2
25
180
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18393/PBradburyDC17010041.1.pdf
2c505736cf783a2fe2e34648ba94640d
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18393/PBradburyDC17010042.1.pdf
ce981c286973b36d0940a40b81f8ddd3
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18393/PBradburyDC17010043.1.pdf
d48b320749bc04ff2cb8efe46b902f43
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 41, 42 and 43 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Lancasters at RAF Coningsby
Description
An account of the resource
Photo 1 - inside the hangar at RAF Coningsby. Two aircraft are visible and it is annotated 'BBMF Hanger [sic] prior to the Canadian Lancaster being towed in'.
Photo 2 - a front image of a Spitfire in the hangar.
Photos 3 and 4 - Denis Bradbury chatting to the Canadian aircrew.
Photos 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 - Denis Bradbury and the Canadian aircrew receiving copies of a book. They are captioned 'Chatting to Canadian aircrew and signing complimentary copies of my book'.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Ten colour photographs on three album pages
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Royal Canadian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-09-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010041; PBradburyDC17010042; PBradburyDC17010043
aircrew
hangar
Hurricane
Lancaster
pilot
RAF Coningsby
Spitfire
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18390/PBradburyDC17010040.2.pdf
e370c1299ea886c6f414661035f31d5f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 40 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Miscellaneous photographs at RAF Coningsby
Description
An account of the resource
Photo 1 - Denis Bradbury and family at the tail of the RAF Lancaster.
Photo 2 - a view of a hangar and Spitfire across the wing of the RAF Lancaster.
Photo 3 - Denis and the Canadian pilot at the tail of the Canadian Lancaster, VR-A, captioned 'The Canadian pilot about to take me into their Lancaster'.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Three colour photographs on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Royal Canadian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-09-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010040
aircrew
hangar
Lancaster
pilot
RAF Coningsby
Spitfire
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18384/PBradburyDC17010037.1.pdf
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18384/PBradburyDC17010038.1.pdf
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18384/PBradburyDC17010039.1.pdf
bcd3141efef65694cfadb5bd5e9eafdd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pages 37, 38 and 39 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
The Canadian Lancaster
Description
An account of the resource
Photo 1 - a view of the front of the Lancaster, partly obscured by a head.
Photo 2 - the Lancaster taxing in after landing with the nose of a second Lancaster on the left.
Photo 3 - the Lancaster parked annotated 'Parked for passengers & crew to disembark'.
Photo 4 - the nose of the Lancaster annotated 'Canadian pilot just prior to disembarking'.
Photo 5 - taken under the wing of the RAF Lancaster looking to the side of the Canadian Lancaster. Ground crew are walking towards it with chocks and equipment.
Photo 6 - two photographs on the wall in the hangar.
Photo 7 - Kodak Picture CD index sheet with 39 thumbnail images.
Photo 8 - the mid-upper turret.
Photo 9 - the rear turret.
Photo 10 - captioned 'View from inside the bomb bay of hanger'.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Ten colour photographs three album pages
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Royal Canadian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-09-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010037; PBradburyDC17010038; PBradburyDC17010039
air gunner
aircrew
ground crew
Lancaster
pilot
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18383/PBradburyDC17010035.1.pdf
c682a273f4d2c0c8c21eaa0777530f4a
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18383/PBradburyDC17010036.1.pdf
dea6f916209fbab6d5e6b15ef07ae7b4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pages 35 and 36 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Inside a Lancaster again after 67 years
Description
An account of the resource
Internal images of inside the RAF Lancaster, captioned 'Last time in a Lancaster was on Thursday 20th. March 1947 flying back to Ein Shemer from Malta Now inside a Lancaster some 67 and a half years later.'
Photo 1 - the cockpit, annotated 'Pilot & Co-Pilot (Fl Engineer) seats'.
Photo 2 - annotated 'Navigator's table'.
Photo 3 -the wireless operator's station annotated 'Standing by Main Spar Radio receiver and transmitter'.
Photo 4 - looking past the wireless to the cockpit.
Photo 5 - wireless operator station, annotated 'My radio & radar position'.
Photo 6 - annotated 'Looking back from radio ops toward rear gunner'.
Photo 7 - annotated 'Way in to rear gun turret'.
Photo 8 - the front of the Lancaster with trestles and ladders annotated 'Maintenance'.
Photo 9 - bank of dials annotated 'Co-pilot's (Flight Engineer) Instrumens [sic] panel'.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Eight colour photographs on two album pages
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-09-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010035; PBradburyDC17010036
air gunner
aircrew
flight engineer
Lancaster
military service conditions
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18379/PBradburyDC17010034.1.pdf
1dded5e4f31270208d2e0b2bec6beac5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 34 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Lancaster PA474
Description
An account of the resource
Photo 1 - Lancaster PA474 on the ground undergoing maintenance.
Photo 2 - Denis Bradbury standing at the personnel ladder of Lancaster PA474.
Photo 3 - close up of Denis standing at the personnel ladder of the Lancaster.
Photo 4 - Denis standing at the tail of the Lancaster.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four colour photographs on album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-09-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010034
ground crew
Lancaster
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18378/PBradburyDC17010033.1.pdf
39e63227e4a27753aab5a3546891ec9a
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18378/PBradburyDC17010033.2.pdf
39e63227e4a27753aab5a3546891ec9a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 33 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Visit to RAF Coningsby Tuesday 16th September 2014 the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight Centre
Description
An account of the resource
A montage of four photographs and one sketch map relating to Denis' visit to the centre.
Photo 1 - an aerial photograph of Coningsby with arrows showing the location of the Main Guard Room and the arrival gate.
Item 2 - a location diagram showing RAF Coningsby and local roads from Lincoln, Boston, Grantham and Newark.
Photo 3 and 4 are of Denis and Flt. Lt. Jim Stokes at a coffee bar in the centre. Caption: 'Flt Lt Jim Stokes, who spent the day showing us around, in the squadron headquarters organising morning drinks with me.'
Photo 5 is Denis and Squadron Leader Duncan Mason at the same coffee bar. Caption: 'Talking to Squadron Leader Duncan Mason, Commanding Officer to RAF Coningsby who is a pilot and flew the Spitfire in the demonstration.'
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-09-16
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One montage of four colour photographs and one map on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Map
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-09-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010033; PBradburyDC17010034
aircrew
guard room
RAF Coningsby
Spitfire
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18377/PBradburyDC17010032.1.pdf
b2559872f78cbf35048ac64989f79da2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 32 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
Lancaster Bomber 2014 UK Tour
Description
An account of the resource
Images and text taken from http://www.warplane.com/lancaster-2014-uk-tour.aspx, referring to the visit of the Canadian Warplane Heritage Lancaster.
Also front cover of Royal Air Force Battle of Britain Memorial Flight booklet.
Includes annotation that return of Canadian Lancaster was delayed one day to Tuesday, 23 September 2014.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One printed sheet from website and front cover of booklet on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2014-08
2014-09
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC17010032
Lancaster
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1307/18376/PBradburyDC17010031.1.pdf
8f43989797a91123e15ead3cbbeafa8d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bradbury, Denis Carlos. Scrapbook
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBradburyDC1701
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
49 page scrapbook containing photographs and cuttings concerning Denis Bradbury's training, operations with 514 Squadron, his time in the Far East, and visits to see the remaining Lancasters at RAF Coningsby.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page 31 of D C Bradbury Scrapbook
RAF BBMF to host Canadian Warplane Heritage Museum Lancaster
Description
An account of the resource
RAF BBMF to host Canadian Warplane Heritage Museum Lancaster during visit to England.
Two colour photographs of Lancasters from an online source.
Photo 1 is the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight Lancaster in flight.
Photo 2 is the Canadian Lancaster in flight.
There is some information given about the visit.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
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2014-02-24
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Printout from website on album page
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eng
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Photograph
Text
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Royal Air Force
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2014-08
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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PBradburyDC17010031
Lancaster
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1236/18296/PThompsonKG15010148.1.jpg
04d9191863b0d15a2d82347d42971a3a
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Title
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Thompson, Keith G
K G Thompson
Description
An account of the resource
95 items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant Keith Thompson DFC (1238603 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents, photographs and training material as well as his navigation logs. He flew operations as a navigator with 101 and 199 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Mark S Thompson and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-09-07
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Thompson, KG
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Permission granted for commercial projects
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Keith Thompson's time as a Photographic Interpreter
Description
An account of the resource
Formal course photograph of No 87 Officer Photographic Interpreters course at RAF Wyton Sept-December 1969, three rows posed on entrance steps to the Joint School of Photographic Interpretation. Back row, M/Nav Thompson, M/Plt Garrett, Plt. Off Fawcett, Fl. Lt Walker, Fl. Lt Ludlow, Centre row, Fl. Lt. Platt, M/Plt Forrester, Fl. Lt Ballard, Fg. Off Pearson, Sgt Sandercock, Sgt Hollingshead, Fl.Lt. Porter, Fl.Lt Frost, Fl.Lt. Applegarth. Front row, Fl.Lt Wilkinson, Plt. Off Marvin, Major Kennington, C.I., Sqn. Ldr. Whiteford O.C., Fl. Lt. Oxlee Ad. O., Plt .Off Offord, Plt. Off. Barrett, Inset Capt Dixon WRAC.
Three small aerial stereo photographs annotated 'Reecce. Intelligence Centre Coningsby, July '70-Jan '72'.
Colour image of N.A.T.O. shield annotated 'I.M.S. N.A.T.O. H.Q. Brussels Jan '72-Feb '75'. Coningsby 41(F) Squadron, Feb '75-April '77. 29(F) Retired June '78'.
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Two b/w photographs on an album page
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eng
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Photograph
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PThompsonKG15010148
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Royal Air Force
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Belgium--Brussels
Great Britain
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
Belgium
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wyton
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/847/17936/PGurneyDAE1603.2.jpg
31ea303a7361a856a31f09fe238ee30e
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/847/17936/PGurneyDAE1604.2.jpg
b8c07d5adabe2330f51d7eb0adb0832a
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Title
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Gurney, Derek
Derek Alec Edwards Gurney
D A E Gurney
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Derek Gurney (1925 - 2018, 31006156 Royal Air Force) and two photographs. He served as a Halifax air gunner on 10 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Derek Gurney and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2016-01-28
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Gurney, DAE
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Derek Gurney in the tail turret of a Lancaster
Description
An account of the resource
Derek Gurney sitting in the tail turret of a Lancaster. The aircraft was inside a hangar. On the reverse 'Derek Gurney, 01/03/2017, Pictured in Lancaster rear turret at BBMF Coningsby although he was a mid-upper man on Halifax with 10 Squadron'.
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2017-03-01
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One colour photograph
Type
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Photograph
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PGurneyDAE1603, PGurneyDAE1604
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Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
2017-03-01
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
10 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
Halifax
Lancaster
RAF Coningsby
-
Dublin Core
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Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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Base [underlined] Int [/underlined]
Wadd 9
Skell 10
[Indecipherable]
Base 1
minuted
V GROUP NEWS V
APRIL 1944 [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 21
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Last month I said that it was up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that we were right in our view that night bombing could be made more accurate than day bombing. During April we have gone a long way towards furnishing the proof. The concentration of bombs which was achieved during some of the attacks, notably those on the marshalling yards at La Chappelle and Juvisy, and against some of the small aircraft factories, was outstanding, and probably represents the greatest weight of bombs in a small areas which has yet been achieved in this war.
By previous standards, therefore, our results have been excellent. But there is still much more to be done before we can afford to be satisfied. We can, however, say that the system of marking, which was pioneered by W/Cdr Cheshire and 617 Squadron, has been applied with success to larger operations, including the highly successful attack on Munich. Nevertheless, in all our attacks during April we inflicted less damage than could have been caused by the weight of bombs carried, and I want crews to think carefully over the reasons which I outline below and to take note of the remedies which are being applied.
[Underlined] Communications [/underlined]
On nearly all targets a proportion of the effort was misplaced due to a failure in communications. It is recognised that the T.R. 1196 operates on an unsuitable frequency and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the wireless link which, on occasions, has proved highly satisfactory, is not well suited to the transmission of anything except short instructions in a pre-arranged code. The solution to these communication problems is the introduction of V.H.F. throughout the Group and this policy has now been approved by the Air Ministry although some little time must elapse before all squadrons are fitted. In the meantime, Wireless Operators must ensure a very high degree of efficiency in handling communications.
[Underlined] Smoke [/underlined]
The smoke given off by the bombs has, on many occasions, obscured, or partially obscured, the markers and has made bomb aiming exceedingly difficult during later stages of an attack. Delay action fuses will soon be available once more and their use on certain types of target will ensure that the aiming point is clearly visible throughout the whole run up. An additional method of avoiding the smoke nuisance by aiming off, is described below.
[Underlined] Bombing Errors [/underlined]
There is no doubt that crew bombing errors are still too large and that the pattern of bombs plotted around these precision targets bears a remarkably close relationship to the pattern of bombs plotted around the practice targets at Wainfleet. A proportion of crews obtain good results up to the performance of the sight, which is well under 100 yards. Other crews seem content with results between 200 and 300 yards and a small proportion manage to drop bombs at even greater distances from heights of 10,000 feet or below. There are many causes for these errors but all can be remedied if crews determine that every load of bombs carried out of this country shall fall fair and square on the aiming point.
In the past, the majority of errors in practice bombing have been due to wrong winds, but this source of error should be virtually eliminated by the introduction of the A.P.I. wind finding method. This method will also be used by selected crews on operations so that the bombing winds transmitted to the main force should be more accurate than in the past.
A further source of bombing error has been unserviceable instruments and many Air Bombers are still failing to take the close personal interest in their bombsight which is essential if they are to obtain good results. Although the Instrument Repairer forms the fourth member of the bombing team, it is the Air Bomber who uses the instrument and who must ensure that any difficulties, however trivial, are immediately reported so that they can be put right.
A third main source of error arises out of the manner in which the Pilot flies the aircraft. I find that a number of pilots are still attempting to turn the aircraft flat when making their final corrections during the run up and I can only say to them that such action may easily throw the bombs off by 100 or 200 yards, and that every turn, however small, must be made with the appropriate angle of bank. Far better not to turn at all at the last moment rather than risk a sked. Even a skid of 2° or 3°.
Finally there are errors due to the Air Bomber. Errors which can only be avoided by constant practice in directing the pilot over objects on the ground on every flight; by learning how to adjust in plenty of time for a drift greater or less than that set on the sight. This will become of increasing importance with the introduction of the technique described below.
The accumulative effect of all these errors results in the employment of too many aircraft on each attack, or, put another way, we knock out too few targets each night with the force available. There are many targets which could be destroyed with the effort of a single squadron if the bombing errors could be reduced to 100 yards. These are targets which, at present, have to be attacked by a Base.
I have referred above to the new technique which is being introduced for attacks against small targets on which it is essential that the whole weight of bombs should fall. In the past we have endeavoured to put a marker on the aiming point and, if there were two or more aiming points to put down two or more markers. Examples are some of the railway marshalling yards, or the dispersed hangars making up the aircraft factories at Toulouse. There are several disadvantages in this method of marking. First, the markers often fall through the roofs of buildings and are consequently difficult to see. Secondly, they may be blown out by the concentrated bombing which follows or, if not blown out, obscured by smoke.
It is now proposed that the markers shall be laid by Mosquitos on the upwind edge of the target and that the bombs shall be displaced by the simple expedient of setting a false wind vector on the sight. Recent trials at Wainfleet have shown that a displacement of 300 yards does not unduly complicate the Air Bomber’s run up. If, therefore, the target is 1000 yards long or consists of scattered buildings, one aiming point will be put down and portions of the force will be given different wind settings which will offset their bombs accurately on to the various parts of the target which it is desired to erase. By this means, the target can be scientifically covered and improved results obtained from fewer aircraft.
Success depends, however, on accurate bombing and I would again ask all crews to tackle this problem and to determine that, during May, they will not be satisfied with a bombing error, whether on the practice ranges or against small precision targets, of more than 100 yards from the aiming point or the M.P.I. if a false wind has been applied.
Nothing can more quickly bring this war to a close than the regular achievement of bombing errors of this order.
The arrival in 5 Group of Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons on attachment from P.F.F. provides the Group with the means of marking targets with great accuracy and I consequently look forward to a steady reduction throughout May in the number of aircraft which have to be detailed for the destruction of these small targets, and by this means to a steady increase in the effective aid which this Group can give in the great offensive which lies ahead.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF SERVICING
One of the major problems of the Engineering Branch is to maintain large numbers of aircraft which are of very complex design, with a limited number of tradesmen and with the use of the minimum quantity of test equipment. At the same time, the serviceability state must be high; therefore the time taken over periodical maintenance must be short and the work efficiently carried out.
Early in the war the number of really experienced tradesmen was comparatively few. All the men were exceptionally keen, and to make full use of experienced tradesmen on jobs requiring the greatest amount of skill, a reorganisation of the system of aircraft maintenance was effected.
Originally the squadrons on a station worked as independent units, each squadron being divided into two or three flights according to the number of aircraft held. Each of these flights had its own separate maintenance “set up”, with all equipment required for minor and major inspections. Each of these flights also kept its own supply of spares and tools, and minor and major inspections on aircraft were carried out by the ground crew who remained with the aircraft for all purposes including daily servicing.
This was so obviously uneconomical, not only in equipment, spares and tools, but also in the employment of skilled men and expenditure of man hours, that the new scheme was brought into force very soon after the commencement of hostilities.
The maintenance layout then consisted of the Flying Flights and a Maintenance Flight. Squadrons were still maintained as separate units, but the detailed maintenance was carried out in “M” (Maintenance Flight), i.e. minor and major inspections, acceptance checks and engine or power plant changes, whilst in the Flying Flights, daily inspections, refuelling and rectification of petty unserviceability only was necessary. The man power was of course split up accordingly, the more skilled and experienced men forming the maintenance gangs, whilst the men with less experience were employed in the flying flights.
The economy was marked and as can be visualised, only one squadron store, one pool of ground equipment for aircraft inspections and one set of test equipment for the various ancilliary trades were necessary. The economy however which made itself felt as much as anything was the saving of man-hours caused by the use of highly skilled men on detailed maintenance in the Maintenance Flight, with the result that a generally higher serviceability state was achieved.
There was a certain amount of opposition to this scheme by those who though that flights would lose their identity and spirit. This did not happen.
At a later date a further change in maintenance organisation took place. This was the formation of Station Maintenance. The resources of all squadrons on a station were pooled, and a Station Major Servicing Section was formed, catering for all major servicing work for all squadrons on the station.
These two improvements were merely forerunners of the present Base Maintenance Organisation and the advantages from the aircraft maintenance point of view are manifold.
With this scheme, squadrons do not carry out any of the detailed maintenance, this being left to the Base Major Servicing or Repair and Inspection Squadron. All tradesmen with the exception of the daily servicing squadron are controlled entirely by the Chief Technical Officer, so that by far the greatest amount of maintenance work which goes to keep the squadron at a high serviceability figure is carried out by tradesmen who, whilst working for the squadrons may not be known by members of the squadron.
It would appear therefore that those who said that we would lose the Squadron spirit etc., stood a good chance of being correct. These fears were proved groundless; the spirit has grown to embrace something which was very rare in the early days of the war. Not only have we squadron spirit which has never been as strong as it is now, but we also have pride in the station and Base achievements, and progress of the Group has naturally followed.
An extract from a letter written by a Flight Commander to the Base Maintenance Staff at his Base is typical of the spirit which exists at present. The letter refers to certain aircraft which had been modified, and brought up to operational standard in time for a specific operation, and continues:-
“It is known that in order to have these aircraft ready for operational requirements it was necessary for the staff to sacrifice much of their leisure time and to work long hours without relief.
“Occasions such as this bring forcibly to notice the excellent work being performed daily by the ground staff, and show how necessary it is for us to have their co-operation.
“We member [sic] of aircrew know that we can rely on the ground staff to help in every way possible, and we hope that we can show our appreciation by carrying out the duties in our particular sphere with the same thoroughness, perseverance, and resourcefulness which we have learned to expect from the members of ground staff.”
GARDENING
Interrogation, Easter Monday:-
“That wasn’t a U-boast, it was me – low!”.
Thus, when 5 Group staged a large scale comeback to gardening, out of six aircraft specially detailed to mine a stretch of water in the Eastern Gardens about the width of a runway, 4 (3 of 106 and 1 of 49 Squadrons) were successful despite heavy opposition, and the remaining 2 (49 Squadron) after valiant attempts, during which good use was made of firing the front guns, correctly planted in another furrow. The remaining 50 gardeners put down 244 vegetables off ports in the Gulf of Danzig. Two were missing and one returned early after jettisoning safe in the North Sea. This operation took place almost exactly on the fourth anniversary of the opening by 5 Group of Bomber Command’s mining offensive. During the four years over 30,000 vegetables have been planted, and over 1,000,000 tons of enemy shipping accounted for.
On 18/19th April, and again on 23/24th April, the approaches to Swinemunde received a total of 125 vegetables.
These attacks in the Baltic fill what was a serious gap in the mining campaign in these waters. This year intensive minelaying has been carried out by the Command to the West of Pomeranian Bay with highly successful results. One effect of this, however, was to intensify the use of mine-free waters further east as:-
(i) Training areas for all types of Warships especially U-boats.
(ii) Supply routes for vital imports and military exports to Scandinavia.
(iii) Supply routes to the North Russian front.
Press reports describe very great congestion throughout the Baltic due to closing of ports and channels; P.R.U. cover of the Western Baltic shows some of this, but was unfortunately not obtained of the 5 Group Gardens. Ground reports of sinkings are hard to come by, and take time to reach us, so for the moment we must wait for the news – which will surely come providing our mines were well and truly laid in the swept channels.
The summary of the month’s work is as follows:-
Sorties 80
Successful 77
%age successful 96.25
Mileage flown 126,880
Total vegetables planted 388
The Squadrons responsible were:- 44, 49, 57, 630, 207 and 106.
The Command effort for this month resulted in the successful planting of 2,643 vegetables in some 40 gardens ranging from South West France to the Gulf of Danzig. About half this total was planted in the Baltic, a quarter in the North Sea and the remainder in the Bay of Biscay and Channel. This is easily a record – the previous highest total for one month being 1,869, in April, 1943. A German Naval Correspondent of Transocean, states that in the Channel alone it has been necessary to treble the mine sweeping effort, but discreetly does not mention the Baltic. The problem that faces the German mine sweeping effort is to cope with a great increase in mining spread over some 2000 miles of shipping lanes. The same correspondent complains that we sometimes use 12 different types of mines necessitating the use of numbers of ships fitted with different types of sweeps to clear the same patch, [sic] of water. In fact, the number of different
(Continued in previous column)
types of mine now in use is about four times that number.
A special word of praise is due to the Armament Staffs for their complete success in the unfamiliar work of preparing and loading the vegetables. In particular, East Kirkby’s effort on the 9th April, in sending off 108 in good order, was outstanding. In some cases the weekly stock return continues to be rendered incorrectly, chiefly due to confusion about the different types sterilisers for the new and old marks of mines. The correct use of these sterilisers will literally be a matter of life and death to any of our forces who may operate in areas where we use them, and now is the time therefore, to clear up any doubts as to exactly what types are held.
Station Tracings have proved something of a stumbling block, as have some of the details required in Raid Reports. Both are designed to answer the question – “where do those mines actually fall”, using all the available evidence. Naturally the planning and success of future operations, especially the “triphibious” variety, depend to a large extent on the accuracy of this information.
5 Group News. No. 21. April, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
There has been a marked improvement in the navigation this month. Navigators are now realising how important it is to obtain constant checks on their position by intelligent use of either H2S or application of the broadcast w/v’s.
H2S navigators and bomb aimers are checking and cross checking all fixes they receive. If the navigator obtains constant D.R. positions along track, say every 15 minutes, and corrects these positions as ground speed checks are obtained, then it is impossible to obtain wrong fixes on the H 2 S. All Navigators should ensure that bomb aimers cross check every fix obtained, no matter how confident they may be. Also remember that a track made good, w/v and G/S check can be obtained from an unknown response. Very few operators make use of this.
The majority of navigators now use the broadcast w/v’s in an intelligent manner. There are a few, however, who [underlined] do not. ALL NAVIGATORS [/underlined] are to make a regular practice of obtaining a D.R. position by use of broadcast winds every 30 minutes – and do not forget to use the “Past” w/v!! If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, alter course immediately and regain track. Now that 5 Group operate alone, concentration is even more important. Station Navigation Officers must have a concentrated drive in this direction, and ensure that all H 2 S navigators are making the fullest possible use of their equipment, and also that the remainder are making full use of broadcast w/v’s, by obtaining constant D.R. positions checks on ground speed etc.
The importance of timing was discussed in last month’s “News”. We would do well however, to reconsider this subject seriously. Accurate timekeeping is more important now than ever before. The largest discrepancies in timing occur on the return journey. This is due partly to the fact that aircraft do not all bomb at the same time and therefore do not leave the target at the same time. To overcome this it may be necessary to establish a concentration point on the return journey, situated close to the target. It is obvious, however, that many navigators make no effort to achieve good timing; they merely carry on and get there “sometime or other”. There are a few pilots who consistently fly at greater speeds than those laid down, and consequently on the return journey are some 10 or 15 minutes ahead of the main force, By so doing they give the Hun a few extra minutes warning of the route home, apart from exposing themselves to individual interception. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must watch for and stem any tendency for bad time-keeping. Sufficient navigational aids are now available to ensure that you are on track and on time. Now it is up to [underlined] YOU [/underlined].
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
April has been a very good month for broadcast w/v’s, particularly since the Group began operating alone. Windfinders have been doing an excellent job. On two occasions this month more than 300 w/v’s were received from aircraft – an excellent effort. Windfinders are transmitting all the winds they obtain. If you note a sudden change in the wind direction or speed, then provided you are satisfied with the fixes used, send back [missing word] w/v immediately.
There are one or two cases, however of navigators chosen as windfinders not realising their responsibility. One navigator for instance, stated that he just couldn’t be bothered to send back w/v’s!! Another said that sufficient w/v’s were being sent back by other aircraft, so he didn’t bother either. Those few navigators who are chosen as windfinders must realise that the whole Group is navigating on the w/v’s they transmit to Base. We cannot afford to have anyone “not bothering”. So buck up chaps, the vast majority of you are doing an excellent job, but those few, who just “don’t bother” – well -- !!
Many experiments have been carried out on French targets to ascertain the most accurate and practical method of obtaining a bombing W/V, which must of course, be a w/v prevailing in the target area. The experiments have proved that the most accurate method is to use a datum point in conjunction with the A.P.I. It is hoped therefore that this method will be adopted on all future operations where practical. Any suggestions or criticisms on this subject will be welcomed.
[Underlined] ASTRO NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
It has been decided that Astro can no longer be considered as an essential aid to navigation. Much time has been devoted to teaching this subject to Navigators, but the results obtained do not justify this training. Therefore this training time is to be devoted to improving the general standard of navigation. More time is to be devoted to plotting and computing two of the weakest links in navigation at the moment.
This decision for not mean that Astro is now “dead” and can be forgotten by all., It is still a standby aid, and all navigators should keep themselves in practice. There have been isolated incidents where a Polaris shot or an Astro fix have been the means of saving an aircraft. You may find yourselves in such a predicament one night – so be ready.
All Astrographs and sextants are to be withdrawn from aircraft, but those navigators who are considered by the Station Navigation Officer as competent Astro Navigators may draw the equipment from the station stores.
[Underlined] SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS [/underlined]
(i) Many station and squadron navigation officers find it impossible to spend as much time as they would like in supervising the work of a new navigator, and teaching him all the things he should know. To overcome this [underlined] East Kirkby [/underlined] put each navigator under the care of a very experienced navigator whose responsibility it is to supervise the other at briefing, to check his log and chart the next day, and to pass on to him all useful information and “tips”. In short the senior navigator acts as a “father” to the “sprog”.
This scheme is working extremely well, and should be adopted by all squadrons.
(ii) Many navigators cannot remember to check compasses regularly. [Underlined] Dunholme [/underlined] have overcome this by marking red or green dots on the face of the Astro watch. This serves as a constant reminder to the navigator. It is recommended that compasses be checked every 20 minutes, and therefore the dots on the face of the Astro watch should be spaced accordingly.
(iii) [Underlined] Metheringham [/underlined] suggest that since Astro will no longer be used to any great extent that astrograph films should be treated and used instead of Gee charts. The procedure would be to mark on the film the lattice lines in the same way as on the Gee Charts. The film or films applicable for each night’s operation would be placed in the aircraft before take-off.
There are two great advantages:-
(a) Fixes would be plotted directly on the plotting chart, thus saving time and reducing the risk of errors.
(b) It would not be necessary to carry a large supply of Gee Charts as at present.
[Underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined]
We welcome the arrival of the 3 P.F.F. squadrons to this Group. There is no doubt that we shall be able to pick up from them many useful ideas and suggestions. These will be passed on to Squadrons as soon as possible.
It is hoped that all station navigation Officers will make a determined effort to visit these 3 squadrons whilst they are attached to the Group.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s Summary that one A.P.I. was being modified by having a “miles flown counter” fitted. This has been done & has been tested by No.617 Squadron on three 6-hour cross countries, undertaken at operational height.
The results are as follows:-
Miles flown registered on counter = 2927
Miles flown calculated by navigator = 2892
Percentage error = 1.2
These tests have proved conclusively that the over reading error in the A.P.I. is negligible.
Permission is now being obtained from Bomber Command for the fitting of the “air miles flown” counter to all A.P.I’s. The manufacturers state however, that the modification may not be retrospective.
There is still considerable difference of opinion as to the best method of using the A.P.I. One third of the Group prefer to reset, the remainder prefer the “graphical” resetting method. It is not necessary to lay down any one method of use but Station Nav Officers must ensure that all Navigators use one of the above two methods.
Station navigations officers are to discuss the use of the A.P.I. with all navigators. Any suggestions on improvements or methods of resetting etc. should be tried out immediately and if successful passed to Group Headquarters.
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Put the switch on the heading Control unit to “Manual” and by means of the setting knob adjust the line of flight marker until it corresponds to the true course as indicated by the P.4 compass. Maintain the switch on “manual” until the D.R. compass is functioning correctly, when you should switch to “Auto”.
(Continued on page 4, Column1.)
GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
(Continued from page 3 column 3)
2. To obtain ground returns, tune in brightest responses on the P.P.I. by means of brightness, contrast, gain and tuning controls. To obtain correct height set range drum at zero and adjust the range marker ring by means of the height control until it is on the first ground returns.
3. (i) Check the pinpoint yourself, visually and by the aid of D.R.
(ii) If pinpoint correct, alter course immediately to regain track by 30° if more than 10 miles off track, by 15° if less than 10 miles off track.
4. You would lose the time in hand by flying small dog legs, preferably either side of track, and of a maximum duration of 2 minutes. Dog legs to be completed before reaching a position 50 miles from the target. Navigator must use his own discretion as to the most suitable area in which to lose time.
5. (i) France (ii) Germany (French name for AACHEN) (iii) Germany (iv) Belgium (v) Czecho-Slovakia (vi) Germany (Part of Berlin).
6. Stuttgart to London.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Quinn, DFC. Sqdn Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn to Stn Nav. Officer, Skellingthorpe.
F/Lt Cunningham 50 Sqdn promoted to Sqdn Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Waterkeyn Sqdn Nav. Officer 44 Sqdn to P.F.F.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, DFM. H2S Instructor, Metheringham to Sqdn. Nav. Officer, 44 Squadron.
P/O Blackham 49 Squadron to H2S Instructor, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Bone, DFC. H2S Instructor Swinderby to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Murphy Sqdn. Nav. Officer No. 467 Sqdn. to No. 61 Squadron (with W/Cdr Doubleday)
F/O Abbott 467 Squadron promoted to Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Bonefield Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No. 9 Squadron – Missing.
F/Lt. Jones Nav. Officer, 1660 Con. Unit to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 9 Squadron.
S/Ldr. Georgeson, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer No.83. Squadron.
S/Ldr Stevens, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No.97 Squadron.
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.R. HEAD D.S.O.
[/Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. CHATTERTON D.F.C.
P/O R.T. MANNING D.F.C.
P/O J. BRADBURN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. A. WARD D.F.M.
SGT. R. MACHIN D.F.M.
SGT. R.A. FRIARS D.F.M.
P/O SANDERS D.F.C.
SGT. R.H. HUDSON D.F.M.
P/O A.W. SHINN D.F.C.
F/L. D. MILLER, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O J.E.W. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. LLOYD D.F.C.
W/CDR. A.W. HEWARD D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.S. LUDFORD D.F.C.
F/O F.A. THOMAS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. FARMILOE D.S.O.
F/O S. HALLIWELL, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O D. PAULL D.F.C.
SGT. P. MCGABNEY D.F.M.
P/O D.C. FREEMAN D.F.C.
SGT. L. CHAPMAN C.G.M.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F. GRIFFITHS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT T.W.J. HALL D.F.M.
F/O R.F. ANDERSON D.F.C.
P/O G.S. MILNE D.F.C.
F/O J.B. LATHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR. J.R. BALMER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR G.L. CHESHIRE, D.S.O. & BAR 2nd Bar to D.S.O.
S/LDR J.L. MUNRO, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/L C.K. ASTBURY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
S/LDR J.C. MCCARTHY, D.S.O. D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O W.G. BICKLEY C.G.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W. KELLAWAY, D.S.O. Bar to D.S.O.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR A.S. JOHNSON D.S.O.
The following non-immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.J. KNELL D.F.C.
F/O R.H. SMITH D.F.C.
F/L J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C.
F/O J.N.G. WYATT D.F.C.
F/SGT. K.J. DAGNALL D.F.M.
F/SGT R.N. BROWN D.F.M.
SGT. E. SULLIVAN D.F.M.
SGT. E.R. BAKER D.F.M.
F/SGT. E.G.B. COLE D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.F. PARSONS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J. MURPHY D.F.M.
F/O D.C. ARMSTRONG D.F.C.
F/SGT. A. HOLDEN D.F.M.
W/O G.A. WILKIE D.F.C.
P/O G.G. WHITEHEAD D.F.C.
F/SGT J.R. OSWICK D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. J. CHALONER D.F.M.
SGT. (NOW P/O [sic] A.E. BOASE D.F.M.
P/O H.C. DARNTON D.F.C.
P/O G. SERGEEV D.F.C.
SGT. R. JEFCOCK D.F.M.
F/SGT (NOW P/O) W.A. MOORE D.F.M.
F/L D.J. BACON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.C.B. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O E.C. WEATHERSTONE D.F.C.
P/O A. BEALE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W. FEARN D.F.C.
F/L R.V. MUNDY D.F.C.
F/L R.K. EGGINS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.H. PULLMAN D.F.C.
[/Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J. SEARS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O R.E. KNIGHTS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.C. GREENHALGH D.F.C.
S/LDR A.R. DUNN D.F.C.
F/SGT. M.D.J. PARKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT. L. BENDING D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.J. FLOWER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.O.P. BEATTY D.F.C.
P/O D.E. FREEMAN D.F.C.
P/O H. THOMAS D.F.C.
P/O L.W. MITCHELL D.F.C.
P/O C.M. LAWES D.F.C.
F/SGT. P. PULLAR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. ROBERTSON D.F.C.
P/O W.T. LOFTUS D.F.C.
P/O W. BOOTH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. R.W. JAGGS D.F.M.
F/O H. McDONALD D.F.C.
F/O C.H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O N.H. KOBELKE D.F.C.
W/O H. McCABE D.F.C.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
April has provided another milestone on our road to the fullest use being made of radiations and echoes helping to get more bombs on the target. V.H.F. R/T has been fitted to two more squadrons – W/T has provided almost 100% communication between Controllers and Main Forces – the serviceability of all Radar devices has improved.
We are grateful to all those outside the Group who have helped us so readily – particularly 92 Group and the Signals Schools with their special drive to train Wireless Operators to read morse through severe interference and to tune their W/T sets with one eye on a C.R.T.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
A hearty welcome to all those faces, both old and new, that have appeared within the Group since our last edition.
April 1944 will long be remembered in the history of 5 Group as a month of hard work, which was crowned with the success it so richly deserved. Wireless Operators (Air) played their part with the energy and determination that is always to be found when there is an extra job to be done, and a large slice of the credit for our recent achievements is due to them.
As usual, the “Back Room Boys” at stations and in our own W/T cabin at Headquarters gladly threw their weight into the fray, and we are indebted to them. Their keenness has always been an inspiration.
Several points have been brought out this month, first and foremost being the quality of morse emanating from the Controllers’ aircraft. There has been a noticeable difference between operators, which, if all past suggestions re training had been acted upon, should never re-occur.
It has been stressed time and again that ANY ONE Wireless Operator (Air) may be called upon to transmit control signals and the only way to ensure perfection is by constant practice.
In this connection, it is pointed out that the Group exercise is an ideal medium for improvement of morse (although not even a whisper of control code must be allowed to pass through the other), and during the coming month the exercise frequency will be closely watched.
Signals Leaders, get this fact thoroughly instilled into your flock – “The ultimate success or failure of future operations may depend on the ability of a Wireless Operator to send or receive signals”. Display it in your training room, convert it into morse symbols, give morse tests regularly each week for we have reached a stage in the conflict where every minute spent in training counts one hundred fold in the air.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following is a combat report from 619 Squadron for the night of 22/23 April:-
“The first indication was a contact by W/Op. on Visual Monica Mark V at 1,800 yards… E/A dropped back out of gunner’s sight and W/Op reported it 800 yards astern down… E/A broke away to starboard and disappeared from gunner’s sight, W/Op again reported E/A 1100 yards, closing slowly…E/A disappeared and was reported once again by the W/Op.”
The outcome of this combat was one JU. 88 probably destroyed. Sgt. Brady, Wireless Operator (Air) deserves the highest praise for his reporting.
You see, it can be done, and when handled in the proper manner not only SAVES YOUR AIRCRAFT but probably destroys a Hun, which reduces the total that can be put in the air against you on the following operation.
Once again, there is only one path to take to success, and that path is labelled TRAINING. Constant practice with your Early Warning devices will pay handsome dividends.
Points for Signals Leaders to include in their “daily ration” to the Section:-
(i) Spare Groups No.12 and 15 in CD.0250.
(ii) X114 and X623 are still being used by some careless operators.
(iii) Log keeping could improve (we have seen some good logs this month).
(iv) More practice – or has that been mentioned somewhere before?
F/O Cook, D.F.M., has gone to No.9 Sqdn., as Signals Leader.
F/Lts Gronow and Chambers, D.F.C. are the Signals Leaders of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons respectively, who are to be congratulated in accepting such a sudden change of procedure and dovetailing into the 5 Group system with the minimum of trouble.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
Facts and Figures about Failures
Out of a total of 2034 operational sorties during the month, 34 Signals failures were reported. Although these represent an increase over last month’s figure, this can be attributed almost entirely to the rise in Category 4 failures (miscellaneous). It is again stressed that Category 4 failures are most unsatisfactory. Most of the failures in this Category are of the type “Equipment reported u/s. O.K. on ground test. No fault found.” Every effort must be made to pin down any reported failure to some definite cause.
An investigation into failures in this Group over the past year reveals some interesting results. Apart from an unfortunate month in February, the percentage of failures shows a slight decrease over the year. This unfortunate February figure coincides with a large percentage of miscellaneous failures as well as a large percentage of T.1154/R.1155 failures. Category I (Equipment) failures show a general tendency to rise during the year. The other categories (2 and 3) have a see saw effect and no general conclusion can be made.
Intercom. failures over the year show a pronounced tendency to decrease, while T.1154/R.1155 failures show a corresponding pronounced increase. The reason for the former can be put down to the energetic drive which Signals Officers have kept up in their Squadron Maintenance Sections against this type of fault. The reason for the latter is not hard to find. During the past year the W/T installation has come into its own again and is an essential piece of equipment for the success of current operations. Whereas in the past unserviceability of the of the main W/T installation may have gone by unnoticed, now it cannot escape report.
[Underlined] THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH…. [/underlined]
Authority has finally been given for the removal of S.D.A. equipment from all Lancaster aircraft in 5 Group. This event has fortunately coincided with the partial introduction of V.H.F. (T.R.1143) installation. Command have agreed in principle that the fitting of V.H.F. is a necessity for the success of the type of operation now being undertaken by 5 Group, and every endeavour is being made to find sufficient equipment to fit all 5 Group squadrons. Careful thought has been given to the possibility of utilising the S.B.A. connectors as a small contribution to ease the very tight V.H.F. equipment production. The only small saving envisioned is the main receiver aerial and lead in; the length of the aerial will, of course, have to be shortened.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Last month saw a great improvement in the serviceability of all Radar equipment. However, before anyone relaxes and sticks his chest out, it should be remembered that the advent of warm, dry weather was a contributory cause. In addition, many sorties have been at lower altitudes than usual, which would eliminate many of those non-reproduceable faults.
(Continued on page 6, col.1)
Then and Now – and how!!
[Underlined] Then [/underlined] In Ancient times, the D.S.O.
Performed his duties staid and slow.
He did his routine work by day,
And dozed his duty nights away,
Untroubled save for threats of violence
‘Gainst those who busted wireless silence!
[Underlined] Now [/underlined] The aethor’s full of legal dope
Which we receive, (at least we hope!).
It’s also full of surplus dits
Transmitted by the brainier twits;
While brighter souls – misguided clots –
Originate redundant dots!
Amendments to a basic plan
Are never ending, and unman
The D.S.O. who, frantic, chases
Vital gen in awkward places;
And rubs – with bitter rueful tear –
His Port, or Telephonic, Ear!
Poor chap, how like a sponge his brain,
Which, like a sponge, he’ll learn to squeeze;
And fill it daily once again
With brand new gen – with practiced ease!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. APRIL, 1944. NO.21 PAGE 5.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from Page 8, col.3)
Having however, realised the existence of those contributory causes, it is possible to say that a considerable increase in serviceability was due to more efficient maintenance and manipulation. It is sincerely hoped that this improvement will continue.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 767 sorties was flown with H.2.S, with 99 defects for a serviceability rate if 87.87. This is an increase of 10% over March. With an extra effort, and the weather on our side it could be made over 90% in May.
There has been a noticeable drop in filament transformer failures, largely due to the weather and height conditions. It is not expected that we will see the end of filament transformer breakdowns until the new type is introduced. The same is true for the 2000v condensers.
The expansion of H 2 S training in Conversion Units should go a long way towards eliminating the alarming number of manipulation failures. Manipulation and maintenance failures can be eliminated by constant training.
The arrival of 83 and 97 Squadrons has given us a taste of equipment to come. These Squadrons have a few Mark III sets and every one is very pleased with their performance. To date, the serviceability of the equipment is 92.8% which is very satisfactory for a new set. In this connection a debt is owed to 8 Group for having pioneered so well and eliminated most of the teething troubles. We can now look forward to a general changeover to Mark III with confidence in our ability to maintain and use it.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond was 86% serviceable, an increase of 8% over March. This increase is of little value of W/Ops are not fully trained in the use of this equipment. The necessity for the Navigator – W/Op co-ordination cannot be overemphasised. Efforts have been made to reduce the minimum range below its present 600 – 800 yards. These have been unsuccessful, but it is believed the “back room boys” are now on the right track, so an answer should be forthcoming soon.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
As usual, Gee is top man when it comes to serviceability. In 96.5% of sorties, Gee was 100& serviceable. This reflects credit on both maintenance personnel and navigators, as it is an increase of 1.2% over last month. Gee could be made almost 100% serviceable; those last few percent are hard to get, but keep trying. The next few months of dry weather should give ample opportunity to break all records.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK IIIA [/underlined]
The expression “Ever Upwards” could be fittingly applied to Mark IIIA serviceability. This Group has watched Monica grow from an idea to a headache when the word “Switchmotor” nearly drove a Radar mechanic mad, and now to a reliable and efficient tail warning device. April serviceability was 91.6% out of 534 sorties, an increase of 1.3% on March.
An examination of combat reports provides innumerable examples of Monica’s capabilities in the hands of a trained operator. The fitting of 10 aircraft at 5 L.F.S. should relieve squadrons of a great deal of preliminary training.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK V [/underlined]
Another 5 Group “baby” (Lulu to some) is growing up, after a rather shaky beginning. Out of 299 sorties flown, 259 were trouble free for a serviceability rate of 86.7% - an increase of 5%. Now that the initial teething snags are over, it should be possible to make Mark V follow the footsteps of IIIA and push serviceability to 90%.
TACTICS
[Underlined] PRECISION ATTACKS [/underlined]
The big step made this month towards perfection of target marking, with its detailed methods of target illumination, initial marking, assessing, backing up, and controlling the force, although introducing many new ideas and problems, has brought little change in basic tactics. Indeed more attention than ever must be directed to tactics, particularly to precise orders and instructions given out for each operation. Special attention must be paid to timing and track keeping, adherence to allocated heights, compliance with instructions from the Controller and an exact knowledge of the marking method. These are dealt with separately.
[Underlined] TIMING AND TRACK KEEPING [/underlined]
The force employed on each target is now normally very much smaller than that in the past. This means that greater accuracy is needed in timing and keeping on track. It also means that if you stray a few miles off track with force of 150 aircraft or less, you are more likely to be singled out by G.C.I. than if you stray the same distance with a force of 800aircraft. Timing is vital. Only a limited number of target markers are dropped, and unless all aircraft are ready to bomb on time, these may be obscured by smoke or blown out by the bombs that drop before yours, and in any case may be difficult to locate.
[Underlined] HEIGHT BAND [/underlined]
The allocation of height bands to Bases, which means that each crew must fly at a given height, has been introduced for several reasons and entirely for your own protection. Firstly, it is intended to protect the force against a collision risk, mainly in the target area, where it may be necessary to do dog legs. Secondly, as a countermeasure against barrage flak. The Hun must now put up the same number of rounds into a very much larger area than before, thus decreasing the chance of individual aircraft being hit. Thirdly, combined with extremely accurate timing, the length of the stream can be very much shorter, and therefore less liable to interception by radio controlled fighters. To achieve the full advantage of this scheme, it must be accompanied by a drive by each Captain to make sure that Window is always thrown out correctly, particularly OVER THE TARGET AREA. If this is done, then there is no reason why crews at the lower heights need have any concern. It is, however, their duty to tighten up the normal crew search procedure and to be aware of fighters which may attack from above.
[Underlined] CONTROLLER’S INSTRUCTIONS [/underlined]
It is essential to comply strictly with the Controller’s instructions throughout the attack, and his decisions should never be questioned in the air. A wrongly timed load of incendiaries dropped whilst the Mosquitos are examining the roof tops to assess the marking, may upset the whole routine and possibly divert the main weight of the attack.
[Underlined] TARGET MARKING METHODS [/underlined]
All crews must be quite clear before leaving the briefing room of the colour of the spot-fires to be used, and the details of the controlling code. It doesn’t pay to be doubtful after you have taken off. You must be ready to carry out orders given over the target without hesitation.
(Continued in col.2)
TACTICS (Continued from Col.3)
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The fruits of good training in tail warning devices are borne out by the following Combat Report. Each month there are many similar instances of fighters which have been beaten off because the correct drill has been carried out. Each month there are also instances of fighter damage sustained, and the fighter that did it is not picked up until after the attack. It pays to practice the reporting code at least once a day!
“First indication was contact by W/Optr. on Visual Monica Mk.V, 1,800 yards, Port Quarter down. Pilot altered course and E/A followed and closed in to 800 yards. W/Optr. ordered corkscrew to Port, and at the same time E/A opened fire and scored hits on tail unit on Lancaster “G”. R/G sighted E/A at 500 yards, Port beam down 30° and opened fire. E/A fired again and missed Lancaster. W/Optr. reported E/A closing in slowly and R/G sighted it at 500 yards astern level. R/G opened fire and E/A broke away to Starboard Quarter up. Hits claimed on E/A which disappeared from Gunner’s sight. W/Optr. again reported E/A on starboard quarter up at 1,100 yards and closing slowly. Rear and Mid-Upper Gunners sighted E/A simultaneously at 500 yards, Starboard Quarter level. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits on E/A which broke away at 300 yards, diving to Port Quarter down with smoke pouring from both engines.”
The Station Commander’s comments are self-explanatory: “I consider that Mark V Monica saved this crew. The Wireless Operator’s commentary was excellent, and the crew co-operation of a very high standard.”
FLYING CONTROL (Continued from page 15)
play a part in the final choice. From the condition of the airfield right down to such small items as the cleanliness of the flare path party room will be reviewed, so if you want to top the bill S.F.C.O’s, start cracking the whip NOW.
