeting a real Hun which flashes cannon shells instead of its landing light.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The enthusiasm of Squadrons in Monica and Fishpond training is welcomed, but there is still room for improvement. Wireless Operators must not relax until they are able to interpret the cathode tube from a mere glance. Remember that whilst you are thinking whether to report a blip or not, you can be shot out of the sky. Interpretation and reporting must be immediate and accurate. If you know your drill you can get away with it. Here’s someone who did :-
“At 2127 in the target area Monica indicated a fighter closing rapidly at 1,800 yards. Lancaster corkscrewed at 750 yards. Enemy aircraft then opened fire but tracer went above the Lancaster. Later gunners identified JU.188 at 100 yards range as they fired, tracer ricochetted [sic] off the nose of the fighter. JU.188 claimed as damaged.
[Underlined] Conclusions [/underlined]
(i) The fighter’s burst would obviously have been fatal if the Lancaster had not corkscrewed.
(ii) A standard patter was carried out throughout the attack and a corkscrew was started at the correct range on Monica.
Do [underlined] you [/underlined] know the standard patter and tactics? If not, study 5G/34/Air dated 4th February, 1944 (Appendix “A”) until you talk Monica language in your sleep.
[Underlined] TAILPIECE [/underlined]
The following is quoted without comment with apologies to A.A. Command Intelligence Review :-
“On 24 Feb. according to the Berlin radio, American bombers flew over Switzerland. This radio conversation is then stated to have been exchanged between Swiss A.A. gunners and the USAAF :-
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “Look out, you are over Switzerland.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “If you don’t turn back we shall shoot.”
[Underlined] USAAF [/underlined] “We know!”
(Swiss guns open fire)
[Underlined] USAAF “Your A.A. fire is about 1,000 feet too low”
[Underlined] Swiss A.A. [/underlined] “We know!”
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
Concentration this month was, on the whole, better than last month. Timing with the exception of the raids on LEIPZIG (19/20 February) and SCHWEINFURT (24/25th February) was very good. This is the combined result of the excellent effort of the Windfinders and the good use made of the broadcast w/v’s by all the Navigators.
We still have a long way to go however. Many simple mistakes are being made by Windfinders, e.g. incorrect plotting of air positions, wrong computions, errors made in measuring the w/v, messages wrongly coded, to mention a few. It will be appreciated that if plotting and compution errors are made, incorrect w/v’s will be the result, and therefore, the Senior Met. Officer at H.Q. 5 Group cannot forecast the correct w/v for use of other aircraft. Windfinders have a great responsibility and must make every effort to obtain accurate w/v checks.
The same mistakes are also being made by the rest of the force. A recent O.R.S. report stated that errors in compution are reaching a phenomenal figure. Every effort must be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate this fault. Compution of true airspeeds presents a big problem to many Navigators , the average error is approximately 5 m.p.h. Calculation of courses is another stumbling block, the average error being 2° or 3°. The combination of these errors has an adverse effect on concentration, besides nullifying much of the good work done by the Windfinders. Watch computions and calculations carefully, Navigators. Also check each calculation at least once.
One word about interpolation. The w/v’s broadcast are those applicable to the mean height band. Therefore, if you are at the top or bottom of the band, the broadcast w/v is not accurate for your height. Interpolation is the answer. Consult the Form 2330 and note the forecasted change in the wind speed and then interpolate and apply the correction to the broadcast w/v. There have been instances of the wind speed increasing by 15 m.p.h. for an increase in height of only 2,000 feet.
Many Navigators do not use the broadcast w/v’s correctly. Some do not use the corrected w/v if it is “within a few degrees and a few miles per hour” of the previous forecast w/v. There are still a few Navigators too, who do not seem capable of applying the corrected w/v when it is given to them. A plotting method to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s has been described in A.S.I. Nav/14, issued 14.2.44. All Navigators must make sure they are fully conversant with this method. Any suggestions of criticisms are welcomed.
One final word to Windfinders, you did an excellent job last month, the record achieved being 153 w/v on the night of 15/16th February, a very fine effort. Keep this up!!!
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
Many A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have been issued to the Group during the last month, and we are now in the happy position of having 100% A.P.I’s, though all are not yet fitted.
There is an inherent error in the A.P.I. This is caused by the heating in the Navigator’s cabin. A modification is now being fitted to all A.P.I’s which should reduce the error to less than one percent. It is hoped all aircraft will be fitted with the A.P.I. and the modification by the end of the next moon period.
Con. Units are also being supplied with A.P.I’s; Navigators will soon be arriving at Squadrons fully trained in the use of this instrument.
Trouble is still being experienced when re-setting the Air Position Indicator. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must have a drive on this procedure. Several Squadrons have suggested methods to be adopted when re-setting the A.P.I; any other suggestions will be welcomed.
[Underlined]LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
The present system of log keeping and chart work involves unnecessary duplication of effort. If a Navigator’s chart work is done correctly, less detail is required in the log, and the Navigator can devote more time to his primary object of navigating the aircraft to the target and back to base.
The following entries are considered by some Navigators to be superfluous because the detail already appears on the chart, (a) Position and time of all fixes, pinpoints, D. R. positions and air positions, (b) all w/v’s obtained, tracks made good and position lines.
If these entries were omitted from the log approximately 10 minutes would be saved hourly. Moreover, the Navigator’s attention would not be constantly distracted by having to refer to the log each time a fix, D.R. position etc was obtained. This scheme has been tried successfully by several Navigators in this Group.
All Navigators should consider this suggestion carefully and discuss with the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION “BLACK OF THE MONTH” (No names no Packdrills) [/underlined]
A very good example of what can happen if a Navigator boobs and there is little co-operation in the crew, occurred on a recent sortie in this Group.
The crew in question set course from Base for Position “A”, and arrived there early. It was decided to carry out a dog leg and return to Position “B” (the South Coast). When the dog-leg was almost completed as Gee fix was obtained and course altered for Position “B”. This is where the mistake was made. The Navigator gave the pilot a course to steer of 024°(M) instead of 064°(M). The Navigator then decided to “try his hand” with the H2S. It was his second operational sortie. He was hoping to pick up the English Coast line, but this did not appear. Just before E.T.A. the Navigator decided that “something was wrong”, and obtained a Gee fix. This placed the aircraft a great many miles North of Position “B”. The mistake was immediately realised and course altered for Position “B”. The aircraft arrived at this position 19 minutes after the latest time, and so the sortie was abandoned.
Apart from the glorious “boob” of the Navigator, the pilot should have realised that the course of 024° (M) was greatly in error. This is a warning to all pilots and navigators. Had the pilot studied his “Captains of aircraft” map, he would have spotted the error in the course given. Pilots should always check a course with the Navigator if it sounds “phoney”. The Navigator [underlined] must always [/underlined] recheck all his calculations and computions.
ASTRO COMPASS
It was stated in last month’s News that the Astro Compass was being modified. This has now been done with the result that only the Pole Star can be used for checking the aircraft’s course. The advantage is that the instrument is very much simpler to use. No calculation is necessary, the observer merely rotates the bearing plate until the Pole Star is in the sights, and reads off the aircraft’s course against the Red pointer.
Trials carried out by No. 49 Squadron, Fiskerton, have proved successful. The compass was found very simple to use. The checking of the aircraft’s course is now a very simple task, and can be done by any member of the crew, as no calculations are necessary.
The difficult task of finding a good position for the Astro Compass still remains however; numerous trials have been carried out but with little or no success. Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] help to solve the problem? Remember the Astro Compass can also be used for obtaining bearings, so bear this in mind when you are hunting for a new position.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What part does the Navigator play in (a) Emergency procedure, (b) S.O.S. procedure?
2. If you are 10 miles or more off track by how many degrees would you alter course to regain track?
3. What is the procedure for obtaining a Gee fix if either the “B” or “C” Strobe is missing?
4. You are not certain of your position and suddenly red flares are seen ahead of you. (a) What does this mean? (b) What immediate action would you take?
Answers to last month’s Quiz
1. (a) 3500 ft. (b) 2500 ft. (c) 1000 ft. (d) 5000 ft.
2. (a) Section “E”. (b) Section “N”.
3. Lincoln!! (by approx. 100 miles)
4. The Navigator should immediately co-operate with the W/Op, and attempt to home on to the dinghy. (The W/Op. on hearing the S.O.S. will listen for an acknowledgement from the ground listening station, and if this is not heard he will pass the intercepted message on to M/F Section “J”, saying that it has been picked up and giving his own call sign etc but not his position (this will be known by Section “J” from the aircraft’s own transmission)).
5. (i) Change the fuse. (ii) Check [underlined] all [/underlined] leads.
6. The creeping line ahead method of search is best under all conditions (see Appendix “A” to A.S.I. Ops.1/18).
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. H.C. Lobb – B.N.O. Swinderby to 8 Group P.F.F.
S/Ldr. H.L. Creeth – Radar/Nav 5 Group to B.N.O. Swinderby.
F/Lt. N.W. Mould, DFC – 57 Nav.Offr. to S.N.O. Dunholme.
F/O. J. Simms, DFC – 57 Sqdn appointed Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. G. Crowe, DFC – 106 Nav.Officer to S.N.O. Metheringham.
F/Lt. W.J. Beeston – Attached to 5 Group O.R.S. posted to Flying Trg. Command.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] CALLING ALL PILOT BOMBING OFFICERS ! [/underlined]
The following paragraphs are the precis of an address by Air/Cdr. Patch, C.B.E., to the first Conference of Bombing Officers :-
The post of Flight Bombing Officer was created to improve bombing in 5 Group. Enthusiasm of such officers is essential, and should be directed to keeping bombing in the forefront by constant pressure on Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders. The Squadron Bombing Leader is able to deal with the bombing problems of the Air Bomber but he has difficulty in convincing pilots that their ability should be shown in bombing flying rather than aerobatics. In 4 engined bomber aircraft, Pilots should concentrate in the first place on flying accurately over a given point on the ground. Next, Pilots must appreciate that on any given heading the bomb must be released from one point in the air. It requires most skilful flying to direct the aircraft through this point. Analysis of bombing errors showed that, excluding Vector Errors, 90% of the errors were due to bad flying, in particular in tracking and aircraft “skid”. The Mark XIV Bombsight has been designed to give tactical freedom but it is essential that a steady approach be made, accuracy depending on the final steady run. There must be no sudden alteration of aircraft attitude, no skidding, and complete accuracy of tracking.
Flight Bombing Officers must think over these practical points and decide how best to put it over to the Pilots. They must point out to Pilots that their aircraft are, in reallity [sic], sighting platforms from which, with the help of a complicated piece of mechanism – the Mark XIV Bombsight – they are to direct a tremendous bomb load against an enemy target. The conception of “area bombing” has caused bad bombing flying. If we can attain precision, not only against small targets but also large cities, we can reduce the number of raids required to obliterate Berlin and those other vital targets we must destroy.
Under operational conditions now being developed, and with the help of improving P.F.F. technique, we should be able to achieve greater accuracy at night in attacking a point of light, that is a T.I. or Wanganui Flare. The Bombing Officer’s job was to make Pilots “think bombing”, “talk bombing” and “fly bombing” until the time is reached that over the pint of beer in the Mess the main conversation is bombing accuracy.
[Underlined] N.B. [/underlined] The first Bombing Officers Air Staff Instruction was issued 11th January, 1944, No. BL/15.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Why should incendiaries not be dropped by the Main Force before Zero Hour on a Newhaven attack?
2. If an engine cut on take-off, and it was necessary to lighten the aircraft quickly, what action could the Air Bomber suggest concerning the bomb load?
3. If you were carrying a 1000 lb bomb on No. 5 Station, and it was not pre-selected on the Connell Pre-Selector, would it be released by Jettison action?
4. Why should the camera [underlined] NOT [/underlined] be operated before bombing?
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET) [/underlined]
[Table of Bombs dropped and errors found by category and Squadron]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES FOR FEBRUARY
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 ft.
9 P/O Blow F/Sgt Smith Sgt Hurrell 131 yds
44 P/O Charlesworth Sgt Frederuck F/Sgt Hill 148 yards
P/O Butt Sgt Whiter F/O Sparrow 143 yds
49 W/O Jones Sgt Blackham F/Sgt Stevenson 123 yds
61 P/O Nixon F/Sgt Garrett F/Sgt Devenish 140 yds
106 P/O O’Leary F/Sgt Snowden F/Sgt Williams 142 yds
207 P/O Briggs F/O Bujac P/O Murray 147 yds
P/O Barnett Sgt Hazel F/O Anderson 61 yds
463 P/O McKnight F/O Johnson P/O Isham 140 yds
619 Sgt Wadsworth Sgt Bengston Sgt Shenton 72 yds
1660 Sgt Newman Sgt Outram Sgt Ratner 132 yds
F/Sgt Riddle F/O Larsen Sgt Glulow 140 yds
1661 Sgt Grantham Sgt Young Sgt Hobbs 145 yds
F/Sgt Monaghan Sgt Wand Sgt Philpott 147 yds
617 Squadron obtained 18 exercises, error less than 150 yards, the best 3 being
F/Lt Wilson F/O Finlay F/O Parkin 55 yds
F/Lt Kearns F/O Daniels F/O Barclay 60 yds
P/O Knight F/Sgt Bell W/O Giller 57 yds
ADDITIONAL BOMBING TRAINING
[Table of Training exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley, 619 Squadron, made the only, and most creditable, effort in the Leader Competition, his Bombing Error at 20,000 feet being 79 yards!!! Congratulations.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
8 Squadrons qualified in this month’s competition, with results as follows, all errors being converted to 20,000 fett.
[Underlined] Pilots & Air Bombers Navigators [/underlined]
1st 106 Sqdn – 88 yds 1st 207 Sqdn -108 yds
2nd 50 Sqdn -125 yds 2nd 619 Sqdn -138 yds
3rd 61 Sqdn -141 yds 3rd 61 Sqdn -169 yds
4th 619 Sqdn -147 yds 4th 467 Sqdn -170 yds
5th 9 Sqdn -157 yds 5th 9 Sqdn -174 yds
6th 44 Sqdn -166 yds 6th 50 Sqdn -188 yds
7th 207 Sqdn -189 yds 7th 106 Sqdn -216 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -201 yds 8th 44 Sqdn -231 yds
9th 630 Sqdn -175 yds 9th 630 Sqdn -170 yds
(630 Sqdn completed [underlined] 5 [/underlined] exercises only)
The following Squadrons completed 1 exercise only.
10th 463 Sqdn -86 yds 10th 463 Sqdn – 95 yds
11th 49 Sqdn- 90 yds 11th 57 Sqdn -162 yds
12th 57 Sqdn-245 yds 12th 49 Sqdn -291 yds
Congratulations to 106 Squadron who have now won the Bombing Competition for 3 successive months. Nos.9, 50, and 61 Squadrons have all improved their positions considerably but 619 have relinquished their customary “runners up” place in the table. We expect a maximum entry for March and a keen effort on all Squadrons part to topple 106 from the top.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The following news items are provided by the Range Staff at Wainfleet.
1. It is emphatically denied that the entire Night Staff applied for compassionate posting after a night programme carried out at maximum height by No. 5 L.F.S.
2. [Underlined] Heard over the R/T [/underlined]
R/T Operator – “Hullo ----- Please give me a TT.”
Pilot of A/C – “Time over Target 22.26.”
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined] A TT is a tuning transmission.
3. [Underlined] Advice to Crews. [/underlined]
(i) Conform to the established R/T procedure.
(ii) Be sure you burn the correct Downward Recognition Light during NIGHT exercises.
(iii) Pass times of strike and headings QUICKLY after the exercise.
(iv) Wait for silence on R/T before calling the Range.
(v) When you query errors given by the range REMEMBER please that a Direct Hit from 20,000 feet gives the Range Staff as much pleasure as it gives you !!
4. [Underlined] A Thought for the Month. [/underlined]
DO make sure you know which target you are to bomb !! (Many Wainfleet workmen have of late doubled their insurance).
P.S. A certain Mosquito from a certain well-known Group dropped a practice bomb which hit a lorry standing in front of the Range Headquarters. A 3,500 yards error.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) have introduced the Pilot’s Miniature Route Chart for the use of Air Bombers. Thus a single map of the complete route is available and the defended localities and route markers can be recorded. Its use is primarily for dark nights when map reading using the topographical maps is difficult.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DF.C.) has originated an excellent scheme with the use of operational 3073’s. After each operation a chart is made out which shows on one sheet of paper each Bomb Aimer’s picture of the markers bombed. The full sequence of marking in the order of the times of bombing is thus available to each Air Bomber who can compare his attack and estimation of distances with the other Bomb Aimers in the Squadron.
[Underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Walmesly, D.F.C.) states that of the 300 practice bombs dropped this year, not one has been aimed below 5000 feet. Further they claim to be the only Unit in the Group (yea, verily, even in the Command) with such a record.
[Underlined] 57 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Keates) reports that training was concentrated on to H2S and Gunnery. Blind Bombing with H 2 S had taken a prominent part in this training.
The Squadron Bombing Leader has compiled a graph consisting of nine curves on one sheet, which shows the forwards travel in yards and seconds of groundspeed of all bombs with T.V. between 420 and 1900 feet per second, for specific heights and groundspeeds. The groups apply to the selected heights 15000, 20000 and 25000 feet and the curves in each group cover height and groundspeeds 200, 210 and 220 m.p.h. Any other combinations of height and groundspeeds could be used. All information has been extracted from 5 Group Armament Training Notes, Part 1.
The advantage of this graph is that all information is contained in one graph and considerable time and labour is saved in calculating time intervals or compiling or checking preselector figures for any kind of load within the limitations of T.V., heights and speeds selected.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
F/O Billington has succeeded F/Lt Bray as Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
F/O. Astbury, D.F.C., moves up to F/Lt. Bombing Leader, 617 Squadron, and is joined by F/O. Harden, D.F.C., and F/O. Walker, Bombing Leaders from 1660 Conversion Unit and 61 Squadron respectively.
Congratulations to F/Lt. Bell (9 Squadron) F/Lt. Wake (106 Squadron) and F/Lt. Walmsley (619 Squadron) on the award of D.F.C’s.
Congratulations also to P/O Ball (1661 Con Unit) 3rd on No. 76 Bombing Leader’s Course with an “A” category and P/O Watford (1661 Con Unit) on gaining 1st place on No. 27 A.B.I’s Course.
F/Sgt. Coates (9 Squadron) obtained “B” category on No. 76 Bombing Leaders’ Course. F/O Lyons (61 Squadron) was 9th on No. 75 Course with a “B” Pass.
GARDENING
Despite February weather, the Command planted no less than 1647 vegetables, the second highest total for any month. As all Lancasters were busy discomforting the enemy by more direct methods it fell mainly to the Stirlings of 3 Group, followed by Halifaxes of 4 and 6 Groups and, on a smaller but useful scale, Wellingtons of 1 Group, to achieve this mighty total.
KIEL BAY received over 35%. The French U-boat bases about 20%, and the Western German Estuaries, the Kattegat and Channel also received good measure. Small numbers were planted off the French South Western Iron Ore Ports and in Oslo Fjord.
A Swedish newspaper reports the closing of the ports and shipping channels as an immediate result of 4 and 6 Groups’ visits to the last named. Photographic evidence is already available of the effects of the great effort on Kiel Bay. It shows one 6000 ton liner sunk and lying on her side, and also great congestion of shipping, indicating beyond doubt that traffic has been stopped for a time. It is hard to over estimate the importance of Kiel, which is the focal point of all German traffic in Northern Waters; the annual turnover is 29,000,000 tons of war material, nearly one half of which is iron ore imported from Norway and Sweden. The amount handled [underlined] DAILY [/underlined] would fill 12 1/2 miles of railway trucks. One effect of heavy and sustained mining against this traffic would be to force the enemy to use the sea route to the West of Denmark down to the Elbe and Ems. In hard winters this is done for us by ice in the Baltic, but this winter we have been let down by this ally.
Two interesting points arise from the month’s work. First, nearly all of it has been carried out from high level with great success. A variety of techniques have been used including:- The use of P.F.F. methods (both by aircraft of that force and H 2 S aircraft from the other Groups, marking pinpoints for those not so fitted); the use of the Mark XIV Bombsight when visual means have been possible; and dropping entirely on H 2 S. Secondly, a start has been made in the mining of the enemy’s inner harbours.
We have the task in 5 Group of studying and keeping up to date with the new methods which are still in an experimental stage, and therefore, subject to frequent changes, so that when the call comes for either a small or large gardening effort we can carry it out with our traditional efficiency.
49 Squadron have already been informed of the success of their accurate attack from high level with H 2 S on the 5/6th January.
[Boxed] [Underlined] PILOTS – TAKE IT EASY! [/underlined]
Use your throttles LEISURELY at all times. Do not open up with a rush. You won’t get off the ground any quicker if you “ram” the throttles open, and you are more liable to swing. Make any correction with engines smoothly. There’s no such thing as a “short burst” of engine in proper flying. Make your maxim “EASE your throttles open. EASE your throttles back”. That applies to all aircraft including the Stirling, Lancaster and the Tiger Moth – if your Station Commander lets you get your hands on it. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 19. FEBRUARY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
SPORTS
Bad weather rendered most sports pitches u/s during the last few days of February, but there has been a full quota of matches played in spite of this. Attention is again drawn to the desirability of each Station submitting its sports resume two days or so before month end, to allow ample time for publication in this News. Several Stations have not submitted resumes this month, and so the picture is necessarily incomplete.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] proved unbeatable during the month, playing six games of which they won four (including two Matz Cup matches). However, Lincoln Rovers held them to a 2 – 2 draw, and Waddington to a 3 – 3 draw. Both these games were in the Lincoln League, Division 1, and Scampton could ill afford to drop these points since the League Championship is a neck and neck finish between them and Lincoln Rovers.
[Underlined] FISKERTON [/underlined] had four Station games of which they drew one home game with R.A.F. Wickenby. The inter-section competition is now in full swing.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME [/underlined] beat Fiskerton at home, but lost to Ruston Bucyrus, A.V. Roe and R.A.F. Wickenby. Four games were played in the Inter-Section League.
[Underlined] EAST KIRKBY [/underlined] beat Spilsby but lost their Matz Cup game against Skellingthorpe 5 – 1. The Section League produced 5 games, and in addition there were 7 ‘friendlies’, the aircrew cadets team winning all three of their games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] Inter-Section games were plentiful. The outstanding match of the month was the Matz Round One win against Woodhall. This has been followed by a 3 – 2 victory against Dunholme, taking Coningsby into the Semi-finals.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] scored a sweeping 10 – 0 win against Bardney in the Matz Cup Round One. They proved it no fluke by holding Waddington to a 2 – 2 draw. They now boast a “Reserve XI”. In the Inter-Section events, 5 games were played. “A” Flight have a strong side and should go well towards winning the trophy generously presented by S/Ldr. Whattam.
[Underlined] SKELLINGTHORPE [/underlined] had 5 Station games and 9 in the Inter-Section events, while there were a further 3 games restricted to aircrew personnel.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] XI beat Winthorpe and Wigsley, and were unlucky to lose 3 – 5 to Scampton in Round Two of the Matz Cup. It was a splendid effort at “giant killing”.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] had 3 games of which they won two, including a 4 – 0 win against a R.A.F. side from Fulbeck.
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The second round saw Coningsby, Scampton and Skellingthorpe emerge as semi-finalists, defeating Dunholme, Swinderby and East Kirkby respectively. Winthorpe and Metheringham have still to decide their event. The semi-final draw is as follows:-
WINTHORPE [underlined] or [/underlined] METHERINGHAM v SKELLINGTHORPE
CONINGSBY v SCAMPTON
Both matches will be played on neutral ground at dates to be announced in G.R.O’s.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined] now boasts a strong side. They beat the Air Crew School 6 – 3, and ran up an astronomical total of 68 – 6 against Lincoln Home Guard. The Home Guard did better in the second game and held them to 18 – 6.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] were unlucky in having to cancel all Rugger games due to flying.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] completed only one out of four games, losing 5 – 0 to 7th K.O.S.B. after an extremely hard game.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] won three out of three games. A hard struggle with their old rivals, 93 M.U., produced a 3 – 0 win, and Winthorpe and Lincoln Home Guard were beaten 14 – 3 and 18 – 0 respectively.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] XV is doing well and won all three games played, Magnus School and Newark R.F.C. 9 – 6, and Rufford Home Guard 24 – 6.
[Underlined] LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDES [/underlined]
This competition is fast developing into a 53 Base monopoly. 9, 463 and 467 have all concluded their Squadron events now, producing F/Lt. Hadland’s team, P/O. McKnight’s team and P/O. Simpson’s team as the respective winners. In these three Squadron events, 65 crews took to the field. 50 Squadron are following suit, and three games have so far been played. Other Squadrons please note and “get cracking”! A complete Squadron event can be decided in two afternoons, and the physical “uplift” is amazing – try it and see.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
[Underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined] won three out of four games, suffering their only defeat at the hands of 5 Group in a “mixed” game.
[Underlined] EASY [sic] KIRKBY [/underlined] had one station event, losing to Spilsby Town. The Aircrew Cadets “A” and “B” sides fought two very close games.
[Underlined] CONINGSBY [/underlined] lost to the Green Howards, and held K.O.S.B. to a 3 all draw.
[Underlined] SWINDERBY [/underlined] mixed side beat 5 Group 7 – 3. The Station side beat Lincoln Home Guard, but lost to Wigsley.
[Underlined] SYERSTON [/underlined] lost 2 – 4 to O.C.T.U. Newark, but won a mixed game versus Winthorpe R.A.S.C. by 3 – 1.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP [/underlined] mixed side defeated Wigsley 7 – 5 on Swinderby ground, lost to Swinderby 3 – 7, and enjoyed a 3 – 2 win against Scampton.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
49 Squadron now allot one afternoon per week to physical “fitness”. Wood-chopping, country walks (pubs out of bounds) and gardening are all featured. Swimming at Lincoln is laid on each Tuesday, and for ground staff on Sundays. All that is needed now is the completion of the “gym”.
Dunholme R.A.F. Regiment keep up their water worthiness by attending Lincoln Baths.
Coningsby gym is now in full swing for badminton, boxing and gymnastics.
Metheringham gym will open this month for badminton, boxing, fencing and P.T.
[Underlined] COMPETITIONS [/UNDERLINED] The Wines Rugby Cup Competition has been launched, also a new event in 5 Group –“5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy”. There should be some keen games in both these events. New events need new trophies. Two are needed – a Lancaster seven-s-side trophy, and a Mixed Hockey Trophy. Benefactors please contact F/Lt. Stott, Headquarters 5 Group (Ext. 54)
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
Spring brings the cuckoo and cricket, a 5 Group Cricket League is being formed. It is hoped that every Station will enter a team. Details are being circulated.
TRAINING
Training on Stirlings and Lancasters in 51 Base pressed on during the month and 66 crews were posted to Squadron.
The Stirling programme has a few teething troubles and but for this there would have been a larger output of crews. Ignition and electrical failures were particularly troublesome and infectious.
The snow fall at the end of the month involved all available man and machine power on a new and unwelcome form of training – shovelling snow – and prevented a last minute spurt in training.
The incoming crews judged by ground training standards are quite good, and the Aircrew School at Scampton did a lot of the spade work in giving them a sound basic knowledge of 5 Group tactics and operational procedure.
H 2 S training has been reorganised in the Base. The present aim is to train selected crews during the ordinary Conversion Unit course. Ground training is being given, and an initial demonstration flight arranged as early as possible in the course so that the cross country exercises (day and might) are flown using H 2 S as a navigation aid. No practice bombing is now being attempted. Air Training has been held up by the unserviceability of the H 2 S Stirling.
The Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston has so far done no H 2 S training, but a synthetic trainer has been promised by Bomber Command. When it is installed crews will be able to keep in practice by dry swims before passing out to H 2 S Squadrons.
With the disbandment of No.1485 (Bombing and Gunnery) Flight, the training of Air Gunners has been incorporated in the normal Conversion Unit Course. When No.1690 (Bomber) Defence Training Flight begins its work it is hoped that the former high standard of training can be maintained.
Flight Engineers are passing through the Stirling Units twice to give them the maximum possible flying time before going to Lancaster Finishing School. This ensures that they are well experienced in the air by the time they reach their operational Squadrons.
Crews under training took part in a large scale Command Bullseye which was laid on as a diversionary feature for the operation against Stuttgart on the night 20th February. The diversion achieved the success hoped for and attracted a large proportion of the weight of the German Fighter Force away from the area in which the Squadrons were operating.
5 Group News. No. 19 February, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
H 2 S
H 2 S training has progressed favourably during the month, but unfortunately once again training in blind bombing has been held up due to bad weather and cloud over targets. Good use is being made of synthetic trainers now installed at 49, 57 and 630 Squadrons and 1660 and 1661 Conversion Units. Navigators and Bomb Aimers should look upon this ground training as an essential part of their syllabus, and endeavour to make as much use of the synthetic trainer as navigational and blind bombing aid in the limited time they have.
It is gratifying to note that many crews are becoming increasingly aware of the value of H 2 S as a navigational aid and should realise the amount of work that is carried out by the Radar Sections for their benefit. Many set operators can help to decrease this work by reporting all faults personally to either the Radar Officer or one of the Radar Mechanics, and not merely to one of the ground crew who pass it on in hushed tones to the Radar Section, but with no explanations regarding unserviceability. You, the set operators, are the ones to let the section know the faults experienced and their symptoms. It may mean the difference between a “ropey” or good set on the next flight. Cultivate this habit of personal contact and you will earn the gratitude of the Radar Section and probably pick up some useful tips.
Some operators are having trouble with poor reception. This is a complaint particularly common amongst crews under training. Like ourselves, components of H 2 S have age limits, and their deterioration may cause poor reception; but remember the set can easily go off tune and it is necessary to check tuning whenever doubts arise regarding the quality of reception.
Cupolas are also liable to give trouble with reception. Extraneous matter which has a habit of collecting in the cupola will materially affect reception, giving rise to a mushy picture. Set operators are advised to see that the cupola is clean both inside and out before every flight.
Does this happen in YOUR aircraft?
[Cartoon] GREMLIN’S GARDEN
N.C.M.
Plotting charts are now being revised every three months to give the H 2 S operator as accurate a view as possible of the shape of towns from which he should receive responses. Every set operator can help in the revising of those charts by noting any peculiarity in town shapes and passing the information to this Headquarters by means of the usual report made at interrogation.
Know your Landmarks. The following are well known H 2 S landmarks on the continent.
Can you identify them?
[Three drawn outline maps]
FLYING CONTROL
Coningsby tops the list, with Waddington a close second; it is encouraging to note that landing times of all Stations are getting more consistent, and the overall landing time of 2.75 minutes is an encouraging improvement on January’s figures. It is hoped to see, each month, a further reduction so that the Group can record an overall average of below two minutes per aircraft.
In planning operations it can now be assumed with confidence that 5 Group aircraft, sometimes in excess of 200, can be landed within one hour of the return of the first machine. Compare this period of landing with that of 12 months ago, when smaller numbers of aircraft were concerned, and when a landing hook up often used to last 80 or 90 minutes. This reduction in the landing period has meant greater safety for the crews, less fuel to be carried, and a greater tonnage of bombs available for delivery.
Reports from Eastern airfields indicate that aircraft are not adhering strictly to lattice line approach procedure. This is essentially a part of the quick landing scheme and rigid compliance with this part of the scheme must be stressed to all crews.
[Underlined] FEBRUARY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of landing times and averages by Station]
GEE
Rather poor range on Gee was experienced in operations this month, and once again XF transmissions were little used by Navigators. However it is apparent that there are still a few navigators who endeavour to get the best out of their sets and try all available means to secure fixes at maximum range. Success in track keeping and timing is the result of their efforts.
Other Navigators seem more concerned with finding reasons why ranges cannot be improved without endeavouring to improve them. This attitude is more effective than any jammer that the Hun can produce. It is therefore, up to every Navigator to use Gee to its actual and not its apparent limits. Plots of fixes made on the last three operations show the distance between the worst and best fixes to be 200 miles or more. Many of the worst ranges come from non-H2S Squadrons in which Gee is the sole navigational aid. Gee Trainers and Jammers are available on all Squadrons and Conversion Units and, therefore, it is up to every navigator, whether on Squadron or Conversion Unit, to carry out maximum training in Gee, particularly in the reading of signals through jamming.
One general complaint is that the Series3, Southern Chain miniature lattice charts do not afford full coverage and many fixes cannot be plotted. Charts covering such areas are to be issued in the near future, but in the meantime the remedy is in the Navigator’s own hands. Continue your lattice lines in pencil along the margins of the those charts you have, covering areas where fixes might be obtained, but no chart coverage is available.
With the constant lack of interest in XF transmissions, enquiries have been made, and many Navigators complain that they find it difficult to insert the XF unit into the receiver and use it in its present position. If this difficulty is arising now, it will be even greater when the new RF unit is issued, because of the attention required to secure maximum results. A little perseverance now may help in the future. However, how about a few ideas on the repositioning of the Gee receiver to obviate this complaint? They will be welcome at the Headquarters providing they are practicable.
Navigators of 630 and 57 Squadrons visited a Gee transmitter station during the month, and were given an idea of the ground organisation necessary to provide so valuable a navigational aid. The visit was much appreciated by all concerned, and it is hoped that other Squadrons and the Conversion Units will take advantage of this facility in the future.
[Underlined] FLYING ACCIDENTS [/underlined]
(Continued from page12 Col 3)
investigations into them are not yet complete. One aircraft dived to avoid another and crashed in the funnel. Another failed to get airborne by the time it reached the airfield boundary. The undercarriage hit the hedge and the Lancaster crashed. Another hit a hill while the pilot was flying low in bad weather. In others the causes are still obscure.
15 avoidable accidents occurred in 51 Base during February, of which 8 were taxying accidents. This means that more than half of the avoidable accidents in the Group occurred at Conversion Units and No.5 L.F.S.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
January’s low percentage of photographic failures was not maintained during the month of February, and the following increases occurred:-
Photographic + .02%
Armament + 2.1%
Electrical + 1.07%
It is curious that a large number of failures occurred on the first raids following the stand down period. It is expected that technical efficiency should then be at its peak, as ample time is available to effect thorough maintenance and servicing of camera equipment etc. That this is not so, points to the fact that this period is not being used to the best advantage.
During the stand down period N.C.O’s must ensure that everything possible is done to produce Type 35 Controls and camera gearboxes which are without fault. Particular attention must be given to timing the camera sequence – control contact strips – gear box spring teeth and film measuring roller needles; this applies particularly to newly issued equipment.
Photographic film processing and printing is taking [underlined] far too long to accomplish [/underlined] and NCO photographers are to check the internal section organisation. Delay always occurs when numerous Ground Detail photographs are obtained, indicating that the organisation is based on having a minimum amount of printing instead of the maximum. Station Intelligence Officers need prints to plot with a minimum of delay. Printing should therefore, be arranged to allow the S.I.O. to have the prints in batches instead of waiting to complete the whole of the work.
Every photographer must realise the importance of carrying out his tasks, with the [underlined] utmost speed and efficiency [/underlined]. The aircrews have completed their tasks, but delay in producing photographic evidence of the effect of the raid is comparable to sabotaging their efforts.
The use of Composite film (Kodacolour and H.S. Night) was carried a stage further during the month and it is hoped that in the near future other Squadrons will be using this method of recording attacks.
The problem of operating the camera when the bomb doors are opened prior to the bombing run is now considered to be solved. Aircraft of 44 Squadron are carrying out final tests which have so far been successful and the advantage of the circuit now under trial is that it does not impose exacting Drill upon the pilot and Air Bomber.
[Table of Photographic Analysis including Target Conditions and Failure Analysis by Squadron]
HONOURS & AWARDS
The following immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
44 SQUADRON
F/Sgt. G. PRATT. DFM
W/Cdr. R.L. BOWES, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. P.A. DOREHILL, DFC. BAR TO DFC
F/Lt. C.D. WIGGIN. DFC
P/O. R.M. HIGGS. DFC
Sgt. R.W. JOY DFM
50 SQUADRON
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
61 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. BURGESS. DFC
207 SQUADRON
P/O. F.W. GALLAGHER. DSO
F/Sgt. C.E. STEWART. DFM
463 SQUADRON
Sgt. W. HOLT. DFM
The following non-immediate Awards have been approved during the month:-
9 SQUADRON
P/O. K. GILL. DFC
P/O. G.E. LOCKEY. DFC
F/Sgt. T.C. OVEREND. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/Lt. S. BURROWS. DFC
Sgt. R.W.T. TUCKER. DFM
P/O. A.G. SMYTHE. DFC
F/Sgt. J. CUSHION. DFM
F/O. S.H. LETLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON
F/O. R.E. HIDDERLEY. DFC
49 SQUADRON (Continued)
P/O. L.A. COXHILL DFC
P/O. J.B. WARWICK DFC
F/O. J.D. HARRIS DFC
W/O. E.M. WEBB DFC
W/O. E.L. JONES DFC
P/O. G.P. GEORGE DFC
P/O. K.O. BARNES DFC
W/O. T.P. JUBB DFC
Sgt. G. BOAG DFM
Sgt. T. TYLER DFM
F/Sgt. J DORRIAN DFM
F/Sgt. G.A. EDY DFM
F/O. F.E. WHITTMER DFC
50 SQUADRON
P/O. J.F.C. BROWN DFC
F/Lt. K. RUSKELL DFC
F/Lt. J.A. EDWARD DFC
F/O. W. BODEN DFC
F/O. L.T. PRITCHARD DFC
F/Sgt. R.V. POOLEY DFM
F/Sgt. S.J. PROCTER DFM
W/O. E.T. McLEOD DFC
F/O. D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/Sgt. H. BROWN DFM
F/O. J.M. DICKS DFC
P/O. J.B. BLOTT DFC
P/O. D.R. TOOVEY DFC
Sgt. C.H. BROWN DFM
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. KING DFC
F/Sgt. W.L. BELL DFM
F/Sgt. J.A. THOMAS DFM
61 SQUADRON
F/Lt. N.D. WEBB DFC
106 SQUADRON
F/Lt. J.G. CLARIDGE DFC
F/O. V.L. COLE DFC
P/O. W.R.P. PERRY DFC
F/Lt. L.R. HARVEY DFC
F/O. J. FORSYTH DFC
P/O. L.G. BERRY DFC
F/Lt. R.L. WAKE DFC
207 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. P.N. JENNINGS DFC
F/Lt. J.F. GRIME DFC
F/Lt. M.J. BAUD DFC
F/Sgt. G. BROADHEAD DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. BROWN DFM
F/Sgt. W.J. JAMIESON DFM
F/Lt. W.C.T. BRAY, DFC. BAR TO DFC
467 SQUADRON
P/O. W.J.O. GRIME DFC
P/O. J.G. SIMPSON DFC
619 SQUADRON
F/O. H.W. KEAN, DFM. DFC
F/Lt. J.A. HOWARD DFC
F/Lt. P.J.F. WALMSLEY DFC
W/O. J.H. MASON DFC
630 SQUADRON
F/Lt. D.S. PATERSON DFC
P/O. A.E.A. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. A.H. GIBSON DFC
P/O. J.H. WORTHINGTON DFC
F/Sgt. J. MARTIN. DFM
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
[Underlined] RADAR WORKSHOPS [/underlined]
Although none of the Radar Workshops in this Group have quite reached the stage depicted in the picture on the opposite page, it does show what can befall a section if it is left to sweep itself out after you have all packed up for the day. It is surprising what a few minutes at the end of the day can do if everyone pitches in before leaving for town. It also helps to ward off that hopeless feeling one experiences in the morning on entering a section which looks as if our bombers had got a bit off track (Gee u/s?).
Odd pieces of timber can be scrounged on the Station (NOT packing cases – which have now supplanted the gold standard), and with these can be built trays for spare components which we trust you have saved from detonated sets and other salvage material.
Test equipment should be treated with the greatest respect and kept in its proper place when not in use.
An up-to-date serviceability and fitting board in the office or workshop can save no end of trouble and time for all concerned when information is required at short notice. It keeps all mechanics posted too, and they will add that extra little drive which helps to make the picture the board portrays a rosier one.
General interest diagrams – excluding polar diagrams of Dorothy Lamour and other homing devices – should be neatly displayed on notice boards and walls.
The use of lino is nullified if the mud is not left outside, so get hold of those foot scrapers and door mats which the equipment section will be only too pleased to provide.
So let your aim be to keep your Radar workshop clean and reasonably tidy, so that the priceless equipment you have the privilege of handling may have the best chance of ensuring more bombs on the target.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATIONS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Codes [/underlined]
The month of February saw the last of our old standby, the “X” book, and in its place comes the A.P.3026. This will be easier to understand if Wireless Operators (Air) take the trouble to study its contents during the odd spare moment.
The new edition of C.D. 0250(16) should also receive a little of your attention, as the contents have been enlarged and the spare groups decreased. Remember that any time spent in studying these new editions might well save a frantic turning over of pages and a panic in the air.
Tests will be carried out on the Group W/T exercises, embodying the additions to the C.D.0250. Operators are reminded that this is an excellent means of getting up to date with anything new, and if you are not on the exercise you can always learn something from the logs of those who were taking part.
[Underlined] Finding Messages [/underlined]
All Wireless Operators (Air) are to be congratulated on the splendid work done during the month in connection with the “wind finding scheme”, especially on the night 15/16th February when 153 wind messages were received from aircraft. There was great joy and jubilation in the Signals Cabin at this Headquarters, for the “Back Room Boys” are always in the show.
[Underlined] Tail Warning Devices [/underlined]
Training in the use of the various early warning devices should now be standardised throughout the Group, but there are Squadrons who have not sent to the Group Signals Leader their version of the synthetic training cards. These cards are the best method of obtaining a quick snappy reaction to what is seen on the screen. The combined efforts of O.R.S., T.R.E., B.D.U. and the Radar “Kings” produced a piece of equipment designed to aid the bomber crews to beat the Hun when he is met in the air. Are [underlined] you [/underlined] tackling the job with the enthusiasm it deserves? Remember, TRAINING is the only answer.
A fault finding table for Visual Monica has been prepared and will be issued to Squadrons for inclusion in the current fault finding booklet carried by all Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] Lighting of Operator’s Cabin [/underlined]
Quite recently the old complaint of lighting in the Wireless Operator’s position has cropped up again. Now, at this present stage of the war, it is quite impossible to start producing modified lighting on a large scale, and it must be left to the initiative of the individual to produce something for himself. The maintenance section of No.50 Squadron produced and excellent lighting system for the T.R.1154 and are working on the R.1155. Come along fellows, don’t leave it to one – try saving your breath on complaints and using it up on some action.
[Underlined] “Brace up” [/underlined]
Now for a final word to all airborne “key bashers”. Things are likely to get cracking in the very near future. Can you say with a clear conscience that you are ready to meet any emergency? [Underlined] If [/underlined] not, now is the time to GO TO IT INT QRL QRV K 2359
[Underlined] Stop Press [/underlined]
A tip from No.630 Squadron. Switch on your T. R. 1196 when going in on your bombing run, and then, should your intercom. go unserviceable, the change-over can be effected immediately.
SIGNALS FAILURES
There has been an alarming increase in the percentage of Signals failures during February and whilst it is true that almost 50% (13 out of a total of 29) were due to definite failures of components in the equipment, it is felt that this number could have been reduced, particularly those of a recurring nature. Special attention should be paid to the starter relay contacts in the Power Unit type 35 pending the introduction of the new type with silvered contacts in a more accessible position. Faults in the switch type 170 in the fighter warning circuit are nearly always due to an insufficient allowance of slack in the connecting cable exerting a pull on the switch during the rotation of the turret, causing a displacement of the switch contacts. This results in a point contact and an intermittent high resistance connection.
There were six failures reported in which no fault could be found. Five affected intercom, four of which were contributory to early returns. Every member of a crew can assist in diagnosing obscure intercom faults by remembering the details and symptoms of the failure and passing them on to the Signals Officer.
The object of reporting failure is to ascertain the reason why the failure occurred, and if possible to originate a modification or maintenance instruction which will tend to eliminate the type of failure. This object is defeated unless all failures are conscientiously reported, and the number of failures reported by a Squadron does not reflect upon its maintenance efficiency, but rather indicates a conscientious devotion to detail, in an effort to reduce the number of failures and increase the delivery of goods to the customer.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee remains one of the most serviceable of all Radar devices; out of 1115 sorties flown, 94% of the sets were completely trouble free. This is a very good effort, but with all the experience obtained on this equipment there is no reason why the figure should not be far higher.
Another R. F. Unit is about to be introduced; these units are not, however, to be available in large quantities for some time. It is probable, therefore, than [sic] non H 2 S Squadrons will receive them first. In this connection it is of interest to learn that the Lancasters will soon have a stowage provided for the units not in use.
Authority has at last been obtained for lino to be laid on Radar workshop floors; many enterprising Squadrons have already had their floors covered, and were repaid by increased serviceability. It is hoped that no time will be wasted in so equipping all workshops.
Air Ministry has now ruled that detonators need no longer be fitted; although this will present the Hun with a considerable quantity of Gee equipment, it will be a great help to Squadrons, as many men were necessary for the fitting and removal of detonators.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The serviceability figures for H 2 S are very unsatisfactory. Last month only 68.8% were serviceable for the whole trip; the one blessing is that most of the failures occurred after the target. Main causes of failures are filament transformers, power units and manipulation. An oil filled filament transformer is now being tried, and this may be the solution to our main cause of unserviceability.
Manipulation is confined only to U/T crews but is assuming alarming proportions. Some Squadrons are still troubled by freezing scanner, and repeater motors. Bomber Command is trying to get approval for a new method of heating, but meanwhile the existing heater elements should be repositioned forward of the scanner motor.
The equipment situation is considerably improved, and with the Group Pool now at this Headquarters, Squadrons will have little difficulty in obtaining the main units of H 2 S.
(continued on Page 9 col 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
[Cartoon of Workshop]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 19. February 1944.
- Maurice levell –
IS THIS [underlined] YOUR [/underlined] RADAR WORKSHOP?
[Page break]
[Blank page]
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] GUNS AND TURRETS [/underlined]
The month of February shows a notable increase in the number of gun failures still being attributed to freezing. Rare reports have been received where conclusive evidence is available that guns have frozen, while instances have occurred that gunners have attempted to operate the breech blocks by operating the triggers. Attempts have also been made to release the breech blocks by means of the manually operated rear scar release units with little or no success. It is considered that the hydraulic media in the rear scar pipes becomes either frozen or congealed, and that trouble is not brought about by ice in the breech blocks.
To provide conclusive evidence that this is so, trials have been arranged whereby a percentage of gunners operate their breech blocks at intervals of 30 minutes, with guns at “safe”, throughout the operational sortie once operational height has been gained. A percentage of guns are also to be tested during the return, and by this means it is considered a valuable comparison will be obtained.
[Underlined] GALLEY HEATERS [/underlined]
A turret heater known as the “Galley Heater” is shortly to be introduced. The first 10 heaters are being delivered to Skellingthorpe for installation in aircraft of No.50 Squadron. The inside temperature of the turret is raised by means of a steady flow of hot air via air ducts, the ducts being so arranged as to spray the air on to the guns and turret components most susceptible to freezing, and re-bounding on to the gunner’s face.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet Bombing Range. [/underlined] Extreme difficulty has been experienced during recent weeks in keeping targets and their lighting fully serviceable at Wainfleet Range. This has been due to the heavy tides experienced, causing the ingress of salt water into lighting fittings, and resulting in a depletion of vital bombing training. An all-out drive is being made which, it is hoped, will ensure one hundred percent serviceability at all times.
[Underlined] Owthorpe and Epperstone Ranges [/underlined] are available for both day and night bombing, target illumination being effected by flares.
(continued in next column)
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURE [/underlined]
It can be seen from the failures table below that certain Squadrons claim to have had comparatively few, if any, bomb or S.B.C. failures during the month; it is known from Raid Reports received that this is not a true representation of the month’s failures. It is once again emphasised that all Armament failures are to be signalled in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Part I, Section S, Leaflet No. 2, Issue No. 4.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
An Armament Officers’ Conference was held at Base Station, Scampton, on Friday, 11th February, 1944, and afforded an excellent opportunity for the Command Armament Officer, Air Commodore Bilney, to meet all Armament Officers within the Group. Minutes have been circulated.
[Underlined] MINES “A” – MKS. I – IV [/underlined]
With the introduction of numerous types of new assemblies, it has been found that the personnel who carry out the testing and preparation, need instruction on all these later assemblies. To meet this requirement, courses have been arranged and allocated to all Units within the Group.
