1
25
65
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/27/153/PFilliputtiA16010064.1.jpg
df03c5611228059194f149deb3907d84
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Filiputti, Angiolino
Angiolino Filiputti
Alfonsino Filiputti
A Filiputti
Description
An account of the resource
127 items. The collection consists of a selection of works created by Alfonsino ‘Angiolino’ Filiputti (1924-1999). A promising painter from childhood, Angiolino was initially fascinated by marine subjects but his parents’ financial hardships forced an end to his formal education after completing primary school. Thereafter, he took up painting as an absorbing pastime. Angiolino depicted some of the most dramatic and controversial aspects of the Second World War as seen from the perspective of San Giorgio di Nogaro, a small town in the Friuli region of Italy. Bombings, events reported by newspapers, broadcast by the radio or spread by eyewitnesses, became the subject of colourful paintings, in which news details were embellished by his own rich imaginings. Each work was accompanied by long pasted-on captions, so as to create fascinating works in which text and image were inseparable. After the war, however, interest in his work declined and Angiolino grew increasingly disenchanted as he lamented the lack of recognition accorded his art, of which he was proud.
The work of Angiolino Filiputti was rediscovered thanks to the efforts of Pierluigi Visintin (San Giorgio di Nogaro 1946 – Udine 2008), a figurehead of the Friulan cultural movement, author, journalist, screenwriter and translator of Greek and Latin classical works into the Friulan language. 183 temperas were eventually displayed in 2005 under the title "La guerra di Angiolino" (“Angiolino’s war”.) The exhibition toured many cities and towns, jointly curated by the late Pierluigi Visintin, the art critic Giancarlo Pauletto and Flavio Fabbroni, member of the Istituto Friulano per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione (Institute for the history of the resistance movement in the Friuli region).
The IBCC Digital Archive would like to express its gratitude to Anna and Stefano Filiputti, the sons of Angiolino Filipputi, for granting permission to reproduce his works. The BCC Digital Archive is also grateful to Alessandra Bertolissi, wife of Pierluigi Visintin, Alessandra Kerservan, head of the publishing house Kappa Vu and Pietro Del Frate, mayor of San Giorgio di Nogaro.
Originals are on display at
Biblioteca comunale di San Giorgio di Nogaro
Piazza Plebiscito, 2
33058 San Giorgio di Nogaro (UD)
ITALY
++39 0431 620281
info.biblioteca@comune.sangiorgiodinogaro.ud.it
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Filiputti, A-S
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cossack occupation of the Carnia region
Description
An account of the resource
On a clear day in the mountains, armed Cossacks are passing through a valley, using camels and a horse and cart to transport goods. In the foreground, one figure is pointing to the right.
Label reads “158”; signed by the author; caption reads “CARNIA OTTOBRE 1944. Cessata l’azione bellica tutti i paesi furono invasi, assistemmo per 3 settimane ad un vero insediamento migratorio, via via che l’enorme marea umana si rovesciava sulla regione. L’occupazione russa fu terribilmente dura, massiccia pesante prepotente. Dopo gli attacchi aerei su Tolmezzo, i cosacchi occuparono il sud della Carnia, i caucasici il nord vi facevano parte cosacchi del Don, del Kuban, circassi e grusini georgiani con al seguito le famiglie, a Verzegnis pur una ventina di cammelli.”
Caption translates as: “Carnia, October 1944. As the military operation ceased, all countries were invaded. For three weeks, we witnessed a real migratory settlement, as the human mass flowed into the region. The Russian occupation was terribly harsh, brutal, and aggressive. After the air raids to Tolmezzo, the Cossacks occupied the south of the Carnia region. The Caucasians from the north formed part of the Don River Cossacks, from the Kuban region; they were Circassians, North Macedonian, and Georgians, together with their families. In Verzegnis, even twenty camels were present.”
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PFilliputtiA16010064
Language
A language of the resource
ita
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Angiolino Filiputti
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Francesca Campani
Alessandro Pesaro
Helen Durham
Giulia Banti
Maureen Clarke
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One tempera on paper, pasted on mount board
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Alps
Italy--Friuli
Italy
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Artwork
arts and crafts
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/27/154/PFilliputtiA16010065.1.jpg
31f89821156ccd7a951f99a534cbe1b8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Filiputti, Angiolino
Angiolino Filiputti
Alfonsino Filiputti
A Filiputti
Description
An account of the resource
127 items. The collection consists of a selection of works created by Alfonsino ‘Angiolino’ Filiputti (1924-1999). A promising painter from childhood, Angiolino was initially fascinated by marine subjects but his parents’ financial hardships forced an end to his formal education after completing primary school. Thereafter, he took up painting as an absorbing pastime. Angiolino depicted some of the most dramatic and controversial aspects of the Second World War as seen from the perspective of San Giorgio di Nogaro, a small town in the Friuli region of Italy. Bombings, events reported by newspapers, broadcast by the radio or spread by eyewitnesses, became the subject of colourful paintings, in which news details were embellished by his own rich imaginings. Each work was accompanied by long pasted-on captions, so as to create fascinating works in which text and image were inseparable. After the war, however, interest in his work declined and Angiolino grew increasingly disenchanted as he lamented the lack of recognition accorded his art, of which he was proud.
The work of Angiolino Filiputti was rediscovered thanks to the efforts of Pierluigi Visintin (San Giorgio di Nogaro 1946 – Udine 2008), a figurehead of the Friulan cultural movement, author, journalist, screenwriter and translator of Greek and Latin classical works into the Friulan language. 183 temperas were eventually displayed in 2005 under the title "La guerra di Angiolino" (“Angiolino’s war”.) The exhibition toured many cities and towns, jointly curated by the late Pierluigi Visintin, the art critic Giancarlo Pauletto and Flavio Fabbroni, member of the Istituto Friulano per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione (Institute for the history of the resistance movement in the Friuli region).
The IBCC Digital Archive would like to express its gratitude to Anna and Stefano Filiputti, the sons of Angiolino Filipputi, for granting permission to reproduce his works. The BCC Digital Archive is also grateful to Alessandra Bertolissi, wife of Pierluigi Visintin, Alessandra Kerservan, head of the publishing house Kappa Vu and Pietro Del Frate, mayor of San Giorgio di Nogaro.
Originals are on display at
Biblioteca comunale di San Giorgio di Nogaro
Piazza Plebiscito, 2
33058 San Giorgio di Nogaro (UD)
ITALY
++39 0431 620281
info.biblioteca@comune.sangiorgiodinogaro.ud.it
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Filiputti, A-S
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Death of Don Giuseppe Treppo
Description
An account of the resource
Two civilians have been shot and are lying on the ground whilst a soldier is beating Don Giuseppe Treppo on the head with a baton. A soldier is shooting in the background. Other civilians are featured in different poses.
Label reads “161”; signed by the author; caption reads “CARNIA. Ottobre 1944. L’arresto della spedizione punitive avvenne per lo sganciamento dei patrioti, cosi la macchina da Guerra tesa per un’azione a fondo si scaricò in pieno contro i primi paesi oltre Tolmezzo. L’operazione di rastrellamento inesorabile cruda e pronta fu ingente nella somma delle devastazioni 14 uccisi, fra essi Don Giuseppe Treppo parroco di Imponza, assasinato mentre tentava di difendere le donne dagli attentati della soldataglia russa. Tutta la popolazione era stata presente al calvario dell’eroico sacerdote, costretto dalla soldataglia a procedere a braccia alzate, sotto feroci bastonature, fino all‘orto dove una fucilata pose fine al tormento.”
Caption translates as: “Carnia, October 1944. The withdrawal of the patriots stopped the reprisal. The war machine - set up for a devastating blow - unleash its fury on the first villages beyond Tolmezzo. The sweeping operation was so relentless, swift, and brutal that the death toll of the devastation was enormous: 14 people were killed. Amongst them, was Father Giuseppe Treppo, vicar of Imponzo. He was assassinated while defending some women from the aggressions of the Russian troops. The whole population of the village witnessed the suffering of the heroic priest. He was forced by the troops to walk holding his hands up – while they were beating him with a baton – up to the vegetable garden where a shot put an end to his sufferings.”
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PFilliputtiA16010065
Language
A language of the resource
ita
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Angiolino Filiputti
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Francesca Campani
Alessandro Pesaro
Helen Durham
Giulia Banti
Maureen Clarke
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One tempera on paper, pasted on mount board
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Alps
Italy--Friuli
Italy
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Artwork
arts and crafts
Resistance
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/27/160/WARNING GRAPHIC CONTENT.2.jpg
b53cc613b8a2d6c309628ea583201a9c
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/27/160/PFilliputtiA16010071.2.jpg
36abf66758feb0c0ea8ff12f709408f7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Filiputti, Angiolino
Angiolino Filiputti
Alfonsino Filiputti
A Filiputti
Description
An account of the resource
127 items. The collection consists of a selection of works created by Alfonsino ‘Angiolino’ Filiputti (1924-1999). A promising painter from childhood, Angiolino was initially fascinated by marine subjects but his parents’ financial hardships forced an end to his formal education after completing primary school. Thereafter, he took up painting as an absorbing pastime. Angiolino depicted some of the most dramatic and controversial aspects of the Second World War as seen from the perspective of San Giorgio di Nogaro, a small town in the Friuli region of Italy. Bombings, events reported by newspapers, broadcast by the radio or spread by eyewitnesses, became the subject of colourful paintings, in which news details were embellished by his own rich imaginings. Each work was accompanied by long pasted-on captions, so as to create fascinating works in which text and image were inseparable. After the war, however, interest in his work declined and Angiolino grew increasingly disenchanted as he lamented the lack of recognition accorded his art, of which he was proud.
The work of Angiolino Filiputti was rediscovered thanks to the efforts of Pierluigi Visintin (San Giorgio di Nogaro 1946 – Udine 2008), a figurehead of the Friulan cultural movement, author, journalist, screenwriter and translator of Greek and Latin classical works into the Friulan language. 183 temperas were eventually displayed in 2005 under the title "La guerra di Angiolino" (“Angiolino’s war”.) The exhibition toured many cities and towns, jointly curated by the late Pierluigi Visintin, the art critic Giancarlo Pauletto and Flavio Fabbroni, member of the Istituto Friulano per la Storia del Movimento di Liberazione (Institute for the history of the resistance movement in the Friuli region).
The IBCC Digital Archive would like to express its gratitude to Anna and Stefano Filiputti, the sons of Angiolino Filipputi, for granting permission to reproduce his works. The BCC Digital Archive is also grateful to Alessandra Bertolissi, wife of Pierluigi Visintin, Alessandra Kerservan, head of the publishing house Kappa Vu and Pietro Del Frate, mayor of San Giorgio di Nogaro.
Originals are on display at
Biblioteca comunale di San Giorgio di Nogaro
Piazza Plebiscito, 2
33058 San Giorgio di Nogaro (UD)
ITALY
++39 0431 620281
info.biblioteca@comune.sangiorgiodinogaro.ud.it
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Filiputti, A-S
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Silvio ‘Montes’ Marcuzzi being tortured
Description
An account of the resource
Two men are chained to a prison wall covered in blood. The one on the left hand side has a gaping wound on his head and blood is coming from his mouth. In the foreground, a figure in fascist uniform holds a blood-stained bludgeon while an officer points at him. A bucket is visible on the floor. The inscription on the wall reads “W L’ITALIA”.
Label reads “177”, signed by the author, caption reads “[illegible] OTTOBRE 1944. SILVIO MARCUZZI “MONTES” veniva catturato assieme ad altri al mulino di Muzzana del Turgnana UD. Dal 1943 all’agosto 1944 opera del Marcuzzi, fu’ creata l‘intendenza “Montes” dalle Prealpi Giulie ai territori della Venezia Giulia, all’Emilia, ai reparti in Carnia e al IX Corpus Sloveno. Portato a Palmanoa UD nelle mani del tenente Borsatti, e torturato a sangue nella cella No 1. Il pavimento era lordo fi sangue, e un pezzo del suo cervello era attaccato al muro, mori’ il 2 novembre 1944, 4 ore prima della decretata impiccagione, urlava come i cani, chiamava nomi strani, e cantava, chi lo vide disse: era una larva di uomo sanguinante da ogni parte, specie dalla testa, lacero scalzo completamente assente, ira impazzito, poi la fine."
Caption translates as: “[illegible] October 1944. Silvio Marcuzzi (also known as “Montes”) and others were arrested at the watermill of Muzzana del Turgnano (Udine province). Between 1943 and August 1944, the “Montes” bureau was created at the behest of Marcuzzi. It operated from the Julian Pre-Alps to the Venezia Giulia region, the Emilia, the Carnia units, and the 9th Slovenian Corps. Silvio Marcuzzi was carried to Palmanova (Udine province) by lieutenant Borsatti. He was then brutally tortured in cell number 1. The floor was filthy and covered by blood. A piece of his brain was on the wall. He died on 2 November 1944. Four hours before the hanging sentence was carried out, he was screaming like a dog, calling strange names, singing. Those who saw him stated that, by that time, he was a wreck, bleeding everywhere, especially in the head. He was lacerated, barefoot, completely distant. He went insane, then died.”
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PFilliputtiA16010071
Language
A language of the resource
ita
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Angiolino Filiputti
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Francesca Campani
Alessandro Pesaro
Helen Durham
Giulia Banti
Maureen Clarke
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One tempera on paper, pasted on mount board
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Italy--Palmanova
Italy
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Artwork
arts and crafts
Resistance
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/88/860/PYoungJ1502.1.jpg
84333ffef632624517d30a35057f59a3
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/88/860/PYoungJ1503.1.jpg
cd619dcd788d357f0a763bf190980d07
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/88/860/PYoungJ1711.1.jpg
3f9edb3e606faa3137a3424bb4580ae7
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/88/860/PYoungJ1712.2.jpg
d4d594489856bbe4971c1d616908643a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Young, John
J Young
Description
An account of the resource
13 items. The collection consists of an oral history interview with Sergeant John Young (1569980, Royal Canadian Air Force), his logbook and 11 photographs of aircrew groups and Halifax aircraft. John Young was a flight engineer on 432 Squadron based at RAF East Moor, part of 6 Group. The collection shows a number of aircrew groups which include him as well as ground and air shots of his Halifax Mk 3 with Ferdinand II nose art.
The collection was donated by John Young and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-02
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Young, J
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
John Young and aircrew
Description
An account of the resource
Two photographs of the same seven aircrew in line wearing Mae West and parachute harnesses. Sergeant John Young is on the far left of the group. In the background is part of the bottom of an aircraft. On the reverse of PYoungJ1502 'Sept-Oct 1944.' On the reverse of PYoungJ1711 'Oct 1944'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PYoungJ1502, PYoungJ1503,PYoungJ1711, PYoungJ1712
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1944-10
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Canadian Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
aircrew
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/275/3616/OHughesAM417845-151001-010001.1.jpg
cf9b7e8e88d371dd770e029421556265
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/275/3616/OHughesAM417845-151001-010002.1.jpg
b389106825e03ae6062753d0bd1ceec1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hughes, Angas
Angas Hughes
Angas M Hughes
A M Hughes
A Hughes
Description
An account of the resource
29 items. An oral history interview with Flight Sergeant Angas Murray Hughes (b. 1923, 417845 Royal Australian Air Force), his logbook, prisoner of war identity cards and dog tags, two memoirs and 21 photographs. Angas Hughes flew 32 operations as a bomb aimer with 467 Squadron from RAF Waddington. One of the aircraft he flew in was Lancaster R5868, S-Sugar, now at RAF Hendon. He was shot down in September 1944 and became a prisoner of war.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Angas Hughes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hughes, AM
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Angas Hughes prisoner of war personnel card
Description
An account of the resource
Personnel record card with photograph, fingerprint and personal details of Angas Hughes. Captured 27 September 1944 at Rastatt. Stamped with 'Officially Interrogated'. On the second page '10.10.44, Dulag Luft' and '28.10.44 Kgf.ag.d.Lw.7'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09-27
1944-10-20
1944-10-28
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page document
Language
A language of the resource
deu
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Rastatt
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1944-10
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
OHughesAM417845-151001-010001, OHughesAM417845-151001-010002
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dulag Luft
prisoner of war
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hughes, Angas
Angas Hughes
Angas M Hughes
A M Hughes
A Hughes
Description
An account of the resource
29 items. An oral history interview with Flight Sergeant Angas Murray Hughes (b. 1923, 417845 Royal Australian Air Force), his logbook, prisoner of war identity cards and dog tags, two memoirs and 21 photographs. Angas Hughes flew 32 operations as a bomb aimer with 467 Squadron from RAF Waddington. One of the aircraft he flew in was Lancaster R5868, S-Sugar, now at RAF Hendon. He was shot down in September 1944 and became a prisoner of war.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Angas Hughes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-01
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hughes, AM
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Angas Hughes Dulag Luft personnel record
Description
An account of the resource
Contains personal details front and side photograph and fingerprint. Notes captured on 27 September 1944 at Rastatt.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-20-10
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
OHughesAM417845-151001-020001, OHughesAM417845-151001-020002
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Rastatt
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page document
Language
A language of the resource
deu
Type
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Text
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dulag Luft
prisoner of war
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/367/6106/PCavalierRG17010051.2.jpg
41a2df17e796b0b31dd3c0936be86730
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/367/6106/PCavalierRG17010052.2.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/367/6106/PCavalierRG17010053.2.jpg
7b0e5c3c287c523f5c754c148b8ef8ed
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cavalier, Reginald George. Album one
Description
An account of the resource
57 items. Photograph album showing pictures taken during Reginald George Cavalier's service as a squadron photographer. It includes material from his photographic course training in 1940, and service with 76 Squadron at RAF Middleton St George, and with 88 Squadron and 226 Squadron with 2 Group and 2nd Tactical Air Force at RAF West Raynham. The album also includes target photographs, images of Christmas parties, visits by VIPs including Eisenhower and the King, as well as captured German ordnance and aircraft in France, the Netherlands and Germany.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-10
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cavalier, RG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Construction of Photographic Section Hut, Vitry en Artois
Description
An account of the resource
Photograph 1 is of five airmen at work outside their trailer, captioned 'Photographic Mobile Unit.'
Photograph 2 is of four airmen including Reginald George Cavalier at work outside their trailer. Captioned 'Sid Burton, Les Seymour, John Vassell.'
Photographs 3, 4, 5 and 6 are of groups of airmen working on the foundations, captioned 'Laying the foundations.'
They are captioned 'R.A.F. Vitroy [sic] en Artois, France. Construction of Photographic Section Hut by 137 Wing S.H.Q. Oct 1944.'
Photographs 7 to 24 are of groups of airmen working on the assembly of the wooden hut.
Photograph 16 is captioned 'Jock Sadler, John Vassell, Les Seymour, Hal Ashley, Chalky White, Sid Burton'. John Vassell is marked with a cross and is further captioned 'John Vassell working at the Foreign office as a junior clerk in Moscow Russia after the war, was convicted of spying for the Russians, sentenced to six years.'
Photograph 24 is captioned 'The final piece'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Format
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24 b/w photographs on three album pages
Type
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Photograph
Identifier
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PCavalierRG17010051, PCavalierRG17010052, PCavalierRG17010053
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Vitry-en-Artois
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
ground personnel
military service conditions
service vehicle
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/442/7843/PTwellsE15070018.1.jpg
d616f351f2d8d6bb1382c0059d4e2a0d
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/442/7843/PTwellsE15070019.1.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/442/7843/PTwellsE15070020.1.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/442/7843/PTwellsE15070021.1.jpg
af5c646ac5ba616fdc885f444a90317a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Twells, Ernie. Album
Description
An account of the resource
A scrapbook containing photographs and documents of Ernie Twells' wartime and post-war service including squadron reunions. The photographs and documents are contained in wallets in a scrapbook. The wallet page has been scanned and then the individual items rescanned. The scans have been grouped together.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-26
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Twells, E
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ernie Twells and airmen
Bob Knights' crew with Ernie Twells
Description
An account of the resource
Ernie Twells and five airmen colleagues before he became aircrew. Captioned 'Ernie Twells 2nd from right'. On the reverse the names and addresses of four of the other men.
Bob Knights and seven crew wearing flying gear standing in front of Lancaster PB415. Captioned 'Ernie Twells 4th from right on return from Tripitz Op.'
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs from a scrapbook
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PTwellsE15070018, PTwellsE15070019, PTwellsE15070020, PTwellsE15070021
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
617 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
flight engineer
ground personnel
Lancaster
navigator
pilot
Tirpitz
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/477/8359/PBrileyWG1502.2.jpg
88f12b161e5a47cf71c561733e1c9465
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/477/8359/ABrileyW150522.1.mp3
18e7d5718da098c6dae85ec69ead9533
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/477/8359/PBrileyWG1503.2.jpg
ccd30a6b9b18cea87c0269a963f6dc2b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Briley, William George
George Briley
W G Briley
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Briley, WG
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer William George Briley (1586825, Royal Air Force), his log book, service material and a sight log book containing <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/987">18 target photographs</a>. After training in South Africa, George Briley completed 39 bombing and supply dropping operations as a navigator with 40 Squadron flying Wellingtons from Foggia in Italy. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by William George Briley and catalogued by Barry Hunter, <span>with additional identification provided by the Archeologi dell'Aria research group (</span><a href="https://www.archeologidellaria.org/">https://www.archeologidellaria.org</a><span>)</span>
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-09
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
MJ: Now.
WB: My name is Warrant Officer Briley. I’m recording this for the International Bomber Command Centre on 22 May 19 - 2015. And we - where I am is at Ruskington in Lincolnshire. I’ll try and see if I can. Well, my first big run to get to a training place was down to South Africa where I stayed for five months and picked up my brevet. And then, where I, I came back down by flying boat which took four days from Durban to Cairo. From then onwards, I was doing all around that area until they had vacancies up on the training field where the temperature of 150 – 120 was very warm. Then we got back down to Cairo and for - picked up me flight to Italy where I went through Naples and out then to Foggia where I stayed with the 40 Squadron the whole time until I’d finished my term, and then I went back to Naples and they gave me a [unclear]. That gave me a lot more places and also I was sent up to Athens where I was a gunner on on private Wellingtons that had been stripped with passengers and freight all over the Middle East. Then then I was – land – I was - oh sorry. After we done all that I was land down – I was down on the ground there until they got me a job back on Egypt where they sent me up to Udine in northern Italy. No no way of getting up there, but I went out and a British army driver took me all the way, which was very good of him, and the little – when I got up there they hadn’t a clue what I was doing up there for, although they knew themselves, 39 Squadron it was and they gave me a leave over the weekend when I got there and there’s a chance I had of seeing and being in Venice in the holiday part of the RAF they had out there. We came back by a big – by a big plane from Bari having had a train journey all the way back. And that landed me on besides the besides the canal on the Suez Canal and from there we were doing I was doing quite a lot of driving which I wanted to do until they found a place for me which was in El Alamein[?] Back to Cairo and on to the flying the flying out to El Adam [?]. And I stayed here that’s where I picked up my WO. And I and I was put in charge, once I got away the driving they put me in charge of a sy – system well, well in in in an where the people going through and also the pilots and that. I had to, had to sign them through. Some didn’t want to do that and but then they had to. They got no signature otherwise. Anyway, from there that’s when I was sent – I was on leave then at the end and I made out. I picked up my brother who was in Cairo or rather he was up in – he was up in Palestine. Picked him up, we went to Haifa and stayed a fortnight. We enjoyed ourselves. I, I was lucky in that ‘cause I – that’s one brother. The other brother I picked up on the way in at Cairo. So I doubt if there were many other brothers who met du – met during the war. So [unclear] in the end it – we came by boat from Alexandria to Toulon. Waited there for the train back to England. And came – got back in June. One of the coldest Junes I think I knew at that time, especially when you’d been at a temperature of a hundred-and-twenty and that. Now the temperature here went across that boat was really ferocious. And then we was sent up to Wednesbury for discharge. They had to make a suit for me I was so ruddy small and out of all proportion and today I’m even worse. The trouble is I aint going in. I was dead on the lowest figure. When I was on the Foggia we took off from Foggia and went down the Corinth Canal or to it, where we had been told there was a big storm up. It’s too high to go over. Too low to go under. So we were given a height which was about the best. As we came into it. Here we go, the thing is we went up like a ruddy express [mumble] express lift, and stopped and went down straight away, and oh my head hit the blooming geodetics. It, it was so loud the pilot put - turned put it hard head round. He said: ‘What was that?’ I said ‘That was my flipping head.’ [Chuckles] It was yeah.
MJ: Yeah yeah.
WB: Yeah, we got through it and carried on. [Chuckle]
MJ: Well, well that’s the sort of thing –
WB: Yeah
MJ: - that you got to remember, you know.
WB: Hmm. [Chuckle].
MJ: What was it about the bridge?
WB: Eh?
MJ: That one about the bridge? You said about the [unclear]. Can you repeat that?
WB: Yes.
MJ: Please.
WB: [Sigh] [Background noise] I done that one.
MJ: So, so what was the story about that one?
WB: No, it’s not. It’s this one. The one with the four-thousand pound bomb. Kitzscher [?] And – our – well I was quite, quite surprised, you know, you see, where this bomb was. It was only a big hole that was there and they – one of the Italians came about and said ‘What you looking at it for?’ I said ‘I got an idea that’s our bomb.’ ‘Oh,’ he said – he said ‘What has happened?’ He said ’There were two trains on that bridge when you dropped it.’ He said ’One of them went into it to– [unclear] into reinforcements and one coming out. He said: ‘The one coming out got the bar –part of it. The whole the back of [unclear] train and that other one run into the hole that was there. [Chuckle] He says: ‘So you done a damn good job.’ [Laughter]. I’ve never been seen anybody about that - the crew I could tell to.
MJ: Well that’s -
WB: Yeah.
MJ: That’s the good part about it.
WB: Apparently in the Blitz –
MJ: Yeah.
WB: The eight months Blitz. Every night. [Chuckle]. And, it’s so much so I managed to get it out of – but other people commanding me. ‘I can’t go on the back of this bike.’ I said ‘Why not?’ He said ‘Well, I’m out in the open.’ I should have sat on mine all the time. [Chuckle] Any rate, in the end, a number of them complained about it and but, they were more or less protecting me. [Laugh]. I can see their point and any way, they said – they asked me whether I’d like to learn how to drive. I said ‘I would very much.’ And so they brought a driver in from a local gas company depot and he said ‘Now, let’s see. What do you wanna learn?’ I said: ‘Anything I can drive. I was able to – so lorries and that.’ ‘Ah, so you want double declutching.’ You know to this day, and that was in the war. To this day, I still use, I didn’t realise it, part of the double declutching.
MJ: Hm.
WB: Right the way through, and it was only my sister who told me that my changing up and changing down and that was smooth, and I can’t see how it – how it can be smooth? And I worked it out. The – I wasn’t doing the whole double declutching, what I was doing – now with double declutching you use your feet as well. That’s all I wasn’t doing. [Mumble] Step in here.
MJ: Here. It’s good. What – what –
WB: What?
MJ: What – what sort of ops and things did you actually stand out for one reason of another?
WB: What you want me to do?
MJ: I’m here.
WB: Supplied it and then I went and got – I went there to be of service there. [Laughter]. All on one aerodrome. We called it Kalamaki Avenue[?]. It was –
MJ: So – what ‘s that bit of paper?
WB: Yeah. [Unclear]. Can’t hardly read it now. [Unclear] Penetration. Frontal conditions. Last night your bombers carried out their mission with excellent results. This attack which – which you carried out [unclear] or in the port of crews participated. Please convey to all ranks under your command my opposition – appreciation of this noteworthy effort. That was from the Group Captain commanding 263 Wing.
MJ: What did you have to do in that?
WB: Hm?
MJ: What what what was the op? Operation? What operation – what?
WB: Oh these aerodromes.
MJ: You say you had to bomb them? Or –
WB: No, it – thing is they were all bombed on one night by different – they sent out the squadron. Three or four to one – three or four to [unclear].
MJ:
WB: I don’t think that was the one that hit me on the head. I hadn’t been given my flight badge then. I was just a Sergeant. [Pause]. 9th to the 10th of October 1944 [turning of pages] 9 10 of October –
MJ: What was that op?
WB: Hm.
MJ: What did you have to do for that one?
WB: [Pause] On the – on the 4th – 4th of October ’44 we went to the Danube and put a mine – two mines down there. Have having had to fly there at thirty foot and then there was a a – I think there was haystacks even higher than we were. So I was expecting anytime that we – that we should get a gun from behind them. Then the next one we went on the 9th we went to Athens, we did that and they were put for us they were pretty long trips. Athens six hours and the Danube was five fifty-one.
MJ: So what – why did you that one to similar to the Dam Busters one. Why?
WB: It was the [unclear] valley. There’s the valley. South, it was south of one of their big cities. I forget which one it was. Began with a B, I know that. [Laughter].
MJ: So what did you have to do that made it similar to the other dams? Did you have to go lower or was it just too hot or what?
WB: While we kept low was to get underneath their mining thing and also we were down there so as we could get in underneath it and without them noticing it, and we didn’t – did manage it seems ‘cause nobody came to try and have a go at us. Then five days later we went over there again. Not this to the Danube which was up south of a – a big city beginning with B, I think it was. And this this second one, our eleventh was on Kalamaki operation bombed over flares. So we had two long ones. [Pause] I know that we bombed one of the American bombings. They gave us a photo of what they had left. When we got there it hadn’t even been touched. So we had to do all the bombing for them. That’s the Americans all along, which I never did quite like.
MJ: [Unclear]
WB: [Unclear]. More modern, modern aircraft and that. I mean the Wellington was a pre-war, but we had it all the way through the war out there.
MJ: So did you fly different aircraft more often or just one particular one? ‘Cause you got –
WB: You could hardly see the blinder[?]. All I know is it was going off track and I couldn’t I couldn’t get the thing to go in at all. In the end, when he when he went ran out of [unclear] I expect and well that’s that. He said ‘[Unclear] Which way you going? I said ‘No, you’re too late to go the back.’ I said ‘So turn on and face, face Yugoslavia.’ And I said ‘When you get - as soon as you’ve seen the mountains over there, turn south. Don’t wait for me.’ I said ‘Then we’ll sort – start sorting out some.’ Anyway I got ‘em back in.
MJ: So what happened when you got to base then?
WB: Then – then I was a bit late when I got, of course, when we got in. But after that on three occasions I got them to go another route because there was a blooming eight-hundred – and sent us out on our own valley, there was a hill eight-hundred foot high and quite often the clouds comes came down so they forced them under the thousand so I sort of – ‘What’s the matter Briley?’ I said : ‘There’s a hill in that valley eight hundred foot.’ Said ‘Yeah.’ So he turned round to his thing[?]and said ‘Go and see if he’s right.’ The bloke said when he came back he said : ‘He’s right.’ ‘Oh, sent him round the end of the peninsula.’ That happened three times. I had to – ‘cause I knew where it was. I was coming in through the valley at two-thousand in the cloud dived down at the end where I knew it’d be.’ ‘Didn’t you – didn’t you see the target?’ ‘Yeah.’ ‘Well how come you came back here half-hour before any others [unclear]. I said ‘’Cause I used the valley.’ ‘But you told us.’ ‘But yeah I know where it is.’
MJ: So you took a short cut?
WB: Yep. You see the second time he was sending me down for – I I didn’t do much on that. I knew it – I knew how it was. So so we had a look down at it and found this thing this hill. ‘Right we can use that.’ I did on three occasions. Got back in. Nice time I was the only one on breakfast. [Chuckle]. Everybody else came in half-hour later. Every time ‘Missed it again.’ I said : ‘No we did not miss it.’ Berh, that was another bleeding officer and then, and I gather from one of our other, one of the crew I saw in Cairo. He said ‘You know what has happened up at up at - up at Foggia?’ I said ‘No.’ ‘ See they sent out those big aircraft, up our valley at a thousand feet.’ ‘Yeah.’ ‘Three crashed into that hill you told them about.’ I said ‘That’s bloody murder.’ And if I had my way I’d have had him but they took no notice of me, but it was them that - I mean the big aircraft, American aircraft has about twelve people on board. The Wellington only had five. You think it. Three aircraft. Thirty-six. Dead. Before they’d even started.
MJ: ‘Cause they took the wrong route.
WB: Yeah. I wish I could have done but you supposed to be a – on their side. [Laughter]. Yeah. And one or two people told me about it and I said that ‘I said I quite agree with ya. But we daren’t do it.’
MJ: Yeah.
WB: Whether they learned after that when they hit this hill there’s one way to find out. Not the [unclear] of the bleeding crew though.
MJ: Was there any more situations like that you had before? Was it a lot like that?
WB: Yeah well. This is how it is.
MJ: Yeah.
WB: Another time she came down to – oh blimey – begins will L.
MJ: Well –
WB: Yeah.
MJ: Yeah. Well anyway yeah.
WB: Yeah. Anyway, she came down there. I was [unclear] been on there a fortnight and she said ‘That comes off.’
MJ: So you had to lose your –
WB: So my mate said ‘Are you gonna?’ ‘No,’ I said ‘I’ve got home. I’ve worked it out. I want us to have three weeks to see what it’s like.’ Anyway, I didn’t get any in the end. Wasn’t for her, it was for myself. It itched though underneath. [Shudder].
MJ: Yeah I know.
WB: So I –
MJ: Yeah. Don’t go good with a uniform. So I put that on. Ok I’m gonna take a photo. You in 40 Squadron.
WB: That’s 40 Squadron in 3 Group with Wellingtons in 1940 or ‘41. Towards the end of ’41, 40 Squadron moved toward Malta. Moved to Egypt early in ’42 into 205 Group. Moving to North Africa and eventually to Italy. During – I joined 40 Squadron in Foggia Italy in August ’44. First flight 30th of August ’44 and first op 1st of September ’44. And last one 39, 21st of January 1945. Book says last, last 13th of March. Hmm, it’s wrong. Otherwise how was I doing it in ’45?
MJ: There’s there’s –
WB: It was a remake Manchester. Found that the Manchester were two Merlins was like the blooming Wellington Mark II was Merlins. They’re useless, so they took it back, extended the wing, put in two more engines and extended other things, call it the Lancaster, and it was a success. Makes you wonder doesn’t it?
MJ: It does yeah.
WB: I’m lying. I don’t think it’s been made public much ‘cause the Manchester was a dud.
MJ: Yeah.
WB: Hmm.
MJ: This is Michael Jeffery on behalf of the International Bomber Command Historical Project Unit. Thank you to William Briley for his recording.
WB: It won’t. Make it George, George Briley.
MJ: George Briley, it is.
WB: George, it’s what I’m known as. You’ll find on here that no one knows about a Duckworth[?]. It’s George everybody.
MJ: Well that’s good.
WB: Yeah.
MJ: Well, it’s very nice to meet you George. Thank you very much for you co-operation and your photographs and such like and I hope to meet you again. On behalf of the International Bomber Command, thank you again. On the 22nd of May 2015.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Interview with William George Briley
Creator
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Mick Jeffery
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-05-22
Format
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00:28:49 Audio recording
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ABrileyW150522
Conforms To
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Pending review
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Contributor
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Gemma Clapton
Language
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eng
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Description
An account of the resource
After training in South Africa, William Briley flew operations as a navigator with 40 Squadron flying Wellingtons from Foggia, Italy. One of his operations involved the dropping of a 4000lb bomb which derailed two trains. He was also involved in mine laying in the Danube.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Egypt
Greece
Italy
Italy
Danube River
South Africa
Greece--Zakynthos
Italy--Foggia
Greece--Corinth Canal
Danube River
40 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
mine laying
navigator
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/585/8854/AHopgoodPA160215.1.mp3
6ad151db1a38b91f0efb4ca94a994f53
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hopgood, Philip David
P D Hopgood
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Hopgood, PD
Description
An account of the resource
Four items in main collection, plus photograph album in sub-collection. An oral history interview with Peter Andrew Hopgood about his father, Flight Sergeant Philip Hopgood (1924-1999, 1673132 Royal Air Force), his memoir, log book, service record and photograph album. Philip Hopgood trained as a pilot and later as a flight engineer.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Peter Hopgood (1673132 Royal Air Force) and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
CB: Right, my name is Chris Brockbank and today is the 15th of February 2016. This is number eleven of the proxy interviews, the purpose of which is really to record the experiences of deceased World War Two aircrew and also some of the people who are still around but are not well enough to be able to participate. It is important that these stories are added really to the live ones from aircrew at the moment. The background is that we need to remember that a lot of veterans weren’t happy to divulge their experiences in the war to their immediate offspring, or even to their other halves, and the horrors that some of them went through. However there are some people who were prepared to talk to their offspring. And so today I am speaking with Peter Hopgood whose father 67, 1673132 Hopgood PD, Phillip Hopgood joined the RAF in 1942. And trained as a pilot but then was diverted to become a flight engineer. So Peter can we start with your, what you regard as your father‘s earliest recollection of family and then go through how he came to leave school? What he did before joining the RAF, where he joined the RAF and his experiences through that and afterwards?
PAH: When you say his earliest recoll—
CB: Recollection of family?
PAH: Of family?
PAH: So where he went to school, what his father did?
CB: Right, sorry erm, he, so the earliest I remember is secondary school. I remember him talking about secondary school where he went to the Holt which was a grammar school in Liverpool and he matriculated from there. Not sure when forty one or forty two or something like that and he was very good at chemistry. He was hoping to go to university and study chemistry, but there was a war on so that didn’t happen. Then I remember him talking about the bombings around Liverpool. So that would have been I think it was 1941 round about the time. When he was about sixteen anyway, fifteen, sixteen and I don’t know whether this prompted him to join the Air Training Corps or whether that had always been a passion. There are photographs of him with model aeroplanes, so I guess that he had always wanted to be a pilot, as I did and he joined the Air Training Corps. The war had been running a couple of years by that stage so I suppose this was the channel in for lots of boys getting them into the idea that they were going to have to go to war and this was the part of the indoctrination if you want to call it that or something. Just getting them used to the idea of authority, and the things that they would have to do. He, during the bombing raids on Liverpool, there was a story told by my grannie of a bomb which dropped in the allotments. Probably less than half a mile away, so certainly within walking distance. And they were aiming at the railway line I think at the bottom of the road which was two hundred yards away from where they lived. And er, and they were on their way into Liverpool and into the docks as well, so the bombs were scattered all over the place. And there are records of deaths from the bombs in roads very nearby. This would have been a further prompt for my dad to join up and get his own back, ‘cause that was the sort of attitude that my grannie and grandad had. That reflected in what he felt as well, I think. So in, before he was eighteen, he registered to be joined up. I don’t know an awful lot about this part particularly and that is why I have done the research and the document that I have put together is from other people’s stories. I’ve gleaned, movements from Liverpool to recruitment centres to, and all the messing about that they had to do for medicals and things like that. And it is a very similar story although not necessarily my dad‘s story. Because he went, had his medical, went to oh just outside Manchester to be recruited and have his interview. And then went off to Lord‘s which was the, where they got everybody together, the initial training. Just forgot a little bit I suppose, prior to that he was in the Air Training Corps as I said but he had a professional certificate part one. Which then meant that he was recommended for commission and for training as pilot,observer. ‘So where do we go from here Chris?’
CB: Well, really he signed up initially and went to Lord‘s where they did all their getting their kit and getting their jabs and everything else. And then they went on to initial training —
PAH: Oh sorry, missed a bit, which is the time between when he signed up, he, that was—
CB: Because he was too young.
PAH: That was February ’42 before he was eighteen, he would be seventeen and a half, signed up. And I remember the little RAF Volunteer Regiment badge that he, you know the lapel badge. I found that in and amongst bits and pieces so he had that. And there is a photograph that I have of him somewhere wearing that on a blazer. And they had that to prove that they weren’t shirking their responsibilities. Because in Liverpool I think people were, would be tarred and feathered if they weren’t volunteering to do their duty and protect the country. And particularly protect Liverpool which was having a hammering of the bombings. And so he had that at seventeen and a half. And then he was only called up to go down to Lord‘s in March 1943. So again he would be eighteen and a half at that stage. In between time he worked in the Liver building in Liverpool I think it was for the Ministry of Supply, but he worked there as a clerk. Just filling in time I think ‘cause otherwise he would have been taking A Levels, well our equivalent of A Levels and going onto university which is what he wanted to do. Which is something he always regretted, because he loved his chemistry and didn’t get to further his studies in that area.
CB: Then he went to the Initial Training Wing and that was at Babbacolme?
PAH: Yes, again I don’t know a lot about that and the story that I have written down was a similar story from somebody else. But they did sort of physical training and a little bit of flying training, erm —
CB: This was in Cornwall?
PAH: Yes, yes Torquay wasn’t it? No, in fact, actually no he didn’t go there first, he went to Shillingford, Shollingford[?] near Shrivenham. And they put them up in aeroplanes just to see whether they would be actually trainable as pilots.
CB: Ok.
PAH: And this was just to, they weren’t piloting but they were taken up by flight sergeants, flight lieutenants, flying officers, I guess to see whether they were suitable. Because there is a test at the end of that of twenty one days flying —
CB: And this is an aptitude test for pilot training.
PAH: CF 1.
CB: Mm.
PAH: Yeah which he passed.
CB: Which is shown in his log book.
PAH: Yeah it is that one there isn’t it, I think?
CB: His log book has got some entries at the beginning which is before he started flying training, seriously, as a pilot.
PAH: This is before he got his log book in elementary flying training, I think; in Canada because those people there, people that signed him off here are Canadians.
CB: Right, so he had his initial training wing and then he went to have his initial training for aptitude -
PAH: And then he went to —
CB: Then they thought that was okay and they sent him to Canada is that right?
PAH: Yeah, so he went to flying training.
CB: Yeah.
PAH: In Shellingford, then he went to the ITW in Babbacombe.
CB: Yeah.
PAH: For the physical and all the other stuff and then he went to Canada after that.
CB: Right.
PAH: So that was the Sixth Elementary Flying Training School where they were bombing about in Tiger Moths and —
CB: Cornells.
PAH: Cornells, yes erm, and spent a lot of time on link trainers and et cetera, et cetera. So they got over there by boat from Liverpool and then took the train from Monkton. They spent a couple of days, a couple of weeks there, I think, in Monkton acclimatising, getting their winter kit I would imagine. And there was a long, long train journey through Quebec and down the side of Lake Superior et cetera, which he took photographs of. Ended up at Prince Albert initially that was the elementary flying training school and doing a lot of flying around there. And then, they seemed to have holidays when they were there as well because they went out and stayed with Canadian families, for a break. I have seen some photographs of that where they are out riding ponies and driving cars around and generally mucking about, and so that was a bit of a holiday. He always said that in Canada it was so cold that you had to eat ice cream because you might as well have been cold inside as well as outside. [laugh] He kept the flying jacket, I don’t remember ever seeing a full sheepskin but it certainly had a sheepskin collar, yeah.
CB: So he was at two places there, he was at Prince Albert -
PAH: Yes, so then he moved onto the four, number four, what was that, Secondary Flying Training School.
CB: For twin engine flying.
PAH: Yeah for multiple engines, so he was on twin engined planes.
CB: Okay.
PAH: Er, what were they? Cranes and Avro Ansons and then they had a bit of a holiday on the way home, because there were photographs of him in uniform in New York.
CB: Let me just interrupt. Where did he get, did he get his wings then at the end of, his pilot‘s wings at the end of the experience in Saskatoon does it say?
PAH: 1944, 27th of October—
CB: I will stop it just for a moment. [tape stopped]
PAH: So at the, what do you call it, the SFTS, Secondary Flying Training School in, this was in Saskatoon in Canada where they were training on multiple engine planes, the Crane and what did we say? The Avro Anson. He gained his wings and became a pilot on the 27th of October 1944. Gained his wings and have got photographs of that. And then they, he came out of Canada on a ship and came back to UK. And shortly after that became a sergeant on the 31st of December 1944 and classified as a Sergeant Pilot at that stage. And then on the ship back he must have caught something pretty bad, because he was in hospital for a week in Forward Military Hospital near Preston, don’t know why. Then went from there to the School of Technical Training that is at St Athan, number Four School of Technical Training where they were working on Lancasters mark 1 and 3 and he has got a certificate in his log book or stamp anyway to say that he passed the flight engineer course.
CB: So he’s a pilot but because they were short of flight engineers, is that right?
PAH: Well I think so, he didn’t really talk much about this, this time, but I guess that’s why that happened. Because he, he really wanted to be a pilot and was happier flying than doing anything else. But to get in, the most important thing for him was to be in a plane. So if it was as a flight engineer then that was better that not being in a plane at all, I guess. He passed out on the 14th of March and then there is a bit of a gap in his log book between there and going to various bases around and about. He seemed to spend a lot of time at Harrogate, but he was at various air bases, referring to the list.
CB: This was a time in the war when they had lots of aircrew who were unallocated to squadron tasks.
PAH: Mm.
CB: But he then moved onto heavy bombers?
PAH: Yes that’s right, so he did his flight engineers training then went to 1651 Conversion Unit at Woolfox Lodge. That’s where he was flying as second pilot in Lancasters and doing various training exercises. And after that seems to be where his flying stops, in Lancasters anyway.
CB: Yeah.
PAH: June 7th ’45.
CB: Well, with the heavy bombers the engineer joined the aircraft when the crew had already been formed at its operational training unit.
PAH: Oh okay.
CB: He would have been there as an engineer but because of his skill as a pilot he could do both tasks.
PAH: Right okay, so pilot number two is the flight engineer is it?
CB: It is but he always kept, they always kept their pilots wings.
PAH: Yeah. So then there were a number of sort of short stays at various different places. From Woolfox Lodge he then went to— [papers rustling]
CB: This is because the war in Europe had ended.
PAH: Yes. He was then in Harrogate in June number 7PRC, then RAF Acinos, Akin [?] A-C-N-C-O-S Locking, July to August. 7PRC, Harrogate for a couple of weeks in August. Then Cottesmore for a couple, a week or so in August to September. Then back to Harrogate in September to October and then was at Cliff Pypard 29EFTS, October 1945 to February 1946. Seems that they were just flying around in Tiger Moths just to keep up their flying time I would imagine. But he would be the pilot or second pilot on those. But I do remember him admiring the countryside and probably getting lost in flying and ran out of petrol on one occasion. Landed in a farmer‘s field which nobody was very happy about. [laugh] After flying in Cliff Pypard he went off to Wheaton Aston near Stafford. That is a pilots advanced flying unit, no idea what they were doing there and no flying time shown. He was there for about three weeks and then went on to, number 7PRC, Market Harborough. Then ACA, Aircrew Allocation Centre at Catterick in March 1946 for a week. Then number 4ACHU Cranard, Cranage in March to April 1946 again at an aircrew holding unit so, not really sure what they were doing there. Then went to number 1 Gliding Training School in Croughton that’s a couple of weeks in April 1946. Then to number 4 School of, I think it is Airframe Training but I am not entirely sure at Kirkholme, Lancashire for about six weeks. But I think it was a demob centre at that stage. So they would be learning how to live in civvy street. After that he went to 2051MU in Bristol June to August 1946. Where there were lots of motor vehicles, I don’t know whether he went there to learn to drive. Or just move vehicles around, not really sure. Then had a little spell in number 30MU Sealand August ‘46 to February 1947. That was a maintenance unit. Then went to number 101 Personnel Dispatch Centre in February ’47 for a day. That was the end of his service, that’s Wharton Aerodrome in Lancashire. And then came out of the RAF at that stage.
CB: It just shows the difficulty they had in allocating trained people to useful tasks didn’t they?
PAH: Yes, I think so.
CB: And also that they were doing a staged demobilisation so that the civilian world wasn’t saturated with people.
PAH: Yes, yes.
CB: But it must have been quite soul destroying, did he ever talk about the peripatetic, soul destroying process?
PAH: No. [laugh] I think he just wanted to get out. Either fly or get out.
CB: What did he do after the war?
PAH: So after the war he worked for Dunlop at Speak Airport. Erm, and working in scientific labs, looking at the bonding between metal and rubber. And I guess his engineering training, flight engineering training would have helped there. And maybe some of the stuff at the maintenance unit that he went to may have led him into that. Because it was very much a, an aeroplane suspension system I suppose, well like an engine mounting unit type thing, which is rubber. And they used them in aeroplanes, which is why he was based at Speak Airport. So they would be using those, the things that they were dealing with in the aeroplanes that were coming for maintenance there. Yes, he spent quite a few years there and that’s where he met my mum. They got married, so he must have been there for about six years probably, something like that. Maybe even longer six or seven years and then decided that he wanted to get out of Liverpool and have a job which paid a bit better than being a scientist, couldn’t see the job going anywhere so he became a salesman for Avery Scales. So again the technical side helped because he was a technical sales rep. Started off in Liverpool and then he was transferred to Cumberland, lived in Carlisle after that.
CB: And then worked there until he retired?
PAH: For the rest of his life.
CB: So when did he retire?
PAH: He retired at age sixty four on ill health because he had multiple sclerosis.
CB: Oh dear, and when did he die?
PAH: Nineteen seventy, oh no nineteen, ninety nine.
CB: Okay, good, thank you very much. I think that is a really interesting insight into the sort of things that went on. Where people who had really good skills as in a pilot and engineer were not able really to use them during the times of hostilities.
PAH: Er, yeah.
CB: But it worked out alright in civilian life.
PAH: Yes I think so, good training.
CB: Thank you very much Peter.
PAH: Okay. [recording paused and restarted]
CB: Peter just as a supplement to that. My father never spoke to me about what he did in the war really, but in your case you got quite a bit. Were there parts that he was more, found more comfortable in talking about or did you have to tease it out? How did it work?