[Underlined] BLIND LANDING EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
It has been decided by this Group to remove all S.B.A. equipment from operational aircraft and it is hoped that in the not too distant future other and better means will be introduced. The first piece of equipment which we hope to get is a P.P.I. which will be installed in the watch tower and on which will be indicated the positions of all aircraft in the circuit.
Other equipment such as Radar Landing Beam, coupled with a Radar G.P.I. Radar Homing Beacons will all follow in due course. These will naturally give Flying Control Officers more work and more responsibilities but with the increased safety of aircraft this work and the short training required will be well repaid.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
April has been a most satisfying month for the bombing crews of 5 Group. Numerous precision attacks have been carried out with a great measure of success. The front pages of the Daily Press made public the achievements of 5 Group when they printed the after-bombing photographs of the marshalling yards at JUVISY, South of Paris. Equal success rewarded the attacks at TOURS and LA CHAPPELLE. The raid on MUNICH was successful, and a fair measure of success resulted from the attacks on BRUNSWICK and SCHWEINFURT. Finally, further small factories near OSLO, BORDEAUX and CLERMONT FERRAND are now devastated.
[Underlined] HOW HAS ALL THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? [/underlined]
Firstly, of course, most credit is due to the marking success of 54 Base. The next main contribution to the Group’s success has been the intense practice bombing carried out by the squadrons for the last year.
Owing to the very limited time available for bombing training at Conversion Units the final co-ordination of the bombing team has to be carried out on the squadrons. Much credit is due to the Conversion Units for their efforts, and particular praise is due to the Lancaster Finishing School who have elevated the importance of crew practice bombing to the extent of averaging between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in all bombing exercises over the last three months!!!
However, the crews are inexperienced with both aircraft and bombsight on arrival in the squadrons and intensive training is essential to bring them into line with the precision our operations require.
[Underlined] THE MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT [/underlined]
This bombsight has proved its worth. Although it is by no means a perfect sight, it is true that provided it is expertly maintained by the Instrument Sections and carefully handled by the Air Bombers, it can put bomb loads on to a target.
Air Bombers should make sure that their bombsights [underlined] are [/underlined] serviceable. It is the most important individual item of equipment that your aircraft carried, and as such should be the most carefully maintained. Its best test is on the practice bombing range – 6 bombs aimed accurately on different headings should produce a CLOSE GROUP. If not, then SOMETHING is wrong – report it to the instrument section – help them to find out what is wrong and then test it again. It may not always be possible to get this test exercise in the air – if not you must do the next best – carry out the exhaustive N.F.T. check.
In every P.R.U. picture there are sticks off the main concentration – it is almost certain that these sticks are wide because they were aimed with an unserviceable bombsight – are they yours? Were you absolutely certain that on Juvisy, La Chappelle, Tours, Brunswick, Munich or Schweinfurt, your bombsight was functioning correctly – when did you last do practice bombing with it – did you give is a thorough check during your N.F.T. or Ground Check? Did you??
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined]
O.R.S. at Bomber Command have conducted a painstaking analysis of 5 Group’s practice and operational bombing. They report that
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING [/underlined]
(ERRORS IN YARDS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training achievements by Squadron and Conversion Units]
[Underlined] THE BEST RESULTS FOR APRIL. [/underlined]
In previous months all crew errors at 20,000 ft. of less than 150 yards were listed in this column However, in April [underlined] 103 [/underlined] such results were obtained and it is therefore impossible to record them all. The crew errors of less than 100 yards are shown this month but it is confidently expected that in future space will only permit inclusion of results of less than 75 yards. It is possible – the list below proves it – therefore it must be done!!!
Squadron or Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 ft
9 S/Ldr. Keir F/Sgt. Coates P/O. Lewis 54 yards
44 F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 99 yards
49 F/Lt. Adams F/Sgt. Underwood S/Ldr. Evans 84 yards
F/O. Edwards F/O W. Smith F/Sgt. Cavanagh 83 yards
50 P/O. Lundy F/O. Bignall F/Sgt. Jordan 90 yards
P/O. McFarlin Sgt. Ball Sgt. Elliott 75 yards
F/O. Botha Sgt. Thompson F/O. Bishton 95 yards
S/Ldr. McLeod Sgt. Price F/Lt. Cunningham 80 yards
61 P/O. Ascott F/Sgt. May F/O. Ward 98 yards
F/O. Jeavons Sgt. Graham F/Sgt. Dow 93 yards
F/O. Paul P/O. Cook P/O. Griffin 40 yards
W/Cdr. Stidolph F/O. Aley F/O. Dyer 71 yards
F/Sgt. Woolnough F/O. Ravenscroft F/O. Haggerstone 71 yards
467 F/Lt. Marshall F/Sgt. Borman F/O. Easton 96 yards
619 P/O. Roberts F/Sgt. DeViell F/Sgt. Lott 43 yards
P/O. Saunders F/O. Rosenfield F/Sgt. Greacen 84 yards
630 F/Lt. Roberts F/Sgt. Jeffery F/Sgt. Davies 75 yards
S/Ldr. Calvert F/Sgt. Hogg F/O. Beaudoin 95 yards
Sgt. Mallinson Sgt. Pomeroy Sgt. Nassau 73 yards
F/O. Joblin F/O. Beeson F/O. Lambton 80 yards
1654 F/O. McLaughlan Sgt. Leeson F/O. Phillips 90 yards
F/Sgt. Pethick Sgt. Wallace F/O. Baldwin 82 yards
P/O. Richards Sgt. Buckby Sgt. Fazackerley 93 yards
F/O. Long F/O. De Sautels Sgt. Thomas 88 yards
1661 Sgt. Marsh Sgt. Carr ? ? 98 yards
5 LFS F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 98 yards
617 F/O. Knights F/Sgt. Bell ) The best two 49 yards
S/Ldr. Munro F/Lt. Astbury ) exercises 53 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
APRIL has produced the first maximum entry for the Competition since its inception in June, 1943. Some excellent results have been submitted and hearty congratulations are due to 61 Squadron for their outstanding exercises. The results are as follows:-
PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS
1st 61 Squadron – 55 Yards 1st 50 Squadron – 59 Yards.
2nd 619 Squadron – 63 Yards 2nd 61 Squadron – 84 Yards.
3rd 49 Squadron – 71 Yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 96 Yards.
4th 50 Squadron – 80 Yards 4th 630 Squadron – 98 Yards
5th 44 Squadron – 81 Yards 5th 463 Squadron – 111 Yards.
6th (630 Squadron – 90 Yards 6th 44 Squadron – 125 Yards.
(106 Squadron – 90 Yards 7th 57 Squadron – 136 Yards.
8th 207 Squadron - 101 Yards 8th 467 Squadron – 141 Yards.
9th 9 Squadron – 112 Yards 9th 49 Squadron – 152 Yards.
10th 463 Squadron – 116 Yards 10th 106 Squadron – 163 Yards.
11th 467 Squadron – 125 Yards 11th 9 Squadron – 167 Yards.
12th 57 Squadron – 135 Yards 12th 207 Squadron – 188 Yards.
Group Captain Butler (R.A.F. Dunholme Lodge) produced a token cup to celebrate 44 Squadron’s victory in March. It is hoped that 44 will pass on the token to 61 Squadron.
It is noteworthy that the three Squadrons of 52 Base are all in the first five.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Only two entries were received this month:-
1st F/Lt. FARARA (630 Sqdn) – 85 yds.
2nd F/Lt. McDONALD (61 Sqdn) – 160 yds.
Congratulations F/Lt. Farara!!
(Continued from Page [sic]
our errors on both are similar – that means that 5 Group Bombing Teams achieve substantially the same results on German targets that they obtain at Wainfleet, Epperstone, Owthorpe and Bassingham Ranges, therefore, it merely remains to improve our results on the “home” ranges in order to obtain more hits on the “away” targets.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 106 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Wake DFC) reports that their descent from top position in the Bombing Competition is only temporary and is due to their best crews finishing about the same time. Other Squadrons are warned that 106 intend to be back at the top by the end of May.
[Underlined] 44 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Lowry) have constructed an effective Mk.XIV mock-up as follows:-
1. No suction used – Gyros are counter-balanced in Sighting Head and Computor.
2. All electric motor is used to obtain pressure.
3 Airspeed and Height operation is obtained by connecting two external sylphan tubes to the static and pitot heads of Computor Unit. Attached to sylphan tubes are adjustable thumb screws to enable airspeed and height indicators to be carried throughout their range.
This go ahead Bombing Section have also introduced the use of Navigator’s Log Books (an idea borrowed from 5 L.F.S Syerston) in which are posted all permanent information such as Bomb T.V’s Conversion of True to Indicated Wind speed tables, etc. and is also used to carry target maps and operational bomb load instructions.
[Underlined] 1661 Con. Unit. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Brewer, DFC.) have completed the installation of Mk. XIV bombsight complete, in the A.M.B.T. A really first-class job by all concerned!!!
[Underlined] 61 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. MacDonald) Competition winners for April, report that W/Cdr. STIDOLPH and crew set the pace with a Crew Error of 71 yds. This aroused competitive spirit to a marked degree in the Squadron. The following result was obtained:-
Crew Error ar 20,000 ft. – 40 yards
Navigator’s Error – 25 yards
Pilot & Air Bomber’s Error – 37 yards
The crew were:- Pilot – F/O PAUL
Air Bomber – P/O COOK
Navigator – P/O GRIFFIN
[Underlined] 9 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DFC.) reports the following excellent method of plotting crater positions from night photographs.
Plot the centre of the photograph on tracing paper pinned on to the target illustration. Mark the heading accurately from the compass rose on the tracing. Calculate distance between centre of the bombing photograph and centre of bomb craters commencing with position of bomb and flash release. The distance from this position to the centre of the photograph is the ground speed of the aircraft in feet per second multiplied by the flash setting; a deduction being allowed for the 5° aft tilt of the camera.
Forward travel of the bombs can be noted in A.P.1730A.Vol.1. to which must be added or subtracted the distance due to the wind component.
Plot this distance forward along track on the tracing paper and the approximate position of the centre of the stick is recorded. The stick length is known and should be drawn to scale. This method if accurate provided that:-
(i) the aircraft maintains heading and attitude from bomb release to explosion of flash (this can be checked by study of pre-bombing frames on the film)
(ii) There is only a small error due to cross trail - allowance can be made for this if necessary.
9 Squadron have found that their plots using this method are accurate to within 100 yards by subsequent comparisons with P.R.U. photographs.
[Underlined] 617 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/L Astbury, D.F.C) reports the following outstanding exercise:-
F/L Clayton, Pilot, F/O Watson, Air Bomber, carried out an application exercise from 20,000 ft. And averaged 73 yards. Two of the six bombs were DIRECT HITS!!
[Underlined] “G”N” [sic] FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
(I) [Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] – plotted 5,492 bombs aimed by 1,044 aircraft during April. Thus in one month 28 tons of practice bombs have been dropped at this range.
(ii) [Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] – plotted 990 bombs aimed by 200 aircraft.
(iii) [Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] – plotted 916 bombs aimed by 147 aircraft.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. What would happen to the Mk. XIV Bombsight if the Port Inner engine had to be feathered?
2. How would you use the Quadrant Plate and Pointer at 13,000 feet?
3. How could you jettison a load of incendiaries “SAFE” with reasonable certainty?
4. If the Pilot operated the Jettison toggle what would happen to your Jettison bars and what extra action is necessary to put them back to “SAFE”?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Abbott [/underlined] is now Bombing Leader at 49 Squadron. It is noted that 49 moved from hitherto unplaced position in the Competition up to [underlined] 3rd [/underlined] in April.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Stoney, DFC. [/underlined] (1660 Con.Unit) has moved to 97 Squadron for his 2nd tour of operations. Good Luck!
[Underlined] F/O Lowans, DFM. [/underlined] has moved from 49 Squadron to 54 Base where he is attached for Bombing Leader duties.
[Underlined] F/O Tibbs (207 Squadron) [/underlined] obtained “B” category on No. 79 Bombing Leaders Course.
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (619 Squadron) [/underlined] and F/O Martins (106 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on No. 80 Course.
[Underlined] P/O Ball, DFM. (1660 Con. Unit) [/underlined] has been attached to Headquarters, Bomber Command for Bombing Analysis duties.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place in H2S training during the month, the most notable being:-
(i) H2S training has been expanded at the Conversion Units to cover 12 crews per course, to meet increased demands of the squadrons.
(ii) To standardise training throughout the Group, a Ground Training Syllabus has been issued outlining the minimum amount of ground training to be carried out by H2S crews, whether trained on squadrons or Conversion Units.
(iii) Greater emphasis is being placed on the Navigational aspect of H2S to increase further the reliability of fixes and winds obtained.
A concentrated drive is being made by all Instructors to improve D.R. navigation by H2S, to ensure that failures due to lack of confidence and inability to interpret the P.P.I. are things of the past. The tendency to slur over H2S navigation must be overcome as a successful H2S bombing run is largely dependent on a correct navigational approach to the target. This does not mean however that blind bombing is to be relegated to a mere fraction of the training time; on the contrary a large part of training can be devoted to blind bombing technique when crews are able to navigate accurately by H2S and ensure that the target is reached at the correct time.
Manipulation failures still continue to be reported and every effort must be made by operators to prevent such failures being attributed to their neglect. Now that the Air Bomber is required to sit in the navigator’s compartment and manipulate the H2S equipment, manipulation failures should be on the downward path. Two heads are usually better than one and with the list of H2S faults and remedies, one of them should at least have some knowledge of the symptoms and their correction. The impression conveyed is that many of these manipulation failures are due to lack of understanding of the equipment. The Technical Radar Officer is always willing to part with “gen” providing questions are asked. Don’t be afraid to worry these officers because in the long run by asking questions about your equipment you are probably saving their time and yours.
Leica cameras are now being used to photograph the P.P.I. on training flights and several remarkable prints have been obtained. particularly [sic] on Edinburgh and London. Two squadrons are now equipped and it is eventually hoped to obtain further cameras for the remainder. With the advent of P.P.I. photography blind bombing can be carried out irrespective of cloud cover and accurate results obtained. Much information can also be obtained on the definition of built up areas and it is hoped eventually to relate individual bright responses with definite structures in these built up areas. It is therefore essential that the camera operator fills in the photographic interrogation report in a concise and accurate manner, enabling much valuable information to be obtained for use of H2S crews on future operations.
The results of the blind bombing competition have now been received and are published below. All crews who participated are to be congratulated on the excellent results obtained.
[Underlined] Final Order Captain Squadron Av. Error. in miles. [/underlined]
1 P/O Rogers 630 .33
2 F/S Canever 57 .38
3 P/O Manning 44 .42
4 F/L Smith 57 .46
5 P/O Ross 57 .46
6 P/O Higgs 44 .48
7 F/O Bayley 57 .49
8 F/L Healy, DFC. 49 .60
9 F/O Penman 106 .64
10 P/O Shinn 49 .65
11 P/O Jones, J. 49 .66
12 F/O Thomas 57 .87
13 F/L Kellaway, DSO. 630 1.12
14 F/L Roberts, DFC. 630 1.15
One point arising out of blind bombing on H2S which has been noticeable on operations during the last month is that many H2S operators who claim to mark blind are unduly influenced by the markers showing a lack of faith in the instrument. Complete confidence can only be built up by sufficient training in which advantageous use should be made of the synthetic trainer.
Talking about synthetic trainers, East Kirkby have introduced a modification to the trainer which gives correct crystal current movement and a tuning position, thus enabling operators to practice manipulation on the trainer. It is hoped to introduce this modification to other trainers in the Group as soon as the technical details are settled.
This month we welcome 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons into the Group. They have brought with them new equipment and methods and it is felt that as pioneers in H2S much can be learnt from them. It is hoped that all H2S Instructors will take the opportunity of visiting these squadrons and utilising the information gained to the benefit of their respective units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee range has improved considerably during the month and many navigators obtained fixes over targets attacked. However, there is still a tendency to neglect Gee when jamming appears.
Some navigators had opportunities of using the new North Eastern chain this month with gratifying results, many fixes being obtained further than 8° East, and off chart coverage. Providing navigators continue to give reports on the reception they receive outside the limits of the present lattice charts, something can be done to produce additional charts.
Coding has not caused any confusion, and the blinking of the “A” pulse appears to have been a success. There is one point, however, which must be borne in mind by all navigators and wireless operators regarding the use of coding in distress signals. All fixes passed for transmission during distress procedure must give the true lattice line values and therefore the coding figures must be deducted by the navigator from the indicator readings prior to passing the fix to the Wireless Operator. Watch this or you will be plotted miles away from your true position.
Manipulation failures are still too high and these can be overcome only by constant practice in setting up and correction of faults. Many navigators to whom manipulations faults have been attributed are still changing over alternator plugs with the set switched on resulting in fuses being blown. When changing the R. F. Units or alternator plugs, Gee must be switched OFF.
The following is an extract from a report on Gee which should be of interest to all navigators:-
“There seems to be a popular idea with navigators that XF’s necessarily give extra range. This is based on the fact that when they were first introduced, they gave extra ranges before the enemy had time to organise counter measures. The main advantage of XF’s is not to give extra range but to make the enemy spread his jamming over more than one frequency, tending to make it less intense on any one frequency”
Another point is that many navigators are using stud settings and RF Units which have not been detailed for the operation in question. There is even a case this month of a navigator using a chain which was not detailed, and he claimed far greater range though admitted the fixes were unpotable.
(Continued on page 14, col.2)
Link Trainer
The nil returns for 630, 617 and 627, and the very low return for 57 Squadron were due to the absence of Link Trainers at East Kirkby and Woodhall. Machines were, however, installed at these Stations at the end of the month and it is hoped these Squadrons will make up the deficiency by an increased effort next month. A revised Link Trainer Syllabus is being drafted and should be available to Units by the middle of the coming month. The amount of Link done on the squadrons still warrants improvement and it is hoped that the new Syllabus will assist in this.
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron and Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoons]
April, and the first few days of May, saw the last of the two Group Competitions – the Lancaster Seven-a-Side Rugger Trophy, and the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] The Lancaster Seven-a-Side Competition [/underlined] has had a very mixed reception. Although designed on a Group inter-squadron basis, to include every crew in each Squadron, and having a system of points that favoured squadrons fielding the greatest number of teams, no squadron outside 53 Base even began the competition. But within 53 Base it was an amazing success. 86 teams took part, and the resulting increase in fitness, and the keenness that developed, fully repaid the efforts of A/Cdre. Hesketh who originated the competition. Next season this is going to be one of the Rugger high-lights, with a smashing Boxing Day final meeting of all the squadron finalists, followed by “noggins for all” round “Ye Olde Yule Logge”.
[Underlined] The Matz Soccer Cup. [/underlined] Coningsby crowned a successful soccer season by beating Winthorpe 2 – 0 in the Matz final on the Lincoln City ground on 6th May. In their semi-final game, Coningsby met the Group “giants” – Scampton – at Waddington, and emerged successfully after a terrific duel. Winthorpe had to play three games with Metheringham before they got to the semi-final stage. Then they defeated Skellingthorpe 3 – 2, after being 2 goals down with only twenty minutes to go. The final was worthy of the competition, and produced a clean, hard fought duel, perfectly even in the first half, but with the Coningsby forwards more dangerous than their opposites in the second. Winthorpe goalie and backs are to be congratulated on their fight, they certainly kept the flag flying. Coningsby’s first goal came from a penalty, their second from a beautifully placed header into the corner of the net in classic “corner kick” style. Coningsby were minus their professional left winger, Colinridge, but his successor ably filled the bill, and the forwards were presented with many openings by a clever half back division. After the game, Mrs. Cochrane presented the cup in the stand, and the A.O.C., who had been a delighted spectator, congratulated the teams in the dressing rooms on their splendid show. Later the teams had tea together in Lincoln, and later again the Cup was christened with the traditional quart of “old and mild”, we hope.
[Underlined] The Wines Rugger Trophy. [/underlined] Dunholme are hot on the scent of this “pot”, and it will take a good side to stop them. Winthorpe are in the remaining semi-final with Waddington. It is proposed to polish off the semi-final and the final before the 14th, leaving King Willow in peaceful possession.
[Underlined] 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. [/underlined] East Kirkby reached the final by beating the redoubtable Swinderby on their own ground. It now remains for Metheringham to play Waddington and the winner to meet Scampton, to provide the other finalist. This competition must be polished off quickly, before hardening grounds make the ball a little too lively for all but the steel shinned types. This new competition has proved very successful and should provide a most interesting final.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played eight Station matches, during the month, of which they lost only one, 2 – 1 to R.A.F. Ingham. In the semi-final replay of the Lincoln and District Amateur Cup they defeated R.A.F. Wickenby 3 – 0. In the final with Lincoln Rovers on City ground they played magnificently for a 5 – 4 victory, finishing the game with only nine men. Now they are all out for the Lincoln and District League Championship. They have had a most brilliant season.
DUNHOLME had six games, of which they won four. Their two losses were to Scampton – 1 – 5, and to Headquarters 5 Group 3 – 4. Eight inter-section games were played off.
FISKERTON laid out two soccer pitches during the month and gained a considerable impetus in ensuing activity. The station team won its last three Lincoln League games. A combined league and knock-out competition is running with eleven teams competing. 49 Squadron has three teams entered. Two games per day is common; B.A.T. Flight v Echelon have already fought three pointless duels, playing extra time in the last two games. Which shows what a new pitch can do.
BARDNEY have a very strong team, and won six out of their seven April games, including Coningsby and Skellingthorpe, Matz winners and semi-finalists, among their victims. They challenge all comers to do battle! and they are keen, they even cycled to a match – and won!!
METHERINGHAM were unlucky in having three station games cancelled. They played three losing to Digby and 373 Battery, Woodhall, but beating Woodhall Spa 5 – 2. Inter-section fixtures (league and knock-out) produced 14 games, Squadron Armoury, the League champs, being knocked out by R.A.F. Regiment.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is building up steadily, the laying out of a pitch having provided a much needed stimulus. After winning the opening game against Wigsley, 3 – 1, on the new pitch, the Group lost to Skellingthorpe away. Six games yielded four wins, a draw with 93 M.U. the old rivals, and one defeat. In early May, there was much creaking of joints when an officer’s team emerged minus winter woollies and held the Group side to a mere 3 – 1 triumph.
RUGBY
DUNHOLME, finalists in the Wines Trophy, have a powerful side. They defeated Swinderby 8 – 0 in the Wines’ second round, defeated 2 A.A. Command School both away and at home, and Scampton 7 – 6 on the latter’s ground. They are all out for the Wines Trophy and beat Fiskerton 27 – 0 in the semi-final.
METHERINGHAM with a greatly improved side held Waddington to a 9 – 0 victory, and win one and lost one with R.A.F. Digby.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON certainly got in plenty of practice, with eight April games. They won five, knocking Syerston out of the Group Trophy, their victories also included Ingham, Faldingworth and 5 Group. They are in a strong position for the Trophy competition.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is most active. Through the generosity of Swinderby they hold “home” games there pending completion of their Morton Hall pitch. During April they played six games winning two, with one draw. East Kirkby proved their downfall in the Group Trophy. A friendly three game duel with Swinderby has produced one win each and one draw. It is hoped to continue hockey, even if only in inter-section “sixes” throughout the summer.
[Underlined] GENERAL JOTTINGS. [/underlined]
SOFT-BALL 0 Fiskerton have a team in the Lincoln area league. Metheringham are also running a team, playing in a Digby League. 5 Group H.Q. have a willing, if unskilled, nucleus who like to “play ball”. There should be some scope for friendly games within the Group.
TENNIS and BOWLING – Bardney and Metheringham are lucky in having village facilities available, and the games are in full swing.
CYCLING is popular in Bardney. The tough kind with a “cow’s horn” handlebar and a “tail up” racing crouch. Any ex “roadmen” are welcomed to compete in a friendly “25”. A perimeter track is the proposed venue.
CRICKET – The great concern of every captain’s heart is the pitch. The sacred sward where worms and birds both “fear to tread” is THE FOCUS OF ALL CRICKETERS THOUGHTS. May we remind stations that it will be appreciated if they will keep to the date schedule of the Group competition, and not insist on a too Velvet like patch before playing their first round.
WAR SAVINGS
FISKERTON are to be congratulated on another fine effort in National Savings this month. Last month’s increase of 143% to £884 has again been increased by 34% to £1185.
FISKERTON will doubtless be only too pleased to pass on details of their fruitful methods to other Stations – if only to get a bit of competition!!
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) Percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTALS 6309.13.4.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RECORD [/underlined]
The month of April showed a welcome drop in the number of accidents in the Group compared with March, but though there was a large increase in total flying hours, this accident rate did not improve in the same ratio, and is still well below the Group’s best standards.
In all 40 aircraft were damaged during the month, 19 of which were classed as “avoidables”. The remainder were classed as technical failures or obscure. The total of “avoidables” may be subject to alteration as one or two accidents occurring at the end of the month have not been fully investigated and are not included. At the moment they appear to be technical failures or entirely obscure.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE [/underlined]
The details of the avoidable accidents are as follows:-
Ground collision (including taxying) – 6
Swings … 2
Heavy landings …2
Low flying … 2
Overshoots landing … 2
Mid air collisions … 2
Errors of judgement landing … 1
Other errors of judgement … 2
TOTAL … 19
51 Base accounted for 11 and Squadrons 8.
[Underlined] M.T. COLLISIONS & TAXYING [/underlined]
There were again two M.T. accidents this month. In spite of strenuous efforts to stamp out this type of accident it still recurs. Next month [underlined] MUST [/underlined] be “M.T. Accident Free”.
Of the taxying accidents two occurred at night and two during the day. One of the “night” accidents was caused primarily by the pilot neglecting to use an Aldis lamp or taxying light. He struck an obstruction just off the dispersal lead in. In this instance his Flight Engineer was aware of the obstruction but did not warn his captain. Both log books were endorsed in RED.
A Lancaster pilot had just landed landed [sic] and was proceeding round the perimeter, when he told his Engineer to cut the outer engines. The Flight Engineer did so, but opened the starboard outer throttle fully before the propeller stopped turning. The engine roared into life and swung the aircraft off the perimeter. Again, the log books of both pilot and F/E were endorsed in RED.
[Underlined] SWINGS AND HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
Both Swings this month were on take off – one Stirling and one Lancaster.
In the Stirling the pupil pilot swung off the runway, throttled back completely as per drill, but did not stop before his aircraft struck another in dispersal.
The Lancaster pilot ignored all he had ever been told about take-off procedure, handed over his throttles too soon to the Flight Engineer, swung to port at “full power”, over-corrected and broke his undercarriage on a final swing to starboard. His bomb load exploded. Luckily the crew got clear before this happened.
This pilot made another mistake in running up to +4 lbs, 2650 revs. against the brakes.
Heavy landings were of the usual pattern. One occurred at Conversion Unit in unfavourable weather conditions. The other was the result of a Lancaster pilot levelling off too high and not using the engine to correct.
[Underlined] MID-AIR COLLISIONS [/underlined]
There have been four mid-air collisions in the Group in recent months – two in April. There are so many aircraft over this country both by day and night that crews must keep absolutely on their toes at all times. We hear reports of “narrow squeaks” almost every
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash, the immaculate W.A.A.F’s … “and I’d have been all right if that Stirling hadn’t backed into me”
day. The answer, of course, is to maintain a thorough look-out.
Don’t ignore the new “look-out” drill which was sent out this month. There should be no tendency to relax when an aircraft comes back into the circuit after an Op. or any other flight. The danger of collision is always present, and as the pilot is necessarily busy with his cockpit drills, it is up to the rest of the crew, especially gunners, to ensure the safety of the aircraft by keeping up a search and warning the captain of other aircraft.
[Underlined] OTHER INCIDENTS [/underlined]
A pupil pilot in a Stirling was out of line with the runway at 500’ on a good clear night. He landed anyway, off the runway, and knocked over the wind sock.
An Instructor in a Lancaster in showery weather, also found himself out of line with the runway. Instead of going round again he landed off the runway. His speed was excessive and he overshot. A deliberate ground loop placed the aircraft – CAT AC.
A Conversion Unit Mid-Upper Gunner was unloading his guns after a flight. One went off and fired a round into the “fin”. The fin had to be replaced. Gunners! make sure your guns are on “Safe” – all of them.
One Lancaster crashed this month in obscure circumstances. The aircraft was seen coming out of cloud in a high power dive. The tail fell off and then the aircraft broke up. The suggestion at the moment is that the pilot lost control in daylight in cumulo-nimbus cloud. The Accidents Investigation Branch may produce further evidence.
Further proof of the merits of the Lancaster came out this month. An aircraft returned on two engines after being badly shot up. On making an approach at a strange airfield, the pilot could not get his wheels down and went round again from a low height. Unfortunately on his second attempt the pilot overshot on a short flarepath and crashed.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Milne of 50 Squadron displayed exceptional airmanship, and also proved that the Lancaster can be flown on two engines even with a load. He lost both starboard engines while outward bound on ops., at 3,000 feet. Forced to return to Base, he jettisoned the fuel from the inboard tanks and effected a perfect approach and landing still carrying full bomb load.
F/Sgt Young, a pupil at 5 L.F.S., put up a good show which also reflects credit on his Instructor. Shortly after take-off on his first solo in a Lancaster, the starboard tyre burst. F/S. Young was diverted to Woodbridge where he made a successful landing without causing any further damage to the aircraft.
F/Sgt. White and F/Sgt Millikan, the Navigator and Air Bomber of a crew under training at Conversion Unit, set an example which would have done credit to an experienced crew. While on a high level cross country flight, their pilot passed out through lack of oxygen and lost control of the aircraft. F/Sgt Millikan regained control of the Stirling and under the direction of F/Sgt White who assumed the responsibility of captain, they flew the aircraft for 1 1/2 hours back to Base when the pilot had recovered sufficiently to land the aircraft.
The “Plumbers Union” have also distinguished themselves. F/Sgt Gledhill, a Staff Engineer of 1660 Conversion Unit, was a member of a crew of a Stirling. While the aircraft was taxying to dispersal, the port inner caught fire. The Graviner had no effect, and F/Sgt Gledhill promptly removed the engine cowling and extinguished the fire with a hand extinguisher, saving the aircraft from much more serious damage.
(Continued on page 12, col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING [/underlined]
F/Lt. Lucas of Flying Training Command visited the Group during April to advise on the subject of Clay Pigeon Shooting, this Officer is stationed at 54 Group Headquarters, and is responsible for Clay Pigeon Shooting in the I.T.W’s. It was obvious that we are getting little if any training value out of clay pigeon shooting at present, due to the lack of proper ranges and the fact that very few Gunnery Leaders have ever had instruction in the art.
A trap house was constructed at Waddington from sandbags, and seven firing points laid out; this work was done in two days. The lay-out in use at I.T.W’s has two trap houses, but this was not considered necessary for our purpose. A request has been made for an officer from Flying Training Command to be attached to the Group to give advice and instruction to all stations, and the possibility of constructing a sandbag trap house on each station is under consideration. A demonstration of the lay-out at Waddington, makes it obvious that clay pigeon shooting must be done on a properly constructed range under the supervision of an instructor; under these conditions it is an excellent quickening exercise and when gunners are proficient in hitting clays, they have confidence in themselves.
[Underlined] .5 UNDER DEFENCE GUN. [/underlined]
Six squadrons have aircraft fitted with this gun and squadrons have been asked for opinions on the value of the gun on operations, and if H 2 S is preferred to the gun, as the aircraft can obviously only have one or the other. Opinions given to date are not very favourable as several snags have been encountered during the trials carried out so far. With the gunner strapped in his seat it is difficult to follow the gun round on the beam; it is difficult for the gunner to get his head down behind the sight as it tends to push the oxygen mask upwards on the gunners face; and also considerable vibration is experienced on the sight when the gun is fired.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Combats for April numbered 81, resulting in 5 enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed, 1 as probably destroyed and 7 damaged. The maximum number for any one operation was 24 and this was on the 22/23rd April on Brunswick five claims being made on that night; 1 destroyed, 1 probable and 2 damaged. Combats on French targets were few, but these sorites are not to be treated lightly by air gunners and the most vigilant search is to be maintained at all times. Squadrons must include instruction on search during night vision training. Search from the rear turret is difficult as it entails the rear gunner standing or crouching in a most uncomfortable position for short periods to enable him to see below and astern; this must be carried out as the view below is very poor when the gunner is in the seat.
[Underlined] SELF TOWED DROGUES [/underlined]
This practice has not been carried out on the scale it was hoped for, due to a variety of reasons, the main one being the shortage of brackets for attachment to the aircraft. Some Stations have had difficulty in obtaining the material for the manufacture of these items and snags have been met in obtaining the quick release unit. Gunnery Leaders should press for this equipment to enable a consensus of opinion to be obtained on the value of the exercise. Self tow at night with the drogue illuminated is the best step and should present no difficulties when Squadrons are satisfied that the existing equipment is satisfactory.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO. 77 COURSE. [/underlined]
F/O Wyand – 9 Sqdn. – 83.8% - Cat. “B”.
F/O Fisher – 1660 C.U. – 77.8% - Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 14. [/underlined]
F/O Gross – 1660 C.U. – Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 17. [/underlined]
P/O Hammond – 619 Sqdn. – Cat. “A”.
Congratulations to P/O Hammond on obtaining first place on the course.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
49 Sqdn. “M” 20/21st April,1944 FW.190 C.
106 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 ME.109 C.
467 Sqdn. “N” 26th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “B” 29/30th April,1944 FW.190 C.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
619 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 JU. 88 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
44 Sqdn. “Z” 9/10th April,1944 ME.110 C.
207 Sqdn. “A” 22/23rd April, 1944 ME.210 C.
467 Sqdn. “W” 22nd April,1944 ME.109 C.
630 Sqdn. “J” 24th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “T” 24th April,1944 ME.109 C.
97 Sqdn. “Q” 24th April,1944 JU.88 C.
[Table of Air Training for April showing Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS (Contd. From page 11, col.3) [/underlined]
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
A Stirling made a crash landing last month and the only man injured was the rear gunner. He was also unique in that he was the only man not in his crash position.
A Squadron aircraft crashed in poor visibility. There were several diversion airfields available and the pilot was told to stand by and orbit Base. But he thought he’d come down to have a look!! He and two occupants were killed as a result.
Two aircrew baled out over the Wash. They did not take their ‘K’ type dinghy, and so threw away their last chance.
An experienced captain was recently forced to make an early return. His Flight Commander removed his pitot head cover for him when he landed.
Another “gen man” thought it unnecessary to await the ground crew’s signal to leave dispersal. He taxied into the tail of an aircraft in front of him. Both aircraft are CAT A/C!!
A very much sadder and wiser crew landed badly shot up recently. They explained they had lost the Concentration. The pilot had put red on black on one course. Yes it can still happen!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of April was 1635, of these 952 produced plottable ground detail, this increase being due to better conditions and the type of attack. It will be seen from the analysis that the percentage of failures is still excessive with a considerable increase in failures attributed to “no flash” illumination”. [sic]
There can be no doubt that, in the past, many flash failures were passing through as “flash muffled by cloud”, since it is impossible to assess bombing frames exposed by the light from fires on the ground when cloud conditions are 10/10ths. This is no attempt to draw attention to the high percentage of Armament failures; failures, whatever the cause, result in the loss of very valuable information and represent a loss in efficiency.
Photographic and Armament personnel must co-operate with each other to establish the [underlined] real cause [/underlined] of these failures; Type 35 camera controls and photo flash fuse settings must be identical with each other. It is not enough to set the control pointer to the required setting. Make sure that the timing of the control agrees with that indicated upon the setting dial before it is fitted to the aircraft; adjustments can be made to the pointer where necessary.
It is again necessary to stress that once the aircraft have returned from the attack, the production of the photographic results in the minimum period of time is essential to the Air Staff. The majority of the section personnel are aware of this fact, but improvement can be made by better organisation and attention to the following:-
(i) Ensure that everything is ready to commence processing as soon as the first magazines arrive (at one section seven minutes were lost between the time of the first magazine going into the darkroom and the lights being switched off).
(ii) The photographer detailed to receive the film magazine from the aircrew must obtain essential information and pass the first four or six magazines to the processing section in the quickest possible manner. (One section wasted valu-
{Continued on Page 14 Column 3)
[Table of Photographic Analysis Results by Squadron]
TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD MONTH FOR TRAINING BASE [/underlined]
During April, 51 Base flew more hours and passed out more crews than ever before in its existence. The Stirling Conversion Units produced a grand total of 5500 flying hours, and the Lancaster Finishing School a total of almost 1900 hours. The Lancaster Finishing School posted 109 crews to squadrons and 95 crews were posted into the Lancaster Finishing School for Lancaster training.
These results were achieved as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of maintenance personnel and instructional staffs throughout the Base, despite the fact that the first ten days of the month produced little flying owing to bad weather. The operational stations in the Group assisted by providing their airfields for circuits and landings when training base airfields were overcrowded.
With excellent co-operation between this Group and 10 and 12 Fighter Groups, Training Base flew Bullseyes on 18 nights. Crews also took part in Command Bullseyes, including three spoofs over the North Sea which, in addition to providing good D.R. practice for the Navigators, helped divert the enemy’s fighter strength from the operations against enemy centres in France.
The main concern during the month has been burst tyres on Lancasters and Stirlings, and every precaution is being taken to reduce these to a minimum, because it is fully appreciated that the minor mishap caused by a burst tyre can well lead to a serious accident. The overall total of accidents for the Base is still too high, and the staff is pressing forward strongly with an “accident reduction” drive.
The forthcoming expansion in Training Base by which 132 crews are to be produced each month, has led to a revision of the Ground Syllabus and the Flying Syllabus. The revised Flying Syllabus is not yet effective, but will come into operation during May. There has been an expansion of H 2 S training in the two Units at present equipped for this training, and when 1654 Conversion Unit at Wigsley becomes productive, the periodical shortage of H 2 S crews should cease.
AIR SEA RESCUE
It is a very easy thing, when ordered to practice Parachute or Dinghy Drills to go out to an aircraft sit around smoking for half an hour and then report back to the Flight Office “D.C.O.” These drills are the “Safety Drills” and the instinct of self preservation alone should make crews practice them until “Practice makes Perfect”.
Generally speaking parachute drills are carried out more conscientiously than Dinghy Drills, but in recent incidents in this Group it appears that even this drill is not receiving the attention it should. Note the findings of the investigating officer after a recent fatal accident. “It seems doubtful whether the crew had done the amount of parachute drill accredited to them in the “Flight Records”. In other words completed records may save you a lot of bother, but unless the records are true they are valueless and wasteful.
Let us face facts. Even [underlined] you [/underlined] may be shot down and bale-out or ditch some time or other. If you have just a rough working knowledge of the drills, some of the crew will probably save their lives, but, equally probably, some will lose their lives. If you and your crew are word and action perfect in the drill, you will live to fight again, and get a good spell of “Survivors’ leave” into the bargain. Most probably!
Saturday morning had now been set aside as the time when every available crew is to spend at least an hour on these Safety Drills. It should also be regarded as a suitable time to acquaint aircrews with the latest safety equipment and modifications. This period, however, should not be regarded as an excuse for not doing drills at other times. There’ll be the odd occasion when you are elsewhere on a Saturday morning.
One Base has issued instructions that crews are to be ordered at Briefing, from time to time, that they are to do these drills after landing from Operations – when tired and in darkness, when their physical condition is similar to that when facing a real “Bods out” or ditching, or baling our [sic] conditions. This is a very good way of doing things – you get the maximum benefit, as you are already in full flying kit, with the minimum of effort.
In March 36.9% of aircrews in all Groups who ditched in “Home Waters” were saved, while 397 lost their lives. The fact that 73 lives were lost in crews where other members were saved stresses the importance of drills. The Americans are still making better use of your Air Sea Rescue Service than you are.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT (Continued from Page 15 Col.2) [/underlined]
stations in the near future to service the F.N.64 turrets prior to their being returned to Maintenance Units – a step in the right direction at last. All Armament Officers can assist in speeding up this servicing process by ensuring that a hydraulic turret test rig and a complete set of tools are available for the party when they arrive. Don’t leave it until the day the party is expected, and so waste a day collecting the equipment from various dispersed points around the station. Do it now and ensure that the floor space at present cluttered up by these turrets is made available for more important equipment.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
A record number of sorties has been carried out during April and it was pleasing to note that note that the cancellations due to technical defects were: Early Returns .73% - Cancellations .69% - both being very definite improvements.
The number of engine failures which occur and necessitate change of an engine before the completion of its life are not decreasing at the rate we should expect now that a more reliable engine forms the bulk of our holdings. The Merlin 24 from which we expected such high performance is doing its best to produce this performance. It is however handicapped by the fact that paddle-blade propellers and AY/118 constant speed units have invariably been fitted to this type of engine, the results being that instances are occurring of over speeding and the odd case of engine disintegration. Action is in hand to fit modified C.S.U’s and this must go ahead with all possible speed.
The Merlin 28 and 38 still suffer from loss of coolant occasionally, and we still get failures due to fracture of the oil pipe to the dual drive, mainly due to the slow rate at which the modified oil pipe is being supplied.
It is pleasing to see the local improvements which are being carried out by C.T.O’s the improvement of technical sites on the “self help” scheme and the general clean-up and overhaul of equipment.
Although the introduction of a technical adjutant was mainly to allow the C.T.O. to be out amongst the aircraft more, there may be a tendency for the C.T.O’s to leave too much to the technical adjutant. This is a point which must be watched and although it is not the intention to pin the C.T.O. to his office, he must keep a tight control on correspondence, returns and technical reports and keep “au fait” with all leaflets and technical letters issued.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
It is gratifying to note that the maintenance of the Mk.XIV Bombsight improves month by month, as is evidenced by recent photographs of targets after a visit by 5 Group. Ground crews in general share in these achievements, but the instrument repairer deserves a special pat on the back for the hours well spent in tuning and levelling the Bombsights to produce these results.
The same degree of accuracy is unfortunately not apparent in the A.P.I./A.M.U. Cases are still being reported of “racing” of the A.M.I. despite the fitting of Command Modification No. 57. This “racing” can be attributed in most cases to incorrect tension of the relay spring and as no test equipment is yet available the fault cannot be laid at the door of bad maintenance. Efforts are being made to obtain the necessary tension gauges so that this fault can be cured. In the meantime units must make every effort to complete the manufacture of the Coningsby A.P.I./A.M.U. test bench, details of which were forwarded several weeks ago.
April witnessed the introduction of new equipment the responsibility of which rests on the instrument repairer. The most important is the nitrogen installation. It is not necessary to demand the ground charging equipment, but units must advise their Equipment Officer when an aircraft with nitrogen is received so that the necessary steps can be taken to obtain the charging equipment. At the same time the Group electrical officer must also be informed.
The other item of new equipment arriving in aircraft is the Mk.VIII Automatic Control, the introduction of which should ease maintenance problems. The Group servicing van has been round all operational stations to give preliminary instructions on the maintenance of this instrument and courses of three weeks’ duration will shortly become available to those personnel who have already attended the Mk.IV Control course. The question of the inferior luminous markings of the Mk.IA repeater has been brought to the notice of Headquarters Bomber Command, and it is hoped that an improvement will be made shortly.
The Electrical Sections – particularly those in Base major servicing units – continue to do a good job of work, despite the increasing number of modifications in which the Electrician is involved. Further modifications of an operational necessity are on the way, so electrical officers must give all future suggested modifications very serious consideration before submitting them to higher authority, if the electrical sections are not to be overburdened.
A word about Bumph. There appears to be a rooted objection among electrical officers to put pen, pencil or typewriter – if you can get one – to paper. Base and Station electrical officers must realise that it is impossible to get on without a certain minimum of paper work and promptness in replies is essential. If you are asked to reply to a question by a certain date make sure that your reply is one time.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability for Stirling and Lancaster]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV. (Contd. From Page 9 Column 3) [/underlined]
This dangerous habit must cease. Some navigators seem to use R.F. Units and Stud Settings as toys to be changed and switched about to see what fixes they can obtain; the result is incorrect fixes, and chaos. These navigators are playing right into the enemy’s hands, particularly if they obtain signals which do not emanate from our Gee Stations!”
All Navigators must realise the importance of the above points as it is possible that in future several operations per night may be planned with an XF possibility for each operation. If navigators persist in using XF’s which are not assigned to them and phased for their route, there will be multitudes of incorrect fixes, and possibly casualties as a result of careless navigation.
Flight Engineers
In the past the Flight Engineers have been selected from Group I or II tradesmen; having been in the R.A.F. for long periods they gained quite considerable experience of many types of aircraft and engines, and therefore the changeover to their new duties was easy.
To-day we are faced with the problem of having to train pupils who perhaps a few weeks ago, had never seen inside an aircraft. During their training in the early stages, many subjects are taught which would appear to have no bearing on their job as Flight Engineers; this must be done however, so that later in the course, when boost control, hydraulics and pneumatics are explained, the pupil will have the basic knowledge to understand them. This takes time, and as we must produce more and more Flight Engineers, time cannot be spared to train them as Fitters. They are trained as Flight Engineers but perhaps a few corners remain that can be “polished off” by the Flight Engineer Leader.
The Flight Engineer Leader in a Squadron is responsible for training new members until he is satisfied that after a personal check, they can carry out the duties as laid down in A.M.O. A.538/43. He must make them continue their practical training, and whenever possible let them be with the ground crews on Daily Inspections, or any other work on their aircraft. Only in this way will good aircraft familiarisation be gained.
The training to be carried out in Squadrons must consist of Daily and Between Flight Inspections, instructions on the electrical panel, log keeping and engine limitations. The last subject is most important; only last month an early return which could have been avoided was made by a crew in this Group. On this occasion the oil pressure dropped to 50 lbs. per square inch at 20,000 feet, but the temperature remained at 80°C. Engine limitations laid down in A.P. 2062C (Pilot’s Notes) are:-
Oil Pressure minimum 45 lbs. per sq. in.
Oil temp. maximum 90°C.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY (Continued from Page 13 Col.1) [/underlined]
able time in processing a batch of films which had not been exposed, for the simple reason that the bombs had been brought back. This was negligence on the part of the airman who took over the magazines from the aircrew.
The photographic N.C.O. is responsible for the first film analysis and must decide whether it is a success or failure. Despite repeated instructions, many instances still occur where films are sent to this Headquarters as successes when in fact they are failures, and failures which should be classified as successes. This wastes the time spent on correspondence and telephone calls. One N.C.O. stated that it was because everything was required in a rush; this is true. THE AIR STAFF MUST HAVE PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS as soon as they can be produced and in ensuring this there must be no reduction of effort. Once the prints have been despatched, all films should be carefully re-examined, to ensure that no mistakes have been made.
Now that Headquarters, Bomber Command have reduced the amount of photographic printing, an improvement in the printing quality is expected. Faint ground details which could be plotted is often lost through poor processing and printing.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
The expression “unable owing to pressure of work” has become the password for excusing a dirty and untidy bomb dump. A slovenly bomb dump is too often the hall mark of poor workmanship and the effect is cumulative until unstacked empty cases, broken trollies and transporters disposed at random are taken for granted.
It takes little longer during a fusing operation to stock the tail boxes when removing the tails, rather than strew them indiscriminately over a large area; the effort is not great but the resultant tidiness is surprising.
A scene reminiscent of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow can be avoided if only a few men are employed on cleaning up after a fusing detail. If the broken transporters, trollies and liners are not repairable, write them off for scrap metal – the country needs it.
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH [/underlined]
Nearly 7% of the total number of photoflashes carried in April have been classed as flash failure. The classification flash failure is given when:-
(i) There is no indication of illumination on frames 6, 7 and 8 (or 4, 5 and 6 in the old sequence) of the film.
(ii) The fusing wire from the fuse is brought back.
(iii) There is no indication of violent evasive action on any of the bombing frames.
(iv) The camera control is checked and found correct.
(v) The electrical circuit and release slip are found serviceable.
This figure of 7% is excessive and so much higher than any previous month that it must be assumed, as in many cases the same lot numbers were used over two consecutive months, that some of this 7% was, in fact, incorrect fuse setting and bad maintenance. Co-operation with the photographic section can solve this problem.
[Underlined] “J” CLUSTERS [/underlined]
Loading ramps and rollers for 500 lb “J” clusters should be spring cleaned so that the clusters which are now arriving in quantity may be loaded directly on the rollers, thus saving double humping.
[Underlined] SUPPLY [/underlined]
Owing to the present precarious supply position of certain weapons the C.O. and personnel of No.93 M.U. have been called upon to produce stores at a moment’s notice from nowhere. To the credit of 93 M.U. these stores always turn up, but it is realised how much extra work is entailed in meeting a rush demand.