[Underlined] FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D= TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
Link Trainer Hours
[Table of hours spent on the Link Trainer by Pilots and Flight Engineers per Squadron]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(continued from page 8 col 3)
[Underlined] VISUAL MONICA [/underlined]
Serviceability of this equipment has still not reached a satisfactory figure; last month it was approximately 81% serviceable. A large percentage of the failures were due to switch motors seizing. A great deal of time and trouble has gone into this switch motor problem, and it is hoped that the solution is close at hand. All Units will have received information regarding the Manufacturer’s methods of setting up, and soon a report will be issued summarising the findings of a local ball bearing works which has been testing these motors. In the meantime the 2-way Pye sockets will allow the Wireless Operator full coverage even though the switch motor stops.
The biggest headache is still the shortage of equipment. Many Squadrons have managed to “acquire” bits from here and there, and in this manner fit more aircraft. This unfortunately, appears to be the only way in which replacement can be maintained at present.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond, unfortunately, depends on H 2 S serviceability and manipulation by both the Navigator and Wireless Operator. In such circumstances one would expect the Fishpond serviceability to be bad, and such is the case. In spite of this general low serviceability, Squadrons which have trained their crews well are now very pleased with the results obtained, and indeed managed to show a figure of 73% serviceable.
[Underlined] A. I. [/underlined]
Trials have been going on for some time with Mark IV A.I. It is believed that this equipment will make a good “Tail Warning Device”.
There are many snags yet to be cured before both elevation and bearing can be obtained.
It is expected however, that the experts will find the answer soon, and once more 5 Group will have pioneered a first class “Tail Warning Device”.
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of amount saved by Base and Unit]
TOTAL 4170.10.9
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Unit]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
You should always have a clear picture of each leg of the route in your mind. Study your track throughout briefing. Your [sic] can’t overdo this. It will prevent you accepting a completely wrong course from your Navigator. They have been known to give airspeeds for courses! It will help you as a rough guide to your track make good to take approximate bearings on defended areas each side of the route. But [underlined] don’t [/underlined] pinpoint on flak. One gun site can seem like “Happy Valley” if you are getting its undivided attention.
Always trim forward after bombing. The Lancaster becomes appreciably tail heavy after the bombs have gone. One pilot didn’t trim forward. He was a trifle shaken when the “wizard prang” he was giving all his attention to suddenly took off and orbited him. It was a sadder and wiser man who finally recovered from a stall some 8,000 feet nearer the ground.
Watch the “George” auto-control on take-off, especially taller pilots. It is possible during powerful movements to knock the auto-control lever to “In” and though “George” can fly straight and level, he can’t cope with a take-off, and you may not either with his unwanted co-operation.
By the way, when did you last do a proper Link Trainer exercise? Did you blank off the artificial horizon and carry out recovery from more extreme attitudes by use of the turn and bank indicator, A.S.I. and rate of climb? Or did you just fill in time?
If you have to “queue up” for take-off, don’t leave your engines idling. The plugs may oil up if you have long to wait. Run each engine up against the brakes to about 1600 revs. This will be sufficient to clear them, and it will also prevent overheating.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
A Pilot in this Group did his take-off drill the wrong way round. He left the boost cut-out till the end of his checks. When he did pull it down, his heavily gloved hand knocked the port outer fuel cock off, Fortunately his Engineer noticed it. He may not have done!
Keep your beam flying on the top line. Don’t just switch it on to test it on N.F.T’s Fly down the beam and do an approach each time. It’s a good scheme after training flights and N.F.T’s to find the aerodrome yourself on your own and other beams in the area.
Have you got your drills for using portable oxygen bottles weighted up? If you have any doubts at all- which you shouldn’t have – read 5 Group Aircraft Drills, No.12. Do you know how long the supply will last?
On your next N.F.T. carry out a dummy drill for an emergency. Have your Flight Engineer and Wireless Operator go down and lift the Rear Gunner out of his turret and carry him to the rest bed, using portable bottles. One pilot we know had three of his crew unconscious on the rear turret cat-walk just as he was approaching the target. They knew how to use the bottles, but had never practiced it!
Don’t wear signet rings on operations, however well dressed you may feel. You may regret your elegance. It increases the danger of frostbite if you have to bale out at altitude. It is also difficult for the M.O. to treat you for hand wounds or abrasions. Either the ring comes off – or your finger does!!
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
All Flight Engineer Leaders in the Group must have a drive on their Squadron in log keeping. So much valuable information is lost because details of small defects the recording of airspeeds, and the time of descent are omitted. It is difficult to keep a good log when the Flight Engineer is to “Window”, but if we can instil more keenness in the keeping of these logs, Flight Engineers in the long run, would benefit from the research which is given to all operational flights.
There is much discrepancy in the duration of flight from these logs. In future the time from airborne to landing must be taken from the Watch Office records and entered in the log.
This month at least one early return was made that should have been avoided. On the outward trip, the port engine showed a higher temperature than the other three; it was decided to return. On the check the next day it was found that this temperature was within the limits laid down for this type of engine; the Flight Engineer should have known this and advised the pilot that there was no danger. Another case was one engine feathered because the oil temperature gauge dropped to zero, yet both the oil pressure gauge and the coolant temperature gauge remained normal. On check it was found that the gauge was faulty.
[Cartoon] Dot and Dash – our immaculate W.A.A.F’s
“- and you needn’t say I’m jealous of this Monica of Bill’s – “
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
The Group operated five times only during February, and these five operations produced 1000 sorties; to achieve this an exceedingly high percentage of aircraft held on charge flew on each of these operations, the outstanding feature being the first operation of the month, when 226 Lancasters took off from this Group. Further comment on this achievement is unnecessary as it must be obvious to any person who knows the difficulties which have to be overcome to get such a large force off the ground, what work was entailed.
March should see an even larger effort than did February, but we still have our cancellations and early returns which do not appear to reduce by very many in spite of all our efforts. The technical defects which cause early returns and cancellations are not of a recurring nature; that is why it is so difficult to overcome each single case, but in spite of these individual faults, the numbers of early returns will be at least reduced if we persevere.
Much discussion has taken place during the month on the salvage of equipment, and one point which affect all Engineer Officers in this connection is that they must make sure that full use is made of the Base facilities for the repair and testing of technical equipment. A very frequent check should be made on R. & I. stores, and station equipment sections, to ensure that items of equipment have not been returned for subsequent return to the R.E.D. when these items can be repaired within the Base facilities.
During March it is intended to review the Maintenance Schedules for both Lancaster and Stirling aircraft; committees will be set up for each type and each individual inspection item will be checked both for the Daily and Minor Inspections; as a result it is hoped to cut out many items which exist in the Daily Inspection which are unnecessary, similarly with the Minor Inspection. Many hours are at present expended inspecting items which happen to be shown as requiring inspection by the schedule where, in fact, no defects were ever found. At the same time that the schedules are being revised, the card system will be introduced which will assist greatly with carrying out inspections, and it may be no longer necessary, once the scheme is introduced, to put aircraft unserviceable for longer than a few hours for inspection purposes.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Underlined] STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Conversion Unit]
LANCASTER AIRCRAFT
[Aircraft Serviceability for 5. L.F.S.]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] HARMONIZATION [/underlined]
Standard diagrams for each turret in Lancaster aircraft for harmonization at 100 yds and 25 yds have been issued to all Squadrons (5 Group letter 5G/237/2/Trg. Dated 1st Dec. 1943). These diagrams show all dimensions including the height of boards above ground, colour scheme for the gun spots and size of gun spots. The Mid Upper Turret is harmonized on the PORT beam and in all instances the distances are measured from a point vertically beneath the gun pivots to the board. The Tail turret is harmonized with the board dead astern and the nose turret with the board dead ahead.
A good tip is to strip each gun in turn, and not have four breech blocks laid around the rear turret at the same time, as instances have occurred of the breech blocks finding their way into the wrong gun, with the result that the Gunner has had a little difficulty in getting all the guns to fire. It is essential to check the harmonization again after the gun has been trained on the gun spot and the locking device screwed tight as the gun sometimes moves slightly during the locking procedure. The best type of board is the solid wooden one, fitted with a handle for carrying, and the best place to keep the boards is in the Gunnery Office and NOT laid about the dispersal points, remember somebody else may want the board after you and will expect to find it in its proper place. The guns should be harmonized at 100 yards and the 25 yards board used only for checking, it will be realised that the danger of harmonizing at 25 yds is that a slight error at this range is a large one at 400 yards, and although it is often easier to use the short range, don’t get into the habit of doing it every time.
[Underlined] COMBAT REPORTS [/underlined]
These reports are showing a tendency to become very brief and a lot of valuable information is omitted; this may be due to the gunners not giving the information at interrogation, or the duty gunner not including everything that is laid down in Appendix “A” INT. 1 and 2 to Air Staff Instructions, it is not easy to remember each item in this Appendix, and it is suggested that a copy is made and used at interrogation to ensure that all the information required is obtained from the crew.
All gunners should realise that the gun freezing bogey is still very much in existence and gunners should do everything possible during the trip when freezing is suspected, to find out where the trouble is; this is not simple, but if the guns won’t fire with the firing gear, the manual release should be tried. This may not cure the trouble as the breech block may go forward and stay there, instances have occurred of the firing gear taking some few seconds to function after the triggers have been pressed. These points and the presence of ice on guns should be noted by the gunners and stated at interrogation. Will all air gunners, therefore, do their utmost to help the technical staff to solve the serious and difficult problem.
[Underlined] MARK II GYRO GUNSIGHT[/underlined]
The Standard Free Gunnery Trainer at Fiskerton is being modified to take the Gyro Gunsight and training of gunners will commence as soon as this modification is complete. Considerable practice is required with this gunsight before the gunner becomes proficient in following the target accurately, due to the slight lag produced by the gyro on the moving graticule. It is found at first that when following a target which changes direction, the gunner is apt to overshoot with the sight, as the graticule carries on after the turret has stopped, and this, coupled with the foot pedals which are operated to feed the range into the sight, are both innovations which are new and must be mastered before accurate shooting can be expected.
The turret in which these sights will be installed is the F.N. 121 which has an electric motor to operate the servo mechanism, which eliminates any inter-action of trigger and turret movements. The control characteristics in the valve box have been modified to give more positive control for small turret movements at the cost of a slight reduction in the speed of the turret. No information is available at the moment regarding the speed with which the remaining Squadrons will be equipped after 49 Squadron is complete, but it is expected that the rate will be speeded up after the first Squadron has been completed.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO.73 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FINAL EXAMINATION RESULTS [/underlined]
P/O. Sandford – 467 Sqdn. – 79.2% - Cat. “A”
P/O. Powell – 619 Sqdn. – 67% - Cat “C”
[Underlined] NO.74 GUNNERY LEADERS’ COURSE [/underlined]
F/O. Williams – 463 Sqdn. – 74.8% - Cat “C”
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn. A/C Night Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 M 19/20.2.44. DO.217
49 D 19/20.2.44. JU,88
207 F 20/21.2.44. ME.110
49 C 24/25.2.44. T/E.
463 S 25/26.2.44. FW.190
207 K 25/26.2.44. ME.410
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
50 B 15/16.2.44. JU.88
44 J 15/16.2.44. DO.217
50 H 15/16.2.44. ME.210
207 C 15/16.2.44. ME.110
9 C 15/16.2.44. T/E.
44 A 19/20.2.44. ME.210
50 J 19/20.2.44. JU.88
106 M 19/20.2.44. ME.410
619 B 19/20.2.44. ME.109
44 Y 20/21.2.44. ME.210
49 G 24/25.2.44. JU.88
49 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.210
57 P 24/25.2.44. JU.88
207 P 24/25.2.44. S/E.
9 Q 24/25.2.44. ME.100
9 S 25/26.2.44. JU.88
630 G 25/26.2.44. FW.190
All these claims have been confirmed by Command.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.19. FEBRUARY, 1944 PAGE 11.
[Page break]
M.T. & FLYING ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ‘YOU’VE HAD IT’ [/underlined]
Reporting an M.T. accident, even filling up Form 446, is easy enough if the driver does it straight away, but it gets more difficult every day he puts it off.
In the end you will find that he doesn’t report it at all, but don’t be misled; the other man will and A.D. Claims then start the ball rolling from the other end, and you will find that you are in more trouble than ever, and it’s quite a big snowball by the time it reaches you.
Will M.T. Officers and N.C.O’s i/c Transport try to impress their drivers with the necessity for keeping the following rules.
(i) If you hit an aircraft or an aircraft hits you – REPORT IT – Everybody will; it’s a BLACK, but Training are dealing with this more fully.
(ii) If you knock someone’s wall down, or even bend it, --REPORT IT – the owner may quite like it, and he’s sure to be watching out of the window.
[Cartoon] E.M.P.
(iii) If you bump a car in the blackout – REPORT IT – the owner values his car much more than you think; usually more than it’s worth.
(iv) If you knock his daughter down – REPORT IT – injuries get so much worse if no one calls to sympathise from A.D. Claims. By the way, don’t call to sympathise yourself, however pretty she may be; this is against the rules, A.D. Claims have all the luck! A.M.O. A475/42, paragraph 17 lays down quite definitely that you must not approach the civilian involved in an accident. If you can get yourself invited to tea after the whole thing is settled – well that’s different!
Very few MT accidents now require more than F.446 action if they are reported at once. Page.16 of the AMO tells you all about this.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE ACCIDENT RATE ALMOST TREBLED IN 3 MONTHS [/underlined]
DECEMBER - [/underlined] 10; [/underlined] JANUARY – [underlined] 18; [/underlined] FEBRUARY – [underlined] 27. [/underlined]
The exalted position held by this Group for the past three months in the Bomber Command Accident Ladder will certainly not be held for the month just finished. It has been the blackest month from the accident point of view for a long time, and the most prevalent type, viz. [underlined] Ground Collisions [/underlined] has contributed to a greater extent than ever to the long list of damaged Lancasters and Stirlings in the Group. THESE AVOIDABLE, UNECESSARY AND EXPENSIVE ACCIDENTS MUST CEASE.
The “taxying” record for the past 3 months reads as follows:-
December – 9; January – 9; February – 11.
When it is realised that at least half of the aircraft involved were [underlined] CAT. AC. [/underlined] the effect on the war effort from this type of accident alone is immediately apparent.
So much has been written in these notes recently that it is difficult to avoid repetition, but it is hoped that the new instructions issued in February have the desired effect. However, the exercise of care and foresight on the part of everybody, especially pilots, is essential at all times when taxying an aircraft if the number of accidents in this category is to be reduced. There is no doubt that if ground personnel and aircrew do their very best, taxying accidents can be brought to within reasonable limits.
Manpower, paper, time and tempers can be saved by getting your report off quickly and giving AD Claims a chance to settle the case at once.
A great deal depends on M.T. Officers ensuring that their drivers report accidents promptly. If the drivers was not at fault he will not be punished (Not often!!! Editor), but he may be if he doesn’t report it at all.
Of course it saves an awful lot of trouble not to have the accident at all. It’s worth trying!
An unusual accident occurred at a Station in No.51 Base this month. An aircraft had landed and was slowing down towards the end of the runway, when the rear gunner called up the captain and told him an aircraft was landing beside him. The quick landing scheme was in force , and just prior to the gunner’s warning, Flying Control had advised the pilot to clear the runway quickly. As a result of these warnings, the captain thought the aircraft was close behind him (it was still in the funnel) and accelerated. He had too much speed on turning off the end of the runway, and broke his undercarriage. Rear Gunners should pay particular attention to give their captains precise information as to where an aircraft landing behind actually is. If it is still in the funnel they should definitely say so.
The month’s total of all kinds of avoidable accidents is made up as follows:-
Ground Collisions- 11; Heavy Landings – 4; Overshoots on Landing – 3; Swings on take off – 3; Crashes on Overshooting – 1; Other errors of judgement – 5. Of the aircraft which made heavy landings, two were Cat. A. and two were Cat.A.C. Three of these occurred at night. In one of them the pilot was prevented from using engine [sic] to recover from the first bounce because the Flight Engineer still had his hands on the throttles after ensuring they were fully closed. He was thrown off balance and held on to the throttles. This is a point which must be watched. Another occurred after an operational trip, when the pilot was caught unawares by his flaps only partly lowering. The flap gauge must always be checked.
Investigation of 2 of the swings on take off shows that either the wrong procedure for take off was used, or the wrong action taken when the swing started. Every pilot should ensure that he thoroughly understands the 5 Group Drills on swinging.
The accidents classed as errors of judgement were almost all of a serious nature, and the
(continued on page 6 Col. 3)
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
SELF HELP
A recent letter from Air Ministry impressed upon Command Group and Station Commanders the critical shortage of labour and materials that exists today. Notwithstanding the evidence of this on Stations in the shape of current establishment deficiencies and shortage of equipment, very few people realise how serious the position really is.
In effect, the allocation of labour for constructional work has been considerably reduced. This labour will be required to cover minor Works Services, as well as larger schemes.
[Cartoon] P/O Snooks will Help Himself any time! EMP.
Therefore, the available labour must only be used on those schemes that are essentially of an operational necessity and this can only be done at the expense of day-to-day minor services. If the minor Work Services themselves are to be carried out, it will only be possible to implement them by a “Self Help” scheme.
Now the expression “Self Help” should not be taken too literally. It does not mean that it can be taken as a good excuse to knock down the local guard room, or to pull down the intervening wall between the W.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Dining Room. A “Self Help” scheme is done by Service labour, and as such must be organised as a Service for the benefit of the Station as a whole, and not to satisfy the whim of any individual. There still seem to be a number of people who, being accustomed to “Having jam on it” in the shape of the excellent facilities normally available at a R.A.F. Station of peace-time design, think that the provision of any little extra convenience for anyone connected, however remotely, with the many activities involved in running a flying station, can justifiably be regarded as “operationally essential”. This, of course, is nonsense – ask some of our fellows who have served overseas.
The problem is, therefore, how to get a fuller effort from the available R.A.F. man and woman. There is, no doubt, very many R.A.F. personnel who are not doing the full amount of work of which they are capable and quite a lot of them have not yet grasped that they ought to do more than they are doing. Quite a few regard the acquisition of as many late passes and “forty eights” as possible as their chief aim in life, with unofficial extension to such periods of absence as a minor hobby. Quite a number of these might well contribute a few hours to “Self Help” each week, without suffering any grave hardship.
There are, on the other hand, a considerable number of individuals who continuously work to the limit of their capacity and sometimes beyond that limit (“Not you Adj. – sit down”). Everyone should feel a strong personal urge to give of their utmost to their Service tasks and to put no limit to the amount of effort which should be demanded of them. As we have now reached the stage when national resources are inadequate to provide us with every facility we need just when we want it, this extra effort must be organised and well led, to help ourselves as far as we can. This extra effort can be used on Station Maintenance, to replace broken windows, re-painting quarters and firming up paths and standings.
But, in conclusion, remember the buildings etc., on the Station are Air Ministry property so don’t knock down that Guard Room without first obtaining authority from the higher formation – it is really quite embarrassing to stand on Pay Parade and find you have no money to come.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, Col. 1) [/underlined]
It is not done at all even thought the men drown. Recently in Lincoln Swimming Bath an aircrew member who couldn’t swim took the precaution of providing himself with a Mae West and took care to fasten it properly; he then jumped into the bath from the top board – and wasn’t seen for a long time, he eventually came up shouting for help and on being pulled out immediately started blaming his Mae West, only to find that he hadn’t inflated it – it goes to show!!
[Underlined] Note for Gunners. [/underlined] If your Buoyant Suit has no pocket for a floating torch don’t take it that this means you are not to have one – have a pocket fitted. If no pockets are available, you can still wear the torch round your neck inside the suit. Similarly make sure that there is an attachment for the lanyard of the K-dinghy on your suit – if you don’t know then make enquiries [underlined] now [/underlined]
IN “Air Sea Rescue” the proverb is:-
[Underlined] “YOU CAN BE TOO LATE TO LEARN”. [/underlined]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] CARE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As one goes about the Stations, it is obvious that equipment in general is not being cared for as it might, or rather as it should. There is no doubt whatever that at the present time, especially owing to the shortage of materials, we must make the best use of that which has been given to us. There is a feeling that the Government is a good firm and that “there is plenty more where that came from”. That may be true in certain respects, but as this war goes on, demands will increase, but whether the material will be there to meet our needs is another matter; so it is up to everyone [sic] of us to safeguard, handle and use articles of equipment entrusted to us as though they were our own and we had paid for them. Can you imagine yourself buying an expensive article and then after a short time throwing it away because perhaps a small component of it had become unserviceable! Of course you wouldn’t, you would get another part and make it serviceable. Why should you not, therefore, treat Government property in the same way, and thus save materials, manpower, man-hours and money?
[Underlined] REPAIRABLE EQUIUPMENT [/underlined]
Have you read, thoroughly digested and understood AMO A.736/43? This order gives in great detail the method for disposal of repairable equipment. Amongst the many important things one has to do, none is greater than the labelling of an unserviceable article correctly, for if this is not done (i) you are likely to get it thrown back at you by the Equipment Officer – which may mean humping a heavy article back to where it came from, or (ii) you will have to wait for the new article in exchange for the old until you present it in its proper form; thus considerable manpower and time has been unnecessarily expended. Again, if the label does not state the reason for unserviceability of the item, when it gets back to the R.E.D. many more man-hours are lost investigating the cause and extent of its unserviceability, whereas had the label borne the exact cause of failure, the mechanic at the R.E.D. whose job it is to repair such equipment, could have repaired it with the minimum of delay. Special labels are available for this type of equipment (see A.M.O. N.1174/43) – ensure you have a plentiful supply, and use ‘em.
WHO?
Thoroughness is a virtue which we view
With envy, and with admiration too;
And we, in common fairness must agree,
That rarely in a fellow man have we
Encountered such tenacity and drive
As led him on a recent day to strive,
And show his humble tyros how ‘tis done
To fly an aircraft properly, and shun
The common errors that all pupils make.
Enthusiasm prompted him to take
An aircraft up, and as they turned he spoke
“A broken undercarriage is no joke,
And if you swing on take-off you will find
Your legs will go; you’ll sit on your behind!”
Then as he spoke he swung to demonstrate
And proved his words.
……….he met his forecast fate!!
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR * SEA * RESCUE
A man suffering from shock or the after effects of great mental strain usually behaves in a most peculiar manner, as his brain has become numbed and does not function properly. It is on this account that it is necessary for aircrews to practice dinghy drills and have a sound knowledge of safety and rescue equipment carried in their aircraft and also of the equipment that might be dropped to them in the sea.
A crew of this Group was recently forced down in the sea and an airborne lifeboat was dropped to them – they dug about and found the sleeping suits but did not use them as it was considered that, in the crews wet state, these would not be of any use; similarly because the “Everhot” bags had been immersed they did not attempt to use them, thinking that they would be useless! Normally these men are not the “dim clots” you are now calling them – they are an outstanding example of how dim your brain can become after a climax of mental strain, and also of how insufficient knowledge of equipment can be the cause of much unnecessary suffering. Imagine it – wet through, at sea in a small boat on a cold winter’s day, and the means of warming themselves discarded as useless!
In addition, this same crew showed abysmal ignorance of the ditching stations to be taken up – the two gunners ditched with their [underlined] backs [/underlined] to the flap jack and the flight engineer was badly out of position with his back to the rear spar. As this aircraft broke its back at the rear spar, it is logical to suppose that each of these men, had they taken up their correct stations would have been alive today – the flight engineer should have been on the rest bed and the two gunners probably broke their backs on impact, they should have been facing the other way round with their backs on the floor, and “buttocks to flap jack with feet over it”.
Many flying men still seem to have the idea that fully inflated Mae West makes escape through the upper exits of an aircraft difficult. This is not true and tests have shown that the biggest and smallest members can easily “evacuate” Lancasters and Stirlings with a fully inflated Mae West. Inflate your Mae West when your Dinghy Drills provides – experience has shown time and again that unless this is done at the proper time
(Continued on Page 13 Col. 2.)
OPERATIONS
Until the moth was half spent and the “fighter” moon had been allowed to wane, the Group was unable to stage a major attack, although 617 Squadron found two opportunities to add further to their history. Nevertheless, the 1000 sorties mark was again achieved of which 89.7% were successful in attacking the primary targets, with 3.3% casualties. The lull in operational activity, however, was not allowed to pass unprofitably, as can be evidenced in the record figure of 226 aircraft airborne on the 15/16th.
With the progress of the month it became clear that the immediate objective of the Allied Air Command was to strike and crush Germany’s air strength at its source, by a sustained and co-ordinated air offensive against factories associated with aircraft production. To this end LIMOGES featured as the Group’s first assignment on the 8/9th. Until that night, memorable as indeed it must be to those “locals” who were fortunate enough to remain spectators, The Gnome and Rhone aero-engine factory was producing in the region of 50 engines per month for the Axis. Immediate assessment of the results was greatly facilitated by excellent night photographs and a particularly impressive cine film which was eloquent testimony to the accuracy of the marking. It is now apparent from P.R.U. cover following the raid, that of the 48 bays comprising the factory, 7 only have escaped destruction or serious damage – a considerable part of the machinery being wrecked and production brought to a standstill.
On 12/13th February, ANTHEOR again bore a charmed life, and escaped with no direct hits from an attack pressed home in the face of increased opposition. A few very near misses were recorded, from which, however, the Viaduct sustained no apparent damage.
Having husbanded her main bomber strength until 15/16th., Command directed a record effort against the Reich capital. The weight of the blow appears to have fallen to the South of the city and the West of the Potsdamer Railway Station, where extensive damage can be observed.
Continuing the offensive against the enemy’s aircraft industry, LEIPZIG was singled out for a 2,300 ton raid on the 19/20th. Within a few hours of this attack, made in conditions of 10/10ths cloud, American heavies returned in daylight with yet another load for the battered city. Photographic confirmation of the results is awaited with interest.
The night following, viz 20/21st. STUTTGART received a damaging blow – the attack being carried out against an apparently weakening Luftwaffe, since little enemy fighter activity was experienced by our crews. Heavy smoke rolling South Westwards away from the target obscured the Central, South and South Western areas of the town, hindering photographic cover the next day, but fires still burning, apparently unchecked, in the Northern outskirts, gave rise to the impression (later confirmed) that severe damage had been suffered.
The strain on the German night fighter and ground defences was further aggravate on 24/25th by a two-phase attack on the important ball and roller bearing plant at SCHWEINFURT, which originally contributed something approaching 50 per cent of the total production available to Germany. This attack followed closely in the wake of a heavy daylight assault by the Americans. Guided by fires started by their predecessors, later aircraft were able to continue the bombardment which largely wrecked the group of factories as a war time centre.
The month’s activities wound up with a double blow at AUGSBURG on 25/26th. The targets included the Messerschmitt plant and experimental establishment (believed to be engaged in the production of the Me.410) and the M.A.N. Diesel Engine Factory. Following the precedent of the previous day, this important aircraft centre had been attacked in daylight a few hours before by the Americans, and the evidence of night photographs taken during the raid indicates that enormous fires were left burning throughout the area, with a vast pall of smoke shrouding the stricken city.
It is true to say that never before has the enemy’s war production been so heavily bombed, or their defences subjected to such continued strain as that imposed during the sustained attacks of the last nine days of the month, which in themselves exemplify the crushing might of the Allied co-ordinated offensive.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft, hours flow, bombs dropped, sorties carried out and results by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 19. February, 1944.
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V Group News, February 1944
5 Group News, February 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 19, February 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about tactics, navigation, air bombing, gardening, sports, training, flying control, H2S, Gee, photography, honours and awards, signals / radar, armament, link trainer hours, war savings, flight engineers, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, aircrew volunteers, engineering, gunnery, motor transport and flying accidents, self help, equipment, who?, air sea rescue, operations and the war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-02
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-23
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
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1944-02
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
civil defence
control tower
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Scampton
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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[Underlined] 53 Base Commander [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
JANUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] [indecipherable] * NUMBER 18
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The final battle of Germany has now been joined. The enemy has been forced to concentrate two-thirds of his whole fighter strength for the protection of his citied, thus providing a classis example of the way in which air superiority, contrary to popular opinion, is won as much by the bomber as by the fighter. Crews should know that the superiority which the Russian Air Force enjoys on the Eastern Front, with all that this means to Russian military operations, is largely their doing; and the same is true of the Italian theatre.
This massing of the German fighter strength in an attempt to stop our attacks and those of the U.S.S.A.F.E. calls for serious thought on our part. In the long run the effect of the combined R.A.F. and American attacks will reduce the German fighter production so that they will be unable to support their present first line units, and the force will slowly diminish, but this is not a result which can be expected immediately, and much hard fighting lays ahead.
Bomber attacks are planned to reach the target having encountered as little opposition as possible. This is achieved by taking advantage of weather which will keep fighters on the ground, or involve them in great hazards if they take off; by careful routeing; by feint attacks; and by the full use of the radio offensive which prevents orders reaching the German pilots. In spite of this planning, scheming and foxing, a proportion of fighters are bound to get into the bomber stream. It is then that the tactics of the individual crews win or lose the battle.
There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand it may be considered that the sole duty of a crew is to reach the target and bomb it. Therefore, it is said it is imprudent to become involved in any fighting, and a crew should do its best to avoid combat and only open fire if directly attacked, and then only after failing to shake off the fighter by manoeuvre. On the other hand, while accepting that it is the object of the bomber to reach the target, refusal to engage in combat, while possibly safeguarding the individual, may by no means be the best for the force as a whole.
The German night fighter pilot must pray fervently that crews will adopt the first policy, for then he can cruise in the bomber stream unconcerned, except to find and stalk an unsuspecting prey. He will not be shot at by a bomber, which he has failed to see below him or to one side, and he can devote his whole attention to manoeuvring for the final shot. In other words he has a job almost free from the hazards of war, and as a result he will grow fat, and gain in skill and experience, and, therefore, in his ability to do us harm.
Now consider the other policy – to shoot at every German aircraft within range. About that policy I will say this. Firstly, that it is in general the duty of every combatant officer and man of any of His Majesty’s Forces to attempt by every means in their power, to destroy such of the King’s enemies as come within range. Secondly, that execution of this duty will aid the security of the bomber force as a whole, and, therefore, of the individual crew.
The matter is not, however, entirely straightforward, and there are two situations which have to be considered. Firstly, one in which a crew sees an enemy fighter not in a position to attack them but attacking, or about to attack, another bomber. They should be prepared to go in and shoot it down. At the foot of this foreword will be found some selected combats in which crews have acted in this way. They acted rightly, and deserve the congratulations of all in the Group, for they saved the lives of other crews, and rid us of pests who, if not destroyed, will quickly become adept at the art of killing at night.
The second situation is more complicated. A crew know, from their early warning device, that a fighter is nosing after them, and will soon be in a position to attack. Should they continue on their course until it is within range, and then attempt to shoot it down? Emphatically no – because the fighter in these circumstances has certain advantages which will give him temporarily the upper hand. The crew should carry out the standard corkscrew, remembering that this is designed to give the Gunners a standard deflection shot, known to them but not to the fighter pilot. Hence the importance of keeping to the exact standard speeds, rates of turn, loss and gain in height etc., set out in 5 Group Tactical Notes. Any other manoeuvre executed in the heat of action will provide the Gunners with deflection shots which, with present equipment, they have no means of calculating, but which the fighter pilot will find no more, and probably less, difficult to assess than the corkscrew.
Thus, while the standard corkscrew can be used as a manoeuvre for disengaging from enemy fighters, it is also a manoeuvre – and in fact the only manoeuvre – which we can employ and at the same time shoot accurately. Different speeds or rates of turn, or any skid or slip, may cause the Gunner to miss by 40 feet or more. In particular, too high a speed on the downward legs will lessen the rate of turn and, therefore, provide an easier shot for the fighter.
The policy outlined above was first set out in June, 1943. Over the following four months the Group shot down 58 fighters, but recently the numbers have been less, because I believe some crews are in doubt as to the correct action to take.
There is one final point; there must be no firing at an aircraft unless it is identified beyond any reasonable doubt. There have been instances in the past of Lancasters firing on other Lancasters, and there can be no justification for this.
To sum up, every crew in the Group should know that weather – routes – spoof targets and all other devices at the disposal of Bomber Command – are used to out-manoeuvre the German Fighter Force. It can only be out-fought if every crew in the Group is ready to “FORCE HIS WAY IN AND FIGHT HIS WAY OUT”. By that means we shall reduce the power of the German fighter to do us harm, to our own lasting advantage.
Need I add that the Air Gunners are playing a more and more vital part in the success of the bomber offensive. It is their quickness of eye and hand which determines success or disaster – but they are gravely handicapped if the pilot does not keep to the standard corkscrew, and may be caught unawares if the Wireless Operator relaxes his watch on his Monica or Fishpond tube. Such, then, is the team on which we rely to defeat the enemy fighters.
[Underlined] 23/24th August, 1943. J/207. [/underlined] Twin-engined enemy aircraft attacking another aircraft at 800 yards range. Rear gunner opened fore at 700 yards. Enemy aircraft broke in two and hit the ground in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 22/23rd November, 1943. P/619. [/underlined] Rear gunner saw ME109 attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster “P” turned starboard and Rear Gunner opened fire at 200 yards range and scored hits. ME.109 reversed and dived violently to port, emitting flames. Enemy aircraft disappeared in the cloud, after which an explosion was seen. ME.109 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 26/27th November, 1943. Z/44. [/underlined] Rear gunner sighted ME.210 flying to attack another Lancaster ahead. Lancaster Z corkscrewed and both gunners opened fire at 800 y ards [sic] range. Enemy aircraft followed the corkscrew and fired a burst which went well above [sic] Both gunners kept firing short burst, registering hits. Enemy aircraft seen to disintegrate by another crew, and ME.210 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 16/17th December, 1943. A/44. [/underlined] ME.109 sighted 600 yards range parallel, following another Lancaster. ME.109 opened fire on another Lancaster who did not return fire. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits. ME.109 burst into flames and disintegrated. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 30/31st January,1944.U/44. [/underlined] Over target area Rear Gunner sights ME.210 800 yards down attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster U was corkscrewing on a Monica IIIA indication. Rear Gunner opened fire and strikes were observed. Enemy aircraft dived away with port engine on fire. Last seen entering cloud in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographs with plottable ground detail obtained during January, was 73; these were almost entirely due to the conditions prevailing during the Stettin raid. For the remaining raids, the presence of heavy cloud caused the majority of technical successful exposures to be placed into the Target Conditions category.
Failures for the month were 58, which represents 5.4%. These failures can be reduced considerably if the personnel concerned will make the necessary effort, and it is suggested that still more co-operation is needed between the Bombing Leaders, Electrical, Armament and Photographic personnel in tracing the causes and ensuring that failures are not repeated. The first step in film fault analysis is to decide the ‘bombing frame’; failure to do this correctly will normally cause the investigation to be abortive and a complete waste of time.
There is reason to think that insufficient care is being exercised when setting the fusing time on the Type 35 Control. It is of the utmost importance that the fuse setting and the Type 35 Control are identical. Squadron photographers must realise that the setting is extremely critical, and even a small misadjustment of the Control Setting Knob will normally be sufficient to cause the flash illumination to be misplaced, and may therefore be considered a ‘pick-up’, resulting in a theoretical failure.
A new method of Night Photography is being tried out by Nos. 44 and 49 Squadrons. This is the use of Kodacolour film on frames Nos. 3 and 4 and H.S. night film on the remaining frames. The object of this composite Colour and Black and White is to photograph any T.I’s and Sky Markers in colour and at the same time to procure ground detail on Frame 5 by the illumination provided by the photo flash if conditions permit. The Photographic Section, R.A.F., Scampton, have undertaken to make up and process the films, and with full co-operation of the Station Workshops, have produced some very fine work.
It is too early to forecast whether this new method will generally be adopted. Much depends on the value of interpretation, supply of Kodacolour and technical equipment, but so far results are very promising.
[Table of Photographic analysis results by Squadron]
[Table of Photographic failure analysis results by Squadron]
A.S.R. (CONTINUED)
(Continued from back page Col. 1)
follows :-
(i) 256 aircrew lost their lives when other members of their crews were saved, which gives a strong indication of incorrect dinghy drill being carried out.
(ii) 23 lost their lives after having been sighted in dinghies – weather and lack of knowledge of searching procedure were the main causes for this.
(iii) 663 are known to have come down in the sea but no S.O.S. signal was transmitted making search almost impossible.
(iv) 280 disappeared over the sea without word or trace.
The above figures show that aircrews generally have a very sad lack of knowledge of what to do in the event of an emergency over the sea, both as regards W/T procedure and dinghy drills. A tremendous amount of money has been spent building up the Air Sea Rescue Service, and in providing safety equipment for aircrews, all of which can work satisfactorily with the full co-operation of the aircrews for whose benefit they have been designed.
When you bale out over enemy territory, your future welfare depends on your own initiative [underlined] after [/underlined] you have come to earth, but the reverse holds good in baling out over the sea or ditching. Emergency incidents over the sea depend for their success on full crew co-operation and knowledge of W/T procedure and dinghy drills – all of which must be gained [underlined] before [/underlined] the incident occurs.
One hour a week spent on the study of search procedure, emergency and S.O.S. W/T procedure, and dinghy drills, is sufficient to ensure that you will never be caught unprepared in case of emergency over the sea.
[Underlined] HELP A.S.R. TO HELP YOU [/underlined]
OPERATIONS
It would perhaps not be inopportune in the first month of the New Year, to reflect on one of the most valuable technical inovations introduced this time last year, and which is to-day largely instrumental in waging the Battle of Berlin with unabated vigour. It was just a year ago that blind bombing was first on trial and an analysis of its success or otherwise was anxiously awaited. This month, with the aid of this technique, we were enabled to conduct seven raids on Berlin, and one each on Brunswick and Magdeburg. Stettin alone, to its everlasting regret, was cloud free. 1341 sorties were flown, of which 89% were successful in attacking the primary. Increased fighter activity and the long range at which targets were attacked perhaps accounted for the rather higher loss rate of 4.6%.
At the beginning of this month, Hitler declared “The Winter may be difficult. Its blows, however, cannot hit us harder than last year”. The month was not out before this illusion was shattered by a sustained series of attacks on the Nazi capital, bringing the tonnage dropped since the beginning of the Battle of Berlin, to over 24,500 tons. One is perhaps best able to appreciate the magnitude of this figure when it is borne in mind that 50,000 tons would “Hamburgise” Berlin. The latest reconnaissance to secure photographic evidence of the raids up to and including 2/3rd January, was made on 4th January, but only poor quality photographs of parts of the city (excluding in particular the centre) were obtained. These however revealed important industrial damage in the Johannisthal district to the South East, with severe damage to several less important business and residential areas. It is interesting to note that in a statement issued by Transocean on 7th January, it was estimated that the damage sustained up to that date would take some 7 1/2 years to rebuild.
Little is yet known of the remaining 4 major attacks of the month against the Reich capital on 20/21st, 27/28th, 28/29th and 30/31st, except that reports suggest they were concentrated. Ground information points to the significant fact that with the possible exception of the North Eastern outer suburbs of the city, not a district in the capital has escaped. Impressive as this picture is , it really affords no index to the scale of administrative dislocation which must be a most acute problem for the Nazis; added to which the paralysis of the focus of German was industry and transport, together with the ever increasing influence of the raids on that intangible factor, morale, would also appear to promote a depressing effect on the Hun’s capacity to wage war.
The attack on Stettin on 5/6th January, provided adequate material for our reports. The blanket of cloud, which for some time past has shrouded the continent, was absent at the target, enabling the snow outlined town to be clearly identified. The resultant attack was well concentrated, and P.R.U. cover indicates severe damage in the Southern half of the town centre, extending into the West and East basins of the dock area. Ten buildings of the large military barracks to the South of the town have been gutted, and fairly heavy damage was sustained by business and residential property. The same night a
(Continued on page 4, col. 1)
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT RATE INCREASES
Halfway through January, it was apparent that the excellent accident figure for December was not to be repeated, and the number of avoidable accidents, of all kinds, by the end of the month was nearly doubled – 18 against 10.
This month’s total is made up as follows: Ground collisions – 9; Overshoots on landing – 3; Heavy landings – 1; Swings on take-off – 1; Other errors of judgement – 3.
In spite of all that has been done and written about “ground collisions” there has been no decrease whatsoever in these avoidable accidents. This month there were again 9, and they follow much the same patter as those of December, with this difference:-
Two aircraft were damaged in dispersal while being run up by ground crew, through chocks slipping on greasy surfaces. In both instances the aircraft swung round and collided with obstacles.
It has been a long time since an accident of this type occurred in the Group. The remedy is obvious. Ground crews must examine all chocks for serviceability, keep dispersals well sanded, and, above all, never start to run up engines until the dispersal is clear of obstructions. It is the old, old story of a little foresight paying a big dividend.
During this month a taxying incident occurred in which a major contributory factor was the failure of a captain of aircraft and of ground crew to notify Flying Control quickly that a Lancaster was obstructing the perimeter track. The aircraft had become bogged in soft ground just off the track at night, and was struck by another Lancaster taxying, without an aldis lamp, and at excessive speed.
Flying Control, had they known, could have taken immediate steps to have the aircraft marked as an obstruction, and could have warned other captains of its position.
This accident adds emphasis to the warning in last Month’s News that ground crew should make every effort to let pilots know of obstructions. The captain of this particular Lancaster showed bad captaincy in not notifying Flying Control, and also in leaving his aircraft in charge of ground crew when he knew it was in a dangerous position.
Needless to say, the pilot of the moving aircraft had his log book endorsed in “RED”.
The 3 “overshoots on landing” this month bring out the usual pilot error – too fast an approach in bad visibility and failure to go round again. If the various factors of height, speed, cockpit drill etc., are not correct, it is no use “hoping you’ll stop in time”. It might be all right nine times out of ten, but the tenth means another Lancaster in a heap at the end of the runway.
One crash occurred again this month on a 3-engined overshoot. The pilot was an experienced captain with many Lancaster hours to his credit, yet he [underlined] failed to keep in trim for 3 engined flying [/underlined] on his approach. When the engines were opened up to full power, the inevitable swing caught him unawares. Result was a bad crash with fatal consequences.
Drills and instructions are not issued by this Headquarters just to be read and forgotten, so if there are any you are not sure about, now is the time to brush up your knowledge. [Underlined] You [/underlined] will reap the benefit.
Conversion Units had a bad time this month. The total of nine “avoidables” exceeds the total of all the Squadrons put together. Winthorpe had four. 1660, 1654 and 5 L.F.S. had one each. 1485 Flight had two taxying accidents.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
FRESHMEN
1. Remember the lowest fuel consumption is not obtained when you are flying at the lowest possible speed. With the increased angle of attack of the wings at a low speed, you get increased drag and consequently require a greater power output. Neither maximum endurance nor maximum range will be obtained by flying as slowly as you can, so don’t “waffle” around the sky hanging on to your props. If you are getting short of petrol and have got a long way to go, try 2000 revs + 3 boost. That will give you a healthy airspeed, economical petrol consumption and excellent range.
2. You know why you can expect climbing difficulties on warm nights? The air is thinner at a given aeronoid height and so increases the true air speed at which the aircraft must be flown and the power required to fly it. The thinner air also reduces the charge drawn in to the engine and so reduces the power available.
3. Don’t sheer off track because you see pinpoints of flak dead ahead. It may be anything up to 100 miles away and as you get closer you will find that your route will probably bypass the flak area. Flak which explodes with a large orange coloured flash is within 15 mls and is quite harmless. It is only when you can hear or feel it that it is within 250 feet and getting dangerous. If you SMELL it, well get cracking.
[Cartoon]
4. Always take a note at Briefing of the times of the other waves in the attack in case you strike trouble on the way and cannot make good your T.O.T. Aim to make good the T.O.T. of another wave. It is safer to be bombing with bags of company.
5. Give your Navigator as good a platform for his Astro shots as you give your Air Bomber for his bombing run. Hand over to “George” if your instrument flying is not 100% and let the Navigator know the moment you consider the aircraft is as stable as it is likely to be.
6. If you use Caffein tablets it is a good plan to take one as you leave the English Coast outward bound. That will see you to the target. Take another when you are clear of the defences to see you home. Never take any just before take-off. Once upon a time there was a mid-upper gunner who took four tablets 10 minutes before take-off. The “Op” was scrubbed. The gunner wasn’t seen for 24 hours after he eventually went to sleep about noon the next day. Then he was posted !
VETERANS
1. Don’t get out of touch with existing orders. You have read them once, but only by constantly referring to the Flight Order books can you be sure that you have got them buttoned up. Just one example – never take off rudder bias on the approach for a 3-engined landing. You can easily control any tendency to swing after landing, but if you have to overshoot on 3 engines, the bias is the only thing that will enable you to control the immediate swing towards the dead engine at full power. If the swing is not controlled the result is fatal.
2. Another word on overshoots. You can still overshoot even though you are in the green of the G.P.I. and the airspeed is O.K. This circumstance may arise if your initial approach has been too low and you have used the extra engine to get back into the Green. Don’t forget once you have made good the undershoot throttle back again and get your angle of descent right.
3. Don’t attempt to raise flaps after landing when you have “pulled the bottle”, because there is a danger of bursting the header tank. If in an emergency you have to raise flaps in the air after pulling the bottle, do so slowly and in stages.
4. If you have to jettison fuel, close the valve while there is still 75 to 100 gallons in each tank. It is a precaution against fire, because the last 30 gallons of jettisonable fuel runs out slowly and splashes over the airframe. Never jettison if you are going to do a wheels up landing when there is any likelihood of fire.
5. Never take off flap during an approach if you suddenly decide you don’t want flap in a very high wind. The lowering of the flap increases the lift coefficient of a wing and any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the stalling speed being increased above the approach speed.
6. Get together regularly with the other members of your crew behind a hangar or in the crew room and exchange ideas on your recent trips. There’s bound to be a few points in crew routine that need patching up. Don’t wait until there is a party in the Sergeants’ Mess before you find out that the crew have a thing or two on their minds.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
WIND MESSAGES
Bomber Command Signals Staff Instructions commence with an “Order of the Day” by the C.-in-C. which says that :- “The tradition of the Signals Service is that the safety of aircraft overrides every other consideration and every other interest…The Signals Service aspires never to lose an aircraft”.
Since this message was originated, many and varied aids have been introduced falling within the purview of the Signals Service which attain towards the achievement of this objective.
It is generally agreed that losses in the main bomber force may be considerably reduced if a high degree of concentration of aircraft during the route to and from the target, and at the target itself, can be effected.
Radar/Navigation aids fitted to many aircraft now make it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy, the velocity and direction of winds at the height and in the area of the main force. The means of communicating this to the Meteorological staffs on the ground, and of passing to every aircraft on the force the assessment of accurate winds on their route, is the responsibility of the Signals Service.
This method has been in use since towards the end of the Old Year, and, from the signals aspect, has been successful. The method used has been for wind-finding aircraft to transmit their winds to the Base D/F Station, and the ground staff to transmit the wind assessment to the main force on Group operational frequency.
The transmissions by Wind Finders to Bases gives an increase on the number of channels, with a better spread over of the volume of traffic at any one time. To ensure that every message which can possibly be received, is received, an additional watch is maintained at each Base on a normal receiver, and a watch, on each frequency in use, at Group Headquarters. The watch at Group Headquarters serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables received winds to be in the Meteorological Officers’ hands in the minimum time, and secondly, provides an additional check on the Base D/F frequencies. Any Wind Finding aircraft unable to establish satisfactory communication on its Base frequency, reverts to the Group operational frequency, and by these means we have been successful in receiving almost 100% of wind finding messages transmitted. There have been two occasions when conditions on the 3 to 4 m/c band made communication rather difficult, and in order to provide an additional channel should this re-occur, an allotment of a frequency in the 7 m/c band has been obtained. The results of this frequency on similar occasions, should they arise, are awaited with interest.
The reception of the wind assessments by the main force has been good, but could be improved. Generally, the number of messages missed has been in the region of 2.5% of the total which should have been received.
The loop aerial has proved a reliable selectivity device, and it should always be tried when other efforts to get rid of jamming fail.
GEE
The introduction of new equipment leaves Radar Sections less time for standard Gee maintenance. It is gratifying to note that, in spite of this, the serviceability remains high. There are however, numerous unnecessary faults, which render the equipment difficult to use, or completely unserviceable. Great care should be taken to prevent slipshod D.I’s, and faults such as leads off etc. Many Squadrons are still reporting divider trouble, indicating that the necessary modification has not been completed. If this is due to a shortage of equipment, ask the Equipment Officer to expedite.