PAH: I think erm, back in the sixties there was quite a big thing about ‘well, what did you do in the war dad?’ And I seem to remember adverts on the television and things like that. Because there was still a stream of being against people who were conscientious objectors at that stage. Because there were wars coming around, there were other events after the Second World War, which they needed forces for, and so it was a way of making sure that people volunteered as necessary or joined up as necessary. Because there was quite a big drive for joining the forces when I was at school in the sixties and seventies. But he was always reticent about talking. He said he had a jolly good time and probably wished he could have stayed in, but that didn’t look possible because there were, as you said, there were so many pilots. So many people with skills, that they could only choose a few of them for whatever reason. They graded them and he wasn’t to be one of those that stayed in, and I don’t know if the moving around was at his choosing. Or whether he was being put into different places to see if he fitted any particular place to be assigned to after the war. But that wasn’t to be, he always acted like a flight sergeant. [laugh] So the discipline was passed down to everybody else. And my mum always said. ‘Oh blooming, still thinks he is a sergeant.’ [laughs] Sergeant major and telling everybody what to do. But that would have been drilled into him, I think in the training that he had. So it was very difficult to get rid of that. My grandfather wasn’t like that at all, he was a very easy going chap. But my dad was very regimented as it were, yeah. What were we talking about?
CB: Okay, so just an extension of that there are all sorts of anecdotes and some things people don’t like talking about. I have had situations where they have said. ‘Turn off the recorder while we talk about such and such.’ But a sensitive topic that is called a different title now which is battle stress in various ways. There was a feeling, well a title called “LMF” which is lacking moral fibre. Did he ever make any reference to that to you?
PAH: That he didn’t have any moral fibre or — ?
CB: No, no that he came across people who had been graded or branded or —
PAH: No I don’t think so.
CB: Described as people who failed to do their role when they were flying.
PAH: No.
CB: Because of fear amongst other things.
PAH: I don’t think he ever mentioned that.
CB: No.
PAH: And partly because they never, I don’t think they ever faced any action as such. Although there was the one story, of where they went out in a Lancaster and dropped a bomb in the North Sea, because they couldn’t find where they were going to. But whether that was a bomb or whether that was a training exercise I am not really sure. It could just have been a dummy, it could just have been waste that they were trying to get rid of, I don’t know. But er, no I don’t think there were any instances of people that weren’t up to the tasks as you mentioned.
CB: Okay thank you.
[recording paused and restarted]
CB: In terms of flying hours it’s interesting to see that the log book of Phillip Hopgood showed three hundred hours he had done by the beginning of ’45, by the beginning of ’46 it was at three hundred and sixty five so he’d done quite a substantial amount of flying during that period.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Peter Andrew Hopgood
Description
An account of the resource
This interview is with Peter Hopgood, who relates the experiences of his father, Sergeant Pilot Phillip Hopgood.
Philip Hopgood lived in Liverpool and after matriculation he registered for the Royal Air force as he was a member of the Air Training Corps. Too young to be enlisted, he worked as a clerk in the Ministry of Supply.
Called up at the age of 18 in March 1943, he was given pilot aptitude testing and basic training in England before travelling to Canada as part of the Empire Training Scheme. There he completed his pilot training at 6 Elementary Flying School at Prince Albert and 4 Secondary Flying Training School in Saskatoon, flying Ansons. Leave was spent being entertained in the homes of local Canadians.
He became a pilot in October 1944 and returned to England. Phillip spent time in hospital and on discharge was sent to 4 School of Technical Training at RAF St Athans where he was trained on Lancaster aircraft as a flight engineer. Phillip was posted to various stations before being sent to 1651 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Woolfox Lodge flying as a flight engineer on Lancasters.
The war ended and he spent time at various stations, then 29 Elementary Flying Training school at Cliff Pypard flying Tiger Moths. Here he made a forced landing after running out of fuel.
After various aircrew allocation centres, he spent time at 1 Gliding Training School at RAF Croughton before being sent to a number of maintenance units.
Finally in February 1947, he was discharged and worked for Dunlop at Speak Airport in the laboratories, and then as a salesman for Avery Scales.
Phillip Hopgood died in 1999.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Chris Brockbank
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-02-15
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Sound
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
AHopgoodPA160215
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
00:30:23 audio recording
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Second generation
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Saskatchewan
Saskatchewan--Saskatoon
Great Britain
England--Yorkshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1943-03-18
1944-10
1947-02
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
T Holmes
Carolyn Emery
1651 HCU
aircrew
Anson
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
RAF Cranage
RAF St Athan
RAF Woolfox Lodge
Tiger Moth
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/641/8911/ASmithJG160408.1.mp3
6d16663cc2df8504569f79a4c660d19f
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/641/8911/PSmithJG1601.1.jpg
539605fd7b5011ef5d9f78fb4e506c21
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/641/8911/PSmithJG1602.1.jpg
5f42fdfc71fb9f4a4d8b502b766e4e60
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Smith, Jack
John George Smith
J G Smith
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Smith, JG
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history interview with John 'Jack' Smith (1921 -2019) and his memoirs. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 189 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by John Smith and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
DK: Right. So it’s David Kavanagh for the International Bomber Command Centre interviewing Jack — would you mind if I call you Jack?
JS: Yes.
DK: Jack, Jack Smith, um, on the 8th of April 2016. [slight cough] OK, I’ll just put that there.
JS: Right.
DK: If I keep looking down at it, don’t worry. I’m just checking that it’s still working.
JS. Yes, alright. OK.
DK: OK. So if, if I could just take you back a little bit before, before you actually joined the Air Force —
JS: Before, yes.
DK: What were you actually doing then before you joined up?
JS: I was a trainee chartered accountant.
DK: Right.
JS: And of course I was only — I was eighteen the year the war started. So, er, knowing when the war started they were calling up men at twenty I didn’t want to join the Army, I wanted to be in the RAF. So when — as soon as I was nineteen I, along with one of my colleagues, we volunteered for the RAF and we went to Padgate in September 1940 and in fact we were sort of sworn in at the Battle of Britain weekend on the 14th of September 1940.
DK: Oh right.
JS: And then after six weeks we were sent home and, and called for, for active service on the 4th of November 1940.
DK: Was there anything in particular that made you choose the RAF? Was it simply because you didn’t want the Army? [slight laugh]
JS: Well, why I wanted is rather interesting. When I was still at school I considered joining the RAF and I went for a medical and, er, I had quite a lot of bad teeth. My father was kept out of the First World War because he had bad teeth. Anyway, I said, ‘That’s not a problem. I’ll have them out.’ And they said, ‘Well no. If you’ve had more than twelve out you don’t pass the medical.’ I said, ‘Well OK.’ So, I couldn’t get any further at that stage so, to cut a long story short there, I had twenty-two teeth out when I was seventeen and I’ve had dentures ever since, you see? Well, of course, when the war came, 1940, and then I wanted to join the RAF, I went in and of course passed medical A1, no problem at all really, with me dentures. So, er, that’s how I came to be in the RAF. I wanted to be in the RAF anyway.
DK: Right.
JS: And I thoroughly enjoyed it, you know, thoroughly enjoyed it. And so, of course, when we joined the — we went to — as I say, we were sworn in at Padgate and then started service on the 4th of November by going to Blackpool to commence training as a wireless operator and, of course, there we did all our drill on the promenade and marching and all that sort of thing. Then you did your Morse, one word a — increase one word a minute per week and then, when you got up to twelve words a minute, you were posted to a radio school. So then I left Blackpool and then I went down to, er, Compton Bassett, which was strictly speaking the, er, wireless operators for ground [emphasis] staff, which several of us couldn’t understand we were sent there ‘cause air crew used to go to Yatesbury —
DK: Right.
JS: For the training, you see. And then, of course, qualified as operators and I was posted, er, to a unit, RAF Bramcote, and I was only there a month as a wireless operator when I was posted abroad and, er, of course, found that there were fifty of us, wireless operators, had all been treated the same and we were not very happy about it.
DK: And this is when you went to Iraq, was it?
JS: That’s right. We went to Iraq, you see, and then when we got to Iraq the officer there didn’t know what to do with us but eventually we all settled down on different units and, er, got on to the ground operating, which was OK, and then, of course, we kept on moaning about the fact we wanted to fly and then, after much moaning and groaning and, sort of confined to quarters and everything, er, February 1943 I’d been on night duty on wireless operating duties and, er, the officer from the orderly room was there reading out names, including mine, of wireless operators to be returned to United Kingdom for air [emphasis] crew training.
DK: Ah, so were you pleased about this when you heard this?
JS: We were quite happy about it, see? So, of course, we all belted down to the air officer in charge of signals and, ‘Oh hold on a minute. Hold on a minute. There’s fifty of you.’ He said, ‘You’re all experienced ground operators. I want replacements.’ So, of course, we had to wait for replacements and they didn’t arrived ‘till July 1943. So eventually we travelled overland, through Iraq, and through to Gaza, and then by train into Egypt, and then we waited for a couple of weeks, and then we were put on board a troop ship to return to the UK. And we were the first convoy to return through the Mediterranean after it had been reopened. This was August 1943. This time Italy were packing up and so we eventually came through the Med and we stopped at Algiers and two days after we left Algiers the Germans bombed it. And then we pulled into, um, Gibraltar and, er, whilst we were there every night they let off depth charges in the docks to prevent submarines from entering and, anyway, we eventually got home. We arrived at Greenock in end of August 1943 and, of course, we were given disembarkation leave for three weeks and then I was then posted to the radio school at RAF Manley to resume my air crew training. And, of course, then I went through the course there and qualified at the end of December ‘43 and then I was kept on as sort of help the trainers with the, with the new intakes and eventually started then going to advanced flying unit in North Wales, and then on to Operational Training Unit at Silverstone, and then on to, er, on to heavy aircraft at RAF Winthorpe, on to Stirling aircraft, and then we went to Scampton then for a couple of weeks to convert to Lancasters.
DK: What did you think of the — flying on the Stirlings?
JS: Well, we, we enjoyed it in a way but our skipper, he was an Australian skipper, he said it was like driving a double-decker bus. And I mean he didn’t like it an awful lot, you know.
DK: So at what point did you meet your crew then? [unclear]
JS: Oh, when you were at Silverstone, at the Operational Training Unit. You’re all sort of assembled in one big hall and the pilots there are left then to, more or less, go round discussing the various members of the crew, you know, and sort of saying — you’re in different groups, you know, wireless operators and whatever, you see, and you, you just wait for a pilot to sort of come and say, ‘Well, would you like to join my crew?’
DK: Did you think that worked? Because it’s a bit of unusual for the Forces ‘cause normally you’re usually told where to go. This was all a bit hit and miss.
JS: Yes. It worked. In, in my case it worked fairly well really, er, but I suppose if you wanted to be sort of really hundred per cent sure about it then no because, I mean, you didn’t — the pilot didn’t get an awful lot of chance to ask questions of you, you know.
DK: No, no.
JS: You qualified as whatever and because you qualified as a wireless op, ‘OK, well you can come in my crew.’ You see, I mean we were fortunate, we got a pretty very good skipper. But our crew worked out very well except for our tail gunner, who was an Irishman, and we had to ditch him after the third trip because twice he went to sleep on the way back from Germany, you know. I had the job to go down to see what had happened to him and there he was with the turret doors open, fast asleep.
DK: Oh dear.
JS: So we had to ditch him. So apart from that —
DK: So from the, er, Operational Training Unit then did you then go to —
JS: Operational Training Unit. Let’s see, we went straight from Silverstone, then to Winthorpe on to Stirlings.
DK: Yeah.
JS: And then —
DK: This is the Heavy Conversion Unit?
JS: That was the Heavy Conversion Unit at Winthorpe and then, having done that, you then went to Scampton just to get on to Lancasters.
DK: Right.
JS: Oh, and then we went — let’s see, we went to one more station, just near Newark, the Lancaster Finishing School near Newark, yeah.
DK: Right, and what did you think of the Lancasters after the Stirlings?
JS: Well, we liked it and some of us liked better, much more comfortable in many ways, you know. Certainly, I mean, it didn’t affect me too much but it was a bit more of a, a barn of an aircraft. The, the Lancaster was also nice and cosy and compact, as cosy as it could be, you know. We were all pretty well close together but you didn’t feel quite the same in a Stirling.
DK: No.
JS: But, er —
DK: So from the Lancaster Finishing School then was that on to your operational squadron?
JS: Operational squadron then.
DK: Yeah, and which squadron was —
JS: I went to 189 Squadron.
DK: 189, yeah.
JS: And they were based at Fulbeck, which is no longer operating, because it was near Cranwell, very near to Cranwell. And so we got there, I think it was in October ’40, ’44, October ’44, and then I actually started my first operation. We were b—, we were briefed, I think for three trips, which were aborted before — so we had all that operation for your first trip, you know, getting geared up for it, and then at the last minute it was cancelled, you see.
DK: How did that make you feel then? Was it very frustrating?
JS: Well not very happy about that, you know. You’re all geared up for your first trip, you know, and you think, ‘Oh well this is it. Tonight we’re — OK, fine.’ Then sort of five minutes before you’re going it’s cancelled.
DK: And that happened three times.
JS: It happened three times, yeah, it did.
DK: So, can you remember where your first operation was to then?
JS: Yeah I can. Er, without looking in me book, er, it was a mar—, a marshalling yard, um, railway marshalling yard.
DK: In France?
JS: In Germany.
DK: In Germany.
JS: Yeah.
DK: OK.
JS: But, um, we did quite a lot of marshalling yards and oil targets obviously. One of my raids — I did the Dresden raid.
DK: Right.
JS: And we did two targets on —
DK: So how, how many operations did you do altogether?
JS: I did twenty-four and two semi-operational trips because before you go on to a squadron, when you’re still on OTU, we did a leaflet raid in, in Wellington bombers.
DK: Right.
JS: A, a leaflet raid over France and then we did — what they called the Bullseye — a diversion off the Dutch coast to try and put the German radar off, thinking it was the main force were going there, you see. So you did two semi-, semi-operational raids and then, of course, by the time I did my twenty-four VE Day arrived and that was it and, of course, even then there were crews then waiting then obviously to go out to the Far East but, of course, I was considered tour-expired anyway then. That was alright, you see.
DK: So as, as a wireless operator then what were your main duties once you were on board the aircraft and you —
JS: Well your main duties really were to keep a listening watch all the time as to whether you got anything coming through from your base, and weather reports and things like that, anything of importance like that, and then, of course, it was also you were needed in case, as it happened, we had to sort of, er, get diverted because, er, we were running short of fuel on a couple of times and then, on one occasion, Lincolnshire was fog-bound for the whole of December 1944 and we were diverted to the north of Scotland and we had to spend a whole week in the north of Scotland before we could get back down to Lincolnshire because of the fog. So, then my other duty then would have been if we had to ditch. I had the job in the dinghy, if you got the dinghy, I had the emergency radio and I got to operate that.
DK: Right.
JS: And that was the worst thing I’d have to do really.
DK: But that never happened then?
JS: That never happened, thank God, no. But listening out and of course — well, I had to call up to request where we could be diverted to because we were short of fuel and we wanted to know the best place we could put down so it was Carnaby in, in Yorkshire or Manston in Kent.
DK: Because they had the wider runways there?
JS: Yes and they had what they called FIDO.
DK: FIDO.
JS: The fog dispersal unit, yeah. So I did two or three, probably three, diversions I think, yeah.
DK: And was, was your aircraft ever attacked at all? Or —
JS: Well, we were attacked but we was — we never had more than glancing blows, should I say. The worst we had, we did the — one raid to Gdynia in Poland. The German Navy were there and to, er, to get on the correct heading for the bombing run, we had to sort of go south of the target to come out over the port so that when we released the bombs we were over the Baltic. And somehow or other the navigator miscalculated and we got to the target five minutes early and then we got coned with searchlights. So we had a, a few hectic minutes with the searchlights on us so — but even that wasn’t too bad because they didn’t hit us anyway but it was a bit of a hair raising moment shall we say, you know. You’re sort of pretty vulnerable when you’re sort of coned.
DK: Yeah. So were, were all your operations at night?
JS: Not all of them, no.
DK: Some were in daylight?
JS: I did a thousand bomber raid on Dortmund and this — you’ll see in my log book they’re in green and all the night time ones are all in red.
DK: Right. OK.
JS: So I think we did three daylight raids, probably. Yeah.
DK: But what was it like at night though? Was it — is it something you got used to? Because its —
JS: Well you did. It sounds, now you think — you wonder how you did it, ‘cause there were no lights on anywhere, you see. I mean, your aircraft, you had no lights on, and most of our bomber strength, it was usually two hundred, that was the average strength of a bomber force, and sometimes more than that, but the average, average two hundred. Well, when you consider that you had a rendezvous point, quite often in our case it would be over Northampton or Beachy Head. Well, you consider you come in from different squadrons to the rendezvous point and there’s two hundred of you getting together to go to the same place and you’ve got no lights on. When you think about it that’s a bit hairy.
DK: Yeah.
JS: And of course, obviously, there’s no, no lights below you at all. The only time we got lights when we were sort of coming back, like, when we’d been to Gdynia and we came back over the Baltic. We then followed the Swedish coast and the Swedes were very kind. They put sort of small lights up along their coast so they were quite decent about it. But those were the only lights we ever saw, you know.
DK: So when — what was it like when it got back then as you saw the airfield and you came into land?
JS: Well, a mighty relief, obviously, that was and, of course, it was a relief and it sounds silly in a way but with so many aerodromes, particularly in Lincolnshire, as you know, it was a bit hairy coming in over your own circuit because a lot of circuits nearly overlapped.
DK: Yeah.
JS: And, of course, towards the end the Germans were getting so desperate that, er, they were sending their, some of their fighters back amongst the bomber force, and two or three of our planes got shot down over Norfolk because they’d been followed all the way back, you know. So there were those situations arising.
DK: So you never got attacked by another aircraft then?
JS: No, no, we didn’t. We sort of — obviously, when you’re in the target area you feel, obviously, all the explosions coming underneath, all the bumps and everything like that and then, of course, on one or two raids the Germans put up — what they called Scarecrows — that was sort of the imitation of an aircraft crashing, which can be a bit unnerving, you know, because you’re not too sure whether it is a Scarecrow or not and it gives all the appearance of being an aircraft going down in flames so it doesn’t do your morale any good, you know.
DK: Did you see many of those then?
JS: Oh we saw, I think over the years, over the operations, I probably saw half a dozen of those, I suppose, you know.
DK: So when, when you weren’t flying and you were off duty did — what did you do then? Did you and your crew socialise together? Or —
JS: Well, yes, yes. I mean, we often socialised, probably not all of you together. I mean, er, you bond in different ways really. I mean there’s seven of you. Well, er, in our crew our navigator was a bit of a quiet type and he, he never or hardly ever came out with us. I mean the rest of us were going down into Newark or the towns and having a night out but the navigator, he was an architect by profession, and he was a bit more quiet and he didn’t join us. But the skipper was a good, good Aussie, and he was the oldest member of the crew. He was early thirties. Well, I mean, we called him ‘dad’ because I was the second oldest member. I was twenty-three.
DK: Right.
JS: And — but he was a real Aussie and when you were out with him you had a good time, you know. We —
DK: Can you remember the pilot’s name?
JS: Yeah, Richter. Rod Richter, yeah.
DK: And how did you feel, feel about, um, those from the Commonwealth, Australia and wherever?
JS: Well, they were a terrific asset. I mean, we had a lot of Aussies, a lot New Zealanders as well, and Canadians, and they all mixed in with the rest of us very well, you know.
DK: And did you, did you stay in touch with your crew after the war?
JS: No and that was the big, big mistake I think perhaps a lot of us made. It was awfully sad. You say ‘Why didn’t you?’ Well, it didn’t happen. I don’t know why.
DK: Because presumably he went back to Australia?
JS: He went back to Australia, yeah, but I mean we were all good friends and there’s no reason why we shouldn’t have done but, for whatever reason, we didn’t, you know.
DK: And the rest of your crew were they all — well the Irish gunner — but were the rest of them all English then?
JS: Yeah. The navigator was from Stoke on Trent, the bomb aimer was from Llanelli in South Wales, the flight engineer was from New Malden in Surrey, the mid-upper gunner was from Hartlepool and the tail gunner was the Irishman from Belfast. So we were all around the British Isle.
DK: And, and some of the major raids then. You mention you few to Dresden?
JS: Dresden.
DK: And what, what was that like?
JS: Well, that was, of course — it was just one hell of a raid. I mean, we were bombing at midnight. We’d sort of — the Americans had been during the day and then the British were going at night. And I remember we were flying and we were flying over the Alps and we were getting iced up and we were getting a bit bothered, the skipper was a bit bothered, because we had to sort of reduce our height a bit from what the flight plan said but we were getting iced up rather badly. And then, of course, you could see the target miles away before you got there because, I mean, it was as you know, it was just one big blaze. And, er, actually over the target, I mean, there was a terrific amount of anti-aircraft fire and a lot of activity from night bomb— night fighters, you know, so you were getting quite a bit of hassle from one way or another but it was such a big raid that — but, there again, we were pretty fortunate. We missed anything of any serious consequence, you know.
DK: Did Dresden at the time stand out as anything? Or was it just another raid?
JS: Well, the reason we did the raid and I noted it in my log book. The reason — when we were being briefed we said the reason we were going, the Russians had pushed the German Army back and Dresden was absolutely full of the German Army, and that’s why we went to Dresden, as simple as that. And so you were sort of quite encouraged to think that there you were doing a target which you got the Germany Army there and wonderful, you know, just the job. You couldn’t have a better target with that sort of description, you know, but it was — it covered, it seemed to cover one hell of a big area, you know, because you’d see it, I don’t know, must have been at least a hundred miles away, must have been.
DK: Yeah.
JS: Because we were one hell of a height up, as you know. We were given the height we had to fly and all that sort of thing and we were sort of — well we were usually about anything between fourteen and sixteen thousand feet, I suppose, on average, and sometimes we’d been down as low as ten, you know.
DK: Yeah.
JS: And, er, but — I mean, all the raids you have you got sort of, obviously, a lot of apprehension because whilst you’re in the target area — when you consider that there’s two hundred of you going over one place in about twelve min— twelve, twenty minutes I should say, you’ve all got your bombing times, you know, H plus whatever, and when you think you’ve got — there’s two hundred of you going over that small area all in the same time and you’re stacked. And of course that was another job the wireless operator’d do. I had to stand, if the radio was OK, I had to stand on it and look through the astrodome and if we got our own aircraft with bomb doors open above us I gotta tell the skipper to dive port or starboard, you know.
DK: Did that ever happen at all? Did you actually see aircraft blown up?
JS: Yes. Well, I mean, we did that three or four times. Well, it happened quite often because, as you know, when you’ve got so many up more or less together, I mean, in fairly good layers, you know. And, particularly, it seemed to be the more trips you did the further down the stack you came, you see.
DK: Yeah.
JS: And so there was a big risk. I mean, we did lose — not our squadron but there were quite a lot of our aircraft lost through bombs from the ones above, you know. Because there isn’t much room. If you’ve got a bomber upstairs there and he’s getting set to load and let his load go, you know, and you’re just beneath, you’ve got to get out, you know, because otherwise you’ll soon get involved in it.
DK: Yeah, yeah. So the war’s come to an end then. What, what happened to you in the RAF then? Did you leave soon after?
JS: Well, I had a bit of a relaxing time because I was a flight sergeant and then I became a warrant officer because of the time and so I was on good money and very little to do. And the station near Ipswich and that’s where I met my wife.
DK: Ah.
JS: I met my wife in November 1945.
DK: Right.
JS: And so Ipswich was the nearest town. I was stationed at Woodbridge and Woodbridge actually was one of the stations with an emergency landing strip.
DK: Yeah, yeah.
JS: So I spent the rest of my time — I was actually working on the flying control tower signals, you know, and I didn’t have a lot to do really. I mean, as I say, it was — the end of the war, you see, fortunately VE Day came just as I’d done my 24th trip and that was the end of the war, you see, and there was nothing much for us to do except we’d obviously have a rest period anyway.
DK: When did you leave the RAF then?
JS: Oh, April 1946, yes.
DK: And did you go back to your previous career? Or —
JS: Yes, yes. I had my job kept open for me, you see.
DK: Oh, right. OK.
JS: In fact, I was released on the 3rd of April 1946 and on the 4th May I got married and so the next 4th of May it’s seventy years since we got married.
DK: Oh, congratulations. [slight laugh]
JS: So, our seventy years dear, isn’t it? [slight laugh] Unfortunately, my wife had a stroke four years ago and it affected her speech and so we, we haven’t been able to socialise these last four years like we usually do. It’s awful difficult. We have carers come in four times a day so — we’re social people and we miss that so much, you know. We haven’t had a holiday for six years. We sort of — it’s not as easy as it sounds, you know.
DK: How do you look back on that period of your life in the RAF then? Do you, do you think about it still? [unclear]
JS: I — it sounds silly in a way but I enjoyed it, er, not because it was a war but the spirit of the RAF. I enjoyed being in the RAF. And, er, no I thoroughly enjoyed it from that point of view, yeah. I mean, I did consider whether I should stay in but, of course, if you wanted to stay in you had to reduce two ranks and I was a warrant officer I didn’t want to go back down to being a sergeant. So anyway, as it happens, I’m still working as an account. I’m ninety-five in August.
DK: And you’re still working?
JS: I’m still working.
DK: Oh excellent. [slight laugh]
JS: So, you know —
DK: [laugh] That’s good.
JS: Oh no. The brain keeps ticking over.
DK: That’s amazing.
JS: And people still pay me so —
DK: Well, we’ll stop there.
JS: Yeah.
DK: I think that’s probably enough.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Jack Smith
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
David Kavanagh
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-08
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Sound
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
ASmithJG160408, PSmithJG1601, PSmithJG1602
Conforms To
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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00:29:00 audio recording
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Iraq
England--Blackpool
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Herefordshire
England--Lancashire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Warwickshire
England--Wiltshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Suffolk
Germany
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
1945-02
1940-09
1943-12
1946-03
Description
An account of the resource
Jack volunteered for the Royal Air Force (RAF) in September 1940. He went to Padgate and then on to Blackpool where he trained as a wireless operator. Jack proceeded to a radio school at RAF Compton Bassett and then RAF Bramcote. He was posted to Iraq, doing ground operating rather than flying. He eventually returned to the UK for aircrew training. Jack was posted to radio school at RAF Manley and qualified in December 1943. He went to the advanced flying unit in North Wales and then the Operational Training Unit at RAF Silverstone where he met his crew. This was followed by the heavy conversion unit at RAF Winthorpe on Stirling aircraft. Jack went to RAF Scampton to convert onto Lancasters and a Lancaster Finishing School near Newark.
In October 1944 Jack was posted to 189 Squadron at RAF Fulbeck. His first three trips were aborted. He carried out 24 operations and two semi-operational trips (leaflets dropping and a diversion to confuse German radar). Several operations were to railway marshalling yards in Germany. He also describes an operation to Gdynia in Poland and the Dresden operation and its rationale.
Jack discusses the main duties of the wireless operator, his experience of ‘scarecrows’ and the difficulty of flying at night in close proximity to other aircraft.
When the war ended, Jack became warrant officer and was stationed at RAF Woodbridge, working on flying control tower signals. He left the RAF in April 1946 and returned to his job as trainee chartered accountant.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sally Coulter
189 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
crewing up
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Operational Training Unit
perception of bombing war
RAF Bramcote
RAF Compton Bassett
RAF Fulbeck
RAF Scampton
RAF Silverstone
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodbridge
RAF Yatesbury
Scarecrow
Stirling
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/660/9268/EGortonHGortonLCM441010.1.jpg
ee694473851b2cff16b6de79c10fd473
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Gorton, Harold
Description
An account of the resource
136 items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader Harold Gorton (1914 - 1944, 120984, Royal Air Force) and contains eight photographs and 126 letters to his wife and family. Harold Gorton studied at Oxford, and throughout his time in the RAF he continued studying law. He completed a tour of operations as a pilot in 1941 and was then posted as an instructor to RAF Cark. He returned to operations with 49 Squadron stationed at RAF Fulbeck in 1944. He was killed 11/12 November 1944 during an operation to Harburg.<br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Mair Gorton and Ian Gorton, and catalogued by Barry Hunter. <br /><br />Additional information on Harold Gorton is available via the <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/108964/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-05-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Gorton, H
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Fiskerton,
10/10/44.
Dearest,
I thought I’d better write to you as I don’t know when I shall be able to go & see you. I’m not very busy, but I’m not getting sufficient free time to be able to get away.
I hope you got back safely on Sunday. I felt afterwards that I was rather a heel in making you go back on your own, & I’m sorry, darling. To my surprise, when I got to the Sergeants’ Mess, I found that you were expected, because they told me that they’d saved supper for the Group Captain & his wife, & for you & me. Still, I don’t think you’d have enjoyed the party; it wasn’t my cup of tea at all.
I hope everything is going well with you, & I’ll be over as soon as I possibly can.
All my love,
Harold.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Letter from Harold Gorton to his wife
Description
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Harold Gorton writes about his wife's departure and a party she missed.
Creator
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Harold Gorton
Date
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1944-10-10
Format
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One handwritten sheet
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Correspondence
Identifier
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EGortonHGortonLCM441010
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Temporal Coverage
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1944-10
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
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Tricia Marshall
aircrew
military living conditions
military service conditions
pilot
RAF Fiskerton
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/701/10102/ABeckettPC180317.1.mp3
d8e89c29fd5e9a78d9de74b886763975
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Beckett, Peter Cyril
P C Beckett
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Peter Beckett (b. 1925 1869405 Royal Air Force).
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-03-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Beckett, PC
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
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DB: Today I’m interviewing Peter Cyril Beckett in his home at Holywell Row. It’s the 17th of March 2018 and the time is 1500 hours. Peter, would you like to tell me a little bit about your life with Bomber Command?
PB: Certainly. Yes. I am ninety two years old, and my name is Peter and I was born in Mildenhall in December 1925. For a long time I had wanted to put in writing my tribute to the amazing fortitude, courage and self-sacrifice of the wartime serving aircrews of Bomber Command 1939 to ’45 jokingly referred to as the Brylcreem boys during the Phoney War and ultimately Bomber Harris’ Bomber Boys. The Command had an abundance of coded slang in place of everyday words. Many incredible facts apply to the aircrew. Firstly, every one of them was a volunteer. There were no, there was no going back on the deal. They were committed. If the RAF didn’t want them they had to throw them out unceremoniously. In all my years I never met one aircrew member who wanted to give up his job. My association with Bomber Command began in 1940, just after I had joined the local Air Training Corps Cadets at my home town in Mildenhall. It was 301 Bury St Edmunds Squadron and I was only fifteen. Our local Air Training Corps voluntary, volunteer officer Flight Lieutenant Parker was a former Royal Flying Corps officer from the World War 1914 to ’18, and with, and was well acquainted with the group captain of RAF Mildenhall, one mile from my home and I had, and I suspect also acquainted with other officers of 3 Group Bomber Command which was also at the RAF station. In any event it transpired that a limited number of Cadets could on weekends facilitate their training and instruction on the station including some station duties. Full marks to our Air Training Corps Squadron instructors. They trained us twice a week at our local school. We got our uniforms, learned the Morse code, did dead reckoning navigation, did square bashing to a high standard. So, it was at the tender age of fifteen but with a war on, and it was 1940 I found myself on RAF Mildenhall bomber station in 1940, having marched from the guardroom at the gate to the parachute section. And among a dozen of my colleagues in the Air Training Corps following some quick instructions on the, on the fitting of parachute harnesses and carrying, and carrying the chute in a pack he, including a warning from the equipment, parachute equipment staff the dire consequences of touching the release handle we then marched, not so smartly this time because of the, of the parachutes to the grassy side entrance to Number 1 Hangar, and were dismissed to wait on the grass while the aircrews inside on duty held their briefing in one of the hangar rooms. I imagine a few ribald remarks about baby minding and a lot of, ‘what next,’ in inverted commas were expressed within [pause] and a few of the aircrew were peering through the anti-blast strips of the windows of the room to see what sort of rabble was awaiting them outside. By the time they came out from the briefing we were lined up either side of the entrance. A motley crew of the long, the short and the tall draped with, with canopy canvas straps. The keenness and the feeling of expectation must have aroused the aircrew and convinced them that there that was no going back and so with good grace individual members of the crew picked three or four dozen of the Cadets to accompany them to the newly arrived driver, WAAF driver’s truck. Some of the lads were too small to make it up to the back of the Bedford QL, especially incumbered with their chute bag and harnesses so a playful, there was a playful heave up from the, by the crews who obviously were beginning to enjoy the diversion. As each dispersal is reached the waggon disgorged, disgorged two or three Cadets with their crew of six or seven members, where some adjustments were made to the Cadet’s safety equipment. Then to entering the Wellington bomber supervised by a crew member. The engines are running up on test and Cadets were told to stand as near the main spar in the centre of the aircraft and shown where to hold on to and to remain there during the taxiing and take off, and to move only when told to do so. Cadets would, cadets were advised to hold their hands over their ears during the engine run up and take off which was not an easy task and holding at the same time. There was no issue of flying helmets or ear guards. And this, this flying each weekend continued all through 1940, 1941, ’42 and ’43. Many hours flying with operational Bomber Command crews. Squadrons stationed at Mildenhall included 149 OJ squadron, number 15 LS squadron, 622 GI, 622 Squadron, 419 Squadron VR. The wonderful aircraft Vickers Wellington, Short Stirlings, Lancasters. All flew in all those aircraft during those years. And there were two station aircraft however in which I never flew and they were the Gloster Gladiators of the Meteorological Flight which flew every morning near dawn in rain, hail or snow to provide a local forecast. The flights, the Cadet flights with operational crews could last anything between an hour to three. Mostly they were known as night flying tests. It was a test to prove every operational, every operational function connected with the aircraft was in full order for the night’s operation. Not always the, was the crew carrying out the air test the same crew to fly the aircraft on operations that night but it would most likely be the case. Through the years I learned a lot from these, these men. After three years I became a Senior Cadet flight sergeant and in wartime there was the ability to grow up quickly. These young flyers were only a few years older than myself, and I could perceive that for all their horseplay between themselves there was a deadly serious attitude. An attitude with, with some rigidly serious rules. Rule one was don’t ever let the side down. Rule two was give your crew one hundred percent support. Put your crew first in all your decisions. And I realised it was because each man believed that it was only his colleagues that could save him from death. This I realised was indeed logical thinking. These gallant, grave men that were called the bomber boys. The pilot’s skill saved the lives of many crews. Witness Middleton VC. Air gunners have shot down numerous FW190s, ME109s, and 110 night fighters about to perform the coup de gras with a bomber. A wireless operator finding a beacon with the aircraft lost in fog even on training missions for example. The navigator who provides a vital plot to avoid enemy flak concentrations. The bomb aimer making a decision for the pilot to abort the bomb run and go around again. To think every bomber crew had a right. It was their crew that was most, that was most essential to their survival. Turning to these cadet flights organised at weekends between 1940 and ’44, not all were night flying tests. Some as I remember were cross country and even local flying. These, these were helpful to new crews from Operational Conversion Units, or even overseas crews new to the station. This suited us Cadets admirably because we loved looking on our familiar countryside bird’s eye view. But more exciting flying was after ’42 and ’43 in the beautiful Lancasters, especially on fighter affiliation. At six to eight thousand feet enter the Spitfire. We are taking turns in the astrodome. We have been searching the blue sky paying special attention to the fluffy white clouds but have seen nothing, but through the borrowed helmet we hear the rear gunner call, ‘4 o’clock high, skipper.’ Prepare [unclear] skipper. Prepare to dive. Left. Left.’ Before we’d done, before we fall I think, shortly before we fall I think I saw a moving dot. How did that rear gunner see that speck? Would he see, what would he, how would he see it in the dark? On a dark night over Germany. Also, not every weekend did we fly. Some weekends we gave support to the ground crew. Ground crews. We rode around on the bomb trolleys towed by tractors and helping with the bombing up was good, good fun in good weather but serving on the airfield in bad weather was tougher. On occasions the whole flight of Cadets were allowed to be present at take-off for a night raid. One such night we were allowed to go to be in the control room of the control tower for a raid on Duisburg [pause] Yeah. That’s it.
[recording paused]
PB: In 1943, April 1943, I was at last able to attend a interview in Cambridge for my application for aircrew to join aircrew in the RAF and I attended an interview and medical in Cambridge. And my result was passing medically fit, A1, for pilot, navigator or bomb aimer category. And now I have to await now before I’m called up to the Aircrew Recruiting Centre. In effect, I, I didn’t much like the waiting game. Forty, forty, all through the beginning of 1943 but was only too pleased that at last news had come through that I was ok to enter the RAF as aircrew. And then on, after another long wait on the 24th of June I did receive my papers for calling, call up papers to go to the Aircrew Receiving Centre in London, and I went to, it was unfortunate that only the week previously the, the Doodlebug buzz bomb threat started in London and had been, the flying bombs had been landing all the previous week. Nevertheless, I was only too pleased to get on the road to the RAF and sure enough I found that we were to be billeted right in the heart of the city at St John’s Wood, a short distance from Lord’s Cricket Ground, on the Prince of Wales Road near Regent’s Park in a empty hotel called Viceroy Court. The situation to be in London in the wonderful city was dampened somewhat by the debris and ruins and bomb damage, but wasn’t helped at all by the fact that very shortly we were subjected to another onslaught of flying bombs which were different to the enemy bombers which I’d heard over in Suffolk which only droned over. These were devils of the sky which cut their motors and then we waited, holding our breath for the blast explosion. But training had to go on and we paraded in the streets for our marching. We marched to the dining, our dining place for meals. We went to the swimming pool for our physical training and also running in Regent’s Park for PT. We had to get used to the, a whistle which meant that we immediately had, if we were in marching, running we had to disperse immediately and lay flat every time that the whistle blew for an air raid alarm. In all we had some narrow escapes with, with the flying bombs landing. One, one particularly in the opposite side of the street where our billets were and my kit bag tied up with all my worldly goods had to be abandoned after the raid because it was full of splintered glass that had penetrated the whole of the kit bag and all my kit was rubbished. And we, we then had to stay there for our training for a further eight weeks with the flying bomb menace day and night which meant that we also had many extra pickets to, to go on duty. Fire picket, pickets spotting on the roof of the hotel and to give warning for others to take cover, and even we had to mount pickets in the military hospital which was in Baker Street. A converted building in Baker Street. All in all, we were looking forward to the end of our eight week course and passing out. Leaving, leaving London in August ’44 the next stop was to be the Initial Training Wing, where we learned further skills and learned further, oh —
[recording paused]
PB: For our next stage of training which was to leave St John’s Wood and the flying bombs we were all trained to, put on train, trains to go to peaceful Yorkshire. What a change from London was the seaside Yorkshire town of Bridlington and its sunny beaches. We were, that we had then to do a course for further training on deflection of firing. Firing guns, and further drilling, and the learning the Morse code, sending and receiving. It was to be an eight, a further eight week course. One we were billeted in civilian empty, or civilian boarding houses on the front. Four of us to a room. The rooms were very sparse. One electric lightbulb was the whole of the furniture in the room and of course the RAF beds. Our food. We received our food by queuing and going to the local Spa on the seafront but we were soon recovering from our experiences in London except for one thing. The Halifaxes, as they landed or took off for a raid, or came home from raids were very disturbing for us. Having been so used to the flying bomb and it’s cut off engine we almost fell out of bed when the Halifaxes came over before we realised it wasn’t going to stop its engine and plunge on us. Apart from that the weather was fine, the shooting on the beach with shotguns to learn us deflection was fun, and apart from one thing, one obvious fault was that I succumbed to, and along with six other airmen to a bout of dysentery which was supposedly caught from an airman who had returned from the far, from the Middle East.
[recording paused]
I finished off in a lovely country house outside Bridlington for convalescence, or for treatment in the RAF sick bay. So, in 1944, October 1944 the course at, at Bridlington for the Initial Training Wing was ended. And having passed out on the, on the ITW we expected to move on further on the flying course but unfortunately, it was not to be because the radio school which was our next step for, for our course for signaller wireless operator air gunner was fully booked up and unable to take any more trainees. So, in the interim period we were to be placed on a course for a ground trade which was going to be a driver’s course on a mechanical transport course for drivers. So, we were to move from Bridlington to, of all places another seaside venue, Blackpool which was where we were to receive further training for, to become drivers of mechanical transports. The, the stay, my sixth day in the hospital as a result of catching the dysentery bug meant that I was with a different flight of, of trainees for this move to Blackpool and during the month of October the whole flight was entrained to, to journey to Blackpool. So, we moved to, the flight moved to, to Blackpool and the accommodation was to be the same as we had experienced at Bridlington in that we also were to be billeted in civilian boarding houses which were empty other than for, for RAF. The RAF having taken over the empty boarding houses and my billet was in Hornby Road in the centre. The training was to be, we understood done with Hillman cars and was to learn to pass proficiency in driving and the course began with driving the Hillman RAF staff car. After four weeks of doing all the tests, and passing the tests on, on driving cars, we were once more on the move and the movement order was given in the middle of November, and on the timing was to leave by the railway station in the dark November evening. The whole flight of thirty to forty airmen marched through the streets of Blackpool, full kit, carrying their kit bags, and in full marching order. Three, in ranks of three. For some reason the local populace, sightseers and holiday makers decided to line the route and give the boys a send-off mistakenly thinking that they were going to be embarking on the second front. Unfortunately, we were only moving to Wiltshire but we marched in full order never the less. So, after marching to the railway station at Blackpool, on board we get with all our kit and we each carrying our loaded kit bags, in great coats. Not the best way of travelling. Not the easiest. The train is absolutely full up with our RAF men and we’ve got a longish journey, a slow journey to Melksham in Wiltshire. Finally arriving at Melksham we’re transported to the, to the RAF Melksham and starting a new driving course which will be more advanced than what we have passed through at Blackpool, and the first introduction comes with the, a bigger vehicle to drive and, but the main interest with most of the airmen is driving the RAF armoured vehicle. A tank like vehicle with only a slit viewing screen from the front to drive by which means the travelling at a terrific speed when you’re only going slowly, and incidentally missing corners or misjudging corners as one of our pupils destroys a wall in Devizes. But everybody carries, enjoyed the course, and most passed it. But we are still waiting to get to a radio school, which is our next objective and proceed with our training for wireless operator air gunners.
[recording paused]
Before leaving the course at Melksham the whole, the whole curriculum had to be gone through and passed on vehicles from small light vans up to Crossley bomb tenders and, and large Bedford lorries. A lot of driving was done in convoys and, and particularly the Crossley vintage lorries were of World War One vintage and had gears that needed double, the use of the double clutch and gate gear so, but that was finally passed and still there was no news of leaving for the Number 4 Radio School to which we were awaiting. So nevertheless, apart from a final test for the practical side of the driver’s course, identifying various engine parts the, the whole flight were presented with a list in Daily Routine Orders of the various postings which would apply while the flight was waiting for the radio course. On inspection I found that RAF Mildenhall was one of the postings that could be applied for and I told my, my particular friend, Skid Archer who I knew lived in Ipswich if he would like to go and join me and get posted to Mildenhall, which would still be in Suffolk. And he agreed to do so and so we both put in for a posting to RAF Mildenhall. and eventually the postings came through. And so again I was to be on the move, this time with my best mate Skid, Sam in brackets, Archer. While posted in Melksham I was, I was confronted with this information that, that I could ask for a posting to RAF Mildenhall and so my friend, my best mate Skid Archer and I both put in and we found the next day that that posting application had been successful. And so, my next move will be back home to Suffolk from Wiltshire, and, and stationed near enough home to go home for a NAAFI break. And so the next move was to RAF Mildenhall. A bomber station. Skid and I both settled down to life at Mildenhall. I found I couldn’t get home as I had expected, every day of the week. The embargo was placed on the personnel if there were operations taking place on that day or that night the whole base, the whole camp were confined to, as they put it, confined to barracks. So to get home from the short distance of only two and a half miles just wasn’t possible and I had to stay on base with my friend Skid. We were, we were billeted in one of the airmen blocks and we had both been booked in at the mechanical transport depot and department. There we had the experience of sitting in a waiting room like a lot of taxi drivers. In with the woolly old sweats who were there and had been there for years just waiting to see what the corporal sitting behind a desk in a, in one side of the room was going to come up with for, for driving jobs for us. And it wasn’t long before Skid was called up and given a, a form to, for the application for transport and the details of which vehicle to have, where to pick up the passenger and where to go. And we found this quite, quite nerve wracking at first because we didn’t know what we would have to go and take out of the, out of the compound to drive, or where we would have to drive it to and if we would know where to go. I was fairly confident that if there was anywhere off base there was no problem. I would know. I would know the whole district but not always would I know where on the base, or on the camp that we were expected to take the vehicles. As the days went by we, it became easier and easier for us. Notably one of the first jobs we had were to pick up explosive bombs from the bomb dump at RAF Barnham and transport them back to the bomb dump at RAF Mildenhall. And of course I knew the way to Barnham but I had no idea what sort of job it would be carrying high explosives. In the end accompanied by an older driver or one of the other drivers I took a Austin flat back bomb tender and drove to Barnham and had to reverse down the embankments to the sidings where the railway wagons were unloading and they unloaded eight or twelve bombs, thousand pounders, high explosives on to the tender at the back. I was amazed to find that the wooden floor of the bomb tender was all that was going to support these heavy weight bombs. And, and I was also amazed that the, the armourers were, that were loading the bombs up made sure the bombs didn’t roll off the vehicle or about the vehicle by hammering four inch nails into the floor, the floorboards of the trailer in order to, to support and keep the bombs from rolling against each other. And, but the, it seemed to work and although the load was very heavy once the bomb, the lorry was loaded we met with all the success we required. Except, following that on that the week or so after when I became quite adept at, at procuring these bombs and securing them I was asked to take a trailer on the Austin tender, also fully loaded with bombs and on the return journey taking a corner in the village of Barnham I found that the trailer had come off with a load of bombs on it and embedded the tow bar into the grassy bank and this caused quite some concern. But the breakdown crane from the base, from the camp came out, and virtually pulled the trailer out and refixed it on, and all was sailing again. The, I didn’t realise how, how dangerous a job the ground crew on the, on the camp in operations, and on operations how dangerous their work was until I joined permanently the armoury section staff as an MT driver. Not an armourer but as an MT driver and realised then the conditions and the danger that they worked under. I was only the driver for the sergeant in charge of B Flight, 622 Squadron and my job was to drive him around night and day all around the perimeter of the of the airfield from dispersal to dispersal and back to armoury sorting all the necessary bombing up and de-bombing work that had to be done. But the conditions in the middle of the night in December were, had to be seen to be believed. Especially one night, especially when things just did not go well. Did not go right. In connection with my new job as driver for the sergeant in charge of B Flight Armoury Section, and the bombing up of the Lancasters of 622 Squadron for operations I realised that every Lancaster had two crews. The crew that were in charge of her in the air and the crew who were in charge of her on the ground. But this particular night the huge black Lanny stands alone after two small vehicles a Hillman car, canvas backed Hillman van and, melting into the darkness a couple of armed guards. Other kites, RAF for planes, kites have returned successfully from the raid and they are at their respective dispersals all around the airfield where lights show their, their ground crews fussing around them. Working on them through the night. But T-Tommy stands in darkness seemingly abandoned. But not quite, we see. There’s an aircrew Cadet, that’s me, driver of the canvas backed Hillman, and the sergeant, that’s my sergeant, the armourer of 622 Squadron and we are peering up at the bomb doors of T-Tommy with a torch. They have, we have been called out to deal with a problem, and unusually on a squadron where the motto is, “We Wage War at Night,” every night operation over enemy territory in [pause] every night operation over enemy territory instigates problems. But this one is extremely unusual. A high explosive bomb, fully primed and fused is resting on the bomb doors only which are three to four inches apart, and give every sign of further widening. The sergeant has checked the hydraulic system would hold the doors but with the weight of the thousand pounder it wasn’t entirely predictable. He decided the only safe answer was to defuse the device. Once the aircrew bomb aimer had selected the bombs and pressed the bomb release the bombs were fused. Each bomb had two fused, two fuses. A tail fuse which operated as the bomb fell through the space and a nose fuse which operated on impact. The bomb was lethal, and by the light of the torch that was held it looked a khaki green ominous monster. As we inspected both ends by the light of the torch, had the land lights and the land lights from tractors diverted away, their lights reflected into our eyes and caused the dark shadows. Dark shadows. A torch was the only answer. We needed a powerful light concentrated on the specific point to, to a specific point. All I had, had to do was to direct the service torch to his instructions. To my relief he decided to commence with removing the tail fuse. It seemed an age to complete and despite the freezing conditions we both had to remove our leather jerkins. We were, we were sweating and had to remove them. It was amazing to see how he worked with only enough room to get his wrists through the gap of the bomb doors and used the tools of his trade. I passed and received them as per, as per his instructions as well as directing the torch. When he finally removed the tail fuse and made that safe, after this time seemed to go much faster as we moved to the nose of the monster. This time when the fuse came out I was given vital instruction to place it in, on the ground with great care which I did very gingerly. The whole operation must have taken two hours but it seemed to me like two days. In fact, at that stage I seemed to be in a daze. I dimly remember everybody moving back behind any sort of cover, and the sergeant being given the doubtful honour of entering T-Tommy and releasing the bomb doors. Also walking over to the monster lounging in its, walking over to the monster laying in its own depression in the tarmac of the dispersal bay. The question is how had the aircraft flown back from Germany with the high explosive thousand pounder rolling on the bomb doors? How had it had made a successful approach and landing without the crew’s knowledge, plus taxiing to the dispersal? Who made the decision not to open the bomb doors which was the normal practice on return to the dispersal after a raid? Why didn’t the sergeant armourer receive some recognition for his courageous action? Why is there no record of the incident in station orders? What was the risk factor of a chain reaction to the explosion of a heavy high explosive thousand pounder bomb exploding among bombed up aircraft, including the station bomb dump and final filled fuel storage tanks? In fact, a conflagration. A conflagration. In such a conflagration how much damage would have occurred to the village and its population? Yeah. After the experience of working on and living with the ground crew personnel on a wartime bomber base such as RAF Mildenhall it became very noticeable to me how important bombing operations with the RAF was considered. Firstly, the security position so that everybody, all personnel on, on the station were, were aware of something big occurring and nobody ever interfered or objected or, or put anything to stop the operation taking place. People could be put under jurisdiction of a court martial if they did anything that prevented the base from supplying the number and providing the aircraft for that operation. It was very, so very important and it was an importance that was felt by every person on the base. Every person on the station. Cooks, parachute packers, fitters, instrument repairers, petrol tank drivers, MT drivers. Everybody had to bow to the god of operations. This, and this occurred every day. Every day, because every night there were the operations from the stations and that applied all through 1940, ‘41, ‘42, ‘43, ‘44 and ’45. Of a driver on the MT transport, for instance that was transporting Window, packets of Window to be dropped by the Lancasters on the forthcoming raid inadvertently reversed the back of his Bedford truck in to the side of the door of the Lancaster and dented the, just two dents either side of the door completely accidentally. He was immediately took to the guardroom and the last thing we knew he was posted away simply because he’d that accident that prevented that aircraft from being airworthy to fly on the night’s raid. Such was the, such was the power of the operation of a bombing mission.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Interview with Peter Cyril Beckett
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Denise Boneham
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-03-17
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Sound
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
ABeckettPC180317
Conforms To
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Pending review
Pending revision of OH transcription
Format
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01:04:57 audio recording
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
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eng
Description
An account of the resource
Peter Beckett grew up in Mildenhall village. He attended the local Air Training Corps which enabled him to visit the airfield and take the opportunity to have air test flights with operational aircrews and help the ground staff with their work. He volunteered for the RAF and was selected for aircrew training but while awaiting the signals course to begin he was posted back to Blackpool for driver training. He was then posted to RAF Melksham for advanced driver training. He was posted back to Mildenhall and became the driver for the sergeant in charge of B Flight Armoury. This meant that on one occasion Peter had to assist the armoury sergeant to defuse a bomb that was still contained in the bomb bay of a Lancaster.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944-10
1945
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Suffolk
England--Wiltshire
England--London
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Julie Williams
622 Squadron
bomb disposal
ground personnel
Lancaster
RAF Melksham
service vehicle
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/583/10641/OHolmesGH187788-161021-020001.1.jpg
32b1e13333df61cc7ccf09227913ab82
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/583/10641/OHolmesGH187788-161021-020002.1.jpg
1d649146093f26efab7d597e4b03b12a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Holmes, George
George Henry Holmes
G H Holmes
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Holmes, GH
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. An oral history interview with Pilot Officer George Holmes (b. 1922, 1579658, 187788 Royal Air Force) his log book, records of operation, newspaper cuttings and photographs of personnel. He flew operations as a wireless operator / air gunner with 9, 50 and 83 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by George Holmes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins
Date
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2016-10-21
2017-01-14
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Transcription
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[underlined] SORTIE RECORD SHEET [/underlined]
Number 187788 Rank P/O Name HOLMES Aircrew Category WOP/AIR.