The staff of 93 M.U. are extremely well informed regarding the requirements and difficulties of operational armament, but it is doubted if Armament Officers realise the difficulties of the M.U. who handled nearly 30,000 tons of bombs last month.
It is suggested that Armament Officers could spend a profitable day by accompanying an Austin to the M.U. and see for themselves how large scale humping is organised.
[Underlined] MANIPULATION FAILURES. [/underlined]
A marked increase in manipulation failures has been apparent this month resulting in a large number of bombs and pyrotechnics being returned to base. The more outstanding “boobs” are set out below:-
1. 2 S.B.C’s complete with contents returned to Base – distributor arm fouled by the quadrant peg card. No jettison action carried out.
2. The following stores were returned to Base due to non-[underlined] selection [/underlined]:-
2 x 4.5” photoflashes
2 x 250 lb Target Indicators
2 x 7” Hooded Flare Clusters
1 x 1000 lb M.C.
NO FURTHER COMMENT IS NECESSARY.
[Underlined] FN.64 TURRETS [/underlined]
The turret servicing party is visiting all
(Continued on Page 4 Column 2) [sic]
[Table of Failures by Squadron]
FLYING CONTROL
The high standard of landing achieved last month has been maintained during April. It is significant to note that SKELLINGTHORPE who pioneered this scheme when it was first introduced and in fact, carried out all the trials, have risen to the top of the ladder with an excellent average of 1.85 minutes.
The most outstanding figure for the month, however, is 30 aircraft landed in 36 minutes at Waddington. This is, in fact, the finest performance which has ever been put up within the Group and possibly within the Command. The following are some examples of really first-class performances for the month:-
[Table of Selected Flying Control Sessions by Stations]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
It is hoped to introduce shortly a competition embracing all Flying Control aspects. This will be judged on a quarterly basis and the condition and efficiency of every part of the Station Flying Control organisation will
(Continued on Page 6 Column 2)
[Table of April Landing Times by Station]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
Our brief this month was abundantly clear. With the Allied air offensive continuing almost uninterruptedly on a rising scale against communications targets and airfields, it appeared certain that our own role would be integrated in the common plan to wear down the Western Wall. To this end we have seen during the course of the month a revolution in our bombing technique confirming the undoubted accuracy of low level precision attacks.
The importance of hammering railway targets as a means of reducing the enemy’s capacity to meet a threat from the West was fully recognised. On 10/11th TOURS was effectively attacked, followed by JUVISY and LA CHAPELLE on 18/19th and 21/22nd respectively. The results in each case were impressive. At Tours an exceptional concentration with over 100 hits fell on the track disrupting all communications. A particularly high precedent was established at Juvisy. Here we achieved one of the greatest concentrations of craters yet obtained on a target of this type – the attack almost completely devastating the marshalling yards.
The attack on La Chappelle was no less successful. Damage is severe at the southern end of the Marshalling Yard which sustained the main weight of the attack. Large fires were still burning in the area the day following the raid, and it could be seen that tracks had been severed at several important junctions. The importance which the enemy attaches to keeping his railroads open, and the difficulties which he is experiencing in handling even high priority traffic is perhaps reflected in the fact that some 50000 Germans have now been transported into France to relieve the situation and, furthermore, German branch lines have been torn up to provide new tracks.
This wearing down process is also being applied with particular attention to the Luftwaffe itself, its sources of supply being very seriously threatened by repeated attacks on aircraft factories. On 5/6th, 605 tons of bombs were dropped on four plants at TOULOUSE. The S.N.C.A.S.E. Aircraft Assembly Plant has sustained serious damage to its three main buildings – the assembly plant, component store, and testing shop. At the A.I.A. Works, every building is more or less severely damaged, while the Aircraft Factory buildings are all damaged – amongst those completely destroyed being the components manufactory shop, components store, drawing offices, heat treatment and plate shop. The Montaudran Airfield is now without its three principal hangars, and has suffered damage to other unidentified buildings.
Coupled with the first attack on St. Medard-on-Jalles (reported later) was a raid on the KIELLER Airframe Factory near OSLO – PRU cover is not complete, but the photographs available indicate that damage is considerable in the North Eastern part of the target area, including heavy destruction in the Bayerische Motorenwerke.
It is perhaps interesting to note that following the attack on CLERMONT FERRAND Aulnat Aircraft Factory, the sick bay is almost the only building undamaged. It is open to some doubt as to whether this fact can be accepted as a tribute to our precision bombing, but whatever the position may be in this respect, it is manifest that this Repair Factory will not be available to the enemy for a long time to come.
The attack on the ST CYR Signals Equipment Depot on 10/11th was highly successful – resulting in the destruction of several of the principal buildings in the Depot.
Although the focus of attention was directed on rail centres and other special targets in the occupied zone, this concentration in policy did not imply that other forms of attack would be discontinued; still less that they were conceived independently of the supreme invasion task. In fact four “blitz” attacks were staged during the course of the month. AACHEN was singled out for attack on 11/12th. Throughout the city – particularly to the South and South West, industrial and residential damage has been fairly severe, while the Main Station and sidings, large Passenger Station, Locomotive Sheds, and Goods Depot Shed have suffered heavily. Reconnaissance following our attack on BRUNSWICK on 22/23rd is not complete, but from the photographs obtained, it can be seen that damage is considerable in the business/residential area South of the City Centre, with many hits in the South Eastern marshalling yards. A high measure of success also attended the attack on MUNICH on 24/25th.
[Underlined] RIDER [/underlined]
Until that date this Nazi birthplace had escaped serious damage, but it is now known that the town has suffered its first heavy battering. No interpretation of the reconnaissance photographs is yet available but even to the unpractised eye it is obvious that the target is severely hit. Widespread areas of devastation are apparent in the old city (which is 30 - 40% gutted) continuing in a wide sear from East to West up to and including the Main Railway Station. The Nazi Party meeting place Kreig Ministerium and Prinz Leopold Platz, to mention but a few of the important Municipal Buildings are either destroyed or severely damaged.
Fierce fighter activity was encountered in defence of SCHWEINFURT on 26/27th. Despite this violent reaction, however, the attack was pressed home, resulting in severe damage to all five ball-bearing plants, in particular to the Deutsche Star Kugalhalter where two thirds of the machine shops have been demolished. The adjoining marshalling yards have also sustained damage, and there are many incidents throughout the town.
No less important were our minelaying trips on 9/10th, 18/19th and again on 23/24th. These sorties probably lack the spectacle of a bombing attack, but their sinister loads will doubtless reap a very real contribution in the war harvest.
The culminating stage of the month was in the final raid on 29/30th against the Explosives Works at ST. MEDARD-on-JALLES. A pass had already been made at this same target the previous night, but had been frustrated by unfortunate weather conditions. So with redoubled vigour another attack was launched. On this occasion the weather chose to be our ally, and the opportunity afforded was seized to produce one of the most impressive pyrotechnic displays. For more than half an hour the target was in the throes of a succession of violent explosions. The greatest concentration of the attack fell to the North East of the works area extending across the centre of the works to the western border. A most heartening result and an inspiring conclusion to the month’s work.
The above achievements were contributed by 1950 Lancs and 84 Mosquitos – 88.6% of which were successful in attacking the primary, with 2.5% casualties.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Statistics by Squadron showing Availability, Sorties, Results and Points]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944
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V Group News, April 1944
5 Group Newsletter April 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 21, April 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about process of servicing, gardening, navigation, honours and awards, signals / radar, tactics, air bombing, radar / navigation, link trainer, sports, war savings, accidents, gunnery, training, air sea rescue, engineering, armament, flying control, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-04
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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16 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-25
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Tours
France--Toulouse
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
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1944-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Metheringham
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Base Commander.
Base Int: [Stamp]
MARCH * 1944* CONFIDENTIAL * NO * 20
V GROUP NEWS V
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
March proved a record month for 5 Group, with a total of 1720 aircraft despatched, and a bomb load of 7200 tons. The month also showed a lower figure for early returns at 4.01%, and a missing rate well below the average for the past six months.
Outstanding during the month were the series of attacks on small targets, by individual Bases. These were well undertaken and caused much damage to the French aircraft industry, which is engaged on sub-contracting and repair work for the G.A.F. – work which is of increasing importance as the major factories in Germany are obliterated by the U.S. .A.F.
These attacks call for exact marking, accurate bombing and good signals communications. Much training is still necessary before every operation runs smoothly and can be undertaken with equal success on dark nights, by the aid of flares instead of the moon. That such attacks are possible is shown by the success achieved by No. 617 Squadron, who in this respect are acting as pioneers and gaining invaluable experience of a type of attack which is of growing importance.
The success which this Squadron has achieved was rewarded by a special visit from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the United States Strategic Air Forces, and General Doolittle, Commanding the 8th Bomber Force, who came to see for themselves the methods which are employed.
Further evidence of the wide interest which is being taken in these attacks can be found in the Air Intelligence Summary of the United States Strategic Forces in Europe, for the week ending April 2nd.
An article headed “R.A.F. Precision Attacks by Night”, after describing the results of many of the recent attacks, including those undertaken by all squadrons in this Group, continues as follows:-
“Relatively small formations of Lancasters, manned by experienced and carefully trained crews, are responsible for the success of these missions, an outstanding feature of which has been the economy of force used to produce the desired result. Expert navigation followed by pin point marking of the target by a single aircraft at low level, has permitted visual bombing with a precision comparable to the best results obtained in daylight.”
This praise, coming from the United States Air Force, is indeed welcome, for we recognise the magnificent results which they are achieving by day. If we think that precision bombing by night is not only possible, but in some respects easier than precision bombing by day, as well as being more economical, it is up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that our conviction is right by the only valid method – that of results. I hope that during April we shall have an opportunity of gaining further experience and providing further proof of what can be done.
With so much activity in front of the Group a heavier load than ever will be placed on the Training Base. It is going to be hard work for everyone, but it is only through their efforts that we have been able to carry out these damaging attacks. I congratulate all ranks in the Base on having achieved the full planned output of crews throughout the winter months, in spite of great difficulties of weather and an unexpected change in the type of aircraft used for conversion training. The requirements from now on are for the maximum number of crews who can be trained with the available resources.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION
For the first two years of the war, the policy of operational navigation was controlled by individual Station and Squadron Commanders. Routeing, timing, heights to fly and recommendations of the best Navigational aids then available were decided locally.
As the Command effort increased, and the enemy night defences grew stronger, it became necessary to route aircraft in concentration; thus, routeing was taken over by Bomber Command. The concentration achieved was still poor, however. There were several contributory factors:-
(i) Lack of Navigational aids which would enable all aircraft to establish their positions when over enemy territory.
(ii) Inaccurate flying of courses by Pilots due to weaving, evasive action, etc.
(iii) Inaccuracies in calculations and computations by navigators.
(iv) Due to the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, the inability of the Navigator to determine the correct wind velocities.
A concentrated drive was then made to remove these shortcomings. Gee, and later H.2.S. was introduced to enable Navigators to determine their position over enemy territory. The introduction of the A.P.I. which maintains an accurate air plot, gave the Navigator a method of recording inaccuracies of the aircraft and of the pilot which would normally pass unnoticed. Weaving was forbidden. More attention during the Navigator’s training, was given to computations and the elimination of careless mathematical errors.
H 2 S and the A.P.I., however, were not available to the entire force, and the average Navigator was still unable to determine correct wind velocities. An analysis of many raids proved that a certain number of experienced Navigators, with the required aids, could find accurate winds, and it was decided to let the whole force benefit by the experience and capabilities of these crews. The scheme was pioneered by this Group on several occasions, and the results were very successful. It was then adopted by Bomber Command for general use. The procedure is as follows
15/25 crews from each Group flying in aircraft equipped with H 2 S and A.P.I. are detailed as “wind finders”. The Navigators of these aircraft obtain wind velocity checks as often as possible, and transmit to Base all wind velocities found.
Before the operation, the Senior Met. Officer at Group prepares a chart illustrating the route, the meridian code and the estimated position of aircraft at broadcast times. Attached to this chart is a list of the wind finding aircraft. As each wind is received, it is entered in the column allotted to the particular aircraft.
The wind signals from aircraft are intercepted at Group Headquarters by the Signals Section, who keep a monitoring watch on all Base frequencies. From the time of breaking enemy R.D.F. cover, signals runners are constantly employed delivering wind messages to the Met. Office.
There is a hook up between all Group Met. Sections within the Command, and winds received from the entire force are collated. The Met. Officer sits with one eye on his chart and one eye on the clock, and five minutes before the next broadcast is due, a forecast wind is issued, and, if necessary, a corrected past wind.
As the raid progresses, and the chart fills up, so the look of satisfaction grows on the Senior Met. Officer’s face. Sometimes there are blanks when aircraft cannot obtain a wind velocity check, due to u/s equipment, or because aircraft have returned early. At other times a wind velocity obtained is not transmitted by the aircraft until long after it has left the area to which the wind velocity applies. In both instances, this gives the Met. Staff so much less information on which to base their corrections and forecasts. There have been instances when they have had no more than two or three wind velocities over a detailed area, and even then there have been large discrepancies. A good example is the Berlin raid of 24/25 March, 1944, when only 9 wind velocities were received, homeward bound, from the target to the enemy coast – 2 1/4 hours flying! In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult to give you accurate forecast winds. Crews now realise how important it is to obtain as many wind velocity checks as possible, and pass them to Base immediately. Even if the wind velocity obtained differs considerably from the forecast on the Form 2330, then providing you are confident of the fix used, send back the w/v you have found. If you have “boobed”, then the Met. Staff can, and will, see this, and no harm will be done. There will be no “strips” for the crew concerned. If, however, you obtain a w/v and [underlined] DO NOT [/underlined] send it back, then you are withholding vital information which may affect the safety of the whole Bomber Force, including your own.
The Group Met. Staff have had considerable experience of this scheme, and they are getting to know the various windfinders. One often hears a remark in the Met. Office “Old Snooks is flying in “F”57 tonight, we shall get some reliable winds from him” – and they do!! They know that each wind “Old Snooks” sends back will be reliable, and his messages are greatly treasured.
A Navigator is employed in the Met. Office whose duty it was in the past, to present to the Air Staff the effect of the corrected w/v’s on track and time keeping, and whether aircraft would arrive at the target early or late. All went well until the attack on Leipzig on the night of 19/20th February, when it was obvious from application of the broadcast winds that aircraft would arrive at the target 10 – 15 minutes early. We all know the result – 79 aircraft lost.
The obvious way to tackle this problem was to adjust the zero hour, and since we were obtaining from aircraft reliable information of true winds over enemy territory, a scheme was devised whereby the zero hour could be amended if necessary. The Duty Navigator in the Command Met. Office ascertains from application of the corrected w/v’s, whether the aircraft will arrive at the target early on time, or late, and consequently whether the zero hour needs amending. All H 2 S wind finders in this Group transmit the times at which they pass two datum points on the route. It is obvious, however, that both calculations will be valueless unless all aircraft [underlined] do [/underlined] leave the concentration point [underlined] exactly [/underlined] on time, and fly at the speeds laid down at the Flight Planning Conference. It must also be obvious to the reader, that unless wind information and times at the datum points are sent back by aircraft immediately, then there will be neither sufficient information on which to base an amendment to the zero hour, nor time in which to take necessary action.
Accurate time keeping, good concentration and correct timing of the attack, in short the success of the operation, depend on every wind finder knowing and doing his job. It’s up to you.
WHERE TO LOOK
A.O.C’s Foreword. Page 1
Aircrew Volunteers. 6
Air Bombing. 7
Air Sea Rescue. 8
Absence. 11
Accidents. 14
Armament. 15
Bombing, Air. 7
Decorations. 6
Engineering. 14
Equipment. 11
Flying Control. 5
Flight Engineers. 6
Gardening. 4
Gee. 5
Gunnery. 9
H 2 S. Page 5
Link Trainer Times. 10
Navigation, Progress of. 2
Navigation. 13
Organisation. 14
Operations. 16
Progress of Navigation. 2
Photography. 4
Public Relations. 10
Signals/Radar. 3
Second Thoughts for Pilots 10
Sports. 12
Tactics. 6
Training. 11
War Effort. 16
War Savings. 6
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
March was not the best of months from the Aircrew Signals point of view, and it is to be hoped that Signals Leaders will make every endeavour to effect an improvement in the coming month.
You may not have any connection with the following examples but is that because you know all the answers, or is it that you have not been caught out.
There was once a Wireless Operator (Air) who after 14 operational sorties, used the spelling table of CD0250 for the following – REQUEST Q.F.E. – a total of 5 Groups where 1 Group would have covered the situation. Five minutes instruction per day would prevent any unnecessary waste of ether time.
Once upon a time (in March) a Wireless Operator (Air) gave out the wrong Bomber Code, which all the simpletons in his section accepted without a murmur. It is said at this Headquarters that all the murmuring came from the Duty Signals Officer – I wouldn’t know. In days gone by (March again), a Wireless Operator (Air) did not know where to find the fuse of his Visual Monica equipment, and the aircraft had no Early Warning Device – a congratulatory message from the Luftwaffe is expected any day. Talking of Early Warning Devices, the writer knows of two Operators (no names, no Grade 1) who did not know how to cope with simple fault finding.
Now we can do better than this, and it is suggested that every Signals Leader has a daily session with all the Wireless Operators, just ten minutes every morning will pay handsome dividends.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The new system of reporting the performance of Early Warning Devices by pro-forma is working very well, thanks to the co-operation of all concerned. This is going to save a lot of time and unnecessary telephone calls, which ultimately will help the war effort. Since the last News, a new instruction on the use of I.F.F. when circling dinghies or crashed aircraft, has been brought into force, 5G/S.4403/50/Sigs, of 23rd March, refers.
On Flight Planning for Thursday, 30th March, the Air Officer Commanding outlined the danger to the Bomber Force caused by selfish captains trying to but [sic] a little extra security for themselves at the expense of their fellow captains, when they order their Wireless Operators into the Astro-dome. It is hoped that this point has now gone right home, and that there will be nor further occurrence of this practice.
Just one more item that requires the attention of all Airborne Signals types. The constant back tuning that goes on during every operation, and the passing back of wind messages during the normal transmission times. When you read the first part of these notes again, as it is hoped you will, add a reminder about back tuning and listening out, to your daily session.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
Two good points stand out for the month; they are both from No.57 Squadron.
P/O. Bracker, on the night of 24/25th did some quick thinking to get his R1155 working and receive the broadcasts.
On the same night, Sgt. Robinson saw on his Fishpond screen, two aircraft close together. He reported this, and gunners reports a combat taking place. The aircraft joined in the fight, drew the enemy aircraft’s fire and eventually shot it down.
This is an excellent example of the intelligent use of Fishpond – a good show by the W/Op and his crew.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]
Congratulations to F/Lt. Stevens, Signals Leader of No.57 Squadron, on obtaining an “A” category on No.5 Signals Leader’s Course.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures for March is considerably lower than for February, being less than 50% of the February figures. No Signals failure was responsible for a cancelled sortie, but out of the total of 24 failures reported, four were the reason for, or a contributory cause of, early returns.
The very small percentage contribution to early returns for March 0.235% against 1.30% for February is a welcome indication of a general drive to eliminate the possibility of Signals contribution in any way to a cancelled or abandoned sortie.
This does not mean that failure reports generally show a decrease. On the contrary, the conscientious reporting of any type of failure whatsoever, irrespective of whether it affects the success of the sortie or not, or even appears on the raid report, is essential.
A perusal of the details of failures for March, shows that one Squadron reported ten failures, none of which caused an early return; but they do provide the information required to enable action to be taken to institute modifications which will, in time, make failures almost impossible. The more attention which is paid to reporting failures the sooner will the improvements be incorporated.
We do not wish to take part in any competition between Groups for the lowest number of reported failures, but we must show the lowest percentage contributing to cancellations and early returns.
[Underlined] COUNTERMEASURE MANDREL [/underlined]
The fitting of Mandrel is proceeding satisfactorily. The great hold-up has been due to so many new aircraft arriving with the downward vision blister, thus denying us our original aerial position. However, Bomber Command have now authorised the removal of these blisters and, as a result, the aerial returns to its original position.
We still manage to fly a high proportion of the Command Mandrel effort.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]
During the month there occurred an outstanding example of loss of security on an operation through injudicious use of R/T. Take-off was 18.13, the route was northerly, and W/T silence was not to be broken until approximately 20.45. At 19.09 an early return called up his station, stating that his instruments were u/s, and requesting permission to land after jettisoning petrol. On being told to stand by, the E.R. stated that although he was aware that boomerang procedure was to jettison the cookie, he didn’t want to fly around much longer, and suggested jettisoning the petrol and landing with cookie. The ground station then requested details as to what was wrong with the aircraft instruments. After replying, the aircraft requested instructions again, and was told to jettison incendiaries safe, and pancake. This instruction was repeated, the aircraft carried out the instructions and returned, making a final reference to his cookie as a warning to ground crews. The entire conversation lasted 23 minutes, by which time any doubts the enemy might have had of the hostile intentions of the force plotted by his long range Radar must have been completely dispersed. “It is to be assumed” say Bomber Command, “that every time a word is spoken, it is heard by the enemy”. So, on this particular night, we gave him one hour’s prior notice of the attack and that is a luxury we can’t afford.
After many representations, the British Joint Communications Board have now conceded that for INTER RAF WORKING ONLY, J – Johnny may be used in lieu of J-Jig. For combined and joint working, J-Jig must still be used. This latter point is important. The probability of joint and combined working is imminent, and strict observance of the alphabet and standard procedure will play an important part in ensuring the smooth working of our forces.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee remains high, and shows a slight improvement over February. A total of 1201 Gee sorties were flown during the month, and in 96.7% of them the equipment was completely serviceable. It is hoped that a further increase can be shown next month.
Three new Radar Workshops have been completed during the month. All squadrons now possess their own building, which should help considerably to increase serviceability.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
H 2 S serviceability improved slightly during last month, but it is still far from satisfactory; the percentage serviceable to the target and back was 76%.
The new Filament Transformers, which have now flown up to 50 sorties, give every indication of being the solution to the main causes of unserviceability; unfortunately, production difficulties will cause considerable delay in a changeover programme. The arrival of a drier season should prevent a further source of unserviceability that has been caused by dampness. It is felt that a considerable percentage on non-reproduceable faults were due to such dampness.
Manipulation failures due to lack of experience with the equipment, still assume too high a percentage, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. A new switch procedure has been drawn up and put into force which, if strictly adhered to, should result in greater serviceability.
The repositioning of the Scanner Heater
(Continued on page 4, col.3)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Failures from all causes totalled 109, equalling 6.9%; this represents a decrease of 1.4% on the month of February. These technical failures remain persistently at 6-7% and there is no doubt that many of them can be avoided with more careful inspection and maintenance.
Instructions have been issued by Eng/Elect Branch to modify all Lancaster aircraft camera circuits; this is a return to bomb door operation of the camera. Briefly this circuit is wired through the Mk. XIV bombsight panel, and incorporates a relay which safeguards the camera from premature operation through deliberate or accidental movement of the pilot’s bomb door selector arm, provided that the bombsight graticule is not switched on. Once the bombsight graticule has been switched on, the circuit from the selector arm is “live”. Therefore, when the bomb doors are selected open, the camera winds over one frame; when the Air Bomber releases the bombs, the normal camera cycle commences. During the period that the Type 35 Control motor is running, the pilot’s selector arm circuit to the camera is “dead”, and should the doors be closed before the camera cycle is completed, the frame sequence remains uninterrupted.
An effort has been made to produce an ideal circuit, and the modification now being introduced is as near to the ideal as possible; for instance, switching on the graticule late i.e. after the bomb doors have been opened, would result in the loss of the first frame, and would bring the bombing frame into position at No.6 instead of No.7. This will be bad enough with ordinary H.S. night film, but with composite colour in use, the probable loss of ground detail on the bombing frame would be serious.
The introduction of this circuit does not mean that technical failures in Type 35 Controls and camera gear boxes are overcome. Careful inspection, testing and thorough maintenance, are the only cures. It is evident from failure reports that insufficient care is being taken to ensure that camera equipment issued from the Equipment Section is entirely satisfactory before installing it into operational aircraft.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadrons]
GARDENING
The Command planted 1,472 vegetables this month, 76% being distributed off the East Frisians, in Keil Bay and the Fehmarn Belt and off the French U-boat bases; the remainder in the Channel, off Holland and on the Spanish Iron Ore Routes. 3 Group planted over half the total 6 Group nearly 400 and 4 Group nearly 300.
This is the third month of intensive high altitude gardening and reports of results now coming in are proof of its success. So far this year the casualty rate due to Bomber Command’s mining is 5 ships sunk or damaged per week, but latest reports show that this has now increased to a rate of [underlined] 1.4 ships per day. [/underlined]
The most encouraging report has come to hand from a source now in this country, who, up until recently, has been obliged to sail the German North Sea Convoy Routes, and who had to “swim for it” at least once. “Minephobia” is so acute that whenever minelaying is even suspected, all traffic is stopped for 24 hrs. The crews of mine sweepers after a six months “tour”, now get three months leave, most of which is spent in hospitals specialising in the cure of neurosis.
Now that the various methods of high altitude mining have had fair operational trial, it is possible to lay down standard rules, and various orders lately issued will be consolidated. A point which stands out from the last three months work, is that the success of high altitude mining outside Gee range has been dependent on H 2 S aircraft being available either to mark for those not so fitted, or, in restricted gardens, to do the laying.
Undoubtedly the ideal method is a D.R. run from a visual pinpoint using the Mark XIV bombsight and aided by H 2 S, but weather conditions which will permit visual pinpointing unaided by markers are the exception rather than the rule.
Commander R. A. McDonald, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Vernon, explained to aircrews of 49, 57, 630, 207, and 106 Squadrons some of the pleasant little surprises that our mines spring on the enemy’s shipping and mine sweepers (and the devices which prevent them from being sprung on our own Armament staffs). He was unfortunately prevented from visiting other Squadrons, by operations.
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from page 3, col. 3)
has been practically completed, and during the last month no scanners have frozen where this modification has been incorporated. Bomber Command is also issuing a modification covering heating of Scanner Motors, and repositioning of the Scanner Heater Switch.
[Boxed] FISHPOND [/boxed]
This device also showed an improvement during the month, but here too a great deal of work remains to be done. The serviceability percentage for March was 78%.
W/Ops and Navigators still lack the training and co-ordination required to derive the full benefit from this Warning Device. It is to their own advantage to become fully proficient in its operation. A shortened maximum range has been experimented with, and those Operators who have used it express complete satisfaction. Bomber Command have been requested to approve this modification for general installation.
[Boxed] VISUAL MONICA [/boxed]
Serviceability continues to improve, and last month reached 89.5%. It is felt, however, that this figure may still be improved.
The amount of work spent on the Switch Motors has paid great dividends, and the old theory that the Motor was to blame has been refuted. In this connection, the changeover plugs for the aerial leads have proved very valuable on the few occasions when Switch Motors have stopped.
The introduction of Mark IV A.I. as a Tail Warning Device has made available from 54 Base further supplies of Visual Monica, with which it has been possible to almost completely equip the Group with Visual Tail Warning Devices, and thus eliminate Aural Monica.
[Boxed] A.I. [/boxed]
The new addition to Bomber aircraft has now seen considerable operational work, and shows the qualities of a fine Tail Warning Device. Serviceability was 78% for the two weeks it has been in operation. This will, without doubt, be raised week by week as personnel become fully conversant with the equipment.
Operators find the equipment easy to use, due to previous experience in Visual Monica, and are very enthusiastic. The elevation part has worked very satisfactorily in No. 617 Squadron, and a general installation programme is now in hand for the other A.I. squadrons.
[Underlined] SPORTS (Contd. From page 12, col. 3) [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUTURE EVENTS [/underlined]
RUGBY – No. 1 Air Landing Brigade is of the opinion that its Brigade Rugger side can put paid to a 5 Group representative team. The challenge is being joyfully taken up; the result should be a first class game.
CRICKET – It has, unfortunately, been impossible to obtain transport for a ‘straight’ Group Cricket League. The next best thing, a Group Cricket Knock-out, is being run. Full details will be forwarded to all stations. It [sic] the meantime, stations are advised to look up friendlies as usual.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
GEE
Ranges obtained on Gee this month were average on all major operations. Many Navigators however, obtained quite remarkable fixes on special operations, and in a number of cases over the targets. Single position lines from strong signals were intelligently used, and in a few cases Gee was used by Navigators as a means of homing to the special targets.
The mere fact that signals begin to fade into the jamming appears to act as a deterrent to many navigators who forget that jamming can occur in certain local areas on the continent. Once through a local jamming area fixes may again be obtained and under no circumstances should a Navigator neglect to check the Gee Indicator to see if this is so. If a local jamming area is encountered report it at interrogation for the benefit of others.
“Coding” does not appear to have caused any serious trouble and is reported to be phased and timed accurately. However, now that further instructions have been issued, navigators and wireless operators are warned to take greater care in reading the indicator to prevent serious mistakes being made. If you are uncertain of the present day instructions check up at your section now.
Don’t forget that the Southern and South-Eastern Chains are now on a new frequency. This recent changeover should solve the problem of break through pulses which have been reported recently.
The new North Eastern Chain is now operating daily for test purposes and reports on transmissions are requested. Navigators and Wireless Operators, this chain has been provided for your benefit, let us have these reports; in doing so you are helping the technicians to provide a better facility for yourselves. It is hoped that charts to cover this chain will be issued this month.
One word about descent through cloud and the correct homing procedure to Base. Air Staff Instructions lay down the procedure to be adopted for descent through cloud and homing to Base on Gee and these instructions must be followed. Navigators should ensure that the captain follows the correct procedure. Descent through cloud must be made between the correct lattice lines and along the correct homing lattice line applicable to base. Remember – individual lattice lines have been chosen for each airfield to prevent the risk of collision, and these are to be used like railway tracks. Follow the Green Indicator to safety.
H 2 S
H 2 S training on Squadrons this month was confined mainly to the Bombing Competition, and although a considerable number of aircraft were detailed, few obtained photographs owing to unsatisfactory target conditions. Of the results received to date, the majority are within one mile of the aiming point, reflecting great credit on the crews taking part. It is hoped to publish a summary of results in the next issue of the “News”.
Training at Conversion Units is improving and many crews are now completing 10 – 15 hours air training, which should prove of considerable benefit to the squadrons.
Full use is being made of the ground trainers both as navigational and bombing aids. Emphasis must be placed on the use of H 2 S as a navigational aid, particularly in the early stages of training, and trainer cross countries should be carried out with this point in mind. Navigators and Air Bombers must aim at a high standard of efficiency in both the taking and plotting of fixes, particularly as the whole of the Bomber Force depends on this aid for accurate broadcast winds.
An investigation has been carried out this month into all manipulation failures since the beginning of the year, and it is noted that they occur during the first 20 hours of air training and are mainly due to incorrect tuning. To overcome this, Aircraft Drill No.14 was issued setting out the correct H 2 S switching, tuning and re-tuning sequences and operators are to follow this procedure at all times. It is of no practical use to switch the set on, tune and leave it whilst Gee is in range, then commence trying to identify responses when out of Gee coverage, without re-tuning. Tuning varies with the height and time the set is on, so recheck frequently.
Bomber Command intend issuing in the near future a list of faults which can be remedied in the air. However, it is pointed out at this stage, operators are still failing to check fuses when the equipment goes unserviceable. This fault is the easiest which can be remedied in the air and failure to do this is inexcusable.
As always, practice makes perfect, and to overcome manipulation failures, operators should endeavour to spend considerable time tuning and re-tuning the bench set, following the procedure laid down in the drill. This applies to trained and untrained crews alike.
H 2 S and Fishpond are inter-dependent; consequently a manipulation failure on H 2 S leaves a crew without an essential warning device. This point alone easily outweighs all other arguments which may be brought up regarding manipulation failures. H 2 S operators and Wireless Operators must therefore realise that by spending a little time in training to keep efficient on both H 2 S and Fishpond, they are contributing to the safety of their aircraft and crew.
FLYING CONTROL
33 AIRCRAFT LANDED IN 45 MINS:
March has seen a further improvement in landing times, the average for the Group for the month being 2.13 minutes per aircraft. There is still, however, room for improvement in Single-squadron Stations, and Skellingthorpe has shown that the Landing Scheme can produce a high landing rate with small numbers of aircraft; on the night 18/19th March they landed fifteen aircraft in 25 minutes; the fact that a station only has one squadron to land is no excuse for poor landing times. If all single squadron stations follow Skellingthorpe’s example, then we can look forward to an overall Group average of well below the two minute mark.
Some excellent performances have been put up by Stations in this Group during the past month. Below are some figures which are the result of good flying discipline and good airmanship. They are not “peak period” figures, but are taken over the total period.
[Table of selected Aircraft recovery times by Station]
A conference was held at this Headquarters early in the month to review the landing scheme, and improve where necessary. One point raised was the difficulty in persuading pilots to adhere to the airspeeds laid down for return from the last concentration point. If you are one of the unfortunate ones, and are allotted one of the lower airspeeds, make up your mind to stick to it, for it does eliminate that tedious and highly dangerous orbiting of the airfield on return. There are many aircraft using a small piece of sky, and although we are not often troubled with intruders yet, one Hun fighter operating around 5 Group could do a deal of damage. If you rush back, you will certainly have to waste time before landing, so why not waste it peacefully over the sea, rather than be told to go for a short cross country in a congested area.
On reviewing diversions over the past six month it is obvious that standard R/T and control drills are lacking. As the result of a conference held at Headquarters Bomber Command, a standard method of control and R/T procedure has been agreed and will be issued shortly. It is to be used when aircraft are diverted away from Base and the 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme consequently not in operation. It is important that pilots have this procedure at their fingertips. Diversions are never a pleasant end to an operational sortie, but if you can get down at your diversion airfield with the minimum trouble, it makes the task an easier one for all concerned.
FOG DISPERSAL
The fog dispersal apparatus at Fiskerton was responsible for the landing of 14 aircraft during the month. The total number of aircraft landed to date, using this installation is 48. On the 17th March, when five aircraft landed, visibility before lighting up was only 200 yards, with fog estimated to be 800 feet thick. In sixteen minutes visibility on the runway had improved from 15 – 2,000 yards. Again on the 24th, 5 Group aircraft were able to use Fiskerton, and visibility was increased from 100 yards to 1500 yards in 12 minutes. Fog Dispersal is there for your use and your safety. Landing Notes have been issued to all Units and pilots must ensure that they are fully conversant with the use of the Fog Dispersal Installation. We will shortly have another installation serviceable at Metheringham, and perhaps the day
(Continued on page 8, col. 3)
MARCH LANDING TIMES
[Table of March Landing Times by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
DECORATIONS
The following immediate awards were approved during the month.
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ W.D. ERVINE D.F.C.
A/W/Cdr E.L. PORTER, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt F.H. PHILLIPS. D.F.C.
P/O H.N. DAVIES D.F.C.
A/F/L I. RADEMEYER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.B. HEALEY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L/ L.A.J. McLEOD D.F.C.
R/O T.H. BLACKHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT J. BRADFORD D.F.M.
F/SGT D. LIGHTFOOT D.F.M.
A/F/L C.J. SPRIGGS D.F.C.
A/F/L W.M. WALTON D.F.C.
P/O S.F. ATCHESON D.F.C.
A/S/L M.I. BOYLE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L E.H. MOSS D.F.C.
F/Lt B.C. FITCH D.F.C.
F/O T.D. HALLIWELL D.F.C.
SGT A.E. HARRIS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O V.H. TRIMBLEE D.F.C.
SGT G.R. PRICE D.F.M.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L/ I. WHITTAKER, DFC. Bar to D.F.C.
A/S/L H.B. MARTIN, DSO, DFC & Bar. Bar to D.S.O.
F/O L.W. CURTISS, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.
F/O T.D. SIMPSON D.F.C.
F/O B.T. FOXLEE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O K. ROBERTS D.F.C.
F/SGT G.C. KING D.F.M.
F/SGT D. SCHOFIELD D.F.M.
F/SGT G.E. HEXTER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L J.C.W. WELLER D.F.C.
SGT R. PARLE D.F.M.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £7299.2.0.
TACTICS
The ill effects of weaving in the bomber stream have been recorded by an experienced Flak Liaison Officer, and his opinions are set out in 5G/1/41/Air, sent to Stations on the 27th March, 1944. All crews should read this letter.
Since the introduction of early warning devices, more attention than ever must be paid to flying straight and level unless attacked. In this connection there is a point about weaving which is perhaps not fully appreciated. A weaving aircraft is continually closing range on other aircraft in the stream and is likely to confuse Monica and Fishpond operators, who may interpret the resultant blip as an enemy fighter closing in to attack. The consequencies [sic] may then be serious, particularly on a dark night, when gunners have been known to mistake four engines for two. In these days when all crews are conscious of some collision risk, the sighting of an aircraft crossing their line of flight is, to say the least, upsetting, and in any event, is unfair to gunners who can ill afford to waste time in identifying friendly bombers which behave in a suspicious manner.
Further, the straight and level policy is enforced to enable crews more easily to keep to the track laid down. The dangers of straying from track and the concentration are known to all. All the old hands at the game have realised that weaving is out of date and leads to trouble, and are now following the straight and narrow. Why not you?
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Two points of interest have been sorted out from an investigation into combats for March. They are:-
(i) Enemy fighters rarely fire more than one burst during each attack.
(ii) Period between opening fire and breaking away is a matter of seconds.
It is clear that many enemy fighters are opening fire at about the same time as they are identified by gunners or before a defensive manoeuvre is started. Night fighters as a rule depend on surprise and accuracy of their first burst, and if this fails, there is no doubt that the advantage passes to the gunners. The main problems are therefore:-
(i) To see the fighter and recognise it before it opens fire, and
(ii) to convey the information to the pilot immediately.
Problem (i) can only be met by energetic use of early warning devices, constant recognition practice and efficient night vision by gunners.
Problem (ii) can be solved if gunners report sightings immediately to the pilot, using the standard reporting code. A second’s delay in identifying the attacker before reporting it may mean the difference between eventually shooting it down, or your sustaining damage before you have that opportunity. Remember that a defensive manoeuvre, although designed to give gunners a known deflection, is also intended to evade the fighter’s fire; therefore, in view of the apparent short duration of combats, if an aircraft is flying suspiciously, gunners should not wait to identify it before ordering a corkscrew, particularly if the suspected aircraft is within firing range.
Flight Engineers
The most important job of the Flight Engineer is to help in getting his aircraft to the target and back, in the most efficient manner possible. But there us another side of his job that must not be forgotten; it is of the greatest importance. He must assist in keeping his machine up to the best standard of serviceability.
He can only do this id he is a keen, conscientious worker. He must pay every attention to the smallest detail in his aircraft, both when he is flying and on the ground; he should be with the ground crew whenever he can while they carry out their daily inspection.
He is the “Flying Spanner”, but firstly he should be the engineer on the ground, and know that the aircraft is tuned up to the last ounce. How can he know this if he only visits his dispersal about one hour before he goes on “Ops”?
Delay has occurred many times in the rectification of defects through an aircraft landing away from the parent station; this must be altered. It must be impressed upon Flight Engineers that it is their responsibility to report to the C.T.O. of that Station any defects or trouble which have developed during flight, and which may prevent them returning to their Base at the earliest moment. It is no good to be interrogated, have a meal and go to bed forgetting to report to the C.T.O. until the next day. The report must be given in person to the Engineering Officer on duty that night; he should also be told if petrol and oil is required, and the approximate time the aircraft will take off.
In the past, aircraft have been delayed through wrong information being passed on, and so it is essential that the Flight Engineer reports all known defects to the C.T.O. Confusion and incorrect information is caused by too many inexperienced people handling the message.
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BOMBING [/underlined]
March was a varied month for the Bomb Aimers in the Group, the highlight from the bombing point of view being the precision attacks by Bases on special targets deep into France.
On the whole bombing was accurate, severe damage being done by Nos. 52, 53 and 54 Bases. It is apparent therefore, that our continuous practice has not been wasted. However, no one who studies the stick craters on the P.R.U. photographs can possibly feel complacent. Many crews missed!!!
The question immediately raised by these misses is whether or not the bombsight was serviceable. It is an intricate bombsight, but anyone who doubts its capabilities should study the long list of bombing errors less than 150 yards at 20,000 feet, given on this page. It must be serviceable, though, and it can only be proven serviceable though use. Therefore you must, at every opportunity, carry out practice bombing with your sight. Whenever you fly, carry out the established N.F.T. checks – report any failings you discover in the bombsight to the Instrument Section, and when you get crew errors of 100 yds or less, thank the instrument section who have helped to make it possible.
Finally, treat all practice bombing as precision bombing – the Air Bombers in 106 Squadron have reason to be proud. In teamwork with their pilots, they won the Squadron Bombing Competition against all-comers in the Group for 3 successive months, and were runners up in March. There is a great gap between the top and bottom errors in the Competition – there should not be! It should be a neck-and-neck struggle with only a few yards separating the Squadrons in the Group.
Are [underlined] YOU [/underlined] bombing your best for your Squadron?
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Bell, D.F.C.) reports the construction and issue to all Air Bombers of a hook as per diagram.
[Diagram]
This device is used for manual release of any H.E. hang-ups, and is of a length that ensures the linkage can be raised. Further, it can be used on No. 13 Station to make certain the “Cookie” has actually left the aircraft, a visual check from the nose being impeded by the incendiary containers.
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) has had the illumination bulbs in the Mark XIV Bombsight Computor [sic] painted red to counteract the glare. This ensures minimum effect on Night Vision.
[Underlined] 1654 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Morgan) has completed the installation of the complete Mark XIV Bombsight in the A.M.B.T.
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.) have nearly completed installation of A.M.B.T. Mk. XIV, several clever modifications being introduced. Excellent co-operation has been provided by the Armament and Electrical Officer and their staffs.
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS IN YARDS, CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training and Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units, with averages]
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES DURING MARCH
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.
44 P/O Levy Sgt Peck F/O Fox 82 & 130 yds
P/O Hobbs F/S Scott F/S Fenwick 144 yds
F/L Dorehill F/S Deacon F/S Wright 116 yds
W/O Barton F/S Barnes F/O Sparrow 125 yds
F/L Wiggin F/O Marshall F/O Maury 112 yds
50 P/O Lundy F/O Bignell F/S Jordan 125 & 145 yds
Sgt MacFarlin Sgt Ball Sgt Elliott 108 yds
57 F/L Munday F/O Evans P/O West 120 yds
106 P/O Rossel Sgt Goss F/S White 140 yds
F/O Clement F/O Gautschi F/O Wilkinson 82 & 120 yds
463 F/S Page F/O Braithwaite W/O Fair 84 yds
619 W/Cdr Jeudwine Sgt Booth Sgt Gosling 79 yds
S/L Whamond F/O Kennedy F/O Marshall 135 yds
F/L McGilvray F/O Baker F/O Drake 140 yds
F/L Moore F/O Butler F/O Wood 123 yds
F/S Schofield F/S Hexter F/S Withinshaw 147 yds
630 F/L Roberts Sgt Davies Sgt Jeffreys 140 yds
W/Cdr Deas F/O Barker Sgt Wright 120 (twice) and 143 yds
S/L Calvert F/S Hogg F/S Beaudoin 148 yds
P/O Hill Sgt Allen F/S Stancer 120 yds
1654 S/L Bloom-Jones F/O Foulkes F/L Martin 148 yds
F/O Murray F/O Towers F/S Keeble 144 yds
F/S Ayres Sgt Charteris Sgt Airey 114 yds
P/O Spencer Sgt. Gordge Agt Hugh-Games 122 yds
1661 S/L Jones F/O Seibal F/O West 140 yds
5 LFS F/S Horne Sgt Johnson F/S Shipley 88 yds
Sgt Patterson Sgt Hall Sgt Rice 121 yds
Special mention is made of W/Cdr Deas and crew, 630 Squadron, who achieved Crew Errors less than 150 yards on [underlined] three [/underlined] exercises this month.
617 Squadron obtained a total of 26 exercises in the “Less than 150 yards” category the best three being:-
[Underlined] PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR [/underlined]
F/O Kell F/O Morieson 47 yards
F/L Cooper F/O Harden 68 yards
F/O Willsher F/S Everitt 75 yards
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION
In a month where 9 Squadrons qualified in the Competition it fell to 44 Squadron to wrest the leadership from 106 Squadron who headed the table for the three months December, January and February. 44 Squadron have set a very high standard and are to be congratulated on rising from the 6th position to the top of the table.
57 Squadron have shown notable improvement in rising to 5th place, which they share with 207 Squadron.
It is expected that April will bring maximum qualification by all Squadrons in the Group and a really close struggle for the top position.
[Underlined] PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS [/underlined]
[Underlined] ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET [/underlined]
1st 44 Squadron – 85 yards 1st 630 Squadron – 120 yards
2nd 106 Squadron – 98 yards 57 Squadron – 120 yards
3rd 619 Squadron – 108 yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 134 yards
4th 630 Squadron – 119 yards 4th 44 Squadron – 138 yards
5th 207 Squadron – 141 yards 5th 207 Squadron – 154 yards
57 Squadron - 141 yards 6th 467 Squadron – 181 yards
7th 463 Squadron – 169 yards 7th 463 Squadron – 197 yards
9 Squadron – 169 yards 8th 9 Squadron – 223 yards
9th 467 Squadron – 196 yards 9th 106 Squadron – 253 yards
The following Squadrons failed to enter the necessary 8 qualifying exercises:-
10th 61 Squadron – 132 yards (5 exercises) 10th 61 Squadron – 143 yards
11th 50 Squadron – 90 yards (4 exercises) 11th 50 Squadron – 123 yards
12th 49 Squadron – 89 yards (1 exercise) 12th 49 Squadron – 92 yards
ADDITION BOMBING TRAINER
[Table of Trainer Activity by Squadron]
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
Two entries were received this month:
W/Cdr Porter 112 yards (Errors include bombsight error)
G/Cpt Pleasance 289 yards (Error of 98 yards)
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]
F/Lt Walmsley – 122 yards
How about some competition, Bombing Leaders?
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What is the theory of Wanganui technique and what are the correct bombsight settings?
2. If the Bomb Doors were open, but the Bomb Release Test could not be extracted from the positive Fusing Device, what check would you make before manually releasing?
3. Where is the type “H” Jettison Button and when do you need to use it?
4. Why do you set [underlined] indicated [/underlined] Wind Speed on the Mk. XIV Computor. [sic]
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
F/Lt Allan has left Scampton and is passing through the Conversion Units in order to return to operations for his 2nd tour. Good Luck!
F/Lt Gibson has become tour-expired and moved to Scampton to superintend the Bombing Section of the Aircrew School.
F/O Abbott has moved from 106 Squadron to 49 Squadron. We now expect to see [underlined] 49 [/underlined] Squadron top of the Bombing Competition!!
F/O Toogood (106 Squadron), tour-expired has moved to 92 Group for Bombing Leader’s duties.
P/O Duck who obtained 14th position with “B” pass on 77 Bombing Leaders’ Course has moved from 619 to 617 Squadron.
F/O Falgate (463 Squadron) and P/O Hulland D.F.M., (1654 Con. Unit) were 8th and 12th respectively on No.78 Bombing Leaders’ Course, with “B” passes.
AIR SEA RESCUE
For two months now there has been no ditching in this Group, which shows a deal of consideration for the Air Sea Rescue Officers in the Group, but at the same time it is wondered whether crews generally have increased their knowledge to an equivalent extent – have you got all your A.S.R. gen and equipment buttoned up?
In addition to giving swimming instruction P.F.O’s are now lending a hand with dinghy instruction in the South Park Girls’ School Swimming Baths. Now that summer is almost here, this should be a real attraction, and every effort must be made for regular attendance. As a further attraction some stations have periods during the early evening so that, with the co-operation of the M.T. Sections, an evening out in Lincoln should be enjoyed by all – after the instruction is over.
[Cartoon] EMP.
It is hoped that “Q” type dinghies (which will replace the “J” type fairly soon) will shortly be available on the scale of one per Squadron for instructional purposes. This dinghy is quite a complicated bit of work, and crews should take every opportunity of getting in sailing practice on local stretches of water (remembering that the depth of water must be at least 4 feet, owing to the depth of keel). Some good fun should be had these long summer evenings – when you can afford time off from obliterating the Hun.
[Underlined] HINT TO USERS [/underlined]
The floating torch has a nasty habit of lighting at awkward moments – why not pad the torch pocket in Mae Wests and Buoyancy suits with some light-damping material, so that the light will not shine through? Whatever happens, don’t go flying over the sea without your floating torch.