AURAL MONICA
Aural Monica is slowly disappearing. Many crews would, however, like to keep Monica, even though they now have Fishpond. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the Radar Sections to maintain both installations in all aircraft.
VISUAL MONICA
This installation remains a most effective and valuable Radar aid. Serviceability is high in comparison with other equipment, but to be a first class warning device, 100 per cent serviceability is required. Switch motors have caused nearly one third of Visual Monica failures, but it is hoped that this trouble will soon be cleared, since the correct type of grease has now been found. Next month should show a large increase in serviceability. Unfortunately, there is no more equipment available, so squadrons must ensure that no sets remain unserviceable, or are destroyed, through careless maintenance. Many crews already owe much to Visual Monica. Don’t let the lack of serviceability spoil a first class device.
H 2 S
The fitting of H 2 S is greatly retarded by the shortage of scanners. It is impossible to fit all H 2 S aircraft in the existing squadrons, and so there is little likliehood [sic] of fitting new H 2 S squadrons for some time. Last month’s problem, freezing scanners, appears to have been corrected by use of anti-freeze oil and repositioning of the scanner heater. A new snag is now appearing in the slowing down of the repeater motors. Radar Sections should contact Instrument people for information regarding the correct type of oil to use on the motor bearings. A new pulse transformer has been designed and trials are being conducted. It is hoped that a large percentage of the very numerous H 2 S failures will now be prevented.
FISHPOND
Fishpond fitting still continues slowly, hampered by the connector shortage. Trained crews are getting very good results, but it is necessary to emphasise that Wireless Operators should spend considerable time on the Fishpond trainer. A few extra minutes learning to use the set correctly may well save many an unpleasant trip.
MONICA AND FISHPOND TRAINING
Now that all available sets have been fitted, a drive has started to eliminate preventable failures. Aircraft are being deprived of the protection of a tail warning device during entire sorties, simply because one plug is loose, or a fuse blown. We must make full use of every available set and to do this, Operators must be given a greater insight into the workings thereof. Fault finding tables – with sketches of what the CRT shows for various faults – are being prepared.
Various synthetic training schemes have been evolved, including a series of cards showing typical “blip” pictures with the appropriate patter printed underneath. A similar set of cards without the patter is used to test the Operator’s reactions.
An epidiascope is being used by one Squadron, and lifelike “blips” are introduced up and down the time base, and shown on the screen for brief intervals.
Which squadron will produce the best synthetic training device?
Signals and Radar officers – are you getting that occasional flight? (See A.M.O. A.1323/43). You should all have flown with Monica or Fishpond by now. Don’t forget to enter your trips in the old log book.
WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR)
[Underlined] (CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO LOOK) [/underlined]
The article on wind finding from the signals aspect, which heads this Section of the News, should be read and digested by all Wireless Operators.
The Group W/T Exercise has improved this month, but Section I are definitely superior to Section II, and should any Operators of Section II doubt the truth of this statement they may like to do a little eavesdropping. After all, the ether is free.
This month’s three star effort for air operating was the performance by Wireless Operator Sgt. Barnes Moss of No.61 Squadron (formerly of 1661 Con. Unit and 16 O.T.U.), on the night of 5/6th January. The aircraft “J”Jig was severely damaged over the target, the port outer engine being rendered unserviceable, resulting in a loss of the Gee facilities. Sgt. Barnes Moss rose to the occasion and managed 12 fixes, 1 bearing and 1 message, keeping a good log, and also receiving the odd Group broadcast at the same time. It would appear that this Wireless Operator set about his job with calm determination, and was partly responsible for the safe return of his aircraft to this country, and in doing so proved a credit to his Squadron, captain and crew.
(continued on Page 12, Col.1)
(Continued from Page 2, Col.3)
small force of our aircraft successfully laid mines.
Although for the moment we are without precise information as to the result of the raids on Brunswick on 14/15th, and against Magdeburg and Berlin on 21/22nd, preliminary reports show promise of impressive returns. These attacks will contribute to the nomadic population of the Reich, and provide a tinge of irony to the announcement in a Frankfurt paper that “Evacuees are not gypsies but Germans”.
Thus ends the first month of our “decisive year, boasting a new record tonnage dropped on Germany itself – a portent of the scale of future operations.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
It was at the beginning of May, 1943, that the initial drive on greater accuracy in practice bombing was commenced throughout the Group. Very good co-operation by the Squadrons within the Group led to most intensified training, so much so that in the months of May, June, July and August a grand total of 23,310 bombs were dropped. This total almost equalled the number of bombs that were dropped in the preceding [underlined] 4 years. [/underlined] However, one fact emerged, namely the average error was remaining at approximately the same figure, and that this figure, 220 yards, was still much too high.
September heralded the introduction of bombing analysis. F/Lt. Cooper, an expert analyst was attached to us from No. 25 Group and travelled from Squadron to Squadron to implement the Group’s very scanty knowledge of assessment of bombing. Thus, slowly we learned the way bombing errors are split into certain definite categories. The first major item which was tackled was the bombsight maintenance, which had contributed no small portion of bombing errors; and by the end of November, errors directly attributable to bombsight defects were almost eliminated.
We next learned that the main error, called Crew Error, had two components. The error caused by the failings of Pilot and Air Bomber, and the Vector Error, that is the error due to the use of faulty wind velocities.
The Pilot and Air Bomber’s error was tackled with considerable vigour until, by the end of December we were really getting down to very small proportions. 106 Squadron for instance, dropped 182 bombs from High Level during December for an average Pilot/Air Bomber error of 78 yards, an astonishingly good achievement. 619 Squadron with 101 yards, 467 with 115 yards and 50 and 463 Squadrons with 116 and 117 yards respectively were close behind.
However, and now we come to the major bombing problem, our Crew Errors were still too large because our average Vector Errors were much too high.
November/December and January has shown the gradual appreciation of this Vector Error problem, and in the Squadrons where bombing is accepted as the be-all and end-all of 5 Group (and their number is ever-increasing) the problem is a matter of real concern. The Group’s average Vector Error for November was 169 yards at 10,000 feet, in in December 162 yards, and these figures convert to roughly 13 m.p.h. A good Vector Error is considered to be 5 m.p.h. (that is 60 yards at 10,000 feet) and it is to this figure Crews must make their way.
When this is achieved, and it will come only with the greatest flying care by the pilots and the most accurate plotting, timing and computing by the Navigators, then a crew will be able to take up 6 bombs, drop them in a close group of less than 50 yards radius with the Mean Point of Impact less than 70 yards from the target. Then, and not until then, can we call ourselves BOMBER CREWS.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt.Walmsley) submits the following “Stop Press” news on the Vector Error problem.
(continued in next column)
“ F/O. Ingleby, a Navigator of 619 Squadron has spent a great deal of time on trying to find out why such large Vector Errors occur. He back-plotted a navigator’s bombing wind, [underlined] to a much larger scale, [/underlined] and discovered that a 15 seconds error in timing over 6-7 minutes gave a Vector Error of 10 m.p.h., that is 130 yards at 10,000 feet. “
The wind found, in the words of the Navigator, brought us from Nottingham to Base on E.T.A. “
Agreed that such a wind would, because an error up to 300-400 yards in track and 1/2 to 1 second in time is almost unnoticeable, but it is such small and apparently insignificant Navigation Errors that cause displacement of bombs from the target to distances up to 200 to 250 yards away.
COMPETITION BOMBING
A much better show was put up by the Squadrons this month in the Competition, the results of which are as follows:-
Pilot & Air Bombers Navigators
1st 106 Sqdn – 58 yds 1st 630 Sqdn – 87 yds
2nd 619 Sqdn – 82 yds 2nd 106 Sqdn - 124 yds
3rd 630 Sqdn – 92 yds 3rd 619 Sqdn – 183 yds
4th 57 Sqdn – 118 yds 4th 57 Sqdn – 264 yds
Further entries with less than [underlined] 8 [/underlined] qualifying exercises.
5th 50 Sqdn – 74 yds 5th 467 Sqdn -110 yds
6th 463 Sqdn -129 yds 6th 50 Sqdn – 119 yds
7th 61 Sqdn -145 yds 7th 61 Sqdn -163 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -158 yds 8th 463 Sqdn -165 yds
9th 207 Sqdn -165 yds 9th 44 Sqdn -176 yds
10th 44 Sqdn -221 yds 10th 207 Sqdn -220 yds
No entries were submitted by 9 & 49 Sqdns. Next month we want a TOTAL all-out effort!
[Table of High Level Bombing Training by Squadron showing Error Rates]
[Underlined] OUTSTANDING BOMBING DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 10,000 ft.
[Underlined] 9 W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined] F/O. Prior P/O. Gall 66 yds
[Underlined] 50 F/O. Robinson [/underlined] F/O. Lavery Sgt. Sanderson 84 yds
[Underlined] P/O. Dobbyn [/underlined] Sgt. Jackson F/O. Horner 66 yds
61 P/O. Wallis Sgt. Pardoe F/Sgt. Tozer 67 yds
F/O. Fitch F/O. Lyons. F/O. Jennings 86 yds
106 F/O. Latham F/O. Martins F/L. Williamson 89 yds
P/O. Lee F/Sgt. Hoyland F/Sgt. McKie 81 yds
P/O. Gibbs F/O. Cramp F/Sgt. Appleyard 75 yds
F/Sgt. Rosser Sgt. Goss F/Sgt. White 61 yds
F/O. Lee F/O Beven F/O. Langrish 95 & 72 yds
P/O. Pezaro Sgt. Greenwood Sgt. Wade 63 yds
[Underlined] 463 P/O. Saunders [/underlined] Sgt. Govett Sgt. Falconer 84 yds
[Underlined] F/Sgt. James [/underlined] F/Sgt. Bowes F/O. Pettitt 92 yds
630 W/Cdr. Rollinson F/Sgt. Rosser F/L. Ehrman 88 yds
1654 C.U. F/Sgt. Page F/O. Braithwaite F/Sgt. Fair 99 yds
F/Sgt. Perry Sgt. Duncombe Sgt. Hather 84 yds
Sgt. Paterson Sgt. Hall Sgt. Rice 90 yds
1661 C.U. F/Sgt. Falsted F/Sgt. Hancock Sgt. O’Connor 95 yds
617 Squadron obtained 11 exercises with less than 100 yards average error, and the following :
S/Ldr. Suggitt F/O. Davidson W/O. Gordon 30 yds
[Table of Additional Bombing Training by Squadron, including bombs dropped, error, A.M.B.T. hours, infra-red exercises, traces and T. & D. runs & indirect attacks]
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CON)
“GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS
[Underlined] 61 Squadron’s [/UNDERLINED] (F/Lt. McDonald) bombing figures for December failed to include the month’s best week of bombing because the return affecting that week was mislaid. 15 exercises were carried out, 77 bombs being dropped for an average Crew Error at 10,000 feet, of 177 yards. Vector Error averaged 126 yards and Pilot’s and Air Bomber’s error was 129 yards.
Congratulations to the Bombing Staff off [underlined] No. 5 LANCASTER FINISHING SCHOOL, R. A. F. [/underlined] Syerston, who, under the guidance of W/O. Linnett, constructed an excellent small instructional display of ‘Paramatta’ and ‘Wanganui’ attacks showing the danger of incendiaries “creep-back”.
Group Captain Evans-Evans, R.A.F. Coningsby, has pointed out that [underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Walmsley) in the first two weeks of January AIMED 36 day and 54 night Practice Bombs and not one of these 90 bombs were “aimed” below 8,000 feet.
To quote the Station Commander – “a real effort on all crews’ part to bomb as near operational height as possible.”
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S., R.A.F. Syerston [/underlined] (F/Lt.Wonham.) reports the most creditable attainment of 12,300 feet average height for all practice bombing during January. This is what we want !!!
[Underlined] 467 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. McCarthy) reports yet a further “Mod” to the Bomb Aimer’s compartment.
To quote :-
“The stationary lights do not supply illumination to points where they are needed, i.e. the lamp on the bombing instrument panel does not afford enough light to read the pre-selector box and no light is in position to check camera leads. A “wander” light has been installed above the selector box and will supply any part of the nose for any job including map reading”.
5 Group will seek permission to make this modification general as soon as possible.
Thank you, 467 !!!
It is pointed out that [underlined] 49 Squadron [/underlined] are doing a considerable amount of bombing training which does not appear in the normal returns.
This training is in the form of blind bombing using H2S, which is achieving considerable success.
[Underlined] 617 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Hay) reports that average bombing error for December was 90 yards – on one [underlined] operation [/underlined] during January the Squadron’s average error was 94 yards from 12,000 feet. Enough said !!!
In column 2 will be found an article by F/Lt. Hay on the “617” bombing team, as promised in the December issue.
“GEN” FROM WAINFLEET
Despite 8 days and 15 nights unfit for bombing training, Wainfleet plotted [underlined] 2398 [/underlined] bombs dropped by 363 aircraft during the month. All Squadrons used the range for night training, special mention being made of 617, 106, 207 and 619 Squadrons who aimed 155, 60, 51 and 50 bombs respectively.
[Boxed] LATE ENTRY FROM 49 SQUADRON FOR COMPETITION
Bombing Error – 156 yards
Navigator’s Error – 124 yards [/boxed]
THE SECRET OF 617 SQUADRON’S HIGH STANDARD OF PRACTICE BOMBING.
The S.A.B.S. – Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber Team.
The excellent results gained by crews of 617 Squadron using the SABS have only been achieved by the fullest, most practical use of the “Bombing team”. Before any bombs are dropped some four hours training on the specially adapted A.M.B.T. are carried out by the Pilot and Air Bomber to give manipulation practice to the latter, and to familiarise the pilot with the B.D.I. (Bombing Direction Indicator). The Navigator is trained to carry out compution of true height and airspeed, and settings for a given course of attack with the instruments and computers at his disposal. Some 2 - 4 hours are then spent in the air doing “dummy runs”, firstly on objects “on track”, and then choosing targets and “turning on”, and finally on to targets and setting up sight in accordance with settings computed from known navigational data. The sight is only accurate when correct height above target is set. Thus the pilot must fly at the indicated height he states he will be at, the Navigator must correctly compute this to the true height above target, and the Air Bomber set this accurately.
True height is dependent upon :-
(i) [Underlined] Sea Level Pressure at Target. [/underlined] This is gained by setting aerodrome height for practice bombing or, operationally, from Form 2330. It is the Q.F.F. which is set.
(ii) [Underlined] Indicated Height above Sea Level. [/underlined] All 617 Squadron altimeters have been accurately calibrated for every 1000’ for 140 and 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. and from the appropriate card the Navigator allows for this error, which may be up to 300’
(iii) [Underlined] Temperature. [/underlined] “Thermometer, Air, Direct Reading, Mk.I”, now fitted, does not give an accurate reading for temperature of the outside air, as (a) the stem is heated by cabin temperature, and (b) the outside air bearing against the bulb is under pressure varying with airspeed. Both factors tend to give a “warmer” reading than true. Again the Navigator computes from a special computer to get an accurate air temperature.
With these factors and the use of an ICAN computer, true height (c) can be computed. True height above target will need a deduction of target height above sea level, and there will be a further allowance (addition) to be made where stick bombing is being used.
When the pilot advises IAS with aircraft trimmed and bomb doors open, the Navigator computes a T.A.S. which is used against a Trail scale for the appropriate bomb number. Errors of + or – 5 m.p.h. make negligible ground errors. Most errors in range can be traced to (1) flying at other than the indicated height stated by the pilot, (2) incorrect compution of height and/or T.A.S., by the navigator, or (3) by incorrect settings or bad manipulation, by the Air Bomber.
The sight will automatically correct for Drift and Ground Speed if switched on with the target in the graticule, and held there by proper manipulation of the sight by the Air Bomber, and by the pilot following the direction of his B D. I., until such time as the point of release is attained. Those who remember the A.B.S., and who used it to its utmost efficiency, realise that the length of run could be considerably decreased if settings were applied before the run. As the heading of attack is generally known, the navigator just prior to the run, can pass a drift and G/S setting to the Air Bomber. So, after practice, the Air Bomber need only wind his sighting head back for a 25 second run, whereas 40 -50 seconds may be required without these settings.
Let us listen to a typical 617 Squadron bombing run :-
Pilot. “Turning on to a heading of 250°”
Nav. “250° - drift 4° port, G/Setting 17”
A/B acknowledges, directs pilot on and calls “Run stated”, at the appropriate moment. After 30 seconds of concentration, but silence, by Pilot and Air Bomber, we hear :-
A/B. “ Bombs gone, good run here, drift 3° port, G/S 16.5 “, and after time of fall “ Bomb plotted, 10 yards overshoot “.
Pilot. “Sorry, my fault, I was 120 ft. high!!
When results are received from the Range, the team assembles about the plotting table to further sort out factors causing any errors.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
A hearty welcome to F/Lt. Lowry ex 3 Group who has arrived in this Group to become Bombing Leader to 44 Squadron, R.A.F., Dunholme Lodge.
F/O. Jacombs (463 Squadron) was 1st and F/O. Abbot (106 Squadron) was 3rd, both with “A” Categories on No. 74 Bombing Leaders’ Course. This is a particularly good show on the part of these two Officers. F/O. Jones (49 Squadron) obtained a “B” category on the same Course, being 15th.
[Cartoon of two WAAFs] Dot and Dark – the immaculate W.A.A.F’s – “… and don’t you suggest he made the first Begin Approach…”]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Concentration, track keeping, and Navigation generally improved during the month. This was largely due to the efficiency of the selected wind finders and to the working of the Wind Finding Scheme as a whole. The selected wind finders’ results have been carefully analysed and it is now possible for the Met. Section at Group Headquarters to place certain degrees of reliability on the information which is passed back from individual crews. Special mention is made here of F/Lt. Townsend – Pilot, and F/O. Haxby, Navigator, of No.57 Squadron who have proved to be most reliable as wind finders; they have consistently sent back accurate wind information which was used as a basis for future winds transmitted to all 5 Group aircraft. It is hoped that all crews selected for this special duty will reach a 100% reliability standard, and send back wind information which will not only be of great value to non-wind finding crews in the Group but to many other crews in the Command.
It has been suggested in some quarters that transmitting winds from aircraft over enemy territory renders the aircraft more susceptible to Freya and Wurtzburg plotting, and therefore to greater danger from vectored fighters, flak and searchlights. As far as the losses in this Group show, there is absolutely no foundation in fact for this belief, so that crews need have no qualms about using the W/T transmitter. They should regard their transmissions as a valuable means of helping all the other aircraft to keep to the planned route.
It was particularly emphasised in the December Monthly News that all Navigators must continue to find winds whenever possible and to check accuracy of their wind finding with broadcast winds. Many crews are not doing this, but are content to use all broadcast winds without checking their accuracy. This practice is a dangerous one, and can easily lead a crew into trouble. Assume that the Navigator has rechecked his calculations and is satisfied that the course and airspeeds flown are those for which he is calculating. The winds found by this Navigator are the only ones on which a revised wind could be based should the aircraft get into difficulties as a result of using the broadcast wind. It is imperative, therefore that all Navigators check, and re-check, the wind velocity whenever a good air position and fix are obtained simultaneously. Your ability to find accurate wind velocities may mean that you will be selected as a Group wind finder, and that in consequence, the main force concentration and track keeping will be directly affected by your efficiency.
5 GROUP SPOOF ATTACK 21/22ND JANUARY
Reference must be made here to the Spoof Attack carried out by 22 aircraft of this Group on BERLIN. Theirs was not considered a desirable mission, and the success of the attack makes the job they did all the more noteworthy. It seems that this small attack drew off the enemy fighters from the stream of the main force aircraft which attacked Brunswick at the same time, and the combats recorded on the two routes bear this out.
The return from this raid was flown over 10/10ths cloud almost the whole way. Route Markers were dropped by our own aircraft along this route and winds were broadcast by 57 “C” for the assistance of the rest of the force. Only one aircraft failed to return from this attack, which emphasises the general quality of the Navigation and the careful pre-flight planning employed.
A.P.I.
Supplies of A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have now been received in the Group and they will be sufficient to equip all H 2 S aircraft. Any surplus A. P. I’s will be distributed to the non-H 2 S Squadrons. This method of distribution was decided on so that the maximum assistance in windfinding would be available in certain Squadrons. Their help will be to the benefit of all non-H 2 S squadrons.
Fitting is going on as rapidly as possible in all squadrons.
M/F FIXES
In the past many Navigators have considered that to request a fix from the W/Op means an admission of defeat in their job as a Navigator. If the security of the aircraft is in danger and the Navigator is temporarily uncertain of his position when returning from operations, then he should not hesitate to obtain a fix.
This of course must only be resorted to in emergency, otherwise aircraft which urgently require W/T assistance are unable to receive from the M/F Station until it has dealt with the first aircraft. Recently a fix was requested from Heston, (Section D) by an aircraft returning from the South from operations. This was not obtained, although a position line was given instead. (The significance of this was not appreciated by the Navigator). If a line bearing is received in reply to a request for a fix, it normally means that the aircraft is in transit with the base line of the M/F Stations. This Navigator should have requested another fix about 15 minutes later from the same M/F Station, or better still should have asked the W/Op to change over to Section N.
STRAIGHT FROM THE O R S’s MOUTH
A system of Raid Assessment has now been in operation in 5 Group since May, 1943. The system has progressed, and ways and means to improve it are considered daily. The objects of the system are (i) to try to discover [underlined] quickly [/underlined] what went right or what went wrong with each attack, and (ii) to consider over a period what lessons can be learnt. In this way, it is hoped, future attacks may be conducted with greater precision and reduced casualties.
Each Station has a copy of the teleprinted O.R.S. (R) form – the information on this form, the additional data on raid reports and the details of combats, will enable Stations to draw their own conclusions. Finally, the Group Raid Assessment Report, the statistical Chart and track keeping diagram, furnish as complete a picture of each attack as is possible at the moment.
The consideration of the salient features of each assessment means that the plans for each subsequent attack can be more carefully prepared. Aerial warfare has now become a highly scientific affair, and as with all scientific ventures, rapid future progress depends on intelligent deductions from a fund of accurate and ‘up to date’ facts.
Aircrew will, therefore, realise that the navigational and other ‘gen’ which is collected from them at interrogation is not just another ‘bind’. This ‘gen’ is of the greatest importance, and must be given with the utmost accuracy which the conditions under which it is obtained permit.
GEE
Range on Gee increased on the raids towards the end of the month, particularly on the Berlin operation of January 30/31st when fixes were obtained of XF frequencies up to 8 E, with position lines still further. If this excellent reception continues, there should be a marked improvement in concentration and timing. With regard to position lines, these may be the means of keeping within the 10 mile band of concentration, particularly if the track runs parallel to the Gee lines, and Navigators should endeavour to make the utmost use of Position Lines wherever possible.
From reports sent in after each operation it appears that some navigators are relying solely upon the XF frequencies on the RF unit 25 and not attempting to use the RF unit 24. When reception fades on the unit 25 navigators should insert the Unit 24, and at least endeavour to find out whether reception is better on this or not.
Whilst the usual technical failures still occur due to deterioration of components, serviceability on the whole has been good, but unfortunately the odd manipulation fault crops up now and again, and every effort must be made by navigators, (particularly those on H2S Squadrons) to remain proficient in the operation of the set, and in the correction of simple faults. (See the Navigation Quiz).
With the introduction of miniature lattice charts, errors in the plotting and transferring of fixed should be reduced to the minimum. However, these charts do not cover certain areas and navigators must carry the large charts for those areas until miniatures are published.
It is hoped that a North Eastern chain will be available within a month, to cover the present blank areas of the Western North Sea.
[Boxed] [Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. J.H. Evans, D.F.C. – H.Q. No.5 Group to 49 Sqdn. as Flt. Commander.
S/Ldr. J. Vivian, D.S.O., D.F.C. – No. 57 Sqdn. to H.Q. No. 5 Group as Group Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. R.H. Schofield, (H2S Instructor) – H.Q. No. 5 Group to Fiskerton. (Stn.Navigation Officer)
F/O. W.T. Haxby, D.F.C. – 57 Sqdn.to H.Q. 5 Group (Radar Nav.)
F/Lt. P.F. Bailey. – 1661 C.U. to 619 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. P.M. Materkeyn – 93 Group to 44 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. B. Asson, D.F.C. – 44 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to 10 O.T.U.
F/Lt. M.J. Baud. – 207 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to SPILSBY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/Lt. W.M. Burnside, DFC. – No 5 LFS. (Sqdn Navigation Offr.) to BARDNEY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/O. Parker. 44 Sqdn. to 207 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/O. R.O. Beattie. 207 Sqdn. to 5 L.F.S. SYERSTON [/boxed]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
Navigation (Cont.)
H 2 S
Training on H 2 S has progressed satisfactorily during the month, but once again bad weather and cloud have prevented much blind bombing, and until this training is given, crews cannot be considered fully trained.
Serviceability during this month has been quite up to standard considering the difficulties of replacement and our main worry at the present time is failure due to bad manipulation. Failures such as these can only be overcome by constant practice both in the air and on the ground. Ground training is essential, and with Ground trainers now installed at 1660 and 1661 Con. Units, and 49 57 and 630 Squadrons, there should be less reason for manipulation failures in the future.
Intelligent use was made of the H 2 S in operations this month, and many operators are finding it a great help in avoiding defended areas. Navigational fixes are being obtained up to 40 and 50 miles by some operators, but still 17% of the fixes are wrongly taken or plotted. With the advent of broadcast W/Vs there is even greater need for accuracy in D.R. and the navigator must work in close co-operation with the Air Bomber if they wish to make the most of H 2 S.
A few simple rules such as the following should result in greater accuracy in navigation with H 2 S :-
(i) Pre-flight planning must be looked upon by the Navigator and Air Bomber as an essential part of the operation, and they must work in close conjunction with each other. The Navigator should point out to the Air Bomber all features from which fixes are likely to be required, and their Flight Plan E.T.A’s. The Air Bomber must draw in the tracks on a Mercator Plotting Chart, clearly ring all recommended H 2 S landmarks and mark in their Flight Plan E.T.A’s.
(ii) This close co-operation must be maintained in flight, and the Navigator must inform the Air Bomber from time to time of the aircraft’s D.R. position and alterations in E.T.A’s, which he must mark on his chart. The Air Bomber must be allowed time to take a fix and the Navigator must cross check all fixes used. To save time and unnecessary chatter over the inter-com. the Air Bomber could be taking fixes and entering them on a log form giving time, place, bearing and distance, or, the Bomb Aimer can make a track crawl on a chart of his own, so that the Navigator will be able to choose any suitable fix at any time.
Remember, it is the reliability of fixes that matters, not the quantity.
The reliability of H 2 S is dependent upon the accuracy of the D.R. Navigation, and conversely without frequent reliable fixes the D.R. becomes increasingly inaccurate. The H 2 S must, therefore, be used to increase the accuracy of the D.R. navigation.
GARDENING
On 5/6th January, 49 Squadron provided 6 aircraft fitted with special equipment, to plant vegetables in the approaches of SWINEMUNDE. This force was detached from the main stream (bound for STETTIN) close to the gardens, and re-joined shortly after planting. This operation was the first of its kind to be carried out entirely with special equipment, and one of the first from high altitude (12,000 feet). Five out of six aircraft planted successfully on a timed run from the pinpoint. The sixth was unable to pinpoint due to failure of special equipment and descended to the lowest permissible height as briefed; being still unable to pinpoint visually, due to cloud, the vegetables were correctly jettisoned in a previously ordered position. The importance of the sea routes here is their use for supplying the Russian front – and by the look of things on the Leningrad front – for repatriation purposes. There is every indication that the vegetables went into the right “hole”, but definite information on the results is hard to come by from such distant places.
The raising of the maximum height for dropping mines to 15,000 ft., has made gardening possible, with reasonable safety, in many areas hitherto immune, and where the presence of mines will present an even worse problem to the enemy than hitherto.
The Bombing Development Unit has carried out trials which prove conclusively that, contrary to expectation, the mine has an extremely consistent flight, and figures for drift due to wind have also been found.
Allowances for Forward Travel and drift due to wind can, therefore, easily be made.
The Command planted 1100 vegetables during the month – 3 Group were responsible for 833. Gardens visited were many and varied, the most densely sown being those off the ELBE, WESER, and EMS; KIEL BAY; the FRANCH COAST U-BOAT BASES.
-“Where angels fear to tread”
In seemly and imposing state, th’elect of God conferred,
The operations staff did hang upon their spoken word.
Save which, the room all silent was, and deathly as the tomb,
(Though sound of trotting horsed permeated through the room)
Tranquility [sic]was shattered as a vulgar voice did rant
“Connect me please with Swinderby, for Swinderby I pant”
The Lords of all creation ceased. A frozen silence fell;
The D.S.O. was seized, and cast into a dungeon cell.
And there without a trial doth the poor wretch meditate,
The sins of other people, for whose crimes he’ll meet his fate.
Let those who keep the watches now resolve they never will
Repeat th’offence, the cure for which is published in the drill.
ANON. CIRCA. 1944.
LINK TRAINER
[Table showing Link Trainer use by Squadron]
ASTRO COMPASS
The astro compass is a precision instrument for checking courses against any heavenly body. In this Command, however, it is rarely used, and even then only for sights on the Pole star.
The Astro compass in its present form is a precision and somewhat complicated instrument, and it is suggested that a much simpler instrument should serve the purpose equally well. This Headquarters is experimenting with a very simplified Astro Compass, and as soon as it is ready for trials, Squadrons will be informed and asked to give their criticisms.
The DR and P4 Compasses should be checked approximately every 15 minutes, and also after every major alteration of course. If these two compasses agree within 2 degrees, then it is not considered essential to check them by use of the Astro Compass. If however, they do not agree within these limits an immediate check should be made of the D.R. Repeaters and the Master Unit. If the compasses still disagree, then a check should be made to ascertain which is correct.
NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ
1. What is the safety height over :-
(a) North Yorkshire.
(b) S.W. England.
(c) Lincolnshire.
(d) West Scotland.
2. What M/F Sections would you use if you were approaching Cornwall (a) from the Wexford region, (b) from the Cherbourg region?
3. Which is the shortest distance from Berlin – Lincoln or Leningrad?
4. Assume your aircraft is engaged on a dinghy search. The W/Op receives an S.O.S. on 500 K/Cs. What immediate action should be taken by the Navigator.
5. If none of the 6 pin sockets on the V C P give a proper picture on the screen, two separate actions can be taken by the navigator. What are they? (N.B. The V.C.P. light is on all the time.)
6. What is the recommended method of search to be used when engaged on dinghy search?
Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
TRAINING ON SQUADRONS
Checks carried out recently reveal that the standard of knowledge on tactics and the corkscrew among Air Gunners is well below the high standard required. It would appear that insufficient time is being allocated to “vetting” air gunners on arrival, and ensuring that their knowledge is retained by constant practice and instruction. It is a simple matter to get the gunners together and hold a quiz on these subjects; naturally some will be on leave, others flying or sick, but if this is carried out regularly all the gunners will receive checks.
This check can be carried out whenever gunners have a few minutes to spare and requires no equipment. All that is required is to ensure that every gunner on every Squadron knows automatically the sequence of the corkscrew manoeuvre, the correct deflection and how to give a clear picture to the remainder of the crew of what is going on during an attack. Squadron Gunnery Leaders recently attended a two day course at R.A.E. Farnborough. This was primarily concerned with the function of ice in oxygen equipment, and should have been passed on to the gunners. It included quite a few valuable tips on the care of this equipment and how to keep it working in severe icing conditions.
FIGHTING CONTROL EXERCISE
An excellent scheme for carrying out the Fighting Control exercise at night on the ground is contained in the February issue of “TEE EMM”. It will be found on page 274; it requires little equipment and can be carried out on the aerodrome, and also gives good practice in night vision training.
10 DAY SIGHTING COURSE AT NO.1 A.A.S. MANBY
This course has recently been started with the object of providing expert sighting instructions, with particular emphasis on the assessment of Gyro films.
During the first few courses it was found that adjustments to the syllabus had to be made, and now the course has settled down to what might be termed an advanced sighting course; the subject is covered more thoroughly even than the C.G.S. course, and any prospective candidate should ensure that he has a thorough knowledge of the G2 notes, as a lack of preliminary knowledge has caused the downfall of several air gunners who have attended the course.
The vacancies on this course are very few, and only gunners who are keen on sighting and have already proved their worth as instructors, should be submitted.
FLYING CLOTHING FOR AIR GUNNERS
During the two-day course which the Gunnery Leaders attended at Farnborough, a discussion was held with the officers responsible for the design and production of clothing and oxygen equipment, and most interesting “gen” was obtained. Here are a few of the new items to be produced :-
New type Oxygen Mask (H) which is much smaller, lighter in weight, causes less obstruction to downward vision and houses a much smaller microphone.
(Continued in column 3)
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBATS – 155
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 K 2/3.1.44. ME.110
61 J 2/3.1.44. ME.210
207 D 5/6.1.44. JU. 88
49 U 5/6.1.44. ME.109
49 K 14/15.1.44. TE/EA
[Underlined] 463 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 W 21/22.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 T 28/29.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 467 T 30/31.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
44 U 30/31.1.44. ME.210
[Underlined] 50 X 30/31.1.44. TE/EA [/underlined]
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 O 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 L 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 V 1/2.1.44. JU. 88
44 A 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 R 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 M 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 G 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 K 2/3.1.44. Unidentified
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
49 H 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 P 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 467 C 5/6.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
106 V 5/6.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 R 5/6.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 J 14/15.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 F 14/15.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
49 M 14/15/.1.44. JU. 88
630 Z 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
44 L 14/15.1.44. ME.110
207 M 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
207 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190
49 H 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 9 T 21/22.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 G 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 J 21/22.1.44. ME.109
207 K 21/22.1.44. ME.210
207 K 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 K 21/22.1.44. ME.109
57 O 27/28.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 M 27/28.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
49 J 28/29.1.44. TE/EA
106 G 28/29.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 B 28/29.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
49 J 30/31.1.44. ME.110
DAMAGED (Continued)
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 L 30/31.1.44.JU.88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 D 30/31.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 P 30/31.1.44. ME.109
630 P 30/31.1.44. T/E
57 G 30/31.1.44. DO.217
All except G/106 28/29th and G/57 30/31st have been confirmed by Command.
OMITTED FROM LAST MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
44 Z 16/17.12.43. T/E E/A
(confirmed by Command)
The type “E” heated lining is to have more heating elements in the knees and seat, heated gloves are to have extra heating elements, and the high wattage socks to have the heating slightly reduced.
A new glove with all the heating elements in the back to give better grip and a more positive control over the equipment when handled with the gloves on, is on the way.
A silk glove, which has had the finger tips dipped in Latex to give a coating of rubber and enable even small articles to be picked up with ease, has been experimented with.
A flap has been attached to the neck of the flying helmet in order to exclude draught; this flap is made to go inside the flying suit and form a seal around the neck, which keeps the draught out and the heat in.
With the introduction of the new oxygen mask and microphone, the inter-com lead is taken round the back of the helmet, this making for more freedom of movement.
Production on the Taylor Suit has ceased but as there is still a large number in service, the new suit will not be seen for some time.
STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER
The first of these trainers to appear in the Group is being erected at Fiskerton and by the time this “News” reaches the Squadrons, it should be in working order. The trainer provides for deflection practice and range estimation, aircraft recognition, zone sightings and also produces tracer simulation. The trainer will shortly be adapted to take the Mark II Gyro Sight as 49 Squadron have been fortunate enough to be selected for the installation of this sight. The sight is similar to the one now in use as an assessor in the Group, but has a range component which enables the range to be fed into the sight by means of foot pedals operated by the gunner. It is a reflector sight with much improved dimming controls on the graticules; in short, all the gunner has to do is to make settings on the sight for height and airspeed, place the moving graticule on the target, estimate the range, and he cannot miss.
Considerable practice is required in the manipulation of this sight, and the free gunnery trainer has been installed for that purpose.
(Continued on page 13, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.18. JANUARY, 1944. PAGE 9.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
GUNS AND TURRETS
Guns freezing, combined with sluggish turrets, due to the extreme cold conditions experienced on operational sorties, sets a problem which is, at present, being tackled in several ways.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined] The exclusion of moisture from the moving portions will, it is considered, be ensured by the fitting of gun ejection slot seals which have been issued to all units in the Group.
There is little point in fitting ejection seals if guns are being tested or cocked after being fully loaded for operations, as the ejection seal will be broken. After the seal is broken, moist air entering the ejection slot is sure to freeze under certain conditions, and a cure for this cannot be found by the application of Anti-Freeze oils.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined] From reports received, turrets appear to give various troubles, when subjected to extreme cold. Various hydraulic media are being tried to overcome these troubles, but it is the Air Gunner who can tell the Armament Staff what actually happened.
First hand information from Air Gunners to their Gunnery Leaders or Armament Officers is of vital assistance in the investigation of all suspected freezing troubles. The Air Gunner is the man who experiences the trouble, and he is the only one who can give the required information on the actual failure and the conditions prevailing at the time. A remark made, and later entered on a combat report such as “Guns would not fire during combat”, does not help in any way.
An Armament representative is always present at Interrogation, and any information passed to him there and then will greatly assist the investigation to be carried out at once. This information will surely help to diagnose the cause of the trouble.
See to it, gunners, that you give full details of all troubles experienced with either guns or turrets, to your Gunnery Leader or Armament Officer. They cannot get a story from anyone but you. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU TELL THE ARMAMENT OFFICER. He cannot reproduce what you experienced under the same conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHIC FAILURE
A small percentage of photographic failures have, on investigation, been attributed to Armament causes. It was hoped that with the introduction of the Mk.111 fuse those failures, however small in number, would disappear. A very careful analysis of the film gives indication that a certain discrepancy exists between the timing of the camera control and the E.111 Fuse. The importance of setting this clockwork fuse correctly cannot be too strongly emphasised, and all Armament Officers can help stamp out this type of failure if they ensure that all fuses M.111 are set correctly.
NEAR ENOUGH IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH
Liaison between Armament and Photographic Sections is essential. Try it and see – who knows, it might reduce the number of failures all round, and so produce vitally important plottable pictures of the target area.
SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS
The preparation of the ever-faithful S.B C. has been, and still is, the immediate concern of all Armament Sections. To prepare the bomb load and bomb up aircraft for an operation is, with the S.B.C’s now available, a matter for organisation. Difficulty can, however, be experienced on the second day when these S.B.C’s have to be filled in the limited time available.
The introduction of Conveyor Rollers has undoubtedly relieved this arduous task, but there is still room for improvement. These rollers can be put to untold uses, and with this in mind, numerous schemes are at present undergoing trials, which will, if applied in the correct manner, enable bomb loads to be prepared for the second sortie in quick time.
Full details of these schemes will be distributed to all Units in the near future. When the new equipment is received it should be subjected to a fair trial according to storage conditions available.
BOMBING RANGES
The lighting of Targets at Wainfleet Bombing Range is causing grave concern, owing to the ingress of salt water into the electric light fittings. Every effort is being made to keep the targets serviceable for night use, but after high tides, faults appear which may, therefore, make it necessary on occasions to declare certain targets unserviceable.
Representatives have been made to obtain an improved type of electric light fitting. In the event of it becoming necessary, improvised lighting has been arranged at EPPERSTONE Range.
FENTON BOMBING RANGE
A further Bombing Range, to be known as Fenton, has been allotted to the Group, making five ranges in all. Work has already commenced on this range, and when complete it is to be administered by R.A.F. Station, WIGSLEY.
FLYING CONTROL
In the table below will be seen two average landing times. The first is calculated by dividing the total period occupied by landing, from first to last aircraft, by the number of aircraft landed. This does not take into account any allowance for the time when the circuit was empty. The adjusted time shows the nett period, that is with allowances made for spasmodic return of aircraft, and the final average is the average time per aircraft based on this adjusted time.
From these two averages can be seen that whereas most Stations have got accustomed to the circuit drill of the landing scheme, there is still scope for improvement in the arrival of aircraft at the airfield.
However, the averages of 3.49 and 2.66 indicate that all Stations have really got down to the problem of landing aircraft quickly, and from reports to hand, it is encouraging to note that the scheme has met with the full approval of the aircrew. Some Stations who, at present, house only one Squadron, are not giving the results they might; this would seem to be an indication that on account of the limited number of
(continued on page 12, Col. 3)
JANUARY LANDING TIMES
[Table showing the Number of aircraft, Time, Average, Adjusted Time and Average by Station]
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Gun Turret Failures and Bombing Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
SPORTS
[Cartoons]
FOOTBALL – THE MATZ CUP
The first round of this annual knock-out is now complete, except for one match, Strubby v Scampton. In the Preliminary Round, Waddington held Scampton to “2 all”, but lost the replay. Without being too partisan, may we wish good luck to the Strubby “giant killers”.
PRELIMINARY ROUND
WADDINGTON 2 SCAMPTON 2
WADDINGTON 0 SCAMPTON 2
(re-play)
ROUND ONE
WINTHORPE 1 SYERSTON 0
WIGSLEY 0 SWINDERBY 11
BARDNEY 0 METHERINGHAM 10
DUNHOLME 2 FISKERTON 0
WOODHALL SPA 1 CONINGSBY 3
SPILSBY 2 EAST KIRKBY 3
SKELLINGTHORPE 3 H.Q. 5 GROUP 1
Scampton are again holding second place in the Lincoln League, Division 1, having won 7 out of 9 games. They were runners up in the League last year, and winners of the Matz Trophy – a fine record.
Dunholme had a busy soccer month, winning four out of five games, in addition to their Matz Cup game with Fiskerton.
Syerston, like Scampton, are all out for the Newark and District League championship. They have, to date, won six out of seven games. Intersection competition produced 12 matches during the month.
Skellingthorpe and Bardney have been busy with both inter-section games and weekly Station matches.
Metheringham lost only one out of four station games, and in inter-section matches, Squadron Armoury won all their games decisively.
Coningsby soccer has been notable for a duel between 619 and 61 Squadrons. Each Squadron has won one game each and the decider should be a real blood match.
Swinderby Station team won four out of five games, losing to O.C.T.U. Newark. Judging from their Matz Cup score, they have some big guns in the forward line.
Winthorpe had four Station games, and were unlucky to win only one, but although losing 5 – 2 to Syerston, they pulled off the Matz Cup game. There was much inter-section activity.
Wigsley were unlucky to have two Station games cancelled. Of the remaining two, they won one and lost one. The R.A.F. Regiment had several games in the inter-section matches.
RUGGER
LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE COMPETITION
It has unfortunately proved impossible to complete the squadrons knock-out phase of this competition by January 31st. To date, only 9 Squadron have completed their finals, F/Lt. Hadland’s crew beating P/O. Glover’s crew in the final by 11 – 3. Nineteen teams took part in the competition. Within 53 Base alone, 61 matches have been played and the competition has become increasingly popular as it has progressed. All squadrons are urged to play off their matches as early as possible, so that the date for the Inter-Unit competition can be re-arranged. There will be some magnificent rugger in the final games, so get cracking squadrons, so we can arrange the big play off.
Syerston Rugger side is now considerably stronger than its early season form, and won three out of four games during the month.
Metheringham played two games, beating Bardney, and losing to 7 K.O.S.B.
Coningsby beat the 9th Field Regt. R.E.D., and the S. Staffs. Regiment in no uncertain manner.
Swinderby suffered their second defeat of the season against R.C.A.F. Digby, losing 6 – 0. Several Canadian Football mannerisms crept into the game, such as the referee putting the ball into the scrum, players “blocking” their opponents, and an occasional forward throw. All of which served to fox the Swinderby team.
Winthorpe lost to Syerston, but beat both 93 M. U. and Newark R. F. C. The Winthorpe pitch has, unfortunately, been “put to the plough”, necessitating all away matches.
HOCKEY
Swinderby can put out a very strong team, and only failed to win one game, which they drew with O.C.T.U. Newark, 4 – 4.
Syerston played 7 games in all, including two mixed and two all W.A.A.F. games, winning six of them.
Coningsby played four Station games, of which they won one.
Scampton, Metheringham, Winthorpe and Wigsley, all had Station matches. Metheringham hope to have their new hockey pitch ready in a few days.
H.Q.5 Group played its first match (mixed) against Syerston on February 6th, losing 2 – 1 a very promising start for a team that has only a half-sized pitch to practice on, until permission is obtained to fell a few trees.
It is hoped to promote a Group mixed Hockey knock-out in the very near future.
CROSS-COUNTRY
Wigsley, Skellingthorpe, Dunholme Lodge and Coningsby have all had successful runs during the month. 619 Squadron took over a hundred bodies about four miles from the camp by coach and released them. S/Ldr. Churcher was first man home. Feeling fit and frisky after their first gamble, 619 now challenge all cross country teams to battle.
SWIMMING
The stations around Lincoln make good use of the baths, and it should be possible to promote an interesting gala.
FISHING
Syerston has a thriving Anglers’ Club with facilities in the River Trent and in the lake at Flintham Hall. The club boasts over 40 “line shooters”. Other Stations please note. (What about a Strubby Wild Fowlers’ Society?)
MINOR GAMES
A most popular game at Bardney is Skittle Ball, played daily inside or outside the Maintenance Hangar at Tea Van time. A P. T. I. arrives with the van, and the fun begins. 20 – 40 men take part, and it is a most enjoyable and stimulating way of spending break.
It is regretted that some Station Sports summaries are not to hand for inclusion in the News, and it is requested that all Stations will despatch their summaries to reach H.Q. within two days of the end of the month.
TRAINING
STIRLING TRAINED CREWS GOING TO SQUADRONS
The first of the Stirling trained Conversion Unit crews went to Squadrons by way of 5 L. F. S. during the month, and the new training policy is now in full swing. A total of 35 crews were posted to Squadrons from 51 Base in January. 45 crews went from Conversion Units to No.5 L.F.S.
The weather was fairly good, and had no great adverse effect on flying, but many unfamiliar technical snags with the Stirling had to be overcome. Serviceability was affected by the carrying out of Acceptance Checks, but these have now been nearly completed, and improved serviceability is expected during the coming month.
Three fatal accidents, involving Stirling aircraft at night, are at present under investigation. Two occurred during Bullseye Exercises, and one during local night flying.
The standard of crews coming from O.T.U’s was maintained. High Level bombing training was very much improved throughout 51 Base, and heights up to 20,000 feet were recorded on night details. H 2 S training suffered owing to an initial shortage of instructors. The aircraft position earlier in the month was also acute, and H 2 S aircraft were being employed on normal training commitments.
The majority of the Squadron crews attached to No. 5 L.F.S. for a short refresher course during the month, completed the syllabus despite some restrictions by weather, and much valuable information was obtained from this mid-tour check.
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD)
There are, however, a few entries on the other side of this month’s balance sheet, such as the two Wireless Operators who, on the night 27/28th January, when briefed to use M/F D/F Section “N” on return from operations, obtained LINE BEARINGS from Hull and Heston. The question arises, what were the Captains and Navigators doing to allow the Wireless Operators to be so dim? Then there is the Wireless Operator who, when sending an early return message, spelt the word STARBD in Bomber Code, when there exists a code group for the word. When questioned, he admitted that he “was in a bit of a spin”. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened to any of these Wireless Operators AND THEIR CREWS (Captains please note), had they been in the position in which Sgt. Barnes Moss found himself, and confronted with a big job to do. Consider then, and note well, ye who do wear the badge of Sparks, that when trouble cometh, it doth not come after friendlie warning, but is swift and sudden, and never forget – it might be YOU.
Now let us consider the question of the Wireless Operator being in the astrodome over the target area. It is difficult to see any advantage that captains gain by having him there. In fact, if they take care to study a few facts, they will see that placing the Wireless Operator in the astrodome only gives a false sense of security and endangers [underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined]
Firstly, the Wireless Operator has very little night vision, having been employed during the three hours previous in gazing at a cathode ray tube or magic eye. Just ask yourselves how you feel when emerging from a cinema into the night –“Hell, I can’t see a thing”. Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that if your Wireless Operator is off Tinsel, one of your own aircraft may be shot down by an enemy night fighter free to operate because you have cleared the obstacle out of his path. Thirdly, the majority, but not all, of the Wireless Operators in astrodome incidents, come from squadrons fitted with Monica III, where the operator would see a fighter so much plainer on the CRT than in the flesh, in spite of all the blips made by friendly aircraft. Captains who make a habit of doing this are invited to reconsider their views in the light of the above remarks.
MOVEMENTS FOR JANUARY
F/Lt. Andrews, No.467 Squadron, has completed No.4 Signals Leaders Course, and is to be congratulated on being the first Signals Leader in this Group to obtain an “A” categorisation.