PRESENT GROUP NUMBER 5. SQUADRON 83 POSTED IN w.e.f. 2.4.44
[underlined] PREVIOUS RECORD [/underlined]
[underlined] TOUR No. [/underlined] 1 [underlined] IN GROUP NUMBER [/underlined] 5 [underlined] UNIT OR SQUADRON NUMBER [/underlined] 50
SORTIES COMPLETED [underlined] TYPE OF AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
2nd Pilot 1st Pilot Other categories than Pilot LANC III
[underlined] Date commenced : [/underlined] 3.6.44
[underlined] Date finished : [/underlined]
[underlined] TOUR No. [/underlined] [underlined] IN GROUP NUMBER [/underlined] [underlined] UNIT OR SQUADRON NUMBER [/underlined]
SORTIES COMPLETED [underlined] TYPE OF AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
2nd Pilot 1st Pilot Other categories than Pilot
[underlined] Date commenced : [/underlined]
[underlined] Date finished : [/underlined]
[page break]
(*14892-13366) Wt. 18766-Q1152 20M 6/44 T.S. 700
(*15456-13366) Wt. 35557-Q2668 60M 10/44 T.S. 700 [underlined] CURRENT RECORD [/underlined]
TOUR No. ONE IN SQUADRON No.
DATE 1 TYPE OF AIRCRAFT 2 AIRCRAFT LETTER 3 SORTIE No. 4 TARGET 5 6 REMARKS, including reasons for :- (i) Failure to complete sortie; (ii) Ceasing to operate in, or leaving, current squadron (e.g. missing, posted, killed, etc.) 7
(1) 19.8.44 (2) LANC III (3) - (4) 16 (5) LA PALLICE (6) C (7)
(1) 10.9.44 (2) LANC III (3) - (4) 17 (5) LA HERVE (6) C (7)
(1) 17.9.44 (2) LANC III (3) - (4) 18 (5) BREMERHAVEN (6) C (7)
(1) 19.9.44 (2) LANC III (3) - (4) 19 (5) M. GLADBACH (6) C (7)
(1) 23.10.44 (2) LANC III (3) - (4) 20 (5) FLUSHING (6) C (7)
(1) 13.1.45 (2) LANC III (3) H (4) 21 (5) POLITZ (6) C (7) FF2
(1) 7.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) J (4) 22 (5) DORTMUND-EMS (6) C (7) FF2
(1) 8.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) J (4) 23 (5) POLETZ (6) C (7) FF1
(1) 13.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) D (4) 24 (5) DRESDEN (6) C (7) FF1
(1) 14.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) D (4) 25 (5) ROSITZ (6) C (7) FF1
(1) 23.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) D (4) 26 (5) HORTEN (SHIPS) (6) C (7) FF1
(1) 21.3.45 (2) LANC III (3) S (4) 27 (5) HAMBURG (6) C (7) FF2
(1) 8.4.45 (2) LANC III (3) U (4) 28 (5) LUTZKENDORF (6) C (7) FF1
(1) 17.4.45 (2) LANC III (3) W (4) 29 (5) CHAM (6) C (7) FF3
(1) 1.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) C (4) 30 (5) SIEGEN (6) C (7)
(1) 2.2.45 (2) LANC III (3) J (4) 31 (5) KARLSRUHE (6) C (7)
POSTED FROM THIS SQUADRON ON (Date) TO
If the sheet is completed in respect of a pilot, insert a star in column (4) against sorties as second pilot.
In column (6) insert C if sortie was completed.
NC if sortie was not completed.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
George Holmes sortie record sheet 83 Squadron
Description
An account of the resource
A Sortie Record Sheet dated from 19 August 1944 to 17 March 1945. Relating to Pilot Officer George Holmes’ service as a Wireless Operator/Air Gunner with 83 Squadron. The sheet records 16 operations, all of which are recorded as being on Lancaster Mk 3.
Format
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Two page form document filled in
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
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OHolmesGH187788-161021-02
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-08
1944-09
1944-10
1945-01
1945-02
1945-03
1945-04
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
France--La Rochelle
France--Le Havre
Germany--Altenburg (Thuringia)
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Siegen
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Horten
Poland--Szczecin
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
5 Group
83 Squadron
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 3
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1005/10746/AColbeckJC170524.1.mp3
523a16a235ce2e945b8a2efc683102c5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wenham, John
J Wenham
Description
An account of the resource
46 items. An oral history interview with Joy Colbeck (b. 1923) about her brother John Wenham (1925 - 1945, 1894709 Royal Air Force) documents and a family photograph album. He flew as an air gunner but was killed in a training accident 4 January 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Joy Colbeck and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle. <br /><br />Additional information on John Wenham is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/124831/ ">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-05-24
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Wenham, J
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
CB: My name Is Chris Brockbank and today is the 24th of May 2017 and I am in Luton with Joy Colbeck and we’re going to talk about initially Joy’s experience in the war in the Royal Navy as a Wren but principally we’re talking about the experience of her younger brother who was killed on a training flight in the RAF and, in a crash near North Marston near Aylesbury in Buckinghamshire. So, Joy, what are your earliest recollections of early life?
JC: Well, I think it was recollections were moving house. I remember the house I was born in and my brother was born in. When we were about six or seven we moved to the next road to a slightly bigger house.
CB: In Maidstone.
JC: In Maidstone. All the time my father was a second in command in the grocery shop to Mr Henry Topley, his partner. And my father was, ran the business by his hard work. Mr Topley used to wear a top hat, stand outside and take the customers to the pay desk etcetera but, but my father was the one who drove the van, and he went to all the biggest houses in our part of Kent. Castles. Boarding schools. Had to pick, to pick up the orders from the cookhouse keepers, take them back to the shop, and a fortnight later my father would drive the van and deliver them back to the big houses before all, all mass buying. And so my brother, my brother never seemed to be part of this performance because he was always two years younger than me if you know what I mean. He, he took second, played second fiddle really. He [pause] I don’t remember him. He was a Boy Scout and all the way up and on, on the, we have a photograph here of his War Memorial, my brother’s death, in the Scout camp next to Guy Gibson who was a friend of Scout Master and practicing for the —
CB: The dam’s raid.
JC: The dams.
CB: Yes.
JC: On the Scout master’s lake. In his garden. But that’s beside the point but my brother was, he did it. He, my brother for some reason and we never know, we never got to the end he, he could not read. Now, we find this, I find this extremely difficult. He was [pause] I had left school and had been to secretarial college and was working at County Hall when my brother left school, because the school became a hospital and we were in a war zone. Whatever’s the word. Not war zone, is it? It was [pause] that we were in, it was, yeah, I suppose you’d say it was a war zone in England really, and was treated as such. My father was the chief air raid warden so he knew what was going on. And my brother just got on his bicycle and followed every Spitfire that was shot down and every German plane that was shot down. That was his whole interest in life that I remember. When I used to come home from work we used to say, ‘What have you got hold of today?’ And it was a bit of plastic or something which they all sat down, this little group of boys and made a little cottage out of the, out of the plastic windows. And he didn’t have a lot of friends and when, when his school closed my mother was so worried. He was in elementary school. He couldn’t pass any grammar school at all. And his reading and writing was extremely bad, but of course nobody took much notice of it and we wondered if he was dyslexic would he have been discovered by the RAF? How on earth did he become a bomber when he couldn’t read when he was thirteen?
CB: Extraordinary.
JC: I don’t know. Nobody ever mentions it. But he was, he was a nice boy. He was a lovely boy. People liked him but he, he didn’t shine. He didn’t shine at anything. So when he left school it would have been [pause] 1941 I suppose. I was seventeen in 1941. ’42, the school would have closed and my mother just had a tutor for him and my father got him a job in the brewery next to the shop, the grocery shop. Style and Winch’s brewery. And he worked in the lab washing bottles I suppose. But I don’t know. I’ve got a big gap because I wasn’t there.
CB: So, at seventeen what did you do?
JC: At seventeen I volunteered for the Wrens.
CB: Right.
JC: I left my job at County Hall and was supposed to go in the Wrens with my best friend who as soon as we got to London said she didn’t want to go and she became a Land Girl and I became a Wren. And they put me, I had no preliminary war training whatsoever. They sent me a letter saying, and a railway ticket to report to [pause] I was just going to say Paddington. It wasn’t Paddington. To the, to go to Lowestoft to report to HMS Minos as a writer to the captain. A writer meaning a shorthand typist but the rank is writer [pause] and I wasn’t welcomed. I was the first Wren and they didn’t want me because they were regular sailors. They weren’t service, there was no conscription in to the Navy at that time so they didn’t really want the Wrens but they got them. And so by the time I would get home on a weekend’s leave all the way by train across London and back by train down to Kent there wasn’t much left of a forty eight Wren’s pass getting there, and I didn’t see a lot of my brother. All I got was that he was working at Style and Winches. He was doing quite well in, in the brewery section and the next thing was that he had volunteered. He volunteered. He wasn’t conscripted. Volunteered for the RAF. And I think I only saw him two or three times after that. I, I’m trying to think how many times I saw him back. Not a lot.
[telephone ringing]
CB: I’ll just stop there.
[recording paused]
JC: And of course then we got, we got, I got shifted from up in Norfolk back down in to London to HMS Pembroke which is all the Wrens working in London. Whitehall. And I stayed there until I went to Westcliff on Sea which was a holding base for sailors waiting for Dunkirk, not Dunkirk, for D-Day. But I spent nearly two years in London.
CB: What were you doing in London?
[pause]
CB: What were you doing in London?
JC: Well, I just worked in in offices. Office job. And —
CB: Secretarial.
JC: I also, I did one interesting thing. I, because I had worked very hard on the setting up this, I’d been promoted to leading Wren and I was working very hard on the setting up of this holding camp and we had a lot of rather important people on the staff there. And we, the whole of Westcliff on Sea Promenade and the roads adjacent to the Promenade were requisitioned as a block and the civilians were moved off. It was mostly holidays. Small hotels. Private hotels. So it wasn’t difficult but the whole lot moved off and we moved, the Navy moved in and there were four thousand sailors and about four hundred Wrens.
Other: You had your choice ma.
JC: And then I worked very hard. Very, very hard because I worked for a wonderful woman called First Officer Bowen-Jones who was quite a high up ranking officer in the Wrens and she used to push, give me lots of difficult jobs to do. And one day she called me in and she said, ‘You’ve worked very hard. I want to send you on special duties.’ And she said, she’d got a lovely smile and she said, ‘You’re going to, maybe you’ll go with Churchill on one of his ventures abroad, to one of the conferences.’ She said, ‘Go and enjoy it. Report tomorrow to the Admiralty.’ When I got to the Admiralty it was a busy, busy, busy office full of American officers and British Naval officers from all over the world. And they were all [pause] well they would sort of shuffle up. We went on the back of a Land Rover from our billets in in [pause] oh, it was a long time ago. I’ll tell you in a minute. But we assembled at 6 o’clock in our billets. We were taken by Army car to the Admiralty. They had been working all day long deciding which way they’d go. Who’d go, who went and who didn’t. And as soon as we got there at 6 o’clock in the evening, it would be about seven we got there we started and we typed all that the, you know the ships and Naval officers had learned during the day. We typed it during the night on stencils on [reniers], and then we ran them off and we did that for six weeks and we had no time off. And then we were sent back to our posts and told to keep quiet. Not to say where we’d been. Not even to our officers. And we had done the invasion of Sicily and Italy, but in fact we didn’t know it was Sicily and Italy because we didn’t know and they didn’t tell us they were going to go to Italy. They just gave us a map reference along the, along the garden and up the stairs on the, on the grids. It was all done on the grid. And it’s all boring. There you are.
CB: Right. We’ll just take a break.
[recording paused]
JC: You mean one of the AGs ones.
CB: Now, we’re just going to recap quickly on yourself because you had two interesting experiences. One, Joy early on, one experience you had early on was in Lowestoft.
JC: That’s it.
CB: What happened there?
JC: What happened there? It was a Tuesday.
CB: Yeah.
JC: I had every Tuesday off. Worked the rest of the six days. In the mornings we did our washing and sewed on our buttons, etcetera. Well, about half past one the girls, we were, we were billeted in a private hotel in the attic. There were two rooms in the attic either side of the stairs and three of them were occupied over the stairs. They didn’t work, they worked in HMS Minos 2 which was a holding base. I worked in HMS 1, which was a minesweeper base, active service. So, they knocked on the door and said, ‘Are you coming down in to Yeovil, err into Lowestoft for a cup of tea at Waller’s Restaurant because they have cream buns. So I said, ‘Yes. I think so.’ So, they said, ‘Pick you up in half an hour.’ Half an hour later it was snowing. I said, ‘I think I’ve got a cold coming and it means walking both ways to Lowestoft in the snow. I’m not coming.’ And they said, ‘Ok. We’ll go without you.’ I’d been, I decided to have a bath. I was in the bath when the claxon went. We had no air raid warning. The claxon went. Out in the garden. Get in the shelters. Hit and run raids. So we, we just went. Ran down the stairs, out the back door, got in. We’d only just got in the air raid shelter when there was the most enormous explosion and about, we just didn’t know anything about it. About half an hour later the Wren officer on duty said, ‘Wren Wenham,’ that was me, ‘Back to duty.’ So I got dressed in to my uniform and walked in to Lowestoft and the whole of Lowestoft High Street was flattened. And I’ve got a picture. I, I don’t know.
[pause]
CB: Ok. Well, we’ll look at the pictures in a minute.
JC: No, we don’t. Here it is. Here’s my whatnot.
CB: Oh, report.
Other: Yes.
JC: There they are. Digging up twenty years later.
CB: Right.
JC: But, and I went into my office and the captain said that we had to stay on duty because the bomb had fallen on the main supply department and all, all my three, and it had fallen on Waller’s Restaurant next to the Naval supply because we were all in the High Street. So bang on Waller’s and every one, I think there were, seventy were killed. So, I lost my three friends. That was, that was number one.
CB: Right. Very hard.
JC: About three weeks later I was.
CB: This was 1941.
JC: About three weeks later I was machine gunned with two other Wrens walking to our quarters along the cliffs at Lowestoft. We just got down in the, in the whatnot. You had no warnings. So, that was two. I can’t think what the third one was.
CB: Right. So, if we go now towards the end of the war there were the V-1s and V-2s. So what experience did you have?
JC: Oh yes. That was dreadful.
CB: That’s in London.
JC: I, I was, I was at Westcliff. HMS Westcliff. After D-Day they began to get rid of, the numbers went down and the places were closed. We were just a closure. In August, in August 1944 I was promoted to chief, to Wren petty officer and it meant that I had to be moved because there was no, no requirement for a petty officer in there. So I was sent to the Royal Marines at Burnham on Crouch on a single posting as petty, just as what would be called secretary to the Marine’s officers because they had a big Court of Enquiry of, of, to do with the firing of an officer. And I had to go every day and take down in shorthand the doings of the court. I don’t know whether I made a very good job of it because nobody then was interested in, in talking slowly or [laughs] even knowing how to put questions. It was very difficult. And so there I was down in Burnham on Crouch, and every Sunday morning all the Royal Marines assembled outside of the Burnham Yacht Club for Sunday morning divisions. In the middle of the second, second hymn we got this colossal blowing, and we were all flattened on to the roads. Yeah. Onto the ground. Nobody was hit. The thing, the thing exploded up in the air, away up in the air and if it hadn’t exploded we wouldn’t probably have been here I suppose. But that was the third time that and after that I couldn’t sleep. And my posting came to an end and I went to the Royal Naval College at, hospital at Chatham and I was turned out. My husband came to tell me and [pause] I was still packing up my belongings when he came back again and told me that John had died. And —
CB: This is January 1944. Your brother John.
JC: Yes. And my father had phoned my husband who was on duty and he’d been to see the captain who gave him permission to come to Burnham because there was, it was the back of beyond to tell me and take me home. And I went home and, and it was awful really when I got home because my mother and [pause] when, when I was two and a half years old I had double pneumonia, and there was no hospital. I was just, my mother cared for me. My brother was eight months old and John went to stay with my father’s sister for [pause] I’ve no idea but he was certainly away from home for three months. So my mother couldn’t see him. There was, it was a real break and —
[doorbell]
JC: It was a real break. Not very nice I suppose. I don’t know how my mother would have coped to have her baby boy taken away from her. She had to look after me at home. I had pneumonia. Pneumonia for six weeks and my father took me out on my first walk and I cried so much that he kept on walking rather than take me home, and the next day I had pneumonia again. So that, so my brother still stayed with, with Auntie May and she features in this book. So he had a real break in his parenting. I don’t suppose it would have been a very quick cut off when I had pneumonia. I mean the doctor would have come. Our doctor, he came on a horse, on a horse, horseback. Privately. And, and my father took my brother in the van and off he went. So I don’t know what effect that would have had on my brother. It must have broken my mother’s heart I think. She was a wonderful mother wasn’t she?
Other: She was a lovely lady.
JC: Lovely woman.
CB: You said, you said your brother John had difficulty with reading.
JC: Yes.
CB: Did that get linked with that experience?
JC: I don’t know. Of course, he was only eight months old. I don’t [pause] that’s the only time. I know that it was snowing and there was no ambulances available. The doctor and the, and the vicar spent three nights at our house. Did their calls in between. He was very well looked after but —
CB: We’ll just stop there again.
[recording paused]
CB: These are all very important experiences to know in the background but returning to your brother John. Returning to your brother John. He joined the RAF on the 24th err the 28th of April 1943. Well, he attested then but he was only seventeen.
JC: Yes.
CB: He started, according to the records we’ve looked at, at Number 19 ITW on the 5th of February 1944 and shortly after that he was admitted to hospital and then he was temporarily discharged and put into hospital again. He then went to a different Initial Training Wing on the 24th of April 1944 and according to the records he then had been identified as an air gunner and you mentioned his difficulty with reading and so on and it may be that that had some bearing on the selection.
JC: Yes.
CB: Of his position in the aircraft.
JC: Yes.
CB: He then went to Number 1 Air Gunnery School on the 1st of July ’44 and from there in October, the 19th of October 1944 he went to 11 OTU, Operational Training Unit which was at Westcott. Which is the point of our story.
JC: Yes.
CB: And then he was killed in the crash on the 4th.
JC: Yes.
CB: Of January 1945.
JC: Yes.
CB: So my question there is that as you were in the Navy and busy and had little opportunity of finding out what was going on, what do you understand about what he was doing and what your parents knew? What did your —
JC: You mean while he was still training?
CB: While he was in the RAF.
JC: I don’t know. You see it was such a different life. Everybody’s son was in, in the Army, The Navy or the Air Force all of the way around him. If, if you weren’t, if you weren’t in the Forces there was something funny with you and I suppose you had to, I suppose you had to accept that your son or your daughter would go off into the Army. And, take my father, he’d spent four years of his, six years of his youth, of his young life not his youth because he married during his service but they’d all experienced Army life. So it was nothing different in a way. And I think they would have accepted what was going on. That he would join. He would join up but whether they would have ever accepted that he was going to be in the Air Force I don’t know.
CB: Why did he join the RAF?
JC: Why did he join the RAF?
CB: And not the Army or the Navy.
JC: I have no idea. I have no idea.
CB: And did you have any, you saw him rarely but did you have any conversations with him?
JC: No.
CB: About his service.
JC: No. No. I had no, you see I saw so little of him. I wouldn’t like to say how many times I saw him. Definitely not during the previous year to his death did I. I was going to. I told you, it’s in my husband’s diary we were going, I was going to take my husband home to meet my parents on a weekend leave because my husband had, we were already engaged but we were going to go home. Became engaged on my twenty first birthday and so [pause] I, when it came to, it’s just written in some, about the middle of October, November we were going to, my husband was coming to spend the weekend with, and would have slept in my brother’s bed and I was going to join them and I was hit by this bomb, V-2 bomber thing. So I was in [laughs] I couldn’t go to Maidstone. So my husband went by myself to meet my parents.
CB: For the first time.
JC: I think he’d met my mother because he came, he came to my mother at Southend on my twenty first birthday when I was in sick bay for a different reason, and they had given me [pause] He had produced my engagement ring while I was in bed covered in, I had a series of boils, awful things all the way around my neck and I’d had them for about a year, and they were trying to do what they could to get rid of it in the sickbay. But they couldn’t and I was swathed up in all these bandages and my mother came on the train to celebrate my birthday and she met Gerry there and he gave me my engagement ring. There it is. There we are.
CB: Very nice. Yes.
JC: And [pause] so it was, it was so natural in a way. It was happening all the way around him.
CB: And people didn’t talk about what they did in the Forces.
JC: They didn’t talk about it.
CB: They weren’t allowed to, and they didn’t want to.
JC: And they weren’t allowed to. They didn’t have the time. They were so worn out. My father was head of the ARP and they met, we were about the only people who got an air raid, a decent air raid shelter, and we had it because our next door neighbour’s brother built the new County Hall. He was a big builder, and while he was building the big County Hall he dug the hole with his digger of our, of our air raid shelter and he built us a double deck, double brick air raid shelter in our, half in their garden, half in ours. Two doors. We were very posh. We had radio and we had electricity and, but my father came home from work he, we were, we were down there. We, we put our pyjamas on as soon as we came home from work and we went straight down and we had our tea down in the air raid shelter. My mother, of course women didn’t work so my mother, my mother looked after my father and all the people who worked for him. And as soon as my father had had his tea he became the air raid warden. So I mean he didn’t talk about, we didn’t talk about family.
Other: I think the horrors were so bad as well.
JC: Yes.
Other: People didn’t want to dwell on them.
JC: They didn’t want to. They used to say —
Other: They wanted a change in their lives.
JC: My, my brother’s friends, four boys came to Maidstone in 1939 when his father built the A20. Not the M20. The A20 over, over the hill, down into the Weald of Kent and he bought these, his four sons all at school. And my father saw the for sale notice on the house and investigated who was moving in. Met them and said, ‘I’ll be your grocer. I’ll take your cards from you.’
CB: Ration cards.
JC: The [Riccomini] family. I’d love to know what happened to the [Riccomini] boys because as far as I know only the eldest one, who had a cleft palate survived and I think my brother was, was very friendly with the second boy called Geoffrey. And I don’t know what the other two were and I wouldn’t have met them anyway but Geoffrey used to come and play in our garden, and was the same age as my brother. And to think that they could, my father knew the mother and parents. To think that he knew that there was a family losing three and his was one. It was—
Other: I see what you’re saying.
JC: I’m sorry.
CB: Very difficult.
JC: We’re getting off, aren’t we?
CB: Well, it doesn’t matter because the point in the background there is Maidstone is in the front line.
JC: Yes.
CB: Effectively closest almost —
JC: It was.
CB: To the continent.
Other: Well, it’s about —
CB: So to what extent did you suffer air raids there?
Other: [laughs] She was hit by one.
JC: Well, we didn’t really suffer any real damage but we did have an unexploded bomb come through the roof of our detached house and my mother ran. Obviously, it was in the middle of the afternoon. There were no men. My mother, when the men came home from work ran to the ARP post, and said that there was a hole in the roof and they sent, they sent a man, an ARP man to investigate and he went up inside the house on a ladder and he got stuck in the hole. In the, in the, he was a big fat man and he got stuck.
CB: In the loft hatch.
JC: And [laughs] he became [laughs] didn’t he? All our children remembered the second world war was the man who got stuck in the hole. We had, we had behind our house was a place called Vinters Park which was a big private place and was used as a war, as a hospital in the war and their guns came over in to our garden at the back. So we were very close to the, we had every night we slept when we were there. Even when I came home on leave we slept down in the, we had six bunks in our —
CB: In your air raid shelter.
JC: Mr and Mrs Shaw didn’t have any children so there was my mother and brother. We mostly played cards and sent the money to the Red Cross. But we don’t, I don’t remember that we talked about people who’d died that day.
CB: What about these, these were anti-aircraft guns.
JC: The?
CB: Anti-aircraft guns you are talking about are you?
JC: We didn’t meet them.
CB: No. You had anti-aircraft guns next to you.
JC: They were over the field.
CB: Right.
JC: In Vinters Park, and they came over. The men didn’t come into our garden but in 19 — before I joined the Wrens, that was July ’41 Detling Aerodrome which was a mile from our house was bombed by the RAF and obliterated.
CB: By the Germans.
JC: And my father was on duty that night at the top of the road called the Chiltern Hundreds, the public house and he, he had the road closed and they wouldn’t allow anybody to come over the road. Well, about 11 o’clock that night he, my father brought two men to our house. They were soldiers. They were men from the Royal Air Force Defence Regiment. It wasn’t a very, it wasn’t an active, it was [pause] then anyway, they’d come back from a day, they’d come back from holiday leave to find they’d no air, no, no air base left. Not allowed up on the road. My father brought them home and they slept upstairs in my father’s bed that night, and the next morning they went back on duty. And the following night they came and knocked, morning they came and knocked on the door and said, ‘Can we, can we please come and sleep again because we’re frightened.’ And my father said they looked it. And they came for about three weeks and my father said, ‘Yes. You can come and you can sleep in a bedroom in the house in the daytime and you’re to help the men dig the hole and finish off the air raid shelter.’ So these men built our air raid shelter. And that was the only contact we had with, with soldiers.
CB: Yeah.
JC: But they were all the way around us. So my brother must, my brother was down in that air raid shelter every night. Had to be. And they weren’t allowed, boys they weren’t allowed to go off to the cinema in the evening. I mean, you didn’t go out. You went in to the air raid shelter. And what he did I don’t know, apart from the fact that after I left probably somebody else came and borrowed a bed for the night. Any vacant bed was taken up and it was, it was busy. It was really, really busy.
CB: We’ll take a break there.
[recording paused]
JC: My husband.
Other: Just one second.
CB: Right. So where did you meet your husband?
JC: At the Royal Palace Ballroom, Southend on Sea. And it was, I’d been in the Navy then for, I met him on the 28th of April 1944, Saturday night. And it was only the second dance I had been to in the whole of the war and the whole of my service. We seemed to spend all our time working. And so I met my husband at the dance and he asked me for a dance, and I met him then. And he was, he had just arrived at HMS Westcliff. I had been there already since, I think the 4th of September 1942. So I had been there nearly two years. My husband was a year younger than me.
CB: And what did he do? What was he?
JC: He was, he was, he was a sub lieutenant in the Naval Coastal Forces. He tried to be in the RAF VR but he failed one of his. I don’t know which one it was, but he failed one of his tests.
CB: And when were you married?
JC: 31st of March 1945.
CB: Right.
JC: And that was arranged before my brother died and we hadn’t told my brother. That would all have been, I don’t know if, well I suppose of course my husband would have told his future brother in law that wouldn’t he? So my brother must have known, but we didn’t send many letters. I can honestly, I can’t remember sending many letters.
CB: So —
JC: We didn’t send many. Didn’t send many [laughs] we sent food parcels to each other [laughs] but we didn’t send much else.
CB: We’ve talked about the fact that what your brother John was doing that your parents didn’t seem to know about it.
JC: Yes.
CB: And you certainly didn’t know.
JC: No. I didn’t know.
CB: So, how was it that you learned about your brother John’s death?
[pause]
JC: But what I learned, I arrived home with my husband on the 6th. Let’s see. Yes. It took, it took twenty four hours for the news to get through to my husband so that would have been the 5th of January. And we travelled back. There was no over, no trains out of Burnham on Crouch in the evening so it was morning of January the 6th that we got the train to Maidstone. And my mother was sitting there with her sister in law, Auntie May who’d brought John up as a baby, and they were just sitting there on the settee next to each other. They didn’t, they didn’t even seem to talk. It was absolutely unbelief on their, on their face that this could really have happened.
CB: Then what?
JC: Hmm?
CB: So you got there and saw mother and aunt.
JC: Saw mother and aunt and then all the, all the family and friends came up. I had to, my husband had to go back the next day. They wouldn’t give him any more leave. I had. I was given seven days, because by this time I was already on, I’d already been shifted to the Royal Naval Hospital at Chatham for despatch. And it was the old Naval physical standard.
CB: So, when your parents knew about your brother’s death, Joy —
JC: Pardon?
CB: When your parents knew about your brother’s death.
JC: Yes.
CB: What happened next?
JC: Well, we heard that, my father got on the phone to the, to the vicar in Buckinghamshire and asked him to find out some news. This young curate, eighteen, nineteen, no he would be about twenty. Twenty years old. He went to Westcott and requested an interview and was told, they said they wanted a letter. Well, actually my parents were very happy when they got this letter which is dated the 9th of January. But what they didn’t know was that every one of that, every one of the aircrew got the same letter. I mean actually lettered the same letter. I mean this must have been the standard letter one or two because we’ve seen it mentioned in the New Zealand papers. So, my father, all the other members of the crew, the five members were buried at Westcott.
CB: At Botley.
JC: Nearby. My father arranged, my father was church warden of our church and he arranged that my brother would have [pause] my brother would be buried at, from the funeral in his own church. My parents were Christian. Church of England. I’d say fairly strict Christian people but were very good people. Very, very good people. They, all the way through the war they entertained next to the church. Our family church was the Kent Royal Regiment’s Headquarters at Sandy Lane, Maidstone and every Sunday we entertained soldiers. And these soldiers were collected at church. I think the word got around, ‘Go to church on Sunday morning and Mr and Mrs Wenham will invite you to lunch,’ because we had a procession of soldiers and my father would write letters for them, because lots of soldiers were illiterate. My father would write letters. My mother mended them their socks, knitted their things for them. So they, they were very good people. They weren’t [pause] how do you put it? I don’t think they showed their grief apart, my mother became very quiet. She, she must have talked to my father about it. She must have told to him she didn’t want to stay. And as soon as we’d married within a year they’d sold the business which was due to be, my father had always hoped that John would follow in his business but that was no longer possible. And they, they sold everything up and moved to Hastings. Although my father at that stage was only borderline retirement and he went on to work for a further twenty years, but he really didn’t know what else to do with himself.
CB: So after the, after the funeral.
JC: Yes.
CB: The funeral was in the church at Maidstone.
JC: No. No. The funeral in the church was absolutely full of people. There was standing at the back. We all went and there were six airmen who carried the hearse, and we all went by transport of some sort to the Maidstone Cemetery. The military cemetery attached to Maidstone Cemetery and we had another service at the graveside and we had the Last Post and it’s the one bit of music I cannot abide. But it was snowing. Snowing again. Afterwards we went back to my parent’s home and his close relations were there and our neighbours and people from the church and we all had afternoon tea provided by my mother. Two of the airmen came up to, to my father and said that it made life easier to know that people could be so sensible over the loss of family they, they just thought that the fact that my mother had baked all these cakes for them eased the problem. It didn’t, did it? But so they all came back and then the men, we’d no idea they, I seem to remember I didn’t speak to them an awful lot but I seem to remember that, that they weren’t close members of [pause] they weren’t colleagues. They didn’t actually know my brother. Perhaps they had a special job, ‘Your turn’s come up,’ you know.
CB: They were representing the RAF.
JC: RAF. Yeah. Representatives of the RAF.
CB: Were, were they ground crew or aircrew? Do you remember whether they were —
JC: The men? I’ve no idea. No. No idea at all. But they spent the whole afternoon and part of the evening with us. And we didn’t know. We had no idea. I think that my father must have known that the New Zealanders were involved, but apart from that I don’t think my mother and father knew anything about these airmen.
CB: The other five were buried at the —
JC: Hmm?
CB: The other five were buried at the Military Cemetery at Botley.
JC: Yes. Yes, and there are pictures.
CB: Oxford.
JC: In it. In Sue Chaplain’s book.
CB: So when did you find out details of the crash?
JC: Oh, well that was when I belonged, I joined the U3A in Luton about ten years ago, I suppose. And I joined the family history group because I’d got an awful lot of pictures and things of Maidstone and that’s my that’s —
CB: Did you —
JC: That’s Maidstone. London Road, Maidstone. Sharp’s Toffee Factory Headquarters. That was the Sports Club.
Other: That was a Sports Club.
JC: And that house was built by my great grandfather.
Other: That’s right.
CB: Now —
JC: There he is.
CB: Just —
JC: And there she is.
Other: Listen. Listen, Chris is saying something.
JC: Hmmn?
CB: Just quickly, just —
JC: Yes. So, that —
CB: You didn’t know from the end of the war, well January ’45, until ten years ago are you saying you did not know how the crash had occurred?
JC: No. No. No, it wasn’t —
CB: And —
JC: It wasn’t mentioned. And I, I believe I’m positive that my father and mother, or my father never knew that. How the plane had crashed. I think he would have talked to us, don’t you?
CB: Did, where, when your own children were born did that cause your parents to wonder how their son, your brother had died?
JC: I don’t somehow think it did. We weren’t [pause] we weren’t actually living close to them. But Christopher the oldest was born when my husband was in Germany and my husband didn’t see Chris until he was nearly eight weeks old.
CB: Right.
JC: Graham was born, and his father had just had a heart attack so myself and Christopher and baby Graham we couldn’t go back. We were, we were living with my father in law. We couldn’t go back there. We had to catch a train and go to Maidstone where my mother took over.
CB: But your parents weren’t prompted to recall.
JC: No.
CB: The death.
JC: No.
CB: Do you think they had —
JC: No.
CB: Accepted that they would never find out or they were pushing it to the back of their minds?
JC: I don’t know. I can’t think. I really can’t think what —
CB: I think we’ll have a pause there.
[recording paused]
CB: We’ve talked about your perception of your parent’s attitude and the fact that they didn’t really talk about it but when your parents moved up here to the Luton area and settled here they had pictures, family pictures in the house did they? And how did they explain that?
JC: My parents.
CB: Yes.
Other: Yeah. They didn’t.
JC: My parents never lived in Luton.
Other: Luton.
CB: Oh, they didn’t.
Other: No. We lived together.
CB: No.
Other: We lived together after my parents, my grandparents moved to Hastings. My father my mother and us moved to Somerset to his parents and we were born and brought up in Somerset. So they never lived, we lived together.
CB: Ok.
Other: In Somerset. My grandparents then moved to Somerset so the whole family were in Somerset.
CB: Ok. So, I’m trying to focus on the pictures that your, your parents, Joy had in their house.
JC: Well, they had —
CB: They had pictures of your brother.
JC: My mother’s, my mother’s brother in law, her eldest sister’s husband was a photographer. A private. Made his own, hung his own things across the —
CB: For drying them.
Other: Plates.
JC: The negatives. And developed his own, and this was my mother’s and she had another one and she was very proud of the fact that they were always taking photographs and putting them in this book.
CB: But what I meant was in the house.
JC: In the house.
CB: Did they have pictures and how did they explain?
JC: Yes. Inside the house you mean.
CB: Yes. And what, how did they explain the picture of your brother?
JC: I don’t, I don’t think they needed to explain because —
CB: If they were asked.
JC: Because my brother was so much a part of, of the tight little family that there was then in Maidstone.
CB: Yes.
JC: That we all attended all the family dos. My father wasn’t very happy about it because they would drink, and they would have a singsong around the, around the, around the piano but my father wasn’t very keen on that and neither was my mother. But we all met together and I think my father was, you would describe him as the steady one of the family wouldn’t you? He was the one who, who worked hard and bought his own house.
CB: Yes.
JC: And he bought his sister a house because she was a complete invalid and any family trouble they went to my father, and my brother grew up in that. They didn’t have to talk about him because he was part of it.
CB: Yes. I’ve got that. What I was trying to get at was after the war.
JC: Yeah.
CB: After the war.
JC: After the war.
CB: There would be pictures in the house and your children —
JC: There was always a picture of my brother.
CB: Yes.
JC: Yes. There isn’t one in my house because I decided that that we’ve always got our poppy and we always talk about him but I, we’ve got three great grandsons. Nine, twelve and twelve. And although they came to, they were there at, at the parish meeting. You know. The church.
CB: In North Marston. Yes.
JC: They came to them all but I was, I was delighted. The two didn’t come up from Bath because it was a long way. No, but my, Sue’s daughter brought Woody who is now twelve. He came and he was a good boy. He enjoyed it and he, he, you know, took part. But apart from that I think on the whole that we, we don’t talk about it but they all have four of these books.
CB: Yes.
JC: This is the first book one. And then each one. We did it because in 1986 my husband had to leave the Civil Service because he was a driving examiner and he was injured in three work accidents.
CB: Right.
JC: And couldn’t, couldn’t undertake doing eight or nine emergency stops every, every day.
CB: Yeah.
JC: And he worked for Brian’s family and, but we, we, I was having to make the decision to carry on working.
CB: Yeah.
JC: Because otherwise we, you know we couldn’t manage to pay the mortgage etcetera and it was, it was [pause] oh, I don’t quite know how you would explain it but we felt a bit as if we were the bottom of the pile. All our children were successful. They were all running their own businesses except for Richard in Canada who worked in a furniture store. But all the rest were very successful and we felt that our grandchildren were growing up thinking of us as these were poor relations down the bottom. We didn’t have this and we didn’t have that, you know. We didn’t have lots of things. And so I sat down not thinking in, in 1986, three weeks before Christmas I wrote that book in my lunch hour at work.
CB: Right.
JC: Straight on to the typewriter. Straight on to the photocopier.
CB: Yeah.
JC: At the Post Office.
CB: Right.
JC: We had no other equipment. And it was to try and show them that we didn’t all have all these wonderful trips to America. One of them had been off in Concorde. That we didn’t live that way.
CB: No.
JC: Ours had been a wartime struggle.
CB: Indeed.
JC: And of course there’s that, part of my book was about telling them about my brother.
CB: Right.
JC: So we, we put it in to print for them.
CB: Yes.
JC: And they’ve still got that book.
CB: Right.
Other: Treasure it.
CB: A real treasure.
JC: Reduce them by half.
Other: It’s lovely. A lovely book to read.
CB: Yes. So the reason I asked the question was because so many people after the war, veterans didn’t talk.
JC: No.
CB: About their experiences.
JC: No. True.
CB: And what happens is that grandchildren, children of the children, children don’t, direct children often don’t get the information but the grandchildren sometimes —
JC: Yes.
CB: Elicit the story from their grandparents. So that’s why I was asking about the picture.
JC: Every one of our grandchildren has taken that book to school, haven’t they?
Other: Yeah.
JC: And it’s as I say it’s only half this size.
CB: Yes.
JC: It’s —
CB: It’s A5 size.
JC: A5.
CB: Yeah.
JC: And they still produce it and on occasions and they take, all of them all of them have taken them into school and we heard from the teachers how helpful it’s been.
Other: Helpful.
JC: And Woody’s family, when he was leaving junior, infants [pause] Junior School to go to a Senior Academy they did turning Luton into wartime as an event.
CB: Did they really?
JC: With an evacuee section.
CB: Amazing.
JC: And he used to, he took our book, and they wrote a book for me. His class. Telling me about —
CB: About Luton.
JC: About what they knew about. Yeah.
CB: Yeah. It was a catalyst for wider.
JC: It’s been a real. I wish everyone would do it.
CB: Yeah.
JC: And it did help me. It did help me through going through the U3A. We had a wonderful tutor and she told us, I told her that I had got in the back of my book here the obituaries of my great grandfather, Mr Joe. And my husband’s great grandfather who was a wool merchant. A scrimmage man. And we got them printed from the paper and I showed them to her and in my husband’s book it said that Mr Colbeck’s background were mostly public ministers in the Methodist Church, but one of his great grandfathers fought at Waterloo. So she said to me, ‘Send your money to the Waterloo Society. Three pounds.’ I waited nearly six months for an answer.
CB: Did you?
JC: And the Waterloo Society Man said, ‘We’ve had a reply. Somebody would like to meet you.’ So I said, ‘Well, can I have their number?’ ‘No.’ she said ‘But you, can we give her your number?’ And I said, ‘Yes.’ And so I met my husband’s cousin. No. Yes. My husband’s second cousin. A lady in Lancashire where the family came from. Or Yorkshire. And they invited me to meet the family and I was the only relative left and it was incredible.
CB: Extraordinary.
JC: I don’t know. I can’t see that we can be any interest. Any, we haven’t got anything to tell anyone have we?
CB: People are very curious about their history.
JC: Pardon?
CB: People are very curious.
JC: Do you think so?
CB: About their history. Well, that’s why some —
JC: They are?
CB: Well, on the television there are two programmes based on finding out your history.
JC: Yes.
CB: Anyway, I think we’ll stop there. Thank you very much indeed, Joy.
JC: Yes.
CB: For a most interesting interview.
JC: Yes.
CB: To do with —
JC: Yes
CB: The air crash of John Wenham.
JC: Yes.
CB: And the loss of his life.
JC: Yes.
CB: In North Marston.
JC: Yes.
CB: In January 1945.
JC: You’ve got all the rest. It’s wonderful.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Joy Colbeck
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Chris Brockbank
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-05-24
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Sound
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
AColbeckJC170524
Conforms To
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Pending review
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
01:17:58 audio recording
Language
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eng
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Navy
Description
An account of the resource
Joy Colbeck was born in Maidstone, Kent and served within the Women’s Royal Naval Service during the war. Her brother, John, joined the RAF on the 28 of April 1943, qualified at as an air gunner in April 1944, before being transferred to an Operational Training Unit in October 1944 at RAF Westcot. It was here that he, along with the rest of his crew, crashed during a training exercise in January 1945. Joy goes on to explain that she doesn’t believe this affected her family very much, although she does state that people do not recall the war often, likely as they want to forget the experiences they had during it. Joy recounts several experiences of her own during the war, being a typewriter operator after volunteering at age 17. She served on board the destroyers HMS Whitehall and HMS Whitecliff, and the minesweeper HMS 01. She tells a number of anecdotes of her time during the war, including three stories of near-misses with bombs and machine guns. Joy was promoted to a petty officer before joining the Royal Marines at Bermondsey. She recalls meeting her husband during a formal dance at her naval base, but also recalls being incredibly busy during the war, an example being her husband having to meet her parents for the first time by himself as she couldn’t get the time off. Following the war, she believes that people did not talk about their experiences because they didn’t want to dwell on them and would rather move on. Joy continues to take part in memorial services, both Navy and RAF. As part of this, her mother, father, herself and her husband have all written books outlining their experiences during the war and she takes pride in her grandchildren knowing her story.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sam Harper-Coulson
Julie Williams
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Suffolk
England--London
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941-08
1943-04-28
1944-02-05
1944-03
1944-10
1945-01-04
11 OTU
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
bombing
crash
home front
Initial Training Wing
love and romance
military living conditions
Operational Training Unit
RAF Westcott
shelter
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1213/16144/PGrundyAF1534.1.jpg
54c753837041130909df088e8095cd33
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1213/16144/PGrundyAF1535.1.jpg
4a2ca278bfc8afa5876039e287f474e3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Donaldson, David
David Donaldson
D Donaldson
Description
An account of the resource
309 Items and a sub-collection of 51 items. Concerns Royal Air Force career of Wing Commander David Donaldson DSO and bar, DFC. A pilot, he joined the Royal Air Force Reserve in 1934. Mobilized in 1939. he undertook tours on 149, 57 and 156 and 192 Squadrons. He was photographed by Cecil Beaton at RAF Mildenhall in 1941. Collection contains a large number of letters to and from family members, friends as well as Royal Air Force personnel. Also included are personal and service documents, and his logbooks. In addition, there are photographs of family, service personnel and aircraft. After the war he became a solicitor. The collection also contains an oral history interview with Frances Grundy, his daughter.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Anna Frances Grundy and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-02
2022-10-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Donaldson, D
Grundy, AF
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bombs on Walcheren
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph of bomb explosion on a coastline running across image. On the reverse '192 Squadron, Attack on Walcheren, Oct 1944'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PGrundyAF1534, PGrundyAF1535
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Netherlands
Netherlands--Walcheren
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
192 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1246/16379/MNealeETH1395951-150731-0380001.2.jpg
4607f74ee8cad5dc7b9497a03f20f346
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1246/16379/MNealeETH1395951-150731-0380002.2.jpg
c4b311d9c30940594e4a8695d0db3c45
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Neale, Ted
E T H Neale
Description
An account of the resource
123 items. The collection concerns Edward Thomas Henry Neale (b. 1922, 1395951 Royal Air Force) who served as a navigator with 37 Squadron in North Africa, the Middle East and Italy. The collection contains his training notebooks from South Africa as well as propaganda leaflets dropped by the allies in the Mediterranean theatre.
The collection also contains a photograph album, navigation logs and target photographs.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Alison Neale and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-31
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Neale, ETH
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[newspaper cuttings]
Title
Soldaten-Nachrichten
Description
A newsletter issued for propaganda purposes, in German
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Soldaten-Nachrichten
Description
An account of the resource
A newsletter issued for propaganda purposes, in German
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10-29
Format
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One two-sided printed sheet
Language
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deu
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MNealeETH1395951-150731-0380001,
MNealeETH1395951-150731-0380002
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
United States Army Air Force
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
United States. United States Army Air Force
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Bloomfield
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription. Other languages than English
propaganda
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/875/17047/MHollisAN124522-171107-020001.1.jpg
643745da70413a670f677bf7e082a0cb
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/875/17047/MHollisAN124522-171107-020002.1.jpg
72645ded2a8ac650d7b548370cde7853
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hollis, Arthur
Arthur Norman Hollis
A N Hollis
Description
An account of the resource
56 items. The collection concerns Arthur Hollis (b. 1922) who joined the RAF in 1940 and after training completed a tour on 50 Squadron before becoming an instructor. At the end of the war he was deployed as part of Tiger Force. Collection contains a biography and memoir, his logbook, correspondence, training records, photographs of people, aircraft and places, his medals and flying jacket. It includes an oral history interview with his son, Richard Hollis.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Richard Hollis and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-11-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Hollis, AN
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Form 364 (c)
[Underlined] ROYAL AIR FORCE [/Underlined]
[Underlined] Examination Report Form for Flying Instructors [/Underlined]
(This form to be used for Recategorisation [Sic] Tests).
Name Hollis A.N
Rank F/Lt.
Number 124522
Unit 11. O.T.U. Westcott.
1. PARTICULARS OF PREVIOUS INSTRUCTORS COURSE:
(a) Place 3. F.I.S.
(b) Date Oct/Nov 1943 (c) Category Awarded Q
PRESENT CATEGORY HELD Q
EXPERIENCE: (a) Total hours flown as
Pilot: 1020
Day 600
Night 420
(b) Total hours flown as
Instructor: 240
Day 130
Night 110
(c) On Instructional Duties 12 months
2. PARTICULARS OF TEST:
(a) Place Westcott. (b) Date 18/10/44
(c) Type of Aircraft Wellington
3. ASSESSMENT:
(a) Flying Ability Above average.