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL (Contd. From page 5, col. 3) [/underlined]
is not far off when an operation will be planned and will depend solely on Fog Dispersal Installations for landing of aircraft.
There will be, therefore, three Fog Dispersal airfields situated in a comparatively small area, LUDFORD MAGNA in 1 Group, FISKERTON and METHERINGHAM. The identification of these airfields as night presents a problem, for you if you mistake another airfield for your own and are listening on your local airfield frequency, there is no means of contacting you by R/T. It is essential therefore, that darky frequency is used for all R/T control at Fog Dispersal airfields.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER [/underlined]
The trainer at Fiskerton is now equipped for training with the Mark IIC Gyro Gunsight, and training of the squadron gunners is going ahead under the supervision of F/O Johnson-Biggs, ex 619 Squadron, P/O Collingwood, ex 50 Squadron, and Sgt Kennedy of 49 Squadron. The trainer is housed in a spacious blister type building equipped with a large screen on which the target aircraft is projected, together with the fixed and moving graticules which are a feature of the new sight. An F.N. 16 turret is used for manipulation, and this is fitted with all the controls of the gunsight. Very realistic conditions can be reproduced, although until a trainer is produced which will introduce conditions like the Link Trainer with its “Bumps” attachment, the gunner is still operating from a rock steady platform which does not give a true indication of his ability to hold a target in the sight. A demonstration stand is housed in the same building which has a complete Gyro Gunsight with all controls and fittings. This is used for introducing gunners to the sight during initial instruction, and enables one gunner to operate the sight on the stand whilst another gunner is operating the turret on the trainer. A new type of film is available for use with the trainer; this gives a light coloured aircraft on the screen with a dark background, differing from the film in general use for aircraft recognition training on the Jurby trainer, which project a dark aircraft on a light background.
[Underlined] FUTURE INSTALLATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] Swinderby [/underlined] is the next station to have the trainer installed. This will be housed in the standard spotlight trainer building, which at present is being modified by removing the steelwork situated on the front of the screen. All the equipment is available and installation should commence within the next two weeks.
[Underlined] Winthorpe [/underlined] have received part of the equipment and the construction of the building has been commenced.
[Underlined] G.2. GUNNERY NOTES [/underlined]
On the 6th January, 1944, a letter (BC/S.24636/Trg.) was issued from H.Q.B.C. stating that the G.2 Notes were available in large quantities, and intimating that they could be demanded on the following scale.
[Underlined] Instructors’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per instructor or Gunnery Leader not already holding one.
[Underlined] Students’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per Air Gunner not already holding one. This would appear to be a straightforward matter, but certain Units within the Group are still without these very important notes for a variety of reasons; units who demanded the notes as instructed received their demands promptly, but any unit who has not received these notes may obtain single copies by contacting the G.G.O. As these notes form the basis for all instructions on sighting in the Command, it is of paramount importance that all Gunnery Leaders instructors and gunners be familiar with their contents. It has been discovered that gunners attending the Specialist Sighting Course and Air Gunner Instructors’ Course at Manby have been handicapped by a lack of preliminary knowledge of sighting due to the failure of Units to obtain the notes when the instruction was first issued.
(Continued on page 10, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
THIS MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
49 Sqdn “D” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
619 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “L” 18/19 March, 1944. ME109 c
61 Sqdn “K” 22/23 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “R” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109
106 Sqdn “N” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109
PROBABLY DESTROYED
619 Sqdn “T” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “S” 24/25/ March, 1944. ME109 c
463 Sqdn “Q” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88 c
DAMAGED
207 Sqdn “G” 1/2 March, 1944. T/E c
467 Sqdn “F” 1/2 March, 1944. FW190 c
61 Sqdn “W” 15/16 March, 1944. FW190 c
619 Sqdn “P” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c
207 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. ME109 c
50 Sqdn “M” 18/19 March. 1944. ME109 c
467 Sqdn “J” 18/19 March, 1944. ME110 c
207 Sqdn “O” 18/19 March, 1944. JU88 c
630 Sqdn “D” 22/23 March, 1944. JU88 c
467 Sqdn “Q” 22/23 March, 1944. ME109
50 Sqdn “U” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
49 Sqdn “K” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c
44 Sqdn “J” 24/25 March, 1944. S/E c
57 Sqdn “H” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109 c
57 Sqdn “M” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
463 Sqdn “G” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88
44 Sqdn “U” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
57 Sqdn “B” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88
50 Sqdn “Z” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109 c
Claims annotated “c” have been confirmed by Command. Other claims have not been confirmed owing to late rendition of combat reports.
It is intended to publish in the “News” a table showing the amount of air training carried out by Units each month. This will chiefly consist of Fighter Affiliation exercises and air firing, and provision is made for tabulating the Fighter Affiliation under three headings, i.e. “Camera & Gyro”, “Camera only” and “Without Camera”. This table is standard throughout the Command.
To ensure that a standard method is used throughout, a fighter combat exercise is to be considered as a “Combat” between a fighter and one air gunner in a bomber aircraft. Thus, if both Mid-Upper and Tail turrets are in use two exercises would be carried out. In future monthly training returns are to state the number of exercises as defined above. It is hoped that future tables published will include attacks by fighters on “Bullseye” exercises.
[Underlined] C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Course No. 75 [/underlined]
F/O Spilsbury – 5 LFS – 82% - Cat. “A”
Sgt Boardman – 49 Sqdn – 77.2% - Cat. “C”
Gunnery Leaders are reminded that they are invited to attend the Assessment Committee held at the conclusion of each course, and Gunnery Leaders who have gunners taking the course should make an effort to attend this board and obtain first hand information of their pupil’s efforts.
Gunnery Leaders desirous of visiting the C.G.S. for this purpose are to contact the G.G.O. who will make the necessary arrangements.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING – MARCH [/underlined]
[Table of Gunnery Exercises by Squadron]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 9.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHT FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Stick rigidly to your lattice lines when homing to your airfield. There was a regrettable accident during the month when a pilot in the Group arrived at the airfield on the wrong side of the circuit and crashed when he was forced to dive to avoid an aircraft on the circuit. The lattice lines are your “right of way“ in the sky.
Don’t get careless about your flaps, and remember the Lancaster flaps provide maximum lift from 25° to the fully up position. From the 25° stage to the fully down position, lift is decreasing and drag is increasing. So, remember, take your flap off in two stages and exercise great care in taking off the last 25°. Trim as you do it.
If you make a “sighting” and you are orbiting a ditched aircraft or a dinghy, switch your I.F.F. on to “distress”. Do not change height while orbiting otherwise your plot will fade and you may give the impression that you have ditched. This new Signals Instruction is to enable R.D.F. to plot you, and thus double check your position, and the position of the sighting.
Don’t get off hand about reporting defects after flight. Record any defect on Form 700. Let the ground crew or Flight Commander and the N.C.O. know. Keep them all in the picture, the Security Officer won’t jump on you for that.
By the way, when did you and your crew last go through the bombing up procedure with the Armament types? There might be a day when you have to do your own bombing up.
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
If you are unlucky and get fire in the air, do not dive your aircraft in the hope of putting the flames out. It will make them spread more, making it difficult to abandon aircraft, and will produce structural strain, causing a more rapid break up as the fire develops. The “gen” for fire in the air is in the 5 Group Aircraft Drills.
You can now land from West to East as well as from East to West at Woodbridge. The landing is from East to West at all times except when you see smoke generators burning at each end of the main runway. So watch for the smoke, and then land towards the sea.
Inspect S.D. 158 periodically. It is a secret document, and therefore you won’t find it lying around the Flight office; Ops/Flying Control will oblige. Note the instruction to burn resin lights above 8,000 feet at night.
Pay the closest attention to the latest “gen” about the moveable T.O.T. and remember the importance of sticking to the air speed laid down. 5 m.p.h. either side of the specified air speed it not good enough.
Have you dropped any practice bombs yet? It is the duty of every pilot to try his hand at bombing. Team up with another pilot in your flight, and see who gets the best result.
Public Relations
[Underlined] SIX STATIONS ON THE AIR [/underlined]
No.5 Group entered the radio world in earnest during March, no fewer than six stations being visited by B.B.C. recording units.
Though the resulting broadcasts did not hit the high lights in home programmes, they were given many times, and in many languages, all over the world. They reminded our overseas troops that the R.A.F. is still doing big business!!
First, a five day visit was paid to Skellingthorpe by F/Lt W Caverhill, of the broadcasting branch at Air Ministry, accompanied by B.B.C. engineers. They prepared scripts and made records of 18 R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel, who gave short talks to be included in the B.B.C’s overseas programme “Radio News Reel”.
Bardney was visited on the night of March 18/19th by a B.B.C. recording unit, and more than a doz en [sic] records were made of the station’s contribution towards the night’s attack on Frankfurt. This picture of R.A.F. life was broadcast in both short and long versions on the General Forces programme, as well as overseas.
The success of the Bardney broadcasts prompted the B.B.C. to make a return visit to record the operation against Berlin, on the night of March 24/25th. This time, the famous commentators, Mr. Robert Dunnett and Mr. Stewart MacPherson, brought a recording unit to Coningsby. On the way, the unit stopped at Metheringham as the aircraft were taking off and filled one disc with an interesting description of the scene.
At Coningsby a number of members of ground crews and station personnel came to the microphone and described their work. Further recordings were made in the Operations Room.
Owing to weather changes, the party beat a hasty retreat from Coningsby and went to
(Continued on page 11col.1)
Negotium Perambulans In Tenebris
The Meteorological Gremlin has spectacles and grey hair,
And his mysterious lair
Is very jealously guarded;
And must be regarded
With suitable awe, by all except
The few adept.
It is chiefly a nocturnal beast, and is often found
Prowling and prowling
(Like a host of Midian)
Searching for a datum or perhaps a meridian.
In this it is frequently assisted by a tiny female mammal whose chemical formula is PA2AOC,
Whose small scurrying figure you will often see
Bearing winds to the Gremlin. It is easy to please
With an airy zephyr, or a balmy breeze
Which it consumes with avidity, and that is why
It is able to prophesy!!
ANON (Circa, 1944)
Link Trainer
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
[Underlined] GUNNERY (Continued from page 9 col 1) [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY [/underlined]
The object of this course, which lasts for 10 days, is the training of sighting instructors and instructors capable of assessing cine gyro films. Originally only Conversion Unit or Gunnery Flight personnel could attend but this restriction has recently been removed, and all Units may now nominate gunners for this course; they must show an aptitude for sighting and must have passed well in this subject on a Gunnery Leaders’ Course or Air Gunner Instructors’ course. One vacancy only is allotted to the Group per month.
[Underlined] THOSE SQUADRON GYROS [/underlined]
The Gyro Assessors held by squadrons have in some instances been leading a very quiet life tucked away nicely in the Armoury or on a shelf in a cupboard. Numerous reasons are put forward for not using the Gyro during Fighter Affiliation exercises; for instance, aircraft not modified, not enough notice given to Gunnery sections, Photo. Section unable to process film, etc., etc. None of these reasons is really serious , and all can be easily overcome by a little more co-operation from the sections concerned. Modification on the aircraft is simple, consisting of enlarging the port inner gun port in the rear turret, and can be done in half-an-hour. It is not, repeat not, necessary to blank off the servo motor, and the gyro assembly can be installed in half an hour at the most. All the electrical gear is mounted on the gyro rig and after the rig has been fitted to the gun cradle only three things remain to be done:-
(i) Connect electrical cable to supply in turret.
(ii) Connect rear sear release pipe to gyro rig.
(iii) Harmonize gun sight to camera.
All Photo. Sections CAN process the film, and there is no shortage of magazines in the Group. At 51 Base, a Corporal Armourer is available to give assistance on gyro assessors. This N.C.O. has constructed all the Gyro Assessors in use in the Group, and the present compact and efficient rig is his product. Units requiring his services should contact 51 Base Armament Officer. The Gyro Assessors are not to be left in aircraft which are engaged on night flying as two assessors have already been lost through aircraft with gyros fitted, crashing on night flying.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] M.T. SPARES [/underlined]
Concern Is being caused by the unserviceability of M.T. vehicles in general, and every effort should be made by Equipment Officers to review establishments and ensure that demands are raised regularly to keep stocks of the generally used items up to maximum. It is impracticable and uneconomical to hold stocks of the many parts which not only vary with the make of vehicles but also with the diverse models of each make of vehicle, which again vary according to the year of manufacture. Therefore all M.T. Officers must anticipate requirements for inspection overhauls and other contingencies where certain parts are known to be badly worn and will need replacement in the near future. [Underlined] At least two weeks’ [/underlined] notice of these requirements should be given to the Equipment Officer, and Forms 674 should not only state for what purpose the spares are required, but the approximate date the replacement is required; the chassis and engine number of the vehicle MUST in all cases be quoted. Demands will then be raised in accordance with A.M.O. A.481/43.
[Underlined] A.E.C. TANKER FUEL HOSES [/underlined] (Stores Ref 4K/2009) have for some considerable time been in very short supply, and the chief cause for this is the difficulty in the manufacture of sufficient protective coverings. Bomber Command have now agreed to accept these hoses without this covering and as a result it is anticipated that the supply position will improve considerably within the next two months. In the meantime, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for the repair of these hoses by the manufacturer, under Station local purchase powers.
It is understood that Messrs. Zwicky of Slough (telephone: Slough 23776) are prepared to sell these hoses to the Service, but stations are only to resort to local purchase in extreme cases, where operational efficiency is directly affected and supplies cannot be obtained through Service channels.
A meeting of Base and Station Equipment Officers was held at this Headquarters during the month, when points of mutual interest were discussed, with a view to giving even better service than in the past, to all and sundry.
Before closing the meeting, the A.O.C. spoke highly of the service given by the Equipment Branch. This, naturally, was most gratifying, for sometimes we feel that quite a lot of people look upon us as mere “dogsbodies”, and give no thought to the time, patience and methods (sometimes very unorthodox) adopted in an endeavour to produce the goods.
(Continued from page10, col. 2)
Fiskerton, where the return of aircraft was described, and aircrew were interviewed.
Dunholme received a short visit of the Hon. Herman Hodge, of the Colonial Office, and a B.B.C. recording unit, on 21st March.
Press visitors during the month included representatives of “The Star”, Sheffield, to the Sheffield Squadron at Fiskkerton, on March 15th, and Mrs K. Wilson of the “Sydney Morning Herald”, to Waddington on 31st March.
TRAINING
The Stirling is becoming slowly but surely a nicely house-trained creature. It can be taken out for long or short trips with few difficulties that delay training and rend the tempers of Lancaster loving instructors. The lurid language of February, which produced a glow like unto many batteries of sodiums, is scarcely remembered. Perhaps ‘tis Spring and everything is set for an ideal world.
The L.F.S. at Syerston achieved great success with 93 crews passed out to Squadrons and the H.C.U’s were in no way overshadowed, for they passed on 98 crews for Lancaster training. The outlook for April is therefore fairly good, and squadrons may look forward with confidence to a reasonably early increase in crews, weather permitting.
It is a matter of real regret that accidents have marred an otherwise good month, and may have dragged 5 Group to the bottom of the ladder. A promise has however, been extracted from all and sundry, that 5 Group shall move to the top in April and there will be no avoidable accidents in 51 Base. The heavy snow fall, and the resultant snow banks were chiefly responsible- or perhaps it was the determination to get on with flying and crew output, despite the snow banks.
The April programme is optimistic indeed. There is a measure of quiet confidence about, and if results come up to expectation a new high standard will have been set for Conversion Bases. The results will be seen in better trained and more experienced crews, and we hope the squadrons will not be reluctant to pay the Units a visit and express their appreciation.
Fighter Affiliation Training is now being carried out in Units with detachments of 1690 Flight (1485 regenerated) and an improvement in Gunnery standards is expected.
Synthetic Fishpond training has been introduced, and is likely to be adopted generally.
Recent changes include Group Captain Vintras to command Wigsley; Wing Commander Baxter (106) to Chief Instructor, Swinderby; Wing Commander Jennings (207) to Wing Commander Training, 51 Base; Wing Commander MacFarlane (51 Base) to Chief Instructor Wigsley, and Wing Commander Hallows (5 Group) to Chief Instructor, Winthorpe.
Squadron Leader Osborne (1660) is training Lancaster instructors at Syerston, and also Wing Commanders “Ops” from operational Bases. Squadron Leader Shields and Flight Lieutenant Wyness (1654) are training Stirling instructors at Swinderby. Both “Academies [sic] are doing well.
ABSENCE
ENEMY AGENTS – ABSENTEES
During the coming months, the Allied Forces are likely to be called upon for a maximum effort on land, sea and air, to defeat the enemy.
No. 5 Group will certainly be expected to take its full part in this effort, and there can be no doubt that at heart every man and woman serving in the Group would agree that he or she was going to do it. In spite of all these good intentions there are still far too many absentees, aircrew and ground staff alike. Not long absences, just a few hours or a few days, but absences just the same, at a time when the manpower position simply cannot afford absentees. There isn’t a Tom there now to do Dick’s work while he slips off to see the Dog-races, and there isn’t a Joan there to drive that van while Mary goes off to her sister’s wedding.
[Cartoon] WFW
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE
Of course those two extra days at home in the garden with the wife were well worth two days pay, and even a bit of C.C. as well, and that special party was well worth a day’s pay and a rep., but that isn’t the point. It’s to have days at home in the garden and special parties that we are fighting this war. There might very well not be a garden or wife at all if the Germans laid down the orders for us, and we should certainly not be the ones to enjoy any parties that were arranged.
There is this special point for aircrews to remember too. You work together as a team and your captain has to have complete confidence in each one of his crew or he cannot give his best to his job. If you have let him down by going absent once or twice during training is he going to have that confidence and is he going to feel quite certain that you’re not absent(minded) in that rear turret? It might make all the difference!
If you’re absent on the ground, you’re quite likely to be absent in the air; it’s all a matter of self-discipline, and that’s the same in each case.
In this war, no-one in the services can be a neutral; if you don’t do a day’s work for the Allies, you are doing a day’s work for the Axis, and at the end of the war your Form 121 will show just how many days you put in fighting [underlined] for [/underlined] Hitler. If you put it that way, that day’s absence doesn’t look so good, so cut it out and [underlined] don’t be an enemy agent. [/underlined]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]
The semi final between Coningsby and Scampton was a tremendous affair. From the kick off, Scampton’s attack went all out, and Coningsby’s defence is to be congratulated on the way they held them. Coningsby’s attack improved, and the game swung from goal to goal. Ten minutes before half time, Coningsby centre headed a goal from a corner kick. After the break, Scampton forced the pace and equalised after ten minutes with a shot that gave the Coningsby goalie no chance. Both sides were all out in an endeavour to snatch the lead. Coningsby left wing repeatedly broke away and centred, but nobody could connect. By three quarters time both teams were slackening as a result of the terrific pace; both defences, and especially the goalies, were coping brilliantly. A draw seemed inevitable. Then came the turning point; Coningsby attacked, their left half was well up the field, and instead of the usual pass to the wing he made ground, then shot hard and true for the top corner. The last 15 minutes of the game saw repeated Coningsby attacks, and five minutes from time they got a third goal. It was a magnificent game, and Coningsby are to be congratulated on entering the final via such a tremendous obstacle in the powerful Scampton team.
Round two produced a hard fought duel between Winthorpe and Metheringham. Two draws were played, 1-1 and 3-3 after extra time in each game. In the third game Winthorpe won 4 – 1, and are now due to play Skellingthorpe at Swinderby in the semi final.
[Underlined] THE LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE RUGGER COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has been a failure as a Group competition, but has been an immense success in 53 Base where 86 teams in all have taken part. Very few casualties have resulted in the large number of games played, the most serious being a broken collar bone, which is undoubtedly more than could be claimed for a Soccer competition boasting a equivalent number of entrants. The event must now be considered a 53 Base monopoly, since in spite of many appeals from this Headquarters, no other squadrons have got cracking. The inter unit play off will be at Waddington within the next few days (to be signalled to all stations) and it is hoped that Stations will provide transport for as many of their aircrew personnel as possible to witness the play off.
[Underlined] THE WINES RUGGER TROPHY [/underlined]
Round two of the competition saw Winthorpe beat Scampton 14 – 11 in a hard fought game. Dunholme beat Swinderby 8 – 0, so these two teams pass to the semi final. Round two games still undecided are – Waddington v Metheringham/Woodhall and East Kirkby v Fiskerton. It is hoped those Stations will complete the events within the next few days.
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]
Swinderby are now in the semi final, and the outstanding matches are – Waddington v Metheringham. Syerston v Scampton and East Kirkby v 5 Group. These three games should be decided within the next week.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played six station matches with the very fine result of 4 wins. Their only loss was with Coningsby in the Matz semi-final. They beat A.V. Roe 5 – 4 in the 3rd round of the Lincoln Amateur Cup, and drew 0 - 0 with R.A.F. Wickenby in the semi-final of the Amateur Cup.
DUNHOLME had a busy but rather unsuccessful month. They lost their 3rd round Matz Cup game 2 – 3 to Coningsby, and their 3rd round in the Amateur Cup by the same score to R.A.F. Wickenby.
CONINGSBY – The highlight of the Coningsby month, indeed to quote 54 Base excellent “GEN” – of the season, was their MATZ Cup victory over Scampton. Intersection league games were fewer than usual owing to the bad weather. 619 v 617 and 106 v 61 are also games due this month in the Base Commander’s “All Sports” Trophy.
METHERINGHAM – The duel with Winthorpe in the 2nd round of the Matz Cup was most notable. Weather caused cancellations of no fewer than 10 games, but five inter-section games were completed.
BARDNEY played 4 station matches, playing the 1st Border Regt. twice (1 win 3 – 2, 1 draw 1 – 1), beating Metheringham 3 – 2 and losing to Coningsby by the same margin. 5 inter-section games were completed.
EAST KIRKBY Station XI played 4 games, and won all four, beating Kirkby and Spilsby R.A.F.R. teams and two Field-Craft Airborne Units. In the seven inter-section events, 630 – B Flight were most successful.
SPILSBY had seven games during the month. Their R.A.F.R. Squadron beat East Kirkby R.A.F.R. Squadron 7 – 2, and the local Suffolks 9 – 3, losing 4 – 2 to Kirkby and 3 – 2 to R.A.F. Skegness.
H.Q. 5 GROUP – The Group side are still only able to play away fixtures. In March they had three games, losing to a Scampton team 2 – 3, to Skellingthorpe 0 – 4, and holding their old opponents 93 M.U. to a 2 – 2 draw.
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON had only the two games completed due to cancellations by opponents. They lost to Hemswell 0 – 3 and to Winthorpe 11 – 14 in round two of the Wines Cup.
DUNHOLME have a really strong side led by F/L Waterhouse. They overwhelmed Bardney 33 – 0 in round 1 of the Wines Cup, and have since beaten Swinderby 8 – 0 in round two.
METHERINGHAM list 0 – 27 to Waddington, and were unlucky to have six games postponed, their opponents including Digby, Bardney and Coningsby.
BARDNEY had only one station game, in which they were unlucky to meet Dunholme on top of their form in the Wines Cup, and suffer a 33 – 0 defeat.
EAST KIRKBY had three games, a 630 Squadron A and B practice game, and a 57 Squadron A and B practice, followed by a station A and B trial. In spite of this preparation they were unlucky enough to forego their Wines Cup round one as Wigsley could not raise a side. They are now waiting to play Fiskerton in the second round.
HOCKEY
SCAMPTON had four games of mixed hockey, beating Spilsby 6 – 1 in round one of the Group competition, and Foldingsworth 5 – 0. They lost 2 – 3 to 368 Searchlight Battery and 1 – 5 to Rose Bros. In the second round of the cup they have now to play Syerston.
DUNHOLME had only one mixed hockey game, v Scampton in the Group competition, which they lost 1 – 4.
METHERINGHAM played a 2 – 2 draw with Waddington on their new aerodrome pitch. They are now due to play Waddington again in the Group contest.
BARDNEY neat Dunholme 4 – 1 in the Group contest, and later registered a 4 – 1 win against Waddington. They were finally knocked out of the trophy by Swinderby (5 – 1).
EADT KIRKBY had four games, three inter-station and one (a 1- 1 draw) with Spilsby G.S. They are now waiting to meet 5 Group at home in the contest.
SPILSBY played Scampton in the Group trophy, but were defeated 6 – 1.
[Underlined] ICE HOCKEY [/underlined]
54 Base boast a Canadian Cougars’ team that is certainly 100% full blooded, judging from the “GEN” account of their 5 – 4 victory over Digby Dynamites.
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]
F/Lt. Rodgers (Gunnery Leader 617) now has a Woodhall Soft Ball team that challenges all comers. Roll up, roll up, and have your money ready!!
(Continued on page 4, col. 3)
[Cartoon] WFW
Dot and Dash, the immaculate WAAFs.
“…OPERATIONS? I’VE ‘AD ‘EM!”
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1044. Page 12.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Navigation generally has been of a high order this month. There is still room for considerable improvement however. A good many of the Navigators’ Charts still look very bare. Although all aircraft are equipped with Air Position Indicators, a few Navigators still do not “keep an air plot”, in that they do not plot their Air Position regularly and obtain a D.R. position. This is most important and must be done. A standard Navigational procedure to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s, has been laid down (see Air Staff Instruction Nav/14). We are constantly striving for concentration, and for obvious reasons the concentration should be on the planned track, it is therefore imperative that you constantly obtain your D.R. position by intelligent use of the broadcast w/v’s. If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, then alter course immediately and regain track.
The A.P.I. has been modified, and the error in this instrument is now very small. If the windfinders obtain accurate fixes on their H 2 S, the resultant w/v should be almost perfect. Navigators should, therefore, have every confidence in the broadcast w/v’s and make the fullest possible use of them.
Whilst track keeping is very important, it must be remembered that timing is equally important. This does not seem to be fully appreciated, and a few Navigators still persist om leaving the concentration point with “a few minutes in hand”. Other aircraft inadvertently leave the concentration point a few minutes late (possibly due to late take-off, etc.) with the result that the stream of aircraft is very much longer than it should be, and the chance of success by the German night fighter is increased. If it is calculated that the aircraft will arrive at the concentration point early, then dog-legs [underlined] must [/underlined] be carried out before reaching this position. All Navigation Officers are to check the time at the concentration point of each aircraft, and they must insist that no aircraft leaves this position with any time in hand.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]
All aircraft of the Group are now equipped with the A.P.I. fully modified. Several tests have been carried out to ascertain the accuracy of this instrument now it has been modified, and the results have shown that the error is now very small, and of the order of 3 or 4 m.p.h. We must, therefore, make every use of this valuable instrument. It is considered by a few Navigators that errors arise when resetting the A.P.I. Mechanically this is not so, and any errors are due to incorrect setting by the Navigator. If the A.P.I. is reset every 30 minutes, as it should be, then the amount to be subtracted or added to the counters should not be great, and would not generally be more that 30-35 minutes of latitude or longitude. For ease and simplicity, the A.P.I. should not be reset until the latitude or longitude counters are showing an even number of minutes, e.g. 10, 20, 30, etc. It should then be a simple matter to add or subtract say 25 minutes of latitude or longitude.
It is advocated by a small section of the “Union” that the A.P.I. should be reset as little as possible, e.g. at the last Gee fix, the target, and first Gee fix, etc., but this method has several disadvantages. It will become cumbersome after a long period of D.R. e.g. the Berlin raid 24/25 March, 1944, when the wind vector from target to Enemy Coast was approx. 230 miles long. There is as great a risk of error in plotting this vector as in resetting the A.P.I. Another disadvantage is that the Air Position may run off the chart in use. This would necessitate carrying several charts.
The Air Position Indicator is a valuable instrument if correctly used. Navigators are urged to experiment with the A.P.I. in the various methods of use, and discuss with their Station Navigation Officers.
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
March was a mixed month for broadcast w/v’s. The wind finding and resultant track keeping was good, with the exception of Berlin and Nuremburg. The last two mentioned raids have been investigated, and the results are worthy of special comment.
[Underlined] Berlin. [/underlined] Average forecast w/v from Base to Target at 20,000 feet was 350/60. Average w/v transmitted was 350/90. Average true w/v was approximately 350/105. It will be noted that the winds transmitted by Aircraft were, on average, 15 m.p.h. under strength. A large percentage of windfinders obtained the accurate w/v, but only a few transmitted it. The remainder either did not send it, or, not believing there could be such a large error in the forecast w/v’s, “watered it down” and sent that. This procedure is very dangerous. Navigators must send back all w/v’s they obtain, providing they are confident the fixes used are accurate.
Another feature of the Berlin raid was the delay in aircraft sending back w/v’s. All the difficulties experienced by aircrew are fully appreciated, but every effort must be made to get the w/v’s back to Base as soon as possible.
[Underlined] Nuremburg. [/underlined] The investigation into this raid has not yet been completed, but the one outstanding feature is that the wind direction at and above 20,000 feet backed by 15° - 20° and this was a contributory factor to the Northerly trend on the return journey.
[Underlined] LIAISON VISITS [/underlined
Only a few liaison visits have been completed during the month. It is very difficult for operational Station and Squadron Navigational Officers to visit the Con. Units or Scampton Aircrew School, but every effort should be made. Make a note of all the deficiencies of Navigators, your suggestions, criticisms etc., then go and discuss them with the Con. Unit or Scampton. More good can be done by paying one liaison visit than by writing a hundred letters. Con. Unit, L.F.S. and Scampton Instructors must also pay regular visits to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]
During the month, one Navigator from each Squadron was detailed to experiment with Log and Chart work. Each was asked to work almost entirely on the Chart, making only a very few log entries. This method has proved very popular. Full reports are not yet to hand, but an analysis of all reports will be sent to Stations and Squadrons in due course.
1. If the D.R. Compass topples, and the repeater rotates, what action would you take to maintain the line of flight marker on the H 2 S correctly orientated?
2. What action would you take to tune in the ground returns and set up the height marker on the H 2 S equipment if the trace on the height tube were missing?
3. You are using broadcast wind velocities, and the Bomb Aimer gives you a pinpoint which is “off track”. What two actions would you take?
4. You have received an amendment to the zero hour, but, having applied the correction, observe that you still have several minutes in hand. How and where would you lose this time?
5. In which countries are the following towns: Strasbourg, Aix-le Chappelle, Flensburg, Ghent, Pilsen, Charlattenburg?
6. Which is the shorter distance – Stuttgart to ROME or Stuttgart to LONDON?
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. (a) Passes to W/Optr. On paper (1) Course, (2) Height, (3) I.A.S., (4) present position, (5) estimated time of ditching, (6) reason for ditching. ( )
(b) Obtain a Gee fix and pass to W/Op., on paper, the Gee co-ordinates and time of fix.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Few crews carry out correct procedure, which is – the emergency procedure when ditching is considered unavoidable, S.O.S. procedure when ditching is imminent within 15 minutes.
2. 30°
3. If B strobe is missing. Line up signals in usual manner, and take “C” reading. Then reverse signals so that B signal is on the C trace, strobe the signal and take the reading remembering to subtract 30. If “C” strobe is missing, reverse above procedure and add 30 to the “C” pulse reading.
4. (a) It means that you are heading for high ground.
(b) Turn on reciprocal course and obtain a check on your position. If no reliable aids are available in the aircraft, the Navigator should request W/Op. to obtain an M/F D/F fix.
Lines to those who went on leave on April 4th.
For you the birds tra-la do sing!
For me the heavens do glower and rain!
For you buds burst like anything!
My buds ‘gainst blight do strive in vain!
The reason’s simple why I grieve,’
And why my downtrod soul doth pine;
For you continue with your leave,
But I’ve just heard that I’ve had mine!!
ANON (Circa 1944)
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] ANOTHER BAD MONTH [/underlined]
The [underlined] Avoidable [/underlined] Accident Summary for March again makes bad reading – Squadrons had 9 and Training Base had 33. These figures speak for themselves, and they use pretty strong language. As a result of these accidents, 4 aircraft were CAT “E”, 6 were CAT “B”, 20 were CAT AC” and 12 were CAT “A”. Bear in mind these were only avoidable accidents. Technical failures are not included in this list. Details are as follows:-
Ground collisions (including taxying) – 15; overshoot landing – 3; crashes on 3-engined overshoots – 3; swings on take off – 5; swings landing – 4; errors of judgement landing – 5; heavy landings – 3; maintenance – 2; taking off – 1; other errors of judgement – 1: Total [underlined] 42 [/underlined].
The snow period at the beginning of the month was directly responsible for 14 of these accidents, all within 51 Base. Had there been no hard snow banks, no damage would have been done to these aircraft. The hazard had to be accepted, and no action was on these “snow” accidents. Under this heading there were 5 taxying, 7 swinging and 2 landing. This however, still leaves 19 avoidable accidents in 51 Base, in the usual categories, and 9 in squadrons – total 28, as under:-
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined] – Ground collisions – 3; overshoot landing – 2; maintenance errors – 2; other errors of judgement – 2.
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined] Ground collisions – 7; swings – 2; overshoot landing 1; heavy landings – 2; other landing errors – 4; crashes on 3 engined overshoots – 3.
Collisions on the ground (10) still account for more damaged aircraft than any other category. There were two more M.T. collisions this month, both due to careless driving by ground personnel, in spite of the recent drive to eliminate these costly entirely inexcusable accidents. One aircraft was damaged during compass swinging at a squadron, and two more were damaged on dispersal. In the others, only a very slight degree of carelessness was shown by aircrew. They were more unfortunate than anything else. Apart from the M.T. collisions, there has not been an instance this month of down right careless taxying, which is a step in the right direction.
The swings were by inexperienced pilots, both of whom took the correct action after the swing developed. This action avoided serious damage. One of the heavy landings was made in difficult wind conditions, the other only accentuated damage which had been started as a result of previous heavy landings; both pilots were under training.
Three aircraft crashed on 3 engined overshoots – two Stirlings and one Lancaster. It is hoped that the revised technique of dealing with three engined landings at Conversion Units will minimise these three engined accidents. The overshoot landing at Training Base was also made on three engines. The pilot hesitated between landing and going round again, decided on one, then changed his mind; he finished up in the overshoot area. Overshoots on the squadrons were made under extremely difficult circumstances. One was made on two engines, and in the other, visibility was practically nil.
(Continued on page 15, col. 3)
ORGANISATION
[Underlined] (MAY BE READ BY AIRCREW TYPES) [/underlined]
When the so-called “brained types” of the Royal Air Force are binding round the fireplace in the mess, they sometimes utter the most amazing theories on how the war can be won on a date earlier than that already forecast by Lindoe. But no one tries to make a note of what is said by these Fuehrers, except, maybe, to insert a few rude remarks in the local “Line Book”.
When, however, an observation is made that is clever and helpful, quotations are extracted and issued to the world at large. Such an extract is made in Section 1 of A.P.837 – “Principles of Administration”.
An extract from the Manual says “A good organisation requires competent management to produce satisfactory results”. In the Royal Air Force, this management of the [underlined] ORGANISATION [/underlined] is called Administration; it is the system whereby, in principle and in executive detail, the Service carries out its function ….TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY….!!!... and to work efficiently, co-operation is essential. (Co-operation, by the way, is something to which every member of a Service contributes).
Another famous quotation by Socrates, was to the effect that “A disorderly mob is no more an army than a “pranged” aircraft a fighting machine”. The bits and pieces must be [underlined] organised. [/underlined]
So, therefore, let’s have a look at organisation in action-theory is not sufficient, it must be applied.
With apologies to Tee Emm. here are a few “Do’s and Don’t s”.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] see that Orders issued are brief, complete and unambiguous. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] lay yourself open to being misunderstood. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that in your planning, you must always ask yourself who has to be consulted before you reach a decision, and who has to be informed of your decision.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] grasp the scope of the task, and foresee what it demands, with thoroughness and imagination. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] see with what other tasks run by other Sections, you must interlock. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] co-ordinate with your equals and underlings. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] plan until you are absolutely clear what is to be done. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] jump at the first solution. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] consider all the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] go off at half-cock.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] remember that in war, speed is nearly everything.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that ceaseless driving force and ceaseless supervision are essential.
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] check and check again.
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget, whatever your job, your ability to organise is every bit as important to the Service as a whole, whether you are throwing an aircraft about the sky, or writing Railway Warrants.
ENGINEERING
Early returns for the month of March were about average, and cancellations were much reduced. Cancellations for March were 0.98%, a considerable improvement on the 3.47% recorded for February. Early Returns for March were 4.01% for all causes, again, an improvement on February’s figures which were 6.5%.
Serviceability was generally good, the main causes of unserviceability being:-
1. Aircraft on acceptance checks.
2. Aircraft on minor inspection.
3. Aircraft landing away from base due to diversion.
The number of sorties flown by this Group is again a record, but still greater numbers will be expected during the coming months.
The maintenance statistics staff are still at Waddington and very soon experiments will proceed with a 75 hour maintenance cycle, using the revised maintenance schedule.
Much unnecessary engine running is taking place on the ground, and the method of some of the running is harsh and detrimental to the engine. C.T.O’s must ensure that all N.C.O’s and men who “run up” engines are qualified to do so, and that they have passed the necessary test.
Many cases have been noticed where on a ground run a mag drop has been experienced, and the fitter at the controls has run the engine up three or four times “hoping! It may clear. This is a waste of time, imposes heavy loads on the engine, and proves the man in the cockpit does not know his job.
Another point about ground running is that much damage is done on a ground test by inspection panels and turret covers not being secure, and being damaged by the slipstream. C.T.O’s must have a drive on this, and when they see it happening, check the man at the controls and the N.C.O. i/c aircraft.
[Underlined] RENDITION OF FORMS 765C [/underlined]
The remarks on Form 765C by the specialist officers are in many cases too brief and are of no assistance to this Headquarters in attempting to establish a cause, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the trouble which led to the forced landing or failure. This is liable to indicate, in the case of engine trouble, that the cause is not investigated thoroughly at the Station. As it is known that the cause is always investigated it is small trouble to insert more details in the paragraph provided in the 765C for Specialist’s remarks, and it will save a large amount of correspondence and telephone calls between Group and Stations. If a full technical report is to follow after rendition of the 765C then of course this should be stated in the appropriate paragraph.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Tables of Serviceability of Stirling and Lancaster aircraft by Unit]
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 14.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
This has been a month of records, and on one occasion a period of sweat, toil, and almost tears.
To create a record with the existing power available, whether it be sprinting, car racing or bombing up, it is necessary to exclude wasted energy. As man power cannot be increased and new armament records must be realised, it is essential that this strive for maximum efficiency be closely investigated.
Wasted energy in the bombing up phase of operations is too often attributed to shortage of equipment, bomb trollies, small bomb containers, Whitlocks, Hampden twins, liners; even spanners. It is admitted that there is a shortage of some of these items; all the more reason why the few available should be kept serviceable; further, if failures and faults occur, an expedient system of repair must be instituted. A flat tyre on a bomb trolley, a few popped rivets on a small bomb container, small faults, easily remedied, but if allowed to accumulate they may easily cause a bottleneck in the repair section and eventually a complete breakdown.
A large percentage of the necessary repairs are caused by mishandling. Bombing up parties must not be allowed to model on the popular conception of a dockyard stevedore.
A release slip that fails is a bomb returned, and a stupendous effort is wasted, especially as it is necessary to cart the weapon back to the bomb dump. Do not therefore allow speed to interfere with the quality of workmanship.
Short cuts and new devices of local manufacture, such as tools and loading platforms save time, and time saved is man hours of effort that can be directed to raising the standard of workmanship, and thus increasing the tonnage dropped on the enemy.
New records will be set, so prepare now for every eventuality.
Load the [underlined] GOODS [/underlined] so that our colleagues the aircrew may deliver them.
[Underlined] WARNING TO WANTONS [/underlined]
A rumour is rife that by trial, a certain Group discovered that if the centre station release mechanism is plugged to the rear turret electric heating system, and the gunner turns on his heated clothing, the following incidents occur:-
(a) A large bomb goes through the bomb doors.
(b) The rear gunner is practically electrocuted.
(c) Pandemonium reigns in the aircraft.
(The Group and Unit concerned prefer to remain anonymous.)
[Underlined] FIREWORKS [/underlined]
To alleviate the somewhat chaotic state brought about by the increase in the use of target markers and indicators, and the need for an improved system of supply, it has been decided to form a pyrotechnical park at Woodhall. It is intended that this park should hold a quantity sufficient to supply any Station at short notice, and that any technical information regarding these new and unheralded devices will be available from that source.
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]
A word of appreciation is directed to the transport sections, who undertook many nocturnal journeys to ensure prompt deliveries of bombs in readiness for operations.
[Underlined] FAILURES [/underlined]
This month a total of 2 cancellations and 7 Early Returns were attributed to Armament. Although this represents a decided improvement on last month’s figures, it is still too high. The total of 9 abortive sorties were due to:-
(i) 3 Gunners’ “boobs”.
(ii) 1 aircraft returned early as a result of a sticky Palmer Firing Valve, the result of a tight gland nut on the valve spindle.
(iii) 1 aircraft was not bombed up in time for take-off and consequently cancelled.
(iv) 4 aircraft returned with unserviceable tail turrets due to defects in technical equipment, i.e.
(a) A broken ball bearing resulted in a seized vane oil motor.
(b) Spline shaft of the E.D.P. sheared.
(c) Pressure pipe union at the Engine Driven Pump fractured during flight – exit the last old type flex pipe in the Group.
(d) Collapsed gun ram washer.
From this analysis it can be seen that at least 5 out of 9 abortive sorties could, and should, have been avoided. After deducting the three gunners’ “boobs” and 4 failures due to defective equipment, Armament can say with satisfaction, that they were responsible for only two abortive sorties out of a total of 1720 sorties flown. (.116%) – Good show!! A record number of sorties flown, a record tonnage dropped on the Hun and an all-time low of abortive sorties.
There is, however, grave cause for alarm regarding small bomb container compartment hang-ups. Although a greater tonnage than ever before was dropped, so also was a greater tonnage returned to the bomb store, and unfortunately over 50% of the failures were caused by carelessness. Of 102 S.B.C. hang-ups there were 60 maintenance failures directly attributed to severed and trapped leads.
These maintenance failures cannot be accepted, and it is obvious that the present system of supervision during bombing up needs overhaul.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE + = H 2 S Squadron
ACCIDENTS
(Continued from page 14, col.1)
The other landing accidents occurred in 51 Base. They consisted of collapsing of Stirling under-carriages after touch-down. These have not yet been fully investigated.
The remaining “error of judgement” occurred in a squadron. The aircraft crashed in the circuit at dusk. The reason for this crash is still obscure, and has only been included because investigation at this stage does not suggest technical failure of any kind.
A fatal accident took place this month in the Waddington circuit. A Lancaster collided in mid-air with a 1 Group aircraft on its way home to base. Responsibility for the accident has not yet been allocated, but it brings home once again the necessity for keeping a thorough look-out at all times. The pilot of an aircraft is naturally preoccupied in the circuit with his cockpit drill etc., and it is up to the crew, especially the gunners to keep up a search all round. The natural tendency to look inside the circuit at the flarepath must be resisted.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 15.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
The opening months of the year have each [missing word] noteworthy contributions to the Bomber Offensive, and this month has proved no exception. Not only have we established a new sortie peak of 1720, but our achievements also include the distinction of being the first Group in the field to drop over 1000 tons in one night on a single target. The high percentage of successes (89.7%) was maintained despite the set-back of two abortive operations, and losses remained a constant 3.37%.
The principal role of the Group, outside the main force “blitz” targets, has been the continuation of the offensive, commenced last month, against Germany’s aircraft production – an essential prelude to the establishment of a Second Front. This offensive has been rewarded by no mean success.
The attack on 2/3rd March against ALBERT resulted in the total destruction of the aero-engine factory of Cle Mecanique d’Albert, with the aircraft factory of S.N.C.A. du Nord more than half destroyed – an impressive result.
MARIGNANE, singled out for attack on the 9/10th, also sustained extremely severe damage, particularly to the assembly shop, heat treatment shop, offices, flight hangar, components’ store, garages, workshops and other buildings in the factory area.
The following night (namely the 10/11th), an ambitious programme was conducted against aircraft factories at CHATEAUROUX, CLERMOND FERRAND and OSSUN, and the Needle Bearing Factory at LA RICAMARIE. Interpretation of P.R.U. photographs provides evidence of the high measure of success which attended these missions. Thirteen buildings comprising the larger part of the workshops of S.N.C.A. du Sud-Ouest Chateauroux, have been destroyed or severely damaged, including the main assembly store, transformer house and other key buildings. The aircraft repair factory at CLERMOND FERRAND has received major damage throughout, including two large multi-bay buildings, compounding plant and power station – the latter now being observed to be inactive – OSSUN Factory airfield bears its scars in the form of severe damage to the two larger factory buildings and other ancillary buildings. The devastation at LA RICAMARIE is particularly acute. The eastern two thirds of the plant has suffered heavily, and every building, with one exception, has been either damaged or destroyed.
Three persistent attacks against the Sigma Aero Engine Works, LYONS, on 23/24th, 25/26th and again on 29/30th, terminated in sixteen out of the 22 buildings comprising the Factory receiving varying degrees of damage, in addition to which a neighbouring hutted encampment has been virtually destroyed.
A further two nights out of the month were devoted with great profit to the firing of Hun powder magazines. The results were impressive indeed, and upheld the high hopes of the crews. BERGERAC on 18/19th took the count in the first round. The east end of the plant is almost completely demolished, while the nitration houses and acid recovery plant are severely damaged, with evidence of severe blast throughout the Factory. ANGOULEME, attacked on 20/21st, was still burning the day following the raid, and severe damage throughout the target area, particularly to the nitro-cellulose plant, can be seen.
We, as a Group, also played a small, but nevertheless noteworthy part in the attack against the enemy’s communications supplying his Channel Ports. AULNOYE was selected as our target, and the ensuing attack on 25/26th resulted in the central portion of one of the carriage and wagon repair shop being damaged. Rather more than twenty direct hits have been secured on the tracks – and the locomotive shed to the south is half destroyed.
An outstandingly successful attack was made on 16/17th against the CLERMOND FERRAND MICHELIN PLANT – not a building of which escaped. Severe damage is displayed throughout the entire area.
Seven major attacks were undertaken during the month. STUTTGART was our first objective on 1/2nd and again on 15/16th. The heaviest concentration of damage from these attacks is seen to the North West and North East of the town centre, where many factories of high priority are situated. Throughout the town, scattered incidents to business and residential property are apparent.
FRANKFURT on 18/19th and 22/23rd, was spectacular, not only by reason of the success of the attack, but because the Group seized the unique opportunity of unloading bombs exceeding 1000 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the target. Some 12 hours after the second attack, columns of smoke were rising to 15,000 feet, and drifting southwards for at least 200 miles – a grave spectacle for dwellers in the South of the Reich. The principal damage is concentrated in the city centre, stretching a scarred arm northwards between the railway station and east harbour.
No month would be complete without an attack on the “Big City”. Limited cover only was available the day following the raid on 24/25th, but from the provisional report (which omits reference to the centre and the east), the potential results can be contemplated with some optimism. At the time of photography, fires were still burning.
For some months, rebuilding in ESSEN has been stealthily proceeding, and the night of 26/27th was selected as a favourable opportunity to disrupt this activity. PR.U. photographs are of poor quality, but fresh damage can be identified in many parts of the town, and in the workshops of Krupps. A full report is awaited.
The final bout of the month witnessed a bitter struggle with the enemy’s fighter defences throughout the deep penetration to NURNBERG on 30/31st, involving our heaviest loss so far recorded. Our aircraft, however, put up a spirited defence, shooting down a number of the enemy. The losses were not a small price to pay, even for a successful attack on this extremely important war production centre, but the casualties can perhaps be placed in their proper perspective, and to some extent minimised, when viewing the Battle of Germany as a whole. It is difficult to place any assessment on the raid owing to cloud conditions, and P.R.U. cover has not yet been obtained.
To speculate on the value of our contribution towards the opening of the Second Front is obviously vain, but there can be no doubt that the month’s activity has left its mark clearly impressed on the Reich.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of statistics on aircraft, sorties, bombing and training by Squadron]
ORDER OF MERIT in this table is now based on the number of SUCCESSFUL sorties completed, per average aircraft on charge, i.e. Total number of sorties minus Early Returns and Missing, divided by Average A/C on charge. No 617 Squadron, in view of their special task, are shown separately.
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944.