F/O. Rademeyer has taken the post of Signals Leader with No. 44 Squadron, F/Lt. Barrett having completed his operational tour.
P/O’s. Worthington, Thomas and Freeman should now be installed, and working to full pressure as Fishpond Instructors at East Kirkby, Fiskerton and Metheringham respectively, and Squadrons are invited to make full use of their services.
The visits to O.T.U. by Signals Leaders are in full swing, and squadrons should benefit from the move at a later date.
Now, here is an open invitation for any Signals Leader, Deputy Signals Leader or Wireless Operator (Air) to visit the W/T cabin at this Headquarters on an operational night. The only thing you need to do to take advantage of this offer, is to give a few hours notice on the telephone (extension 54).
TACTICS
EFFECT OF WINDOW AND COUNTERMEASURES
The enemy G. C. I. system continues to be subdued by Window. To retain maximum effect, however, there must be no slacking off in the rates of dropping. The times and rates of dropping laid down for each operation must be rigidly adhered to, and Window dropping must never be regarded as just another ‘bind’. These rates have been carefully calculated, and the individual who is “too lazy” or “forgets” is jeopardising not only his own safety, but that of the whole force. The Window dropper’s slogan must be “Not too much, not too little…..”
It is interesting to study the development of the enemy’s reaction to Window, and the results of our countermeasures over the past few months. That the highly mobile fighter force controlled by HF and V.H.F./RT, organised after the initial success of Window, could be a serious menace, was soon appreciated by the planning staff, who set to work to devise new tactics. As this fighter force was being directed to target areas being attacked, the first essential was to delude the enemy as to the areas to be attacked. Spoof attacks by Mosquitoes and small forces of “heavies” were attempted, and the main force was routed to within 20-30 miles of defended areas before turning to attack another target. These spoof attacks and feints have undoubtedly drawn a number of fighters away from the main targets. A more recent attempt at delusion was to move the whole force by ordering all aircraft to alter course simultaneously at a predetermined time, so as to displace the main stream suddenly. The unprecedented manoeuvre undoubtedly upset the enemy controllers’ calculations.
Not the least important of our countermeasures are the radio jamming devices. These are many and varied, and have produced very marked results. Special Tinsel is rated highly amongst the successful jamming devices, thus Wireless Operators must comply with Tinselling instructions on all occasions. Information on the work of the Radio Countermeasures Group must obviously be guarded, but a report on the results achieved by Ground Cigar, Ground Grocer, Corona and other H.F. and VHF. countermeasure schemes, is set out in a paper BC/S.31009/Sigs., dated 3rd February, 1944, “Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command”. Aircrew should read this report, which is available in all Intelligence libraries. The extract quoted below is typical of the confusion that arises, and shows the measure of success achieved. In fact, jamming has been so complete as to force the enemy to use his National Broadcast wavelengths to get orders through to his fighters. This new step should present no difficulty to our Countermeasure Experts, who are continually a step ahead of the enemy in radio jamming.
[Underlined] “Corona (HF) [/underlined]
This countermeasure continues to annoy the enemy Controllers and harass their pilots, and on occasion has been known to lead to unprintable ruderies being addressed to the efficient young W.A.A.F. officer who frequently plays the controller’s part for us. However, one of the methods of judging the success of Corona is by noting the enemy controller’s reaction to it over the air, and it is considered an unsuccessful night if we do not succeed in drawing at least one crack which is worth recording in the line book.”
TAIL WARMING DEVICES
With the advent of Monica IIIA and Fishpond, the duties of Wireless Operator have been still further extended. It is unfortunate that the sole attention of a crew member cannot be diverted to these devices, but for the moment the Wireless Operator has under his control something which, when properly used, can have immeasurable success against enemy fighters. A high degree of training in the manipulation of the set and interpretation of the P.P.I. and cathode tubes, is called for, and a drive must be made for the Wireless Operators to have as much air practice as possible with the sets.
MONICA IIIA
Several squadrons have now had experience with Monica IIIA, and have proved that for the set to be of any value at all, certain factors are essential. A detailed knowledge by the Wireless Operator of the suppression and gain settings to give well defined blips which can be followed in to a minimum of 250 yards range, a standard reporting patter by the Wireless Operator, and a knowledge of the interpretation of blips by pilots and gunners so that there is perfect crew co-operation whenever an enemy blip is sighted. The exact procedure for using Monica IIIA is set out in an instruction which is available in all Signals Leaders’ Offices. Gunners, pilots and Wireless Operators should be given an opportunity of reading this instruction.
FISHPOND
57 Squadron, from an investigation into Fishpond results, estimate that out of 80 Fishpond sorties, 9 combats have been avoided by utilising the early warning given by Fishpond. Their knowledge and experience will shortly be made available to other Fishpond Squadrons in the form of a tactics instruction. To get a good P.P.I. picture, liaison between Wireless Operator and H 2 S operator is essential, as is also a knowledge by the Wireless Operator of H 2 S manipulation and P.P.I. settings. Captains must remember that Fishpond does not record fighters attacking from above, and should therefore see that their gunners never relax the normal crew search procedure.
[Underlined] Continued from page 10, col.1) [/underlined]
aircraft no great need for quick landing is felt. Those Stations should remember that a second Squadron is always liable to be posted in at very short notice when, under these conditions, the average landing time of two minutes per aircraft, for between 30 and 40 aircraft, would be a godsend.
The Landing Board, originally designed by R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, has been improved on by many Stations in the Group. It is gratifying to note that new suggestions and modifications are continually being submitted. They are a big help, let’s have more of them.
No. 5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 12.
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
[Drawing]
HEADQUARTERS NO. 5 GROUP
A/Cdre. H.V. SATTERLY, D.F.C. C.B.E.
HEADQUARTERS NO. 53 BASE
A/Cdre. A. HESKETH, O.B.E., D.F.C. C.B.E.
R.A.F. STATION, SCAMPTON
F/O. C.F. GIBSON. M.B.E.
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. GLOVER. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. A. LYNCH, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. K.L. HOWARD. D.F.M.
F/O. E. MERCER. D.F.C.
P/O. A. WRIGHT. D.F.C.
P/O. V.D. PURVIS. D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. J.G.DAY. D.S.O.
Sgt. A.E. KEELING. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
A/F/Lt. G.H. LAING. D.F.C.
F/O. W.T. HAXBY. D.F.C.
61 SQUADRON
F/O. J.W. EINARSON, D.F.M. D.F.C.
W/Cdr. R.M. STIDOLPH. D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
P/O. D.C. HARVEY. D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
F/O. N.E. WESTERGAARD. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.E. BROOKES. D.F.M.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/Lt. C.J. BRAIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
9 SQUADRON (Contd.)
P/O. R.W. CORKHILL. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
P/O. R.L. ASH. D.F.C.
F/O. C.R. SAVAGE. D.F.C.
F/Lt. B. ASSON. D.F.C.
Sgt. L. UNWIN. D.F.M.
F/Lt. D.A. BARRETT. D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
A/S/L/ W.F. PARKS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
Sgt. J.E. HEATH D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.W. THOMPSON. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.R. POLLOCK. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. JOSLING. D.F.C.
P/O. S.G. TOWNSEND. D.F.C.
P/O. A.R. KNOWLES. D.F.C.
F/O. R. McROBBIE. D.F.C.
P/O. R.J. GOOCH. D.F.C.
P/O. J.A. KIMBER. D.F.C.
P/O. E.J. HOWES. D.F.C.
P/O. F. NORTHCLIFFE. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.B. HUGHES. D.F.M.
P/O. W.H. SIDDONS. D.F.C.
Sgt. D.J. GRIFFITH. D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
A/S/L. E.A. BENJAMIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.F. EMERSON. D.F.M.
106 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. R.E. BAXTER. D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
Sgt. T. GEDLING. D.F.M.
F/O. J.E.F. MITCHELL. D.F.C.
P/O. J. KIRKWOOD. D.F.C.
W/O. H.F. CONELLY. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.C. METCALFE. D.F.M.
619 SQUADRON
P/O. T.A. PEATFIELD. D.F.C.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J. SIMKIN. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.T. PAGE. D.F.M.
[Page break]
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
[Tables of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Total] 25 18 5 26
WAR SAVINGS
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved. £. s. d.
H.Q. (UNIT) 5 GROUP 51.4 10.0 95. 7. 6.
£2935.2.0.
[Page break]
GUNNERY (CONTD)
(Continued from page 9, col.3)
Now 49 Air Gunners, this is the biggest thing that has hit gunnery in 25 years, and it is up to you to take every opportunity of make for 100% proficiency in the use of this new equipment. Great things will be expected from you, losses should go down and E/A destroyed go up; so go to it, and make the life of the Hun fighter short and sweet!
CENTRAL GUNNERY SCHOOL RESULTS
No. 72 COURSE
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit. Category. Exam. Results. [/underlined]
P/O. Gross “B” 90.4%
Results of No. 73 Course not yet to hand.
SQUADRON AND FLIGHT GUNNERY LEADERS
Below is a list of Squadron and Flight Gunnery Leaders at present in Squadrons and Conversion Units.
44 Squadron F/Lt. McCurdy
F/O. Neison
49 Squadron F/Lt. Cork
F/O. Hamilton
463 Squadron F/Lt. Moorhead
F/O. Kirkpatrick
467 Squadron F/Lt. Nordon-Hare
9 Squadron F/Lt. Armstrong
50 Squadron F/Lt. Gray
P/O. Beale
619 Squadron F/Lt. Howard
P/O. Hammond
61 Squadron F/Lt. Breakey
617 Squadron F/Lt. Rodger
F/O. Buckley
F/O. Chandler
106 Squadron F/Lt. Sullivan
630 Squadron F/Lt. Stead
57 Squadron F/Lt. Taylor
F/O. Ward
207 Squadron F/O. Moore
F/O. Harper
1485 Gunnery Flight S/Ldr. Undery
F/Lt. Leonard
F/O. Mills
1660 Con.Unit F/Lt. Clark
P/O. Gross
1661 Con.Unit F/Lt. Gray
1654 Con.Unit F/Lt. Hoad
F/O. Simister
No. 5 L.F.S. F/Lt. Cass
P/O. Black
Aircrew School SCAMPTON F/Lt. Patten
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
On taking an analysis of a large number of flight engineers logs a considerable discrepancy has been noticed between the fuel consumption of different aircraft. This discrepancy is not due to the varying consumptions inherent in the engines of any particular aircraft. In most cases where an aircraft has had a high fuel consumption on a specific operation, the subsequent operation with a different crew proves that this aircraft has a low consumption. This all points to manipulation.
There are many cases where far too high revs are used at too low a boost and it is apparent that many flight engineers are not paying sufficient attention to the boost and revs required for the most economical conditions.
It is not economical above full throttle height and boost below E.C.B. to reduce I.A.S. by throttle manipulation. I.A.S. should be controlled on propellor speed only, and if you are at an altitude where the ‘S’ blower is in operation, by controlling I.A.S. on the throttles you are merely strangling your engine. To quote one instance, an extract from one flight engineer’s log shows that 2850 r.p.m. was used at + 2 lbs boost at 15,000 feet in ‘S’ gear. This is an obvious case of engine strangling, and had the throttles been open to + 4 boost E.C.B. to take full advantage of the engine power available at that altitude, then the r.p.m. could have been cut down to maintain the required I.A.S. with the resultant decrease in fuel consumption. The consumption in the particular case quoted averaged 66 gallons per hour per engine which speaks for itself. Flight Engineer Leaders must bring home by means of lectures to their flight engineers instances such as this. Such manipulation may cost you an aircraft and maybe the crew, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the fuel consumption of a Lancaster is in the hands of the flight engineer, and where the flight engineer knows that incorrect revs and boost are being used for any specific condition, then he should advise the pilot accordingly; if this advice is ignored, the cause of the high fuel consumption should be reported on return. Many more instances such as that quoted have been found, and space does not allow to quote them all. Efforts are being made at this Headquarters to find other reasons for high consumption in each case, but so far high consumptions have been caused solely by incorrect engine manipulation.
EARLY RETURNS
In The case of an oil pressure gauge failure which causes quite a few early returns, this can be diagnosed quite easily. If the oil pressure drops off suddenly, and coolant and oil temperatures remain normal, the oil temperature should be watched closely, and if this remains normal, together with the coolant temperature the gauge is definitely suspect. Flight engineers should watch this sort of thing and advise the pilot accordingly.
Many early returns are caused by so called generator failure, and the following notes will be of interest to all flight engineers, and should go a long way to preventing unnecessary early returns due to this fault. These notes will be circulated separately to flight engineers.
1. [Underlined] The Voltmeter [/underlined] is the most important of the three instruments on the main control panel. In flight it normally indicates between 27 – 29 volts.
2. The Ammeters merely indicate how the generators are sharing the load, and as long as they both give a positive reading, even though unbalanced, the circuit is O.K. (i.e. +55 and +5). If the degree of unbalance is above 15 amps this matter must be reported to the Electrical Officer.
3. If one of the ammeters shows a negative reading, i.e. a discharge”, then before switching off one of the generators, reference must be made to the voltmeter. If the voltmeter reads 29 volts or under, switch off the generator giving the negative reading. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts, switch off the generator giving the positive reading.
4. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts the accumulators are being overcharged. In this case switch off the generator showing the higher current. If the voltmeter still indicates over 29 volts switch off the other generator and all non-essential loads to conserve the accumulators. The pressure head heater [underlined] must [/underlined] remain ‘ON’. After a short time, say 5 minutes, [underlined] one [/underlined] generator, preferably the one giving the lower reading, may be switched ‘ON’ again, but a careful check must be kept on the voltmeter. Both generators must [underlined] not [/underlined] be switched ‘ON’ again after they have been switched ‘OFF’.
5. [Underlined] Never [/underlined] disconnect the cables from the accumulator in flight, otherwise it may cause an explosion. If the accumulators become overheated and are gassing excessively, turn the “Ground-Flight” switch to “Ground”.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, col.3) [/underlined]
from service sources does not appear to fulfil our requirements. Coningsby has produced a most useful piece of apparatus, and details of it will be circulated to other Bases and Stations. It will be to the advantage of Electrical Officers of other Units if they pay a personal visit to Coningsby to see this test rig for themselves. Further, it is suggested that visits to other Stations will enable the best ideas to be incorporated in all instrument and electrical sections. So far as is known, the many excellent schemes which have been produced by local initiative have not been patented.
In the last month the incidence of oxygen failure has increased, but in many cases no technical fault has been found. This indicates that more “gen” in the use of oxygen must be passed on by Electrical Officers to members of aircrew. The introduction of the microphone heater and the Mk.I jet has produced very favourable results, and steps have been taken to obtain further supplies of heaters for the use of all gunners.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table showing the serviceability of aircraft by Conversion Unit and Lancaster aircraft]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
Look after your ‘K’ type dinghies, you may find them very useful one day – F/Sgt. Groves of 50 Squadron did, on the night 29/30th December. The aircraft of which he was rear gunner had been damaged on operations. The pilot could not close the bomb doors, and due to lack of petrol the captain of the aircraft, while still over the sea, was forced to decide whether to ditch the aircraft or to bale out his crew. The captain eventually had to give the order to bale out using ‘K’ dinghies, having first sent out an S.O.S. and received fixes.
F/Sgt. Grove was the first out of the aircraft and the only one saved. The indications are that at least one other member of the crew was prepared to abandon the aircraft but no more was seen or heard of the crew or the aircraft after F/Sgt. Groves had left. F/Sgt. Groves suffered considerably from exposure while in his ‘K’ dinghy, but has since recovered.
It is possible to ditch an aircraft with open bomb doors, and it has been successfully accomplished on more than one occasion. In any case the doors are liable to collapse on impact with the water, and where this has happened, crews have managed to clear the aircraft without too much trouble. While no blame is attached to the pilot of this particular aircraft, this fact should be borne in mind, and pilots should resort to the ‘K’ type dinghy only as a last resort – e.g. should the aircraft be on fire, or in danger of breaking up in the air.
Successful ditchings, in seemingly impossible sea and weather conditions have shown that, provided you have practiced your emergency procedure and dinghy drills you should have no worry in making the decision to ditch. The days are over when a successful ditching was something to be marvelled at. To-day they are a common occurrence, and experience has shown that ignorance and stupidity are to blame in almost every case of failure.
A summary of Air Sea Rescue incidents for the six month ending 31st December, 1943, show that of a total of 3271 aircrew involved, 1,078 were rescued and brought back to England; most of the remainder fared as
(continued on page 2, col 2)
ENGINEERING
The operational effort for January was very high considering the bad weather periods which were encountered during the month. The squadrons were all down in aircraft strength, but in spite of this a high total was achieved; this, of course, was only possible by many squadrons operating 100% each night. With the man power shortage it requires very hard work and long hours to maintain this effort, and now that squadrons are almost up to full strength on the new establishment, the load will be even heavier. Due, however, to the efforts of the ground crews, February should see the biggest effort ever put out from this Group.
No.54 Base, Coningsby, which formed on 1st January, 1944, is already making itself felt as a formidable and efficient formation. There is still much to do to bring the various sections up to the peak of perfection, but as these were started on sound lines, there is no doubt of their ultimate efficiency.
All operational bases and R. & I. sections have been kept extremely busy on acceptance checks recently, and as a result certain other work has had to be left. This is only a passing phase, and it is hoped that once the squadrons are up to full strength, the task will be easier by dealing with the normal replacements. The many high speed enemy action repairs which have been carried out in time to get aircraft ready for ops on the second night, including many power plant changes, which are carried out immediately the aircraft lands during the night, are so numerous that it is difficult to single out individuals for praise; it all points to the splendid morale and staying powers of the ground crews.
There are many early returns and cancellations which could be avoided and Engineer Officers must keep on with the drive to eliminate these entirely, as far as is humanly possible; they are responsible for the non-delivery of a very large tonnage of bombs when calculated over a month.
The number of failures of exhaust studs has been considerably reduced where 3.5% Nickel steel studs have been fitted, and results so far are very pleasing. When further experience has been gained it is hoped to go over to this kind of stud completely.
The introduction of the 30 lbs pressure type relief valve on the header tank in place of the thermostatic valve is gradually taking place throughout the Group, and a marked improvement is noticed by the smaller number of failures due to engines being “cooked”.
WEIGHT SHEET SUMMARIES
A new weight sheet summary as applicable to 5 Group has been issued to all Bases. Stations and Squadrons, and the use of this with the bomb load chart which accompanied it should dispel any further doubts as to what can and what cannot be carried at an all-up weight of 65,000 lbs.
CONVERSION UNITS AND NO.5 L.F.S.
The Conversion Units commenced a Stirling programme early in the month, and although the results of the first month’s work were good and called for a colossal amount of work, it is anticipated that with certain improvements, the February figures will be much higher. Great credit is due to the C.T.O’s and men under them, who have tackled this task and overcome their setbacks in an admirable manner. The programme which has been set for No. 5 L. F. S. calls for good organisation and planning on the technical side, and so far the job has been done well.
FLIGHT ENGINEER LEADER
A very necessary addition to the Group Headquarters staff is the establishment of a Flight Engineer Leader. This post has been filled by F/Lt. Gottwaltz, and Base Engineers and C. T. O.’s are requested to afford him every facility to assist in attempting to solve the carrying fuel consumption problem. A column elsewhere in this News has been allocated to Flight Engineers.
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS
It is most important the Command Modification No. 57 is completed on all aircraft fitted with A.P.I. and A.M.U. at the earliest opportunity, to eliminate errors due to inefficient cooling.
The test rig for the instruments issued
(continued on page 13, col.3 )
WAR EFFORT
[Table containing details by Squadron of averages and numbers of sorties, tonnage dropped, operational hours and losses as well as ratings]
ORDER OF MERIT IN THE FOREGOING TABLE IS BASED ON THE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED PER AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON CHARGE
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944.
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V Group News, January 1944
5 Group News, January 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 18, January 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, tactics, sports and operations.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-22 jan 44
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
Germany
England--Lincolnshire
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1944-01
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
ground personnel
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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V GROUP NEWS V
[Picture]
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[Underlined] BASE INTELLIGENCE [/underlined] [Indecipherable]
[Drawing]
[Stamp] [Underlined] Copies to Stns [/underlined]
Base.
[Circled] [Indecipherable [/circled]
FIVE
GROUP
NEWS
JULY
No. 36
1945
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[Blank page]
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Foreword by A.O.C.
At mid-night yesterday, Mr. Attlee, our Prime Minister, our Prime Minister, announced the final cessation of the War with Japan. This is great news. At last the world is at peace. To-day, August 15th, is VJ-Day and there can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that we are all greatly relieved that the end of hostilities has at last come. Nevertheless, for some, and particularly those who had volunteered to go to the Far East, there must be a certain sense of disappointment and, no doubt, many will feel annoyed that they personally have not been able to have a crack at the Japs.
The future of 5 Group is now very much in the air and I am unable to give you the answer to the many queries you may have at the moment. I doubt if many heavy bomber Squadrons will be required as part of the occupation forces in Japan, although it is more than possible that one or two of the Squadrons will proceed somewhere out to the East in the near future. It is unlikely that the Government and the Air Ministry will be able to review the many difficult problems and agree on new policy for some days, and, until definite orders are received, all Squadrons should continue their normal training and their normal routine of work.
More than any other Group, 5 Group has had a particularly difficult time since VE-Day. The Squadrons have undergone many changes; some Squadrons have been disbanded; others moved to new Stations; there has been a vast change round of personnel to ensure that only those fit and eligible for the Far East were left in those Units proceeding overseas. Many others have left the Service but, in spite of all this change, I have noticed that many long and arduous hours of training have been put in by Squadron and Station personnel to prepare themselves for what was to have been a very hard role in the Pacific. In addition to this training, I decided to carry out a series of inspections of all Stations. I have now completed six out of the ten and have been very impressed with the high standard of smartness and efficiency which have been attained at those Stations which I have inspected. I realise that many man hours of hard work have been put in by all ranks, both in the training and preparation of Squadrons for war against Japan and also to attain such a high standard of cleanliness at Stations.
Much of the material and information contained in this “5 Group News” is now out of date, but I have, nevertheless, decided to issue it in spite of the fact that all hostilities have now ceased. I thank all ranks for their hard work and fine spirit of co-operation during these last few months, and I know full well that, if 5 Group had managed to reach the Pacific before the end of hostilities, the various Units that have been preparing themselves for War, would have put up a very fine show.
MORTON HALL,
[Underlined] 15th August, 1945. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
The weather, particularly at the beginning of the month, did not prove very helpful in enabling the Group to put in as many flying hours as was hoped for. The G.T.I’s Flying Training Chart shows little or no increase in night flying training from the period 6th – 11th July to the period 23rd – 29th July, while the day flying line shows a steady rise with very few breaks throughout the month.
During their visits to Stations and Squadrons throughout the Group, the G.T.I. and his training Specialist Officers have noticed a lethargic attitude in some Squadrons to Tiger training. Such phrases as “We’ve got plenty of time to go yet”, “The War will be finished before we get there”, and “Do you think we’ll go?” have been heard time and time again. It should have become apparent by now that there is only a limited time available for training and that every opportunity should be made to seize every spare hour for ground training and every period of fine weather for air training. Certain Squadrons have already found out that there is even less time than they thought left for training on this side of the world.
As for the phrase “The War will be finished before we get there” – unless crews finish their training thoroughly they won’t get there at all, and it is to be borne in mind that there are still immense areas of land and sea yet to be regained. As is well known, the Jap is a fanatical fighter and does not give up until he is dead. There are millions of Japs who have yet to be made to give up in Burma, Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra, Thailand and French Indo-China, to say nothing of Japan, China and Manchuria, where the Japs are most firmly rooted. As regards to the question “Do you think we’ll go?” – the answer is “Yes”.
The G.T.I. and the Training Specialists welcome 460 and 75 Squadrons into the Group. When the G.T.I. first visited these Squadrons and explained the number of hours flying and number of hours ground lectures required from them, one of the first remarks was “What – only 22 1/2 hours training per crew per month: that is 675 hours per Squadron … We shall get over 1,000 hours in next month”.
Whilst figures of flying times are not a perfect indication of training done, they provide a fairly sound means of assessing the training efforts of individual Squadrons. Therefore to enable Squadron Commanders to appreciate the position of their Squadron in relation to the rest of the Group, the flying times for June and July are given below:-
[Table of Flying Times by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] OTHER SPECIAL UNITS [/underlined]
[Table of Flying Times by Unit]
No. 467 Squadron is congratulated on its training effort, particularly since it has been at R.A.F. Metheringham, where it has done over 1,000 hours during July.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER [/underlined]
Tiger Squadrons in Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and R.A.F. Stations Syerston are progressing satisfactorily with Link Training in B.A.B.S. and Radio Range. No.54 Base Squadrons, however, are a long way behind and there is room for great improvement.
Nos.44 and 619 Squadrons put in a total of 90 hours before they left the Group in the middle of the month.
[Table of Aircrew Hours by Base and Squadron]
Total hours by Group – 1,285
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
Total Categorised in Group = 270
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
Group Captain Vickers, D.S.O., Chief Signals Officer, Tiger Force, who has just returned from a tour of the American Theatre of Operations, visited this Headquarters on Saturday, 4th August, and gave us a very interesting and descriptive lecture on the Signals facilities in use there. As the Tiger Force will be operating in conjunction with the American Air Forces, the existing facilities are practically those which Tiger Force will be required to adopt. A brief outline of these facilities is given below.
[Underlined] AIR-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS [/underlined]
Group or Wing (American equivalent to our Group) have W/T control channels in the 3 mc, 6 mc and 8 mc bands, keyed simultaneously throughout the 24 hours, thus affording the air operator three channels of reception, dependent upon the time of day or night the aircraft is airborne. Broadcasts are made at half-hourly intervals and control, in general, is similar to that of our G.C.F. Weather information is broadcast on these channels every hour in the U.C.O. P.A.C. (the weather code used in that theatre).
H.F./D.F. facilities are available, but our Wireless Operators must train themselves to request QUJ instead of QDM as used in this country. H.F./D.F. fixing facilities are available in an emergency. MF/DF facilities are not available, but other aids, such as M/F Beacons, Radio Ranges and V.H.F. Homing facilities are numerous. I.F.F. is also carried and can be used for fixing purposes in an emergency. R/T communication is by V.H.F. and each Group or Wing has V.H.F./D.F. facilities for homing when within 100 miles from Base. Weather information is also broadcast by R/T at four minute intervals once aircraft are within 100 miles from Base.
[Underlined] CODES AND PUBLICATIONS [/underlined]
As all ground W/T Stations already hold C.S.P.1270 (the American Aircraft Code) the problem of supply is greatly reduced if Tiger Force adopt the same code. Wireless Operators will find this code similar to our own C.D.0250 except that it is a four letter code instead of two as in C.D.0250. The lay-out is similar and spare groups are allotted for any specific requirement. In each of these codes, which change about every four days, is an authenticator table which is used extensively. The method of authentication, while not quite similar to that in C.C.B.P.127, is on the same lines, and Wireless Operators should have no difficulty in learning the procedure. Weather information is obtained, normally by the Group or Wing W/T broadcasts, in code, using the U.C.O. P.A.C. – a code similar to our own U.C.O. Request. If a more detailed weather report is required, it can be requested, and this information is supplied in another weather code – W.A.F.3. In any message where the need for speed outweighs the need for security, Q Code or plain language can be used.
[Underlined] AIR/SEA RESCUE [/underlined]
As most operations involve long hours of flying over water, the facilities for Air/Sea Rescue are well organised. Practically every island in Allied hands has an Air/Sea Rescue Unit located on it. In addition to these units, which maintain a continuous W/T watch on two
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
exclusive distress frequencies, there is an elaborate organisation of Naval aircraft (Dumbos) at rendezvous points along the track. B.29 aircraft (Super Dumbos) are also circling rendezvous points on track, and submarines and destroyers are at pre-arranged stations on the route. Aircraft, surface vessels and submarines all maintain a continuous listening watch on the above two distress frequencies, and in addition on the international distress frequency (500 k/cs). A V.H.F. watch is also maintained so that aircraft in distress have no less than four channels of communication with rescue craft.
[Underlined] CLIMACTIC CONDITIONS AFFECTING RADIO RECEPTION [/underlined]
The climactic conditions in the theatre where Tiger Force aircraft will be located, will at times adversely affect radio reception, and Wireless Operators must be trained to overcome “atmospherics”. Morse reception through interference must be regularly practiced to enable Wireless Operators to overcome the conditions which prevail.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
W/T and R/T silence are normally maintained throughout an operation, unless otherwise ordered, or when aircraft are in an emergency or distress.
[Underlined] BULLSEYES [/underlined]
As everyone must know by this time, the latest Bullseye exercise carried out by this Group was practically ruined by another case of inadvertent radiation of intercomm. on V.H.F. The details have been fully covered in this Headquarters letter 5G/S.14500/9/Sigs., dated 3rd August. At the risk, however, of being accused of emphasising the obvious, the main points to be noted are repeated below:-
(a) If satisfactory V.H.F. reception is not obtained by H – 10, the whole set is to be switched off. Instructions can still be obtained by W/T.
(b) All crews of Marker Force, Flare Force and Master Bomber aircraft are to be reminded of the need to watch the neon “V.H.F. R/T on transmit” indicator lamp from H – 30 until the end of the attack.
(c) Captains of Nos. 9 and 617 Squadron aircraft which require V.H.F. for landing, are to ensure that the V.H.F. H/T switch is not put in the “On” position until the aircraft are within 50 miles of Base on return.
(d) All crews must receive constant instruction on the contents of 5 Group A.S.I. Part VI, Sigs/1.
(e) The transmissions made by the Master Bomber, his deputy and the Link aircraft during the period H – 16 to H – 10 serve as the V.H.F. R/T reception test for all other aircraft. These transmissions must therefore be made in a precise, deliberate manner. All volume controls should be set at maximum volume during this period.
[Underlined] WIRLESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Tiger Training [/underlined] Throughout July the training of Wireless Operators (Air) for Tiger Force continued satisfactorily and results so far obtained are gratifying. Many Squadrons have almost finished the Ground Training Syllabus and revision will ensure that all Wireless Operators are 100% trained. The results of loop and Radio Range training have been very good – Wireless Operators obtaining good loop bearings and Pilots carrying out successful Beam flying. Perfect-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ion in this type of homing to an airfield is absolutely essential in the new theatre and only constant practice at every available opportunity will ensure this. It Is hoped to have all aircraft fitted with American type Radio Range Receiver for use by Pilots only, thus the Wireless Operator will have his Marconi equipment free to use for any other purpose. The training on “Consol” beacons has been held up due to lack of information regarding the beacons in use and for charts to cover them. It is hoped, however, to have all the information of these beacons which are in operation in the European Theatre very soon, so that air training can be carried out, but as there are not yet “Consol” facilities in the new theatre this training should come at the bottom of your priority training list.
[Underlined] Squadron Signals Training Trophy [/underlined] The result of the Squadron Signals Training Trophy competition was announced during July. The winner was No.44 Squadron, whose training room was an outstanding example of what can be done to make these rooms places where Wireless Operators can really find inspiration and interest in every phase of their work. Second and third places in the competition were won by 57 and 83 Squadrons respectively. The standard of all Signals training rooms was very high throughout, and showed that Signals Leaders and Wireless Operators really had taken a keen interest in their layout and cleanliness – Good work chaps – keep it up, and remember when you may be in a tent in some far land, that these too can be kept clean, tidy and made places of interest. The same spirit which prevailed in your training rooms here can be maintained despite all they may say about fungus, mosquitoes, sunshine and rain – not to mention some yellow rats which will soon be dealt with.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise [/underlined] This exercise has been re-arranged, thus enabling the two new Squadrons to No.5 Group to take part. The work carried out during July has been up to standard, though there are still a few cases of incorrect tuning which must be eliminated. Nos.75 and 460 Squadrons will find this exercise their introduction to 5 Group W/T Control, and practice will soon make them quite familiar with the procedure.
[Underlined] W/T Controllers’ Test [/underlined] Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their splendid efforts to get all their Wireless Operators qualified as W/T Controllers. At the end of July only four Operators of 97 Squadron and 7 of 83 Squadron had still to pass the tests laid down in 5 G. S.S.I. No.13. We should like to see a percentage of all Wireless Operators in each Squadron passing out as W/T controllers, as there is always the possibility that they may be called upon to carry out these duties.
[Underlined] Signals Leaders [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to the two new Signals Leaders to the Group, namely F/Lt Baxter, Signals Leader, No.75 (N.Z.) Squadron and F/O Moir, Signals Leader, No.460 Squadron. We hope that they are now settled down in their new quarters and will soon be familiar with 5 Group Signals technique.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
[Underlined] Gee [/underlined] The news came as a bombshell late last month, that as a result of consultations in the Theatre, and the need to conserve shipping space, Gee was not to be used by the Tiger Force. Training in this equipment for both aircrew and maintenance personnel was to cease immediately. Although the consternation of the navigators was great, the maintenance side was no less concerned, because in three years of operational development Gee became a sound and reliable equipment, easy to maintain and relatively fault free. However, the Loran and Rebecca combination will do the work of Gee from the operational point of view. We have had experience of Loran, and if our efforts to obtain Modification IV are successful, with the divider troubles elimin-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS [/underlined]
ated, we can hope for high serviceability. Few of us have had experience with Rebecca, but the equipment was developed by other Commands and with constant practice there should be little difficulty in maintenance.
[Underlined] Workshop Convoys [/underlined] At a rather sultry conference at Coningsby the final form of the workshop convoys was decided. Bomber Command rules that the 3 H.P. Motors were not to be removed from the R.V. 421B, although provision could be made to allow this to be done in the Theatre. The only major modification what was approved by Bomber Command was the installation of a scanner on the roof of the R.V.420B, this work to be carried out by Coningsby.
The task of the preparation of these vehicles for operational use fell on the No.381 M.U. detachment at Coningsby. The work included the installation of bench sets, the scanner modifications, minor re-arrangement of shelving and other work. Five convoys had to be completed in ten days, and the fact that the work is well up to schedule reflects great credit on F/O Milsom in charge of the job, and the remainder of the personnel concerned.
[Underlined] ADMONITORY SONNET [/underlined]
O, ye who venture forth in War’s array
To fight vile Nippon’s hordes, the yellow foe,
From some Pacific islet far away,
Know ye that there ye’ll find no G.P.O.?
All those of ye with gadget minds take heed,
The surplus fittings of the German war
Will vanish quite. Austere will be, indeed,
Your future days compared with those of yore.
Reproach us not in future when you find
That telephones are quantitively few,
And qualitively very far behind
The standards which in England you once knew.
One cheerful note! Be very sure we’ll fix
That telephones supplied aren’t candlesticks!
(Anon. (Circa 1945))
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION TRAINING [/underlined]
The training programme is proceeding satisfactorily. Navigators and Set Operators are making ample use of the aids available with the exception of loop and radio range bearings. These seem to be avoided like a plague, or, if they are not entirely neglected, the Navigators [underlined] do not use them. [/underlined]
They lack faith in them. Why? Providing the loop is swung satisfactorily and the Wireless Operator takes great care in obtaining his readings, the resulting bearings should be very accurate. “Alright”, you may say, “but the bearings we get are hopeless, never nearer than 10 miles to the actual position.” Well, you have the solution in your own hands – either the loops are not correctly swung or the Wireless Operator is not doing his job properly. We repeat, the solution is in your own hands.
Apart from these two aids, however, the impressive array of navigational aids are being used to full advantage. In fact, too much so in the case of Gee. A few navigators have taken a commonsense attitude towards “Gee” and so not use it unless it is required in an emergency. They navigate with the assistance of the other and more difficult-to-manipulate aids. This is sound common sense and can result in one thing only – a very high standard of efficiency. But what of those people who do not adopt this rightful attitude, who continually obtain Gee fixes even though they have serviceable H2S, Loran and loop? By pursuing this policy they will never attain a high degree of manipulation skill, nor will they gain real confidence in other aids. Therefore, leave Gee alone. Discard it altogether. Use it only in an emergency – then you will quickly gain efficiency – and confidence – in all your other “boxes of tricks”.
The Drift Sights and G.P.I’s are not yet available in sufficient quantities to allow fitting to aircraft, and it may not be possible for crews to obtain flying practice with these instruments until Squadrons receive their new aircraft, which is leaving it very late. To compensate for this crews must get the maximum ground practice. It is not quite the same thing, but nearly so. Both these instruments are easy to manipulate and it requires but a little time and effort to become proficient in their use. Therefore, get as much practice as you can, reduce the drills to habit and then you can perform the actions automatically. (A tip here- always try to reduce your work to a series of habits, it then becomes much simpler to perform. If you have to think about a thing before you can do it, you use up energy – a lot of energy. If you can do it habitually then very little energy is required. There is no need to wear yourself out navigating for a few hours – so, make a habit of each and every drill. On every occasion you obtain a fix, go through the complete cycle of obtaining a wind, G/S and E.T.A. check and altering course if necessary. Do this a few times and you have reduced the whole thing to a habit – a very good habit too, because as a result you will be a very reliable and efficient Navigator).
To sum up, Navigation training is proceeding satisfactorily, but a little more attention is required in the direction of Loop bearings, Drift Sights and G.P.I’s. Polish off these three and we may
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
consider the training situation very satisfactory.
[Underlined] FAR EASTERN NAVIGATION FLASHES [/underlined]
(a) Serviceability of Radar aids ‘out there’ is approximately 92%.
(b) Loran ranges fluctuate violently, maximum 1500 nautical miles, minimum 700 nautical miles.
(c) Wireless reception satisfactory, no undue interference from any source. Bearings and emergency fixes therefore easily obtainable and reliable.
(d) Maps and Charts for the Far East are now ready. Two copies of each sheet are being forwarded to Squadrons for perusal.
[Underlined] ASTRO COMPASS [/underlined]
Agreement has at last been reached on the position to be occupied by the Astro Compass in Lancaster aircraft. This is on the starboard side of the coaming which is just forward of the Navigator’s table. A trial installation was held at an 8 Group Station recently and this position seemed very satisfactory. It is easy to get at, very easy to manipulate and is also easily stowed.
Owing to great pressure of work it may be impossible for the Astro Compass to be mounted in this position in the existing aircraft, but some compensation will be found in the fact that the new aircraft which we shall shortly receive will have the Astro Compass correctly positioned. Crews will, therefore, not have much opportunity of practice in using this instrument in the correct position, but continue to obtain the maximum possible practice whilst it is situated in the present position, so that when you do get the new aircraft you will require only familiarisation.,
[Underlined] DRIFT SIGHT [/underlined]
A final position for the fitting of the U.S. Navy Mark VI Drift Sight into Lancaster aircraft has not yet been decided. The present approved position is aft of the flare chute; it is considered to be far from ideal. We in this Group are therefore experimenting by fitting the sight in different positions in the nose of the aircraft. The most obvious and easily accessible position has been vetoed by the larger escape hatch about to be incorporated in the production line aircraft. A second position just aft of the bomb sight is now being perfected and it is earnestly hoped that it will be satisfactory for everyone. A decision on this matter will be reached before the end of August.
Once again, however, no matter what the approved position, it will be impossible to have the sights installed in the existing aircraft, so crews must obtain the maximum practice, ground practice in this instance, on the instructional “mock up”. It is not very difficult to manipulate this new drift sight and fifteen minutes practice should be sufficient to make everyone at least partly proficient. Much experience can be gained of course, either during the short time between the arrival of the new aircraft and the “fly out”, or whilst on the “fly out”.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
(a) [Underlined] Station Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE – Waddington – S/Ldr Evans, D.F.C.
Bardney – S/Ldr Rumbles, D.F.C.
Skellingthorpe – S/Ldr Bray, D.F.C.
551 Wing - F/Lt Johnson.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
54 BASE – Coningsby – S/Ldr Baxter, D.S.O., D.F.C.
Woodhall – S/Ldr Bennett, D.F.M.
Metheringham – S/Ldr Martin, D.F.C.
552 Wing – S/Ldr Hatch, D.F.C.
553 Wing – S/Ldr Ayles, D.F.C., D.F.M.
55 BASE East Kirkby – S/Ldr St.Clair Miller, D.F.C.
Spilsby – F/Lt McKinnon, D.F.C.
SYERSTON – S/Ldr De Friend, D.F.M.
(b) [Underlined] Squadron Navigation Officers. [/underlined]
53 BASE 9 Squadron – F/Lt Peasfield
189 Squadron – F/Lt Booth
463 Squadron – F/Lt Markham
617 Squadron – F/Lt Martin
54 BASE 83 Squadron – F/Lt Bowes
97 Squadron – F/Lt Woolcott
106 Squadron – F/Lt Curry
467 Squadron – F/Lt Pickard
627 Squadron – F/Lt Tyce
55 BASE 57 Squadron – F/Lt Bradley
75 Squadron – F/O Parsons
207 Squadron – F/Lt Gully
460 Squadron – F/Lt Young
SYERSTON 49 Squadron – F/O Prentice
This month we have said goodbye to two stalwarts of the “Union”, namely S/Ldr Mould, D.F.C, and S/Ldr Crowe, D.F.C. Both of them have been with us for a very considerable period and have done outstanding work. They have been responsible in no small part for the progress of Navigation in this Group during the last two years. We are very sorry to see them go, because they will be sorely missed, but we wish them every success and the very best of luck in “civvy street”.
[Underlined] BOUQUETS [/underlined]
After omitting the “bouquets” for two months, it has been decided to re-introduce them. Below is a list of the two best training efforts from each Base during the month of July. The navigators have been chosen for their consistently accurate work, rigid adherence to system, constant checking of winds, ground speeds and E.T.A’s, and log and chart work, particularly chart work, of a very high order.
53 BASE 1. F/O Burke 463 Squadron
2. F/O MacIntyre 453 Squadron
54 BASE 3. F/Lt Stevens 106 Squadron
4. F/S Barker 97 Squadron
55 BASE 5. F/S Mancer 57 Squadron
6. F/O Huggins 57 Squadron
SYERSTON 7. F/O Prentice 49 Squadron
No one is barred from this competition. We do not ask for ultra neatness; the qualifications are as stated in the introductory paragraph. All of you can produce exemplary work if you try. You have the knowledge, you have the necessary Navigational aids available, and all that is required is hard work and common sense on your part. You will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
see that it is possible for anyone to qualify as one of the seven best Navigators in the Group. You have been given knowledge, now apply it, and produce some really first-class work. We do not like to see the same name appearing each month and are always anxious to replace the “old timers” with a newcomer. Let us therefore see a new list of names next month, and YOU make sure your name is on the list.
[Underlined] ALLOCATION OF DUTIES IN THE NAVIGATION SECTION [/underlined]
Checks carried out in all Navigation Sections throughout last month have shown that a number of Navigation Officers are loath to appoint the more senior Navigators to assist them in their multifarious tasks. It is the view of a few of them that as they are responsible for the entire section they should do all the work; but this is an unwise policy. It is impossible for a Squadron Navigation Officer to carry out all the necessary work himself. Consequently it is necessary to delegate authority to the senior Navigators in the Section. In nine out of every ten cases it will be found that these people are only too willing to assist the Navigation Officer in any way. Therefore, Squadron Navigation Officers, do not take upon yourselves entirely the burden of the Navigation Section – share this responsibility with your experienced Navigators and make your task, and in fact your life, much easier to bear.
A word to you Senior Navigators – do your bit for the “Union” and give your Navigation Officer all the assistance you possibly can. Take over one or two of his minor duties, such as looking after Order Books, supervising stores etc., By such action you will help not only the Squadron Navigation Officer, but you will also improve the efficiency of your Section.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS [/underlined]
The average error for the month was 2.7 knots, an improvement of .3 knots on the last two month’s figures.
Once again we are treading the path of progress! By the combined and determined efforts pf every Navigation team the bombing vector error is being systematically reduced to what may well be considered a negligible error.
Don’t forget that we set ourselves the task of reducing this error to 2.5 knots. It can be done as five Squadrons have shown this month; press on therefore, and let us obtain our objective immediately.
[Table of Vector Errors Ranked by Squadron]
No.189 Squadron have dropped with a very big bang from 3rd place last month to bottom of the ladder this month. This month’s vector error is the highest ever obtained by No.189 Squadron since their formation. We hope they will never again obtain such a distinction. Come on now 189 Squadron, make a really determined effort this month and let us see you at the top of the ladder next month!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVOGRAPHS [/underlined]
Did you decipher the word picture couplets included in last month’s News? If you didn’t here they are:-
[Underlined] Couplet No.1 [/underlined] “Destination Tokyo – a very long hop,
Maintain track or you’ll get the chop.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.2 [/underlined] “Loran, H2S. Rebecca and Gee,
Keep your future trouble free.”
[Underlined] Couplet No.3 [/underlined] “Accurate winds so timing sound,
Target pranged, then homeward bound.”
Now, although these word pictures may have provided a very welcome diversion when reading through the News, it was our intention that they should bring home to you, with great force, the morals enclosed therein. Did they have this effect on you, and did you apply the morals immediately?
Those of you who did not decipher them and did not, therefore, get the gist of the thing, now have the answers given to you – now it is up to you to apply them immediately [underlined] and always. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place amongst the Gee transmitting stations during the past month – changes intended to standardize [sic] the system in Europe for peace time Air Force flying, for certain operations taking place in the Italian zone, and to bring all frequencies on the same RF Unit.
As the majority of these changes have taken place with little or no warning, there may still be doubt amongst some Navigators as to the correct frequencies to use for the now standardized [sic] chains. To counteract this confusion, details of the new frequencies are outlined below.
[Table of Gee Chain Frequencies and Ident Blinks]
+ New chains – not yet working.
Information relating to Gee in the Far Eastern Theatre is going to cause considerable heartburning amongst Navigators and Pilots alike, as it is now definitely known that no Gee Chain is to be provided there. To ensure that crews reach a high standard of efficiency in navigating without this aid, it is expected that instructions will shortly be issued for Gee to be taken out of all aircraft. It must, however, be emphasised that Gee is not the be all and end all of navigation and has never superceded [sic] the basic principles of navigation. Therefore, however great the loss of this aid may seem at first, air navigation will not become impossible. Other aids are available, equally as accurate, and crews must develop them to a high standard.
When this instruction is issued, Pilots, Navigators and Set Operators must therefore concentrate on Loran, to ensure a higher standard of fixing accuracy, and on Rebecca and Radio Range for more accurate homing. Only by determination and continued training can crews overcome the disadvantages which will necessarily result from the taking out of Gee.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
The training of crews in H2S Navigation and Blind Bombing is progressing satisfactorily throughout the Group despite the shortages of equipment and the lower serviceability rate.
With the expected loss of Gee, H2S is quickly becoming the most accurate method of overland navigation, and much greater importance must be paid to its homing facilities in view of the nature of the Pacific Bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
An accuracy in fixing, equal to that of Gee, is not expected but one of less than 1 1/2 miles (this is about the present error) is demanded and can be obtained, providing set operators are made aware of their responsibilities, particularly when using H2S fixes for windfinding. The less accurate a crew is in H2S fixing, the lower will be their standard in blind bombing.
No relaxation in H2S training can therefore be allowed, in fact greater effort is essential and instructors and crews alike must take every opportunity of furthering their ability in the use of H2S, both for navigational and blind bombing purposes.
On the last Bullseye, instructions were issued for all crews to blind bomb on Bristol and take a P.P.I. photograph within 30 seconds of release. The results obtained were far from gratifying, and it was noted that many operators had forgotten the most elementary principles of blind bombing and P.P.I. photography.
It is hard to realise that some crews even attempted bombing on the 30 mile scan, others had too large 10 mile zeros, and many did not make any serious attempt at obtaining a decent photograph.
Great emphasis is being placed upon Blind Bombing and P.P.I. photography in the Far East, and results such as these reflect seriously upon the upon the attitude which is being adopted in the training for the Pacific. No.5 Group has been, and is, a precision bombing Group on visual targets, it must retain that distinction in Blind Bombing. Let the results obtained on the next Bullseye prove this beyond doubt. It is up to every crew to see that it turns in the best effort possible, and Instructors must watch their briefing if this is to be achieved.
No.97 Squadron have challenged the remainder of the squadrons in 5 Group to a blind bombing competition. This competition to take place as soon as sufficient crews are blind bombing trained and the Plotting Unit at Ipswich is operating. By the use of IPSWICH and the plotting unit all crews will have the same advantages and each aircraft will be plotted within the same degree of accuracy. Conditions of the competition are to be agreed shortly and forwarded to all Units. The results should prove interesting in view of the various types of equipment which will have to be used.