(b) Ability to impart knowledge Above average.
(c) Knowledge of sequence Above average.
(d) Technical knowledge Above average.
4. CATEGORY RECOMMENDED A.2 (ME)
(Overleaf.)
[Inserted] [Indecipherable] [/Inserted]
[Page Break]
5. REMARKS BY TESTING OFFICER:
This Officer has a sound knowledge of the Principles of Flight and the Wellington aircraft. He flies confidently and well, and his demonstrations were accurate. He has the ideal temperament for a flying instructor.
Signed E.P.S. Booker. S/Ldr.
6. REMARKS BY O.C. EXAMINING SQUADRON or UNIT C.I.
Recommended Category A.2 (ME)
Signed H.C. Smith, W/Cdr.
O.C. Examining Squadron. E.C.F.S.
CATEGORY APPROVED A.2 (ME)
Signed. C. Mc. C. Vincent, A/Cdr.
Commandant, Empire Central Flying School.
Date: 21st October 1944.
[Underlined] INSTRUCTIONS. [/Underlined]
1. This report will be rendered in respect of any officer or airman pilot who is tested for a Flying Instructor Category.
2. Assessment of Instructional ability and award of category will be made in accordance with the requirements set out in A.M.Os.
3. Assessment of ability in Section 3 of the Form is to be one of the following:
Exceptional; Above Average; Average; Below Average.
4. Distribution of the completed report will be as follows:-
Air Ministry S.7.d. (2) (in respect of Officers) 1 copy.
Air Ministry D.P.2. (in respect of airmen) 1 copy.
Empire Central Flying School 1 copy.
Air Officer i/c Records (in respect of airmen) 1 copy.
Unit to which an Instructor is posted on completion of training 1 copy.
6335/M16748/2467/10m./J.G.&S./57-(1).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Arthur Hollis: examination report form for flying instructors
Form 364 (c)
Description
An account of the resource
Provides particulars of previous instructor courses, present category, experience flying hours, particulars of test, assessment, category recommended and remarks by testing officer. Notes that had good knowledge of principles of flight and Wellington.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
C Mc C Vincent
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10-21
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page printed form completed by typewriter
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MHollisAN124522-171107-02
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Buckinghamshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Bradley Froggatt
aircrew
Operational Training Unit
pilot
RAF Westcott
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1272/17696/PBrookerWH1803.2.jpg
8acb5f763e03d9a73c5651e715cd0024
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Brooker, William Harry
W H Brooker
Miller James
J Miller
Description
An account of the resource
11 items. The collection concerns brothers in law James Miller (b. 1919) and
William Harry Brooker (b.1920). It contains propaganda leaflets, two photographs, a NSDAP Car flag, documents and a memoir.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ann Brookfield and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-04-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Brooker, WH-Miller, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
STAFF OFFICERS
LICHFIELD
[R.A.F. crest]
ROYAL AIR FORCE
OCTOBER, 1944
[photograph]
Photo by WAKEFIELDS, EALING, LONDON, W.5.
Back Row: P/O. R.B. Stirling, P/O. R.B. Patch, P/O. T.W. Mortimer, P/O. B.W. FitzGerald, F/O. J.R.F. Howell, D.F.C., F/O. A. Neall, P/O. J.E. Williamson, P/O. J.G. Griffiths, D.F.C., F/O. R.F. Anderson, D.F.M., F/O. U.W. Kelleher, P/O. W.G. Smith, D.F.M., F/O. J.W. Scott, D.F.C., P/O. M.A. Rodgers, P/O. A.J. Jordan, F/O. W.A.C. Irwin, D.F.C., F/O. C. Rountree, D.F.C., F/O. L.L. Wilson, F/O. J.H. Frith, F/O. R. Marks, D.F.C., F/O. D.R. Courage, D.F.C., F/O. J.H. Brooker, D.F.C., P/O. R. Harding, F/O. W.G. Rate, P/O. T.A. Rowe, F/O. M.L. Hubbard, F/O. C.G. Reilly, F/O. P. McNeill, F/O. C.G. Roberton, D.F.C., F/O. V.F.M. Carr, D.F.C.
Fourth Row: F/O. J.C. Fraser, F/O. T.W. Anthoney, P/O. A. Stark, F/O. T.J. Foster, F/O. C.J. McDonall, P/O. J.A. Patterson, F/O. R.W. Jew, D.F.C., P/O. C.C. Booth, P/O. T. Morris, P/O. M. Sutherland, D.F.M., F/O. W.A. Chisholme, F/O. D.J. Stewart, F/O. G.E. Duncan, F/O. R.F. Anderson, D.F.C., F/O. P.V. Withers, D.F.C., F/O. I.E. Goss, F/O. J.P. Quane, P/O. L.T. Jenkins, F/Lt. M.A. Lacayo, P/O. A. Richardson, D.F.C., F/Lt. A.E. Garrod, F/Lt. E.J. Bunting, P/O. W. MacDonald, P/O. G. Yates, F/O. F. Rooke, F/O. J.T. Terrance, D.F.C., P/O. A.L. Cohen, D.F.C., P/O. N.L. Dalby, P/O. L.R. Seton, P/O. P.J. Scott.
Third Row: P/O. C.G. Thurecht, F/O. P.H. Morris, F/O. A. Camps, F/O. H.R. Mahon, D.F.C., F/O. F. Wootton, F/O. E.T. Lewis, F/O. G.A. Laskey, F/O. J.D. Murtha, F/O. J.J. Allen, D.F.C., F/O. J.E. Kinlay, F/O. G.J. Brown, P/O. G.M. Burcher, D.F.C., D.F.M., F/O. M.G. Datson, F/O. R. Goldman, F/O. G. Otho-Briggs, F/O. J.T. Burn, F/O. R.H. Espley, B.E.M., F/O. T.W.A. Yarrenton, F/O. S.E. Leetch, F/O. J.E. Doughty, F/O. A.R.T. Boys, D.F.C., F/O. P. Maxwell, D.F.C., F/O. E.R. Belbin, D.F.C., F/O. W. Bremner, F/O. I.H. Paul, P/O. J.V. Cannon, D.F.C., P/O. J.J. Bewes, P/O. L.C. Rosewarne, P/O. E.G. Starr.
Second Row: P/O. J.C. Bailey, F/O. J.J. Lynch, F/O. W.M. Mitchell, D.F.C., D.F.M., F/O. W. Street, D.F.C., F/Lt. F.G. Cracknell, D.F.C., F/Lt. D.W.T. Gibbin, D.F.C., F/Lt. R.P. Ramsay, D.F.C., F/Lt. J. Wheelens, F/Lt. L.J. Dyke, F/Lt. E.R. Stevens, F/Lt. R. Barrett, F/Lt. A.B. Craig, D.F.C., F/Lt. H.A. Cohen, S/O. J. Reid, A/S/O. H.J. Pawson, F/O. M.A. Cook, S/O. E. Henderson, M.M., S/O. M.J. Murray, S/O. E.M. Moneypenny, S/O. K.M. Gurney, F/Lt. G. Jury, F/Lt. J.K. Cheatle, F/Lt. H.D. Ingram, F/Lt. W.H. Holmes, F/Lt. L. Rae, F/Lt. A.H. Page, F/Lt. J.B. Haywood, F/Lt. W. Elliott, F/Lt. J. Green, M.B.E., F/Lt. P.I. Howard-Williams, D.F.C., F/Lt. R.H.A. Williams, F/O. G.G. Williams, F/O. F. Knowles.
Front Row: F/Lt. F. Laurence, D.F.M., F/Lt. J.H. Cameron, D.F.C., F/Lt. P.C. Ramachandran, F/Lt. R.M. Hetherington, D.F.C., F/Lt. W. Ellis, D.F.M., S/Ldr. R. Wilkinson, S/Ldr. Rev. M.J. O’Mahony, S/Ldr. J.E. Pike, S/Ldr. H.H. Foster, D.F.C., S/Ldr. W.G. Evans, S/Ldr. S. Rogers, W/Cdr. R.L. Palmer, A.F.C., W/Cdr. A. Doubleday, D.S.O., D.F.C., F/Lt. N. Barratt, Group Captain E. Burton, W/Cdr. R.W. Edwards, S/Ldr. A.J. Bridge, S/Ldr. H.V. James, S/Ldr. K. McIntyre, D.F.C., S/Ldr. J.J. Lewis, D.F.M., S/Ldr. F.D. Davidson, M.C. S/Ldr. D.Y. Douglas, S/Ldr. Rev. E.W. Batterham, F/Lt. H.L. Pleydell, F/Lt. R. Beckett, F/Lt. W. Burdett, F/Lt. E.F. Lawson, F/Lt. R. Hughes, F/Lt. L.C. Guthrie.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Staff Officers Royal Air Force Lichfield October 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Large group of airmen arranged in five rows in front of a Wellington 'N'. The background is dark. Underneath is captioned the names of each airman.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PBrookerWH1803
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Staffordshire
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
aircrew
RAF Lichfield
training
Wellington
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1315 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A O C
October has seen a fine month’s work with many important operations successfully concluded. Several of these took place in difficult conditions, reflecting the improved standard of training which crews have reached before they go on operations.
As this month marks the departure of No.51 Base on its incorporation into the newly formed 7 Group, I would like to congratulate all in the Base on the fine results which they have achieved over the past 20 months. Although they now move to 7 Group they will continue to provide crews for this Group, and since the Stirlings with which they are now equipped, are shortly to be replaced by Lancasters, it will soon be possible to relieve squadrons of much of their training commitments.
While there has been a steady improvement in the efficiency of all members of aircrew there is one matter in which the standards are still deplorably and dangerously low. I refer to the problem of security.
I am certain that if I asked any member of an aircrew whether he would, of his own free will, give information to the enemy he would hotly deny the suggestion. Yet the names of no less than 17 members of 5 Group who are now Prisoners of War, appear on a list lately captured from an enemy Headquarters, which was over-run during the Army’s advance.
The list contains the names of individuals who had passed through the normal interrogation centre, and gives a precis of the information which the interrogating officer gleaned from each; some of it is of considerable value to the enemy. I do not suggest that the information was given with any treasonable intent, but the orders state that nothing may be said at interrogation except NUMBER, RANK AND NAME, and the individuals whose names appear on this list have flagrantly disobeyed these orders.
In the aggregate very great harm has been occasioned to the Allied cause by disclosures which have been made by Prisoners of War. Some were no doubt doing no more than airing their ideas, or repeating what they had heard, hoping, by appearing to give information, to appease the interrogating officer. Unfortunately, when faced with a skilled interrogator there is no “half way house”, either you say nothing and get away with it, or you start to talk and everything you know will be dragged out of you.
There is ample evidence to show that the German Interrogation centre is conducted along the lines specified in the Geneva Convention, and that no undue pressure is brought to bear on any individual who will not talk. If, however, a Prisoner appears to be of the talkative type he will certainly be interrogated at considerable length. Anyone who gives only the details of Number, Rank and Name and thereafter keeps his mouth firmly shut, will not only be respected by the enemy, but is unlikely to be further interrogated.
I suggest that members of aircrew who may have the misfortune to find themselves Prisoners of War, should bear in mind that the Allied
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] A. O. C’S FOREWORD [/underlined]
Armies are still advancing and that in their progress towards Berlin, they will no doubt capture other lists containing the names of Prisoners and what they have said. They should ponder on the sharp retribution which will overtake those individuals when they again set foot on British soil. But this retribution will not bring to life those of their comrades who have been killed because of their failure to carry out their orders.
Unfortunately, this unworthy giving of information to the enemy has its counterpart in dangerous talk in this country. Before the first attack on the Tirpitz on the 15th September, 1944, all crews taking part had to be briefed some days in advance. They were told that on no account must a word be breathed outside, and there were very good reasons for this special warning.
Yet, within 48 hours loose talk by members of certain crews in front of individuals in no way concerned with the operation, had spread the news to other Units in the Group where it was being freely debated. A number of individuals are about to face the consequences of their folly and I cannot, at present, refer in more detail to this episode. But it shows that there are still those who fail to realise their responsibilities.
A further form of laxity is the carriage of documents in aircraft. We know that diaries containing valuable and secret information have been taken by the Germans off Bomber crews; while the other night an aircraft of this Group which had been detailed to attack Bergen, landed at a diversion airfield where the captain dropped his copy of the complete briefing instructions which he had been given before take-off and which is expressly forbidden to take into the air.
Great harm is being done by this slackness in matters of security. It reflects on the standard of discipline of aircrew, and shows the lack of a proper sense of responsibility. We cannot afford to give information to the enemy, even on matters which may appear trivial; for we are up against a powerful and experienced defence which knows well how to turn information to good account.
I ask aircrew to give this matter of security the serious thought that it deserves, and ensure that they thoroughly understand the orders on the subject and obey them.
[Underlined] PONDER ON THIS. [/underlined]
A crew of No. 61 Squadron interrogated in April, 1944, gave the enemy details of the 5 Group method of attack including our technique of marking, the part played by the Master Bomber, and even such matters as the frequencies used in the control of the operation.
[Underlined] ALSO THIS. [/underlined]
Sgt. D. was extremely well drilled in security. For this reason he would say nothing, especially as the crew had been repeatedly warned against talking by the Intelligence Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] WILHELMSHAVEN – 5TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Operations in October started with a daylight attack by a force of 221 aircraft on the Great Naval base at Wilhelmshaven.
PLAN Although previously attacked by both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F., no great or widespread damage had been done, and on this occasion, the intention was to devastate the built-up area and suburbs of the town, rather than the dock area. The bomb load was 10 x 1,000 lb H.E. with only a small proportion of incendiaries, a change from our usual 80% incendiary load.
Two aiming lines some 4,000 yards long and running roughly east to west through the town, were allotted to Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, whose aircraft were to be evenly distributed over the whole length of both aiming lines. Nos. 49, 9 and 106 Squadrons were given individual aiming points in the north east sector of the town. No. 54 Base were to place proximity markers on the coast line to the north east, to aid crews in their run-up. Bombing to be direct and visual. Failing visual identification, crews were ordered to bomb on H.2.S., or (for non-H.2.S. aircraft) on bombs dropped by H.2.S. aircraft; or as a last resort, any built up area in Germany.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud was encountered over the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered crews to bomb on H.2.S. 198 aircraft attacked the primary target area, the remainder bombed last resort targets. Bombing was consequently very scattered, and only minor points of fresh damage are reported.
An H hour of 09.00 hours involved a dark take-off, and forming up was not easy. In spite of this, and of the unfavourable weather conditions, the fighter escort reported that this was one of the easiest operations they have yet had to cover.
[Underlined] BREMEN – 6/7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Bremen, frequently the target for both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. had suffered wide-spread damage both to harbour installations and industrial premises, but a large built-up area in the town itself, remained undamaged. A force of 237 aircraft of the Group was despatched on the night of October 6/7th to devastate this area, which was probably the largest the Group has yet had to tackle since it has operated as a separate force. Two aircraft from each Squadron carried H.E. bombs and the remainder a 100% load of 4 lb incendiaries.
PLAN Four areas were selected: two of them heavily built up, on opposite banks of the river, in the centre of the town, and the other two, rather larger but not quite so heavily built up, to the S.E. and S.W. respectively of the two areas lining the river bank.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
The large marshalling yard, some 1,500 yards to the north, was chosen as a convenient marking point. Three Squadrons were allotted to each of the four areas, three of which were divided into sectors, while the fourth was covered by a single track. All crews were ordered to aim at the marking point, delaying release for a detailed number of seconds.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather, with slight haze, and the illumination and marking went according to plan. The markers fell in a sector roughly NW – SW some 200 – 300 yards from the selected point. Photographs show that considerable damage has been inflicted in the areas selected for attack, and the devastation of the old town has been extended south eastwards, and is now almost complete. The part of the town on the West bank of the river is also heavily damaged. Nevertheless, an examination of the photographic and incendiary plots show that the concentration aimed at was not achieved, and that a large proportion of the bomb loads fell in areas previously devastated. Moreover, it is obvious that many incendiary loads were dropped short of the aiming point and although a certain amount of damage was caused in the housing estate to the north of it, this area was not included in the sectors selected for attack. Many loads have also fallen to the west, outside the planned sectors. The weather conditions for the attack were most favourable, and the marking was punctual and accurate, and no satisfactory explanation for the wide bombing spread has yet been arrived at. Two obvious possibilities are that:-
(a) the plan of attack is still not being explained to crews in sufficient detail and with sufficient emphasis.
(b) crews are not adhering rigidly to the tracks allotted to them nor carrying out the required delay when dropping their bombs.
Provided we can be satisfied that these conditions are being fulfilled, we can then begin to look elsewhere for causes which result in these incendiary attacks failing to achieve the saturation aimed at.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – OCTOBER 7TH. [/underlined]
The port of Antwerp had been in Allied hands for some time, but the facilities could not yet be used for unloading supplies for the invading armies, since Walcheren Island at the mouth of the Scheldt esturary [sic] was still held by the Germans, and the approaches to the port were under fire from enemy gun batteries.
120 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases were therefore detailed to attack two point either side of Flushing, the sea wall on the east and the Dyke to the West, with the intention of flooding the island and forcing the enemy to abandon his gun positions.
PLAN Each Base was allotted an aiming point, and each Squadron within the Base was to attack separately at 10 minute intervals, making individual attacks and bombing in line astern at right angles to the dyke. The bomb load consisted of 14 x 1,000 lb bombs fused half an hour or one hour delay. Two runs were to be made, half the load to be dropped on each run. Crews were to bomb visually, using a Red T.I. dropped near the base of the dyke, as a guide to the run-up. Particular stress was laid on the necessity for reducing line error to a minimum, in view of the nature of the target.
RESULTS The attack was successful. The sea wall on the east side
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of Flushing was broken in several places. The dyke on the west side was breached at one point only, but there were many craters along its crest. A few days later the water had penetrated as far as two miles inland in both areas.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 11TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Breaches were made in the dyke and sea wall during our attack on Flushing, but the process of flooding is slow. A further force was therefore detailed to help the process, this time by attacking the dyke at Veere, on the North East side of the island. No. 55 Base provided 60 aircraft for this attack, while a second force of 113 aircraft of Nos. 53 and 55 Bases was sent to deal with four gun positions in the dock area of Flushing.
PLAN Aircraft were ordered to make individual bombing runs in line astern against the dyke, and once again emphasis was laid on the importance of reducing line error to a minimum. A red T.I. was to be dropped as a guide to visual bombing. On this occasion too, the bomb load consisted of 1,000 lb. bombs with half an hour or one hour delay. No marking was used on the gun positions, and all crews bombed visually. The bombs for this target were fused T.D. 0.025.
RESULTS [Underlined] Veere Dyke. [/underlined] This attack was also successful, and on the following day an area approximately 800 X 250 yards was seen to be flooded. Several breaches were made, one of 200 yards, a second of 100 to 150 yards, three more small breaks and in addition, four more places where the wall was cratered which would probably erode into breaks.
[Underlined] Gun Positions. [/underlined] Although good concentrations were achieved round all four aiming points, many units being destroyed by direct hits and others affected by near misses, some of the casemated positions escaped damage. These guns are almost entirely screened from blast by thick mounds and only direct hits, or very near misses near the gun apertures, are likely to put them out of action.
REMARKS The plan of flooding the Germans out of their positions on Walcheren Island started with the breaching off the sea wall at Westkapelle by other Groups early in the month. This was followed by the successful breaching of the sea wall and dyke at Flushing, and later the Veere Dyke, on the N.E. of the island, by No.5 Group, which completed the flooding of substantially the whole of the low lying areas of the island.
The importance of eliminating line error was stressed on these attacks. Their success shows that this was, in the main, achieved, though too few bomb craters are visible on the photographic cover for an accurate analysis to be made.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Brunswick has proved an elusive target for the R.A.F. in the past although it has been attacked on numerous occasions both by the R.A.F. and by the U.S.A.A.F. It was last attacked some two months ago, and on that occasion was the guinea pig for an experiment in blind bombing, entirely on H.2.S. The results were inconclusive, and only scattered incidents of damage were caused, and the guinea pig survived. On the night of the 14/15th October a strong force of 241 aircraft took off to complete the destruction of this important industrial centre.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN The plan for this attack followed what has now become our normal procedure on targets of this nature, i.e. a suitable marking point was selected (the main railway terminus) and sectors between 345°T and 080°T measured from the marking point. Bases and Squadrons were to spread their aircraft evenly along tracks in these sectors and appropriate delays for bomb release were ordered. Separate height bands were given to each Base. Illumination and marking in the normal sequence.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather and was well controlled by the Master Bomber. Flares were accurately dropped, and the marking went according to plan. Bombing was somewhat scattered early in the attack, with a tendency to creep back towards the markers. This was later corrected, and a good concentration was achieved. A large area in the centre of the town, previously undamaged and containing the majority of administrative buildings and business premises, was devastated. On this occasion, the bomb load included a proportion of H.E., 4,000 lb, 2,000 lb and 1,000 lb H.C. and M.C. bombs, and in addition to the incendiary damage, large areas have been levelled by blast. On the whole, this was a very successful attack. A proportion of the bombing has fallen outside the westerly sector, and although considerable roof damage is visible in the easternmost sector, the destruction is not so concentrated as in the central portion. It appears probable that the displacement may have been caused by the difficulty in assessing the true position of the markers. It has not been possible to plot these on night photographs on account of smoke and fires.
REMARKS (i) Many crews reported having received instructions on R/T to delay H hour by 5 minutes, and giving a different wind. Fortunately, the attack was well under way and no-one was misled. This was at first attributed to attempts by the enemy to disrupt the attack, but was later found to be due to an 8 Group force operating on the same frequency. Action has been taken to prevent a recurrence.
(ii) Many crews reported a number of incendiaries jettisoned on track on the was back from the target. This shows gross thoughtlessness and lack of regard for other aircraft in the stream, particularly having regard to the low level return. This action is absolutely inexcusable, except in an emergency.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 17TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
A force of 50 aircraft was detailed to attack the sea wall of Westkapelle, with the intention of extending the existing breach southwards, and inundating German strong points.
PLAN Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s on a given point on the wall south of the existing breach, and crews were to aim their bombs at a position midway between the markers and the edge of the breach. Planned bombing height 5,000 to 6,000 feet. Each aircraft carried a load of 14 x 1,000 lb MC/GP bombs fused half or one hour delay. Two aircraft were detailed to find a bombing wind by means of flame floats and the A.P.I. attachment.
RESULTS Although many sticks straddled the target, most of the bombing appeared to overshoot the narrow strip of land, and fell into the flood water near the village of Westkapelle. One of the A.P.I. attachments was partially unserviceable, resulting in an incorrect bombing wind being used. This resulted in a slight overshoot, and no appreciable extension of the breach was made.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NUREMBURG – 19/20TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
A force of 270 aircraft took off to attack Nuremburg, a target which has escaped lightly in previous raids.
PLAN There were three areas to be attacked, two large and one small. A convenient marking point was selected, and the bombs were to cover the two large areas by means of the delayed release, while the smaller area was to be attacked direct, with a false wind vector set on the bombsight. Sectors were distributed between Bases and Squadrons in the normal way. The marking plan followed the normal sequence and provided for one additional alternative, i.e. Wanganui flares were to be dropped if cloud conditions rendered other methods Impracticable. There were therefore four alternative methods for bombing, the Master Bomber to decide upon the one to be used. Crews were ordered to bomb:-
(i) The red T.I. with delayed release as planned.
(ii) The green T.I. backed up by reds, without the delay.
(iii) The red T.I. direct (in the event of the greens dropped by blind markers being incorrect and the Mosquitoes being able to mark the centre of the town with red T.I’s).
(iv) The Wanganui flares.
RESULTS There was 8 – 10/10ths cloud over the target, but the Master Bomber decided that the red and green T.I’s would be visible through the cloud, and did not order Wanganui. The Mosquitoes were therefore ordered to back up with their red T.I’s, the greens dropped by the blind markers, and the main force ordered to bomb them direct. It was impossible to assess the markers accurately, and night photographs show no ground detail. Although there were reports of the glow of fires through the clouds, it is probable that the attack was scattered. Unfortunately, Nuremburg appears to have escaped once more.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – 23RD OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Three gun positions in the harbour at Flushing, not previously attacked by this Group, were the targets for 112 aircraft of 53 and 55 Bases.
PLAN Each aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 lb bombs, fused .025 secs, planned bombing height 6/7,000 feet, minimum 4,000 feet. Aircraft to identify targets and aim visually.
RESULTS Visibility in the target area was poor with 10/10ths cloud, base 4,000 – 5,000 feet, with rain. Most crews had to make several orbits before they could identify the targets and obtain a good run up. Many crews reported being practically over the top of their targets before being able to identify their aiming point. Although many sticks straddled the targets, many more are reported to have overshot. Photographs show at least 70 craters in the area of the gun positions.
[Underlined] BERGEN – 28/29th OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
With the loss of France, the Germans also lost their U-boat bases on the Atlantic coast, and since then, they are known to have been
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
operating from Norway. Reconnaissance showed that strenuous efforts were being made to complete U-boat pens at Bergen, and these were the target for 244 aircraft on October 28/29th.
PLAN Green T.I’s and flares were to be dropped in the target area, and by the aid of these the Mosquito markers were to mark the marking point with T.I. red. The Master Bomber was then to assess the accuracy of the markers, and to broadcast to the main force a false bombing vector to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Six aircraft of the Flare Force acted as wind-finders. In view of the small size of the target, all crews were warned against loose bombing, to avoid endangering the lives and property of the Norwegians, and were ordered on no account to bomb unless they had a steady run-up on to the red T.I’s.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud in layers from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet was encountered over the target, with haze and poor visibility below. Flares were dropped punctually in the target area, but markers found it difficult to locate the marking point. Eventually marker No.4 dropped his red T.I’s and assessed them as within 50 yards of the marking point. The Master Bomber called the force down to bomb from between 5,000 and 8,000 feet with the wind vector as planned, provided they could get a clear run. Only 45 aircraft attacked the red T.I’s. The remainder were unable to see them or were unable to make an accurate bombing run, and did not attack, according to briefed instructions.
The attack inflicted considerable damage on the pens.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- S/Ldr. Oakley and F/Lt. de Vigne.
[Underlined] Target [/underlined] – Four gun positions in the vicinity of Flushing and Westkapelle.
PLAN No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the exact aiming points with low bursting red T.I’s, the attacks to be controlled by a Master Bomber, also provided by No.54 Base. Six aircraft of No.55 Base were to find winds for each force. These were sent back to Group, and a bombing wind corrected for the bombsight, transmitted to both forces.
RESULTS {underlined] Flushing [/underlined] - Weather 7-10/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet.
[Underlined] Western Aiming Point [/underlined] – Bombing was carried out according to Master Bomber’s instructions. Believed that a fair concentration was achieved.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Crews had difficulty in identifying the target as it was almost entirely submerged, and markers extinguished as they fell. Those who attacked bombed visually aiming at the tops of the casements, which were above the water, with unobserved results.
[Underlined] Westkapelle [/underlined] – Weather 4/10ths – 7/10ths strato cu. Clear below.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking and bombing reported as accurate – No results observed.
[Underlined] Southern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking assessed as accurate, but the main force had difficulty in seeing the T.I’s, which were partly buried in the sand dunes. As a result, there was a tendency to overshoot.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] KEMBS BARRAGE – 7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
The Kembs Barrage, which lies 6 1/2 miles below Basle, governs the flow of the Rhine between the Swiss town and Strasbourg. Apart from its navigational importance to barge traffic between Strasbourg and the upper reaches of the river, the Barrage was a weapon in the hands of the enemy which they could have used to impede the operations of our land forces in the south eastern sector of France. The sudden release of a large volume of water from the barrage and the breaching of the river banks below it would result in the flooding of large areas. The Barrage is 180 metres wide, and consists of five bays, each of 30 m. span separated by piers 5 m. thick. Each bay is closed by metal sluices, operated electrically, on a principle similar to that of sash windows.
PLAN 7 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, fused T.D. 0.025 were to bomb from high level (8,000 feet or below cloud base, minimum 5,000 feet), and six aircraft with Tallboys fused 1/2 hour delay, from low level (500 to 800 feet, 500 feet minimum). The force was to be covered by three squadrons of Mustangs, one of which was detailed to deal with light gun positions near the target. The high force was to bomb first and the low force was timed to go in after the smoke from the high force bombs had cleared.
RESULTS Weather was clear at the target, with good visibility, and the attack was carried out as planned. The defences proved to be more formidable than had been shown on recent photographs, and intense light flak was experienced, mainly coming from the eastern bank of the river. Of the high force, several aircraft experienced bomb release trouble, and as a result there were several overshoots. Two bombs were dropped as much as 600 yards west owing to hang-ups. Of the low force bombs, one fell immediately beyond the barrage, and there were two overshoots of 40/50 yards. One bomb fell close to the westernmost sluice gate, and demolished it. Visual reconnaissance later the same day, reported that the water level 2 1/2 miles up stream from the target had fallen 11 feet 4 inches and that many barges were stranded. Later, photographs showed that the iron superstructure above the first and second pillars on the west side had been completely destroyed, together with the sluice gate.
[Underlined] THE SORPE DAM – 15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Railway communications between northern and central Germany and the Ruhr have become increasingly important to the enemy since the successful attack by 5 Group on the Dortmund Ems canal. These lines not only supply the Ruhr industrial area itself, but are also the life-lines to the enemy’s main front facing our forces advancing on the Ruhr. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would result in the flooding of a considerable area, including the Neheim-Schwerte railway, one of the three main lines serving the Ruhr from the east, and would thus add to the enemy’s communications and supply problems. It was therefore decided that the Dam should be attacked by 18 aircraft of No.9 Squadron, all carrying Tallboy bombs. No immediate results were expected, owing to the peculiar nature of the Dam’s construction, but it was hoped that direct hits from Tallboys would unbalance the retaining wall of the dam, resulting in gradual erosion, finally enabling the water to break through.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN 18 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, six fused 1/2 hour delay and 12 fused 11 seconds delay, were to attack the Dam from 14/15,000 feet. The attack was to be made at right angles to the face of the Dam, to obtain maximum penetration. Winds were to be found by six aircraft, using visual pinpoint and A.P.I. These were then to be averaged and a bombing wind transmitted by the force leader. Fighter cover was provided by seven squadrons of Mustangs. When 20 miles short of the target, the force was to divide into two formations, the first composed of the 12 aircraft carrying 11 second delay bombs and the second formation, of the 6 aircraft carrying the half hour delay bombs. Aircraft were to bomb in line astern, each aircraft to position itself 100 feet below and 200 yards astern of the aircraft in front. Bombs were to be aimed at the shore of the compensating lake below the dam face, and a false height setting applied to the bombsight, so that the bombs should strike a point 50 yards short of the crest of the dam. It was appreciated that the water level in the lake was somewhat low to be certain of success, but it was nevertheless considered that there was a reasonable chance of destroying the dam.
RESULTS 16 aircraft dropped their Tallboys. Two were unfortunate enough to be “jostled” during their run up, and were unable to bomb. The force flew over 10/10ths cloud to within a short distance of the target, but were lucky to find a clear gap over the target itself. Navigation winds had to be used, as visual pinpointing was impossible. Several direct hits were registered on the crest of the dam, one fair and square on the road running about 50 yards below the crest, and several on the dam face at its western extremity. In addition to these, several bombs slightly overshot the crest and fell in the water, and should have done their fair share of damage. There appears to have been a slight vector error, which resulted in the M.P.I. of the bombs (those visible on P.R.U. cover), being displaced some 200 yards 330 degrees from the aiming point. Although the dam was not breached, the enemy has been forced to lower the level of the dam to reduce the pressure on the water side. If the water had been a little higher the dam would undoubtedly have gone.
[Underlined] TIRPITZ – 29/30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Since the last attack on September 15th the Tirpitz had been moved from Alten Fiord, to an anchorage off the small island of Haak, 4 miles West of Tromso, and some 200 miles nearer to the British Isles than her previous berth.
Possibly this move was prompted by the Germans’ fear of the ship falling into the hands of the Russians, who were rapidly over-running the Petsamo area, or possibly because they wished to get her back by stages to a German base, where major repairs and a refit could be carried out.
It was decided that, by increasing the all-up weight for take-off, and with the addition of an extra fuel load, an attack from bases in the British Isles was practicable. To achieve this, Merlin 24 engines, giving + 18 boost for take off, were installed in all Nos. 617 and 9 Squadrons’ aircraft. This involved the changing of 120 engines, and was a magnificent feat carried out in a few days. One Wellington long range tank and one Mosquito drop tank were added, giving a total fuel load of 2406 gallons. The round trip totalled 2,252 track miles.
All aircraft carried Tallboy bombs. The take off presented no difficulties, and aircraft flew at 2,000 feet to within a short distance
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of the Norwegian coast, where a rapid climb was made to negotiate the high ground. A rendezvous point was chosen within a convenient distance of the target, and here both squadrons formed up, to attack the target in two separate forces, having made a rapid climb to bombing height. All went well as far as this point.
During the approach to the target, which lay along a fiord, all bomb-aimers obtained a good view of the battleship, which was lying in the briefed position. Unfortunately, at the crucial stage of the bombing run, cloud was encountered, caused doubtless by a wind coming in off the sea and striking the high ground surrounding the Tirpitz’s anchorage. The majority of crews were able to release their bombs, some after several runs, but four aircraft were unable to obtain a satisfactory run, and returned with their bombs.
There was without doubt, one very near miss, but up to the present there is no evidence, photographic or otherwise, to show that the battleship was hit.
Once again, these two squadrons were cheated of their prey, and this time by a trick of the weather which was wholly unexpected, and certainly undeserved.
With the exception of one 617 Squadron aircraft, which was hit over the target, and forced to land in Sweden, all aircraft returned safely with a reasonable safety margin of petrol, to advanced bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
All Group Gardeners returned to battle in excellent strength this month, and successfully planted 316 vegetables in 60 sorties, bringing our share to 39% of the Command total of 808.
The plantings were all made by H.2.S. and mostly confined to the Kattegat area, and continued the good work of dislocating the enemy’s shipping routes, by dropping over carefully chosen pinpoints and channel intersections through which the shipping is known to pass. Despite the long distances involved, with frequent icing conditions over target areas, and Bases often unfit for return, it is very satisfying to note that the high standard of efficiency and determination is being maintained by the Captains and their crews, and that the average load per aircraft has been kept to the maximum of six vegetables.
One of our largest operations for some months occurred on the 24th October, when twenty-five Gardeners set course to the Eastward and planted 149 vegetables. 10 loads were supplied by No.106 Squadron and 4, 4, 4, and 3 by Nos. 57, 630, 44 and 207 Squadrons respectively. The results of this lay were very promising, and as the crews sighted some twenty ships on this occasion within the vicinity, it is earnestly hoped that they did not all reach port safely.
To round off the month’s activities Nos.619 and 106 Squadrons had the honour to add to the ‘History of Mining’ by planting in a new and important Garden on the 28th October. It is early to anticipate results but as the enemy is bound to use this hitherto virgin piece of water, it will be interesting to see how he fares.
In the light of past experience, all Gardeners must now remain on their toes for the coming winter months are bound to offer excellent opportunities to strike hard at the enemy’s shipping organisation in every possible position, and to rapidly assist in his ultimate downfall.
A total summary of the value of this mode of warfare is unfortunately on the Top Secret list at this stage of the war, and is therefore unable to be disclosed. But when it is realised that the total sorties this year have already reached 14,457, as against 5,313 in 1943, some estimation can immediately be made on its degree of vital importance and effect. The area in which this offensive can be conducted has now diminished to a corner of Europe. But inside the limits of this area is contained an enemy who is feverishly pressing hard to retain his command of that sea, and so move his troops, stores, equipment and trade from Scandinavia to Germany. By the terms of the Russian-Finnish Armistice Germany has been denied the use of enormous tonnage in shipping. This means that their Merchant Fleet, Minesweepers and other craft already busily employed, will be forced to double their work to make good the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
requirements of a nation at war. Added to this distressing state of affairs, the enemy is now hurriedly building prefabricated U-Boats, and fitting them with every device possible in order to risk another strike at our forces. But each U-Boat is useless if she has not been ‘worked up’ by a highly trained crew for weeks, in a [underlined] safe [/underlined] area for practicing her ‘Torpedo Attacks’ and ‘Diving Trials’, or is unable to be completed at her building yard for the lack of some equipment that was to have arrived by sea transport and has been [underlined] sunk en route. [/underlined]
Whoever shall be so bold as to venture forth from this area for attack on our trade, will undoubtedly meet a hot reception from the Allied Navies and Coastal Command, but in the meantime let us delay, and if possible, prevent this, by the strong and penetrating effects of our Gardening effort.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Sorties Carried Out by Squadron]
[Underlined] GROUP VISITORS. [/underlined]
On the 2nd October, Rear Admiral J.H. Edelsten, C.B.E., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (U-Boats and Trade), paid a short visit to R.A.F. Station, Woodhall, to thank the Bombing and Gardening Squadrons for their excellent work and co-operation with the Royal Navy during the past months.
Rear Admiral Edelsten gave a short address stating the vital importance of this work, and strongly congratulated the Captains and crews who had taken part. He said that the results of the precision bombing had been most effective and successful towards the war effort as a whole, in assisting to force the U-Boats to retire to more distant bases, and that minelayers were performing a vitally important task in a thoroughly efficient and successful manner. Aerial mining is denying the safe passage of enemy shipping in their own waters, which for the time being were out of reach of His Majesty’s Ships.
Accompanying Rear Admiral Edelsten, were Rear Admiral E.D.B. McCarthy, D.S.O., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (Home Station), and Captain F.A. Slocum, O.B.E., Royal Navy, Deputy Director Operations Division (Intelligence).
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TEST. [/underlined]
One of the outstanding features in the Wireless Operators (Air) domain last month was the enthusiasm shown by squadrons in carrying out the W/T Controllers’ test. During the month 67 operators carried out the tests laid down in 5G. S.I. No.13, and out of that number 65 passed as suitable for W/T Link duties. It is hoped that this enthusiasm will continue, and all Wireless Operators (Air) will eventually pass this test of their ability in accurate tuning and operating of their W/T equipment under “target-area” conditions. The operators who passed the test during October were drawn from the squadrons shown in the following table:-
[Table of Numbers of W/Ops. (Air) Passing Test by Base and Squadron]
Now that the names of all W/T Link Wireless Operators are forwarded to Group Headquarters prior to each operation, it is possible to know exactly who are our first class men, and note how they perform in the crucial test of operating over the target area.
Next month it is hoped to publish the names of all Wireless Operators who have carried out Link duties during the month.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
During the month, this part of the Wireless Operators (Air) training was curtailed to some extent by daylight operations, but some good exercises were carried out. The introduction of an 18 and 20 w.p.m. test was well received, and still further changes in this training are impending. It is proposed that squadrons be divided
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
into four sections, and each section participate once per week. An alteration to the time of the exercise is also proposed.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS. [/underlined]
With the coming winter months, and the possible decrease in the number of operational and training flights, Signals Leaders must ensure that their training rooms are properly equipped and in good preparation for the extra ground training which will be necessary. All morse keys, headsets and equipment, should be checked over to ensure that full benefit can be derived from their use. Liaison between Signals Leaders and visits to neighbouring squadron training rooms should be encouraged.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES. [/underlined]
The curtailment in the use of early warning devices did leave the Wireless Operator (Air) with more time on his hands during an operational flight, and on many occasions the W/Op. did his watching from the astrodome when not required on the W/T equipment. It is hoped that in the near future these early warning devices will again become available, and with this in view training has continued at Conversion Units. Operators on the squadrons who may have let this training lapse should take steps to bring themselves up to the highest state of efficiency in manipulation and interpretation of these devices.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS. [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to four new Signals Leaders – F/O Cheshire, who has taken over Signals Leaders duties on 227 Squadron, F/O Chapman, 463 Squadron, F/O Tyler, 50 Squadron, and F/O Smith, 189 Squadron. We also take this opportunity of saying au revoir to F/Lt. Howarth, 50 Squadron and F/O Bulmer, 463 Squadron, who have now taken up other duties. We wish them every success in their new sphere.
[Underlined] SIGNALS’ WORKSHOPS. [/underlined]
The aim of all Base and Station Signals Officers must be to make their workshops into well laid out, comfortable, well lighted and warm laboratories. It is appreciated, that, with the type of accommodation available, this will not be an easy task, but it is certainly not an insurmountable one. Furthermore, this “pepping up” of workshops must take place before the full rigour of winter is upon us.
Every one must agree that mechanics will be far happier and therefore produce far more efficient work if their workshops are comfortable. In addition, workshops in which such delicate equipment as the T.R.5043 is being serviced, must be clean, tidy and warm, if the highest standard of serviceability is to be achieved.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
It is pleasing to record that throughout the past month not one operational sortie was cancelled, and only one aircraft returned early, as the result of a signals defect. The reason for this one early return is attributed to a flight engineer, who, in an attempt to repair a mid upper hydraulic leak, disconnected the intercom. wiring, allowing it to short circuit, thus rendering the whole intercommunication system unserviceable. Under classification ‘C’ (aircraft completing
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
mission) the failures were as follows:- W/T – 6; H/F. R/T – 9; V.H.F. R/T – 21; and intercom. – 9.
Of the V.H.F. defects, 50% were attributable to broken whip aerials. We are doing all in our power to overcome this breakage of aerials. The official view is that 20° backward rate could cure the trouble, but unfortunately to obtain this necessitates lowering part of the aerial beneath the aircraft skin, with the result that very severe interference is then caused to V.H.F. by the aircraft’s own H.2.S. equipment. We are endeavouring to obtain fighter type V.H.F. aerials – at least for the flare force and marking aircraft. Meanwhile, the application of de-icing paste and ensuring that the aerial is screwed right home, with no part of the aerial thread showing above the Rubber Lord mounting are the best palliatives. The necessity for units to report these defects in accordance with A.M.O. A.869/43 is again emphasised.
There were two servicing failures during the month. In both cases the T.R. 5043 receivers were off tune. Signals Officers must do all in their power to eliminate this criminal type of defect.
[Underlined] V.H.F. CHANGEOVER. [/underlined]
The month of October saw the quick and successful changeover from T.R.1143’s to T.R.5043’s in all operational aircraft of the Group. Apart from one dynamotor overheating and one selector mechanism being jammed, there have been no serious defects. This state of affairs is very promising. It is stressed, however, that G.P.O. keystops No.2 must be fitted on all controllers’ electric type 5003, and that when fitted there must be no “play” whatsoever in the T/R/REM switch – the tolerance of a few thousandths of an inch may result in the equipment going over to transmit. In this connection, all concerned are reminded that the type 170 switch in the transmitter H.T. lead is sealed in the “off” position prior to operational take-off.
Pilots are talking enthusiastically about the wonderfully clear, but sometimes too loud R/T now obtained. The audio pre-set control in the T.R.5043 should be set back to give comfortable volume, but it is appreciated that that will not cater for every taste. Rest assured, however, we are still trying hard to get a pilot’s manual volume control.
The efficiency of our new V.H.F. R/T equipment was well described recently by a main force flight commander who said how comforting it was when still miles away from the target to hear and recognise the calm voice of W/Cdr. Woodroffe talking to his markers and flare force, and to realise several minutes before the attack that the target had already been correctly located and marked.
[Underlined] SIGNALS HITS THE HEADLINES. [/underlined]
On the 1 o’clock news on Sunday, 29th October, the B.B.C. announced that the Tirpitz had been hit by a 12,000 lb bomb. This announcement was made approximately 3 hours before the aircraft which made the attack were due to return, and was based solely on two short W/T messages transmitted soon after the attack by a 9 Squadron aircraft, while that aircraft was still well over 1000 miles away from base.
These W/T messages were two of quite a number transmitted at ranges of up to and over 1000 miles, on this target.
This is an outstanding example of the ability of the present day Wireless Operator in long range daylight W/T communication. It is
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
all the more remarkable considering that the frequency in use was in the 8 mc/s band, and required spot on tuning to ensure any measure of success.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
There is a custom, now hoary with age, of prefixing ALL Bomber Code messages with the month and day of the code used in encyphering. This means that all Bomber Code messages are prefaced by a four-figure group, and the figures are NOT part of the encyphered text. This system has been explained slowly and laboriously to all users of the code, but for all that, a simple two group message, such as “2329 XY” was recently pronounced “unbreakable” by an officer who should have known better. Had the message been transmitted simply as “XY” he would have known it at once, and robbed himself of his present glory of the “Highly Derogatory Order of the Irremovable Digit”.
[Underlined] FLIGHT PLANNING. [/underlined]
The F.P.C. has now been in use for well over twelve months, and has proved to be a very reliable and efficient arrangement, which has contributed largely to the Group’s success. Despite its obvious efficiency, there are certain faults which cannot be eradicated without the complete isolation of all the circuits involved – a formidable task (involving 169 miles of cable for main circuits, and 185 miles for reserve circuits between Group and Bases alone), which cannot be contemplated. These faults mainly comprise overhearing teleprinter chatter and induced “ringing” tones, all of which are familiar to listeners.
There is another type of fault, which is not due to equipment, but which is traceable to users of the network. This can be stated briefly as a tendency to forget that the loudspeaker was designed to cater for an audience of two or three in a small room, and to speak too fast as though taking part in an ordinary telephone conversation. This speed, allied with the extraneous noises explained above, tends to mystify rather than enlighten the listener in a large room. Slower and more carefully enunciated speech, pitched somewhat higher than normal, but without shouting, will be found to produce more satisfactory results.
One last word. The conference is not secret for the reason, already given, that the conference circuits run in multi-pair G.P.O. cables, where mutual overhearing was always liable to occur. For this reason mention of the target by name, or of turning points with reference to altitude and longitude should always be avoided. Lest this warning should result in too obscure future plannings, it should be added that civilian conversations which are frequently overheard on conferences are amplified at this Headquarters, whereas civilians who overhear part of the conference do not receive an amplified version.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
Although operations completed by the Group during October were considerably fewer than in the preceding few months, there was no let up in the work being done by the Radar Sections.
With the opening of two stations at Fulbeck and Balderton, the transfer of the Base to Syerston and 49 Squadron to Fulbeck, there was plenty of work to be done. In addition to all this, two new squadrons have now been formed and moved to the new stations. The most critical problem arising out of the formation of these squadrons has
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1933 [sic].
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
been the furnishing of Radar Mechanics, and up to this date is still causing considerable inconvenience. In order to lighten the burden on those few already there, several mechanics were withdrawn from other Bases and posted to 56 Base. In the past few days, however, a number of mechanics have been posted into 56 Base from Radio Schools, and this should alleviate the situation somewhat. It is hoped that the remaining deficiency will gradually improve and will eventually be eliminated.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
The success of the trials and experiments on H.2S. [sic] Mark III is proceeding with a vengeance at Coningsby. To relieve the strain on those mechanics doing the valuable work, action has been taken to attach temporarily a number of H.2.S. II mechanics from 53 Base Stations.
In pursuance of this experiment, a new type of scanner was procured from T.R.E. Air Tests were made immediately, and results, to say the least, were encouraging. Arrangements have now been made to have several of these scanners produced, and the first should be available about the second week of November. In the meantime, further tests are being made with the existing scanners in an endeavour to raise their efficiency. Several different ideas have been investigated, the latest of which shows considerable promise.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK II. [/underlined]
The restrictions on the use of H.2.S. remained in force during October, and this was the prime reason for the decision to remove the equipment from 53 Base Squadrons. It was felt that the time being spent by personnel in servicing the equipment there would be more valuably spent if they were transferred to 54 and 56 Bases, where acute shortages in strength existed. Simultaneously it was decided to halt the fitting of H.2.S. in 227 Squadron, and to remove what had already been installed.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Right on the heels of the decision to withdraw H.2.S. from 53 Base, came the policy to equip 53 Base and some of the 54 Base Squadrons with Loran. This policy has since been altered to include all 5 Group Squadrons. Fitting is now going ahead, and it is hoped to see the whole Group equipped by the 1st December, and also to have a large number of radar and navigation personnel trained on the equipment. It is stressed, however, that the Bomber Command school cannot hope to train more than a nucleus of mechanics between now and December, and for this reason Radar Officers should ensure that the knowledge of those attending the course at Bomber Command is imparted to the remainder of their respective sections. To facilitate easier servicing of Loran, photostatic copies of circuit diagrams, which can be placed on the walls above benches will be made in the near future.
[Underlined] GEE MARK II. [/underlined]
Much to our regret, although it was forecast in September’s Summary, the supply position of Gee had gradually deteriorated, and even now there is no indication of it improving in the near future. Every possible effort is being made to obtain components which will enable sets, which at present cannot be used, to be made serviceable. This number has fortunately been greatly reduced during the last month. In view of this acute shortage of equipment, it becomes increasingly essential that all cases of component breakdowns are brought to the notice of Sigs.7 at Air Ministry, vide A.M.O. A.869/43. A reminder
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
is also given that if no reply has been received from Air Ministry within a month dating from the originating of the report, there is no need to hold the unit or component for investigation. Secondly, if operational requirements demand that the unit be used before the month has elapsed, a record to this effect should be kept.
[Underlined] GEE SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
As mentioned at the outset of the Summary of October’s activities, the number of sorties undertaken by 5 Group were fewer than for the preceding months. Gee was reported ‘bang on’ for 96.8% of the sorties, despite the most unsatisfactory supply position, and accordingly all due credit must be given to the radar mechanics who made this possible.