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V Group News, March 1944
5 Group News, March 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 20, March 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about processes of navigation, signals/radar, photography, gardening, Gee, flying control, H2S, decorations, tactics, flight engineers, war savings, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, air sea rescue, gunnery, second thoughts for pilots, public relations, link trainer, equipment, training absence, sports, navigation, accidents, organisation, engineering, armament, accidents, operations and war effort.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-03
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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17 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-24
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France--Albert
France--Bergerac
France--Châteauroux
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--La Ricamarie
France--Lyon
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
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1944-03
5 Group
Absent Without Leave
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
FIDO
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
ground personnel
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Scampton
RAF Waddington
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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[Underlined] 53 Base Commander [/underlined]
V GROUP NEWS V
JANUARY 1944 * [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] [indecipherable] * NUMBER 18
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
The final battle of Germany has now been joined. The enemy has been forced to concentrate two-thirds of his whole fighter strength for the protection of his citied, thus providing a classis example of the way in which air superiority, contrary to popular opinion, is won as much by the bomber as by the fighter. Crews should know that the superiority which the Russian Air Force enjoys on the Eastern Front, with all that this means to Russian military operations, is largely their doing; and the same is true of the Italian theatre.
This massing of the German fighter strength in an attempt to stop our attacks and those of the U.S.S.A.F.E. calls for serious thought on our part. In the long run the effect of the combined R.A.F. and American attacks will reduce the German fighter production so that they will be unable to support their present first line units, and the force will slowly diminish, but this is not a result which can be expected immediately, and much hard fighting lays ahead.
Bomber attacks are planned to reach the target having encountered as little opposition as possible. This is achieved by taking advantage of weather which will keep fighters on the ground, or involve them in great hazards if they take off; by careful routeing; by feint attacks; and by the full use of the radio offensive which prevents orders reaching the German pilots. In spite of this planning, scheming and foxing, a proportion of fighters are bound to get into the bomber stream. It is then that the tactics of the individual crews win or lose the battle.
There are two broad alternatives. On the one hand it may be considered that the sole duty of a crew is to reach the target and bomb it. Therefore, it is said it is imprudent to become involved in any fighting, and a crew should do its best to avoid combat and only open fire if directly attacked, and then only after failing to shake off the fighter by manoeuvre. On the other hand, while accepting that it is the object of the bomber to reach the target, refusal to engage in combat, while possibly safeguarding the individual, may by no means be the best for the force as a whole.
The German night fighter pilot must pray fervently that crews will adopt the first policy, for then he can cruise in the bomber stream unconcerned, except to find and stalk an unsuspecting prey. He will not be shot at by a bomber, which he has failed to see below him or to one side, and he can devote his whole attention to manoeuvring for the final shot. In other words he has a job almost free from the hazards of war, and as a result he will grow fat, and gain in skill and experience, and, therefore, in his ability to do us harm.
Now consider the other policy – to shoot at every German aircraft within range. About that policy I will say this. Firstly, that it is in general the duty of every combatant officer and man of any of His Majesty’s Forces to attempt by every means in their power, to destroy such of the King’s enemies as come within range. Secondly, that execution of this duty will aid the security of the bomber force as a whole, and, therefore, of the individual crew.
The matter is not, however, entirely straightforward, and there are two situations which have to be considered. Firstly, one in which a crew sees an enemy fighter not in a position to attack them but attacking, or about to attack, another bomber. They should be prepared to go in and shoot it down. At the foot of this foreword will be found some selected combats in which crews have acted in this way. They acted rightly, and deserve the congratulations of all in the Group, for they saved the lives of other crews, and rid us of pests who, if not destroyed, will quickly become adept at the art of killing at night.
The second situation is more complicated. A crew know, from their early warning device, that a fighter is nosing after them, and will soon be in a position to attack. Should they continue on their course until it is within range, and then attempt to shoot it down? Emphatically no – because the fighter in these circumstances has certain advantages which will give him temporarily the upper hand. The crew should carry out the standard corkscrew, remembering that this is designed to give the Gunners a standard deflection shot, known to them but not to the fighter pilot. Hence the importance of keeping to the exact standard speeds, rates of turn, loss and gain in height etc., set out in 5 Group Tactical Notes. Any other manoeuvre executed in the heat of action will provide the Gunners with deflection shots which, with present equipment, they have no means of calculating, but which the fighter pilot will find no more, and probably less, difficult to assess than the corkscrew.
Thus, while the standard corkscrew can be used as a manoeuvre for disengaging from enemy fighters, it is also a manoeuvre – and in fact the only manoeuvre – which we can employ and at the same time shoot accurately. Different speeds or rates of turn, or any skid or slip, may cause the Gunner to miss by 40 feet or more. In particular, too high a speed on the downward legs will lessen the rate of turn and, therefore, provide an easier shot for the fighter.
The policy outlined above was first set out in June, 1943. Over the following four months the Group shot down 58 fighters, but recently the numbers have been less, because I believe some crews are in doubt as to the correct action to take.
There is one final point; there must be no firing at an aircraft unless it is identified beyond any reasonable doubt. There have been instances in the past of Lancasters firing on other Lancasters, and there can be no justification for this.
To sum up, every crew in the Group should know that weather – routes – spoof targets and all other devices at the disposal of Bomber Command – are used to out-manoeuvre the German Fighter Force. It can only be out-fought if every crew in the Group is ready to “FORCE HIS WAY IN AND FIGHT HIS WAY OUT”. By that means we shall reduce the power of the German fighter to do us harm, to our own lasting advantage.
Need I add that the Air Gunners are playing a more and more vital part in the success of the bomber offensive. It is their quickness of eye and hand which determines success or disaster – but they are gravely handicapped if the pilot does not keep to the standard corkscrew, and may be caught unawares if the Wireless Operator relaxes his watch on his Monica or Fishpond tube. Such, then, is the team on which we rely to defeat the enemy fighters.
[Underlined] 23/24th August, 1943. J/207. [/underlined] Twin-engined enemy aircraft attacking another aircraft at 800 yards range. Rear gunner opened fore at 700 yards. Enemy aircraft broke in two and hit the ground in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 22/23rd November, 1943. P/619. [/underlined] Rear gunner saw ME109 attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster “P” turned starboard and Rear Gunner opened fire at 200 yards range and scored hits. ME.109 reversed and dived violently to port, emitting flames. Enemy aircraft disappeared in the cloud, after which an explosion was seen. ME.109 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 26/27th November, 1943. Z/44. [/underlined] Rear gunner sighted ME.210 flying to attack another Lancaster ahead. Lancaster Z corkscrewed and both gunners opened fire at 800 y ards [sic] range. Enemy aircraft followed the corkscrew and fired a burst which went well above [sic] Both gunners kept firing short burst, registering hits. Enemy aircraft seen to disintegrate by another crew, and ME.210 claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 16/17th December, 1943. A/44. [/underlined] ME.109 sighted 600 yards range parallel, following another Lancaster. ME.109 opened fire on another Lancaster who did not return fire. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits. ME.109 burst into flames and disintegrated. Claimed as destroyed.
[Underlined] 30/31st January,1944.U/44. [/underlined] Over target area Rear Gunner sights ME.210 800 yards down attacking another Lancaster. Lancaster U was corkscrewing on a Monica IIIA indication. Rear Gunner opened fire and strikes were observed. Enemy aircraft dived away with port engine on fire. Last seen entering cloud in flames. Claimed as destroyed.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographs with plottable ground detail obtained during January, was 73; these were almost entirely due to the conditions prevailing during the Stettin raid. For the remaining raids, the presence of heavy cloud caused the majority of technical successful exposures to be placed into the Target Conditions category.
Failures for the month were 58, which represents 5.4%. These failures can be reduced considerably if the personnel concerned will make the necessary effort, and it is suggested that still more co-operation is needed between the Bombing Leaders, Electrical, Armament and Photographic personnel in tracing the causes and ensuring that failures are not repeated. The first step in film fault analysis is to decide the ‘bombing frame’; failure to do this correctly will normally cause the investigation to be abortive and a complete waste of time.
There is reason to think that insufficient care is being exercised when setting the fusing time on the Type 35 Control. It is of the utmost importance that the fuse setting and the Type 35 Control are identical. Squadron photographers must realise that the setting is extremely critical, and even a small misadjustment of the Control Setting Knob will normally be sufficient to cause the flash illumination to be misplaced, and may therefore be considered a ‘pick-up’, resulting in a theoretical failure.
A new method of Night Photography is being tried out by Nos. 44 and 49 Squadrons. This is the use of Kodacolour film on frames Nos. 3 and 4 and H.S. night film on the remaining frames. The object of this composite Colour and Black and White is to photograph any T.I’s and Sky Markers in colour and at the same time to procure ground detail on Frame 5 by the illumination provided by the photo flash if conditions permit. The Photographic Section, R.A.F., Scampton, have undertaken to make up and process the films, and with full co-operation of the Station Workshops, have produced some very fine work.
It is too early to forecast whether this new method will generally be adopted. Much depends on the value of interpretation, supply of Kodacolour and technical equipment, but so far results are very promising.
[Table of Photographic analysis results by Squadron]
[Table of Photographic failure analysis results by Squadron]
A.S.R. (CONTINUED)
(Continued from back page Col. 1)
follows :-
(i) 256 aircrew lost their lives when other members of their crews were saved, which gives a strong indication of incorrect dinghy drill being carried out.
(ii) 23 lost their lives after having been sighted in dinghies – weather and lack of knowledge of searching procedure were the main causes for this.
(iii) 663 are known to have come down in the sea but no S.O.S. signal was transmitted making search almost impossible.
(iv) 280 disappeared over the sea without word or trace.
The above figures show that aircrews generally have a very sad lack of knowledge of what to do in the event of an emergency over the sea, both as regards W/T procedure and dinghy drills. A tremendous amount of money has been spent building up the Air Sea Rescue Service, and in providing safety equipment for aircrews, all of which can work satisfactorily with the full co-operation of the aircrews for whose benefit they have been designed.
When you bale out over enemy territory, your future welfare depends on your own initiative [underlined] after [/underlined] you have come to earth, but the reverse holds good in baling out over the sea or ditching. Emergency incidents over the sea depend for their success on full crew co-operation and knowledge of W/T procedure and dinghy drills – all of which must be gained [underlined] before [/underlined] the incident occurs.
One hour a week spent on the study of search procedure, emergency and S.O.S. W/T procedure, and dinghy drills, is sufficient to ensure that you will never be caught unprepared in case of emergency over the sea.
[Underlined] HELP A.S.R. TO HELP YOU [/underlined]
OPERATIONS
It would perhaps not be inopportune in the first month of the New Year, to reflect on one of the most valuable technical inovations introduced this time last year, and which is to-day largely instrumental in waging the Battle of Berlin with unabated vigour. It was just a year ago that blind bombing was first on trial and an analysis of its success or otherwise was anxiously awaited. This month, with the aid of this technique, we were enabled to conduct seven raids on Berlin, and one each on Brunswick and Magdeburg. Stettin alone, to its everlasting regret, was cloud free. 1341 sorties were flown, of which 89% were successful in attacking the primary. Increased fighter activity and the long range at which targets were attacked perhaps accounted for the rather higher loss rate of 4.6%.
At the beginning of this month, Hitler declared “The Winter may be difficult. Its blows, however, cannot hit us harder than last year”. The month was not out before this illusion was shattered by a sustained series of attacks on the Nazi capital, bringing the tonnage dropped since the beginning of the Battle of Berlin, to over 24,500 tons. One is perhaps best able to appreciate the magnitude of this figure when it is borne in mind that 50,000 tons would “Hamburgise” Berlin. The latest reconnaissance to secure photographic evidence of the raids up to and including 2/3rd January, was made on 4th January, but only poor quality photographs of parts of the city (excluding in particular the centre) were obtained. These however revealed important industrial damage in the Johannisthal district to the South East, with severe damage to several less important business and residential areas. It is interesting to note that in a statement issued by Transocean on 7th January, it was estimated that the damage sustained up to that date would take some 7 1/2 years to rebuild.
Little is yet known of the remaining 4 major attacks of the month against the Reich capital on 20/21st, 27/28th, 28/29th and 30/31st, except that reports suggest they were concentrated. Ground information points to the significant fact that with the possible exception of the North Eastern outer suburbs of the city, not a district in the capital has escaped. Impressive as this picture is , it really affords no index to the scale of administrative dislocation which must be a most acute problem for the Nazis; added to which the paralysis of the focus of German was industry and transport, together with the ever increasing influence of the raids on that intangible factor, morale, would also appear to promote a depressing effect on the Hun’s capacity to wage war.
The attack on Stettin on 5/6th January, provided adequate material for our reports. The blanket of cloud, which for some time past has shrouded the continent, was absent at the target, enabling the snow outlined town to be clearly identified. The resultant attack was well concentrated, and P.R.U. cover indicates severe damage in the Southern half of the town centre, extending into the West and East basins of the dock area. Ten buildings of the large military barracks to the South of the town have been gutted, and fairly heavy damage was sustained by business and residential property. The same night a
(Continued on page 4, col. 1)
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT RATE INCREASES
Halfway through January, it was apparent that the excellent accident figure for December was not to be repeated, and the number of avoidable accidents, of all kinds, by the end of the month was nearly doubled – 18 against 10.
This month’s total is made up as follows: Ground collisions – 9; Overshoots on landing – 3; Heavy landings – 1; Swings on take-off – 1; Other errors of judgement – 3.
In spite of all that has been done and written about “ground collisions” there has been no decrease whatsoever in these avoidable accidents. This month there were again 9, and they follow much the same patter as those of December, with this difference:-
Two aircraft were damaged in dispersal while being run up by ground crew, through chocks slipping on greasy surfaces. In both instances the aircraft swung round and collided with obstacles.
It has been a long time since an accident of this type occurred in the Group. The remedy is obvious. Ground crews must examine all chocks for serviceability, keep dispersals well sanded, and, above all, never start to run up engines until the dispersal is clear of obstructions. It is the old, old story of a little foresight paying a big dividend.
During this month a taxying incident occurred in which a major contributory factor was the failure of a captain of aircraft and of ground crew to notify Flying Control quickly that a Lancaster was obstructing the perimeter track. The aircraft had become bogged in soft ground just off the track at night, and was struck by another Lancaster taxying, without an aldis lamp, and at excessive speed.
Flying Control, had they known, could have taken immediate steps to have the aircraft marked as an obstruction, and could have warned other captains of its position.
This accident adds emphasis to the warning in last Month’s News that ground crew should make every effort to let pilots know of obstructions. The captain of this particular Lancaster showed bad captaincy in not notifying Flying Control, and also in leaving his aircraft in charge of ground crew when he knew it was in a dangerous position.
Needless to say, the pilot of the moving aircraft had his log book endorsed in “RED”.
The 3 “overshoots on landing” this month bring out the usual pilot error – too fast an approach in bad visibility and failure to go round again. If the various factors of height, speed, cockpit drill etc., are not correct, it is no use “hoping you’ll stop in time”. It might be all right nine times out of ten, but the tenth means another Lancaster in a heap at the end of the runway.
One crash occurred again this month on a 3-engined overshoot. The pilot was an experienced captain with many Lancaster hours to his credit, yet he [underlined] failed to keep in trim for 3 engined flying [/underlined] on his approach. When the engines were opened up to full power, the inevitable swing caught him unawares. Result was a bad crash with fatal consequences.
Drills and instructions are not issued by this Headquarters just to be read and forgotten, so if there are any you are not sure about, now is the time to brush up your knowledge. [Underlined] You [/underlined] will reap the benefit.
Conversion Units had a bad time this month. The total of nine “avoidables” exceeds the total of all the Squadrons put together. Winthorpe had four. 1660, 1654 and 5 L.F.S. had one each. 1485 Flight had two taxying accidents.
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
FRESHMEN
1. Remember the lowest fuel consumption is not obtained when you are flying at the lowest possible speed. With the increased angle of attack of the wings at a low speed, you get increased drag and consequently require a greater power output. Neither maximum endurance nor maximum range will be obtained by flying as slowly as you can, so don’t “waffle” around the sky hanging on to your props. If you are getting short of petrol and have got a long way to go, try 2000 revs + 3 boost. That will give you a healthy airspeed, economical petrol consumption and excellent range.
2. You know why you can expect climbing difficulties on warm nights? The air is thinner at a given aeronoid height and so increases the true air speed at which the aircraft must be flown and the power required to fly it. The thinner air also reduces the charge drawn in to the engine and so reduces the power available.
3. Don’t sheer off track because you see pinpoints of flak dead ahead. It may be anything up to 100 miles away and as you get closer you will find that your route will probably bypass the flak area. Flak which explodes with a large orange coloured flash is within 15 mls and is quite harmless. It is only when you can hear or feel it that it is within 250 feet and getting dangerous. If you SMELL it, well get cracking.
[Cartoon]
4. Always take a note at Briefing of the times of the other waves in the attack in case you strike trouble on the way and cannot make good your T.O.T. Aim to make good the T.O.T. of another wave. It is safer to be bombing with bags of company.
5. Give your Navigator as good a platform for his Astro shots as you give your Air Bomber for his bombing run. Hand over to “George” if your instrument flying is not 100% and let the Navigator know the moment you consider the aircraft is as stable as it is likely to be.
6. If you use Caffein tablets it is a good plan to take one as you leave the English Coast outward bound. That will see you to the target. Take another when you are clear of the defences to see you home. Never take any just before take-off. Once upon a time there was a mid-upper gunner who took four tablets 10 minutes before take-off. The “Op” was scrubbed. The gunner wasn’t seen for 24 hours after he eventually went to sleep about noon the next day. Then he was posted !
VETERANS
1. Don’t get out of touch with existing orders. You have read them once, but only by constantly referring to the Flight Order books can you be sure that you have got them buttoned up. Just one example – never take off rudder bias on the approach for a 3-engined landing. You can easily control any tendency to swing after landing, but if you have to overshoot on 3 engines, the bias is the only thing that will enable you to control the immediate swing towards the dead engine at full power. If the swing is not controlled the result is fatal.
2. Another word on overshoots. You can still overshoot even though you are in the green of the G.P.I. and the airspeed is O.K. This circumstance may arise if your initial approach has been too low and you have used the extra engine to get back into the Green. Don’t forget once you have made good the undershoot throttle back again and get your angle of descent right.
3. Don’t attempt to raise flaps after landing when you have “pulled the bottle”, because there is a danger of bursting the header tank. If in an emergency you have to raise flaps in the air after pulling the bottle, do so slowly and in stages.
4. If you have to jettison fuel, close the valve while there is still 75 to 100 gallons in each tank. It is a precaution against fire, because the last 30 gallons of jettisonable fuel runs out slowly and splashes over the airframe. Never jettison if you are going to do a wheels up landing when there is any likelihood of fire.
5. Never take off flap during an approach if you suddenly decide you don’t want flap in a very high wind. The lowering of the flap increases the lift coefficient of a wing and any reduction of the flap angle during an approach may result in the stalling speed being increased above the approach speed.
6. Get together regularly with the other members of your crew behind a hangar or in the crew room and exchange ideas on your recent trips. There’s bound to be a few points in crew routine that need patching up. Don’t wait until there is a party in the Sergeants’ Mess before you find out that the crew have a thing or two on their minds.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS
WIND MESSAGES
Bomber Command Signals Staff Instructions commence with an “Order of the Day” by the C.-in-C. which says that :- “The tradition of the Signals Service is that the safety of aircraft overrides every other consideration and every other interest…The Signals Service aspires never to lose an aircraft”.
Since this message was originated, many and varied aids have been introduced falling within the purview of the Signals Service which attain towards the achievement of this objective.
It is generally agreed that losses in the main bomber force may be considerably reduced if a high degree of concentration of aircraft during the route to and from the target, and at the target itself, can be effected.
Radar/Navigation aids fitted to many aircraft now make it possible to determine with a high degree of accuracy, the velocity and direction of winds at the height and in the area of the main force. The means of communicating this to the Meteorological staffs on the ground, and of passing to every aircraft on the force the assessment of accurate winds on their route, is the responsibility of the Signals Service.
This method has been in use since towards the end of the Old Year, and, from the signals aspect, has been successful. The method used has been for wind-finding aircraft to transmit their winds to the Base D/F Station, and the ground staff to transmit the wind assessment to the main force on Group operational frequency.
The transmissions by Wind Finders to Bases gives an increase on the number of channels, with a better spread over of the volume of traffic at any one time. To ensure that every message which can possibly be received, is received, an additional watch is maintained at each Base on a normal receiver, and a watch, on each frequency in use, at Group Headquarters. The watch at Group Headquarters serves two purposes. Firstly, it enables received winds to be in the Meteorological Officers’ hands in the minimum time, and secondly, provides an additional check on the Base D/F frequencies. Any Wind Finding aircraft unable to establish satisfactory communication on its Base frequency, reverts to the Group operational frequency, and by these means we have been successful in receiving almost 100% of wind finding messages transmitted. There have been two occasions when conditions on the 3 to 4 m/c band made communication rather difficult, and in order to provide an additional channel should this re-occur, an allotment of a frequency in the 7 m/c band has been obtained. The results of this frequency on similar occasions, should they arise, are awaited with interest.
The reception of the wind assessments by the main force has been good, but could be improved. Generally, the number of messages missed has been in the region of 2.5% of the total which should have been received.
The loop aerial has proved a reliable selectivity device, and it should always be tried when other efforts to get rid of jamming fail.
GEE
The introduction of new equipment leaves Radar Sections less time for standard Gee maintenance. It is gratifying to note that, in spite of this, the serviceability remains high. There are however, numerous unnecessary faults, which render the equipment difficult to use, or completely unserviceable. Great care should be taken to prevent slipshod D.I’s, and faults such as leads off etc. Many Squadrons are still reporting divider trouble, indicating that the necessary modification has not been completed. If this is due to a shortage of equipment, ask the Equipment Officer to expedite.
AURAL MONICA
Aural Monica is slowly disappearing. Many crews would, however, like to keep Monica, even though they now have Fishpond. It is, unfortunately, impossible for the Radar Sections to maintain both installations in all aircraft.
VISUAL MONICA
This installation remains a most effective and valuable Radar aid. Serviceability is high in comparison with other equipment, but to be a first class warning device, 100 per cent serviceability is required. Switch motors have caused nearly one third of Visual Monica failures, but it is hoped that this trouble will soon be cleared, since the correct type of grease has now been found. Next month should show a large increase in serviceability. Unfortunately, there is no more equipment available, so squadrons must ensure that no sets remain unserviceable, or are destroyed, through careless maintenance. Many crews already owe much to Visual Monica. Don’t let the lack of serviceability spoil a first class device.
H 2 S
The fitting of H 2 S is greatly retarded by the shortage of scanners. It is impossible to fit all H 2 S aircraft in the existing squadrons, and so there is little likliehood [sic] of fitting new H 2 S squadrons for some time. Last month’s problem, freezing scanners, appears to have been corrected by use of anti-freeze oil and repositioning of the scanner heater. A new snag is now appearing in the slowing down of the repeater motors. Radar Sections should contact Instrument people for information regarding the correct type of oil to use on the motor bearings. A new pulse transformer has been designed and trials are being conducted. It is hoped that a large percentage of the very numerous H 2 S failures will now be prevented.
FISHPOND
Fishpond fitting still continues slowly, hampered by the connector shortage. Trained crews are getting very good results, but it is necessary to emphasise that Wireless Operators should spend considerable time on the Fishpond trainer. A few extra minutes learning to use the set correctly may well save many an unpleasant trip.
MONICA AND FISHPOND TRAINING
Now that all available sets have been fitted, a drive has started to eliminate preventable failures. Aircraft are being deprived of the protection of a tail warning device during entire sorties, simply because one plug is loose, or a fuse blown. We must make full use of every available set and to do this, Operators must be given a greater insight into the workings thereof. Fault finding tables – with sketches of what the CRT shows for various faults – are being prepared.
Various synthetic training schemes have been evolved, including a series of cards showing typical “blip” pictures with the appropriate patter printed underneath. A similar set of cards without the patter is used to test the Operator’s reactions.
An epidiascope is being used by one Squadron, and lifelike “blips” are introduced up and down the time base, and shown on the screen for brief intervals.
Which squadron will produce the best synthetic training device?
Signals and Radar officers – are you getting that occasional flight? (See A.M.O. A.1323/43). You should all have flown with Monica or Fishpond by now. Don’t forget to enter your trips in the old log book.
WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR)
[Underlined] (CAPTAINS OF AIRCRAFT MAY ALSO LOOK) [/underlined]
The article on wind finding from the signals aspect, which heads this Section of the News, should be read and digested by all Wireless Operators.
The Group W/T Exercise has improved this month, but Section I are definitely superior to Section II, and should any Operators of Section II doubt the truth of this statement they may like to do a little eavesdropping. After all, the ether is free.
This month’s three star effort for air operating was the performance by Wireless Operator Sgt. Barnes Moss of No.61 Squadron (formerly of 1661 Con. Unit and 16 O.T.U.), on the night of 5/6th January. The aircraft “J”Jig was severely damaged over the target, the port outer engine being rendered unserviceable, resulting in a loss of the Gee facilities. Sgt. Barnes Moss rose to the occasion and managed 12 fixes, 1 bearing and 1 message, keeping a good log, and also receiving the odd Group broadcast at the same time. It would appear that this Wireless Operator set about his job with calm determination, and was partly responsible for the safe return of his aircraft to this country, and in doing so proved a credit to his Squadron, captain and crew.
(continued on Page 12, Col.1)
(Continued from Page 2, Col.3)
small force of our aircraft successfully laid mines.
Although for the moment we are without precise information as to the result of the raids on Brunswick on 14/15th, and against Magdeburg and Berlin on 21/22nd, preliminary reports show promise of impressive returns. These attacks will contribute to the nomadic population of the Reich, and provide a tinge of irony to the announcement in a Frankfurt paper that “Evacuees are not gypsies but Germans”.
Thus ends the first month of our “decisive year, boasting a new record tonnage dropped on Germany itself – a portent of the scale of future operations.
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 4.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
It was at the beginning of May, 1943, that the initial drive on greater accuracy in practice bombing was commenced throughout the Group. Very good co-operation by the Squadrons within the Group led to most intensified training, so much so that in the months of May, June, July and August a grand total of 23,310 bombs were dropped. This total almost equalled the number of bombs that were dropped in the preceding [underlined] 4 years. [/underlined] However, one fact emerged, namely the average error was remaining at approximately the same figure, and that this figure, 220 yards, was still much too high.
September heralded the introduction of bombing analysis. F/Lt. Cooper, an expert analyst was attached to us from No. 25 Group and travelled from Squadron to Squadron to implement the Group’s very scanty knowledge of assessment of bombing. Thus, slowly we learned the way bombing errors are split into certain definite categories. The first major item which was tackled was the bombsight maintenance, which had contributed no small portion of bombing errors; and by the end of November, errors directly attributable to bombsight defects were almost eliminated.
We next learned that the main error, called Crew Error, had two components. The error caused by the failings of Pilot and Air Bomber, and the Vector Error, that is the error due to the use of faulty wind velocities.
The Pilot and Air Bomber’s error was tackled with considerable vigour until, by the end of December we were really getting down to very small proportions. 106 Squadron for instance, dropped 182 bombs from High Level during December for an average Pilot/Air Bomber error of 78 yards, an astonishingly good achievement. 619 Squadron with 101 yards, 467 with 115 yards and 50 and 463 Squadrons with 116 and 117 yards respectively were close behind.
However, and now we come to the major bombing problem, our Crew Errors were still too large because our average Vector Errors were much too high.
November/December and January has shown the gradual appreciation of this Vector Error problem, and in the Squadrons where bombing is accepted as the be-all and end-all of 5 Group (and their number is ever-increasing) the problem is a matter of real concern. The Group’s average Vector Error for November was 169 yards at 10,000 feet, in in December 162 yards, and these figures convert to roughly 13 m.p.h. A good Vector Error is considered to be 5 m.p.h. (that is 60 yards at 10,000 feet) and it is to this figure Crews must make their way.
When this is achieved, and it will come only with the greatest flying care by the pilots and the most accurate plotting, timing and computing by the Navigators, then a crew will be able to take up 6 bombs, drop them in a close group of less than 50 yards radius with the Mean Point of Impact less than 70 yards from the target. Then, and not until then, can we call ourselves BOMBER CREWS.
[Underlined] FOOTNOTE. [/underlined] 619 Squadron (F/Lt.Walmsley) submits the following “Stop Press” news on the Vector Error problem.
(continued in next column)
“ F/O. Ingleby, a Navigator of 619 Squadron has spent a great deal of time on trying to find out why such large Vector Errors occur. He back-plotted a navigator’s bombing wind, [underlined] to a much larger scale, [/underlined] and discovered that a 15 seconds error in timing over 6-7 minutes gave a Vector Error of 10 m.p.h., that is 130 yards at 10,000 feet. “
The wind found, in the words of the Navigator, brought us from Nottingham to Base on E.T.A. “
Agreed that such a wind would, because an error up to 300-400 yards in track and 1/2 to 1 second in time is almost unnoticeable, but it is such small and apparently insignificant Navigation Errors that cause displacement of bombs from the target to distances up to 200 to 250 yards away.
COMPETITION BOMBING
A much better show was put up by the Squadrons this month in the Competition, the results of which are as follows:-
Pilot & Air Bombers Navigators
1st 106 Sqdn – 58 yds 1st 630 Sqdn – 87 yds
2nd 619 Sqdn – 82 yds 2nd 106 Sqdn - 124 yds
3rd 630 Sqdn – 92 yds 3rd 619 Sqdn – 183 yds
4th 57 Sqdn – 118 yds 4th 57 Sqdn – 264 yds
Further entries with less than [underlined] 8 [/underlined] qualifying exercises.
5th 50 Sqdn – 74 yds 5th 467 Sqdn -110 yds
6th 463 Sqdn -129 yds 6th 50 Sqdn – 119 yds
7th 61 Sqdn -145 yds 7th 61 Sqdn -163 yds
8th 467 Sqdn -158 yds 8th 463 Sqdn -165 yds
9th 207 Sqdn -165 yds 9th 44 Sqdn -176 yds
10th 44 Sqdn -221 yds 10th 207 Sqdn -220 yds
No entries were submitted by 9 & 49 Sqdns. Next month we want a TOTAL all-out effort!
[Table of High Level Bombing Training by Squadron showing Error Rates]
[Underlined] OUTSTANDING BOMBING DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
Squadron Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 10,000 ft.
[Underlined] 9 W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined] F/O. Prior P/O. Gall 66 yds
[Underlined] 50 F/O. Robinson [/underlined] F/O. Lavery Sgt. Sanderson 84 yds
[Underlined] P/O. Dobbyn [/underlined] Sgt. Jackson F/O. Horner 66 yds
61 P/O. Wallis Sgt. Pardoe F/Sgt. Tozer 67 yds
F/O. Fitch F/O. Lyons. F/O. Jennings 86 yds
106 F/O. Latham F/O. Martins F/L. Williamson 89 yds
P/O. Lee F/Sgt. Hoyland F/Sgt. McKie 81 yds
P/O. Gibbs F/O. Cramp F/Sgt. Appleyard 75 yds
F/Sgt. Rosser Sgt. Goss F/Sgt. White 61 yds
F/O. Lee F/O Beven F/O. Langrish 95 & 72 yds
P/O. Pezaro Sgt. Greenwood Sgt. Wade 63 yds
[Underlined] 463 P/O. Saunders [/underlined] Sgt. Govett Sgt. Falconer 84 yds
[Underlined] F/Sgt. James [/underlined] F/Sgt. Bowes F/O. Pettitt 92 yds
630 W/Cdr. Rollinson F/Sgt. Rosser F/L. Ehrman 88 yds
1654 C.U. F/Sgt. Page F/O. Braithwaite F/Sgt. Fair 99 yds
F/Sgt. Perry Sgt. Duncombe Sgt. Hather 84 yds
Sgt. Paterson Sgt. Hall Sgt. Rice 90 yds
1661 C.U. F/Sgt. Falsted F/Sgt. Hancock Sgt. O’Connor 95 yds
617 Squadron obtained 11 exercises with less than 100 yards average error, and the following :
S/Ldr. Suggitt F/O. Davidson W/O. Gordon 30 yds
[Table of Additional Bombing Training by Squadron, including bombs dropped, error, A.M.B.T. hours, infra-red exercises, traces and T. & D. runs & indirect attacks]
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 5.
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CON)
“GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS
[Underlined] 61 Squadron’s [/UNDERLINED] (F/Lt. McDonald) bombing figures for December failed to include the month’s best week of bombing because the return affecting that week was mislaid. 15 exercises were carried out, 77 bombs being dropped for an average Crew Error at 10,000 feet, of 177 yards. Vector Error averaged 126 yards and Pilot’s and Air Bomber’s error was 129 yards.
Congratulations to the Bombing Staff off [underlined] No. 5 LANCASTER FINISHING SCHOOL, R. A. F. [/underlined] Syerston, who, under the guidance of W/O. Linnett, constructed an excellent small instructional display of ‘Paramatta’ and ‘Wanganui’ attacks showing the danger of incendiaries “creep-back”.
Group Captain Evans-Evans, R.A.F. Coningsby, has pointed out that [underlined] 619 Squadron [/underlined] (F/L Walmsley) in the first two weeks of January AIMED 36 day and 54 night Practice Bombs and not one of these 90 bombs were “aimed” below 8,000 feet.
To quote the Station Commander – “a real effort on all crews’ part to bomb as near operational height as possible.”
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S., R.A.F. Syerston [/underlined] (F/Lt.Wonham.) reports the most creditable attainment of 12,300 feet average height for all practice bombing during January. This is what we want !!!
[Underlined] 467 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. McCarthy) reports yet a further “Mod” to the Bomb Aimer’s compartment.
To quote :-
“The stationary lights do not supply illumination to points where they are needed, i.e. the lamp on the bombing instrument panel does not afford enough light to read the pre-selector box and no light is in position to check camera leads. A “wander” light has been installed above the selector box and will supply any part of the nose for any job including map reading”.
5 Group will seek permission to make this modification general as soon as possible.
Thank you, 467 !!!
It is pointed out that [underlined] 49 Squadron [/underlined] are doing a considerable amount of bombing training which does not appear in the normal returns.
This training is in the form of blind bombing using H2S, which is achieving considerable success.
[Underlined] 617 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt. Hay) reports that average bombing error for December was 90 yards – on one [underlined] operation [/underlined] during January the Squadron’s average error was 94 yards from 12,000 feet. Enough said !!!
In column 2 will be found an article by F/Lt. Hay on the “617” bombing team, as promised in the December issue.
“GEN” FROM WAINFLEET
Despite 8 days and 15 nights unfit for bombing training, Wainfleet plotted [underlined] 2398 [/underlined] bombs dropped by 363 aircraft during the month. All Squadrons used the range for night training, special mention being made of 617, 106, 207 and 619 Squadrons who aimed 155, 60, 51 and 50 bombs respectively.
[Boxed] LATE ENTRY FROM 49 SQUADRON FOR COMPETITION
Bombing Error – 156 yards
Navigator’s Error – 124 yards [/boxed]
THE SECRET OF 617 SQUADRON’S HIGH STANDARD OF PRACTICE BOMBING.
The S.A.B.S. – Pilot/Navigator/Air Bomber Team.
The excellent results gained by crews of 617 Squadron using the SABS have only been achieved by the fullest, most practical use of the “Bombing team”. Before any bombs are dropped some four hours training on the specially adapted A.M.B.T. are carried out by the Pilot and Air Bomber to give manipulation practice to the latter, and to familiarise the pilot with the B.D.I. (Bombing Direction Indicator). The Navigator is trained to carry out compution of true height and airspeed, and settings for a given course of attack with the instruments and computers at his disposal. Some 2 - 4 hours are then spent in the air doing “dummy runs”, firstly on objects “on track”, and then choosing targets and “turning on”, and finally on to targets and setting up sight in accordance with settings computed from known navigational data. The sight is only accurate when correct height above target is set. Thus the pilot must fly at the indicated height he states he will be at, the Navigator must correctly compute this to the true height above target, and the Air Bomber set this accurately.
True height is dependent upon :-
(i) [Underlined] Sea Level Pressure at Target. [/underlined] This is gained by setting aerodrome height for practice bombing or, operationally, from Form 2330. It is the Q.F.F. which is set.
(ii) [Underlined] Indicated Height above Sea Level. [/underlined] All 617 Squadron altimeters have been accurately calibrated for every 1000’ for 140 and 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. and from the appropriate card the Navigator allows for this error, which may be up to 300’
(iii) [Underlined] Temperature. [/underlined] “Thermometer, Air, Direct Reading, Mk.I”, now fitted, does not give an accurate reading for temperature of the outside air, as (a) the stem is heated by cabin temperature, and (b) the outside air bearing against the bulb is under pressure varying with airspeed. Both factors tend to give a “warmer” reading than true. Again the Navigator computes from a special computer to get an accurate air temperature.
With these factors and the use of an ICAN computer, true height (c) can be computed. True height above target will need a deduction of target height above sea level, and there will be a further allowance (addition) to be made where stick bombing is being used.
When the pilot advises IAS with aircraft trimmed and bomb doors open, the Navigator computes a T.A.S. which is used against a Trail scale for the appropriate bomb number. Errors of + or – 5 m.p.h. make negligible ground errors. Most errors in range can be traced to (1) flying at other than the indicated height stated by the pilot, (2) incorrect compution of height and/or T.A.S., by the navigator, or (3) by incorrect settings or bad manipulation, by the Air Bomber.
The sight will automatically correct for Drift and Ground Speed if switched on with the target in the graticule, and held there by proper manipulation of the sight by the Air Bomber, and by the pilot following the direction of his B D. I., until such time as the point of release is attained. Those who remember the A.B.S., and who used it to its utmost efficiency, realise that the length of run could be considerably decreased if settings were applied before the run. As the heading of attack is generally known, the navigator just prior to the run, can pass a drift and G/S setting to the Air Bomber. So, after practice, the Air Bomber need only wind his sighting head back for a 25 second run, whereas 40 -50 seconds may be required without these settings.
Let us listen to a typical 617 Squadron bombing run :-
Pilot. “Turning on to a heading of 250°”
Nav. “250° - drift 4° port, G/Setting 17”
A/B acknowledges, directs pilot on and calls “Run stated”, at the appropriate moment. After 30 seconds of concentration, but silence, by Pilot and Air Bomber, we hear :-
A/B. “ Bombs gone, good run here, drift 3° port, G/S 16.5 “, and after time of fall “ Bomb plotted, 10 yards overshoot “.
Pilot. “Sorry, my fault, I was 120 ft. high!!
When results are received from the Range, the team assembles about the plotting table to further sort out factors causing any errors.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
A hearty welcome to F/Lt. Lowry ex 3 Group who has arrived in this Group to become Bombing Leader to 44 Squadron, R.A.F., Dunholme Lodge.
F/O. Jacombs (463 Squadron) was 1st and F/O. Abbot (106 Squadron) was 3rd, both with “A” Categories on No. 74 Bombing Leaders’ Course. This is a particularly good show on the part of these two Officers. F/O. Jones (49 Squadron) obtained a “B” category on the same Course, being 15th.
[Cartoon of two WAAFs] Dot and Dark – the immaculate W.A.A.F’s – “… and don’t you suggest he made the first Begin Approach…”]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 6.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Concentration, track keeping, and Navigation generally improved during the month. This was largely due to the efficiency of the selected wind finders and to the working of the Wind Finding Scheme as a whole. The selected wind finders’ results have been carefully analysed and it is now possible for the Met. Section at Group Headquarters to place certain degrees of reliability on the information which is passed back from individual crews. Special mention is made here of F/Lt. Townsend – Pilot, and F/O. Haxby, Navigator, of No.57 Squadron who have proved to be most reliable as wind finders; they have consistently sent back accurate wind information which was used as a basis for future winds transmitted to all 5 Group aircraft. It is hoped that all crews selected for this special duty will reach a 100% reliability standard, and send back wind information which will not only be of great value to non-wind finding crews in the Group but to many other crews in the Command.
It has been suggested in some quarters that transmitting winds from aircraft over enemy territory renders the aircraft more susceptible to Freya and Wurtzburg plotting, and therefore to greater danger from vectored fighters, flak and searchlights. As far as the losses in this Group show, there is absolutely no foundation in fact for this belief, so that crews need have no qualms about using the W/T transmitter. They should regard their transmissions as a valuable means of helping all the other aircraft to keep to the planned route.
It was particularly emphasised in the December Monthly News that all Navigators must continue to find winds whenever possible and to check accuracy of their wind finding with broadcast winds. Many crews are not doing this, but are content to use all broadcast winds without checking their accuracy. This practice is a dangerous one, and can easily lead a crew into trouble. Assume that the Navigator has rechecked his calculations and is satisfied that the course and airspeeds flown are those for which he is calculating. The winds found by this Navigator are the only ones on which a revised wind could be based should the aircraft get into difficulties as a result of using the broadcast wind. It is imperative, therefore that all Navigators check, and re-check, the wind velocity whenever a good air position and fix are obtained simultaneously. Your ability to find accurate wind velocities may mean that you will be selected as a Group wind finder, and that in consequence, the main force concentration and track keeping will be directly affected by your efficiency.
5 GROUP SPOOF ATTACK 21/22ND JANUARY
Reference must be made here to the Spoof Attack carried out by 22 aircraft of this Group on BERLIN. Theirs was not considered a desirable mission, and the success of the attack makes the job they did all the more noteworthy. It seems that this small attack drew off the enemy fighters from the stream of the main force aircraft which attacked Brunswick at the same time, and the combats recorded on the two routes bear this out.
The return from this raid was flown over 10/10ths cloud almost the whole way. Route Markers were dropped by our own aircraft along this route and winds were broadcast by 57 “C” for the assistance of the rest of the force. Only one aircraft failed to return from this attack, which emphasises the general quality of the Navigation and the careful pre-flight planning employed.
A.P.I.
Supplies of A.P.I’s and A.M.U’s have now been received in the Group and they will be sufficient to equip all H 2 S aircraft. Any surplus A. P. I’s will be distributed to the non-H 2 S Squadrons. This method of distribution was decided on so that the maximum assistance in windfinding would be available in certain Squadrons. Their help will be to the benefit of all non-H 2 S squadrons.
Fitting is going on as rapidly as possible in all squadrons.
M/F FIXES
In the past many Navigators have considered that to request a fix from the W/Op means an admission of defeat in their job as a Navigator. If the security of the aircraft is in danger and the Navigator is temporarily uncertain of his position when returning from operations, then he should not hesitate to obtain a fix.
This of course must only be resorted to in emergency, otherwise aircraft which urgently require W/T assistance are unable to receive from the M/F Station until it has dealt with the first aircraft. Recently a fix was requested from Heston, (Section D) by an aircraft returning from the South from operations. This was not obtained, although a position line was given instead. (The significance of this was not appreciated by the Navigator). If a line bearing is received in reply to a request for a fix, it normally means that the aircraft is in transit with the base line of the M/F Stations. This Navigator should have requested another fix about 15 minutes later from the same M/F Station, or better still should have asked the W/Op to change over to Section N.
STRAIGHT FROM THE O R S’s MOUTH
A system of Raid Assessment has now been in operation in 5 Group since May, 1943. The system has progressed, and ways and means to improve it are considered daily. The objects of the system are (i) to try to discover [underlined] quickly [/underlined] what went right or what went wrong with each attack, and (ii) to consider over a period what lessons can be learnt. In this way, it is hoped, future attacks may be conducted with greater precision and reduced casualties.
Each Station has a copy of the teleprinted O.R.S. (R) form – the information on this form, the additional data on raid reports and the details of combats, will enable Stations to draw their own conclusions. Finally, the Group Raid Assessment Report, the statistical Chart and track keeping diagram, furnish as complete a picture of each attack as is possible at the moment.
The consideration of the salient features of each assessment means that the plans for each subsequent attack can be more carefully prepared. Aerial warfare has now become a highly scientific affair, and as with all scientific ventures, rapid future progress depends on intelligent deductions from a fund of accurate and ‘up to date’ facts.
Aircrew will, therefore, realise that the navigational and other ‘gen’ which is collected from them at interrogation is not just another ‘bind’. This ‘gen’ is of the greatest importance, and must be given with the utmost accuracy which the conditions under which it is obtained permit.
GEE
Range on Gee increased on the raids towards the end of the month, particularly on the Berlin operation of January 30/31st when fixes were obtained of XF frequencies up to 8 E, with position lines still further. If this excellent reception continues, there should be a marked improvement in concentration and timing. With regard to position lines, these may be the means of keeping within the 10 mile band of concentration, particularly if the track runs parallel to the Gee lines, and Navigators should endeavour to make the utmost use of Position Lines wherever possible.
From reports sent in after each operation it appears that some navigators are relying solely upon the XF frequencies on the RF unit 25 and not attempting to use the RF unit 24. When reception fades on the unit 25 navigators should insert the Unit 24, and at least endeavour to find out whether reception is better on this or not.
Whilst the usual technical failures still occur due to deterioration of components, serviceability on the whole has been good, but unfortunately the odd manipulation fault crops up now and again, and every effort must be made by navigators, (particularly those on H2S Squadrons) to remain proficient in the operation of the set, and in the correction of simple faults. (See the Navigation Quiz).
With the introduction of miniature lattice charts, errors in the plotting and transferring of fixed should be reduced to the minimum. However, these charts do not cover certain areas and navigators must carry the large charts for those areas until miniatures are published.
It is hoped that a North Eastern chain will be available within a month, to cover the present blank areas of the Western North Sea.
[Boxed] [Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. J.H. Evans, D.F.C. – H.Q. No.5 Group to 49 Sqdn. as Flt. Commander.
S/Ldr. J. Vivian, D.S.O., D.F.C. – No. 57 Sqdn. to H.Q. No. 5 Group as Group Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. R.H. Schofield, (H2S Instructor) – H.Q. No. 5 Group to Fiskerton. (Stn.Navigation Officer)
F/O. W.T. Haxby, D.F.C. – 57 Sqdn.to H.Q. 5 Group (Radar Nav.)
F/Lt. P.F. Bailey. – 1661 C.U. to 619 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. P.M. Materkeyn – 93 Group to 44 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/Lt. B. Asson, D.F.C. – 44 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to 10 O.T.U.
F/Lt. M.J. Baud. – 207 Sqdn (Sqdn Navigation Offr) to SPILSBY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/Lt. W.M. Burnside, DFC. – No 5 LFS. (Sqdn Navigation Offr.) to BARDNEY (Stn. Navigation Offr.)
F/O. Parker. 44 Sqdn. to 207 Sqdn. (Squadron Navigation Offr)
F/O. R.O. Beattie. 207 Sqdn. to 5 L.F.S. SYERSTON [/boxed]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 7.
[Page break]
Navigation (Cont.)
H 2 S
Training on H 2 S has progressed satisfactorily during the month, but once again bad weather and cloud have prevented much blind bombing, and until this training is given, crews cannot be considered fully trained.
Serviceability during this month has been quite up to standard considering the difficulties of replacement and our main worry at the present time is failure due to bad manipulation. Failures such as these can only be overcome by constant practice both in the air and on the ground. Ground training is essential, and with Ground trainers now installed at 1660 and 1661 Con. Units, and 49 57 and 630 Squadrons, there should be less reason for manipulation failures in the future.
Intelligent use was made of the H 2 S in operations this month, and many operators are finding it a great help in avoiding defended areas. Navigational fixes are being obtained up to 40 and 50 miles by some operators, but still 17% of the fixes are wrongly taken or plotted. With the advent of broadcast W/Vs there is even greater need for accuracy in D.R. and the navigator must work in close co-operation with the Air Bomber if they wish to make the most of H 2 S.
A few simple rules such as the following should result in greater accuracy in navigation with H 2 S :-
(i) Pre-flight planning must be looked upon by the Navigator and Air Bomber as an essential part of the operation, and they must work in close conjunction with each other. The Navigator should point out to the Air Bomber all features from which fixes are likely to be required, and their Flight Plan E.T.A’s. The Air Bomber must draw in the tracks on a Mercator Plotting Chart, clearly ring all recommended H 2 S landmarks and mark in their Flight Plan E.T.A’s.
(ii) This close co-operation must be maintained in flight, and the Navigator must inform the Air Bomber from time to time of the aircraft’s D.R. position and alterations in E.T.A’s, which he must mark on his chart. The Air Bomber must be allowed time to take a fix and the Navigator must cross check all fixes used. To save time and unnecessary chatter over the inter-com. the Air Bomber could be taking fixes and entering them on a log form giving time, place, bearing and distance, or, the Bomb Aimer can make a track crawl on a chart of his own, so that the Navigator will be able to choose any suitable fix at any time.
Remember, it is the reliability of fixes that matters, not the quantity.