[Underlined] REBECCA [/underlined]
More Rebecca equipment is becoming available daily, and many crews will soon have the opportunity of testing this aid for themselves.
With the likelihood of Gee being taken out of aircraft, Rebecca will be the main Radar homing aid, and if used correctly is far more accurate than Gee.
Training is comparatively simple and quick, but requires constant practice. Don’t let the equipment lie forgotten once you’ve learnt how to use it. Make it your job to home on Rebecca to your Base after every flight – you may have need of it someday.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran is coming into it’s [sic] own. Gee is out in the Pacific Theatre.
This is a plain statement of fact, not to be passed over lightly. Loran facilities in the Far East are not all they ought to be but providing an operator has the basic principles at his finger-tips, can take a fix accurately and can correct simple faults, navigation in the Far East should be just as simple as in Europe.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAVIGATION [/underlined]
It is known that the United States Army Air Forces are obtaining Loran with a reasonable degree of accuracy to the coast of Japan. A further Master Station and Slave are being provided to give position lines running N.E. to S.W. and coupled with the present facilities, reasonable coverage should result.
It has been evident from reports received after Cross-countries and other flying exercises that insufficient care is being taken in fixing. Complaints have been made that Loran is inaccurate over this country, fixes being in error etc. Investigations often prove that the wrong skywave has been used, or that the count has been made incorrectly. Watch these points carefully, particularly identification of skywaves, as this will be extremely important in the areas in which you may be operating in the Pacific Theatre.
[Underlined] RADAR ALTIMETER SCR718C [/underlined]
Supplies of this equipment are extremely short, and up to the present time little use has been made of the aid.
There is one little point to stress however. This altimeter can be used to show when an aircraft is over sea or over land. Over sea the reflected pulse is very steady – over land the pulse moves about most irregularly. Watch this point when you have a chance and see if you can detect your change from sea to land.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
During the month S/Ldr S.J. Abbott relinquished the post of Group Bombing Leader to go back to “Civvy Street” and his old job in the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police Force.
Never the spectacular type, as probably became his Police Force training, S/Ldr Abbott’s quiet efficiency was a contributory factor in the Group’s present high standard of bombing accuracy. Much was achieved during his 10 months spell of duty, and, in saying farewell, all of us wish him every success in his new post.
His is one job where the bowler hat will be useful anyway!!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
Far too many crews saw the end of July without achieving a bombing category. It is realised that most crews were starting July from scratch, owing to re-shuffling, but every effort must be made to categorise all crews as soon as possible.
[Underlined] AN OUTSTANDING RESULT [/underlined]
No.97 Squadron (F/Lt Coates) report a magnificent effort on the part of F/Lt Wilkinson and crew. The error achieved was a CREW error of 23 yards converted to 20,000 feet. This is really excellent, particularly so as their Air Bomber is actually a Squadron trained PILOT/FLIGHT ENGINEER; what makes the feat even more remarkable is that it was the first exercise completed by this crew.
This is an all time record for No.5 Group, and can’t possibly fall far short of the “best ever” for Mark XIV bombing.
Congratulations to:-
F/Lt Wilkinson (P) F/Sgt Salter (P/FE) F/O Collins (Nav)
not forgetting the Rear Gunner for keeping his turret still!!
[Underlined] REMOTE CONTROL INDICATORS [/underlined]
No.207 Squadron have been carrying out trials with a Remote Control attachment to the Mark XIV Sighting Head. This attachment is operated by the Navigator who feeds Sighting Angle and Drift to the Sighting Head. The object of the attachment is to cope with winds above those for which the Mark XIV is built (i.e. over 66 knots Indicated) and it is worked in conjunction with the Emergency Computor [sic] You will be hearing more of this later.
[Underlined] THE M.P.I. TRAINER [/underlined]
The purpose of this trainer is to give Air Bombers practice in judging the Mean Point of Impact of various Target Indicator Patterns. S/Ldr Graham Rogers (No.54 Base Bombing Leader) reports that the Trainer is proving extremely popular and Air Bombers are not finding it easy to judge the centre of a group both quickly and accurately. The trainer works on a similar principle to the A.M.B.T. and is about the size of a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
pin-table (hence its popularity!) Twenty slides are provided, each having a pattern of six Green T.I’s. No.1 slide being a compact group, the groups becoming more scattered as the slide number increases until finally, No.20 requires considerable thought. Errors can be measured both for Line and Range from the scales provided. It is hoped that all Air Bombers will see that they derive maximum benefit from the trainer when it is allocated to their Squadron.
[Underlined] NEW INCENDIARY BOMBS [/underlined]
Models of new incendiary bombs, which we shall use “out there” will be coming along to all Squadrons. Study these and get all the gen you can on them from your Armament Officer.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM WAINFLEET [/underlined]
The N.C.O. i/c Wainfleet Bombing Range reports that 2,286 bombs and 667 T.I’s were plotted during the month. This number could be stepped up considerably if only Squadrons would spread their bombing times more evenly throughout the day. Early morning and evening details are the answer.
[Underlined] BEST CREW ERRORS FOR JULY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error
9 F/O Bloodworth F/S Turner F/S Walker 64 – 75
F/O Plowman F/O Frazer F/S Esterman 48 – 57
F/O Myatt F/S Cubitt F/S Smith 62
S/L Blair F/O Skinner F/O Herks 58
57 F/L Nichols F/S Knight F/S Sheldon 72
S/L King F/O Crate F/O Thom 67
F/L Karop F/S Drackett F/S Fishman 76
F/O Wood F/S Crowther F/S Streathfield 72
F/L Appleton F/S Stevens W/O Cobb 68
97 F/L Wilkinson F/S Salter (P/F.E.) F/O Collins 23
463 F/O Houngan F/S Niblock P/O Pepper 58
F/O Ferris F/S Cliff F/O Richardson 74
467 F/L Morris F/S Gillespie F/S Silver 51
617 F/O Taylor F/S Shires F/S Bache 54
F/O Young F/S Hill F/S Howell 53
F/L Martin F/S Tedder P/O Barlow 65
S/L Ward F/L Sumpter F/O Christian 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Competition Results]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Base and Squadron [/underlined]
[Underlined] No.627 Squadron [/underlined] 668 T.I’s – Average error 118 yards.
176 Practice Bombs – Average Error 81 yards.
F/O George’s average error was 54 yards for 5 exercises – good show!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
Since our last issue, Squadrons preparing for service with the Tiger Force have completed 75-80% of the Training Syllabus. This is a remarkably good effort, and Gunnery sections concerned are to be congratulated on the fine showing and the results obtained.
During the next few weeks it is hoped that aircraft recognition will be given as much priority as possible, in order that there will be no doubt in the mind of any gunner when called upon to identify aircraft. Most gunners by now have an excellent working knowledge of the .5 and a little study in one’s spare time should be sufficient to keep in touch with this gun.
It is refreshing to note that gunners have taken an active interest in subjects dealing with the “other fellow’s jobs” and Base Gunnery Leaders report that of the many gunners questioned, quite 75% have exhibited a marked degree of “gen”.
The new type of flying suit has been tested recently and most gunners have commented with enthusiasm on this equipment. The diligence displayed during the test of this clothing has given satisfaction, and we look forward to a general issue of the new suits as and when such issue becomes possible.
Owing to the fact that all Squadrons within the Group are conforming to the Tiger Training Syllabus, the “Order of Merit” for Fighter Affiliation Exercises is now cancelled.
Trials have been carried out in the FN.82 – reports of which have been submitted to Bomber Command. In the meantime, gunners are advised to rehearse speedy exit from the FN.82 – one or two helpful points being:-
(i) Avoiding the V.O.M. adjacent to the right leg.
(ii) Ensuring the freedom of the right foot before falling out.
(iii) Familiarising oneself with the Hand Rotation Lever (This is difficult to operate in its present position and will call for practice in manipulation).
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
Total Day Affiliation = 333: Total Night Affiliation = 142.
Total Number of Affiliation Exercises for July = 475.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
Recent reports from 21st Bomber Command, U.S.A.A.F., have shown that Japanese night ground defences are rapidly assuming the proportions, if not the accuracy, of the Germans’. Superforts operating at night have reported accurate coning by radar controlled searchlights, with intense concentrations of heavy and light flak in the cones. The Japs’ task is, of course, made easier by the low altitude at which the Superforts operate at night, and also by the very low concentration rate over the target, allowing a large proportion of the attacking aircraft to be engaged individually.
Japanese night fighters have still apparently got a lot to learn, and are learning the hard way by attacking with navigation and cockpit lights burning. They have, however, had some success when attacking aircraft illuminated by searchlights, the old German “Wilde Sau” technique, and have on occasion pressed their attacks to very close range. We can expect an increase in this form of attack, as it has the advantages of not needing efficient A.I. and also, day fighters can be used.
The latest phenomenon over Japan at night is the “Ball of Fire”. Variously described as a “flaming onion” or “Fiery rocket”, it has all the hallmarks of the rocket projectile used by the Germans in the closing weeks of the war. In fact, one Superfort crew has reported “a small winged projectile with flames emitting from it”. Unless it is a great improvement on the German model it is likely to be merely an interesting addition to the other fireworks commonly seen over a target at night.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION ON THE BULLSEYE [/underlined]
The one Bullseye flown this month, on the night off the 23rd, showed once again the overwhelming advantage possessed by night-fighters in moonlight conditions. We had 154 Lancasters airborne and the fighters claimed 161 successful combats, a total amassed by only 24 Mosquitos! The fighter pilots reported that our Gunners were keeping a very poor look-out over the Channel, but improved over the land. One Mosquito carried out 12 unseen attacks, although burning navigation lights! The loss of mid-upper gunners has, of course, made the carrying out of a thorough search more difficult, but the figures show that a great many crews either have incompetent gunners or else are not taking sufficient interest in a training exercise designed to increase their chances of survival once they start operating over Japan. It cannot be overemphasised that a Group Bullseye is the best experience a crew can get without risking being shot down, and as such it should be treated as a real operation from take-off to landing. The pilot who thinks that a Bullseye is just another training bind is heading right for a posthumous Pacific Star.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
Jap Fighter Control
As yet there is no comparison between Allied and Japanese fighter control, for though the enemy early warning system is considered adequate for giving general warning of the approach of large Allied air formations to Japan, Japanese fighter control is in an undeveloped state. The limited scope of Japanese fighter operations control is demonstrated by the type of fighter reaction experienced on Allied bomber missions over Japanese-held territories and by the poor performance characteristics, for purposes of fighter control, of radar and communications equipment known to be in operational use in the Japanese Air Force. The Japanese have under development a number of special devices for use in ground and air-controlled interception and they have been conducting research and experiments in fighter control organisation and procedure. Eventually, these activities may be expected to result in fighter control operations of wider scope.
The present Japanese early warning and fighter control system for air defence, however, is in a state of development roughly comparable to German development in the period from 1939 to 1941. The Germans also used picket boats to supplement the early warning radar and their first night interception system depended on illumination of raiders by searchlights. The Japanese early warning system appears to be adequate for the purpose of giving general warning of the approach of Allied aircraft to Japan. In view of the inferior performance of the radars, however, and of the apparent lack of a well organised filtering system, it is doubtful if accurate and prompt information on pin points, courses, speeds, heights, identifications and strengths is being supplied to Japanese Air Force Control Centres.
Without such information, the operations of these Control Centres must be quite restricted, and it is not likely that they are in a position to make material changes in the disposition of fighter squadrons to meet the special tactical requirements of individual raids. As a corollary, it may be stated that Allied diversionary raids staged in connection with bomber attacks against primary targets in Japan probably have little effect on lessening the number of fighters available for attack against the main force.
Operations at Japanese Fighter Control Centres appear to consist of scrambling fighters, broadcasting warning to airborne aircraft of the presence of enemy aircraft, and ordering fighters to proceed to designated general areas in the vicinity, most often a target area, for “attack” , or in other cases to take appropriate action for evasion.
Night interceptions are accomplished by co-ordination of night fighters with searchlights and in other cases by night fighters free-lancing in the target area, often with no detection aid of any kind.
It is possible that in the immediate future the Japanese will perfect a system of air control interception based on homing fighters on to a shadowing aircraft by means of airborne detection finders. This system might be fairly effective for day operations, when spotting and closing can be done visually, but does not seem to be suited for night operations.
It is unlikely that the Japanese Air Force will be able
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] JAP FIGHTER CONTROL [/underlined]
to organise an effective system for ground control interception or fighter control, especially for night operations until such time as they have in operation ground and airborne radar more suitable for the purpose than any now in operation. It is possible, however, that the Japanese are developing specially designed fighter control radar, perhaps an adaptation of the Giant Wurzburg, and also A.I. equipment possibly adapted from Allied airborne 10-centimetre equipment.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia. W.I.S.86. [/underlined]
Further light on this subject is now cast by the capture of a document on Luzon which gives a description of Japanese fighter direction methods, as they existed in April, 1944. It is reprinted from A.T.I.S. Translations, No.156. Particularly interesting is the dependence of the Japanese on reconnaissance aircraft – which should make good targets – and on a constant speed and course of the attacking aircraft.
The physical system is not unlike our own shore-based system in basic respects. Various radars report to a control station which we should call a filter centre. At this location pilots are displayed and evaluated and action is taken. (Apparently each radar reports bearing and range from itself and does not convert to a common reference point; nor does it appear to use any sort of “grid” system). The Japanese have an organisation designated an “intelligence squad” which would compare to our intercept team. One sketch indicated that D/F equipment is used in some manner for tracking their own intercepting aircraft.
Numerous references in the document indicate that Japanese radar bearings and range discrimination are not reliable. Furthermore, the enemy does not seem to have any search radar which is dependable for altitude determination on incoming raids.
To compensate for shortcomings in bearing, range and altitude from their radar, scouting aircraft are sent out initially to contact our raids. These scouts shadow and report position, type, strength, altitude etc., as an aid to directing the intercepting group. This would suggest the conclusion that our raids frequently will be spotted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, which will act as shadows and not as attacking units. The reconnaissance aircraft represent an important cog in the intercept system.
Due to the time element required in the filter centre, the method of radio relay, and the fact that mechanical methods are utilised for computation of vectors, much time is wasted; time lag in plot is an obvious conclusion. All computation is on the premise that the “enemy raids” will remain on almost constant course and speed. This suggests that a few diversionary raids with marked changes in course and speed might create confusion in Japanese intercepts.
After their intercepting aircraft are given the initial “vector” and “range” on the “point of encounter” (intercept position), the subsequent changes in vector seem to be given in a manner similar to our clock-code method; e.g. “03.10” equals “right front ten kilometres”.
[Underlined] Extracted from H.Q. Air Command, S.E. Asia, W.I.S.87. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was no operational activity during the month. Four aircraft of No.54 Base “stood by” for a search on the 24th but were not required. This followed a report by a No.463 Squadron aircraft of what appeared to be a dinghy in the sea off the East Coast, and A.S.R. Warwicks carried out a search although there were no aircraft missing at the time.
Casual sightings are going to be just as important in the new theatre as they were over here, maybe more so, and all that is required to ensure a happy ending to someone’s troubles is:-
(a) A careful description of what is seen.
(b) The most accurate fix possible.
(c) The time of the sighting and good signals procedure.
Accurate information will assist both those below and those above – if passed quickly.
Training on all Squadrons has made good progress during the month. The Mark II Airborne Lifeboat commenced a Group tour, and a mobile parachute instruction unit is also going ahead.
Yet a third circus is lining up to spread knowledge on Air Sea Rescue and land and sea survival in all theatres.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “CAN YOU SWIM?” [/underlined]
(If you can’t you are missing a lot of fun and – by the way – if you ditch you may not reach the dinghy!! [/boxed]
As was stated in last month’s News, S/Ldr Becker left this Group to take up a Safety and Rescue appointment with Transport Command. B.B. was one of the earliest members of the team, then led by W/Cdr Dabbs, by whose efforts such vast improvements were made in Air Sea Rescue throughout Bomber Command, and to whom a lot of chaps indirectly owe their present existence.
During his long stay with No.5 Group, S/Ldr Becker played a big part in improving both training and equipment, and we wish him the best of luck in his new appointment and also when he returns to his tobacco manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
During July flying accidents in the Group rendered one aircraft Cat. B., one Cat. A., and completely destroyed four others. Three Formal Investigations were convened to inquire into the more serious ones and two of them are still incomplete. Evidence so far places three of the six accidents in the avoidable category, viz:-
Swing on take off – 1; Overshoot on landing – 1;
Crashed on overshoot on one engine (Mosquito) – 1.
In addition one aircraft burst a tyre and crashed on landing; another had an engine failure on take off and crashed with fatal results. The remaining accident in unclassified as results of the investigation are not yet to hand: the aircraft belly landed after engine failure on a three engined practice overshoot.
One accident is singled out for special mention this month as the errors made by the pilot provide lessons for all Mosquito pilots in the Group. A Mosquito with the port engine feathered returned to Base and was given permission to land (in daylight) on the 2,000 yards runway. The pilot made a [underlined] right hand [/underlined] circuit and turned in for his approach rather low. He came in too fast and purposely delayed his selection of wheels down. The aircraft levelled off 300 yards along the runway and floated for some 600 yards. At this stage the pilot [underlined] decided to go round again [/underlined] as the wheels had not locked down. Full flap had been applied. The aircraft climbed to approximately 40 feet, at which height the left wing dropped and the aircraft stalled. The pilot was killed and the Navigator seriously injured.
The greatest mistake this pilot made was to try to take a Mosquito, with one engine feathered and wheels and flaps down, round again from ground level. Pilots Notes state that going round again in only possible in these circumstances if the decision is made at an early stage in the approach when it is clear that the undercarriage and flaps can be raised and speed increased by diving in the height available. Contributory factors to this crash were the [underlined] right [/underlined] hand circuit and the low, excessively fast approach. Final approach speed should be 122 knots and circuits should be made left handed irrespective of which engine has failed.
[Underlined] CASUALTY SIGNALS AND FORMS (765C) [/underlined]
Of recent weeks some slackness in the compilation of casualty signals has been evident. Once again Units are reminded that [underlined] every type [/underlined] of damage to an aircraft, including straightforward engine failure, requires notification by signal. Under para. “G” should be stated “765(C) yes” or “765(C) no”. A.M.O. A.1348/43 gives detailed instructions on the compilation of casualty signals. This A.M.O. must be obeyed to the letter. Those Officers who are concerned in any way with signals for aircraft damage must have this A.M.O. by them at all times.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS [/underlined]
All Units have Gold Stars this month with the exception of Nos.627 Squadron (Blue) and 97 Squadron (Red). The position of No.106 Squadron is still undecided.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
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[Drawing] engineering
The following are the main observations made during the Group Engineering Staff Inspection of Stations, prior to the A.O.C’s inspection:-
(i) On the whole the Base Servicing Sections and Servicing Wings are organised on sound and efficient lines.
(ii) The inevitable chopping and changing between Units of both aircraft and personnel is causing some dislocation in Servicing Wings.
(iii) A considerable amount of surplus equipment exists in most Servicing Wings.
(iv) M.T. Servicing leaves much to be desired on some Stations.
With regard to (ii). It is a well known fact that the standard of servicing in one Unit is not acceptable to another. The spirit behind this is natural and it cannot be expected that anyone will accept full responsibility for the serviceability of a strange part worn aircraft without a very careful and critical inspection. This applies particularly to engine, airframe, instrument and electrical trades, whose responsibility covers almost entirely the safety of the aircraft and a single point overlooked is liable to have most serious consequences for both the aircraft and crew and tradesmen concerned.
Although it is appreciated that the swopping od old aircraft is bad business, it is inevitable at this stage and in dealing with this problem the following points should be noted:-
(i) In view of possible changes it is now more important than ever that all defects are recorded on F.700.
(ii) The servicing of such aircraft on receipt should as far as possible be carried out by experienced tradesmen.
(iii) Cases of indifferent servicing by the previous holding Unit should be reported officially, the reports being confined to statement of facts.
The surplus equipment referred to in para.1 (iii) should be returned to the Equipment Section on paper and stored under arrangements made by the C.T.O. and equipment Officers pending final disposal.
The present shortage of personnel and equipment is undoubtedly reflected in the comparatively low standard of M.T. servicing. This standard has recently improved but there is still room for improvement with the existing resources. It was apparent during the inspection that some C.T.O’s were not keeping up to date with the progress of unserviceable vehicles and where this was the case, the number of unserviceable vehicles was comparatively high.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY AND FLYING HOURS [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Hours Flown by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
Further information has now been received from Headquarters Tiger Force regarding the requirements and commitments of Photography. The growing importance of careful preparation is further emphasised, and the points enumerated below will prove to be of paramount importance to all concerned.
[Underlined] F.60 CAMERAS [/underlined]
It can now be stated that the F.60 (35 mm) fully automatic camera with scanner contact, and fitted with visor mounting, will be issued on 100% basis to all aircraft proceeding with Tiger Force. This camera will supercede [sic] the Bantam and Kodak 35 mm now in use, and will entirely eliminate manipulation failures. The camera is on a fixed mounting and is operated by the Bomb Firing Key. This feature will be greatly appreciated by the Set Operator, as he will have no knobs and triggers to bother about, and we are certain that operational photography will be thereby improved.
[Underlined] F.67 CAMERAS [/underlined]
In addition to the F.60 cameras, each Squadron will be equipped with two F.67 (16 mm) cameras. This camera is similar in operation to the F.60, being fully automatic and operated by the scanner contact making one exposure per second and like the F.60 it is operated by the bomb firing key.
[Underlined] TYPE 35 CONTROL DIAL [/underlined]
The existing Bromide Paper Control Dial is considered unsuitable for use in all conditions of high humidity. Arrangements have therefore been made for the production of dials manufactured from some suitable plastic material which would stand up to the wear and tear of exacting tropical conditions. The lay-out of the dial has been arranged to suit bombs having a terminal velocity above 1200 feet per second. In order to ensure accuracy, the R.A.E., Farnborough, are checking the dials against a stop watch, and will amend the calibrations as necessary. It is anticipated that 400 of these new dials will be ready for issue at an early date.
[Underlined] TYPE 20A, 35 CONTROL [/underlined]
In future the No.20 Controls will be fitted with contact springs and will be known as type 20A. These controls will be made a general issue to Units from 1st September, when they will be coming off production at 50 per week.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC TENT – TRIALS [/underlined]
Good progress has been made by Nos. 54 and 55 Bases in the use of the photographic tent, and from the reports so far received, the tents appear very satisfactory. The chief difficulty with the equipment appears to be the limited size of the film drying drum and the fact that it has to be revolved by hand while the film is drying. For this reason the standard portable type 14B/528 complete with motor and belt is being issued instead. It is also hoped to include 3 or more table fans to ensure a speedier method of drying.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH SPEED DAY FILM [/underlined]
The poor keeping qualities of High Speed Night Film has rendered it unsuitable for use in the East, and High Speed Day Film is to be issued instead. It will be necessary in the initial stages however, to cut the present 125 exposure lengths into 14 exposure lengths until such times as the manufacturers supply the film in the requisite size.
[Underlined] CAMERA – F.24 – TRANSPORTATION [/underlined]
It can now be confirmed that cameras will be housed in their storage cases with ancillary equipment and flown out direct to the Theatre of operations. Units have been instructed to demand storage cases for the purposes from the appropriate M.U.
[Underlined] INITIAL EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
As preparation against any unforeseen emergency, or the delay of equipment arriving by sea, quantities of photographic materials are to be conveyed by other methods ready for immediate use if necessary. Early in the campaign R.A.F. photographers may have to use the American type Photographic Tents pending the arrival of the standard R.A.F. equipment. Some considerable time may elapse before pre-fabricated buildings are erected, and in consequence use will have to be made of these tents until more permanent buildings are available.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL [/underlined]
Some anxiety has been experienced regarding the ever increasing problem of staff who are eligible for overseas service. The matter has been taken up with Records, and it is thought that we shall soon have a much clearer idea of the personnel required. The confirmed establishment of photographic personnel for two Squadrons proceeding with “Tiger” Force is as follows:-
1 F/Sgt. 1 Sgt. 2 Cpls. 13 A.C’s.
[Underlined] WATER SUPPLY [/underlined]
It is of interest to note that the estimated consumption of water by the Tiger Force for photographic purposes alone will be approximately 8,000 gallons per day! In order to secure this supply special well boring equipment is being taken to the area.
[Underlined] H2S PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
Results now being received show a marked improvement in H2S photographs, but it is felt that there is still room for more care and attention in the developing and printing of the films. Special attention is necessary to ensure that each film has the “Start Frame” recorded, and also that cameras are in correct focus. On the last Bullseye training exercise carried out on the night of 23/24th July, several H2S films received at this Headquarters indicate that no attempt had been made to record the “Start Frame”. As pointed out in last month’s News, frank criticism is very necessary, and W/O’s i/c Bases and N.C.O’s i/c Sections should pay particular attention to this, and thereby ensure that such “snags” are brought to light. Bullseye exercises provide excellent training of personnel and it is important that this training is used as fully as possible.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
Photography is a recognised indispensable factor in war;
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
the article of military intelligence in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica [sic], written by a great military authority, mentions photography as a main source of obtaining information form the enemy. We must always keep this in mind and realise that only by the continuous vigilance of all photographic personnel, and their extreme care and attention to detail, can this be achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] 2,000LB. MARK II WINCHES [/underlined]
In our last issue we referred to the trials being carried out with the modified Mark II, 2,000lb Bomb Winches. We are pleased to say that these trials have been successful and the modified winches can be positioned on all bomb stations in the Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] RETURNS – GENERAL [/underlined]
Again!! We request Armament Officers to ensure that [underlined] ALL [/underlined] returns to this Headquarters are made on the appropriate days and [underlined] NOT [/underlined] three or four days later. Also, please ensure that the information is accurate. The importance of accuracy cannot be over-emphasised, because all information submitted to this Headquarters is consolidated and passed on to Higher Authority. Finally, to eliminate unnecessary telephone calls to Stations, please submit “NIL” returns where applicable.
And, while we are on the subject of telephone calls, may we draw your attention to the paragraph headed “Co-operation” in Issue No.28 of this News. We repeat that we are always prepared to help the Armament Staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but please first try to settle your problems at Station and Base level. If you cannot obtain satisfaction there, then telephone us by all means. A day in this office would convince you that it was never more aptly named than by the word “Madhouse” which appears on one of our telephones.
[Underlined] DEMANDS [/underlined]
A tip! when a demand has been submitted, do not just sit back and wait. Periodically “chase” those concerned. With the end of the war in Europe, the pressure of work at Maintenance Units and Equipment Sections has, if anything, increased, but we are certain that an occasional reminder, stating fairly the reasons for your inquiry, will be received in the spirit in which it is given.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS [/underlined]
Here we would like to draw your attention to the Editorial of the August issue of the Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, in which reference is made to Forms 1022 and 1023. Especially do we concur with the last paragraph, having noticed the fall-off in the number of 1023’s received. Please note that we require a “Nil” return, but it is very unlikely that such a return will be necessary.
Having relieved ourselves of these moans and as we are talking about the BOMBER COMMAND ARMAMENT BULLETIN – you will by now have received your copy of this month’s bumper issue. It is full of most interesting information.
As this Group us carrying out an extensive training programme, we feel sure that the Booklet on the Handling etc., of Practice Bombs, mentioned in the Bulletin, will be most useful in reducing the number of accidents, and look forward to receiving our copies.
Another matter likely to be of interest to Armament
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT [/underlined]
Officers in the near future, is the article on Tropical Storage of Explosives. We recommend you study this thoroughly.
We are now beginning to receive reports on the effectiveness of our bombing of Germany. A very interesting article on this subject appears on Page 37 of the Bulletin. It is gratifying, to say the least, to know that the work of the Armament Sections throughout the War has yielded such worth while results.
To close this month’s News, we should like to wish those Armament Officers who will be leaving us for warmer climes, the best of luck in their new assignments, and hope that their job will not be a long one.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
medical
In the forthcoming operations overseas, the following information may prove of value to all personnel concerned.
[Underlined] D.D.T. [/underlined]
The above initials represent a white, crystalline powder with the full chemical name of dichloro-diphenyl-trichlorethane. It is a comparative newcomer to the field of preventative medicine, but promises to be of the greatest value in the prevention of insect-borne diseases. Supplies of D.D.T. are now adequate for its full use on operational areas overseas.
In tropical and sub-tropical areas, many diseases are conveyed by insects which fly or crawl and which transmit the diseases by biting or being crushed into skin abrasions during scratching, and so convey to man the disease which the insect carries. Any substance which will kill insects in an efficient manner will thus help to reduce the incidence of disease. To date D.D.T. is the most effective substance to be discovered.
In brief, D.D.T. exercises its lethal effect by producing paralysis of the insect followed by death. The precise way in which D.D.T. reaches the body of the insect is uncertain, but absorption through its feet is believed to be the principal route. Swallowing, during feeding, of D.D.T. is also important. The absorption of D.D.T. is hastened by incorporating it into a liquid such as Kerosene or a water emulsion. The precise way in which D.D.T. is used will vary according to the insect. Thus, it may be dissolved in Kerosene, or in a water emulsion, and used as a spray, or incorporated in a dust with talc, flour or road-dust, and dusted onto the surface requiring such treatment.
In the prevention of malaria, the anopheline mosquito which carries the parasite of malaria, is attacked in all its stages.
The young mosquito, or larva, may be killed by covering the surface of the water in which the larva breeds with a dust containing D.D.T. Large areas of water may be dusted by aircraft. The adult mosquito is more effectively killed by spraying with a solution containing D.D.T. in Kerosene.
Typhus Fever, which is conveyed to man by the body louse, can be most effectively prevented by dusting the skin of people exposed to the disease with a dust of talc and D.D.T. The louse is killed before it can bite. Underclothing, such as shirts, can be impregnated with D.D.T. and is still lethal after a number of washings. The method of dusting was used in Naples in 1943, during an outbreak of typhus, with outstanding success. The whole civil population was dusted, and for the first time in history a typhus outbreak was halted.
The above information is only of the briefest, and should not be regarded as in any way exhaustive.
[Underlined] SCHISTOSOMA JAPONICUM [/underlined]
This disease is likely to be met with in the operational
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] MEDICAL [/underlined]
area overseas.
The schistosome is a small worm, 1 to 2 1/2 cms in length and is capable of living within the body of a man for long periods. It can cause serious disease unless treated adequately.
The young worm leaves the body of man as an egg. This egg will only hatch out in [underlined] fresh [/underlined] water, and the young worm so liberated enters, and lives for a period, in the body of a small water snail. Subsequently, it leaves the snail, and in swimming about, it will readily attach itself to and enter the human skin. Thenceforth it grows to maturity in the body of man, sets up disease, and produces eggs which are voided in the urine or faeces.
With the above in mind, it is easy to see how streams, rivers and water holes can easily become infected with the young worm in an area where the native population exercises no sanitary control.
To avoid infection one should never bathe in rivers or streams which are likely to be infected. Also, water for drinking or washing should come from an approved source – that is, water which has been filtered and chlorinated.
Sea-bathing is quite safe if well away from the mouths of rivers.
[Underlined] MALARIA PREVENTION BY SUPPRESSIVE MEPACRINE [/underlined]
In view of the lessening of the incidence of malaria in the operational area, it will not be necessary for personnel travelling by sea to take suppressive meparine. Parties travelling by air, however, will still take meparine from the date of their departure from the United Kingdom, as they will be living in malarious zones en route. The improvement has been effected by American anti-malarial unites and by R.A.F. anti-malarial workers already in the theatre.
Other anti-malarial precautions, already mentioned in previous articles in this section, will continue to be necessary.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.W. BAIRD DFM
P/O A.J. WILLIAMS DFC
F/O J.A. PETERSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O A.E. BOON DFC
F/SGT F. WHITFIELD DFC
F/SGT F. STEBBINGS DFM
F/SGT H.R. LYNHAM DFM
F/SGT P.R. ASLIN DFM
P/O J.C.B. GRAN DFC
P/O J.W. SINGER DFC
F/SGT P.F. JACKSON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR R.A. NEWMARCH DSO
F/L L.W. HAYLER DFC
F/O R.T.F. COVENTRY DFC
[Underline] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. NOWRIE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.W. FIRMIN DFC
F/O W.J.K. ENDEAN DFC
F/O A.H. NISBETT DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR E.G. WARD DFC
P/O K.G.W. MANTOCK DFC
P/O A.G. WEAVER DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR I.G. FADDEN DFC
F/L P.M.P. CRAMPTON, DFM DFC
F/O J.W. ATKINSON DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/LDR H.L. CREETH DFC
F/O J.W. HUDSON DFC
F/L A.H. GIBSON DFC
F/O G.E. GAMBLE DFC
F/O R.B. PHILLIPS DFC
F/L J.E. DUNCAN DFC
F/L J.E. CARTWRIGHT DFC
P/O L. GRIMSHAW DFC
W/O L.R. GOULBURN DFC
F/O J.F. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L D.H. SIMPSON DFC
F/L E.F. ROBERTS DFC
P/O J. RAYNER DFC
F/L F.W.A. HENDRY DFC
F/L J. MOLLISON DFC
F/SGT J.R. WHITEHEAD DFM
F/SGT J. SPRIGGS DFM
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J.K. DANIEL DFC
CAPT. A.E. HOWES DFC
F/L G.H. EAKINS DFC
CAPT. P.C. PECHEY DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.E.W. PRICE DFC
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L M.R. CROCKER DFC
F/L F.E. WILSON DFC
P/O J.H. PECK DFC
P/O H.R. SEARLE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W. SINCLAIR DFC
S/LDR H.W. RADFORD, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.B. EASTON DFC
F/O R.C. FAULKES DFC
F/SGT H.C. ADAMS DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.G. FARTHING DFC
P/O J.E. RONALD DFC
F/O E.L. McKAY DFC
F/SGT G.R. BRADBURY DFM
W/O D. HAMILTON DFC
F/SGT S.J. HENDERSON DFM
F/SGT J.A. DADGE DFM
F/O E.G. STROM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.M. PROCTOR DFC
P/O W.L. REEVES DFC
F/O K.L. KELLY DFC
F/O K.R. HICKMOTT DFC
F/O R. DICKINSON DFC
F/SGT T.T. TURNBULL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.G. BOYDEN, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR J.E. GRINDON DSO
F/L H.B. ARCHER DFC
F/O F.E.H. MILLAR DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL [/underlined]
NO. 53 BASE … 26
NO. 54 BASE … 27
NO. 55 BASE … 23
R.A.F. Station, SYERSTON … 10
No. 75 Base (For attention Base Intelligence Officer) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command. … 6
Headquarters, Bomber Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickins, O.R.S., Headquarters, Bomber Command …1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q. P.F.F. Wyton … 1
R.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (via H.Q.D.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2. .. 2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. …1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr Nairn, Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank … 1
A/Cdr H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.) … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey …1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C. in C. , Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C., 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Vice Marshal H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middlesex … 1
W/Cdr G.W. Gilpin, D.F.C., R.A.F. Staff College, HAIFA … 1
Headquarters, No.25 Group … 8
Headquarters, Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 54, 91 Groups … 1
Headquarters No.29 Group … 9
Nos.11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No.16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby …1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No.93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College … 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No. 25 Group School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
R.A.E., Farnborough … 1
Headquarters, Tiger Force, R.A.F., Bushy Park, Teddington, Middx. 1
[Underlined] INTERNAL [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. … 1
OPS. 1. … 1
S. MET. O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS.RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE …1
NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATIONS TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.36. JULY, 1945.
[Page break]
Recognition Test
Here are the 17 aircraft hidden in last month’s puzzle – did you find and name them correctly?
[Drawing]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
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V Group News, July 1945
5 Group News, July 1945
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Five Group Newsletter, number 36, July 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on training, signals, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, gunnery, tactics, Japanese fighter control, air crew safety, accidents, engineering, photography, armament, medical and decorations.
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1945-07
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Anne-Marie Watson
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
Japan
Pacific Ocean
England--Lincolnshire
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1945-07
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
Tiger force
training
wireless operator
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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To be inserted in folder when returned by S/L Lynch. [Underlined] Intelligence [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
[Waddington Central Registry Stamp]
SEPTEMBER 1943. [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 14.
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
This Group now carries a weight of incendiaries which, if concentrated on any target, could not fail to burn it out. Unfortunately analysis of night photographs continues to reveal a spread of incendiaries which, if it continues, can only result in a needless prolongation of the War. It is common for incendiaries to cover an area measuring five to ten miles in length and this is true even on some of the most successful attacks. Large areas of Hamburg have been burnt out and I have no doubt that crews who took part in the main attacks are satisfied with what was achieved, yet it is unfortunately true that of the bombs which left this country only 30% fell in the built-up area of Hamburg, the remainder in open fields outside. That is equivalent to only one crew out of three achieving the object of bombing Hamburg. Luck, was, however, on our side and the city caught fire, but luck has not been on our side in many recent attacks, and results have been disappointing because the density of the incendiary attack has not been sufficient to start a conflagration.
I believe that one cause of this spread is that crews have difficulty in appreciating the area which is covered by incendiaries. Invariably they uber-estimate distances and report a concentrated attack when subsequent photographs show it to have been spread over seven or more miles of country. The belief that the attack is concentrated and, therefore, that it does not matter a great deal where the bombs fall provided they are within the area in which incendiaries and T.I’s are lying is at the root of much of the trouble. As a guide to distance the ordinary target indicator, by the time it hits the ground, covers an area of quarter of a mile, while a single incendiary load has a spread of about half a mile. From operational heights it is hard to appreciate these distances.
The solution to greater concentration lies in a determination by the bombing team, Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber and Instrument Repair Staff, that the bombs will fall on the precise spot aimed at. This calls for constant practice and training, and the full analysis of results obtained on the bombing ranges.
It is sometimes said that practice bombing bears little relation to the requirements of operations, but this is not so. Turn to the table showing bombing results achieved by Squadrons last month. You will see that one Squadron with 22 details had an average error of 475 yards. Another Squadron with 32 details an error of 152 yards. Which of these two Squadrons is likely to achieve the better results on operations? An error of 475 yards under practice conditions, can only be a result of failure to maintain the sights in proper condition, coupled with failure on the part of crews to give the necessary time, thought and energy to the problem of accurate bombing. The moment carelessness creeps in there is no limit to bombing errors. An error of 475 yards on the practice range may be ten times that amount on operations, whereas an error on the practice range of under 100 yards demonstrates
(Continued on Back Page Col. 3)
[Boxed] ROLLS ROYCE AND THE MERLIN [/boxed]
PART II.
[Rolls Royce Logo]
Some idea of the complexity of the modern aero engine can be obtained from the fact that in the Merlin engine there are approximately 11,000 separate pieces, and of these, 4,500 are different. As would be expected, owing to the fundamental necessity for keeping weight down to the minimum, the maximum possible use is made of light alloy metals, and of the total engine weight almost one half is aluminium. All the metals used have been especially produced for the particular purpose for which they are used, and give the maximum strength in combination with minimum weight. Some parts are called upon to operate under exceptional conditions of heat, other parts to rotate at enormous speeds continuously; the valves, for instance, must work at 850 degrees Centigrade, the temperature of the wire in an ordinary electric radiator, and the impellor in the supercharger must revolve over 30,000 times every minute.
The aero engine of today is a highly complex piece of mechanism which must be capable of functioning under widely different conditions of temperature, and it must not falter when the machine in which it is installed is climbed, dived, rolled or flown upside down. During fighting manoeuvres the pilot’s life depends upon the response of the engine to its controls, it must not fade or cut out when he changes direction or altitude suddenly to avoid enemy attack, it must be immediately responsive to his will when he himself is attacking. Apart from the fact that it must function equally satisfactorily in climates as far opposed as Russia and the Middle East, it is subject to very quick temperature changes every time it climbs to altitudes. On a summer day in England, the pilot can leave the ground in the sweltering 90’s and climb straight up to, say, 7 miles high, where the temperature will be down to 100 degrees of frost.
Apart from the quick temperature variation encountered when climbing to altitude, there is one other natural effect which is all important, and this is rarification of the atmosphere; the higher the distance from the earth the less dense the air becomes. Air, in combination with petrol in the correct proportion, is the main factor, which determines how much power the engine is capable of giving, the more air and petrol that can be consumed by the engine in a given time the greater is the power developed. The higher the machine flies, the more difficult it is for the engine to obtain sufficient air due, of course, to the rarified atmosphere. Arrangements have to be made therefore to compensate for this effect, and in order to do so a supercharger is employed. A supercharger is in effect a pump which supplies air to the engine under pressure; this device is usually associated in the minds of most people with racing cars on which it is used to force as much air as possible into the engine, and so obtain the maximum power from a small sized engine. On the aero engine, this is a secondary consideration, and its main object is to compensate automatically for the gradually decreasing air density as the aeroplane climbs to altitude. The power output of an engine without a supercharger rapidly decreases as it climbs and at a height of 4 miles the power is less than half of what it was on the ground. By using a suitable supercharger it is possible to maintain the ground level power up to 40,000 feet or more. This has to be done automatically so that the pilot does not have to worry about working any controls.
The aero engine must also be as small and compact as possible, so that it offers the minimum wind resistance when installed in the aircraft, it must also be as light as it is possible to make it – power also is of course all important.
The Merlin engine produces more power than a modern express train engine, yet its weight including the propeller is only 1/84th. of the locomotive. All this colossal energy is packed into a space no bigger than that occupied by a single bed.
At the outbreak of war the fighter aircraft of the R.A.F. were exclusively powered by Merlin engines, it was the only engine used in all the fighter machines which so successfully defended our country in the Battle of Britain. In Spitfires and Hurricanes it is still the mainstay of our fighter attack and defence. It is employed in Defiant and Beaufighter night fighters, and the Fleet Air Arm use it to good effect in the Fulmar. In bomber aircraft also the Merlin is extensively used; the Battle medium single engined bomber which gave such good service in France prior to Dunkirk is now relegated to training use; the twin engined Whitley bomber famous for leaflet and bomb raids far into enemy territory in the early days of the was still does yeoman service defending our Atlantic convoys. It is used in Wellington bombers, and was more recently chosen as the motive power for the four engined Halifax heavy bomber, and also for the Lancaster, acknowledged the most effective bomber in the World, and which made its glorious debut in the daring Augsberg raid by 97 and 44 Squadrons
(Continued on Back Page Column 2 )
[Page break]
[Boxed] SIGNALS [/boxed] EFFORTS FOR IMPROVED TR.1196 PERFORMANCE BEARING FRUIT.
Our efforts towards improved performance from the TR. 1196 have advanced during the month. RAE are trying out two mods., one on a Conversion Unit aircraft – aimed at permitting good intercom. undisturbed by “blot out” from neighbouring R/T. An extra R – RA switch is fitted for the convenience of the instructor. Initial reports from the staff auger well. At Waddington the ground TR. 1196 has been modified to give better modulation and also provision of a manual volume control for use by the R/T operator. Tests are in progress.
A thorough vetting of Local Flying Control TR. 1196 frequencies has just been completed at all airfields. The present practice of accepting a maximum R/T range of only a few miles has rather fogged the issue. Range tests are now being carried out and all pilots are thanked in advance for the co-operation we are sure they will give. Remember our aim is to help you safely down immediately you arrive in the circuit and the greater the R/T range the nearer we shall be to attaining our object.
[Boxed] SIGNALS FAILURES [/boxed]
Helmets icing up and oil on the slip rings of the mid-upper turret are adding their toll of failures. Here are a couple of tips to help overcome them:-
Fit the oxygen mask snugly to the face and blow hard at regular intervals both before and during flight. This action prevents the valve adhering to the composition holder and so moisture cannot collect in the mask and freeze at high altitudes.
W/OP. A.G’s always carry a piece of material (4x2 is good stuff if the Gunnery Leader isn’t looking!) to clean the oil from the top of the mid-upper turret slip ring cover.
[Boxed] FAILURE SUMMARY [/boxed]
The percentage of failures against sorties detailed for operations is as follows:-
49 SQDN NIL 106 SQDN. NIL. 207 SQDN NIL
467 SQDN NIL. 57 SQDN. NIL. 61 SQDN .95
50 SQDN 2.13 44 SQDN. 2.74 9 SQDN 2.99
619 SQDN 4.25 617 SQDN 4.54
It will be noted that the figures for 617 and 619 Squadron appear unduly high: in the case of 617 it will be appreciated that due to the comparatively small number of sortied, the multiplicity of equipment carried and the nature of their tasks, the percentage represents only a small number of failures. In the case of 619, it is felt that this is due to very consciencious [sic] reporting of component failures particularly. It will be realised that the reporting of failures involving the breakdown of an individual component which, whilst not affecting the operational success of a sortie, does provide details which help considerably towards preventing their recurrence.
[Boxed] FLIGHT PLANNING TELEPHONE NETWORK CONFERENCE FACILITY [/boxed]
The conference facility has proved a great boon for flight planning purposes since its inception. To improve its efficiency and smooth workability, steps are being taken to have Base and Station installations standardised as soon as possible. This will mean that at a Base where the flight planning equipment is in the Intelligence room, this equipment will be transferred to the Operations room. Stations and Satellites provide a slight headache in this respect, because they by no means conform to a standard layout themselves.
A second aspect of the conference facility is its use as an intruder warning channel, which is not working satisfactorily. Local re-arrangements have just been completed at Group and it is hoped that a really efficient scheme has been evolved. The Teller and the Controller are now able to sit side by side, in full view of the plotting table, and each with a separate flight planning telephone. Flying Control “hook-up” will be set up whenever weather conditions or intruder activity make it necessary. Both Teller and Controller can then speak to Stations, the one to pass the intruder activity the other to order any necessary diversions.
[Boxed] MONICA [/boxed]
Our girlfriend Monica is still giving us all grey hair. The experts have now been at work for several weeks and are finding the problem far more difficult than at first expected.
In spits [sic] of this the serviceability has increased, and the faults in the sets are being cleared, slowly but surely.
A method of accurately testing the sensitivity of the Rx has been found preventing a fighter from getting into range without warning.
Some sets may give a fighter warning, but not respond to test. Crews are inclined to think these sets serviceable, but they must remember that such sets are on the borderline, and may not warn in every case. It is this drifting of the Rx gain that we are trying so hard to correct.
The aerials are a further source of trouble, partly caused by personnel using them as step ladders. A bent aerial will often make the set unserviceable.
In spite of all these difficulties, Monica has proved its usefulness over and over again, as many satisfied customers will testify. It is the only warning system we have, it can be made to work, so all concerned must keep at it until the answer is found.
[Boxed] GEE [/boxed]
As usual the GEE ranges vary from sortie to sortie. The serviceability, however, is very good from a maintenance and component viewpoint. Manipulation failures are too frequent, and every opportunity should be made to prevent these RF unit and aerial lead manipulation failures.
W/Op. A.G’s are now applying their GEE knowledge and are getting fixed on the return journeys.
[Boxed] SIGNALS SECURITY
Not many of us liked the new phonetic alphabet and the changeover was allowed to be gradual. However the time has now arrived when our Berties and Freddies should be discarded for ever. Squadrons which persist in the use of the old alphabet are labelling themselves to the Hun. [/boxed]
[Boxed] TRAINING [/boxed] WEATHER RETARDS OUTPUT.
A NEW TRAINING VENTURE.
[Illustration] MY LANDING ARE WIZARD
FAMOUS LAST WORDS Due to bad weather and shortage of Lancaster aircraft, the high output of over 100 crews per month could not be maintained by Conversion Units, and the figure dropped to 82 crews trained during the month. To overcome the temporary shortage of aircraft, it was necessary for Squadrons to loan aircraft during the stand down period to the Conversion Units and it is hoped that, given good weather, next month the deficit in crews will be more than made up.
[Boxed] THE NEW TRAINING VENTURE [/boxed]
The Conversion Base started on a new venture with a short course for Flight Commanders. All the Officers attending benefited by the course, and it is thought that at least three of the instructional staff have learned a great deal as well. Courses will continue during the coming months with, it is hoped, beneficial results.
[Boxed] TOTAL FLYING HOURS FOR THE MONTH WERE – 5481 FOR TRAINING UNITS [/boxed]
[Boxed] CREW SAFETY [/boxed]
The number of ditchings by Lancasters continues to go up. Most crews pay sufficient attention to this vital crew drill to ensure that they can leave the aircraft safely. However, constant practice is necessary to keep yourself up to the mark. In one unfortunate ditching it is known that complete panic ensued and all the crew simply leapt out of the nearest escape hatch straight into the water with fatal results excepting one man.
[Table of Link Trainer times per squadron]
[Table of Squadron Flying Times – Day and Night]
SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 2.