[Underlined] H.2.S. SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
For the very limited number of occasions on which H2S II was used an increased serviceability of .7% over September was obtained, to bring it up to 91.4%. The time is fast approaching when scanners will require careful attention with regard to lubrication and heating. Radar Officers should ensure that the modification has been completed in all aircraft, to eliminate the danger of freezing up, which gave us so much bother last winter. It is again stressed that A.M.O. A. 869/43 action is to be taken on all occasions when components break down.
H.2.S. III suffered a slight set-back in serviceability for October, and out of the 85 sorties completed, 10 developed difficulties, giving a percentage of 88.2 serviceable.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond maintained approximately the same degree of serviceability for September and October, being 90.7 and 90.8 per cent respectively.
[Underlined] SALVETE ET VALETE. [/underlined]
The 1st of November marked the loss to the Group of our old Radar I, S/Ldr. Tom Branson. He had been with the Group for over two years, and all will agree that it was to a large degree due to his guidance and whole-hearted support that Radar is playing such a successful part in the operations conducted by the Group. We wish him the greatest success in his new work, and at the same time, extend to S/Ldr. Perrin a most hearty welcome.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] tactics
This month has produced the unusual phenomena of heavy raids well into Germany with negligible losses from fighters. This has been due to the very short warning that the German defences now get of the approach of a raid, and a skilful combination of Window spoofs, the Mandrel screen and other countermeasures.
We have won the first round, but the Hun is bound to stage a come-back. With the lengthening nights and deeper penetrations his job will become easier. He has a highly developed Radar system, and it is now known that, in addition to the H.E.219, considerable numbers of the M.E.110 and J.U.88 are fitted with two upward firing 20 m.m. cannon.
[Cartoon] WHERE’S THAT FLAK COMING FROM?
I WOULDN’T KNOW – I’M ONLY THE REAR GUNNER
These fighters attempt to formate some distance below the bomber’s tail, and rake it. With the loss of early warning devices, the only answer to this form of attack is a regular banking search and an ability to see the fighter during the search. The first is useless without the second. Gunners must realise that to see a fighter underneath on a dark winter’s night is a very different proposition from d=seeing a fighter coming in level astern on a clear starlit night. The importance of efficient night vision and, therefore, night-vision training, cannot be over emphasised.
With regard to combat manoeuvres, the corkscrew is still the most effective provided the fighter is seen in time. On a dark night, however, crews must be prepared for sudden unseen attacks, to which the only answer is the diving turn. Captains must ensure that they have some form of emergency signal from their gunners and that they can act on it immediately. This does not mean violent mishandling of the controls. On pilot of this Group put up an ‘black’ this month by returning to base with a large number of rivets missing from the wings of his aircraft. He was lucky to get back at all. Two doses of such handling and even a Lancaster would have succumbed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER,1944.
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[Underlined] TACTICS. [/underlined]
Two last points:-
(i) The Hun has started to use jet-propelled aircraft at night. They are very easily seen, and can only be considered a threat on bright nights. Gunners should remember, however, that due to the very high speed of these aircraft, combat manoeuvres should be started at increased range.
(ii) “Stepping Down” out of a target does not mean 20°of flap and everything closed. It is a series of dives at high speed with normal boost and revs, the idea being to get down quickly and also to leave the target quickly. Some figures for the guidance of crews are being produced for distribution.
[Cartoon] KEEP OFF THE GRASS
“Detailed – 15 Took off – 9:
E.R’s – Nil: Missing – Nil”
[Underlined] Cancelled – 6 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] air bombing
The night attacks on German targets undertaken by the Group were again planned to destroy sectors of towns and cities that had to a large extent, escaped major damage during previous attacks. However, incendiary plots show that quite a large proportion of the bomb loads did not fall on the section of the target area they were intended for. There were quite a number of early releases causing the “creep-back” it is so important to avoid, and aircraft not adhering to the briefed [underlined] TRACKS, [/underlined] scattered thousands of incendiaries on areas which had been burned out during previous raids. Cross-trail has been practically eliminated by the use of the wind conversion factors for various T.V’s, and additional time delay.
Now that the chances of a cloud-covered target are greater than during the summer months, the Air Bomber must be prepared for a sudden change of tactics a matter of minutes before the commencement of the bombing run. If he is not sure of the “Wanganui” procedure, and cannot make the necessary alterations to the bombsight in a short space of time, the opportunity for an accurate attack will be lost.
The Group has reached a very high standard of practice bombing and if German targets are attacked with this same degree of accuracy, every bomb will fall where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] THE LORD CAMROSE TROPHY. [/underlined]
The Air Officer Commanding visited R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, to present the Lord Camrose Trophy to No.50 Squadron who have won the competition for the second consecutive period of three months, with an average crew error of 148 yards at 20,000 feet, for all high level practice bombing during that period.
The A.O.C. congratulated the Squadron upon their success which had only been achieved by the close co-operation between all members of the bombing team and the high standard of bombsight serviceability provided by the Instrument Section.
The fact that practice bombing results provide an indication of a Squadron’s efficiency and accuracy on operations was also stressed.
In conclusion, No.50 Squadron were warned that other squadrons in the Group were making a great effort to defeat them during the next three months and it will need an even greater effort on their part to retain the trophy.
W/Cdr. Frogley, O.C., No.50 Squadron, thanked the A.O.C. and assured him that the Squadron were determined not the lose the trophy, despite increasing opposition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OCTOBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
The qualification for inclusion on this list is now 75 yards at 20,000 ft. instead of 80 yards.
SQDN. OR CON. UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
9 F/O Davis Sgt. Harrison Sgt. Ward 55 yards
F/O Tweddle P/O Singer P/O Shields 73 yards
44 F/O Lewis F/Sgt. King F/Sgt. Shearman 70 yards
49 F/Lt. Le Marquand Sgt. Boyce F/O Ransome 44 yards
F/O Rowley F/O Barlow P/O Deutscher 62 yards
50 F/Lt. Enoch F/Sgt. Hugh F/O George 73 yards
61 F/O Swales Sgt. Taylor F/O Saunders 56 yards
106 F/O Bowell F/Sgt. Plumb Sgt. Peterson 74 yards
207 F/O Dougal F/Sgt. Scowen Sgt. Stewart 70 yards
617 F/O Martin F/Sgt. Day P/O Jackson 58 & 58 yards
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly P/O McKie 62 yards
630 F/O Waterfall Sgt. Dixon Sgt. Kindler 68 yards
1654 C.U. F/Lt. Dagnon Sgt. Watson F/O Mayer 72 yards
F/Sgt. Eggins Sgt. Grady F/Sgt. Cahill 51 yards
F/O Gilmour F/O Burrington Sgt. Steadman 56 yards
No.617 Squadron report the following outstanding Mk.III Low Level exercise.
F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien
8 bombs – 400 feet – Average Error 9 yards.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
This month’s figures show a decrease in the number of bombs dropped within the Group, due to the limitations imposed by unfavourable weather conditions. The errors however, have decreased considerably and much of the credit must go to the navigators, the majority of whom now realise that the prime factor in an exercise is the obtaining of an accurate wind velocity.
The outstanding result of the month is that achieved by No. 61 Squadron. After a temporary fall from grace last month, they have, during October, dropped 522 bombs for an average crew error of 131 yards. An excellent start in the first round of the Lord Camrose Trophy competition.
Nos.9 and 50 Squadrons can also be congratulated on obtaining crew errors of 135 yards and 138 yards respectively.
The Conversion Units appear in this Summary for the last time, but it is hoped that we shall be able to publish their figures as a matter of interest to the Squadrons who will eventually receive crews trained in No.75 Base.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The following article has been contributed by S/Ldr. Wonham, D.F.M., Bombing Leader, 55 Base, and outlines a practical method of obtaining maximum benefit from the limited opportunities for practice bombing available during the winter months.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING. [/underlined]
With the coming of the winter weather, practice bombing on operational squadrons will be more and more difficult to organise, and the somewhat haphazard method of laying on the maximum number of exercises which has served during the summer months is going to prove very inadequate now that early take-offs and low cloud will limit the opportunities for high level practice bombing. It is felt that a definite system should be aimed at by Flight and Squadron Commanders.
The advantage of a regular and systematic method had amply proved itself in all manner of training from the creating of a rugby team to the organisation of the crew of a battleship. On first thought it would appear that the many difficulties entailed by practice bombing training in a squadron make it impossible to use one system, but a method is necessary, and if squadrons try to adhere to a form of training on the lines of that suggested, it would be found that in a few months errors would be reduced to an even lower level than at present believed possible with the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
Firstly let us consider as average squadron with 30 crews as a permanent strength, and an intake of about 10 crews per month. On the first of any given month the categories of the crews will probably be:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 5
CAT. B 18
CAT. C 6
CAT. D 1
The 10 new arrivals would have a bombing standard on Stirlings of:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 2
CAT. B 6
CAT. C 1
CAT. D1
In actual fact when bombing from Lancaster aircraft at first, these categories fall considerably, and it is usual that a crew on its first exercise on the squadron gets an error of about 240 yards. Experience has shown that on an average, with careful analysis and instruction, this error improves to 200x on the second exercise, and 160x on the third. Consider, therefore, the average new crew as in Cat. C on arrival and a potential B after the first three exercises.
In the same way we may consider the Squadron Crews (as apart from the new arrivals) who are Category C., as potential A’s and B’s after 2 exercises, and the Category D crews as potential B’s after 3 exercises.
The target, therefore, for a Squadron Commander should be to give during the month:-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
10 New Crews 3 exercises each – 30
6 Cat. C. Crews 2 exercises each – 12
1 Cat.D. Crew 3 exercises – 3
[Underlined] TOTAL – 45 [/underlined]
This appears to be quite a large programme to complete during a winter month, and as the Category A and B crews already on the squadron also need some bombing practice, the total number of exercises completed by the squadron would be in the region of 60 to 70.
If this is to be accomplished it means taking advantage of every opportunity provided by the weather and operational needs. Base Bombing Leaders must endeavour to avoid over-crowding on the range at their disposal, and crews can assist by being on the range at the times detailed.
[Underlined] DO YOU KNOW YOUR SWITCH DRILL? [/underlined]
An aircraft returned from an abortive sortie with a full bomb-load of H.E., and it was decided that a few of the bombs would have to be jettisoned in order to get down to the safe all-up weight for landing. On reaching the jettison area, the Air Bomber put the fusing switches to “SAFE”, turned the drum-switch to “SINGLE AND SALVO”, selected the appropriate bomb stations, then pushed the jettison bars over.
[Underlined] ITEMS OF INTEREST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1661 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Price) [/underlined] now have an excellent ‘mock-up’ of the Lancaster bombing panel including the camera. Several unusual and effective ideas are incorporated and thanks are due to F/Lt. Buckley, Station Electrical Officer, for providing this excellent aid to instruction.
[Underlined] 1654 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Kennedy) [/underlined] report that No.95 Course completed 30 High Level practice bombing exercises with an average crew error 138 yards at 20,000 feet. This is an excellent result and as nine of the Captains are Australians, Waddington should produce some A+ category crews very shortly.
F/O Mason (Pilot) and F/O Barker (Air Bomber) completed a very good exercise despite the absence of wind finding aids. Their aircraft had no A.P.I. and Gee was found to be u/s, so a three-drift wind of 286 degrees 24 m.p.h. was found, and six bombs were dropped using this wind. The resulting errors were:-
Crew 111 yards
Vector 85 yards
Basic 82 yards at 20,000 feet.
Another three-drift wind, 280 degrees 30 m.p.h. was found, and a further six bombs were dropped with even better results.
Crew error 61 yards
Vector error 42 yards
Basic error 46 yards
Both winds were checked by the 90° method and the results of the exercise are a tribute to the accuracy of both the Pilot and the Air Bomber.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1660 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Wake) [/underlined] report an example of perseverance on the part of F/O Howard and crew who were detailed to drop 12 practice bombs in indifferent weather conditions. The exercise took four hours to complete and two ‘A’ category results were obtained.
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Linnett) [/underlined] issue all Air Bombers with a height correction card to allow for the difference between the T.V. of the practice bomb, and the minimum it is possible to set on the bombsight. This has helped to bring the average crew error down from 238 yards to 160 yards.
[Underlined] East Kirkby (F/Lt. Hanniball & F/Lt. Foulkes) [/underlined] are endeavouring to equip a Station Training Room where Air Bombers will have all the available training equipment concentrated in one place.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 207 53 yards
2nd 83 54 yards
3rd 630 63 yards
4th 57 65 yards
5th 97 69 yards
6th 44 72 yards
7th 9 73 yards
8th 49 79 yards
9th 463 88 yards
10th 61 92 yards
11th 619 93 yards
12th 106 98 yards
13th 50 103 yards
14th 467 118 yards
No. 227 Squadron completed 5 exercises with an average error of 162 yards.
No.207 Squadron are the winners of the Inter-Squadron Competition with an exceptionally good average for eight exercises, only just beating 83 Squadron. The results obtained by both these Squadrons are highly commendable.
No.55 Base have staged a revival during the past few months and four of their squadrons are included in the first six, a careful study of these pages will provide a few of the reasons for their success.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1660 C.U. 60 yards
2nd 1654 C.U. 65 yards
3rd 1661 C.U. 75 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 145 yards
No.1660 Conversion Unit have done well during the month, and competition between the three Conversion Units remains very keen, but No.5 L.F.S. cannot do enough bombing to compete with them and consequently are once again at the bottom of the list.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The only entry for this month comes from 55 Base:-
G/Capt. Harris (Spilsby) – 136 yards.
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Campbell (9 Sqdn) – 92 yards.
F/Lt. Foulkes (630 Sqdn) – 120 yards.
There should be more than two entries for the Leader’s competition, and a 100% entry is expected for November.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
ӿ Excluding Nos.617 and 627 Squadrons.
X Plus 14 not categorised.
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
The number of A+ category crews is a record for the Group. All crews in this category demonstrate their ability to maintain a consistently high standard of bombing and it should be given the widest publicity within the squadron.
The crew bombing category is not applied to an individual, but to the combination of Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber and it should be every Captain’s duty to discover [underlined] WHY [/underlined] his team is in C or D category.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Price (1661 C.U.) [/underlined] has returned to operational duties as Bombing Leader with No.50 Squadron, and has been replaced at Winthorpe by F/Lt. Falgate (50 Sqdn.).
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (49 Sqdn.) [/underlined] is Bombing Leader with No.227 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Lewis (92 Group) [/underlined] has been appointed Bombing Leader at No.189 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Woods (617 Sqdn.) [/underlined has completed his tour and been replaced by F/O Rumgay.
[underlined] F/Lt. Gibson (A.C.S.) [/underlined] returns to No.49 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
No.617 Squadron also dropped 209 T.I’s with an average error of 58 yards.
No.627 Squadron dropped 308 bombs and 280 T.I’s with average errors of 60 yards and 151 yards respectively.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS OF COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Manos 50 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Palmer 57 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Krinke 619 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Woollam 44 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Goodwin 467 Sqdn ‘D’
F/O ALEY, 1654 Conversion Unit, obtained 1st place and an ‘A’ category on No. 94 Course.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
The following are the figures from the Bombing Ranges for the month of October, 1944.
[Table of Bombs and T.I’s Dropped by Range]
[Underlined] TOTAL 7626 [/underlined]
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Less than half the attacks this month have been on Germany, the majority being on short range targets at the battlefront. An interesting operation was carried out on Bergen at the end of the month, which gave some navigators their first experience of navigation on the Northern Gee Chain, undisturbed by the enemy’s defences jamming. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons attacked the “Tirpitz” again in Northern Waters, making a round flight of 2400 miles. (This operation will be dealt with in another paragraph).
The standard of navigation achieved throughout the month has been good – BUT NOT EXCEPTIONAL. It has been said that one must either progress or retrogress, but never stand still. At the moment the Navigation Union of this Group is standing still, inasmuch that our standard is not improving. We have reached a standard of concentration which is good but not yet good enough. It must be our aim to improve this standard to guarantee a concentration, at any time, covering an area of not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width – and we are a long way from this as yet.
Take the raid on Nuremburg, 19/20th October, 1944, as an example. The concentration plot for this raid one hour after bombing showed that the spread, in length, was 100 miles, and in width, 42 miles. No less than 43 aircraft were out of the “tram lines”, and this only 80 minutes after bombing! What are the causes of such a spread? The following are suggested:-
(i) [Underlined] Track Keeping. [/underlined]
(a) Navigators do not find an accurate w/v at the target on which they can set course on the return journey.
(b) Navigators do not obtain D.R. check positions, by use of A.P.I. and target w/v, every 10 or 15 minutes on the return journey when out of Gee range.
(c) In consequence of (b) G/S and E.T.A. checks are not obtained regularly when out of Gee range, consequently turning points are under and over-shot.
(ii) [Underlined] Timing. [/underlined]
(a) Corner are cut to make up or gain a little time.
(b) Captains [underlined] do not [/underlined] fly at the agreed speeds and [underlined] do not [/underlined] take any notice of navigators’ warnings of being early at turning points.
(c) Navigators “sit back” and do not inform the pilot that they are running ahead of time. (It has been noted that very few aircraft are behind concentration times on the return journey).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Of all the above suggested cases, it is known (ii) (b) is the most important and is the chief cause of the spread. Pilots are entirely at fault here, but navigation is primarily YOUR responsibility, so make sure that YOUR pilot sees this paragraph. If he doesn’t believe it, tell him to go and see your Station Navigation Officer and he will put him right. Also see that your pilot is shown every concentration diagram sent from Group, or better still, show it to him yourself. Get him navigation conscious, he is the captain of the aircraft and as such must realise his responsibilities.
Station Navigation Officers have already discussed this matter and have given their suggestions for combatting these failings. These are being attended to but meantime it is requested that all Station Navigation Officers, working in conjunction with Analysis Officers, give this problem their undivided attention. Discussions, with not only navigators but also pilots, should be arranged frequently until we have achieved our aim.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT. [/underlined]
We still have only five of these attachments in the Group – all there are in the Command! No.9 Squadron have two of these and have put them to good use on operation and training flights. In some instances they have obtained amazingly low vector errors. It is doubtful whether the large vector errors, which have been occasionally obtained, are attributable to the crews concerned, because it is known that one of the instruments does not always function correctly.
The remaining three attachments are installed in Mosquito aircraft of No.627 Squadron for trial purposes. To date 24 exercises have been completed and the results fully justify our demand for a large supply of these instruments. Approximately 100 w/v’s were obtained on these trials and were compared with smoke puffs and Balloon Sonde winds. This comparison showed that an A.P.I. attachment w/v had an average vector error of only 2.64 m.p.h. These results are excellent, and there is no reason why they cannot be repeated on operations. As soon as we have more of these instruments available, and are able to equip the Mosquito Squadron completely, we shall have solved our target windfinding problems. Everything is being done to obtain these extra attachments.
It is interesting to compare the above results with those achieved by (i) Lancasters fitted with A.P.I. attachment, (ii) Lancaster fitted only with A.P.I. To date 25 practice and operational flights have been undertaken by Lancaster attachment aircraft and their average vector error, computed as for Mosquitoes, was 1.75 m.p.h. The average practice bombing vector error for main force squadrons, using only the A.P.I. was 4.75 m.p.h. for the month of September, and 4.3 m.p.h. for the month of October.
The difference between the Mosquito and Lancaster attachment errors is probably explained by the fact that in a Lancaster aircraft the job is done by two men as against the Mosquito’s one, also the Lancaster navigator can work in comfort, bright light and in a spacious compartment. All these lead to greater accuracy in work.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
All analysis officers are now installed and have settled down to their arduous task. Already they are achieving some good results. There has been a noticeable improvement in the general standard of wind finding, log and chart work and computations. An improvement on the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
general standard so soon after appointing these officers was unexpected and augers well for the future.
The number of ‘A’ and ‘A+’ Navigators in the Group has increased from 101 in September to 142 in October; and the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Navigators has decreased from 61 in September to 33 in October. This is good, but the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Category Navigators is still far too high. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must do everything in their power to reduce this figure of 33 to nil.
The standard of navigation set by this Headquarters in the Categorisation Test, which is the basis of all analyses, is high. Analysis Officers must maintain this standard and must be strict in their marking. Only by adopting this attitude will you ensure that your analyses reflect a true picture of the general standard of navigation in your particular squadron. The predominating weaknesses of each navigator, so obvious from the analysis of his log and chart, must be passed on to the Station Navigation Officer immediately and definitely within 36 hours of completing an operation. He will do the rest. The information must be passed [underlined] quickly [/underlined] however, to ensure that the navigator in question can have his faults pointed out to him before he operates again.
One final word to Analysis Officers. You have much work to do which will keep you well occupied, but even so you should make a special point of liaising with your opposite numbers in other squadrons, preferably in another Base. Much can be learnt from the liaison visit, and you are bound to pick up one or two ideas better than your own.
[Underlined] SECOND ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ”. [/underlined]
The battleship “Tirpitz” was attacked a second time by aircraft of No.9 and 617 Squadrons. Navigators of the two squadrons were therefore given another chance to show their skill – and once again they came up to expectations.
The operation was carried out as a “night gaggle”, all aircraft burning lights until within 50 miles of enemy territory. Weather was poor over the first part of the trip, which was carried out at a height of 1,000 feet. This low altitude combined with the very heavy static in the cloud, restricted the Gee range to 62N 01E in most cases, although some fixes were obtained as far as 63N. After Gee coverage, cloud made the use of Astro very difficult, and the remainder of the route over the sea was mainly on DR. Due to a change of wind landfall was made some 15 miles south of track, but the moonlight made it possible to pinpoint very accurately, and no further navigational troubles were experienced from then until the target was reached.
The return trip was uneventful, accurate navigation was made almost impossible because of the lack of aids. From the target aircraft had to fly for a total of 3 1/2 hours on D.R. Navigation before they came into Gee range once again. Loop homing facilities were made available and good use was made of them. Gee re-appeared at approximately 62° north, and from then on it was all plain sailing.
The average duration of this trip was 13 hours, and the navigators have every reason to feel satisfied with their contribution to this operation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1844.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
It has been decided that the names of the eight navigators who submit the best work for the month shall appear in this Summary. The following navigators have been picked out for their consistent accurate and methodical work. This includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks, and checking of E.T.A’s, and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Ward – 467 Squadron.
F/O. Markham – 463 Squadron.
Sgt. Berry – 106 Squadron.
Sgt. Burns – 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Lengston – 630 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Latus – 619 Squadron.
F/O. Bailey – 49 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Searle – 227 Squadron.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TRAINING IN THE CONVERSION UNITS. [/underlined]
This month has seen little change in the training programme, with the exception that still greater stress has been laid on the importance of timing. Its importance is being stressed at every “verse end”; no doubt squadrons will appreciate this when the present lot of trainees are posted to them.
Every effort has been made to get crews up to standard in their Radar training. This has been most difficult because of the weather and a sudden “torrent” of aircraft unserviceability. However, crews are receiving plenty of valuable ground training and manipulation exercises on the trainers. It is hoped that this extra ground training will partially compensate the loss of a little air training.
The Conversion Units are carrying out experiments on practice bombing wind finding, using Gee co-ordinated as a datum point. The vector errors will be compared with those obtained using a visual datum point and a Mk.XIV Sighting Head. If these experiments prove successful, then, with the introduction of the new Continental Gee chains, it may be possible to use such a method on operations when cloud prevents the using of a visual datum point. The results are eagerly awaited.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all squadrons and conversion units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 4.3 m.p.h.
Average error of Conversion Units – 5.5 m.p.h.
These figures show an improvement for the squadrons of .4 m.p.h., but
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
a deterioration for the conversion units of .5 m.p.h. The over-all average is still below 5 m.p.h., let us now go all out for reducing it below the 4 m.p.h. mark.
[Ranked Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadrons and Conversion Units]
For the fifth month in succession Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons hold the first two places. There is no doubt that this excellent performance on the part of these two squadrons is due entirely to their hard work and great keenness. There is a noticeable improvement in the errors obtained by the three squadrons of No.54 Base. This is good, but we are confident that they can do much better. We hope to see them at the top of the list next month.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Williams, DFC, DFM – No.463 Squadron Navigation Leader – posted to No.1661 Con. Unit as Navigation Leader.
S/Ldr. Walker, DFC & Bar – Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall repatriated to Canada.
S/Ldr. Crowe, DFC – Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/Lt. Martin – No.630 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Hewitt – No.630 Squadron, to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Ayles, DFC, DFM – Navigation Leader, Aircrew School, to be Station Navigation Officer, Balderton.
F/O. Swinyard, DFC – Aircrew School, to be Navigation Leader.
F/Lt. Kilbey, DFM – No.1660 Con. Unit Navigation Leader, to be Squadron Navigation Officer, No.227 Squadron.
F/Lt. Ingram, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be Navigation Leader.
F/O. Booth, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be No.189 Squadron Navigation Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Once again much greater use has been made of this efficient little aid than of its bigger brother H.2.S.
Ranges on the primary Gee chains have been much similar to those experienced during September, but areas of intensive jamming noted in Northern Holland, along the Frisians and in the Ruhr and Frankfurt areas.
Opportunity has again been afforded for operators to use the north-eastern and northern chains. Both chains gave excellent cover, with the northern chain giving target fixes. The only “moan” being that the chart coverage of the north-eastern chain is insufficient, leaving a blank area at its northern limits before the northern chain comes in.
After much trouble with the siting of Stations, preparation of lattice charts and their distribution, the Ruhr and Rheims chains have at last come into being. So far the Rheims chain has proved quite satisfactory with little or no interference. However teething troubles are still being experienced with the Ruhr chain, mainly due to the fact that two of the stations are light mobiles. When these have been changed far better reception and coverage should be obtained, and charts are to be produced covering the North Sea, and Straits of Dover, thus cutting out the changeover of the R.F. Units over the Continent. Until this is done the eastern chain transmission on the R.F.27 is to continue.
Although little or no jamming has yet been experienced on the two new chains, it does not mean to say that the Hun will not devote his time to them. Operators are therefore reminded that much time can usefully be spent reading through jamming on the trainer. You may need this experience some day.
With the positioning of Gee stations nearer and nearer the Reich and probably on Reich territory, the possibility of Gee bombing again comes to the forefront. Every opportunity must therefore be made of practicing your Gee bombing. Homing to your airfield control tower is quite satisfactory, why not do it after every flight? (Don’t forget to keep above circuit height however).
A word about Gee homing with the advent of winter and possibilities of low cloud or drissle [sic] on return. The facilities afforded by Gee in order to reach your airfield are too numerous to outline here. You have your homing lattice lines and instructions regarding losing height. These have been provided for your safety – use them intelligently and avoid the repetition of many unfortunate accidents which occurred last winter.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Yet another navigational aid has made its debut this month in the form of Loran (Long Range Navigation). Whilst not so simple to operate as its older brother Gee it has one distinct advantage – its range. As Loran does not afford adequate homing facilities it has been fitted to aircraft in addition to and not in place of Gee, giving the navigator one more “baby” to care for. Let us see that we bring it through the teething stages without much trouble and use it as intelligently as Gee has been used in the past.
To help to counteract the teething trouble it might be as well to enumerate here the main difficulties which will be experienced with Loran by most operators during training.
(i) Difficulty in identifying the pulses, particularly the sky waves.
Ground waves are steady in amplitude.
Sky waves frequently vary in amplitude and are constantly changing their general shape. This is known as SPLITTING and usually the trailing or right edge only is affected. This is not particularly serious in the taking of readings.
(ii) DANGEROUS SPLITTING of the sky waves, causing the leading or left edge of the pulses to collapse and appear ragged. This does not persist for more than two or three minutes and operators should therefore wait until the normal pulse shape reappears before attempting to take any readings.
(iii) Interference from outside sources. Navigators are warned that Loran may be affected by many wireless transmissions, but patience must be exercised when this occurs. Wait until the interferences stop before attempting to take a reading. This interference is in no way to be confused with jamming, which is hardly likely to occur at the present time.
(iv) Blinking of the pulses, i.e. signals moving from side to side at regular intervals of about 1 second. This denoted the slave station is experiencing trouble in receiving the Master Station’s transmissions. Readings are not to be taken when blinking is on.
Training in Loran is to be undertaken by operational navigators trained by B.D.U. These instructors will be withdrawn from squadrons, trained at B.D.U. and returned on completion of the course. Each squadron should have at least one per flight in the very near future.
With the present operational commitments it is hardly possible that much time will be allowed for air training and the majority of training will have to be carried out on the ground.
Unfortunately air training over this country does not allow operators much chance to use the S.S. Loran chain and training flights over the Continent have therefore been organised. It is hardly likely that time will allow many of these flights to be made. Many navigators may therefore have to train whilst on operational sorties. With the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
difficulties that are experienced with Loran, this method of training may not appear too satisfactory, but every navigator can, by devoting a proportion of his time in the operation of Loran on each sortie, attain a good standard of efficiency.
Air Bombers too are to acquaint themselves with this new aid and give as much help to the navigators as they possibly can.
Very little is known about the reception of Loran over the Continent, and we are relying on every individual operator using this equipment to bring back as much information as possible. From this information better facilities may be provided in the future. It is up to each and every one of you to see that this duty is carried out.
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
Very little can be said of the performance of H2S Mark II on operations during the month due to the severe restrictions which have been placed upon its use.
However several gardening sorties have been undertaken with the use of H2S Mark II and results have shown no decrease in the efficiency of its operators.
It must necessarily follow that under present restrictions, the training of operators will take much longer than before. In addition, little opportunity is given to operators to study the appearance of European territory on the P.P.I.
To make up for this time lost, it is all the more necessary for even greater use to be made of flying time over this country and of synthetic training.
No N.F.T. or bombing exercises should be carried out without using the equipment either for practice blind bombing or navigational purposes. Every minute spent over this country making yourself familiar with the equipment may mean the saving of valuable time over the Continent, particularly if you have the full manipulation drill at your finger tips.
It has been noted that since the restrictions have been placed on the use of H2S Mark II, considerable lack of faith in the equipment has been expressed by many operators. This it is believed has been due to the various tales which have invariably spread amongst aircrew.
To counteract this lack of faith a report has been issued to all squadrons detailing the reasons for the restrictions and if operators spend a little time in reading the report it will do a lot to dispel these rumours. In addition they will feel more determined to obtain the maximum out of H2S on the various occasions it can be used.
The performance of H2S Mark II has been of its usual high order, 83 and 97 Squadrons again having carried out several successful attacks during the month.
Experiments have been going ahead to design a perfect scanner to eliminate the serious gap which has been occurring in the picture at 6 miles. This has been achieved and with equipment fitted with the new scanner it should be possible to bomb direct on the response with greater accuracy and less difficulty than with the present indicator. Good work 54 Base!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
P.P.I. Photography has been carried out on all operations during the month and several good photographs have been obtained by Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons. Whilst the present camera leaves much to be desired, operators must remember that it is the only check on the target area if cloud conditions prevail; every effort must be made therefore to obtain successful photographs.
If the photograph is not taken at bomb release, enter on your Interrogation form the number of seconds it was taken before or after release and you will be plotted correctly.
The excuse that both set operator and plotter are busy when in the target areas cannot be accepted. This is an operational photograph and it must be taken.
Experiments are being made by this Headquarters and at Headquarters, Bomber Command, to simplify the manipulation of the present camera and also to improve the quality of photographs obtained. It is realised that if sufficiently good photographs can be obtained, navigational and target approach strip maps can be produced for the benefit of all concerned. It is therefore up to every individual operator to see that these photographs are forthcoming.
106 Squadron are progressing favourably in the training of crews for the P.F.F. Squadrons. It is realised that H2S Mark II, whilst it gives a good idea of the basic principles of H2S, does not provide the facilities of the 184 Indicator and Mark III H2S. Despite this, every effort is being made by 106 Squadron to see that crews are fully aware of the basic principles of all H2S equipment before they arrive at 83 and 97 Squadrons, leaving only the finer points and intensive blind bombing training to be carried out by those squadrons.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] 51 BASE’S LAST MONTH. [/underlined]
This month was the last in which 51 Base was part and parcel of No.5 Group. On the 3rd November the three Heavy Conversion Units became No.75 Base under the administration of the newly formed No. 7 Heavy Conversion Unit Group. No.75 Base will, however, retain a direct affiliation with No.5 Group, and except in special circumstances will provide crews for No. 5 L.F.S. and No.5 Group Squadrons in the usual way. No.5 L.F.S. will remain within No.5 Group until Heavy Conversion Units are re-armed with Lancasters instead of Stirlings.
During their period in No.5 Group, 51 Base has produced 2,000 crews for Squadrons and has used Manchester-Lancaster, Halifax-Lancaster and Stirling-Lancaster combinations for four-engined conversion. The training organisation not only covered all the basic features of operational training but also embraced latest instruction in the rapidly developing Radar devices. Despite its many problems caused by using such a variety of aircraft types, the Base met all its Squadron commitments and, this last summer during the months July – September, produced 70 crews in excess of Bomber Command’s estimate. The formation of the two new Squadrons, Nos. 189 and 227, therefore presented no crew difficulties. The accident rate during this peak period of training also continued to improve steadily.
The pinch of the approaching winter was reflected in the hours flown during October and the Base logged just over 7,000 hours compared with 8,000 hours the previous month. The average hours per crew, however, were according to the syllabi and a total of 133 crews were posted from No.5 L.F.S. to Squadrons – one in excess of the estimate for the month. No.5 L.F.S. from now on is training on the winter rate, and investments have been made to produce 115 crews in November and 100 crews in December.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING. [/underlined]
Squadrons completed 4,500 hours day operational training and 1,500 hours night operational training during the month – 1,000 hours more than in September. The organisation for training new crews and for 10/20 sortie checks has been summarised in the Headquarters Air Staff Instructional Training/24 dated 26th October. This instruction includes a revised syllabus for initial crew training and a list of the duties and responsibilities of the Squadron Training Instructors. The last of the Squadron Training Instructors took up their duties during the month and particular attention to the details contained in the Instruction is essential to ensure the smooth operation of the squadron training scheme.
Of 133 new crews posted to squadrons, 113 completed initial crew training and were passed fit to operate. The average flying time for initial training by new crews in main force squadrons was 16 hours, which excludes No.49 Squadron on A.G.L.T. training. The syllabus in Air Staff Instruction Trg/24, Appendix ‘A’ lays down 11 hours 15 minutes,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
and every effort is to be made to keep close to this figure unless individual crews reveal deficiencies which require more flying. All Bases reported that the standard of crews from 5 L.F.S. was satisfactory.
The 10/20 sortie checks are not being regularly carried out. During recent weeks a total of 76 outstanding checks have been accumulated. A total of 32 were completed during the month – 30% - a sorry figure. 53 Base has 27 checks outstanding, 55 Base 38, and 56 Base 10. This aspect of squadron training requires immediate attention and Squadron and Flight Commanders are to assist the squadron instructors in clearing the 76 checks without delay. [Underlined] These checks are COMPULSORY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
No. 1690 B.D.T. Flight exercised 2116 gunners during 929 details. The Flight did 785 hours flying which included day and night affiliation, A.G.L.T. training and a small amount of drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. Pilots average 33 hours flying, the Hurricanes 38 hours, Spitfires 27 hours, and the Martinets 14 hours. These figures were slightly less than last month, but taking into account the weather, the Flight operated more intensively during fit periods.
October 17th was a record day for the Flight. It carried out affiliations with 103 crews including 17 night details, thereby exercising 240 gunners in 24 hours. Night affiliation again showed an increase for the third successive month and a total of 94 details, in which 200 gunners were exercised, was carried out. In addition to this squadron crews had other sources for night affiliation.
The opportunity still exists for more and more night affiliation as nights grow darker and longer as the Group is nowhere near the ideal of giving all crews two affiliation exercises in a month. The Flight also assisted 51 Base by providing 10 night details.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
There was another increase in Squadron times this month by pilots (49 hours) and Flight Engineers (150 hours). This is largely due to the good work put in by 54 and 55 Bases in increasing their total hours to 316 and 377 hours respectively.
56 Base has not been able to get off the mark properly owing to the shortage of Link trainers. However, congratulations are due to 49 Squadron whose pilots reached the 50/60 mark set in last month’s summary.
53 Base with a total of only 240 hours will have to put in some time this month to catch up with the leaders. Their pilots’ times in particular are very low at 61 hours.
All pilots should now have had some experience of the Artificial Horizon toppling device. This should help to improve their appreciation of the turn and bank indicator.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Training by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots…1367 hours. Flight Engineers…1127
[Drawing] SWINDERBY, WIGSLEY & WINTHORPE LTD
FINISHED CREWS A SPECIALITY 51
SUCCESSFUL TOURS GUARANTEED
UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT
Good Luck and Many Thanks!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “WINTER’S TALE”. [/underlined]
The best place for “Second Thoughts” is in the Flight Office before you go near your aircraft. It is not much good having them when you are bogged off the perimeter track in a foot of Lincolnshire mud with six other aircraft from your own Flight queuing up behind – five minutes to go to “last time of take-off” on a raw winter night and the tractor has broken down. It is warmer by the Flight Officer fire anyway, and you have three good books to read – 5 Group Aircraft Drills, 5 Group Air Staff Instructions and Pilots and Flight Engineers Notes, (that little blue book which looks brand new because it has been in the cupboard for the last six months).
You’ve never some winter operations before; but thousands have and there is nothing new to learn. It is a matter of remembering what you’ve been told. Check your personal clothing (you get cold in the feet and finger tips first so pay plenty of attention to your boots and your gloves). See that your crew are kitted according to scale, especially the Rear Gunner, and see that your oxygen masks and helmets are tested on the rigs in the cloakroom before you go to dispersal.
[Underlined] “BEFORE YOU LEAP”. [/underlined]
That hour before take off which you spend with your aircraft in dispersal is not a dreary one because you have got plenty to do. During the winter it is not always possible to do an N.F.T. and therefore a thorough check is more essential than ever. All the points to note are covered in the Check Lists provided at the Crew Stations in every aircraft. Take a special note of the condition of the dispersal surface when you tumble out of the crew bus. Don’t allow a dispersal to accumulate dirty oil, its [sic] slippery enough at the best of times and worse still in winter. Inspect the chocks closely to make sure there is no danger of them slipping during the run up, especially if there has been “freeze” beforehand and there is frost or ice about.
Don’t roar out of dispersal in a hurry with the Flight Engineer still busily stowing “Window”. Switch on the landing light, have the Flight Engineer manning the Aldis light, and follow the marshalling airman. Check your brakes as you move out of dispersal. Taxy slowly and take the corners easily. As you taxy round check your Gyro and Artificial Horizon to ensure that they are operating (you’ve already checked the suction on both Pesco pumps before you left dispersal), and see your Pitot head heater is ON.
[Underlined] “THE TEMPEST”. [/underlined]
You have got all the Met. information you need, and it is not much good having “Second Thoughts” about something you have forgotten if you are off the ground. If you have been warned of isolated Cu.Nims. up to 24,000 feet, keep clear of them. You know the icing level, and you know your critical temperatures for icing – between 0°Cent. and -8°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
Cent. for airframe icing, and between 0° Cent. and -30° Cent. for carburettor icing. There are of course extremes to both temperatures at which you can get icing, but it is not serious if you stick to the Flight Plan and know the symptoms.
Airframe icing is obvious. You can see it and sometimes hear it cracking off the airscrews and beating against the fuselage. If this occurs, climb out of the temperature layer, keep your flying controls free by moving them slightly all the time, and if you get the perspex icing up, use the de-icing spray to clear it. Carburettor icing makes the boost drop or surge. Fly in hot air for ten minutes and then return to cold air. Repeat this procedure whenever icing occurs and remember that hot air increases tour petrol consumption by 16%.
[Underlined] “THROUGH THE OVERCAST”. [/underlined]
Home strictly to your lattice lines and observe any special instructions you have received about where you break cloud on the return from the target. Do a proper controlled descent through cloud, 20° of flap, 400 feet a minute, and don’t be over anxious for sight of the ground. Check Q.F.E. and Q.F.F. When you clear the cloud base stay on your instruments until you are in level flight. Order your crew to keep a lookout, otherwise you may, at a low altitude, forget your lateral level because you are pre-occupied in trying to read beacons or see the ground. If you break cloud at the right point on your lattice line, there will be no danger of striking high ground. Incidentally, [underlined] never [/underlined] break cloud until you have fixed your position. You should know by now the instructions contained in 5 Group Air Staff Instruction, Trg./14, Safety Measures to Prevent Aircraft Flying into High Ground.
On the circuit give the precise order “Circuit lookout” to your crew as you prepare for the Quick Landing Scheme. This is most important in winter when cloud base might well be below 1,000 feet. Do not amble in with the intention of “Getting down this time” if conditions are difficult for landing. There is no shame in an overshoot and do not be satisfied until you are sitting comfortably in the Green of the Glide Path Indicator with your approach speed right and all your drills completed. Keep your speed down to 120 on the initial approach and get it down to 105 – 110 across the boundary. It is pointless to throw away valuable distance on the runway, especially as the brakes may be less effective than normal, because the runway is wet or freezing. “Second Thoughts” in the overshoot area are usually pretty cheerless.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “V” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88 c.
15.10.44 “X” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “G” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 c.
11.10.44 “Y” – 9 Sqdn. – FW.190
Claims annotated ‘c’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
The number of combats during the month’s operations shows a big decrease on last month’s figures. The total stands at 44 combats and of these two enemy aircraft are claimed as probably destroyed and two as damaged.
The majority of the attacks emanated from astern and above, due, no doubt, to the good conditions of visibility prevailing at the time. Now that it has been confirmed from P. of W. interrogation that upward firing guns are being fitted to the majority of the long range night fighter, attacks from astern and below must again be reckoned with, and good all-round search organised, with particular attention to the dark part of the sky.
With a night fighter breaking away below the bomber, make doubly sure that the Hun is not lying in wait below you, before giving orders to the pilot to resume course. One or two people have had very unpleasant surprises, by resuming course too soon and receiving a raking attack from below.
[Underlined] “Beware the Jetties” [/underlined] At the time of going to press no sightings of the jet propelled aircraft have been reported at night, but no doubt that has yet to come. Be prepared for their excessive closing speed when giving the order to corkscrew. The jet should be distinguishable on dark nights and the con-trail on light nights.
An account of the interesting exploits of 619/”W” on the night 4/5th is given below.
“Aircraft “W” of 619 Squadron was returning at 10,000 ft. heading 273T returning from Gardening on the night 4/5th October, and had reached position 5605N 0807E when the Rear Gunner sighted a JU.88 on the starboard quarter level silhouetted against the lighter part of the sky. At that time the bomber was flying in clear visibility with 10/10ths cloud below, tops 2000 ft. and thin stratus above 15,000 ft. The JU.88 attacked from the starboard quarter on a curve of pursuit and the bomber commenced a corkscrew when the fighter
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
reached 600 yards. The corkscrew took the bomber into cloud and the fighter was lost to view. On reappearing from cloud the F/E sighted a JU.88 below camouflaged white and Rear Gunner ordered banking search, the fighter imitated all the bomber’s manoeuvres, preventing the guns from being brought to bear. As the bomber resumed course another JU.88 attacked from Port beam with heavy calibre armament. The attack came from the dark part of the sky and was not seen by the Mid Upper Gunner. The first indication of the attack was when the bomber was hit. The strikes caused a fire amidships which exploded the ammunition in the rear turret tanks in the fuselage and disabled all the hydraulic and intercommunication system. The Mid Upper immediately vacated his turret and attacked the fire with extinguishers. The Rear Gunner saw the attacking JU.88 break away starboard quarter up and fired a long burst using manual rotation and operating one gun manually by the rear sear.
By this time the aircraft was on fire from cockpit to Elsan and the Mid Upper gunner was unable to control it on his own. The Rear Gunner, seeing the Mid Upper Gunner’s flying kit ablaze came to his assistance and with the aid of the Air Bomber, stripped him of his burning harness and placed it in the Elsan. The flames were spreading through the bomb bay and had burnt a hole in the bottom of the fuselage.
By using fire extinguishers, personal clothing and various other means, the fire was extinguished, but approximately 5 minutes later it flared up again at the rear of the ammunition tanks on the starboard side. This was extinguished by the Rear and Mid Upper Gunners.
The Rear Gunner then went into the Mid Upper turret and the Mid Upper Gunner went forward owing to lack of flying clothing which had been burnt.
The aircraft was crash-landed and on landing it was found that the Mid Upper Gunner had received extensive burns on hands and face and was suffering from shock, and the Navigator was burnet on his right hand.
It is considered that both gunners put up an exceptionally fine show in extraordinary circumstances as the hole burnt in the aircraft made any movement extremely hazardous.”
[Underlined] “ODD GOINGS ON”. [/underlined]
A Rear Gunner got repeated number one stoppages on all four guns. This continued through much “cocking and firing” until he suddenly remembered he hadn’t put the “Fire and Safe” units to “Fire”. Having completed this small operation the guns functioned perfectly.
A Gunnery Leader took a crew on drogue firing. He put the Air Bomber into the mid upper and told him to fire one gun only. During the exercise the Gunnery Leader got the impression that both mid upper guns were firing and on mentioning this to the Air Bomber, received the reply “Well, I’m only pressing one trigger!”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Roberts 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
P/O Danahar 44 Sqdn. Cat. ‘C’.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR OCTOBER:- 2190. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TABLES. [/underlined]
Though the total of affiliation exercises is below that of last month, the Squadrons’ totals are better, which is a very good sign. The night affiliation exercises with Hurricanes and Mosquitoes show an increase on last month, but whilst credit is due in this respect, it is hoped that next month’s total will be the equivalent to one night affiliation exercises per crew throughout the Group. Successful trials have been carried out by No.54 Base using infra-red film and instructions are being issued by this Headquarters in the near future.
Bomber Command have now approved the modifications to incorporate the hydraulically operated winch for self-towed drogue in the Lancaster, and this Headquarters’ letter 5G/3204/2/1/Eng. dated 25th October, 1944, refers. It is anticipated therefore, that next month that very barren column headed “AIR TO AIR” will blossom forth with digits.
Base Gunnery Leaders are warned that in all probability two extra Mark 1C Gyros will be allotted to each Squadron in the near future. It is suggested therefore, that they take immediate steps to have the necessary parts for the rig made in workshops and wired in a similar manner to their existing assemblies, so that there will be the minimum amount of delay when these Gyros arrive.
Up to date there have been two cases of frostbite in the Group due chiefly to the metal parts of the mask and helmet not being covered. This covering is very liable to have been torn and neglected during the summer months, so that now the cold weather is upon us, Gunnery Leaders would do well to check all helmets and masks immediately to see that they are in 100% fit condition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] oiling up [Drawing]
The perfect Air Gunner climbed out of his aircraft, and turned to the Armourer. “Those guns are good enough” he said, and his Captain and his crew heard and felt happy as they knew by “good enough” the perfect Gunner meant “very good indeed”. Two other Gunners, who were by no means perfect, also heard and remarked to themselves “Old Smithy must have been born with a gun in his hand, think of all the trouble you and I have had with that turret, yet Smithy goes up a couple of times, and everything is bang on. Either he’s just plumb lucky, or he’s got a gift that way. Yes, I think he takes to it naturally”. So saying, the speaker and his friend cautiously made their way towards the Mess, cautiously, in case their Gunnery Leader or Captain should catch sight of them, and acting on experience promptly put them on some sort of training. “After all” they used to argue “Why should we have to bind at aircraft Recce etc., just like any sprogs – we are almost the original operational types, we know the answers”.
“Hope the old skipper is in a better mood this evening, Bill, he seemed to be quite shirty with me after that Daylight yesterday. Called me a bloody fool and told me to pull my finger out. Me of all people. Me! Why I told him he was lucky to have two Gunners like us in his aircraft, but even that didn’t seem to cheer him up. After all, as I said, anyone might have mistaken those Thunderbolts for 190’s, and after all, he only did two corkscrews. I suppose he’ll be binding next about that turret, just because old Smithy gets airborne and it happens to work. Things always seem to work with Smithy”. The speaker pulled his chair a little nearer to the fire.
In the meantime, the perfect Air Gunner and the Armourer had finished cleaning the guns and were packing up. “It always seems to be the same when you take over someone else’s aircraft, doesn’t it”, said the perfect Gunner. “However, they begin to look a bit more like guns now, don’t they, and I don’t think we’ve much more to worry about, goodnight, and many thanks”.
The not-so-perfect Gunners, were still sitting by the fire in the Mess. “Hulloo, here comes old Smithy – Hi Smithy, how did you manage to make those ropey guns go this afternoon?”
“Well, as a matter of fact, we only gave the turret a good D.I., and all the guns a thorough cleaning, and everything went like clockwork. There’s nothing much wrong with those guns”.
As one not-so-perfect Gunner said to the other “Old Smithy may be lucky, but he’s a secretive sort of bloke, keeps things to himself you know – just cleaned the guns and they worked my foot – why they’ll be saying we don’t know our job next – you and me!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
Throughout the year this Group has steadily climbed the Bomber Command accident ladder until in September we reached the top with a rate of 7.9 aircraft damaged for every 10,000 hours flown. This goal was achieved with 23 aircraft damaged and was largely due to a drop in the number of crashes during non-operational flying. 51 Base therefore, can feel they have pulled their weight in the struggle for accident reduction, especially as October figures again stand comparison with the squadrons.