The reliability of H 2 S is dependent upon the accuracy of the D.R. Navigation, and conversely without frequent reliable fixes the D.R. becomes increasingly inaccurate. The H 2 S must, therefore, be used to increase the accuracy of the D.R. navigation.
GARDENING
On 5/6th January, 49 Squadron provided 6 aircraft fitted with special equipment, to plant vegetables in the approaches of SWINEMUNDE. This force was detached from the main stream (bound for STETTIN) close to the gardens, and re-joined shortly after planting. This operation was the first of its kind to be carried out entirely with special equipment, and one of the first from high altitude (12,000 feet). Five out of six aircraft planted successfully on a timed run from the pinpoint. The sixth was unable to pinpoint due to failure of special equipment and descended to the lowest permissible height as briefed; being still unable to pinpoint visually, due to cloud, the vegetables were correctly jettisoned in a previously ordered position. The importance of the sea routes here is their use for supplying the Russian front – and by the look of things on the Leningrad front – for repatriation purposes. There is every indication that the vegetables went into the right “hole”, but definite information on the results is hard to come by from such distant places.
The raising of the maximum height for dropping mines to 15,000 ft., has made gardening possible, with reasonable safety, in many areas hitherto immune, and where the presence of mines will present an even worse problem to the enemy than hitherto.
The Bombing Development Unit has carried out trials which prove conclusively that, contrary to expectation, the mine has an extremely consistent flight, and figures for drift due to wind have also been found.
Allowances for Forward Travel and drift due to wind can, therefore, easily be made.
The Command planted 1100 vegetables during the month – 3 Group were responsible for 833. Gardens visited were many and varied, the most densely sown being those off the ELBE, WESER, and EMS; KIEL BAY; the FRANCH COAST U-BOAT BASES.
-“Where angels fear to tread”
In seemly and imposing state, th’elect of God conferred,
The operations staff did hang upon their spoken word.
Save which, the room all silent was, and deathly as the tomb,
(Though sound of trotting horsed permeated through the room)
Tranquility [sic]was shattered as a vulgar voice did rant
“Connect me please with Swinderby, for Swinderby I pant”
The Lords of all creation ceased. A frozen silence fell;
The D.S.O. was seized, and cast into a dungeon cell.
And there without a trial doth the poor wretch meditate,
The sins of other people, for whose crimes he’ll meet his fate.
Let those who keep the watches now resolve they never will
Repeat th’offence, the cure for which is published in the drill.
ANON. CIRCA. 1944.
LINK TRAINER
[Table showing Link Trainer use by Squadron]
ASTRO COMPASS
The astro compass is a precision instrument for checking courses against any heavenly body. In this Command, however, it is rarely used, and even then only for sights on the Pole star.
The Astro compass in its present form is a precision and somewhat complicated instrument, and it is suggested that a much simpler instrument should serve the purpose equally well. This Headquarters is experimenting with a very simplified Astro Compass, and as soon as it is ready for trials, Squadrons will be informed and asked to give their criticisms.
The DR and P4 Compasses should be checked approximately every 15 minutes, and also after every major alteration of course. If these two compasses agree within 2 degrees, then it is not considered essential to check them by use of the Astro Compass. If however, they do not agree within these limits an immediate check should be made of the D.R. Repeaters and the Master Unit. If the compasses still disagree, then a check should be made to ascertain which is correct.
NAVIGATIONAL QUIZ
1. What is the safety height over :-
(a) North Yorkshire.
(b) S.W. England.
(c) Lincolnshire.
(d) West Scotland.
2. What M/F Sections would you use if you were approaching Cornwall (a) from the Wexford region, (b) from the Cherbourg region?
3. Which is the shortest distance from Berlin – Lincoln or Leningrad?
4. Assume your aircraft is engaged on a dinghy search. The W/Op receives an S.O.S. on 500 K/Cs. What immediate action should be taken by the Navigator.
5. If none of the 6 pin sockets on the V C P give a proper picture on the screen, two separate actions can be taken by the navigator. What are they? (N.B. The V.C.P. light is on all the time.)
6. What is the recommended method of search to be used when engaged on dinghy search?
Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 8.
[Page break]
GUNNERY
TRAINING ON SQUADRONS
Checks carried out recently reveal that the standard of knowledge on tactics and the corkscrew among Air Gunners is well below the high standard required. It would appear that insufficient time is being allocated to “vetting” air gunners on arrival, and ensuring that their knowledge is retained by constant practice and instruction. It is a simple matter to get the gunners together and hold a quiz on these subjects; naturally some will be on leave, others flying or sick, but if this is carried out regularly all the gunners will receive checks.
This check can be carried out whenever gunners have a few minutes to spare and requires no equipment. All that is required is to ensure that every gunner on every Squadron knows automatically the sequence of the corkscrew manoeuvre, the correct deflection and how to give a clear picture to the remainder of the crew of what is going on during an attack. Squadron Gunnery Leaders recently attended a two day course at R.A.E. Farnborough. This was primarily concerned with the function of ice in oxygen equipment, and should have been passed on to the gunners. It included quite a few valuable tips on the care of this equipment and how to keep it working in severe icing conditions.
FIGHTING CONTROL EXERCISE
An excellent scheme for carrying out the Fighting Control exercise at night on the ground is contained in the February issue of “TEE EMM”. It will be found on page 274; it requires little equipment and can be carried out on the aerodrome, and also gives good practice in night vision training.
10 DAY SIGHTING COURSE AT NO.1 A.A.S. MANBY
This course has recently been started with the object of providing expert sighting instructions, with particular emphasis on the assessment of Gyro films.
During the first few courses it was found that adjustments to the syllabus had to be made, and now the course has settled down to what might be termed an advanced sighting course; the subject is covered more thoroughly even than the C.G.S. course, and any prospective candidate should ensure that he has a thorough knowledge of the G2 notes, as a lack of preliminary knowledge has caused the downfall of several air gunners who have attended the course.
The vacancies on this course are very few, and only gunners who are keen on sighting and have already proved their worth as instructors, should be submitted.
FLYING CLOTHING FOR AIR GUNNERS
During the two-day course which the Gunnery Leaders attended at Farnborough, a discussion was held with the officers responsible for the design and production of clothing and oxygen equipment, and most interesting “gen” was obtained. Here are a few of the new items to be produced :-
New type Oxygen Mask (H) which is much smaller, lighter in weight, causes less obstruction to downward vision and houses a much smaller microphone.
(Continued in column 3)
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMBATS – 155
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
49 K 2/3.1.44. ME.110
61 J 2/3.1.44. ME.210
207 D 5/6.1.44. JU. 88
49 U 5/6.1.44. ME.109
49 K 14/15.1.44. TE/EA
[Underlined] 463 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 9 W 21/22.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 T 28/29.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 467 T 30/31.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
44 U 30/31.1.44. ME.210
[Underlined] 50 X 30/31.1.44. TE/EA [/underlined]
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 O 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 L 1/2.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 V 1/2.1.44. JU. 88
44 A 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 R 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 M 2/3.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
106 G 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 K 2/3.1.44. Unidentified
[Underlined] 50 T 2/3.1.44. FW.190 [/underlined]
49 H 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
49 P 2/3.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 467 C 5/6.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
106 V 5/6.1.44. FW.190
[Underlined] 463 R 5/6.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 J 14/15.1.44. ME.110 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 F 14/15.1.44. ME.210 [/underlined]
49 M 14/15/.1.44. JU. 88
630 Z 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
44 L 14/15.1.44. ME.110
207 M 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
207 N 14/15.1.44. FW.190
49 H 14/15.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 9 T 21/22.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 G 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 J 21/22.1.44. ME.109
207 K 21/22.1.44. ME.210
207 K 21/22.1.44. JU. 88
44 K 21/22.1.44. ME.109
57 O 27/28.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 M 27/28.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
207 K 27/28.1.44. FW.190
49 J 28/29.1.44. TE/EA
106 G 28/29.1.44. JU. 88
[Underlined] 50 B 28/29.1.44. JU. 88 [/underlined]
49 J 30/31.1.44. ME.110
DAMAGED (Continued)
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
[Underlined] 50 L 30/31.1.44.JU.88 [/underlined]
[Underlined] 463 D 30/31.1.44. JU.88 [/underlined]
207 P 30/31.1.44. ME.109
630 P 30/31.1.44. T/E
57 G 30/31.1.44. DO.217
All except G/106 28/29th and G/57 30/31st have been confirmed by Command.
OMITTED FROM LAST MONTH’S BAG
DESTROYED
[Underlined] Sqdn A/C Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
44 Z 16/17.12.43. T/E E/A
(confirmed by Command)
The type “E” heated lining is to have more heating elements in the knees and seat, heated gloves are to have extra heating elements, and the high wattage socks to have the heating slightly reduced.
A new glove with all the heating elements in the back to give better grip and a more positive control over the equipment when handled with the gloves on, is on the way.
A silk glove, which has had the finger tips dipped in Latex to give a coating of rubber and enable even small articles to be picked up with ease, has been experimented with.
A flap has been attached to the neck of the flying helmet in order to exclude draught; this flap is made to go inside the flying suit and form a seal around the neck, which keeps the draught out and the heat in.
With the introduction of the new oxygen mask and microphone, the inter-com lead is taken round the back of the helmet, this making for more freedom of movement.
Production on the Taylor Suit has ceased but as there is still a large number in service, the new suit will not be seen for some time.
STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER
The first of these trainers to appear in the Group is being erected at Fiskerton and by the time this “News” reaches the Squadrons, it should be in working order. The trainer provides for deflection practice and range estimation, aircraft recognition, zone sightings and also produces tracer simulation. The trainer will shortly be adapted to take the Mark II Gyro Sight as 49 Squadron have been fortunate enough to be selected for the installation of this sight. The sight is similar to the one now in use as an assessor in the Group, but has a range component which enables the range to be fed into the sight by means of foot pedals operated by the gunner. It is a reflector sight with much improved dimming controls on the graticules; in short, all the gunner has to do is to make settings on the sight for height and airspeed, place the moving graticule on the target, estimate the range, and he cannot miss.
Considerable practice is required in the manipulation of this sight, and the free gunnery trainer has been installed for that purpose.
(Continued on page 13, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.18. JANUARY, 1944. PAGE 9.
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
GUNS AND TURRETS
Guns freezing, combined with sluggish turrets, due to the extreme cold conditions experienced on operational sorties, sets a problem which is, at present, being tackled in several ways.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined] The exclusion of moisture from the moving portions will, it is considered, be ensured by the fitting of gun ejection slot seals which have been issued to all units in the Group.
There is little point in fitting ejection seals if guns are being tested or cocked after being fully loaded for operations, as the ejection seal will be broken. After the seal is broken, moist air entering the ejection slot is sure to freeze under certain conditions, and a cure for this cannot be found by the application of Anti-Freeze oils.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined] From reports received, turrets appear to give various troubles, when subjected to extreme cold. Various hydraulic media are being tried to overcome these troubles, but it is the Air Gunner who can tell the Armament Staff what actually happened.
First hand information from Air Gunners to their Gunnery Leaders or Armament Officers is of vital assistance in the investigation of all suspected freezing troubles. The Air Gunner is the man who experiences the trouble, and he is the only one who can give the required information on the actual failure and the conditions prevailing at the time. A remark made, and later entered on a combat report such as “Guns would not fire during combat”, does not help in any way.
An Armament representative is always present at Interrogation, and any information passed to him there and then will greatly assist the investigation to be carried out at once. This information will surely help to diagnose the cause of the trouble.
See to it, gunners, that you give full details of all troubles experienced with either guns or turrets, to your Gunnery Leader or Armament Officer. They cannot get a story from anyone but you. IT ALL DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU TELL THE ARMAMENT OFFICER. He cannot reproduce what you experienced under the same conditions.
PHOTOGRAPHIC FAILURE
A small percentage of photographic failures have, on investigation, been attributed to Armament causes. It was hoped that with the introduction of the Mk.111 fuse those failures, however small in number, would disappear. A very careful analysis of the film gives indication that a certain discrepancy exists between the timing of the camera control and the E.111 Fuse. The importance of setting this clockwork fuse correctly cannot be too strongly emphasised, and all Armament Officers can help stamp out this type of failure if they ensure that all fuses M.111 are set correctly.
NEAR ENOUGH IS NOT GOOD ENOUGH
Liaison between Armament and Photographic Sections is essential. Try it and see – who knows, it might reduce the number of failures all round, and so produce vitally important plottable pictures of the target area.
SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS
The preparation of the ever-faithful S.B C. has been, and still is, the immediate concern of all Armament Sections. To prepare the bomb load and bomb up aircraft for an operation is, with the S.B.C’s now available, a matter for organisation. Difficulty can, however, be experienced on the second day when these S.B.C’s have to be filled in the limited time available.
The introduction of Conveyor Rollers has undoubtedly relieved this arduous task, but there is still room for improvement. These rollers can be put to untold uses, and with this in mind, numerous schemes are at present undergoing trials, which will, if applied in the correct manner, enable bomb loads to be prepared for the second sortie in quick time.
Full details of these schemes will be distributed to all Units in the near future. When the new equipment is received it should be subjected to a fair trial according to storage conditions available.
BOMBING RANGES
The lighting of Targets at Wainfleet Bombing Range is causing grave concern, owing to the ingress of salt water into the electric light fittings. Every effort is being made to keep the targets serviceable for night use, but after high tides, faults appear which may, therefore, make it necessary on occasions to declare certain targets unserviceable.
Representatives have been made to obtain an improved type of electric light fitting. In the event of it becoming necessary, improvised lighting has been arranged at EPPERSTONE Range.
FENTON BOMBING RANGE
A further Bombing Range, to be known as Fenton, has been allotted to the Group, making five ranges in all. Work has already commenced on this range, and when complete it is to be administered by R.A.F. Station, WIGSLEY.
FLYING CONTROL
In the table below will be seen two average landing times. The first is calculated by dividing the total period occupied by landing, from first to last aircraft, by the number of aircraft landed. This does not take into account any allowance for the time when the circuit was empty. The adjusted time shows the nett period, that is with allowances made for spasmodic return of aircraft, and the final average is the average time per aircraft based on this adjusted time.
From these two averages can be seen that whereas most Stations have got accustomed to the circuit drill of the landing scheme, there is still scope for improvement in the arrival of aircraft at the airfield.
However, the averages of 3.49 and 2.66 indicate that all Stations have really got down to the problem of landing aircraft quickly, and from reports to hand, it is encouraging to note that the scheme has met with the full approval of the aircrew. Some Stations who, at present, house only one Squadron, are not giving the results they might; this would seem to be an indication that on account of the limited number of
(continued on page 12, Col. 3)
JANUARY LANDING TIMES
[Table showing the Number of aircraft, Time, Average, Adjusted Time and Average by Station]
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Gun Turret Failures and Bombing Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 10.
[Page break]
SPORTS
[Cartoons]
FOOTBALL – THE MATZ CUP
The first round of this annual knock-out is now complete, except for one match, Strubby v Scampton. In the Preliminary Round, Waddington held Scampton to “2 all”, but lost the replay. Without being too partisan, may we wish good luck to the Strubby “giant killers”.
PRELIMINARY ROUND
WADDINGTON 2 SCAMPTON 2
WADDINGTON 0 SCAMPTON 2
(re-play)
ROUND ONE
WINTHORPE 1 SYERSTON 0
WIGSLEY 0 SWINDERBY 11
BARDNEY 0 METHERINGHAM 10
DUNHOLME 2 FISKERTON 0
WOODHALL SPA 1 CONINGSBY 3
SPILSBY 2 EAST KIRKBY 3
SKELLINGTHORPE 3 H.Q. 5 GROUP 1
Scampton are again holding second place in the Lincoln League, Division 1, having won 7 out of 9 games. They were runners up in the League last year, and winners of the Matz Trophy – a fine record.
Dunholme had a busy soccer month, winning four out of five games, in addition to their Matz Cup game with Fiskerton.
Syerston, like Scampton, are all out for the Newark and District League championship. They have, to date, won six out of seven games. Intersection competition produced 12 matches during the month.
Skellingthorpe and Bardney have been busy with both inter-section games and weekly Station matches.
Metheringham lost only one out of four station games, and in inter-section matches, Squadron Armoury won all their games decisively.
Coningsby soccer has been notable for a duel between 619 and 61 Squadrons. Each Squadron has won one game each and the decider should be a real blood match.
Swinderby Station team won four out of five games, losing to O.C.T.U. Newark. Judging from their Matz Cup score, they have some big guns in the forward line.
Winthorpe had four Station games, and were unlucky to win only one, but although losing 5 – 2 to Syerston, they pulled off the Matz Cup game. There was much inter-section activity.
Wigsley were unlucky to have two Station games cancelled. Of the remaining two, they won one and lost one. The R.A.F. Regiment had several games in the inter-section matches.
RUGGER
LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE COMPETITION
It has unfortunately proved impossible to complete the squadrons knock-out phase of this competition by January 31st. To date, only 9 Squadron have completed their finals, F/Lt. Hadland’s crew beating P/O. Glover’s crew in the final by 11 – 3. Nineteen teams took part in the competition. Within 53 Base alone, 61 matches have been played and the competition has become increasingly popular as it has progressed. All squadrons are urged to play off their matches as early as possible, so that the date for the Inter-Unit competition can be re-arranged. There will be some magnificent rugger in the final games, so get cracking squadrons, so we can arrange the big play off.
Syerston Rugger side is now considerably stronger than its early season form, and won three out of four games during the month.
Metheringham played two games, beating Bardney, and losing to 7 K.O.S.B.
Coningsby beat the 9th Field Regt. R.E.D., and the S. Staffs. Regiment in no uncertain manner.
Swinderby suffered their second defeat of the season against R.C.A.F. Digby, losing 6 – 0. Several Canadian Football mannerisms crept into the game, such as the referee putting the ball into the scrum, players “blocking” their opponents, and an occasional forward throw. All of which served to fox the Swinderby team.
Winthorpe lost to Syerston, but beat both 93 M. U. and Newark R. F. C. The Winthorpe pitch has, unfortunately, been “put to the plough”, necessitating all away matches.
HOCKEY
Swinderby can put out a very strong team, and only failed to win one game, which they drew with O.C.T.U. Newark, 4 – 4.
Syerston played 7 games in all, including two mixed and two all W.A.A.F. games, winning six of them.
Coningsby played four Station games, of which they won one.
Scampton, Metheringham, Winthorpe and Wigsley, all had Station matches. Metheringham hope to have their new hockey pitch ready in a few days.
H.Q.5 Group played its first match (mixed) against Syerston on February 6th, losing 2 – 1 a very promising start for a team that has only a half-sized pitch to practice on, until permission is obtained to fell a few trees.
It is hoped to promote a Group mixed Hockey knock-out in the very near future.
CROSS-COUNTRY
Wigsley, Skellingthorpe, Dunholme Lodge and Coningsby have all had successful runs during the month. 619 Squadron took over a hundred bodies about four miles from the camp by coach and released them. S/Ldr. Churcher was first man home. Feeling fit and frisky after their first gamble, 619 now challenge all cross country teams to battle.
SWIMMING
The stations around Lincoln make good use of the baths, and it should be possible to promote an interesting gala.
FISHING
Syerston has a thriving Anglers’ Club with facilities in the River Trent and in the lake at Flintham Hall. The club boasts over 40 “line shooters”. Other Stations please note. (What about a Strubby Wild Fowlers’ Society?)
MINOR GAMES
A most popular game at Bardney is Skittle Ball, played daily inside or outside the Maintenance Hangar at Tea Van time. A P. T. I. arrives with the van, and the fun begins. 20 – 40 men take part, and it is a most enjoyable and stimulating way of spending break.
It is regretted that some Station Sports summaries are not to hand for inclusion in the News, and it is requested that all Stations will despatch their summaries to reach H.Q. within two days of the end of the month.
TRAINING
STIRLING TRAINED CREWS GOING TO SQUADRONS
The first of the Stirling trained Conversion Unit crews went to Squadrons by way of 5 L. F. S. during the month, and the new training policy is now in full swing. A total of 35 crews were posted to Squadrons from 51 Base in January. 45 crews went from Conversion Units to No.5 L.F.S.
The weather was fairly good, and had no great adverse effect on flying, but many unfamiliar technical snags with the Stirling had to be overcome. Serviceability was affected by the carrying out of Acceptance Checks, but these have now been nearly completed, and improved serviceability is expected during the coming month.
Three fatal accidents, involving Stirling aircraft at night, are at present under investigation. Two occurred during Bullseye Exercises, and one during local night flying.
The standard of crews coming from O.T.U’s was maintained. High Level bombing training was very much improved throughout 51 Base, and heights up to 20,000 feet were recorded on night details. H 2 S training suffered owing to an initial shortage of instructors. The aircraft position earlier in the month was also acute, and H 2 S aircraft were being employed on normal training commitments.
The majority of the Squadron crews attached to No. 5 L.F.S. for a short refresher course during the month, completed the syllabus despite some restrictions by weather, and much valuable information was obtained from this mid-tour check.
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944. Page 11.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD)
There are, however, a few entries on the other side of this month’s balance sheet, such as the two Wireless Operators who, on the night 27/28th January, when briefed to use M/F D/F Section “N” on return from operations, obtained LINE BEARINGS from Hull and Heston. The question arises, what were the Captains and Navigators doing to allow the Wireless Operators to be so dim? Then there is the Wireless Operator who, when sending an early return message, spelt the word STARBD in Bomber Code, when there exists a code group for the word. When questioned, he admitted that he “was in a bit of a spin”. One cannot help but wonder what would have happened to any of these Wireless Operators AND THEIR CREWS (Captains please note), had they been in the position in which Sgt. Barnes Moss found himself, and confronted with a big job to do. Consider then, and note well, ye who do wear the badge of Sparks, that when trouble cometh, it doth not come after friendlie warning, but is swift and sudden, and never forget – it might be YOU.
Now let us consider the question of the Wireless Operator being in the astrodome over the target area. It is difficult to see any advantage that captains gain by having him there. In fact, if they take care to study a few facts, they will see that placing the Wireless Operator in the astrodome only gives a false sense of security and endangers [underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined]
Firstly, the Wireless Operator has very little night vision, having been employed during the three hours previous in gazing at a cathode ray tube or magic eye. Just ask yourselves how you feel when emerging from a cinema into the night –“Hell, I can’t see a thing”. Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that if your Wireless Operator is off Tinsel, one of your own aircraft may be shot down by an enemy night fighter free to operate because you have cleared the obstacle out of his path. Thirdly, the majority, but not all, of the Wireless Operators in astrodome incidents, come from squadrons fitted with Monica III, where the operator would see a fighter so much plainer on the CRT than in the flesh, in spite of all the blips made by friendly aircraft. Captains who make a habit of doing this are invited to reconsider their views in the light of the above remarks.
MOVEMENTS FOR JANUARY
F/Lt. Andrews, No.467 Squadron, has completed No.4 Signals Leaders Course, and is to be congratulated on being the first Signals Leader in this Group to obtain an “A” categorisation.
F/O. Rademeyer has taken the post of Signals Leader with No. 44 Squadron, F/Lt. Barrett having completed his operational tour.
P/O’s. Worthington, Thomas and Freeman should now be installed, and working to full pressure as Fishpond Instructors at East Kirkby, Fiskerton and Metheringham respectively, and Squadrons are invited to make full use of their services.
The visits to O.T.U. by Signals Leaders are in full swing, and squadrons should benefit from the move at a later date.
Now, here is an open invitation for any Signals Leader, Deputy Signals Leader or Wireless Operator (Air) to visit the W/T cabin at this Headquarters on an operational night. The only thing you need to do to take advantage of this offer, is to give a few hours notice on the telephone (extension 54).
TACTICS
EFFECT OF WINDOW AND COUNTERMEASURES
The enemy G. C. I. system continues to be subdued by Window. To retain maximum effect, however, there must be no slacking off in the rates of dropping. The times and rates of dropping laid down for each operation must be rigidly adhered to, and Window dropping must never be regarded as just another ‘bind’. These rates have been carefully calculated, and the individual who is “too lazy” or “forgets” is jeopardising not only his own safety, but that of the whole force. The Window dropper’s slogan must be “Not too much, not too little…..”
It is interesting to study the development of the enemy’s reaction to Window, and the results of our countermeasures over the past few months. That the highly mobile fighter force controlled by HF and V.H.F./RT, organised after the initial success of Window, could be a serious menace, was soon appreciated by the planning staff, who set to work to devise new tactics. As this fighter force was being directed to target areas being attacked, the first essential was to delude the enemy as to the areas to be attacked. Spoof attacks by Mosquitoes and small forces of “heavies” were attempted, and the main force was routed to within 20-30 miles of defended areas before turning to attack another target. These spoof attacks and feints have undoubtedly drawn a number of fighters away from the main targets. A more recent attempt at delusion was to move the whole force by ordering all aircraft to alter course simultaneously at a predetermined time, so as to displace the main stream suddenly. The unprecedented manoeuvre undoubtedly upset the enemy controllers’ calculations.
Not the least important of our countermeasures are the radio jamming devices. These are many and varied, and have produced very marked results. Special Tinsel is rated highly amongst the successful jamming devices, thus Wireless Operators must comply with Tinselling instructions on all occasions. Information on the work of the Radio Countermeasures Group must obviously be guarded, but a report on the results achieved by Ground Cigar, Ground Grocer, Corona and other H.F. and VHF. countermeasure schemes, is set out in a paper BC/S.31009/Sigs., dated 3rd February, 1944, “Radio Countermeasures in Bomber Command”. Aircrew should read this report, which is available in all Intelligence libraries. The extract quoted below is typical of the confusion that arises, and shows the measure of success achieved. In fact, jamming has been so complete as to force the enemy to use his National Broadcast wavelengths to get orders through to his fighters. This new step should present no difficulty to our Countermeasure Experts, who are continually a step ahead of the enemy in radio jamming.
[Underlined] “Corona (HF) [/underlined]
This countermeasure continues to annoy the enemy Controllers and harass their pilots, and on occasion has been known to lead to unprintable ruderies being addressed to the efficient young W.A.A.F. officer who frequently plays the controller’s part for us. However, one of the methods of judging the success of Corona is by noting the enemy controller’s reaction to it over the air, and it is considered an unsuccessful night if we do not succeed in drawing at least one crack which is worth recording in the line book.”
TAIL WARMING DEVICES
With the advent of Monica IIIA and Fishpond, the duties of Wireless Operator have been still further extended. It is unfortunate that the sole attention of a crew member cannot be diverted to these devices, but for the moment the Wireless Operator has under his control something which, when properly used, can have immeasurable success against enemy fighters. A high degree of training in the manipulation of the set and interpretation of the P.P.I. and cathode tubes, is called for, and a drive must be made for the Wireless Operators to have as much air practice as possible with the sets.
MONICA IIIA
Several squadrons have now had experience with Monica IIIA, and have proved that for the set to be of any value at all, certain factors are essential. A detailed knowledge by the Wireless Operator of the suppression and gain settings to give well defined blips which can be followed in to a minimum of 250 yards range, a standard reporting patter by the Wireless Operator, and a knowledge of the interpretation of blips by pilots and gunners so that there is perfect crew co-operation whenever an enemy blip is sighted. The exact procedure for using Monica IIIA is set out in an instruction which is available in all Signals Leaders’ Offices. Gunners, pilots and Wireless Operators should be given an opportunity of reading this instruction.
FISHPOND
57 Squadron, from an investigation into Fishpond results, estimate that out of 80 Fishpond sorties, 9 combats have been avoided by utilising the early warning given by Fishpond. Their knowledge and experience will shortly be made available to other Fishpond Squadrons in the form of a tactics instruction. To get a good P.P.I. picture, liaison between Wireless Operator and H 2 S operator is essential, as is also a knowledge by the Wireless Operator of H 2 S manipulation and P.P.I. settings. Captains must remember that Fishpond does not record fighters attacking from above, and should therefore see that their gunners never relax the normal crew search procedure.
[Underlined] Continued from page 10, col.1) [/underlined]
aircraft no great need for quick landing is felt. Those Stations should remember that a second Squadron is always liable to be posted in at very short notice when, under these conditions, the average landing time of two minutes per aircraft, for between 30 and 40 aircraft, would be a godsend.
The Landing Board, originally designed by R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, has been improved on by many Stations in the Group. It is gratifying to note that new suggestions and modifications are continually being submitted. They are a big help, let’s have more of them.
No. 5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 12.
[Page break]
HONOURS & AWARDS
[Drawing]
HEADQUARTERS NO. 5 GROUP
A/Cdre. H.V. SATTERLY, D.F.C. C.B.E.
HEADQUARTERS NO. 53 BASE
A/Cdre. A. HESKETH, O.B.E., D.F.C. C.B.E.
R.A.F. STATION, SCAMPTON
F/O. C.F. GIBSON. M.B.E.
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
P/O. J. GLOVER. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. A. LYNCH, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. K.L. HOWARD. D.F.M.
F/O. E. MERCER. D.F.C.
P/O. A. WRIGHT. D.F.C.
P/O. V.D. PURVIS. D.F.C.
49 SQUADRON
S/Ldr. J.G.DAY. D.S.O.
Sgt. A.E. KEELING. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
A/F/Lt. G.H. LAING. D.F.C.
F/O. W.T. HAXBY. D.F.C.
61 SQUADRON
F/O. J.W. EINARSON, D.F.M. D.F.C.
W/Cdr. R.M. STIDOLPH. D.F.C.
467 SQUADRON
P/O. D.C. HARVEY. D.F.C.
619 SQUADRON
F/O. N.E. WESTERGAARD. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.E. BROOKES. D.F.M.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
The following Non-Immediate awards were approved during the month.
9 SQUADRON
F/Lt. C.J. BRAIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
9 SQUADRON (Contd.)
P/O. R.W. CORKHILL. D.F.C.
44 SQUADRON
P/O. R.L. ASH. D.F.C.
F/O. C.R. SAVAGE. D.F.C.
F/Lt. B. ASSON. D.F.C.
Sgt. L. UNWIN. D.F.M.
F/Lt. D.A. BARRETT. D.F.C.
50 SQUADRON
A/S/L/ W.F. PARKS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
Sgt. J.E. HEATH D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.W. THOMPSON. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.R. POLLOCK. D.F.M.
57 SQUADRON
P/O. J.B. JOSLING. D.F.C.
P/O. S.G. TOWNSEND. D.F.C.
P/O. A.R. KNOWLES. D.F.C.
F/O. R. McROBBIE. D.F.C.
P/O. R.J. GOOCH. D.F.C.
P/O. J.A. KIMBER. D.F.C.
P/O. E.J. HOWES. D.F.C.
P/O. F. NORTHCLIFFE. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.B. HUGHES. D.F.M.
P/O. W.H. SIDDONS. D.F.C.
Sgt. D.J. GRIFFITH. D.F.M.
61 SQUADRON
A/S/L. E.A. BENJAMIN, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt. A.F. EMERSON. D.F.M.
106 SQUADRON
W/Cdr. R.E. BAXTER. D.F.C.
207 SQUADRON
Sgt. T. GEDLING. D.F.M.
F/O. J.E.F. MITCHELL. D.F.C.
P/O. J. KIRKWOOD. D.F.C.
W/O. H.F. CONELLY. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J.C. METCALFE. D.F.M.
619 SQUADRON
P/O. T.A. PEATFIELD. D.F.C.
F/Lt. A.H. TOMLIN. D.F.C.
F/Sgt. J. SIMKIN. D.F.M.
F/Sgt. J.T. PAGE. D.F.M.
[Page break]
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
[Tables of Aircrew Volunteers by Base and Station]
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Total] 25 18 5 26
WAR SAVINGS
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing.
(c) Total amount saved. £. s. d.
H.Q. (UNIT) 5 GROUP 51.4 10.0 95. 7. 6.
£2935.2.0.
[Page break]
GUNNERY (CONTD)
(Continued from page 9, col.3)
Now 49 Air Gunners, this is the biggest thing that has hit gunnery in 25 years, and it is up to you to take every opportunity of make for 100% proficiency in the use of this new equipment. Great things will be expected from you, losses should go down and E/A destroyed go up; so go to it, and make the life of the Hun fighter short and sweet!
CENTRAL GUNNERY SCHOOL RESULTS
No. 72 COURSE
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit. Category. Exam. Results. [/underlined]
P/O. Gross “B” 90.4%
Results of No. 73 Course not yet to hand.
SQUADRON AND FLIGHT GUNNERY LEADERS
Below is a list of Squadron and Flight Gunnery Leaders at present in Squadrons and Conversion Units.
44 Squadron F/Lt. McCurdy
F/O. Neison
49 Squadron F/Lt. Cork
F/O. Hamilton
463 Squadron F/Lt. Moorhead
F/O. Kirkpatrick
467 Squadron F/Lt. Nordon-Hare
9 Squadron F/Lt. Armstrong
50 Squadron F/Lt. Gray
P/O. Beale
619 Squadron F/Lt. Howard
P/O. Hammond
61 Squadron F/Lt. Breakey
617 Squadron F/Lt. Rodger
F/O. Buckley
F/O. Chandler
106 Squadron F/Lt. Sullivan
630 Squadron F/Lt. Stead
57 Squadron F/Lt. Taylor
F/O. Ward
207 Squadron F/O. Moore
F/O. Harper
1485 Gunnery Flight S/Ldr. Undery
F/Lt. Leonard
F/O. Mills
1660 Con.Unit F/Lt. Clark
P/O. Gross
1661 Con.Unit F/Lt. Gray
1654 Con.Unit F/Lt. Hoad
F/O. Simister
No. 5 L.F.S. F/Lt. Cass
P/O. Black
Aircrew School SCAMPTON F/Lt. Patten
FLIGHT ENGINEERS
On taking an analysis of a large number of flight engineers logs a considerable discrepancy has been noticed between the fuel consumption of different aircraft. This discrepancy is not due to the varying consumptions inherent in the engines of any particular aircraft. In most cases where an aircraft has had a high fuel consumption on a specific operation, the subsequent operation with a different crew proves that this aircraft has a low consumption. This all points to manipulation.
There are many cases where far too high revs are used at too low a boost and it is apparent that many flight engineers are not paying sufficient attention to the boost and revs required for the most economical conditions.
It is not economical above full throttle height and boost below E.C.B. to reduce I.A.S. by throttle manipulation. I.A.S. should be controlled on propellor speed only, and if you are at an altitude where the ‘S’ blower is in operation, by controlling I.A.S. on the throttles you are merely strangling your engine. To quote one instance, an extract from one flight engineer’s log shows that 2850 r.p.m. was used at + 2 lbs boost at 15,000 feet in ‘S’ gear. This is an obvious case of engine strangling, and had the throttles been open to + 4 boost E.C.B. to take full advantage of the engine power available at that altitude, then the r.p.m. could have been cut down to maintain the required I.A.S. with the resultant decrease in fuel consumption. The consumption in the particular case quoted averaged 66 gallons per hour per engine which speaks for itself. Flight Engineer Leaders must bring home by means of lectures to their flight engineers instances such as this. Such manipulation may cost you an aircraft and maybe the crew, and it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the fuel consumption of a Lancaster is in the hands of the flight engineer, and where the flight engineer knows that incorrect revs and boost are being used for any specific condition, then he should advise the pilot accordingly; if this advice is ignored, the cause of the high fuel consumption should be reported on return. Many more instances such as that quoted have been found, and space does not allow to quote them all. Efforts are being made at this Headquarters to find other reasons for high consumption in each case, but so far high consumptions have been caused solely by incorrect engine manipulation.
EARLY RETURNS
In The case of an oil pressure gauge failure which causes quite a few early returns, this can be diagnosed quite easily. If the oil pressure drops off suddenly, and coolant and oil temperatures remain normal, the oil temperature should be watched closely, and if this remains normal, together with the coolant temperature the gauge is definitely suspect. Flight engineers should watch this sort of thing and advise the pilot accordingly.
Many early returns are caused by so called generator failure, and the following notes will be of interest to all flight engineers, and should go a long way to preventing unnecessary early returns due to this fault. These notes will be circulated separately to flight engineers.
1. [Underlined] The Voltmeter [/underlined] is the most important of the three instruments on the main control panel. In flight it normally indicates between 27 – 29 volts.
2. The Ammeters merely indicate how the generators are sharing the load, and as long as they both give a positive reading, even though unbalanced, the circuit is O.K. (i.e. +55 and +5). If the degree of unbalance is above 15 amps this matter must be reported to the Electrical Officer.
3. If one of the ammeters shows a negative reading, i.e. a discharge”, then before switching off one of the generators, reference must be made to the voltmeter. If the voltmeter reads 29 volts or under, switch off the generator giving the negative reading. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts, switch off the generator giving the positive reading.
4. If the voltmeter is above 29 volts the accumulators are being overcharged. In this case switch off the generator showing the higher current. If the voltmeter still indicates over 29 volts switch off the other generator and all non-essential loads to conserve the accumulators. The pressure head heater [underlined] must [/underlined] remain ‘ON’. After a short time, say 5 minutes, [underlined] one [/underlined] generator, preferably the one giving the lower reading, may be switched ‘ON’ again, but a careful check must be kept on the voltmeter. Both generators must [underlined] not [/underlined] be switched ‘ON’ again after they have been switched ‘OFF’.
5. [Underlined] Never [/underlined] disconnect the cables from the accumulator in flight, otherwise it may cause an explosion. If the accumulators become overheated and are gassing excessively, turn the “Ground-Flight” switch to “Ground”.
[Underlined] (Continued from back page, col.3) [/underlined]
from service sources does not appear to fulfil our requirements. Coningsby has produced a most useful piece of apparatus, and details of it will be circulated to other Bases and Stations. It will be to the advantage of Electrical Officers of other Units if they pay a personal visit to Coningsby to see this test rig for themselves. Further, it is suggested that visits to other Stations will enable the best ideas to be incorporated in all instrument and electrical sections. So far as is known, the many excellent schemes which have been produced by local initiative have not been patented.
In the last month the incidence of oxygen failure has increased, but in many cases no technical fault has been found. This indicates that more “gen” in the use of oxygen must be passed on by Electrical Officers to members of aircrew. The introduction of the microphone heater and the Mk.I jet has produced very favourable results, and steps have been taken to obtain further supplies of heaters for the use of all gunners.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT SERVICEABILITY
STIRLING AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
[Table showing the serviceability of aircraft by Conversion Unit and Lancaster aircraft]
5 Group News. No. 18. January, 1944. Page 13.
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
Look after your ‘K’ type dinghies, you may find them very useful one day – F/Sgt. Groves of 50 Squadron did, on the night 29/30th December. The aircraft of which he was rear gunner had been damaged on operations. The pilot could not close the bomb doors, and due to lack of petrol the captain of the aircraft, while still over the sea, was forced to decide whether to ditch the aircraft or to bale out his crew. The captain eventually had to give the order to bale out using ‘K’ dinghies, having first sent out an S.O.S. and received fixes.
F/Sgt. Grove was the first out of the aircraft and the only one saved. The indications are that at least one other member of the crew was prepared to abandon the aircraft but no more was seen or heard of the crew or the aircraft after F/Sgt. Groves had left. F/Sgt. Groves suffered considerably from exposure while in his ‘K’ dinghy, but has since recovered.
It is possible to ditch an aircraft with open bomb doors, and it has been successfully accomplished on more than one occasion. In any case the doors are liable to collapse on impact with the water, and where this has happened, crews have managed to clear the aircraft without too much trouble. While no blame is attached to the pilot of this particular aircraft, this fact should be borne in mind, and pilots should resort to the ‘K’ type dinghy only as a last resort – e.g. should the aircraft be on fire, or in danger of breaking up in the air.
Successful ditchings, in seemingly impossible sea and weather conditions have shown that, provided you have practiced your emergency procedure and dinghy drills you should have no worry in making the decision to ditch. The days are over when a successful ditching was something to be marvelled at. To-day they are a common occurrence, and experience has shown that ignorance and stupidity are to blame in almost every case of failure.
A summary of Air Sea Rescue incidents for the six month ending 31st December, 1943, show that of a total of 3271 aircrew involved, 1,078 were rescued and brought back to England; most of the remainder fared as
(continued on page 2, col 2)
ENGINEERING
The operational effort for January was very high considering the bad weather periods which were encountered during the month. The squadrons were all down in aircraft strength, but in spite of this a high total was achieved; this, of course, was only possible by many squadrons operating 100% each night. With the man power shortage it requires very hard work and long hours to maintain this effort, and now that squadrons are almost up to full strength on the new establishment, the load will be even heavier. Due, however, to the efforts of the ground crews, February should see the biggest effort ever put out from this Group.
No.54 Base, Coningsby, which formed on 1st January, 1944, is already making itself felt as a formidable and efficient formation. There is still much to do to bring the various sections up to the peak of perfection, but as these were started on sound lines, there is no doubt of their ultimate efficiency.
All operational bases and R. & I. sections have been kept extremely busy on acceptance checks recently, and as a result certain other work has had to be left. This is only a passing phase, and it is hoped that once the squadrons are up to full strength, the task will be easier by dealing with the normal replacements. The many high speed enemy action repairs which have been carried out in time to get aircraft ready for ops on the second night, including many power plant changes, which are carried out immediately the aircraft lands during the night, are so numerous that it is difficult to single out individuals for praise; it all points to the splendid morale and staying powers of the ground crews.
There are many early returns and cancellations which could be avoided and Engineer Officers must keep on with the drive to eliminate these entirely, as far as is humanly possible; they are responsible for the non-delivery of a very large tonnage of bombs when calculated over a month.
The number of failures of exhaust studs has been considerably reduced where 3.5% Nickel steel studs have been fitted, and results so far are very pleasing. When further experience has been gained it is hoped to go over to this kind of stud completely.
The introduction of the 30 lbs pressure type relief valve on the header tank in place of the thermostatic valve is gradually taking place throughout the Group, and a marked improvement is noticed by the smaller number of failures due to engines being “cooked”.
WEIGHT SHEET SUMMARIES
A new weight sheet summary as applicable to 5 Group has been issued to all Bases. Stations and Squadrons, and the use of this with the bomb load chart which accompanied it should dispel any further doubts as to what can and what cannot be carried at an all-up weight of 65,000 lbs.
CONVERSION UNITS AND NO.5 L.F.S.
The Conversion Units commenced a Stirling programme early in the month, and although the results of the first month’s work were good and called for a colossal amount of work, it is anticipated that with certain improvements, the February figures will be much higher. Great credit is due to the C.T.O’s and men under them, who have tackled this task and overcome their setbacks in an admirable manner. The programme which has been set for No. 5 L. F. S. calls for good organisation and planning on the technical side, and so far the job has been done well.
FLIGHT ENGINEER LEADER
A very necessary addition to the Group Headquarters staff is the establishment of a Flight Engineer Leader. This post has been filled by F/Lt. Gottwaltz, and Base Engineers and C. T. O.’s are requested to afford him every facility to assist in attempting to solve the carrying fuel consumption problem. A column elsewhere in this News has been allocated to Flight Engineers.
ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS
It is most important the Command Modification No. 57 is completed on all aircraft fitted with A.P.I. and A.M.U. at the earliest opportunity, to eliminate errors due to inefficient cooling.
The test rig for the instruments issued
(continued on page 13, col.3 )
WAR EFFORT
[Table containing details by Squadron of averages and numbers of sorties, tonnage dropped, operational hours and losses as well as ratings]
ORDER OF MERIT IN THE FOREGOING TABLE IS BASED ON THE TONS OF BOMBS DROPPED PER AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ON CHARGE
5 Group News. No. 18 January, 1944.
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, January 1944
5 Group News, January 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 18, January 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about training, signals, gunnery, accidents, bombing, decorations, photography, engineering, armament, navigation, flying control, tactics, sports and operations.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-01
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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16 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-22 jan 44
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Germany
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-01
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
ground personnel
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/583/10639/LHolmesGH1579658v1.1.pdf
bf036945795cfbfa29a4383912ff5c45
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Holmes, George
George Henry Holmes
G H Holmes
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Holmes, GH
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. An oral history interview with Pilot Officer George Holmes (b. 1922, 1579658, 187788 Royal Air Force) his log book, records of operation, newspaper cuttings and photographs of personnel. He flew operations as a wireless operator / air gunner with 9, 50 and 83 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by George Holmes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-10-21
2017-01-14
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Partial transcription of page 60 - 61]
LUCKY ESCAPE – iii
One night on return – on the circuit we collided with another A/C on opposite direction – losing about 4-5 foot of the tip of main plane and nearly spun upside down – but recovered level flying – and landed – OK!!
On the night of July 24th in Lancaster VN-O. 50 Sqdn Skellingthorpe we were on route to Stuttgart when we were attacked by a german night fighter. Which shot away our bomb bay door. Damaged the starboard landing gear Fractured the main spar and put 5-6 cannon shells in the fuel tanks, on a 2nd attack the gunners shot the attacker down. We all agreed to carry on to the target, on arriving back at Base we were told to orbit until all the other A/C were down – On inspection we found that the cannon shells were still there. They were removed and were emptied. They were found to contain SAND instead of explosive – which saved all our lives. A very lucky escape. After a Belly Landing our first big escape.
15/3/2016 – G Holmes (aged 93)
[Page break]
RAF Coningsby 83 Sqdn 1945
Between Feb 1 to 18 March 1945 I flew with an Aussie pilot F/O Cassidy
His A/C was named –
“Hopalong Cassidy’s Flying Circus”!!
Dublin Core
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Title
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George Holmes' navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
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Mike Connock
Anne-Marie Watson
Format
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One booklet
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
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LHolmesGH1579658v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Chile
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Wiltshire
France--Argentan
France--Beauvoir-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--La Pallice
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Normandy
France--Orléans
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Horten
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Ross and Cromarty
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1944-06-03
1944-06-04
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-10
1944-06-11
1944-06-21
1944-06-22
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-29
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-30
1944-08-01
1944-08-02
1944-08-05
1944-08-14
1944-08-19
1944-09-10
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-10-23
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-24
1945-03-21
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-17
1945-09-10
1945-09-29
1945-10-02
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for G H Holmes, covering the period from 7 June 1943 to 23 May 1947. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Yatesbury, RAF Evanton, RAF Turweston, RAF Silverstone, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston, RAF Bardney, RAF Skellingthorpe, RAF Coningsby and RAF Hemswell. Aircraft flown in were, Dominie, Procter, Botha, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster, Lincoln and Oxford. He flew a total of 31 Operations, 7 night with 9 squadron, 9 daylight and 4 night with 50 squadron and 11 night with 83 squadron. Targets were, Ferme D’urville, St Peirre du Mond, Argentan, Rennes, Orlean, Gelsenkirchen, Limoges, Beauvoir, Kiel, Stuttgart, Cahagnes, Mont Cadon, Bois de Cassau, St Leu D’esserent, Brest, La Pallice, Le Havre, Bremerhaven, Mönchengladbach, Flushing, Politz, Siegen, Karlsruhe, Ladbergen, Dresden, Rositz, Horton Fjord, Hamburg, Lutzkendorf, Pilsen. <span>His pilots on operations were </span>Squadron Leader Stubbs, Flying Officer Inniss, Flying Officer Cassidy, Flight Lieutenant Siddle, Wing Commander Osbourne and Flight Lieutenant Weber. He survived a fighter attack and a mid air collision. He also flew on a Cook's Tour, Operation Dodge to Bari and a goodwill tour to Chile. The log book has been annotated and also contains various pictures of the aircraft flown in, the squadron badges and a photo of himself in uniform.
1660 HCU
17 OTU
50 Squadron
83 Squadron
9 Squadron
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Botha
Cook’s tour
Dominie
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Lincoln
mid-air collision
military service conditions
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
Proctor
RAF Bardney
RAF Coningsby
RAF Evanton
RAF Hemswell
RAF Silverstone
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Turweston
RAF Yatesbury
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7603/SChattertonJ159568v10512.2.jpg
7eba9475c05e3cb2f6cce2e5cd62d323
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7603/SChattertonJ159568v10513.2.jpg
35e94817d67dfc85a5ccab627702a551
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Chatterton, John. 44 Squadron operations order book
Description
An account of the resource
Collection consists of 521 items which are mostly Operations orders, aircraft load and weight tables and bomb aimers briefings for 44 Squadron operations between January 1944 and April 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning Dewhurst Graaf and his crew, and Donald Neil McKechnie and his crew. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/109020/">Dewhurst Graaf</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/115642/">Donald Neil McKechnie</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Chatterton, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Boxed] JOESSY ST MAXMIN [/boxed]
DATE 3-8-44
[Table of bomb loads]
PETROL 1400
DISTRIBUTOR 15 YDS
BOMB WEIGHT 13080
ALL UP. WEIGHT. 64,510.