[Page break]
[Boxed] GUNNERY. [/boxed] FEWER SORTIES – MORE COMBATS: THE VITAL NEED FOR PERFECT RECOGNITION.
Although the number of sorties during the month was considerably less than August, the number of combats for September was 133. 14 Enemy aircraft are claimed as destroyed and 27 damaged. Enemy aircraft marked “C” in “This Month’s Bag” are those confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command at the time of going to press.
Unfortunately instances are still occurring of Lancasters being engaged by other Lancasters and it would appear that sufficient care is not taken to identify the other aircraft before pressing the trigger. This problem of identifying aircraft is extremely difficult under certain conditions and this statement is supported by night fighter pilots with considerable experience, but the only solution is Aircraft Recognition of a 101 per cent quality and Squadron Gunnery Leaders should keep this problem in mind always and Air Gunners should be classified on their ability and a scheme instituted whereby the Gunners who are weak in this respect are given exercises daily until the required standard of 100% is reached.
Instances are still occurring of early return due to turret doors not locking, no excuse can be accepted for this, as turret doors should be checked on N.F.T. and again when the crew go out to the aircraft for take-off. It is again stressed that Gunners should check as far as possible guns and turrets immediately on arriving at the aircraft prior to take-off; this practice has frequently enabled the ground staff to put right minor troubles. Any Gunner who is not 100 per cent satisfied with the operation of his turret and guns is to request the Pilot to run the engine and a test then carried out on the turret which is suspect.
[Boxed] MODIFICATIONS AND NEW EQUIPMENT [/boxed]
Experiments with an F.N. 50 Turret are being carried out by 1660 C.U. in an attempt to improve the visibility, metal is being replaced by perspex in the Cupola and much of the metal in front of the Gunner is being removed. A new bulb for the reflector sight is also being tested by this unit. 50 Squadron are carrying out tests on a reflector sight with most of the material from the hood removed, this precludes the sight being used in bright sunlight, but it is hoped to produce an attachment to overcome this difficulty.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
NO. 64 COURSE
P/O HUGHES – 61 SQDN – 13TH, PLACE CAT “B”
NO. 65 COURSE
F/O ARMSTRONG – 9 SQDN – 10TH. PLACE CAT “B”
F/O BUCKLEY – 617 SQDN – 17TH. PLACE CAT. “A”
NO. 66 COURSE
P/O BLACK – 1661 C.U. – 2ND. PLACE CAT “B”
F/SGT. VAUGHAN – 49 SQDN – FAILED CAT “D”
[Boxed] WAR EFFORT [/boxed]
[Table of Group aircraft statistics by Squadron]
[Boxed] This Months Bag [/boxed]
[Cartoon]
DESTROYED
ENEMY A/C AIRCRAFT LETTER SQUADRON DATE
ME109 F “C” 207 3/.4.9.43.
S.E. B “C” 44 3/4.9.43.
S.E. Z “C” 9 5/6.9.43.
ME110 C “C” 106 3/4.9.43.
S.E. R “C” 9 5/6.9/43.
S.E. U 467 23/24.9.43.
ME109 V 467 23/24.9.43.
JU88 K 61 23/24.9.43.
ME109 Z 207 27/28.9.43.
ME109 T 57 27/28.9.43.
JU88 N 57 27/28.9.43.
JU88 P 50 27/28.9.43.
ME109 X 44 29/30.9.43.
FW190 P 207 29/30.9.43.
DAMAGED
ME210 A 207 31/1.9.43.
ME100 J 49 3/4.9.43.
JU88 O 207 3/4.9.43.
T.E. X 44 3/4.9.43.
T.E. K 44 3/4.9.43.
FW190 K 49 6/7.9.43.
JU88 A 50 5/6.9.43.
FW190 C 619 6/7.9.43.
JU88 H 57 22/23.9.43.
JU88 X 57 22/23.9.43.
ME210 P 50 22/23.9.43.
JU88 ED944 57 23/24.9.43.
ME109 Z 207 23/24.9.43.
ME109 J 207 23/24.9.43.
ME210 D 106 23/24.9.43.
JU88 H 44 27/28.9.43.
ME109 Q 61 22/23.9.43.
ME109 F 61 22/23.9.43.
JU88 A 61 22/23.9.43.
ME210 C 207 23/24.9.43.
JU88 J 207 27/28.9.43.
ME109 K 61 23/24.9.43.
ME109 A 61 27/28.9.43.
DO217 L 44 29/30.9.43
T.E. X 44 29/30.9.43.
FW190 J 61 29/30.9.43.
JU88 R 61 5/6.9.43.
[Boxed] The Gunnery Leaders’ Conference was held at Waddington on the 27th. September. The minutes of the Conference have been circulated together with information on several points raised at the Conference which have now been clarified. [/boxed]
[Boxed] ACCIDENTS. [/boxed] INCREASED FLYING HOURS BRINGS SLIGHT RISE IN ACCIDENT RATE.
There were 17 accidents listed as avoidable for September, an increase of three on last month’s total, for an increase of 378 flying hours.
Flying hours for September – 13,520
Flying hours for August – 13,142
The summary of avoidable accidents for September is as follows:-
TAXYING – 2: HEAVY LANDINGS – 5: SWINGS – 2 (One on landing the other on take-off): OVERSHOOTING – 2: ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT – 5. The errors of judgement consist of:-
1. The pilot started the three engined overshoot at 20 ft., but was caught out by the swing resulting from three engines being opened to full power. The aircraft swung completely round from 180° and came to rest in the River Trent, luckily without fatal results. As a contributory factor the Navigator was not calling Air Speeds on the approach. As a result of this accident the Captain’s log book was endorsed in red for not ensuring that his own and his crew drill was correct. MORAL – TAKE CARE OF YOUR CREW DRILL.
2. Another instance of carelessness occurred at the end of last month when an aircraft crashed through taking off with four engines switched to No. 2 tanks which were empty, and were known to be empty by the Captain and Flight Engineer. Luckily the crew were not fatally injured.
3. At 23,000 ft. the pilot passed out for lack of oxygen and it was later found that he had inadvertently nipped his oxygen tube in his harness, cutting off the supply. The aircraft went into a steep dive and was only pulled out by the Navigator and Flight Engineer in unison, after losing 15,000 feet. The terrific stresses set up rendered the aircraft Cat. AC. MORAL – TAKE CARE OF YOUR OXYGEN TUBE.
4. On return from a long sortie the crew of a Lancaster decided they had enough fuel left to reach Base, but on approaching to land three engines cut out for lack of petrol and the aircraft crashed. Attention of all aircrew especially Pilots and Flight Engineers, must be drawn to the fact that a rigorous check of fuel consumption must be kept with the untrustworthiness of fuel gauges always kept in mind. Fuel consumption calculators have been issued to all Units MORAL – KEEP YOUR FUEL CONSUMPTION CALCULATOR HANDY ON ALL FLIGHTS.
5. On return from operations a Lancaster hit the sea with the altimeter reading 160 feet. MORAL WHY COME SO LOW AS THIS?
6. On a low flying exercise a pilot took his hands off the controls to adjust his goggles, and the aircraft hit a tree. MORAL – IF LOW FLYING, DON’T LET YOUR ATTENTION WANDER.
All these accidents are entirely due to carelessness on the part of aircrew and the cost to the country is appalling. Remember, every Lancaster lostthrough [sic] your “clottishness” is one less Lancaster to drop bombs on the Hun.
[Boxed] NEARLY A GOOD RECORD [/boxed]
1660 Con. Unit’s excellent record was marred this month by a swing on Landing but there is a gratifying decrease in all Con. Units this month. In all training Units there were five avoidable accidents for a total of 5481 flying hours.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. No. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
[Boxed] AIR BOMBING. [V Group drawings] [/boxed]
[Boxed] PRACTICE BOMBING ON THE SQUADRONS [/BOXED]
[Boxed] [Table of Practice Bombing exercises carried out by each Squadron] [/boxed]
[Boxed] Weekly returns have not yet been received from 49 Squadron and 1654 Conversion Unit, consequently leaving the monthly table incomplete.
617’s results were obtained using the S.A.B.S. Mark IIA.
5258 Practice bombs were dropped (excluding 49 Squadron and 1654 Conversion Unit)
The high level bombing average on Squadrons (from date available) was 218 yards at 10,000 feet and 308 yards at 20,000 feet. In general, results were a slight improvement on August, but the Group error was adversely affected by the high average error of 44 Squadron.
Great credit id due to 1660 Conversion Unit who achieved a Mark XIV Grouping Error better than that of any Squadron. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE [/underlined]
During September, exactly 5,000 bombs were plotted at Wainfleet Sands, although all targets were unserviceable for part of the month.
GOOD BOMBING
The number of details with average error less than 100 yards was greatly increased
SQUADRON PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR
617 (Using SABS)
F/O. CLAYTON P/O. WATSON 43, 59, 71.
P/O. BROWN SGT. DANCIA 72, 86, 75 (Twice)
F/LT. WILSON SGT. BARROW 94, 70, 61, 78.
F/LT MUNRO F/SGT. CALY 88, 41, 60, 94, 87, 65.
S/LDR. MARTIN F/LT. HAY 51, 82, 71, 64, 82.
F/Lt. MCCARTHY F/O. DAVIDSON 80, 49, 76.
619
P/O. JOSS F/O. ANDERSON 91.
F/O. MORRISON SGT. ALLEY 85.
F/LT. SANDISON F/O. WILKIE 81.
F/LT. SANDISON F/LT. SALMSLEY 95.
F/LT. SANDISON W/CDR. ABERCROMBIE 64.
SGT. THOMAS SGT. FONTAINE 70.
F/O. O’SHAUGNESSY F/O. KENDRICK 26.
S/LDR. CHURCHER F/O. MACDONALD 84.
F/O. FOX F/O. BRAID 77.
106
P/O. CALLAN SGT. GOMERSALL. 94.
P/O. COOPER F/SGT. CHRISTMAS 88.
P/O. STORER SGT. HACKETT 97.
P/O. YACKMAN P/O. MOREY 94.
467
F/LT. FORBES P/O. GRIME 79.
P/O. RILEY SGT. VALASTIN 90.
57
SGT. YATES P/O. WANGLER (PILOT) 86.
50
SGT. DURHAM SGT. BROCK 76.
61
F/O. PITCH P/O. LYONS 92.
1654 C.U. SGT. HOMEWOOD SSGT. WALKER 93. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
F/O. Murtough and P/O. Wonham, both of 1661 Conversion Unit assume command of the Bombing Section of 44 Squadron and 1668 Conversion Unit respectively.
The following have passed the Bombing Leader’s Course :-
GRADE “A” F/O. HAZELL (44) F/O. STANISLAUS (9) F/SGT. RUMGAY (207)
P/O. PRICE (1654) P/O. WONHAM (1668)
GRADE “B” F/SGT. LOWANS (49) F/O. TOOGOOD (106) F/O. BOSWELL (619)
SGT. TELFORD (467) F/O. McROBBIE (57) F/O. HARDEN (1660)
F/O. ASTBURG (1661)
P/ . Wonham was 2nd. on No. 63 Course and F/Sgt. Rumgay 3rd. on No. 66 Course.
WELL DONE BOTH! [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Despite a record number of details only 3 Squadrons qualified for this competition.
619 Squadron are to be congratulated on winning the competition for the third successive month, and in so doing obtained by far the best average yet returned although the errors include vector error and are application errors.
[Table of Squadrons and bombing results]
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
Only two entries were received, F/Lt. Walmsley improving on his winning score of the previous month.
LEADER PILOT HEIGHT ERROR
F/LT. WALMSLEY F/LT. SANDISON 10000FT 95 YDS
S/LDR. BEACH S/LDR. PARKES 10000FT 280 YDS [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Diagram]
From 20,000 feet the Mark XIV graticule covers a width of 540 yards and a length of 3,100 yards on the ground at the moment of release.
If the centre of your graticule is only two graticule lengths from the aiming point, you stand a grave chance of missing even quite a large city. Remember, one T.I. has a diameter of 300 yards ! [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] ‘BIGCHIEF’ COMPETITION [/underlined]
BIGCHIEF PILOT ERROR AT 10000 FT.
W/CDR. ABERCROMBIE S/LDR. SANDISON 64 YDS
G/CPT. CHRISTIE S/LDR PULLEN 94 YDS
W/CDR. PENMAN P/O. EAGER 123 YDS
G/CAPT. CHRISTIE S/LDR. PULLEN 142 YDS
W/CDR. BURNETT S/LDR. BUNKER 238 YDS
It will be noted that representatives of 619 Squadron won all three competitions. Is this the result of bombing analysis ?!
A hot pace has already been set for October, several details have already been carried out, among them two by the A.O.C. who achieved average errors of 42 yards and 48 yards respectively – the latter was actually at 18,000 feet. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
[Underlined] V GROUP NEWS NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943.
SUPPLEMENT.
AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The month of September was notable for a complete revision of bombing training policy.
In the days of the A.B.S. only application bombing was possible and analysis of results was haphazard and involved considerable guesswork. Now that we are rapidly becoming equipped with Mark XIV bombsights, it is possible to carry out a full analysis by means of bombing grouping which reveals clearly where bombing faults lie.
These faults may be classified in three categories (a) bombing errors due to bombsight inaccuracies or unserviceability (b) vector errors (c) errors of pure bombing attributed to the pilot/air bomber team and caused by inaccurate flying, faulty bombsight settings and bombsight levelling, imperfect co-operation on the bombing run and various other personal factors.
The errors under (a) can be discovered by careful analysis of grouping exercises and must be eliminated completely. Those under (b) are now the joint responsibility of pilot and navigator. Flying for windfinding must be completely accurate and every care is to be taken by navigators to ensure the calculated wind is as accurate as conditions permit. Analysis has proved that in almost every exercise faulty windfinding is largely responsible for the bombing errors obtained.
After (a) and (b) have been removed we come to the Grouping error (c) which can be steadily reduced by a thorough understanding of bombing problems and true co-operation on the bombing run between pilot and air-bomber.
With the present percentage of Mark XIV bombsights in Squadron aircraft, it should now be possible for all competition details to be carried out with that sight, and the results of all such details in October are to be submitted as Grouping errors, in either of the following categories:-
(i) CLOSE GROUP
(ii) As open group if bombsight error is directly attributable to mechanical fault in the Bomb Sight which could not be detected by the Bomb Aimer in his pre-bombing check.
N.B. Bombs forming an OPEN GROUP pattern around an M.P.I. where the error from M.P.I. to the inner radius of the open group is attributable to Bomb Aimer’s negligence in N.F.T. check.
e.g. Drift de-synchronisation
Wring T.V. setting
Incorrect Level Readings etc.
MUST be returned as CLOSE GROUP error being from M.P.I. to inner radius of CLOSE GROUP pattern.
Now that all Mark XIV exercises in which four or more bombs are dropped are to be carried out as Grouping exercises, the following points are to be borne in mind:-
(i) All crews must carry bombing pro formae for bombing details
(ii) The position where bombs fall is to be estimated by the air bomber and plotted in pencil on the plotting rose.
(iii) On landing, the bombing leader is to plot the position of the bombs from the quadrant readings, and transfer the plots
/to the plotting rose…
[Page break]
to the plotting rose of the bombing pro-forma in coloured pencil.
(iv) Pilot, Navigator, Air Bomber and Flight Engineer are to take the form and make an analysis of the exercise.
(v) This analysis is to be checked and amended as necessary by the Bombing Leader and Bombing Officer.
(vi) The captain of the crew is to keep all pro-formae used for future reference.
The results submitted in weekly returns are to be the Grouping errors (c) on all MKXIV exercises, but when a wind velocity is found by the Navigator his vector error is to be noted in a book and kept for future reference. Similarly, bombsight errors are to be noted and rectified where necessary by the instrument section.
The results given in the bombing training table are not a true representation of bombing in the past month, as grouping and application errors are inextricably intermingled and in many cases incorrectly compiled returns failed to differentiate between the bombsights used.
Next month’s ‘News’ should give a true picture of the training carried out. Already we are discovering where our bombing failures lie, and it is only by rigid adherence to the new system that we can hope for a tangible improvement in the operational success of our bombing sorties.
[Boxed] [Underlined] STOP PRESS GUNNERY. [/underlined]
All aircraft claimed by the Group for September have now been confirmed by Headquarters,Bomber Command. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Boxed] DECORATIONS. [/boxed]
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE AWARDS WERE APPROVED DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1943. [/underlined]
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. McGUBBIN. DFC
44 SQUADRON
F/O. A.E.H. PARSONS. DFC
F/O. G.G. PASCOE. DFC
F/O. L.W. PILGRIM. DFC
F/O. H.J. BARLEY. DFC
P/O. H. ROGERS. DFC
106 SQUADRON
SGT. N.L.E. GALE. DFM
SGT. A.J. SARGEANT. DFM
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWINF NON-IMMEDIATE AWARDS WERE APPROVED DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER, 1943. [/underlined]
9 SQUADRON
W/CDR. P. BURNETT. DFC
F/LT. C.A. PATTERN, MBE. DFC
F/O. C.A. HALE. DFC
P/O. J. BOCZAR. DFC
P/O. J.P.H. CARRERE. DFC
SGT. R.V. PIPER. DFM
SGT. J.W. VINALL. DFM
44 SQUADRON
F/LT. R.D. ROBINSON. DFC
F/O. A.A. ST.CLAIR-MILLER. DFC
F/O. D.F.H. WALKER. DFC
F/O. W.J. HILTON. DFC
P/O. H. DUTTON. DFC
P/O. J.O. PENNINGTON. DFC
P/O. HEWITT. DFC
SGT. D. MORRISON. DFM
SGT. L.B. HAYWARD. DFM
SGT. G. HOMEWOOD. DFM
49 SQUADRON
W/CDR. P.W. JOHNSON, AFC. DFC
F/O. S.H. MANSBRIDGE. DFC
F/O. R.C. MUNRO. DFC
F/O. T.D. TAYLOR. DFC
F/O. L.R. HASTINGS. DFC
F/O. L.H. TOLCHARD. DFC
P/O. J.T. TAYLOR. DFC
P/O. B.C. DREAVER. DFC
50 SQUADRON
F/O. G.B. MURTOUGH. DFC
F/O. R.M. METHIESON. DFC
F/O. C.F. BONEFIELD. DFC
F/O. T.E. TANDLE. DFC
P/O. J.O. CHRISTIE. DFC
P/O. H.C. BERNARD. DFC
F/SGT. A.C. PARSONS. DFM
F/SGT. A.J. CORK. DFM
SGT. A. BRANSON. DFM
SGT. G. CABLE. DFM
SGT. W. MOONEY. DFM
57 SQUADRON
F/LT. J.C. ANDERSON. DFC
F/O. F. CARTER, DFM. DFC
F/O. E.W. PATTERSON. DFC
F/O. E.W. ADAMS. DFC
F/O. C. SHAW. DFC
2ND. LT. J.E. RUSSELL (USAAF). DFC
2ND. LT. R. WRIGHT (USAAF). DFC
P/O. C.A. MACDONALD. DFC
W/O. J. TOUGH. DFC
W/O. E.T. ENGLISH. DFC
F/SGT. R.W. LORELL. DFM
F/SGT. A.B. WELFORD. DFM
F/SGT. R. ROBERTS, DFM. BAR
SGT. S.J. MONDEL. DFM
61 SQUADRON
W/CDR. W.M. PENMAN. DFC
S/LDR. S.A. BENJAMIN. DFC
F/O. R.H. WILLIAMS. DFC
F/O. J. CRAVEN DFC
[Missing] FROST. DFC
[Remainder of page corner missing]
61 SQUADRON (Continued)
SGT. C.D. TOWSE. DFM
SGT. A.C. MULLINS. DFM
106 SQUADRON
F/LT. R LODGE. DFC
F/LT. W.D. BROWNE. DFC
F/O. G.T. HARDEN. DFC
P/O. J.A.C. MUNRO. DFC
P/O. J.E. CAMPBELL. DFC
W/O. T.R. KWILL. DFC
F/SGT. G.N. FELTHAM. DFM
F/SGT. G.W. CHRISTIE. DFM
207 SQUADRON
F/O. K.H.F. LETFORD. DFC
F/O. K.T. KNIGHT. DFC
F/O. F.G. SPANNER. DFC
P/O. F.M.H. FISHER. DFC
P/O. C. SUTTOR. DFC
SGT. E.D. LUCAN. DFM
207 SQUADRON (Continued)
SGT. G.T.C. BASSFORD. DFM
SGT. R. NUTTON. DFM
467 SQUADRON
S/LDR. E.K. SINCLAIR. DFC
F/O. R. McCURDY. DFC
F/O. G.D. CURRIE. DFC
F/O. T.W. HOPPETT. DFC
F/SGT. W.H. WHITE. DFM
SGT. S.R. ANDERSON. DFM
617 SQUADRON
W/CDR. G.P. GIBSON, VC, DSO, DFC. LEGION OF MERIT. (DEGREE OF COMMANDER)
619 SQUADRON
F/SGT. W.L. VADER-DASSON. DFM
SGT. D.J. COOMBES. DFM
[Boxed] PHOTOGRAPHY [/boxed] TECHNICAL EXPERT
DECLARE WAR ON “SMOKE OBLITERATION.”
Successful ground photographs, which were of immediate operational value, total 204 this month. Whilst there is a slight reduction in the percentage of success it is still good when it is considered that the presence of cloud and smoke over targets provide conditions which are anything but conductive to good night photography.
It is ironical that the very subject which has done so much towards the improvement of bombing should now be the one which is suffering from its effects.
Obtaining good night pictures of ground detail over targets is now almost impossible when large numbers of incendiaries are used, but the camera remains the one and only proof of bombing concentration. Fire track pictures, coupled with a few ground detail photographs, provide a very true picture of a bombing attack and from these fire track pictures, those responsible for assessing operations are able to gain a very good idea as to the degree of success of a particular raid.
In the meantime research is being made to combat the factor of smoke obliteration. Every effort is being made to improve the technical equipment so that ground detail is recorded despite the adverse conditions over the targets. We have already done much in the past few months towards this aim. For instance, the introduction of the American clockwork fuse which has proved so accurate and has permitted the reduction of “open frame time” in the camera from a second to within the region of three seconds, has solved the problem of fire track obliteration
From the analysis of results this month it will be observed that there were comparatively few actual technical faults. Other than the small percentage of flash failures and camera maintenance faults, the chief cause of failures spears to be unsatisfactory bomb firing button. This button has now been modified, but it is still necessary for the Air Bomber to press the button as far as possible to ensure positive contact for camera operation.
Manipulation faults on the part of Aircrews have again decreased in number, but there are still far too many failures due to camera leads being out at the time of bombing. As mentioned in last months’ NEWS it would greatly assist if Air Bombers would check all Cameraleads [sic] and any which are out of sockets should be replaced and upon return from operations the fact should be reported. In this connection a modification is now being produced which will prevent camera leads from the control being removed accidentally.
[Table of Analysis of Results by Squadron]
[Boxed] [Cartoon] QUINTUS QUINCE THE V GROUP ACE SAYS:- “MY GUNNER IS A [underlined] HUMAN [/underlined] ‘MONICA’” [/boxed]
PAGE 5.
[Page break]
[Boxed] ENGINEERING. [/boxed] INSPECTION DIFFICULTIES OVERCOME BY HARD WORK.
All Squadrons being well below establishment in aircraft find it difficult to stagger inspection, as in many cases 100 per cent aircraft are used for each operation. This obviously brings the inspection round rapidly, and three or four more inspections become due at one time. This has made planning very difficult and Squadrons are to be congratulated on the manner in which the work has been carried out. Although the aircraft situation is improving, a somewhat similar state of affairs will exist for the most part of October and we are relying on Squadrons to keep up the good work and even intensify their efforts where possible to produce the effort in spite of the aircraft shortage. Due to certain Squadrons outside this Group re-arming it has meant Squadrons being allocated old aircraft thrown up as a result. This is never a pleasant position, as new aircraft are always more acceptable than old, but the way Squadrons have “tightened their belts” and got down to rendering these old aircraft serviceable to our standards without any undue complaint, reflects a very good spirit. Certain ex-Cat B which have had to be accepted put a great strain on the maintenance personnel, but it is hoped that there will not be many more of these unless they are fully modified prior to receipt.
With the lengthening of the nights and the aircraft being diverted or landing away from Base, it is often long after midday by the time the aircraft returns to its parent unit. This leaves very little time to prepare it for operations again that night. This cannot be helped and so speed is absolutely essential.
Often aircraft are damaged by enemy action and land away from Base. They may be Cat. ‘A’ or ‘AC’. Wherever possible, Engineer Officers are to send a representative down to examine these aircraft with a view to carrying out temporary repairs to fly them back to Base for the completion of the repair. So much time and labour is saved by carrying out the repair at the Parent Unit whether it be Cat. ‘A’ or ‘AC’.
[Boxed] ENGINES [/boxed]
Exhaust stud failures are not on the decline and further sets of trepanning tools are being made available. This is obviously only a palliative: the answer lies in the fitting of a more suitable type of stud and it is hoped that before long we will have the 3.5 per cent nickel steel stud which has given very good service on its trials.
All Lancaster III’s with Merlin 28’s and 38’s and Lancaster I’s with Merlin 22’s are now modified to Mod. 1087 and adjusted to 14lbs. boost for take-off. It is pleasing to note that power plant changes are being speeded up generally throughout the Group and it is only by quick thinking and speedy organisation that repairs and power plant changes can be accomplished in quick time.
[Boxed] MAN POWER [/boxed]
All Squadrons are now working much below establishment and this calls for most economical use of the man power available. The sending of a ground crew to dinner at 1230 while their aircraft is in the air is an example of how N.C.O’s i/c Flights can employ their resources more usefully.
All Electrical Officers will by now have become acquainted with the Mk.XIV Bombsight Group Servicing Van. It has already proved its usefulness and has cleared the few minor snags so far encountered on the A.P.I./A.M.U. and the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
The fitting of the Mk.XIV is proceeding in a very satisfactory manner and only 44 aircraft remain to be fitted. Every assistance should be afforded to the fitting parties in order to finish these aircraft before the end of the month, since the training of Air Bombers on the A.B.S. has ceased.
Most of the available A.P.I./A.M.U’s have now been fitted and are giving very satisfactory results. The accuracy of this aid to Navigation and other instruments depends to a large extent on the D.R. Compass, the maintenance of which must be kept on “top line”. Resistance units for the D.R. Compass Master Unit are coming through slowly and it is hoped that all Units will be supplied to their requirements in the near future.
[Boxed] SQUADRON SERVICEABILITY [/boxed]
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Squadron] [/boxed]
[Boxed] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
[Table of aircraft serviceability by Unit] [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] ARMAMENT CONFERENCE [/underlined]
[Boxed] ARMAMENT. [/boxed] GOOD NEWS OF HANDLING TACKLE.
With the increased weight of bombs it has been apparent that a means of handling these heavier type weapons had to be accomplished. The rolling technique was introduced and up to the present has not proved successful compatible with the speed of handling required. The super type lorry crane known as the “COLES” is in limited supply and its use divided between all Branches on Stations.
All available forms of lifting and handling tackle were recently demonstrated at R.A.F. Station Binbrook, and at the meeting held following this demonstration it was agreed that some form of crane was a necessity and it was not imperative that it should be a prime mover. It was decided that a type known as the Neal Rapid Mobile Crane Type N. would satisfy Armament requirements and a trial was immediately arranged for one of these type cranes to be put on one week’s trial at East Kirkby. This trial has proved entirely successful and we now await further supplies.
[Boxed] SBC FILLING, HANDLING AND STORAGE [/boxed]
With the introduction of the heavier type of SBC known as the Mk. VA (150 x 4lb.) certain preparation and loading problems have arisen. The man handling of the SBC weighing some 657 lbs. when filled, presents a difficulty likewise does the filling. It is apparent that a standardised procedure is a necessity. Several schemes showing promise are at present being investigated on Units within the Group, details and results are eagerly awaited.
[Boxed] BOMB LOADS INCREASED INCENDIARY [/boxed]
Standard bomb loads giving all the necessary details of Bomb Stations, Pre-selector settings, Peg Hole and time interval and false height settings are in the course of preparation and their issue to all Units will be completed early in the month.
[Boxed] “WHITLOCK” TWIN ADAPTORS [/boxed]
Production of the “Whitlock” adaptor is progressing slowly but surely and a limited number have been diverted to this Group by Headquarters No. 1 Group. It is anticipated that with the commencement of production by other manufacturers all Units within the Group will be equipped by the end of this month, thus ensuring that a standard bomb load can be ordered for all aircraft.
[Boxed] CAMOUFLAGE STATION BOMB STORES [/boxed]
This type of camouflage has been the “headache” of Armament Officers for some time past, and authority has been received for its removal in bomb stored at the discretion of Station Commanders.
[Boxed] AFTER ESCAPE HATCH [/boxed]
The fitment of flare chutes, H.2.S., F.N. 64 Turrets and the .5” under defence gun, all centre around the bung.
Aircraft fitted H.2.S. are being fitted tricell as the modification parts become available, whilst the armoured chute remains fitted to non H.2.S. aircraft. With the introduction of the .5” under defence gun the single flare chute will take a new position to be decided after trial installation. In all Squadrons except three 75 per cent F.N.64 Turrets are being withdrawn.
[Boxed] [Underlined] “BOMBFOOLERIES”. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH HANG-UP. [/underlined]
Air Bomber failed to select switch.
[TURRET DOORS FAILED TO CLOSE [/underlined]
Rear Gunner damaged door runner.
[Underlined] ARTICULATING PIPE [/underlined]
Fracture – due to obstruction. [/boxed]
[Boxed] FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failure types by Squadron] [/boxed] [Bottom right hand corner missing]
The monthly Armament Conference was held at Waddington. Minutes have been circulated. [/boxed]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 14. SEPTEMBER, 1943.
[Page break]
[Boxed] NAVIGATION [/boxed] MINIMUM GAIN FOR BEST RECEPTION
BREAKDOWN OF D.R. AFTER LEAVING TARGET
VALUABLE GROUND TRAINING.
This month’s Navigation on the whole was satisfactory, although the general standard was not as high as the preceding month’s. D.R. Navigation and allied calculations showed a considerable improvement but concentration and accurate timing at turning points did not move in parallel. On the homeward journey the chief cause of spread when reaching GEE Range is found in the initial stages after leaving the target. Most navigators do not take full advantage of the target as a pin-point. The trouble begins after “Photoflash Gone” when for the next few minutes there appears to be a complete disregard of courses and true air speed flown. This means that over 5 or 6 minutes, an aircraft may be 20 or 30 miles away from its intended position at that time, and thus the initial error creeps in. The first 5 -10 minutes flying out of the target are most important in Navigation, and if concentration and track keeping is to be maintained, the Navigator must ensure that an accurate timed run is made from “Flash Gone” to the turning point. The average indicated air speed and course flown during this run must be carefully watched, and the next course set from D.R. position - initial displacement of position after leaving the target is certainly responsible for aircraft being out of concentration and off the prescribed track when out of GEE coverage.
[Boxed] TRAINING [/boxed]
During the month’s training period most Navigators put in some good ground work and were able to brush up on certain navigational problems. It is hoped that when these training periods are arranged all Navigators will do their utmost to increase efficiency and apply the ground training to this end. You are primarily concerned with the problem of keeping the aircraft on the prescribed track at the right time, and supplying the Air Bomber with an accurate bombing wind – this requires constant practice and, above all, accuracy in calculation.
[Boxed] WIND FINDING FOR PRACTICE BOMBING [/boxed]
Until recently most Navigators were not fully alive to the fact that they are vital members of the bombing team. In the past, many approximations and inaccuracies have been made by the Navigator when finding a practice bombing wind - this has had a corresponding effect on bombing accuracy. Simple appreciation of bombing errors will prove the necessity for accurate wind finding. If an inaccurate wind is set on the bombsight, the Air Bomber’s difficulty in tracking on to the target is increased, and bombing errors will result out of all proportion to the wind vector error. The Navigator is responsible for navigating the aircraft, [underlined] and [/underlined] for providing an accurate wind to the Air Bomber, if the aiming point is to be hit. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO INCREASE OUR BOMBING ACCURACY.
[Boxed] SPECIAL MENTION [/boxed]
F/Sgt. Lawes,C.M. of 207 Squadron, produced excellent work during the month and particularly on a recent mining sortie in the Baltic. On this occasion F/Sgt Lawes produced no less than 18 good wind velocity checks, six good Polaris position lines, and one 1st class Astro fix. This log and chart have been forwarded to H.Q.B.C. for potential publication. [/boxed]
[Boxed] [Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Your W/T, R/T, I.F.F. and TR.1196 are all U/S. What radio facility is still available for contacting ground ?
2. What is the maximum shift in wind direction over likely to be experienced at 15,000 feet when flying over a distance of 50 miles ?
3. In what order from South to North should the following be placed:-
Hull, Hamberg, Wilhelmshaven, Manchester, Stettin, Dublin, Bremen.
[Missing] which airfield in 5 Group does the Greenwich hour [missing] equal the local hour angle ?
[Missing] on the D.R. Master Unit compensated [missing P.I.
[Missing] be set at night if the [missing] U/S and all radio [missing] [/boxed]
[Boxed] FLYING CONTROL.
[Table of aircraft landing times after operations by Station]
MONTHLY AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP – 3.67 MINUTES
Syerston still lead the Group in landing aircraft quickly after operations. It is hoped, in the near future, to put to practical test several quick landing schemes which are now in preparation. Suggestions from Stations, on the question of quick landings, will be welcomed. [/boxed]
[Underlined] A.P.I’s [/underlined]
During the month, many Navigators became proficient in the operational use of A.P.I. – this instrument is already proving the value of knowing an aircraft’s true position. Interesting analysis is being carried out on certain Squadrons showing the discrepancy between the plotted, and actual air positions. In most cases the fault seems to lie in the Navigator’s faulty computation of true air speed, and his failure to check the true course, and indicated air speed more frequently. One suggestion is, that the latitude and longitude of 2 A.P.I. readings be plotted about 6 minutes apart and compared with the D.R. calculations. This method will give the true air speed and true course flown, on which E.T.A’s and Ground speed can easily be calculated.
[Boxed] THIS MONTH’S NAVIGATION “PRUNERY” [/boxed]
During the month a sortie was abandoned for the following reasons:-
1. THE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR THOUGHT THEY WERE FLYING ON A STATIC VENT AIRCRAFT – THIS WAS NOT SO !!!
2. THE NAVIGATOR APPLIED COMPASS DEVIATION IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION AND GAVE THE PILOT TWO COURSES TO STEER WHICH AFTERWARDS PROVED TO BE 6 DEGREES OUT.THE COMBINATION OF THESE ERRORS RESULTED IN A LARGE ERROR BETWEEN THE PLOTTED AND ACTUAL AIR POSITION – THIS MEANT THAT WIND VELOCITIES WERE FOUND TO BE OVER 100 MILES PER HR.
If these careless mistakes had not been made this Navigator would have found a wind velocity of 255 degrees 70 miles per hour which was in agreement with the post-met winds.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
During September very varied results have been received on different raids. The exact difference in ranges on different dates are now difficult to assess owing to the new method used in reporting. It is certain that GEE is still providing the most valuable aid to Navigators.
The enemy is now concentrating on transmitting “noise” which is proving as much a nuisance as the previous sine waves and railings. Some noise is always present if a gain has turned up over England, but a special transmitting grass would appear with low gain. This means that over the jamming areas, signals all tend to disappear into the grass as the distance from the transmitters increases. To combat this the Navigator is tempted to increase the gain so as to increase the signal strength. Instead of increasing signal strength, the result is increased grass which swamps all signals.
It is not necessarily weak signals which limit range but the grass signal ratio – if this ratio is kept low then the range will increase – and it can only be kept low by working with the lowest possible gain. Therefore, as a general rule always use [underlined] minimum gain [/underlined] and keep the focus and transference adjusted to meet the reduced gain.
[Boxed] [Underlined] LATTICE CHARTS [/underlined]
Command have decided that the I/M Miniature Lattice Charts shall become available for the Main force aircraft. These will not be issued immediately, for charts are not yet printed in quantity. When they are issued all charts for Series 2, 3 and 5 will be contained in one book conveniently folded. (Series 4 Charts which are rarely used in this Group will continue to be issued as large sheets). Each Navigator can then carry his own book of charts covering all likely areas, and it is thought that this system will be more convenient to use in the air.
The similarity of scales between Lattice and Plotting Charts will make the transference of a fix from one to the other much easier. [/boxed]
GEOGRAPHY Few of us liked Geography at school because so much of what we had to learn had no bearing on our lives. We knew of the Alps as a mountain range somewhere North of Italy, but did they ever become real until that night when we staggered back through cloud on three engines and silently prayed that we were on track ? What were the islands of Holland until we passed over them and joyfully put the nose down for home ?
War has made us all place and name conscious, but do we make the most of our opportunities ? Every sortie should add to our knowledge of Eurpoe [sic] and beyond: the shape of the land, its mountains, its rivers and lakes, its cities. Develop a habit of studying the earth over which you fly. Try to memorise your topographical maps. Your knowledge may come in useful if you ever have to walk back. [boxed]
PAGE 7.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS BAD WEATHER INTERVENES
NAZI WAR MACHINE SLOWING DOWN.
The month’s total of sorties (915) shows a very considerable decrease on last month’s record figure of 1507. This was entirely due to circumstances which are always beyond our control – a bad patch of weather from the 7th. to the 22nd. of the month, which limited the number of sorties to 28 of which 8 were recalled before reaching the target. The number of targets attacked during the month is, therefore, not an imposing one, but we are doing our best at the present moment to make up for lost time. In passing it may be of interest to recall our own experience in 1940/41, that the return of large scale bombing after a lull has an even more depressing effect on morale than an unbroken “Blitz”.
[Boxed] INDUSTRIAL TARGETS [/boxed]
Apart from one attack on Berlin, a special small scale operation in Southern France and two nights of Gardening, the month’s targets have all been industrial centres in Western and South Western Germany. Mannheim and Hannover were both attacked twice, Munich and Bochum once each. The percentage of successful attacks (89.1) is again very satisfactory; the percentage of lost aircraft (4.4) rather higher than usual, though it may be noted that four raids alone counted for 77 pre cent of our casualties.
[Boxed] BERLIN [/boxed]
The raid on Berlin on 3/4th. was a good one: the luck of the weather was with us and a providential gap in the clouds enabled a concentrated attack to be carried out. Once again the Western and South Western parts of the city suffered the most, and while the excited and extravagant accounts of neutral reporters must be taken with a large amount of salt, there is no doubt that severe damage, most of it industrial, has been inflicted on the areas of Berlin roughly corresponding to Hammersmith and Wandsworth and a severe shock has been administered to the Berlin morale at the end of the first round of the Battle of Berlin: one of the most important results of this is that a large scale evacuation of the city, which started after the raids on Hamburg, has been considerably speeded up.
The raid on Mannheim on the 6/7th. was carried out in excellent visibility, and a strong attack developed. Photographs taken on the 7th. and 9th. show that severe damage was caused on both sides of the river, and that several important factories were hit. The weather for Munich the next night was not so good, but after a scattered start two good concentration of fires were started and particularly large explosions reported.
[Boxed] A SPECIAL OPERATION [/boxed]
On the night of 16/17th. 5 Group were entrusted with the task of attempting to destroy the viaduct at Antheor near Cannes, which carries one of the main railway lines between France and Italy. At the same time, other aircraft of Bomber Command struck at the marshalling yards at Modane, where the other French-Italian line enters the Mt. Cenis tunnel. It was hoped that by this double blow to impede the flow of reinforcements to the Germans in Italy at a time when they might most desperately be needed. The viaduct was n extremely difficult target and well defended by Nature against air attack, and in spite of the most careful planning and organisation , and the close proximity of some of the bombs, only slight damage was done to the target.
[Boxed] GERMAN WAR PRODUCTION REDUCED [/boxed]
After another lull the month finished up with a series of large scale attacks. Hannover was attacked in great strength on the night of 27/28th. On neither occasion did the full weight of the attack fall on the centre of the city, but two important factories on the outskirts received very severe damage. Mannheim was strongly attacked on the night of 23/24th., the weight of the attack falling on the Southern parts of the city and Bochum on the night 29/30th. got a good hammering. All these attacks were pressed home in the face of very determined opposition, which however, never succeeded in upsetting the pre-conceived plan of attack, in spite of German claims to the contrary, nor in preventing the major part of the bomber force getting through. Already German war production is about 25 per cent below normal as a result of our air attacks, and if the present scale of attack is maintained it will soon drop to a level, below which, so the economists say, the German war machine will no longer be able to function. With every raid that day grows closer and closer.
[Boxed] [Rolls Royce logo] ROLLS ROYCE. (CONTINUED)
[Circled] From Page 1 Col. 1 [/circled]
94 of them more recently took part in the 5 Group daylight raid on the Schneider Works at Le Creuset far into the heart of France, 93 of them returned, 376 Merlin engines, well over half a million reliable horse power. It has also been chosen for use in the Mosquito reconnaissance bomber, which made it bow to the public following on the spectacular daylight raid on Quisling’s Headquarters in Oslo.
It is not, of course, possible to divulge particulars of the numbers of Merlin engines being produced. It is an established fact that during the last War the Derby Rolls-Royce factory was responsible for the output of more aero engine horse power than all the remaining British Manufacturers combined. The same spirit and quality of product is very evident during the present conflict, and the total Merlin Horse power produced so far has already reached the staggering figure of over 54 millions. [/boxed]
[Boxed] GARDENING:-
On 2nd. September, 15 Lancasters planted 90 vegetables off the Frisians. The operation was uneventful but was a useful contribution to the plastering of this area, which is going steadily on, and which, together with the strafing of shipping by Fighter and Coastal Commands is making life a misery for the enemy’s convoys and steadily cutting down his available tonnage.
Gardening has always produced the highest yield of casualties in the Baltic. It is the only way in which we can get at the enemy’s shipping there and also at the U-boats in their training grounds. Most of the German fleet, except those ships in Norway, is also in harbours in the Easter Baltic. On this occasion it was appreciated from previous sighting reports that the Lutzow was due in the area from Norway. As usual, we shall have to wait to hear the results but there is no doubt that the perseverance of the crews in making the long trip and getting mines down in the right spot in the face of considerable opposition caused great alarm and despondency as an immediate effect and the Admiralty expressed great satisfaction at the success of the operation. [/boxed]
FOREWORD by A.O.C. (CONTINUED.)
well-trained and determined crew whose errors on operations may be little greater.
Every crew in this Group must think bombing, talk bombing and practice bombing until it has an error from 10,000 feet of less than 100 yards; and there is no reason why this standard should not be achieved provided:-
1. The Air Bomber takes a personal interest in the sight and ensures that any bombing errors due to faulty adjustments in the mechanism of the sight are immediately put right by the instrument repair staff.
2. Pilot and Navigator work together so that the wind velocity found by GEE fix has a vector error not exceeding 7 miles per hour. They must study and apply the new 5 Group instructions on wind finding by GEE fixes.
3. Pilot and Air Bomber take the aircraft over the target without skid, bearing in mind that at 20,000 feet one degree of skid introduces an error of 100 yards, and there are many pilots who are unable to make small turns without skid.
4. Finally, the Captain exercises supervision over the bombing team and insists that every bombing detail is fully analysed and the causes of errors understood and rectified. That means hard work and enthusiasm.
I repeat that a crew who, with practice bombs, can achieve an error not exceeding 100 yards from 10,000 feet has shown that it takes bombing seriously, and there is no reason why, with normal luck, it should not achieve similar results on operations. Every trip by this crew will contribute to victory.
When the whole Group can put down its bombs with this accuracy the spread of the attack will be no more than the spread of the T.I’s and should be less because the aiming point is the centre of those T.I’s which are visible.
The spread of the incendiary attack must be reduced. I give that as No. 1 problem facing the Group. If it can be solved – as I believe it can – it will represent the biggest single contribution to Victory of which the Group is capable. The first step is to realise that good bombing is the result of good team work un which Pilot, Air Bomber, Navigator and Instrument Repairer all play essential parts. The second that precision bombing means precision work by each member of the team. The third is that there is no time to waste.
B.B.C. VISIT TO 5 GROUP – “AN OUTSTANDING BROADCAST.”
On the night of the 3/4th. September, Mr. Vaughan Thomas and Mr. Reginald Pidsley, both of the B.B.C., made a recording of the raid over the German capital.
How ‘F’ for Font, the Lancaster in which they were flying was attacked by a fighter over Berlin with the result that the gunners of the recording aircraft shot down their opponent, is well known to listeners all over the world.
Within three hours of landing, the B.B.C. men were speeding back to London with their precious discs.
The recordings of the trip were broadcast three times in the English programmes and on innumerable European and Foreign transmissions. It is interesting to note that the Blue Network in the United States cancelled its prog [missing] to have this recording on Sunday, [missing] described as the outstanding [missing] war.
This month [rest of this page corner is missing]
GROUP NEWS. No. 14.
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V Group News, September 1943
5 Group News, September 1943
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Five Group Newsletter, number 14, September 1943. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, an article on the Rolls Royce Merlin and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, operations, and a BBC broadcast from 5 Group.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1943-10-13
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Anne-Marie Watson
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10 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-21
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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CC BY-NC 4.0 International license
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Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Mannheim
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1943-09
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
106 Squadron
1654 HCU
1660 HCU
1661 HCU
1668 HCU
207 Squadron
44 Squadron
467 Squadron
49 Squadron
5 Group
50 Squadron
57 Squadron
61 Squadron
617 Squadron
619 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
ground personnel
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
propaganda
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
take-off crash
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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[Picture]
V
GROUP
NEWS
No 26 SEPTEMBER 1944
Copies sent to Stns.
[Stamp] Base Copy.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
FOREWORD BY A.O.C.
September was a most successful month and a reward for the hard work which all ranks have put in throughout the Summer. The Group secured two prizes for which many have striven since the early days of the War, the Tirpitz and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The attack on the Tirpitz was splendidly undertaken by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons and appears to have been highly successful in spite of a most efficient smoke screen. The attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal has earned the following message from the Secretary of State for Air.
“The War Cabinet have instructed me to convey to you and to all concerned their congratulations on the outstanding success achieved in the recent attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Pressed home with great determination against strong opposition and in difficult weather it constituted yet another major blow against German War economy.”
These two attacks have once more shown the remarkable efficiency of the 12,000 lb. “Tallboy” bomb when it hits the target.
The Group has achieved an equally high measure of success in attacks against German cities. During September alone, an area of nearly 3,000 acres has been burnt out. Such results can only be achieved if the marking is accurately placed and if the incendiaries are spread evenly over the whole area to be burnt. With a small force of Group strength there are no loads to be spared and if incendiaries go wide or are over-concentrated on certain sectors, it must be at the expense of the total area destroyed. Examples are Stuttgart where too high a percentage of loads fell wide of their sectors and Kaiserslautern where crews allowed themselves to be deflected inwards by the fires raging in the central sector, thus allowing the equally important areas on either side to escape.
I want to impress on crews that area bombing calls for every bit as much accuracy as attacks on the smallest factory or railway targets. In attacks on these targets during the Summer crews achieved remarkably small errors, and similar accuracy is needed on these large targets if they are to be burnt out from end to end leaving no gaps calling for an uneconomical return visit. Each crew in fact is given a small area of his own to burn and if his load falls on his neighbour’s patch, his own area may well escape destruction, and this has happened on some of our recent attacks.
The problems of lining up the aircraft on the correct heading after allowing for drift and of carrying out the overshoot procedure, are not easy to solve but instructions have recently been issued which should help crews in this matter. If an even spread of incendiaries can be achieved we should be able, with our normal effort, to burn out nearly 1,000 acres on each attack. This will represent a tremendous achievement, and one which will bring nearer the end of the War.
No.51 Base has also put out a great effort in training 161 crews during the month. This has enabled all squadrons to be kept up to establishment and had provided a margin from which new squadrons are already starting to be formed. I congratulate all concerned.
[Page break]
[Drawing] OPERATIONS
[Underlined] BREST – 2ND SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Humphreys.
Operations in September opened with an attack on the dry docks and shipping in Brest Harbour by 67 Lancasters of Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, in daylight on September 2nd. There was no marking for this attack, which was carried out visually and according to plan. Officers who have since visited Brest say that the concentration of bomb craters around the two docks in such that it is almost impossible to get across this area on foot. Both ships are shattered by many bombs.