Unfortunately it is unlikely that we will remain in that exalted position at the top of the ladder. There is every indication that the rate for October will have increased, particularly as the total number of aircraft damaged rose to 31: 10 were totally destroyed, 7 were Cat.B., and 14 were Cat.AC; in addition there were 6 Cat.A(R), but these will not count against us. The [underlined] avoidable [/underlined] accidents against which every drive is concentrated, rose in proportion. October’s figures read:-
[List of Avoidable Accidents by Squadrons, Conversion Units and Other Flights]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL – 25 Avoidable Accidents. [/underlined]
It may be argued that the number of avoidable accidents during October is merely an indication of the seasonal rise in accidents as a whole. This is probably true, but the danger lies in passing this rise off as inevitable. It is up to pilots to combat the additional difficulties of winter flying by such means as more concentration on instrument flying, increased care when taxying, and a demand for full support and co-operation from their crews. With regard to taxying, you will note that accidents in this class continue to hold a notorious position in the Summary. Read and digest the notes on taxying given under another heading in this News. A typical example from the month’s records will emphasise
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the inexcusability of such accidents. Can you find any mitigating circumstances in this one:-
(i) In broad daylight a pilot was following another aircraft round the perimeter to take off point. The leading pilot stopped, naturally, at the taxy post to do his pre-flight checks. He was immediately struck from behind by the following aircraft, the pilot of which simply states that “he did not know the other aircraft had stopped until too late”.
[Underlined] EMERGENCY AIR. [/underlined]
A “new” accident occurred in October, and details are given here so that a pitfall may be avoided. Briefly, a Lancaster pilot had to use the “emergency air” to lower his undercarriage on landing. He left the lever in the [underlined] “up” [/underlined] position, made a perfect landing and taxied to dispersal. A few hours later the undercarriage collapsed. Now, wheels can be lowered by emergency air with the lever in [underlined] any [/underlined] position, but take another look at Pilot’s Notes (Latest) and there read that the lever should be fully [underlined] down. [/underlined] Now you know!
The other accidents do not provide any special features.
51 Base now passes from 5 Group to 7 Group. The accident rate on Stirlings has been steadily reduced since January, and reflects creditably on the way Stirling problems have been tackled. At the risk of repetition, this is best shown by October’s “avoidable” figures. For the first time 51 Base total is less than the total for the squadrons. In 1654 Conversion Unit only one aircraft was damaged during the whole of the month, and even this was only damaged to a slight extent, namely Cat.A(R). A commendable effort.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Squadron with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was only one known ditching throughout the Group during October – “R” of No.467 Squadron ditched 50 miles North of Terschelling on 5th October. First the port outer engine failed at 1500 ft. followed by the port inner at 900 ft. on the outward flight to the target. The Pilot incorrectly thought that he could not jettison his particular load below 2,000 ft. and turned for home, at the same time firing a red Verey cartridge to let the concentration know that he was in trouble. The port inner engine failed at 900 ft. and not until this happened was the Wireless Operator ordered to institute W/T S.O.S. procedure. These signals were transmitted at 200 ft. and naturally were not received.
Fuel jettisoning action was taken, but the jettison cocks were not closed again the the [sic] aircraft ditched with a full bomb load and little or no buoyancy from the fuel tanks. It ditched successfully but sank in 1 1/2 minutes. The Flight Engineer did not brace his back on the rest bed and the shock threw him upwards and forwards. His head splintered the bulkhead door but he was not injured, and the inrush of cold water brought him round from his temporary stunning. (Hard heads are necessary for an awkward situation!).
All members of the crew reached the dinghy without difficulty and although the mast was broken it was repaired and erected. A sail was made from silk escape maps and with a North Easterly wind the dinghy sailed about 27 miles towards the English Coast before it was located by air.
An airborne lifeboat was dropped and the crew, transferred successfully, started the engines and set course for home. The mast was slipped without releasing the whip aerial and before this was noticed, the sea had freshened, making it impossible to rectify the mistake. As the covering aircraft lost contact with them on three occasions this mistake might easily have had more serious consequences.
The crew was finally rescued by a Naval launch after 36 hours in their dinghy and almost as long in the lifeboat.
This ditching should prove a lesson to those disbelievers in transmitting “Emergency” messaged on the failure of one engine.
Though the Rear Gunner of another aircraft saw the distress cartridge being fired, no sighting report was transmitted, nor, due to a misunderstanding, was any notice taken of the report at Interrogation. W/T silence does [underlined] not [/underlined] apply to aircraft in distress or sightings of aircraft in distress unless specifically ordered at briefing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
What have now become common errors were again made by this crew:-
(i) The dinghy radio was released from its stowage prior to ditching and was lost on impact.
(ii) Mae Wests were not inflated until after impact.
Two interesting new Air Diagrams have been issued:-
Flying Control and A.S.R. Services – A.D. 3970, Issued June, 1944.
Air Sea Rescue Services – A.D.3971, Issued June, 1944.
The Lancaster Static line parachute drill has been amended. The new diagram is numbered 3011A issued May, 1944. Note those helping the wounded man should wear their parachutes – just in case.
[Drawing] THIS
OR
THIS?
PILOTS & REAR GUNNERS –
Have YOU drawn YOUR seat type parachute?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] Flying Control Competition [/underlined] – The second quarterly Flying Control Competition has now ended and the award goes to METHERINGHAM. It is only fair to Skellingthorpe to say that they have not fallen behind but have been surpassed. Sections have, in many cases, taken serious steps to bring up to scratch the surrounds of Watch Offices. The tidiness of the grass surrounds, the layout of the car park, all raise or lower the value of Control in the eyes of visitors.
The heavy winter months ahead with their problems of snow, ice and water, will demand from every Flying Control Section the maximum serviceability of portable equipment. Night Flying Equipment should be thoroughly examined to bring it up to 100% efficiency. All lamps and accs. should be tested and necessary replacements made. Never let the responsibility for a “bogging” or a taxying accident be laid on your shoulders because equipment was unserviceable or inadequate for emergencies.
[Underlined] V.H.F. Landing Trials [/underlined] – Waddington are carrying out VHF/RT trials for Command, more particularly on the control side. The policy is a “long term” one, attempting to meet future requirements of all Commands, and future layouts of Watch Offices. Preliminary trials will probably occupy a month, after which “visitors will be admitted”.
[Underlined] Rangefinder Attachment [/underlined] – Details of a ranging instrument for the Airfield Controller have been issued to stations, to ensure that at night the A.F.C. knows whether an aircraft is inside or outside the 2000 yards safety line. The adaption consists of the insertion in the inner ring sight of a metal “thimble” in which is cut an aperture of .1225 inches, equivalent to the wing span of a four-engined bomber at 200 yards.
[Underlined] Circuit Marking [/underlined] – Trials are to be carried out at Metheringham to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions on the circuit. It has not been possible to instal [sic] permanent lighting which will cater for marking the circuit points when each runway is in use. A compromise has been effected, however, to concentrate on the main runway. The “ball-up” point and the “cross-wind” position are at present marked with the identification letters of the airfield, and it is proposed to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions by means of a bar of three lights across the outer circuit.
Bases will be informed when this installation is complete at Metheringham, and Flying Control Officers should fly over there at night to inspect and report on the efficiency of this system of marking.
In saying goodbye to 51 Base on their translation to 7 Group, one must express our best wishes for their continued good work in their new “orbit”. All three stations have recently made vast improvements in their airfield conditions. Control work at Conversion Units is much heavier than on operational units and the zeal of Control Officers at those stations to bring control conditions into line with operational stations, is to be commended.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
Landing times for October refer in the main to daylight times and an improvement has again been shown over the previous month’s average. The new form of monthly return of landings to meet the requirements of Headquarters, Bomber Command, will be used to compile future returns for these records. The return should be compiled day by day and not left to the end of the month.
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Underlined] AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP 1.59 MINUTES PER AIRCRAFT. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COAL AND COKE. [/underlined]
The fuel situation this winter is going to be very difficult [sic] This is due, of course, to the fact that we will be supplying most of the liberated countries, until they can produce their own fuel.
Equipment Officers should therefore make their stations more fuel conscious, and try to save every pound of coal and coke they can.
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT TO U.E.D. AND R.E.D. (A.M.O. A.736/43). [/underlined]
Many letters have been written upon the necessity of following the instructions laid down in A,M.O. A.736/43.
Headquarters, Bomber Command, have now dealt us a bitter blow. A list has been sent to this Headquarters, showing all stations who have not carried out the instructions, and practically every station in the Group is named.
This is a bad state of affairs, and we hope in future stations in this Group will do much better and make certain equipment is returned to the right place.
[Underlined] RADIATORS. [/underlined]
The radiator pool at Coningsby is working satisfactorily, and since it has been going, the flow of radiators to the squadrons has been better, though, of course, we could do with a lot more.
We now hear from Command that this system may be stopped, and the normal demand procedure put in its place. This matter is being dealt with between Command and Air Ministry, and we can only hope that the present system is retained.
[Underlined] DEMANDS. [/underlined]
Units should take more care making out their equipment demands; cases have been reported where, either the unit serial number or the nearest railway station has been omitted. A further point is that stations are not using the rubber stamp in the Consignee’s Block.
Equipment Officers must scrutinise their demands, before signing them, and see that the demand is made out correctly. If the section has not got the rubber stamp then it should be demanded from the Orderly Room at once.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During October, 56 Base formed, and two new squadrons were built up. With the formation of 56 Base much hard work has been entailed in the organising of Base sections once more, but these are coming along very nicely and will soon be up to the desired standard. Balderton and Fulbeck, which are sub-stations to 56 Base, provide a heavy task in themselves to bring them up to the standard of airfields which were vacated by 5 Group. It is “self-help” with a vengeance. However, even in the short time that the airfields have been occupied by 5 Group units, the improvement is most noticeable.
An interesting feature of the month is the manner in which Bases have helped each other with acceptance chekes [sic] modifications and engine changes where necessary. Acceptance checks for the new squadrons were split evenly through the Bases.
Good reports are being received as a result of pilots and flight engineers of the Test Crews at Bases attending the Test Pilots’ Course at A.V. Roe’s. All Base Major Servicing Sections are enthusiastic about the testing of their aircraft and consider that greatly improved handling is given to aircraft passing out of B.M.S.S. as a result of the excellent reports submitted after these test flights.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
Since starting the drive on improving the condition and maintenance of ground equipment and the general cleanliness of hangars and dispersals, a big improvement has been noticed throughout the Group. The cleanliness of hangars is far more important than some C.T.O’s realise. However busy a servicing section is, it can always find time to keep the hangar and its surrounds clean and tidy if the will to do so is present. The mechanical sweepers which have been issued throughout the Group have proved an asset in keeping the hangar floors swept, but we still have the odd C.T.O. who allows his maintenance hangar to get into a filthy, oily state, and complains that pressure of work is the cause. Pressure of work is never the cause of this state of affairs as it is usually due to lack of interest in this aspect of maintenance over a long period. Once a hangar and its surrounds have been made to look clean, neat and tidy, this state can be maintained by just a small amount of work daily. It is again repeated that if a Servicing Wing looks neat, well organised and tidy, it invariably is also efficient.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FAILURES. [/underlined]
Engineer faults which prevented the successful completion of operational sorties totalled 1%. This is a slight increase over the previous month, but is still a general improvement. Only one of these defects could be attributed to faulty maintenance; unfortunately
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
this maintenance defect occurred in a squadron which would otherwise have had a clear sheet. 54 Base gets the “Big Hand” this month, with only two engineer operational failures. The following squadrons are to be congratulated on having no engineer operational failures during October:- 9, 50, 83, 227, 617 and 627 Squadrons. This is a very good start indeed for the first month 227 Squadron appeared as an operational squadron.
[Underlined] 51 BASE. [/underlined]
With the passing of 51 Base, complete with Wigsley, Swinderby and Winthorpe and maintenance staffs, go many engineer officers and maintenance personnel who have worked hard for 5 Group for a very long period. The type of work which they have been carrying out has been arduous and we are very reluctant to see them pass to another Group; to the newly formed No.7 Group such officers and maintenance personnel who have worked so loyally for 5 Group will be a great asset.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Conversion Units]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ENGINE HANDLING. [/underlined]
Much controversy has taken place since Air Ministry has cleared Merlin 22’s, 24’s, 28’s and 38’s at +7 lbs. boost for cruising. It is thought by so many pilots that this extra 3 lbs. boost is something for nothing, that petrol consumption at 2650 r.p.m. and + 7 lbs. boost will be the same as 2650 r.p.m. and 4 lbs. boost; this is not the case. This is what has taken place – before the modification was incorporated, the S.U. Carburettor richened when the boost was increased above + 4 lbs. and the Stromberg Carburettors richened with boost above + 3 1/2 lbs. With Mod.582 both these carburettors will now be progressively weak throughout their range up to + 7 lbs. boost.
In all cases for economical flying it is necessary to fly at a given optimum R.A.S. This optimum R.A.S. is governed by the all-up weight of the aircraft, so crews should always attempt to obtain the I.A.S. for which they are briefed.
Boost of + 7 lbs will only be obtained up to rated altitude, this will be approximately 9,000 ft. in ‘M’ gear and 17,000 ft. in ‘S’ gear. Therefore if an I.A.S. of 170 m.p.h. is required at 8,000 ft.,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
to fly economically the boost would be increased to + 5 or 6 lbs, but the revs must be reduced below 2650; the only advantage in this case is, the throttles would be fully open. If, however, the revs were left at 2650 using + 5 or 6 lbs. boost petrol consumption would increase. A case in point – a Lancaster in this Group was fitted with flowmeters; at 10,000 ft. using 2650 + 4 the R.A.S. obtained was 200 m.p.h. and petrol consumption 228 galls/hr. The same aircraft when using 2650 + 6 at the same altitude obtained an R.A.S. of 215 m.p.h., but the petrol consumption increased to 271.2 galls/Hr. As can be seen, for the extra 15 m.p.h. the consumption was out of all proportion.
The advantage of + 7 lbs. boost will be found in the climb. When climbing at 2650 + 4 with a fully laden aircraft, the R.A.S. should be 157 m.p.h.; if this speed cannot be maintained or the aircraft becomes “heavy” to handle, the boost can be increased over the + 4 lbs. setting to obtain the optimum R.A.S. of 157 m.p.h.
If the general rule of high boost and low revs together with the optimum R.A.S. is carried out on all flights, the petrol consumption will always be good.
[Underlined] WINTER FLYING. [/underlined]
To overcome many of the “snags” of winter flying due to the inexperience of crews, a list of the most important points are set out for the guidance of Flight Engineer Leaders who must instruct and advise all Flight Engineers in their section.
1. Special care and instruction on the use of oxygen, care and maintenance of masks, and the use of the extra 12 ft. oxygen tube carried in all aircraft.
2. Have each Flight Engineer work the Dead Man’s release of the rear turret.
3. Make certain each Flight Engineer knows how to use the hot and cold air valve, and under what conditions this should be used.
4. Use of de-icing fluid for windscreens – how to operate the pump. Advise each Flight Engineer to have a can of de-icing fluid in his aircraft for use inside the cabin. [Underlined] Danger [/underlined] – this fluid is inflammable.
5. Check clothing. Warm but not bulky, electrically heated waistcoat and socks are a great advantage.
6. Care to be taken when running up – see that chocks cannot slip.
7. Check “storm window” for freedom.
8. Pulsometer pumps must be switched “ON” at 17,000 ft.
9. All Flight Engineers to know 5 Group Drill No.12 “Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill”.
10. Flight Engineers to inspect the de-icing paste on the leading edge of the control surfaces; care must be taken that this is evenly applied.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
On the 25th October a meeting of Base Armament Officers was held at Headquarters, No.5 Group, when a very lengthy discussion took place covering almost all the points affecting armament work and organisation. Every effort is being made to provide more man power, more supervision and more equipment, but all armament personnel should bear in mind the vital need for careful planning and organisation of work to eliminate unnecessary handling of stores. In this connection, a tidy and well planned bomb store will always be able to handle a greater tonnage of bombs for less man hours of work (i.e. a reasonable number of days off for everybody), than a bomb store which is allowed to become disorganised and congested, thus entailing handling stores two or three times.
To run a bomb store in this ideal way calls for clear thinking and planning by the Officer i/c and an appreciation of the work and handling schemes in use by N.C.O’s.
The new heavy transporter referred to in our last issue has at last made its appearance but unfortunately only in very small quantities. Reports from the station fortunate enough to receive the first issue show that this piece of equipment is a great time and labour saver, and in addition, ensures that the tail units of 4 lb. incendiaries carried in S.B.C’s are not damaged when loaded on to bomb trolleys.
One station, not content to sit back and wait for the arrival of these items, has produced its own transporter. The transporter has been constructed from a portion of the M.7 cluster mechanism suitably modified with two small angle brackets to slip under the drop bar of the S.B.C. This transporter has been in issue for some time and has proved entirely satisfactory and easy to handle. Details of this modification are being forwarded to Units, and Armament Officers should take the opportunity of constructing as many of these transporters as possible for use prior to the introduction of the improved type heavy transporter.
No doubt many of you can think of more and possibly better methods of simplifying the handling and transportation of clusters and S.B.C’s, so get your heads together and see what you can produce. To a great extent this problem will have to be solved by ourselves, so don’t be content to sit back and wait for someone else to find the answer. You are the people who know what is required and are in the best position for finding the solution.
[Underlined] REPORTING OF DEFECTS. [/underlined]
Many instances have occurred during the past months of Armament Officers failing to carry out the correct procedure for the reporting of defects of ammunition, explosives and their components or ancilliary equipments.
The correct procedure is laid down fully in A.P. 2608A, Appendix 12, and it is suggested that a few minutes spent with this very valuable publication would benefit the majority of Armament Officers.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “BOOBS”! [/underlined]
On two occasions this month Bomb Aimers omitted to select the isolation switch with the result that the photoflash was not released and no photographs obtained.
Two full bomb loads were returned to base, one due to the Bomb Aimer setting the distributor drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo”, and the other due to the failure of the Bomb Aimer to ensure that his Master switch was wired in the “ON” position.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The total number of operational sorties for the month of October was below previous months’ figures and details of the photographic results are shown in the analysis.
[Underlined] Technical Failures [/underlined] were not high, but it is an undeniable fact that many of those which did occur could have been avoided – Photographers, Instrument Repairers and Electricians responsible for the maintenance and testing, and Photographers who process the films should make a special effort to reduce the number of failures which occur through insufficient maintenance testing and processing.
A percentage of failures also occurs because the Bomb Release Key Switch sometimes releases the bombs but does not make a positive contact to operate the camera. Headquarters, Bomber Command, have stated that a new type of key has been designed and will be issued in due course; until the new key is fitted bomb aimers must remember to depress the key fully.
[Underlined] American K.24 Camera [/underlined] is now rapidly taking the place of the F.24; despite certain criticisms there can be no doubt that the camera will give good results, provided that a few minor details are attended to. Owing to the unbalanced weight, mainly due to the motor position, this camera is not to be stood upright on the lens cone, but is to be laid on its side; furthermore, the camera should not be lifted by the motor, otherwise there is every possibility that the motor gear will become mis-aligned. Air Ministry have been asked to provide muffs which will fit the K.24, but it is not known when these muffs will become available. However, owing to the rubber film roller, brittle film should not prove very troublesome since the main cause of torn film in the F.24 camera is the measuring roller needles.
[Underlined] Composite colour [/underlined] is now in standard use, and it is hoped to increase its use but, before doing so, Photographic N.C.O’s should ensure that all photographers are trained in making up and processing the film. It is necessary to stress once again the importance of temperature and time; failure to bear this in mind will produce out of colour balance results, A different type of colour film, called the “Ansco” has been tested by No.56 Base , but the results were inferior to those produced by Kodacolour.
[Underlined] H.2.S. Photography. [/underlined] The number of cameras now available for this type of photography has materially increased, but there is much to be done before it can be claimed that the results produced are as good as they should be. The best H.2.S. Photographic results can only be obtained by correct set operation and good quality processing and printing. It has been reported that Photographers are not sufficiently informed on the working of H.2.S. to get the best out of the results. Therefore, it is hoped that the Radar/Nav. officer will arrange demonstrations in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
[Page break]
Education [Drawing]
During October, many airmen began study, which it is hoped will be continued during the winter months. The suggested programmes and facilities drawn up by Station Education Officers were widely circulated on most stations and the response on the whole has been satisfactory. The most popular demand has been for classes at the local Technical Institutes – indeed, the Lincoln Technical College was quite unable to cope for a time with the numbers of students who wished to attend. Most of the requirements appear to have been catered for now, however. It should be stressed that the college authorities have taken considerable trouble to accommodate R.A.F. personnel and we in our turn must attend as regularly as possible to make the work they have put in worth while.
Organised study is difficult in view of the uncertain hours of duty. One solution to this problem is the correspondence course method, which does give the chance of doing the work at the student’s own convenience. A full list of courses cannot be enumerated here, but there are roughly 500, and they cater for almost all the professions as well as individual subjects. The cost is only 10/-. Your Education Officer will show you what is available.
About 700 people have enrolled for correspondence courses in this Group during the past few months, and some stations have over 100 airmen attending local evening institutes each week. These are the people who are looking to the future, and there must be many hundreds more in the Group who would benefit from something of this kind. After all, its [sic] your future, so it is up to you to prepare for your return to civilian life.
Do you ever visit your Station News Room? If you do you will realise the tremendous amount of work put in to keep it fresh and up to date, and usually the Education Officer is doing the job himself. He would welcome any suggestions and ideas for improving the room, and any practical help towards putting the ideas into practice. About half a dozen airmen who are interested, can make a great difference to the freshness and appeal of the News Room.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME
[Drawings] IS HIS NISSEN
Due to the long hours of blackout, bad weather and general deterioration of living and working conditions, all of which affect the health of personnel, operational efficiency may be reduced during the winter unless strenuous efforts are made by all concerned to offset its effects.
If initiative is used NOW to plan essential precautions, this Group can be fully prepared to operate during the winter months at an even higher pressure and even more efficiently than during the last few months.
Instructions to all Base and Station Commanders have already been issued by the Air Officer Commanding, summarising instructions which have already been issued. Indication will only be given in this article of those additional jobs we may be called upon to do which are not of a routine nature, and which merely involve the use of average common-sense.
There is an old saying that “An Englishman’s Home is his Castle”. However, the true sense of this saying is, unfortunately, not fully established during war-time, as the majority of our lives is being spent in Nissen huts or, for the more fortunate (?), in rooms shared with many others, who have various ideas of conditions in which one should eat and sleep.
A balance, therefore, has to be made and the foundation for our “War Castles” should be waterproof rooms, clean approaches to living quarters, well-prepared food, hot water supply, good entertainment and ample warm clothing, together with the sensible use of camp amenities which are provided for all and not for any one individual.
In the first years of war, ample labour and material were available for ensuring that the above conditions were met, but due to the withdrawal of labour and material to priority work in the South of England, each and every one of us will be called upon to perform duties which, hitherto, have been implemented by “Specialists”. Take, for instance, that leaking roof. It’s all very well saying that it’s about time Works and Buildings repaired it; the fact is that Works and Buildings have not the labour to meet all the requirements of daily maintenance on a present-day Bomber Station. Therefore, instead of sitting back and waiting for somebody else to do the work, we shall have to do it ourselves. Material, and technical supervision will be provided and we shall have to initiate our own repairs in our “spare time”.
If we were back in our own homes, we wouldn’t need to be told to implement maintenance or to redecorate rooms which have become shabby. We would take off our coats after our day’s work and do all within our power to make it as comfortable as possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] “AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME IS HIS NISSEN”. [/underlined]
Similarly, in peace-time, when we called at the local for “one for the road” and, due to bad navigation we encroached on the muddy part of the front garden, we wouldn’t dream of entering the house without wiping our feet or scraping the mud off. This should be kept well in mind when returning from the N.A.A.F.I., or the Mess back to our quarters, or to the places where we work.
In this respect, mud can be one of the chief factors of lowering the morale during the winter. Mud is usually introduced on to the concrete roads on stations, primarily by mechanical transport being driven off perimeter tracks and from concrete roads on to the airfield, and by certain types who will insist on taking “short cuts”. This practice must be stopped; by so doing, we shall also improve the appearance of our airfields.
In regard to clothing, facilities exist for the exchange of worn clothing which would not provide proper warmth during the winter months and would, therefore, result in health conditions which seriously affect the manpower question during this particular time of the year.
Personnel working in exposed conditions are entitled to draw protective clothing consisting of a variety of items which may be obtained on request. In Civvy Street the wise man ensures that his clothing is in a constant state of good repair and although the responsibility is usually shelved on to our mothers or wives, in war-time it is up to each individual to fend for himself.
With a little bit of research “someone” can always be found to do the necessary darning, and to execute the necessary repairs if the individual has not the maternal instinct.
To deal with all the troubles would involve writing at some length and it is again repeated that average commonsense [sic] must be used. If the powers-that-be are to be believed, this is going to be the last winter of the European War. Everyone should make a supreme effort to ensure that our living and working conditions are such that our operational efficiency is not affected, and that all precautions are introduced in time to meet the trouble which they are intended to cure.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. DUNNE DFC
P/O R.F. ADAMS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. AMEY DFC
SGT G.W. LANE DFM
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.F. GRAY, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O F.T. GRIFFIN DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.H. STEWART DFC
F/SGT R. CALOV DFM
F/SGT D.J. MORLAND DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.J.B. WILSON, DFC DSO
F/O P.H. MARTIN DFC
F/O W.A. DANIEL DFC
F/O J.A. SANDERS, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/CDR J.B. TAIT, DSO, 2 BARS, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT F. WEBSTER DFM
P/O D.H. STRACHAN DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT R.E.W. OAKLEY, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT D.S. MORGAN BEM
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
A/Cdr. A.C.H. SHARP, ADC. DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.H.B. LUCAS DFC
F/O J.E. LOGAN DFC
F/O J. CHADDERTON DFC
F/O D.A. KEEBLE DFC
W/O R.P. ALLEN DFC
F/O C.H. CALTON DFC
P/O D.D. McLEAN DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.A. MILDRED DFC
P/O N.H. LLOYD DFC
P/O A. AIREY DFC
SGT W.J. ROBINSON DFM
F/SGT A. WILSON DFM
P/O A. DICKEN DFC
F/SGT M.J. STANCER DFM
F/O K.A. MATHIESON DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.J. ORAM DFC
P/O H.M. MILNE DFC
F/SGT W.J. BEESLEY DFM
F/SGT D.P. PIERSON DFM
SGT A. DARBY DFM
F/SGT J. SHORT DFM
W/O G.F. GRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.V. HAZELDENE DFC
F/O H.B. MacKINNON DFC
P/O H. WELLAND DFC
F/O J.C. LUMSDEN DFC
F/SGT P.S. BAKER DFM
F/O C.S. PATON DFC
F/O G. POW DFC
F/SGT R.A. HAMMERSLEY DFM
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.S. TURNER DFC
P/O E.W. HALLETT DFC
S/LDR J. WOODROFFE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.T. REID DFC
F/SGT J. MORAN DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/O J.A. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L T.W. BLAIR, DSO, DFC.BAR TO DFC
W/O R.G. GOODWIN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.J. HEGARTY DFC
F/O J.A. KELLY DFC
A/S/L G.A. WATSON, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT C. BAUMBER DFM
A/F/LT J.L. COMANS, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/F/LT W.T. GEE DFC
F/SGT G.H. WIDDIS DFM
P/O M.J. BRIDGMAN DFC
F/O D.H. SHORTER DFC
P/O T.W.L. LEAK DFC
P/O J.A. PEARSON DFC
F/O J.F. THOMSON DFC
F/O J.W. NEDWICH DFC
P/O J.W. MULLER DFC
F/O R.D.H. PACKER DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/LT J.E. TAYLOR, DFM DFC
P/O C.E. THOMPSON DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.G.S. SCOTT DFM
P/O N. OWEN DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.J.C. CASSELL DFC
P/O C. JAMES DFC
F/O J.H. DECHASTEL DFC
F/O A. WILLIAMS, DFM DFC
F/O P.R. PETTIT DFC
P/O E.A. MUSTARD DFC
P/O B.W. WEBB DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT P.E. McCARTHY, DFM DFC
F/O R.O. FULLER, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT E.N. CHANDLER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O T.R. DAVIES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O G.A. CHALMERS, DFM DFC
F/LT F.G. RUMBLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O E. TWELLS DFC
F/O D.A. BELL DFC
F/O H.B.R. RHUDE DFC
P/O J.R. BELL DFC
F/O R.E. WOODS DFC
F/SGT P.W. DERHAM DFM
F/O H.V. CORNISH-UNDERWOOD DFC
P/O J.R. GURNEY DFC
F/O J.K. STOTT, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT L. HOPE DFM
P/O A. WHITELEY DFC
P/O G.F. WILSON DFC
P/O F.S. GARSIDE DFC
SGT A.J. GRIFFEE DFM
SGT H.D. CAMPBELL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT N.W. MacKENZIE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.G. GREY, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT N. LEWIS, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J. MARSHALLSAY DFC
F/LT E.F. NELLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.R. GOODMAN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT N.A. RANSHAW DFM
F/LT A.J.L. HICKOX, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W.Q. CONNOR, DFM DFC
F/O K.G. CHAMBERLAIN DFC
F/O L.N. RACKLEY DFC
P/O W. MOONEY DFC
F/SGT W.E.J. COX DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO, 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of Savings by Station]
TOTAL:- [Underlined] £3,635. 7. 6. [/underlined]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP CREST [/underlined]
Many designs for a Group Crest have been received at this Headquarters and have had continued close scrutiny and study. Due to the high standard of work produced it has not, as yet, been possible to select the winning crest, but it is hoped to do so in the near future. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Flying Hours by Squadron]
ӿ New Squadron – formed 7th October, 1944.
Squadrons are place in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
All Lancaster Squadrons are above establishment and therefore flying hours are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Boxed] The cover of this month’s News has been designed by S/Ldr. N. Mould, D.F.C., of Headquarters, No. 56 Base. All personnel with artistic tendencies are requested to submit designs for covers of future issues. So far only very few have been received, and it is hoped that during the coming month the editor will receive an increasing flow of specimen designs. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
October 1944 Secret No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1325 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, October 1944
5 Group News, October 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 27, October 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, signals, tactics, air bombing, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, oiling up, accidents, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, engineering, armament, photography, education, an Englishman's home is his Nissen, decorations, war savings and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-10
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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75 printed sheets
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-19
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Konstanz
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Sorpe Dam
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Bergen
Temporal Coverage
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1944-10
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Master Bomber
military living conditions
military service conditions
mine laying
navigator
Nissen hut
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Transcription
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V GROUP NEWS
NOVEMBER 1944 No 28
[Drawing] [9 and 617 Squadron Crests] TIRPITZ
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[Blank Page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A.O.C.
In sending Christmas greetings to all ranks of 5 Group, I do so with the greater pleasure because through their combined efforts over the past months, the hitting power of the Group has been raised to a new high level, and greater harm inflicted on the enemy than ever before. In November the Group completed the destruction of the Tirpitz, an event which brought in messages of congratulations from all branches of the Service and from many of our Allies. In November also, the Group again cut the Dortmund Ems and Mitteland canals thus ensuring that an overwhelming burden of traffic should continue to be thrown on the German railways. While to ensure that this task should be made even more difficult the Group also took part in the general campaign against railway centres, achieving highly satisfactory results.
These results were made possible by the steady improvement in the efficiency with which attacks are undertaken, and in the greater numbers of aircraft available. To give two examples of this improved efficiency. In November last year, the average Squadron error in practice bombing from 20,000 feet was 310 yards; this November it is 160 yards. This means that the number of bombs which may be expected to fall within the central area of a target is now four times as great as it was a year ago, and this is borne out by photographs. Similar improvements in airmanship and crew discipline are shown by the reduction in landing times and in the lower accident rate. A year ago the average interval between aircraft landing at night was 3.18 minutes, and the best Station in November, 1943, only achieved 2.56 minutes. These times have now been halved, with a consequent reduction in the hazards of landing after an operation in conditions of poor visibility or low cloud, or when intruders are active.
Improvements on a like scale have been achieved in all other branches and sections and the serviceability rate is now higher than ever before, while the percentage of technical failures leading to early returns has been halved. These are most gratifying results deserving the highest praise; yet in no branch of Group activity have we yet reached the summit of our abilities or fulfilled our maximum expectations.
It is clear that the War will not now be over by Christmas although we can be fairly confident that this will be the last Christmas of the War in Europe. What is required therefore is a firm resolve to do everything in our power to reduce the number of days during which the War will continue to drag on. As a start I would ask air crews to aim at a reduction of the bombing error from 160 yards to 120 yards, and ground crews to determine that no aircraft shall remain on the ground if it can possibly be got ready in time to take off on operations. Although the ultimate release of the bombs is the province of the aircrew, the scale of their effort depends
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] FOREWORD BY A.O.C. [/underlined]
upon the exertions of everybody on each Station, and it is to everyone, aircrew and ground crew, that I send this Christmas message urging them to put forward their every endeavour so that in spite of all that winter weather means, we continue to increase our pressure on the enemy, and thus hasten on his collapse.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [Drawing]
That moment when the Admiral Von Tirpitz was suddenly enveloped in smoke and flame and spray, from a cascade of Tallboy bombs was not merely the T.O.T. of an operations; it was the culmination of two months planning, training, toil and patience. After the abortive attacks on 15th September, and the 13th October, there was universal determination to try again. Statistical analysis of bombing results showed thatthree [sic] hits, and several near misses, could be anticipated, if the Bomb Aimers could get their graticules on the ship; the designers and users of the Tallboy were confident that the weapon would sink any battleship.
Time and the weather were the chief adversaries. Tromso is in the Gulf Stream, and the prevailing Westerly wind causes persistent Stratus cloud. The sky is only clear when the wind is Easterly, and about five such days could be expected in November. The end of November was the expiration of the time limit for a daylight attack this year. On the 26th of November, the sun does not rise above the horizon, and for a few days after, there would be enough twilight at mid-day to bomb. After that there would be no light until the Spring. It was obvious that there was a nice problem of long range weather forecasting, and that the slightest opportunity could not be wasted.
On the 5th of November, there was a false start, because the fickle weather set fair, and then deteriorated, but on the 11th the force once more flew to its advance bases. As this was the third week-end in succession that this avalanche had descended upon them, the inhabitants if the advanced bases had mixed feelings, which they courteously concealed. The force consisted of 36 Tallboy Lancasters, the Film Unit Lancaster, a meteorological reconnaissance Mosquito, and Transport aircraft. The Lancasters had been specially modified for the previous attempt. After the experience of the Russian operation, it was clear that the all up weight could safely be increased to 70,000 lbs. Merlin 24 power units, and extra tanks in the fuselage to bring the petrol capacity up to 2,400 gallons, had been installed. Mid-turrets, and every removeable item of equipment not needed for this operation, had been taken out. The all-up weight for take-off was then between 68,000 and 69,000 lbs. This was a most formidable striking force - - - 36 aeroplanes which could attack a target 1100 miles away, with 12,000 lb bombs.
The force took off to attack the Tirpitz for the third time at 03.00 hours on 12th November. The preliminary forecast had been poor, threatening convection cloud over the Norwegian coast, with a low freezing level, and high icing index, while there was no guarantee of the target being clear of Strato-cumulus, the meteorologists’ hoodoo. The met. reconnaissance Mosquito landed at Lossiemouth two hours before take-off, and improved this forecast, but not much. There was no convection cloud, but there were patches of Stratus. Remembering how they were cheated by the weather on the previous occasion, crews were determined, but not optimistic.
The flight plan was to fly low, less than 2,000 feet above the water, to a turning point at 65.00N 06.47E, then turn due East and climb to cross the Norwegian mountains, then lose height and turn North, flying
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
East of the mountains. It was expected that this would prevent detection by the German radar system along the Norwegian coast.
The weather was fine and clear for take-off, in pleasant contrast to the previous occasion, when it had poured with rain. This was to prove an omen. The force was distributed over three airfields to avoid congestion, and aircraft set course without delay for the rendezvous point at North Unst. All aircraft burned navigation lights to assist keeping together, and flew at 185 R.A.S., the most economical cruising speed for the first part of the flight. The engine settings were 1800 R.P.M. and about 4 1/2 lbs boost, giving a consumption of almost exactly 1 A.M.P.G. The route was studded with flame floats, which crews were using diligently for checking drift.
It was twilight at the Norwegian coast and map reading, after a long period of D.R. navigation, soon put all aircraft back on track. By the time the mountains were crossed, it was broad daylight, and large areas of Strato-cumulus were depressingly evident, while every lake was covered with Stratus. Map reading in the mountains, particularly when they are snow-covered, and the lakes are frozen, is tricky. The rendezvous, Akka Lake, was only recognisable because the sheet of cloud which covered it conformed exactly to its shape. The first view of Tromso therefore, with no cloud and no smoke, and of the Tirpitz in her anchorage, massive, black and unmistakeable, was better than any crew had dared to hope for, and the job was then as good as done.
Flak was plentiful but inaccurate, and there were no fighters. The only impediment to the bombing was the smoke which hung, black and brown over the ship from the first bomb strikes, and the guns. It was impossible to be certain of results through that smoke, but fairly late in the attack, a plume of white smoke shot up two or three hundred feet like a jet. The last aircraft to leave watched the ship heel slowly on to one side. The Film Unit aircraft was able to take photographs of the ship throughout the entire action, and the last photographs showed that the attack had been a complete success, and that the Tirpitz had capsized. This was confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft, less than two hours after the attack, who reported the bottom of the ship just above the water.
Why the Tirpitz was not adequately protected by fighters, the only protections against high level bombing, can at present be only a matter for conjecture here, and may be being more thoroughly investigated by the German High Command. The ship must have been aware of the approach of the force, at least half an hour before the attack, once the climb to bombing height was commenced from the rendezvous. It may be that the German Navy did not rate the bombing accuracy of the Royal Air Force as high as it does now, or that fighters were despatched to intercept, but too late. After the attack, which was delivered by 29 aircraft, 18 of 617 Squadron and 11 of 9 Squadron, all aircraft dived towards the sea, and until well out of range of Norwegian fighter bases, flew low. No fighters were seen at all on this operation, or for that matter on the two previous ones. All aircraft landed without incident with the exception of one, of which the crew is known to be safe.
Thus was brought to an end the inglorious career of one of the largest and most heavily armed and armoured ships afloat.
The following gives a brief outline of the career of the Tirpitz:-
(i) April 1st, 1939. Launched at Wilhelmshaven.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
(ii) March, 1942. Attacked off the Loften Islands by Naval aircraft of H.M.S. Victorious. (Unserviceable for four months)
(iii) July, 1942. Attacked by a Russian submarine. (Undergoing repairs at Trondheim until December).
(iv) After a complete refit, the earlier months of 1943 were spent in trials, cruises, and the training of the crew for naval operations.
(v) September 9th, 1943. Tirpitz raided the Island of Spitzbergen in the face of negligible opposition.
(vi) September 22nd, 1943. Midget submarines of H.M. Navy attacked and badly damaged the Tirpitz in Alten Fiord. (Next six months spent in Alten Fiord undergoing repairs).
(vii) April, 1944. Tirpitz once again ready to go to sea, when she was attacked by Naval aircraft and once again sent into retirement.
(viii) July 17th, August 22nd, 24th and 29th, 1944. With signs of completion of repairs, Tirpitz was once again attacked by Naval aircraft, this time by Barracudas, and was again rendered unseaworthy.
(ix) September 15th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters flying from Russian bases. Damaged by at least one hit.
(x) October 29th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters. On this occasion cloud over the target rendered the attack inconclusive.
(xi) November 12th, 1944. Attacked in clear weather by Lancasters of No. 5 Group carrying Tallboy bombs, and capsized at her berth West of Tromso.
The coup-de-grace was delivered without the loss of a single life of the attacking force. The success of this attack cannot be measured in terms of the thousands of gallons of fuel used, hundreds of hours flown, or the number of 12,000 lb bombs dropped. The mere existence of the Tirpitz in her Northern berth has threatened all our convoys to and from Russia and North Atlantic shipping, and has cost the lives of a number of Fleet Air Arm crews who have attacked her, and has tied down a not inconsiderable force of the British Home Fleet in Northern Bases.
As the Commander-in-Chief himself has said, there was no doubt about the ultimate fate of the Tirpitz once the crews were able to draw a bead on her, and those who took part have received many congratulations on their magnificent achievement.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
German Ports and their approaches have been the main target for our Gardeners this month; the remainder of the Command effort continued to be directed against the Kattegat area.
Penetrations to the enemy’s door step were evenly shared by all squadrons, and P.P.I. photographs reveal neat patterns of well planted vegetables in their allotted positions. 126 vegetables were successfully laid, and it is already known that great disturbances were caused off a certain German harbour; shipping came to a stand still for several days, while the local harbour master was at pains to find a safe channel “out” or “in” for his concentrated shipping traffic jam.
No.627 Squadron have now joined the Group Gardening Force, and were most unfortunate in their first sortie, owing to unexpected weather conditions in the target area. But like true Gardeners they returned to base with their valuable load. Well done, and better luck next time.
[Tables Showing Command and Group Summaries of Vegetables Planted]
[Underlined] NEWS EXTRACTS OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST SHIPPING. [/underlined]
Some German captains of coal ships are reported to have opposed successfully attempts to make them sail to Western Norwegian ports from Oslo. Colliers sent from Germany cannot be unloaded – as the coal dumps in the Oslo area are full, and therefore lose valuable time while waiting for discharge. This shows weakness in administration if ships are in fact allowed to leave Germany for places where coal is either not wanted or cannot be discharged.
It is reported that in various ports, Norwegian crews have refused to sail, and in some cases foreign crews have left their ships.
The enemy has been short of crews for his merchant ships for some time. There is little chance of his being able to find substitutes for crews which refuse to sail. If these reports are true, then dislocation to shipping must be considerable.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HOMBERG – 1ST NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith
Operations opened with a daylight attack by 226 aircraft on the synthetic oil plant at Homberg, a few miles to the North West of Duisburg.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] By the time the main force reached the target area, the target itself was covered by a layer of 10/10ths cloud, 8,000 – 10,000 feet. Gee reception was poor, and the wind-finding was consequently not up to the usual standard. The first wave arrived over the target about two minutes before the Wanganui flares went down, and were unable to attack. This illustrates the importance and the difficulty of accurate timing when marking is by Oboe. They brought their bombs back. 158 main force aircraft bombed the sky markers, which were reported as scattered. 54 were abortive, and twelve bombed alternative or last resort targets.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] (i) The chances of success of this operation were still further prejudiced by an aircraft which had its V.H.F. transmitter switched on during the entire period of control. The Master Bomber’s orders were jammed, and very few crews were able to hear his instructions. The pilot of the aircraft concerned, was gripping the press-to-speak switch continuously in the target area. Arrangements are now in hand to substitute the bombing switch on the control wheel for the existing press-to-speak switch. The bombing switch cannot possibly be operated accidentally.
Incidentally on each occasion on which intercom. has been inadvertently radiated during an operation, much unnecessary chatter has been heard, and the crews have addressed each other by their Christian or nick-names. This not only displays a low standard of crew discipline, but is also contrary to Ni.5 Group Air Staff Instruction TRG/18 which reads as follows:-
“To obviate the risk of confusion over the aircraft intercommunication system, members of aircrews are to address each other according to their duty in the aircraft, viz:-
Captain
Navigator
Bomb Aimer
Wireless Operator
Engineer
Mid-upper
Tail Gunner”
(ii) Fighter Command reported that the formation was good, reasonably compact, and easy to escort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DUSSELDORF – 2/3RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
187 aircraft of the Group took part in a combined Command attack on Dusseldorf, the chief administrative centre of the Ruhr. An undamaged portion of the built-up area on the eastside of the Ruhr was selected for attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. using both ground and skymarkers. Crews were to use their own navigation winds for bombing. A mixed load of H.E. and incendiaries was carried. Possible cloud cover of as much as 6/10ths – 9/10ths cu. and strato cu. was forecast in the target area, and crews were given separate aiming instructions for attacking the Wanganui flares.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather over the target proved to be clear, with the normal industrial ground haze. 177 aircraft attacked the primary target, aiming at the ground markers. Marking was reported as accurate, and the bombing was believed to have been well concentrated, with the exception of a few aircraft whose photographs showed that they bombed short. The sorties of these crews have been cancelled. Reconnaissance has revealed that a very heavy concentration of bombs fell in the Northern suburbs which were the target, and the whole area was virtually destroyed. This practically completes the entire destruction of Dusseldorf. In addition, all the important industrial plants in this area, including the large Rheinmetal-Borsig armament works, were severely damaged, and scarcely a building has escaped either complete destruction or heavy damage.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – 4/5TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr Smith
Deputy:- S/Ldr Churcher
The importance which the Germans attach to the Dortmund-Ems Canal as one of their main transport arteries was amply demonstrated by the fact that both branches of the canal, breached and emptied by the 5 Group raid on 23/24th September, were repaired within less than six weeks, and in full working order. The same stretch of canal was therefore attacked for a second time, by 176 main force aircraft on 4/5th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point, on the narrow island separating the two branches of the canal, was to be marked direct by Mosquitoes of No.54 Base with Red T.I’s. All aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 G.P’s and crews were ordered to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the red T.I’s.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] There was no cloud in the target area, and visibility was good. Illumination and marking was punctual, but the markers fell some two hundred yards N.N.E. of the marking point and these, together with the T.I’s dropped by the backers up, formed a concentration at which the main force aimed their bombs.
The resulting concentration was the best the Group has yet achieved. An analysis shows that all but 5% of the bombs are contained in a circle radius 530 yards about the M.P.I. This works out at 25 bombs per acre per 1,000 bombs dropped around the M.P.I. and far exceeds any previous results. Both branches of the canal were once again breached and drained, and where the eastern arm crosses the river Glane bombs have penetrated through the bed of the canal.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This attack pulverised the Eastern subsidiary channel but only the fringe fell over the Western area with the result that the damage was soon repaired. It draws attention to the serious effect of even a slight vector or marking error when attacking such small targets.
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – 6/7TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith.
This canal, which joins the Dortmund-Ems canal at Gravenhorst, connects the Ruhr with Osnabruck, Hanover, Brunswick, Magdeburg and Berlin. A section of it near Gravenhorst was selected for an attack by 248 aircraft on 6/7th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Mosquitoes were given a point to mark up against the embankment on the Northern side of the canal. A tolerance of 200 yards to either side of the embankment was allowed. Winds were to be found by aircraft of the flare force, and a vector broadcast to the main force by this Headquarters, to shift the bombing some 300 yards along the canal to the North East. With a surface wind from the West, it was hoped to lay a lozenge shaped concentration across the canal at an angle of approximately 30°.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Owing to a combination of unforeseen circumstances, this attack was abortive, and the Master Bomber ordered the force to return to base with their bombs. This operation is an example of how things can go wrong, in spite of careful planning. The snags encountered are listed below:-
(i) There were 7 H.2.S. failures amongst the aircraft of the Blind Marker and Flare Forces, an altogether exceptional number.
(ii) The target area winds were found to be much stronger than forecast, although accurate in direction. The flares were consequently scattered and too far to the East, and although two Mosquitoes found the canal junction there was insufficient illumination for them to identify the marking point.
(iii) One of the Mosquito markers eventually identified the marking point, and succeeded in dropping a Red T.I. close to the bridge nearby, but it unfortunately fell into the canal, and was extinguished before any backing up could take place.
An additional cause of confusion was the choice of Green T.I’s for both the route markers and the Primary Blind Markers, and in future different colours will be used.
[Underlined] HARBURG – 11/12TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
A force of 245 aircraft was despatched to attack the oil refinery and storage installations and the town centre at Harburg, on the South side of the River Elbe, opposite Hamburg.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] There were four aiming points, A, B, C, and D, the first three in the dock area to the North-West of the town and the fourth (D) in the town centre. All aircraft were to approach on a heading of 143° T. Approximately 70% of the force carried on H.E. load: (those attacking the oil plant) and 30% an incendiary load (for the town area).
A suitable marking point was selected, upwind of the target area. At H – 11, blind markers were to drop T.I. Green on the target, these were to be followed by flares, in the light of which Mosquitoes were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point.
[Underlined] Primary Method. [/underlined] Aircraft on aiming points A, B and C were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I’s releasing without any delay. False vectors were to be applied to the bombsight to bring the bombs onto the aiming points. Aircraft on aiming point D were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I. Red, on the ordered heading, delaying the release for 26 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather was clear, except for a thin layer of stratus at 8,000 feet, and the Master Bomber decided on the primary plan. The flares were rather late, but they were dropped accurately, and Marker 2 dropped a Red T.I. estimated as 80 yards West of the aiming point. These were backed up by further Red T.I’s in positions assessed as 200 yards North and 200 yards South. The actual positions of the markers cannot be identified on the night photographs. The main force was instructed to attack the resulting concentration of Red T.I’s according to plan. Bombing in the early stages was reported as rather scattered, but a good concentration developed later, and at the end of the attack, both target areas were well alight.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Both these targets had previously been attacked on daylight by aircraft of the U.S.A.A.F. on three recent occasions previous to the 5 Group attack, and although considerable damage by H.E. is seen in the oil refinery area, and damage to residential and business property, and the marshalling yards in the Northern half of the town, no precise statement of the damage inflicted by this night attack can at present by [sic] given.
[Underlined] DUREN – 16TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber provided by P.F.F.
Duren lay on the main road between Aix la Chappelle and Cologne, and therefore on the direct route of the Allies’ advance to the Ruhr in that sector. The entire town was a fortified area containing troops, munitions and other supplies. A force of 214 aircraft, was despatched to destroy the buildings, their contents, and the defences, and in addition to block the roads and crossings. No.1 Group also provided a force of over 200 aircraft to attack the same target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] In view of the weather conditions en route, Bases were ordered to form up in “gaggles” on a time basis, and a leader was appointed for each pair of Squadrons. Marking for the attack was controlled musical parramatta, provided by No.8 Group. Primary markers were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I’s and other P.F.F. aircraft were to keep the aiming point marked with T.I. Red and Green throughout the attack. If the T.I’s became obscured, the Master Bomber was to give aiming instructions with reference to the upwind edge of the smoke.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
In view of the proximity of American troops, very strict orders were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless:-
(i) The T.I’s could be clearly seen.