[Table of preselect]
[Table of aircraft height and false heights]
TIME OFF 1130 E.T.R. 1645 ZERO 1430. H+3.
WINDOWS. 15 PKGS. Drop at Rate G in Δ area if engaged by flak. NICKELS. NIL
TARGET A.U.W. 62,000 TARGET HEIGHT 250FT.
BOMBING HEIGHTS. 15-18,000’
[Page break]
[Boxed SAFE [/boxed]
[Underlined] Marking Point[/underlined] Oboe Red TI. cascading from 5000’ for 7 minutes. H-4, H-3, H-2.
Use Oboe only as a guide on run in.
Bomb visually or on markers if visual bombing not possible.
S/C 9, - 12,000’ over Coningsby.
2 V’s of 3 A/C one at top height & one at bottom. White Fins and vertical black stripes.
[Underlined] NB [/underlined] Controller is in Lanc flying astern of bottom vic with fins marked with a white cross. 54 Base firing Red vereys every 10 mins from base to English coast.
If markers become obscured by smoke crews are not to drop their bombs blindly into the smoke but are to aim carefully at the upwind edge of the main smoke concentration.
Controllers callsign – HOOKY
Cease Bombing. [Underlined] BISCUIT BOX [/underlined]
Bombing wind by H -5.
Bombing heading on track.
[Underlined] No orbitting. [/underlined]
[Table of individual aircraft heights]
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Title
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Bomb aimers briefing 3 August 1944 Joessy St Maxmin [sic]
Bomb aimers briefing 3 August 1944 Trossy St Maximin
Description
An account of the resource
Shows one bomb load for operation. Details distributor, preselection and false height settings. Includes weights, Window and bombing heights. On the reverse; the marking plan, form up over Conningsby, formations, bomber controller position and call signs. List aircraft letter and corresponding height.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-08-03
Format
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Two sides front form document partially filled in on the reverse handwritten
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
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SChattertonJ159568v10512, SChattertonJ159568v10513
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Creil
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-08-03
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
briefing
Master Bomber
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
RAF Coningsby
target indicator
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/187/2537/SMarshallS1594781v10078.2.jpg
589a7bf0fc35ef238491e4b3ae2b0399
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Marshall, Syd. Album
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Marshall, S
Description
An account of the resource
77 items. The album contains wartime and post-war photographs, newspaper cuttings, and memorabilia assembled by Warrant Officer Sidney Charles Marshall (1924 - 2017, 1594781 Royal Air Force). Syd Marshall was a flight engineer with 103 Squadron and flew operations from RAF Elsham Wolds.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Marshall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-05-08
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Title
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RAF Coningsby Freedom March
Description
An account of the resource
Photograph 1 is airmen parading through the streets of Coningsby captioned 'RAF Coningsby "Freedom march" '.
Photograph is a marching band of airmen captioned 'Cranwell Band leading parade'.
Format
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Two colour photographs on an album page
Language
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eng
Type
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Photograph
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SMarshallS1594781v10078
Coverage
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Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
entertainment
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/187/2531/SMarshallS1594781v10069.2.jpg
b1b1b63b9c36593dfe5b908f50ff83f2
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Title
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Marshall, Syd. Album
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Marshall, S
Description
An account of the resource
77 items. The album contains wartime and post-war photographs, newspaper cuttings, and memorabilia assembled by Warrant Officer Sidney Charles Marshall (1924 - 2017, 1594781 Royal Air Force). Syd Marshall was a flight engineer with 103 Squadron and flew operations from RAF Elsham Wolds.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Marshall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Date
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2015-05-08
Dublin Core
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Title
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Lancaster, Hurricane and Spitfire, Parachute display
Description
An account of the resource
Photograph 1 is Battle of Britain Memorial Flight Lancaster, Spitfire and Hurricane at RAF Coningsby.
Photograph 2 is a parachute display. One parachutist is landing beside a smoke flare. He has an RAF ensign attached. There is a large attendance with hangars behind.
Format
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Two colour photographs from an album page
Type
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Photograph
Identifier
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SMarshallS1594781v10069
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Hurricane
Lancaster
RAF Coningsby
Spitfire
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/187/2527/SMarshallS1594781v10064.2.jpg
7d8c0a710c5a3b42f35a14f2a066e473
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Marshall, Syd. Album
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Marshall, S
Description
An account of the resource
77 items. The album contains wartime and post-war photographs, newspaper cuttings, and memorabilia assembled by Warrant Officer Sidney Charles Marshall (1924 - 2017, 1594781 Royal Air Force). Syd Marshall was a flight engineer with 103 Squadron and flew operations from RAF Elsham Wolds.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Marshall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-05-08
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Syd Marshall and Grand Slam bomb
Description
An account of the resource
Photograph 1 is Syd Marshall standing beside a Grand Slam bomb at RAF Coningsby.
Photograph 2 is a group of people outside a building.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two colour photographs on an album page
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
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SMarshallS1594781v10064
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
bombing
Grand Slam
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1411/26579/OThomsonT1366937-160303-010001.1.jpg
bc666b9d3e8d971c5bf402599fa74f76
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1411/26579/OThomsonT1366937-160303-010002.1.jpg
8df0ef463472cad559a6f9efe986ee68
Dublin Core
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Title
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Thomson, Thomas
T Thomson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2016-03-03
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Thomson, T
Description
An account of the resource
18 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant Thomas Thomson (1919 - 1991, 1366937 Royal Air Force) He flew operations as a wireless operator with 49 Squadron. It contains photographs, documents, a brief biography and a copy of E J Haddow's log book.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Suzanne Fletcher and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
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Title
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Provisional Authority to wear a 1939/45 Star, Aircrew Europe Star and Clasp
Description
An account of the resource
An advice note authorising Thomas Thomson to wear medals.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Wing Commander 97 Squadron
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-12-18
Format
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One double sided printed slip
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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OThomsonT1366937-160303-010001,
OThomsonT1366937-160303-010002
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-08-30
97 Squadron
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/483/19134/BBullockWEJBullockWEJv1.2.pdf
c6610ae666cf526b25116a161780062b
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Bullock, William
William Edward James Bullock
W E J Bullock
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Bullock, WEJ
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. An oral history interview with Flight Lieutenant William Bullock (1916 - 2017, 566069 Royal Air Force) and a memoir. He served in Egypt and Iraq before serving as an engineering officer at RAF East Kirkby and Coningsby.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by William Bullock and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Bits & Pieces from a Long Career – William Edward James Bullock (Bill)
I joined the RAF on 6 September 1932 shortly before my 16th birthday, as a Halton Aircraft Apprenticeship, to be trained as an Aircraft Fitter. Training over, I was posted in July 1935 to No 13 Army Coop Squadron at Old Sarum, just north of Salisbury. No 16 AC Squadron, and the School of Army Coop, were also based there. Although we were closely linked to the Army, Sarum kept ship’s time. The times for changing the watch were rung on a big ship’s bell hanging outside the Guard Room. We even took a bell with us on joint manoeuvres with the Army. This was no doubt a legacy from the days of the Royal Naval Air Service, forerunner of the RFC and RAF.
I was posted to No 4 Flying Training School at Abu Sueir in Egypt in March 1937. This was a ‘desert station’ 12 miles west of Ismailia, a small town on the west bank of the Suez Canal. During my two and a half years there I enjoyed sand yacht racing, also sailing on Lake Timsah near Ismailia. I did the usual tourist sights – Cairo Museum housing all the King Tutankhamen exhibits etc, and out to Gizeh to see the Pyramids and Sphinx. I could not climb the 450-foot Great Pyramid of Cheops as a sand storm was blowing, but I spent time exploring inside.
With the threat of war looming, No 4 FTS was moved to Iraq to the big RAF base at Habbaniya, on the west bank of the River Euphrates, 55 miles west of Baghdad. From here I got to see the ruins of Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar’s Palace etc, and also the remains of The Hanging Gardens, one of the Seven Wonders of the World. For some time the Iraqi Government had been plotting with Germany to get the British out of Iraq and let in the Germans, especially promising them the Habbaniya base. This would have given Germany access to the oil supplies of Iraq and Iran, a crippling blow to the Allies. Negotiations and threats having failed to move us, the Iraqi Army moved up overnight on the 29 April 1941 and occupied the Plateau, a large 200 foot high ridge of ground less than a mile from the camp. An aerial survey on the 30 April showed that there were 27 field guns and howitzers trained down on the camp, supported by armoured cars and light tanks, assembled there with an estimated 2,000 troops, and more guns could be seen coming from Baghdad.
Meanwhile No 4 FTS had been busily converting its trainer aircraft to act as bombers. A mixture of 28 planes could carry 2x250lb bombs, and another 36 could carry just 8x20lb anti-personnel bombs. As we could only muster 39 pilots from all sources, including the Embassy in Baghdad, we could not deploy the full strength of our bombers at the same time. However we had the support of ten Wellington bombers operating from Shaibah, near Basra, 300 miles south, plus nine Gladiator single-seat fighters loaned to us, with pilots, from Egypt.
Our bombers took to the air at first light and circled the Plateau then, at precisely 5am on 2 May, started bombing. The Iraqi Army immediately started shelling the camp with all their guns, aiming mostly at the hangar area from where a lot of our planes operated. The rest of the planes were on the polo pitch, well dispersed and screened by trees. The RAF suffered heavy causalities that day, losing 22 aircraft and ten pilots, either killed or too seriously injured to fly, as the Iraqi Air Force had also attacked us, with their far superior aircraft.
We stopped our bombing operations at dusk, but the Iraqis kept up their shelling, continuing all through the night. Some estimated that we had a shell every minute from 8pm to 5am next day. So we bombed them heavily every day for the next four days, whilst they bombed and machine-gunned us daily, and continued to shell us day and night. On 6 May the Iraqi Army started to leave
1
[Page break]
the Plateau, thoroughly beaten and demoralised by our determined efforts, and we also hammered them well in their retreat.
Peace at last, we thought, but NO! There were a few isolated raids from the Iraqi Air Force for the next ten days then, on the 16 May, we were rather shaken to find that we were attacked by Heinkel 111 bombers and Messerschmitt 110 fighters from the German Luftwaffe. These had sneaked into Iraq and were based at Mosul, an ex-RAF station, 200 miles north of us. By then we had been loaned two long-range cannon-firing Hurricanes from Egypt, which could cope with the Luftwaffe. Once they followed the Luftwaffe back to Mosul after one of their raids, and caught them defenceless on the ground, destroying at least one and seriously damaging others. The Luftwaffe suffered various other mishaps and by 26 May they no longer posed a serious threat to us. We were at peace at last and the very crucial Battle of Habbaniya had been won, with No 4 FTS having played a very important part in it.
I was about due home, having completed my overseas tour, and eventually sailed from Basra on 17 June 1941, the start of what turned out to be a 17-week sea voyage.
We stopped and changed ships, having several days ashore at Bombay, Mombassa, Durham and Cape Town. At Cape Town I managed a trip to the tip of 3,500-foot Table Mountain, via a mile-long cable railway starting from a level area halfway up the mountain – with spectacular views from the top.
I finally arrived at Liverpool on 11 October 1941 and was posted to Cranwell, then on to Wigsley to a Lancaster Conversion Unit. I was commissioned as an Engineer Officer in July 1943 and after various courses finished up early in November as Technical Adjutant at East Kirkby. Here I was in charge of the Technical Library doing technical returns, reports and miscellaneous paper work. I was in charge of the Station workshops, power plant and propeller bays supporting two Lancaster Squadrons at East Kirkby, two at Spilsby and one at Strubby, with replacement engines and propellers. Units for overhaul or repair came back to me at Kirkby, from where I sent the engines to either Derby or Glasgow and propellers to Bolton, Lancashire for overhaul or repair.
Whilst at Kirkby I attended a Hunt Ball at Revesby Abbey where I met my future wife, Mary Brackenbury, a farmer’s daughter from Claxby Pluckacre. Mary was a Leading Firewoman in the Auxiliary Fire Service, on leave from her station at Seaford at the time.
After a year at East Kirkby I was moved to Metheringham as Engineer Office to No 106 Squadron and a hanger full of small single-engined [sic] planes used for navigation training – these were no bother at all and I could just leave their Flight Sergeant to deal with them.
No 106 Squadron had received some of No 617 Squadron’s ‘gutless wonders’. These were Lancasters with their big bomb-doors removed to accommodate Dr Barnes Wallis’s ‘bouncing bomb’ used in the Dam Busters’ Raid. They were very suitable for carrying the big sea mines, which No 106 dropped on their mine-laying ops off the German and Dutch coasts.
On 7 Janurary 1945, after two months’ hard work, I got my big move – posted to Coningsby as Engineer Officer to Nos 83 and 97 Pathfinder Squadrons and promoted to Flight Lieutenant. My job was to supervise the day-to-day servicing of the 40 odd Lancasters from the two Squadrons and ensure that they had whatever aircraft were needed for their ops. Occasionally the call was for ‘maximum effort’, which meant they needed all 40 Lancasters. I copied and always supplied what was needed, though it was a bit of a struggle at times. With the end of the war in Europe in May I
2
[Page break]
was eventually posted to Strubby where ‘Tiger Force’ was being assembled. This was a Lancaster Wing, scheduled to go to Okinawa, a Japanese island captured by the Americans. From here we were to bomb the Japanese mainland. My job was to supervise the repair of damaged aircraft and collect any which crashed on return from ops. With the surrender of Japan, Tiger Force was not needed, and I was posted at the end of August to a workshop’s unit 54 RU (Plant) of the Airfield Construction Service. Their job to service and repair Civil Engineering Equipment, such as bulldozers, excavators and suchlike required for building runways. The Wing was scheduled to go to Singapore four days after I arrived but, fortunately, an Advance Party went from 54 RU (Plant) and I was given 14 day’s leave.
Mary and I got a Marriage Licence from the office of the Bishop of Lincoln, allowing us to marry without waiting for Banns to be called in church. We were married in the tiny church at Wilksby on Wednesday 26 September, and on Saturday I was recalled from leave and the following Wednesday I embarked at Liverpool on a ship for Singapore. However we were disembarked at Bombay to wait for the next stage. A week or more later we proceeded on our final stage on the aircraft carrier HMS Venerable. Arriving at Singapore we were accommodated at Seletar, a flying boat base on the east of the island. Our workshop machinery had not arrived and after a couple of months at Seletar we were moved on, eventually settling on Changi Airfield, in tents, very near the temporary runway running out into the sea. This was covered in PSP – large sheets of perforated steel planking – which made a terrible rattling when anything landed or took off. On 3 July 1946 I was sent on a Junior Commander’s Course at Kandy, Ceylon, the last stage of the move being ten hours on a Sunderland flying-boat from Penang to Lake Kogala, in the south of Ceylon. Kandy was a small town, high up in the hills; the RAF unit was just a small training school with no aircraft facilities. Whilst I was there the ‘Perahera’ took place. This was a big religious festival, culminating in a long procession through the streets of Kandy. The procession was made up from the contingents from several temples, each contingent having a large group of priests, led by men cracking long whips, fire-eaters, dancers and a group of elephants. From our vantage point on a hotel balcony I counted over 70 elephants – quite a procession!
The entire procession was led by a sacred elephant from Kandy’s own ‘temple of the tooth’ – so called because it house a casket said to contain a tooth from Buddha. This sacred elephant, reputedly over 100 years old, was not allowed to walk barefoot on the road, so teams of men laid long, wide strips of white silk ahead of him to walk on.
My five-week course over, I moved down to Colombo, capital of Ceylon, and had several interesting days waiting for a ship back to Singapore, five very pleasant days, and much better than the Sunderland.
Arriving back at Changi, I found that with the completion of the runways at Tengah the Airfield Construction Wing was being disbanded. The big majority of the personnel were returning to the UK, and all the plant and transport was being transferred to Air Ministry Works Directorate- the civilian part of the RAF. I was given the job of supervising the rounding up and handing over of all this equipment. At the same time I was to prepare all the plant and equipment required to lay a permanent runway at Changi – the so-called Changi Runway Project.
At the same time, with the runways at Kai Tak (the RAF station on the Chinese mainland opposite Hong Kong) having been completed, their entire stock of plant and transport was to be shipped down to Singapore and the Construction Wing disbanded.
3
[Page Break]
I was given the job of getting everything collected and somehow hauling it out to Changi, 18 miles away. Our compound at Changi Point was on the sea edge, very near where a fresh water creek joined the sea. At some high tides a group of crocodiles would gather there, probably enjoying the fresh water. They were only 100 yards or so away, about eight or ten of them, up to around 16 feet long as far as we could estimate. They did not really bother us but one man, working in his boat, looked up to see a big crocodile steadily watching him, just a few feet away – he swore that it was as long as his boat – 16 feet and quite capable of taking a bite out of his boat to get at him. We were also paid a visit by a young five-footer, which swam up an open drain into the compound. We tried to fence him in with some tent floorboards but he smashed his way out, and back out to sea at top speed!
At this time the Air Ministry was settling its peacetime establishment of Engineers. The senior, older men were offered permanent commissions, the Air Ministry knowing that in a few years they would all be retiring. To us younger 25-30 year olds they would only offer short service commissions, giving time to sort out whom they wanted to keep. They offered me a short service commission, but back on aircraft, and refused to let me stay in airfield construction. I wanted a workshop’s job, so refused the offer and did things my way. I relinquished my War Emergency Commission, came home, had three months’ leave, and then rejoined [sic] ‘in the ranks’. I then changed trades – from aircraft fitter to general engineer – and spent the next 18 years a Warrant Officer in charge of various workshop units, at home and in Germany. I had a ‘Mentioned in Despatches’ from war service and, in my post war service, had three Commander in Chief’s Commendations, with cash awards for technical inventions and an AOC Commendation for Efficiency. To me, that justified the decision I had made regarding my career. I finally retired from the RAF in April 1966 and joined Horncastle RDC as a Clerical Officer.
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Bits and Pieces from a Long Career
Description
An account of the resource
Covers the period from joining as a Halton Apprentice in September 1932 for training as an Aircraft Fitter. Through the completion of his training and posting to 16 squadron, before being transferred to Egypt in 1937 and on to Iraq with No 4 Flying Training School. In April 1941 he was present at the Battle of Habbaniya when the Iraqi army and German Luftwaffe attempted to capture the base. On return to the United Kingdom he was commissioned as an Engineering Officer and served at East Kirkby, Metheringham, Coningsby and Strubby. Post war he was involved with airfield construction in the Far East. When the Air Ministry re-structured the post war RAF, he relinquished his wartime commission re-mustered to General Engineer and spent the next eighteen years running station workshops in the UK and Germany.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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Four typewritten sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BBullockWEJBullockWEJv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Egypt
Great Britain
Iraq
England--Lincolnshire
Iraq--Mosul
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1937
1941
1943
1945
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
William Bullock
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Bradley Froggatt
106 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
fitter airframe
ground crew
ground personnel
Pathfinders
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Halton
RAF Metheringham
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16941/SCheshireGL72021v10022.1.jpg
3004039e4879fbb7b39b5d9717e56677
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
P.F.F.
[National scheme for Disabled Men crest]
[unknown crest]
MINISTRY OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION,
MILLBANK, S.W.1.
RD.Arm.8/PFF
17th January, 1944.
Dear Cheshire,
You left these gloves in the RD.Arm.8 Office when you called recently.
My apologies for not sending them on earlier, but I rather thought that I should be seeing you again.
Yours sincerely
WJ Gibbs
Wing Commander Cheshire, DSO., DFC.,
R.A.F. Station,
Conningsby.
Dublin Core
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Letter to Leonard Cheshire from Wing Commander W J Gibbs
Description
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From officer in Ministry of Aircraft Production. Writes that Cheshire left gloves in his office and is now sending them on.
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W J Gibbs
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1944-01-17
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eng
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Text
Text. Correspondence
Text. Service material
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SCheshireGL72021v10022
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--London
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1944-01-17
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Cheshire, Leonard. Correspondence
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Royalty-free permission to publish
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This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
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One-page typewritten letter
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Claire Monk
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/3442/PKirbyH1511.1.jpg
f2f26de792cac70f6b6c69e353b3a563
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/3442/AKirbyHVA160611.2.mp3
77fbbeda6cb538a1fc8c3a042b4c080b
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Kirby, Harold
Harold V A Kirby
H V A Kirby
Harold Kirby
H Kirby
Description
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Nine items. Two oral history interviews with Warrant Officer Harold Kirby (1923 - 2022, 1637087 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs and documents. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 467, 97 and 156 Squadrons.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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2015-07-10
2015-09-21
2016-06-11
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Kirby, H
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Warrant Officer Harold Kirby 1637087 was born in Kilbourne, Loncon in 1923, his job after leaving school was in the accounting department at London Electric Supplies. He initially tried to volunteer for the RAF but failed the medical, at that time. He was subsequently drafted in 1942. Skill training started with training as a Flight Mechanic, but during this was asked to volunteer to rain as a Flight Engineer. His first posting was as an Aircraft Fitter at No.460 Squadron, RAF Binbrook, although only for 6 months.
After Flight Engineer training at St Athan and then training on the Short Stirling and then the Lancaster with 1661 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Winthorpe, the first solo flight for the crew, the port landing gear would not lock, during the landing the gear collapsed, although there were no injuries.
First operational unit was No.467 Squadron at RAF Waddington a mainly Australian Squadron, the crew were here for July and August 1944, One operation 3/4th August 1944, to the V1 storage site at Trossy Saint Maximin had another bomber flying above their aircraft and dropping their bombs, one going through the wing, narrowly missing vital structures, this resulted in a gear up landing, due to hydraulic loss, but again there were no injuries resulting.
He was then posted along with the crew to No 97 Squadron, based at RAF Coningsby a pathfinder squadron, tasked to mark the targets for other aircraft,
In total two tours were completed before the end of the European war, after finishing as a Flight Engineer, Harold trained as a RADAR mechanic, before leaving the RAF.
Andy St.Denis
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Transcription
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TO: This recording was recorded for the International Bomber Command Centre digital archive which owns the copyright for this performance. OK, so what year were you born in?
HK: 1923.
TO: And, er, where were you born?
HK: In Kilburn. Kingsgate Road, Kilburn.
TO: I live near there. I live near there at the moment. I’m in West Hampstead.
HK: Oh, right. OK.
TO: And, er, when were you a child were you interested in aircraft?
HK: Not particularly no, although we did go to the Hendon Air Mus— display on occasions, um, but not, not particularly interested when I was young.
TO: What, what kind of aircraft did they have at the display?
HK: I think they were, er, sort of two-winged planes, yes. I can’t really remember much about it.
TO: Right and were your parents in the First World War?
HK: Yes, my fa— yes, my father was in the Army but he managed to survive.
TO: Did you, er, did he ever talk about his time in the war?
HK: Very rarely. We did go to the, er, an Army museum somewhere and he did explain a bit what he did but not very much.
TO: Is that on? And, er, when did you leave school?
HK: When did I leave school? At sixteen. We had moved to Kingsbury by then and I went to Kingsbury County School.
TO: And, er, what were your favourite subjects at school?
HK: Maths.
TO: And, er, did you use maths in your first job?
HK: No, not really, no. My first job was in the accounts department of London Electrics Supply. That was in Waterloo but, er, maths didn’t really come into it much.
TO: And, er, in the 1930s did they, did the papers talk about what Hitler was doing in Europe?
HK: I think they must have done but I wasn’t really interested at that time.
TO: And did you go to the cinema much?
HK: Yes, quite often, yes. I usually went with my mother and brother. My father wasn’t terribly interested.
TO: Do you remember any specific films you saw? Are there any films you remember seeing?
HK: Not really, no. I remember seeing some silent films early on but, er, I remember a film called “Rin Tin Tin” about a dog but I can’t really remember much about it.
TO: I have heard about that film but I don’t think I’ve ever seen it but my grandmother mentioned it to me once. And, er, do remember hearing about the Munich Agreement?
HK: Oh, yes, yes. That was 1938 was it? Yes, oh yes. I was a bit older by then.
TO: And what did you think of Chamberlain appeasing Hitler?
HK: I’m not sure whether it was just to delay things or not or whether he really thought it would be appeasement. But, er, I just don’t know.
TO: And after the agreement were people making preparations for war?
HK: Yes. Oh, definitely, yes. They seemed to think it was definitely coming by then.
TO: Was there any preparations you were involved in?
HK: No, not until the war started and then we dug the garden for allotments but nothing much at the time.
TO: And do you think Britain could have made better preparations?
HK: I don’t think so, no. Oh, possibly got in a better store of food [slight laugh]. I don’t know.
TO: But were you surprised though when you heard that war had started?
HK: I think we knew it was coming. Yes. Yes. I heard the, um, broadcast by Neville Chamberlain.
TO: Do you remember how you felt when you heard it?
HK: I really felt that, er, we’d have to — well, I don’t really know at that time. I was only about sixteen so — but apprehensive probably.
TO: And did you have any relatives who were in the armed forces?
HK: I had some uncles in the First World War. Oh, a younger uncle, um, was in the fire service and then he went in the Army. Yes. That was all at the time.
TO: And, er, did, how did you feel when you heard that France had been defeated?
HK: Well, I thought we had our backs to the wall by then, yes. So, er, had to get down and try and preserve ourselves.
TO: Do you think France let Britain down?
HK: I don’t really think there was much they could do at the time. Germany was too powerful.
TO: And, er, when war had started did you think it would be a short war or a long war?
HK: Well, I had hoped it would be a short one but I, I really don’t know. I didn’t really have an opinion then.
TO: Were you living in London when the Luftwaffe started their bombing?
HK: In Kingsbury, yeah.
TO: And can you remember any specific occasions?
HK: We did have a, a bomb came down in the road but it didn’t explode but, er, it damaged houses, they — I think the toilets cracked or something and there was a house about three doors away that was more damaged and they had to leave it. But no, no explosions took place.
TO: Did you witness any aerial battles at that time?
HK: Oh yes, at the time, yes. I was quite interested.
TO: Were you worried that the Luftwaffe might win?
HK: What, what’s that?
TO: The Luftwaffe might defeat the RAF. Were you worried?
HK: Well, I suppose I was worried but, er, we seemed to have the upper hand at the end of the Battle of Britain.
TO: What did you think of RAF leaders at the time, like, er, Dowding?
HK: Well, I can’t say I had much opinion at that age, no.
TO: OK. Do you remember what kind of rations you had? [sound of rustling papers]
HK: I couldn’t say definitely but I knew we had rations. Things were in short supply, yes?
TO: Did you have better rations though when you were in the Air Force?
HK: Yes, definitely.
TO: And did you, did you have an air raid shelter where you lived?
HK: We had the indoor one, the Morrison shelter, yes. I don’t think we ever used it really.
TO: Would the Morrison have been much use do you think?
HK: The shelter?
TO: Yes.
HK: Well, it, it would have been but as I said I don’t think we really used it much.
TO: And as there much bomb damage near where you worked?
HK: Where I worked? Quite a bit, yes. This was up in Waterloo.
TO: And were you worried that Britain might surrender?
HK: I don’t think I was. No, I don’t think I was, no. I, if I thought about I thought we’d probably succeed which we did eventually.
TO: And did you ever see anyone behaving badly during the Blitz?
HK: I can’t that say I did. No.
TO: Do you think people pulled together?
HK: Yes.
TO: So, when exactly did you come to join the Air Force then? [sound of rustling papers]
HK: This is a bit of a long story. Two school friends and myself tried to get in early on flying duties. They got in, eventually became navigators, but I was turned down. I wasn’t fit for flying duties at the time but I was called up in ’42, initially trained as a, a flight mechanic, er, went on to do a training as a fitter and, um, while I was doing the courses they were calling for volunteers to become flight engineers. This time I passed the medical and eventually became a flight engineer.
TO: Do you remember what kind of medical tests they gave you?
HK: Well, I remember sort of blowing in a tube and holding the mercury up and the colour blindness test. I don’t really remember much else.
TO: Was there a certain, was there a certain kind of educational test you had to do?
HK: I’m pretty certain there was but I can’t remember it.
TO: And did your maths play a role with you being selected as a flight engineer?
HK: I think it helped, yes. [sound of rustling papers]
TO: And would you — did you ever consider trying to be a pilot or navigator?
HK: I did but, um, eventually when I was called for the medical, um, I did explain I had originally applied and they said at that time I was quite fit to become a navigator but as that was going to take longer I thought I’d persevere with being flight engineer.
TO: Once you got into a certain role, like flight engineer, could you reapply to be something else?
HK: Yes, certainly. Yes.
TO: And what did you relatives think of you being in the Air Force?
HK: My mother was very apprehensive, yes. But I don’t know what else, no.
TO: And so, er, can you describe a bit more about your training for being air crew?
HK: Yes, well after I’d become a fitter I was posted up to Binbrook and did six months, mainly repairing airplanes, and after the six months I was posted to St Athan to do my training as a flight engineer. Eventually I passed out, went to the heavy engineering, er, heavy aircraft place at Winthorpe where I crewed-up. The rest of the crew were all Australian. So, er, then we went to Waddington on 467 Squadron initially and later, after about sixteen operations we were transferred to, um, 97 Squadron, a Pathfinders squadron.
TO: And do you remember the first time you went up in a plane?
HK: Yes. That, that was when we had the old Stirling planes for training. That was the first time I went up, yeah, but I don’t really remember much about that.
TO: What did you, er, think of the Stirling?
HK: I think they were really clapped out by then. This was in, yes, early ’44. Actually, on the — my pilot’s first, um, solo on the Stirlings he couldn’t get the wheels down. I had to wind them down by hand which was a long job but then the, um, port one wouldn’t lock so we were advised to go to, um, one of the air, air stations that were — had damaged aircraft. That was in Suffolk somewhere. I forget the name and, er, we went there and the undercarriage collapsed on that, collapsed on that side. We spun round but no-one was hurt. Then the instructor came down with another aircraft and made my pilot fly it back. That was all the excitement we had on that station.
TO: Were most bombers, did most bombers have the same layout inside?
HK: No, not at all, no. They were quite different. The flight engineer on a Stirling was way back. I’m not sure what it was on the Halifax now but, er, with the Lancaster it was next to the pilot.
TO: I, a couple of years ago I spoke to a chap who had been a navigator in Lancasters and he said in the Halifax you had, the navigator had a separate office downstairs or something.
HK: I believe so, yes.
TO: Did you have a particular favourite aircraft of the war?
HK: A favourite one. Well that was the Lancaster. No doubt about it.
TO: Was it, was it, was it, did it feel different flying a Lancaster, flying in a Lancaster to other planes?
HK: What?
TO: You said you were flying in a Lancaster. Did it feel different on board a Stirling?
HK: Yes, yes, it was much better, yes. I can’t really remember much about the Stirling.
TO: Were you ever aboard a Halifax?
HK: No.
TO: Or a Wellington?
HK: No. No.
TO: OK. OK. So, er, when you were sent to the squadrons what, what did — were they mainly Lancasters?
HK: Yeah. They were all Lancasters where we were, at Waddington and then Coningsby.
TO: And as the flight engineer what would your duties be aboard the plane?
HK: Well, to assist the pilot in taking off, um, keeping an eye on the engine temperatures and oil pressures all the time, um, keeping a lookout on the starboard side, um, and doing any repairs which were possible on board. That was about it I think.
TO: Could you please describe the procedure for taking off in a Lancaster?
HK: Well [clears throat] initially we had to check, um, go round the aircraft and check the outside, then inside we had to run up the engines in turn to see how they were, watch there no significant [unclear] as they called it and, er, then we taxied to the start off point, run up the engines with the brakes on until we got the green light and then we were away. The only trouble was on one occasion, as we were going round the runway, um, the brakes failed and the pilot managed to guide it by the engines and at the start off point we couldn’t run up against the brakes as was normal. We just got to the start and pushed the throttle forwards and went off. But we got off OK then coming back we went — I’m trying to remember the name of the place where we first went with the, er, the Stirling, but they’d got a long runway so we flew there and so they repaired the brakes and we flew back.
TO: How reliable was the Lancaster?
HK: Very reliable generally, yes. We did have a bit of trouble with the intercom now and again but no, generally very reliable.
TO: And were you quite friendly with the ground crew?
HK: Yes, quite, quite friendly yes but, er, I think I ought to have been more friendly at the time but I was young, young and they were older people so, er, I, I don’t think I got as friendly as I should have done.
TO: How old were the people you were with?
HK: The, the ground crew? Oh, I reckon in their thirties, um, most, most of them I think were regulars. [beep sound]
TO: And what about the crew aboard the bomber. How old were they?
HK: Well, I was the youngest. The pilot was twenty-eight. I was just, just turned twenty-one. The bomb aimer was also early thirties and, um, the mid upper gunner and the wireless operator were quite young, um, mid mid-twenties I suppose but I got on very well with them.
TO: Did, were you, were you allowed to be friends with the — sorry, what was your rank?
HK: Rank? At the time I was just a sergeant, then flight sergeant and eventually warrant officer.
TO: Were there any rules about who you could be friends with?
HK: No, not, not really. I went about with some of the crew, yes. Of course though we were kept separate at the station, the officers and the NCOs separate.
TO: Was there ever any friction between the crew of the bomber?
HK: Not as far as I was concerned no. Never heard any.
TO: What did you think of Arthur Harris?
HK: I think he was just the man for the job at the time, yes.
TO: And, er, what did you think of the German aircraft of the war?
HK: Oh well, they — fortunately we didn’t have much of a contact with them. On our first, very first operation we were coming back and the rear gunner suddenly shouted to corkscrew and there was a plane. It was a twin-engine plane coming up behind and it let off a burst, and one bullet went through the rear turret and went through the rear gunner’s clothing and cut off his heating supply, which he was very aggrieved because it got very cold but we got back safely. The attacking aircraft I saw over— overtook us as we dived on the corkscrew and we never saw it again. So that was really a sort of a foretaste of what could have come but we were quite fortunate. We never saw any single or twin-engine aircraft again.
TO: And how do you feel about the Churchill deciding to order the bombing of Germany?
HK: How about —
TO: Churchill ordering Germany to be bombed?
HK: Well, I think it was war-time. I must say that in all our briefing we were all briefed to bomb military targets, um, not just towns, but at the time the accuracy of bombing was such that towns were destroyed, um, acc— well, not accidently, but I think the powers that be knew what was going on but, um, as I said we, we were briefed to bomb targets.
TO: I’ve, I’ve, er, I read, listened to an interview with Harris where he defended the tactics he used and he says that anyone who wants to criticise him for ordering the bombing of towns has never looked out of a window because if they had done they would know the cloud conditions over Europe means you can’t hit individual targets.
HK: That’s right, yeah.
TO: And were there ever any occasions where aircraft were damaged by the weather?
HK: By the weather?
TO: Like snow or thunderstorms?
HK: No, I don’t think so. Well, not as far as I was concerned, no.
TO: And, er, you just mentioned briefings. How did the briefings work?
HK: In what way?
TO: Well, how many people would you have in the room? Were you shown maps or photos?
HK: Yeah, well there was a big map at the front and with the target route marked. The pilot and the navigator had a separate briefing initially and then we all went together to the main briefing. I suppose, depending on the number of planes that were going, about seven crew, um, there must have been sort of getting on for seventy, possibly, in the main briefing, yeah. [clears throat] The commander got up and gave a brief talk and then the chief navigator and bomb— bomb— bombing instructor all gave a brief talk and we went for a pre-operational meal and got ready.
TO: What did you do to prepare yourselves for the mission?
HK: Well, just went, um, to the equipment room and got our parachutes and got dressed and waited around for the time to, to go off.
TO: And as you got on board the plane were you feeling nervous?
HK: Tiredness more than nervous, yes.
TO: And was there anyone who was actually showing any fear or were they all keeping it, keeping it to themselves?
HK: I think they were all keeping to themselves, yes.
TO: Do you know of anyone who during the war who wasn’t able — who just felt too nervous to get on board the plane?
HK: I don’t know of anyone, no. I knew there were people who decided they couldn’t go on but they were got off the stations as quickly as they could.
TO: So, if you can please could you describe your first ever mission over German?
HK: Well, as I said the first ever mission was the one in which we got shot at but survived that. The, er, worst trip was on the VI storage sites in France. This was a daylight raid and the mid upper gunner said, ‘There’s a Lanc immediately above us just opened his bomb doors.’ But before we could do anything we felt two thumps and one of the bombs went through the port wing and took away the port undercarriage and so I shut down the engine on that side because it was immediately behind the engine and, er, we came home on three engines and landed but our pilot decided to land on the grass runway, which we did, and again no one was hurt.
TO: Were you worried the plane would crash when the —
HK: Oh yes, yes. It came down. Our pilot was very successful in landing it. We did a belly landing because we lost all the hydraulics. We couldn’t get the other undercarriage down, couldn’t use the flaps on it. We just had to come in but, um, yeah, we were quite fortunate.
TO: And incidents like that ever — after that incident, were you reluctant to go on more missions?
HK: No, no, no. It was just a job.
TO: So, you mentioned that — was it VIs you were bombing?
HK: Yes, the VI storage sites, yes.
TO: Sorry can you describe what they are? I’m not familiar with them.
HK: The VI, the Doodlebugs, yes. They had storage places for them. This was at Trossy Saint Maximin. I don’t know where that is now but it’s in France somewhere.
TO: And what kind of pay load would the, would your Lancaster carry?
HK: Well, initially it was, er, thousand pounders and the incendiaries and then when we went to Pathfinders it was — we dropped flares initially to light up the target area as well as high explosives.
TO: Do you remember what kind of military targets you were generally after?
HK: What, um — the canal, Dortmund-Ems [?] canal, railway sidings, bridges, harbours, all sorts of things.
TO: And did you ever hear how, how successful your missions had been?
HK: Well, they did display photographs afterwards so we could see. I — definitely some of them were definitely successful. But, um, I don’t remember a lot about it, no.
TO: OK. So, was your first raid over Germany in 1943?
HK: No. ’44.
TO: OK and had you heard about the thousand bomber raids that —
HK: Yes. I had, had read about them, yes.
TO: And how many planes would generally accompany your Lancaster?
HK: I think it depended a lot, um, possibly upwards twenty, fifty, possibly a hundred. I, I don’t really know.
TO: Was there, were there any points on board a mission where you could relax to a degree?
HK: Well, we relaxed to a degree once we were on the North Sea on the way home but, um, we still had to keep a look-out. But, er, we didn’t really relax until we’d landed.
TO: And what was the procedure for coming into land?
HK: We had to call up the station and were given directions as to what height to circle and sort of gradually come down and then told we could go into land.
TO: Were landings scary at all?
HK: No, I don’t think so. I don’t recall.
TO: So, the incident where you mentioned with the — where had to shut down the engines, could, did you have control, does that mean you had control over the engines as you were the engineer?
HK: Yeah, it was, yes. I, I’m not sure I got the order to shut it down but I did it anyway because as the bomber had sort of taken all the bits behind the engine I thought there was a danger of petrol coming and catching fire and so that’s why I shut it down.
TO: But was the rest of the aircraft still working fine?
HK: It was, yes, yes. As I said we’d lost all the hydraulics. We couldn’t operate the flaps or what was left of the undercarriage but, um, the pilot did a good job.
TO: So, how many people would you normally have aboard the bomber?
HK: Seven altogether.
TO: And can you describe the conditions in general aboard the bomber?
HK: There wasn’t a lot of room I know that. Yes, well we had to get from the door up to the front of the aircraft, over the main spar and, er, but once we were in position it was quite OK.
TO: And how was morale in general amongst the crew?
HK: Generally pretty good, yes, yeah.
TO: And did your squadron suffer heavy losses?
HK: Occasionally yes, yes. I can’t recall any particular case but we did lose certainly some.
TO: Did you hear much about the American bombing of Germany?
HK: I didn’t hear much about it, no.
TO: And did the, your friends in the plane, did they talk much about their lives at home?
HK: Which, the friends?
TO: Your fellow crew members on the plane?
HK: Not a lot, no, no.
TO: And did the Lancasters get new bombs as the war went on?
HK: Sorry, did —
TO: Did the Lancasters get new bombs as the war went on?
HK: I suppose so. I don’t really know.
TO: And, er, were there any — do you remember any occasions where you were over major German cities?
HK: I remember going to Munich and Hamburg a number of times. We never went to Berlin but, er, yes. I don’t really remember much about that.
TO: Was there heavy anti-aircraft fire?
HK: Oh, plenty, yes. We could see them exploding in the air, yes.
TO: Did they ever come near the plane?
HK: We were fortunate. We didn’t have a lot of damage. We did have some shrapnel damage but not a lot, no.
TO: You mentioned was it the tail gunner who got the heating supply cut off? Did he seem traumatised at all by that?
HK: I don’t think he was traumatised but, er, he certainly remembered it because, um, when my wife and I went to Perth in Australia where he lived, we managed to meet him, he was telling my wife about it. He was most aggrieved about the heating supply going off [laugh].
TO: Was his reaction to it pretty normal?
HK: I think so, yes.
TO: And I’m sorry to ask this but do you know of anyone who died during the raids?
HK: During the Blitz, yes, distant, well, distant friends of my parents moved to a place. I lived in Kilburn initially and then moved to, um, a place near Barking and then one of the girls who was my age, um, was out doing fire watching or something but she was killed and, er, the others, one of the other sisters was wounded but I don’t know anyone else really close.
TO: Did you know anyone who, anyone in RAF who died on raids over Germany?
HK: Yes, yes, quite a number from the squadron we were on, yes.
TO: Did you ever talk about them?
HK: Not a lot, no. I remember we had two people from Ireland. One was a young chap, probably my age, and the other was a bit older and the older man was on his last mission, got shot down and killed, and this young chap was really upset about that. But, um, I don’t remember much about anyone else.
TO: And did you hear about the attack on the Ruhr dams?
HK: Heard about them, yes, yes.
TO: Did that have much effect on morale?
HK: I think it probably did but we were quite, um, happy that they had done it but we didn’t know a lot about it at the time.
TO: Do you think the raid was successful? [bleep sound]
HK: It was successful I think, yes.
TO: And were there any occasions when your squadron dropped leaflets?
HK: I can’t recall dropping actual leaflets, no. We did drop the window over — you’ve heard about that. Yes, but I don’t remember about leaflets, no.
TO: Can you please describe what the procedure was for deploying window.
HK: Well, there was the chutes near where I was and it was just unpacking the, er, packets and dropping them sort of shortly before went into Germany. But, er, I don’t think we had them all that much.
TO: Do you think window was effective?
HK: I think it probably was, well initially anyway. Later on I don’t know. There was a chute next to my position where I could drop them through.
TO: So it was your duty and not the bomb aimer?
HK: Yes.
TO: Can you explain how, what impact window had on the Germans?
HK: Well, initially it upset their radar quite a bit but then eventually they got used to it and I think that was probably why we stopped.
TO: I’m not sure if you’re aware but I think that just before Hamburg when they first used window Germany actually had developed the same thing but didn’t want to used it on Britain in case Britain used it on Germany. So both sides had window but both sides didn’t want to use it. [slight laughter] And you mentioned you only saw that twin-engine plane on that one occasion, did you ever see other German planes?
HK: In the distance, yes, yes, or near a target we saw a couple way below us. I don’t remember seeing any, any more, no.
TO: When you saw them were you worried that they would come near you?
HK: Was I what?
TO: When you saw the planes below you were you worried that they would come and attack?
HK: Well, they were well below us. I, I don’t know what they were doing but they were coming cross-wise but, um, two of them together, but whether they were after a particular target or not I don’t know.
TO: And were you sat in the cockpit the whole time?
HK: Yes, well mainly, yes.
TO: What would you do if you had to move around the bomber?
HK: Well, we had portable oxygen bottles we had to take. I did have to go back to the rear gunner once because his, um, the fluid was leaking from his supply line that operated the turret. I managed to put one of these circuits round because it, it had come off the supply, but he had to be very careful ultimate.
TO: Can you describe what kind of equipment you — sorry, what kind of clothes would you wear on board the bomber?
HK: A very thick jumper, um, some form of outer coat of some sort. I don’t really remember. Then a Mae West. I remember it was very bulky getting through the aircraft at the time.
TO: And did you wear an oxygen mask at all times?
HK: Yes. Pretty well all the time, yes. [cough]
TO: And where did you keep the parachutes?
HK: The parachutes. Well, my parachute was stored just behind me. The pilot had a, er, sit-on one as did the rear gunner I think. The rest of the crew had the parachutes as near as they could get them.
TO: And did the Lancaster have escape hatches?
HK: Yes, yes. There was one by the bomb aimer down in the front and then there was the door at the back and hatches in the roof.
TO: Were you ever told what to do it you ever had to bail out?
HK: Well, yes. We had to practice getting out.
TO: How did that practice work?
HK: Well it wasn’t in the air. It was on the ground, just getting through the front hatch.
TO: Were you ever worried about being shot down?
HK: I can’t say that I was particularly worried, no?
TO: And what kind of instruments did you have in front of you when you were sat in the cockpit?
HK: Well, the instruments at the side were the oil pressures and temperatures etcetera. In the front you had the normal — you know, I can’t really remember. I know we had the, um, all the knobs for pressing to cut off the engines but I wasn’t so much concerned with the flight controls as the engine temperatures and pressures that was at the side.
TO: Can you remember what would happen aboard the plane when you reached the targets and had to drop the bombs?
HK: Well, the bomb aimer gave directions and, er, and had to fly straight and level for a certain length of time and then he said, ‘Bombs gone.’ And immediately closed the bomb doors and got off as quickly as we could.
TO: Did your Lancaster ever carry a cookie?
HK: That’s the four thousand pound. Yes, I think it did on occasions but I can’t really remember now.
TO: Could you actually feel the bombs leaving the plane?
HK: Did —
TO: Could you feel the bombs leaving the plane?
HK: Oh, well when they were dropped yes. We did sort of go up quite suddenly.
TO: And were there any times when engines, when, not when damaged but when the engines just malfunctioned without warning?
HK: No, no. The engines were pretty good on the whole, yes.
TO: Merlins weren’t they?
HK: Merlins yes.
TO: [unclear] And did you ever go on — were your missions mainly at night?
HK: Mainly at night although we did do some daylight ones. These were mainly, as I said, over the storage sites of — in France.
TO: Did you prefer daylight or night missions?
HK: I think night because we couldn’t see what was going on.
TO: Could you ever see the cities below you?
HK: Yes, we could especially when we were doing dropping the flares, yes.
TO: And can you explain, can you explain what the, how the other Pathfinder missions worked?
HK: Yes, there was Flare Force 1, which was — went out early when the bombing was due to start and we dropped flares then, er, if necessary, the master bomber called out for more flares and then there was the Flare Force 2 which was sort of circling around and then came in and dropped the other flares, and that’s really mainly what I can remember.
TO: When did they actually invent the Pathfinders, if you like?
HK: I think it came into force in 1942 because, um, they were worried about the, er, the bombing wasn’t very accurate at the time and, er, I think it did improve with the Pathfinders.
TO: So just to make sure I’ve got this right, the Pathfinders dropped the flares and the other main bombers would follow the flares?
HK: That’s right, yes.
TO: And was Pathfinding just as dangerous as other bombing?
HK: I think it was but we didn’t know much about it at the time.
TO: I don’t know if you can answer this question but how long did the missions tend to last, usually?
HK: From about five hours up to about ten depending on where the target was.
TO: How far into Germany would you tend to go?
HK: I think the furthest was a place called — I’ve got the, er, name of the place here.
TO: Do you want me to get it? Shall I get it? [background noises]
HK: No. [background noises] Yes, Trondheim in Norway but I don’t remember what the target was? That was ten hours.
TO: Would that have been the Tirpitz? The Tirpitz?
HK: Sorry?
TO: Would that have been the battleship, Tirpitz?
HK: Yes. Yes.
TO: Because that was around Trondheim or Tromso or something when it was sunk by 617 Squadron I think when they were dropping Barnes Wallis’s tallboys.
HK: Yes, yes. I think that was the longest one, ten hours.
TO: So, so were you on a pathfinding mission for the Tirpitz do you think?
HK: Yes. I, I don’t really remember what we were doing over Trondheim.
TO: I could be entirely wrong when I say the Tirpitz but I know that the RAF did go after it and finally got it in November 1944 so, so I don’t know if that’s adds up or — did you hear about the sinking of the Tirpitz though?
HK: Yes, I heard about it, yes.
TO: And do you feel glad to have had a role in it be destroyed?
HK: I, I don’t remember much about that raid, no. I think we had to go to Scotland and refuel before we took off but I don’t, don’t remember much about it.
TO: And what do you think about the bombing of Hamburg in 1943?
HK: We didn’t hear much about it at the time, no, so I can’t really say.