[Underlined] DEELEN AIRFIELD – 3RD SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
103 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, plus No. 106 Squadron, took off to attack Deelen airfield in daylight. Two Mosquitoes from No.54 Base went ahead of the main force to mark the target with smoke. One Mosquito fitted with an A.P.I. was detailed to find a bombing wind and pass it to the Master Bomber Two smoke bombs were assessed as being on the aiming point but no trace of markers was seen on strike photographs. No. 106 Squadron bombs were fused T.D. 0.025 while both 52 and 55 Bases carried a load of 1,000 lb. and 500 ln bombs all fused half an hour delay, with the object of avoiding smoke and thereby allowing each crew to have a clear run up to the target. This was the first occasion on which we have used the half hour delay fuse against an airfield target. Unfortunately there was much cloud so that the experiment was not conclusive.
RESULTS Only partial cover was obtained, but concentrations of bombs were seen to have fallen on the S.W. and Eastern intersections of the runways, and at least 60 craters are seen in the partial cover of the runways.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Wing Commander Simpson.
The United Stated Forces investing Brest were meeting stiff opposition from the defences around Brest. These enemy batteries were the target for 60 aircraft of No. 53 Base in daylight on September 5th. There were four aiming points, A.B.C. and D, to be marked by 7 Mosquitoes of No.627 Squadron. Crews were to bomb visually.
RESULTS All aiming points were attacked, a fair concentration being achieved, with the exception of some loose bombing on A. and B., several bombs falling as much as 400 – 500 yards to the West. A full interpretation from photographic cover was unobtainable owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the Lancaster and previous attacks.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH – 9/10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
Nos. 52 and 55 Bases provided 113 Lancasters to attack this target on the Western fringe of the Ruhr; in conditions of cloudless weather and good visibility.
PLAN For this attack, as area of the town was selected and a suitable marking point chosen, upwind from it. The marking point was to be marked with T.I’s dropped by Mosquitoes in the light of flares, after which the
[Page break]
main force, tracking over the T.I’s on pre-determined headings through a sector of 90° were to aim their bombs at the T.I., but delay release for a certain number of seconds. The aircraft were divided throughout the sector and each division given its own band. In this way the incendiary load would be spread evenly over the selected target area.
Should the 54 Base Mosquitoes find it impossible to locate their marking point then they were to back up yellow Oboe T.I’s dropped in the centre of the target area by P.F.F. Mosquitoes, and the main force were to bomb the yellow and red direct, without delaying release. The Oboe T.I’s were dropped on time, but visual marking was delayed owing to the first and second flare waves dropping their flares too far to the South and South East over open country. The Master Bomber, therefore, ordered the third flare wave to drop their flares on the Oboe T.I’s, and by their aid, Marker II was able to identify and mark the marking point. The main force were then called in to attack.
RESULTS Photographs show enormous volumes of smoke coming from a very large number of fires scattered throughout the centre of the built up area of the town. Large new areas of complete devastation, mostly by fires, are seen all around the main railway station. This was a successful attack, but the Mosquito markers would have been aided had a more conspicuous marker point been chosen.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
Defences at Le Havre which were holding up the besieging Allied Forces were attacked by 108 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases in cloudless weather in daylight on September 10th. Aiming points were marked by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and the attack went according to plan.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that all areas have been heavily cratered in a widespread fashion. It was noticeable that there were no craters North of the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 11TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
A force of 101 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, plus 106 Squadron, again attacked the defences at Le Havre in good weather in daylight on 11th September. Here again the marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and P.R.U. cover confirms the success of the attack, showing that all aiming points were well covered. Once again no bombs were seen outside the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 11/12TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
The weather in the target area was clear with some ground haze.
PLAN The “fanning out” method employed against Munchen Gladbach was again planned for this attack, each Base being allotted a separate sector. On this occasion, leading aircraft of the flare force assumed the additional role of blind markers and, in addition to illuminating the target for the Mosquitoes, were to drop T.I. green in the centre of the target area. Mosquitoes were then to mark the marking point with T.I. Red, and the main force in their allotted height bands were again to aim their bombs at the Red, delaying release. To ensure the distribution of the incendiary load over the whole of the required area the first wave was to delay 20 seconds, the second wave 10 seconds, and the third wave 8 seconds. As on a previous occasion the green T.I’s from the Lancaster markers were to be backed up by the Mosquitoes, if the latter were unable to locate their own marking point, and the centre of
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these two sets of T.I’s was to be bombed direct by the main force. Flares were dropped accurately and on time, and the markers successfully dropped their red T.I’s on the marking point. The attack then proceeded according to the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographs show the main area of the city to be completely gutted. On the whole a highly successful attack but something went wrong with the Northern edge which has escaped devastation. Investigation into the reason is not yet complete.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 12/13TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
The target was heavily attacked by a force of 195 Lancasters from all Bases, in good weather on 12/13th September.
PLAN The target had suffered severe and wide spread damage from previous R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. attacks, and so a plan of attack was required to cover the remaining comparatively undamaged areas.
A marking point was therefore chosen, and sectors allotted to each Base in which bombing headings were to be evenly distributed, in order to cover the whole of the undamaged area.
No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the big railway yards with T.I. Red and Red Spot fires, with the help of illumination from the flare force.
Appropriate delays were ordered, and blind markers were again dropped by 54 Base Lancasters as an initial guide to the Mosquitoes, and as an insurance if the latter failed to locate their marking point.
Flares were dropped accurately and punctually. Marking was completed successfully and the attack was carried out in accordance with the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows new areas of damage round the aiming point, in the Bad Constadt district, and at Fueurbach to the North of Stuttgart, in addition to several important industrial works.
Plots show that, although a fair concentration of incendiaries was obtained within the sectors planned, the main weight in the later part of the attack tended to spread to the East and North. The reasons for this are being investigated.
[Underlined] BOULOGNE – 17TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Provided by P.F.F.
The garrison at Boulogne was putting up a heavy resistance against the Canadians attacking the town and harbour, and two forces comprising 199 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the specific aiming points.
PLAN All aiming points were marked by full P.F.F. Oboe marking. The first two forces were timed to attack in two separate waves, the first at 0830 hours and the second at 0940 hours. In view of the proximity of our own troops, crews were carefully briefed to make their run up from a well defined pin-point on the coast and use was made of the Navigator’s Master Bomber switch.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows well bombing concentrated around the aiming points.
[Page break]
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN – 18/19TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
207 Lancasters from all Bases and 7 Mosquitoes took part in a heavy and devastating attack on the town and harbour installations at Bremerhaven, in cloudless weather conditions, with good visibility.
PLAN There were five aiming points, lying in a rough direction from N.N.W. to S.E.E. on the Eastern bank of the river. Marking procedure for this target was to be similar to that for the preceding targets, but its shape restricted the use of sectors and it was therefore planned that part of the force would attack on defined tracks over the Mosquitoes’ T.I’s, with the appropriate delay in the release of the bombs, whilst others would aim direct at these T.I’s with a false wind vector applied to the bombsight. Illumination and marking was carried out without any hitches, and the attack was completed according to plan.
RESULTS The two most closely built up areas North and South of the harbour entrances have been completely devastated. Most of the warehouses and dockside buildings have been gutted. This was a model for an incendiary attack.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH AND RHEYDT – 19/20TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Gibson.
A further heavy attack was carried out on this target by 227 aircraft from all Bases in the Group, the intention being to complete the destruction of this enemy industrial centre.
PLAN There were three forces – Red (53 Base plus 106 Squadron), Green (52 Base), and Yellow (55 Base), each force being allotted separate height bands and its own Marking Point, each of which was to be illuminated by flares and marked with Red, Green and Yellow T.I’s respectively. The aiming point of the Red force was the primary target and was to be fully controlled. If the green or yellow targets could not be successfully attacked aircraft were to be ordered to attack the red target.
There was a hitch with the marking for the Red Force. In the light of accurately placed flares, the Master Bomber went in to drop his T.I’s on the Red Marking Point, but his markers hung up. He then called the markers to come in. Number one marker had trouble with exhaust studs and Markers 2 and 3 could not identify. As no Red markers were down, the Master Bomber ordered the Red Force to bomb the green T.I’s which were dropped on time. Later, however, Marker number one identified and marked his target. The order to bomb the green T.I’s was cancelled and the force were then ordered to bomb the red T.I’s. The yellow marking point was punctually and accurately marked, and the Yellow force completed their attack as planned.
RESULTS Considerable additional damage over the whole N.W. perimeter of the town is revealed adding to the already severe and widespread damage. This almost completes the destruction of the town. There is little additional damage in Rheydt.
Plots of night photographs and the incendiary plot show that although the incendiary sticks dropped early in the attack fell near the aiming point, a spread rapidly developed both to the South and W.S.W. and at the end of the attack, an area from S.E. to West was covered. No markers were plotted in these areas. No explanation for this wide spread beyond and outside the planned sectors has yet been arrived at.
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[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, HANDORF AIRFIELD AND MUNSTER – 23/24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Red Target: Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Green Target: Squadron Leader Owen.
A large force comprising 254 aircraft from all Bases in the Group was detailed to attack these targets, the first two being the primaries and the last, Munster, an alternative, should the weather present difficulties for marking and attack. Unfortunately 10/10ths cloud was encountered in the target area with base 8,000 ft.
PLAN No.53 Base plus 106 Squadron and 617 Squadron were ordered to attack the red target (Dortmund-Ems Canal) and Nos. 52 and 55 Bases the green target (Handorf Airfield). If the red target were not marked, the red force, excluding the Tallboy aircraft, were to attack the green target, or if the green target was not marked, the yellow target. Similarly, the green force were to attack the yellow target as an alternative.
RESULTS [Underlined] Dortmund-Ems Canal [/underlined] – Although the portion of the canal marked and attacked was some 7 miles North of the planned aiming point, a very successful attack ensued, and both branches of the embanked portion of the canal were breached. A stretch of 18 miles of the canal is now dry, and over 100 barges are stranded. A splendid result. Of the red force, 82 Lancasters attacked the primary, and 12 the alternative.
[Underlined] Handorf Airfield [/underlined] – The marker force experienced difficulty in identifying the target area, and after an unsuccessful attempt, the main force was ordered to bomb the alternative. 20 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes claim to have attacked the primary, and 61 Lancasters attacked the alternative. There was no new damage to the alternative.
[Underlined] CALAIS – 24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
30 Lancasters of 53 Base were ordered to attack defence positions at Calais in daylight on 24th September. Marking was to be carried out throughout the attack by Oboe Mosquitoes of P.F.F.
RESULTS Weather conditions were unfavourable, there being 10/10ths cloud, base between 2/3,000 feet. In view of this the Master Bomber cancelled the attack. This order was not received by 8 aircraft of the force, who carried out the attack visually having identified their respective aiming points.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE – 26/27TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Force employed – 216 Lancasters, 11 Mosquitoes. Weather conditions experienced over the target were 8 – 10/10ths cloud 6 – 8,000 feet.
PLAN In order that the whole weight of the attack should fall on previously undamaged areas of the town, a marking point was selected, to be marked with red T.I’s and each Base was allotted a sector or track, radiating from the marking point. Main force crews were to aim their bombs at the red T.I’s and delay for the detailed number of seconds. The usual blind marking technique was ordered to ensure against the failure of the Mosquitoes to locate and mark the aiming point visually.
Cloud conditions and poor visibility prevented the visual markers from identifying the marking point and consequently the secondary plan was resorted to.
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RESULTS P.R.U. photographs reveal a large area of gutted buildings extending over many blocks. This devastation spreads on both sides of the main East to West road through the city around the closely built up area, for a distance of 1,500 yards by 500 yards to 1,000 yards. There are many scattered incidents of destruction beyond this central area, and a large number of commercial and administrative buildings have been destroyed. This is a great triumph for the blind markers.
[Underlined] KAISERLAUTERN – 27/28TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
207 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes from all Bases in the Group were to attack the industrial centre and railway workshops. The attack was carried out in weather conditions of 2 – 8/10ths thin stratus at 3,000 feet and 10/10ths cloud at 7,000 feet.
PLAN The railway workshops were to be attacked with ‘J’ bombs using a false wind vector on the bombsight, and the town by the normal method of overshooting.
RESULTS The illumination and marking on both areas were accurate and punctual.
The damage inflicted on the town, confined chiefly to a narrow belt across the centre of the area id disappointing in relation to the number of aircraft used. Investigation shows that over 70% of the aircraft bombed on headings within a small sector, and were not evenly spread over the whole sector as planned, thus little damage was sustained by the Northern and Southern outskirts. Greater attention should be paid at briefing to explaining the details of the plan of attack, and the importance of aircraft adhering to their briefed bombing headings must be strongly emphasised. The attack on the railway workshops achieved a greater measure of success.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACK BY NO. 617 AND NO. 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ – SEPTEMBER 15TH. [/underlined]
Previous attempts made by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and midget submarines to sink the Tirpitz had proved unsuccessful. It was considered that a force of Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs and other special bombs would have a good chance of inflicting severe damage to the battleship, if not sinking her, provided the element of surprise could be achieved, so that aircraft could carry out their bombing run before the smoke screen, which was known to be capable of covering the ship and fiord in which she lay within 10 minutes, could be brought into operation.
On September 11th, 38 Lancasters and 2 Liberators took off and with the exception of one aircraft of No. 9 Squadron, which had to return to base, all arrived at Archangel or in that area. Weather conditions were appalling, with rain and low cloud, and some crews were unable to locate the advanced base and had to land on other airfields and even in open country. But for a very high standard of airmanship many more aircraft might have been damaged or lost.
It was hoped that by approaching the target from the South, the necessary element of surprise would be achieved. Tallboy aircraft were to attack first, as it was essential that they should see and aim at the Tirpitz visually. The aircraft carrying the special bombs did not depend on visual sighting of the target. A separate plan and aiming data were provided for them. The plan consisted of the selection of two clearly identifiable landmarks close to the target, at which the bomb aimers could aim, using false settings on their bombsights. Two lakes, one on either side of the fiord were chosen for this purpose. Each aircraft was given a separate track, with the intention of covering an area of 750 yards X 750 yards with the target at its centre.
The flight plan proceeded as detailed until the approach to the target area, when the Tallboy force had to make a last minute alteration of course, as they were west of track.
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The leading Tallboy aircraft saw the Tirpitz clearly when 8 minutes flying time away from it, but by the time the first bombing run was made, the smoke screen was already in operation, and later aircraft found the target area completely obscured. Some aircraft were able to aim their bombs before the last traces of the Tirpitz disappeared under the smoke screen, but others had to aim at the gun flashes and light flak seen through the smoke screen. Others, unable to identify the target, took their bombs back to the advanced base.
The six aircraft carrying the special load aimed their bombs at the planned aiming points, but were unable to observe any results.
The majority of bombing frame photographs are unplottable due to smoke but the release point frames of thirteen of the Tallboy aircraft have been plotted, and the calculated strike position of the bombs indicate that at least one direct hit, and three near misses are probable. Neither the bombing nor release point frames of the aircraft carrying the special load are plottable, as they are obscured by smoke.
Subsequent P.R.U. photographs show a large rent in the starboard side of the ship forward, covering much of the forecastle. Apart from this hit the explosion of some 6,000 lbs of Torpex at a depth of 60 feet within a few yards of the ship’s side cannot fail to have given her a severe shaking, and at least one of the near misses was very close.
This was a highly successful operation carried through in spite of considerable difficulties.
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[Drawing] GARDENING
The Group Gardening effort this month has been on a small scale, and has only called for two operations in which a total of 77 vegetables were successfully planted, although crews stood by for other operations which were cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions.
It is interesting to note that in our first operation this month, the Gardeners from 44 Squadron were co-ordinated into the main force attack on an important German Port, and planted visually by the light of the Flare Force, close to the docks in a channel 800 yards wide, from 12,000 feet.
The second operation, performed by 57 and 630 Squadrons, was a normal H 2 S high lay off the entrance to important German shipping channels where 53 selected vegetables were successfully planted. Unfortunately H/57 had trouble with H 2 S equipment after trying local repairs to within 20 minutes of the target, and then correctly returned with a complete load.
The Command effort totalled 748 vegetables, mostly planted in the Baltic and Kattegat area, with the object of continuing the present dislocation of enemy shipping routes, and preventing troop movements from Scandinavia to the mainlands of the European offensive.
It can be estimated that at present the figures for vegetables planted per ships sunk, stand at 47 to 1. This is an encouraging figure when taking into account the number of Gardening sortied made, and bearing in mind that this does not include the loss to war effort while sweeping measures are put in hand and completed in each area, or the number of ships that are severely damaged and can only be repaired under difficult conditions, or the all-important morale effect on those who “go down to the sea in ships”.
The following extract from the “News Digest” of 28th September reveals the present state of our enemy’s imagination:
“Norway – German fear of Paratroops. British bombers have recently flown over Oslofjord dropping mines.”
“…The Germans are nervous because they think that paratroops were dropped at the same time as the mines. After the first attack some weeks ago, Oslo harbour was closed to all traffic for two days. Since then many attacks have been made, and the harbour has been closed every time. Even the Bygde ferries have, at times, had to stop their traffic. Large-scale raids have been carried out in Cjelleras, and even as far away as Lillestrom there have been raids for paratroops”.
It is also reported that all ships entering narrow channels in the Kiel area have to place two strong cables round their bottoms, and so sail until they are out of the area. This is done in order to facilitate the salvaging of a ship by cranes or other salvage devices in case she is bombed or mined.
In other words, our enemy has developed the minephobic complaint to a very high degree, and with our present increase in stocks he will receive further innoculations [sic] as, and where, we may decide in the future.
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WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties, Tonnage and Hours by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
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[Drawing] TACTICS
The main tactical development of this month has been the withdrawal of early warning devices, i.e. MONICA and BOOZER, and the limitation in the use of H.2.S. It is now known that Hun night fighters can home upon these devices. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no alternative but to withdraw them. MONICA is in the process of modification and may be reissued eventually, but in its absence, crews must exert the utmost vigilance in their search.
It must be appreciated that, although German C.G.I. is getting very much shorter warning of an approaching raid, the number of targets to which a bomber force may be going is also decreasing, making the night fighter controller’s job easier. He also has his night fighter squadrons concentrated into a smaller area and their transfer from one area to another is consequently easier. Bearing these factors in mind, there can be no doubt that the German night fighter will constitute our main problem during the coming months. The following steps should be taken to ensure utmost efficiency in combatting the enemy’s defensive measures.
(i) [Underlined] Night Vision Training. [/underlined]
No opportunity should be lost of training crews in night vision. Night vision efficiency is something which can be improved with practice. Remember, with the withdrawal of the early warning devices, it is now your eyes and night vision versus the night vision aided by A.I. of the enemy night fighter. On the other hand, you have seven pairs of eyes where he has one. This advantage must be exploited to the utmost.
(ii) [Underlined] Increased Banking Search. [/underlined]
Surprise remains the night fighter’s most important weapon. The only effective counter to surprise from behind and below is a constant banking search, and captains must increase the frequency with which they carry out this banking search.
(iii) [Underlined] Corkscrew. [/underlined]
The 5 Group Corkscrew continues to be a very effective fighting manoeuvre. A scrutiny of recent combat reports, however, reveals that there is little doubt that the Hun night fighters now expect the corkscrew and anticipate it. Out of 94 combats reported the enemy fighter opened fire only 37 times, and in many cases was seen to make a feint attack, sufficient to persuade the Lancaster’s captain to corkscrew, and then to hold off and wait until the manoeuvre was completed. The existence of a combat report proves that the corkscrew was successful, but it is considered that where no combat report exists, i.e. where the bomber has been shot down, the fighter’s tactics have been successful. In other words, he waited until the corkscrew has been completed and the aircraft has resumed course, and has then closed in and opened fire.
You are no longer safe in assuming, therefore, that one cycle of a corkscrew will throw off the fighter. Should the gunners lose the fighter in a corkscrew, a banking search should be carried out as soon as course is resumed, to ensure that he is not directly under the
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aircraft.
A new German night fighter, the H.E.219, is now known to carry two fixed astral guns, oblique upwards firing. It is believed that these fire at an angle of 65° upwards and forwards and are fired by the pilot. This adds further weight to the necessity for constant banking search.
To summarise:-
1. Learn how to use your eyes at night!
2. Carry out the correct search to find the enemy.
3. When you have found him – don’t lose him!
[Cartoon]
THE MAN WHO EMNTIONED THE TARGET AT FLIGHT PLANNING!
[Underlined] WITH APOLOGIES TO H.M. BATEMAN [/underlined]
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[Drawing] SIGNALS
[Underlined] W/T DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
On the night 27/28th. September, 217 aircraft of this Group attacked Kaiserslautern. In accordance with recent practice, very strict W/T, R/T and Radar silence was ordered en route to and from the target. Wireless Operators should have been well aware of the vital need for strict W/T silence on this occasion, in view of the unusual measures taken. In spite of this, however, five Wireless Operators of this Group broke W/T silence during the period 0114 to 0325. Their transmissions took the form of such senseless remarks as “INT WOP – HOW ARE YOU – BANG ON – IMI – GOOD SHOW – INT CUP OF TEA.”
What satisfaction these inane natterbugs got out of their efforts it is hard to see. The enemy, deprived of his usual means of detecting the stream, might easily have obtained bearings on these continuous transmissions, with the result that five brainless Operators would have been the direct cause of the loss of several Group aircraft and many of their comrades.
Despite energetic enquiry and investigation, it has not been possible – so far – to track down the culprits; they are obviously not the type who would own up. If they are found, however, they may rest assured that never again will they have the opportunity to jeopardise their comrades. That such incidents must never occur again has been made perfectly plain.
The Wireless Operators of 5 Group have had the privilege, since the attack on the Dams, of a fair amount of interesting W/T operating. This makes it all the more incomprehensible, therefore, that a few of them should adopt this culpable form of keybashing. It is known, however, that the vast majority of Wireless Operators are responsible men, who feel just as strongly about this “black” as does the C.S.O. It is hard that their good name should have been sullied by the action of so few, and all must now combine to ensure that such flagrant breaches of W/T discipline never occur again.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS. [/underlined]
The hope expressed in last month’s summary that a healthy competition between Bases would develop, has now materialised. In fact, it is almost a full time job for one man at Group Headquarters to book and supervise these exercises. Signals Leader should note that many a good exercise is spoilt by failure of the Operators to pay attention to detail. Before an operator takes part in any of these exercises, he should know 5 G.S.I. No. 12 backwards. In this connection, the main points to watch are:-
(1) The number of times call signs should be sent.
(2) How often the text of a message should be repeated.
In next month’s issue, it is intended to publish a table showing the number of exercises completed by Bases.
[Underlined] REGRADING. [/underlined]
The Group Signals Leader examined a large number of wireless Operators during the month, and claimed he was more or less up to date on regrading before proceeding on leave. Perhaps it is not generally known that the main purpose of this leave was to see for the first time Gilmour Junior – of the ‘transmitter’ variety we believe. It is known, however, that during the past fortnight quite a formidable queue of W/Ops Grade II has been forming, and every endeavour will be made to deal with these as soon as possible.
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[Underlined] GROUP EXERCISES. [/underlined]
These have taken place regularly throughout the month, and the high standard of operating maintained. They still reveal, however, that morse practice and more morse practice is essential. It is hoped that the recent quiet spell has been taken advantage of in this connection.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Signals failure percentage continues to increase, the figure for September being 2.459. Over the past 3 months the percentage has risen steadily. On reading through the defects summary however, it can be seen that over 90% of the trouble is still attributable to component failures. The long spell of no maintenance faults has broken, one Squadron having no less than three such failures. There are still quite a number under the heading miscellaneous – the “remarks” column being “No fault found”. This type of alleged failure must stop. There were two manipulation failures which could easily have been avoided, in one case an incorrect VHF channel was selected, in the other, the type 51 Junction box switch was in the wrong position.
It is most gratifying to see that not one failure of VR.101, i.e. output valve V8, was reported throughout the month. It appears that the recent glut of V8 failures can be attributed either to faulty manufacture or wartime materials.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
There have been many essential changes in the V.H.F. policy during the past month, the reason being, an operation on HANDORF airfield, night 23/24th September, when very heavy FREYA interference was experienced on the TR.1143 equipment. This setback made it quite clear that the series noise limiting diode modification had to be carried out on all the new SCR.522 equipments prior to their debut into 5 Group Lancasters and Mosquitoes. The modification is quite simple, the only difficulty being the realigning of the four I.F. stages and all Squadrons not possessing a suitable 12 m/c oscillator. It was decided, therefore, that the Americans be asked to incorporate the modifications for us, and this they most willingly agreed to. The result is, at the time of going to press, only 35 of the 435 SCR.522’s held, now require to be modified.
For 100% suppression of all noise, it has also been found necessary to filter the 150 volt Dynamotor output with a 5 uf electrolytic 200 volts D.C.W. Capacitor. If this equipment is readily available through R.A.F. sources, in such a large quantity the modification will be carried out locally. Failing this the U.S. Air Force has again expressed willingness to assist.
[Underlined] NOISE SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION. SCR.522. [/underlined]
Briefly the Noise Limiting modification functions as follows:- A double diode is inserted in series with the output from the 2nd Detector, one section of the valve is biassed by a portion of the average D.C. voltage developed by this detector. When normal speech is being received, the bias is such as to allow the diode to conduct, i.e. the diode becomes a low impedance. When any pulse waveform is impressed on the incoming required signal the diode anode is biassed more negative and cuts off; hence it offers a high impedance to the interfering pulse. The other half of the valve holds the A.V.C. to zero until the average D.C. voltage developed by the A.V.C. diode exceeds the delay voltage. The A.V.C. voltage, after the modification, is derived from the primary of the last I.F. transformer. Changes are also made in the I.F. Grid circuits, to reduce cross modulation effects caused by the grid current as the result of high noise voltage pulses.
[Underlined] BLIND MARKING – CONINGSBY’S SPECIAL RADAR EFFORT. [/underlined]
The story may now be told of the work done at Coningsby to improve the performance of MK.III H2S. During the latter half of July, it was decided that efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of our offensive Radar devices. Hs” MK.III was selected for particular attention, the main requirement was for an accurate Blind Bombing Instrument, and immediate steps were taken to improve MK.III H2S to enable it to perform this function. T.R.E. aided us in every way possible, to enable this commitment to be undertaken without impairing operational serviceability.
The greatest difficulty which had to be overcome was the tendency of the presentation on the screen to disintegrate or disappear at the shorter ranges. It was felt by T.R.E. that this was due to the inefficiency of the scanners, and therefore, scanners received the first attention. Those which had previously
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given the best results were carefully selected, and thorough checks made against specifications, at the same time the best Units of the equipment were subjected to a detailed and exacting overhaul for power output, tuning, and accurate calibration of height and range markers. When one complete installation had been fully tested in this manner, it was placed in an aircraft, and one of the most experienced crews commenced bombing trials on Wainfleet, and on several inland towns. The results obtained on these trials are compared here with results which were obtained previous to these experiments. The average error obtained at Wainfleet for 5 bombs was 316 yards as compared to a previous error of 1,193 yards. A second crew dropped 6 bombs with an average error of 1.6 miles with the ordinary Mk. III H 2 S equipment, and on using the improved equipment reduced this error to 800 yards. On inland towns the bombing results were similar to those on Wainfleet, an average error of 700 and 500 yards being obtained with the special equipment, whilst errors of 1,600 and 2,000 yards were obtained with the standard equipment.
It was decided from these figures that the experiments and improvements were making more accurate bombing possible, and a further 6 aircraft were similarly equipped, and the best Operators assigned to these aircraft. Further training and trials were carried out, and the results gave additional proof that the experiments were on the right road. The final assurance that all this concentration on improvements and selection of all Units and Operators was improving the bombing was soon forthcoming. The operations were conducted against Konigsberg, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe were most successful, the average error of the proximity markers being 550 yards.
These results do not by any means mark the successful conclusion of the experiments, but rather indicate that we are just beginning, and the coming few months will see an ever increasing improvement in both equipment and crews.
It is desired at this point to express our appreciation for the assistance which has been rendered by T.R.E. and H.Q.B.C. and for the close co-operation by all concerned at Coningsby without whose help none of this work would have been possible.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee maintained its usual high standard of serviceability through September. Of the 2386 sorties reported for the month, 62 difficulties were experienced for a percentage serviceable of 97.4 as compared with 97.26 for August.
The supply of Gee remains a very critical problem, although the position has eased up slightly. The new aerial loading unit is apparently becoming available shortly, and a few have already been received in new aircraft. The supply of R.F. Units Type 27 has also improved and an effort is being made to fit all Squadrons completely in the near future.
A modification which enables the simultaneous presentation of signals and calibration pips on the screen has been submitted by 617 Squadron, and forwarded to Headquarters Bomber Command for approval.
[Underlined] H 2 S. [/underlined]
Although for obvious reasons the use of H 2 S Mark II was restricted this month, a total of 819 sorties was completed and out of these 90.7 per cent were free of technical difficulty. A switch unit which allows the equipment to be switched on and off at altitude has been developed by T.R.E. This should soon be in production.
H.2.S. Mark III is not so badly affected by this restriction, and during September, a total of 135 sorties was reported. Twelve difficulties were experienced, which brings serviceability back to 91.2 per cent, an increase of 2.3 above last month. The work which has been undertaken on the H.2.S. Mark III at Coningsby has served to familiarise the Radar Mechanics even more with the equipment, and the benefits thus derived should bring the serviceability to a much higher standard from day to day.
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[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
Unfortunately Monica has had to be removed from all aircraft, but it is hoped only temporarily, pending the introduction of a modification developed by 53 Base and T.R.E. This modification is being pursued at T.R.E. with the assistance of a Radar Officer from this Group.
Before it was restricted, Monica IIIA reached its highest serviceability. Of the 139 sorties completed, only one defect was experienced, giving a percentage serviceable of 99.3. This provides a record which will require a great deal of effort if it is to be bettered on the re-installation of the equipment.
Monica V was, however, not far behind, for out of 99 sorties only one difficulty occurred, giving a serviceability of 99 per cent – another record which we will endeavour to equal.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond, due to the restriction on H 2 S, was also used to a lesser extent during September. Despite this, it rendered a very satisfactory service for 722 sorties out of 796 reported, a percentage of 90.7. Training of operators has increased the usefulness of the equipment, and every effort should be made to aid those operators in quickly interpreting the picture on the screen.
[Underlined] A. G. L. (T) [/underlined]
During the second week of September, A.G.L. (T) became operational and up to the end of the month 70 sorties had been completed. Of these, 20 developed difficulty which gives a percentage serviceable of 71.5. Nine of these defects were due to components in the A.G.L. (T) installation itself, whilst H 2 S, Fishpond and the power supply were responsible for the remaining eleven.
Although this standard of serviceability leaves a great deal to be desired, October should bring about an encouraging improvement, in view of the experience which has now been gained by servicing personnel. It is very gratifying to note the enthusiasm with which this new device has been received, on the part of both the air and ground crews. As it becomes increasingly familiar and serviceability steadily climbs, this enthusiasm will grow and the full benefit will be derived from it.
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[Drawing] AIR BOMBING
The month of September has provided some excellent results from the attacks on German towns, and despite adverse weather conditions on one or two occasions the determination of crews provided better results than were, at first anticipated.
Incendiaries formed the greater part of the bomb loads, and the previous difficulties experienced in aiming the 4 lb I.B. have been largely overcome by the use of the new wind conversion factors for bombs of low T.V. However, it is still very necessary for Air Bombers to adhere strictly to the “delay release” times supplied at briefing, and Bombing Leaders must ensure that the importance of this is stressed.
Another point which cannot be stressed too often is the necessity for not dropping any bombs until either the Controller has given the order to bomb, or ‘H’ hour has arrived and no instructions have been received from the Controller. You will be briefed to adopt the latter alternative is it has been decided that there will be no orbiting in the target area. The reasons for these instructions should be apparent; the difficulties of the Mosquito markers are greatly increased if a few stray ‘cookies’ are dropping while they are searching for the marking point, and a load of 4 lb. I.B’s can be very dazzling to the low-flying markers.
The destruction of towns and cities behind the actual battle-front will have a direct effect upon the results of the hard battles which the ground forces will have to undertake soon. The enemy will be denied the use of his most essential means of transport, shelter for his reserves, and what remains of his armament production in the previously attacked areas. To achieve this, all Air Bomber must make sure that their bombs hit the areas they are intended for, and that means constant practice, a thorough knowledge of all equipment, and the ability to conform strictly to the plan of attack.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
Although the amount of practice bombing has increased considerably during the past six months, there is still a large number of details being cancelled because of snags which could have been avoided.
Now that the winter months are approaching, and opportunities for bombing will decrease, it is essential that the best advantage be taken of every chance to complete an exercise.
Quite a large number of faults which cause an abandonment of an exercise could have been prevented if the air bomber had thoroughly checked his equipment before take-off.
First of all make certain that the auto-selector box on the Light series carrier has been reset to No.1. The ground crew will usually attend to that, but there are occasions when it has been missed.
Examine the bombs and change any that have damaged tail fins. At the same time see that the safety pins have been withdrawn.
Test your bombsight on the ground and make sure that you have an emergency computor [sic]. In the event of a bombsight failure you can still derive some benefit from the exercise.
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
The provision of Bombing Analysis Officers on Squadrons and Conversion Units has proved of great value during the past few months, ensuring speedy
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assessment of exercises and the abolition of inevitable errors which occurred when Bombing Leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to this very important duty.
However, there are still one or two points not receiving the attention required:-
(i) Crews must be given a detailed analysis of their exercises. It is not always possible to have the Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber present during the actual analysis, but they should see the plot as soon as possible.
(ii) Form 3073 must be completed, and the details supplied must be accurate. It will then afford the Analysis Officer, and the Bombsight Maintenance Staff, the maximum amount of assistance. It should be possible for the Squadron Commander to pick up a Form 3073 relating to an analysed exercise and thereby obtain a complete account of the bombing and any relevant comments from the Bombing Leader.
(iii) Do not forget that new crews have had very little experience in bombing from a Lancaster, and an accurate analysis will be of the greatest assistance to them.
(iv) When a bombsight fault has been discovered, inform the Instrument Section [underlined] immediately, [/underlined] and give them all the information you can. If necessary, produce the bomb plot and explain the errors. The Bombsight maintenance staff will appreciate all the assistance you can give them.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What action would you take if you obtained maximum starboard drift on the sighting head with zero wind set on the computor [sic]?
2. What is the procedure on landing at a strange airfield with 500 lb bombs (37 pistol) still on the aircraft?
3. Why is it essential to conform to the briefed air speed when making a “Wanganui” attack?
4. How does the Flight Engineer check the suction and what readings would you require to ensure that the bombsight was serviceable?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Mansbridge [/underlined] has left Group Headquarters and is now on a Staff Officers’ Course.
[Underlined] F/Lt Abbott [/underlined] (49 Squadron) is carrying out Group Bombing Leader’s duties.
[Underlined] S/Ldr Murtough [/underlined] (53 Base) has gone to Manby to take charge of the Bombing Leaders’ Courses.
[Underlined] F/Lt McCarthy [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) has gone to 53 Base and has been replaced by [underlined] F/Lt Kennedy [/underlined] (463 Squadron)
[Underlined] F/O Grime [/underlined] is doing Bombing Leader’s duties at 463 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt Harris [/underlined] (5 L.F.S.) has met with an unfortunate accident, and [underlined] F/O Wilkie [/underlined] (1661 C.U.) has taken over the Bombing Section at Syerston.
[Underlined] COURSES [/underlined]
The Group had three Air Bombers on No.91 Bombing Leaders’ Course, F/O Moreton (106 Squadron) was 6th, P/O Muhl (207 Squadron) 8th, and F/O Pyle (1661 C.U.) 10th, all obtaining “B” categories.
The bombing analysis courses are proceeding satisfactorily, and our
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candidates have all received excellent assessments. If any Squadron or Conversion Unit has not appointed a Bombing Analysis Officer who has completed the course, please apply for an early vacancy.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 97 61 yards
2nd 630 64 yards
3rd 619 71 yards
4th 83 74 yards
5th 467 77 yards
6th 207 81 yards
7th 9 89 yards
8th 49 90 yards
9th 463 93 yards
10th 61 113 yards
11th 44 114 yards
12th 50 117 yards
13th 57 118 yards
14th 122 yards
September has produced a 100% entry in the Squadron Bombing Competition and 97 Squadron are at the top with an average error, for 8 exercises, of 61 yards.
This is an excellent result and 97 are to be congratulated, more especially as quite a lot of their bombing was carried out by Flight Engineers.
With the exception of 619 Squadron, 52 Base have slipped down the ladder, but assurances have been received from 44 and 49 Squadrons that this is only a temporary lapse, and every effort will be made to return to their former positions.
106 Squadron are handicapped by having many unexperienced crews on their strength and consequently are at the bottom of the list. However, the keenness which is apparent on the station is sure to produce better results.
Competition should be very keen during October; 97 Squadron will be ‘all out’ to keep on top, and it will need a very special effort from the “Main Force” to depose them. Given suitable weather, all records should be broken.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1654 56 yards
2nd 1660 65 yards
3rd 1661 72 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 85 yards
1661 Conversion Unit, after leading for two successive months, have gone down to third place, and 1654 Conversion Unit have taken over the top position with an average error of 56 yards.
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
The only entry this month comes from 51 Base:-
G/Capt Coats (Swinderby) – 103 yards
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has only produced one entrant also:-
F/Lt Foulkes (630 Squadron) – 158 yards
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[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Errors by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
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[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
Wainfleet plotted 4945 bombs and 111 T.I’s dropped from 921 aircraft.
It is obvious that the Range staff have had a busy time, and to ensure accurate plotting, crews must conform to range procedure.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Wonham [/underlined] (55 Base) extends a hearty welcome to 44 and 619 Squadrons. The rivalry between the Squadrons, on Practice Bombing matters, is very keen and errors have shown a steady decrease during the past few months.
[Underlined] F/Lt Foulkes [/underlined] (630 Squadron) has equipped an excellent Bombing Analysis room. Points concerning Bombing, which need stressing, are emphasised by humorous cartoons, and the room itself is kept very clean and tidy.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
* Excluding 617 and 627 Squadrons.
A+ 85 yards or less.
A 140 yards or less.
B 210 yards or less.
C 280 yards or less.
D Over 280 yards.
The number of “D” category crews has decreased from 41 in August, to 15 for this month. This is a considerable improvement, but it is not good enough – there should be no “D” crews on an Operational Squadron, and Bombing Leaders must give careful attention to these errors.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
9 F/O Marsh F/O Carr - 78
44 P/O Evans Sgt Harper F/S Hunter 73
49 F/O Furber F/S Gentleman F/O Hassell 75
50 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 79
97 F/O Woolnough W/O Shearwood F/O Haggerston 57
F/L Shorter F/S Betts P/O Aveline 57 – 79
467 F/O Jones F/S Burns F/S Michelmore 74
617 F/L Knights F/O Rogers F/O Playford 74
F/O Levy F/S Peck F/O Fox 78
F/O Stout F/O Rupert F/O Graham 59
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard F/S Fish 70
F/L Hamilton F/O Rogers P/O Jackson 72
F/O Leavitt Sgt Oldham F/O Withams 73
619 F/O Cottman F/S Coster F/S Murray 71
1654 F/O Gray F/O Aitken Sgt Adams 62
F/O Denton F/O Goebel Sgt Kneebone 77
F/O Brammer Sgt White W/O Davies 69
P/O Dockworth F/S Quealy F/S Kenward 43
F/O Langridge F/O Cavanagh F/S Diggins 65
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OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS (continued)
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
1660 P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowen Sgt Ransom 56
Sgt Sargent Sgt Walters F/S Symes 67
Sgt Keen Sgt Hurst Sgt Fidler 62
Lt Evenson Sgt BJorcy P/O Carling 61
P/O Penman F/S Dash P/O Pointon 78
F/S Cox F/S Smitherwaite Sgt Taylor 68
F/O Downing F/O Harrison P/O Semark 64
Lt Howes Sgt Johnston F/O Butterfield 78
1661 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 78
F/O James Sgt Longhurst P/O Jeffreys 70
F/O Gillegin Sgt Jenden Sgt Elliott 58
P/O Smith F/S Scott F/O Sweeney 77
F/O Caryer F/O Arnett P/O Grassie 71
5 L.F.S. P/O Aryton Sgt Herkes F/S Bardsley 65
P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowers Sgt Ransom 78
Owing to the large number of crew errors below 100 yards, it is only possible to publish those below 80 yards. Congratulations are due to F/L Shorter and crew (97 Squadron), F/S Wonders and crew (50 Squadron) and P/O Le Marquand and crew (now of 49 Squadron) for their consistently good bombing during the month.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” BOMBING TROPHY [/underlined]
The “Lord Camrose” trophy remains at Skellingthorpe for another three months.
50 Squadron’s average crew error for the months of July, August and September is 148 yards at 20,000 feet. Well done 50 Squadron!
463 Squadron are the runners up with an average error of 153 yards at 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The complete summary of practice bombing results for the month of September provides some very interesting facts and comparisons.
The number of bombs dropped is the best ever, and 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their magnificent effort in dropping 789. However, it will be noted that 61 Squadron dropped only 96 and assuming the Squadron strength to be 25 crews, that gives an average of 4 bombs per crew for one month. This compares unfavourably with the other Squadrons in the same Base, and it is essential that crews have the maximum amount of bombing training permitted by operational commitments and weather conditions.
Crew errors have declined slightly this month, the average being 9 yards less than that of August. This is a step in the right direction and it is hoped that there will be a steady reduction in errors until we can get our average error down to less than 150 yards. It can be done, 50 Squadron have proved it by obtaining an average crew error of 148 yards for the last three months.
The number of bombsight errors has increased from 42 in August to 90 in September, but the proportion of bombsight errors to exercises completed remains the same. Close co-operation between the Bombing Analysis Officer and the Instrument Section will help to bring bombsight serviceability up to a satisfactory level.
Our practice bombing has improved considerably during the past six months, from 275 to 183 yards at 20,000 feet and this improvement is apparent in the results of the attacks on German targets. However, it is possible to reach an even higher standard of accuracy but it means constant practice on the part of every member of the bombing team.
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[Drawing] NAVIGATION
Almost all attacks this month have been on German objectives and navigators have done a good job on these longer range targets. Radar restrictions have necessitated flying considerable distances outside Gee range, and with winter approaching we must be prepared to fly even greater distances on D.R. alone. To achieve the high standard of navigation necessary for correct timing at the target, your D.R. navigation must be as sound and as complete as possible.
Mathematical accuracy, constant checking of D.R. positions and constant w/v checks, are the keynote of efficient D.R. navigation. Unfortunately very few navigators comply with all these points, and cases still occur of navigators not obtaining one D.R. position between their last Gee fix and the target.
Timing has been stressed frequently but on the coming long range operations it will be of paramount importance. By comparing forecast winds with winds found it is nearly always possible after the first hour’s flying to tell whether the aircraft will arrive at the target on time or not. If no moveable zero hour is being employed, then the earlier you can adjust your air speed, the easier it will be for you to arrive at the target at your scheduled time. During the winter months of last year it was not unusual to experience a spread of 15 – 20 minutes in the time over the target or along the route. With the concentration of enemy defences YOU CANNOT afford to fly in a bomber stream some 60 miles in length.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity scheme has not been used this month. Crews detailed to find correct bombing winds have put in some very good work, however, particular mention being due to 49 Squadron on the night 26/27th (Karlsruhe).
[Underlined] EXAMPLE OF GOOD “PILOT” NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
On the night of 27/28th September, 1944 (Kaiserlauten) F/O Nunns, Pilot of 630 Squadron gave an excellent example of “Pilot” Navigation. His aircraft was hit by flak on the return journey when some 150 miles inside France. He ordered the crew to abandon aircraft and was about to bale out himself when he managed to regain control. He decided to bring the aircraft back to base himself. Levelling out the aircraft and putting in “George” he went back to the navigator’s compartment and studied the log and chart carefully. From the information on the chart he was able to ascertain the aircraft’s present approximate position, and from the flight plan the courses to steer to reach base and the times on each leg. He flew the courses stated for the requisite amount of time and (strangely enough!) reached the base area. He was able to identify the beacons en route from the navigator’s flimsy and was thus able to “map read” the last few miles to base by this method.
This was a great effort and praise is due to both the pilot and also to his navigator who must have kept a complete and tidy chart to enable F/O Nunns to reach base the way he did.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF NAVIGATORS. [/underlined]
During the month of August it was decided to categorise navigators. Navigation does not lend itself easily to categorisation, mainly because it is impossible to lay down a procedure which will cater for every eventuality. It therefore will depend upon common sense and judgement of navigation officers.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
It is essential that all navigator’s operational logs and charts are thoroughly analysed immediately after each raid, and the results of that analysis made known to the navigation team as soon as possible, so that mistakes made will not be repeated. The analysis of logs and charts has always been the responsibility of Station and Squadron Navigation Officers; the present frequency of operations makes this an impossible task. It has therefore been decided to appoint one Navigation Analysis Officer to each Squadron, whose whole time duty it will be to analyse very thoroughly each log and chart.
By these appointments it is hoped to bring to light the errors and omissions of each navigator within 24 hours of completing a sortie. The Station Navigation Officer will thus be able to point out to each Navigator the “error of his ways” immediately, and will thus ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
Navigation Officers have a very big job in front of them and much hard work will be required.
[Underlined] APPROACH OF WINTER – WHAT IT MEANS! [/underlined]
Apart from all the well-known discomforts, the approach of winter means that OLD MAN WIND – the Navigator’s greatest enemy – will start hitting out again in force and will do all he can to land you in mischief. Low pressure systems are more prevalent in winter time, and therefore stronger winds have to be combated. Longer range targets means passing over territory which cannot at the moment, be too well explored by the Met. man, therefore you may pass over a front with a consequent wind change or run into a low pressure system which has not been forecast by the Met. Section. All this means that every individual Navigator must have a very thorough understanding of wind system. He must be able to interpolate for wind changes and must anticipate any sudden change of wind velocity. In last month’s summary attention was drawn to the Berlin raid of last Winter. We do not want this to happen again.
Get to know the wind system; visit the Met. man regularly and discuss the subject with him. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers should arrange constant lectures on this subject for the benefit of their Navigators. Wind is your biggest enemy.
[Underlined] O.R.S. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
A word about the O.R.S. information which is taken from you at interrogation. Numerous instances are occurring of incorrect information being forwarded to Group Headquarters. For example, an aircraft’s position is given as 4720N when it should be 4920N. These inaccuracies are obvious but other smaller inaccuracies are not so obvious. The concentration diagrams prepared from this information do not present a true picture of the situation, also many statistics prepared by O.R.S. are equally inaccurate and are therefore of no value.
All this O.R.S. information is collected and collated for your benefit and ultimate safety so do make sure that you give the CORRECT information and SEE that the Interrogator logs it correctly.
[Underlined] ATTACK ON TIRPITZ. [/underlined]
Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons had an opportunity during the month of showing their skill as “real” Navigators. The occasion was the attack on Tirpitz in Northern Waters and the landing at advanced bases in Russia. This operation, undertaken under difficult weather conditions and in total darkness, called for a very high standard of Navigation. It was anticipated that Gee would be received as far as 63° or 64°N; this was in fact correct. The remaining 1,000 miles over enemy occupied territory and enemy waters had to be tackled without the aid of Radar fixing facilities. Map reading was of course the most accurate method of fixing available, but this was very difficult over mountainous country studded with lakes and rivers. Nevertheless Air Bombers did some excellent work. Good use was also made of drifts
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and astro shots. Unfortunately the low pressure system which could not be accurately positioned by Met., was encountered over the most difficult part of the route. This meant that winds became much stronger than forecast and also a considerable lowering of cloud base. Nevertheless, practically all the Navigators noted this sudden strengthening and varying of the wind velocity and were able to combat it successfully.
It was anticipated that a little trouble might be experienced with the P4 Compasses in these Northern latitudes. Every precaution was therefore taken before the aircraft left this country, compasses were swung and as much deviation was removed before take-off for this operation. It was gratifying to note, however, that not one single instance of compass failure or excessive deviation occurred.
The Air Bombers and Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons did an excellent job on this operation, under the most difficult conditions. They brought back with them much valuable information on the performance of compasses, Northern chain Gee range at varying heights etc. – information which will be of considerable importance in the planning of future operations.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING W/VS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is shown below.
Average Error of Squadrons – 4.7
Average Error of C. Units – 5.0
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1.8 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.6 m.p.h. This is excellent and the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h. has been reached. Let us now try and reduce this ideal over-all to 4 m.p.h.