(ii) The target could be positively identified.
(iii) A timed run could be made from a positively identified position not more than 3 miles from the target.
The Master Bombing Switch was used on this occasion, as an additional precaution against the premature release of bombs. Aircraft were also ordered to home on Gee along the ‘B’ lattice line on the last leg into the target, with the release-point co-ordinated set up.
[Underlined] RESULTS [underlined] The weather was clear over the target, but there was ground haze and smoke from a previous attack. The attack was carried out according to plan. Marking was accurate and the bombing very concentrated; crews bombed either the T.I’s or the upwind edge of the smoke, according to the instructions of the Master Bomber whose controlling was reported to have been excellent. The centre of Duren was entirely devastated, only a few walls being left standing. To the South and East, scattered buildings were largely gutted or destroyed, and all roads were rendered impassable. The town marshalling yards, previously damaged in a U.S.A.A.F. raid, received a further severe mauling.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – LADBERGEN – 21/22 ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were making strenuous efforts to repair the damage inflicted on this canal by 176 of the Group on 4/5th November. It was decided to attack this target in the same place once again, to prevent this repair work from being carried out and if possible to add to the damage caused in the previous attacks.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Illumination and marking in normal sequence. Mosquitoes to mark aiming point with Red T.I. Main force crews to aim the first bomb of the stick at the Red T.I. or as ordered by the Master Bomber. Bomb load maximum load 1,000 lb. A few aircraft carried 6 X 1,900 lb G.P. bombs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 123 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes attacked. The weather in the target area was 6 – 9/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet, with good visibility below. Flares were accurate and on time, and the Mosquitoes were able to identify and mark the aiming point. The Master Bomber called the main force in to bomb as planned and the attack was concluded without a hitch.
A very satisfactory concentration was achieved round the markers, and subsequent reconnaissance shows that very great damage has been done. Both branches of the canal have been breached where they cross the River Glane, and both arms have once again been drained, flooding considerable areas of surrounding countryside, and leaving many barges high and dry. The Western embankment of the main canal has been breached in one position for about 150 feet. The subsidiary arm of the canal has been so heavily cratered that its outline can scarcely be recognised. Once again a long stretch of this important canal has been drained, many barges have been destroyed, and others lie with their cargoes high and dry on the canal bed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – GRAVENHORST – 21/22ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
The Mittelland canal, which runs from East to West from Berlin to the Ruhr, joins the Dortmund-Ems canal (which runs South to North, to connect the Ruhr with the North Sea) a few miles East of Rheine. A section of this canal, just East of its junction with the Dortmund-Ems, was selected for attack with the intention of severing both these important arteries.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A bridge across the canal was selected as the aiming point and a suitable position near the bank some 500 yards to the S.W. as a marking point. The illumination and marking plan was as usual, but in this case the markers were not to be attacked direct, but crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s dropped by the Mosquitoes, and a false vector set on the bombsight was calculated to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Ordered bombing height was 8 – 9,500 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Illumination and marking were punctual and accurate, but 8/10ths to 10/10ths strato cu, base about 4,000 feet, was encountered in the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb below cloud. 137 Lancasters and 6 Mosquitoes attacked. A good concentration developed, but there was some undershooting, which was inevitable owing to the change in height and the difficulty of vectoring when so low. Nevertheless, the canal has been breached on the West side for a distance of some 50 feet immediately South of the bridge, which was the aiming point. The canal itself has been almost emptied in this stretch and many barges are stranded. In addition many barges have been damaged by direct hits, and both banks of the canal have been heavily cratered.
[Underlined] TRONDHEIM – 22/23RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
A force of 178 aircraft took off to attack the submarine pens.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected near the pens. The usual blind marker and flare sequence was ordered, and in the light of the flares, Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s to mark the marking point. A false wind vector was to be used to shift the bombs onto the aiming point. Bombing heights, 9,000 to 12,000 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather conditions favoured a precision attack such as this: the target area was located without difficulty, and flares and two blind marker Green T.I’s were dropped accurately. Unfortunately the enemy was able to put a smoke screen into operation, which effectively obscured both the marking and aiming points, and the Mosquitoes were unable to mark. Unfortunately the target lay immediately outside a Norwegian town, thus precluding blind bombing, and the Master Bomber was reluctantly obliged to order the force to return to base with their bombs.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 26/27TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Weather conditions over the target promised to be ideal for an attack on Munich, during the night of 26/27th November, so a maximum
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
effort was ordered. The weather at bases and en route was very tricky, and the decision to go ahead with the attack was not made until the last possible moment. 278 aircraft took off, many with a visibility in the region of 1,000 yards and cloud base 600 feet. A fine achievement.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two major sectors of the town were selected, one radiating between 019° T. and 060° T, from the marking point, and the other between 081° T. and 150° T. The aircraft in the first sector to carry 1 X 1,000 MC/GP plus maximum ‘J’ incendiary clusters, and those in the second sector 4 lb incendiary clusters, with 50% of them carrying 1 X 4,000 lb bomb.
The two major sectors were sub-divided, and sector headings and appropriate delays were allotted in the usual way. No. 9 Squadron aircraft each carrying 1 X 12,000 lb H.C. bomb were spread throughout all sectors.
Illumination and marking in the normal sequence, bombing heights 16,000 – 20,000 feet.
With freezing level at 2,000 feet and a front lying approximately over the English Channel with tops generally at 20,000 feet, with occasional cu. nimb. Up to 25,000 feet, the flight plan presented a difficult problem. It was eventually decided that, after take off, aircraft should fly South over England below 2,500 feet, maintaining this height until the front had been crossed. Aircraft were to fly over the top of the front on the homeward route, losing height behind it.
The route to the target was chosen to give the enemy as little warning as possible: it lay South of Switzerland, crossed Lakes Maggiore and Como, and then went N.N.E. to the target, across the Alps. This plan was entirely successful, and the defences did not come to life until the attack was well under way.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The Master Bomber was delayed taking off, so Marker I, who was the deputy, conducted the opening phases of the attack. Illumination and blind marking went as planned. At H – 7 a Red T.I. was dropped, and assessed as almost on the marking point. At this moment the Master Bomber arrived, assumed control, and confirmed the accuracy of the Red T.I. Backers-up were called in, and marking was completed by H – 1. One Red T.I. which was assessed as wide to the North was cancelled by a Yellow T.I. The main force was then ordered to attack as planned.
Pilot’s reports were very enthusiastic about the success of this attack, but a large proportion of the night photographs plotted show ground detail to the South of the target, and it is now clear that the point marked was some 2/3,000 yards too far South. Nevertheless at least half of the attack went into the town and Southern suburbs and considerable damage should have been caused.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This was the first occasion on which the Group as a whole has used Loran, and the results were very satisfactory. The concentration on the return route showed a marked improvement on the degree of concentration previously achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATOR (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] CONTROLLED OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
W/T operating by the W/T link operators throughout November maintained a fairly high standard, and reception of their transmissions by the Main Force operators was also of a high order. 54 Base again supplied all the W/T link operators and both squadrons are to be congratulated on their efficiency. This result has been accomplished by hard training.
Two interesting incidents which took place on the night of the 11th and 22nd respectively are worthy of mention. On the night of the 11th, four minutes before the first bombing wind was due to be transmitted back to Group, sever ‘jostling’ was experienced on the frequency. Prompt action by the C.S.O. enabled this frequency to be cleared just in time for controlling to commence. We again realise just how effective this countermeasure is. On the night of the 22nd propagation conditions were such that reception at all the Group Ground Stations was practically impossible, yet when crews returned it was found that ait to air reception was perfect and 100% reception accomplished.
The Link 1 and 2 operators who carried out control duties during the month were:-
Night 4th F/O Booth 83 Squadron Link 1
F/O Chapman 83 Squadron Link 2
Night 6th F/Sgt Manderson 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Whitehead 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 11th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Utting 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 12th F/O Ward 617 Squadron Link 1 )Tirpitz
Sgt Morgan 9 Squadron Link 1 ) attack
Night 22nd Sgt Smith 97 Squadron Link 1
Sgt Moroney 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 27th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 2
F/Lt Summerscales 83 Squadron Link 3
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During the month 61 Wireless Operators took part in the test as detailed in 5G.S.I. No.13 and out of this number 54 passed as fit for W/T Link duties. Tabulated below are the number of operators per squadron who took part in these tests.
[Table of Numbers of Wireless Operator Tests by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during last month was disappointing, due to a number of squadrons not yet having all their equipment installed in their new training rooms, Signals Leaders are asked to exert pressure in the right direction to hurry along the completion of these training rooms so as to enable advantage to be taken of this organised and highly profitable training. We extend a hearty welcome to the Heavy Conversion Units of No.75 Base to take part in these exercises, and hope they will find the exercise interesting and of instructional value.
[Underlined] POINTS FOR SIGNALS LEADERS. [/underlined]
During regrading tests throughout the month it was distressing to find that very few Wireless Operators (Air) knew anything at all about the V.H.F. equipment TR.5043. Now this is definitely Signals equipment, and all Wireless Operators (Air) should know at least sufficient about the installation to enable them to rectify any simple fault which may occur in the air, such as the replacing of fuses, power leads, aerial connections etc. Particular instruction should be given to the drill for checking whether the set is on transmit or receive.
The introduction of the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule has filled a long felt want, and will be much appreciated by all Wireless Operators (Air). Like all other publications it will only fulfil [sic] its rightful purpose if it is always kept amended up to date, and the responsibility for amending all copies lies with the Signals Leader. He should ensure that all “Wilmot” signals are received and any amendments to the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule are embodied immediately.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The total percentage of Signals Failures against sorties flown for the month of November, was 1.82 which shows a decrease of 0.497 against the figure for October. It will be seen from the Signals Failure Monthly Circular that there was also a decrease during October, the percentage decrease for both months being 0.619. This achievement is really outstanding when one realises the unfavourable weather conditions the servicing personnel have encountered over this period. It all goes to show that IT CAN BE DONE – good show chaps!
There is also a bouquet this month for the Wireless Operators (Air) – there were no manipulation failures; an excellent state of affairs.
During the month not one sortie was cancelled (Class A) as the result of a signals defect. How many realise that this record has been maintained over the past 5 months?
[Underlined] I.F.F. COURSES. [/underlined]
Five courses involving 57 Wireless Mechanics drawn from all stations in the Group were held at Morton Hall during the month. Great keeness [sic] was shown and the instructor, Sergeant Ryder, reports very favourably on the standard attained. The Chief Signals Officer took the opportunity of discussing with each course the problems connected with aircraft servicing and was able to obtain some useful ‘gen’. The fact that a vast majority of our Group 1 tradesmen are still looking forward to an early return to civilian occupations was once more confirmed, and was countered by a graphic description of life in the peace-time airforce which it is hoped may have the effect of changing some of their minds.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T – TR.5043. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
The TR.5043 gave good serviceability during November, there were ten failures reported against more than 2,000 sorties. Four of the failures (all in one Base) were “NOTHING HEARD – NO FAULT FOUND”. Are Signals Officers doing all in their power to prevent this type of defect? There were two cases of Aerials Type 147 breaking; this is a decrease in comparison with the figure for October.
During the month, exhaustive experiments were carried out at Metheringham by 3 R.A.E. specialists in connection with aerial breakages. The result of these experiments is, that [underlined] all [/underlined] Lancaster aircraft TR.5043 aerials (including H.2.S. aircraft) can safely be fitted in strict accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10.
[Underlined] VOLUME CONTROLS. [/underlined]
Three different types of volume controls for operation by the pilot are now undergoing test in various Lancaster aircraft in the Group. Results to date are somewhat varied, some pilots stating that the new control in ‘bang on’ whilst others aver that the minimum position still permits incoming V.H.F. R/T Signals to interfere with intercom. We are determined to find the ideal before launching a general fitting programme.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T COURSES. [/underlined]
No.1 Radio School, Cranwell, has undertaken to give all Signals Officers in the Group a four-day course on the V.H.F. R/T set TR.5043.
The first two courses report enthusiastically on the efficiency with which this course is being run and they thoroughly enjoyed the brief opportunity to be immune from telephone calls and other diversions whilst learning all there is to know about this interesting set.
[Underlined] INADVERTENT RADIATION ON INTERCOM. [/underlined]
Yet another case has occurred of crew intercom. being radiated on V.H.F. R/T in the target area. This resulted in serious inconvenience by jamming to some extent the R/T traffic. It had been considered that all possible action had been taken to prevent this sort of thing happening. All Main Force aircraft have a switch fitted in the H.T lead to the V.H.F. Transmitter, and this switch is locked in the ‘Off’ position prior to take off. All aircraft which may be called upon to transmit on their V.H.F. R/T, have this switch in the ‘On’ position, but are equipped with a Neon light indicator positioned near the navigator which lights up whenever the V.H.F. set is transmitting. In spite of these precautions, however, an aircraft of the illuminating force inadvertently radiated intercom. on V.H.F. It seems that it will be necessary to reposition the neon indicator, and also make use of the pilot’s bomb release switch in lieu of the existing press-to-speak switch which unfortunately is in such a position on the control wheel that it can be gripped, and pressed, in the ‘On’ position accidentally. The Pilot’s bomb release switch is fitted on the control wheel in such a way that it cannot possibly be actuated accidentally.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The closing days of the month saw the final stages of the Loran fitting programme. This fitting programme almost brought back reminiscences of the Monica Mark V days, and much credit must be accorded to the wholehearted efforts of the Engineering and Radar personnel who installed the bracketry and equipment in double-quick time.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
The successful use of the equipment on the Munich operation on the night 26/27th gave a very useful fillip to enthusiasm, and effectively squashed the mutterings of the “doubting Thomases”. The serviceability figures, in view of the usual manipulation troubles and initial “bugs”, are promising. It has been found that the indicator becomes unusually temperamental when damp, but waterproof covers should clear this trouble.
Shortage of the main boxes and lack of spare components were sources of complaints, but both will be cleared almost directly.
[Underlined] A.G.L.(T). [/underlined]
Despite the spring tides at Fulbeck which threaten to engulf the Radar workshop, the A.G.L.(T) situation is well in hand. No physical success has been claimed, and the shortage of equipped aircraft is acute, but much useful data has been brought to light, which should do much to assist the final development of this device.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
Progress at Coningsby is steady. The scanner trouble has been cleared, gaps in the polar diagram have been filled in by a simple modifications [sic] which consists of strategically mounting a 16” X 6” sheet of perspex on the mirror. We [underlined] know [/underlined] it does the job all we want to know is [underlined] how [/underlined] it does it. Improvements to the scanner testing equipment have effected considerable economy in flying hours.
[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
The addendum to Monica to defeat the Hun, reached its flying trials this month which were very encouraging, and earned official sanction for the Group to experiment with Monica. All credit for this device must go to F/O Tovey of 53 Base. His prototype made all Walt Disney’s conceptions look very ordinary but he continued to work on the idea tirelessly and patiently, and with T.R.E. assistance brought forth a very workable unit, of which we hope a lot more will be heard.
[Underlined] SECURITY. [/underlined]
This month has seen the introduction of the long awaited Bomber Command Diversion Schedule. As the tag has it “The mountains shall labour and bring forth a ridiculous little mouse”. In this case at least, an eighteen month gestation has produced a noble offspring. There is one note of ridicule, introduced we imagine by some frolicsome “printer’s devil”, and this defect in the Schedule required one of the three following ‘mods’ for its eradication:-
(i) The Schedule to be mounted on a bracket and swivel fixed to the W/Op’s (Air) table.
(ii) All W/Op’s (Air) to be fitted with swivel vertebrae above the shoulders.
(iii) The even numbered pages of the Schedule to be printed “the other way up”.
The last of these three ‘mods’ has been requisitioned, and until it appears we wish you good luck and happy diversions.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED. [/underlined]
The Field Security Police have a multitude of duties,
And amongst other things these precious beauties
Sit in post offices and monitor calls,
And lap up every word that falls
From the lips of Service folk;
This is by no means a joke,
Though it may seem to be at first.
The police laugh simply fit to burst
Whenever they hear some solemn voice say,
“This is an Ops. circuit so we needn’t scramble, heh?”
And the other bloke
Says, “Oke!”
When this happens you might guess,
They take it down in shorthad, [sic] (more or less),
And after a court-marital –
To which they’re very partial –
The perpetrators of the crime
Do “time”,
Or they may, it is feared,
Be cashiered!
It all depends upon the rank,
AC Plonk or Flight Lieutenant Blank.
The moral is by now quite clear, I’m sure.
NO circuits can be trusted as secure.
When secrets must be spoken, your preamble
Must always be the magic words, “Please scramble!”
Ops. circuits only give you what you need,
And that is NOT security but Speed!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] WHAT ARE THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD NAVIGATOR? [/underlined]
A good navigator may be summed up as one who works hard all the time, uses his intelligence constantly and makes a conscious effort to be on track and on time throughout every operation.
Do you think you fill that category? To assist you in answering the first question, below is a self analysis chart for you to complete. Be honest with yourself in answering these questions.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUESTIONS. [/underlined]
(1) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] work to a system, and a regular time interval?
(2) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] make a “snap” alteration of course immediately you ascertain you are off track?
(3) Do you check your ETA’s [underlined] regularly [/underlined] every 15 minutes?
(4) When coming into Gee range to you [underlined] always [/underlined] believe the first Gee fix you obtain and act on it?
(5) When no fixing aids available, do you [underlined] always [/underlined] obtain a D.R. position every 15 minutes?
(6) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] “home” on your Southern or Eastern Lattice lines as instructed.
(7) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] check your compasses every 20 minutes?
(8) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] find a w/v over the ideal period of time, i.e. between 15 and 40 minutes.
(9) When necessary to you [underlined] always [/underlined] dog leg or alter IAS so as to arrive at each turning point exactly on time?
This is by no means a comprehensive list, but if you answer all the questions frankly, you will obtain a good assessment of your own ability. If you can say “Yes” to only 70% or less, you are below average; 80% you are average; 90% ad above you can consider yourself a good navigator.
Make a note of the points on which you lose marks, then rectify them [underlined] immediately [/underlined]. Further lists will appear in the next two summaries, so keep a note of your results on this test and by January you will have a complete assessment of yourself.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
The importance of finding accurate w/v’s, [underlined] and using them, [/underlined] has been stressed constantly for the last five years. One would therefore think that, as a result of all this “binding” every Navigator would now realise the importance of windfinding. BUT, unfortunately this is not so, Why?
We now have four “gen boxes” given us to assist in finding really accurate w/v., i.e. Gee, Loran, H.2.S. and A.P.I. All these instruments have been tested very thoroughly and have been proved accurate. All Navigators acknowledge the accuracy of these instruments and trust individual fixes and A/P’s obtained, but when it comes to joining two of these positions together, i.e. fix and Air Position, and obtained a w/v, many Navigators automatically become dubious. If the w/v obtained agrees fairly well with that forecast, or the last few w/v’s found, it is considered accurate. BUT, on the other hand if it differs by any appreciable amount, then in 7 out of every 10 instances a Navigator will say he got a “duff fix”, or else the A.P.I. is overreading!! In other words many Navigators just haven’t the confidence in themselves. Are YOU one of these? If you are, then reform yourself!
It is not generally appreciated that, even with a so-called steady wind the direction is never constant to within 30°, and the speed is never constant to within 10 or 15 miles an hour, so how can you expect to find idential [sic] w/v’s, and in any case how are you to know that there hasn’t been a sudden wind change caused by an unpredicted front or other reason?
Therefore in future, do not mistrust your fixes, A.P.I. readings and resultant w/v’s. Take great care in obtaining these readings and in plotting them accurately, but once you’ve got them treat them as correct – and [underlined] USE [/underlined] the resultant w/v!
[Underlined] COMPASSES. [/underlined]
Do [underlined] YOU [/underlined] always check your Compasses every 20 minutes? This question has been asked already, but it will bear repeating. There are now 3 instruments dependent on the serviceability of the D.R. Compass, namely H.2.S., A.P.I. and Mk.XIV Bombsight, besides of course the safety of the aircraft itself. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the D.R. Compass is fully serviceable all the time.
A recent analysis showed that very few Navigators ever pay sufficient attention to their compasses. Are YOU one of these people who take the Compasses for granted, or do you carry out your checks methodically. Do you for example, ever go out to your aircraft and assist in the swinging, or do you even ask the Compass Adjusters on their return how your compasses are? Do you always carry a compass key in your pocket? Have a look and make sure before you answer the last question. Are you thoroughly conversant with the symptoms of a toppled gyro, and do you know the procedure to be adopted to correct the gyro? [Underlined] But above all, [/underlined] do you know that you should never return early because one of your compasses is unserviceable?
An analysis is carried out after every Group concentration plan has been completed to ascertain why certain aircraft are off track. On every occasion the answer for [underlined] AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT [/underlined] is that vague phrase “COMPASSES U/S”, which, on further examination, means nothing more than “Compasses desynchronised”.
The safety of an aircraft and its crew was therefore jeopardised because the crew [underlined] forgot to check their compasses! [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Longer range targets will be the the priority this Winter and that means deep penetration into a heavily fortified Germany. Accurate Navigation will therefore be absolutely essential and this is directly dependent on the accuracy of your compasses. Be compass minded then – learn all you can about them, know your drills and manipulation procedures off by heart – and above all [underlined] CHECK YOUR COMPASS REGULARLY. [/underlined]
Use the Astro Compass when there is any discrepancy between the P.4 and D.R. Compasses.
Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must continue to drive hard on this subject, checking all new crews on their arrival See that they are thoroughly conversant with the drills, faults, remedies and manipulation procedures, and make it clear to them that on no account do they return early if one compass is unserviceable.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by the squadrons this month is 3.8 m.p.h. This is excellent. This figure shows a decrease of .5 m.p.h. We have achieved our goal of an average vector error below 4 m.p.h. Can we now possibly reduce this error to below 3 m.p.h.? If we can then all navigators can truthfully say they are contributing to very largely to the high standard of bombing we are achieving. Go to it! and see what records you can break this month.
[Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadron]
It will be noted that three squadrons of No.53 Base occupy the first three places this month, the two “old faithfuls”, Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons, still retaining their lead on the rest of the Group. No. 56 Base Squadrons are all down towards the bottom of the list. They can, and have, done very much better than this. Com on No.56 Base, let us see you at the top next month!
Apologies to No. 57 Squadron for last month. Their average vector error was inadvertently shown as 4 m.p.h., whereas it should have read 3.5 m.p.h.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators who submitted the best work this month as [sic] set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track-keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks and checking of E.T.A’s and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/O Hart – No.467 Squadron
P/O Briggs No.83 Squadron
F/O Martin No.106 Squadron
F/O Skinner No.189 Squadron
P/O Searle No.227 Squadron
F/Sgt Shapman No.207 Squadron
F/O Kay No.630 Squadron
F/Sgt Murray No. 50 Squadron
Note that P/O SEARLE appears for the second time. Good work SEARLE – keep it up!
[Underlined] TIMING. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary a long article was written on the slackness of timing on the return journey. Three causes of this “timing spread” were suggested and you were asked to eliminate them and so bring about a much needed improvement in the return journey concentration. Base, Station and Squadron Commanders and Navigation Officers were also asked to have a “drive” in this direction. Only one operation has been carried out since this letter was sent, and on this raid there was a very big improvement. In fact the concentration on the return journey was better than that going to the target!! This is good, keep it up, and make it your aim to achieve the concentration we desire, i.e. “an area covering not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width” – and no more.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Markham – No.463 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Martin – No.61 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Bennett, D.F.M. – No.617 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall. (now S/Ldr.).
F/O Bayne, D.F.C. – No.617 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. De Boos, D.F.C. – No.627 Squadron Navigation Officer, tour expired, posted to No.7 Group.
F/Lt. Tice – No.627 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
S/Ldr. Kelly, D.F.C. – Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck, missing on operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
This new navigational aid has only been used to any great advantage on one operation this month. Despite the difficulties in training and the short time since the introduction of the Loran equipment, operators made full use of the facility it affords, and it has proved without doubt a useful addition to our navigational equipment. The fact that to the present time no interference has been encountered which would make fixing difficult does not imply that the Hun will not attempt to jam the equipment and with this fact in mind every possible operator must use Loran to its fullest advantage whilst it is still possible.
There are one or two points which have arisen in the manipulation and use of this equipment which must be stressed. They are:-
(i) Loran operators are not spending sufficient time in the recognition of signals – particularly differentiation between 1st and 2nd Hop E sky waves. Perseverence [sic] and close watch of the signals on Sweep Speed 3 will ascertain whether the signals are the correct ones. It is appreciated that very little, if any, training can be carried out on the S.S. Loran Chain and operators must endeavour to use time on operations for sky wave training. If you are uncertain as to the appearance of sky waves your obvious remedy is to visit the Radar Training Room after 1630 hours any day and you can get all the gen on the sky waves by using the S.S. or North Eastern Loran Chain on a bench set. Why not make this a nightly feature until you are sure in the identification of all signals.
(ii) No system of taking position lines at regular intervals is being followed. It is no use taking a position line from one rate and keep transferring it along track for an undeterminable number of times to give you fixes with position lines from the other rate. Try taking position lines at regular intervals of say 10 minutes e.g.:-
Rate 4 at 2010 and 2020 and so on.
Rate 5 at 2011 and 2021 and so on.
(iii) The time base readings are easily upset by movement of the fine strobe control during the switching of the Sweep Speed Control through position 5, 6 and 7. Watch this carefully or else you are going to get false fixes. If necessary use your left hand for switching the Sweep Speed Control.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
(iv) Several operators reported the four dividers out of alignment but a few using commonsense [sic] and initiative correctly aligned the dividers and obtained full use of the equipment. As the dividers, particularly A, B, C and D are very critical, alignment checks must be made:-
(a) After switching on procedure has been carried out.
(b) Every two hours when LORAN is in use.
(c) After any large changes of temperature or pressure.
An Aircraft Drill has been produced and is available at all units, detailing the alignment procedure. Loran operators must know this procedure fully and screwdrivers have been made a general issue to all navigators in order that alignment corrections can be made in the air. It is important, however, that operators should know the symptoms of incorrect alignment before they attempt any correction at all. Loran Instructors or Radar Officers will supply all the “gen” on this.
A slight modification to the Loran set is being introduced shortly which enables operators to change the basic rate so that the new North Eastern Loran Chain can be used. This North Eastern Loran Chain the details of which will be available shortly, gives coverage over the whole of the North Sea and should be very useful on Northern trips. It is, however, emphasised that as this Chain is not as accurate as the Norther Gee Chain, Gee must be used to the limit of its coverage. The present charts are to a scale of one to three million and therefore hopeless for Bomber Command navigation. Representations have been made for larger scale charts and these will be distributed as soon as they are received at this Headquarters.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Welcome changes have been made this month in the Continental Gee Chain frequencies with the intention of giving far better facilities from the Ruhr and Rheims Chains. However emphasis is placed upon the correct setting up of the R.F.27 tuning dial to obtain the best reception. Great care is therefore to be exercised in setting the dial correctly when changing from one frequency to another.
The Rheims Chain continues to give excellent results with ranges reported as great as 0930E. Interference is slight and on most occasions non-existent. On the Munich operation the Chain could have been used to considerably greater advantage if suitable charts had been available in time.
The Ruhr Chain is still producing disappointing results and below the standard of the Rheims Chain. A and C Station signal strengths are fairly good. The B and D signals are weak limiting the operational value of the Chain. Sine wave jamming and Heavy Grass has been reported in the Brunswick and Cologne areas.
The Eastern Chain gave excellent results on the Harburg operation, many operators obtaining fixes in the target area. This indicates either the meteorological conditions were favourable for Gee that night, or that the enemy has transferred his jamming to other frequencies.
Representatives have again been made for the production of miniature lattice charts for the Continental Chain as the navigator nowadays has to carry no less than eighteen topographical lattice charts if he is to be prepared for any emergencies. The total area covered by these topographical lattice charts can be reproduced on approximately four miniature lattice charts.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
H.2.S. silence is still being maintained on the Group with total restriction on the use of H.2.S. Mark II and part restriction on H.2.S. Mark III. With the risk of early warning of operations, and until the efficiency of the enemy night fighter equipment is definitely ascertained, it is the policy of this Group to give the enemy as little help from H.2.S. sources as is possible.
H.2.S. operators are reminded that although the use of H.2.S. Mark II is almost totally restricted it may be possible that at some future date consent will be given to its use again. H.2.S. Mark II can be used from the enemy coast on the return journey. This relaxation of the restrictions is intended for training purposes and operators should make the best use of this time to raise their standard of efficiency. H.2.S. is and will remain the most efficient navigational aid over enemy territory because it cannot be jammed efficiently, and with the introduction of new Marks it will again come into general use. All Marks of H.2.S. are manipulated in a similar manner and thorough knowledge of Mark II will ensure more efficient use of the later Marks.
54 Base still continue to make great strides in the use of H.2.S. Mark III as an efficient bombing aid and trials are continuing to ascertain the accuracy of individual sets of H.2.S. equipment by means of ground Radar plots at positions of bombs gone on various targets. Complete analysis of every run is being made to ascertain the errors due to equipment and to the human element. Those due to the equipment can be eliminated. It is up to the individual operators to eliminate the inaccuracy due to human error.
H.2.S. Photography is proceeding satisfactorily throughout the Group, although all main force photographs, except those from 106 Squadron, are of landmarks in this country. From these training photographs it is evident that the standard is improving, and operators are taking a little more time in the manipulation of the camera. There are, however, still one or two unsatisfactory details which can be overcome:- For instance, some operators still persist in having a 10 mile zero as big as a half crown thus distorting the photograph obtained. Remember is should be the size of a sixpence. Others persist in having lights on or letting the daylight into the compartment when taking the photographs thus wasting negatives and printing material. If you persist in making these mistakes during training, far more may be made during an operational sortie due to operational stress. 54 Base have produced some excellent operational photographs, particularly those taken on the operation to Munich. These photographs show the lakes and valleys in the Alps as clearly as on a relief map. The photographs also indicate that the target and lakes nearby are very well defined on the H.2.S. Mark III P.P.I. and will no doubt prove useful for any future attacks.
Squadrons of 55 Base and 106 Squadron have carried out several mining sorties during the month, the results of which have been excellent. The importance of this work cannot be too highly stressed and H.2.S. training on these squadrons is being carried out with this type of operation in mind. There are several convenient landmarks on the East Coast which can be used for mining runs and the number of P.P.I. photographs which have been received indicate that some operators are making use of them during training. The important fact is that all operators on these squadrons must be able to release mines accurately on H.2.S. We cannot afford to lay them outside the normal channels, where they may be a danger to our own shipping.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month the German Night Fighter Force has again failed to offer effective opposition to Bomber Command’s night offensive. The German fighter controllers have been bewildered by the profusion of Window spoofs, Mosquito raids and Intruders, combined with the main attacks, and have failed to intercept the bomber stream with an effective number of fighters. Night fighter are, however, still the biggest danger, and there is no reason to suppose that, once they have contacted the bomber stream, they are any less efficient than they were last Winter. A night fighter, particularly if equipped with upward firing cannon, is a formidable adversary, and a crew must be on the top line to combat it successfully. Good crew discipline is essential. In particular, intercommunications between the pilot and gunners must be clear and concise. Idle chatter and the use of Christian names on the intercom. may mean attending interrogation at Dulag Luft instead of Base.
There are indications that the enemy may, in the very near future, send up fighters against our daylight attacks, particularly on the deeper penetrations we shall be making in the coming months. The fighter escort will deal with what it can, but crews must be prepared for small formations of enemy fighters to get through the escort. This will provide a quick and decisive answer to the ever recurrent problem of stragglers. The enemy may well use jet fighters for these attacks, but crews should remember that, although their speed is very high, there is nothing miraculous about these aircraft. In an attack they behave like conventional fighters and should be treated as such. Although they are armed with 30 m.m. cannon, these have such a low muzzle velocity that, for accurate shooting, they are not effective over 400 yards, which will give gunners a good chance of shooting back.
A final warning. A case has come to light recently where a captain admitted letting his rear gunner leave his turret over France and the sea when returning from the target. This is criminal. German night fighters are often ordered to follow the bomber stream across friendly territory, and well out to sea, and captains must remember that an operation finishes in dispersal, and not a moment sooner.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The activities of the Group in the operational sphere have mostly been intended to destroy small targets rather than to bomb areas of large cities.
Despite unfavourable weather conditions on frequent occasions, the results have been reasonably satisfactory from the Air Bomber’s point of view and the necessity of maintaining a high standard of precision bombing must be apparent. Obtaining the best possible results on precision targets at night, when visual identification is impossible, necessitates a thorough knowledge of the tactical plan and the ability to carry it out to the letter. The plots of the incendiary attacks on sectors illustrate that the majority of Air Bombers are doing their best to guide the aircraft over the marking point, but it must be realised that after the dummy bombing run on to the marker, it is essential that the aircraft should be on the briefed track as quickly as possible. As soon as the marker comes into the intersection of the bombsight graticule and is reported by the Air Bomber, the immediate reactions of the bombing team are as follows:-
(a) The Navigator commences to count off the required number of seconds consistent with the basic delay plus the delay for the incendiary bombs.
(b) The Pilot turns on to the course given by the Navigator prior to reaching the target area, and confirms that he is on the correct course.
(c) The Air Bomber does a last minute check of the bombing panel and releases the bombs on the executive word from the Navigator.
The correct observance of this procedure will ensure that the required incendiary concentration falls in the areas where the maximum amount of damage can be caused.
Now that Winter has arrived, all Air Bombers must be prepared for icing in the bomb-bay. The only preventative measure that can be undertaken is to see that the release slip heater for No.13 station is switched on at take-off, but by a careful examination of the bomb-bay after landing, it will be possible to see if any incendiaries have fallen from the S.B.C’s on to the doors and the ground crew will know what to expect when they open the bomb-doors. A careful examination of the bomb-bay after the aircraft has been flying below freezing level for some time will help to prevent any accidents on the ground after landing. It should be remembered that there will be no indication of bombs hanging-up due to icing, when the Air Bomber does his lights check.
The importance of switch drill, and accuracy in bombsight settings, must be frequently stressed by Bombing Leaders at every possible opportunity. An error of one or two degrees in bombsight levelling will give a large error on the ground, and despite the difficulty in setting the correct levelling figure on the computor [sic] box, every effort must be made to see that it is correct to the nearest degree. Constantly check your switches and bombsight on the way to the target, and remember that your target is not a town or city, but a small area in that town or city, and to hit is successfully you must be accurate as if bombing a practice target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOVEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS. [/underlined]
9 F/O Newton F/Sgt Flynn F/Sgt Grant 71
F/L Marsh F/O Carr F/Sgt Haydon 66
F/O Coater F/Sgt Boag F/Sgt Black 57
F/O Williams F/Sgt Gold Sgt Lockerbie 53
50 F/O Jones Sgt Jarmy Sgt Davis 77
F/O Ling F/Sgt Howard F/O Rutland 68
83 F/O Inniss F/O Morrison F/Sgt Dormer 73
F/L Weber Sgt Summers Sgt Thorn 76
97 F/O Greening Sgt Nutt F/Sgt Cairn 72
F/L Brooker F/O Pearce F/O Brown 42
F/O Ryan Sgt Kirkby F/O Sabine 56
F/O Royston-Piggott W/O Bate F/Sgt Madley 73
106 P/O May Sgt George F/Sgt Barling 61
207 F/O Rose Sgt Weaver Sgt Bell 75
617 F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien 63
F/O Gingles W/O Hazell F/Sgt Johnson 70
F/L Sayers P/O Weaver F/O Strom 73
F/O Martin F/Sgt Day F/Sgt Jackson 54 54
F/O Joplin F/Sgt Hebbard F/Sgt Fish 71
630 F/O Baker F/Sgt Leyden F/Sgt Taeuber 66
F/O Miller F/O Banks W/O Wildey 74
F/O Martin and crew, No.617 Squadron, have for the second successive month, obtained two crew errors of less than 60 yards at 20,000 feet. These results are obtained only by concentration on the part of Pilot and Air Bomber and are commendable efforts.
F/L Brooker and crew, No.97 Squadron, obtained the excellent result of 42 yards using the Mark XIV Bombsight.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
P/O Willmot, No.49 Squadron, obtained fifth place on the Bombing Leader’s Course, being awarded a “B” Category.
There have been no changes in the squadrons during November.
All Bombing Leaders are asked to make a point of seeing that their returns are forwarded to Group Headquarters as soon as possible after the end of each week and month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING . [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE ERROR [/underlined]
1 9 65 yards
2 ) 97 70 yards
2 ) 619 70 yards
4 630 71 yards
5 49 72 yards
6 83 73 yards
7 44 74 yards
8 207 86 yards
9 463 87 yards
10 57 88 yards
11 50 100 yards
12 467 114 yards
13 106 124 yards
14 61 125 yards
15 189 126 yards
The top place in the Group Competition has again changed hands, 9 Squadron having improved on their last month’s entry by 8 yards, and they are well ahead of the next six Squadrons who submitted entries all within 6 yards.
No. 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their excellent bombing and it is hoped that they can hold their place against the strong opposition which will be provided by other squadrons during December.
No.55 Base have repeated their recent consistently good bombing and all five squadrons are included in the first ten, 619 Squadron showing the greatest improvement with a decrease of 23 yards on their October result.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three practice bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
No. 627 Squadron dropped 409 bombs at heights lower than 1000 feet with an average error of 71 yards.
172 T.I’s were dropped producing an average error of 191 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. If you find you are getting no air supply after switching on the air control what is the first thing to check?
2. Which pistol is liable to operate even though the bomb has been released “SAFE”?
3. What is used to indicate the presence of Allied troops during close support attacks on targets near the front line?
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The two entries received in this competition have both been sent in from Strubby.
G/Capt. Jeudwine – 138 yards at 20,000 ft.
W/Cdr. Milward (619 Sqdn.) – 205 yards at 20,000 ft.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The solitary entry for this competition came from 55 Base.
F/Lt. Linnett (57 Sqdn.) – 104 yards.
F/Lt Rumgay (617 Sqddn.) has completed several excellent exercises using the S.A.B.S. which unfortunately, cannot be included in the competition.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The total number of practice bombs dropped during November shows a considerable decrease when compared with October’s figures (2577 against 3898). Adverse weather conditions made practice bombing impossible on many days during the month, but some Squadrons made maximum use of the available opportunities.
The average crew error, although slightly higher than last month, is very satisfactory and special mention must be made of 9 Squadron’s efforts which produced and average error of 122 yards.
There are occasions when considerable congestion has been caused at Bombing Ranges because of the large number of aircraft attempting to bomb at the same time. It is only possible to allocate two targets to each Base and this congestion should be reduced with closer co-operation between Squadron Bombing Leaders, and the staggering of Bombing times allocated to each aircraft.
Bombing Leaders are also reminded that night practice bombing programmes should be transmitted to Ranges before 1800 hours if possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
incendiary attacks
[Underlined] BRUINSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER [/underlined]
It is probable that with the limited time available before an operation, crews may not appreciate the complete picture of the plan of which each squadron forms a component part. It is proposed, therefore, to take one of the incendiary attacks which this Group has carried out, giving in broad outline the intention, plan and execution of the attack.
The target chosen is Brunswick, which was selected for attack by this Group on the 14/15th October. Appended is a P.R.U. photograph of the town of Brunswick, showing the damage inflicted by the attack, bounded by the red line. The smaller areas bounded by green lines represent damage prior to the 14/15th October. The attack was highly successful but nevertheless illustrated how even small deviations from the agreed plan can jeopardise success.
[Underlined] INTENTION. [/underlined]
Brunswick has always been an important communications centre due to its position on the trade route from Hamburg to Southern Germany and its importance increased with the development of inland waterways and railways. Its pre-war major industries were swiftly placed on a war footing to supply the German armed forces and the beginning of the war also saw the rapid development of major aircraft and engineering industries in the town, particularly in the Northern and Southern suburbs.
It is not surprising therefore that this town, lying as it does within range of bases in Great Britain, has received regular attention from the Allied Air Forces. Since the strategical bombing of Germany began, a total of 6129 tons of bombs have been reported as dropped on the town by Bomber Command alone. But in common with a few other towns, like STUTTGART and FRANKFURT, it bore an unusually charmed life. While bombing depended upon visual methods of target finding, this was partly explained by the lack of good water landmarks near the town, but the difficulty of finding and bombing the target persisted after the introduction of RADAR aids, as will be seen from the following summary of major Bomber Command raids this year, including two by this Group, which left the town almost unscathed.
14/15th January – 472 aircraft
22/23rd April – 256 aircraft
22/23rd May – 211 aircraft
13/14th August – 350 aircraft
These raids are additional to several A.S.A.A.F. raids directed specific factories which were in the main successful.
[Underlined] PLAN. [/underlined]
There are two main alternative methods of carrying out an incendiary attack on a town of this nature. The first is to put the T.I’s on the centre of the town and to bomb these direct. This method
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
has a number of disadvantages the most important being that T.I’s in a built up area will seldom show up as brightly as those dropped on open ground, so that any markers which may be wide of the target will almost certainly attract the bombing. This occurred on the first attack on Konigsberg. Moreover, as soon as bombing starts the markers become obscured by incendiaries and smoke, and have to be continually backed up, this adding to the risk of inaccurate markers falling outside the town.
The alternative is to select a marking point which us likely to be easily recognisable by the marker force and located somewhere on the upwind side of the target. Provided visibility is reasonable all markers should fall within 300 yards of the marking point. If each crew is then given a heading on which to fly and a number of seconds to delay the release of bombs, the whole target area should in theory be covered with an even density of incendiaries and thus be totally destroyed.
It should be noted that this system entails the most precise bombing by each crew otherwise some areas will receive too many incendiaries and others will be left unburnt. The method by which each crew is to pass precisely over the markers and thus get on to the exact heading is laid down in Air Staff Instructions, and must be known to all.
[Underlined] NARRATIVE [/underlined]
(i) [Underlined] Weather. [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear with slight ground haze.
(ii) [Underlined] Marking. [/underlined] At H – 11 the first green T.I. dropped blind as a proximity marker, went down followed almost immediately by the first flares. At H – 8 the second flare wave dropped and by this time three more green T.I’s had gone down. Mosquito Marker No.3 gave a “Tallyho” and went in to mark, his T.I. being assessed as 200 yards to the North of the marking point. The Master Bomber ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up 200 yards to the South. The backing up eventually resulted in 2 T.I’s roughly on the marking point, one 300 yards S.E. which probably fell in water and quickly went out, and one wide marker 800 yards to the West. This error was due to a variety of causes of which undue haste was probably the major. At H – 1 the markers were ordered off the target and the main force instructed to attack. The illustration shows the positions of the Red T.I’s in relation to the marking point as assessed from night photographs.
[Diagram]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS. [/underlined]
(iii) [Underlined] Main Force Bombing. [/underlined] The attack went mainly according to plan although the Master Bomber had to instruct crews to steady down as there were some wide sticks in the early stages. These few loose sticks are a regrettable feature of all attacks, and it is hard to understand crews who have carried their loads all the way to the target can allow themselves to release them in open country on the edge of the target when a few more seconds would enable them to be placed on the aiming point. At H + 8 the main force were instructed to complete bombing and return to base.
[Photograph – missing] This photograph is a still from film shot by a 463 Squadron Lancaster equipped with cine apparatus. The photograph was taken six minutes after the main force bombing started, and can be clearly picked out on the P.R.U. cover as the North East corner of the sector allotted to Nos. 50 and 61 Squadrons.
[Underlined] DAMAGE ASSESSMENT [/underlined]
The greater part of the central core of the town was contained in the central sector shown on the tracing overlay. The two boundary sectors also contain a portion of this central core, all of which was fully built up and therefore highly vulnerable to incendiary attack. Whilst the primary intention of the raid was to destroy the central core of the town, two squadrons were allotted to an area to the East and North East which is less fully built up, as a trial to see what damage could be achieved by a small force.
An examination of photographs shows that of the three markers remaining after Marker D had become extinguished, only A showed up clearly, and that markers B and C became covered by incendiaries from a load released short, and may not have been clearly visible to bomb aimers. This left the extreme Westerly T.I. clearly visible throughout the attack and as a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Photograph]
[Page break]
[Photograph with Overlay Showing Bombing Sectors] BRUNSWICK 14/15 OCTOBER.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
result all incendiary loads had a tendency to fall in the Westerly part of a central sector or else in the Western sector, or even West of this. There was also a tendency for loads to overshoot rather more than planned. As far as it is possible to estimate from available data about 90% of the loads other than those which were dropped loosely outside the area, fell within the central core of the town but only a few scattered sticks on the N.E. area. This was clearly due to crews using the Westerly marker as their datum point, thus shifting the whole area of attack some hundreds of yards to the West.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
It can be seen that the greater part of the central core of the town has been completely destroyed, and that there has also been some damage in the more Northerly sectors. Damage in the North East sector is slight due to the shifting of the marking point. The attack therefore illustrates the manner in which any marker wide of the concentration will draw on itself undue attention. It also illustrates the harm that can be done by loads of incendiaries dropped on the markers thus making them difficult to see. Apart from these two points the attack was extremely well carried out, timings were accurate, winds found were excellent and the great majority of aircraft attacked exactly on the headings laid down. Incidentally one reason for the marker which went wide was the tendency on previous attacks for some crews before H hour. As a result of experience the Mosquito markers who are marking from below 1,000 feet like to be clear of the target with a minute or two in hand. It is obviously essential that the markers should not be hurried in their task and crews must on no account bomb before H hour unless the Master Bomber calls them in earlier.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Sortied Carried Out with Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
Squadrons above establishment are calculate on an establishment of 20.
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
During the month the scheme for the Categorisation of Heavy Bomber pilots in the Group was issued. Full details are contained in this Headquarters’ letter reference 209/Trg. dated 18th November, 1944. The success of this scheme depends on co-operation between Squadron/Flight Commanders and the Squadron Instructors to see that crews are available for their initial and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks so that a Category can be awarded or revised.
The Squadron Instructor has a vital responsibility. He must be thoroughly familiar with Pilots’ Notes for the Lancaster, relevant Air Staff Instructions and in particular No.5 Group Aircraft Drills. Some Squadrons have already completed a number of Category Tests, which incidentally are done in the New Crew Check and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks. No separate test is necessary.
A preliminary examination shows that some of the Category Test Proformas have been completed accurately, others show a definite tendency to overmark. An [underlined] A+ [/underlined] Category should not be lightly awarded because it amounts to an “Exceptional” assessment. One proforma showed 100% marks for Captaincy! Section No.8 requires special care. A pilot scoring full marks for Captaincy must be faultless (and we’re all human).
The number of pilots categorised in the ten days following the introduction of the scheme is as follows:-
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
A total of 177 New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks were done during the month (including the Category tests in the above table), leaving 101 checks outstanding. Nearly half the outstanding checks were in 56 Base, where a temporary shortage of aircraft, absence of dual sets and a deficiency of a Squadron Instructor, gave the Base more than its share of problems.
Total squadron training hours amounted to 4,000 hours day, and 1,300 hours night – about 700 hours less than the previous month. (We blame the weather again). Now that the Winter is on us the old skeleton (“No training – aircraft are bombed-up”) is rattling its ancient bones. Lock it up. We’ve heard the jingle before. If the Met. gives half a chance of training, get a couple of aircraft per Flight de-bombed as soon as the operation is cancelled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION AND 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
Fighter affiliation results are encouraging. Squadrons did a grand total of 1105 exercises on 500 details – nearly two exercises per gunner in the Group.
Night affiliation by squadrons continues to climb to higher figures. This time it totalled 314 exercises of which 76 were done with 100 Group Mosquitoes, and the remainder with 1690 B.D.T. Flight. This was the fourth successive month to show an increase.
1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month was reduced from 26 aircraft to 12 by the withdrawal of the Spitfires and Martinets. It continued, however, to assist No.7 Group with day and night details for 75 Base, and a few night details for 72 Base. The Flight flew 560 hours on 670 details. Pilots averaged 23 hours, the Hurricanes 33 hours, the Spitfires 16 hours and the Martinets 9 hours.
Night affiliation by the Flight was the highest ever, rising from 94 details in October to 139 in November, thus exercising nearly 300 gunners in the hours of darkness; (a first rate performance bearing in mind the persistent bad weather).
It is satisfying to hear on the hook-up that on one night the Flight booked 33 night details. They were not all done owing to the weather, but on the night of 28th November, 22 details were completed – a record night for the Flight. On five nights on the last week of the month, 89 details were done. This shows what can be achieved when the weather is fit. Incidentally, the moon was up. Bear in mind that affiliation on dark nights provide the real test.
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S. TRAINING. [/underlined]
Unusually bad weather during the month affected No.5 L.F.S. Only two days during the month were fit for full flying, but despite this, and repairs to the perimeter track, full advantage was taken on of every opportunity and 5 L.F.S. completed the training of 92 crews for squadrons and had 11 crews within a day of finishing their course at the end of the month. The total of 92 crews was 6 crews in excess of Command estimate.
The Unit flew a total of 1344 hours. The average hours flown per aircraft on charge was 48. There were two avoidable accidents during the month. The rigorous policy of “quality and not quantity” is being followed and three crews have already been put up for disposal on the grounds of poor captaincy.
The crews posted during the month averaged 12 hours 35 minutes training at the Unit, nearly 2 hours more than the previous month. This was largely due to extra time being given to the short cross country exercise to give additional navigational instruction. Loran training has also been introduced and crews are getting 7 hours ground training on their course.
12 Instructors were recategorized by E.C.F.S. during the month. Two obtained A2 Categories and the remainder B Categories ([Underlined] Note: [/underlined] These Categories have no relation to the Pilots’ Categorisation Scheme introduced by 5 Group). The Examining Flight expressed the opinion that the standard of instruction at 5 L.F.S. was slightly above the average for Four Engined Training Units.
The next month’s commitment for 5 L.F.S. is 100 crews, less wastage. If the weather is reasonable, the Unit can do it as it always has in the past.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING (LINK). [/underlined]
[Underlined] NEW EXERCISES. [/underlined]
The exercises in the Instrument Flying Syllabus on the Link are being revised to include exercises designed to cover operational procedure, and to practice more thoroughly and stimulate the pilot’s interest in keeping his I.F. up to scratch.
[Underlined] NEW LINK TRAINERS. [/underlined]
When installation of the new Link Trainers is complete, there will be one available for each squadron in the Group. This will put the ideal squadron monthly total times for pilots (50 – 60 hours) within reach of every squadron. Many squadrons will have double the amount of Link Time available. This extra time can only be used efficiently if a Link Trainer Programme is organised and kept going by the officer detailed by the squadron for co-ordination of I.F. and Link Training (Air Staff Instruction TRG/3 refers).
[Underlined] PRIMARY OBJECT OF THE LINK TRAINER. [/underlined]
Units whose Flight Engineers have done double the time of the Pilots seem to have lost sight of the primary object of the Link Trainer; that is to keep pilots in constant practice in all forms of instrument flying. The ideal is for pilots and flight engineers times to be equal.
[Underlined] LINK TIMES. [/underlined]
Squadron Link hours generally are improving. The total pilot times were [underlined] DOUBLE [/underlined] the previous month. There are, however, still weak places in the chain, which are easily visible from the training return. Two squadrons in both 53 and 54 Bases and one in 55 Base have done less than 20 hours pilot time per month.
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots – 742 hours. Flight Engineers- 764 hours. Other Aircrew – 101 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED. [/underlined]
2.11.44 – “D” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
2.11.44 – “D” – 227 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
4/5.11.44 – “L” – 227 Sqdn. – 2 Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 630 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “J” – 467 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 227 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED. [/underlined]
4/5.11.44 – “S” – 207 Sqdn. – ME.109 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined]
6/7.11.44 – “B” – 189 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
Claims annotated ‘C’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
From a total of 84 combats during the month, 7 were claimed to have been with jet propelled aircraft of which 5 were claimed as destroyed. The other claims stand at 4 destroyed, 1 probably destroyed, and 1 damaged, all of which have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. The correct identity of the reported jet aircraft is now under consideration by the experts and no claims are being considered until a decision has been reached as to whether these phenomena are in fact jet propelled aircraft or some form of jet projectile.
Two aircraft were surprised by under attacks. The first warning being when the aircraft was hit by cannon fire. In both cases the aircraft were extensively damaged and casualties to the crew incurred. The answer to these under attacks is 100% crew co-operation and correct and frequent “Banking Search”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
W/O HANSON 97 Sqdn. Cat. ‘B’
F/O KETHRO 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT. [/underlined]
[Tables of Fighter Affiliation Results by Squadron]
Note: Figures in the above table represent “Points”.
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR NOVEMBER:- 1105. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
The Order of Merit will, in future, be based on a points system, points being allotted as follows:-
Night Affiliation with Camera and Infra Red Film 10 points
Night Affiliation without Camera 8 points
Day Affiliation with Gyro and Camera 5 points
Day affiliation with Camera 3 points
Day Affiliation without Camera 1 point
The total of night affiliation exercises continues to increase and it is hoped that the Gunnery Leaders will co-operate with Squadron and Flight Commanders to ensure that the maximum number of details are flown whenever operations and weather permit. The importance of this exercise cannot be over emphasised and the aim of every Squadron should be to achieve at least one exercise per crew per month.
It is apparent from the training returns that certain Squadrons are not making the maximum use of their Gyro camera assemblies during day affiliation exercises. These assemblies must be fitted on every possible occasion. Gunnery Analysis Officers are now established on each Squadron and it is their duty to assess the films taken during these exercises and to keep a proper for future reference for categorisation etc.
No. 53 Base are to be congratulated on setting the pace as regards outdoor night vision training. Each Squadron within the Base has fitted up a simple obstacle course which has been in use regularly by Squadron gunners. Other Bases would be well advised to follow the lead of No.53 Base in this simple, but very effective, practical form of instruction.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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Leave it to Smith [Drawing]
“Pass over yesterday’s fighter affil. reports will you Bill, and let’s see how some of those new crews are panning out. – Correct directions given – Range usually 800 yards – Range O.K. corkscrew appeared slow – Range 700 yards, corkscrew very good – Ranges generally good 600 to 650 yards – Range good – Range varied from 300 to 900 yards – gunners poor – corkscrew good. Who on earth was flying ‘N’ Nuts yesterday Bill – with two clueless gunners the crew can’t be anywhere near fit for operations?”
“One moment Dick – ‘N’ Nuts – that Clarkson – a new crew with only a Mid-Upper, but we put old Smith in there as Rear Gunner as he wants to get finished and since his old skipper went sick he’s had no crew; he only needs a half dozen to finish his second tour.”
“Smith always seems to have wads of clues, he’s certainly been operating for ages without getting himself bumped off. Quite a lot of the time as a spare too – the pilots seems to like to have him in the aircraft.”
“I suppose Bill, that Smith is O.K. Somehow we always seem to have taken it for granted. I must say he seemed very rusty when we gave him that Sighting test, didn’t he, but as he said, he’d only just come out of Sick Quarters and wasn’t feeling at all himself. We were going to give him another shot later on but somehow we never have. Let’s do it right away and clear our consciences. See if you can find him in the Gunnery Section as he’s not down for D.I. this morning, and as you go you might hand down the questions!”
Bill put his head into the Gunnery Section, W/O Smith, who was sitting by the fire greeted him enthusiastically. “Good morning, Sir, anything doing today?”
“Haven’t heard of anything as yet Mr. Smith, but in the meantime the Gunnery Leader wants you in his office.”
Mr Smith entered the Gunnery office not quite so enthusiastically. “Good morning Mr. Smith, come in and sit down. It seems a good morning to give you that sighting test again, but before we start that, what on earth happened in your fighter affil. show yesterday? – Look at this report – Range varied 300 to 900 yards. It’s appalling, isn’t it Mr. Smith?”
“Very bad indeed Sir, very bad indeed. I’ll go and chase up that new gunner in the Mid Upper right away, tell him to pull his finger out, Sir. You leave him to me Sir, I’ll see he’s ‘bang on’ in a few days.”
“But you know, Mr. Smith, he got a very good report from his Gunnery School, really a very good report. Of course, I know none of the crew have had any operational experience as yet, but that wouldn’t affect his range estimation would it?”
“Well Sir, you know how they turn them out these days, they’re not trained like us old stagers were. You leave him to me, Sir – a couple of ops and he’ll be quite O.K., in fact if you don’t mind, Sir, I’d like to start on him right away, no time like the present, Sir!” – Brr - Brr – Brr – Brr –
“One moment Mr. Smith while I answer the ‘phone” – “Gunnery Leader speaking – What – Maximum effort tonight – Flight planning at
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] LEAVE IT TO SMITH. [/underlined]
twelve. Right you are, thank you. Sorry Mr. Smith, I’m afraid you’ll have no time to teach your other gunner to-day as your crew is sure to be on the battle order and I’m afraid we’ll have to leave your sighting test over to another day as well, as I’ve got plenty to get on with at the moment.”
“Sorry about the sighting Sir, I was feeling just in the mood for a bit of sighting this morning. I’d have surprised you, Sir. Oh, and about that Mid Upper Sir, don’t you worry. I’ll be there myself Sir, and I’ll look after them all. You leave it to me, Sir. ‘N’ Nuts our aircraft again, Sir?” “Yes.” “Thank you Sir.”
‘N’ for Nuts was homeward bound. Her crew was feeling elated. They had bombed – they were well on the way back. The coast line showed ahead and beyond it the sea, pale in the moonlight.
“O.K. Mid Upper?”
“O.K. Pilot.”
“O.K. Rear Gunner?”
“On the job skip.”
“Good – we’re trusting to you Smithy if we get in trouble!”
“Skip, in this visibility, I could see a Jerry take off. Just leave it to me.”
‘N’ for Nuts was overdue. ‘N’ for Nuts was missing. In the Gunnery Section someone said “Poor old Smith, all the ops he’s done and then gets himself bumped off by flying with a sprog crew.”
Far away Unterleutnant Hans Hoffman was buying beer. His Gruppen-Fuhrer was pleased with him. He stood in front of the fire, a tankard in his hand. “Three time before I chase Lancaster, Lancaster see me coming, Lancaster corkscrew, I fire, I miss. Lancaster fire back, sometimes he hit me, sometimes not but always I miss. I am sprog. But last night things different. I see Lancaster, I chase, range 800 yards, 600, 500, 400, 300 yards, Lancaster still no corkscrew, no nothing. I press the button, I cannot miss – Lancaster go ‘pouf’. Lancaster fall in the sea. I feel I am no longer sprog. Lancaster sprog. I give my Lancaster a name to remember it by, I think of an English name, very English, I call my Lancaster ‘Schmidt’.”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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Second Thoughts for Pilots
YOUR CHARTER AGAINST ACCIDENTS – 7 GOLDEN RULES
I TAXY CAREFULLY – use the landing lamp at night.
II ON TAKE OFF – open the throttle slowly, easily & smoothly.
III NEVER BREAK CLOUD WITHOUT A FIX
IV AVOID CUMULO-NIMBUS CLOUD – it’s the hazard of the overcast.
V BEFORE LANDING – always get a corrected Q.F.E.
VI WATCH THE APPROACH ACROSS THE BOUNDARY – 105 – 110 m.p.h. without bombs – 115 m.p.h. with bombs.
VII DON’T HAVE ACCIDENTS – [/underlined] OF ANY KIND!! [/underlined]
CUT THIS OUT & PIN IT UP IN YOUR FLIGHT OFFICE
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[Drawing] accidents
26 aircraft were damaged in accidents in the Group during November. 11 were totally destroyed, 4 are CAT. B, 7 CAT.AC, while 4 were only CAT. A. There is the possibility that two of these aircraft were lost as a result of enemy action, but out of the remainder, 21 were either destroyed or damaged [underlined] in accidents which were avoidable. [/underlined] L.F.S. damaged 2, leaving 19 to be chalked up against the squadrons. October produced 14. The Group, therefore, damaged 7 more this month. Bad weather or not, this is going the wrong way.
Here is the month’s list of avoidable accidents. Some of these accidents damaged more than one aircraft, so that the accident and damage totals do not tally:-
[Tables of Accidents for Squadrons and L.F.S.]
[Underlined] Q.F.E’S AGAIN. [/underlined]
Last winter a number of Lancasters crashed on return from long trips because pilots took no account of the dangers attending a large drop in barometric pressure after take off. Altimeters not reset to the lower pressure engendered a false sense of security and the aircraft either hit the sea when returning at low heights or undershot in bad visibility. Consequent upon these accidents Air Staff Instruction FC/19 dated 17.1.44 was issued, but what was thought to be a bogey well and truly laid has popped up again this month. Two aircraft were damaged, one in fact totally destroyed, in accidents of this nature.
One returned to a diversion airfield in very bad weather and crashed 300/400 yards short of the flarepath. The pilot says that just before hitting the ground his altimeter was reading 400 ft. He had tried to get a Q.F.E. by R/T but bad reception nullified his efforts. He then proceeded with his approach and good fortune alone prevented a fatal crash. No use was made of W/T to obtain the necessary Q.F.E., which on this particular night had dropped many millibars in a short time.
The other aircraft hit the water while making a long sea crossing on return from an operation. The pilot had been briefed that at certain positions the barometric pressure would be much lower than at the target or at base, and details were given. He came down low beneath cloud (contrary to orders at briefing which stipulated a return height
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
of 2500 ft) and hit the sea, with his altimeter still indicating some hundreds of feet. The pressure at the target was still on the instrument.
Read Air Staff Instruction FC/19 and get this Q.F.E. business buttoned up. Remember that falling pressures spell trouble. Talk to the Met. Officer anyway. You can’t know too much. Incidentally, the second of these two accidents again shows the danger of ignoring the flight plan.
[Underlined] COLLISIONS IN THE CIRCUIT. [/underlined]
Two aircraft from the same airfield returned from operations one night last month, and collided at the entrance to the funnel. – Fourteen lives were lost. The evidence put forward at the subsequent investigation was sufficient to show that the aircraft which called up first either made a very wide circuit or contacted Flying Control before reaching the call up position. The second pilot likewise, called up at the wrong positions and, further was at the wrong height when he did so. These digressions led to tragedy. The moral needs no pointing. 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme must be followed [underlined] to the letter, [/underlined] and any pilot who disregards this instruction in any way is a menace to his colleagues, who are just as keen as he is to get down to “bacon and eggs”. The importance of good flying discipline on the circuit cannot be too strongly impressed on pilots. Keeping a good lookout until the aircraft is safely back in dispersal with engines stopped is part of it.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
It is apparently impossible for a month to go past without a serious taxying accident. A feature of such incidents recently has been the failure of pilots to warn Flying Control that they are about to leave dispersal. Consequently, as happened in one particular incident this month, Flying Control did not have the chance to control the traffic on an airfield at night. This, allied with disobedience of taxying instructions and the absence of taxying lights or aldis lamp led to a bad collision at night. Sever disciplinary action is bound to follow accidents of this kind. There can be no excuse.
[Underlined] OBSCURE ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
There are four obscure crashes this month still under investigation. At present there is insufficient known about them for the cause to be commented upon.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below gives details of avoidable accidents by squadrons for November. This table is not final. It only contains those accidents which are known definitely to be avoidable. A few will remain undecided till the results of investigations now in progress are known.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] A VISIT TO FRANCE. [/underlined]
An account of the visit of a representative of this Headquarters to France will be of interest to all Armament personnel. This item under the heading “The Proof of the Pudding….” will give Armament personnel a very good idea of what devastation is wrought when bombs are delivered to the right place.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN. [/underlined]
The Armament Bulletin of December contains much valuable information, not only of interest to Armament personnel but also to Air Bombers and Air Gunners. In fact this issue contains much of particular interest to Air Bombers, so circulate your copy.
[Underlined] BOMB STORE – SUPERVISION. [/underlined]
Tour expired Aircrew Officers have become available for supervision work in bomb dumps. These officers have undergone a course of training and should be of great assistance to Armament Officers, and a further improvement in the general condition of the bomb dump is expected.
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STORE HOUSE. [/underlined]
The trials with the large incendiary store house which are being carried out at East Kirkby are now almost completed, and in the near future details of the most satisfactory lay-out will be available to Units.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Armament failures table would have shown considerable improvement had it not been for Col. ‘C’ – ‘Icing’. Col. ‘F’ – ‘Obscure’ is however, still far too popular. An improvement has been shown over last month with 23 as against 29 obscure failures. These obscure failures are causing more concern to the armament staff at this Headquarters than failures which are classed under other headings, because steps can usually be taken to remedy a known fault, whereas if the fault remains obscure it may well recur frequently before it is finally diagnosed. It is, therefore, essential that greater efforts be made to obtain all possible information regarding these obscure failures, thus tracking the “gremlin” to his lair where he can be dealt with. Column ‘A’ tells its own tale and is a matter which should be brought to the attention of Bombing Leaders.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION. [/underlined]
The armament staff at this Headquarters are always out to help the armament staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but it is felt that many of the questions passed direct to this Headquarters concerning equipment and transport etc. could well be dealt with by the appropriate branch at Station and Base level. The equipment chapter of this number of well worth reading.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE.
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the proof of the pudding….
We assembled at Headquarters, Bomber Command, for a final briefing on the programme we were going to carry out. The object of the visit was to examine French targets which had been subjected to concentrated bombing by Bomber Command aircraft.
The targets visited included the following:-
ISLE D’ADAM – storage site.
ST. LEU D’ESSERENT – flying bomb storage site in limestone caves.
WIZERNE – storage and probable firing site for flying bombs, situated in a chalk quarry.
WATTEN – probably intended for the storage and manufacture of hydrogen peroxide.
MIMOYECQUES – site tunnelled into solid chalk and probably intended for V2, or some other unknown weapon.
JUVISY – Marshalling yard.
TRAPPES – Marshalling tard.
From Le Bourget we travelled to Paris by road in two cars which had been put at our disposal by S.H.A.E.F. and which were to remain with us for the rest of the visit. Our first job in Paris was to visit the Army Headquarters and obtain sufficient rations to tide us over for five or six days, since we were not permitted to purchase food from French cafes or restaurants. We then travelled to a very comfortable hotel situated near the Arc de Triomphe, where we were to be the guests of the American Forces for our first night in Paris, and although the majority of buildings in France are without any form of heating we were lucky enough to be billeted in a hotel which had all the comforts of home. The following morning at 0930 hours we loaded our kit in the cars and set off for Isle d’Adam.
[Underlined] ISLE D’ADAM [/underlined]
This site consisted of a number of wooden storage huts with reinforced brick chimney stacks and situated in thick woods. The huts were sunk approximately 12 to 15 feet below ground level and the surrounding earth had been reinforced with sloping brick walls.
The whole site had been subjected to concentrated bombing with medium calibre bombs, all huts having been severely damaged. The majority in fact were completely demolished apart from the brick chimney stacks which were still standing. Approximately 3/4 of a mile from the storage huts was a large chateau reputed to have been used by the German officers controlling the site. This chateau had also received damage from several 1000 lb. bombs and although not entirely uninhabitable, a great deal of damage had been done to one side of the building exposing a maze of twisted steel girders and blasted concrete. The woods in which this site was situated were dotted with numerous one-man foxholes sunk approximately 4 feet deep, carefully boarded up to form a small firing aperture and provided with a small and very uncomfortable wooden seat. Having satisfied ourselves that no above-surface storage huts
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
could withstand concentrated H.E. bombing, we ploughed our way back through the mud, and set off again for St. Leu d’Esserent.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT. [/underlined]
This site had been constructed some years ago by tunnelling into the limestone and had been cleaned up in recent years and used for the storage of flying bombs. The whole cliff area had been excavated to form two main tunnels and numerous intercommunicating passages and storage bays covering many hundreds of yards. So complicated was the layout inside these tunnels that the Hun had found it necessary to number all passages and bays, and to paint arrows on the walls to prevent anyone from becoming lost; in spite of this, we did experience a certain amount of difficulty in finding our way into daylight again.
Bomber Command’s attack had resulted in three separate subsidences of the tunnel roof, one by a Tallboy hit which had completely sealed one the main tunnel and crushed two flying bombs complete with warheads. The remaining two had apparently been caused by multiple hits with 1000 lb. bombs. Unfortunately it was not possible to make a complete examination of the damage due to the presence of mines.
Many bomb trolleys and hydraulic jacks were found, the majority of which were badly damaged although there were some serviceable items. The entire area between the caves and the River Oise had been very heavily hit by H.E. and French labour was being employed in clearing up the devastation to railway lines, roads etc. The empty case of a 250 lb. Red T.I. was seen approximately 50 yards from the railway lines between the railway and the caves. Unfortunately the village of St. Leu d’Esserent was very close to the site and as must invariably happen, had received considerable damage.
Having decided that we had seen enough for one day we set off again for Amiens where we were to be billeted for the night. The procedure for obtaining a billet is very simple. Each town in France has its Town Major who is responsible, amongst other things, for the billeting of all troops either staying in or passing through the town, and it was he who furnished us with the necessary chits to obtain a night’s lodging in the official hotel. Unfortunately Amiens is one of the towns without heating and those of us who had brought additional blankets found that they came in very useful. At first we were billeted two in a room and each pair had to toss up as to who would be the lucky one to sleep in the bed, the unlucky one having to spend the night on the floor!! Fortunately several rooms were vacated later in the day which enabled us all to spend the night in comparative comfort. No food was provided at the hotel and once again we had to resort to the use of our tinned rations – hash, meat and beans.
We left Amiens at 0900 hours intending to visit the sites at Wiserne and Watten and push on to St. Omer for the night. On the way to Wizerne however, we came across a temporary flying bomb launching ramp at Crepy only 20 yards from the main road, so we took the opportunity of checking up on this structure. The ramp had been bombed and badly damaged by H.E. and, in addition, the Hun had taken the precaution of demolishing the loading end of the ramp. Nevertheless, it was possible to get a very good idea of what the finished job looked like. The ramp itself was approximately 2ft. 6 inches wide and mounted on small steel girders at an angle of approximately 35° to 40° to the horizontal. The ramp had been snapped in the centre and it was not possible therefore, to estimate to what height it had originally projected. A large crater some yards from the end of the launching ramp was mute evidence of a flying bomb which had “returned early” and two incomplete flying bombs were also seen some yards from the launching ramp.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] WIZERNE. [/underlined]
The Wizerne site situated in a chalk quarry, is reputed to have been constructed by several thousand prisoners assisted by Italian labour and work was commenced in the Summer of 1943. The centrepiece of the site is a large concrete dome approximately 300 feet in diameter and 12 feet thick on the circumference. This thickness was undoubtedly greater in the centre of the dome, and at the time of his departure, the Hun was in the process of dumping an additional layer of soil on top of the dome. Around the circumference of the dome was a collar approximately 25 feet wide reinforced by huge concrete buttresses. It is not known whether these buttresses supported this collar round its entire periphery or whether they were utilised as additional supports at the front of the quarry where the collar protruded slightly over the quarry edge. Three such buttresses were, however, plainly visible as the result of a Tallboy hit on the face of the quarry just below the collar, and which had brought down part of the cliff face.
[Photograph]
Just below and slightly to the left of the dome is a concrete structure (pointing in the direction of London) which was presumed to be a launching ramp as its vertical walls were grooved for the mounting of launching rails. This launching tunnel has been canted over several degrees by the Tallboy hit referred to above.
A series of tunnels approximately 18 feet across, had been cut through the chalk and extended inside the quarry for approximately 500 yards. These tunnels formed the workings, the main entrance of which was along the railway track below and to one side of the dome at normal ground level. At the end of these tunnels a vertical shaft approximately 100 feet deep extended to the surface. This shaft was permanently reinforced with timber and may probably have been intended as a lift shaft.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
It was in the neighbourhood of this shaft that a Tallboy had hit the edge of the quarry face and buried several hundred workers. Royal Engineers, who were making a survey of this site, were faced with the difficulty and unpleasant task of removing tons of rock and chalk to ascertain whether the bodies inside contained any useful information.
The whole area outside the excavations, which was littered with railway lines, machinery, cranes and subsidiary buildings, had been very badly damaged by H.E.
It was interesting to note that the concreting of the tunnels was in sections and no effort appeared to have been made to interlace the various sections. Consequently a hit by a 1000 lb. bomb upon the entrance had penetrated and blown one complete section of tunnelling (approximately 12 feet thick) several feet away from the rest of the tunnel.
One member of the party was fortunate enough to have paid a previous visit to this site and was able to take us to a cottage nearby where the good lady heated up our rations for us and also provided a very welcome bottle of beer with our lunch and the usual bowl of black coffee.
[Underlined] WATTEN. [/underlined]
We left Wizerne soon after lunch for the site at Watten, a building which produced one of the biggest mysteries of the trip and provoked much argument as to its intended use. The site consisted of a reinforced concrete building located at the edge of a vastly wooded forest. The building is approximately 50 feet wide and contains four floors each divided into numerous rooms, and storage bays all heavily reinforced with concrete. The whole structure is built around a skeleton of steel girders supported internally by the numerous dividing walls.
One Tallboy hit on top of the main structure had dislodged a huge piece of concrete reputed to weigh approximately 300 tons and had dropped it on to a small concrete outbuilding. Attempts had been made to repair the damage caused to the roof by this Tallboy hit, and the majority of the concrete had already been relaid. A Tallboy crater whose edge was only a few feet from the main building and which was approximately 100 feet in diameter, had apparently caused no damage to the structure.
This site had to be approached on foot and the devastation on the way to the target was indescribable. Hundreds of trees had been torn up in the forests and large areas had been completely cleared of the timber as a result of this concentrated bombing.
It was interesting to note that the Hun had made some effort to camouflage the entrance of this site, particularly over the rail track.
We arrived at St. Omer in the early evening and once again the Town Major did his stuff and found us a billet in a French hotel, again without heating. Our first job was to hand over our rations to our landlady who served these up for us on a large table in the centre of what in this country would be the public bar, the locals sitting around in their chairs taking a very great interest in all that was going on. Our entertainment that evening was provided for us at the hotel, as luckily a dance had been laid on. We were amazed to see how much the French idea of dancing differs from ours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOULOGNE. [/underlined]
On Sunday morning we set off for Mimoyecques but made a slight detour on the way and inspected the docks at Boulogne. Destruction in the dock area was very heavy, some of which had been caused by bombing, but the majority by demolition. In spite of this several large unloading points had been established. The town of Boulogne was also very badly hit, presumably by shelling, and whole areas of the town had been completely flattened. Several concrete pill-boxes were seen in the dock area, all of which were marked with a large red cross and it was believed that they were used for the German wounded.
[Underlined] MIMOYECQUES. [/underlined]
Our next target, Mimoyecques, consisted of one main tunnel approximately 1000 yards long which runs from S.E./N.W. into the chalk hillside, and running throughout the full length of the tunnel is a railway track. Lateral tunnels branch off from this main tunnel at regular intervals, all of which are approximately 16 feet wide and have cemented dome shaped roofs. These lateral tunnels join up with a further passage parallel to the main tunnel and from this passage several inclined shafts led up to what was presumed to be the firing platform. On top of the hillside are six vertical shafts descending to the bottom floor, two of which had received direct hits from small calibre bombs (the tail unit of a 500 lb G.P. was found nearby) The general appearance on top of the hill was that of a ploughed field and it was almost impossible to define individual craters. Several Tallboy craters were, however, seen, one which had pierced and blocked the tunnel in which the labourers had been working.
Here again the Major in charge of the surveying party informed us that several hundreds of workers were known to have been trapped in the tunnel, thinking that the safest place during a raid was this “bomb proof” excavation.
Engineers had just commenced to survey this site and were busy collecting all papers etc. which had been left by the Hun. One of the papers discovered was a roll of personnel employed on the construction of the site and included Russians, Flemish, French and Spanish workers and it is understood that large numbers of Russian women were employed as slave labour on this site. Several of the rooms in the hillside had been used as dormitories and heavy locks on the doors suggested that some of the workers had been locked in at night to prevent their escape. A further room had been set aside for use as a sick quarters and it was interesting to see that crepe paper bandages had been in use.
Our next two targets being Juvisy and Trappes marshalling yards both in the Paris area, we decided to return to Paris direct from Mimoyecques and not, as had previously been intended, to spend a second night at St. Omer. The fact that night life in Paris was in full swing and that our comfortable hotel was still at our disposal had nothing, of course, to do with our decision.
[Underlined] JUVISY AND TRAPPES. [/underlined]
Our first impression on visiting the marshalling yards at Juvisy and Trappes was that both targets had been very much saturated by bombing and it is impossible to give any idea of the complete devastation of the entire areas covered by the marshalling yards. It is estimated that it will take the very minimum of 12 months to bring any semblance of order into either of these targets. Locomotives had been hurled one on top of the other, lines had been turned up and flung against rolling
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Photograph] JUVISY MARSHALLING YARDS
stock, repair sheds, engine rooms and other buildings had been severely damaged. The French were rather annoyed to think that we had attacked the yards at an angle, resulting in severe damage to a neighbouring village, and not up and down the lines. Our French not being particularly good we did not make any effort to teach them the theory of bombing.
The following day we were due to return to this country but were able to spend a few hours in the morning shopping in Paris. This may sound attractive but on looking at prices in the various shops a few thousand francs did not go very far. If one wishes to purchase any small gold object such as a brooch, it is first necessary to surrender the equivalent amount of gold by weight before the purchase can be made; thus you pay a very high price for workmanship involved and not for the quality of the gold.
Transportation throughout France is very difficult. No issue of petrol is made to civilians and what few cars are seen all provide their own fuel (producer gas), and it is a common sight to see a car pull up and the driver get out and stoke up the fire before proceeding!! Taxis in Paris have completely disappeared and have been replaced by cycle taxis and handsome cabs, the cycle taxis consisting of a home made carriage of numerous designs and towed by a bicycle.
Many of the famous monuments in Paris, including the Arc de Triomphe are badly bullet scarred from snipers who held out after the city had been occupied and several incidents of street to street fighting would be seen at several points.
At 1530 hours we took off from Le Bourget for Croydon. This time the trip was far more interesting as the weather was comparatively good and we were able to get a final aerial view of bomb scarred France.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
Two known ditching incidents occurred this month – a Lancaster of 83 Squadron accidentally struck the sea in the Wash and finally came to rest on a sandbank, the crew of six being saved; a Mosquito of 627 Squadron having contacted Sundburg airfield in the Shetlands, on V.H.F. disappeared without trace.
The Operational Research Section at Bomber Command Headquarters has been studying the incidents of ditching within the Command, and a copy of this report has been sent to each station under cover of letter reference 5G/251/26/ASR dated 20th November, 1944.
The report, on very sound arguments, draws the conclusion that the proportion of Command’s losses over the sea to the total can be as high as 26%. It is clearly shown that many more rescues have been made of crews who have used radio than of crews who have not, but at the same time it is pointed out that more rescues could have been effected had the crews concerned carried out the [underlined] correct [/underlined] W/T procedure and started this procedure at the [underlined] first sign of trouble. [/underlined]
The waste of valuable crews will continue until captains of aircraft realise the necessity of quick radio action when in trouble (this can always be cancelled should the emergency pass) and the need for more and more Dinghy Drill practice.
There are no grounds to suppose that aircrew are any more prepared for emergency abandonment by parachute than they are for ditching, so that a large number of casualties must also occue [sic] through lack of practice in Parachute Drills.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
American Hight Lighting is now installed at 15 U.S.A.A.F. stations and at a few stations in Bomber Command. It is essential that aircrews should be acquainted with the lay-out of this “high intensity lighting for low visibility”. Senior Control Officers should ensure that the information is given to aircrews at lectures, in case any station with the installation uses it on diversion.
On this matter of diversion, keep up your lectures on the Bomber Command Standard procedure. There are still occasions when diverted aircraft are said to use “any method except the Standard procedure”. Local divergences create hazards. If even one reply on R/T is varied, if some unusual auxiliary lights are laid, if the Airfield Lighting is misused, hazards are created for visitors, and even greater hazards for your own aircrews. They become so accustomed to the local variations that, when they are diverted, a standard lay-out “foxes” them, reduces landing times and may even imperil other aircrews if the visibility is clamping down. Overhaul the whole of your local lay-out, ensure that it complies with A.P.3024, and Air Staff Instructions, and above all, see that even if it does comply, it has not little local “extras” which will deceive a visitor.
If you have any ideas that, in your opinion, would help, submit them, but do not put them into practice until a test has been agreed upon. Remember, that however good and practical your idea may be [underlined] for local application [/underlined] it may be unsuitable for universal use and may be turned down on those grounds alone. Remember, too, that almost all existing lighting and power circuits are loaded to capacity. A few extra lights here or there may not seem much, but may turn the scales sufficiently to impair the use of the operational teleprinter at your Headquarters.
Landing times for November, set out below, are based on returns received from Stations. “Dead” times have already been deducted in accordance with instructions from Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR NOVEMBER [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT AND HOW TO GET IT. [/underlined]
Once upon a time, a man, who laboured in the town of Wadd and was named Serg Armt, finding he lacked something for the machine he worked with, straightaway sent a message to his superiors at Wadd, his Overlords at Mort and the Kings of Wick, asking for this something which his machine lacked.
But alas! – all Serg Armt received was a message from the Kings of Wick, saying “We are not a Maintenance Unit”.
Nevertheless, the men at Mort, who received the original message, immediately spoke words to Equip of Wadd who as once went and gave Serg Armt the something he required. Thus the machine had been repaired before the message from the Kings of Wick arrived at Wadd.
[Underlined] MORAL. [/underlined]
They say two sides of a triangle are together longer than the third. So in future ask the Station Equipment Officer first. That’s why he’s there.
[Underlined] RADIATOR SUPPLY. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers will see that the Radiator Group Pool system is to continue. We hope now that Command have control of issues the difficulties in getting radiators will be lessened.
[Underlined] URGENT DEMANDS. [/underlined]
A.M.O. A.481/43 has been added to by A.M.O. A.1109/44. Equipment Officers should draw the attention of all Specialist Officers to this new A.M.O.
[Underlined] NEW REGISTERS. [/underlined]
This month sees the introduction, at two Bases, of the new Manifold Voucher Registers. It is too early to give any comments on these Registers, but we hope by the end of the year to sum up their usefulness, and to overcome any faults. Base Equipment Officers should keep a watchful eye on their use, and report to Group any major difficulties that might arise.
[Underlined] LAUNDRY ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIRMEN ON POSTING. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of unnecessary discomfort is being given to airmen who have been posted without their laundry. Equipment Officers are to make sure that an airman, when posted, has been issued with kit to replace items at the laundry. Bomber Command letter BC/3000/13/E.2 dated 18th August, 1944, deals with this type of issue in detail.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
November 15th was the date by which the Air Officer Commanding required Discussion Groups to be “in full swing”. Most stations have reorganised their teams of Group Leaders which had been allowed to become somewhat out of during the Summer. It is on these leaders that the success or failure of the schemes depends, since, properly led discussion groups are popular. So often does it happen, that an officer claims that meetings are regarded by the airmen and airwomen as a ‘bind’, - when really it is his own inadequate leadership that has made his group a failure.
Leaders must make some effort to find out what the scheme sets out to do, and the best way of achieving its aims. A great deal has been written about the object of the scheme, and if officers are still in doubt about how to set about running their group, they should contact their Education Officer and find out, rather than grope blindly into the work and only obtain average results. To new group leaders – your group will improve as they get to know you, and you learn by experience how to handle them, so don’t be discouraged if your first attempt is not as successful as you would have wished.
On December 16th, there is a Group One Day Course at the Usher Art Gallery in Lincoln on “National Insurance”. Speakers are men and women who have theoretical and practical knowledge of the scheme and should provide a great deal of useful information. Leaders, apart from those detailed, are invited to attend providing they give their names to their Education Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During the month of November only an average number of sorties was carried out by the Group but the hours flown were quite extensive, as also was the work carried out by the maintenance staffs.
The outstanding achievement of the month was the manufacture and fitting of the necessary parts for the fitment of Loran, all aircraft being completed within three weeks.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FIALURES. [/underlined]
C.T.O’s are reminded that the signal reporting failures must be sent off the day following the operation, and when the signal stated that the defect is under investigation, this must be followed up by a further signal when the cause of failure is known. If C.T.O’s do the reporting correctly, much telephoning will be avoided.
The operational failures increased over the previous month and were 1.77%.
The ‘Big Hand’ goes to Nos.9, 50 and 617 Squadrons for having no operational failures due to engineering during November, this being their second trouble free month is succession.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
An improvement is noticeable throughout the Group in the maintenance of Group Equipment, though in some instances the equipment is still far short of the desired standard.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
The introduction of the Gyro Gun Sight into general service has necessitated the training of Instrument Repairers in the maintenance of the sight. A short course was instituted at Fulbeck which was attended by representatives from all Bases who profited well from the experience gained by Fulbeck personnel during the past 3 – 4 months. Details of the test equipment necessary for efficient maintenance has been circulated to all Bases and Stations, and these test sets must be manufactured locally as they are not yet available from Service sources.
The high light of the month was the sinking of the Tirpitz, and this cannot be allowed to pass without a special word of praise to those Instrument Repairers of Bardney and Woodhall who have tirelessly maintained the Bombsights. They can fell that they played their part with the aircrews in achieving this success.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
In the near future all Flight Engineers will be categorised on their ability in the air and on the ground. It is hoped that by this categorisation the standard of Flight Engineers will be improved.
The categorisation will be divided into two parts – Air and Ground. The first part, Air, will consist of the 5 Group Lancaster Drills, log keeping, a technical examination and an examination on airmanship.
The second part, Ground, will be a practical test on refuelling aircraft, Daily Inspection Airframe and Daily Inspection Engines. It is appreciated that many Flight Engineers have not had the opportunity to learn as much about their aircraft from the technical aspect as would be desired; to overcome this, instructions on Airframe and Engines will be given in each squadron. When Flight Engineers have completed the second part they will receive a Certificate of Proficiency.
Keen competition is anticipated and it should be the desire of every Flight Engineer to obtain at least an ‘A’ pass; no doubt many will get the maximum – an ‘A+’ pass.
Instructions have been issued by Headquarters, Bomber Command, with regard to the flap operation of a Lancaster. Now that a standard drill has been laid down, Flight Engineer Leaders must instruct all their Flight Engineers to use this drill on all occasions, at the same time advising them always to check the flap gauge when flaps are selected fully down; if there is a tendency for flaps to creep back, the flap control should be brought back to the neutral position, and then reselected to the fully down position. Under no circumstances should the flap control be taken to the “up” position on the final approach as this may cause the aircraft to sink.
[Boxed] [Underlined] INTER-BASE SQUASH COMPETITION. [/underlined]
A/Cdr. Pope, D.F.C., A.F.C., Base Commander. 56 Base, has very kindly offered a silver challenge cup to be contested for within the Group in an Inter-Base Squash Competition on the American system.
Details of this latest 5 Group “Racquet” have already been circulated around the Bases, and it is hoped that the battles will be well under way early in the New Year, to decide who is to wrest the Trophy from the clutches of 56 Base.
In the meantime decision of the Competition is in the lap of the Gods. But there is no doubt that, as the bridegroom said some years later “The Best Man always wins”. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The failures this month for night photography increased to 13.18% as compared with 4.92% for the previous month. This is a serious increase and while it is fully appreciated that inclement weather, particularly the incessant rain, is bound to have caused a certain number of failures, it cannot be stated that the increase quoted above entirely resulted from this cause.
During Winter months it is imperative that maintenance is thorough, and that efforts are made to eliminate all causes of technical failures, particularly those which are known as “avoidable”. Every photographer must bear in mind, that cameras are carried on operations for one purpose only, that is, to being back film which has been exposed over the target, and which, when processed, will result in plottable ground detail photographs from which the success of the raid can be assessed. Photographic personnel whether engaged upon camera maintenance or processing can, if they will make the necessary effort, reduce the number of technical failures to a much smaller figure.
In vetting the photographic failure reports which pass through this Headquarters, it is noted that when aircraft have not operated for several days there is always an increase in the failure rate immediately after a Stand Down period; furthermore, there are still too many unexplained failures, and in many cases the report is so obscure that it is of little value, mainly because the photographic personnel have failed to assess the evidence of the film correctly. This results in misleading other specialist officers to whom the film is passed. It should be the effort of all concerned to produce a photographic result which will be useful to the Air Staff, and when failures occur, get down to the proper cause and report it accurately.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Failures by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/L C.D. KEIR, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O D.T. IBBOTSON DFC
F/SGT S.W. WALTERS CGM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L C.B. OWEN, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.E. FAWKE, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.F. MALLENDER DFC
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L R. REEVE DFC
F/O M.E. ANDERTON DFC
P/O G.A. SANGSTER DFC
F/O H.F.S. MITCHELL DFC
SGT C.L.S. WILLIAMS DFM
P/O H.O. REDMOND DFC
F/O A. BOSWARD DFC
F/O H.C. CLARK DFC
P/O H.T. FORREST DFC
SGT T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT W.F. BELBEN DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C.E. BINION DFC
P/O F.G. DAVEY DFC
F/SGT F.W. STROUD DFM
F/SGT A.O. KENNEDY DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.E. DICKSON DFC
F/O D. BRADY DFC
F/O W.F. EDWARDS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.H.F. WHYTE DFC
F/O J.D. MOUAT DFC
P/O S.H.K. EYRE DFC
F/O A. SLYWCHUK DFC
P/O D.A.T. MILLIKIN DFC
P/O L.W. PETHICK DFC
F/SGT F.B. KNOTT DFM
F/O R.H.W. LAWRENCE DFC
F/SGT J.E. TAYLOR DFM
F/O A.N. FRANKLAND DFC
F/SGT K.H. SNEDDON DFM
F/O D. EGGLESTON DFC
F/O G.S. PYLE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J. CASTAGNOLA DFC
F/SGT G.P. GAUWELOOSE DFM
P/O E.C.W. ANDERSON DFC
S/L D.I. FAIRBURN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.L.P. DUNSTONE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.K.W. GLOVER DFC
F/O B.M. ACOTT DFC
P/O F. NORTON DFC
P/O R.A.E. DEAR DFC
F/L W.E. JEAVONS DFC
P/O D. STREET DFC
P/O J.F. MILLS DFC
SGT G.R. GILBERT DFM
SGT D. BOOTHBY DFM
F/O R.B. WARD DFC
SGT P.T. HADDON DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L C.P. McDONALD, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT S.R. LAMBERT DFM
F/O D.A. JENNINGS DFC
F/O A.K. IRWIN DFC
A/F/L D.W. WOOLLEY, DFM DFC
W/O A.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/L A.R. GALBRAITH DFC
F/O W. FITCH DFC
A/F/L G. ROBINSON, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
A/F/L F.P.L. BROOME DFC
F/SGT K. FORREST DFM
F/SGT H. WILSON DFM
A/F/L T. CAMPBELL DFC
F/O J. PEDEN DFC
W/O J.J.H. MAXWELL DFC
P/O W.R. DORAN DFC
P/O C.A.P. THOMPSON DFC
W/O E.H. HANSEN DFC
P/O A.P. BOULTBEE DFC
P/O A.J. TINDALL DFC
F/SGT S. OSBORNE DFM
P/O E.J. WATSON DFC
P/O W.A. REFFIN DFC
P/O W.D. KNOWLES DFC
P/O C.W. HOWE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.A. HARRIS DFC
A/F/O P.C. BROWNE DFC
A/F/O A.R. KITTO DFC
A/F/O P.A. FYSON DFC
F/O P.R.J.M. MAVAUT DFC
A/F/O J.G. THOMPSON DFC
A/F/O H. ARCHER DFC
W/O R.E. CARMICHAEL DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L S.E. PATTINSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.M. GRANT DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.A. BUCKHAM DFC
F/O A.B.L. TOTTENHAM DFC
F/O N.W. SAUNDERS DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L L.C. DEIGNAN DFC
P/O L.G. BURDEN DFC
F/O T.C. TAYLOR DFC
P/O H.R. GOODWIN DFC
P/O J.W. WAUGH DFC
F/O J.L. SAYERS DFC
F/O E.G. PARSONS DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. MARSHALL DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.D. BRIBBIN, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
NOTES: In column (a) above, A indicates the number of pence saved per head of strength.
B indicates the percentage of personnel saving.
and C indicates the total amount saved through the Unit Savings Group.
In column (b) above, the sum indicated as saved by Syerston, also includes the savings by deduction from Pay Ledgers for Fulbeck and Balderton.
In column (c) only stations with Class ‘A’ Camp Post Offices are included.
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR NOVEMBER: £7,843, 17.10d.
[Page break]
[Drawing] volte face
For day after day, and for year upon year
Of this utterly futile inordinate war
We’ve fought the unspeakable Gremlin;
From aircraft and engines, wherever they were,
We’ve harried and hounded and chased them galore,
And prevent the brutes from assemblin’.
Our aim was unvaried and clearly defined,
No quarter or mercy was ever displayed;
No cavilling, fear, or dissemblin’.
Undeterred by defeat, in our ranks you would find
A resurgence of effort – the foemen were made
To cower in their shelters a-tremblin’.
Yet with ultimate victory looming in sight,
The powers that rule us have altered their stand
And ordered a truce with the Gremlin;
And the tribe’s C.in C. is respectably dight
As a uniformed “wingco”, an officer grand,
(Or something quite closely resemblin’).
ANON. (CIRCA 1944).
[Boxed] The cover for this month’s News has been designed by Sgt. Morley of this Headquarters. Suggested designs are still invited from all personnel within the Group. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, November 1944
5 Group News, November 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 28, November 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on the end of the Tirpitz, gardening, operations, signals, navigation, this month's bouquetes, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, incendiary attacks, war effort, training, gunnery, leave it to Smith, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, armament, the proof of the pudding, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, education, engineering, photography, decorations, war savings, and volte face.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-11
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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75 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-20 nov 44
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Creil
France--Juvisy-sur-Orge
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Mimoyecques
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Soligny-la-Trappe
France--Watten
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Norway--Tromsø
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
1944-11
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22137/PHopgoodPD16010034.2.jpg
aed24afaa05ee8b94243d79cbffdb3a9
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22137/PHopgoodPD16010035.1.jpg
063687dddc5445f258372b3e4658c4d6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hopgood, Philip David. Album
Description
An account of the resource
Photographs of Philip Hopgood's family and friends and then his training in Canada and Great Britain.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hopgood, PD
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Saskatoon to Dauphin October 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Eight photographs from two pages of an album.
Page 28:
Photo 1 is an airman in the cockpit of an aircraft, captioned 'Self "driving" '.
Photo 2 is an air to air shot of a Cessna Crane, captioned 'Cessna Crane'.
Photo 3 and 4 are aerial views of a town, captioned 'The "Typhoon Town" Kamsack'.
Page 29:
Photo 5 is fields from the air, captioned 'Fields and things'.
Photo 6 is a town from the air, captioned 'Dauphin and one of the Winnipeg Lakes'.
Photo 7 is a town from the air, captioned 'Yorkton'.
Photo 8 is a view of a lake from the air, captioned 'Quill Lakes'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Eight b/w photographs on two album pages
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PHopgoodPD16010034,
PHopgoodPD16010035
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Canadian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Saskatchewan--Saskatoon
Manitoba--Dauphin
Saskatchewan--Yorkton
Saskatchewan--Big Quill Lake
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Geolocated
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
aerial photograph
aircrew
pilot
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22138/PHopgoodPD16010036.1.jpg
20422cccd9a55c696308fd666cb61647
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22138/PHopgoodPD16010037.1.jpg
d1653a47dd12935c21813b535c609975
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hopgood, Philip David. Album
Description
An account of the resource
Photographs of Philip Hopgood's family and friends and then his training in Canada and Great Britain.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hopgood, PD
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Saskatoon
Description
An account of the resource
Three vertical aerial photographs on two pages:
Photo 1 is a grain elevator, captioned 'Government Grain Elevator'.
Photo 2 is a bridge crossing a river, captioned 'Main rail bridge over S Sask R'.
Photo 3 is a railway and town, captioned 'Sutherland CPR Roundhouse and marshalling yards September 1944'.
Photo 4 is of two men standing outside a wooden building, captioned 'Senlac October 1944 Dave and self'.
Additional information kindly provided by Donald Klippert.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four b/w photographs on two album pages
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PHopgoodPD16010036,
PHopgoodPD16010037
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Saskatchewan--Saskatoon
Canada--South Saskatchewan River
Saskatchewan
Canada
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1944-10
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Geolocated
aerial photograph
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22139/PHopgoodPD16010038.2.jpg
a49ab3b0c73ae5702e07fff7a3fd6a60
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22139/PHopgoodPD16010039.2.jpg
863edc91953b6af6ff35c7a947bd4a35
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hopgood, Philip David. Album
Description
An account of the resource
Photographs of Philip Hopgood's family and friends and then his training in Canada and Great Britain.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hopgood, PD
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Senlac October 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Ten photographs from two album pages:
Page 32:
Photo 1 is a street scene, captioned 'Main Street'.
Photo 2 is of several grain elevators, captioned 'Grain Elevators'. Nearest one has 'Searle' on outside.
Photo 3 and 5 are of a woman and two different men captioned 'Mrs Trodd, Dave and I'.
Photo 4 is a hut two people and a car, captioned 'Evelyn, Dave and jalopy outside Bill Anderson's shack'.
Page 33:
Photo 6 is a man and an old car captioned 'Lizzie and Me'.
Photo 7 is a woman sitting on a wooden walkway, captioned 'Shiela [sic] - the town's telephone operator'.
Photo 8 is a man sitting in an old car (reg: 90413), captioned 'Liz and Dave'.
Photo 9 is a man using a starting handle on the same car, captioned 'Winding'.
Photo 10 is a view of an empty gravel road taken out of a window, captioned 'Main Road'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Ten b/w photographs on two album pages
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PHopgoodPD16010038,
PHopgoodPD16010039
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Saskatchewan
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1344/22142/PHopgoodPD16010048.2.jpg
361933d9c7c9bc658e8c438a53f07a12
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hopgood, Philip David. Album
Description
An account of the resource
Photographs of Philip Hopgood's family and friends and then his training in Canada and Great Britain.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hopgood, PD
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Quebec, Flying and Brooklyn
Description
An account of the resource
Four photographs on an album page.
Photos 1 and 2 are a sunset, captioned 'St Lawrence River at Levis November 1944' and 'Quebec Sunset'.
Photo 3 is a pilot in the cockpit of an aircraft, captioned 'Saskatoon to Dauphin October 1944, Charlie Warner driving'.
Photo 4 is a house with two people standing outside, captioned 'Brooklyn, NY November 1944. A few late arrivals. Mrs and Ritchie Boatke'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
1944-11
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four b/w photographs
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PHopgoodPD16010048
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Québec--Lévis
Saskatchewan--Saskatoon
United States
New York (State)--New York
New York (State)
Québec
Saskatchewan
North America--Saint Lawrence River
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
1944-11
aircrew
pilot
training