TO: And what about the bombing of Berlin?
HK: Well, there again I said we never went to Berlin so there again I can’t really say.
TO: And what about Dresden?
HK: Well, Dresden we were briefed to bomb the railway sidings. There, there was supposed to be a lot of German concentrations ready to go to the Eastern Front, er, which was what we did. We didn’t really know at the time how the town was devastated.
TO: Were you still on Pathfinders at that point?
HK: Sorry?
TO: Were you still on Pathfinders at that point?
HK: Oh yes, yes.
TO: So did Pathfinders actually carry bombs or just flares?
HK: We did carry bombs as well, yes.
TO: And were some cities more heavily defended than others?
HK: Yes. Those in the Ruhr were quite heavily defended, yes. Others not so much.
TO: Was Dresden heavily defended?
HK: That I can’t remember. I don’t think it was, no.
TO: When, was the, was the, was the AK 88 the main anti-aircraft weapon the Germans have?
HK: Yes.
TO: Were the crews afraid of it or was the firing generally inaccurate?
HK: I don’t know that we thought about it all that much and just hoped it didn’t get too close.
TO: Did you ever — I know you were at night but could you ever actually make out other RAF bombers nearby?
HK: Not usually, now and again, yes, we saw — yes. Some got very close.
TO: Was that — you probably don’t know but was the, the bomb aimer or pilot of that was above you when it bumped into the wing, do you think they would have been reprimanded for what happened?
HK: I don’t think they would have known because the bomb aimer would have been looking forward. I don’t suppose they realised what was happening but we never found out who it was.
TO: Would you hold it against them if you found out then?
HK: It was just one of those things. I don’t think they — well they obviously didn’t do it on purpose.
TO: How much do you think a Lancaster could take and still get home?
HK: Quite a bit, yes. I have pictures of the hole in the Lancaster the bomb went through if you would like to see it?
TO: We can see that later. Can we see that later? I’d love to see that. And ss the war went on did you, did you think the bombing campaign was being successful.
HK: I think, as far as I was concerned I thought it was, yes.
TO: And was there anyone claiming that the tactics weren’t working?
HK: I didn’t hear any, no.
TO: And, this is a strange question probably but when you’re, or not when you’re on missions but when you’re just sitting in the cockpit of the aircraft, did you ever get the chance just to admire the view down below?
HK: Yes, um, on one of the missions to Munich we were briefed to fly over the Alps and it was moonlight and that was a sight to see I must admit and, er, when we went to some of the eastern European count— towns we had to fly over Sweden, which was all lit up, and that was a sight to see as well. They did, well, we were told they would shoot at us but not to be too near. I don’t think anyone was shot down over Sweden.
TO: My, the navigator I mentioned earlier he mentioned that there was a crew of his that used to fly over Switzerland and said the Swiss would fire anti-aircraft guns but they would deliberately fire them too far away so —
HK: I think that was the same with Sweden, yeah.
TO: Was that strange to see towns that were lit rather than in black-out?
HK: Yes, it was certainly a sight to see [laugh].
TO: And did your plane, did the navigator, or not necessarily the navigator, but did your plane ever get lost, as in not sure where they were going?
HK: No, I don’t think so, no. I don’t recall that.
TO: So, again there was a pilot whose plane got lost because the navigation equipment got broken or something. Was it quite cold on board the plane?
HK: It wasn’t too bad where we were up near the front but it got cold further back but the mid gunner and the rear gunner had a heated suit but yes it was pretty cold back there.
TO: Do you know any Lancaster gunners who successfully shot down fighters?
HK: No, I don’t know any definitely, no.
TO: Do you think they were much use against fighters?
HK: I think so, probably helpful in, in keeping the fighters away, even if they were just looking out.
TO: Did you carry any food aboard the plane with you?
HK: Yes we had some rations. On the long, long operations but I don’t remember much about what we had except they were — we did have tins of juice, er, vacuum flask of coffee, some food of some sort but I don’t remember what it was.
TO: Do you remember if anyone had a firearm aboard the plane?
HK: No.
TO: And were you ever given instruction on how to evade capture if you were shot down?
HK: Oh, we did had some instruction, yes. Try and keep low and if we were over a country other than Germany trying to get hold of some local people if we could.
TO: Did anyone on board the plane actually speak German?
HK: Not as far as I know, no.
TO: How many missions did you go on during the war?
HK: Forty-four altogether.
TO: Was that a lot by RAF standards?
HK: Well, with the Pathfinders the normal tour was forty-four. You did the normal thirty and then there was another fifteen so we were one short of the total.
TO: How often would you go on a mission would you say?
HK: Sometimes it might be two or three times in a week. Other times it might be sort of a few weeks before we went on an operation, depending possibly on the weather or the targets, I don’t know.
TO: When you were on bombing raids could you ever see the fires below?
HK: I remember seeing when we were over some sort of harbour. I don’t know where it was. I saw one of the ships that appeared to be burning but it might have been a smokescreen. But apart from that I, I don’t remember because, er, we were usually the first in and then away.
TO: So, when, when you did go on missions were you told to — were you generally aiming as you said earlier only for certain targets, like the railways?
HK: Yes, we were always, um, given a briefing like that, not just a town, but definitely some sort of target.
TO: And was there anyone in the crew who just deliberately didn’t pay attention in the briefings?
HK: I can’t say that I know, no.
TO: Because I was just thinking well that if a gunner was at a briefing they probably thought it doesn’t matter what I’m doing. I’ve just got to shoot at the planes.
HK: I suppose they were.
TO: I don’t know.
HK: I suppose the gunners were at the briefings. I can’t remember.
TO: That’s just speculation by me. They might have been very interested but, sorry, it’s just that I think that’s what I would have done if I was a gunner. And what kind of entertainment did you have in the squadron?
HK: In the squadron? I can’t say that I remember much about any entertainment [slight laugh] at all, no. I suppose there must have been some but, no, it’s not something I remember.
TO: Did you ever go out to pubs or dances?
HK: The crew weren’t very, er, pub-minded and neither was I. We did go on some outings, um, some of the crew together. When we were doing the training for Pathfinders we went into Cambridge and out there. In truth there we had more interest in museums, which suited me, yes.
TO: Which museums did you like?
HK: I don’t remember now [laugh] but I remember going to some and — yes.
TO: I was recently in a few museums myself and looking round the Lancaster they have, or rather the Lancaster cabin, that they have at the, in the Imperial War Museum. I think they put it back as far as the navigator’s positon so you can, you can see into where everyone was sitting, sort of thing.
HK: Oh yeah.
TO: And other than the other ones you’ve mentioned to me already were there other missions that you remember very clearly?
HK: I think I’ve told you the ones that, er, I really remember but, um, I can’t say that I remember any others. We were quite fortunate really over all.
TO: You mentioned earlier on that — was it a gunner? One of the gunners shouted, ‘Corkscrew,’ when the plane, the fighter arrived. What kind of basic manoeuvres did the planes have?
HK: Well, we immediately dived and up and around and that’s why it’s called a corkscrew and, anyway we dived in one direction and up in another and so on but, er, we didn’t have to do that much and, as I said, the plane overshot us and —
TO: I remember reading I think that even though the Stirling wasn’t as good as a Lancaster it was decent at turning or something when it came to manoeuvres.
HK: It was too heavy I think.
TO: It was quite good at climbing but wasn’t good at turning or something.
HK: Oh yeah.
TO: Were you ever — was there any time when they brought in new equipment and you were confused by it?
HK: Yes. We had some new equipment, some cathode ray tubes, um, which the bomb aimer used to sit next to the navigator and assist him with the navigating and, er, that was towards the end of the war and, um, I was doing the bomb aiming then.
TO: So, what did you do as a bomb aimer?
HK: Well, the — I merely had to go down into the bay and press the tips when the graticule showed the marker but the bombs were all pre-set to go off at a particular time, um, but that was all done by the bomb aimer. He set up the equipment initially and all I had to do was press the tip when the target came into view.
TO: Was that to drop, release the bombs then?
HK: Yes.
TO: OK and did you do that often?
HK: I did about four or five times towards the end of the war, yes.
TO: And did you find out roughly how much damage the raids were causing?
HK: No, not really, no. We did have pictures taken by the later aircraft going over but I can’t say that I recall.
TO: And was there ever any occasions where your plane had to return early before it reached the target?
HK: No, apart from the fact that once we were all recalled because the target had been overrun by our troops so, um, but no, we, we carried on although I said once when we had the intercom equipment went the — we were told not to use it because the, the rear gunner, pilot were in contact but it was too weak to let anyone else but we decided to carry on anyway.
TO: So, how did the, er, communication work aboard the aircraft?
HK: Well, we had the speakers in the, er, speakers in the helmets plus microphones and you had to switch on the microphone if you wanted to speak. That’s all, pretty well.
TO: Was it very noisy aboard those planes?
HK: It was very noisy, yes, yes. So when we didn’t have the intercom it meant really shouting at the pilot.
TO: Was the noise mainly from the engines?
HK: Yeah.
TO: Were there any other occasions when you went to a target and found it was too cloudy to see the city?
HK: That I can’t really recall now, no.
TO: So, just going back, I’m keen to go back this one, the one over France with the VIs, did you actually get the chance to drop your [emphasis] bombs at the time?
HK: Yes. We did drop them, yep.
TO: So, so if I get this right. So even though you had a hole in the wing you were still able to go on with the mission or had you already dropped them?
HK: No, we hadn’t already dropped them. We were on the bombing run and we did actually drop them but, er, I don’t remember much about it, no.
TO: That’s fine, fine.
HK: I know we had to and I was watching out of the — because in case the wing was moving up and down more than it should but, er, fortunately we didn’t have to — if it had gone [laugh] we wouldn’t have done anything about it anyway.
TO: Would the, er, the pilot of the plane, would he ever be speaking to other aircraft in the squadron?
HK: Would he be?
TO: On the radio, would he ever speak to other aircraft?
HK: I don’t think so. Not generally no, no, I wouldn’t think so, no?
TO: Was it possible to communicate with them?
HK: It would be possible I think [unclear] had the necessary permission to do so. I don’t think it was normal, no.
TO: And did you ever attack coastal targets?
HK: Yes but I don’t remember where but I know we did have some, er, harbours and shipping there.
TO: What did you think of the — I know you weren’t on it — but what did you think of bombers like the Halifax?
HK: Well, some people that, er, flew the Halifax thought they were OK but I, I don’t think they had the — I don’t think they were as good as the Lancaster anyway but it is a matter of opinion.
TO: I do remember reading that a Lanc, a Halifax couldn’t carry a cookie because they didn’t have the space.
HK: Couldn’t carry them because of the load, no.
TO: So, er, did you hear about how — other events of the war, like the invasion of Normandy?
HK: Only on the radio I think. I don’t think we heard a lot internally about what went on.
TO: But when you heard that Normandy had been invaded did you think the war was in its final stages?
HK: Well, certainly thought so. We hadn’t actually started operations then. We were still at the Heavy Conversion Unit when we heard all the planes going over one night and, er, we realised what it was, yes.
TO: So, did you ever drop bombs around Normandy?
HK: Drop bombs?
TO: Around Normandy to help with the invasion?
HK: Oh yes, yes, yes.
TO: Was that area less heavily defended than Germany? Was there less anti-aircraft fire in Normandy than Germany?
HK: Oh yes, less, definitely less.
TO: And did you hear of events like Japan attacking Pearl Harbour?
HK: Heard about it only on the news.
TO: And do, did you ever hear about other cases that happened where, where planes got damaged by overhead bombs?
HK: Not at the time. Although I believe it did happen on occasions.
TO: I know it happened to William Read, one of the VCs in Bomber Command, I think on a Norway mission or something.
HK: Yeah.
TO: And were there, was there anyone you know in your squadron who was shot down and became a prisoner?
HK: I didn’t know of anyone, no.
TO: And at the time of the war were you aware that Bomber Command had a fifty per cent casualty rate?
HK: Bomber Command?
TO: Had a fifty per cent casualty rate?
HK: No. We didn’t know at the time, no.
TO: This is a slightly odd question but if had you known at the time would you have volunteered for the Air Force?
HK: Maybe not but, er, once I was in — yes, it, it became just a job. I didn’t really didn’t take much notice. We didn’t hear of the, the losses at the time. I didn’t realise they were so great.
TO: Do you think they might have been keeping it quiet deliberately?
HK: I think they would, yes. I think that was definitely.
TO: Did you hear about, er, certain stories about the war and just dismissed them as propaganda?
HK: Yes, I’m not sure. I don’t remember any, no.
TO: And was there, was there a, a certain type of single-engine German fighter that was very feared by the crew?
HK: Oh, the Messerschmitt but, um, I didn’t think we were worried one way or the other, no.
TO: [background noise] So I’m just seeing which ones are nice. I’m just seeing which ones are nicer.
HK: [slight laugh] Thanks.
TO: Did you ever regret joining the Air Force?
HK: No. No. It was, in a way it was a university to me.
TO: And when, when you joined the Air Force was it possible, did you get a choice as to what duty, whether you went to Bomber Command or Fighter Command?
HK: It would have been Bomber Command, yes. As I say, when I was called up initially I was trained as a flight mechanic and, er, it was mainly for the Bomber Command.
TO: Do you remember when you receiv— received your call-up papers?
HK: Well, I only vaguely remember, yeah.
TO: And do you think there was a reason why, do you think there might have been a certain reason why you were put in the RAF and not the Army?
HK: I don’t know whether it was the education at the time. I don’t know. It may have had something to do with it, yes.
TO: Do you think you were properly trained enough before you were sent on missions?
HK: I think so. We had quite a good training, yes.
TO: And did you feel ready for war when it finished?
HK: Yes, I think so, yes.
TO: And were you ever stationed anywhere other than Britain?
HK: No, no.
TO: Do you know of anyone who was sent abroad?
HK: I know that some in [beep noise] [unclear] Association Branch were abroad. I didn’t know at the time but heard about it afterwards.
TO: And were you ever escorted by allied fighters?
HK: Only, only once I remember. That was when we were coming back on three engines. The rear gunner said, ‘There’s two single-engine aircraft approaching from the starboard quarter.’ But only a couple of seconds later he said, ‘It’s alright, they’re Spitfires.’ And one of them did escort us back to the coast.
TO: Do you think maybe the pilot of that Spitfire could see the damage on your plane?
HK: Probably. Well, could see we’d only three engines going, yeah.
TO: I think there was one time, I was reading about it recently, during the war a German fighter actually saw a damaged American bomber and deliberately decided not to attack it because he could see how damaged it was and let it fly back. How did you actually feel about Germany during the war?
HK: Well, we knew it was the enemy and we had to do what we were instructed to do. I didn’t really think much about it at the time.
TO: Did you ever feel animosity against the German people?
HK: No. I can’t say that I did.
TO: Were any of your airfields ever attacked by German bombers?
HK: Not while I was there, no.
TO: And did any of the airfields ever run short of bombs or fuel?
HK: I don’t know, no.
TO: Sorry, I’m asking difficult questions here. And how many squadrons were you in during the war?
HK: Well, operational squadrons, two. That was 467 Squadron at Waddington and then 97 Squadron at Coningsby.
TO: Were there any times when actually your bombers were asked to attack German armies?
HK: The armies, German armies?
TO: Yeah.
HK: No, I don’t think so, no.
TO: And do you remember if the airfields you were stationed at had anti-aircraft defences?
HK: I think they must have done but I can’t say definitely.
TO: After Dunkirk were people in Britain afraid that Hitler would invade?
HK: I think they were yes, yes. Yes, we were very fortunate with the, er, the Battle of Britain fighters.
TO: Do you actually feel glad that you’d been put in the RAF?
HK: I what?
TO: Glad you were called up for the RAF?
HK: Glad it wasn’t the Army. Yes, certainly.
TO: Do you know anyone who was in or have any friends who were in the Army?
HK: I didn’t know anyone though definitely there were some from school who were in the Army, yes, joined the Army. Also at the time I think quite a few of them were called up for the RAF but I didn’t keep in contact.
TO: And what do you think was the most important battle of the war?
HK: Possibly what was known as the Battle of the Bulge was quite important at the time but I can’t say that I knew much about it at that time. I only read about it later.
TO: Was there heavy snow in Britain at that time?
HK: There was quite a lot of snow. We had to clear the aircraft and the runways.
TO: Did that ever effect operations much?
HK: I think it must have done to a certain extent but I don’t know details.
TO: OK. So what do you think was the best plane that the RAF had, in general?
HK: Well, as far as the Bomber Command was concerned the Lancaster but of course during the early part of the war the Hurricanes and Spitfires were the best.
TO: Did you know much about Wellington bombers?
HK: I didn’t know much about them, no.
TO: Was there ever any bullying in the Air Force?
HK: What?
TO: Bullying.
HK: What? Sorry I’m not with you.
TO: Was there any bullying in the Air force?
HK: Bullying? I didn’t know of any. No, I can’t say that I did.
TO: And were there particular songs the crew liked to sing at all?
HK: There was one that the bomb-aimer came out with. It was an Australian one presumably. I don’t know if you’ve heard it. It was about a — yes, something like “I put my finger in a woodpecker’s hole. The woodpecker said, ‘God bless my soul, take it out, take it out, remove it.’”And then it was, “Put it back, put it back, replace it” and it went on like that but I’ve never heard it before or since.
TO: I’m afraid I’ve never heard of it. [slight laugh] I guess I was lucky. Was most of your, was anyone else in the crew Australian?
HK: They were all Australian, yes.
TO: And did they, did anyone bring any kind of souvenirs aboard the plane, like personal possessions?
HK: I don’t know of any, no.
TO: Were you allowed to, I don’t know, decorate your own plane at all, that you could bring, I don’t know, if you wanted to bring an ornament with you could you bring that onto the plane?
HK: We could have done, yes, yes. The only things we were not allowed to take was money or things that could, um, easily tell the captors if we had to bail out where we’d come from, in case we had to try and have an identity of some other country.
TO: Were you ever told what you — did the RAF ever tell you how much information you could give if you were ever captured?
HK: Yeah. Name, rank and number. That was all we were supposed to say. [pause]
TO: So, when did the Lancaster actually become the main bomber of the RAF?
HK: It started in 1942 and it gradually built up from there so it was definitely the main plane of Bomber Command by the end of the war.
TO: What did you think of the bombers the Americans were using?
HK: Well, they — I think they did quite a good job but the aircraft weren’t any patch on the Lancasters. They couldn’t carry the, the load but, er, going as they did all alone at daytime I think they were very brave to do it.
TO: Did, er, did your squadron ever try and fly in formation when you were on missions?
HK: No, no formation. I know that when we went on to the daylight raids we were just more or less in a gaggle, not as a formation.
TO: Were there any ever any times when a bomb you were carrying failed to be released?
HK: Yes, there was one, which unfortunately got stuck up and we brought it back. We didn’t realise it at the time but no, no damage was done.
TO: So, what did they do with that bomb then?
HK: Oh, released it. It was up to the armourers. I think they released it and took it away. I don’t know what happened to it. It was a five hundred pounder apparently.
TO: Did you ever attack ships at all while they were at sea?
HK: Not at sea, no.
TO: [background noise] Sorry, you’ve answered a lot of my questions. I’m just trying to find some other ones. Did anyone, did the pilot try and tell anyone what would happen if he ever happened to get killed?
HK: Well, I was the one that had to take over it as necessary and I on training flights I was able to take over the controls and keep the plane more or less straight and level although the rear gunner said when I did it was more like a switchback [slight laugh]. But that was all.
TO: So, did the Lancaster have two steering columns or just one?
HK: No, we just had the one so I would have had to get the pilot out of the, his seat and get in myself.
TO: Was he allowed to teach you to do that?
HK: Yes.
TO: And would you have been able to land it at all?
HK: I don’t know [laugh]. I wasn’t taught how to do that.
TO: So, I’m just a bit puzzled why, why wouldn’t they teach you to land if you ever happened take over. It seems to kind of defeat the object of teaching —
HK: I think it was just that I had to try and keep it in the air while the rest of the crew got out.
TO: How did it feel to be in control of the plane though when you had it?
HK: I quite enjoyed it.
TO: Did you get a sense of pride doing that?
HK: Yes.
TO: What’s your best memory of your time during the war?
HK: I suppose the best memory was, um, when I heard that I was medically fit to fly.
TO: So, er, do you remember why they turned you down during your first medical test?
HK: I was slightly short sighted in one eye. At the time, um, that was quite important but it ceased to be important when I wanted to be a flight engineer, although as I ended up doing bomb aiming I don’t know. [laugh]
TO: Well did it ever, did your eyesight ever effect your performance?
HK: No, no. It wasn’t bad enough.
TO: Do you know whether the gunners had to have the same education as the other members of the aircraft?
HK: I don’t think they did, no. I’m sure they didn’t.
TO: Did you ever meet any famous people during the war as in senior commanders or leaders?
HK: I don’t remember, no.
TO: Did you listen to the radio very much?
HK: Quite a bit, yeah.
TO: And again, sorry for asking you this, but was the scariest thing that happened to you during the war?
HK: I think it was when the bombs came through the wing, yes.
TO: Did you think the plane was going to crash or did you think it could survive?
HK: I wasn’t sure whether the wing was going to fall off or not [slight laugh] but, er, so we were fortunate. Another few inches one way or the other it would have hit the front or rear spar.
TO: So, how far, how close to the fuselage was the hole?
HK: Well, it wasn’t very far away. It was the inner engine that got hit or just behind the inner engine. No, it couldn’t happen at a better place actually [slight laugh].
TO: And did it send a big shock wave through the aircraft when that happened?
HK: Well, certainly, yes. There was a big thump, yes.
TO: And when they said the Lancaster was overhead was everyone expecting a bomb?
HK: Well, we were expecting it but we didn’t have any time to do any manoeuvres. As soon as the mid-upper called out we heard the bumps. That was it.
TO: Did you think for a minute you might have to bail out?
HK: I thought that might be a possibility, yeah.
TO: And what about when you saw the German night fighter?
HK: Well, we were glad to see it disappear but, er, yes —
TO: Is there anything else you can add about that mission, about where you were going at the time?
HK: No. I can’t really remember.
TO: That’s fine. So, when — you mentioned as the flight engineer you might have to take over from the plane sometimes. Was it hard to learn how to take over or was it quite easy?
HK: No. We had training on the Link trainer so I knew what to do.
TO: So, did you volunteer for the Pathfinders or were you assigned?
HK: I heard after the war that the pilot, my pilot, had volunteered because he got extra pay for being — but whether that was true or not I don’t know but yes he volunteered first and we all agreed to go.
TO: Did you get extra pay for that?
HK: I think we did but I can’t remember that but I think we did.
TO: What was the average pay in the RAF?
HK: It was a few shillings a day I think. I don’t remember that, no. I know some people can remember these details but I don’t.
TO: That’s fine. And how do you feel about Japan and Germany today for the war?
HK: I think we should have lost the war [laugh] and we would have been better off than — yes. I don’t know.
TO: And why do you think that?
HK: Well, Germany and Japan seem to have done very well but—
TO: And do you think the war was worth the price?
HK: Sorry?
TO: Do you think the war was worth the price?
HK: Probably wasn’t but I don’t know how things would have turned out if it —
TO: And what did you think of the memorial that they built in Green Park a few years ago?
HK: It’s a very good memorial, certainly. I wasn’t able to go up to the unveiling.
TO: They’re having a service in a couple of weekends there and going to be recording that as well. Did you hear about the holocaust?
HK: I can’t say I did during the war, no.
TO: And do you think Bomber Command was treated unfairly after the war?
HK: I certainly think so, yes. I think Harris was given a bad, was bad, er, treated badly. That was — everyone thought Dresden was his idea but in fact it came direct from Churchill originally.
TO: Did you ever happen to meet Harris after the war?
HK: No, no.
TO: And do you think the RAF played a critical role in Britain’s victory?
HK: Oh, definitely, yes.
TO: And do you think there was anything that happened to you during the war which affected you later in your life? [beeping sound]
HK: Oh, yes. I think the fact that, um, I did some technical training during my life in the RAF was — before I was called up I was working at the, er, an accounts department in Electrics Supply but after the war I wanted to do something more technical and the GEC were advertising for people in their, um, research laboratories in Wembley and I applied and joined and came a patent agent so, yes, it made quite a bit of difference.
TO: And what did you do in your career after that?
HK: Well I trained as — initially I got a science degree and did the patent office, patent agent examination and I actually stayed with the research laboratories, um, until I, my official retirement and then I went on a couple of days a week after that until they moved the whole thing to Chelmsford and I decided that was enough.
TO: And, sorry to ask this, but what, what was the saddest thing you’d say that happened during the war?
HK: During the war? That I can’t really say. I suppose the saddest thing was, um, losing a very close cousin, who I was sort of brought up with, and caught diabetes and there wasn’t so much they could do about it at the time and she died. But that was during the war. It wasn’t anything to do with the war itself. I don’t know of anything connected with the war but it was so sad.
TO: And do you remember what you were doing the day the war ended?
HK: Yes. I was at, stationed at Coningsby, um, then we were sent home on leave, um, but the rest of the crew as they were all Australian were called back before me to be sent back to Australia, so I never really got a chance to say a proper goodbye, and it was only after the war when I went to Perth and saw the rear gunner’s name in the telephone directory that I got in touch with him. So, I don’t know if there’s anything else.
TO: So did everyone who were on that bomber meet again would you say?
HK: No, no.
TO: Did you get involved in any of the VE Day celebrations?
HK: No. I don’t remember any, no.
TO: Or did you listen to Churchill’s victory speech?
HK: I’m sure I did, yes, but I can’t remember it.
TO: Were you bothered by the fact that he didn’t mention Bomber Command?
HK: He what, sorry?
TO: In Churchill’s victory speech he didn’t mention Bomber Command.
HK: Oh yeah. I read about that afterwards, yes.
TO: But did that bother you when you heard the speech?
HK: Well, I can’t say I remember if I heard the speech. I must have missed it. I don’t know.
TO: And how do you feel today about your war-time service?
HK: Well, my particular service, I think I was quite fortunate and overall I had quite a reasonable time.
TO: Have you ever watched any films about the war?
HK: Some, certainly, yes.
TO: And what do you think of them?
HK: Some of them are quite good otherwise some aren’t.
TO: Any ones in particular that you liked?
HK: I think the one, the first one about “The Dambusters” was excellent, yes.
TO: And, er, do you think the atomic bombs were necessary against Japan?
HK: I think overall probably, yes, but if it had gone on we would have lost many more people, both Japanese and American and our country, so I suppose it, it was necessary. I think in a way it was a pity because it really put a shadow on nuclear reactors. I think if it hadn’t happened there wouldn’t have been quite an outcry on reactors that there is today.
TO: Were you involved in nuclear reactors after the war?
HK: Not directly but, um, the — our department was involved in patents for nuclear reactors and they did quite a bit of work.
TO: And, er, how do you feel about Britain’s involvement in events like Iraq and Afghanistan?
HK: In?
TO: In Afghanistan and Iraq?
HK: I think we probably should have kept out. I don’t think it really helps in any way. I just think it’s just made things worse.
TO: Is there anything you want to add at all about you war-time service?
HK: No, I don’t think so. I was quite fortunate overall and had quite a reasonable time.
TO: OK. Or is there anything you want to add which was important to you at the time which you‘ve not mentioned?
HK: No, I don’t think so, no.
TO: OK. Well, er, thank you very much for telling me about your experiences. It was really fascinating.
HK: I hope it’s not been a bit too boring. I couldn’t remember lots of things.
TO: It’s not boring at all. It’s amazing. No, no. What you could remember is amazing. Can I just, er, there is something I showed to another RAF veteran and you can either read yourself or if you want I can read it out for you now. This is a speech that Arthur Harris gave at an RAF reunion in 1977.
HK: Oh right.
TO: And he just basically talks about the role, basically pointing out, explaining what Bomber Command did and why it was so important now. If you like I can read it out but if you’d rather read it yourself out in your own time you can, whichever you prefer.
HK: Can I?
TO: Yes. You can read it out now if you want.
HK: Well, can I keep this?
TO: Of course. That’s why I bought it for you.
HK: Right, thank you.
TO: If you want to read it now you can or if you want me to read it out I can, whichever.
HK: Yeah. Well, I’d like to read it later.
TO: OK. OK. Right, thank you very much.
HK: Not at all.
TO: Sorry, I should have explained at the start, er, as an introduction that I’m supposed to do but because I was, because I was getting so many interviews done I forgot it. I just wanted to end by saying that we’ve recorded this interview for the International Bomber Command Centre. My name’s Thomas Ozel and we were interviewing Mr Harold Kirby in London on the 10th of June 2016. Sorry, that’s the 11th of June. Thank you for this.
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AKirbyHVA160611
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Interview with Harold Kirby. Two
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Sound
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eng
Format
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02:04:49 audio recording
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Pending review
Creator
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Tom Ozel
Date
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2016-06-11
Description
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Harold Kirby grew up in London and worked in an accounts department before joining the Royal Air Force. He served as a fitter with 460 Squadron at RAF Binbrook before remustering as a flight engineer. He flew two tours of operations with 467, 97 and 156 Squadrons. He describes the Stirling that was used for training and also the Lancaster in which he flew on operations. He also describes the preparations before an operation and the procedure for landing. He explains how window and how flares were used by the Pathfinders. Harold gives an account of an incident where his Lancaster was damaged by another Lancaster dropping its bombs from above but otherwise says his crew were very fortunate. After the war, he worked as a patent agent until he retired.
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Contributor
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Christine Kavanagh
156 Squadron
460 Squadron
467 Squadron
97 Squadron
aircrew
bomb struck
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
briefing
flight engineer
ground crew
ground personnel
Lancaster
military ethos
Pathfinders
RAF Binbrook
RAF Coningsby
RAF Waddington
Stirling
target indicator
training
V-1
V-weapon
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1875/46471/SHarriganD[Ser -DoB]v530002.mp3
2ac052dbdd90e145baf146bcb066a382
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-06-19
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire
Description
An account of the resource
34 items. Interviews with veterans recorded by Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire.<br /><br />Interview with Bertie Salvage <br />Three part interview with Dougie Marsh <br />Interview with Terry Hodson <br />Interview with Stan Waite Interview with John Langston<br />Interview with Nelson Nix <br />Two part interview with Bob Panton <br />Interview with Basil Fish <br />Interview with Ernest Groeger <br />Interview with Wilf Keyte <br />Interview with Reginald John Herring <br />Interview with Kathleen Reid <br />Interview with Allan Holmes <br />Interview with John Tomlinson <br />Interview with Cliff Thorpe and Roy Smith <br />Interview with Peter Scoley <br />Interview with Kenneth Ivan Duddell <br />Interview with Christopher Francis Allison <br />Interview with Bernard Bell <br />Interview with George Arthur Bell <br />Interview with George William Taplin <br />Interview with Richard Moore <br />Interview with Kenneth Edgar Neve <br />Interview with Annie Mary Blood <br />Interview with Dennis Brader <br />Interview with Les Stedman <br />Interview with Anthony Edward Mason <br />Interview with Anne Morgan Rose Harcombe<br />
<p>The following interviews have been moved to the relevant collections.<br /><span>Interview with <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/show/46454">Kathleen Reid</a></span><br />Interview with Wing Commander <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/show/46467">Kenneth Cook DFC</a><br />Interview with <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/show/46456">Colin Cole</a><br />Interview with <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/46464">Charles Avey</a><br />Interview with <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/show/46470">John Bell</a><br />Interview with <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/show/46459">Les Rutherford</a><br />Interview with <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/show/46460">James Douglas Hudson</a></p>
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
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interviewer: I’m with Terry Hodson who’s going to tell us some of his memories of the Royal Air Force. Terry, I understand your first exposure to the Air Force is when you were conscripted at the end of the Second World War. Can you tell me a little bit about, you know what that period of your employment with the Air Force was.
TH: Yes. I was conscripted into the Air Force as many people were in those days and I was in an Airfield Construction Squadron all over the country at various places and ended up at Royal Air Force Coningsby where I met my wife.
interviewer: But this was right at the end of the Second World War so —
TH: Yeah.
interviewer: There were airfields still being constructed at the end of the Second World War were there?
TH: We were mainly a couple of memories, a couple of real memories over this period was that I was in Green Park when we were doing things for the, the end of the war processions that went on. The Victory Parade.
interviewer: Green Park in London.
TH: Green Park in London.
interviewer: Right where the tube station is.
TH: Yeah.
interviewer: By Bushey. Yeah.
TH: Opposite, opposite Buckingham Palace and we put parking areas down and fencing around aircraft. I remember one particular thing. The Derby was won by a horse called Horsa and we had just put a Horsa glider in situ in Green Park.
interviewer: So this is the Green Park in Piccadilly. Right. The actual, right between Piccadilly and Buckingham Palace then.
TH: That’s it. Yeah.
interviewer: Right.
TH: And we were —
interviewer: So, so despite you being in airfield construction you ended up working sort of in, they misemployed you in looking after parks.
TH: Well, no. This was our job. To do jobs for the Air Force. We also took down blast walls in MOD as it is now. It was Air Ministry in my day and we moved all around the country.
interviewer: So putting right. Sort of, so everything to do with at the end of the Second World War, removing all the blast pens and preparations for the Second World War and getting things back to a semblance of normality.
TH: Plus building balloon bases for the parachute jumping in Oxfordshire. Converting buildings in in Coningsby that were WAAF quarters but they were then turned in to officer’s married quarters and that’s where I met my wife.
interviewer: So when you would do these jobs would you stay in these locations for a short period or longer period?
TH: Yeah. The longest period was at RAF Coningsby and the shortest period was three weeks in Piccadilly.
interviewer: And was Coningsby the last, getting towards the end of your conscripted time after you were conscripted?
TH: That was my demob number came up and I was happy to go up to [Waltham] and get my demob suit and go home on leave.
interviewer: But you told me earlier that they offered you the chance of staying in the Air Force at that stage.
TH: Yes, and I didn’t want to.
interviewer: You declined the offer.
TH: Yeah. Quite forcefully.
interviewer: Was there, was that what, why was that then? You’d had enough at that stage?
TH: I’d had enough of moving around. Three weeks here, two months there. A week there. A fortnight at another place. Another month. Maybe six weeks. And three months at Coningsby was the longest so I was happy to get out and do a regular job.
interviewer: Take back any other job. And you stayed in Coningsby at that time, did you?
TH: No. I went back to my job pre-war or during the wartime. I worked at Bart’s Hospital Sports Ground at Chislehurst in Kent and I was then with my mother at Sydenham. And they used to bus down to Chislehurst to work. I came up once or twice to Coningsby to see Evelyn at weekends and thought this is getting a bit rough. I will now move up there, find work in Coningsby area which I did with a building site building married quarters for RAF Coningsby.
interviewer: Again working for a construction firm.
TH: Yeah. Yeah.
interviewer: Yeah. And then, and then sort of a couple of years after that you decided to apply for the Civil Service. Is that right?
TH: Yeah, the jobs, the job on the building site was virtually ending and I heard that they were civilianising a lot of RAF jobs. I applied and was taken on as a labourer and we did all sorts of work emptying dustbins [pause] emptying dustbins and delivering coal to married quarters that I’d helped to build. Then there was a polio scare on the camp and several airmen had gone down to it. Gone down with polio.
interviewer: So this is the late ‘40s I guess.
TH: It’s the early 50s.
interviewer: Early 50s now. Ok.
TH: Early 50s. And I went then as a messenger and after that I helped to run the Registry while a lot of the servicemen were off ill and doing various tests. And when the opportunity arose I became a clerical assistant in the Registry on the mail out, mail in. The corporal who was in charge of Registry at that time was demobbed and they asked me if I’d like to take on the Registry on promotion which I did. I then went around the general offices and various, various jobs.
interviewer: So, so this would and what was, Coningsby at that stage had the B29, the Washington that that sort of era now are we talking about?
TH: No, just before that time.
interviewer: Just before.
TH: Yeah. Just before.
interviewer: So —
TH: Just before and during that time I was in the General Office on various things. As I said I did Registry. I also did Airmen’s Movements and Releases. And later on I then went on to P1 and P2. P1 is discipline and the P2 is on the officer’s side. All their records. Postings in, postings out, leave.
interviewer: So had the big National Service call up for Korea started at this stage?
TH: I wasn’t involved in that.
interviewer: Yeah, there was a massive increase in servicemen and flying training to get ready for Korea in the sort of early 50s and so you know, I would have thought —
TH: I probably wasn’t in on the policy at that time [laughs] being a lowly CO.
interviewer: But there were lots of camps started to, you know that were run down after the Second World War started to ramp up again to train everybody for potential —
TH: I don’t think Coningsby was ever run down to be perfectly honest. Only one. One I can remember is when the TSR2 was supposed to come in. They wanted care and maintenance during that time.
interviewer: Middle ‘60s we’re talking about now. Yes.
TH: Yes. Yeah.
interviewer: And then, and then the Phantom came in in what? About 1968 didn’t it?
TH: Yeah. Well, in between times I’d been posted to the County Courts at Boston on promotion.
interviewer: County courts.
TH: County courts. Yes.
interviewer: And —
TH: Divorce and bankruptcies.
interviewer: Oh [laughs] That must have kept you busy.
TH: Yeah. Even some of them were friends [laughs] were on the list and some of Evelyn’s relations. One of Evelyn’s relations I should say was on the list.
interviewer: It must have been difficult.
TH: It was. Especially difficult was when I said to the bailiff’s when they were coming around this area, ‘Well, call in and have a cup of tea with us.’ And I couldn’t understand why they wouldn’t do it. Anyway, they did. Two of them turned up one night and we had, we went out for a beer and all the curtains down the road were twitching. ‘We go there.’ ‘We go there.’ ‘We go there.’ [laughs] And this is why they wouldn’t come to me. But Evelyn went in one car and I went in another which made the curtains twitch even a bit more I think.
interviewer: Have you got any particular memories of some of the personalities that you served with and, or that you worked with at the time?
TH: In the County Courts or in the Air Force?
interviewer: As in, well no —
TH: In the Air Force.
interviewer: On the, at Coningsby the sort of —
TH: Yes.
interviewer: What sort of tricks, what games people used to get up to in those times.
TH: Yeah. Well, we had in the General Office we had a bloke called Bob. I’ve forgotten his other name now but he wasn’t a bad bloke but he was a real joker and he was always pulling our legs over the telephone and it was a big open office. I was one corner on P1s and P2s, right on the other end he was on movements and I got a telephone call one day supposedly from a Wing Commander [unclear] who was a South African. A very nice bloke actually who went on further in the Air Force but supposedly asking me what leave he had to come. So, I saw Bob in the corner laughing away on the telephone and I said, ‘Oh bugger off, Bob.’ Anyway, the phone went down and he was putting it down at the same time. Two minutes later my boss came in and said, ‘In my office, Hodson.’ So I was red faced when I came out of his office because it was actually Wing Commander [unclear] ringing me. But it was an unusual request from an officer because they normally knew what leave they’d got to come.
interviewer: Any other memories of the people that you served with?
TH: Yes. We had a youngster direct from training, secretarial training, posted in and he came in one afternoon. He disappeared off to his billet and was told to report the next morning and he was coming on to the movements I think with Bob but he didn’t come in. So we enquired where he was and he was in the guardroom. He’d been caught underneath a Vulcan that was on QRA and that means it was ready to go off to whoever our enemy was at that time and his excuse was well it was all lights underneath it and he thought it was there just to view. He found out different. I forget what his punishment was but we didn’t see him for a week or two.
interviewer: So it was pretty serious what he’d done then obviously.
TH: Well, naturally but I don’t know how he actually got under it because the dogs were touring the area.
interviewer: Yes.
TH: With RAF police anyway.
interviewer: I dare say —
TH: It was a memory.
interviewer: I dare say as well as him getting in trouble was somebody else got in trouble to the fact that he managed to do what he did.
TH: He got near it. Yeah.
interviewer: Wow. And what sort of, you said you worked in P2 and that was looking after the officers was it?
TH: The officer’s records. Yes. Postings in and out. Their leave. Posting non-effective if they were off sick. All the rest of it.
interviewer: And that presumably was when the station was new aeroplanes and new people coming presumably that was a pretty busy job.
TH: It was fairly, fairly busy. Yeah. You can say that again.
interviewer: And presumably there were no computers around at this stage. It was all the records were all on paper.
TH: That’s it.
interviewer: And in filing cabinets.
TH: Ink. Yeah. Cardex cards all over the place.
interviewer: But the RAF were always known as having everything well sorted out. The systems were good in the, you know that period weren’t they?
TH: They were.
interviewer: Everything was well documented and things didn’t get lost particularly.
TH: And as Civil Servants we worked hard to keep it right.
interviewer: And were there, did you serve along national, with National Servicemen in the sort of 50s or —
TH: Oh yeah. They were in and out all the time. But they did two years and they knew when they were going out. They knew to the day when they were going to be as I call it demobbed but they were being released I think they called in those days.
interviewer: And have you got any particular memories of, of different National Servicemen? I mean it said that people when they served as National Servicemen would get plucked from quiet little villages and they would come out into the big Air Force and they’d have quite a lot of experiences.
TH: They were all sorts. All sorts. Some were called swede bashers because they came from Norfolk. Yellowbellies were from Lincolnshire. And we did get some great lads —
interviewer: But everybody got on. Everybody got on.
TH: Oh yeah. Of course.
interviewer: And it was a happy station from talking to your wife. That everybody mucked in together.
TH: They mucked in.
interviewer: And also, with it being, being a large camp and presumably a long way from Boston and Lincoln there were quite a few social events on the camp in that period.
TH: Yeah. At that time they opened what they called Castle Club and big events and they were, there was a corporal in Accounts, Corporal Murphy who used to do bookings for the events and bands for dances. Girls were bused in from Boston to Coningsby to the Castle Club for the men to dance with. And they also had, I remember one event was, I’m just trying to think of his name now. Ralph McTell who was a country singer. He used to always dress in black and played the guitar.
interviewer: So are we talking the 50s still. This is —
TH: This was during Vulcan times.
interviewer: Ok. So we’re now in the 60s I guess. Yeah.
TH: Yeah. And Evelyn and I were at that function as were many others from the village who worked on the camp and the station warrant officer came in and stopped the event and said, ‘There is a problem outside. I want volunteers.’ And with that a lot of the servicemen were disappearing out of different doors but it was to no avail because he’d got the RAF police all at the doors. And unfortunately, it was a Vulcan that had cartwheeled in potato fields on the runway.
interviewer: Ok.
TH: The entrance to the runway and they didn’t know where the bodies were.
interviewer: Well —
TH: And they were searching. That’s what they wanted the volunteers for. But he got what he wanted.
interviewer: And was that on one night during the week can you remember?
TH: Yeah.
interviewer: Or would that be —
TH: Yeah, I can’t remember the exact dates but no one survived that crash unfortunately.
interviewer: And that was just locally was it? In the local area.
TH: That was what they called Sam Haines Farm which is on the approach to the actual runway. Other, other things I can remember a pilot pulling a Vulcan up fairly steep. As I called it putting his backside to the ground and going up and we were in SHQ and he broke some windows. Other times, another one, a squadron leader clipped the ATC van on the end of the runway. He just clipped it. It didn’t do very much damage to other aircraft but we laughed a bit afterwards because he was posted within a fortnight on promotion as wing commander. So, if you wanted promotion clip the ATC van.
interviewer: Well, thank you very much. That’s, that sounds like your time at Coningsby was an interesting and memorable time.
TH: We had good times. We had bad times.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Terry Hodson
Hodson, Terry E-Cold War
Identifier
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SHarriganD[Ser#-DoB]v53
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Language
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eng
Type
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Sound
Format
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00:18:24 audio recording
Conforms To
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Pending OH summary
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Creator
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This Interview was recorded by Aviation Heritage Lincolnshire.
Description
An account of the resource
Terry Hodson was conscripted to the RAF towards the end of the Second World War. He started in the airfield construction team doing work as and when needed. He was involved in preparing the area in London for the Victory Parade. He left the RAF but returned to RAF Coningsby as a civilian worker through the Vulcan era. He witnessed a number of events including one evening when the station warrant officer needed volunteers to find the bodies of crew of a crashed Vulcan. He also recalls an occasion when a Vulcan was put into a steep dive and broke the windows of the offices. On another occasion a pilot clipped the ATC van on the runway.
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--London
Contributor
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Julie Williams
crash
ground personnel
RAF Coningsby
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/501/22536/MCurnockRM1815605-171114-011.2.pdf
74fa5e15c5e7788b9a6f73056580fbd3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Curnock, Richard
Richard Murdock Curnock
R M Curnock
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Curnock, RM
Date
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2016-04-18
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
92 items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Richard Curnock (1924, 1915605 Royal Air Force), his log book, letters, photographs and prisoner of war magazines. He flew operations with 425 Squadron before being shot down and becoming a prisoner of war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by Richard Curnock and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Kriegie March 2010
Description
An account of the resource
The news-sheet of the RAF ex-POW Association. This edition covers refurbishing the memorial to "The Fifty" and the construction of a replica hut 104 at Zagan., the 65th anniversary of the Great Escape, the Royal Windsor Tattoo, a POW day at High Wycombe, photographs of the memorial at Zagan, the annual dinner at RAF Henlow, Recco Report ofg ex-POWs activities, Obituaries, Book Reviews, changes to the membership directory, and newspaper cuttings about Air Cadets on parade.
Creator
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The RAF ex-POW Association
Date
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2010-03
Format
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21 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MCurnockRM1815605-171114-011
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Royal New Zealand Air Force
United States Army Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Berlin
Great Britain
England--High Wycombe
England--London
Germany--Sylt
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Kiel
Poland--Żagań
Germany--Helgoland
England--Windsor (Windsor and Maidenhead)
Poland
Germany
England--Berkshire
England--Buckinghamshire
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
10 Squadron
144 Squadron
57 Squadron
77 Squadron
aircrew
Blenheim
Distinguished Service Order
Dulag Luft
escaping
evading
flight engineer
Hampden
Hurricane
Ju 88
Lancaster
Me 109
memorial
Military Cross
mine laying
navigator
prisoner of war
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranwell
RAF Dishforth
RAF Halton
RAF Hemswell
RAF Hendon
RAF Henlow
RAF North Coates
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Northolt
Special Operations Executive
Stalag Luft 1
Stalag Luft 3
Stalag Luft 6
Stalag Luft 7
the long march
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16987/SCheshireGL72021v10069.2.jpg
4c645426b2102b61da5af4f8b7b1e8da
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
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Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Royal Air Force,
Bicester,
Oxon.
6th June, 1944.
Dear W/C. Cheshire,
Herewith the lecture of which I spoke.
If you have any comments I should be grateful for them. As you will see we have what amounts to three models which viewed from 6 yards standing up represents 1200ft at 1200 yards, 450 ft and 450 yards and 150 ft and 150 yards, the last being a bit optimistic, but when we asked for the model at the beginning we didn't know much about the very low point. However, fortuitously it has turned out the right size since it covers really both flares and very low work without an extra model. These distances are judged on the worst viewing angle from the Mosquito, since we like to teach in such a way that the synthetic is worse than the real.
A point which still worries me, from the instruction point of view, is how to know you are at 300ft or so. I'm never happy about altimeters when they get over 50 miles away from base, and the Radar type would be impossible to get for our quantity even if they had no limitations. Is here any crew work that one could standardise from the teaching standpoint? I have been unavoidably vague in the script – one watch the horizon and one the ground etc. (“if you can, this kind of thing”).
A scheme which might interest you has been tried lately by Mr Thomas of Leamington Spa (made the models Bomber Command use. He makes rapid artist scetches[sic] of any target as seen from any height, time (night or day), bearing, from a vertical photograph. I introduced him to 2 Group but don't know how far they have got. He may be of some help to you. I have not mentioned you to him. You may, of course, know him. Leamington Spa 2190, Ministry of Home Security – Camouflage.
Thanking you for your help.
T. A.[?] Kell.
Squadron Leader,
Stn. M.O.
W/C. Cheshire, D.S.O., D.F.C.,
R.A.F. Station,
Coningsby, Lincs.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Letter to Leonard Cheshire from Squadron Leader T Kell
Description
An account of the resource
Recounts a lecture using models of targets which when viewed from 6 yards represent various sizes at various distances. Problem is to know accurately what height you are.
Creator
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T Kell
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-06
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Correspondence
Text. Service material
Identifier
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SCheshireGL72021v10069
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Oxfordshire
Temporal Coverage
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1944-06-06
Is Part Of
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Cheshire, Leonard. Correspondence
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
License
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Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
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This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Format
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One-page typewritten letter
Contributor
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Frances Grundy
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
RAF Bicester
RAF Coningsby