[Table of Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the fourth month is succession. A very creditable performance. There still appears to be little improvement in the errors obtained by the three Squadrons from 54 Base. Come along now, let us see them at the top of the list next month.
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[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. Mould, DFC – Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to be Base Nav. Officer, Syerston.
S/Ldr. Bray, DFC – Station Nav. Officer, Dunholme to be Station Nav. Officer, Strubby.
S/Ldr. Warwick, DFC – Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby missing on operations.
[Cartoon] “HERE IS THE BOMBING WIND – AND THIS IS P/O VECTOR READING IT!”
N.M.
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[Drawing] RADAR NAV.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The most outstanding feature regarding 2 S this month has been the severe restrictions placed upon its use for operations.
It is realised that with these restrictions of H 2 S, navigation is bound to suffer slightly, particularly during the autumn months as no one can be too certain of the ranges on Gee. Operators must therefore make the best of the limited use of H 2 S on each operation. This Headquarters will welcome any ideas on how to obtain maximum efficiency from H 2 S during the limited periods it is available.
There are one or two points regarding the restrictions which must be stressed at the present time. Firstly, operators, if they are allowed to use H 2 S on any part of the flight, must make sure that it is switched on below 6,000 feet or else circuit breakdowns may occur. Secondly, close watch must be maintained on the scanner position when turned off, as wander is likely particularly during tactical manoeuvres.
It must be pointed out that despite restrictions on H 2 S on operations, no relaxation in training can be allowed and every effort must be made to see that operators remain proficient in its use. Experiments are being carried out to develop some kind of sector scan and if successful, operators may be able to make use of H 2 S throughout the whole flight. Sector scan requires a high standard of proficiency in H 2 S particularly in the interpretation of the P.P.I., and although training in sector can cannot be given at the moment, operators may do well to bear the problem in mind.
Experiments are also going ahead with the Mark II H 2 S scanner to try and improve the bombing picture on the P.P.I. This is being done by altering the pitch of the scanner to concentrate the beam and alter the polar diagram. If successful it may be possible to modify other Mark II equipment gradually. This will only be done if the range is not seriously restricted and its navigational use is not affected.
Blind bombing technique in the Group has developed further in the past few weeks and considerable success has been obtained by 83 and 97 Squadrons on the last few operations. To indicate the high standard which these two Squadrons have attained, a resume’ of their flare and blind marking errors on operations is given.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 26/27 AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
This was the first operation on which the specially selected H 2 S Mark III equipment was used and F/Lt. Baker, Blind Marker crew of 97 Squadron dropped his marker 400 yds. south of the Aiming Point. Had the whole attack been based on this marker it might have been slightly more successful.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 29/30th AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
An extremely successful operation with the centre of the blind illuminating flares being plotted extremely close to the centre of the town. The blind proximity marker released by a crew of 97 Squadron was reported 600 yds. south of the aiming point although no photograph was obtained.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. 11/12th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
An excellent operation with highly successful blind illumination
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provided by 83 and 97 Squadrons. The direct release method of marking and blind bombing was used and photographs gave the following results:-
F/O TAYLOR 97 SQUADRON AIMING POINT.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O EATON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/LT. BAKER 97 SQUADRON 1.75 n.m.
[Underlined] STUTTGART. 12/13th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Blind marking was carried out by the direct release method with a G.P.I. check from PFORZHEIM. The following successful results were obtained:-
F/LT. AMES 97 SQUADRON 600 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,000yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. SHORTER 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds From Town Centre.
F/O. SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. LAING 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18/19th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A most successful sortie. Of the Primary Blind Markers F/Lt. Kelly of 83 Squadron dropped his T.Is. 500 yds. from the Aiming Point whilst F/Lt. Laing and F/Lt. Lines of 97 Squadron both had errors of less than 1 nautical mile. The Flare Force too was remarkably accurate, illuminating the target area to such effect that the Mosquito aircraft had no difficulty in marking the Aiming Point. The Flare Force photographs showed that F/O Gamble, 83 Squadron, F/O Price, 83 Squadron and F/O Canever of 97 Squadron had Aiming Points, whilst S/Ldr. Hatcher had an error of 1,400 yds.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH 19/20th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Technical failures prevented the plotting of many flare force photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows considerable damage in the target area, proving that the flare force illumination was of its usual high order.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE. [/underlined]
Cloud prevented the plotting of photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows very extensive damage in the most closely built up area of the town. P.P.I. photographs indicate that the accuracy of the blind markers was to the order of 1,000 yds. and 400 yds. respectively.
[Underlined] KAIDERSLAUTERN. [/underlined]
Using the direct release method with a G.P.I. check on SAABRUCKEN, W/C. Ingham of 83 Squadron dropped his flares 1,500 yards, F/Lt. Edwards, 83 Squadron 1.3 miles and F/O Simpson 1.25 miles respectively from the flare aiming point. By this illumination, the low level Mosquitos were able to mark the target accurately.
Great credit is due to the two marking Squadrons for the success obtained on these operations. The majority of the results were obtained on the specially selected and tuned up sets thus proving that not only have crews to be selected, but also the equipment. In addition, the results have been obtained only through particularly extensive training, and the enthusiasm of the crews carrying it out.
If we are to maintain these excellent results, the two squadrons must be provided with crews of a suitable type; Crews selected are carrying on high tradition and are directly responsible for the success of all future operations.
[Underlined] P.P.I. PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
The standard of P.P.I. photography has been raised slightly during the month and several good photographs have been received at this Headquarters. F/Lt. Dobbie of 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph
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of KAISERLAUTERN when on the operation to KARLSRUHE. This was of considerable assistance to set operators in their identification of this target on a later raid.
Very little gardening has been carried out this month. But so far the results received are up to the usual 5 Group standard. A paper on the plotting od H 2 S mining photographs has been received and copies are being sent to the gardening squadrons for their attention. This report supplements the report S.121 on the plotting of “Y” photographs and is based on data from No. 4 and 6 Groups who have carried out the majority of H 2 S gardening sorties.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Increased importance has been placed on the use of Gee this month due to the restrictions placed on the use of H 2 S. Thus the necessity for that very last fix is again well to the forefront. Operators must make every effort to read through the jamming and make maximum use of position lines where fixes cannot be obtained.
On the majority of operations during the month a considerable increase in ranges have been noticed due to the swift advance of the allied armies, capturing large areas of country in which Gee jamming equipment was sited. This at once extended the ranges obtainable over France and Belgium to the limits of the territory held, but no marked improvement was shown further north where enemy interference in Holland and N. West Germany, though varying in intensity from day to day, was nearly always at maximum intensity when heavy bombers were operating.
On the Eastern Chain it has been noted that the enemy has transferred a considerable amount of his jamming to the 27 unit and that greater range is being obtained on the Unit 25. Weakness of pulses only restricts range on the Unit 25.
The average range on the North Eastern Chain has been stabilised at about 6°E with the limiting factor being the weakness of the “A” pulse.
The Southern Chain appears to be giving the best results now that German jamming has ceased with fixes as far as 7°E. These ranges may drop during the Autumn due to meteorological conditions. The limiting factor on this chain appears to be the weakness of the “C” pulse.
There have been few reports on the Channel chain, but it would appear that the limits of its coverage are between 5 and 6° with little jamming. The general complaint on the use of this chain are that the topographical lattice maps suppled are unsuited for heavy bomber navigation.
Two Squadrons had the opportunity of using the Northern Chain at its extreme limits this month. The flight was carried out at low level and signals were received as far as 64 °N, but the small cut of the lattice lines did not enable fixes to be plotted accurately at that range. These results were as much as expected, and confirm the reports of Costal [sic] Command who do the most flying in that area.
The low level at which we are now flying over France may restrict Gee range somewhat but it is thought that the short ranges obtained by navigators on the operation on KAISERLAUTERN was due to the poor propagation properties of the atmosphere. These properties are most noticeable during the months of October and November, and it may well be that our Gee range on the present chains may be restricted to 5°E throughout these months.
However, to counteract this we have news of further chains which are being provided on the Continent and as soon as information is received at this Headquarters it will be passed to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Tests are still being carried out by Bomber Command as to the suitability of the use of the Homing and S.S. Chains for Bomber Command Navigation.
Until the results of these tests are known no action is being taken regarding the training of navigators.
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[Drawing] ENGINEERING
Large number of movements have taken place or about to take place which are liable to upset calculations, but it is apparent that the operational effort has not suffered as a result. 52 Base is about to leave the Group complete with R.A.F. Stations, Scampton, Fiskerton and Dunholme. The good work which we associate with such stations will now be associate with other stations within the Group. 55 Base now comprises as many squadrons as 53 Base, i.e. five full squadrons each, and No. 5 L.F.S., Syerston, comes within a Base Organisation.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL DEFECTS. [/underlined]
The operational effort was not quite so high as the previous month, but the aircraft were available had the weather given us a fair chance. The percentage of operational failures due to Engineer faults was 0.94 which is an improvement on the previous months. Out of this total, 0.24% were abortive sorties and 0.7% were early returns. Special mention must be made to No. 54 Base as a whole and they are given the ‘Big Hand’ for producing the record of having no operational failures due to matters concerning the Engineers during September. 49 Squadron also are to be congratulated for similar reasons.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE – 5 GROUP SERVICING SECTION [/underlined]
Appreciation of the efforts of No. 5 Group Servicing Section is recorded and the good work which is carried out by them under very often difficult conditions. C.T.O’s should realise the personal problems and difficulties of these mobile parties which are moved about at a moment’s notice to wherever the ‘shoe pinches’ within the Group. The sum total of the work carried out by these few men during the last four months comprises eight Major Inspections, thirty initial checks and 120 rebuilt power plants. During September two gangs were in operation as Major Inspection gangs solely for the first time, and their activities within the Group are apparent. Apart from the above work, four base hydraulic bays have been completed, two during the last four months. The instrument personnel have built and installed 110 second pilot’s instrument panels in Stirling aircraft of Conversion Units during the last three months.
[Underlined] FORMS 765C. [/underlined]
The remarks by the Specialist Officer concerned at para. 11 of the 765C are still far too brief and in many cases incomplete, and invariably give no indication whether relevant modifications are embodied or not. It is pointed out once more that care and thought in rendering Forms 765C will prove of assistance in attempting to establish the cause of failures and recommending action for preventing recurrences of such failures.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
Bombsight maintenance continues at a high standard throughout the Group, and accuracy of a high order is being achieved, mainly due to the effective liaison existing between Electrical Officers and Bombing Leaders. Bombing Analysis courses are now open to Base Electrical Officers, and two have, up to the time of writing, completed the course. The course has proved very valuable in assisting Electrical Officers in diagnosing the causes of bombing errors, particularly instrument errors, and we can now look forward to an even higher standard of accuracy. As it will be a long time before all Electrical Officers will be able to attend the course Base Electrical Officers should instruct their junior officers in the art of analysing a bombing plot.
Mk.XIVA bombsights are now arriving in large numbers and the Group Instrument Servicing Van is having a busy time in instructing personnel in
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the differences between the XIV and the XIVA. The new computor [sic] is not all that could be desired, the great majority of them (about 95%) needing retuning or the replacing of defective parts, and are generally requiring about twice the number of man hours to rectify. The matter has been taken up with higher authority and it is hoped that results of our ‘moans’ will soon be evident. In the meantime a thorough check must be given to every computor [sic] and 1022 action taken in every case of faulty design, or workmanship.
A word or two regarding defect action would not come amiss. Far too many defective items of equipment are being returned to stores without 1022 or 1023 action being taken. It must be impressed again on all officers that it is only by taking the correct official procedure that rectification action can be taken. It is of no earthly use just to tell the Group Specialist Officer that such and such is giving trouble if there is no 1022 backing. The Group Specialist Officer of course wants to know what is giving trouble but any report that he may make will be shot down if it is not supported by a 1022. A case in point concerns the low insulation of gun heaters. Only two cases have been reported to Command out of the hundred or so which have occurred. So let us have some more 1022’s.
After putting in a considerable amount of work in their respective sections the Electrical and Instrument personnel of 52 Base have had to evacuate their quarters and move to Syerston and start again from scratch. No doubt their experience will serve them well in producing even better sections.
Command Modification No. 74 is now completed throughout the Group and a word of praise must be given to those men who formed the Group pool to produce the modified bomb aimer’s panels. They worked long hours and did an excellent job of work. All Bases were represented so they will each have a good man to start their own modification gang cracking.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Training Unit Serviceability]
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Many applications have been made in the past by Flight Engineers to change over to Transport Command; This Command is now prepared to accept Flight Engineers for flying duties provided they have completed two operational tours and one tour of instructional duties. Flight Engineers who are eligible should make application through the usual channels at their unit.
Log keeping has improved throughout this Group, but it is noticed that many engineers do not record atmospheric temperatures and airframe serial letter and numbers; this has been pointed out before. Flight Engineer Leaders must insist that this omission is remedied.
Defect reports still come through showing the cause as manipulation trouble on the part of the Flight Engineer, in many cases these result in a cancellation or early return. Points for the Flight Engineer Leader to instruct on are as follows:-
[Underlined] Starter Motor burnt out: [/underlined] if correct drill had been used this would have been avoided.
[Underlined] Overheating of Engines: [/underlined] early returns are made because of supposed overheating; on examination, these temperatures prove to be within the engine limitations.
[Underlined] Misbehaviour of Engines: [/underlined] black smoke from exhaust; on this trip other crews reported same conditions but attributed this to atmospheric conditions on flying through cloud. Had this Flight Engineer checked all his gauges he would have been able to inform his Captain that engines were quite normal and this early return would have been avoided.
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[Drawing] AIR SEA RESCUE
With the liberation of countries in Western Europe, the flow back to England of aircrew who have been shot down is increasing – not only in numbers, but in speed. It is strongly rumoured that one, who was shot down on the outward trip, managed, with the assistance of a jeep and a flip from Paris, to arrive back before the Main Force!
These evaders tell amazing stories – some are good and reveal level-headedness, fine crew discipline and a sound knowledge of Safety Drills. Others are the reverse, and the following extracts from reports by 5 Group aircrew tell their own story.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 6th June, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “We’ve been hit kids, get out”.
“My parachute was only fixed by the right buckle”.
“Informant had known for some time that the left clip was loose, but had neglected to have it repaired”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 24/25th July, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “Get to Hell out of this as quickly as possible”.
“The informant did not leave his turret (Mid-Upper) very speedily as he experienced some difficulty in locating the footbar”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 3/4th May, 1944. [/underlined]
“The W/Op noticed as he passed, that the Navigator’s altimeter was reading 1,000 feet. He therefore pulled his rip cord while still in the aircraft. He gathered the canopy in his arms and went out head first, receiving a kick on the behind from the pilot”.
[Cartoon] DO YOU KNOW YOUR DRILLS? – OR DO [underlined] YOU [/underlined] HAVE TO BE KICKED OUT?? N.M.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 7/8th August, 1944. [/underlined]
“The Mid Upper Gunner was moving so quickly that he overshot the exit and fell against the rear turret. He returned with some difficulty to the exit, which he opened. He then took his parachute from his stowage and fastened it on”.
“The pilot had to go back from his seat for his parachute which the Navigator had failed to give him”.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR ESCAPE HATCH! [/underlined]
There have been too many incidents where the front hatch has
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jammed or taken a long time to open. The Air Bomber’s pre-flight drill calls for a check on this hatch. A check does not mean that the Air Bomber looks to see that the hatch is there, but means that he is to check its ease of release and that it is correctly fastened afterwards.
The parachute drill (5 Group Aircraft Drills) states that the hatch is to be JETTISONED, not pulled up inside the aircraft where it is liable to obstruct the exit.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR PARACHUTE! [/UNDERLINED]
An unfortunate incident occurred during the month when a Hurricane Pilot, not wearing his own parachute, collided with a Martinet and was forced to abandon his aircraft.
The pilot did not get clear until he was at about 3,000 ft. and, although he pulled the rip cord immediately, he was killed on impact with the ground.
An examination of the parachute harness also showed that it was far too loose for the wearer.
Each member of air-crew flying fighters or bombers, must check his parachute for serviceability and fitting before every flight.
[Underlined] EVASION [/underlined]
No less than 25 aircrew of No. 50 Squadron, missing since the beginning of May, are reported to have evaded capture and returned safely to this country.
Successful evasion depends upon:
(i) Your will to evade.
(ii) Your physical fitness.
(iii) An up to date knowledge of the military situation.
(iv) the latest advice which your Intelligence Officer will give you.
Consider these things beforehand and avoid Dulag Luft.
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[Drawing] PHOTOGRAPHY
The total number of failures on Night Photography has decreased to 5.93%. Failures on Day Photography amount to 4.07%. The decrease over the previous month in respect of Night Photography has occurred chiefly on the Armament side. The prevailing target conditions, when smoke from incendiary loads obscured the target, has made it impossible in many cases to determine whether a flash has or has not exploded correctly. This is a recurrence of conditions which existed during last winter. Manipulation failures have shown an increase in the last two months, in 83 and 97 Squadrons. In the past this type of failure has been very low in this Group, and it is to be hoped that the steps now being taken by the Bombing Leaders will eliminate them in these two Squadrons.
The supply of High Speed Night Film has now materially increased and Squadrons are to use this film on all operations. In view of the fact that we are now entering a period of the year when light conditions will often be poor, the use of this film will help to ensure sufficient exposure. It will, of course, save a lot of magazine reloading.
The supply of H 2 S cameras has grown considerably during the past month and promises to continue doing so. These cameras are not constructed for service work or to be handled by service personnel; great care will therefore have to be exercised in the handling and operating of them. A number of H 2 S photographs received have been unsharp and sometimes of poor quality. This poor workmanship will have to be remedied and a special effort by Photographic N.C.O’s in this direction is required.
No. 5 Group Headquarters now hold a K.20 camera for use on hand held obliques. Any station requiring the use of this camera is to inform the Group Photographic Officer who will make arrangements for the camera to be forwarded. Two days’ notice will be required.
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[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
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[Drawing] ARMAMENT
[Underlined] WINTER [/underlined]
Once more the annual reminder which you are no doubt tired of hearing, but a warning which must be even more carefully heeded this year than ever before.
Listed below are a few points which will require your personal attention during the coming months if an increase in failures is to be avoided.
[Underlined] Gun Heaters. [/underlined] Are all your aircraft fitted with gun heaters? The Electrical Officers are giving this matter their personal attention and the fitting of heaters is going ahead. Take a personal interest in this matter yourself, see that the Electrical Branch are given every assistance.
[Underlined] Duct Heaters. [/underlined] New aircraft are now arriving with ducted heating to both rear and mid-upper turrets. Have you any of these aircraft? If so, go and have a look at one and get the “gen” on how it works.
[Underlined] Browning Guns. [/underlined] Has your gun maintenance been allowed to slip during the summer months? If so, now is the time to tighten up. All new guns must be very carefully checked; all grease must be removed, particularly from the breach block, firing pin and spring, etc. and guns must be lubricated in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Pt.2, Section 14, Leaflet No.6, Issue No. 1.
[Underlined] Gun Covers. [/underlined] Have you an adequate supply of gun and turret covers? All Units should now have manufactured the cover for the Direct Vision Aperture in the F.N. 120. This Headquarters’ letter 634/4/Armt. dated 12th May, 1944 refers.
[Underlined] Cluster Projectiles. [/underlined] Wet Cluster Projectiles may cause functioning failures due to ice accretion on the mechanism or from rust. See that full use is made of all available tarpaulins. Recommendations have been made to Headquarters, Bomber Command for an increase in establishment of Covers, Water proof, Large and Small.
[Underlined] Bomb Trollies. [/underlined] Are all your trollies fitted with mud guards to prevent S.B.C. release slips from becoming splashed with mud and water during transportation?
[Underlined] Welfare. [/underlined] During Winter months Armourers will be working long hours in bad weather conditions. See that they are properly equipped with warm clothing, gloves, oil skins, and gum boots etc. A warm and contented man will work better than one half frozen.
[Underlined] SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS. [/underlined]
The month of September saw the return, after a long absence, of the Small Bomb Container. With the introduction of the Cluster Projectile, relief was felt by all Armament Officers as it was thought we had seen the last of the “very difficult to handle” Small Bomb Container. Unfortunately the shortage of Cluster Projectiles has necessitated our return to this item of equipment, consequently a large number of headaches have resulted.
With the introduction of the new Twin Adaptors the Incendiary load has been considerable [sic] increased and it is now possible to carry 20 S.B.C’s on the Lancaster. This increase in bomb load means that far more work is entailed in the preparation of the required number of S.B.C’s for an
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operation and it has been found necessary to seek outside labour to assist in the filling. Unfortunately it is still necessary to fill the Mk. VA. S.B.C. by hand, but small numbers of 50 pack Incendiaries are now being received and it is hoped that in the near future the boxes of 30 x 4lb. Incendiaries will entirely disappear. This step will be welcomed by all.
[Cartoon] THIS – OR THIS?? N.M.
[Underlined]
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES – HANDLING. [/underlined]
The organisation for the handling of Cluster Projectiles still requires a lot of attention on some Stations. Quantities of Roller Conveyors are now held on all Stations and this equipment, suitably raised from the ground on tail unit boxes or cluster projectile cases, provides an excellent method for the handling and fusing of cluster projectiles.
This equipment, suitably laid out, can provide multi unloading, fusing and loading points, and can cut down the man handling required to the barest minimum, and the saving in time will be considerable.
[Underlined] SALVAGE. [/underlined]
The problem of returning salvage has now become a major one, and when one considers that approximately, 4,000 boxes of 4lb. Incendiaries are thrown up from one operation on a 2 Squadron Station, it is obvious that careful attention must be given to the organisation for the return of this salvage. All 2 Squadron Station have now been supplied with additional labour kindly loaned to us by the Army. This additional labour, if correctly employed, should prevent the accumulation of any large quantity of salvage. When lorries deliver explosives to you let your motto be “They shall not return empty.”
All smaller salvage, i.e. nose plugs, transit caps from tail pistols etc., should be placed in bins and not left lying around to form a permanent menace to bomb trolley tyres. Bins are easily obtainable and sufficient should be placed in the bomb store to enable an ample supply to be available at all fusing and handling points.
[Underlined] HEAVY TYPE TRANSPORTERS. [/underlined]
There is at present a deficiency of approximately 2,500 transporters in this Group, including those sent away under Bomber Command’s instructions, for modification. Bomber Command have promised that every effort is being made to expedite the manufacture of new type heavy transporters and early issues are expected. In the meantime, continual care must be exercised in the loading of cluster projectiles on to bomb trolleys to ensure that no tail units are damaged.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BOOBS – BOMBING LEADERS PLEASE NOTE. [/underlined]
Two boobs by Air Bombers this month were responsible for complete bomb loads being returned to Base.
1. Bomb Aimer failed to fully rotate the Distributor Drum Switch with the result that no contact was made – FULL
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BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
2. Bomb Aimer set drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo” – FULL BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
Eight other manipulation failures resulted in 8 photoflashes being returned due to the Isolation switch not being made.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
Is your A.P. 2264A fully amended? If so where would you find the information on the Bomb, Smoke, Aircraft, 100 lb. Mk.1?
[Drawing] WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
TOTAL: £5,722.14s. 3d.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – Manipulation. B – Maintenance. C – Icing. D. – Technical. E – Electrical. F. – Obscure.
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[Drawing] GUNNERY
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BAG [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“E” 630 11/12 Sept. T/E
“B” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“T” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“O” 83 23rd Sept. S/E
“R” 630 23rd Sept. T/E
“U” 207 26/27 Sept. ME410
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“H” 50 11/12 Sept. ME110
“D” 207 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“X” 467 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“J” 106 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“J” 61 11/12 Sept. ME.109
“Y” 9 26/27 Sept. ME.410
Confirmation of these claims, by Headquarters Bomber Command, is awaited.
There was a total of 119 combats during the month’s operations which shows a slight increase on last month’s figure. Of these 8 are claimed as destroyed 3 as probably destroyed and 4 as damaged. The largest number of combats occurred on the night 11/12th September, when Darmstadt was the target. Out of 39 combats the Group claimed 3 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 2 damaged – an excellent return. During the month, tracer was removed from the first 300 rounds, with a view to assisting the gunner in his sighting. Reports have since been submitted by Bases, and these are now under consideration. If the test has convinced gunners that accurate shooting can only be applied through the sight, it has certainly been worth while.
Early Warning Devices, with the exception of Fishpond, have been temporarily suspended, so once again the gunner has got to rely on his ability to see under night conditions and on his mental alertness. Even with the E.W.D. several instances occurred of enemy aircraft approaching and attacking unobserved, and without the E.W.D’s we must expect more instances of this. To arm ourselves against this, we must make use of every opportunity of training under night conditions, either at night with night affiliation, or simple exercises on the ground, or by day in the Night Vision rooms. Whilst on the subject of night vision, it is painful to have to record that two instances of Lancaster firing on Lancaster were reported during the month. In each instance the aggressor was identified as a Lancaster by the gunners. It was fortunate that no serious casualties resulted from these attacks, but it does stress the fact that more aircraft recognition under night conditions is called for.
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[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred of guns being fired in dispersals and seriously damaging other aircraft. Gunners must make certain that all guns are on “SAFE” before unloading or testing.
Instructions are to be issued shortly regarding the wearing of Pilot type parachutes by rear gunners. This will come into force when sufficient quantities of this type of parachute are available.
Fighter affiliation exercises with Gyro Camera have shown a big increase on last month’s figures, and Squadrons are to be congratulated. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future, to issue an extra Gyro Camera assembly to each Squadron.
[Underlined] SQUADRON GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
9 Squadron F/Lt Gabriel
50 Squadron F/Lt Mills
61 Squadron F/Lt Glover
463 Squadron F/Lt Winston
467 Squadron F/O Ellis
44 Squadron F/Lt Clarke
619 Squadron F/Lt Waterhouse
83 Squadron S/Ldr Poole
97 Squadron S/Ldr Sherring
106 Squadron F/Lt Sullivan
617 Squadron F/Lt Armstrong
57 Squadron F/Lt Taylor
630 Squadron F/Lt Cass
207 Squadron F/Lt Wardle
49 Squadron F/Lt Wynyard
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training by Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR SEPTEMBER:- [underlined] 2535 [/underlined]
* 49 Squadron employed on special training.
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[Drawing] TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD OUTPUT [/underlined]
This was the last month of the full Summer Training Programme, and the number of crews produced was the highest on record. A total of 162 pilots (161 full crews) was posted to Squadrons and provided ample surplus for the forthcoming expansion.
Weather was patchy towards the end of the month, but despite this and some difficulties with power plants and tyres, the Stirling Conversion Units flew an average of 2,000 hours each. No. 5 L.F.S. did a total of just over 2,000 hours. The accident rate improved for the third successive month.
No.1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit is getting into its stride and flew 700 hours. The first course is due to pass out early next month. No. 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit which also formed under the control of 5 Group, made rapid progress once the Staff had the airfield to themselves. The first course enters on 7th October.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION [/underlined]
Fighter Affiliation continued to increase and 1690 B.D.T. Flight gave day and night affiliation on over 1,000 details, exercising 2450 gunners compared with 2100 for August.
Night affiliation with Hurricanes is growing from infancy into a robust child. 1690 B.D.T. Flight affiliated with 60 Squadron crews at night, exercising 120 gunners, double the total last month. The Hurricanes averaged 41 hours per aircraft.
The monthly target for night affiliation from now on is 600 details. If 300 crews do two night details each, and 9 of the 12 Hurricanes average 3 details each on approximately 21 fit nights in a month, the results will be 600 details, 1200 gunners exercised, and a figure ten-fold greater than this month!
Incidentally, 1690 B.D.T. Flight packed its bags once again, and is now located at R.A.F. Station, Metheringham.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING [/underlined]
The provision of an instructor for each Squadron, instead of instructors allocated to Bases, will give Squadrons a greater opportunity of supervising closely all new crews, and picking up any deficiencies which arise because of the shortness of the course at the L.F.S.
It is essential that Squadron Training Pilots forward their reports on new crews through the usual channels to Base Headquarters so that the Base Air Staff Officer can submit to this Headquarters at the end of each month a summary of opinion on the standard of training and points requiring attention. 10 and 20 sortie checks are essential for all crews in Squadrons throughout the Group, and Squadron Training Pilots are to give them special attention.
No.106 Squadron now has a new function as the “Nursery” for the two P.F.F. Squadrons in 54 Base. Outstanding crews under training in 51 Base and L.F.S. are being selected for P.F.F. duties in 5 Group, and are posted to 106 Squadron for experience and training, after which they proceed to either 83 or 97 Squadron to provide the necessary experience and for supervising the new crews.
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[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base, Squadron and Conversion Unit]
GRAND TOTAL:- Pilots: 1463 hours
F/Engineers: 965 hours
There was again an increase in Link Trainer Times for the month by both Pilots and Flight Engineers. The Pilots went up by about 100 hours and the Flight Engineers by about 40 hours.
Every little helps, but 140 hours among 21 Units represents an average increase of about 7 hours per Unit.
It should be possible to increase this four-fold now that the more doubtful weather is approaching. Each Squadron in particular should get its Pilots’ Link times up to the 50/60 hour mark.
[Underlined] SPECIAL NOTE [/underlined]
Pilots and Link Trainer Instructors should take special note of the modification to topple the Artificial Horizon and spin the Directional Gyro, and make sure it is used on every exercise.
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[Drawing] ACCIDENTS
The 26 aircraft damaged during August gave us a rate of 7.3 per 10,000 flying hours, one of the best rates the Group has ever attained, and good enough to put us in second place in the Command Accident ladder.
September’s total is 23, made up as follows:- 6 Cat. AC; 5 Cat. B; 12 Cat. E. Quite a number of aircraft were damaged to a lesser extent and repaired more or less “on the spot”. They, happily, do not count against us, and the “rate” should be close to August’s good figures. Flying hours will decide.
11 of the month’s accidents were avoidable.
[Underlined] SQUADRONS: [/underlined] Overshoots landing – 2; Heavy Landings – 1; Miscellaneous – 2.
[Underlined] 51 BASE: [/underlined] Swings Landing – 2; overshoots landing – 2; Taxying – 1.
[Underlined] 1690 Flight: [/underlined] Miscellaneous – 1.
None of these accidents have any special features except perhaps the collision between a Hurricane engaged on affiliation with a Lancaster, and a Master of another Group. From details at present available the Hurricane pilot appears to have been “shooting away” the Master who was taking close an interest in the exercise. Both single aircraft engined aircraft crashed, but the Master pilot escaped by parachute. 1690 pilots take note. Extreme care is required when dealing with these other aircraft which very often have pupil pilots aboard, and do not always do what you would expect.
In addition to the accidents above, there have been 7 minor taxying accidents in the Group this month. In each instance the damage was soon repaired, but that is not the point. Each one was completely avoidable, and required a certain amount of valuable time and labour to put right. With the coming of the darker nights and poorer weather it is most important, yes, essential, that this tendency to careless taxying is stamped out. Last winter’s taxying story was a sorry tale. It must not be duplicated this year.
The period for the second award of the Silver Lancaster has just ended. As soon as all accident reports are forward the result will be published. It looks like another close race.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
The above table includes minor avoidable accidents which are not listed in the review above. The damage was Cat. A in each instance. 51 Base Units are not given STAR awards.
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SECOND THOUGHTS for PILOTS
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take your place in the drive on instrument flying. Nights grow longer and you’ll be getting both dark take-offs and dark returns.
(ii) Give yourself 5 – 10 minutes on your primary instruments – Turn and Bank, A.S.I. and Altimeter – on every N.F.T. Cover up the artificial horizon and cage the gyro.
(iii) Practice the corkscrew on instruments. Its [sic] easy to “mock up” a hood for instrument flying in day-light. Fold a map, fit it on your helmet and draw goggles on to your forehead. The goggles and strap will hold the map in place. Don’t forget to have a member of the crew keeping a look out for other aircraft.
(iv) Get your quota of Link hours in. The new device to topple the artificial horizon and spin the gyro will put you on your mettle.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take things steadily on the ground. The autumn and winter in the past have always produced a sorry tale of bogged aircraft and taxying accidents.
(ii) Look up Air Staff Instruction F.C. 24 for the duties and responsibilities of all aircrew when taxying.
(iii) Use the landing light on the Lancaster and man the Aldis light. Modifications to the landing light are under consideration in an attempt to further increase its usefulness as an aid to taxying.
(iv) Remember you get the illusion at night that you are taxying slowly when you are in fact going fast. CO-OPERATION – CAUTION – CONTROL are the three principles to apply to taxying.
[Underlined] THE LAST 100 FEET. [/underlined]
(i) Wind velocity decreases proportionately from 1,500 feet to ground level because of the friction of the ground. This is most pronounced at night.
(ii) Its [sic] possible to have a wind of gale force at 1,500 feet and dead calm at ground level at night. Its [sic] also possible for the wind direction to be 50° different between 1,500 feet and the ground.
(iii) So watch your approaches. In a very strong wind, increase your air speed by 5/10 m.p.h. and check for drift. The last 100 feet can be difficult if you don’t appreciate the circumstances.
(iv) A word on landings. Your Check Landing Card is a valuable record for [underlined] YOU. [/underlined] Don’t wait until your crew complains your landings are not too good. Inspect your Check Landing Card once a fortnight and see that it is up to date.
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[Drawing] FLYING CONTROL
This month has seen the introduction of a Bomber Command Standard Landing Procedure which aims to provide a simple and standard landing drill, and which will give reasonably good landing times. It is hoped that this procedure will be adopted by other Commands, and that it will eventually be used at every airfield in the British Isles. This Group, however, has been permitted to retain its two R/T channels of communication, and the landing procedure, previously employed by 5 Group, has been substantially modified to bring it in to line with the new Standard Procedure.
In the near future, it is hoped that a directif will be issued to all Flying Control Officers laying down a standard technique of handling aircraft. At present there are two schools of thought. One in which one officer in the Watch Office controls aircraft on both Studs ‘A’ and ‘B’. Secondly where one officer in the Watch office feeds aircraft into the circuit on Stud ‘A’ and a second officer controls aircraft on Stud ‘B’, and gives instructions where necessary should aircraft be too closely or too loosely spaced. Trials are at present being carried out on both these schemes and the details will be issued on which scheme proves itself to be the safest and most efficient.
One word here about flying discipline. At some stations in the Group, breaches of flying discipline in the circuit are reports to Squadron Commanders, who take immediate action with the aircrew concerned. No matter how good or how safe a landing procedure might be, if crews don’t play fair and obey instructions to the letter then one might just as well give up the idea of trying to speed up the rate of landing, and at the same time maintain an adequate safety margin. If every crew takes its turn, plays fair and used its common-sense it will be landed within the minimum time and with perfect safety.
[Underlined] Marking Circuit Points. [/underlined]
It is appreciated that in the past there has been some difficulty in determining when an aircraft exactly reaches the various points of call around the circuit. The problem of marking these points to suit all runways is not an easy one, and several experiments have been carried out as yet with little success. It is hoped, however, that the end is now in sight and that very soon “call-up” and “check” points for use with every runway will be marked around the circuit.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
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[Drawing] EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] UNIT RETURNS. [/underlined]
Cases have occurred where serviceable equipment returned to the U.E.D. has arrived in an unserviceable state. In most cases the cause has been careless packing. Equipment Officers should realise that this almost amounts to sabotage as not only is time and labour wasted at the receiving end, but equipment, which has taken the manufacturers valuable man-hours to make, is useless to the service until more man-hours are spent in repair.
Therefore watch this and thus save labour.
[Underlined] Q. FORM. [/underlined]
The Q Form has been amended and the old “U” has been broken down into “U.1” (awaiting spares, work held up) and “U.2” (awaiting spares but work proceeding). Up to now this Group has had a good record, so Equipment Officers should continue to keep both “U.1” and “U.2” out of the Q Form.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS. [/underlined]
Instances are still occurring where Mechanical Sweepers are unserviceable for some considerable time owing to the delay in obtaining spares. Owing to the very acute rubber shortage it is essential that runways be swept regularly. All Bases should ensure that at least one set of brushes and other frequently required spares are held, and Equipment Officers should give the subject their personal attention.
[Underlined] SURPLUS FIRE CRASH TENDER. [/underlined]
Several Bases are holding one surplus Crash Tender for use within the Group in an emergency. When this is required it is frequently found that the vehicle is unserviceable and in consequence a Station is left with only one Crash Tender standing by, which is totally inadequate. It is essential that these vehicles are kept serviceable, and all demands for spares required to render vehicles serviceable are to be sent by I.O.R. signal and hastened where any undue delay occurs.
[Page break]
[Drawing] DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. R. HARTLEY CGM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.E.P. OXBORROW DFC
F/O. B.J. DOBSON DFC
F/O. J.E. WHITE DFC
F/O. W.C. FREESTONE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L. D.R. STUBBS DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. P. AINLEY DFC
P/O. A.C. MCKELLAR DFC
SGT. L.J. CHAMPION DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. M. MCNEILL DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
S/L. H.B. LOCKE, DFC DSO
S/L. S.M.P. PARKES DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. C.W. KIPFER DFC
F/O. H.E. SAYEAU DFC
F/O. W.N. REDMAN DFC
F/L. M.H. PARRY AFC DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. R.C. DAVIE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. P.N. HERBERT DFC
F/O. F.N. CHANDLER DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/S. C.H. STEWART DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C G.W. CURRY, DFC DSO
The following NON_IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. HANCOCK DFC
SGT. T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT. J.H. MCCREERY DFM
F/O. R.W. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. P.E. PLOWRIGHT DFC
W/O. R. LAWSON DFC
F/O. S.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/O. S.J. MANCEKIVELL, DFM DFC
F/O. J.S. MIDDLETON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. N.H. STEPHENSON DFC
P/O. E.P. BURDEN DFC
P/O. J. HALL DFC
P/O. J.S. DEAN DFC
P/O. W. FARADAY DFC
P/O. R.B. FARREN DFC
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
1st Lt. J.F. STEVENS DFC
F/O. A.V. PATCHETT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. E. BERRY
F/O. J.C.D. GUTHRIE DFC
F/S. L. HOWARTH DFM
F/O. D.T. WATKINS DFC
P/O. G. EARNSHAW DFC
P/O. J.L. BENDIX DFC
W/O. G.W. MORREY DFC
P/O. J.H. COLE DFC
F/S. R. VICKERSTAFFE DFM
F/S. N.F. BACON DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/Underlined]
P/O. A.E. NICKLIN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. ANDERSON, DFM DFC
F/L. J. BREAKLEY DFC
W/O. J.A. LEWIS DFC
W/O. T. DOWYER DFC
P/O. A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/S. E.A. DAVIDSON DFM
SGT. A. KANE DFM
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[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. J. HARRISON DFM
P/O. J.H. WILKINSON DFC
F/S. H.D.K. LEWIS DFM
P/O. J.W. SCOTT DFC
S/L. W.A.G. GALLIENNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L. C.A.S. DREW, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/S. B.A. MANNING DFM
F/S. F. COOPER DFM
S/L. J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
F/L. D.H. PIDDING, D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
W/O. C.A. RUSSELL DFC
F/L. R.W. WESTON DFC
F/S. N. MACHIN DFM
F/O. O. HALLIKAS DFC
F/O. A. DRINKALL DFC
F/L. J.N.C. WRIGHT, DRF. BAR TO DFC
P/O. G.K. CHAPMAN DFC
F/S. R.C.T. LODGE DFM
P/O. M. MACDONALD DFC
P/O. W WARBURTON DFC
F/O. G.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. W.M. REID DFC
F/S. R.C. WOOLLFORD DFM
F/S. D. BOLLAND DFM
F/S. H. TOWNSLEY DFM
P/O. G.D. HOOTON DFC
F/S. K.S. RANDLE DFM
P/O. C.W. LACY DFC
F/O. J.J. ROGERSON DFC
F/L. C.W. SHIRES DFC
W/O. J.T. STANTON, DFM DFC
F/O. R.L.C. LASHAM DFC
F/S. D.P. GANNINGS DFM
F/L. T.H. MACKEPEACE DFC
F/S. R.J. BOWEN DFM
F/O. B.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
W/O. E.K. PIERCY DFC
P/O. B.F. DURRANT DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.T.H. GIDDENS DFC
F/O. R.Y. KENYON DFC
F/S. D.A. DEAR DFM
F/S. W. CHARLESWORTH DFM
F/S. K.E. BOONE DFM
P/O. F.W. BLAKE DFC
P/O. C.A. SKINNER DFC
P/O. A.W. HALLAM DFC
P/O. S. JOHNSON DFC
F/O. R.K. ESSERY DFC
P/O. S.W. CARTER DFC
P/O. J.M. DENTON DFC
F/O. R.W. JEW
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined] (Contd.)
P/O. G.V. MALON DFC
P/O. D.G.J. GRIFFITHS DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.W. MUDDLE DFC
F/O. K. SCHULTZ DFC
F/O. E.T. PICKERD DFC
SGT. A.V. WING DFM
P/O. G.F. FLANAGAN DFC
F/O. J.D.H. BILLAM DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. H.C.J. BENTLEY DFC
F/O. B. HAWES DFC
F/O. A.T. YOUDAN DFC
P/O. J. WESLEY DFC
P/O. L.S. AINSWORTH DFC
F/O. D.L. HARRIS DFC
F/O. J.S.A. MARSHALL DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. D. RODGER DFC
W/O. A. RUSHTON DFC
W/O. R. SMITH DFC
W/O. J.W. HUTTON DFC
F/O. S.R. CLARKE DFC
F/S. W. HUME DFM
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. N.D. KENNEDY DFC
F/O. K.R. MAKIN DFC
F/L. S.E.J. JONES, DFM DFC
F/S. T. FLEETWOOD DFM
F/S. P.V.J. LOWEN DFM
P/O. J.G. NOBLE DFC
F/S. T. AITKEN DFM
F/O. R.W. WOOD DFC
SGT. H. WATERSON DFM
SGT. A. MCINULTY DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. L.C.E. De VIGNE DFC
F/O. A.E. RICHARDS DFC
S/L. R.F. ELLIOTT, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O. S.F. PARLATO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. R.O. CULVERT, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/L. E.R. BUTLER, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/O, A. KUZMA DFC
P/O. D.W. ALLEN DFC
P/O. A.J. PAYNE DFC
P/O. A.J. LUCAS DFC
[Page break]
A TRIP TO RUSSIA
On the 11th September, 1944, Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons together with two Liberators attached from Transport Command, took off for YAGODNIK, an airfield near Archangel. The Liberators re-fuelled at Lossiemouth before leaving, and the hospitality extended by this Station was very much appreciated by the ground staff who were passengers in these aircraft.
The weather at first was good, but when about 150 miles from Archangel considerable low cloud and rain were encountered. Aircraft flew just above tree tops over the most desolate country imaginable – lakes, forests and swamps. Map reading was impossible; weather conditions alone made this too difficult, and in addition it was found that maps of the area were inaccurate – many villages and even railway lines being omitted.
The Archangel area was reached after about 10 hours flying, and with endurance becoming low and with no radio aids available, it was necessary for aircraft to land quickly. Some were fortunate enough to locate airfields quickly, whilst others searched through cloud and heavy rain.
Several aircraft landed at a small airfield named KEG ISLAND. Some of the crews of these aircraft originally thought they had landed at YAGODNIK and were unable to find out the whereabouts of the other aircraft. For some time they thought they were the sole survivors of the force. Later, however, all aircraft were located, though in all six had crash landed. In spite of this nobody was hurt and in the weather conditions it must be considered miraculous that no lives were lost. It was a great tribute to the skill of the pilots and navigators that so many masterly landings were made.
The Russians had originally expected some 250 guests but last minute alterations had increased this to 325. In addition, the crews of the crashed aircraft had to be located and collected from outlying districts.
In the circumstances the Russians performed wonders in giving all available help. A major diversion in this country often causes somewhat of an upheaval, but the Russians placed transport aircraft at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and even dropped a parachutist to direct the crew of one aircraft which had crash landed in a morass. In this particular case the “blind led the blind” for a while as the guide lost his way!
Eventually all crews and serviceable aircraft collected at Yagodnik where accommodation and re-fuelling facilities existed. Yagodnik is an island and is in the middle of the river Dvina, about 20 miles from Archangel It can only be reached from that city by air or river. The accommodation consisted of a paddle steamer which was moored to the river bank, and several underground huts. These huts provide warmth in winter but the absence of any kind of ventilation and the fact that a large brick fireplace forms a major part of the accommodation leads to a degree of stuffiness difficult to bear, and appears to form a breeding ground for various forms of life. The first few nights produced a large number of bug eaten victims until a form of insert [sic] killer, generously given by some American friends in the this country, was used.
Entertainment was provided by the Russians in the form of cinema shows, dances, etc., and on one occasion a lecture on a Russian composer which started 55 minutes late, lasted for 75 minutes, and was a complete mystery from start to finish to the British members of the audience.
The mush publicised football match also took place and proved a huge success. A football match in Russia produces much ceremony including the exchange of bouquets by the opposing captains before the start of game, and a tune somewhat similar to “See the conquering hero comes” has to be played each time the home team scores a goal. Apparently it is also possible for
[Page break]
the weary player to be replaced by a reserve – or was it the fear of possible repercussions that caused two members to retire from the game and be replaced by the Commanding Officer and the local Station Commander? The latter was so fed with passes by his triumphant tam that a glancing blow off his knee which scored a goal must have caused him considerable relief as it enabled the game to be continued under normal conditions! In spite of all this our Allies showed that they thoroughly understood the game and were indeed very capable players.
The major job of servicing and re-fuelling the aircraft for the operation was tackled by the maintenance crews in a whole hearted manner – they worked for 48 hours almost without a break and their keeness and cheerfulness was what one would expect of such a grand team. It was refreshing to see all trades helping where help was most needed. The following instances will give some idea of what difficulties were overcome. With bowsers available it took exactly 18 hours to re-fuel the aircraft alone. A spare engine was carried in the Liberators and as no crane was available to remove this from the aircraft, a ramp of trees with blankets on top had to be built so that the engine could be slid down.
Meantime a Mosquito had arrived in Yagodnik for P.R.U. duties and after a favourable report from the pilot the operation took place on the 15th September.
Both take off and landing were in accordance with the usual 5 Group high traditions, 28 aircraft taking off in 23 minutes and 27 landing in 30 minutes – one aircraft having flown direct to U.K.
The details of the operation are given elsewhere. As aircraft became re-fuelled and serviceable they returned to the U.K., until finally the two Liberators remained and they were held up for about a week.
While waiting for their aircraft to be re-fuelled some of the crews went into Archangel by minesweeper and were entertained by the R.A.F. Mission there. This measure of hospitality extended to them can be gained by the fact that one member on his return decided to jump in the river fully clothed, in an endeavour to return to the city. The sobering influence of the Dvina soon dissuaded him.
The final return to the U.K. was made under variable but much better conditions than the outward journey.
Finally a few impressions of this Northern outpost of the U.S.S.R. as seen in a fleeting visit may be interesting. It is of course, quite impossible to form balanced judgements, or to provide a real comparison between social and economic conditions seen in Archangel and those to which we are accustomed in Great Britain. After all, Archangel is far to the North of the vast land mass which constitutes the U.S.S.R., and was for some period cut off from the rest of Russia by the Finnish-German advances. Bearing all this in mind, it can hardly be described as a health resort. There was not a great deal of food, the clothing of the civilians was poor, and the roads, houses, sanitation and drainage, the latter where they existed, were far below anything generally to be seen in this country. However, we found that the organisation to provide the essentials of war was good, and all the technical teams we encountered were capable and willing workers. The system of privilege is apparent; extra food and clothing are the reward of rank in the armed forces and of position in civil works. But even in the inferior living conditions at Archangel we found among the Russians an intense patriotism, and a belief in the future of Russia after the war. All Russians’ energies seem directed towards the future.
Our hosts, with the limited facilities at their disposal, did all they could for our comfort, and for this we were all very grateful.
[Page break]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP NEWS” [/underlined]
The cover of this month’s News was designed by S/Ldr. N Floyd Wilson of Headquarters No. 5 Group. Each month the cover will be changed, and all artists in the Group are invited to submit specimen designs. The best design will be selected each month and will be adopted for the cover of the current issue. [/boxed]
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[Blank page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, September 1944
5 Group News, September 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 26, September 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, war effort, tactics, signals, air bombing, navigation, radar navigation, engineering, air sea rescue, photography, armament, war savings, gunnery, training, accidents, second thoughts for pilots, flying control, equipment, decorations and a trip to Russia.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
56 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-17
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Le Havre
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway--Kåfjord (Troms fylke)
Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
fuelling
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Pathfinders
petrol bowser
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator